tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/constantino-chiwenga-46517/articlesConstantino Chiwenga – The Conversation2022-07-03T08:10:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1856482022-07-03T08:10:30Z2022-07-03T08:10:30ZBook on Zimbabwe strongman Robert Mugabe’s legacy has many flaws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470799/original/file-20220624-17-oop0y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe died in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Development studies professor David Moore’s new <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">book</a>, Mugabe’s Legacy: Coups, Conspiracies and the Conceits of Power in Zimbabwe, attempts to understand the legacy of <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a>, who led Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017, when he lost power in a military coup. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/david-b-moore-285501">Moore</a> maintains that Mugabe’s legacy revolves around what he terms “the three Cs”: coups, conspiracies and conceits of political power. He shows that “the three Cs” have their origins in the perilous politics of the independence struggle, in which Mugabe was a key participant.</p>
<p>The book consists of a prologue and 10 chapters. The first chapter seeks “to erect a conceptual structure on which the Zimbabwe ‘facts’ will sit”. Chapters two to five set out “the making of Mugabe and his legacy” in the liberation struggle years. Chapters six to nine trace the independence time trajectory of Mugabe’s political career through to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">2017 coup</a>. Chapter ten examines Zimbabwean politics after Mugabe’s fall from power and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49604152">death in 2019</a>.</p>
<p>The scholars <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003026280/personality-cult-politics-mugabe-zimbabwe-ezra-chitando">Ezra Chitando</a>; <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Robert+Mugabe">Sue Onslow and Martin Plaut</a>; <a href="https://www.press.umich.edu/11424894/mugabe">Stephen Chan</a>; and <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2">Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya</a>, among others, have debated the legacies of Mugabe’s 37-year rule. </p>
<p>Moore largely ignores the contributions of these important contending studies about Mugabe’s legacies. This is subnormal academic practice. Consequently, the precise ways in which his book surpasses or buttresses competing works about Mugabe’s legacy are indistinct.</p>
<p>Bar an interview with the veteran nationalist politician Edgar Tekere (who had a mammoth lifelong axe to grind with Mugabe) in 2004, Moore did not interview anybody else in Zanu-PF who knew Mugabe well, or worked closely with him for an extended period. For that reason, the book is bereft of exceptionally revealing findings about Mugabe’s leadership, legacy and the politics of Zanu-PF. Moore’s main sources are unremarkable diplomatic cables in Western archives and material already in the public domain such as newspaper articles, NGO reports and published books. They do not make for a groundbreaking book.</p>
<h2>Missing the point</h2>
<p>We live in an age where the decolonisation of the knowledge agenda has, rightly, come to the fore in the academy. In light of this, I expected arguments about Mugabe’s leadership developed by black Zimbabwean scholars based in Zimbabwe to be central to Moore’s analysis. In place of debates about Mugabe by black Zimbabwean scholars, he has the thought of 20th century Italian Marxist intellectual-politician <a href="https://globalsocialtheory.org/thinkers/gramsci-antonio/">Antonio Gramsci</a> as his book’s central point of reference. </p>
<p>Moore invokes Gramsci <em>ad infinitum</em>, without ever properly contextualising his ideas or making clear their illuminating pertinence in debates about Mugabe’s legacy. Nor does Moore use his study of Mugabe’s legacy to extend and refine Gramscian theories. My comprehension of Mugabe, his legacy and Zanu-PF was not enhanced in any novel way after all that Gramsci. </p>
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<p>Discussion of real and imagined coups is an important theme in Moore’s book. This is presented as a key component of Mugabe’s legacy. But, Moore does not engage relevant coup and military rule literature in order to enhance our understanding of Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup, and for the coup to advance broader studies about the nature and effects of coups, such as work by <a href="https://yalebooks.co.uk/page/detail/?k=9780300040432">Samuel Decalo</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/african-government-politics-and-policy/when-soldiers-rebel-ethnic-armies-and-political-instability-africa?format=HB&isbn=9781108422475">Kristen Harkness</a>, <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/10989/seizing-power">Naunihal Singh</a>, <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418">Barbara Geddes</a> and <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/In+Idi+Amin%E2%80%99s+Shadow">Alicia Decker</a>, among others.</p>
<p>Moore states that he finds coup literature “boring” because it consists of “conservative tracts on the primordial-like prebendal and neo-patrimonial coupishness of Africans” (page 164). Serious coup scholars will bristle at his characterisation of their work as “conservative”, and defined by a propensity to regard Africans as innately prone to coup making because of personalised patronage-based politics. </p>
<p>Moore cursorily engages the African studies scholar <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1973.tb01413.x">Ali Mazrui’s 1973 article</a>, called Lumpen Proletariat and Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as New Political Class, about the consequences of coups, to underline why he finds coup literature “boring” and unhelpful.</p>
<p>The problem with this is that Mazrui’s article is dated and was hardly authoritative even in 1973. Moore depicts a crude caricature of a diverse, sophisticated, instructive and evolving coup and military rule literature.</p>
<h2>Portrayal of women</h2>
<p>Feminist scholarship has done much to challenge patriarchal erasure and trivialisation of women in political science. Moore’s book does precisely what feminist scholars have critiqued for decades now. It is laden with unquestioned patriarchal notions and gendered trivialisations that impoverish the study of politics.</p>
<p>Moore writes as if nothing can be gained analytically by treating women (Zimbabwe’s former <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Grace_Mugabe">first lady Grace Mugabe</a>, specifically) seriously. By this I mean methodically tracing, listening to and understanding women’s actual political incentives and experiences. </p>
<p>Moore employs sexist tropes when discussing Grace Mugabe’s role in politics and the 2017 coup. For example, he describes her as “the volatile former secretary”, “the woman who whipped her son’s girlfriend” and “incendiary Grace”. Yet there is no mention of the equally notable emotional volatility of the powerful political men – Mugabe, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Constantino_Chiwenga">Constantino Chiwenga</a>, <a href="http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Dzinashe%20Machingura.pdf">Dzinashe Machingura</a>, <a href="https://www.colonialrelic.com/biographies/joshua-nkomo/">Joshua Nkomo</a>, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/samora-machel">Samora Machel</a> and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Josiah_Tongogara">Josiah Tongogara</a> – who he discusses in his book.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Moore did not unearth any treasures in his research of Mugabe’s legacy. He has not even drawn a map that might lead us to an enhanced understanding of the making of Mugabe and his legacy, the politics of Zanu-PF, and coups and their corollaries.</p>
<p><em>Blessing Miles Tendi is the author of <a href="http://www.milestendi.com/books">The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe - Mujuru, the liberation fighter and kingmaker</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing-Miles Tendi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Moore did not unearth any treasures in his research of Mugabe’s legacy. He has not even drawn a map that might lead us to them.Blessing-Miles Tendi, Associate Professor in the Politics of Africa, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1070972018-12-17T12:10:59Z2018-12-17T12:10:59ZZimbabwe minus Mugabe: two books on his fall and Mnangagwa’s rise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250014/original/file-20181211-76956-5ex5kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Penguin Books has released two books by Zimbabwean journalists in time to celebrate the first anniversary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113249">coup</a> that finally put Robert Mugabe’s ruinous reign to an end. These are Ray Ndlovu’s <em>In the Jaws of the Crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Rise to Power in Zimbabwe</em> and <em>The Graceless Fall of Robert Mugabe: The End of a Dictator’s Reign</em> by Geoffrey Nyarota.</p>
<p>The books, about the end of Mugabe’s nearly four decades of ruling Zimbabwe, arrive at a time when journalists have to constantly rush to beat tweets and Facebook posts. This haste can work against their claim to be offering something closer to truth’s complexities than can be rendered in 280 characters.</p>
<p>At the time of the coup the international community, the long-suffering urban unemployed and rural peasants, and the business players itching to embrace the graces of a régime “open for business”, hoped that a long-delayed nirvana was just over the horizon. </p>
<p>That vista remains distant: if there was a rainbow – President Emmerson Mnangagwa promised Zimbabwean whites their place back in Zanu-PF’s good books – the pot of gold keeps receding. The long lines of fuel-starved vehicles indicated more about the first birthday of Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic” than Zanu-PF’s comparatively muted celebrations. </p>
<p>‘Queuing after the coup’ seemed an alliteration appropriate to this review of the two books, neither of which does justice to the enormity both of events in Zimbabwe as well as the sheer scale of what’s required to rebuild the country. </p>
<h2>The coup</h2>
<p>‘Romancing the <a href="https://www.commonsensemedia.org/movie-reviews/romancing-the-stone">coup’</a> could also characterise such tales. Ndlovu’s chronicle of Mnangagwa’s adventures bears the hallmarks of a roller-coaster thriller. <em>In the Jaws</em> excurses excitedly through “The Crocodile’s” firing from the vice-presidency, forced exile and escape, his Pretoria-based saviour, corrupt police (contrasted with brave soldier-saints), and his triumphant return to the treasures surely to follow his presidential inauguration. </p>
<p>Nyarota’s more sober historical take characterises former First Lady Grace Mugabe as someone whose treasure map bore little relation to the route she and her fellow plotters in “Generation-40” – the faction conniving to rid their party and country of “Lacoste” (a play on Mnangagwa’s nickname) group – took when they persuaded then President Mugabe to fire his longtime lackey.</p>
<p>Could military commander Constantino Chiwenga save the day and grab the treasure? Now a Vice-President, many credit Chiwenga with organising the “militarily assisted transition” allowing Mnangagwa to cross the river. <em>In The Jaws</em> celebrates the bromance between Chiwenga and Mnangagwa. But circumspection regarding such claims is cautioned. </p>
<p>The real gold lies under Zimbabwe’s putrid piles of economic ruin. Thus hopes are pinned on Mthuli Ncube, Zimbabwe’s new finance minister. These hopes are tied tightly to Zanu-PF’s factional fights for pieces of a Zimbabwean pie as ethereal as the electronic “money” used in the absence of real currency.</p>
<p>Ncube’s fantastical neo-liberal solutions are eerily reminiscent of the economic structural adjustment policies that during the 1990s’ precipitated Zimbabwe’s nosedive. Even the International Monetary Fund had to restrain Ncube’s exuberant <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-11-23-zimbabwe-announces--austerity-measures-to-spur-stalling-growth/">“Austerity for Prosperity”</a> <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/11/23/imf-pressures-ncube-on-reforms-sequence/">plans</a>. Matched with the ruling party’s scrambles and the poor’s impatience, roiling ensues.</p>
<p>Keynesians and neo-liberals alike have little to which they can look forward, although the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry proclaims that industrial capacity rose <a href="https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/industry-optimistic-of-growth">by 5% in early 2018</a>. Yet just after mid-year, the little electoral legitimacy on which the global citadels of finance and investment banked slid away. The military killed at least six demonstrators while, as many say, its intelligence corps took over counting the election’s votes.</p>
<p>Neither of the two books portend much of the coup’s consequences. They improve on an unhappy catalogue of books on Zimbabwean politics. But the bar is low. The best that can be said of them is that they are good in parts. </p>
<h2>Map still missing</h2>
<p>Nyarota’s enthusiasm for the new régime is muted, but he’s very happy to see the back of Mugabe and his unruly wife. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> is more about their drawn-out fall than the coup per se. The elder Nyarota’s world-weary schadenfreude contrasts vividly with Ndlovu’s youthful exuberance. Nyarota’s historical depth, if meandering, gives necessary context to last year’s events. His insight into the near-coups in the 1970s that Ndlovu misses completely – when not misconstruing history – are valuable indeed. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> has no interviews: Mugabe’s minders refused Nyarota’s requests. Yet Ndlovu’s one-on-ones are mostly with the victors. </p>
<p>Of course, purported “Generation-40” leader and former cabinet minister Jonathan Moyo’s unstoppable stream of tweets and interviews from wherever resides his physical self, features prominently. But since they are accessible to anyone with internet they need deconstruction, not replication. </p>
<p>One would expect journalists to criticise Moyo’s nefarious role in his information portfolio (and many others). The elder and the younger don’t disappoint. Unsurprisingly, when the born-again constitutionalist Moyo was interviewed recently he judged Ndlovu’s work as a hagiography for <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2018/11/10/Big-Saturday-Read-One-year-after-the-Coup---A-Conversation-with-Professor-Jonathan-Moyo">Mnangagwa</a>. Unfortunately, Nyarota’s unpacking of Moyo’s past looks too much like Wikipedia to satisfy. </p>
<p>Moyo’s criticism of <em>In the Jaws</em> goes too far. But both books suggest more questions than answers. Even given publishers’ and the media rushes to keep up with insubstantial and fake news circulating via billions of clicks, this is not enough. Zimbabwe’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet, and these journalists-cum-authors haven’t drawn the map.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two new books about Zimbabwe deal with the coup in November 2017. But the country’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011962018-08-07T11:31:17Z2018-08-07T11:31:17ZWill Zimbabwe’s messy election get messier – or will a new path be taken?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230868/original/file-20180807-191019-1v7huj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's "The NewsDay" after violent protests in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is no way to end an election that promised to bring a bright new post-coup and post Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/24/emmerson-mnangagwa-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president">dawn</a> to a blighted Zimbabwe – 50.8% for Zanu-PF’s Emmerson Mnangagwa to 44.3% for the contending Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance’s (MDC-Alliance) Nelson Chamisa. </p>
<p>After a drawn out count for the last constituency, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-tense-zimbabwe-awaits-vote-results-after-troops-fire-on-protesters-20180802">a suspect tally</a> for the supreme ruler. As for the Zanu-PF MPs’ sweeps across the rural areas resulting in a more than two thirds majority in the lower house of assembly (155 to 53), fears triggered by memories <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008eom.htm">of the violent 2008 run-off</a> remain real. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been making gestures to Chamisa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-mnangagwa-calls-for-unity-as-chamisa-cries-foul-16400187">for “unity”</a> <a href="https://harareblitz.com/2018/08/06/watch-video-ed-laughs-at-idea-of-gnu-with-chamisa/">or to</a> play a </p>
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<p>crucial role in Zimbabwe’s present and in its unfolding future. </p>
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<p>He seemed furious when the police converged on journalists attending Chamisa’s presser at the subtly luxurious Bronte Hotel: the police <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkjOG-xFcEk">apologised</a> on Twitter very quickly.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">dozens or more MDC-Alliance supporters</a> are running for their lives, or hiding in safe houses. This, just days after <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">soldiers</a> – not police – <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/three-victims-zimbabwe-post-election-violence-buried">shot and killed</a> at least six protesters and innocent bystanders. Some were shot in the back.</p>
<p>What start is this for a regime promising <a href="http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/life-lessons-for-a-man/">Lazarus-like</a> revival for the ruling party and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-16-00-lord-hains-zimbabwe-hypocrisy">its friends</a> around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?</p>
<p>Yet there is an alternative: if Mnangagwa actually has the power he could call off the attack dogs and let the courts decide the merits, or not, of Chamisa’s case that the poll was rigged. This might not itself result in a peaceful resolution, given rumblings that a coup is in the making led by Vice-President and (unconstitutionally) Minister of Defence, Constantino Chiwenga. But it would be better than allowing the soldiers out onto the streets in force. </p>
<p>And it just could be that this is the tack. The MDC-Alliance’s lawyers will present their case <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-lawyers-to-challenge-zim-presidential-poll-results-16408858">on August 10</a>. Mnangagwa is facing a sharp fork in the road. One hope he takes the right one.</p>
<h2>The crackdown</h2>
<p>The crackdown’s current phase started on August 2. As the election results were trickling in, drunken soldiers beat up equally inebriated MDC-Alliance supporters in the “high density suburbs” (poverty-riddled townships or locations) <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/soldiers-go-berserk-beat-up-revellers-in-harare-chitungwiza/">around Harare</a>, where the opposition party did <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/vimbayi-tsvangirai-java-a-chip-off-the-old-block/">overwhelmingly well</a>. </p>
<p>So much for the hypothesis that the poor soldiers would support their <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">equally suffering</a> brothers and sisters with the long-struggling opposition, poised to take the chalice only a few months after <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai’s death</a>.</p>
<p>The crackdown continued the next day. An MDC-Alliance candidate in Chegutu challenged his loss, won on the recount, and proceeded to run away <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/28995-just-in-zanu-pf-chegutu-west-candidate-dexter-ndunas-win-reversed.html">from rabid soldiers</a>. Many more <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mnangagwa-opponents-disappear-after-election-h079sksf7">were chased</a> in Harare’s townships, Marondera, and Manicaland. The Financial Times <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c3463b8-98bf-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465">reported</a> over 60 arrests, pointing to Chiwenga as the leader of the shakedown. It hinted at a coup – no surprise to many Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>A vice-president’s coup?</h2>
<p>Chiwenga has been the elephant in the room for a very long time. Many Zimbabweans say that Mnangagwa lives in fear of him. Lower ranking members of Zanu-PF in propaganda and intelligence don’t dare challenge this mercurial man <a href="http://www.kentonline.co.uk/sittingbourne/news/zimbabwe-takeovers-kent-connection-135528/">with a history of suicide attempts</a>, and <a href="https://robertrotberg.wordpress.com/2012/02/14/who-killed-solomon-mujuru-the-mystery-in-zimbabwe-deepens/">more</a>. </p>
<p>Promoted to armed forces head by Mugabe well beyond his seniority and capability, but kept to one-year contracts to ensure his fealty, he waited until Grace Mugabe pushed her doddering husband into firing his long-time ally <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVxZ-DAsDZY">Mnangagwa</a> – who was then vice-president – in early November last year. </p>
<p>Chiwenga returned from a China trip and then helped Mnangagwa in what the American Jesuit magazine <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/12/14/interview-zimbabwean-jesuit-who-mediated-mugabes-fall-power">called the</a> </p>
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<p>unexpected, but peaceful, transition </p>
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<p>away from the <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/">nonagenarian ruler</a>.</p>
<p>Chiwenga has kicked out a good number of Central Intelligence Organisation operatives, suspected of loyalty to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX?il=0">“Generation-40”</a> faction, which lost out with the coup. So too with the police, pared down through the year, That’s why the soldiers <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/chamisa-divides-police-military/">were called in last week</a>.</p>
<p>He’s been awaiting his due – the presidency – ever since, and he might be in a hurry. A demotion could ensue if Mnangagwa takes the royal road to respectability via a pleasant deal with the MDC-Alliance, whom the recalcitrant “war-vets” consider a cabal of <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/running-to-america-mdc-t-exposes-its-puppet-nature/">imperialist puppets</a>. </p>
<p>It’s surprising that the local and international cheerleaders for the “military assisted transition”, with a lot riding on peace and goodwill after the election, seemed blissfully unaware of the power behind the already tarnished throne. </p>
<p>South African military intelligence are supposed to be well-connected with their counterparts to the north, and should not be prone to think like the British. The defenders of diminishing empire are more likely to think like Lord Soames, temporary governor of Rhodesia as Zimbabwe was on the cusp. His comments as Robert Mugabe came to power on the wave of a violent election in 1980 included the fact that he wasn’t surprised <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-zim-parliament-begins-session-to-remove-mugabe-20171121">at bit of bloodshed</a>.</p>
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<p>This isn’t Puddleton-on-the-Marsh. Africans think nothing of sticking poles up each others whatnot and doing filthy things. It’s a very wild thing an (African) election.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>British officials, and their global compatriots, presumably don’t think like that anymore. But even if they don’t, they should have known that coups are prone to eat their own children.</p>
<p>Yet there could be another road to take.</p>
<h2>The other fork</h2>
<p>There is still time for Mnangagwa to change tack. The MDC-Alliance’s contention that the election was cooked will be tested in the courts. </p>
<p>This, say Zimbabweans on the run, is what the soldiers are after: they are chasing copies of the V11 forms. These are the results of every polling station that were posted after the local count: they can be captured by anyone on site but are also transported to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s headquarters for the final count. The V11s might be Chamisa’s ace: he claims to possess a tally that will invalidate Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">slim victory</a>. </p>
<p>If the presidential praetorians are sure their man has won, why didn’t they allow Chamisa to present the papers to the constitutional court – <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/legal-ramifications-of-the-july-30-elections/">stacked with Zanu-PF judges as it is</a>? In any case this will happen at the end of the week and the presidential inauguration should be postponed.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa is used to waiting for the right moment. He will have to move faster against Chiwenga than he did against Mugabe.</p>
<p>If he’s too slow there could be a real coup, soldiers running rampant again. Or an electoral rerun? The choice might be Mnangagwa’s. Or it could be Chiwenga’s. No matter: it will be a game-changer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What start is this for a regime promising Lazarus-like revival for the ruling party and its friends around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009712018-08-02T12:41:25Z2018-08-02T12:41:25ZA false new dawn for Zimbabwe: what I got right, and wrong, about the mood<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230374/original/file-20180802-136676-1oflqw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF banners being burnt during a protests against parliamentary polling results in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The afternoon after Zimbabwe’s historic <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">Monday July 30 elections</a>, I was trying to assuage the fears of Jason Burke, the correspondent for the London newspaper, the Guardian, that chaos and violence would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-claims-he-is-on-course-for-election-win">ensue any time</a>. </p>
<p>The military-dominated Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was <a href="https://263chat.com/mdc-piles-more-pressure-on-zec/">dragging out the counting</a>. Meanwhile civil society election monitoring networks were filling the information void. Their preliminary reports said that 21% of the presidential results meant to be posted on the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/29/election-results-to-be-posted-outside-polling-stations">polling stations’ walls</a> were not available: this was against the law and warranted the election <a href="https://twitter.com/DavidColtart/status/1024248453583593473">nullified</a>. The parliamentary and municipal ward results, however, were pasted for all to see.</p>
<p>Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-Alliance) leaders were calling foul – and coming too close to comfort to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-31-weve-won-say-both-the-opposition-mdc-and-ruling-zanu-pf/">declaring a win</a> that they would defend. This too fell foul of the country’s electoral laws. </p>
<p>Folks were rumbling. But I repeated the cliché to Burke that Zimbabweans were too peaceful to mount a full-fledged revolt, and that anyway their equally suffering brothers in the lower ranks of the military would not shoot them if they did resort to a war of the poor and disenfranchised.</p>
<p>The electoral commission had by that relatively quiet Tuesday afternoon announced only seven results for the MPs – resounding successes in very rural constituencies for the governing Zanu-PF. However, within 24 hours (Tuesday August 1), the electoral commission was able to release all the parliamentary results, proclaiming a massive victory in the national parliament: 155 seats for Zanu-PF and only 53 for the long-time aspirants,<a href="https://zwnews.com/zim-latest-voting-winners-results-zec-elections/">the MDC-Alliance</a>. All were still on tenterhooks for the presidential results.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man fires a catapult outside the gates of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zanu-PF thus had more than the two thirds majority in parliament needed to change the constitution – again – so the renewed Zanu-PF president might be able to continue in power for ever. That is what Mugabe thought would be his destiny, until the coup only eight months ago changed his mind. </p>
<p>The long <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">participatory process</a> from 2010 until 2013 that produced the lovely liberalism of the <a href="http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/zimbabwe_constitution.pdf">contemporary constitution</a> could be for naught. That whole legal framework - albeit barely implemented by the last regime - could be replaced by one more amenable to a dictatorship. </p>
<p>On Wednesday August 1 the electoral commission postponed announcing the presidential results. Later it said it was ready to announce them, but had to wait until all the presidential candidates were <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/polling-agents-to-verify-presidential-returns-zec/">present</a>. By evening the MDC-Alliance’s Nelson Chamisa and some of the 21 motley crew of candidates finally arrived to bow to the final straw, opening the way to the electoral commission being able to release the results which it did the next day.</p>
<p>But by Wednesday evening the carnage on the streets had been waged.</p>
<p>Thus my attempt to calm the British journalist was partly right – the people did not launch a war. They did, however, lunge at the gates surrounding the electoral commission centre at the Rainbow Towers, demonstrated at the commission’s headquarters in town, hit out at the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/shows/109/karima-brown-show">Zanu-PF headquarters</a>, threw rocks at cars and scared away some informal vendors. </p>
<p>But I was wrong in my belief – <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">based on</a> mid-July chats with newspaper vendors, car-park security guards, petrol attendants, liberation guerrilla soldiers who had borne the brunt of Mugabe’s wrath in the seventies, and those higher up the divided Zimbabwe hierarchy in MDC circles – that soldiers would refuse orders to shoot their compatriots. The junior officers submitted indeed. Zimbabwe’s history of ruling group violence against the slightest signs of a shift against it rose once again to stifle democratic challenge.</p>
<p>The police – decimated because they were on the wrong side of the security split <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">during the coup</a> and, so we were told, out around the country securitising the election – decided to bow out, calling in their military superiors. </p>
<p>By the end of the day only blood remained. At least three people had <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-zimbabwes-presidential-results-expected-shortly-56958220">been killed</a> (friends in Harare told me five) and many, many more beaten and injured. By Thursday the soldiers were called to their barracks.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters vent their anger after losing the parliamentary poll.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">. EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The MDC-Alliance leaders were no more angelic than their competitors, even though Chamisa may think he has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">divine guidance</a>. One wonders: what leverage would have been gained by sending their followers to death? As the violence waned I hoped that they would not unleash the fabled “hot squads” purportedly trained in Rwanda and Uganda (Mugabe preferred the <em><a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/10670/reviews/11050/kriger-campbell-reclaiming-zimbabwe-exhaustion-patriarchal-model">interahamwe</a></em>). </p>
<p>The presidential results were due to be <a href="https://zwnews.com/zim-votes-latest-winners-elections-2018/">announced</a> by Thursday afternoon. Advance copies were sent to me, and the NGO monitors have them <a href="https://erczim.org/#1523430338575-54c77f69-8af4">too</a>. It’s expected to be a Mnangagwa win.</p>
<p>What should the MDC-Alliance do when the loss is digested?</p>
<p>If, as is widely discussed, both Mnangagwa and Guveya Dominic Nyikadzino Chiwenga, his co-director in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">coup against Robert Mugabe</a>, are sick men, would it not be better to consolidate the poorly organised MDC-Alliance to prepare for the next elections in 2023? Zanu-PF could quite well implode (again) by then. </p>
<p>For now, there are two destroyed parties to leave space for the ever-strengthened military-business conglomerate.</p>
<p>Lastly, how will the regional neighbours and global powers react? They seem to have been foiled by the crafty Zimbabwean comrades once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s more than two-thirds majority win in the parliament poll gives it the power to change the constitution if it wishes.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877122017-11-21T14:04:31Z2017-11-21T14:04:31ZZimbabwe beware: the military is looking after its own interests, not democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195615/original/file-20171121-6031-14lazje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing the media.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>November 2017 will go down in the history of Zimbabwe as the beginning of the end of Robert Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/14/tanks-seen-heading-towards-zimbabwe-capital-harare/">37 year tyranny</a>. A tumultuous week finally culminated in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">his resignation</a> on November 21st. One cannot understate the widespread jubilation at the demise of Mugabe and his desire to create a dynasty for himself <a href="https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/660122/Zimbabwe-news-Robert-Mugabe-Grace-Zanu-PF-Twitter-latest-situation-coup-Emmerson-Mnangagwa">through his wife Grace</a>. </p>
<p>But the optimism is misplaced because it doesn’t deal directly with the dearth of democracy in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>First, contrary to popular sentiment that the coup was meant to usher in a new era of political <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42035981">liberalisation and democracy</a>, the takeover is actually meant to deal with a succession crisis in Zanu-PF. The military made this clear when it said that it was dealing with <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/zimbabwe-military-statement-seizing-power-171115061457199.html">criminals around Mugabe</a>. And the party’s secretary for legal affairs Patrick Chinamasa indicated that removing Mugabe from the party’s Central Committee was an <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">internal party matter</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, I would argue that the military resorted to a “smart coup” only after its preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was fired from the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">party and government</a>. </p>
<p>The way in which the military has gone about executing its plan upends any conventional understanding of what <a href="http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/powell_and_thyne_2011jpr_-_global_instances_of_coups_from_1950_to_2010.pdf">constitutes a coup d'etat</a>. It’s a “smart coup” in the sense that the military combined the frustrations of a restive population, internal party structures and international sympathy to remove a sitting president. It thereby gained legitimacy for an otherwise partisan and unconstitutional political act – toppling an elected government. </p>
<p>This begs the question: Is the military now intervening for the collective good or for its own interests?</p>
<h2>Why the military intervened</h2>
<p>It is baffling to imagine how the military has suddenly become the champion of democracy and regime change in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>It’s clear that what motivated the military commanders was a fear of losing their jobs and influence after their preferred successor was purged. They launched a preemptive strike against Mugabe to safeguard their own selfish interests as a military class and the future of their careers. </p>
<p>Given the symbiotic relationship between the Zimbabwean military and the <a href="https://rusi.org/system/files/Zimbabwe_SSR_Report.pdf">ruling Zanu-PF party</a>, it was inevitable that the top commanders would be embroiled in the party’s succession crisis. After all, the military has been the key lever behind the power of both Mugabe and his ruling Zanu-PF since 1980. </p>
<p>In the past they have acted as part of the Zanu-PF machinery, openly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">campaigning for Mugabe</a> alongside other security agencies.</p>
<p>And they have played a key role in neutralising political opponents. Back in the 1980s the military was responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians and Zapu supporters in <a href="https://archive.org/stream/BreakingTheSilenceBuildingTruePeace/MatabelelandReport_djvu.txt.">Matebeleland</a>. More than two decades later in 2008 they were responsible for the torture, death and disappearance of 200 opposition activists and the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">maiming of hundreds more</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%202001%20357.pdf">the UN</a> has implicated Mnangagwa and the generals in the illegal plundering of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They have also been fingered in the disappearance of diamond revenues from Zimbabwe’s Marange <a>diamond fields</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this the military and Zanu-PF share a special relationship that has its roots in the liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) was the political wing of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) during the liberation war. They therefore have vested interests in the survival of the party.</p>
<p>After independence, the relationship remained intact as the military became the <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-86814.html">guarantors of the revolution</a>. Some of the same surviving commanders of Zanla are still senior high ranking officials. The commanders are also bona fide members of the ruling party and <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">guarantors of Zanu-PF power</a>. </p>
<p>The same securocrats are also members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_National_Liberation_War_Veterans_Association">War Veterans Association</a>. This quasi paramilitary group is an auxiliary association of the ruling party and has fiercely opposed Mugabe’s attempt to create a dynasty.</p>
<h2>Military must step aside</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe goes to the polls next July to choose a new president and parliament. The elections – if conducted in a credible way – will provide the next government with the legitimacy it needs to take the country out of its political and <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-financial-system-is-living-on-borrowed-time-and-borrowed-money-86159">economic crises</a>.</p>
<p>Now that Mugabe <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">has resigned</a> the hope is that the military will allow a genuinely democratic transition to take place. All political players, including opposition parties, would need to be incorporated into a broad-based transitional authority pending credible elections. </p>
<p>But for the elections to be credible, the transitional authority would need urgently to reform the electoral system. This would ensure Zimbabweans can freely and fairly choose their leaders. Without this, peace and prosperity will continue to elude Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In the long run, the military would do well to get out of politics instead of continuing to view itself as <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/14/chiwenga-warns-mugabe-zanu-pf">“stockholders”</a> in the country’s political affairs because of its liberation struggle credentials.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Enock C. Mudzamiri has in the past received funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, American Political Science Association and the National Endowment for the Humanities</span></em></p>Contrary to popular sentiment that the coup in Zimbabwe would usher in a new era of democracy, the military intervention is much more about a succession crisis in the ruling Zanu-PF.Enock C. Mudzamiri, DLitt et DPhil Student in Politics, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/878682017-11-21T13:35:37Z2017-11-21T13:35:37ZWhen the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195591/original/file-20171121-6051-ntf8kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters at a rally outside parliament in preparation ahead of the proposed impeachment of President Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The parliamentary impeachment of beleaguered President Robert Mugabe - in terms of section 97 of <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> – could be the culminating moment of a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-11-17-hope-remains-that-the-soft-coup-in-zimbabwe-could-lead-to-nine-easy-victories/">soft coup</a> that staves off the indignity of slipshod regional interventions, while saving the legitimacy of a régime sans a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/is-zimbabwe-set-for-a-mugabe-dynasty-with-first-lady-grace-as-vp-20171113">disgraced Mugabe dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/globe-in-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-era-ends/article37015276/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links">might just work</a>. But it might not.</p>
<p>Events have not transpired as the faction loyal to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice president of Zanu-PF and of the country who was deposed by Mugabe earlier this month, had planned. The aim of the faction – known as the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a> because of Mnangagwa’s nickname “The Crocodile” – was to get their leader back on the road to power. That was after his derailment by the Zanu-PF Generation 40 group <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_">(aka G-40)</a>
that ostensibly rallies younger, savvy party members to take the lead, but favours Grace Mugabe to succeed her husband.</p>
<p>A number of unintended developments have led to a situation in which, a week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place and a new avenue - parliamentary impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.</p>
<p>It is by no means certain that Zanu-PF’s crocodiles can pull off the next stage. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall.</p>
<h2>The plans that didn’t quite go to plan</h2>
<p>First, the army chiefs’ warning to Mugabe on the <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/13/BSR-General-Chiwenga%E2%80%99s-statement---all-bark-and-no-bite">night of November 13</a> that he vacate office, wasn’t met with the desired response. Rather than Mugabe taking the hint and welcoming Mnangagwa back, or telling G-40 to stop their shenanigans, Zanu-PF accused the Military Chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41991425">of treason</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the effect of this was to trigger a real coup. The military’s round-up and detention of their enemies in G-40 was not quite bloodless: at least one of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/17/mugabes-chief-security-battered/">security guards</a> protecting finance minister Ignatius Chombo was killed. The Central Intelligence Organisation’s security director Albert Ngulube came within a few inches of the same fate. And there was no ambiguity about the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had been detained by his underlings – albeit in his own chintzy <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/inside-robert-mugabes-lavish-blue-11552658?service=responsive">“Blue Roof” mansion</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the delight displayed for the well-organised war vets’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/18/protesters-in-zimbabwe-call-for-mugabe-to-step-down-in-pictures">demonstrations</a> on Saturday was never going to last long. On Saturday it served the purpose of providing the army with a veneer of legitimacy. But by Monday the patience of the soldiers had begun to wear thin. They warned students <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-20-students-shut-down-university-of-zimbabwe/">who had closed down</a> the university to return to classes, encouraging them to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>be calm and to proceed with their <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122553.html">educational programmes</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And when Christopher Mutsvangwa, head of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/organise-sit-in-as-calls-for-president-to-resign-intensify/">announced</a> that the war vets want “the whole population to descend upon Harare”, the putschists soon released a document entitling their project <a href="http://zimbabwedigitalnews.com/2017/11/20/calm-down-zimbabwe-operation-restore-legacy-is-on-track-mugabe-and-mnangagwa-now-talking/">“Operation Restore Legacy”</a>, as if to dampen the masses’ enthusiasm. </p>
<p>Yet Sunday’s setback – the fourth – was the most severe. Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">press conference</a> shocked just about <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-11-19-zimbabwes-mugabe-defies-expectations-of-immediate-resignation/">everybody</a>. He studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s minds: his resignation. Instead, Mugabe noted that the soldiers had raised the concerns causing all of the fuss with “comradeship and collegiality”. This issue was the, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>open public spurts [sic] between high ranking officials in party and government exacerbated by multiple conflicting messages from both the party and government [that] made the criticisms [of lack of unity] levelled against us inescapable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There we had it. The curse of Zanu-PF’s history: disunity. It was in our faces once again. “It has to stop,” Mugabe warned, and scoled: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zimbabweans must resolve their “inter-generation conflict … through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession”. The party must go “back to the guiding principles”, he said.</p>
<h2>Last-ditch attempt to repeat history</h2>
<p>Mugabe was not going anywhere. He was determined to preside over December’s extraordinary Zanu-PF conference that had hastened this crisis. In his view, he and only he could ensure the “processes that must not be prepossessed by any acts calculated to undermine [the congress] or to compromise the outcomes in the eyes of the public”. Only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe addressing the nation at the State House in Harare, on Sunday night.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/The Herald handout.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>those who oppressed us… surely this cannot be unavailable to our own… we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Consciously or not, Mugabe was repeating a history of at least 40 years, albeit in almost mirror image. The coup makers had not forgotten: their Monday Manifesto referred clearly to the <a href="https://openparly.co.zw/2017/11/13/full-press-statement-general-chiwenga-there-is-instability-in-zanu-pf-today/">vashandi moment</a>. This was when in early 1977 Mugabe and others in the “old guard” squashed a group of young and rebellious “political soldiers” who were proving far too threatening to his liking. He sent them to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.1995.10804395">Mozambique’s prisons</a>. </p>
<p>This too was “inter-generation” conflict. But four decades ago he was on the dominant side, and dealt with the disunity somewhat differently than on November 19 2017. In 1977 he said that “we must negate” those who, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>arduously strive in any direction that militates against the party or who, in any way, seeks… to bring about change in the leadership or structure of the party by maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks. This is… the negation of the negation… the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">that binds us all</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. Yet, with a Panglossian view, one could believe that Mugabe has learned something over the past four decades. Now he wants all the older generations in Zanu-PF to embrace and welcome the new contenders for power. Forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance, shall prevail – under his leadership of course.</p>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this self-interested repentance is too late for most members of Zanu-PF. Mugabe’s rhetoric is falling on deaf ears. Impeachment through parliamentary means is not a hard landing, although many hitches could <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/20/BSR-presidential-impeachment-in-Zimbabwe">still arise</a>, including a messier militaristic denouement. </p>
<p>Yet, as political scientist Ralph Mathekga <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">puts it</a>, if we assume the impeachment’s success and a relatively smooth Zanu-PF congress, only fully free and fair elections can resolve the contradictions unleashed by the half-measured coup that started as even less than that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place, and a new avenue - impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.