tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/david-mahlobo-45908/articlesDavid Mahlobo – The Conversation2022-07-12T07:27:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1865822022-07-12T07:27:35Z2022-07-12T07:27:35ZZondo Commission’s report on South Africa’s intelligence agency is important but flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473381/original/file-20220711-14-lesf18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa, right, receives the final State Capture Report from Chief Juistice Raymond Zondo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s judicial probe into state capture and corruption, the <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">Zondo Commission</a>, has concluded that the <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a> was integral to the capture of the state by corrupt elements. These included former president Jacob Zuma’s friends, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/how-gupta-brothers-from-india-landed-south-africas-ruling-party-in-its-biggest-crisis-397138">the Gupta family</a>.</p>
<p>The agency has been unstable for some time. <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf">Previous</a> <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">investigations</a> have made findings to improve the performance of civilian intelligence. Yet problems relating to poor performance and politicisation persist. They escalated during <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/The_Zuma_Years.html?id=BwxbDwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Zuma’s tenure</a>.</p>
<p>The commission’s <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">hearings</a> were remarkable for an institution that had become <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-26-commission-hears-of-alleged-covert-ops-in-media-judiciary-civil-society-academia-and-unions-costing-taxpayers-hundreds-of-millions/">used to operating secretly</a>. Spies testified in detail, and in public, about what had gone wrong at the agency during the Zuma era (<a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">May 2014 to February 2018</a>). Some did so <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-01-28-security-alert-images-circulating-on-social-media-may-put-state-capture-commissions-unidentified-witnesses-at-risk/">at great personal risk</a>.</p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance, and served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>. In my view, the Zondo report is a globally significant example of radical transparency around intelligence abuses. But it lacks the detailed findings and recommendations to enable speedy prosecutions. It also fails to address the broader threats to democracy posed by unaccountable intelligence. </p>
<h2>Covert operations</h2>
<p>The commission heard evidence pointing to fraud, corruption and abuse of taxpayers’ money at the agency. It also heard how the Guptas benefited from these abuses. The agency shielded them from investigations that indicated they were a national security threat. </p>
<p>The most significant recommendation is that law enforcement agencies should further investigate whether people implicated in the report committed crimes. The commission expressed particular concern about covert intelligence projects that appeared to be “special purpose vehicles to siphon funds”. It made specific reference to three people who should be investigated further.</p>
<p>The first is former director-general <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/arthur-fraser-a-law-unto-himself-helped-by-zuma-to-hide-pure-crime-linked-to-r600m-spy-network-20220624">Arthur Fraser</a>, for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-05-the-principal-agent-network-pan-dossier-zuma-and-mahlobo-knew-about-arthur-frasers-rogue-intelligence-programme/">his involvement</a> in the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-06-the-principal-agent-network-pan-dossier-part-2-bugging-the-auditors-dumb-and-dumber/">Principal Agent Network</a>. This was a covert intelligence collection entity outside the State Security Agency. It has been controversial for over a decade after investigations pointed to the abuse of funds.</p>
<p>The second person is former deputy director-general of counter-intelligence <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-15-confessions-of-a-dangerous-mind-a-divinely-inspired-zuma-spy-thulani-dlomo/">Thulani Dlomo</a>. He was responsible for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/ssa-declassified-i-networks-which-looted-r15bn-from-spy-agency-still-in-place-as-investigations-collapse-20220221">Chief Directorate Special Operations</a>, a covert structure which the report says ran irregular projects and operations that could well have been unlawful.</p>
<p>The most significant of these was <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/investigations/ssa-declassified-illegal-operation-mayibuye-allegedly-siphoned-millions-from-ssa-to-jacob-zuma-20220226">Project Mayibuye</a>, a collection of operations designed to counter threats to state authority. In practice, they and others sought to shield Zuma from a growing chorus of criticism of his misrule.</p>
<p>The commission <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202206/electronic-state-capture-commission-report-part-v-vol-i.pdf">found</a> that the project destabilised opposition parties and benefited the Zuma faction in the ruling African National Congress. </p>
<p>The third person is the former minister of state security, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/live-norma-mngoma-david-mahlobo-to-testify-at-state-capture-inquiry-20210409">David Mahlobo</a>. The commission found that he became involved in <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-19-former-state-security-minister-david-mahlobo-distances-himself-from-apartheid-assassin-and-jacob-zuma-poisoning-projects/">operational matters</a> instead of confining himself to executive oversight. It also found that his handling of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-03-09-cash-parcels-to-minister-spying-on-media-and-infiltration-of-anti-zuma-movement-highlighted-in-report-on-sa-spy-agency/">large amounts of cash</a>, ostensibly to fund operations, needed further investigation.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-in-south-africa-how-the-rot-set-in-and-how-the-project-was-rumbled-176481">State capture in South Africa: how the rot set in and how the project was rumbled</a>
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<p>According to the commission, Mahlobo’s predecessor, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/siyabonga-cyprian-cwele/">Siyabonga Cwele</a>, did the same by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-26-how-zuma-and-state-security-minister-cwele-shut-down-2011-investigation-into-the-guptas/">stopping an investigation</a> into the Guptas and their influence on Zuma’s administration.</p>
<p>The commission concluded, based on overwhelming evidence, that Zuma and Cwele did not want the investigation to continue. Had it continued, it could have prevented at least some of the activities that led to the capture of the state by the Guptas and the loss of billions in public money through corruption.</p>
<h2>Recipe for abuse</h2>
<p>The commission also addressed some of the deeper factors that predisposed the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/42/state-security-agency-ssa">State Security Agency</a> to abuse.</p>
<p>One of these was the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/merger-of-spy-agencies-led-to-cabinet-ministers-giving-ssa-operatives-illegal-instructions-20210915">amalgamation</a> of the domestic intelligence branch, the National Intelligence Agency, with the foreign branch, the South African Secret Service, into a new entity, the State Security Agency, in 2009.</p>
<p>The commission found that the amalgamation had disastrous consequences, as it allowed most of the abuses it examined to happen. The two entities were merged in terms of a presidential proclamation. Yet the constitution <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-11.pdf">requires</a> intelligence services to be established through legislation. This meant that until <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/general-intelligence-laws-amendment-act-0">legislation</a> was introduced in 2013, the security agency operated without a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/4715/">clear legal basis</a>.</p>
<p>It was highly centralised, allowing a super-director-general to control all activities. This made abuse easier for an appointee with corrupt intentions. The agency was also based on a state security <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">doctrine</a>, rather than a people-centred doctrine. This doctrinal shift prioritised the protection of the state from criticism, and the president more specifically, rather than the security of society. <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/merger-of-spy-agencies-led-to-cabinet-ministers-giving-ssa-operatives-illegal-instructions-20210915">Ministerial political overreach</a> into operational matters heightened the potential for abuse.</p>
<p>The commission also found that the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/committee-details/169">Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence</a>, the <a href="https://www.oigi.gov.za/">Inspector General of Intelligence</a> and the <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/">Auditor General</a> had failed to exercise proper oversight. This meant the external checks and balances on the State Security Agency were weak to non-existent.</p>
<h2>Weighing the Zondo report</h2>
<p>The struggle for more accountable intelligence has been strengthened through the Zondo report’s exposure of abuses. But many of the findings and recommendations are vague and general. The commission could have been more specific about upgrading the Inspector General’s independence, for instance. Likwewise the Auditor General’s capacity to audit the agency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-state-capture-commission-nears-its-end-after-four-years-was-it-worth-it-182898">South Africa's state capture commission nears its end after four years. Was it worth it?</a>
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<p>The commission could also have made more of the evidence presented to it. And it could have been more categorical about when it thought criminality had occurred. At times, the report does little more than restate the recommendations of previous enquiries.</p>
<p>These include an <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-09-spooks-and-spies-the-pan-progamme-arthur-fraser-and-eight-years-of-investigations/">investigation</a> into the Principal Agent Network programme in 2009, providing prima facie evidence of criminality. </p>
<p>Another is the report of the 2018 <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel</a>, which showed that the agency had been politicised and repurposed to benefit Zuma. </p>
<p>An important gap in the Zondo report relates to the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-01-civil-society-organisations-release-boast-report-demand-accountability-for-rogue-spying/">infiltration and surveillance of civil society</a>, and the agency’s broader threat to democracy.</p>
<p>Little is made of the fact that, according to a recently 2017 declassified <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/580662166/Boast-Report#download&from_embed">performance report</a>, the agency claimed to have infiltrated <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/">Greenpeace Africa</a>, the <a href="https://www.r2k.org.za/">Right2Know Campaign</a>, trade unions and other civil society organs.</p>
<p>The spies masqueraded as activists. They reported back to the agency on supporter strengths, main actors, ideology, support structures and agendas. The report’s author, a security agency member, <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/580662166/Boast-Report#download&from_embed">boasted</a> about these and other accomplishments, such as infiltrating the social media networks of the Western Cape <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1753-59132021000400006">#feesmustfall</a> student movement. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>In the preparations to investigate and prosecute wrongdoers responsible for the abuses by the State Security Agency, its infiltration of civil society must not be allowed to fall under the radar. It must receive as much attention as all the cases of grand corruption that are going to keep the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a> busy. </p>
<p>Otherwise, the social forces that could potentially bring deeper and more meaningful changes to society may remain targets of state spying, as <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745337807/activists-and-the-surveillance-state/">has been the case elsewhere</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the Open Society Foundation for South Africa and Luminate. She served on the 2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency. </span></em></p>The commission could have made more of the evidence and been more categorical about when it thought criminality had taken place.Jane Duncan, Professor, Department of Communication and Media, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877752017-11-23T14:22:25Z2017-11-23T14:22:25ZGroundswell against nuclear in South Africa could put paid to a power deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196103/original/file-20171123-18021-1yzyemz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Jacob Zuma has appointed David Mahlobo, a close ally as energy minister.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/17021409988/in/photolist-rW8bb1-Yhy8c7-ERPYjW-XDSmog-YTFW9K-YCpzhJ-Yhy8BW-sdyVQy-sdErJF-rgHcWh-rW8biL-rW9fRd-rgHcRN-rW9fGW-oSn1fQ-oSmX5a-SXVvZD-NhAf5r-A86rJJ-zRKvaP-A86sj1-quGejg-SXVw4M-SXVw2H-JP8nXL-JiEA1V-K68qnm-JiRvVQ-KfktUX-UB7iUz-ovabK9-oMo3VF-ww8xGr-q8r5Ut-AVMEMD-ZWLunK-p9Pg4U">Flickr/GovernmentZA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Jacob Zuma, has a maximum of 18 months left <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-10-zuma-i-will-never-stand-for-a-3rd-term">as head of state</a>. This time he hopes to rescue a nuclear power deal involving a proposed contract to build between six and eight new nuclear reactors in South Africa. </p>
<p>In an attempt to push through the deal, Zuma has appointed his former minister of state security, <a href="https://www.esi-africa.com/news/president-zuma-appoints-mahlobo-energy-minister/">David Mahlobo as energy minister</a>. The president trusts that Mahlobo, a close ally for over ten years, will act decisively to implement the deal. He <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-11-05-mahlobo-said-to-be-fast-tracking-nuclear-deal/">appears to be under orders</a> to get a deal with Russia done and dusted. </p>
<p>The nuclear deal contract is for nuclear reactors to produce 9600 megawatts of power. This would be five times the amount of energy generated from Koeberg, South Africa’s only nuclear power plant which generates a maximum of <a href="http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/global/africa/publications/the%20true%20cost%20of%20nuclear%20power%20in%20sa-screen.pdf">1844 megawatts</a>. </p>
<p>But the facts show that the country does not need this extra power. Demand for electricity has come down <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=4045">every year since 2011</a>. And the National Treasury <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/nuclear-build-programme-is-unaffordable-gigaba-11721499">argues</a> that the costs, in the range of at least R1-1,8 trillion, will be prohibitive. </p>
<p>Nuclear energy will also be the most costly electricity source, according to work done by <a href="https://www.csir.co.za/sites/default/files/Documents/IRP%20Feedback%20-%20CSIR%20-%207Dec2016_v2.pdf">energy experts</a>. In a climate where the state utility Eskom is deeply in debt and is therefore trying to raise the price of electricity by <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/eskom-seeks-199-tariff-increase-report-20170605">19.9% for the next few years</a>, investment for nuclear will force up the cost to consumers, and meeting the borrowing requirements will put unnecessary pressure on an already stressed economy.</p>
<p>Zuma’s push for nuclear continues to emphasise how isolated he really is. The anti-nuclear lobby is no longer confined to environmentalists. Large sections of civil society, business, academia and even sections of government have come out against it. My hunch is that democracy will win, and the people will triumph over a tainted and over-extended kleptocrat.</p>
<h2>Massaging the energy strategy</h2>
<p>Zuma’s efforts to get the deal underway have been stopped in their tracks following a court ruling <a href="https://theconversation.com/court-ruling-on-zuma's-nuclear-deal-is-a-marker-of-south=africa's-political-health-76870">that declared previous attempts</a> to privilege Russian interests as illegal. The court ruled that before the deal can be reinstated, it has to go through a public participation process and parliament has to approve it. The court also ruled that state efforts to put Eskom in charge of procurement were illegal, as the proper procedures weren’t followed. </p>
<p>It is unlikely that even Mahlobo can meet these legal requirements in the time that his boss has left in office.</p>
<p>Mahlobo’s first step has been to try to speed up the state’s energy strategy – which was supposed to be updated in April 2018. Although the plan is supposed to be updated every two years the 2010 version – which called for more nuclear procurement – is officially still on the table. A subsequent revision in 2013 questioned the need for nuclear. But this plan was never tabled in parliament by the Department of Energy. </p>
<p>The 2018 plan being promised by Mahlobo is expected to re-emphasise the commitment to nuclear. Zuma wants the plan fast tracked. But by speeding it up, the government has indicated to parliament that it will be excluding a public participation process.</p>
<p>This is likely to be challenged given that the plan is the closest thing South Africa has to a national discussion on its energy future. </p>
<p>But even if the plan can be massaged in Zuma’s interests, it won’t be enough to ensure the deal goes through. It will be challenged by political parties and NGOs who are prepared to litigate to challenge a rigged plan if necessary.</p>
<h2>Additional hurdles</h2>
<p>The public participation process that the national electricity regulator must manage – as prescribed by the April 2017 court judgement – is far from being established. The regulator was berated by the court for not doing this. It has to happen before procurement takes place. The process will provide the perfect opportunity for organisations to make the case that the scientific, environmental and economic arguments against new nuclear are backed by solid evidence.</p>
<p>Even if this process approved the orders of new reactors, there are other hurdles to be cleared. Before the competitive procurement process can be initiated, South Africa would need to renew a series of legal memoranda of understanding with vendor countries. These include France, Russia, China, South Korea and the US. This would ensure that these are free of contractual content, and then sanctioned by parliament. Only then can the procurement proceed legally. And government would have to ensure that the process abides by the Constitutional requirements of “fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.”</p>
<p>This means that it will be illegal and unconstitutional to offer Russia preferential treatment in guaranteeing that it secures the deal.</p>
<p>Any transgression of the law or the Constitution will be met by litigation from the environmental lobby. It will be strengthened by an array of other actors, ranging from tax and anti-corruption to human rights activists. </p>
<p>Zuma can of course flout the rule of law, but would he want to jeopardise what is left of an already problematic legacy over this more or less unwinnable issue?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87775/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Fig has written many articles in the past questioning South Africa's nuclear policy. His book, Uranium Road (Jacana, 2006) received support from the Heinrich Boell Foundaton. He is a member of Earthlife Africa, one of the NGOs that litigated against government illegalities in the procurement process. </span></em></p>Even if the nuclear plan can be massaged in South African President Jacob Zuma’s interests, it won’t be enough to ensure the deal goes through.David Fig, Honorary Research Associate, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/870222017-11-09T13:39:13Z2017-11-09T13:39:13ZZuma’s allies are once again gung-ho about nuclear. Will they get their way?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193533/original/file-20171107-1068-lvvdwq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's new Energy Minister David Mahlobo, has launched a fresh push to bag the nuclear energy build programme.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s nuclear build programme seems to be <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mahlobo-rushes-nuclear-deal-20171105-2">back on the agenda</a> after earlier indications that it was dead. Recent <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/those-opposed-to-nuclear-sold-out-to-the-west-zuma">comments</a> by President Jacob Zuma and his new minister of energy David Mahlobo, signal a final push to bag the nuclear deal while Zuma is still in power. In December Zuma’s term as president of the African National Congress will come to an end when the ruling party elects a new leadership. His term as president of the country ends in 2019. The Conversation Africa’s Business and Economy Editor, Sibonelo Radebe, asked Keith Gottschalk to assess the situation.</em></p>
<p><strong>Is it still possible for the Zuma administration to bag the nuclear energy programme?</strong> </p>
<p>The worsening financial plight of the state and its parastatals makes the estimated R1 trillion rand cost of the proposed nuclear build programme increasingly unaffordable. The new Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-finance-minister-admits-situation-is-grave-but-offers-no-solutions-86373">said as much</a>. Slow economic activity is squeezing the tax revenue base while social expenditure demands keep rising. This has caused the <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-budget-underscores-desperate-state-of-south-africas-finances-86362">deficit indicators</a> to rise a cause for serious concern. Its ludicrous for government to insist on adding the humongous nuclear build programme into such dire state of public finances.</p>
<p>It’s also important to consider that government’s atomic ambitions go far beyond the 9 600 MW of extra nuclear power stations. It also wants to rebuild a uranium enrichment plant that dates back to former <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/dismantlement-south-africa039s-nuclear-weapons">apartheid-era</a> President PW Botha in the 1980’s. South Africa gave up its nuclear capability in 1989. It was the only country in Africa that had the ability to make a nuclear bomb.</p>
<p>Zuma’s administration wants to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-10-20-00-zuma-set-to-blast-a-nuclear-path">regain</a> some of the lost nuclear capacity. It wants to construct a fuel element fabrication factory. It has talked of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. All these also bear steep price tags.</p>
<p><strong>What can stop it?</strong></p>
<p>It’s been reported that Mahlobo, the former state security minister turned energy minister, <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mahlobo-rushes-nuclear-deal-20171105-2">wants to rush</a> through the new process of guiding the nuclear energy plan into fruition. So it’s not going to be easy to stop it.</p>
<p>But South Africa’s nuclear ambitions face stiff opposition from different directions. These include environmentalist critics of nuclear power generation who use a blend of media, street theatre, objections at public consultation processes, and lawfare to try and stop the government’s ambitions. </p>
<p>The SA Faith Community Environmental Initiative group won an important victory earlier this year when the Cape High Court ruled that the government had not followed due process in its nuclear energy plans, and that they had to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/court-ruling-on-zumas-nuclear-deal-is-a-marker-of-south-africas-political-health-76870">halted</a>. This effectively sent government back to square one. </p>
<p>Opposition parties have also been active, using parliamentary channels. They’re also considering taking the legal route to halt the nuclear juggernaut. </p>
<p>And there is palpable opposition within the ANC itself. A number of ANC branches sent motions critical of the costs of nuclear electricity to the ANC’s National Policy Conference. That conference’s report censored out all these motions.</p>
<p><strong>The administration seems to be pulling out all the stops to bag this programme: What’s at stake?</strong> </p>
<p>By now, scandal-weary South Africans will react by saying: follow the money. In December 2016 the government dropped the bombshell that the procurement of its nuclear build programme would be <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/eskom-to-take-charge-of-nuclear-build-programme-2078673">taken away</a> from the department of energy and done instead through Eskom.</p>
<p>The reason became clear when months of media headlines <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/download-the-full-state-of-capture-pdf-20161102">revealed</a> that Eskom’s procurement mechanisms had been infiltrated and subverted by the Gupta family conglomerate to become a corporate feeding trough. With close ties to Zuma the Guptas stand accused of operating an elaborate mission to capture state business with a keen eye on the nuclear energy build programme</p>
<p>Every nuclear build contract, from “consulting” to turbines, would be inflated by one-fifth to build in the kickbacks to the corrupt middlemen tenderpreneurs.</p>
<p><strong>Does South Africa need nuclear energy at this stage?</strong></p>
<p>South Africa does not need nuclear energy at any stage. </p>
<p>About a decade ago, the government argued that South Africa’s economic growth was 5% per year every year, and that the resultant increase in electricity demand necessitated building 9 600 MW of <a href="http://safcei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Appendix-A-Review-of-the-Integrated-Resource-Plan-Update-Professor-Steve-Thomas.pdf">new nuclear power stations</a>. Critics pointed out that these <a href="http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Economy/Eskom/call-for-sa-to-halt-energy-decisions-20161104">figures were inaccurate</a>. </p>
<p>Economic growth has shrunk significantly since then together with future projections of electricity demand. But the government still insist that the 9 600 MW of nuclear power proposition is backed by economic fundamentals. Clearly, this is a political decision uncoupled from economic realities.</p>
<p>On top of this, the most <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-not-build-eight-new-nuclear-power-stations-49967">cost-effective</a> generation of electricity would be a blend of imported hydro, imported gas, solar and wind. But these avenues seems to have been blocked by nefarious agendas.</p>
<p>In 2010, the department of energy proudly announced a <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/upington-solar-park-south-africa-2010-10-22">5 000 MW solar park</a> to be built outside Upington. It hosted an international investors’ conference to kickstart progress. Since then, nothing has happened.</p>
<p>In 2014 the department proudly put up on the internet a slide show of how the Zuma and the DRC’s President Kabila had <a href="https://www.ujuh.co.za/movement-on-the-grand-inga-hydropower-project/">signed a treaty</a> guaranteeing South Africa over 10 000 MW of imported hydropower once the Inga dams were constructed.</p>
<p>By December 2016 the department had effectively airbrushed these out of its presentations. Clearly, political power had been applied to compel the department to drop Eskom’s renewable division, and to suck up to its nuclear division. Which political power this was, became exposed this week when Zuma <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/zuma-slams-critics-of-nuclear-programme">smeared opponents</a> of his nuclear plans as western puppets.</p>
<p><strong>What are global trends saying about nuclear energy?</strong> </p>
<p>The building of new nuclear power stations in developed countries is drastically <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-09-15-00-world-renewables-blow-nukes-up">declining</a>. The UK is alone in signing a contract to build a new one. Nuclear vendors have stepped up their sales campaigns in developing countries to compensate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma seems to be making a final push to secure the nuclear power deal before his tenure comes to an end. But it won’t be easy.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/870182017-11-09T13:39:08Z2017-11-09T13:39:08ZSouth African president’s last ditch effort to ram through a nuclear power deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193963/original/file-20171109-27161-1ya2z5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a lack of public support for nuclear in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African President Jacob Zuma’s term of office has been characterised by an absence of vision and <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/has-president-jacob-zumas-government-done-a-good-job/">associated initiatives</a>. Zuma is instead known for his inaction and overt <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/26/da-zuma-a-master-of-delaying-tactics">stalling tactics</a>. Examples include delays in setting up the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-13-state-capture-inquiry-zumas-unconstitutional-delay-the-focus-of-court-action/">State Capture Commission of Inquiry</a>, announcing a new board for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/concern-over-zuma-deliberately-delaying-sabc-board-appointment-20171009">state broadcaster</a>, and delaying the release of a report on the future of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-10-24-two-years-and-counting-university-fees-frustration-mounts/">university fees</a>.</p>
<p>His recent dramatic <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-10-31-iss-today-is-zumas-nuclear-gamble-still-in-play/#.WgMQOI-Czcs">push to fasttrack</a> an expensive and highly controversial nuclear power station build is therefore very much out of character. But Zuma’s advocacy of the nuclear build needs to be understood in terms of another hallmark of his presidency – <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-state-capture-controversy-has-influenced-south-africas-nuclear-build-58879">state capture</a>. This expression refers to the systematic takeover of state institutions by presidential allies and the resulting exploitation of institutions for commercial advantage and profit by his benefactors.</p>
<p>It’s already become clear who is likely to benefit from South Africa pursuing the option to build nuclear power stations. The list includes the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta brothers</a> and Zuma’s son Duduzane through their <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-01-18-zuma-the-guptas-and-the-russians--the-inside-story/">links to the Shiva uranium mine</a>.</p>
<p>And then there’s Zuma himself. Speculation about why the president appears to be favouring a deal with Russian company Rosatom ranges from allegations of grand scale <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1692639/malema-accuses-zuma-of-chasing-nuclear-deal-repaying-russia-with-new-energy-minister/">individual kickbacks</a> to alleged commitments linked to <a href="http://sa-monitor.com/putin-south-africas-anc-friends-troubled-times-south-african-monitor-13-october-2016/">funding</a> for the African National Congress.</p>
<p>The controversy around the nuclear power option was precipitated three years ago when it emerged that <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-12-exposed-scary-details-of-secret-russian-nuke-deal">the government</a> had signed an agreement with Russia that paved the way for the use of Russian technology in planned new nuclear power stations. The problem was that there’d been a complete <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/environmentalists-sa-did-sign-nuclear-deal-with-russia-20160330">lack of due process</a> – no costing, no public consultation, no proper proclamation and no competitive bidding. It was no surprise that the courts declared the awarding of the nuclear build to Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-nuclear-energy-option-for-south-africa-for-now-at-least-76751">illegal</a>. </p>
<p>On top of this a very strong case has been mounted against South Africa pursuing nuclear power. Reasons include the fact that it <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-03-29-nuclear-too-costly-and-sa-does-not-even-need-it/">can’t afford it</a>, and <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/new-study-points-to-90-renewables-mix-being-least-cost-by-2050-2017-09-15">doesn’t need nuclear</a> in its energy mix. </p>
<p>Despite all of these developments, and the growing controversy and mounting opposition to the deal, Zuma appears determined to get it done before his term as president of the ANC ends in December. In the last of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/10/17/strongman-david-mahlobo-key-in-cabinet-reshuffle_a_23245770/">reshuffles</a> he appointed one of his closest allies, David Mahlobo, to the energy portfolio. This is generally seen as a last ditch attempt to roll out the nuclear build in the face of now massive opposition. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/277533/mahlobo-seems-to-be-the-russians-favourite-cabinet-minister-adriaan-basson">Reports</a> suggest that this reshuffle was occasioned by Russian displeasure over what they see as a broken promise to award the building contract to Rosatom.</p>
<h2>The energy minister’s next steps</h2>
<p>Mahlobo appears to have devoted his first few weeks in office entirely to furthering the nuclear project. He has been active in <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/18/listen-will-new-energy-minister-push-nuclear-deal-through">the media</a> declaring the nuclear build as a given – and necessary. </p>
<p>Mahlobo’s next steps are likely to be:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>He is <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mahlobo-rushes-nuclear-deal-20171105-2">reported</a> to be planning to release – in record time – a new energy plan. This, some suspect, will be <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/fast-track-sas-energy-plan-with-immediate-effect---david-mahlobo-11801614">biased towards nuclear</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Heightened public lobbying. This could include <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/zuma-slams-critics-of-his-nuclear-plan-foreign-agents-11872687">verbal attacks on nuclear critics</a> as already initiated by the President.</p></li>
<li><p>The issuing of a request for proposals to build the nuclear plants to potential developers like Rosatom. Most observers expect the evaluation to favour Rosatom regardless of the merits of the other bidders.</p></li>
<li><p>Signing an agreement with Rosatom. This could mirror the USD$30 billion deal Russia signed with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia-nuclear/russia-to-lend-egypt-25-billion-to-build-nuclear-power-plant-idUSKCN0YA1G5">Egypt</a> which, on the surface, will appear attractive because it would offer favourable terms such as annual interest of only 3% and the commencement of repayments after 13 years. But when scaling the 4.8 GW Egyptian agreement up to the 9.6 GW envisioned for South Africa, the total cost then already exceeds R1 trillion. Annual repayments from year 14 to year 35 then amount to about 5% of South Africa’s annual fiscus. Any cost overruns, which are common in many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/03/hinkley-point-c-is-22bn-over-budget-and-a-year-behind-schedule-edf-admits">other nuclear builds</a>, would vastly increase the debt further.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What’s changed</h2>
<p>The global energy landscape has changed dramatically since South Africa first mooted the idea of supplementing its power mix with more nuclear. Major developments and changes include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Growing <a href="http://news.world.edu/?p=24718">mistrust in nuclear energy</a> in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster; </p></li>
<li><p>A dramatic fall in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/06/spectacular-drop-in-renewable-energy-costs-leads-to-record-global-boost">cost of renewable energy</a> and;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-11-15-eskom-from-a-crisis-of-capacity-to-a-crisis-of-rising-prices-declining-demand-and-funding/#.WgMWOo-Czcs">Lower than expected growth</a> in energy demand in South Africa.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Not even government’s own recent energy plans have promoted nuclear. </p>
<p>A 2013 draft energy plan argued against immediate nuclear growth. (The plan was <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/anc-misrepresenting-irp-2013-to-aid-russian-nuclea">never formally adopted</a>). </p>
<p>The last <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-energy-plan-has-sparked-strong-emotions-heres-why-69383">draft plan released in 2016</a> went as far as declaring new nuclear unnecessary until 2037.</p>
<h2>Will it happen?</h2>
<p>Nuclear plants are major long term investments, and these projects will not survive lengthy construction and operation periods without broad public support. There is definitely a lack of public support in South Africa.</p>
<p>The Zuma-Mahlobo work plan will face major opposition by other parties, civil society and even critics within the ruling party. Lengthy <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/threat-of-court-action-if-govt-steps-out-of-line-with-nuclear-plans-20171022">court challenges</a> will query the validity of the energy plan process, the public consultation, the regulatory aspects, the site selection and the constitutionality of the entire process. Public <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-23-sas-students-take-on-union-buildings">protests</a> highly effective in other spheres would now be directed against the nuclear build. The ruling party would probably abandon the scheme if it proves politically costly.</p>
<p>The danger is, however, that huge funds will have been wasted in coming to this realisation.</p>
<p>The stakes are high. Zuma’s efforts to promote this unpopular nuclear project are <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-24-news-analysis-zumas-waning-power-exposed-by-stalled-nuclear-plan">weakening him politically</a>. Even party comrades perceived to be in his inner circle – like newly appointed Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba – recognise that going ahead with the programme at this stage would <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/nuclear-build-programme-is-unaffordable--gigaba-11721499">cripple the country economically</a>. Repeated <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/17/zuma-s-cabinet-reshuffle-rocks-political-fraternity">ministerial reshuffles</a> to sideline his critics has further damaged Zuma’s standing in the ruling party and in broader society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hartmut Winkler receives funding from the NRF. He is a member of OUTA and SaveSA, but writes in his personal capacity.</span></em></p>South African President Jacob Zuma’s efforts to promote his unpopular nuclear project are weakening him politically but he still seems keen to pursue it.Hartmut Winkler, Professor of Physics, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.