tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/customs-12152/articlesCustoms – The Conversation2023-12-27T09:10:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109412023-12-27T09:10:11Z2023-12-27T09:10:11ZHorse skulls and harmony singing – two winter customs which bring people in Wales together<p>Imagine you’re having a quiet evening at home when suddenly there’s a knock on the door. You open it to find a boisterous crowd carrying a horse’s skull mounted on a pole and draped in ribbons – the <em><a href="https://museum.wales/articles/1187/Christmas-Traditions-The-Mari-Lwyd">Mari Lwyd</a></em> has arrived. </p>
<p>The <em>Mari Lwyd</em>, meaning “grey (or pale) mare”, is a Christmas and new year custom in areas of south Wales dating back to the 18th century. A horse’s skull is placed on a pole and covered in a white sheet, decorated with ribbons. A person, concealed under the sheet, carries the pole and operates the horse’s jaw, making it snap. A group of stock characters accompany them including Sergeant, Merryman, Punch and Judy. </p>
<p>The procession goes from house to house and the group sing verses asking for admittance. The household is expected to respond, also in verse. And so begins a (sometimes very long) improvised poetic contest or rhyming ritual known as <em>pwnco</em> before the group is finally invited into the house and offered food and drink.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Mari Lwyd goes from door to door but would you let her in?</span></figcaption>
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<p>Several explanations have been proposed as to the origin of the custom. Some argue that its roots lie in a pre-Christian fertility <a href="http://www.folkwales.org.uk/mari.html">ritual</a>. Others have argued that the <em>Mari Lwyd</em> has associations with the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2791759">Virgin Mary</a>. </p>
<p>The custom is clearly connected to the practice of <a href="https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/discover/history/art-collections/wassailing-ritual-and-revelry#">wassailing</a>, where groups of merrymakers go from one house to another asking for food and drink. It may be linked to other folk performances found elsewhere in Britain and Ireland, including the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100300697">hobby-horse</a> tradition. </p>
<h2>Plygain</h2>
<p>Further north, a tradition celebrated in Montgomeryshire, where I was brought up, is much less colourful and firmly located within a religious context. Deriving from the Latin “pullicantio” (cock crow), the <em><a href="https://museum.wales/articles/1185/Christmas-Traditions-Plygain-Singing/">plygain</a></em> (pronounced “plug-ine”), was an early-morning service originally held on Christmas Day in parish churches and then also in nonconformist chapels, beginning in candlelight and continuing into daylight. </p>
<p>It is now mainly an evening service, although some stalwarts still adhere to the early morning tradition. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A trio singing plygain.</span></figcaption>
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<p>After a congregational hymn, a reading and a prayer, the vicar or minister will announce, “<em>Mae’r blygien yn awr yn agored</em>” (the plygain is now open). There is no programme; rather, a party of singers will get up and make their way to the chancel or the <em>sêt fawr</em> (the elder’s pew in a chapel), and sing a carol, unaccompanied and with no conductor. </p>
<p>These are often from the same family and with an ancient pedigree, their frayed carol books (usually old notebooks) having been passed down through the generations. A tuning fork is often used to pitch the tune – I’ve even seen it struck against a singer’s tooth. </p>
<p>The carols would often have been composed by local poets and sung to popular tunes of the time. They do not describe solely the birth of Christ and frequently focus on the crucifixion. Often very long, they are usually sung in three-part harmonies. </p>
<p>The <em>plygain</em> ends with the spine-chilling sound of <em><a href="http://daibach-welldigger.blogspot.com/2020/12/welsh-carols-15-carol-y-swper.html">Carol y Swper</a></em> (the Supper Carol), when all the men in the congregation come forward to sing. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Carol y Swper performed at a church in Montgomeryshire.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Revival and reinvention</h2>
<p>In the 1960s, the <a href="https://museum.wales/stfagans/">St Fagans National Museum of History</a>, or the Welsh Folk Museum as it was then known, began <a href="https://museum.wales/collections/folksongs/?action=background">collecting</a> different genres of Welsh folk songs. These included <em>plygain</em> carols and <em>Mari Lwyd</em> verses. This has helped to renew interest in both traditions. </p>
<p>The museum hosts annual <em>Mari Lwyd</em> <a href="https://museum.wales/stfagans/whatson/12104/Christmas-Traditions-The-Mari-Lwyd-Performances">performances</a>, while many a Cardiff pub-goer will likely be startled by the sudden appearance of a snapping horse’s skull. The practice has evolved over time – visits can be pre-arranged, participants will sing from song sheets, the <em>Mari</em> may even be made of cardboard. In fact, anything goes.</p>
<p>Today, the <em>Mari</em> (in various guises) is thriving, and can be found as far afield as the USA and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/welshzombiechristmashorse/">Australia</a>. </p>
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<p>The <em>plygain</em> is still going strong in Montgomeryshire and, indeed, all over Wales and beyond. Around 50 <a href="https://plygain.org/dyddiadur.htm">services</a> are held during December and January. </p>
<p>And this tradition, too, has undergone many changes. Several collections of <em>plygain</em> songs have by now been published enabling new carollers to participate. </p>
<p>In 2020 and 2021, a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yifxPBea1f0">virtual</a> <em>plygain</em> took place during the pandemic. A bilingual <em>plygain</em> <a href="https://www.plygain.org/home.htm">website</a> has also been set up and a new carol composed specifically for women’s voices, so that women, too, have their <em>Carol y Swper</em>. </p>
<p>Purists would argue that traditions should not be revived and re-invented. But it is in the nature of traditions to change and constantly evolve – they must do so in order to survive. </p>
<p>We should continue to celebrate the modern-day versions of the <em>Mari Lwyd</em> tradition and the <em>plygain</em> because they contribute to a shared sense of identity and instil in participants a sense of belonging.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sioned Davies does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Mari Lwyd and the plygain are two prominent Welsh traditions celebrated over Christmas and the new year.Sioned Davies, Emeritus Professor of Welsh, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109392023-10-30T12:11:30Z2023-10-30T12:11:30ZNos Galan Gaeaf: the traditional Welsh celebration being eclipsed by modern Halloween<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555331/original/file-20231023-27-3fyhsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6016%2C3998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nos Galan Gaeaf on October 31 is followed by Calan Gaeaf on November 1 in Wales. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sheep-cow-animal-skull-on-abandon-2353014109">PBabic/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children throughout Wales will be dressed in witch or ghost costumes come October 31, going from door to door, chorusing “trick or treat” in the hope of receiving sweets. In other words, the scene will be very much like that encountered at Halloween in the rest of the UK. </p>
<p>On posters advertising Halloween events in Wales, the word Halloween is rendered in Welsh as <a href="https://museum.wales/blog/1857/Halloween-Traditions/"><em>Nos Galan Gaeaf</em></a>. A <a href="https://nation.cymru/news/call-to-ditch-anglo-american-halloween-and-restore-welsh-traditions/">common complaint</a> is that traditional customs at this time of year have been eclipsed by an increasingly homogenised and commercialised event imported from the USA. </p>
<p>But how would Welsh people have celebrated <em>Nos Galan Gaeaf</em> in former centuries? What is its origin? And has it always been intrinsically linked to Halloween?</p>
<h2>October 31 celebrations</h2>
<p>Halloween has its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/All-Saints-Day">origins</a> in AD609 or AD610 when the Pantheon in Rome was converted to a place of Christian worship and dedicated to Mary and to all the martyrs by Pope Boniface IV, who ordered an anniversary to be celebrated. </p>
<p>In the eighth century, the date of the celebration at the Basilica of St. Peter was fixed on November 1. This was extended by Gregory IV in the early ninth century to the whole church. </p>
<p>This celebration was known in English as “All Hallows Day”, and thus the eve is Halloween. It is quite plausible that there was already a seasonal festival of some sort at this date and that some of the features of this festival were transferred to Halloween.</p>
<p>A common <a href="https://blogs.loc.gov/headlinesandheroes/2021/10/the-origins-of-halloween-traditions/#:%7E:text=Yet%2C%20the%20Halloween%20holiday%20has,costumes%20to%20ward%20off%20ghosts.">claim</a> is that Halloween is essentially Celtic. It is true that Gaelic-speaking places (Ireland, Gaelic Scotland and the Isle of Man) celebrated, at this time, a festival called <em><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Samhain">Samhain</a></em>, references to which abound in early medieval Irish <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tXEyEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT8&dq=medieval+irish+samhain&ots=7srml1iSDo&sig=cZXC5ybD81Yu1vJAreNFi34Q1RI&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=medieval%20irish%20samhain&f=false">literature</a>. It was presented as a time of uncanny events and otherworldly visitations. </p>
<p>The name <em>Samhain</em> is often mispronounced by non-Gaelic speakers as “Sam Hain”. But it is actually closer, in modern Irish pronunciation, to “sow won” (sow as in female pig). </p>
<p>However, while Welsh is also a Celtic language, there is no evidence for <em>Samhain</em> having been celebrated in Wales – so, it could well be a Gaelic rather than a Celtic institution. The oft-repeated <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/halloween-owes-its-tricks-and-treats-celtic-new-years-eve-180960944/">claim</a> that it signifies the start of the Celtic year is based on the speculation of comparative mythologists.</p>
<p>The name <em>Nos Galan Gaeaf</em> certainly does not go back to a prehistoric period of Celtic linguistic unity. The word <a href="https://geiriadur.ac.uk/gpc/gpc.html"><em>calan</em></a> is borrowed from the Latin <em>calends</em>, meaning “the first day of the month”, while <em>gaeaf</em> means “winter”. </p>
<p>So we can think of it as “the winter calends”, or “the first day of winter”. <em>Calan</em> was one of hundreds of Latin loan words that entered the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Brythonic-languages">Brittonic</a> language, the ancestor of the Welsh language, during the period in which Britain was part of the Roman Empire. </p>
<p>There is, however, an element of the name which does have Celtic ancestry. <em>Calan Gaeaf</em> on its own is November 1, but <em>Nos Galan Gaeaf</em> (the “night of the winter calends”), is the night before. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.02.0001">Julius Caesar</a> said of the Celtic-speaking Gauls (who inhabited what is now France and Belgium), that they counted the day to begin on the previous evening. This is reflected in <a href="https://celt.ucc.ie">medieval Irish</a>, where the term <em>aidche Lúain</em> means “the night before Monday” – what we would call Sunday night. This is merely a linguistic fossil, however, and does not prove anything about the antiquity of <em>Nos Galan Gaeaf</em>.</p>
<p>There are medieval references to it, for example, in poetry from the <a href="https://www.library.wales/discover-learn/digital-exhibitions/manuscripts/the-middle-ages/the-black-book-of-carmarthen">Black Book of Carmarthen</a>, a collection of early Welsh poems and manuscripts. <em>Calan Gaeaf</em> is also mentioned in the <a href="https://www.library.wales/discover-learn/digital-exhibitions/manuscripts/the-middle-ages/laws-of-hywel-dda#:%7E:text=The%20%27Laws%20of%20Hywel%20Dda,quarter%20of%20the%2013th%20century.">early Welsh laws</a>, detailed in 13th-century manuscripts, but those references are disappointingly prosaic. </p>
<p>And, it is only in the modern period that we have <a href="https://archive.org/details/in.gov.ignca.29074/page/n5/mode/2up">references</a> to <em>Nos Galan Gaeaf</em> customs, exhaustively catalogued in the 20th century by the historian, Trefor M. Owen.</p>
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<img alt="A spooky black and white forest with twisted trees." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555615/original/file-20231024-23-xeucjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Beware the lurking Hwch Ddu Gwta and the Ladi Wen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/spooky-wooodland-scene-twisted-trees-black-619428050">bearacreative/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Spooky customs</h2>
<p>How people <a href="https://museum.wales/blog/1857/Halloween-Traditions/">celebrated</a> varied significantly from region to region. Many, such as bobbing for apples, and various types of divination to determine who will marry who, are far from unique to Wales. Nonetheless, some have an unfamiliar twist. </p>
<p>In south Wales, parties of young people would maraud from door to door like modern trick or treaters. In Glamorgan, boys would wear women’s clothing. Much more sinister were the <em>gwrachod</em> (meaning “witches” or “hags”) of Powys though. These were men who would go about in pairs, dressed as an old man and old woman, or in gangs dressed in sheep skins and masks, drinking heavily and demanding gifts.</p>
<p>The lighting of a bonfire, or <em>coelcerth</em>, was a notable feature too. Close to the fires, people would be safe from wandering spirits, but the return home could be a fraught business. In the darkness lurked the <em><a href="https://www.peoplescollection.wales/items/606778">Hwch Ddu Gwta</a></em> (tail-less black sow) accompanied by the <em><a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100047409">Ladi Wen</a> heb ddim pen</em> (the white lady without a head). </p>
<p>If you want to stand out from the crowd of mummies and vampires this October 31, you could do worse than dressing as one of these gruesome characters instead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Rodway does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nos Galan Gaeaf on October 31 in Wales is steeped in folklore and tradition.Simon Rodway, Lecturer in Celtic Studies, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112522023-10-06T13:06:23Z2023-10-06T13:06:23ZBison are sacred to Native Americans − but each tribe has its own special relationship to them<p>The American bison, or American buffalo as they are commonly called, were once close to extinction. Their numbers dropped from <a href="https://www.nps.gov/gosp/learn/nature/where-the-buffalo-roamed.htm">30-60 million</a> to around 500 because of overhunting in the 19th century.</p>
<p>But they made an unlikely comeback and continue to captivate people. At Yellowstone National Park – home to the largest bison herd in the U.S., with almost 6,000 head of wild bison – they are a major attraction for visitors. In 2023 the park attracted <a href="https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/management/delivering-a-world-class-visitor-experience.htm">more than 3 million people</a>.</p>
<p>Conservationists and Indigenous people successfully saved the American bison from complete annihilation in the 20th century, increasing their numbers from less than 500 to <a href="https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/president-bidens-investing-america-agenda-help-restore-bison-populations-and-grassland">more than 15,000 wild bison</a>, which does not include the thousands of bison living on ranches. The U.S. even designated it as the “<a href="https://www.doi.gov/blog/15-facts-about-our-national-mammal-american-bison">national mammal</a>” in 2016. </p>
<p>Over thousands of years and across diverse landscapes, Indigenous peoples developed traditional ecological knowledge about the bison and their ecosystems. Meanwhile, they also developed religious customs and sacred places important to their relationship with bison. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.rosalynlapier.com/">Indigenous scholar</a> and an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and Métis, I am interested in how Native Americans understand the natural world. <a href="https://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/nebraska/9781496201508/">I learned from my Blackfeet grandparents</a> that bison emerged from the supernatural underwater realm and were given to humans by the Divine to use as food and as material. In return, humans are to respect and revere the bison.</p>
<h2>Thousands of years of history</h2>
<p>The modern-day American bison evolved around 10,000 years ago during the end of the Pleistocene Epoch from an ancient bison species. Over these several thousand years, according to environmental historian <a href="https://www.umt.edu/history/people/emeriti-faculty.php?ID=628">Dan Flores</a>, <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9781324006169">Indigenous peoples and bison “co-evolved”</a> – meaning they influenced the others’ actions and behaviors. </p>
<p>Indigenous peoples used bison meat and fat for food; hides for clothing, footwear and covering for their lodges; bones for tools; and other parts of the bison for rope, thread, glue or dyes. Along with the longtime use of bison for practical purposes, religious rituals and ceremonies also emerged. </p>
<p>Environmental historian <a href="https://history.illinois.edu/directory/profile/rmorriss">Robert Morrissey</a> writes in “<a href="https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295750880/people-of-the-ecotone/">People of the Ecotone</a>” that Indigenous peoples in what is now Illinois ritualized running, a skill necessary for hunting bison. They developed coming-of-age ceremonies that tested the ability of young people to run long distances, as well as fast, to prepare for bison hunting. </p>
<p>Indigenous peoples in what is now Alberta, Canada, constructed shrines out of rocks to offer prayers to divine entities <a href="https://www.aupress.ca/books/120137-imagining-head-smashed-in/">connected to bison hunting</a>. They left offerings of tobacco or other items at these shrines during their seasonal hunts. Some of these rock shrines still exist and are viewed as sacred places.</p>
<h2>Bison origins and sacred places</h2>
<p>Indigenous people continued to remember and revere bison in rituals and ceremonies. Every tribe on the Great Plains has its own “deep individual <a href="https://www.charkoosta.com/news/the-american-buffalo-reviews-history-renews-hope/article_0cdf03c8-0b9d-11ee-9fe1-3b4276296e25.html">connection to bison</a>,” says Whisper Camel-Means, a Salish-Kootenai tribal member and wildlife biologist working at the <a href="https://bisonrange.org/">tribe’s bison range</a>. “We are all connected, but we all have a different relationship. Native people are not all the same.”</p>
<p>The Blackfeet believe that certain <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-native-americans-a-river-is-more-than-a-person-it-is-also-a-sacred-place-85302">lakes and rivers are sacred areas</a> because they are the home of the Suyiitapi, the supernatural underwater persons, and the place where bison emerged from underneath the water. </p>
<p>The Lakota, similar to the Blackfeet, consider bison sacred and a gift from the Divine. For the Lakota, however, bison did not come out of water, they came from inside the earth.</p>
<p>According to anthropologist <a href="https://cla.umn.edu/about/directory/profile/alber033">Patricia Albers</a>, the Lakota believe that both bison and humans emerged <a href="https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/natlpark/158/">onto the Great Plains</a> from what is now <a href="https://www.nps.gov/wica/index.htm">Wind Cave National Park</a> in the Black Hills in South Dakota.</p>
<p>The Lakota believe this landscape to be their “most sacred and culturally significant” area because it is a place of genesis for humans and bison. </p>
<p>Gerard Baker, an elder from the Mandan-Hidatsa tribes, shared in a <a href="https://kenburns.com/films/the-american-buffalo/">new PBS documentary film</a> on the American bison, “When you look at a buffalo you just don’t see a big shaggy beast. You see life, you see existence, you see hope. Those are our relatives. They are a part of us.” </p>
<h2>New efforts to revive the bison</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A few bison Bison graze near a stream." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552367/original/file-20231005-23-4oag72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bison are a major attraction for visitors at Yellowstone National Park.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/YellowstoneBisonEncounters/ab14e1b88dc140ce94e260a6f2f1f5af/photo?Query=bison%20yellowstone%20park&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=448&currentItemNo=16&vs=true">AP Photo/Robert Graves, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>This year, the U.S. federal government <a href="https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-department-announces-significant-action-restore-bison-populations-part-new">added US$25 million</a> to “restore wild and healthy populations” of American bison on federal lands and $5 million toward accomplishing the same goal on <a href="https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/president-bidens-investing-america-agenda-help-restore-bison-populations-and-grassland">tribal lands</a>. And new legislation this fall seeks to further “<a href="https://www.heinrich.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/indian_buffalo_management_act_bill_text.pdf">develop the capacity of tribes</a>” to manage bison and bison habitat.</p>
<p>“The restoration of buffalo back to our tribes and communities and reservations is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/04/us/native-american-tribes-bison.html">part of our healing</a>,” Jason Baldes, a member of the Eastern Shoshone from Wyoming, and the tribal buffalo coordinator for the National Wildlife Federation, told The New York Times, emphasizing why this kind of funding is necessary. </p>
<p>As more bison are returned to tribal communities, I believe, as my grandparents did, that bison are a gift from the Divine. It is a reminder also of how Native peoples relate to and understand the natural world and its deep religious meaning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rosalyn R. LaPier served as an advisor and was interviewed for the PBS documentary film "The American Buffalo". </span></em></p>Efforts are being made to develop the capacity of Native tribes to manage bison and bison habitats. An Indigenous scholar explains their sacred significance.Rosalyn R. LaPier, Professor of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2123982023-09-07T13:27:51Z2023-09-07T13:27:51ZDeath and mourning in Ghana: how gender shapes the rituals of the Akan people<p>Gender has a significant impact on the socio-economic, political and religious experiences of Ghanaians. For <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-94222017000300016">Akans</a>, the country’s largest ethnic group, descent is traced through the <a href="https://resources.saylor.org/wwwresources/archived/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Akan-People.pdf">maternal line</a>. Property is transferred in this line too. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3773817">Mourning rituals</a> are another area of life that’s shaped by gender in Ghana – as in many other cultures of the world. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07481187.2023.2236983">recent paper</a>, we explored the way Akan mourning rituals reflect the culture’s ideas about gender and reproduce social patterns.</p>
<p>Bereavement is gendered in Akan society: there are strict behavioural prescriptions for males and females. We argue that enacting and reproducing masculinity and femininity in these rituals may have negative health and psychological consequences for both men and women.</p>
<p>Our study is useful for therapists and counsellors to understand the impact of gender and culture when working with people who are dealing with grief and loss. Gender shapes how people make meaning of – and cope with – grief and loss in a specific social milieu. </p>
<h2>Mourning, masculinity and femininity</h2>
<p>The responsibilities of the principal cultural players of Akan death and mourning rituals are assigned according to gender. Males are the major players in organising and supervising the rites. </p>
<p>A key player is the lineage head (<em>Abusuapanin</em>), who is invariably male. </p>
<p>In Akan culture, the lineage head must be informed of all deaths occurring in the lineage. He must, in turn, inform the chief and other authorities of the polity (village or town) of all deaths in his lineage when they occur. </p>
<p>The second major player is the chief mourner, who is also usually a male. According to the customs and traditions of the Akan (and the <a href="https://lawsghana.com/judgement/Ghana/High-Court/363">law courts</a>), the body of a deceased person belongs to the extended family into which one is born. The extended family decides at a meeting who the chief mourner should be. </p>
<p>The choice of chief mourner is very important because he makes decisions such as who will succeed the deceased and how to mourn fittingly. He oversees the proper organisation and execution of all rites pertaining to the death, particularly ensuring that the deceased has a funeral that befits his or her status attained in life and is compatible with the social standing of the family in the community.</p>
<p>Women’s roles in Akan mourning rites, though extensive, are secondary to those of men. Women have the responsibility to bathe and prepare the dead body to be laid in state for mourners to file past it. These women are usually members of the deceased’s family and are well versed in handling dead bodies. </p>
<p>Women also fulfil the role of professional mourners or wailers. Some Akan lineages engage the services of these wailers to add solemnity to the mortuary rites. At ordinary Akan funerals where they are absent, it is the women who lament and wail during critical stages of the process. Men are culturally discouraged from loud wailing and weeping. The expression <em>ɔbarima nsu</em>, which means “a man does/must not cry”, calls on Akan men to refrain from such behaviour to avoid labels of effeminacy. </p>
<p>This norm in the mourning process is consistent with a cultural practice that generally demands that Akan men must not <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10896-015-9781-z#citeas">publicly</a> display their emotions, even in the face of adversity, pain and suffering. </p>
<p>In contrast, a woman who does not weep or lament at the death of a close relative is suspected of being a malevolent witch responsible for the deceased’s death. Thus, the Akan mourning rituals can be culturally and psychologically coercive and oppressive for women. </p>
<p>Cash donations have become an important part of Ghanaian funerals. Both men and women make donations. But the archetype is that men will donate large sums of money to the bereaved family while women announce the donations and heap appellations on the male donors. For example, the compliments that women lavish on men to acknowledge their cash or kind donations may include <em>mo ɔpeafo</em> (well done), <em>mompene no na ɔyɛ ɔbarima amu</em> (let all praise him for he is a real man indeed) and other special names such as <em>ɔdenoho</em> (the affluent or independent one).</p>
<p>The male donor, female announcer gender hierarchy at funerals is another instance of gender role (re)enactment and performance. When men demonstrate economic prowess at funerals and women remain on the fringes as announcers, they are both performing and reinforcing a culturally given gender hierarchy. </p>
<h2>The burden of mourning for males and females</h2>
<p>We concluded from our findings that Akan death and mourning rituals can be culturally and psychologically oppressive against men and women. In the case of women, this is due to the unfair power hierarchy and the patriarchal nature of Ghanaian society. </p>
<p>In the case of men, the cultural expectation that they be emotionally restrained in mourning may have health and psychological consequences. These could <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Osafo-Joseph/publication/322708025_Suicide_among_men_in_Ghana_The_burden_of_masculinity/links/5b7c650d92851c1e1224e539/Suicide-among-men-in-Ghana-The-burden-of-masculinity.pdf">include</a> depression, stress and suicide. The masculine requirement for men to resist crying during bereavement leaves men to suffer alone in silence when they experience emotional pain. </p>
<p><em>Anthony Mpiani, a teaching and research assistant at the Department of Sociology at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada, co-authored this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212398/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gender plays a major role in how mourning is done by the Akan ethnic group of GhanaStephen Baffour Adjei, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Akenten Appiah-Menka University of Skills Training and Entrepreneurial Development Mensah Adinkrah, Professor, Sociology and Criminal Justice, Central Michigan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049062023-05-19T00:24:50Z2023-05-19T00:24:50ZNew Caledonia has had an indigenous body advise government since 1999. What can Australia learn?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525263/original/file-20230509-29-ysdzdw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1599%2C1065&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Customary Senate, Nouméa, New Caledonia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eddie Wadrawane</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Australia prepares to vote in a referendum on an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice to parliament later this year, what can we learn from similar models in our region?</p>
<p>New Zealand’s <a href="https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/">Waitangi Tribunal</a> was established in 1975 as a “permanent commission of inquiry” on issues affecting Māori people. Despite resulting from a treaty, it has <a href="https://theconversation.com/australians-should-be-wary-of-scare-stories-comparing-the-voice-with-new-zealands-waitangi-tribunal-204676">no powers to veto legislation</a>.</p>
<p>We can also look to New Caledonia, a French territory northeast of Australia. It has its own version of a Voice to parliament, called the Customary Senate, which represents Kanaks, the territory’s First Peoples and its largest ethnic group at <a href="https://www.iwgia.org/en/kanaky-new-caledonia/4689-iw-2022-kanaky-new-caledonia.html">over 40%</a>.</p>
<p>The Customary Senate must be consulted by the territorial authorities on issues relating to Kanak identity, particularly in matters of customary civil status, and customary lands.</p>
<p>The Customary Senate, which has been sitting for more than 20 years, shows us a First Nations consultative body doesn’t pose a “threat” to democracy or the rule of law.</p>
<p>So how does it work?</p>
<h2>The Customary Senate</h2>
<p>New Caledonia has a unique government. It has a hierarchy of governance from French institutions in Paris, its own government with a Congress that sits in the capital Nouméa, as well as three provincial assemblies and local authorities.</p>
<p>There are differing views on moving to full independence from France. The 1998 Nouméa Accord signed with France, and included in the French Constitution, provided a timetable for independence. Three referendums have since been conducted, none of which has produced a vote in favour of independence – although the most recent referendum in 2021 was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/12/new-caledonia-fears-of-unrest-as-polls-open-for-vote-on-independence-from-france">boycotted by most independence supporters</a>.</p>
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<p>The Customary Senate was established under the Nouméa Accord, and it <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new-caledonia/new-caledonia-country-brief">first sat</a> in 1999. It’s one institution in a long political process to recognise custom as the foundation of Kanak society. This means respecting cultural traditions, many of which date back more than 3,000 years, and norms of social behaviour that <a href="https://unc.nc/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Understanding-New-Caledonia-Web-06-12-21.pdf">prioritise</a> clan duties and values, and hierarchies based on generations over individuals. This is all different from French law.</p>
<p>The Senate is an advisory body composed of representatives from each of the eight customary areas of the archipelago. </p>
<p>Members are appointed for five-year terms, most recently in 2020, and the president <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/senat-coutumier-4-choses-a-savoir-sur-la-designation-du-president-de-l-institution-1362206.html">rotates</a> yearly between the customary areas. Candidates are nominated by local customary councils, which are the direct representatives of the customary world.</p>
<p>The Customary Senate must be consulted by the president of the New Caledonian government and the Congress, the presidents of the three provinces, or the French High Commissioner, on issues related to Kanak identity, custom and society.</p>
<p>It receives bills concerning such issues, and has two months to deliberate, with additional procedures in the case of disagreement.</p>
<p>But the Congress, not the Customary Senate, has ultimate authority under law.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-new-caledonias-instability-is-not-just-a-problem-for-france-154567">Why New Caledonia's instability is not just a problem for France</a>
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<p>In 2014, the Customary Senate published a <a href="https://www.senat-coutumier.nc/phocadownload/userupload/nos_publications/charter_english_version.pdf">Charter of the Kanak People</a> aimed at structuring and formalising an alternative to French administrative organisation, and to promote Kanak values. Although this charter lacks legal status, it inspires legal proceedings and judgements. Across the archipelago, those of Kanak origin are governed in matters of civil law by their customs. Disputes that end up in court, for example, have customary assessors present who advise and assist legal representatives.</p>
<p>The name “Customary Senate” is not trivial in a territory still subject to French republican law. Indeed, some feel there’s an unrealised political project for it to become a second chamber of government, as exists in Paris or Canberra. In March this year, the Senate <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/nouvellecaledonie/le-senat-coutumier-cree-une-instance-autochtone-de-discussions-pour-preparer-l-avenir-institutionnel-1381046.html">created</a> an Indigenous discussion forum to debate the end of the Nouméa Accord.</p>
<p>Resolution of the complex debates surrounding the governance of New Caledonia will decide the Customary Senate’s future. Questions of First Nations sovereignty and independence currently remain unresolved.</p>
<p>Independence supporters have a political majority in two out of three <a href="https://www.newcaledonia-business.com/political-framework">provinces</a>, and strong representation and leadership in the Congress. The president of the Congress is from a pro-independence party, and the president of the current government, Louis Mapou from the Party of Kanak Liberation, also supports independence. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>As Kanak society changes over time, the Customary Senate could also play a role in the adjustment of customary norms, particularly in regard to the place of women in society. It’s already a meeting-place between Kanak clan-based customary consensus and Western democracy, according to its current director of culture, Louis Waia. Discussions are needed to open the Customary Senate to women and younger people, both urban and rural. At present, only (older) men serve in the Senate.</p>
<p>Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong <a href="https://pina.com.fj/2023/04/17/mapou-to-welcome-australias-foreign-minister-to-new-caledonia/">visited New Caledonia</a> in April this year, attending the Customary Senate <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/address-new-caledonias-congress">and the Congress</a>.</p>
<p>She said in 2022 that she’s “determined to see First Nations perspectives at the heart of Australian foreign policy”, and has now <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/indigenous-peoples/ambassador-first-nations-people">appointed</a> an Ambassador for First Nations People. </p>
<p>The minister is aware of New Caledonia’s system of political representation and how independence supporters have recently received a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/france-tightens-screws-new-caledonia">negative</a> reception from the Macron government in negotiations in Paris. Officially, Australia remains neutral on these <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/avenir-institutionnel-de-la-nouvelle-caledonie-les-discussions-s-achevent-sans-grande-avancee-1385334.html">disputed governance arrangements</a>.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Australian Voice to parliament campaign can learn from, and support, these struggles taking place in its multicultural Pacific neighbour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthias Kowasch is affiliated with University College of Teacher Education Styria (Austria) and Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences (Norway). He is also member of the research group Chôros (France).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Batterbury receives funding from the University of Melbourne and the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eddie Wayuone Wadrawane and Isabelle Merle do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s important to understand that a First Nations consultative body such as the Customary Senate doesn’t pose a ‘threat’ to democracy or the rule of law.Eddie Wayuone Wadrawane, Associate Lecturer, Université de Nouvelle CalédonieIsabelle Merle, Directrice de recherche au CNRS (CNRS, CREDO, UMR 7308), histoire de la colonisation, histoire du Pacifique et de la Nouvelle-Calédonie,, Aix-Marseille Université (AMU)Matthias Kowasch, Professor of Didactics in Geography, Pädagogische Hochschule Steiermark Simon Batterbury, Associate Professor, Environmental Studies & Convenor, Melbourne Climate Futures Academy, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1758332022-01-31T03:58:56Z2022-01-31T03:58:56ZElectronic surveillance law review won’t stop Border Force’s warrantless phone snooping<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443281/original/file-20220130-17-173hrm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2504%2C1666&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s electronic surveillance laws are <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/reports-and-publications/submissions-and-discussion-papers/reform-of-australias-electronic-surveillance-framework-discussion-paper">being reformed</a> with a goal of making them “clearer, more coherent and better adapted to the modern world”.</p>
<p>However, there is one significant set of powers beyond the scope of the reforms: the Australian Border Force’s (ABF) broad powers to search personal digital devices and copy electronic information without a warrant.</p>
<p>One man who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/18/returning-travellers-made-to-hand-over-phones-and-passcodes-to-australian-border-force">had his phone searched by the ABF</a> on entering the country recently told The Guardian he had “no idea what officials looked at, whether a copy of any of the data was made, where it would be stored and who would have access to it”.</p>
<p>The surveillance reform aims to deliver better protection of individuals’ information and ensure law enforcement agencies have the powers to investigate serious crimes and threats to security. So why has the privacy of travellers and migrants who cross Australia’s border been left so exposed?</p>
<h2>A notable omission</h2>
<p>The reform aims to replace the “current patchwork of laws” governing electronic surveillance, including the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00032">Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979</a> and the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00021">Surveillance Devices Act 2004</a>, with a single piece of streamlined, technology-neutral legislation. </p>
<p>However, the reform’s scope is limited to accessing information and data <em>covertly</em>. Activities that fall under this definition include “intercepting phone calls, remotely accessing a person’s computer or using a listening or tracking device”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/national-security-review-recommends-complete-overhaul-of-electronic-surveillance-but-will-it-work-151462">National security review recommends complete overhaul of electronic surveillance - but will it work?</a>
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<p>The Deparment of Home Affairs gives as <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/reports-and-pubs/files/electronic-surveillance-framework-discussion-paper.pdf">an example of an activity not covered by the reform</a> an agency accessing a computer when executing a search warrant. This scenario may not involve covert surveillance, but some protection is provided by the need to apply for a warrant.</p>
<p>In contrast, the ABF’s powers to access electronic information and data do not require a warrant. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1901124/s186.html">The Customs Act 1901</a> allows ABF officers to examine any goods subject to customs control, including digital devices such as mobile phones and laptops. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1901124/s186a.html">ABF officers can also make copies</a> of documents that may be relevant to prohibited goods, the commission of an offence, or “security”. A “document” includes mobile and other phones, sim cards, personal electronic recording devices, computers, written material and photographs.</p>
<p>Under the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/s252.html">Migration Act 1958</a>, ABF officers can search a person and their property if the officer suspects there are reasonable grounds for considering cancelling the person’s visa. The person must either be detained or has not been cleared by immigration. “Property” includes digital devices.</p>
<h2>Intrusive powers</h2>
<p>A guiding principle of the reform is to develop a law that “contains appropriate thresholds and robust, effective and consistent controls, limits, safeguards and oversight” of “intrusive” powers. </p>
<p>Electronic surveillance powers are described as “intrusive” because they can reveal sensitive information about an individual or organisation. The ABF’s powers are arguably equally as intrusive, but have less protection and lack transparency.</p>
<p>ABF officers do not require your permission to search your devices. If you refuse, you may be referred “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/18/returning-travellers-made-to-hand-over-phones-and-passcodes-to-australian-border-force">for further law enforcement action</a>”. </p>
<p>The ABF also has no obligation to inform you what information was examined or copied. </p>
<p>The ABF <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/abfa2015225/s44.html">can pass information gathered from searches of digital devices</a> to other federal and state departments, agencies, police forces or a coroner if it falls within a broad category of “permitted purposes”. Permitted purposes include the rather far-reaching “information relating to immigration, quarantine or border control between Australia and a foreign country”.</p>
<p>Notably, it is more difficult for police within Australia to search your mobile phone. Although police have general search powers, if they want to unlock your mobile phone or electronic device they <a href="http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca191482/s3la.html">must apply for a warrant</a> first.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/examination_of_mobile_phones_and?unfold=1">Freedom of Information application</a> made by the transparency activist organisation <a href="https://www.righttoknow.org.au/">Right to Know</a>, between July 1 2009 and June 30 2019 there were 436 incidents where electronic devices were examined. In the same period, the contents of electronic devices were copied 109 times.</p>
<h2>An opportunity missed</h2>
<p>By limiting the reform to covert electronic surveillance powers, the government has missed an opportunity to strengthen accountability of equally intrusive surveillance powers at Australia’s border.</p>
<p>Why the omission? Officially, because the ABF’s powers aren’t covert. This is despite individuals not knowing what information is accessed, copied or stored. </p>
<p>Unofficially, because the government is unlikely to dilute its migration and border control powers. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-01-24/can-border-force-search-your-phone-when-you-travel-to-australia/100774644#:%7E:text=Border%20Force%20has%20powers%20to,into%20Australia%20after%20a%20search">According to the ABF</a>, it “exercises its functions and powers at the border in order to protect the Australian community and deliver its mission to enable legitimate travel and trade”.</p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/send-him-home-poll-reveals-overwhelming-support-for-decision-to-deport-novak-djokovic-20220115-p59oh9.html">recent Novak Djokovic deportation case</a> shows, “strong borders” are popular with the public.</p>
<p>What should you do if the ABF wants to search your mobile phone or laptop? Considering you may face a criminal sanction if you refuse, <a href="https://theconversation.com/travelling-overseas-what-to-do-if-a-border-agent-demands-access-to-your-digital-device-104314">be smart about your data protection</a>. You may wish to use two-factor authentication and store sensitive information in the cloud on a secure European server while you are travelling.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/travelling-overseas-what-to-do-if-a-border-agent-demands-access-to-your-digital-device-104314">Travelling overseas? What to do if a border agent demands access to your digital device</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/reports-and-publications/submissions-and-discussion-papers/reform-of-australias-electronic-surveillance-framework-discussion-paper">Public submissions</a> on the reform of Australia’s electronic surveillance framework are due by February 11 2022. Unfortunately, there is no space for a conversation about the ABF’s extraordinary surveillance powers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niamh Kinchin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s electronic surveillance laws are up for reform – but Border Force’s powers to search phones without a warrant have been left out of the review.Niamh Kinchin, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1740972021-12-21T15:16:55Z2021-12-21T15:16:55ZBrexit: what the UK/EU customs changes mean for businesses from January 1<p>Glance at the headlines and you might be forgiven for wondering if the UK has moved on a year. A debate has been raging about how tough the restrictions must be to combat the latest wave of COVID, while the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is far from over. Brexit minister Lord Frost has just resigned, and January 1 will once again see a set of Brexit changes coming into effect that look likely to exacerbate the economic damage from the pandemic. So what are the January changes and why have we heard so little about them?</p>
<p>Full customs controls will take effect on January 1. One aspect of the changes is new rules that need to be followed to enable trade between the UK and EU to remain tariff free, per the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en">Trade and Cooperation Agreement</a>. </p>
<p>During 2021, exporters have been permitted to provide proof of the origin of goods after they have been exported, so long as they made a customs declaration at the border. But from January 1, when UK exporters can’t prove the origin of a product at customs, the EU customer will have to pay the full <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/customs-tariff/eu-customs-tariff-taric_en">import tariff</a> (and vice versa). For example, a French importer bringing agricultural goods from the UK would incur an average non-preferential tariff of <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/tariff_profiles/CE_e.pdf">around 11%</a>.</p>
<p>Importers have been affected by Brexit much less than exporters until now, having not even had to make customs declarations. This was part of an arrangement called the “staged customs controls”, but from January 1, they will have to make customs declarations too. </p>
<p>This means that on top of all the supply-chain problems that manufacturers have been enduring in recent months, they’ll now face the double whammy of full customs controls for the first time. If businesses do not fulfil the new requirements, then goods won’t be able to leave the port.</p>
<p>Neither is the transition period complete on January 1. During the rest of 2022, we expect to see a range of other safety and security measures introduced. For example, physical checks on live animals will begin on July 1. This too will put more pressure on border controls, and further slow down the movement of trade from one side to the other. </p>
<h2>Lack of clarity</h2>
<p>The basis for all these changes is outlined in the UK government’s policy paper <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-border-operating-model">The Border Operating Model</a>. An updated version was published in November, with further revisions issued as recently as December 16. These changes reflect the new timetable for implementing import controls, which was only set out in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-sets-out-pragmatic-new-timetable-for-introducing-border-controls">September</a>. You’ve probably heard of just-in-time manufacturing, but this is the policymaking equivalent. It has left businesses with considerable uncertainty.</p>
<p>The British government argues that this is simply a “pragmatic new timetable”, but it raises concerns about different levels of compliance in either direction. For example, delaying the implementation of checks coming into the UK may lead to goods crossing the border that do not meet appropriate health and safety standards, while these checks are taking place for UK goods exported to the EU.</p>
<p>Even before all these extra new Brexit rules come into effect in January, UK ports in 2021 look set to have experienced the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d174f95e-cd7d-4ca9-aa11-f61de7d0134b">lowest volumes</a> of trade since 1983. It does not help that Felixstowe, the largest British port, appears to be one of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/566a0a32-affe-419c-8d34-b8e7c65e66ea">least efficient</a> ports both in the UK and compared to rivals in Europe and Asia. This is the case whether you measure efficiency as minutes per container move, or the average number of hours that ships spent at the port. </p>
<p>The UK government is trying to tackle these kinds of challenges with its £200 million <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/200-million-port-infrastructure-fund-opens-for-bids">Port Infrastructure Fund</a>, but this too has been controversial. The Port of Dover took the government to court when it only <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/port-infrastructure-fund-allocations/port-infrastructure-fund-successful-applicants">received around 10%</a> of the funding it requested to build additional passport checkpoints. </p>
<p>The government’s funds <a href="https://uk.style.yahoo.com/port-infrastructure-fund-brexit-disruption-supplies-borders-162634883.html">were squeezed</a> by the fact that the total bids it received from ports amounted to more than double what it had made available, such that no ports got all the funding that they were asking for. As if that were not bad enough, the government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/port-infrastructure-fund-allocations/port-infrastructure-fund-successful-applicants">then reduced</a> the total size of the pot by 34%. If British ports are not able to upgrade themselves properly and are then put under extra pressure because of the changes being introduced in January, it all implies that delays in shipments are likely to be an ongoing issue. </p>
<p>In other words, not only are businesses facing a major adjustment in the way that they deal with customs clearance, but goods are likely to end up waiting longer in UK ports – further increasing costs on businesses because time is money. It increases the prospect that supply chains will divert away from UK businesses towards other partners instead. </p>
<p>UK businesses have already had to cope with <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/bulletins/uktrade/october2021">declining trade</a> as a result of Brexit. And don’t forget that all this is happening against a backdrop of transitioning to Liz Truss becoming the new Brexit minister, while remaining as foreign secretary. For a government that was elected on the motto of “getting Brexit done”, it is perhaps not so surprising that so little has been said about the upcoming changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Exporters and importers alike are facing more bureaucracy as the full effect of many of the Brexit changes come into effect.Karen Jackson, Reader in Economics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1654962021-09-12T08:18:12Z2021-09-12T08:18:12ZRethinking ukuthwala, the South African ‘bride abduction’ custom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420038/original/file-20210908-23-ashuvv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rural Eastern Cape </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Susan Winters Cook/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just over a decade ago in South Africa, a flurry of media reports surfaced about a customary practice known as <em>ukuthwala</em>. The <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-04-forcing-the-issue/">reports</a> described a rise in <em>ukuthwala</em> characterised by the kidnapping, assault and rape of young girls by older men, forcing them into customary marriages. Girls as young as 13 and 14 in the rural areas of provinces such as Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were affected by this violence. In some cases, the girls’ families accepted and arranged the marriages.</p>
<p><em>Ukuthwala</em> is a term in Nguni languages which has various meanings. It can refer to ways (including abduction) of making a customary marriage happen quickly. South Africa has a varied cultural make-up, and the term ‘customary’ is generally used to describe beliefs and traditions of groups that are ‘indigenous’ to the country. Customary marriages therefore are based on localised norms. As a route to customary marriage, multiple types of <em>ukuthwala</em> exist across the country, each with distinct names and elements.</p>
<p>The reports about violent <em>ukuthwala</em> cases provoked responses from different sectors of society. Government leaders organised meetings with affected communities. The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp132-UkuthwalaRevised.pdf">South African Law Reform Commission</a> did an extensive study. <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC51942">Legal scholars</a> outlined the human rights implications of the practice. The ruling political party’s Women’s League <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/ancwl-slams-ukuthwala-1796707">called</a> for <em>ukuthwala</em> to be abolished.</p>
<p>From the media and government reports, legal scholarship and case law, two general conclusions emerged during this period. The first was that non-consensual <em>ukuthwala</em> was a modern phenomenon. The second was that it was an abuse of tradition, not an authentic customary practice.</p>
<p>Through <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/abs/deconstructing-characterizations-of-rape-marriage-and-custom-in-south-africa-revisiting-the-multisectoral-campaign-against-ukuthwala/030D12337FA12BA87D2553E0ED2AF76D">my research</a>, based on interviews with women in the Eastern Cape and examinations of historical and recent sources, I have found that both of these conclusions about <em>ukuthwala</em> are oversimplifications. The reality is far more complex. Coercive <em>ukuthwala</em> has been practised for generations, and many have held the cruel acts accompanying <em>ukuthwala</em> as part of tradition. </p>
<p>The mainstream conclusions obscure the actual nature and extent of this form of gendered violence.</p>
<h2>Misconceptions</h2>
<p>The first misconception is that violent <em>ukuthwala</em> is a new phenomenon. Part of the misunderstanding stems from the fact that before 2009 only a <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/5564/Koyana_Indomitable%282007%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">small body of academic research</a> existed, and much of it concentrated on the romantic <em>ukuthwala</em> forms, akin to elopement. There are however sources that provide rich insights into past practices of violent <em>ukuthwala</em>. The historian <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/colonizing-consent/F26822B9351AC12F6E0F0BBFAECE34D2">Elisabeth Thornberry</a>, for example, explored sexual crimes and customs in colonial-era Eastern Cape. An early legal ethnography was Jacobus van Tromp’s 1947 <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/xhosa-law-of-persons-a-treatise-on-the-legal-principles-of-family-relations-among-the-amaxhosa/oclc/1017118500?referer=di&ht=edition">work</a> on Xhosa customs. Colonial and apartheid-era court cases also provide evidence of women seeking to escape abusive marriages.</p>
<p>Most importantly, older women are repositories of historical knowledge. I conducted my research in partnership with <a href="https://www.masimanyane.org.za/">Masimanyane</a>, an Eastern Cape-based women’s rights organisation. In my interviews women related their experiences of <em>ukuthwala</em>, rape and brutality during the 1970s. Staff of Masimanyane described how older women in affected communities had asked for counselling for the traumas they suffered decades ago. </p>
<p>Collectively these sources demonstrate that coercive <em>ukuthwala</em> is not of recent origin.</p>
<p>The second simplified conclusion about violent <em>ukuthwala</em> is that it is an inauthentic expression of custom. This assertion is most evident in the legal arena. In the 2015 decision <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2015/31.html">Jezile vs S</a> the Western Cape High Court determined that features of traditional <em>ukuthwala</em> under customary law included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the consent of both the bride and groom</p></li>
<li><p>a “pretend” abduction of the bride</p></li>
<li><p>the strict prohibition of any sexual intercourse during the abduction.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The court labelled the forced form of <em>ukuthwala</em> as “aberrant”. In parallel, the South African Law Reform Commission <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp132-ukutwala.pdf">concluded</a> that instances of forced <em>ukuthwala</em> were “illegal distortions” of the custom.</p>
<p>In my research I found that for many communities in rural parts of the Eastern Cape, coercive <em>ukuthwala</em> has been the standard according to customary practice. In my interviews with older survivors, they explained that what they endured in the <em>ukuthwala</em> process, such as abductions and rapes, was part of the custom where they lived. Their families took part in arranging the marriages and then refused to rescue them even after they were raped.</p>
<p>There is fortunately a growing body of scholarship that depicts the cultural acceptance of violent <em>ukuthwala</em>. This includes <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.1080/02587203.2017.1303902">research</a> by legal scholars Lea Mwambene and Helen Kruuse done in Jezile’s community in the Eastern Cape following the court case, as well as in-depth <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2014.896720?src=recsys">explorations</a> by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23323256.2016.1248987">anthropologists</a>. </p>
<p>In sum, my findings affirm that custom cannot be understood as formulaic or benign. How people live and the traditions they invest in are infinitely diverse. There cannot be an essential form of <em>ukuthwala</em>.</p>
<h2>Culture and violence</h2>
<p>The simplified understandings of <em>ukuthwala</em> that I have outlined have particular consequences. For one, the perception of violent <em>ukuthwala</em> as ‘new’ has concealed brutality against black women through the apartheid and colonial eras. This very significant form of familial violence against women in the past remains mostly unacknowledged, and the brutality of <em>ukuthwala</em> today stands without context.</p>
<p>Connected to this is the denial of the link between culture and violence. The strict outlook on <em>ukuthwala</em> hides the very close relationship between marriage processes and rape. This is a relationship that has existed across many cultures. For example, marital rape was only <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1993-133.pdf">criminalised</a> in South Africa in the 1990s, undoing the marital rape exemption based on <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-and-comparative-law-quarterly/article/abs/rape-in-marriage-developments-in-south-african-law/525DC5CD095C77A800C118AF5EF0B613">Roman-Dutch and English laws</a>. In other words, the customary acceptance of sexual violence of ukuthwala is not unique. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, rape in marriage remains under-researched and misunderstood. My research highlights how the institution of marriage continues to diminish women’s sexual autonomy. Coercive <em>ukuthwala</em> happens because families prize marriage and the power of husbands over the individual rights of women and girls. The marriage in effect nullifies a husband’s wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Research must incorporate the voices of women of all ages, question written resources, and create more balanced accounts to inform law and policy. Without this we only have a partial understanding of <em>ukuthwala</em> and the injustices that women and girls have long been subjected to.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165496/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nyasha Karimakwenda receives funding from South African The National Research Foundation SARChI Chair in Security and Justice</span></em></p>Perceptions of marriage abduction as a recent phenomenon hide the violence that has been done to women as part of culture.Nyasha Karimakwenda, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1219452019-08-26T14:16:07Z2019-08-26T14:16:07ZHow a rural community hopes to retain spiritual life undermined by western ways<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288350/original/file-20190816-192254-13gl0no.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C149%2C613%2C261&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lily Heisi/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around the world, the introduction of western ways of life has changed indigenous communities. This has often happened by decreasing or by limiting their access to the resources they need. It’s been deliberate as well as unintentional, often with negative results </p>
<p>AmaBomvane of the Eastern Cape in South Africa provide an example of the impact such disruption can have. The traditional spiritual beliefs of this community underpin their entire way of life, and when “modern” interventions disrupted their spiritual practices, they began to suffer harm.</p>
<p>AmaBomvane aren’t the only community to have been affected in this way. Many indigenous communities around the world experience globalisation as <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1745-5871.2007.00443.x">a loss of spiritual connectedness</a>. They include the Cree of the Whapmagoostui in northeastern Canada, the Anishinaabe (Ojibwa), also in North America, the Mohawk community of Akwesasne, and various indigenous communities in Hawaii, Australia, <a href="http://www.umanitoba.ca/institutes/natural_resources/canadaresearchchair/Gwichin%20berry%20harvesting%20from%20northern%20Canada.pdf">the Pacific islands and New Zealand</a>.</p>
<p>For my PhD, <a href="http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/105990">I studied</a> the understanding and practice of indigenous spirituality and its influence on well-being. I also explored the impact of the imposition of western, individualist values on Bomvanaland, a deeply rural area of Elliotdale, in the former Transkei region of South Africa. And I examined what enables the AmaBomvane to survive despite these challenges. </p>
<h2>AmaBomvane</h2>
<p>AmaBomvane’s beliefs traditionally inform their very existence. During my research I found that they understood spirituality to be about relationships. The main determinant of their community’s well-being was the management of strife in these relationships. </p>
<p>Their belief system is informed by <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/the-meaning-of-ubuntu-43307"><em>ubuntu</em></a> (humaness), a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-archbishop-tutus-ubuntu-credo-teaches-the-world-about-justice-and-harmony-84730">southern African ethic</a> grounded in the belief that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person is a person through other persons.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To amaBomvane, relationships exist between three dimensions: humans (living and dead), nature and the divine. All three areas are in a complex balance.</p>
<p>As they explained their beliefs to me, it became clear that amaBomvane did not see physical death as an end to life. They believe in the continued presence of family members (ancestors). Their core values are kindness, empathy and support for the collective. A person’s humanity depends on how they treat other people.</p>
<p>This beneficence is extended to the land and animals as well. AmaBomvane believe that humans exist in a reciprocal relationship with all of nature. When people harm the earth and the animals, they harm themselves. There is no separation.</p>
<p>AmaBomvane grew various plants for food and for treating illnesses. They also grew grain for making a local brew, which was used in maintaining their relationship with their ancestors and with God. </p>
<p>Their animals supported them to achieve and maintain their relationship to the divine through sacrifices. They protected and cared for their animals, which in turn nourished them physically and spiritually.</p>
<p>The land, too, was cared for and responded in kind. The land received the bodies of people’s ancestors and carried their cattle enclosures, which remained very spiritual spaces. Land also yielded the crops used for food and for making the beer for ancestral veneration. </p>
<p>The ancestors are spirit beings who are believed to liaise between God and family members, relaying messages to support well-being or admonishment for wrongdoing and disobedience. This is at the centre of amaBomvane belief system. Ancestors are believed to provide protection, guidance, advice, good health, and even punishment. </p>
<p>To enjoy well-being and thrive, people must maintain this relationship with the divine, others and the world around them.</p>
<p>AmaBomvane sustain the relationship through a collective expression of their spirituality. This occurs through songs, dance and various familial and communal rites of passage. They hold ceremonies that strengthen their identity and support their connection to each dimension of the relationship.</p>
<p>All these activities contributed to cultural continuity, supporting their well-being.</p>
<p>But, this cultural continuity has been systematically disrupted – historically by the entrance of colonial powers and contemporarily by globalisation and urbanisation.</p>
<h2>Disrupted way of life</h2>
<p>AmaBomvane identified three distinct ways in which their socio-cultural and spiritual wellbeing was disrupted. These were western spirituality, healthcare and education introduced by the colonial powers into their context. Their indigenous spiritual knowledges were demonised and marginalised. Lands were seized, causing forced migration and disrupting their access to spiritual resources, connection to one another and shared identity. </p>
<p>These disruptions continue. The ongoing socio-cultural, political and globalised approaches to “bringing communities into the 21st century” – like the poor engagement and collaboration between traditional healers and western healthcare practitioners – continue to create problems for amaBomvane. They assert that currently, some developmental agencies and businesses have cordoned off land for private use within their villages. </p>
<p>AmaBomvane made it clear that the global development agenda had contributed to division because it sees people as individuals rather than primarily as members of a collective.</p>
<p>They also believed that although it seeks greater good, the way in which human rights have been introduced into their context without incorporating their own moral belief systems has been more detrimental than beneficial to their community. An example that they cited was that children had become disobedient towards their parents and elders, contributing to broken relationships.</p>
<p>And the disruption of their traditional way of life, coupled with the lack of alternative ways of making a living, had led many amaBomvane, especially young people, to seek opportunities elsewhere.</p>
<p>This had negatively affected the practice of their spirituality. Community members were confused about their spirituality, combining both indigenous and western spiritual practices. Youth migration had also robbed the area of the young people needed to farm the land. Alcohol and drug abuse among the youth had also brought new social problems.</p>
<h2>Shared humanity</h2>
<p>There is no easy answer to amaBomvane’s dilemma. But they have proposed a way forward. They argued that those coming into their spaces must seek collaboration, not domination. </p>
<p>This collaboration must be led and infused by their indigenous value system of <em>ubuntu</em>. The community assert that if people recognise their shared humanity, the outcomes would be beneficial to the well-being of all – human, land, animals, and the divine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Chioma Ohajunwa is a lecturer at the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies at the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences at the University of Stellenbosch.
Dr Chioma Ohajunwa received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) Grant Holder Linked Bursary for this study </span></em></p>The Bomvana say the global development agenda has created division because it sees people as individuals rather than primarily as members of a collective.Chioma Ohajunwa, Lecturer and researcher at the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1111532019-02-11T11:23:55Z2019-02-11T11:23:55ZSmuggling in the Irish borderlands – and why it could get worse after Brexit<p>Central to the fate of the Brexit negotiations is the future of the Irish border. Politicians from all sides insist they want to avoid a return to border checks once the UK leaves the EU – but they disagree on how this can be achieved. </p>
<p>The history of smuggling across the Irish border – and what already happens today – is a major issue in this disagreement, yet it has received relatively little attention. </p>
<p>In 1923, soon after the end of the Irish war of independence, British and Irish <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09670882.2017.1346049?journalCode=cisr20">customs authorities agreed</a> on 15 “approved frontier crossing points” on cross-border roads for the inspection of goods in daytime hours. At each point, a border customs checkpoint or “customs hut” was set up. Many unapproved routes crossing the border remained open to pedestrians but travelling on them by vehicle was prohibited. The exception was a small number of “concession roads” on which vehicles could travel from one part of a jurisdiction, passing through another jurisdiction, and re-enter the original one without stopping. </p>
<p>Travellers with contraband on unapproved routes risked detection with penalties enforced by customs patrols. Smuggling became a widespread feature of borderland life between the 1920s and 1960s as borderlanders and those from further afield sought to avoid paying duty on goods bought on the other side of the border.</p>
<p>This period is replete with <a href="http://www.irishborderlands.com/living/smuggling/index.html">tales of small-time, domestic smuggling</a> – tea and butter concealed beneath a petticoat in wartime, whiskey and a turkey beneath a heavy overcoat at Christmas time. Even commercial smuggling stories, usually involving the transportation of animal livestock in some unusual way, were told to generate amusement, even admiration, rather than outrage. </p>
<p>Northern Ireland’s Troubles, beginning in 1969, suppressed smuggling activities because many unapproved routes were closed or blown-up by the British security forces. For many people, the presence of British Army checkpoints at approved crossing points also provided a sufficient disincentive for cross-border travel.</p>
<h2>An end to border checks</h2>
<p>The launch of the European single market on January 1, 1993 – to provide free movement of goods, services, people and capital within the European Union – made border customs checkpoints redundant because import duties on goods were no longer applied. But excise duties on fuel, alcohol and tobacco remained.</p>
<p>Smuggling across the border then became a highly profitable, niche activity that was the preserve of well-organised gangs who have largely concentrated on smuggling tobacco and fuel. The smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes – manufactured in Eastern Europe and Asia – into Ireland and across the border was <a href="https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/justice/cross-border-organised-crime-assessment-2018.PDF">identified</a> in 2018 as a significant threat by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). </p>
<p>In March 2018, an <a href="https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/gardai-uncover-louth-factory-capable-of-producing-250000-illicit-cigarettes-per-hour-832695.html">illicit tobacco factory</a> manufacturing cigarettes from raw tobacco destined for the UK market was discovered in County Louth, south of the border. Fuel smuggling also remains a significant issue despite the success of HMRC’s anti-fraud strategy which contributed to the <a href="https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/justice/cross-border-organised-crime-assessment-2018.PDF">shrinking of the Northern Ireland illicit diesel market</a> share from 19% in 2005-6 to 6% in 2016-17. </p>
<h2>Post-Brexit opportunities for smugglers</h2>
<p>It is entirely possible that the activities of such organised smuggling operations could be turbo-charged by a no-deal Brexit which would bring with it import and export duties between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and regulatory divergence for a wide range of commodities. The golden rule of smuggling is that where there is a difference in the price of a commodity, or it is in short supply on either side of a border, smugglers will seek to step in and make a profit. The organised and experienced smugglers are the most likely candidates to reap the illicit rewards.</p>
<p>An upsurge in smuggling would be facilitated by the most extensive cross-border road network in Europe. Officially, there are <a href="https://www.infrastructure-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/infrastructure/border-crossing-joint-report-final_0.pdf">208 cross-border roads</a> on the island, nearly twice as many as those crossing the EU’s entire eastern external frontier. A security response to that upsurge would be inevitable. One possible retrograde step could be to close scores of the secondary cross-border roads that were <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/tpp/pap/2000/00000028/00000003/art00007">reopened in the 1990s</a> with the support of EU funding. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-eu-played-a-key-role-in-smoothing-relations-between-london-and-dublin-60657">How the EU played a key role in smoothing relations between London and Dublin</a>
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<p>Technology could also be deployed. Motion sensors, scanners, and infra-red and surveillance cameras could be erected on border crossings. But they could also be knocked down in the dead of night. A 2018 <a href="https://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitfilestore/Filetoupload,780606,en.pdf">survey</a> conducted in the central border region found that a majority of the 600 respondents claimed they would not accept border control technology even if it was unmanned and not at the border.</p>
<p>Mobile security patrols along the unwieldy 500km of the Irish border would be almost irresistible, not least to help protect vulnerable customs officials and agrifood inspectors working in isolated border terrain. Such an introduction is made more likely by the fact that the peace and openness of the borderlands for 20 years, courtesy of European integration and the Irish peace process, has led to the <a href="https://www.thedetail.tv/articles/loss-of-more-than-40-of-border-stations-prompts-questions-over-future-policing-of-eu-uk-frontier">closure of 40%</a> of police stations on either side of the border. So it’s also likely that new security personnel would be drafted in from outside and would be unfamiliar with the area, unknown to borderlanders, and characterised by them as “nameless strangers”. Alienation and antagonism would seep into the borderlands as a result.</p>
<p>Chiefs of police on both sides of the border are acutely aware of potential post-Brexit challenges. These difficulties are posed not only by the possible return of alienation, antagonism, and by the likely strengthening of politically-motivated “dissident” Irish republicanism, but also by well-organised, cross-border smugglers motivated by profit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathal McCall received funding from the European Commission (FP7). </span></em></p>The history of smuggling across the Irish border.Cathal McCall, Professor of Politics and International Studies, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1104532019-01-30T10:11:38Z2019-01-30T10:11:38ZBrexit: why customs are central to solving the Irish border impasse<p>In what was a rare victory in recent weeks for Theresa May, the British prime minister has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47050665">won support</a> from a majority of MPs at Westminster to return to the EU and reopen Brexit negotiations. However, EU leaders <a href="https://twitter.com/Stone_SkyNews/status/1090350715300728834/photo/1">immediately</a> indicated their unwillingness to revisit the Brexit withdrawal agreement. The crux of the deadlock is the future of the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. </p>
<p>Central to this impasse is customs policy – a previously obscure aspect of UK trade relations. What has moved the issue centre stage has been the fierce attachment of the Irish government to the absence of a supervised or “hard” border on the island of Ireland. One essential reason why such a border disappeared in 1998 under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was the existence of an EU customs union between the UK and the Republic of Ireland. </p>
<p>Any customs union has two aspects. First, the abolition of internal tariffs – taxes on goods crossing borders – and second, a common external tariff wall, imposing a uniform tariff on any goods entering the customs union from outside. The advantage of such a union is clear: it avoids the need for those border checks that involve controlling for tariffs.</p>
<p>Contrary to what the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-47046104/brexit-corbyn-and-labour-would-negotiate-customs-union">appears to believe</a>, however, creating a customs union does not relieve the need for all border checks on goods. To do that, Northern Ireland (or the whole UK) must remain aligned with EU single market rules on things such health, consumer, agricultural and veterinary standards, because these too require border checks. This is why there has been a longstanding – and effective – insistence from Ireland that Northern Ireland, either alone or with the UK as a whole, both stay within a customs-union type arrangement with the UK and retain elements of the EU single market. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-why-the-eu-doesnt-want-the-uk-to-remain-in-the-backstop-indefinitely-108451">Brexit: why the EU doesn't want the UK to remain in the backstop indefinitely</a>
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<p>A customs union on its own would not be enough to completely eliminate controls on the Irish border. But it makes an essential contribution to eliminating them. Hence Irish attachment to the idea.</p>
<p>Brexiters, however, hate the idea of a customs union. It’s viewed as obstructing their great vision of a global Britain, whereby the UK negotiates its own tariff rates with other countries, securing better terms than a cumbersome, slow-moving EU. The dream is an unreal fantasy, since the UK with a population of <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/articles/overviewoftheukpopulation/november2018">66m</a> lacks anything near the bargaining power of an EU with a population of <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/european-union/population">512m</a>. </p>
<p>Labour policy of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-47046104/brexit-corbyn-and-labour-would-negotiate-customs-union">seeking a permanent UK customs union</a> with the EU, appears more economically realistic. However, a Labour bid to allow MPs a vote on this proposal <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/jan/29/brexit-vote-commons-latest-news-developments-liam-fox-says-may-now-saying-withdrawal-deal-text-must-be-rewritten-politics-live?page=with:block-5c50a5efe4b084eaaff7fb1a#block-5c50a5efe4b084eaaff7fb1a">was rejected</a> in parliament just before MPs voted in favour of “renegotiating” the Brexit deal. </p>
<h2>The fate of the ‘Irish backstop’</h2>
<p>Weeks earlier, in a protocol to November’s Brexit <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759019/25_November_Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf">withdrawal agreement</a>, May had negotiated a so-called “backstop” keeping the UK in a single customs territory with the EU unless and until an alternative future relationship acceptable to all states concerned can be agreed. In other words, to secure EU and Irish agreement, she had accepted a customs union of indefinite duration even after the end of any Brexit transition period. </p>
<p>This half-way house compromise pleased few in Westminster. A record 230-vote parliamentary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46885828">rejection of the deal</a> followed on January 15. The subsequent parliamentary vote to renegotiate the backstop has now restored Conservative Party unity. It will probably achieve little else.</p>
<p>Despite discordant voices <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-poland-irish-backstop-eu-conservative-mps-theresa-may-deal-a8738596.html">from some member states</a>, the EU has backed Ireland to the hilt. This seems wholly unlikely to change. After repeated promises of support, for the EU to alter course now would smack of betrayal of the solidarity underlying common EU membership.</p>
<h2>No deal and the border</h2>
<p>If the Brexit withdrawal agreement accompanied by the backstop is not approved by parliament before March 29, or an <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-how-article-50-could-be-extended-to-delay-uks-departure-from-the-eu-109966">extension to the article 50 withdrawal process</a> engineered, or Brexit notice unilaterally withdrawn by the UK, the parties could collectively move, sleepwalker-like, to the default option in both EU and UK law: no deal. </p>
<p>Since this would involve abandoning any customs union, Brexiters would call this victory. It would be a Pyrrhic one for the UK, however, threatening <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-deal-brexit-scenario-would-create-serious-traffic-congestion-and-supply-chain-chaos-109480">disruption</a>, business closures, unemployment, and even food shortages. It would also be ruinous for Ireland: the Irish Central Bank predicted a disorderly Brexit could reduce the Irish growth rate by <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/2019/0125/1025405-brexit/">up to 4%</a> in the first year, with a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fae218b0-1ff4-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65">predicted 6% drop</a> in long-term economic output. </p>
<p>The question also remains of what would happen on the Irish border in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Ironically, Margaritis Schinas, spokesperson for the EU commission, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-46961982">correctly pointed out in mid-January</a> that a no-deal scenario would bring with it the return of an obligation under both the EU’s Customs Code to install border checks. This is an obligation which under current law simply cannot be avoided on Ireland’s part without leaving the customs union – which in turn cannot be done without Ireland leaving the EU. Analogous World Trade Organisation obligations to impose controls would likely fall on both the UK and Ireland.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, Ireland and the EU’s stout rearguard action against the reintroduction of loathed border controls now risks reacting with Westminster’s dysfunctional Brexit and customs union politics, to produce the hardest of borders – accompanied, for good measure, by a severe economic crisis for both the UK and Ireland.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gavin Barrett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why much of the fate of the Irish border lies in the future of the UK’s customs arrangements with the EU.Gavin Barrett, Professor at the Sutherland School of Law, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1020742018-08-24T12:49:12Z2018-08-24T12:49:12ZNo-deal Brexit: experts on what the UK government’s advice means<p>The UK government is releasing a series of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/how-to-prepare-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-with-no-deal#money-and-tax">“technical notices”</a> outlining what might happen if the country leaves the European Union without striking a deal for its future relationship with the bloc. While Dominic Raab,Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, stressed that this scenario was far from the preferred option, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu/red-tape-border-delays-if-no-brexit-deal-britain-warns-firms-idUSKCN1L72AA">he added</a> that the country needs to have a “a sensible, responsible and realistic conversation about what a no-deal situation really means in practice”. </p>
<p>Here’s what the technical papers reveal about what a no-deal Brexit Britain might look like. </p>
<h2>Trade</h2>
<p><strong>Stephen Roper, professor of enterprise, University of Warwick</strong></p>
<p>Supply chain disruption at the Channel ports seems almost certain in the event of a no-deal Brexit because of the customs and border checks that will have to be introduced. Firms that do not currently export or which only export to the EU will be worst off. </p>
<p>Currently, for most goods, this requires little or no customs paperwork. This changes immediately if there is no deal and, here, the government’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/how-to-prepare-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-with-no-deal#importing-and-exporting">advice in the technical papers</a> is helpful in outlining the steps necessary before March 29 2019. Any preparations impose costs on businesses. But many of these may be prepared to wait and see what emerges from the Brexit negotiations.</p>
<p>For firms which currently export outside the EU a no-deal Brexit will bring few surprises. In the case of no deal you simply fill in exports paperwork for sales in France in the same way that in the past you did for the US or China. This, of course, costs you time and money which French consumers may or may not be prepared to pay for. Customs duties may also be payable.</p>
<p>For firms trading across the Irish border, the government’s advice is much less helpful. Here, the key suggestion seems to be to contact the “Irish government about preparations”. But who firms trading across the Irish border should contact is not clear. And, even if firms do find the right person in the Irish government, would they have any answers?</p>
<h2>Can we talk about Northern Ireland?</h2>
<p><strong>Feargal Cochrane, professor of international conflict analysis, University of Kent</strong> </p>
<p>I am a nervous flyer – borderline phobia level – though being an academic I have to suck it up and get on the plane on a regular basis. But I always know where my emergency exits are, how many rows back my seat is (it matters in terms of the crash survival stats) and I always listen to the safety demo while everyone else is squeezing out one last tweet from their phones before take off. </p>
<p>So I was very excited about the release of the UK government’s “no-deal” technical impact papers about what to do if the worst should happen – especially the paper dealing with a hard border in Ireland. But, on the day of release, no such paper emerged. Given that the Irish border is one of the most <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-the-uks-brexit-plan-and-customs-bill-leave-northern-ireland-100098">prominent obstacles</a> in the Brexit negotiations and the most talked about in terms of the implications of a no-deal outcome, this was a little surprising and disappointing.</p>
<p>The closest these papers came to being relevant to the Irish border issue, was in discussing post-Brexit trade. After the usual blether about commitments to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/good-friday-agreement-37019">the Belfast Agreement</a> and the deep and meaningful relationship between Britain and Ireland, the UK government’s advice to its citizens in Northern Ireland affected by a no-deal outcome was as follows: “We would recommend that, if you trade across the land border, you should consider whether you will need advice from the Irish government about preparations you need to make.” </p>
<p>This has gone down like the proverbial bucket of cold sick in Ireland. Manufacturing Northern Ireland condemned the advice as “madness”, while Hilary Benn, chairman of the House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee, called it an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/23/madness-northern-ireland-firms-on-ask-dublin-brexit-advice">“abdication of responsibility”</a>. The nationalist SDLP’s Brexit spokesperson Claire Hanna, claimed that the reason there was no technical paper on a no-deal hard border in Ireland was because writing one would force the UK government to confront the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/23/madness-northern-ireland-firms-on-ask-dublin-brexit-advice?CMP=share_btn_tw">level of damage</a> this would inflict.</p>
<p>The pilot of the plane has effectively shrugged their shoulders and said: “Hey I don’t know how to fly this thing, call that guy in Aer Lingus.” Even the crappiest airline tells you where the life jackets are and how to fit the oxygen mask, but so far as Air UK is concerned, over a no-deal Brexit in Northern Ireland, it’s a case of BRACE, BRACE, BRACE. </p>
<h2>The City</h2>
<p><strong>Ioannis Glinavos, senior lecturer in law, University of Westminster</strong></p>
<p>The government has finally offered some clarity on what the loss of financial passporting means in practice in the case of a no-deal Brexit. <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/authorisations/passporting">Passporting</a> allows financial services companies within the EU single market to operate across the bloc without requiring a licence in each country. What the relevant <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/banking-insurance-and-other-financial-services-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/banking-insurance-and-other-financial-services-if-theres-no-brexit-deal">government paper</a> reveals is that instead of a no-deal Brexit giving more options to a post-2019 Britain, it demotes it to a rule taker, hostage to the EU’s wishes. This loss of control is clear from the document’s oft-repeated admission that while the British government will do whatever it can to ensure continuity for those offering services to the UK, it cannot ensure the same for those exporting financial services. While this outcome could be expected, this stark admission is novel and noteworthy. </p>
<p>A no-deal outcome means a closed door to UK financial services exporters and exposes them to costs, both in seeking alternative avenues to operate by opening branches in the European Economic Area and in settling breach of contract claims, when alternatives are unavailable. Considering this, one key piece of information missing from the papers released so far is whether and how the government intends to compensate British businesses for the consequences stemming from a potential failure to reach a deal. Admitting potentially costly results of a no-deal Brexit, yet offering nothing but the hope it won’t happen, will not appease Britain’s biggest export industry. </p>
<p><strong>Alan Shipman, lecturer in economics, The Open University</strong></p>
<p>The relative calm with which UK financial services have greeted the possibility of a no-deal Brexit does not assure their high street customers there won’t be adverse impacts. UK finance is dominated by “wholesale” investment bank and financial market operations, <a href="https://www.export.gov/article?id=United-Kingdom-Financial-Sector">concentrated in the City of London</a>. The City’s decades-long global focus stops it from seething about the possible loss of some EU trade. And, even with no Brexit deal, the City can expect to keep much of its international foreign exchange, equity, bond, futures, options, corporate finance and wealth management business, as the EU seeks to avoid both the disruptions that would attend an <a href="https://www.pwc.co.uk/the-eu-referendum/brexit-cost-to-europe-of-fragmenting-financial-services.html">overnight attempt to capture these</a>, and the long-term damage that an oversized financial sector <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100415.en.html">may have inflicted on the UK’s real economy</a>.</p>
<p>While households benefited indirectly in the past from retail banks’ close links to wholesale operations, which could sometimes lower borrowers’ costs and raise savers’ returns, these have already been <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06171">weakened by a post-2008 crisis separation of the two</a>. Regulatory intervention has also stopped banks from cross-subsidising better deals for typical households by exploiting (among others) <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111202184328/http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2002/462banks.htm">small business borrowers</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/jan/02/payday-loans-caps-fca">high-cost credit users</a>. And the cheapening of mortgages by bundling the sub-prime with the solvent <a href="https://web.northeastern.edu/econsociety/what-caused-the-financial-crisis/">blew up spectacularly in 2008</a>.</p>
<p>Banking, insurance and even fund management services remain largely confined within national borders, the UK having chosen to leave when the EU is still <a href="https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/protecting-and-enhancing-the-single-market-for-financial-services-a-regulatory-perspective---speech-by-gerry-cross-director-of-policy-and-risk">far from unifying its market for them</a>. A no-deal Brexit may add to the cost and complication for those making or receiving payments (including pensions) <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2018/08/23/no-deal-brexit-will-cost-you-more-when-online-shopping-and-on-holiday-7876140/">across the new EU border</a>. But for most, the impact on what flows into their bank account (and what they need to insure against) – due to impacts on other sectors of the economy – will be noticed far more than changes in the way those services run.</p>
<h2>Medicine</h2>
<p><strong>Philip Crilly, pharmacy teaching fellow, Kingston University</strong></p>
<p>The secretary of state for health and social care, Matt Hancock, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-to-the-health-and-care-sector-preparations-for-a-potential-no-deal-brexit">told pharmaceutical companies</a> to stockpile an extra six weeks’ worth of medicines to ensure a seamless supply in case no deal is reached on Brexit. There are already <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/uk/the-sunday-telegraph-money-business/20180422/281629600870620">problems getting a supply of some drugs</a>, so any restrictions on supply could make things much worse. GPs and pharmacists will need to work closely to find alternative drug options for those affected.</p>
<p>There are many high-risk conditions in which patients must remain on a specific brand of drug, such as some epileptic medications, so discontinuing the drug isn’t an option, or patients need to be weaned off that drug slowly and started on a new one well before any stock outages occur. Ultimately, a GP and pharmacist body needs to come together to draw up a list of high-risk conditions and high-risk drugs and these must be prioritised to ensure that the drug supply doesn’t stop.</p>
<h2>Universities and research</h2>
<p><strong>Andrew Gunn, researcher in higher education policy, University of Leeds, and Helen Carasso, course leader, MSc in Higher Education Policy, University of Oxford</strong></p>
<p>No deal would have numerous ramifications for <a href="http://www.researchcghe.org/publications/the-brexit-white-paper-what-does-it-mean-for-higher-education-and-research/">higher education</a>, including <a href="https://www.erasmusplus.org.uk/">Erasmus+</a> – the EU programme which provides grants for educational exchanges. </p>
<p>The UK government has <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-philip-hammond-guarantees-eu-funding-beyond-date-uk-leaves-the-eu">promised to underwrite all</a> successful Erasmus+ bids made before withdrawal. And the UK <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-report-on-progress-during-phase-1-of-negotiations-under-article-50-teu-on-the-uks-orderly-withdrawal-from-the-eu">intends to continue participating</a> in the scheme until 2020. However, the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/erasmus-in-the-uk-if-theres-no-brexit-deal">guidance states</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[The] government will need to reach agreement with the EU for UK organisations to continue participating in Erasmus+ projects and is seeking to hold these discussions with the EU.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This indicates there is no guarantee UK students would be able to participate after March 2019. This may create difficulties for universities, for example where a language degree involves a placement in Europe as part of the course. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, <a href="https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/49350560-0d56-11e8-966a-01aa75ed71a1/language-en">more students and staff</a> from elsewhere in the EU come to the UK, compared to the number who go the other way – so it is likely that universities in the EU will be keen to find a way to keep that option open after Brexit. </p>
<p>Another issue is that UK researchers may be unable to access EU funding – such as the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020">Horizon 2020</a> scheme which is a significant funding source for <a href="https://royalsociety.org/%7E/media/policy/Publications/2017/2017-05-technopolis-role-of-EU-funding-report.PDF">UK research</a>. The chancellor has already <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-participation-in-horizon-2020-uk-government-overview">guaranteed funding</a> for all successful projects submitted to the EU prior to exit day, for their full duration. But this guarantee only covers funding for UK participants, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/horizon-2020-funding-if-theres-no-brexit-deal">not their European collaborators</a>. This may present difficulties where a UK body is currently responsible for distributing funding on to non-UK partners, if they no longer have access to this money.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102074/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Gunn has received funding from Worldwide Universities Network, the British Council (administering the Newton Fund), the UK Higher Education Academy, Kantar Public, UEFISCDI Romania, the UK Political Studies Association, the New Zealand Political Studies Association and the UK Quality Assurance Agency. Andrew Gunn concurrently holds visiting academic positions internationally.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Carasso has received funding for research through an ESRC research centre.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Roper is Director of the ESRC-funded Enterprise Research Centre at Warwick Business School.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Shipman, Feargal Cochrane, Ioannis Glinavos, and Philip Crilly do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From trade to medicines, the UK government’s ‘just in case’ planning is revealing.Ioannis Glinavos, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterAlan Shipman, Lecturer in Economics, The Open UniversityAndrew Gunn, Researcher in Higher Education Policy, University of LeedsFeargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of KentHelen Carasso, Course Leader - MSc in Higher Education Policy, University of OxfordPhilip Crilly, Pharmacy Teaching Fellow and PhD student (Digital health), Kingston UniversityStephen Roper, Professor of Enterprise and Director of the Enterprise Research Centre, Warwick Business School, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1000982018-07-18T14:01:55Z2018-07-18T14:01:55ZWhere the UK’s Brexit plan (and Customs Bill) leave Northern Ireland<p>The status of the Irish border after Brexit is the most complicated and contested part of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The UK government insists the issue can only be addressed in the formulation of a new UK-EU relationship. To this end, its most recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-relationship-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-union">white paper</a>, published on July 12, envisages a future deal in which there are no checks and controls at any UK-EU border.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Brussels, the text of primary concern remains the draft <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf">Withdrawal Agreement</a>. It contains a separate protocol on Northern Ireland and Ireland which includes the EU’s own proposal for avoiding checks at the Irish border. Under this so-called “<a href="http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/uk-withdrawal-backstop-ni-key-slides/">backstop</a>”, Northern Ireland would effectively remain part of the EU’s customs union and single market for goods – implying potential checks and controls at sea and air ports on the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.</p>
<p>This backstop is the EU’s (and, with it, Ireland’s) “insurance policy” – only to kick-in if the future trade deal is insufficient to avoid border checks and controls between the UK and EU.</p>
<h2>The Customs Bill amendments</h2>
<p>The amendments made to the <a href="https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/taxationcrossbordertrade.html">Taxation (Cross-Border Trade) Bill</a> (more commonly known as the Customs Bill) in the House of Commons on July 16 have direct bearing on this backstop. One, in particular, came by way of a pro-Brexit alliance between rebel MPs from across the house, including the Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland. </p>
<p><a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-07-16/debates/B3ED8272-3DF1-464E-8ABA-701A376E6A2C/Taxation(Cross-BorderTrade)Bill">Clause 37</a> makes it unlawful for Northern Ireland to be part of any customs territory outside that of the UK. It is obviously intended to cut dead any prospect of a customs border “in the Irish Sea”, and thus to slay the EU’s backstop proposal. </p>
<p>The nodding-through of this clause in Westminster belies the colossal political and economic repercussions of Brexit for the place it most affects. News of the amendment was met with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44857742">vocal expressions</a> of despair and frustration from several quarters in Northern Ireland. The Brexit rollercoaster has been made even more nerve-racking in Northern Ireland by a sense of democratic deficit, given the absence of a functioning Assembly and Executive and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/fighting-an-election-only-to-refuse-a-seat-sinn-fein-and-westminster-abstention-76963">policy of abstention</a> observed by Sinn Féin MPs.</p>
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<p>Nervousness centres on <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/cast-iron-backstop-guarantee-needed-following-brexit-bill-amendments-sf-1.3567930">concerns</a> that the amended Customs Bill could scupper any prospect of a backstop in the protocol, and with it, the likelihood of finalising the Withdrawal Agreement itself. </p>
<p>And where does this leave the UK’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-brexit-plan-revealed-experts-react-99862#comment_1667526">Brexit plan</a>? Well, the white paper was always intended to make the EU’s backstop unnecessary. As it states: “The operational legal text the UK will agree with the EU on the ‘backstop’ solution as part of the Withdrawal Agreement will not have to be used.” How does it propose to achieve this?</p>
<h2>The Irish dimension</h2>
<p>First, the white paper proffers a UK-wide version of the EU’s backstop for Northern Ireland, effective membership of the single market for goods. To the <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/theresa-may-warns-of-harsh-penalties-if-future-pms-break-brexit-deal-bsmcf6jwx">irritation of Brexiteers</a>, it would see the UK subscribe to a “common rulebook” with the EU. The idea is that common rules would mean no UK-EU regulatory divergence, and so no checks or restrictions between the UK and EU on their agricultural and manufactured products.</p>
<p>For goods coming from outside the EU and UK it advocates the creation of a “facilitated customs arrangement”. This is unique and untested. It would require tremendous flexibility, not to mention trust, on the part of the EU – the prospects for which are ever-diminishing. </p>
<p>And on the detail, the EU may straightforwardly query the viability and realism of this proposal – as it did in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/slides_on_uk_technical_note_on_temporary_customs_arrangements.pdf">response</a> to the UK’s proposal for a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-temporary-customs-arrangement?utm_source=2ee1e4f1-35e9-4abd-911e-a64bb2616a3e&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate">temporary customs arrangement</a>, commonly known as the UK’s “alternative backstop”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/backstop-option-for-irish-border-after-brexit-the-difference-between-eu-and-uk-proposals-explained-97963">'Backstop' option for Irish border after Brexit – the difference between EU and UK proposals explained</a>
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<p>But the Irish border is about much more than trade. The fact that the <a href="https://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitfilestore/Filetoupload,824444,en.pdf">border region</a> is so integrated now is due not only to EU membership but to the layers of contact and cooperation that exist across it. Much of these have been established since the 1998 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement">Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement</a>, which remains a cornerstone of peace in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>This complexity and sensitivity was acknowledged in the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2017)607267">priority</a> given to the Irish dimension from the start of the withdrawal negotiations. This resulted in a set of commitments from the EU and UK to Northern Ireland/Ireland in the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf">Joint Report</a> of December 2017. </p>
<p>Elements of the Joint Report are acknowledged at several points in the white paper but there are also <a href="http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/uk-white-paper-irish-dimension-1998-agreement/">serious omissions</a>. Recognising the importance of a holistic approach to the Irish border issue, negotiators in Brussels will want to assess the significance of such omissions. Are they simply due to a lack of space or is there an attempt by London to row back on previous <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-19-march-2018">promises</a>? Whether their assessment is characterised by trust or suspicion will have implications for the wider withdrawal process.</p>
<h2>Back to the backstop</h2>
<p>One thing remains unalterable: the Withdrawal Agreement <a href="http://www.thenational.scot/news/16354133.eu-chief-warns-tories-of-no-deal-if-uk-reject-irish-backstop/">cannot be finalised</a> without an insurance policy to avoid a “hard” Irish border. Whether this backstop is specific to Northern Ireland – as the European Commission has insisted – or UK-wide will only be decided by ongoing UK-EU negotiations. </p>
<p>While the language of the protocol on Northern Ireland can be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-44741402">de-dramatised</a>, the consequences of failing to agree a backstop cannot. Without a backstop for the Irish border, there will be no Withdrawal Agreement. Without this, the UK will simply leave the EU on March 29, 2019 with no transition period, no insurance policy, and no agreed framework for the future relationship.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that such an outcome would cut sharpest at the most vulnerable point in the separation of the UK from the EU: the Irish border.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katy Hayward has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada). The views expressed here do not represent those of any of these funders.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Phinnemore has previously received funding from the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council and the European Union. The views expressed here do not represent those of any of these funders.</span></em></p>Is the UK’s Brexit plan enough to avoid a hard Irish border?Katy Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastDavid Phinnemore, Professor of European Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/967352018-05-23T09:29:11Z2018-05-23T09:29:11ZCan technology and ‘max fac’ solve the Irish border question? Expert explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219759/original/file-20180521-14950-1ru31da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The old border was a source of anger, resentment and violence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/123732078@N07/17393227164">henrikjohn/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>How might the UK “take back control” of its borders without making the border in Ireland any harder. One proposal on the table is maximum facilitation (max fac). This approach does not avoid the creation of a customs border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but rather aims to make the border as invisible and frictionless as possible through the use of technology. This includes electronic customs registration, unobtrusive screening techniques and even the <a href="https://theconversation.com/finally-interesting-uses-for-the-blockchain-that-go-beyond-bitcoin-51213">technology behind Bitcoin</a>.</p>
<p>But the application of technology cannot sugarcoat the fact that being outside the customs union will have a material impact on the Irish border. Such an impact jars with the UK government’s commitment that the Irish border would have <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf">“no physical infrastructure or related checks or controls”</a>. For it is absolutely clear what a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/notice_to_stakeholders_brexit_customs_and_vat_en.pdf">UK-EU customs border would mean</a>. Goods moving between the two would be subject to customs supervision and this means checks and controls. </p>
<h2>Electronic customs</h2>
<p>Custom authorities around the world are keen to find technological means of improving efficiency. Paper forms have steadily been replaced by electronic customs declarations, which can be submitted more easily and enable quicker movement between different customs zones. For this reason, both <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/getting-ready-for-the-customs-declaration-service">the UK</a> and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/union-customs-code_en">the EU</a> are in the process of creating fully electronic customs systems. </p>
<p>Singapore has just revealed the world’s first <a href="http://fintechnews.sg/19677/blockchain/blockchain-based-e-certificate-of-origin-singapore-chamber-of-commerce">blockchain-based platform</a> for electronic certificates of origin (eCOs). <a href="https://theconversation.com/blockchain-could-challenge-the-accepted-ways-we-shape-and-manage-society-53647">Blockchain is a way of recording transactions</a> on a decentralised public register that’s very hard to tamper with, and is the technology behind bitcoin. Verification of eCOs through a private blockchain network helps prevent fraud and alterations of certificates of origin. This could address one issue that the UK and the EU face. </p>
<p>But this doesn’t go anywhere near resolving the risk of customs fraud on the Irish border. The difficulty of policing this border was exploited by smugglers even when it was heavily securitised. </p>
<p>More fundamentally, any solution would have to address the historical, economic and geographical realities of the Irish border, as well as its political and social significance. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-good-friday-agreement-in-northern-ireland-at-20-the-anthill-podcast-94610">The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland at 20 – The Anthill podcast</a>
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<h2>Gathering Information</h2>
<p>The effectiveness of maximum facilitation in customs enforcement stands or falls on the scale and quality of the information the systems receive. This type of border control requires operators and travellers to pre-register for customs checks and constantly disclose accurate information to all relevant parties.</p>
<p>When vehicles pass through approved crossings, officials can track the progress of registered vehicles (albeit without knowledge of what they are carrying). If used on a mass scale, big data can be be used to identify patterns of suspicious activity. </p>
<p>It is also possible to gather information that is not willingly – nor wittingly – submitted by those crossing the border. Sensors buried in the ground or micro <a href="http://spie.org/newsroom/0456-compact-low-cost-synthetic-aperture-radar?SSO=1">synthetic aperture radar</a> on drones in the air could detect unexpected vehicle movement across a border. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Border drones in Ireland would be intrusive and offensive.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CBP_Unmanned_aerial_vehicle.jpg">US Department of Homeland Security</a></span>
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<p>Such technology may have its uses in unpopulated, inhospitable plains where border crossings are almost automatically suspect. But as a means of monitoring a border that is literally criss-crossed with small roads and straddled by farms, households and parishes, it is as redundant as it is offensive. </p>
<p>Just think how the residents of Dover or Holyhead would respond to the idea of being constantly surveilled by drones or mobile phone tracing. Those in the Irish border region have recent experience of close surveillance and border controls. Twenty years on from the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, the negative consequences of militarised security at the Irish border remain evident: economically, socially and politically.</p>
<p>It is absolutely critical to appreciate that the achievement of a porous, unmonitored Irish border is a much-cherished sign of the peace process. Hence the promise to avoid a hard border. </p>
<h2>Checking goods</h2>
<p>Another concern about customs checks is the question of how these might occur. Goods container inspections require physical infrastructure and human resources. Experience on the Irish border shows that routine customs inspections can escalate into <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/23/northern-ireland-brexit-border-old-wounds-troubles">serious operations requiring security protection</a>. Politicians hope technology can alleviate this.</p>
<p>There have been steady advances in non intrusive screening techniques. Vapour analysis using what’s known as <a href="https://nmi3.eu/neutron-research/techniques-for-/chemical-analysis.html">neutron-activated spectroscopy</a> could enable customs to detect the presence of certain chemical compounds. <a href="https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/august-2010/accelerator-apps-cargo-scanning">Gamma ray scanning</a> can be used to give a type of x-ray image of what is inside a container, while <a href="http://www.lanl.gov/org/padste/adeps/physics/thrusts/muon-tomography.php">Muon tomography</a> can help customs assess the volume and location of contents in a container.</p>
<p>But these technologies are very expensive and impractical. They are designed for a particular task, such as detecting a specific type of contraband, and are neither speedy nor invisible.</p>
<p>Human checks on goods will remain critical to customs supervision. At the very least this will require warehouses large enough to inspect freight. Locating them away from the border does not mean no border controls, only less effective ones. For the further from the border these are located, the greater the opportunity for cargo to be swapped or stolen. </p>
<h2>Sugar coating the real problem</h2>
<p>Maximum facilitation can do no more than its name suggests – facilitate customs procedures. It cannot end the need for customs checks. In fact, it relies upon them. </p>
<p>The more hidden the technology monitoring a customs border is, the greater the need for surveillance and data capture. Movements, transactions and communications across the Irish border are a precious part of everyday life for so many in Ireland, north and south. To gather data on such movements, transactions and communications for the purpose of enforcing a customs border that no one in Northern Ireland wishes to see is hardly a viable (let alone democratic) solution. </p>
<p>Max fac could certainly conjure up more efficient and surreptitious border controls than have previously existed between the UK and Ireland. But the sugar-coating of technology would hardly last long before the bitter reality of enforcing a UK-EU customs border in Ireland was revealed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katy Hayward receives funding from SSHRC (Canada) 'Borders in Globalization' project. Research contributing to this article was funded through the ESRC project TRUST Tracing Risk and Uncertainty in Security Technology (ES/K011332/1).</span></em></p>After Brexit, politicians hope that technology can help us avoid a hard border in Ireland.Katy Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/823452017-08-16T08:57:49Z2017-08-16T08:57:49ZThe UK’s plan for post-Brexit customs is more hopeful than realistic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182094/original/file-20170815-5485-1qursx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Things could soon get complicated.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK government has issued its <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/637748/Future_customs_arrangements_-_a_future_partnership_paper.pdf">official position paper</a> on the issue of the customs union and Brexit. It emphasises a desire for the “most frictionless trade possible in goods between the UK and the EU” and proposes two ways of achieving this in the long term, while making it clear that the UK will leave the EU’s customs union when it leaves the EU. </p>
<p>The first option it proposes is a “streamlined customs arrangement” which sounds like a form of free trade agreement (but there is no mention of this as an aim). It involves keeping in place a number of the existing customs arrangements and using (untested) electronic technology to ensure the smooth processing of all documentation. The stated aim is to keep border arrangements as close as possible to what they are now to maintain continuity for businesses.</p>
<p>The second possibility is an untried concept of “a new customs partnership”. Exactly what this will involve is only hinted at, but not spelled out. It involves applying EU tariffs on goods that are destined for final consumption in the EU.</p>
<p>In the meantime, by March 2019, the UK is to have in place a new temporary customs union arrangement with the EU, under which nothing changes except that the UK will have no say in its tariffs, but can potentially negotiate (but not apply) free trade agreements with third countries. </p>
<p>This is extremely ambitious, to say the least. It is not impossible, but it effectively means negotiating the most complex customs union that exists outside the EU for a three-year interim period and then getting rid of it. And, crucially, relies on the EU accepting the proposal.</p>
<h2>Same, but different</h2>
<p>By definition, the kind of customs union the UK is proposing with the EU is not the same as the one it is leaving. A customs union is a type of trade agreement whereby members agree to abolish all tariffs on trade between them and to have a common external tariff on goods coming in from third countries. This allows members to dispense with the need for customs posts at borders and lets trade go through much more smoothly (and quickly).</p>
<p>In practice, trade agreements can be registered at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as “customs unions” so long as “substantially all” trade is covered. This means that border checks are still necessary to deal with any traffic that may contain goods not exempt from tariffs. For example, Turkey has a customs union deal with the EU but it does not cover agricultural goods so every truck has to be checked for these at the border crossing.</p>
<p>On the other hand, a free trade area (such as the EEA) is a group of countries that don’t charge tariffs on the products “originating” from other member states but do not have a common external tariff. There are customs checks within free trade areas to ensure that tariffs are collected on third country goods as they cross an internal frontier and also to collect tariffs on goods made in partner countries that use imported materials in large quantities. Every consignment crossing a border must have documentation confirming its origin, a requirement that does not exist for a customs union.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182100/original/file-20170815-16750-11g7j8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Goods could be subject to border delays.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
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<p>This all goes back to the original purpose of the EU. It started out as a customs union that had removed tariffs on trade by 1969, but there still remained customs barriers for non-tariff purposes such as checking technical standards compliance. By 1992, this had evolved into the EU single market, allowing for the free flow of goods and services – and no border checks. </p>
<p>Norway is a member of the single market but is not in the customs union. This means its technical standards and verification testing and certification procedures for these are harmonised with the EU, with supra-national enforcement. Lorries travelling between Norway and Sweden (which is in the EU) are potentially subject to border checks for whether their load satisfies rules of origin, but there are no technical checks.</p>
<p>It is the combination of the customs union and single market that created a genuinely frictionless market. Leaving the customs union means that, without a free trade agreement, the UK and the EU must in principle charge tariffs on each other’s products under WTO rules. And unless an agreement has been reached to recognise UK regulations and standards, there will still need to be technical checks on goods for safety. Clearly, in practice, there would be spot checks on vehicles at the UK-EU border. </p>
<p>Outside of a free trade agreement with the EU, the UK would need to ensure comprehensive paperwork to document compliance with EU rules and origin status. This would also involve random spot checks at borders to verify the paperwork was in order and also some more time-consuming physical checks to ensure the paperwork and the physical goods matched. </p>
<h2>Reality bites</h2>
<p>The UK government’s new paper addresses many of these issues – but largely in aspirational terms. Its emphasis on the power of technology to smooth over the transition fails to take into account that physical checks will be necessary – something <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/close-sweden-norway-ties-despite-eu-border-dividing-them-1.2683072">Norway has found</a> in its cross-border trade with Sweden. This means the first option of a “streamlined” customs arrangement will likely still involve a lot of red tape and delays for businesses, which must prove they meet the EU’s standards.</p>
<p>It is also very hard to see how the second option proposed of “a new customs partnership with the EU” could work. The position paper’s suggestion that the UK could mimic the EU external tariffs for goods destined for consumption in the EU (in the hope that this would exempt them from further customs checks) would involve complex tracking procedures. This would be extremely hard to apply to components buried inside finished products. </p>
<p>It would also require a supra-national mechanism to enforce or at least monitor compliance with EU standards, if EU states are not to have the right to stop UK goods at the border. Yet there is not much appetite for supra-national bodies in the UK – after all, the whole point of Brexit was to “take back control”.</p>
<p>Having said all this, the question remains: why would the EU accept these proposals? The UK suggests that it would be in everyone’s economic interests to do so, but EU officials have already <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/15/european-minister-pours-cold-water-on-uk-interim-trade-proposal-brexit">expressed scepticism</a>. It could well be wishful thinking – if not some kind of negotiating strategy by the UK government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Holmes does not currently receive any funding for Brexit-related research. He is affiliated with the UK Trade Policy observatory (UKTPO), a partnership between the University of Sussex and Chatham House, and is a member of the Labour Party. </span></em></p>A breakdown of the UK’s position paper on the customs union.Peter Holmes, Reader in Economics, University of Sussex Business School, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/739092017-03-07T00:58:56Z2017-03-07T00:58:56ZHow to protect your private data when you travel to the United States<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159457/original/image-20170305-29009-1t5duq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What do you do if a border official asks for your phone PIN?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ervins Strauhmanis/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On January 30 – three days after US President Donald Trump signed an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states">executive order</a> restricting immigration from several predominantly Muslim countries – an American scientist employed by NASA <a href="http://www.theverge.com/2017/2/12/14583124/nasa-sidd-bikkannavar-detained-cbp-phone-search-trump-travel-ban">was detained at the US border</a> until he relinquished his phone and PIN to border agents. Travellers are also reporting <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-muslim-immigration-ban-facebook-check-iraq-sudan-syria-mana-yegani-a7551256.html">border agents reviewing their Facebook feeds</a>, while the Department of Homeland Security <a href="https://fcw.com/articles/2017/02/07/kelly--dhs-social-media-border.aspx">considers requiring social media passwords as a condition of entry</a>. </p>
<p>Intimidating travellers into revealing passwords is a much greater invasion of privacy than inspecting their belongings for contraband. </p>
<p>Technology pundits have already recommended steps to prevent privacy intrusion at the US border, including <a href="https://qz.com/912950/never-bring-your-phone-on-an-international-flight-unless-you-want-us-border-control-and-customs-to-take-your-data/">leaving your phone at home</a>, <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/14/reg_guide_to_data_security_when_entering_us/">encrypting your hard drive</a> and <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/02/guide-getting-past-customs-digital-privacy-intact/">enabling two-factor authentication</a>. However, these steps only apply to US citizens. Visitors need a totally different strategy to protect their private information.</p>
<h2>The problem</h2>
<p>Giving border agents access to your devices and accounts is problematic for three reasons:</p>
<p>1) It violates the privacy of not only you but also your friends, family, colleagues and anyone else who has shared private messages, pictures, videos or data with you.</p>
<p>2) Doctors, lawyers, scientists, government officials and many business people’s devices contain sensitive data. For example, your lawyer might be carrying documents subject to attorney-client privilege. Providing such privileged information to border agents may be illegal.</p>
<p>3) In the wake of revelations from <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/long-list-what-we-know-thanks-private-manning/">Chelsea Manning</a> and <a href="http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/the-nsa-leaks-a-summary/">Edward Snowden</a>, we have good reason to distrust the US government’s intentions for our data.</p>
<p>This problem cannot be solved through normal cybersecurity countermeasures.</p>
<p>Encryption, passwords and two-factor authentication are useless if someone intimidates you into revealing your passwords. Leaving your devices at home or <a href="https://www.howtogeek.com/213295/how-to-wipe-securely-erase-your-devices-before-disposing-of-or-selling-them/">securely wiping them</a> before travelling is ineffective if all of your data is in the cloud and accessible from any device. What do you do if border agents simply ask for your Facebook password?</p>
<p>And leaving your phone at home, wiping your devices and deactivating your social media will only increase suspicion.</p>
<h2>What you can do</h2>
<p>First, recognise that lying to a border agent (including giving them fake accounts) or obstructing their investigation will land you in serious trouble, and that agents have sweeping power to deny entry to the US. So you need a strategy where you can fully cooperate without disclosing private data or acting suspicious.</p>
<p>Second, recognise that there are two distinct threats:</p>
<p>1) Border agents extracting private or sensitive data from devices (phone, tablet, laptop, camera, USB drive, SIM card, etc.) that you are carrying.</p>
<p>2) Border agents compelling you to disclose your passwords, or extracting your passwords from your devices.</p>
<h2>Protecting your devices</h2>
<p>To protect your privacy when travelling, here’s what you can do.</p>
<p>First, use a cloud-based service such as Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive or Box.com to backup all of your data. Use another service like Boxcryptor, Cryptomator or Sookasa to protect your data such that neither the storage provider nor government agencies can read it. While these services are not foolproof, they significantly increase the difficulty of accessing your data.</p>
<p>Next, cross the border with no or clean devices. Legally-purchased entertainment should be fine, but do not sync your contacts, calendar, email, social media apps, or anything that requires a password. </p>
<p>If a border agent asks you to unlock your device, simply do so and hand it over. There should be nothing for them to find. You can access your data from the cloud at your destination.</p>
<h2>Protecting your cloud data</h2>
<p>However, border agents do not need your device to access your online accounts. What happens if they simply demand your login credentials? Protecting your cloud data requires a more sophisticated strategy. </p>
<p>First, add all of your passwords to a password manager such as LastPass, KeePass or Dashlane. While you’re at it, change any passwords that are easy to guess, easy to remember or are duplicates. </p>
<p>Before leaving home, generate a new master password for your password manager that is difficult to guess <em>and</em> difficult to remember. Give the password to a trusted third party such as your spouse or IT manager. Instruct him or her not to provide the password until you call from your destination. (Don’t forget to memorise their phone number!)</p>
<p>If asked, you can now honestly say that you don’t know or have access to any of your passwords. If pressed, you can explain that your passwords are stored in a password vault precisely so that you cannot be compelled to divulge them, if, for example, you were abducted while travelling. </p>
<p>This may sound pretty suspicious, but we’re not done.</p>
<p>Raise the issue at your workplace. Emphasise the risks of leaking trade secrets or sensitive, protected or legally privileged data about customers, employees, strategy or research while travelling. </p>
<p>Encourage your organisation to develop a policy of holding passwords for travelling employees and lending out secure travel-only devices. Make the policy official, print it and bring it with you when you travel.</p>
<p>Now if border agents demand passwords, you don’t know them, and if they demand you explain how you can not know your own passwords, you can show them your organisation’s policy. </p>
<p>This may all seem like an instruction manual for criminals, but actual criminals will likely just create fake accounts. Rather, I believe it’s important to provide this advice to those who have done nothing illegal but who value their privacy in the face of intrusive government security measures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Ralph has received funding from the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and Google. </span></em></p>Following reports of travellers to the US being forced to unlock their phones for border officials, here are some steps you can take to prevent your personal data from being exposed.Paul Ralph, Senior Lecturer in Computer Science, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/706402016-12-22T19:10:01Z2016-12-22T19:10:01ZHow to tackle the rising tide of poaching in Australia’s tropical seas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151344/original/image-20161222-4063-zy1dm2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Giant clam shells seized by authorities in waters off Australia's north.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">NT government</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>High-value marine species in waters off northern Australia are at increasing risk of poaching by foreign fishing crews, according to <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-06/spike-in-illegal-fishing-australian-waters-rising-asian-tension/7819024">figures</a> from the Australian Fisheries Management Authority. The number of <a href="http://www.gympietimes.com.au/news/breaking-illegal-foreign-fishing-boat-intercepted-/3117099/">foreign fishing boats caught</a> in Australian waters increased from six in 2014–15 to 20 in 2015–16. </p>
<p>These fishers have evidently come to poach species that fetch high prices and have been overfished elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. They seek “<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1890/140312/abstract">lootable resources</a>” – species that are attractive to the black market because they are expensive, easy to catch and weakly regulated.</p>
<p>Among the species being targeted are <a href="http://www.afma.gov.au/vietnamese-fishing-vessel-apprehended-gladstone/">sea cucumbers</a>, <a href="http://www.afma.gov.au/environmental-crime-illegal-fishing/">giant clams</a>, <a href="http://www.afma.gov.au/illegal-foreign-fishing-vessels-apprehended-far-north-queensland-coast/">turtles and sharks (specifically their fins)</a>. </p>
<p>Many of these species are listed as vulnerable or endangered by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (<a href="http://www.iucnredlist.org/">IUCN</a>). Some are even protected from trade by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (<a href="https://www.cites.org/">CITES</a>).</p>
<h2>A long history of poaching</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.afma.gov.au/vietnamese-fishing-vessel-apprehended-gladstone/">apprehended vessels</a> have been primarily from Vietnam and Indonesia. Last month, a Vietnamese fishing vessel stopped inside the Conservation Park Zone of the Coral Sea Commonwealth Marine Reserve was found to be carrying 3 tonnes of partially processed sea cucumbers. Dried sea cucumber, called <em>bêche-de-mer</em>, can fetch more than A$300 per kg when sold in China.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/151356/original/image-20161222-30908-bldha5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sea cucumbers and shark fins on sale in Hong Kong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Steven Purcell</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Timor and Arafura Seas have long histories of <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-2979.2009.00325.x/abstract">illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing due to regional fishery expansion and displacement</a>. Some <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-06/spike-in-illegal-fishing-australian-waters-rising-asian-tension/7819024">scientists</a> believe the tensions in the South China Sea are pushing Southeast Asian fishermen into Australian waters. It is also possible that Indonesia’s <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/06/14/protecting-our-waters-from-fisheries-crimes.html">stricter fisheries policy</a> is shifting fishing patterns in the region.</p>
<p>But apart from economic loss as resources are poached from Australian waters, what are the impacts? A <a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Oceanography-and-Marine-Biology-An-Annual-Review-Volume-54/Hughes-Hughes-Smith-Dale/p/book/9781498747981">new review</a> shows that species such as sea cucumber can play crucial roles in boosting the health of coral reef systems. This is important at a time when reefs are facing <a href="http://theconversation.com/great-barrier-reef-needs-far-more-help-than-australia-claims-in-its-latest-report-to-unesco-69882">intense stress</a> from climate change and coastal development. </p>
<p>Nine species of sea cucumbers from Australian waters were <a href="http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/281/1781/20133296.abstract">recently declared</a> threatened with extinction globally by the IUCN. Removal of some marine fauna might degrade the resilience of coral reef ecosystems to broad-scale stressors. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>In June, Immigration and Border Protection Minister Peter Dutton <a href="http://www.afma.gov.au/illegal-foreign-fishing-vessels-apprehended-far-north-queensland-coast/">said</a>: “Preventing illegal fishers from plundering Australia’s well-managed fisheries is every bit as important as stopping the people smugglers and illegal arrivals.”</p>
<p>Although the Australian Border Force has the capacity to apprehend illegal fishing boats, much of the poaching happens on distant coral reefs. One problem is that illegal fishing boats can plunder lootable resources and get out of Australian waters before Border Force can reach them. So while regulation might be well enforced on reefs within the Great Barrier Reef, for instance, offshore reefs are comparably weakly regulated.</p>
<p>But stronger monitoring and enforcement might not be the only solution anyway. <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0165633">My team’s research</a>, which involved interviewing sea cucumber fishers from Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga and New Caledonia, suggests that they see themselves as having few other livelihood options besides fishing. This means that even if their fishery collapsed or was closed down by authorities, they would simply move elsewhere or fish a different species.</p>
<p>Many fishers from Southeast Asia have doubtless been lured to poaching in Australian waters by similar issues. Curbing the rise in poaching therefore requires not only continued enforcement but also, crucially, foreign aid investment that can help these fishers to diversify their livelihoods.</p>
<p>Australia recently reshaped its <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/australian-aid-promoting-prosperity-reducing-poverty-enhancing-stability.aspx">foreign aid policy</a> to focus predominantly on delivering “economic growth and poverty reduction”. Organisations such as the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) are investing in overseas research and development projects to provide more income-generating opportunities in fisheries and aquaculture. Support to Southeast Asian countries makes up 49% of the budget for <a href="http://aciar.gov.au/programarea/Fisheries">fisheries and aquaculture projects</a>.</p>
<p>Australia’s approach to reducing poaching of threatened resources should therefore be multifaceted. Helping foreign fishers deal with their own problems of overfishing by giving them more options to earn a living will ultimately help to tackle the root cause of marine poaching.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Purcell receives funding from the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hampus Eriksson participates in projects funded by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. </span></em></p>Prized species such as sea cucumbers are increasingly being poached from Australian waters. But if foreign aid can give fishing crews alternative livelihoods, the problem could ease.Steven Purcell, Senior Rearch Fellow in Fisheries Ecology, Southern Cross UniversityHampus Eriksson, Senior research fellow, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/688152016-11-16T19:09:21Z2016-11-16T19:09:21ZAlien invaders: the illegal reptile trade is a serious threat to Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146152/original/image-20161116-31144-7s0w25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Boa constrictors are frequently found at large in Australia, despite being banned.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/56361113@N00/74821060">Marcos André/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australians are <a href="https://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/wildlife-trade/exotics">banned from keeping non-native reptiles as pets</a>, but there is a nevertheless a thriving illegal trade in these often highly prized animals. We have documented the threat that these species – many of them venomous or potentially carrying exotic diseases – pose to people and wildlife in Australia.</p>
<p>In a study published in <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/conl.12301/full">Conservation Letters</a>, we estimate that of 28 alien reptile species illegally traded in Victoria between 1999 and 2012, 5 of them (18%) would have the potential to establish themselves in the wild if they escape or are released. Our findings also indicate that smaller alien reptiles are more likely to establish in the wild in Australia.</p>
<p>Worryingly, more than a third of these illegal reptile species are highly venomous snakes (10 out of the 28 species). The presence of 10 alien venomous snakes represents a serious human health hazard, even in Australia which is already home to <a href="http://www.australiangeographic.com.au/topics/science-environment/2012/07/australias-10-most-dangerous-snakes">some of the most venomous snakes in the world</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146180/original/image-20161116-13555-ugbrun.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Our warning of the dangers posed by the illegal reptile trade.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Environment Institute, University of Adelaide</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Previous research has focused on the <a href="http://www.nature.com/news/biodiversity-the-ravages-of-guns-nets-and-bulldozers-1.20381">overharvesting of wild populations</a> to meet the demand for illegal wildlife products such as traditional medicine ingredients and other commodities, as well as live animals themselves. </p>
<p>But the trade in illegal wildlife poses a risk not just to the species being trafficked, but also to the people and ecosystems potentially exposed to new hazardous alien species as a result. Unfortunately, these risks are often overlooked or underestimated by wildlife agencies.</p>
<h2>Frogs take their diseases with them</h2>
<p>Effective biosecurity measures are crucial for tackling these threats. Are Australia’s biosecurity activities as good as they are made out to be in <a href="https://au.tv.yahoo.com/plus7/border-security/">popular television shows</a> about customs officers policing our borders? </p>
<p>Let’s look at the example of ranaviruses, an emerging disease that kills huge numbers of amphibians around the world. The introduction of these viruses to Australia could be catastrophic for native frogs. Alien frogs transported as unintentional stowaways can carry ranavirus, so intercepting those alien frogs will also prevent the spread of these pathogens. </p>
<p>In an <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1365-2664.12749/full">earlier study</a>, we examined the effectiveness of Australian biosecurity activities for stopping the introduction of dangerous alien ranaviruses. Our main conclusion was that existing biosecurity measures have significantly reduced the likelihood of introduction of alien ranaviruses. </p>
<p>Moreover, biosecurity activities do not need to intercept every single incoming alien frog in order to reduce significantly the likelihood that new diseases will be introduced. This is particularly good news for threatened <a href="https://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/publications/factsheet-frogs-australia">native frogs</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146147/original/image-20161115-31132-vaq520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Puff adders have been illegally kept in Victoria, despite being a seriously dangerous pet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Julius Rückert/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A way forward</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, many other countries seem to have <a href="http://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms12485">inadequate systems for keeping unwanted species out</a>, despite the many <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-agriculture-study-finds-developing-countries-most-threatened-by-invasive-pest-species-61280">social, economic and ecological impacts</a> that alien species cause across the world. </p>
<p>This situation paints a bleak picture for the future of biodiversity, with alien species increasingly wreaking havoc across all environments. But we believe there is <a href="http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/60/8/626.full">hope and a way forward</a> – as long as countries are willing to work much harder to combat the threats posed by alien species. </p>
<p>Foremost, we need to improve our understanding of the importance and drivers of transport pathways through which alien species travel. Armed with that knowledge, we can plan more effective management – although a lack of data is <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v539/n7627/full/539031e.html">no excuse for delay in the meantime</a>. Prevention is always <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10530-016-1332-x">better than cure</a>, so our number one goal should be to prevent the introduction of alien species, rather than simply tackling the problems they cause.</p>
<p>Some important lessons emerge from our research. The illegal wildlife trade and the transport of stowaways are global issues. Therefore no country, however effective its biosecurity, can solve its problems on its own. Multilateral biosecurity agreements will be necessary to manage both stowaways and the illegal wildlife trade. </p>
<p>In Australia, we need to raise public awareness about alien species. We have to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-citizen-science-is-great-news-for-our-native-wildlife-63866">enlist the public</a> in reporting suspicious activities and the presence of alien species at large. Meanwhile, <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-australia-needs-biosecurity-20105">supporting biosecurity activities is a no-brainer</a>. Biosecurity is a responsibility shared by all Australians, and the general public have a role to support biosecurity activities, even if that means a few more minutes to clear biosecurity ports and airports. Be on the lookout for potential alien species, and if you spot anything unusual, report it to the <a href="http://www.agriculture.gov.au/pests-diseases-weeds/report">Department of Agriculture and Water Resources</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pablo Garcia-Diaz receives funding from the Invasive Animals CRC and the Department of Education and Training (Australian Government). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Ross receives funding from the ARC, NHMRC, and D2D CRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phill Cassey receives funding from Australian Research Council and the Invasive Animals CRC. </span></em></p>Keeping non-native reptiles as pets is against the law – with good reason. Alien species traded on the black market can potentially establish themselves in the wild if they are released or escape.Pablo García-Díaz, PhD candidate in invasion ecology, University of AdelaideJoshua Ross, Associate Professor in Applied Mathematics, University of AdelaidePhill Cassey, Assoc Prof in Invasion Biogeography and Biosecurity, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/631792016-07-28T10:58:49Z2016-07-28T10:58:49ZShould the UK remain in the EU customs union after Brexit?<p>The UK government is currently considering what relationship it should seek to negotiate with the EU after Brexit. One option on the table is continued participation in the EU’s customs union, but Liam Fox, the new trade secretary, <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/e87614da-533a-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60">is urging</a> the prime minister, Theresa May, to pull the UK out of it. </p>
<p>When it comes to world trade law, there are clear distinctions between a free trade area and a customs union. Under the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm">law</a> of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a free trade area means that substantially all of the barriers to trade in goods (there is no WTO equivalent for services) between the countries in the area have been abolished. A customs union goes a step further: the countries concerned not only abolish substantially all barriers to trade in goods, they also have the same rules for trading with the outside world. </p>
<h2>Free trade area vs customs union</h2>
<p>As a practical example, Canada, the US and Mexico have a free trade deal, known as <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta">NAFTA</a>. But the US embargoes trade with Cuba, whereas Canada and Mexico trade with that country. Mexico signed a trade deal with the EU years ago; Canada has <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/">just agreed one</a>; and the US is still negotiating one, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ttip">Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a>.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the EU is a customs union. This means its members, including the UK, cannot sign separate trade agreements with countries such as India or China. It is, however, possible for the UK to sign a more general type of commercial “trade deal”, such as selling aircraft to India. </p>
<p>Around the world, free trade areas are more popular than customs unions. But states still do sign customs unions, because having common rules on trade with the outside world simplifies the trade between members of the customs union. </p>
<p>For example, in the NAFTA free trade area, when goods are shipped from Canada to the US, American officials must perform a number of checks. They must check to see whether they are actually Canadian goods (which can enter tariff-free), Cuban goods (in principle banned), or goods from any other country (which are subject to a tariff). Whether a good is Canadian or not depends on complex “rules of origin”, which set out how much of a car (and thousands of other products) must be produced in Canada for it to be called Canadian. </p>
<p>On the other hand, if products from China or Brazil are shipped through EU countries, such as from Rotterdam to Harwich, there is no need to carry out such checks. This is because the products would have been treated exactly the same way when they entered any EU country. </p>
<h2>Stay or go?</h2>
<p>When Britain triggers <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">Article 50 of the EU treaty</a> to leave the EU, it does not necessarily have to leave the customs union. The EU has signed customs union agreements with some micro-states such as San Marino, as well as with Turkey. So the UK could ask to retain participation in the European customs union if it wants to.</p>
<p>Leaving would have both pros and cons for the UK. On the one hand, it would mean that the UK could sign free trade deals with more countries – although not everyone sees the appeal of such deals. On the other hand, it would mean <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-unforeseen-cost-of-brexit-customs-62864">extra paperwork</a> for British exporters to the EU to prove that their product is fully “made in Britain”.</p>
<p>There is a particular issue with Northern Ireland, too. If the UK leaves the EU customs union, in principle there would need to be checks at the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, because they would no longer be applying the same law on trade with the outside world. If there weren’t checks, and the UK had a future free trade deal with China that was different to EU-China’s trade relationship, Chinese products could be shipped to Northern Ireland and then cross the border into the EU tariff-free, circumventing the EU rules. </p>
<p>In theory, it’s possible for Northern Ireland alone to remain part of the EU customs union – but that would mean creating economic barriers between its six counties and the rest of the UK. <a href="http://www.eureferendum.com/blogview.aspx?blogno=86001">Another approach</a> is to adapt an agreement that the EU already has with Switzerland (not in the EU, or the EU customs union) which sets out special procedures to facilitate trade despite the different trade rules with the outside world. That would mean the UK continuing to apply some of the EU’s customs law, however. </p>
<p>Time will tell which approach the UK government prefers – and whether the EU will agree to its requests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Peers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The difference between a customs union and a free trade area – explained.Steve Peers, Professor of Law, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/628642016-07-22T10:43:44Z2016-07-22T10:43:44ZThe unforeseen cost of Brexit – customs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131576/original/image-20160722-26835-2zqbtp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Take back control” was one of the Leave campaign’s main battle cries in Britain’s referendum on EU membership. But reintroducing customs controls on UK-EU trade will have a cost for both business and government. Although it is not yet clear what Brexit will look like, the added costs from trade-related red tape that will result from leaving the EU are certain. And these costs are likely to be significant without adequate reform to customs procedures.</p>
<p>At present, all goods entering the UK from outside the EU require an <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/importing-goods-from-outside-the-eu">import declaration</a>. The most common and practical way of complying is to use the logistics providers carrying the goods as agents. Their fees are often dependent on the specific commercial arrangements, but can range from just a few pounds to £25 plus for declaring a sea container. Once Brexit is in place, UK-EU trade will be subject to similar costs.</p>
<p>According to the World Customs Organisation’s latest <a href="http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/what-is-the-wco/annual-reports.aspx">Annual Report for 2015-16</a>, the UK made 70.5m import declarations and 6.5m export declarations per year. Based on <a href="https://www.uktradeinfo.com/Statistics/BuildYourOwnTables/Pages/Table.aspx">current trade figures</a> it would be fair for UK Customs (HMRC) to expect the number of customs declarations to double once Britain leaves the EU. A corresponding increase in declarations would also arise on the continent since each export declaration at one end of the supply chain is followed by an import declaration at the other. Further analysis is required, but it is easy to imagine an additional cost to UK-EU trade in the order of several billion pounds per year.</p>
<p>Then there is also the risk of physical inspections. Depending on the nature and duration of the inspection, these costs could be anywhere between <a href="http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/2143/">£52 and £1,540 per consignment</a>. Ports would need to accommodate the increased demands for inspection facilities. This would be at the expense of losing valuable space for commercial activities.</p>
<h2>Reams of red tape</h2>
<p>It is likely that any post-Brexit agreement with the European Union will require businesses to comply with additional documentary requirements – as is, for example, the case for preferential trade between the EU and Norway, Switzerland or within the Customs Union with <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-812-european-community-preferences-trade-with-turkey/notice-812-european-community-preferences-trade-with-turkey">Turkey</a>. Additional requirements might include documents (or their electronic equivalent) to prove <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-828-tariff-preferences-rules-of-origin-for-various-countries/notice-828-tariff-preferences-rules-of-origin-for-various-countries">origin</a> – which can be technical and complex – or that goods are free from customs control.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the adverse impact of trade-related red tape does not stop here. UK businesses require HMRC to give the highest levels of service. The UK’s location as a place to do business depends in part on HMRC’s ability to clear goods through the ports and border within hours rather than days. Whether HMRC’s infrastructure and supporting electronic systems at ports and elsewhere in the private sector are up to the job is anyone’s guess, especially since applicable laws, rules and procedures still need to be agreed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/131584/original/image-20160722-26837-964wqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There could be hold-ups to trade ahead.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Additional red tape from other non-customs border agencies, such as for quarantine and health-related controls, remain unclear, too. An extended period of uncertainty about rules and procedures, as well as the necessary supporting systems, is inevitable. This will be further compounded by the fact that putting the systems that support trade and customs in place, tends to take years, rather than months.</p>
<p>Last but not least, there will be resourcing issues for HMRC. According to the <a href="http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/what-is-the-wco/%7E/media/WCO/Public/Global/PDF/Topics/Research/Annual%20reports/AR%20English%20Final%202015_2016.ashx">World Customs Organisation’s Annual Report</a>, the UK has about 5,000 customs staff. But the actual figure of staff with experience in the administration of international trade related customs procedures is likely to be significantly less. This compares poorly with similar-sized countries, such as France (16,500 customs staff). An extra 5,000 officers, for example, with relevant overheads such as office space and pension contributions, could easily amount to £250m per year (£4.8m per week) for the government to fund. </p>
<p>One further concern is that HMRC has very few experts in key technical areas, such as in “valuation” or “origin” – two prerequisites for determining the correct amount of tariff duties. Business practitioners who I have spoken to and deal with customs on a regular basis have highlighted that several of these individuals are close to retirement.</p>
<p>With UK-EU trade in goods worth £354 billion, appropriate measures must be put in place. An increase of buffer stock to counter administrative and inspection related delays at ports and borders is one option; but the resulting costs would undermine competitiveness. Significant investment in staff and a system to accommodate the new trade and customs landscape might be another.</p>
<p>The overall scale of additional costs still needs to be assessed – on behalf of the businesses that will be affected, but also for HMRC’s development. As so often, the devil is in the detail. And unless innovative solutions to cutting the red tape resulting from the UK leaving the EU can be found, end consumers are likely to bear much of the cost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62864/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Grainger has been the recipient of research funding from UK and international sources. On occasion he will also work with relevant International Organisations and lend advice to Governments and Companies on Trade Facilitation related issues.</span></em></p>The added costs from trade-related red tape that will result from leaving the EU are certain and they will be costly for business and government.Andrew Grainger, Assistant Professor in Logistics and Supply Chain Management, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/556992016-03-28T19:07:52Z2016-03-28T19:07:52ZSmall businesses are being hit with import duty as Customs undermines trade policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/116306/original/image-20160324-20810-13grwxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The "free into store" trade terms are being eroded for Australian small business.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Image sourced from www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One of the most popular trade terms that small businesses take advantage of when importing goods into Australia is Delivery Duty Paid (DDP), which makes the seller responsible for any import duties and customs charges. </p>
<p>But this internationally established trade term, often referred to as “free into store”, is being eroded in a way that is having detrimental effects for small businesses, and ultimately customers.</p>
<p>DDP is popular amongst SMEs because they will typically not have in-house administrators; they will pay extra to ensure the seller deals with insurance, shipping, and – importantly – all export and import costs and arrangements. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.incotermsexplained.com/the-incoterms-rules/the-eleven-rules-in-brief/delivered-duty-paid/">DDP Incoterm</a>, a rule formulated by the International Chamber of Commerce, stipulates:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The seller bears all the costs and risks involved in bringing the goods to the place of destination and has an obligation to clear the goods not only for export but also for import, to pay any duty for both export and import and to carry out all customs formalities. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, recent practices by Australian Customs - and a case from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) - have rendered the DDP a risky term for Australian buyers. </p>
<p>Previously, Australian Customs Notices have always ensured that the liabilities for duty fell on the overseas seller. But in July 2014, Customs revoked a previous liability ruling with a new one that establishes the liability for underpayment or nonpayment of duty in a DDP transaction with the Australian buyer, in opposition to the established trade term. </p>
<p>The short term advantage for Customs is clear – it is making it easier for itself to collect underpaid or unpaid duties in a DDP transaction. But it is cutting a dangerous corner: by undermining a tried and tested trade term which represents a valuable distribution of liability, this is harmful to trade itself. </p>
<p>The buyer may, arguably, have a contractual claim from the seller to have any duty paid to Customs reimbursed; but DDP transactions are not meant to incur further duty related expenses on the buyer and litigation to recover this duty may well be an expense which would be difficult for SMEs to bear.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/aat/2015/366.html">decision from the Administrative Appeals tribunal</a> (AAT) on this change in DDP duty liability confirms the unfortunate shift in trade policy concerning DDP. </p>
<p>The case concerned an Australian buyer, Studio Fashion, importing goods from a Chinese seller under DDP terms. For reasons unknown, the Chinese seller misrepresented the value of the goods, causing them to be undervalued on import declarations. Consequently, both duty and GST was significantly underpaid. A new value of the goods was issued after an audit, and Customs issued demands against the Australian buyer for payment of GST and duty. </p>
<p>After making the required duty payment - under protest - the Australian buyer promptly sought review by the AAT, raising a number of arguments against the demand for payment. </p>
<p>These arguments all relied on the nature of the DDP transaction: the seller’s liability for duty and the buyer’s non-involvement in import transactions. It also brought up the (by then revoked) Customs notice which would have prevented the Customs claim in the current case – notably BEFORE the new Customs Notice was published, but after the old was revoked. </p>
<p>The AAT chose to side with Customs, and allow it discretion to change the consequences of a DDP term. The logic is fuzzy: the AAT decision lends weight to an unclear interim notice having the same effect as the new notice, and does not appear concerned about the discretion of Customs to undermine party autonomy and an internationally accepted trade term. </p>
<p>It’s worth noting that by undermining the DDP, the Australian authorities are effectively making an agreed DDP into a DDU (Delivery Duty Unpaid) – a term which was removed from the most recent Incoterms revision in 2010 as it was broadly impractical not to make the seller responsible for import duty as well. </p>
<p>Of course, the Australian authorities are - technically - free to introduce regulations which restrict the operation of trade terms that operate under party autonomy. But it is unnerving to see such blatant disregard to the established operation of a significant international trade custom. </p>
<p>It is certainly not helpful to commerce and the development of Australian trade – and it seems to be targeting the SMEs who use it most.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camilla Baasch Andersen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Small importers rely on the seller being liable for any import duty - but that situation is being eroded.Camilla Baasch Andersen, Professor in International Commercial Law, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/535072016-02-01T04:28:26Z2016-02-01T04:28:26ZBanning child and forced marriages is gaining traction in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109500/original/image-20160128-27140-bn3299.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa is taking a tough stance against the practice of abducting and forcing young girls into marriage that's still rife in some parts of the country.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court has delivered a landmark decision outlawing all marriages <a href="http://jurist.org/paperchase/2016/01/zimbabwe-court-outlaws-child-marriage.php">below the age of 18</a>. This includes customary marriages.</p>
<p>Predictably, the move generated a great deal of comment and questions. There were even <a href="http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/b856fd004b61c907a73ae743e5868fd4/Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Constitutional-Court-outlaws-child-marriage-20162001">suggestions</a> that the Zimbabwean decision was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the first of its kind in Africa.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Though inaccurate, the claim legitimately marks the issue as a regional and continental problem. In 2015 Unicef released <a href="http://uni.cf/1JI041N">a report</a> on child marriages which highlighted the scale of the problem on the continent. </p>
<p>The reasons for the phenomenon of child marriage are complex and include the fact that in customary law, marriageable age was never reckoned as an actual number but depended on puberty, which was the indication that the girl was now physically able to bear children.</p>
<h2>The rights of girls and young women</h2>
<p>The debate about the marriage of young girls has been raging for years in South Africa. It reached a new pitch after a <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm">visible spike</a> in the abduction of girls, ostensibly for the purposes of customary marriage, in certain areas of the country. </p>
<p>The perpetrators claim to be practising the custom of <a href="http://www.masimanyane.org.za/?q=content/quest-understand-ukuthwala"><em>ukuthwala</em></a>.
Typically, these abductors force themselves sexually on girls as their “brides”. In some instances the girls are as young as between nine and 14 years old.</p>
<p>In many cases this is justified on the basis that some money or other material consideration has been paid to the parents. This is a vile distortion of the custom of <a href="http://umsamo.org.za/wpp/ilobolo-its-meaning-and-process/">ilobolo</a> (dowry). Parents living in poverty are thus frequently complicit in this human rights violation.</p>
<p>In 2015 in the case of <a href="https://www.crin.org/en/library/legal-database/nvumeleni-jezile-v-state">Mvumeleni Jezile v. The State</a> the Western Cape High Court confirmed a 22-year sentence of imprisonment against the adult abductor of a 14-year-old girl under the guise of the <em>ukuthwala</em> custom.</p>
<p>The accused had been charged with several crimes arising from his actions. These included three counts of rape and one count of human trafficking, all of which the appeal tribunal upheld.</p>
<p>A further development in 2015 was the publication by the South African Law Reform Commission <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/">(SALRC)</a> of its <em>Revised Discussion Paper on Project 138: The Practice of <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm">Ukuthwala</a></em>.</p>
<p>The Revised Discussion Paper contains a draft Bill, tentatively titled the <em>Prohibition of Forced Marriages and Child Marriages <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm">Bill</a></em>, which is being taken around the country as part of a <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/media.htm">public consultation</a> process. </p>
<p>The Law Commission is aiming for wide public engagements, particularly with government departments, police services, traditional leaders and rural communities. It also wants to attract commentary from NGOs, other civil society organisations, as well as religious organisations, educators and ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>After these steps, the Law Commission will submit a report to the minister of justice in the hope that the cabinet will give approval for it to be passed into law.</p>
<p>The Bill specifically criminalises forced marriages as well as child marriages. Both are already prohibited by the provisions of the <em>Recognition of Customary Marriages <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1998-120.pdf">Act</a></em>. The Act has, since 1998, required not only that customary marriages be conducted only with the consent of the partners, but also that the parties should be at least 18 years old. </p>
<p>The Bill lists the existing crimes of abduction, kidnapping, human trafficking, rape and assault as possible verdicts in such cases. It also explicitly strips protection away from these criminal actions that might be claimed under custom or culture practices.</p>
<p>This points immediately to the difficult issues in this debate.</p>
<h2>Clash of cultures</h2>
<p>For many women’s rights activists, practices such as <em>ukuthwala</em> should be banned in their entirety as being generally inimical to human rights, particularly those of women and the girl child. </p>
<p>On the other hand, cultural activists make the point that the laws of the land are already adequate to target these crimes masquerading as custom. They also argue that it seems arbitrary and discriminatory to treat crime in urban areas as such and suddenly call it “culture” when it occurs in rural areas. </p>
<p>This conflict is but the tip of the iceberg in a country deeply embroiled in increasingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/unease-reigns-as-culture-and-the-constitution-collide-in-south-africa-41795">acrimonious contestations</a> between cultural rights and western law. </p>
<p>At the heart of the disputes is something more than the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/unease-reigns-as-culture-and-the-constitution-collide-in-south-africa-41795">clash of cultures</a>. Some serious misgivings are beginning to emerge about the lack of depth in the national debate about the complexities, sometimes quite intractable, of recognising and accommodating difference while promoting a single nationhood.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.anc.org.za/centenary/show.php?id=8803">Unity in diversity</a> is a nice slogan, but the ideal appears horrendously difficult to realise in practice. </p>
<p>For every opponent of <em>ukuthwala</em>, there will be someone who will remind us that, in its earlier form and function, the practice could have been seen as a subversive avenue empowering youngsters to resist parental authoritarianism. In such cases, the parties were usually consenting lovers of marriageable age who had reason to defy parental expectations and where sex was not sanctioned.</p>
<p>Similarly, criminalisation by the state often ignores the complicity of family in these times of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-current-measures-underestimate-the-level-of-poverty-in-south-africa-46704">abject poverty</a>. A significant obstacle to the reporting of these perversions is usually the reluctance of the victims to send their own parents to jail, often rupturing the extended family in the process. </p>
<p>Add to this toxic mix the emotions generated by different interpretations of the <a href="http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/CONSTITUTION-REPUBLIC-SOUTH-AFRICA-1996-1">Constitution</a> by people and organisations with different agendas, and it becomes clear that the Law Commission has its work cut out in attempting a solution without exacerbating already divisive fault lines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thandabantu Nhlapo is chair of the advisory committee on the Practice of Ukuthwala. It advises the South African Law Reform Commission.</span></em></p>The reasons for the phenomenon of child marriage are complex and include the fact that in customary law, marriageable age was never reckoned as an actual number but depended on puberty.Thandabantu Nhlapo, Emeritus Professor of Private Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/468702015-08-31T03:37:43Z2015-08-31T03:37:43ZOperation Fortitude: it’s not just clumsy wording that should worry us<p>The news that the newly formed Australian Border Force (ABF) was partnering Victoria Police and other agencies to mount a <a href="http://newsroom.border.gov.au/releases/abf-joining-inter-agency-outfit-to-target-crime-in-melbourne-cbd">special operation</a> in Melbourne’s CBD sparked an immediate <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-28/timeline-of-how-operation-fortitude-unravelled/6733252">storm of protest</a> on Friday. Protesters equated the prospect of officers checking the immigration status of “any individual we cross paths with” to the tactics of a police state. </p>
<p>The public outcry forced the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-28/operation-fortitude-cancelled/6733008">cancellation</a> of the operation and sent Immigration Minister <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-30/peter-duttons-office-received-border-force-press-release/6735584">Peter Dutton</a> and Prime Minister <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/prime-minister-tony-abbott-says-border-force-operation-fortitude-was-a-mistake-20150829-gjammd.html">Tony Abbott</a> ducking for cover.</p>
<p>What seems to have prompted less debate is the <a href="http://newsroom.border.gov.au/releases/clarifying-statement-on-operation-fortitude">“clarification”</a> issued the same day. This press release openly acknowledged that not dissimilar multi-agency operations were mounted routinely in Victoria and elsewhere.</p>
<h2>How do immigration compliance operations work?</h2>
<p>Many Australians would be surprised to know that both police and immigration officers possess wide powers under Section 188 of the <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/">Migration Act</a>. Officers can “require a person whom the officer knows or reasonably suspects is a non-citizen” to present either a personal identifier or evidence of being lawfully present. If, as a result, the officer suspects that the person is an unlawful non-citizen, Section 189 requires them to take that person into custody.</p>
<p>Several years ago I conducted <a href="http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/research-agenda/internal-border-control/migration-policing/">research</a> into the methods by which unlawful non-citizens were detected in NSW. Immigration compliance officers told me they would act on specific notifications about suspected non-citizens. These persons were identified through the (subtly named) <a href="http://www.directory.gov.au/directory?ea0_lf99_120.&organizationalUnit&b977d03c-0641-4a70-b35d-81605048af9e">Dob-In Line</a>, or via inter-agency data-matching exercises. </p>
<p>The officers would also raid particular workplaces that were identified as “high risk” through more generalised forms of intelligence analysis. In addition, they would occasionally participate in joint operations in which police or other regulatory agencies would take the lead with compliance checks relating to taxi licences, drivers’ licences or other professional accreditation.</p>
<p>Any individuals identified in these processes who were thought to be non-citizens were referred to immigration officers. In this way, immigration enforcement has “piggy-backed” on the powers of other agencies to initiate such encounters.</p>
<p>Police can also instigate checks themselves via the Immigration Status Service (ISS). The ISS database was established following the scandals surrounding the deportation of <a href="http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/files/investigation_2005_03.pdf">Vivian Solon</a> and the detention of <a href="http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/reviews-and-inquiries/palmer-report.pdf">Cornelia Rau</a> and other overseas-born Australian citizens. </p>
<p>These events revealed that immigration authorities were acting on “referrals” from police with remarkably little scrutiny. Rather than scaling back their enforcement efforts (although deportations and removals did dip for several years following the inquiries into these enforcement “mistakes”), the main response was to invest in improved information technology, including the ISS. This meant an individual’s legal status could be more reliably determined before initiating enforcement action.</p>
<h2>Who can be checked and when?</h2>
<p>Police I spoke with reported a wide range of contexts in which immigration checks might be conducted. These could occur as part of criminal investigations or during vehicle or pedestrian stops, which they claimed would always be initially for a police-related purpose. </p>
<p>In the case of street stops, markers such as language, possession of foreign documents, outward appearance and seeming to be “out of place” were the reasons stated for making opportunistic immigration checks. </p>
<p>The data provided to me on the first 20 months of the ISS’ operation revealed NSW Police was by far the biggest user of the system. Victoria Police came a distant second. </p>
<p>Just over one in ten immigration status checks made via the system confirmed the individual to be unlawfully present. So, nearly 90% of checks were made on lawfully present individuals, including citizens.</p>
<p>This amount of “collateral damage” from immigration checks highlights another example of curious wording from the now-notorious ABF press release. It stated that Operation Fortitude was designed to promote “a secure and cohesive society”. </p>
<p>Many of the police checks reported above were possibly conducted without the knowledge of the person concerned. But where individuals are explicitly referred to immigration authorities, or where non-citizens are aware their immigration status may be checked – in an increasing range of circumstances which includes attempting to access employment, education, medical care and other essential services – there is enormous potential for negative impacts on feelings of secure belonging. </p>
<p>Community workers interviewed in my NSW study gave examples of individuals and families who were confused about their legal status and therefore fearful of approaching authorities for assistance.</p>
<h2>What made Operation Fortitude different?</h2>
<p>What made the bungled Operation Fortitude stand out from these more surreptitious border enforcement efforts was the audacity with which the ABF announced it. Normally, press releases are issued after, rather than before, joint operations or compliance raids. Often these releases have the apparent purpose of reporting how many unlawful non-citizens were detected.</p>
<p>Friday’s announcement was also notable for the curious claim that this operation was a “first” – seemingly a cause of excitement and celebration for the fledgling ABF, but a routine occurrence for more seasoned immigration compliance officers – and for its apparent breadth. </p>
<p>The operation was aimed at “people travelling to, from and around the CBD”, rather than the foreign-born restaurant workers, taxi drivers and fruit pickers whose targeting by immigration authorities is regularly presented as TV infotainment on the aptly named <a href="https://au.tv.yahoo.com/plus7/border-security/">Border Force</a>.</p>
<p>Coupled with the sweeping legal powers described above, when a government deliberately <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-far-reaching-changes-in-immigration-and-border-protection-36427">creates a uniformed branch</a> from what was previously an administrative agency, gives it an aggressive name and appoints a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Quaedvlieg">former police officer</a> to lead it, it is hardly surprising if its members consider they have the green light to present a threatening image to the public. </p>
<p>The issuing of a press release before the operation – although ridiculed in the media as effectively giving the game away – is consistent with the misguided deterrent-based thinking that dominates offshore border control. Strategies of general deterrence rely on “talking up” the threat of detection, not necessarily to those who might be detected in a particular operation, but to all others who fall into the targeted risk category. </p>
<p>How this can be presented as a recipe for social cohesion is another question that both state police and the ABF need to answer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leanne Weber receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>While the Australian Border Force’s Operation Fortitude caused an outcry, people might be surprised at the extent of official powers to check their immigration status in a range of circumstances.Leanne Weber, ARC Future Fellow in Internal Border Policing, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/468602015-08-31T00:25:41Z2015-08-31T00:25:41ZThe border is everywhere: the policy overreach behind Operation Fortitude<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/93380/original/image-20150830-17760-1k4re5g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Australian Border Force's creation was no simple re-shuffling of departmental units.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The cancellation of <a href="http://newsroom.border.gov.au/releases/abf-joining-inter-agency-outfit-to-target-crime-in-melbourne-cbd">Operation Fortitude</a>, a joint law enforcement agency operation involving the Australian Border Force (ABF) slated to be held in Melbourne over the weekend, was <a href="http://newsroom.border.gov.au/releases/statement-by-abf-commissioner-roman-quaedvlieg-on-the-abf-s-role-in-operation-fortitude">put down</a> to a “clumsily worded” press release. But was it an inevitable outcome of the decision to <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-01/border-force-commissioner-operational-matters-roman-quaedvlieg/6586274">fold</a> immigration and customs into the ABF? </p>
<p>The ABF’s creation was no simple re-shuffling of departmental units of the kind that Canberra is used to. It was established with a new <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r5408">statute</a>, a new <a href="http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/border-force-what-is-it-and-why-do-we-need-it/story-e6frfq80-1227430512610">uniform</a> and a new <a href="https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2015L00794/Explanatory%20Statement/Text">oath</a> binding its workers to the defence of the border as a <a href="http://www.border.gov.au/australian-border-force-abf/who-we-are">“strategic national asset”</a>.</p>
<p>The ABF also has a smart new <a href="http://www.border.gov.au">website</a> whose domain name registers the displacement of warm and fuzzy immigration management by the tough façade of border control. The website hosts an attractive presentation of the history of its Customs predecessor and a more muted acknowledgement of the former Immigration Department.</p>
<p>Old thinking about national borders is jettisoned in the ABF vision. In a statement of “Who We Are”, the ABF doesn’t shrink from big conceptual thinking:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We consider the border not to be a purely physical barrier separating national states, but a complex continuum stretching offshore and onshore, including the overseas, maritime, physical border and domestic dimensions of the border.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This approach is more than rhetorical, as we now know from the (failed) planned operation in Melbourne:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Treating the border as a continuum allows an integrated, layered approach to provide border management in depth – working ahead of and behind the border, as well as at the border, to manage threats and take advantage of opportunities.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Back to the future</h2>
<p>In truth, immigration has always been about national security. But the ABF represents a significant departure from <a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-the-old-department-of-immigrations-nation-building-traditions-43616">earlier ways</a> of managing the border.</p>
<p>The ABF’s creation is actually a return to the days before 1946 when the management of the borders – of people as well as goods – was the business of the customs service, in its various guises, along with state police when needed. It was Victorian customs officers who quarantined the merchant ship <a href="https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/49261/40/10chapter8.pdf">the Afghan</a> in April 1888 to prevent the unloading of its cargo of Chinese passengers. </p>
<p>It was the Commonwealth customs service that administered the <a href="http://museumvictoria.com.au/discoverycentre/websites-mini/journeys-australia/1900s20s/immigration-restriction-act/">dictation test</a> in defence of White Australia. It was the state police forces that kept an eye on migrants and visa holders after they entered the country.</p>
<p>The post-war creation of the Immigration Department demanded a new approach – one that could deal with the mass migration program that changed the face of Australia and eroded the old certainties about a British society in the South Pacific. The new departmental website quotes Arthur Calwell, the first immigration minister, in 1945: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If Australians have learned one lesson from the Pacific War, it is surely that we cannot continue to hold our island continent for ourselves and our dependants, unless we greatly increase our numbers.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A symptom of the new approach – one that would subordinate worries about national security to the higher demands of nation-building – was evident in post-war debates about the challenge of absorbing the waves of migrants. </p>
<p>Worried about the threat of crime and subversion among the newcomers, Australian police commissioners in 1946 proposed universal fingerprinting of migrants. Calwell dismissed the idea out of hand, instead removing the control of immigrants from the state police to the Immigration Department. He <a href="https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1301&dat=19470327&id=XtoQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=E5MDAAAAIBAJ&pg=4558,3475272&hl=en">told parliament</a> that the government believed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Aliens should not be supervised by police stations because they had come from policed states.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Stop and search</h2>
<p>In spite of Calwell’s declaration, the powers of the post-war Immigration Department were very considerable. They relied on liaison with state police to carry out their work.</p>
<p>The department did not shrink from an expectation that it keep track of the new Australians. A very large-scale surveillance program tracked those migrants who ran into trouble with the law, harvesting information from the state police forces – only to find that migrants were generally more law-abiding than locals. The program enabled the department to proceed against serious law-breakers, deporting criminals and others in breach of their registration conditions. </p>
<p>The roots of concern over the use of immigration law to surveil the populace may be found in the long-standing powers of police and immigration officials to make non-citizens accountable for their presence. </p>
<p>These powers have enabled the use of “stop and search” practices by police acting on “reasonable suspicion” to demand unfamiliar persons account for themselves. Since 2006 they have been able to do so with the immediate assistance of an Immigration Department database. </p>
<p>The suspicion aroused by the ABF press release last week is one grounded in the reality of existing police practices. But, these are now amplified and made more visible by their threatened adoption by this new agency.</p>
<h2>The vigilant state</h2>
<p>A droll page on the <a href="http://australiancustomshistory.com.au/">Customs history website</a> hosted by the ABF recounts the arrival in 1938 of a new vessel, HMAS Vigilant. Contention between Comptroller-General Abbott and the director of naval ordnance over the vessel’s operational requirements resulted in a decision that its three-pounder gun be loaded with:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… blank ammunition to enable it to intimidate perceived threats without actually firing upon them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Operation Fortitude was left without even blank ammunition to deploy as the collaboration of multiple agencies foundered in the wake of a <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/prime-minister-tony-abbott-says-border-force-operation-fortitude-was-a-mistake-20150829-gjammd.html">“badly worded”</a> press release last Friday. The evidence, however, suggests that the remedy requires more than a new operational spin. </p>
<p>The Australian Border Force is now lumbered with a name whose association with <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/border-farce-and-hot-air-fills-the-leadership-vacuum-20150828-gja8cj.html">“farce”</a> will spring too readily to mind. A good start in addressing its credibility deficit will be more open discussion of the scope and functions of an agency which seems to think that the border is everywhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46860/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Finnane receives funding from the Australian Research Council</span></em></p>The Australian Border Force represents a significant departure from earlier ways of managing the border.Mark Finnane, ARC Laureate Fellow, Professor of History, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/419452015-05-21T04:33:30Z2015-05-21T04:33:30ZHow to rebalance Africa’s relationship with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82422/original/image-20150520-11450-pxgei6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Diego Azubel/Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/04/10-africa-china-foreign-policy-sun">ties with China</a> have grown significantly this century. Beijing became the sub-continent’s biggest trading partner in 2009. But for sub-Saharan Africa to benefit fully from this relationship both parties need to change their behaviour and attitude. </p>
<p>The dramatic rise in trade has been driven by two factors: <a href="http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf">China’s energy needs</a> and Africa’s <a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21951811%7EpagePK:146736%7EpiPK:146830%7EtheSitePK:258644,00.html">lack of infrastructure</a>. China has found a ready source of energy in Africa while the continent has welcomed investment in much-needed infrastructure projects.</p>
<p>The development of infrastructure will benefit Africa, including, for example, enabling the continent to better <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS%20No%20127%20Chinese%20Infrastructure%20Investments%20.pdf">integrate its economies</a>.</p>
<p>But China’s economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa are not without their <a href="http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/uploads/trabalhos/6003/doc/106878267.pdf">tensions</a>. These need to be addressed if the sub-continent and China are to strengthen their ties and the relationship is to become more mutually beneficial.</p>
<h2>What are the big challenges</h2>
<p>The over-riding need is for a rebalancing of the relationship between China and sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>A practical example of this is that many Chinese companies import labour from China to work on large projects. This has conveyed the erroneous impression that local people are incapable of doing the work required. It has also been interpreted as a lack of respect. </p>
<p>No economic relationship is ever truly beneficial if there is no <a href="http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf">technology transfer</a> and building of the local capacity. Chinese companies could easily train local workers to the desired level.</p>
<p>A further source of frustration has been evidence that Chinese companies are importing <a href="http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/brenthurst_commisioned_reports/Brenthurst-paper-201203-Africa-in-their-Words-A-Study-of-Chinese-Traders.pdf">inferior quality</a> products to African countries. </p>
<p>Chinese manufacturers are capable of producing products to different standards. But there is no reason why a Chinese company should produce a product of low quality for a Nigerian importer and do otherwise for a client in Europe or Australia. </p>
<p>There have been cases of producers showing a higher quality product at the inception of a contract and a down payment. On opening the container, the customer in Africa has discovered a lower quality product was supplied. </p>
<p>It is also possible that African importers are conniving with Chinese producers to exploit consumers. African countries should guard against production and technical faults in imported products and ensure that cheap products are of desirable quality. </p>
<p>Improvement of <a href="http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/there-is-strong-commitment-to-customs-modernization-in-africa-kunio-mikuriya-world-customs-organizations-secretary-general-8946/">inadequate customs control </a> would be a good start. </p>
<h2>Reciprocal access</h2>
<p>A noticeable gap in the relationship between China and sub-Saharan Africa is the fact that Chinese entrepreneurs are operating on the continent but the success of African businesses in establishing a presence in China [is minimal](Authors interviews with African entrepreneurs in Shanghai (August, 2010 & May, 2015). </p>
<p>One obstacle is unnecessary bottlenecks in the visa system. Africans can live in China temporarily as students, business people or as English teachers though there is a bias in favour of Caucasians from Europe, Canada or Australia. The [renewal of work permits](Interviews with African entrepreneurs in Shanghai (May, 2015) for Africans that are legitimately in China has improved but more needs to be done. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/living_in_china/abc/2009-07/15/content_18141090.htm">Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise</a> initiative is a step in the right direction. This allows foreigners to start a business in mainland China on their own without a Chinese investor.</p>
<p>It allows for a year-long renewable visa for a chief executive officer and four foreign employees. The major <a href="http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/111061.pdf.">challenge</a> is that it requires a lot of funds from the foreign country and paper work which a start-up entrepreneur may not be able to afford.</p>
<p>African businesses and governments could also take steps to improve access to China. Entrepreneurs should learn more about <a href="http://www.bu.edu/mlcl/home/why-study-chinese/">Chinese culture</a>, including Mandarin and Cantonese.</p>
<p>Embassies should be strengthened with experts who know about China, particularly its economy, competitive advantage and trade. Governments should also publish up-to-date trade information on their websites as stipulated by the World Trade Organization <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm">Trade Facilitation Agreement</a>.</p>
<h2>What Africa needs to do</h2>
<p>There is a great deal that Africa needs to do too. Effective environmental regulations need to be put in place and enforced to ensure that resources are exploited with minimal environmental degradation.</p>
<p>Governments could insist, for example, that timber exporters replace trees they cut down to avoid deforestation and loss of biodiversity.</p>
<p>Africa should also increase its capacity to <a href="https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/china_africa_trading_web.pdf">process products</a> which would create employment. An example would be to start using timber locally instead of <a href="http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_2340.pdf">shipping the raw lumber</a>.</p>
<p>As African countries open their markets to China they should also put in place measures to protect their economies. Market price support by guaranteeing prices for certain products could be trade distorting but would be beneficial to certain economies.</p>
<p>Another strategy that could <a href="http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2011-edia/papers/046-Adekunle.pdf">protect local economies</a> is through the design of a mechanism under which gainers, for example traders and exporters, compensate the losers, for example workers, in a transaction.</p>
<p>And markets should be differentiated in such a way that products for export are attractive to the Chinese market while quality is not compromised at home. </p>
<p>African countries should also investigate joining the Chinese- initiated <a href="http://www.aiibank.org/">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank </a>(AIIB) as non-regional members. Egypt and South Africa are already founding members of AIIB.</p>
<p>Joining the initiative would be in the interests of sub-Saharan African countries. The bank has the potential to transform the development landscape by creating a potential competitor to the World Bank. It will also be another source of technical and financial assistance. </p>
<p><strong>Special thanks to Adedeji Ayodeji Adekunle in Shanghai for providing up-to-date information</strong></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bamidele Adekunle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For sub-Saharan Africa to benefit fully from its growing economic ties with China both parties need to change their behaviour and attitude.Bamidele Adekunle, Contract Faculty, Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University; SEDRD Adjunct Professor, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.