tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/central-africa-24308/articlesCentral Africa – The Conversation2023-09-05T13:40:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128092023-09-05T13:40:23Z2023-09-05T13:40:23ZGabon coup has been years in the making: 3 key factors that ended the Bongo dynasty<p>The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> that put an end to the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56-year hold</a> on power in Gabon has been many years in the making. </p>
<p>Its roots can be traced back to when deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/29/gabon-president-ali-bongo-hospitalised-in-saudi-arabia">suffered a stroke</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>The political crisis caused by Bongo’s illness and the opaque manner in which he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/gabonese-president-ali-bongo-defies-illness-father-s-shadow-4c2dba69">continued</a> to hold the reins of power through close family members during his convalescence created tensions within the power circles. </p>
<p>On one side were critics who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-cabinet-idUSKCN0RC0I720150912">demanded</a> his resignation and sought to end the Bongo dynasty’s grip on power in the oil rich Central African country. These critics were mostly responsible for the emergence of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/01/albert-ondo-ossa-everything-must-be-done-so-that-general-oligui-nguema-hands-over-power-to-me_6119686_124.html">Albert Ondo Ossa</a> as a consensus opposition presidential candidate at the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>On the other side were loyal members of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a>. The party was founded by former <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">president Omar Bongo</a>, who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009. In this group were party members who continued to play an institutional charade of cabinet meetings and rubber-stamp legislation that masked the troubling absence and incapacitation of Ali Bongo. </p>
<p>The group also includes powerful clan members inside the Bongo dynasty jockeying for position and wealth in the uncertainty surrounding Ali Bongo’s health.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist</a> specialising in African politics and the politics of the oil industry in Africa, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240810975_The_Rentier_State_in_Africa_Oil_Rent_Dependency_and_Neocolonialism_in_the_Republic_of_Gabon">researched</a> the implications of oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in Gabon.</p>
<p>My view is that the corrupt oil-rentier dynastic regime that ruled Gabon for the past half century was brought to an end by a combination of three factors. They are Ali Bongo’s illness; the contagion effect of other recent successful coups in Africa; and the power tussle between General Brice Oligui Nguema (the coup leader, who is said to be Bongo’s distant cousin) and Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, Ali Bongo’s wife. The former first lady was believed to be preparing her son, Noureddine Bongo, to succeed his father. </p>
<h2>Factors in favour of coup</h2>
<p>Before the coup d’état there was little hope that Ali Bongo Ondimba would lose his third re-election bid. </p>
<p>His party had over <a href="https://data.ipu.org/node/62/elections?chamber_id=13398">80%</a> of the seats in the legislature, control of regional and municipal governments, and a hold on the courts and the security apparatus of the state. </p>
<p>Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election, which the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%. That was before the military struck. </p>
<p>One of the factors that encouraged the military intervention in Gabon is the contagion effect of recent successful coups in Africa. A series of coups in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) appear to have demonstrated to Gabon’s military that not only was a successful coup possible, it was acceptable. </p>
<p>After the coup, crowds came out in Libreville and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">danced</a> in the streets. </p>
<p>The second factor is a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/1/has-gabons-all-powerful-bongo-dynasty-really-lost-its-55-year-grip">power tussle</a> between the coup leader, Nguema, and Sylvia Bongo. The deposed president’s wife is widely believed to have grown in influence after her husband suffered a stroke in 2018. Nguema was relieved of his duties as head of the president’s security.</p>
<p>If it is true that Sylvia was preparing her son to succeed his father, Noureddine would have been the third generation of the Bongo family to rule Gabon. Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46885467">succeeded</a> his father in 2009. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Prior to the 30 August coup, the only thing that seemed to have united the numerous opposition parties in Gabon (who barely managed to rally around a joint candidate just nine days before the 26 August poll) was the desire to remove Ali Bongo from office. </p>
<p>Now that a coup appears to have achieved that, it will be difficult for Albert Ondo Ossa to take office.</p>
<p>Given what appears like the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/08/31/US-urges-Gabon-military-to-preserve-civilian-rule-">willingness</a> of France and the United States to accept this palace coup, the only question is whether Nguema will lead a transition to civilian rule, hold elections, refuse to present himself for office, or become the next member of the Bongo clan to rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ali Bongo’s illness, the contagion effect of other recent successful coups and palace power tussles are factors responsible for Gabon’s recent coup.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115372023-08-17T15:47:46Z2023-08-17T15:47:46ZGabon: how the Bongo family’s 56-year rule has hurt the country and divided the opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542667/original/file-20230814-15-yo99yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gabon President Ali Bongo Ondimba speaks during a trade conference in London in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> appears set to end the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years hold</a> to power in Gabon. A group of senior military officers <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/military-announce-coup-in-gabon-as-senior-officers-seize-power-after-presidential-election-12950578">announced</a> that they had seized power shortly after President Ali Bongo Ondimba was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">declared winner</a> of the country’s recently held presidential poll.</p>
<p>The coup leaders claimed the 26 August general election was not credible. They announced a cancellation of the election result, closure of all borders and dissolution of all state institutions including the legislative arm of government.<br>
Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election that the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%.</p>
<p>Ali Bongo, (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">son of former president Omar Bongo who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009</a>) contested the election on the platform of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a> (PDG), founded by his father. The party has monopolised power in the oil-rich central African country for more than half a century.</p>
<p>The Bongo family has held onto power for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years</a>. It has done so through single-party government, corruption in the mining and oil sectors, and political kinship. According to some estimates Ali Bongo personally controls <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/8-richest-dictators-history-172424055.html">US$1 billion</a> in assets, much of that secreted overseas, making him the richest man in Gabon. </p>
<p>In addition, the constitution has been <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/revision-gabonese-constitution-between-contestation-modernization-and-inconsistencies">changed several times</a> in the past decades to ensure the Bongos’ continued rule. </p>
<p>First, term limits were removed from the constitution in 2003, ensuring that Bongo could serve as president for life. </p>
<p>Second, traditional two-round ballots were changed into single-round ballots, also in 2003. This was to ensure that Bongo’s opponents could not rally around a single challenger in a run-off. </p>
<p>Third, instead of requiring that the winner obtain a majority, all that is needed for Bongo to be re-elected is a plurality. This means a majority could be less than 50%, as long as the winner has the most votes. Had he been required to win a majority of votes, Ali Bongo, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">49.8%</a> in the 2016 election, would not be president today.</p>
<p>Fourth, in April 2023, the presidential term was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230407-gabon-reduces-presidential-term-to-five-years-before-elections">reduced</a> from seven to five years, ensuring the presidential elections would occur at the same time as legislative and local elections. </p>
<p>In the past, after presidential elections, opposition parties would organise against Bongo’s ruling party to capture seats in the legislative and local elections. The change makes it much more likely that all the institutions of government power will be taken by Bongo and his party in one single election. </p>
<p>Bongo’s party increased its seats in the national assembly, holding 63 out of 120 seats in 1990 and most recently 98 out of 143 in 2018. The ruling party has also increased its seats in the senate from 52 out of 92 in 1997, to 46 out of 67 in 2021.</p>
<p>The continuous rule by the Bongos has not been good for a country of just <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2.3 million</a> people. Gabon is a resource-rich country and was once heralded as the “<a href="https://bondsloans.com/news/gabon-a-step-in-the-right-direction">Kuwait of Africa</a>”. Because of its small population and large oil reserves, per capita income is at least <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Gabon/gdp_per_capita_ppp/#:%7E:text=GDP%20per%20capita%2C%20Purchasing%20Power%20Parity&text=The%20average%20value%20for%20Gabon,2022%20is%2013949.16%20U.S.%20dollars.">US$13,949.16</a>. In neighbouring Cameroon, per capita income is only <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/gdp-per-capita">US$3,733</a> </p>
<p>But Gabon’s “average” is belied by a population where a third of the citizens live below the poverty line and unemployment stands at about <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=GA">37%</a> among young people.</p>
<h2>Dynastic republic</h2>
<p>Gabon is not a monarchy but a “dynastic republic”.</p>
<p>In dynastic republics, presidents have concentrated power in their hands and established systems of personal rule. They transmit state power through nepotism to their family and kin. This includes sons and daughters, wives and ex-wives, brothers and sisters, half-siblings and step-siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, in-laws, illegitimate children and so on. </p>
<p>Under this system, the classical ideal of a legal-rational state – where position and rank are distributed based on merit in the name of the rational (efficient and effective) functioning of government -– is corrupted. </p>
<p>In all dynastic republics around the world – including Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Syria, Azerbaijan, North Korea, Turkmenistan and most recently Cambodia –- an institutionalisation of traditional family power through the modern vehicle of a single ruling party has been critical.</p>
<p>In Gabon, this is the Parti Démocratique Gabonais. The party holds the presidential palace and has a majority in the national assembly (98/143 seats) and in the senate (46/67 seats). It also controls the courts, and the regional and municipal governments. </p>
<p>It is critical to understand that no man rules alone. Only with a large party apparatus can a man and his family rule a republic with millions of people.</p>
<p>But why has the rule by one man and his family been tolerated? </p>
<p>The answer is the political elite need him to keep their own positions.</p>
<p>The economist <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107671/1/81962733X.pdf">Gordon Tullock</a> hypothesised back in 1987 that dynastic succession appeals to non-familial elites who are wary of a leadership struggle. In 2007, professor of government <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231991883_THE_RESILIENCE_OF_RULING_PARTIES_Jason_Brownlee_Authoritarianism_in_an_Age_of_Democratization_Cambridge_Cambridge_University_Press_2007_Pp_xiii_264_2399">Jason Brownlee</a> tested this theory by looking at 258 non-monarchical autocrats. He found that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>in the absence of prior experience selecting a ruler through a party, regime elites accepted filial heirs apparent when the incumbent had arisen from a party and his successor predominantly emerged from that organisation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Dictator_s_Handbook.html?id=UBY5DgAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Bruno Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith</a> argue that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>essential supporters have a much greater chance of retaining their privileged position when power passes within a family from father to son, from king to prince, than when power passes to an outsider.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Omar Bongo founded the PDG in 1967 as a de jure one-party system. After constitutional reforms in 1990, he permitted the existence of opposition parties. But because he never held free or fair elections, the democratic opposition has never managed to wrest power from either the Bongos or their ruling party.</p>
<p>In the past, elections in Gabon were followed by protests, which were followed by security force crackdowns and ultimately silence. But the 2023 election may turn out to be different as it appears to have been followed by a military coup.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated on 30 August to reflect the coup in Gabon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gabon is resource rich, but the Bongo family’s continuous rule has been bad news for the country of 2.3 million people.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2083272023-07-04T13:26:56Z2023-07-04T13:26:56ZBelgium’s AfricaMuseum has a dark colonial past – it’s making slow progress in confronting this history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533840/original/file-20230624-80593-c4qk77.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC Prime Minister Jean-Michel Lukonde (L) at Belgium's AfricaMuseum in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jasper Jacobs via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/belgiums-africamuseum-has-a-dark-colonial-past-its-making-slow-progress-in-confronting-this-history-208327&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Racist displays and stories remain on display in several western European museums. They include grotesque objects depicting African people as “savage” and “wild”. Narratives of a “continent without history” and fantasies of European superiority are still told in ethnographic museums, like the <a href="https://www.humboldtforum.org/en/">Humboldt Forum in Berlin</a> and the <a href="https://www.quaibranly.fr/en/">Musée du quai Branly in Paris</a>.</p>
<p>These museums have been criticised by scholars and activists since the 1970s. Their handling of objects looted during the colonial period, especially from Africa, is seen as an indicator of the political relations between Europe and African nations. </p>
<p>Criticism ranges from the illegitimate acquisition of the objects to the often-racist representation of the African continent and its inhabitants. It also includes the lack of participation by African and diasporic actors.</p>
<p>After initial hesitation, Belgium, a former colonial power, <a href="https://theconversation.com/retracing-belgiums-dark-past-in-the-congo-and-attempts-to-forge-deeper-ties-184903">opened itself</a> to debate about reparations, justice and a common future with its African partners in the late 1990s. </p>
<p>This change in attitude was accelerated by mounting pressure from the <a href="https://www.rosalux.eu/en/article/1796.black-lives-matter-in-belgium-june-july-2020.html">Black Lives Matter movement in Belgium</a>. International advances by other former colonial powers like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/27/world/americas/colonial-reparations.html">France, Germany and Great Britain</a> in the restitution debate also created impetus. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/en/discover/history">AfricaMuseum</a> in the Tervuren suburb is at the centre of these debates in Belgium. It’s an institution in the process of repairing its troubled history. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An long shot of a beige building with its reflection showing in a pool of water" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533646/original/file-20230623-25-2qgxwz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The main building of the AfricaMuseum in Tervuren built in the 1900s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a white and privileged researcher who focuses on colonial memory, racism and anti-colonial movements in Europe, my perspective on the AfricaMuseum is divided. For more than 10 years, the museum has been part of <a href="http://iwk-jena.uni-jena.de/julien-bobineau/">my cultural studies research</a>. In my view, the museum is marked by a dusty past and has shown little evidence of post-colonial self-reflection. On the other hand, there are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-65827002">serious efforts</a> to change. </p>
<h2>Colonial looting</h2>
<p>The AfricaMuseum’s forerunner was initiated in 1897 by the Belgian king <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leopold-II-king-of-Belgium">Leopold II</a> (1835-1909). It was a colonial human zoo within the Brussels World’s Fair. A Congolese village was recreated in Tervuren “exhibiting” 60 Congolese residents. Seven of them didn’t survive the exhibition, which lasted several months. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sculpture of a man drumming while another one holds up a spear ready to attack another man who is lying on the ground. They are in the centre of a room that has knives and swords on display on the walls" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533647/original/file-20230623-25-vgag2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Racist depictions of Africans in the museum in the 1920s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1910, the space opened as the Museum of the Belgian Congo and presented ethnographic collections. The colonial institution initially served the purpose of legitimising the <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/King-Leopolds-Ghost-Heroism-Colonial/dp/1447211359">brutal colonial rule</a> in the Congo Basin. It promoted the so-called “civilising mission” in Africa among the Belgian population. </p>
<p>It presented an alleged European superiority, underlined with pseudo-scientific methods and a racist representation of African cultures. </p>
<p>The exhibited objects were mostly looted from colonised territories by Belgian officials, the military and private persons. </p>
<p>There was <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/39892/pdf">little awareness</a> of these material and immaterial injustices in Belgium until the late 1990s. To this day, some <a href="https://www.memoiresducongo.be/en/">conservative positions</a> glorify the Belgian colonial period as a justified and philanthropic undertaking. </p>
<p>Even after the Democratic Republic of Congo’s independence on 30 June 1960, the museum retained its original concept under the name Royal Museum for Central Africa. It exuded a peculiar kind of colonial “nostalgia”. As late as 2001, the US anthropologist Jean Muteba Rahier described the museum as <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/39892/summary">a colonial place frozen in time</a>. </p>
<p>In 2013, the museum was <a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/en/discover/renovation">closed for extensive renovations</a>. It reopened as the AfricaMuseum in December 2018, with the then director Guido Gryseels <a href="https://www.exhibitionsinternational.be/documents/catalog/objects/PDF/9789085867814_01.pdf#page=4">saying</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the museum has distanced itself from colonialism as a form of government and accepts responsibility for the part it played in the past in disseminating stereotypes about Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Today, the AfricaMuseum holds over 125,000 ethnographic objects. It has 300,000 geological specimens, 8,000 musical instruments and nearly 10 million biological exhibits. It also holds sound and film recordings. A few human remains are among the museum’s collections. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Wooden sculptures on display behind a glass case." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/533652/original/file-20230623-6861-3sw7hp.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Congolese sculptures on display at the AfricaMuseum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Julien Bobineau</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The origin and exact circumstances of the acquisition of these objects remain largely unexplained. It can be assumed that most of the collection was illegally looted during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Belgian-Congo">colonial period</a>. </p>
<h2>Recognising African heritage</h2>
<p>Closely related to the question of restitution is a revision of the way Africa and Africans are represented in ethnographic museums. The AfricaMuseum attempted to address this in its 2013-2018 renovation. </p>
<p>Yet, some objects remain placed in a context that allows for a pejorative view of Africa. This is evidenced by the combination of the depiction of Congolese culture and the natural history of humankind in one space.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/arts/emmanuel-macron-africa.html">French president Emmanuel Macron</a> triggered more debate over restitution while in Burkina Faso in 2017, the AfricaMuseum focused on addressing the origin of its objects. Reparation and representation of African and diasporic voices became a priority. </p>
<p>This was supported by <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/117289/parliament-approves-commission-on-belgiums-colonial-past">political debates</a> in the Belgian parliament in 2021 and 2022. They led to the formulation of <a href="https://restitutionbelgium.be/">ethical principles for restitution</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/en/about_us/restitution">A new law was passed</a> that provides a framework for the return of looted objects. This is a starting point for a redefinition of Belgian-Congolese relations. </p>
<h2>Early results</h2>
<p>Belgium has since sent the Democratic Republic of Congo a <a href="https://www.africamuseum.be/de/about_us/restitution">draft bilateral restitution treaty</a>. It proposes, for example, a joint commission to coordinate scientific investigations into the origin of objects in Belgium’s possession. </p>
<p>In June 2021, the ownership rights of almost <a href="https://heritagetribune.eu/belgium/africa-museum-set-to-start-gradual-return-of-looted-artefacts-to-congo/">800 looted objects</a> from the AfricaMuseum were transferred to the Congolese state – though they still haven’t fully returned to Kinshasa. </p>
<p>In February 2022, Belgian prime minister Alexander De Croo presented Congolese prime minister Jean-Michel Lukonde with a list of more than <a href="https://observer.com/2022/03/restitution-ceremony-at-belgiums-africamuseum-precedes-eu-au-summit/">84,000 artefacts</a> from the Congo. Those artefacts have been in Belgium’s possession since colonisation and are now to be examined with a view to possible restitution.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>The restitution of looted objects from former colonies in Africa is an essential component of a post-colonial reparation. </p>
<p>Some European politicians, museum directors and scholars have pointed to an alleged lack of storage facilities in Africa. This argument shouldn’t count. </p>
<p>The vast majority of artefacts were seized from their original context and only transformed into “art objects” in European museums. In Germany, for example, debate flared up this year as to whether restituted Benin bronzes should become the private property of the royal family of Benin – the legitimate owners – <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-05-19/legitimate-concerns-or-neocolonialism-germany-expresses-worry-about-the-fate-of-the-benin-bronzes-following-their-restitution-to-nigeria.html">or be exhibited in Nigerian museums</a>. This shouldn’t be Germany’s concern.</p>
<p>To put restitution into practice, four things are needed now:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>humility on the European side</p></li>
<li><p>a deeper willingness for cooperation</p></li>
<li><p>funds</p></li>
<li><p>transparent and open dialogue. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The new Belgian path shows that this seems possible, though there’s still a long way to go.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208327/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julien Bobineau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The restitution of looted objects from former colonies in Africa is an essential component of post-colonial reparation.Julien Bobineau, Assistant Professor, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität JenaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854282022-06-30T13:35:49Z2022-06-30T13:35:49ZCOVID hurt West and Central Africa’s small-scale fishers. They need more support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470582/original/file-20220623-51187-g5ccgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Coastal communities in West and Central Africa were severely affected by COVID which brought many aspects of food and seafood supply chains to a halt. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>From Senegal through Ghana to Cameroon, small-scale fishing is both a livelihood and a way of life for people in coastal parts of West and Central Africa, with more than <a href="https://tbtiglobal.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/TBTI_SSF-in-Africa-e-book_F.pdf">two million small-scale fishers</a>. It has been this way for centuries – but that is changing.</p>
<p>Fishers are faced with diminishing fish stocks, competition from foreign industrial fleets, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40152-020-00197-9">illegal fishing</a>, unstable governance, and a lack of infrastructure to support fishing operations. Small-scale fisheries in these countries, as in other areas of the global south, are often part of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00171">informal economy</a>. Despite being critical to local livelihoods – across sectors, informal employment <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/events/informal-economy-africa-which-way-forward">accounts for over 80%</a> of all employment on the continent – small-scale fisheries are generally not regulated or protected by the state. </p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic only worsened the situation. It brought many aspects of <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.614368">food and seafood supply chains to a halt</a>. Fisherfolk and coastal communities in West and Central Africa were severely affected.</p>
<p>Our newly published <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0308597X22001518?casa_token=YW10ykXN-KoAAAAA:MVmbgKAz2xswpVdmSLlwp6KeqNwgB_GoX5etAFHtaJbfiFk_KwL19_pBm3eD2LLj7ZxjYEGMwsk">research from Cameroon and Liberia</a> studied these effects. We found that small-scale fisheries brought in fewer fish and less income. Fish wastage was also a bigger problem than usual because storage facilities weren’t available for fisherfolks. </p>
<p>These experiences, coupled with the sector’s bigger systemic problems before the pandemic, deserve attention. Fishing communities in West and Central Africa receive little attention from academics and policymakers despite their contribution to the region’s <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0964569115001039?casa_token=paf9-SZLVNAAAAAA:m-ynoIRAH-ebWv7P3ZS7CenFGKBGbgTN7Z_vGda7zwSgVbU9_mphXxi6Kvwepr6PIjsQmxBGI4w">food security and employment economics</a>.</p>
<p>From better <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2022.873397/full">ocean stewardship activities</a> to better governance of these resources and those who depend on them, there is much to be done for small-scale fisheries in this region. There is a need for better innovations and policies to help improve the fisheries sector in this region.</p>
<h2>Vibrant, diverse fisheries</h2>
<p>Small-scale fishers in West and Central Africa have a great deal to tell researchers. Small-scale fisheries are <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-94938-3_4">central to food and nutritional security</a>. </p>
<p>They are also remarkably multicultural. It is common to see people from other nationalities settled and fishing in a neighbouring country. In Cameroon, for example, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X22001518?casa_token=YW10ykXN-KoAAAAA:MVmbgKAz2xswpVdmSLlwp6KeqNwgB_GoX5etAFHtaJbfiFk_KwL19_pBm3eD2LLj7ZxjYEGMwsk">our research</a> has shown that many fisherfolks are migrants from Ghana and Nigeria. Similarly, fishers in Liberia are mostly Ghanaians who have obtained fishing permits to fish in the country.</p>
<p>These patterns of migration result in highly culturally diverse fishing communities; fishers bring not just their families to these neighbouring countries but also their traditions and customs. However, this brings in problems in terms of access and mobilisation of collective efforts to address problems as they arise.</p>
<p>COVID-19 exacerbated existing threats to this important informal sector. For instance, it confirmed how the lack of robust governance systems at the state level leaves workers vulnerable to shocks like pandemics and climate change impacts. Workers in these fisheries rarely benefit from any sort of state protections or services related to their employment and occupational safety. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-covid-affected-markets-and-livelihoods-in-kenyas-fisheries-sector-171748">How COVID affected markets and livelihoods in Kenya's fisheries sector</a>
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</em>
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<p>They also don’t have access to the kind of infrastructure that might have kept fish fresh for longer during periods when markets weren’t open or people were afraid to leave their homes because of the pandemic. One Liberian fisher told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>COVID-19 affects our business greatly. Like before, we used to have many customers coming to buy our fresh fish at the beach, but currently, our mothers dry the fish we caught and take to the market. After weeks from drying the fish and they are not bought it gets spoiled.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, how can small-scale fishers in these countries be better supported?</p>
<h2>The need for action</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www1.undp.org/content/singapore-global-centre/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-14-life-below-water.html?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=Cj0KCQjwhqaVBhCxARIsAHK1tiP4qYip1RjSbIiTdNgbJ2tYxbG7KzwE1IvrI5ju5f8klfPMCNSu-KQaAhbZEALw_wcB">UN Sustainable Development Goal 14</a> emphasises the need to conserve ocean resources and to use them sustainably.</p>
<p>Coastal populations are <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/1-4020-3880-1_115#:%7E:text=Sub%2DSaharan%20Africa's%2081%25%20increase,thirds%2Dof%20all%20population%20growth.">growing</a>, and the dependency on fishing and the ocean in these places will continue to increase. Coastal dwellers’ wellbeing and livelihood are at risk – and that’s a threat to both the short and long-term resilience of the fish food system in West and Central Africa.</p>
<p>With increasing environmental stresses and emerging systemic shocks such as COVID-19, there is a need for action to not only achieve this but also to ensure the well-being of those who depend on these resources.</p>
<p>For example, the digitalisation of the fisheries sector could be a sustainable response approach to shocks. In North America, fisherfolks use digital services such as smartphone apps to sell and deliver seafood <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.614368/full?&utm_source=Email_to_authors_&utm_medium=Email&utm_content=T1_11.5e1_author&utm_campaign=Email_publication&field=&journalName=Frontiers_in_Sustainable_Food_Systems&id=614368">to the consumer</a>. This could be replicated in West and Central Africa. Fisherfolks can use local telephone networks and e-money services to facilitate communications and transactions.</p>
<p>Also, the establishment of <a href="https://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/market-reports/resource-detail/en/c/346469/">community supported fisheries</a> programmes can help reorganise local fish marketing, reduce fish losses across the value chain, and build community resilience to shocks.</p>
<p>Whatever approach is taken, it’s crucial to include the fishers themselves in discussing possible pathways forward. They can help guide policy makers on how to ensure <a href="https://www.au-ibar.org/au-ibar-projects/enhancing-sustainable-fisheries-management-and-aquaculture-development-africa">sustainable fisheries practices</a>. Regional and international bodies also need to get more involved by providing funding and institutional support to enhance the fisheries sector.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard A. Nyiawung receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the University of Guelph, Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip A Loring receives funding from the Arrell Food Institute, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>There is a need for better innovations and policies to help improve the fisheries sector in this region.Richard A. Nyiawung, PhD Candidate in Geography and International Development Studies, University of GuelphPhilip A Loring, Associate Professor and Arrell Chair in Food, Policy, and Society, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1714142021-11-10T14:46:26Z2021-11-10T14:46:26ZHow I reconstructed an unwritten ancient African language<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431044/original/file-20211109-25-1jnvile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hausa is the most widely known Chadic language, spoken by some 80 million people or more. It's harder to grasp the history of other, unwritten Chadic languages.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Irene Becker/Contributor/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa is humankind’s home continent. <a href="https://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/species/homo-sapiens"><em>Homo sapiens</em></a>, with the anatomical and cognitive capacity to have human language as we know it today, originated in Africa between 300,000 and 200,000 years ago.</p>
<p>Then, as an abundant fossil and archaeological record <a href="https://humanorigins.si.edu/education/introduction-human-evolution">makes clear</a>, some of our human ancestors left Africa. They spread to neighbouring continents, taking their languages with them. Others remained behind; their descendants speak what we call “African languages”, pointing to these communities’ long histories on the home continent. </p>
<p>There were also those who migrated out of Africa and whose descendants later returned. These include the ancestors of the so-called <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215039021000023">Ethiosemitic</a> <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ethio-Semitic-languages">languages</a> in Eritrea and Ethiopia, some 3,000 years ago. The most recent and dramatic returns came with Arabo-Islamic invasions beginning in 614 CE, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/colonialism">European colonialism after 1492 CE</a>, and the post-colonial work migrations of the 20th and 21st centuries.</p>
<p>One result of all this movement is the geographic spread and continuous development of human languages – most of them unwritten. It is difficult to study and reconstruct them: unlike with excavated finds in palaeoanthropology, human language does not leave fossils behind unless in writing. Very few living or extinct languages left behind written texts. Those that did include the <a href="https://www.worldhistory.org/Egyptian_Hieroglyphs/">Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics</a> dating back about 5,000 years, and languages ancestral to modern Semitic which left written records that also cover several millennia, the oldest from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Akkad">Akkadian</a> in modern day Iraq in cuneiform script.</p>
<p>For more than 50 years, I have devoted <a href="https://www.koeppe.de/titel_the-lamang-language-and-dictionary-3">considerable research efforts</a> to <a href="https://uni-leipzig1.academia.edu/EkkehardWolff">the study</a> of the so-called Chadic languages. These are spoken west, south and east of Lake Chad (hence their name) in Central Africa. The widely known and best researched Chadic language is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hausa-language">Hausa</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/hausa">spoken</a> as one of Africa’s major languages across large parts of West and Central Africa by some 80 million people or more. Unfortunately, knowledge about Hausa’s approximately 200 language relatives in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad is coming in only very slowly. </p>
<p>What researchers most want to know is how these languages have developed as a family from a common ancient proto-language; they also want to unpack how languages relate to other and better known language families – Ancient Egyptian, Berber (Amazigh), Cushitic, Semitic, and possibly Omotic – with whom they are assumed to form a common language phylum, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Afro-Asiatic-languages">Afroasiatic</a>. </p>
<p>The results of my research will be presented in two books. The <a href="http://services.cambridge.org/in/academic/subjects/languages-linguistics/phonetics-and-phonology/historical-phonology-central-chadic-prosodies-and-lexical-reconstruction?format=HB&isbn=9781316519547">first volume</a> focuses on the origin of vowels in these languages. The second and final volume will focus on sound changes affecting consonants in these languages. It is set to be published in 2023. </p>
<p>I used well established linguistic techniques to reconstruct one of the ancestral languages likely spoken a few thousand years ago in the region around Lake Chad in Central Africa and that was ancestral to about 80 present-day languages in the area. Until now, these languages were practically unwritten. </p>
<h2>Proto-languages</h2>
<p>Professional linguists use a number of established tools to unearth language histories even in the absence of written texts. Two of these are <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/internal-reconstruction">internal reconstruction</a> and the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405166201.ch1">comparative method</a>. These were developed some 150 years ago by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/Neogrammarian">Neogrammarian School</a> in Leipzig, whose scholars successfully reconstructed the Indo-European language family relationships that link modern and ancient European languages like English and Ancient Greek to modern and ancient Asian languages like Urdu and Ancient Sanskrit. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-queens-english-has-had-to-defer-to-africas-rich-multilingualism-57673">How the Queen's English has had to defer to Africa's rich multilingualism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>My own research targets the linguistic history of the Afroasiatic language phylum. A phylum, in linguistics, is a group of languages related to each other less closely than those that make up a family. Together, the Afroasiatic phylum consists of approximately 400 languages. Most are spoken in the northern half of Africa from Morocco and Mauritania in the west to Egypt and Tanzania in the east, and in adjacent parts of Asia. They rank among the oldest living languages in terms of traceable records. Experts <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Afro-Asiatic-languages">have estimated</a> that Proto-Afroasiatic emerged in Africa between 12,000 and 16,000 years ago. </p>
<p>My research focused on the almost 200 Chadic languages spoken west, south and east of Lake Chad in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. They form the largest family within the Afroasiatic phylum. There are four branches; the Central Chadic or “<a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095509854">Biu-Mandara</a>” consists of about 80 languages. The aim was to reconstruct the sound system and vocabulary of Proto-Central Chadic. </p>
<p>My main source was an <a href="https://www.webonary.org/centralchadic/">online database</a> containing 250 word meanings like “compound”, “cow”, “to eat”, “millet”, etc. with data from up to 66 living Central Chadic language varieties provided by linguist Richard Gravina, who undertook a pioneering effort to reconstruct Proto-Central Chadic in his 2014 <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2945012/view">PhD dissertation</a>, though using a different methodological approach. Altogether I ended up analysing about 5,500 words from between four and 50 modern languages. </p>
<p>I meticulously analysed each word to delineate its historical development from Proto-Central Chadic to its present-day forms in modern languages, covering a time-depth of potentially thousands of years. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-kiswahili-science-fiction-award-charts-a-path-for-african-languages-163876">New Kiswahili science fiction award charts a path for African languages</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>A profound view</h2>
<p>No language develops in a vacuum. Almost all the words I researched changed sounds over time. This would partly have been because of the language’s own rules and regularities in inter-generational language transfer. But sound changes are also influenced by locally occurring new speech habits adopted by following generations of speakers and forming new dialects, or by borrowing words and expressions from neighbouring languages. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, languages also retain features of linguistic heritage, like from the ultimate proto-language; in this case, Proto-Afroasiatic. </p>
<p>Proto-Central-Chadic only knew one true vowel, “a”. It used “y” and “w” to serve, at the same time, as vowels “i” and “u” when in syllable-nucleus position (the centre of the syllable). Take the modern Mandara word, <em>ira</em> for “head”. In Proto-Central-Chadic, it was <em>*ghwna</em>. I was able to deduce this by understanding vowel substitutions and word sound changes.</p>
<p>Consonants changed, too. The word for “sheep” was <em>*tama</em> in Proto-Central-Chadic; the m became w, and suffixes changed over time too, leading to the modern Mandara word for “sheep”, <em>kyawe</em>. </p>
<h2>New light</h2>
<p>I hope this work will be a step towards unearthing some of the area’s currently unwritten history. By comparing sounds and words of modern languages, it is possible to detect population movements and migrations in the past, since people adopt sounds and words from other languages with whom they have been in contact over a certain period of time. Reconstructed vocabulary also sheds light on cultural items and people’s habitats, including the spread of ideas and the importance of certain concepts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171414/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>H. Ekkehard Wolff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Reconstructed vocabulary sheds light on cultural items and people’s habitats, including the spread of ideas and the importance of certain concepts.H. Ekkehard Wolff, Emeritus Professor of African Linguistics, University of LeipzigLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1683922021-09-27T15:28:35Z2021-09-27T15:28:35ZA grass native to Africa could transform the continent’s dairy yields. Here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423080/original/file-20210924-19-yfgm1m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cows' milk yields rise when they eat _Brachiaria_ grass.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Ouma/ILRI</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The cows kept by small-scale farmers in Africa are notoriously unproductive. The average dairy cow, for example, produces about <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL">540 litres of milk</a> per lactation. By contrast, dairy cows in North America that belong to commercial or intensive farmers can produce up to <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QCL">10,479 litres of milk</a> per lactation.</p>
<p>One of the main differences between the two animals lies in the quality of their feeds and forage. Simply put, the more nutritious cows’ diets are, the more and better quality milk they produce. And small-scale farms – of which there are about 33 million in Africa, contributing <a href="https://www.ifad.org/thefieldreport/#:%7E:text=In%20Africa%2C%20there%20are%20an%20estimated%2033%20million,reduce%20poverty.%20Zambia%20is%20one%20of%20those%20places">up to 70%</a> of the continent’s food supply – usually cannot afford more nutritious feed. </p>
<p><em>Brachiaria</em> – the genus name of <em>Urochloa</em> – consists of about 100 documented species of grass of which seven species used as fodder plants are of African origin. This grass may hold the key to improving milk yields from cows kept by small-scale farmers. Why is this an important goal? </p>
<p>First, it will help to meet rising demand for animal-sourced foods – like cow milk – as the continent becomes more urbanised and its population grows. Second, it will provide an economic boon to individual farmers and communities more broadly. Finally, there’s potential for <em>Brachiaria</em> itself to become a money maker. Local seed traders will benefit if the grass seed is commercialised.</p>
<p><em>Brachiaria</em> has already proven its worth in some parts of the world. It has <a href="http://www.lrrd.org/lrrd16/12/holm16098.htm">been instrumental</a> to the beef industry’s success in the tropical Americas. Brazil alone now has some <a href="https://doi.org/10.1071/CP13319">99 million hectares of land</a> dedicated to <em>Brachiaria</em> grass. </p>
<p>The seed varieties currently used in African agriculture are all imported, most from South America and South East Asia. Long distance transportation and tariffs make these seeds expensive. It would be ideal to develop a quality, climate resilient <em>Brachiaria</em> seed production system on the continent. But where?</p>
<p>We believe the answer lies in Cameroon. Farmers there have long planted Brachiaria seeds, but nobody had ever tested their quality. Our <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-94246-w">research</a> filled this gap. Though the overall seed quality was poor, we’ve found that improved cultivation practices can address this issue. Now we’re hard at work to turn Cameroon into Africa’s <em>Brachiaria</em> seed hub.</p>
<h2>A quality grass</h2>
<p><em>Brachiaria’s</em> forage quality was recognised by scientists <a href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/54362">in the 1950s</a>. It has a high biomass yield potential and is adaptable to low-fertility soil. South American farmers, especially in Brazil, started using <em>Brachiaria</em> on a large-scale in the early 1970s and it is recognised as being <a href="https://www.publish.csiro.au/cp/cp13319">key to the region’s booming beef industry</a>. </p>
<p>In Africa, however, interest in the grass grew more slowly. It was not until the early 2000s, when the continent began to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00128325.2015.1041263">feel the effects</a> of population growth and urbanisation that higher demand for animal-sourced foods piqued renewed interest in ways to improve agricultural yields.</p>
<p>As a plant scientist based at the <a href="https://www.ilri.org/">International Livestock Research Institute</a>, I have <a href="https://www.ilri.org/people/sita-r-ghimire">researched</a> <em>Brachiaria</em> grass since 2013. Through various partnerships, colleagues and I have worked on a <a href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/69364">climate-smart <em>Brachiaria</em> programme</a> to test the varieties already developed in Australia and South America in various African contexts. They performed well independently, but the next step was to integrate them into the mixed crop-livestock systems typical of the continent.</p>
<p>Farmers responded enthusiastically to the grass: it significantly increased milk production <a href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/79797">by up to 40%</a> and caused substantial body weight gain in livestock, by as much as 50% in heifers. Its popularity grew as major journals and media outlets publicised its benefits. However, the seeds that made all this research possible were still unavailable on the continent. We had to import them, an arduous and costly process because of regulations and distance. So we knew that, going forward, we had to look at local seed production.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A close-up view of many small seeds all clustered together." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=689&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=689&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423082/original/file-20210924-25-xicrl0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=689&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brachiaria seeds.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sita Ghimire/ILRI</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>It was also crucial to find the best country for the task at hand. While our work in Kenya and Rwanda was promising, it wasn’t as successful as we would have hoped, possibly due to these countries’ proximity to the equator; the fact that night and day are of equal length affected various stages of seed development in species that favour longer days.</p>
<h2>Why Cameroon?</h2>
<p>Cameroon is often called “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13146029">Africa in miniature</a>”. It represents the continent’s major climatic zones, creating a perfect place for seed research. </p>
<p>During a visit to Cameroon, I noted that farmers had been growing <em>Brachiaria</em> grass for over 50 years and simultaneously producing the seed for domestic uses. </p>
<p>They also sell surplus seed to neighbours, and seed traders from the Central African Republic and Nigeria. However, the quality of seeds produced in Cameroon was not established until <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-94246-w">our study</a>.</p>
<p>There are ten regions in Cameroon; <em>Brachiaria</em> grass is commonly grown in five. Our team collected seeds from these five regions to determine their quality: trueness to variety, germination percentage, purity, vigour and appearance. The quality was generally too low to meet international standards, but with improved cultivation practices this hurdle can be overcome.</p>
<h2>Production hub</h2>
<p>We are currently engaged in activities that would make Cameroon Africa’s <em>Brachiaria</em> seed production hub. Achieving this would significantly increase seed availability to farmers, reduce the cost of the seeds and facilitate the scaling of <em>Brachiaria</em> grass production across the continent.</p>
<p>To this end, my research team at International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and researchers from the <a href="https://irad.cm/index.php/en/">Institute for Agricultural Research and Development</a> in Cameroon have been working to document the quality of <em>Brachiaria</em> seeds produced in the country’s different regions of Cameroon. We’re also fine-tuning agronomic practices to improve seed quality, as well as training local farmers on improved agricultural practices for the production of quality <em>Brachiaria</em> seeds.</p>
<p>We hope that this partnership between the two institutes will develop Cameroon into the continent’s <em>Brachiaria</em> seed production hub in the next three to five years. This will have numerous economic benefits and make quality seeds available in the African continent at a much lower price.</p>
<p><em>Mwihaki Mundia, BecA–ILRI Hub as Communications Officer, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The work discussed in this article was funded by The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)</span></em></p>This grass may hold the key to improving milk yields from cows kept by small-scale farmers across the African continent.Sita Ghimire, Principal Scientist - Plant Pathology, Biosciences eastern and central Africa-International Livestock Research Institute HubLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659442021-08-11T15:00:15Z2021-08-11T15:00:15ZInsights for African countries from the latest climate change projections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415545/original/file-20210810-13-1bx8nj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Flooding is projected to increase in eastern Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Toney Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (<a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/">IPCC</a>) – a body of the UN tasked with providing scientific information on climate change – has released <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/#SPM">a major new report</a>, pulling together evidence from a wide range of current and ancient climate observations. It’s the most up-to-date understanding of climate change, bringing together the latest advances in climate science.</p>
<p>It is crucial that we have a good understanding of the findings as they give an indication of what our future could look like. </p>
<p>According to the report global warming is evident, with each of the last four decades being successively warmer than any decade that preceded it since 1850. Average precipitation on land has also increased since the mid-20th century. In addition, there is high confidence that mean sea level increased by between 0.15 and 0.25m between 1901 and 2018.</p>
<p>The major concern is that as warming continues, more extreme climate events, such as droughts, are projected to increase in both frequency and intensity. This warming is mainly driven by greenhouse gas emissions from human activities such as burning fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and oil) and coal production.</p>
<p>When it comes to African countries, the report projects an increase in average temperatures and hot extremes across the continent. The continent will likely experience drier conditions with an exception of the Sahara and eastern Africa.</p>
<p>Alarmingly, the rate of temperature increase across the continent exceeds the global average. In addition, as warming continues, the frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall events are projected to increase almost everywhere in Africa. Maritime heatwaves and sea level rises are also projected to increase along the continental shores.</p>
<p>Looking into the future, global warming could lead to an increase in hot extremes, including heatwaves. It could also lead to a decrease in cold extremes. </p>
<p>The projected dry and hot conditions will have a devastating impact on a continent where the economies of most countries, and the livelihoods of most people, are dependent on rain-fed agriculture. In fact, changes to the climate will affect almost all parts of our lives.</p>
<h2>Regional impacts</h2>
<p>In a scenario where global warming will reach at least 2°C by mid-21st century (as predicted by the report), southern Africa is highly likely to experience a reduction in mean precipitation (water vapour that falls, such as rain or drizzle or hail). This will adversely affect agriculture. Specifically, the region is likely to witness an increase in aridity, and droughts. We are already seeing this in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/10/at-least-1m-people-facing-starvation-madagascar-drought-worsens">Madagascar</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-real-water-crisis-not-understanding-whats-needed-126361">South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>This has serious implications for all sectors including agriculture, water and health. Drought would also likely reduce hydroelectric generation potential, adversely affecting energy dependent sectors. We are already seeing this at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/12/zambians-water-shortage-drought-lake-rainfall">Kariba dam</a> which sits between Zimbabwe and Zambia.</p>
<p>In addition, there will be more tropical storms in the region. In southern Africa there’s been a southward shift in the occurrence of tropical cyclones. This is due to sea temperatures increasing as a result of global warming. The concern is that these events will be particularly destructive as seen in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/tc-2018-000001-mdg">Madagascar</a> and over <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/cyclone-idai">Mozambique</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-sea-temperatures-are-shaping-tropical-storms-in-southern-africa-73139">Rising sea temperatures are shaping tropical storms in southern Africa</a>
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<p>In relation to eastern Africa, the report projected an increase in mean precipitation that favours agriculture. However, increases in the frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation and flooding may cause a counter effect in some areas, such as arid and semi-arid lands.</p>
<p>There has been some conflicting information regarding rainfall in eastern Africa. This follows <a href="https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/joc.7207">observations</a> that the general circulation models, used in preparation of IPCC reports, do not simulate the observed rainfall well over the region. Most models project increase in rainfall while observations <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-019-0091-7">report the opposite</a>. This has been termed <a href="https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-15-0140.1">‘the paradox of east Africa climate’</a>. This observed <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-019-0091-7">shortening of rainfall season</a> that is not captured by the models explains the paradox.</p>
<p>Besides rainfall, the recorded and projected temperature which is expected to increase will decrease the snow and glaciers in the region. A rise in temperatures will result in <a href="https://malariajournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12936-020-03224-6#auth-Sadie_J_-Ryan">a rise in malaria</a> cases especially in <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphys.2012.00315/full">highland areas</a> within the region. </p>
<p>Northern Africa is a climate change hotspot. The report anticipates with high confidence increase in temperatures in the region,<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-021-00178-7#auth-George-Zittis">causing extreme heatwaves</a>. Projected drying will increase aridity that already <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aae013">begun to emerge</a> in the region and worsen water scarcity. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-worsening-water-crisis-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-83197">A worsening water crisis in North Africa and the Middle East</a>
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<p>Further, the situation will increase the risk of forest fires, a threat to ecosystems. As is currently seen in Algeria where, so far this year, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58165169">more than</a> 100 fires have been reported across 17 provinces, killing over 40 people. </p>
<p>The report also anticipated that there will be a reduction in mean wind speed over northern Africa. The wind speed is dependent on temperature and consequently atmospheric pressure changes. This will limit the region’s wind power potential, however – on a positive note – it will equally reduce dust storms that cause <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/focus-areas/environment/SDS">health impacts</a>, such as causing and aggravating asthma, and bronchitis. </p>
<p>Similarly, west and central Africa are projected to record a reduction in mean precipitation and experience more agricultural and ecological droughts. All these cast a dark cloud on agriculture and water in the region.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lagos-is-getting-less-rain-but-more-heavy-storms-what-it-can-do-to-prepare-134437">Lagos is getting less rain, but more heavy storms. What it can do to prepare</a>
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<p>Along the African coastlines, the relative sea-level rise is likely to contribute to an increase in the frequency and severity of coastal flooding in low-lying areas, like the recent <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/01/africa/lagos-sinking-floods-climate-change-intl-cmd/index.html">cases in Lagos</a>, Nigeria. This causes massive destruction to delicate coastal ecosystems and will displace communities that live in coastal towns. The sea level rise equally causes saltwater intrusion, limiting availability of fresh water.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-affecting-agrarian-migrant-livelihoods-in-ghana-this-is-how-156212">Climate change is affecting agrarian migrant livelihoods in Ghana. This is how</a>
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<h2>Which way for Africa?</h2>
<p>Despite the projection of decrease in mean precipitation over nearly all the regions of Africa, heavy precipitation and pluvial flooding is likely. The increase in wet extremes has far reaching effects on nearly all socioeconomic sectors, from agriculture, water, environment to infrastructure. These are some of the key sectors in socioeconomic development. </p>
<p>This – compounded by <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-africas-population-growth-and-what-can-change-it-126362">growing populations</a> – gives a worrying picture of the challenges that lie ahead. This is likely to widen the existing development gap, calling for concerted effort to strengthen response mechanisms to future challenges posed by climate change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victor Ongoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The report projects an increase in mean temperatures and hot extremes across the continent. Worryingly the rate of temperature increase across the continent exceeds the global average.Victor Ongoma, Assistant Professor, Université Mohammed VI PolytechniqueLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1579442021-03-26T16:41:53Z2021-03-26T16:41:53ZAfrica’s 2 elephant species are both endangered, due to poaching and habitat loss<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391841/original/file-20210325-21-1q6lz7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C22%2C5061%2C3366&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An African forest elephant (_Loxodonta cyclotis_) in Odzala-Kokoua National Park, Republic of the Congo.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/african-forest-elephant-odzala-kokoua-national-park-news-photo/1288088426">Nicolas Deloche/Godong/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=255&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391826/original/file-20210325-13-19hrc5b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>Humans have been over-exploiting African elephants for centuries. More than 2,000 years ago, the Roman Empire’s demand for ivory led to the extinction of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.10.086">genetically distinct elephant populations in northern Africa</a>. But in recent times, population increases among southern African elephants and declines across the rest of the continent have made it hard to clearly assess how threatened the species is overall. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=89PvLp0AAAAJ&hl=en">I serve on a team of scientists</a> that recently reviewed African elephants’ status for the <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/">International Union for Conservation of Nature</a> (IUCN). We compiled data from over 400 sites across Africa, spanning 50 years of conservation efforts – and our results were grim. </p>
<p>The number of African savanna elephants – the largest subspecies of elephants – has <a href="https://www.iucn.org/news/species/202103/african-elephant-species-now-endangered-and-critically-endangered-iucn-red-list">declined by 60%</a> since 1990. And forest elephants, which the IUCN is treating as a separate species for the first time, have declined in number by over 86%. Based on our assessment, the IUCN has changed its listing from “vulnerable” for all African elephants to “endangered” for savanna elephants and “critically endangered” for forest elephants.</p>
<h2>Two species</h2>
<p>By separating savanna and forest elephants into independent assessments, our report reveals the critical state of the more elusive forest elephants, which was obscured in previous reviews that lumped all of Africa’s elephants together. Scientific evidence for separating the species has been <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1059936">building over the past two decades</a>, and many taxonomists felt this recognition was long overdue. </p>
<p>Increased research on forest elephants highlights the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0059469">dramatic declines</a> these <a href="http://www.cnn.com/NATURE/9908/26/africa.elephants/">secretive giants</a> are undergoing. Studies also show that they are among the slowest-reproducing mammals on the planet. This means that even if they receive adequate protection, their <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.12764">recovery will take decades</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of elephant populations across Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391969/original/file-20210326-23-t9ktxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Habitat encroachment, increased human population densities, urban expansion, agricultural development, deforestation and infrastructure development are all reducing African elephants’ rangelands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gridarendal/31514045354/">Riccardo Pravetoni for GRID-Arendal/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Global threats, global solutions</h2>
<p>Scientists believe that elephant populations across Africa actually increased during the early 20th century, when nations were entrenched in global wars and consumption of ivory and other luxury items declined. After World War II, however, conspicuous consumption surged. Over-hunting for ivory drove <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605300020433">severe declines in the number of elephants</a> in the 1970s and 1980s. </p>
<p>Thanks to interconnected global trade networks, along with porous and unregulated borders in many parts of Africa, rising ivory demand in one part of the world quickly translates into <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1403984111">higher black market ivory prices in Africa</a>. And these higher prices lead to poaching.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Female elephant and calf drinking on open savanna." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391962/original/file-20210326-21-1wezvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Savanna elephants (<em>Loxodonta africana</em>) in South Africa’s Addo Elephant National Park.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/SPSSgs">Bernard Dupont/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Removing elephants from an area can pave the way for converting forests and grasslands to agriculture. This cycle has led to the <a href="https://www.traffic.org/publications/reports/elephants-in-the-dust-the-african-elephant-crisis/">depletion of much of African elephants’ historic range</a>. </p>
<p>Habitat loss also brings elephants and humans closer together, leading to more human-elephant conflict. Such clashes lead to the direct loss of elephants. They also are a burden for local communities that can erode their interest in and support for conservation. </p>
<p>While the scale of decline in Africa’s elephant populations is overwhelming, there are many examples of successful conservation efforts across the continent. The <a href="https://www.kavangozambezi.org/en/">KAZA (Kavango-Zambezi) Transfrontier Conservation effort</a>, anchored by Botswana, holds the largest contiguous elephant population on the continent, and that population has experienced strong growth over the past 50 years. This success reflects government collaboration across borders and work with local communities. </p>
<p>Joint international efforts to reduce the illegal ivory trade are raising awareness of the problems with ivory consumption. China <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42532017">banned domestic ivory trade in 2017</a>, and concurrently ivory poaching across many elephant populations in Africa declined – including in the largest populations in Tanzania and Kenya, which were under severe pressure less than 10 years ago. The core population of forest elephants in Gabon, which <a href="https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(17)30024-6?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS0960982217300246%3Fshowall%3Dtrue">declined by 80% between 2004 and 2014</a>, has stabilized with increased government investment and reduced poaching pressure. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wcjBy0fyGl0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Basketball star Yao Ming publicizes China’s domestic ivory trade ban to Chinese viewers.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Innovative work with communities in countries such as Namibia and Kenya to enhance people’s livelihoods by developing wildlife-supported economies has led to the protection of enormous tracts of lands as conservation areas. And researchers and conservationists are working to find solutions to conflicts between human activities and elephant needs that can be applied across Africa. </p>
<p>By highlighting the precarious state of Africa’s two elephant species, my colleagues and I hope that this <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/assessment/process">Red List Assessment</a> can help motivate African countries with elephant populations and the international community to invest in measures that support elephant conservation. </p>
<p>Elephants provide much more than just aesthetic benefits. Recent studies show forest elephants also play an important role in fighting climate change by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-019-0395-6">enhancing carbon storage in central African forests</a>, among the most important carbon reserves on the planet. The elephants disperse seeds and thin out young trees as they forage, which makes room for larger trees to thrive. </p>
<p>Elephants also are a linchpin of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms13379">wildlife-based economy across Africa</a>. And elephants, in compliment with fire, are considered to be ecosystem engineers that structure the balance between trees and grass on Africa’s savannas. Along with many other conservation experts, I see reversing their decline as a global imperative that requires concerted global support.</p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Wittemyer is a member of the IUCN African Elephant Specialist Group and serves as the Chairman of the Scientific Board for Save the Elephants, a Kenyan non-governmental organization.</span></em></p>A new review of the status of African elephants finds scientific grounds for dividing them into two species, and reports that both have suffered drastic population declines since 1990.George Wittemyer, Associate professor of Fish, Wildlife and Conservation Biology, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1100762019-04-01T10:39:03Z2019-04-01T10:39:03ZAs its ruling dynasty withers, Gabon – a US ally and guardian of French influence in Africa – ponders its future<p>The fragility of one of the world’s longest-lasting political dynasties was exposed when the military attempted a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-coup/gabon-thwarts-military-coup-attempt-in-presidents-absence-idUSKCN1P10FE">coup in Gabon in January</a>.</p>
<p>The coup, orchestrated by junior members of Gabon’s military, failed to unseat Ali Bongo Ondimba, whose family has run the central African country since the late 1960s. And Gabon’s next presidential election isn’t until the summer of 2023. </p>
<p>Bongo’s time in office may run out sooner. </p>
<p>The 60-year-old strongman has been effectively unable to rule since suffering <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1N31VY-OZATP">an apparent stroke</a> in October 2018, during Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative – often called “Davos in the desert.” </p>
<p>His evident frailty in recent TV appearances, coupled with the failed coup and lack of an obvious heir, has created a strong national sentiment that Gabon’s five-decade Bongo dynasty is on its last legs.</p>
<h2>One of France’s last neocolonial outposts in Africa</h2>
<p>Political upheaval is rare in Gabon, a diminutive central African nation about the size of the state of Colorado, with a population of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2 million</a> and a lucrative oil industry. </p>
<p>Except for a short-lived military coup in 1964, Gabon has been regarded as a bastion of stability in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/#!/conflict/violence-in-the-central-african-republic">troubled central Africa</a>, <a href="http://ut.academia.edu/GYLDASOFOULHASTOTHAMOT">where my research is focused</a>. Oil wealth and the Bongo dynasty’s French backing has contributed to Gabon’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-corrupt-nepotist-who-ruled-gabon-for-40-years-1700197.html">security</a>, and in recent years Bongo has used this stability to turn Gabon into a key <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/meet-ali-bongo-ondimba-obamas-man-in-africa/">U.S. ally</a> in the region.</p>
<p>But stability is not the same as democracy. </p>
<p>Since winning independence from France, in 1960, Gabon has had just three presidents. The first was Léon M’ba, who ruled from independence until 1967. The current president’s father – Omar Bongo Ondimba – assumed power <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/524984?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">after M'ba died</a>. </p>
<p>Omar Bongo went on to rule Gabon with an iron fist for 42 years. To stay in power, he oversaw changes that ensured that the country’s nascent electoral system never became <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2009-2-page-126.htm">independent, free or fair</a>. </p>
<p>During his rule, the elder Bongo helped to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713675627?casa_token=J8_PMc81kmsAAAAA:74wMxqVYPCQvFxZdf3ttPvD9H7lRvVeu3TzuD65L8EZST9WXaMpw_TH3LrXAlyI78DGWFS_jx_COkQ">keep French political influence</a> and <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gb-forrel-fr.htm">military might</a> alive in Africa by signing several mutual defense treaties with France. His policies benefited the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0963948052000341196">Françafrique</a>” – a now-<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/opinions/francafrique-a-brief-history-of-a-scandalous-word/">disparaged term</a> describing France’s “special” relationship with its former colonies on the continent, which has included supporting dictators who protect its economic interests.</p>
<p>Omar Bongo ensured that Gabon remained a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161015?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">neocolonial enclave</a>,” as anthropologist Michael Reed wrote in 1987 in the Journal of Modern African Studies. </p>
<p>“Gabon’s very identity is inseparable from France,” Reed argued, “and the latter’s continued claim to ‘major power’ status, in which Africa is crucial, requires Gabon’s assistance.” </p>
<p>President Ali Bongo Ondimba, who assumed power after his father died in 2009 – in yet another election marred by <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/gabon">irregularities</a> – inherited his father’s fealty to France. </p>
<p>Gabon still routinely aligns itself with French interests in Africa. During Libya’s 2011 political upheaval, for example, Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-01/african-union-refuses-arrest-gaddafi">broke with the African Union</a> and called for the embattled President Muammar Gaddafi <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/11/us-think-tank-hails-african-leader-accused-of-stealing-an-electi/">to step down</a>. France and other Western powers sought to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20110430-libya-muammar-gaddafi-offers-ceasefire-refuses-to-leave">dislodge the authoritarian Gaddafi</a>, while African nations supported Gaddafi, promoting “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2012.761463?src=recsys&journalCode=cjca20">African solutions to African problems</a>.”</p>
<h2>A stable non-democracy</h2>
<p>The rise of Ali Bongo – who was minister of defense during the latter part of his father’s reign – was contentious even within his own Gabonese Democratic Party.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gabon is an island of peace in the often unsettled central Africa region.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bongo was forcefully challenged by a senior former party member in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/24/gabon-court-rules-president-ali-bongo-rightful-winner-of-september-election">2016 presidential election</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-jean-ping-gabons-presidential-challenger-494551">Jean Ping</a>. Boosted by the failure of Bongo’s reform agenda to <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gabon-politics-insight/gabons-bongo-struggles-to-transform-african-oil-republic-idUKKBN0ET1W720140618">transform Gabon into an emerging economy</a>, Ping almost convinced the Gabonese people that the Bongo dynasty had to go.</p>
<p>In the end, Bongo beat <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-jean-ping-gabons-presidential-challenger-494551">Ping</a>, a former head of the African Union Commission, by fewer than 6,000 votes, with 50.66 percent of the vote. Ping, along with many local and foreign observers, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-election-election-idUSKCN11C112">considers the results of that race</a> fraudulent.</p>
<p>The 2016 presidential election was damaging for the Bongo dynasty. It was the first time that the opposition to the Bongo family coalesced around a single, credible candidacy. </p>
<p>Ever since then, once peaceful Gabon has experienced <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/01/09/a-libreville-un-putsch-rate-revelateur-du-malaise-gabonais_5406573_3212.html">political crises</a>. Ping’s party <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-votes-for-first-time-since-violence-marred-2016-election-20181006-2">boycotted last year’s municipal elections</a>, and his half of the electorate considers Bongo an illegitimate president. </p>
<h2>Rich and poor</h2>
<p>Gabon has also been in an <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gaulme_crisis_oil_producing_countries_gabon_congo_2018.pdf">economic and fiscal crisis</a> since 2014. </p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, government revenues decreased substantially due to the <a href="http://africa-me.com/gabon-economic-crisis-government-fuels-investor-mistrust-expropriation-veolia-seeg/">fall of global oil prices</a>. Last year, the International Monetary Fund agreed to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-economy-imf/gabons-economy-to-recover-in-2018-needs-progress-on-reforms-imf-says-idUSL8N1TS374">bail out Gabon’s government in exchange for</a> structural reforms, including a <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180626-gouvernement-gabonais-reduire-train-vie-etat">three-year hiring freeze in the public sector</a>.</p>
<p>Inequality is also <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient">very high</a> in Gabon. Historically, its oil wealth <a href="http://www.ga.undp.org/content/gabon/fr/home/countryinfo/">has not financially benefited most of its people</a>, who remain quite poor.</p>
<p>Gabon places <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">110 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index</a>, which assesses longevity, education levels, poverty, social equality, maternal death and other measures of well-being. That is higher than <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">immediate neighbors like Cameroon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea</a>, but lower than expected for a middle-income country whose government runs on oil money.</p>
<p>The African island of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mauritius/overview">Mauritius</a>, for instance, whose gross domestic product is similar to Gabon’s – which was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=GA-MU">US$15 billion in 2017</a> – fares far better. It ranks 65th worldwide on the UN’s human development index. </p>
<h2>A future yet to be written</h2>
<p>Surveys show that 87 percent of Gabonese feel that the country is <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/despite-overwhelming-discontent-gabonese-want-democracy-and-reject-military-rule-survey-shows">headed in the wrong direction</a>. They blame Ali Bongo for that, though 71 percent reject any attempt to install a military dictatorship.</p>
<p>Despite attempts by the Gabonese Democratic Party to reassure the public that Bongo’s health is improving, it is <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/gabonNews/idAFL5N20K387">unclear if he will ever recover enough to again lead Gabon</a>. </p>
<p>For now, an amendment of the constitution by Gabon’s constitutional court in November 2018 has ensured that the president remains – at least nominally – <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/gabon-constitutional-court-amends-constitution-address-presidents-absence">in charge</a> while recovering from the stroke.</p>
<p>When Bongo dies or is rendered incapacitated – a scenario that, in my assessment, is already well underway – the Bongo dynasty will end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot is not affiliated with any political organization, but he was a supporter of Jean Ping in Gabon's 2016 presidential election.</span></em></p>Gabon’s strongman president, Ali Bongo, is barely clinging to power after contested elections, a stroke and a coup attempt. The Bongo family has run this stable central African nation for 52 years.Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Adjunct professor, Political Science and International Studies, University of TampaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1086912018-12-20T07:45:00Z2018-12-20T07:45:00ZPeople in Africa live longer. But their health is poor in those extra years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250202/original/file-20181212-76977-x6u7of.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">While women in sub-Saharan Africa live longer than men, many of these extra years are lived in poor health.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People are now living longer in sub-Saharan Africa than they did two <a href="https://theconversation.com/lifestyle-diseases-could-scupper-africas-rising-life-expectancy-107220">decades ago</a>. This is an achievement, given that life expectancy in the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31891-9/fulltext">region</a> went down the drain from the 1990s to the mid-2000s
as it choked under the devastating effects of the HIV epidemic.</p>
<p>The question to ask is whether the additional years are spent in good or poor health. This question matters because how long people live affects the population’s state of health and leading causes of disability. Longevity means that these change over time which in turn has implications for policy, planning and provision of services.</p>
<p>We used information from the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/gbd">Global Burden of Disease</a> study to calculate healthy life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa. Healthy life expectancy refers to the average number of years that a person at a given age can expect to live in good health, taking into account mortality and loss of functional health.</p>
<p>The data suggest that people are living many years in poor health in the region. And <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32279-7/fulltext">our paper</a> shows that there are large inequalities in healthy life expectancy and disease burden between – and within countries – in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>This points to the fact that much more effort is needed to increase healthy life expectancy in the region. </p>
<h2>Discrepancies</h2>
<p>We found that the increase in healthy life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa was smaller than the increase in overall life expectancy. This indicates that many years are lived in poor health in the region. In 2017, life expectancy at birth in sub-Saharan Africa was 63.9 years, but healthy life expectancy was only 55.2 years. This means that 13.6% of years of life in the region is spent in poor health.</p>
<p>Life expectancy in 2017 varied by sub region, ranging from 62.4 years in Central Africa to 65 years in Southern Africa. However, in Central Africa 14.4% and in Southern Africa 13.8% of these years are estimated to be spent in poor health, respectively.</p>
<p>The proportion of years of life spent in poor health varied between countries, ranging from 11.9% in Djibouti to 14.8% in Botswana.</p>
<p>While women live longer than men, many of these extra years are lived in poor health. The life expectancy at birth for women in sub-Saharan Africa in 2017 was 66.2 years, but healthy life expectancy was only 56.8 years. Thus, women spend 14.2% of their years in poor health. For men, life expectancy was 61.7 years and healthy life expectancy was 53.7 years. Thus, men in sub-Saharan African spend 13% of their lives in poor health.</p>
<h2>Healthy life expectancy</h2>
<p>The average healthy life expectancy at birth in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 9.1 years, from 46.1 years in 1990 to 55.2 years in 2017. The increase in health life expectancy at birth varied from 0.9 years in Southern Africa to 12.4 years in Eastern Africa.</p>
<p>Even larger variations in healthy life expectancy than these were observed between countries, ranging from a decrease of 4.9 years in Lesotho (51.9 years in 1990 to 47 years in 2017) to an increase of 23.7 years in Eritrea (30.7 years in 1990 to 54.4 years in 2017).</p>
<p>In most countries, the increase in healthy life expectancy was smaller than the increase in overall life expectancy, indicating more years lived in poor health.</p>
<h2>Causes of premature mortality and disability</h2>
<p>We calculated a measure known as disability-adjusted life-years, which captures both early death and ill health. In 2017, the leading causes of disability-adjusted life-years in sub-Saharan Africa for all ages and both sexes combined were neonatal disorders, pneumonia, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and diarrhoea.</p>
<p>However, we observed various dramatic changes in causes of early death and disability between 1990 and 2017. Measles decreased from a ranking of 5th to 20th, heart attacks increased from 16th to 11th, stroke from 12th to 10th, and diabetes from 27th to 14th. We are thus witnessing gradual shift from communicable to non-communicable causes of disease burden.</p>
<p>There was wide variation between countries in the causes of early death and disability.</p>
<p>In Eritrea, the top causes of early death and disability were neonatal disorders, diarrhoea, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and congenital defects. The most dramatic changes were with conflict and terror (1st in 1990 to 14th in 2017), measles (7th to 74th), tetanus (9th to 82nd), heart attacks (17th to 11th), stroke (12th to 10th), and diabetes (22nd to 15th).</p>
<p>In the Central African Republic, the top causes of early death and disability were diarrhoea, neonatal disorders, pneumonia, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis. The main changes were with conflict and terror (164th to 9th), measles (7th to 20th), heart attacks (14th to 11th), and diabetes (21st to 16th).</p>
<p>In South Africa, the top causes of early death and disability were HIV/AIDS, neonatal disorders, pneumonia, interpersonal violence, and diabetes. The most dramatic changes occurred with HIV/AIDS (53rd to first), measles (12th to 55th), diarrhoea (2nd to 8th), and diabetes (from 13th to 5th).</p>
<p>In the Gambia, the top causes of early death and disability were neonatal disorders, pneumonia, HIV/AIDS, diarrhoea, and sickle cell disease. There were substantial changes in rankings for HIV/AIDS (61st in 1990 to 3rd in 2017), malaria (4th to 25th), measles (9th to 70th), heart attacks (13th to 6th), stroke (14th to 9th), and diabetes (28th to 18th).</p>
<h2>Extraordinary progress, but . .</h2>
<p>Since 1990, we have seen exceptional progress in sub-Saharan Africa in reducing the burden of communicable diseases, especially measles, tetanus and other vaccine-preventable diseases. However, early death and disability due to these causes remain unnecessarily high in many countries. Immunisation efforts have been helpful, but progress in coverage has slowed in the past decade. Close to 20 million children worldwide, most of them in sub-Saharan Africa, didn’t receive vaccines against these deadly diseases in 2017. Conflict, inadequate investment in national immunisation programmes, and vaccine stock outs were among the reasons for the stalled progress in immunisation coverage.</p>
<p>Our report shows that there is an unfinished agenda of controlling communicable diseases – compounded by an increase in non-communicable diseases – in sub-Saharan Africa. The continued burden of disabling conditions has serious implications for health systems and health-related expenditures in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108691/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Shey Wiysonge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Data suggest that people are living many years in poor health in Africa.Charles Shey Wiysonge, Director, Cochrane South Africa, South African Medical Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1072202018-11-26T13:34:18Z2018-11-26T13:34:18ZLifestyle diseases could scupper Africa’s rising life expectancy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/246458/original/file-20181120-161624-r1p1zi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The life expectancy improvements in sub-Saharan Africa vary between men and women.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People in sub-Saharan Africa are now living longer than ever before. A child born in the region today is expected to live up to 64 years on average. This is a remarkable increase of 11 years since the year 2000, when life expectancy at birth was only 53 years in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat2006DefinitionsAndMetadata.pdf">Life expectancy</a> at birth is the average number of years that a newborn is expected to live, if current mortality rates hold steady. Changes in life expectancy can be used to track the impact of population-wide health threats, such as the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. The monitoring of life expectancy can also provide crucial information that’s needed to deploy resources and effective interventions on the ground.</p>
<p>The life expectancy improvements in sub-Saharan Africa vary between men and women, within sub-regions and between countries. </p>
<p>We know all of this, and much more, because of an extensive study we recently published in <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31891-9/fulltext">The Lancet</a>. We drew from the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/gbd">Global Burden of Disease</a> study, which is a systematic effort to gather and analyse a huge amount of data on health loss due to diseases, injuries and risk factors by age, sex and geography over time. This allowed us to look at trends in mortality and life expectancy in the region from 1950 to 2017. It’s the most comprehensive look at these issues that’s ever been published. </p>
<p>Our research shows that the average life expectancy for men in sub-Saharan Africa is 62 years. For women it’s 66 years. </p>
<p>There are regional variations too. For example, men in central Africa will live to 60; those in eastern Africa to 63. Women in central Africa will reach 64 years; in southern Africa the figure is 68 years. The lowest life expectancy among men in sub-Saharan Africa is 49 years in the Central African Republic. The highest – 73 – is in Cape Verde. The corresponding life expectancy for women in those countries is 55 and 79 years.</p>
<p>There has been a huge decrease in mortality among children younger than five in sub-Saharan Africa. As a portion of total deaths, the number of deaths before the age of five has decreased from 45% in 1950 to 10% in 2017. </p>
<p>This is likely linked to a number of interventions such as the scale-up of <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-leaders-step-up-to-the-plate-to-narrow-immunisation-gaps-58237">vaccination programmes</a>, improved water and sanitation, and mass distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets. Mothers’ increased education levels and rising individual incomes have also contributed to the decrease in child deaths. </p>
<p>But caution is necessary. It’s not inevitable that death rates will keep falling. Rising epidemics of high blood pressure, high blood sugar, and obesity in some <a href="https://theconversation.com/people-in-africa-are-living-longer-but-lifestyle-diseases-are-rising-66686">African countries</a> could lead to shifts over time in the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31694-5/fulltext">opposite direction</a>. </p>
<h2>Falling death rates</h2>
<p>Overall, death rates have been dropping in sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the 21st century. There were 702 deaths per 100 000 people in 2017, down from 1366 deaths per 100 000 in 2000.</p>
<p>For all ages, it’s <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/36/3/484/655065">estimated</a> that one-third of life expectancy improvements are because of rising income per capita, one-third can be attributed to improvements in educational attainment, and one-third are a result of changes that have happened over time. These include technological improvement such as new vaccines. We have also <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)32225-6/fulltext">learned more</a> about diseases and how to control them.</p>
<p>There may be additional reasons for the reductions in mortality over time. These would include social factors like availability of job opportunities and good working conditions, existence of social support networks, and safe housing.</p>
<h2>Causes of death</h2>
<p>The five leading causes of death in sub-Saharan Africa for adults between the ages of 15 and 49 years in 2017 were AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, maternal disorders, and road injuries. </p>
<p>The leading causes of death differed when we looked at mortality for each of the sexes over time. There were major changes in the leading causes of death between 1990 and 2017. </p>
<p>Interpersonal violence was the seventh leading cause of death among men in 1990. Now it’s number five. Liver cirrhosis was the eighth leading cause of death; now it’s the sixth. </p>
<p>The main changes in causes of death among women were cervical cancer, which moved from 10th in 1990 to seventh. Breast cancer was the 17th leading cause of death among women – today it is eighth. </p>
<p>For people between the ages of 50 and 69, the three leading causes of death in 2017 were tuberculosis, <a href="https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/heart-attack/about-heart-attacks/silent-ischemia-and-ischemic-heart-disease">heart attacks</a> and stroke among men; and stroke, heart attacks and tuberculosis among women. </p>
<p>This shows that non-communicable diseases are already wreaking havoc in many countries across the continent.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/people-in-africa-are-living-longer-but-lifestyle-diseases-are-rising-66686">People in Africa are living longer but lifestyle diseases are rising</a>
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<h2>Impending epidemic</h2>
<p>High blood pressure, high blood sugar, and obesity are the top risk factors for death in women aged between 50 and 69. The top risk factors for men in the same age group are high blood pressure, high blood sugar, and alcohol use (with obesity in sixth position). </p>
<p>These risk factors are warning signs of an impending, widespread epidemic of <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31694-5/fulltext">non-communicable diseases</a> in sub-Saharan Africa. Some non-communicable diseases such as <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/health/2018-10-17-diabetes-to-be-sas-leading-killer-by-2040-study-shows/">diabetes</a>, heart attacks, and stroke are already projected to be <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31694-5/fulltext">major killers</a> in the region soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Shey Wiysonge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The leading causes of death in sub-Saharan Africa for adults 15 to 49 years were AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, maternal disorders, and road injuries.Charles Shey Wiysonge, Director, Cochrane South Africa, South African Medical Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1019202018-09-18T14:05:16Z2018-09-18T14:05:16ZCollaboration is helping teachers in rural Cameroon fill knowledge gaps<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232876/original/file-20180821-149466-17k9xtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When teachers collaborate, they learn from each other.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Global Partnership for Education/Stephan Bachenheimer/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Good education depends on a number of factors. These include appropriate infrastructure, like buildings, electricity or benches, and what teaching materials are available. But first and foremost, it depends on highly qualified teachers.</p>
<p>The need for qualified teachers is <a href="http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002327/232721E.pdf">a major challenge</a> in a number of African countries with rapidly growing populations. Governments must grapple with what it takes to fill that need while not neglecting quality and standards. But, in most cases, high demand seems more urgent than questions of quality. </p>
<p>In Cameroon, local authorities often try to fill vacancies with parents or volunteers. Mostly, it’s up to schools’ parent-teacher associations to fill the gaps with these so called “PTA-teachers”, who have no formal training as teachers. Another approach is to shorten the regular training period for student teachers in Cameroon’s training colleges, so that they are rapidly available for teaching. These two models – completely untrained or under-trained – compromise the quality of teaching.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18146627.2016.1224586">a recent study</a>, I explored teacher training in rural Cameroon. The study also aimed to understand what undertrained teachers do to develop the necessary skills once they are in classrooms.</p>
<p>The findings suggest that collaboration between teachers are crucial to boosting existing skills and learning more on the job. Teachers interviewed in the study preferred to learn collaboratively. They often asked colleagues for help, exchanged information about students and teaching, shared teaching materials and supported each other. This is happening informally. It would be valuable for education authorities in the country to look at how the process could be more supported. </p>
<h2>Teachers lack support</h2>
<p>Many of Cameroon’s teachers are under-trained. It’s difficult to get precise countrywide figures. But in the region <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18146627.2016.1224586">I surveyed</a> there were very wide discrepancies depending on the type of school. </p>
<p>For example, 93% of teachers at private schools had received training, 73% at government schools and just below this (72%) at Catholic schools. In the case of Islamic schools 60% of teachers were trained. The number dipped below 50% at Presbyterian schools (49%) and Baptist (36%). Some of those who fell into the untrained category had received no training. Others had enrolled for a year-long course which, given holidays and breaks, amounted to just nine months. After those nine months they were considered trained.</p>
<p>The study was conducted in primary schools in the rural areas of an Anglophone region. There were 171 respondents, ranging from teachers to principals. Additionally, people involved in teacher training, such as NGO employees and state authorities, were interviewed to get a wider perspective on the current state of teacher training in Cameroon.</p>
<p>The findings suggest that many teachers in classrooms in rural Cameroon had only one year of training. They could not afford longer training periods, although primary school teachers are supposed to undergo up to three years of training, according to their level of qualification before college (that is, whether they obtained O-levels or A-levels). </p>
<p>The teachers I interviewed were generally satisfied with training, though many said they would have liked to study for longer. They said that the content of the year-long training programme was narrow. Too many topics were packed into a short space of time rather than delving deeper. </p>
<p>While their lecturers in the colleges were mostly approachable and supportive, the student teachers didn’t receive much support while doing practical teaching in schools as part of their studies. This is a crucial point: it’s in this that student teachers transfer their theoretical knowledge into practical situations; they should be supervised and supported while doing so.</p>
<p>Due to the short training, teachers felt overwhelmed by large classes and ill equipped to manage learning once they entered into the field.</p>
<p>Another challenge they faced was the role of official languages in pupils’ learning process. There are more than 250 local dialects in Cameroon, and a variety of these are spoken as mother tongues in the country’s rural areas. This presents a big challenge for teachers: some only speak the official language at a low level. Pupils also struggle, and this makes successful learning and teaching difficult.</p>
<p>But the teachers weren’t entirely at sea. Many said they learned a great deal by collaborating with their colleagues, sharing ideas and lessons. This suggests that more should be done to strengthen collaborative networks, particularly in rural schools.</p>
<h2>Learning from each other</h2>
<p>The collaborative way in which the teachers I spoke to carry out their jobs holds great potential for rural primary school teachers in Cameroon. These practices, which happen naturally, could be bolstered to supplement formal teacher training. For instance, mentoring relationships could be developed to support new teachers - and to give them a chance to share innovative impulses and ideas from outside the school.</p>
<p>School principals play an important role here. Their job is to encourage their colleagues’ professional development and integrating new teachers into the system. They could push for mentoring arrangements to complement state-organised training, which tends to address more broad topics. </p>
<p>At a local school or municipal level, mentoring could help address individual concerns and issues. But most principals are not trained to set up such systems, and will need support from education authorities.</p>
<h2>Collaboration</h2>
<p>The collaborative structures that already exist in rural Cameroon offer great potential to improve teachers’ qualifications when they’re already on the job. This would help to counter the region’s teacher shortage. </p>
<p>The next step would be for these forms of qualification to be formally recognised and supported by state authorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101920/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie Ute Wohlfahrt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The need for qualified teachers is a major challenge in a number of African countries.Melanie Ute Wohlfahrt, Research associate, Technische Universität DresdenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011462018-08-22T08:59:22Z2018-08-22T08:59:22ZRwanda wants to be a Francophone leader – even though it distrusts France<p>For <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Rwanda-campaigns-for-leadership-of-Francophonie-group-/4552908-4626340-brtgbhz/index.html">more than a year now</a> Rwanda has been campaigning enthusiastically to be the next leader of the <a href="https://www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html">Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie</a>, an organisation of French-speaking states that have political, social and economic connections with France. The new secretary-general will be chosen at the Francophonie’s upcoming summit in Armenia in October. Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, is already <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180128/president-paul-kagame-elected-new-chairperson-african-union-year-2018">chair of the African Union</a>, so if his country nets the Francophonie seat, it will lead two of the world’s largest regional and global organisations. </p>
<p>Rwanda’s minister of foreign affairs and co-operation, Louise Mushikiwabo, is campaigning to become the Francophonie’s secretary-general. She’s focusing on <a href="http://lmfrancophonie.com/">four main issues</a>: increasing the influence of the French language around the world, elevating Francophone countries within political and economic international debates, tackling youth unemployment, and exchanging governance practices (encompassing everything from national reconciliation practices to better tax collection systems).</p>
<p>These goals are admirable, and they address some pressing issues facing many Francophone nations. But what makes Rwanda’s Francophonie campaign particularly interesting is the country’s complicated relationship with France. To this day, the two countries’ relations are strained – and many attribute the tension to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ffcbc7ea-df59-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c">France’s failure to accept</a> its historical role in the 1994 genocide. </p>
<h2>Dark times</h2>
<p>Before the genocide began, the French and Rwandan governments had worked together closely for years. Then-president Juvénal Habyarimana shared close relations with his French counterpart, François Mitterand. Scholar <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-rwanda-crisis/9780231104098">Gerard Prunier</a> has described how at the time, French officials distrusted the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), then a Uganda-based rebel group of Rwandan exiles, which it considered part of an Anglo-American attempt to undercut France’s influence in central Africa.</p>
<p>This concern led France to boost its support of Habyarimana despite his government’s ethnic-based public policies, which hindered and victimised Rwanda’s domestic Tutsi population – and which ultimately set the stage for the genocide.</p>
<p>Habyarimana was killed when his Falcon 50 plane was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/12/rwanda-hutu-president-plane-inquiry">shot down</a> by unknown assailants on April 6 1994, triggering the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi Rwandans. The plane itself was a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/03/world/france-s-rwanda-connection.html">French gift</a>, and was piloted by a French crew.</p>
<p>What’s particularly troubling for the current Rwandan government and genocide survivors is the history of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/11/rwanda.insideafrica">French assistance in the formation and training of the Interahamwe</a>, the killing squads that spearheaded the genocide.</p>
<p>After the Rwandan Civil War began in 1990, France provided arms and sent military personal to Rwanda in order to train Interhamwe forces. Journalist <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/P/bo20851207.html">Linda Melvern</a> has researched the close relationship between French and Rwandan officials, and described how France sent military teams of “advisers” and “technical assistants” to prepare not only the Rwandan military but the Interhamwe to stop the RPF and their allies at all costs. France has never fully accepted its responsibility for the consequences.</p>
<p>Since taking power and leading the formation of a post-genocide Rwandan state, the RPF government has consistently held sceptical views of France and French identity. Post-genocide reconstruction has largely tried to turn away from French influence in politics and society. The most pressing example <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2009/jan/16/rwanda-english-genocide">is the demotion of the French language</a>.</p>
<p>Despite Mushikiwabo’s campaign to increase the language’s relevance in the international community, domestically speaking, French has been steadily demoted. It is no longer the country’s primary language (alongside Kinyarwanda) as it was in the past. <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97245421">Since 2008</a>, English has overtaken French as the primary state-recognised foreign language, and Swahili was recently <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/207840">added to the list</a>.</p>
<p>But the demotion of French isn’t just about France’s troubling history in Rwanda; it also reflects a generational shift. The bureaucrats and officials who fought in the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994) and the genocide have slowly been replaced by a new generation of English-speaking Rwandans. Additionally, many Rwandan elites within the government and private sector consider adopting English a matter of necessity, since it’s generally perceived as the primary language of international trade.</p>
<h2>Leading the way</h2>
<p>Set against this background, Rwanda’s campaign to lead the Francophonie looks odd indeed. After all, back in <a href="http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/rwanda">2009</a> the country went in the other direction by joining the British Commonwealth; among the organisation’s 53 members, only Rwanda and Mozambique lack any particular historical connection with the UK.</p>
<p>At the time, Mushikiwabo <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/6685316/Rwanda-joins-the-Commonwealth.html">described</a> Rwanda entering the Commonwealth as an opportunity for the nation’s development: “Rwandans are ready to seize economic, political, cultural and other opportunities offered by the Commonwealth network.” But there’s more to this move than meets the eye. In interviews since 2012, Rwandan informants within the government, private sector and civil society have often described to me how joining the Commonwealth was an “anti-French” decision.</p>
<p>So why is Rwanda campaigning to lead the Francophonie anyway? Just as it currently holds the chair of the African Union, Mushikiwabo’s campaign to lead the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie is part of a larger project: to foster a new international identity and promote state interests around the world. Rwandan elites want the international community to perceive their country as a primary gatekeeper as they try to engage with Africa.</p>
<p>These leadership positions not only boost national self-esteem, but allow the Rwandan elite to strike international agreements that can foster development. The resulting relationships can be used not only to promote Rwandan interests, but to deflect international criticism for questionable <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/rwanda">domestic and regional human rights abuses</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24424868">interfering with neighbouring states</a>. If Rwanda wins the campaign for secretary-general, it will have to somehow not let its past history with France interfere with its grand plans for global influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Beloff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda pivoted towards the Anglophone world. But not entirely.Jonathan Beloff, Teaching Fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/982482018-06-24T07:21:37Z2018-06-24T07:21:37ZCameroon’s Anglophone crisis threatens national unity. The time for change is now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224195/original/file-20180621-137717-1xr78ht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroon's President Paul Biya has been in charge for nearly 40 years. His people want change.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/LINTAO ZHANG</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cameroon’s governance and security problems have historically attracted little outside attention. But this seems likely to change, for two reasons. The first is the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">growing political crisis</a> in the Central African nation’s English-speaking region. The second is a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/cameroon-opposition-party-picks-presidential-candidate-20180224">presidential election</a> scheduled for October 2018.</p>
<p>Roughly <a href="https://qz.com/1097892/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-danger-of-becoming-a-full-blown-conflict/">20% of the country’s population</a> of 24.6 million people are Anglophone. The majority are Francophone. The unfair domination of French-speaking politicians in government has long been the source of conflict.</p>
<p>Activists in the country’s Anglophone western regions are protesting their forced assimilation into the dominant Francophone society. They argue that this process violates their minority rights, which are <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-cameroon-is-at-war-with-itself-over-language-and-culture-85401">protected under agreements that date back to the 1960s</a>. Anglophone political representation and involvement at many levels of society has dwindled since the Federal Republic of Cameroon became the United Republic of Cameroon in 1972. There are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/12/world/africa/ap-af-cameroon-deadly-violence.html">growing calls</a> for the Anglophone region to secede from Cameroon. </p>
<p>This festering conflict represents <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">a major test</a> as Cameroonians prepare for the October elections.</p>
<p>Three things are urgently needed now in Cameroon. The first is to understand the origins of the crisis. The second is to support an inclusive national dialogue. And the third is to ensure that the 2018 elections are free and fair for all.</p>
<h2>Growing crisis</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">Before 1961</a>, the Southern Cameroons were a British administered territory from Nigeria. They elected to join the Republic of Cameroon by UN plebiscite in 1961 around the time of decolonisation. </p>
<p>A power-sharing agreement was reached: the executive branch of government was meant to be shared by Francophones and Anglophones. But that agreement has not been upheld and, over the years, Anglophone political representation has been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">steadily eroded</a>.</p>
<p>The crisis came to a head in late 2016 when lawyers, joined by teachers and others with similar grievances, led protests in major western cities demanding that the integrity of their professional institutions be protected and their minority rights respected. </p>
<p>President Paul Biya responded by deploying troops to the region and blocking internet access. When peaceful demonstrations were met with violent repression it exacerbated tensions and escalated the conflict to a national political crisis. </p>
<p>On 12 June 12 2018, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/12/world/africa/ap-af-cameroon-deadly-violence.html">Amnesty International issued a report</a> documenting human rights violations in Cameroon. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">The International Crisis Group says</a> that at least 120 civilians and 43 members of security forces <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-says-160-000-anglophone-cameroonians-fled-violence-145916871.html">have been killed</a> in the most recent waves of violence. </p>
<p>More than 20,000 people have fled to neighbouring Nigeria, and an estimated 160,000 are displaced within Cameroon. </p>
<p>Some human rights activists <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/30/africas-next-civil-war-could-be-in-cameroon/?utm_term=.0880fcf57106">worry</a> that Cameroon could be the site of Africa’s next civil war.</p>
<p>Agbor Nkongho, an Anglophone human rights lawyer and director of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, told the <em>Washington Post</em>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are gradually, gradually getting there (civil war). I’m not seeing the willingness of the government to try to find and address the issue in a way that we will not get there.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another issue is that there are diverse views even within the Anglophone and Francophone communities about what would be best for Cameroon going forward.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to national unity</h2>
<p>In October 2017 the separatist leader Julius Ayuk Tabe declared the independence of the <a href="https://www.ambazonia.org/">Republic of Ambazonia</a>. His interim government laid claim to a territory whose borders are the same as the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British rule (1922-1961). </p>
<p>The interim government’s spokesman, Nso Foncha Nkem, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KL7HM47aqA8">invited</a> Francophones to leave the region and called on Anglophones in Biya’s “rubber-stamp” government to return to Ambazonia and support the movement. He also pleaded for unity, asking that Anglophones speak in one voice. </p>
<p>However, that call has not overcome the challenges posed by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">diverse viewpoints</a> within the Anglophone population itself. Some favour secession. Others want to return to the 1961 federation and the power-sharing agreement. There are those who prefer decentralisation that would devolve power to regional leaders, and some who simply want an administrative solution that would leave the Republic of Cameroon as it stands. </p>
<p>And among the Francophone population, there is some support for the radical separatists, while some see the Anglophone situation as a general crisis of governance and others deny any problem exists. </p>
<p>Mongo Beti, a Francophone novelist and activist who spent 30 years in exile, observed after <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3820363?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">returning home</a> in the 1990s that a general absence of identification with a viable, unified nation due to various divisions had frayed Cameroon’s social fabric and was a significant impediment to progress. </p>
<p>It is unclear whether Biya, who is 85 and in power since 1982, will run for re-election. His 38 years in office as a corrupt, absent leader have left <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">the nation in tatters</a>. The vast majority of Cameroonians, whether Anglophone or Francophone, are hungry for change. </p>
<h2>The way forward?</h2>
<p>There is an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">urgent need for an inclusive national dialogue</a> to harness this desire for change. </p>
<p>The government must recognise that it faces a substantive national crisis and take extraordinary steps. A general conversation about governance in all its regions is also necessary. Given the depth and severity of people’s grievances, a holistic approach is needed that would address issues of governance, security, and civic engagement to mend the bonds that have been broken. </p>
<p>This is necessary if the current crisis it to become an opportunity to develop a new road map for the future that could empower citizens.</p>
<p><em>Phyllis Taoua is the author of African Freedom: How Africa Responded to Independence (Cambridge University Press, 2018) and was a Tucson Public Voices Fellow with the Op-Ed Project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phyllis Taoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some human rights activists worry that Cameroon could be the site of Africa’s next civil war.Phyllis Taoua, Professor of Francophone Studies (Africa, Caribbean), Faculty Affiliate with Africana Studies, World Literature Program and Human Rights Pracice, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/854012017-10-15T10:23:37Z2017-10-15T10:23:37ZHistory explains why Cameroon is at war with itself over language and culture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189357/original/file-20171009-6990-13j1d29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some Cameroonians don't believe Anglophone regions need an independent state of their own.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Tensions between English-speaking Cameroonians and the West-central African nation’s French-speaking government stretches back to end of colonial rule nearly 60 years ago. At the heart of the tension is Anglophones’ desire to form their own independent state, <a href="http://www.ambazonia.org/">Ambazonia</a>. In recent weeks there have been <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/10/05/us-govt-says-cameroon-s-handling-of-anglophone-crisis-unacceptable/">violent clashes</a> and several protesters have <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/17-protesters-killed-as-clashes-in-cameroon-continue-11467758">been killed</a>, reportedly by government security forces. The Conversation Africa asked Verkijika G. Fanso to explain what’s happening.</em></p>
<p><strong>Why is there such animosity between French-speaking and English-speaking Cameroonians?</strong></p>
<p>The animosity is actually between English-speaking Cameroonians and the government led and dominated by French-speaking Cameroonians. They have ruled the country in an authoritarian way since the unification of the two former United Nations trusteeship territories – French Cameroun and British Southern Cameroons – in 1961. </p>
<p>The current dispute is between the part of the country that was once run by the British, and the larger part where French is spoken and which was once run by the French. In 1972 the original federal structure that post-colonial unification was based on was abrogated. The English-speaking, or Anglophone, West Cameroon was annexed in a united republic, and in 1984 the word “united” was scrapped. The country became Cameroon and the English-speaking region was assimilated into the French-speaking area. </p>
<p>The dignity and statehood of Anglophones was silently destroyed – not by the French-speaking (Francophone) community at large, but by the government led and dominated by Francophones. </p>
<p>Being Anglophone or Francophone in Cameroon is not just the ability to speak, read and use English or French as a working language. It is about being exposed to the Anglophone or Francophone ways including things like outlook, culture and how local governments are run. </p>
<p>Anglophones have long complained that their language and culture are marginalised. They feel their judicial, educational and local government systems should be protected. They want an end to annexation and assimilation and more respect from the government for their language and political philosophies. And if that doesn’t happen, they want a total separation and their own independent state.</p>
<p><strong>What’s the history of the call for an independent state?</strong></p>
<p>On January 1 1960 French Cameroun <a href="http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=pau">gained independence</a> and became Cameroun Republic. Later that year Nigeria gained its independence from Britain and became a Federal Republic. The British-controlled southern Cameroons was then separated from Nigeria and was due to achieve full independence on October 1 1961. </p>
<p>But there was a hitch: the United Nations organised a plebiscite in which southern Cameroonians were asked to chose between joining the Cameroun Republic or Nigeria. This vote was prompted by a British report that insisted its former territory would not survive economically on its own.</p>
<p>Southern Cameroonians wanted nothing more to do with Nigeria. They had suffered enormously at the hands of Igbo people who’d settled in their territory in previous decades. So they elected to unite in a new federation with Cameroun Republic. It was supposed to be a partnership of equals, a notion reinforced by bilateral negotiations that had started before the vote.</p>
<p>These negotiations were concluded at the <a href="http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=jgi">Foumban Conference</a> in July 1961. The general view after the conference was that the delegation from the Cameroun Republic, accompanied by French advisers, got virtually everything they wanted. The Anglophones, who received none of the support promised by the British or the UN, were effectively sidelined. </p>
<p>So the new federation was born, but it was never a happy union. The regions were centrally governed but neither of the two presidents since unification have spoken nor understood English. The incumbent, Paul Biya, reads English with difficulty.</p>
<p>Since then Anglophones have pushed for autonomy. This call is actually supported in a UN <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/198/23/IMG/NR019823.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> passed in April 1961 that defines the joining of the two former territories as a federation of two states, equal in status and autonomous.</p>
<p><strong>What’s prompted the latest violence?</strong></p>
<p>In October 2016 lawyers went <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/cameroon-teachers-lawyers-strike-english-161205095929616.html">on a strike</a> in an effort to force the government to stop appointing Francophone magistrates who spoke no English and had no training in common law to preside over courts in the Anglophone regions.</p>
<p>During peaceful demonstrations in the cities of Bamenda and Buea, the lawyers were roughly manhandled by government security forces.</p>
<p>Teachers soon came out <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/cameroon-teachers-lawyers-strike-english-161205095929616.html">in support</a> of the lawyers. They wanted the government to stop posting Francophone teachers who spoke no English to teach subjects other than French in Anglophone schools. People across professions followed the teachers, and Cameroon’s cities became “ghost towns” everywhere on certain days of the week as part of a <a href="http://www.cameroonintelligencereport.com/anglophone-palaver-consortium-confirms-civil-disobedience-campaign-to-begin-on-monday-says-mtn-camtel-orange-to-face-economic-sanction/">large-scale stay away</a>. </p>
<p>Earlier this year government banned the trade unions that had led the strikes. Many of their members – some of whom were engaged in discussions with the government – were arrested and jailed on charges of terrorism and attempts to change the form of the state. The government also <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/cameroon-anglophone-areas-suffer-internet-blackout-170125174215077.html">shut down</a> internet and other communication services in Anglophone regions to stop people sharing information and organising.*</p>
<p>Shamed by international condemnation, President Biya <a href="https://qz.com/964927/caemroons-internet-shutdown-is-over-after-93-days/">reinstated communication services</a> three months later. He also ordered the release of some strike leaders and <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-drops-terror-case-against-anglophone-activists/a-40306919">scrapped the charges</a> against them. But he didn’t call for a resumption of talks. </p>
<p>Anglophones were unimpressed. On October 1 they took to the streets to commemorate what they consider their independence day. They raised the flag of Ambazonia in various towns and cities. It was an assertion of autonomy. Government security forces were deployed and used excessive. Over the next few days a number of people were killed, some reports suggesting <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/cameroon-english-region-unrest-death-toll-rises-171003061709512.html">17</a> others suggesting <a href="http://cameroon-concord.com/headlines/cameroon-names-of-anglophones-slaughtered-by-biya-s-troops-on-october-1-2017">as many as 100</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Is there any chance of resolving this conflict?</strong></p>
<p>Dialogue and diplomacy are foremost. Cameroon’s leadership must initiate or reinstate dialogue with those representing Anglophone interests. Failing this, the African Union or the UN – or both – should initiate dialogue.</p>
<p>Cameroon is being haunted by agreements that were never respected, from the Foumban Conference to the UN’s resolution regarding autonomy. These agreements must be revisited and respected if the crisis is to end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85401/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Verkijika G. Fanso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Anglophones have long complained that their language and culture are marginalised. They say if this doesn’t change, they must be granted independence.Verkijika G. Fanso, Professor of History, Université de Yaounde 1Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/846532017-10-05T14:51:37Z2017-10-05T14:51:37ZThe attempt to replenish Lake Chad’s water may fail again. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188956/original/file-20171005-9802-10shqhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Issoufou, Yayi, Deby and Buhari at a meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the body in charge of the lake replenishment project </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1997/eirv24n35-19970829/eirv24n35-19970829_007-transaqua_an_idea_for_the_sahel.pdf">Transaqua Project</a> is a big, ambitious initiative to replenish the waters of <a href="http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2012/africa%E2%80%99s-vanishing-lake-chad">Lake Chad</a>, a fresh water inland lake in Central Africa. </p>
<p>It involves <a href="https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/Projects/MULTIN-LAKECHAD-Water-Charter.pdf">12 countries</a> working together to build a 2 400 km canal to move about 100 billion cubic metres of water from the River Congo to the lake every year. The Lake Chad basin supports more than <a href="http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/about_freshwater/rivers/irbm/cases/lake_chad_river_case_study/">20 million people</a>.</p>
<p>If accomplished, the Transaqua Project will change the face of Africa – for better or for worse. But like other regional or transnational projects on the continent, it may be delayed or abandoned if national politics are ignored.</p>
<p>The replenishment project, mooted over 30 years ago, involves building several dams along the length of the canal. </p>
<p>The dams will potentially generate <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina">15 to 25 thousand million KWh</a> of hydroelectricity and irrigate <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina">50 000 to 70 000 km2 of land in the Sahel zone</a>. This will stimulate development in agriculture, industry, transport and electricity for <a href="http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1997/eirv24n35-19970829/eirv24n35-19970829_007-transaqua_an_idea_for_the_sahel.pdf">up to 12 African countries</a>. </p>
<p>But the project is not immune from criticism. Some argue that claims that the lake is shrinking are <a href="http://jpe.library.arizona.edu/volume_23/Magrin.pdf">exaggerated</a>. Others argue that the plan poses serious <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2014:218:FULL&from=EN">environmental risks</a>. </p>
<p>It is difficult to determine whether the canal will address why the lake is drying up. And who benefits, and what the benefits will be to each country still remain unknown. It’s also possible that disagreement within and between countries could scuttle the project. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.cblt.org/en/news/inter-basin-water-transfer-project-signing-memorandum-understanding-between-lcbc-and-PowerChina">memorandum of understanding</a> for a feasibility study and the construction of the project was signed in December 2016 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and PowerChina, the Chinese state engineering and construction firm. </p>
<p>The commission represents the interests of the 12 countries involved in the project and is guided by The <a href="https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/Projects/MULTIN-LAKECHAD-Water-Charter.pdf">Water Charter</a>. This is the main instrument that outlines the mechanisms for dispute settlement.</p>
<p>The Charter, though, focuses on dealing with conflicts between countries rather than within them.</p>
<p>It is therefore worrying that the most important country in the project, Nigeria, faces internal challenges that may affect the project. </p>
<p>The long term nature of the project demands that the participating states are relatively stable in political and economic terms. Nigeria, Cameroon and Libya account for 78% of <a href="https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/presentations/Sahel/Joint_Authorities/LCBC.pdf">member contributions</a> to the commission. Libya is currently seen as a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-today-170418083223563.html">failed state</a>, so the focus is on Nigeria to offer political direction for the project. </p>
<h2>Nigeria mirrors the challenges</h2>
<p>Nigeria plays a powerful role as a regional leader and a major financial member of the Lake Chad Basin. Nigeria also <a href="https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/presentations/Sahel/Joint_Authorities/LCBC.pdf">pays 40%</a> of the commission’s membership contributions of €6,275,906.90 (2013 budget). </p>
<p>Three political issues in Nigeria could affect the project. </p>
<p>The first is that President Muhammadu Buhari has had an important influence on its progress. Since he assumed office in May 2015, four milestones have been reached: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Nigeria ratified the Water Charter, five years after it was signed.</p></li>
<li><p>Nigeria signed the Charter for the Lake Chad Basin into law.</p></li>
<li><p>PowerChina and the Commission signed the memorandum of understanding. </p></li>
<li><p>PowerChina and Italian firm Bonfica Spa signed a <a href="https://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2017/eirv44n32-20170811/11_4432.pdf">deal</a> to conduct the feasibility study and build the Transaqua project. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>If Buhari’s influence wanes, the project could lose momentum. </p>
<p>The second political issue is that Nigerians will go to the polls again in 2019. Buhari’s <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/onogwu-buhari-health-shines-spotlight-on-him/440808-4005738-n3vxob/index.html">health challenges</a>, combined with the country’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/africa/muhammadu-buhari-nigeria-boko-haram.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FNigeria&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection">economic and political</a> challenges, have reduced his approval ratings from 67% when he was elected <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/196136/nigerian-president-buhari-approval-drops-second-year.aspx">to 44% in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>The re-organisation and re-emergence of the opposition People’s Democratic Party gives voters a strong alternative, especially in parts of the country without an alternative political party that can compete with their political structure and finances. </p>
<p>That party, which was in power for 16 years, might not be able to meet the financial or security commitments to the water project because of their <a href="http://newafricanmagazine.com/why-the-pdp-lost/">past history</a> in government.</p>
<p>The third factor relates to institutional politics. The executive secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Abdullahi Sanusi Imran, has stated that the Transaqua idea “<a href="http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2014/eirv41n48-20141205/35-36_4148.pdf">is much more appropriate for the situation of the Lake Chad than all other alternative solutions</a>.” But an informal conversation with a senior Nigerian government official in the course of research fieldwork expressed concern about the choice of the Transaqua idea over other alternatives. </p>
<p>These alternatives were presented in the <a href="https://afrosai-e.org.za/uploads/afrosai_intohost_co_za/cms/files/environmental_audit_on_the_drying_up_of_lake_chad_nigeria.pdf">National Audit Report of Nigeria</a> as part of the <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2015-en-joint-environmental-audit-report-lake-chad.pdf">Joint Environmental Audit report</a> on the drying up of Lake Chad: a report prepared by the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4804">Supreme Audit Institutions </a> of each of the states for the African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions. Dissenting positions can create unnecessary friction between government agencies and make it difficult to coordinate actions.</p>
<h2>So what should come next?</h2>
<p>Amendments to the Water Charter to provide for addressing intra-national political challenges are vital; a task for the African Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Supreme Audit Institutions in their respective national domains. States could be required to outline how they might solve potential political challenges in their domains. Expectations and responsibilities should be built into the Charter beyond negotiations and gentleman’s agreements. </p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin Commission, political office holders and government institutions should work together to make the project’s objectives a key election issue in subsequent elections. </p>
<p>Intra-national and national politics cannot be ignored. But the project should also harness local knowledge and experience, and recognise local conditions so that it’s accepted by everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adegboyega Adeniran receives funding from an ANU PhD Research Grant. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katherine Daniell receives funding from the European Commission. She is a member of the National Committee of Water Engineering (Engineers Australia), a member of the Initiatives of the Future of Great Rivers, A Fellow of the Peter Cullen Water and Environment Trust, and President of the Australian-French Association for Research and Innovation.</span></em></p>The transnational project conceived 30 years ago to replenish the drying waters of Lake Chad finally seems poised to take off. But first, internal politics within member states must be overcome.Adegboyega Adeniran, PhD Candidate, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National UniversityKatherine Daniell, Senior Lecturer, Fenner School of Environment and Society, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/737372017-03-08T10:07:05Z2017-03-08T10:07:05ZCongolese politicians scramble for control as violence ramps up again<p>The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is still struggling to bring an end to months of torrid political wrangling. Ever since the incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, began to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/drc-delays-election-2018-opposition-anger-161016135155845.html">delay and obstruct scheduled elections</a> that could eject him from office, the country has been stuck in political limbo. And while a peace deal to set a proper plan for the election has now been agreed, events are still moving at a dizzying pace. </p>
<p>First, <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/02/19/dr-congo-pope-francis-calls-for-peace//">the Pope and the church</a> dramatically intervened to broker the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/drc-delays-election-2018-opposition-anger-161016135155845.html">deal</a>, which (at least in theory) guarantees that Kabila will step down after the much-delayed election is held in 2018. </p>
<p>Then <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38835381">Etienne Tshisekedi</a>, leader of the opposition umbrella movement <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/drc-opposition-unites-against-president-kabila/3373403.html">Rassemblement</a> (the Rally), suddenly died. Soon afterwards, Moïse Katumbe, a presidential candidate who fled the DRC after being sentenced to three years in prison, said he would <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/02/10/drc-katumbi-confirms-his-return-to-attend-tshisekedi-s-funeral/">return to Kinshasa</a> for Tshisekedi’s funeral. Everyone is still guessing what his intentions really are.</p>
<p>As Congolese politics gets ever more complex and fraught, violence and oppression have become the norm in parts of the country. Regrettably, the movements and forces behind it are too numerous to survey in much detail – but a few stand out.</p>
<p>Central Congo is seeing <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/soldiers-kill-101-clashes-kamwina-nsapu-170214110027063.html">intense fighting</a> between the state and the followers of the late rebel leader Kamwina Nsapu; hundreds of people have been killed and many more displaced. The violence has been condemned by the country’s <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en">UN Stabilisation Mission</a>, but to little effect. It is more than matched in the east of the country, where various <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/battle-control-drc-who-are-mai-mai-groups-1526276">Maï-Maï rebel groups</a> are still furious with the Congolese army for <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/02/09/a-l-est-de-la-rdc-apparaissent-de-nouvelles-milices-inspirees-par-jesus-christ-le-foot-et-la-guerre_5077170_3212.html">arresting</a> their leader, David Maranata, at the start of 2017. They have been stepping up their attacks with a vengeance ever since.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, violent movements once thought nearly extinguished are suddenly back in the picture. The <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/dr-congo-who-are-adf-ugandan-rebels-hacking-civilians-death-399889?rm=eu">Alliance of Democratic Forces</a> (ADF) has gone from an obscure and rather marginal quasi-jihadist group to a serious threat, lately mounting a spate of violent attacks on civil society in the Kivu region, in the east of the country. It’s also unclear whether <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20438531">M23</a>, a dreaded militia movement that was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739">dealt a crippling blow</a> by the Congolese army and Maï-Maï rebels in November 2012, is now <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-rebels-idUSKBN14Z0WL">making a bloody return</a> and threatening to derail the already rickety election process. </p>
<p>With the DRC seemingly fragmenting once again and regional warfare ramping up, it’s only natural to wonder what hope there is for the country’s civil society at all. As long as Kabila remains in power, what little legitimacy the state still enjoys will steadily ebb away, and local warlords such as Maranata will inevitably seize the initiative. Politicians, not least Kabila himself, are running out of time. So what is to be done?</p>
<h2>Onward and upward?</h2>
<p>All politicians, national, local and regional, need to keep up the pressure on the president to resign. Power vacuums in the DRC are seldom filled by anything good; few could forget the fall of Mobutu and the onset of the <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars">first and second Congo Wars</a>, which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8471147.stm">some have estimated</a> killed more civilians than any other conflict since World War Two. </p>
<p>Tshisekedi’s death is a bitter blow to the Rally, and particularly its main constituent party, the <a href="http://udps-rdc.com/">UDPS</a>, which is in a very disorganised state. UDPS members need to remain steadfast and make it clear that their leaders should not accept payoffs from the Kabila government to remain silent. As such, UDPS chairperson Jean-Marc Kabunda needs to quickly unify the party and make it a force to be reckoned with once again. </p>
<p>A strong UDPS could spur some much-needed changes. It could finally seize the initiative to oust the Rally’s president, Pierre Lumbi, who has strong connections to the Kabila regime. He should step down; the list of potential replacements isn’t long, but there are at least some options. If his lawyers can keep him out of jail, Moïse Katumbe is the most obvious and electable presidential candidate. But for just those reasons, Kabila will work hard to lock him up. Clearly, reserve candidates to lead the Rally need to be found.</p>
<p>There are a few options, among them Etienne Tshisekedi’s son Felix; he’s not yet famous in his own right, but his father’s name will carry much weight. Then there’s veteran politician and former cabinet member <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/democratic-republic-congo-who-vital-kamerhe-congos-opposition-heavyweight-1540901">Vital Kamerhe</a>, whose time to lead may finally have come. If he put his heft behind the Rally and Lumbia moved down the hierarchy to make way for him, the movement might be considerably strengthened. </p>
<p>A viable and competent opposition wouldn’t suddenly solve all the DRC’s problems, but it could be the first step towards a secure peace. The international community must continue to show their support for the 2006 constitution and pressure Kabila to step down. His time in office needs to end – and as far as his country’s people are concerned, the sooner the better.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article originally stated that Moïse Katumbe had already returned to Kinshasa; at the time of writing he had only said he will return at some point. The error has been corrected.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Loffman has received funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Economics and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy (BA). </span></em></p>A deal to finally hold long-postponed elections has been reached, but parts of the country are still dealing with violence and chaos.Reuben Loffman, Lecturer in African History, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/535942016-02-04T04:27:35Z2016-02-04T04:27:35ZHow the origin of the KhoiSan tells us that ‘race’ has no place in human ancestry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109968/original/image-20160202-32222-14dj62q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The annual 'Living Landscapes' procession is aimed at raising awareness of the Cedarberg's KhoiSan cultural heritage. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ancient origins, anatomical, linguistic and genetic distinctiveness of southern African San and Khoikhoi people are matters of confusion and debate. They are variously described as the world’s first or oldest people; Africa’s first or oldest people, or the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Khoi-San-want-recognition-as-first-people-of-SA-20150820">first people</a> of South Africa.</p>
<p>They are in fact two evolutionarily related but culturally distinct groups of populations that have occupied southern Africa for up to 140,000 years. Their first-people status is due to the fact that they commonly retain genetic elements of the most ancient <em>Homo sapiens</em>.</p>
<p>This conclusion is based on evidence from specific types of DNA. This evidence also demonstrates that other sub-Saharan human populations retain genetic bits and pieces of DNA from non-KhoiSan primordial humans. These pre-date their out-of-Africa colonisation of the balance of the world.</p>
<p>What is important in the debate on the origins of, and diversity among, population groups of <em>Homo sapiens</em> is to establish what cannot, and should not, be derived from the various DNA evidence used to support the KhoiSan-as-first-people hypothesis. </p>
<p>This is that the KhoiSan, or any other groups of humans, can be assigned to evolutionarily meaningful “races” – or subspecies in biological classification.</p>
<p>The DNA evidence, if interpreted incorrectly, could be used to support the findings of “scientific” racial anthropologists such as <a href="http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Carleton_Stevens_Coon.aspx">Carleton S. Coon</a>. </p>
<p>As recently as 1962, Coon “recognised” the KhoiSan as the Capoid race. He based this on the distinctive anatomical features of the Capoids from those he used to designate the Congoid race. These include golden brown rather than sepia-coloured skin, the presence of epicanthic eye folds, prominent cheekbones and <a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/steatopygia">steatopygia</a>.</p>
<p>But, if correctly interpreted, the scientific evidence points quite to the contrary.</p>
<h2>Human evolution cannot be drawn like a tree</h2>
<p>If one were to compare the entire DNA genomes from representatively sampled human populations from around the world, the resulting relationships would look more like an evolutionarily reticulated chain-link fence. In other words, a network rather than a tree. This applies to even purportedly racially important anatomical features.</p>
<p>This is because human population groups worldwide are highly homogeneous (99.5% similar) genetically and their anatomical features vary in an uncorrelated fashion over the landscape. </p>
<p>These groups are, in evolutionary terms, very recent entities that have no biological or <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-science-has-been-abused-through-the-ages-to-promote-racism-50629">taxonomic</a> significance.</p>
<p>The DNA evidence used to discover the human genetic “footprints” that characterise the KhoiSan, and other diverging populations, is today easily put together. Forensic pathologists use it to determine an unidentifiable corpse’s population group. This process has been popularised on television shows such as <a href="http://www.tvmuse.com/tv-shows/CSI--Crime-Scene-Investigation_8779/">CSI</a> and <a href="http://www.fox.com/bones">Bones</a>.</p>
<p>This DNA evidence comes from:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Y chromosome polymorphisms inherited without recombination along <a href="http://www.ramsdale.org/dna13.htm">male lineages</a>;</p></li>
<li><p>single nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs, from nuclear <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v409/n6822/full/409821a0.html">DNA</a>; and</p></li>
<li><p>most especially from <a href="http://mbe.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/3/757.full.pdf+html">mitochondrial DNA</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Mitochondria are organelles within a cell that have their own independent DNA separate from that in the nucleus that determines an organism’s external appearance and physiology. They are involved with cellular respiration and nothing more.</p>
<p>Mitochondrial DNA allows the detection of direct genetically “ungarbled” connections among evolutionarily evolved human population groups. This is because a component of it evolves much faster than the bulk of nuclear DNA. Also, mitochondrial DNA is inherited maternally and is thus not intermixed with paternal DNA during reproduction.</p>
<p>Some evolutionary genetic anthropologists ignore the overwhelming balance of evidence that there is no evolutionarily significant <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-science-has-been-abused-through-the-ages-to-promote-racism-50629">racial variation</a> in either genes or anatomy. Instead they focus on these very few bits and pieces of DNA that, in evolutionary terms, change rapidly. This way they reach distorted conclusions about discernible “races” within the human species.</p>
<h2>Why there is only one race</h2>
<p>Recent DNA results used to detect human population genetic “footprints” is <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24988-humanitys-forgotten-return-to-africa-revealed-in-dna/">summarised</a> in: Humanity’s forgotten return to Africa revealed in DNA.</p>
<p>The story it tells is as follows. About 140,000 years ago human populations from East or Central Africa moved southwards and “colonise” western southern Africa. The probable nearest living relatives of these source populations are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the <a href="http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/12/hadza/finkel-text">Hadzabe people</a> from north-central Tanzania; and</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0509/feature5/">Mbuti pygmies</a> from the eastern Congo.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This migration gave rise to the present-day <a href="http://www.san.org.za/history.php">San hunter-gatherers</a>.</p>
<p>Much more recently – about 2000 years ago – there was a second movement of “colonists” from the north into southwestern Africa. They gave rise to the pastoral <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people-south-africa/khoikhoi">Khoikhoi people</a>.</p>
<p>This second group of “settlers” carried within its genome bits of Eurasian-sourced – and even some <a href="http://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/species/homo-neanderthalensis">Neanderthal</a> – DNA derived from European humans who had returned to Africa about 3000 years ago.</p>
<p>Subsequent to this second colonisation, there was intermixing between the Khoikhoi and San. This gave rise to their close anatomical similarities despite the fact that they retained their marked cultural and linguistic differences.</p>
<p>Much more recently – about 1700 years ago – there was a third major north-to-south migration. This time it was the Bantu-speaking, black Africans into south-eastern Africa. Those “settlers” that eventually became the Xhosa peoples moved westwards and encountered the Khoikhoi, whom they drove further west and intermixed with genetically.</p>
<p>So, it is now possible for genetic evolutionary “anthropologists” to distinguish population differences among humans to infer the timing of their movements throughout the globe.</p>
<p>It is even possible to map one’s genetic “ancestry”, as South African President Nelson Mandela did, indicating that he possessed some <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/dna-test-may-reveal-youre-related-to-madiba-1.268615">KhoiSan</a> DNA.</p>
<p>The important point is that this evidence should not be used to assert that these differences, or shared bits of “ancient” DNA, support the identification of multiple human “races”. In fact, it confirms the wise assertion by the pan-Africanist leader, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/robert-sobukwe-inaugural-speech-april-1959">Robert Sobukwe</a>, that there was only one race: the human race.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53594/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Before his retirement Tim Crowe received funding from the South African National Research Foundation and Department of Science and Technology through an award to the Percy FitzPatrick Institute of African Ornithology as DST/NRF Centre of Excellence.</span></em></p>Human population groups worldwide are highly homogeneous genetically. They are in fact 99.5% similar and their anatomical features vary in an uncorrelated fashion over the landscape.Tim Crowe, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.