tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/defence-procurement-2137/articlesDefence procurement – The Conversation2023-03-17T04:28:00Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2020262023-03-17T04:28:00Z2023-03-17T04:28:00Z$18 million a job? The AUKUS subs plan will cost Australia way more than that<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515974/original/file-20230317-28-tvz0de.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7315%2C3713&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian governments have a long and generally dismal history of using defence procurement, and particularly naval procurement, as a form of industry policy. </p>
<p>Examples including the Collins-class submarines, Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and, most recently, the Hunter-class “Future Frigates”.</p>
<p>The stated goal is to build a defence-based manufacturing industry. But there is also a large element of old-fashioned pork-barrelling involved. </p>
<p>In particular, South Australia has nursed grievances over the shutdown of local car making, centred in the state, following the withdrawal of federal government subsidies. The closure of the Osborne Naval Shipyard in north Adelaide would be politically “courageous” for any government.</p>
<p>So the projects roll on, despite technical problems (the six Collins-class subs were plagued by problems with their noise signature, propulsion and combat systems) and cost overruns (the three Hobart destroyers <a href="https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/from-the-magazine-the-solution-to-the-surface-combatant-shortfall-new-generation-anzac-frigates/">cost $1.4 billion more</a> than the $8 billion budgeted). The $35 billion plan for nine Hunter-class frigates may yet be abandoned given budget constraints. </p>
<p>All these previous ventures are dwarfed by the AUKUS agreement, which involves projected expenditure of up to $368 billion. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/aukus-submarine-plan-will-be-the-biggest-defence-scheme-in-australian-history-so-how-will-it-work-199492">AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?</a>
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<p>As Richard Denniss of The Australia Institute has noted, the precision implied by this number is spurious. The cost could come in below $300 billion, or easily approach $500 billion.</p>
<h2>Military case lacking</h2>
<p>The case for such a massive investment in submarines has proved hard to make in a simple and convincing way. The “<a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/red-alert-20230306-p5cpt8.html">Red Alert</a>” articles published this month by The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age has helped to raise alarm about China. But the warning Australia could find itself at war with China in the next few years (over Taiwan) isn’t a persuasive argument for submarines that won’t be delivered until the 2030s.</p>
<p>Other questions have emerged. </p>
<p>In different ways, former prime ministers Paul Keating and Malcolm Turnbull have questioned the sense of a renewed alliance with the United Kingdom. The UK in a state of obvious decline, and Labour leader Keir Starmer, likely to be Britain’s next prime minister, has been noticeably lukewarm in his support for AUKUS, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9335/">saying</a>: “Whatever the merits of an Indo-Pacific tilt, maintaining security in Europe must remain our primary objective.”</p>
<p>Then there’s the view, held by many experts, that what has made submarines such potent weapons in the past – stealth – is unlikely to endure. Underwater drones and improved satellite technology <a href="https://theconversation.com/progress-in-detection-tech-could-render-submarines-useless-by-the-2050s-what-does-it-mean-for-the-aukus-pact-201187">could make our subs obsolete</a> even before they are launched.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/progress-in-detection-tech-could-render-submarines-useless-by-the-2050s-what-does-it-mean-for-the-aukus-pact-201187">Progress in detection tech could render submarines useless by the 2050s. What does it mean for the AUKUS pact?</a>
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<h2>What about the jobs?</h2>
<p>In these circumstances, the easiest political strategy to sell the AUKUS package is to present it as a job-creation program.</p>
<p>This is an appealing path for the federal government, given Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s <a href="https://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/2022-anthony-albanese">yearning</a> for “an Australia that make things”. Albanese’s <a href="https://twitter.com/AlboMP">Twitter account</a> has published tweets extolling the economic benefits of the deal, but none about what the submarines will actually do to make Australians safer.</p>
<p>The obvious response is that the 20,000 jobs <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/aukus-submarine-workforce-and-industry-strategy">the government says</a> the program will directly create over the next 30 years will cost more than $18 million apiece. </p>
<p>But that actually understates how bad the case is. </p>
<h2>Where will we find the skilled workers?</h2>
<p>Australia already has a shortage of the type of skilled workers required to build the nuclear-powered subs: scientists, technicians and trade workers. Our existing training programs are unlikely to fill the gap. So, the new jobs will mostly be filled either by diverting skilled workers from other industries or by additional immigrants.</p>
<p>The government is grappling with the policies that can meet this existing shortage. Our migration program, for example, allocates extra points for technical skills in short supply, putting skilled workers ahead of people whose motive for migration is to be with their families and friends. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-improve-the-migration-system-for-the-good-of-temporary-migrants-and-australia-199520">How to improve the migration system for the good of temporary migrants – and Australia</a>
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<p>The “<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-inequity-of-job-ready-graduates-for-students-must-be-brought-to-a-quick-end-heres-how-183808">Job Ready Graduates</a>” policy introduced by the Morrison government subsidises science, technology, engineering and mathematics degrees, at the expense of humanities and social sciences. This policy is now under review, but may well be maintained in some form.</p>
<p>Such is the scale of the problem that the government’s pre-election commitment to deliver a White Paper on Full Employment (inspired the Chifley government’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Paper_on_Full_Employment_in_Australia">1945 White Paper</a>) has been sidelined by a focus on how to increase the supply of skilled labour, through vocational education, immigration and delayed retirement. Hence the title of the “<a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/outcomes-jobs-and-skills-summit">Jobs and Skills Summit</a>” in September 2022.</p>
<p>There is no indication the shortage of skilled tech workers is going to be resolved any time soon. It is, then, a mistake to boast about the number of technical jobs that will be created by AUKUS. </p>
<p>It would be more accurate to say that, just as the massive financial cost of the submarines will come at the expense of spending on social needs, the workers required to build them will divert skills from addressing needs such as decarbonising the economy.</p>
<p>Perhaps, like previous submarine deals, this plan will be scrapped before consuming the stupendous sums of money now projected. But in the meantime it will divert the Australia’s government from addressing urgent domestic problems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202026/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Quiggin has worked with Richard Denniss on a variety of policy issues.</span></em></p>The Albanese government’s attempt to sell the AUKUS nuclear submarine plan as a job-creation program is bad economics.John Quiggin, Professor, School of Economics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986082023-02-07T06:14:51Z2023-02-07T06:14:51ZBig defence projects are usually late and over budget – here’s what we can learn from the build-up to WW2<p>UK defence minister Alex Chalk <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/babcock-cuts-keel-on-royal-navys-second-type-31-frigate/">visited Rosyth shipyard</a> in Fife, Scotland a few days ago to kick off construction on the second ship in a new class of frigates for the Royal Navy. The navy is buying five of these state-of-the-art Type 31 warships for active service by 2027. </p>
<p>Yet while <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-procurement-minister-speech-at-type-31-steel-cutting-ceremony">Chalk talked up</a> the “world-class facilities” at Rosyth and selling more of these ships to other countries in future, doubts are simultaneously <a href="https://www.navylookout.com/the-type-32-frigate-frigate-programme-over-before-it-began/">being raised</a> about the frigates due after the Type 31s. The Type 32 programme, due to start completions by the early 2030s, may be cancelled in the prime minister’s March defence review due to a lack of funds. This threatens the government’s <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmdfence/1160/report.html">whole strategy</a> for increasing the navy. </p>
<p>Defence spending has <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/298527/defense-spending-as-share-of-gdp-united-kingdom-uk/">broadly declined</a> as a percentage of GDP since the end of the cold war, so overspends on one project often require savings elsewhere. The Type 32 programme follows a long line of projects going over budget, missing delivery dates or both. </p>
<p>Among the worst examples is the British Army’s Ajax programme for new armoured tanks. Originally aiming to procure <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/news/no-realistic-timescale-the-uk-ajax-armoured-vehicle/">589 vehicles for £3.5 billion</a> by 2017, the tanks have been beset by <a href="https://www.civilserviceworld.com/in-depth/article/ajax-mod-programme-far-from-on-track-gduk-contractor-claims-mark-francois">technical problems</a>. <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/26-ajax-delivered-even-though-they-may-never-enter-service/">Only 26</a> have been delivered and even they are not considered deployable due to noise and vibration problems. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the two <a href="https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_jun20/naval-programmes-over-budget">Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers</a> cost nearly double the original £3.9 billion estimate. <a href="https://www.navylookout.com/development-of-the-queen-elizabeth-class-aircraft-carrier-a-design-history/">Initially due</a> in 2012, the first did not come <a href="https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/united-kingdom/news/british-aircraft-carrier-hms-queen-elizabeth-begins-50-years-service">into service until 2017</a>, while the second was two years later. The budget for the navy’s Astute class of submarines also roughly doubled, while its six Type 45 destroyers cost 30% more than planned and were two years late. </p>
<p>Defence procurement is regularly reformed, but the same cost overruns and delays continue to occur. So what can be done? </p>
<h2>Learning from the interwar era</h2>
<p>The history of the UK aircraft industry between the first and second world wars is a useful comparison. Like today, the industry was wholly private (it was nationalised between the second world war and the 1980s). This meant the government’s military R&D and information on what was feasible was largely reliant on external contractors whose first priority was making a profit.</p>
<p>Also like today, the 1930s aircraft industry was attempting to use new technologies without knowing what was possible or how to do it. By contrast, there were far fewer technological changes to aircraft in, say, the 1950s or 1960s. </p>
<p>Manufacturers in the 1930s were having to rethink aircraft designs to include <a href="http://www.century-of-flight.freeola.com/Aviation%20history/evolution%20of%20technology/Retractable%20Landing%20Gear.htm">retractable undercarriages</a> and <a href="https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/propeller-variable-pitch-two-blade/nasm_A19340025000">new propellers</a>, while mounting machine guns and cannons on wings for the first time. At the same time, they were moving from wooden to metal aircraft to allow greater airspeeds. </p>
<p>Firms were overconfident in what they said they could deliver. In the 1920s, they had told the Air Ministry that the move to metal aircraft would speed up manufacturing and lead to fewer delays, and yet delays got steadily worse in the 1930s. The ministry talked of adding at least six months to manufacturers’ estimates to make them realistic. </p>
<p>As rearmament took off in the 1930s, the government also changed many requirements. For instance, Supermarine S5s were racing aircraft that had to be modified over several years to become Spitfire fighter aircraft. All these things contributed to delays and cost overruns. </p>
<h2>How it compares</h2>
<p>Today, computer power continually pushes the boundaries of what is possible. Suppliers often don’t know whether a new technology will work and regularly over-promise – while the government is often unsure what it actually needs. </p>
<p>Projects often start with vague ambitions that become detailed during production, and spec changes are one major reason for delays and cost overruns. With the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/24/prince-of-wales-aircraft-carrier-makes-little-sense-report">for example</a>, the take-off and landing mechanisms were changed on several occasions prior to full-scale production. </p>
<p>So what can interwar aircraft production tell us? Of course, they were unique times that required unique solutions, such as turning car plants into “shadow factories” for making more aircraft. But many of the policies introduced to get the air force ready for war could be applied again. </p>
<p>For example, the Air Ministry stated as early as 1925 that when new aircraft were being trialled, pilots should only highlight modifications required for safety and nothing more. Today’s planners could equally avoid big modifications or changes unless absolutely necessary. </p>
<p>Air Ministry procurement officials were often also kept in post for more than five years. Today it’s more like <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/why-is-the-british-armys-equipment-procurement-so-shambolic/">18 months to two years</a>. Make this longer and personnel would have to face the consequences of their decisions.</p>
<p>In the 1930s, budgets and accounting started being done on a multi-year basis. The RAF could then place orders over several years as opposed to one-year contracts, giving manufacturers greater certainty for hiring and training skilled labour and investing in additional capacity. This, too, could be done again. </p>
<p>Admittedly, there is a limit to what we can achieve. The tech issues <a href="https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/team-tempest/">show no signs</a> of abating – and they’re a problem for all countries. This partly explains international collaboration in defence procurement, such as <a href="https://www.eurofighter.com/about-us">the Eurofighter Typhoon</a> combat aircraft. It’s therefore more about managing these issues than eradicating them. </p>
<p>One solution is always to spend more money, but that looks unlikely. The government had been planning to increase defence spending from 2.2% to 3% of GDP by 2030, but <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/uk-delays-defense-spending-increase-raising-fears-3-gdp-target-will-be-axed/">many think</a> this will be abandoned in the current financial climate. </p>
<p>It’s therefore vital to learn what lessons we can from the past. In short, this means being clever about budgets and postings, minimising spec changes and avoiding being hoodwinked by overly optimistic contractors. To maximise what can be afforded and cope with the complexities of technological change, it’s the only logical way forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Both eras are seeing technological advancement on a unique scale.Matthew Powell, Teaching Fellow in Strategic and Air Power Studies, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1059842018-11-23T04:54:31Z2018-11-23T04:54:31ZBuilding our own warships is Australia’s path to the next industrial revolution<p>Naval defence procurement is very big business. <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/article/bae-systems-australia-signs-agreement-for-the-hunter-class-frigate-program">Nine Hunter-class frigates</a> will cost Australian taxpayers A$35 billion; the <a href="http://naval-group.com.au/what-we-do/sea-1000/">12 submarines</a> to replace the existing Collins-class subs at least A$50 billion. </p>
<p>Although both the frigates and submarines will be built by foreign companies – the frigates by Britain’s BAE, the subs by France’s Naval Group – part of the deal is that they build locally. </p>
<p>The federal government isn’t shy about spruiking the local economic benefits.
“We make no apologies for deciding to invest in Australian-built ships, creating Australian jobs and using Australian steel,” said Christopher Pyne, the then defence industry minster and now the defence minister, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-15/governments-89b-shipbuilding-project-at-high-risk-of-blowout/9762992">in May</a>.</p>
<p>There are critics. The Australian National Audit Office, for instance, has flagged the <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/naval-construction-programs-mobilisation">risks</a> of <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/extreme-risk-in-89b-navy-ship-building-plan-auditorgeneral-20180514-h101m0">cost blowouts</a> in a local build. These risks will need to be proactively managed. </p>
<p>But the local shipbuilding program does present a tremendous economic opportunity. It provides a platform to invigorate advanced manufacturing and ride the wave of the next industrial revolution. </p>
<p>We need to focus on how to maximise the benefits by leveraging the program to create competitive new industries and jobs.</p>
<h2>Mapping the manufacturing ecosystem</h2>
<p>Transitioning the Australian economy towards advanced manufacturing is not easy. It is tempting to simply import cheaper products. A good example can found in the renewable energy sector. With a few <a href="http://www.tindosolar.com.au/">exceptions</a>, the majority of solar panels and wind farm components are imported. This is a missed opportunity. </p>
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<p>We can avoid making the same mistake in shipbuilding. Our research shows that building ships locally has huge flow-on effects, and can help underpin other advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>To facilitate this process, we have developed a <a href="https://thesis-5081.firebaseapp.com/#!/home">map of the advanced manufacturing ecosystem</a> in Australia. The aim is to help boost the visibility of Australian organisations capable of supplying components or services to these projects.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An emerging defence innovation ecosystem in Australia, with business, university, government and other key stakeholders.</span>
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<p>This will assist in initiating partnerships. Several Australian <a href="https://www.redarc.com.au/defence">businesses</a> and <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/business/sa-business-journal/italian-frigates-contender-fincantieris-cash-to-float-flinders-boat/news-story/9cbcc55534361bf0c969ee84af715827">universities</a> have already begun to secure relationships with the international shipbuilders. More are in the pipeline. </p>
<h2>Industry opportunities</h2>
<p>Building ships presents many opportunities for Australian organisations. </p>
<p>In Australia, <a href="https://smallcaps.com.au/micro-x-uk-ministry-defence-airport-electronic-device-scanner/">X-ray and imaging products</a> are examples of complex products we have been able to competitively export. This technology is obviously relevant to medical imaging devices. It can also be applied to surveillance systems for the defence sector. </p>
<p>Conversely local manufacturers that develop capabilities in defence shipbuilding can leverage their expertise to supply to non-defence-related supply chains and for export.</p>
<p>Relevant technologies include <a href="https://indaily.com.au/news/business/2016/11/11/engineering-jobs-shape-sa-defence-future/">autonomous vehicles and systems</a>, <a href="https://www.rolls-royce.com/products-and-services/marine/about-marine/market-sectors/naval/gas-turbines.aspx">energy management</a>, <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/video/cyber-security">cyber-security</a>, <a href="https://shipbuildingknowledge.wordpress.com/category/metallurgy/">robust and maintainable materials</a>, <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/news/2017/01/23/tool-predict-acoustic-signatures-navy-vessels">acoustics</a> and <a href="https://www.naval-technology.com/features/digital-naval-shipyard/">digital technologies</a>. These technologies can have flow-on effects for advanced manufacturing in transport, renewables, health, space and information technology.</p>
<p>In these sectors, making <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-complexity-is-the-answer-to-pynes-innovation-problem-48730">complex</a> products is vital for competitiveness. </p>
<h2>Anchoring industry 4.0</h2>
<p>It is wrong to think advanced manufacturing is not viable in Australia. <a href="https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/smmt_the-digitalisation-of-the-uk-auto-industry_kpmg-apr-2017.pdf">Britain</a> and <a href="http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Invest/industrie-4-0.html">Germany</a> are two economies with high labour costs, yet both have been able to sustain manufacturing sectors.</p>
<p>The success of advanced manufacturers in Europe is based on an approach called <a href="https://www.plattform-i40.de/I40/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publikation/acatech-i40-maturity-index.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">industry 4.0</a>. The “4” refers to the advent of the fourth industrial revolution since the 18th century – integrating information and communication technology in industrial production.</p>
<p>During a visit to European manufacturing sites we saw how this involved the use of <a href="https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_feb18/inside_bae_systems_digital_naval_shipyard">robots</a>, <a href="https://www.assemblymag.com/articles/94445-bae-to-use-cobots-to-assemble-fighter-jets">cobots</a> (or collaborative robots), <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212827118302580">digital twins</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulMyFH1M5-4">driverless vehicles</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-the-next-industrial-revolution-spell-the-end-of-manufacturing-jobs-80779">Does the next industrial revolution spell the end of manufacturing jobs?</a>
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<p>Automation means that shipbuilding will not provide the sorts of jobs it did in the past. In Germany’s automotive industry, for example, human labour that cost <a href="https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Th-L6akYSZkJ:https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx%3FDocumentUid%3Dc06aa1a3-d355-4866-beda-9a3a8779ba6e+&cd=18&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au">40 euros an hour</a> has been replaced by robots that cost 5-8 euros an hour to operate – even cheaper than a Chinese worker. But other other jobs have been created, particularly in computing and engineering. There are now <a href="http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/EN/Invest/_SharedDocs/Downloads/GTAI/Industry-overviews/industry-overview-automotive-industry-en.pdf?v=15">100,000 more jobs</a> in Germany’s auto industry than <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/587576/number-employees-german-car-industry/">in 2010</a>.</p>
<p>Another feature of industry 4.0 is digitisation of the supply chain. Information about parts can be captured and used in new ways. When a component needs be serviced or replaced can now be predicted with high accuracy. This is important in any large ship, built to be operational for decades and using vast numbers of components from thousands of suppliers. It’s even more important in a naval ships, where a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/17/americas/argentina-missing-submarine-found-intl/index.html">breakdown</a> could be catastrophic. </p>
<p>Digital transformation will make our factories more competitive. Additionally, economic gains will come from defence procurement that encourages the local development of complex and competitive products. If done well, defence investment will make as powerful a contribution to the nation’s economic prosperity as its military security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Giselle Rampersad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s naval shipbuilding projects could anchor the future of advanced manufacturing in the national economy.Giselle Rampersad, Associate Professor in Innovation, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806012017-07-06T04:14:57Z2017-07-06T04:14:57ZExplainer: what is ballistic missile defence – and would it stop a missile from North Korea?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177010/original/file-20170706-21675-g03pdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The US and its allies currently deploy several ballistic missile defence systems that would be used in the event North Korea actually launched an attack.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/KCNA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>North Korea’s <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-qa-will-there-be-a-nuclear-armageddon">test this week</a> of an intercontinental ballistic missile has reignited interest and debate on the feasibility of ballistic missile defence systems, and whether countries such as Australia should seek to acquire them. </p>
<p>But what are these systems, and how do they work? How effective would they be in providing a defence against a potential missile attack?</p>
<h2>How do they work?</h2>
<p>All ballistic missile defence systems consist of a network of tracking and guidance radars, and the interceptor launchers. </p>
<p>On detecting a ballistic missile launch, the radars track the missile’s trajectory, fire an interceptor to shoot it down, and prepare further interceptors to be launched if the first one misses.</p>
<p>This is referred to as a <a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6882764/">“shoot-look-shoot” strategy</a>, as opposed to a strategy of saturation – where the defender simply shoots as many interceptors as possible in the hope of achieving a kill.</p>
<p>Modern defence systems use interceptor missiles carrying <a href="http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/ekv/">kinetic kill vehicles</a>. These are warheads that are non-explosive and designed to destroy incoming ballistic missiles by simply crashing into them. </p>
<p>All of the systems mentioned below are intended to work in conjunction with one another. They are integrated to provide the ability to shoot down ballistic missiles throughout their flight path. However, they are also capable of operating independently, although with less effectiveness than if operated in conjunction with other systems.</p>
<h2>Missile defence systems in the region</h2>
<p>The US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific currently deploy several ballistic missile defence systems. These would be used in the unlikely event that North Korea decided to actually launch a ballistic missile attack. </p>
<p>The first and most prominent is <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/thaad-missile-system-south-korea-590197">Terminal High Altitude Area Defence</a>, or THAAD, which the US <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-south-us-thaad-missile-defence-system-deployed-president-moon-probe-shocked-a7764341.html">has deployed</a> in South Korea. THAAD is designed to shoot down ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight – that is, as the ballistic missile is re-entering the atmosphere to strike its target. </p>
<p>The second relevant system is <a href="http://lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/PAC-3.html">Patriot PAC-3</a>, which is designed to provide late terminal phase interception – that is, after the missile has re-entered the atmosphere. It is deployed by <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-americas-enemies-fear-the-patriot-missile-defense-system-19833">US forces</a> operating in the region, as well as <a href="http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a19210/japan-deploys-patriot-missiles-in-downtown-tokyo/">Japan</a>. </p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 interceptors at work.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Perhaps the most capable system currently in operation in the region is the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/aegis.html">Aegis naval system</a>, which is deployed on US and Japanese destroyers. It is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase of flight – that is, when the missile is outside of earth’s atmosphere and transiting to its target.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Aegis system in action.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What all of these systems have in common is they are theatre ballistic missile defence systems, designed to provide protection against short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the one tested by North Korea this week, fly too high and fast for these systems to engage with.</p>
<p>Aegis has demonstrated some limited capability to engage targets similar to intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was <a href="https://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html">used to shoot down</a> a malfunctioning spy satellite in 2008, but has never been tested against an actual intercontinental ballistic missile target. </p>
<p>The only system expressly designed to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles is the US <a href="http://www.boeing.com/defense/missile-defense/ground-based-midcourse/index.page">Ground-based Midcourse Defence</a>. However, this has a <a href="https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf">very patchy record</a> in testing. By the end of 2017 it will only have 44 interceptors deployed. </p>
<figure>
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</figure>
<h2>How effective are they?</h2>
<p>None of these systems is 100% effective, and most have an <a href="https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf">iffy record in testing</a>. Aegis has succeeded in 35 out of 42 tests, while Ground-based Midcourse Defence has had only ten successes in 18 tests. However, THAAD has been successful in 18 out of 18 tests.</p>
<p>Tests are conducted in favourable conditions – and it is reasonable to expect the success rates to be lower in actual combat use.</p>
<p>The true difficulty lies with intercontinental ballistic missiles. An intercontinental ballistic missile <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-icbm.html?mcubz=2">can attain altitudes</a> well in excess of low earth orbit. Those fired on a typical long-range trajectory can exceed 1,200km in altitude. The high-trajectory, short-range test shot North Korea conducted this week attained an altitude of 2,700km.</p>
<p>By way of comparison, the International Space Station <a href="https://www.space.com/16748-international-space-station.html">orbits at an altitude</a> of around 400km.</p>
<p>However, the altitude intercontinental ballistic missiles attain is only part of the problem. The other major challenge facing ballistic missile defence is the truly enormous speeds that missiles attain during the terminal phase. They often hit or exceed 20 times the speed of sound.</p>
<p>A common comparison used is that ballistic missile defence is akin to shooting a bullet in flight with another bullet. The reality is even more extreme. </p>
<p>For example, a .300 Winchester Magnum (a high-velocity hunting and sniper round) <a href="http://ballisticscalculator.winchester.com">can achieve a velocity</a> of 2,950 feet per second as it leaves the barrel. This equates to 3,237km/h, or 2.62 times the speed of sound. An intercontinental ballistic missile can achieve speeds almost eight times faster than this. As a result, it is almost impossible to reliably defend against such missiles.</p>
<p>This is not necessarily a problem for countries such as Japan and South Korea. Any ballistic missile used by North Korea against them would be a shorter-range ballistic missile that these systems could engage. </p>
<p>However, countries should be mindful that these systems provide limited-to-no capability to defend against intercontinental ballistic missiles. In Australia’s case, the only missiles capable of reaching this far from North Korea are intercontinental ballistic missiles. Thus, even if Australia decided to invest in ballistic missile defence, it would provide little-to-no protection from a potential North Korean nuclear attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the one tested by North Korea this week, fly far too high and fast for current missile defence systems to engage with.James Dwyer, Teaching Fellow and PhD Candidate, Politics and International Relations Program, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/585882016-04-29T04:26:46Z2016-04-29T04:26:46ZWhat do we want from Australia’s new submarines?<p>The Australian government’s decision to spend A$50 billion to <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-company-dcns-wins-race-to-build-australias-next-submarine-fleet-experts-respond-58060">double its submarine fleet to 12</a> was based on a number of considerations about what the new submarines would be required to do.</p>
<p>In military parlance, the value of submarines can be discussed in terms of the missions they can carry out and the military effects they can create, such as:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Sea denial – the threat of attack by submarines can deny an adversary the use of a strategic area of the sea. An example is the exclusion zone that British submarines enforced around the Falklands Islands in the war with Argentina in 1982. </p></li>
<li><p>Maritime strike – the ability to attack and destroy enemy forces and capabilities.</p></li>
<li><p>Intelligence collection – which can take several forms, such as the gathering of technical information about the capabilities and operational practices of enemy forces, or information that indicates the current or future intentions of an adversary. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The missions</h2>
<p>Submarines carry out <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-australia-need-submarines-at-all-58575">various kinds of missions</a>, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Anti-surface warfare – attacking ships, either merchant shipping carrying supplies or naval ships. This has always been the primary role of most submarines. </p></li>
<li><p>Anti-submarine warfare – submarines can be employed to track and possibly attack other submarines, contributing to anti-submarine operations, which are likely to involve surface ships and maritime aircraft as well. Anti-submarine warfare demands a higher level of capability and proficiency than anti-surface warfare and not all submarines are capable of carrying out this role.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Estimating the capability offered by submarines of a particular design is done through a combination of systems performance analysis and operations analysis.</p>
<p>Systems performance analysis models the submarine and its subsystems to estimate measures such as range, endurance, speed, stealth and sensor detection range. Operations analysis models what the submarine is can do to estimate its mission effectiveness.</p>
<p>The utility of submarines largely derives from stealth, uncertainty, persistent presence and firepower. In plain terms, a submarine can hang around, unseen, in places where other forces might not be able to go and inflict damage when required.</p>
<p>Sustained presence involves requirements for the endurance, the length of time that the presence of the submarine must be sustained, and the number of operational areas that need to be covered.</p>
<h2>The design</h2>
<p>There are a multitude of interconnected drivers in the design of a submarine. These drivers can be modelled starting with high-level requirements for sustained presence and the missions to be undertaken.</p>
<p>The drivers result in a design involving the synthesis and integration of many complex systems and subsystems. To provide a context for this, a Collins class submarine has about 500,000 parts to be assembled. This is about five times as many parts as a large commercial airliner and about three times as many as a frigate.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the important characteristics of submarines can be understood in terms of a few basic building blocks. These are the hull and the manoeuvring control systems, the propulsion system, power and energy, stealth, habitability and the combat system. </p>
<p>Generally the back half of a submarine is devoted to propulsion systems, which for a diesel-electric submarine means the diesel generators, the main electric motor and the electrical power conversion and control equipment.</p>
<p>The front half contains the control room where the sensor information is processed and the submarine is commanded, the crew’s living quarters and the weapon stowage. </p>
<p>Tanks containing fuel and fresh water are distributed around the submarine. The batteries are located along the bottom of the hull where they also act as ballast. </p>
<p>Diesel-electric submarines store electrical energy in a large set of batteries, which are recharged using a diesel generator. While fully submerged, traditional diesel-electric submarines use a battery-powered electric motor to turn the propeller.</p>
<p>Because there are few moving parts with electric drive, a diesel-electric submarine can be extremely quiet when running on batteries. </p>
<h2>Submerged</h2>
<p>The length of time a diesel-electric submarine can stay fully submerged is limited by the amount of energy that can be stored in the battery. The submerged endurance of a diesel-electric submarine while running on its battery depends on its speed for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, the hydrodynamic resistance to moving through water increases steeply as speed increases.</p>
<p>Second, the total amount of energy that can be extracted from a lead-acid battery reduces the faster it is discharged. This means that while a submarine might be able to stay submerged for a few days if it travels slowly, it could exhaust its battery in an hour or two travelling at maximum speed.</p>
<p>Understanding the power requirements of submarines and their interplay with stealth is a key determinant in the design of a submarine. There are two major components that affect the need for power.</p>
<p>One is the power required for propulsion, mentioned above. There is also the power required for the crew (including atmosphere control, victuals and garbage management), for data processing associated with the sensor and combat systems, the platform subsystems and delivery of weapons and countermeasures.</p>
<p>This second component is virtually independent of speed and is sometimes called the “hotel load”. </p>
<h2>Silent running</h2>
<p>The ability of a submarine to operate successfully hinges on its stealth. Stealth underpins survivability and mission success in high-threat environments.</p>
<p>Once a submarine is detected, its mission may be compromised and it is liable to be tracked and destroyed. The ability to remain underwater is paramount to submarine stealth and survivability.</p>
<p>The primary way to detect a submerged submarine is sonar (detection of underwater sound), leading to an ongoing endeavour to make submarines increasingly quieter and harder to detect. </p>
<p>There are two types of anti-submarine sonars: active and passive.</p>
<p>Passive sonar detects the noise radiated by the submarine. This is the most likely way a submerged submarine will be initially detected. The greatest attention must be given during design, and also in maintenance, to eliminating or controlling sources of noise on the submarine. </p>
<p>Active sonar transmits a pulse of sound and detects echoes from the submarine. This transmission can be intercepted by the submarine on its own sonar system, which alerts it to the presence of the threat. This gives it some information about the type, location and movement of the threat.</p>
<p>A submarine can generally detect active sonar at a greater range than the threat sonar can detect the submarine. This is because the sound only has to travel one way to get to the submarine, but has to be reflected and travel back to the threat sonar, losing more signal strength in the two-way round trip.</p>
<p>The control of noise includes addressing sources internal to the submarine as well as the noise generated by the flow of water over the hull and propeller. </p>
<h2>Why 12 submarines?</h2>
<p>A key measure of submarine capability is the level of presence that the fleet as a whole can sustain in operational areas. The level of presence depends on the availability of submarines for operations.</p>
<p>Every submarine goes through a cycle of availability and periods of maintenance. Once or twice during the life of a submarine it will be docked for a deep maintenance period lasting a year or more.</p>
<p>During deep maintenance, the pressure hull may be opened to allow access to major machinery to be repaired or upgraded. Major capability upgrades requiring new masts or sonar arrays may be carried out during deep maintenance. </p>
<p>In addition to the deep maintenance periods, there may be mid-cycle docking for extended, but lesser, maintenance lasting several months.</p>
<p>When a submarine emerges from a major maintenance period, it needs to spend some time working up at sea. During this time, its systems are tested and the crew complete drills and training before deploying on operations.</p>
<p>It is an inescapable fact that for any submarine fleet about half of the boats will be unavailable for operations at any time. The smaller the fleet, the more susceptible it is to fluctuations in availability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janis Cocking works for the Department of Defence </span></em></p>Australia’s new submarine fleet will be designed for a range of different missions in our challenging maritime environment.Janis Cocking, Chief of Science Strategy and Program Division, Defence Science and Technology OrganisationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/577962016-04-26T05:01:49Z2016-04-26T05:01:49ZSubmarines decision ultimately shows the merits of partisan debate on defence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/120132/original/image-20160426-1359-qi3my0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If Tony Abbott is disappointed by the failure to choose Japan to build Australia's new submarines, the only one he can blame is himself.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ben Macmahon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Contrary to conventional wisdom, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-company-dcns-wins-race-to-build-australias-next-submarine-fleet-experts-respond-58060">announcement</a> that French firm DCNS will build Australia’s next fleet of submarines came sooner – and in a better fashion – because of partisan politics.</p>
<p>This hugely technical, expensive and highly secret military capability has been the subject of major public debate, partisan divides and international media campaigns. It has been handled by four prime ministers and six defence ministers.</p>
<p>Like oil and water, party politics and good defence policy are presumed not to mix. And this process has been all about party politics. </p>
<h2>The role of party politics</h2>
<p>The Coalition came into office in 2013 distrusting government support for local industry, and wanting value for money. However, dire polling – particularly in South Australia – would lead the Abbott government to completely reverse course and insist on a large local build.</p>
<p>Labor has been more consistent, though no less partisan. It prefers domestic construction; it is happy to spend government money inefficiently to sustain local industry; and it saw a real opportunity to attack the Abbott and Turnbull governments in vulnerable electorates.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, federal senator Nick Xenophon and his new party seem to have decided that the foremost purpose of Australian defence policy is to protect the jobs of South Australians. </p>
<p>The net cost to Australia? We’re paying <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1093.html">potentially as much as 30-40%</a> more for these already hugely expensive machines.</p>
<p>So no party can claim, hand on heart, that their decisions were made purely on the basis of the national interest. But nor should we expect them to do so. </p>
<p>The notion of isolating policy from politics is a myth. Authoritarian leaders pay attention to politics just as much as democratic populists. And contrary to the usual norm of bipartisanship, the partisan debate over Australia’s submarines has largely been to the country’s benefit.</p>
<p>Time and again during this process, partisan politics has improved – not weakened – the government’s choice. Party politics brought the issue before the public. Party politics helped create a real debate about where the submarines would be built. </p>
<p>Internal party politics helped lead to the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-09/submarines-open-tender-process-falls-short-federal-promise/6078882">competitive evaluation process</a>, which switched the leverage from the supplier to the buyer. This potentially alleviated some of the costs of a local build. And party politics helped ensure a decision was made early in 2016, before the election.</p>
<p>No doubt many who supported the Japanese bid will publicly rue the decision’s political nature. But if former prime minister Tony Abbott in particular is disappointed by the failure to choose Japan, he can only blame himself. </p>
<p>Abbott chose to initiate a competitive evaluation process with multiple bidders. It was his decision to mandate that much of the build <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-15/more-submarine-building-jobs-for-adelaide,-pm-says/6699706">had to occur</a> in South Australia. And it was ultimately his failure to sell the public and national security community on the wisdom of tighter security links with Japan via a submarine deal.</p>
<h2>Lessons for next time?</h2>
<p>The submarine decision could have been better handled in many ways. </p>
<p>Australians never received a sensible explanation from the Rudd government about why 12 was the right number for the size of the fleet. It was never clear why the Gillard government couldn’t make a decision in its term. </p>
<p>The competitive evaluation process was an obvious political fix for Abbott to keep his promise that South Australian companies could be involved in the final build. And it was often uncomfortable watching Bill Shorten demean the Japanese and friendly foreign nations. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Defence Minister Marise Payne have much work to do to convince the public that this is the right choice, within the right time frame, and for the right price.</p>
<p>Many are still uncomfortable with the notion that defence is like any other area of national policy and open for rambunctious debate in the Australian fashion. But given the worsening strategic environment of today’s Asia-Pacific, getting the public informed, and hopefully supportive of this significant decision, is vital. </p>
<p>Australia’s security is aided most not by choosing one particular submarine over the other, but rather by having a public willing to support and fund the military we need, and comfortable with the roles we want them to play. If that means a bit more bickering, or slightly less cost-efficient purchases, it is worth the cost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like oil and water, party politics and good defence policy are presumed not to mix. And the process to buy Australia’s next fleet of submarines has been all about party politics.Andrew Carr, Research Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/580602016-04-26T03:22:48Z2016-04-26T03:22:48ZFrench company DCNS wins race to build Australia’s next submarine fleet: experts respond<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/120129/original/image-20160426-1335-1a18zxy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DCNS' ‘Shortfin Barracuda’ was the winning design for Australia’s next submarine fleet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/DCNS Group</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s next fleet of submarines will be built by French company DCNS but constructed in South Australia, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull <a href="http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/future-submarine-program">announced on Tuesday</a>.</p>
<p>DCNS beat competing bids from German and Japanese manufacturers to win the contract. The fleet of 12, which is to replace the Collins-class submarines, will come at an estimated cost of A$50 billion. The government claims the project will:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… directly sustain around 1,100 Australian jobs and a further 1,700 Australian jobs through the supply chain.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Conversation’s experts respond to key aspects of the announcement below.</p>
<hr>
<h2>What does it mean for local jobs and South Australia?</h2>
<p><strong>John Spoehr, Director, Australian Industrial Transformation Institute, Flinders University</strong></p>
<p>This announcement is one of the building blocks needed to accelerate transformation of South Australia’s ailing manufacturing industry. </p>
<p>Next year will see the closure of the heart of Australia’s automotive manufacturing industry – much of which is concentrated in South Australia. This alone was going to lead to the loss of thousands of jobs in Adelaide’s northern and southern suburbs. </p>
<p>The threat of closure of Arrium’s steel manufacturing and mining operations now hangs over the state. These operations employ around 3,000 people in Whyalla.</p>
<p>A circuit-breaker like the submarine project was urgently needed to instil some hope in South Australia. On its own it won’t solve the short-term problem of job losses in the automotive industry, but it can lay the foundations for the growth of a robust advanced manufacturing sector in South Australia.</p>
<p>Projects of this scale and complexity help underpin more rapid uptake and diffusion of advanced technologies and workplace innovation. This is essential to the successful roll-out of a project like this. And it is enormously beneficial for other industry sectors that can grow more rapidly on the back of this long-term investment.</p>
<p>The choice of the French option is particularly interesting. The Japanese were the favourites to begin with, but they were not as committed to a local build as the other bidders. The Germans offered a local build. The French put forward a hybrid build – with the first of the submarines being manufactured in France. </p>
<p>From an economic development and jobs point of view, the challenge will be to ensure a smooth and certain transition to a local build as soon as possible. This will require a sophisticated knowledge-and-skills-transfer program to ensure that opportunity is maximised.</p>
<h2>What does it mean for our foreign relations?</h2>
<p><strong>Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University</strong></p>
<p>Since the 2009 Defence White Paper, Australia has been committed to a new generation of submarines. The Abbott government got within weeks of announcing that Japanese contractors would build the boats. The unsuccessful leadership spill in February 2015 resulted in the competitive evaluation process that led to the selection of the French firm DCNS.</p>
<p>The government has rightly emphasised that the decision was a merit-based one. The most important factors related to questions such as cost, reliability, operations and the like. </p>
<p>But a fleet of submarines is not a fleet of trucks. The decision has obvious strategic and foreign policy implications. </p>
<p>The conventional wisdom had been that Australia would take the J-option as the culmination of significant tightening of the strategic links between two of America’s most important Asian allies. That Australia did not go with Japan will clearly hurt that relationship to some degree, but it won’t be a major setback.</p>
<p>Although relationship management will be challenging because of the humiliating way in which information was leaked prior to the formal announcement, overall the decision will be more of a roadbump than a significant roadblock. </p>
<p>Japan and Australia have become one another’s most important strategic partners after the US. The reasons for this – the convergence of strategic interests and their shared commitment to the prevailing regional order – mean that the underlying relationship will continue on its long-run trajectory. </p>
<p>Unusually, Australia has a relatively strong hand in the relationship. Japan needs support for its broader security transformation, and it has relatively few friends in Asia. It had been thought that the submarine deal was part of this support – with Australia helping Japan to become a defence exporter – yet it is likely that there will be some other defence procurement of a lower profile and lower risk that Australia will put toward Japan.</p>
<p>While China is likely to be pleased that Japan was unsuccessful, it was not overly concerned about the decision itself. Its concerns remain with what it perceives to be a regional order stacked against its interests.</p>
<p>After Japan, the US will probably be the most disappointed party. The US clearly was hoping that Australia would go with Japan due its desire to support Japan’s broader strategic development and the ties that it would cement between two of its key partners. </p>
<p>That the decision pleases China and displeases both Japan and the US means that Australia’s submarine choice might be seen as a metaphor for Australia’s broader strategic dilemma. But this is to misunderstand the more complex forces that Australia needs to balance in its international dealings. </p>
<p>Australian diplomats will be managing the fact that many will make this mistake. And it is testimony to the region’s febrile nature that this decision has taken on such a stature.</p>
<h2>What were the technological considerations?</h2>
<p><strong>Stephan Fruehling, Associate Professor, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University</strong></p>
<p>By selecting a French bidder to build its next fleet of submarines, Australia is entering a long-term relationship with the only Western country that designs and builds both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines.</p>
<p>Since the survival of a large part of France’s nuclear arsenal hinges on the survival of its submarines, Australia’s new partner is committed to remaining at the forefront of submarine technology.</p>
<p>Australia’s own submarine requirements are driven by the long distances its navy has to deal with in the Indo-Pacific region. No existing submarine provides the range and endurance Australia is looking for. Japan offered a modification of the existing Soryu submarine; Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp proposed a new design based on the smaller Type 214.</p>
<p>DCNS’ proposal is a conventionally powered boat derived from the Barracuda class – the “Shortfin Barracuda”. It was the largest design in the competition at 4,500 tonnes. </p>
<p>In recent weeks, reports that Japan’s design had been ranked third seem to have confirmed the judgement of many submarine experts that the Soryu contained several limitations in its layout and acoustic proofing.</p>
<p>Choosing France’s proposal over Germany’s, Australia will avoid the risks that may come with significantly scaling up a smaller submarine design. However, the Shortfin Barracuda also comes with its own unique technical risks. In particular, Australia’s new submarines will be the only conventionally powered boats using pump jets for propulsion, rather than a propeller at the rear. </p>
<p>While pump jets promise acoustic quieting and are common on nuclear-powered boats, some experts have questioned its efficiency and performance at the slower patrol speeds typical for conventional submarines. At the same time, the German technology for air-independent propulsion is generally seen as more advanced than France’s.</p>
<p>There was a lot of focus on the strategic implications of the Japanese bid. But France’s own position as a regional power – with sovereign territory in the oceans to Australia’s west and east, and a continuing military presence in the region – promises much of the commonality of interest without the strategic drawbacks that some saw in the Japanese proposal. </p>
<p>And, perhaps most importantly, France can offer one thing that Japan and Germany cannot, even if it is unlikely to have featured in the evaluation of the bids: if Australia ever wants to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, it now has a partner that could offer that too.</p>
<h2>Will it meet our needs?</h2>
<p><strong>Hans J. Ohff, Visiting Fellow, University of Adelaide</strong></p>
<p>I have my doubts as to whether any of the three contenders had the right answer for Australia’s future naval needs. Australia owns the intellectual property of the Collins-class submarines. At 3,000 tonnes, an evolved Collins would match or better anything a 4,500-tonne boat can throw at it. </p>
<p>At more than 4,500-tonne submerged displacement, a conventional submarine loses its signature advantage (noise, infrared, radar when on the surface) compared to a nuclear-powered submarine.</p>
<p>The French Navy operates submarines across the five oceans. The French bidder, DCNS, argued that the experience and propulsion technology they transferred from their conventional and nuclear submarines made them the preferred candidate to build Australia’s future submarines. And they turned out to be right.</p>
<p>But it’s a shame that in Australia we always reach for the stars rather keeping our feet on the ground. While the French ran a brilliant campaign, the Germans and Japanese both ran very poor campaigns.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: you can read Hans Ohff’s analysis piece on the decision <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-the-french-submarine-won-the-bid-to-replace-the-collins-class-58223">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hans J. Ohff is the former CEO of the Australian Submarine Corporation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs' national executive.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Spoehr and Stephan Fruehling do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Conversation’s experts respond to key aspects of the announcement that French company DCNS will be build Australia’s next fleet of submarines.John Spoehr, Director, Australian Industrial Transformation Institute, Flinders UniversityHans J. Ohff, Visiting Fellow, University of AdelaideNick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityStephan Fruehling, Associate Professor, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/577912016-04-18T03:50:04Z2016-04-18T03:50:04ZAustralia still hasn’t had the debate on why we even need new submarines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119001/original/image-20160417-26305-rtt43u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Japan is believed to be winning the race to build Australia's new submarine fleet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Franck Robichon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia is about to make its biggest-ever investment in <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/defence-white-paper-new-submarine-fleet-to-cost-taxpayers-150-billion-20160224-gn32kg.html">military hardware</a>. Although we don’t know yet whether Germany, France or Japan will be awarded the contract to build our 12 new submarines, it is possible to make a few confident predictions.</p>
<h2>What to expect</h2>
<p>First, the actual cost of the submarines when completed will be much higher than the figure that is proposed now. </p>
<p>If cost were the only consideration, it would actually make more sense to let the successful bidder build them in their own country. But the construction is now seen as a de-facto industry policy <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-25/any-australian-build-of-submarines-to-be-based-in-adelaide/7199504">for South Australia</a>, a politically important state that has <a href="https://theconversation.com/arriums-whyalla-steelworks-another-threat-to-fragile-manufacturing-sector-57475">haemorrhaged manufacturing jobs</a> of late.</p>
<p>There are good arguments for maintaining a manufacturing capacity in Australia – even on national security grounds. But given the <a href="http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/costs-sinking-our-submarine-fleet/story-fn6ck51p-1226167951592">cost blowouts</a> in the construction and maintenance of the troubled Collins-class submarines, it’s not unreasonable to ask whether building submarines is really our collective strong suit. </p>
<p>Second, it’s a pretty safe bet that Japan will <a href="https://theconversation.com/defence-white-paper-why-australia-will-opt-for-japanese-built-submarines-55224">awarded the contract</a> to build the submarines. This has nothing to do with the debates about the boats’ technical capacities, however. The principal reason Japan is likely to get the contract is that it will consolidate the relationship between America’s regional alliance partners and the collective effort to discourage Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>There may be much to be said for such efforts. Plainly, China has become more aggressive in its pursuit of highly implausible-looking <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349">territorial claims</a> in the South China Sea. This is something Australians might collectively feel <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-16/turnbull-returns-from-first-visit-to-china/7331912">alarmed about</a>. </p>
<p>But if Australia is trying to influence China’s behaviour, a sternly worded diplomatic note is likely to have as much effect and would be rather cheaper, too. The reality is that Australia can do very little to influence the outcome of the growing tensions in the South China Sea, with or without the new submarines.</p>
<p>The third point to make about the submarines is that they will almost certainly never be used in anger. </p>
<p>It is worth asking what the world would look like if we were ever in a situation where we did have to use them. The strategic – not to say economic – circumstances would be so apocalyptic that having the enduring capacity to destroy part of a notional enemy might be the least of our worries.</p>
<p>In reality, the subs are supposed to “deter” our notional foe. The idea is that simply by possessing these sorts of weapons, the likes of China will be discouraged from acting aggressively. But if China is not deterred by the prospect of nuclear annihilation at the hands of the US, why should we imagine that our 12 submarines would do the trick?</p>
<p>Will the subs deter other rising regional powers, such as Indonesia or Vietnam, from having hostile intentions toward us? It is quite possible that we may risk “invasion” from Indonesia – as we did from Vietnam many years ago – but this is likely to take the form of political, economic and environmental refugees in fishing boats, not the Indonesian army’s rather underwhelming might.</p>
<p>The submarines could certainly deter asylum seekers, but this could probably be achieved in more cost-effective ways. It might not do much for Australia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-international-condemnation-on-human-rights-mean-so-little-to-australia-53814">rather battered international reputation</a> either.</p>
<h2>The flow-on effects</h2>
<p>China rightly points out that, unlike the US and Australia, it has not been involved in a war worthy of the name since the 1970s, when it received a humiliating bloody nose at the hands of Vietnam.</p>
<p>Australia, however, has fought in Iraq (twice), Afghanistan and Syria in recent times. </p>
<p>Given Australia’s enthusiasm for foreign military adventures, no matter how remote the conflict, our neighbours may feel understandably alarmed at both the submarine purchase and the relative diminishing of their security as a consequence. </p>
<p>This is a classic <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410903133050">“security dilemma”</a> in which each side feels less secure because of the actions of the other. The all-too-predictable response is to increase spending on national defence in a futile effort to enhance security.</p>
<p>History suggests that arms races end badly. The first world war had complex causes, but the simultaneous ramping-up of national defence spending by the potential belligerents didn’t help. When war did break out, the modernised, more lethal weapons systems were put to astoundingly effective use.</p>
<p>The principal consequence of the inevitable but little-debated decision to acquire these boats is to contribute to a rapidly escalating regional arms race.</p>
<p>This would be a ruinously expensive, dangerous and ultimately futile exercise at the best of times. But in a part of the world where there are still much better uses for public money, despite remarkable improvements in economic development, such expenditures seem entirely unjustifiable. </p>
<p>At the very least, political leaders and strategic thinkers ought to be compelled to give a much more plausible and specific account of the new submarines’ real benefits and demonstrated deterrent effects.</p>
<p>Being secure is undoubtedly a desirable thing. Quite what it means and how it is best achieved ought not to be left entirely to the pointy-heads in the defence establishment, though.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57791/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Beeson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The principal consequence of Australia’s inevitable but little-debated decision to acquire submarines is to contribute to a rapidly escalating regional arms race.Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/552242016-02-25T02:05:17Z2016-02-25T02:05:17ZDefence white paper: why Australia will opt for Japanese-built submarines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/112686/original/image-20160224-32745-dz0yxi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Defence Minister Marise Payne is still to announce who will build Australia's next generation of submarines.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Ben Macmahon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With the release of its much-delayed <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Default.asp">defence white paper</a>, the Coalition has laid out its stall on matters of defence and security. It entails a commitment to increase spending to the <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/2-percent-can-we-should-we-will-we/">magical 2% of GDP</a>, a troop expansion of the Australian Defence Force, and a strong focus on the Navy. </p>
<p>At the heart of the paper is the decision to acquire a fleet of 12 long-range submarines at a potential overall cost of A$150 billion.</p>
<p>The new fleet is needed, the paper says, because Australia will be required to project naval power further from home in a regional security environment increasingly shaped by China’s growing military weight. This basic position appeared in both the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009</a> and <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf">2013</a> defence white papers under Labor. </p>
<p>What this white paper is silent on, however, is where these submarines will be acquired.</p>
<h2>The subs debate</h2>
<p>By some accounts, former prime minister Tony Abbott had locked in a decision to buy <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tony-abbott-and-a-japanese-sub/">submarines from Japan</a>. This unravelled in response to the first challenge to Abbott’s leadership in February 2015. In an effort to shore up partyroom support, he <a href="https://defence-ministers.govspace.gov.au/files/2015/06/Terms-of-Reference.pdf">committed to</a> a nebulous “competitive evaluation process”. </p>
<p>This opened the door to bids from submarine-makers from around the world. It also enabled the government to try to get at least some aspects of the construction process based in Australia.</p>
<p>The Turnbull government has maintained the same public message. Lobbying has become intense and increasingly public, with the politics of the purchase now part of the various parties’ sales pitch. European manufacturers are openly claiming that one of the advantages in buying boats from Germany is that Australia won’t <a href="https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co16038-australias-submarine-decision-a-matter-of-grand-strategy/#.Vs0M1JN96Cc">inflame relations with China</a> as, by implication, buying boats from Japan would.</p>
<p>Japan’s pitch similarly emphasises the politics. Not only does it say its subs have the closest operational fit to what Australia wants from the vessels, but the purchase would strengthen the bilateral relationship and be good for the broader US-centred regional security arrangements. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/submarine-contract-could-lock-in-quasi-military-alliance-with-japan-20160220-gmzfal">Debate in Australia</a> has turned on the purchase’s economic impact and the extent to which it could lead the country into an alliance-type relationship with Japan. By binding itself to Japan, so the argument goes, Australia runs the risk of being dragged into fights it might otherwise have avoided.</p>
<p>Clearly, buying submarines involves a great deal more than buying a Camry, and not only because of the cost. There is a need to develop a kind of technical intimacy with which defence types are always uneasy. </p>
<p>However, those who argue that the J-option will tie Australia into a quasi-alliance with Japan are wrong. In this case, the technological link will follow a strategic choice that has long been made. The submarine decision will flow from Australia having committed itself to an extremely close long-term strategic relationship with Japan – not the other way around.</p>
<h2>A deepening relationship</h2>
<p>For the better part of a decade, strategic policymakers in Japan and Australia have developed a remarkably tight set of relations. The ties between the two are now <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/Pages/japan-country-brief.aspx">publicly acknowledged</a> as both countries’ most important after the US.</p>
<p>In 2007 Japan and Australia inked a <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html">security declaration</a> that laid out the foundation for a series of agreements relating to intelligence sharing, cross-servicing arrangements and defence technology transfer. Australia is also <a href="http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2015/jb_mr_150919.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FlS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D">strongly supportive</a> of the controversial <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/03/the-trouble-with-japans-new-security-bills/">security and defence policy reforms</a> that the Abe government has been pursuing to allow it to do more with its defence forces abroad.</p>
<p>Australia is so keen on Japan and supportive of these reforms primarily because it is profoundly invested in the indefinite perpetuation of the strategic status quo that has prevailed in East Asia since the late 1970s. This is an arrangement that is centred on US military predominance. </p>
<p>The problem is that China’s scale, wealth and ambition mean that things will have to change for the underlying status quo to remain viable. </p>
<p>The most important adjustment that has to occur is for Japan to take on a military and political weight that matches its economic size. Australia knows that Japan has to be able to do more and that the two countries equally have to be able to act together, and in alignment with the US, if the underlying setting in the region is to be sustained in the face of China’s rise. Hence the rapid move to become one another’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/turnbull-aims-to-retain-closest-friend-tag-in-first-japan-visit-52434">best friends</a> in the region.</p>
<p>This is a big strategic decision by Australia. It has bipartisan support but is unexplained by politicians on either side of politics. It is also the reason the J-option will prevail, whatever fig leaves the government tries to put on the “competitive evaluation process”.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can listen to Nick Bisley discuss the submarines issue in more detail in this podcast, produced by LaTrobe University.</em></p>
<iframe width="100%" height="450" scrolling="no" frameborder="no" src="https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/248775995&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=true&show_user=true&show_reposts=false&visual=true"></iframe><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55224/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nick Bisley is a member of the Australian Institute for International Affairs' (AIIA) National Executive. The AIIA is a non-partisan not-for-profit organisation which aims po promote interest in and understanding of international affairs in Australia. </span></em></p>The defence white paper is silent on where Australia’s new fleet of 12 submarines will be acquired.Nick Bisley, Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/418012015-05-13T17:53:35Z2015-05-13T17:53:35ZDull content, but the release of Prince Charles letters is a landmark moment<p>After a decade of legal battles, the content of the infamous <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-office">black spider memos</a> – letters sent by Prince Charles to former government ministers – turned out to be a damp squib rather than the smoking gun we had hoped for.</p>
<p>But even if Charles seems preoccupied with fish, badgers and herbal remedies in his missives, the fact that these letters have been made public is extremely significant. The release of the 27 documents by the UK government – 14 letters from the Prince of Wales written in 2004 and 2005, ten replies, and three exchanges of correspondence between private secretaries – shows just how powerful the Freedom of Information Act has become.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/what-is-the-foi-act/">legislation</a>, which celebrated its tenth birthday in 2015, is responsible for a transformational opening up of British bureaucracy. It turned on its head centuries-old presumption of official secrecy, solidified with official secrets legislation.</p>
<p>The legislation was directly responsible for exposing the large-scale <a href="https://theconversation.com/miller-resigns-but-keeping-mps-honest-is-still-a-messy-business-25287">abuse of expenses</a> among British parliamentarians in 2009. The news that MPs had been making lavish claims at the cost of the taxpayer lead to an unprecedented loss of trust in their kind – and jail for several former politicians who made false claims.</p>
<p>While the scandal initially emerged when documents were leaked to the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/">Daily Telegraph</a> by an anonymous source, the material was being prepared for release under the Freedom of Information Act.</p>
<h2>Fish, farmers and badgers</h2>
<p>There are few such explosive allegations in the Charles letters. In many, he is vocal on issues he is known to be passionate about – architecture; the armed forces; agriculture; the environment; rural affairs; and protecting specific species, such as the Patagonian toothfish – much to the mirth of <a href="https://twitter.com/HRHToothfish">Twitter users</a>.</p>
<p>Arguably his most interesting intervention is a letter raising concerns about the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/427301/No10_Scanned_Letters.pdf">funding of equipment</a> for the armed forces. As a future monarch, holding ranks of Admiral of the Fleet, Field Marshal and Marshal of the Royal Air Force, his intervention is meaningful.</p>
<p>In a letter dated September 8 2004 Charles wrote to the prime minister of his concerns that important “Oxbow” equipment, used in airborne surveillance, was not working properly because of problems with Lynx aircraft.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The procurement of a new aircraft to replace the Lynx is subject to further delays and uncertainty due to the significant pressure on the defence budget. I fear that this is just one more example of where our Armed Forces are being asked to do an extremely challenging job (particularly in Iraq) without the necessary resources.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>By any standard, this can only be interpreted as an implied criticism of the government of the day, and of its support for the Armed Forces in particular during the Iraq war. That it comes directly from the Prince of Wales is all the more significant.</p>
<p>In another exchange with the prime minister, Charles raises concerns about excessive red tape for farmers, and complains about the Office of Fair Trading being overly restrictive on the growth of dairy coops. His comments on the delays in paying single farm payments to farmers – and the difficulties these delays have on rural dwellers.</p>
<p>In another letter dated 24 February, 2005, he raises concerns about bovine tuberculosis and the impact it was having on farmers. He criticises the “badger lobby” for objecting to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/badger-cull">managed culls of badgers</a>, arguing that their opposition to such a proposal is “intellectually dishonest”.</p>
<h2>Dear Tony</h2>
<p>The release of private letters between the prince and Tony Blair are all the more ironic given the Blair government introduced the Freedom of Information Legislation – though Blair subsequently said that FoI was his <a href="http://www.conservativehome.com/leftwatch/2010/09/tony-blair-admits-that-the-hunting-ban-and-foi-legislation-were-mistakes-as-his-memoirs-are-publishe.html">worst mistake</a> in government, describing himself as a “nincompoop” for introducing it.</p>
<p>In one telling letter, the prince notes he was putting his thoughts down on paper “despite the Freedom of Information Act” – confident that his private correspondence would never be released.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81597/original/image-20150513-2452-1rqx5c6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Don’t worry Tony, no-one will ever know.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/427301/No10_Scanned_Letters.pdf">UK government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That really is the most important lesson in this case – and one in danger of being forgotten. When powerful figures think no one is looking, they do write letters like these. </p>
<p>The UK government is now talking about amending the Freedom of Information Act to give ministers more power to deny requests from the public for access to documents. That push back against openness is occurring worldwide – in the US the legislation is <a href="http://cironline.org/foiaproject">riddled with delays and costs</a>; in Australia, the Information Commissioner’s Office was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/02/freedom-of-information-may-cost-800-as-coalition-seeks-to-abolish-regulator">abolished</a> by the government; and in Ireland <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/cabinet-abolishes-15-freedom-of-information-fee-1.1851481">fees were introduced</a> to dissuade FoI requesters – though this decision was recently reversed. </p>
<p>FoI is not a panacea but it does offer a small guarantee of openness and transparency that powerful elites cannot hide behind. Any move by the British government to water that down would be regrettable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41801/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Felle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Prince has views on defence procurement, badger culling and the Patagonian toothfish. Should we care?Tom Felle, Acting Director, Interactive and Newspaper Journalism, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/364362015-01-20T19:24:27Z2015-01-20T19:24:27ZHacking the secrets of Australia’s Joint Strike Fighter<p>Design details of Australia’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (<a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/joint-strike-fighter">JSF</a>) have been stolen by Chinese spies, according to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/china-stole-plans-for-a-new-fighter-plane-spy-documents-have-revealed-20150118-12sp1o.html">reports this week</a>, although it’s not clear whether the information was highly classified or not.</p>
<p>But this isn’t the first time information on the JSF has been stolen – it’s just one among a long history of security breaches over the aircraft and its manufacturer Lockheed Martin.</p>
<p>In May 2013, the Washington Post <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/confidential-report-lists-us-weapons-system-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b-0b5e9247e8ca_story.html">reported</a> that information on more than two dozen weapon systems were compromised by Chinese hackers, including ballistic missile defence systems, the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport and the US Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship.</p>
<p>The list also <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/28/the-u-s-weapons-systems-that-experts-say-were-hacked-by-the-chinese">includes</a> aircraft which Australia does or will operate: the Black Hawk helicopter, the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, the F/A-18 fighter, EA-18 Growler electronic warfare aircraft, the C-17 Globemaster III heavy transport as well as the JSF.</p>
<p>This is vast range of stolen information and is not likely to be from a single incident, but a culmination of hacks and other thefts over a few years.</p>
<p>For example, in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-15/pentagon-admits-stealing-from-defence-contractor-twt/2796340">March 2011</a> the Pentagon admitted that 24,000 files were stolen from a US defence contractor. In May 2011, Reuters <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/us-usa-defense-hackers-idUSTRE74Q6VY20110527">reported</a> that the security systems of JSF manufacturer Lockheed Martin and other military contractors were broken into by hackers using duplicate “SecurID” electronic keys, but it was not clear what, if any, information was stolen. </p>
<h2>Release going on for years</h2>
<p>The JSF has been the subject of the theft or unintentional release of confidential or classified information at various times over the past two decades. In 1996, while Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing were in the new fighter competition, the Pentagon’s JSF Program Office inadvertently released Lockheed’s confidential cost and pricing information to the other two competitors.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/06/freedomofinformation.past">May 2001</a>, much to concern of the US, a petty thief stole a laptop from a British military officer in London. The laptop, which was eventually recovered by the British Ministry of Defence, contained details of progress on the development of the JSF.</p>
<p>In 2009, the Wall Street Journal <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124027491029837401">reported</a> that hackers had been breaking into the JSF project since 2007, and:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] appear to have been interested in data about the design of the plane, its performance statistics and its electronic systems.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The report continued:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The intruders compromised the system responsible for diagnosing a plane’s maintenance problems during flight […] [the] plane’s most vital systems – such as flight controls and sensors – are physically isolated from the publicly accessible internet.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At the time, Lockheed and the US Department of Defense downplayed the seriousness of the report. A Lockheed official was <a href="http://awin.aviationweek.com/portals/awin/cmsfiles/media/pdf/as_pdf/2009/04/22/asd_04_22_2009.pdf">reported</a> to have said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Representation of successful cyber attacks on the F-35 [JSF] program [are] incorrect.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was amended with the statement:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To our knowledge there has never been any classified information breach [despite] attacks on our systems continually.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A Pentagon spokesperson said there was “no special concerns”. Similarly, the Australian Department of Defence was <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-04-22/adf-hoses-down-f-35-hacking-concerns/1659488">reported</a> to have said that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] it has spoken with US Defence officials and Lockheed Martin about the alleged breach, but says extra sensitive data is not kept on systems connected to the internet.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Investigating the thefts</h2>
<p>In the prologue to his 2014 book <a href="http://shaneharris.com/atwar/">@War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex</a>, Shane Harris <a href="http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-12-08/huge-intelligence-screw-turned-government-and-private-companies-cyberwarfare">provides</a> details on the investigation into the security breaches. Harris said that the hackers were operating for months before anyone had noticed.</p>
<p>The US Air Force worked out that the information wasn’t taken from a military computer, and investigators began to look at the computer systems of contractors. Harris writes that the US Air Force brought in its own hacker to investigate but when he arrived at the Lockheed office he was greeted not by officials overseeing the JSF construction, but by the company’s lawyers.</p>
<p>The US air force top generals demanded that Lockheed and other contractors cooperate with the investigation which eventually discovered that Lockheed’s network had been “breached repeatedly”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They couldn’t say precisely how many times, but they judged the damage as severe, given the amount of information stolen and the intruders’ unfettered access to the networks. In the entire campaign, which also targeted other companies, the spies had made off with several terabytes of information on the jet’s inner workings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If events of the past year are any indication, electronic theft of JSF information has been much more successful than the physical theft of information. In <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140113/DEFREG02/301130030/">January 2014</a>, US citizen Mozaffar Khazaee was arrested after trying to send items to Iran including:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] numerous boxes of documents consisting of sensitive technical manuals, specification sheets, and other proprietary material for the F-35 [JSF].</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The shipment included:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] thousands of pages of documents, including diagrams and blueprints of the high-tech fighter jet’s engine.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-accuses-chinese-executive-of-hacking-to-find-military-data-1405105264">July 2014</a>, the US Justice Department charged Su Bin, a Chinese citizen who was living in Canada, with stealing sensitive information about Boeing’s C-17 and Lockheed’s F-22 and F-35 JSF. Working with two co-conspirators in China, Su was breaking into Boeing and Lockheed computers between 2009 and 2013.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/asia-pacific/2014/12/09/chinese-national-accused-of-transporting-usaf-program-information/20155571/">November 2014</a>, Chinese national Yu Long was arrested while carrying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] sensitive proprietary information on titanium used in a US Air Force program, most likely the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Secret or sensitive information?</h2>
<p>In the 2014 cases outlined above, it is important to note the term “sensitive” as opposed to classified or secret. The information may be commercially confidential, but not classified at a national security level.</p>
<p>And so too, it is not clear from the reports this week if classified information has been stolen on the JSF. The <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35687.pdf">slide</a> in question, published by the German newspaper Der Speigel, is marked “Secret”, the whole presentation “Top Secret”, but the (U) for each piece of information indicates “Unclassified”.</p>
<p>What is not known is the security classification of the information stolen, as opposed to classification of the slide itself. Lockheed and Pentagon officials who stated in 2009 that no “classified” information was stolen may be technically correct, but it is still problematic.</p>
<p>In 2013, US Defence acquisitions chief Frank Kendall <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/usa-fighter-hacking-idUSL2N0EV0T320130619">admitted</a> to a Senate hearing that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A lot of [unclassified information] is being stolen right now and it’s a major problem for us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kendall was not primarily concerned that the loss of information would make the JSF vulnerable to attack, but rather that it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] reduces the costs and lead time of our adversaries to doing their own designs, so it gives away a substantial advantage.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What now for Australia’s JSF plan?</h2>
<p>So what does all this mean for Australia’s commitment to the JSF? The federal government has <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/F-35A-Lightning-II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">committed to buying 72</a> of the F-35A version of the JSF at a total cost of A$12.4-billion, with the first to be operational by 2021.</p>
<p>For decades, a pillar of Australia’s defence policy has been possessing a technological edge over other nations in the region. It’s paid a significant premium to maintain that edge with the JSF but the theft of information, even unclassified information, erodes the technological edge in terms of quality and timeframes.</p>
<p>That being said, the JSF is much more than a weapons system. It is an enabler of networked information warfare, and it is the information’s technological edge which is critically important. <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1314/MR1314.ch6.pdf">Information warfare</a> is the process of protecting one’s own sources of battlefield information and, at the same time, seeking to deny, degrade, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s sources of battlefield information.</p>
<p>It is not clear if the electronic and information warfare capabilities of the JSF have been compromised. But China has demonstrated its adeptness in cyberespionage, and it would be concerning if this was indicative of China’s capabilities for electronic and information warfare.</p>
<p>Apart from increasing security measures, the theft of data of the past decade does not have significant short-term consequences for the US or Australia. But the long-term consequences remain unknown, at least until the capabilities of the JSF are fully developed, and we learn more about the Chinese fighters under development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives government scholarship funding for his PhD.</span></em></p>Design details of Australia’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) have been stolen by Chinese spies, according to reports this week, although it’s not clear whether the information was highly classified…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate in International Relations, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/281072014-07-07T20:12:32Z2014-07-07T20:12:32ZTake out the pilot from Australia’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter<p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott sat in the pilot seat of a F-35 <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/joint-strike-fighter">Joint Strike Fighter</a> at the time he announced his government will buy an <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">additional 58 planes</a> at a cost of at least A$12.4 billion. But imagine if there was no need for a pilot to fly inside the so-called fifth generation aircraft.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.f35.com/">F-35</a> is said to be the smartest and most complex fighter jet on the planet, designed to conduct lethal strikes on air and ground targets without being detected by radar.</p>
<p>But its development has been beset by delays and cost overruns and it is not clear whether this aircraft is best <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">suited to the task</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, it’s not even obvious that we need a human in the loop.</p>
<h2>Do we really need a pilot?</h2>
<p>What we need is analysis to consider whether we have the right balance between piloted, optionally piloted and remotely or even automatically (autonomous) piloted systems planned for the future defence and air force structure.</p>
<p>Optionally piloted is where there is still a pilot on board but they can leave some of the aircraft’s operations to its computer systems. A preference for the latter remote or autonomous options might lead to cost savings or strategic benefits.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53145/original/c8nv9jc9-1404710216.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Does the F-35 need a pilot?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/8682921635">Flickr/US Air Force</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While Lockheed Martin has not yet officially confirmed the development of a pilotless or optionally piloted version of the F-35, Boeing has already converted several <a href="http://www.gizmag.com/boeing-f16-jet-unmanned-drone/29203/">F-16 fighter jets into drones</a>.</p>
<p>Bob Rubino, Lockheed’s director of Washington operations for the JSF program, <a href="http://news.usni.org/2012/07/12/unmanned-joint-strike-fighter">has also let on</a> that the company’s <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/aeronautics/skunkworks.html">Skunk Works</a> research and development lab is “constantly looking at all kinds of things”.</p>
<p>The US Naval Institute has <a href="http://news.usni.org/2012/07/12/unmanned-joint-strike-fighter">already pointed</a> out that an optionally piloted F-35 would hold many advantages.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>With a pilot in its seat, the aircraft can concentrate on the task of flying while the pilot gathers intelligence or operates the aircraft’s extensive command and control suite.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This has the potential to enhance decision-making and reduce casualties in armed conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53148/original/fw3bzgf3-1404711302.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pilots still in training for the F-35.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/39955793@N07/8812929354">Flickr/US Department of Defense</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Without a human in the cockpit in the remotely or automatically piloted version, the potential benefits are magnified, as the aircraft would be able to perform riskier missions in support of international security.</p>
<p>Without the need for an ejector seat and other life support systems, the F-35 would also be able to significantly increase its weapon or sensor payload, or fly higher for an extended duration.</p>
<p>Over time, pilotless systems may also prove cheaper to buy and operate with reduced <a href="http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/transportation-and-aviation/unmanned-aerial-vehicle-operator.html">training</a> and maintenance requirements, and the option for a multi-system control interface through which one operator can simultaneously oversee several drones.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned?_afrLoop=49001152028000&_afrWindowMode=2&_afrWindowId=null">BAE Systems</a> has already revealed that it has successfully test-flown the <a href="http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned">Taranis</a>, a highly autonomous prototype drone.</p>
<p>But the best indication of what is to come for the JSF has been provided to me by industry insiders who have suggested that a pilotless conversion is inevitable (if not already underway).</p>
<p>The F-35 is a prime candidate as a fifth generation fighter aircraft with reports of up to <a href="http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/10/software-code-f-35.html">10 million lines of computer code</a> controlling its flight surfaces, engine and weapons systems. That’s more than six times the amount of the 1.7 million lines of code in its piloted cousin, the <a href="http://www.f22fighter.com/avionics.htm">F-22 Raptor</a>.</p>
<p>In essence, the computer already does much of the tough flying and the F-35 aircraft could serve as bridge to test other dedicated combat aircraft, with any lessons learned being applied to other unmanned combat aircraft of the future Australian Defence Force.</p>
<h2>The machines taking over</h2>
<p>Of course, beyond the technical survey and typical cost-benefit analysis, the government also needs to consider the higher level moral, political and strategic costs of employing such novel technologies.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/53151/original/ttqnb7b3-1404711743.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US already flies remotely piloted aircraft such as the MQ-9 Reaper.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/13991119140">Flickr/US Air Force/Staff Sgt John Bainter</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A host of questions go largely unanswered: are pilotless systems capable of discriminating between a fisherman displaying his catch and an angry Somali pirate holding a rocket propelled grenade, or between an Iraqi child playing in the street with a toy gun and a child soldier wielding an AK-47 assault rifle?</p>
<p>Do drone operators benefit from improved situational awareness or is it more like trying to conduct a sword fight in a telephone booth while looking through a toilet paper tube?</p>
<p>Will there be psychological consequences for the operators of these systems if they can see events unfold in real time but are unable to intervene? That is, how mentally and morally disturbed will an operator be when he or she has no option other than to watch an innocent person walk into the ‘kill zone’ of a missile strike?</p>
<p>Some psychologists have proposed that we develop a <a href="http://io9.com/psychologists-propose-horrifying-solution-to-ptsd-in-dr-1453349900">Siri-like like user interface or virtual co-pilot</a> to allow operators to shirk the blame for any collateral damage.</p>
<p>Australia surely has a right to minimise harm to its troops and reduce other costs, but if war and combat can be reduced to saying “Siri, go kill those people”, will this dehumanise and possibly aggravate our enemies?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jai Galliott a former Royal Australian Navy officer and works for DefenceTech Consulting, but the views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of the Australian Government or the Australian Defence Force.</span></em></p>Prime Minister Tony Abbott sat in the pilot seat of a F-35 Joint Strike Fighter at the time he announced his government will buy an additional 58 planes at a cost of at least A$12.4 billion. But imagine…Jai Galliott, Tutor in Applied Ethics, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/280572014-06-18T20:43:38Z2014-06-18T20:43:38ZAustralia’s jump jet strike fighter option: lessons from the UK<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51285/original/7g35br22-1402977303.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/9602152526/in/set-72157635146786820">Flickr/Lockheed Martin </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If Australia is serious about buying the jump jet version of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/joint-strike-fighter">Joint Strike Fighter</a> it would be wise to look at why the UK is the only country to change its mind on which version of the aircraft to buy. </p>
<p>In 2010, the British government decided against buying the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> jump jet as previously planned because of the limitations of the aircraft. It later changed its mind as the costs converting the aircraft carrier for the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html">F-35C</a> carrier variant were too expensive.</p>
<p>In the lead up to a new Australian Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review, Prime Minister Tony Abbott this year ordered Defence to assess the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jump-jet-strike-fighters-for-australia-would-come-at-a-cost-27595">benefits of F-35B jump jets</a> and converting the Canberra class Landing Helicopter Docks (<a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd">LHD</a>) to accommodate them.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/gWBUwq4Qu9o?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The F-35A originally planned for Australia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Previously, the RAAF was committed to buying only the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">F-35A version</a> of the Joint Strike Fighter.</p>
<h2>Change can be costly</h2>
<p>While the British example is not directly comparable to Australia’s potential decision, it offers a warning on the costs and risks of changing plans and hasty policy decision making.</p>
<p>Additionally, the reasons behind the UK’s 2010 decision to buy the F-35C instead of the F-35B provides some insights on the limitations of the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft.</p>
<p>The UK’s 2010 <a href="http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf">Strategic Defence and Security Review</a> said its Queen Elizabeth class <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/future-ships/aircraft-carrier">aircraft carriers</a> would provide it with the long term political flexibility to act without the need to depend on other countries to use of their bases. They also provided options for a response to crises as a “complement or alternative” to ground engagements.</p>
<p>A key element of this capability is the fixed wing aircraft (as opposed to helicopters) which would fly from these carriers. </p>
<h2>The first of plan in the UK</h2>
<p>While the UK had originally signed on the JSF project to buy F-35B jump-jet fighters to replace their Harriers, the <a href="http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf">2010 Review</a> announced the decision to buy the F-35C naval carrier variant instead.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51290/original/8vhbqdd4-1402979835.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=221&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Three variants of the F-35 at three very different costs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/12835132324">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The reason given for the change in policy was that the F-35C carrier variant has a “longer range and greater payload” which was the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future. The carrier-variant was also cheaper, reducing through-life costs by “around 25%”.</p>
<p>The savings would result from a cheaper acquisition cost, as well as the efficiencies from maintaining only one type of aircraft, instead of two versions.</p>
<p>A US Department of Defense <a href="http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf">report on the F-35</a> states that the estimated basic costs per aircraft (the airframe, engines and avionics) are:</p>
<ul>
<li>US$77.7 million – F-35A CTOL variant</li>
<li>US$105.5 million – F-35B STOVL variant </li>
<li>US$89.7 million – F-35C carrier version.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Concerns about the jump jet</h2>
<p>In 2012 Britain’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9217918/Fighter-jets-about-turn-will-harm-capability.html">The Telegraph newspaper reported</a> it had seen a highly classified Operational Analysis Supporting Paper which indicated that “planners have grave doubts about the capabilities of the jump jets”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/51291/original/v5hyt4tg-1402980049.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vertical landing capability of the F-35B comes at a cost.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/9617383748/in/set-72157635146786820">Flickr/Lockheed Martin </a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>According to the newspaper, the conventional variant was “more effective than the jump jet in almost all cases”. For potential missions the British military may have to conduct, the document stated that the F-35B was less useful that the other variants. </p>
<p>The key issue identified was that the F-35B STOVL version carried less fuel than other the other versions, reducing weapons payloads and reducing the amount of time the aircraft could spend over a target area.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a target 300 nautical miles away from the aircraft carrier, the jump jet can spend only 20 minutes over its target before turning back, compared with 80 minutes for the conventional jet. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2010, there were also concerns that with the development of the F-35B and the possibility that the STOVL version could be cancelled. This influenced the British decision to acquire a different version of the F-35.</p>
<p>In January 2011 the then US Defense Secretary Robert Gates put the F-35B on a <a href="http://australianaviation.com.au/2011/01/f-35b-stovl-%E2%80%9Con-probation%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-gates/">two-year probation</a>, saying that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If we cannot fix this variant during this time frame and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it should be cancelled.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But twelve months later the new Defense Secretary Leon Panetta <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66879">lifted the probation</a> on the F-35B variant citing efforts that had been made to bring the STOVL aircraft up to the standards of the other two variants.</p>
<h2>A change of plan again in the UK</h2>
<p>In May 2012 the UK’s Defence Secretary Philip Hammond announced a U-turn on the 2010 decision, changing policy back to buying the F-35B jump jet fighters and cancelling modifications to the ship. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-18008171">He argued</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When the facts change, the responsible thing to do is to examine the decision made and be willing to change, however inconvenient that may be. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The problem was that the estimated cost of converting the carrier HMS Prince of Wales for the F-35C carrier version had blown out from £950 million to £2 billion “with no guarantee that it will not rise further”.</p>
<p>The UK government already had spent between £40 million and £50 million on design and assessment work for modifying the carrier. </p>
<p>In January 2013, the House of Commons <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/9/9.pdf">Defence Committee</a> provided a scathing assessment of the “rushed and flawed decision” of 2010. The Defence Acquisition report stated the decision to choose a different aircraft and modify the ship was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] based upon incomplete and inaccurate policy development [and] was taken without the MoD [Ministry of Defence] understanding how the change could be implemented.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oYy0XR6ESkM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The UK takes flight in a jump jet variant of the JSF.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The challenge for Australia</h2>
<p>While converting the Royal Australian Navy’s LHDs would not be anywhere near as expensive as it was for the British carrier, it would certainly be an expensive exercise.</p>
<p>While the Canberra class LHDs retain the ski jump for STOVL aircraft, the decision to keep them was based on the evaluation that it was cheaper than removing them.</p>
<p>Otherwise, the infrastructure necessary to support aircraft, such as fuel lines and storage, had deliberately not been incorporated as it would have added unnecessary costs to support a capability that they were not intended to have.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2014_06_02_2526.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/0001%22">Senate Estimates hearings</a> recently, senior Defence officials admitted that <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/jump-jets-on-navys-agenda-as-tony-abbott-orders-air-strike-rethink-20140603-39gl0.html">little work</a> had so far been done on the possibility of buying a STOVL variant.</p>
<p>They said a “fairly superficial examination” had been done up until now because there had not been a “serious consideration” of the aircraft flying from the LHDs.</p>
<p>Chief of the Defence Force General David Hurley noted that Defence was in a situation with a new government and a prime minister with a view about a particular capability.</p>
<p>As well as requiring an assessment of the option of acquiring the F-35B and converting the LHDs, the issue raises questions about Australian defence planning and policy broadly.</p>
<p>There are still questions to be asked as to how appropriate were the previous decisions regarding the LHDs and F-35As, and to what extent is Defence flexible enough to change policies with changes in the Australia’s strategic environment.</p>
<p>Alternatively, there are questions as to how independent is defence policy and planning from politics, and to what extent is Defence able to make long term decisions without political interference.</p>
<p>Lastly, assuming the Australian Defence Force had not previously given the suggested capability “serious consideration”, who has the Prime Minister’s ear on strategic and defence policy?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28057/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p>If Australia is serious about buying the jump jet version of the Joint Strike Fighter it would be wise to look at why the UK is the only country to change its mind on which version of the aircraft to buy…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/275952014-06-05T04:39:52Z2014-06-05T04:39:52ZJump jet strike fighters for Australia would come at a cost<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50297/original/hcrb72nj-1401927081.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could the jump version of the Joint Strike Fighter be heading for Australia?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/6310298566/in/set-72157625859980836#">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/jump-jets-on-navys-agenda-as-tony-abbott-orders-air-strike-rethink-20140603-39gl0.html">officers confirmed</a> during <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/toc_pdf/Foreign%20Affairs,%20Defence%20and%20Trade%20Legislation%20Committee_2014_06_02_2526.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/estimate/c5d61275-a1aa-4194-b861-cfe08f848ab3/0000%22">Senate estimates</a> this week that Prime Minister Tony Abbott had ordered Defence to examine options for Australia to acquire the jump jet version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.</p>
<p>To accommodate the jump jet’s short take-off and vertical landing ability. Defence was also asked to look at options to convert the Navy’s two amphibious assault ships, the <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/lhd">Canberra-class</a> Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD), into “aircraft carriers”.</p>
<p>Were it to go ahead, the decision is much more than acquiring a slightly different version of the JSF aircraft. It would represent a major change in Australia’s power projection capabilities, force structure and the nation’s defence posture.</p>
<p>It would allow Australia to project force in a new way with the aircraft able to operate far from Australia’s shores on Australian or allied ships or forward bases. It would require a change in the ADF structure to be able to use and protect the new capabilities, and it would change the way Australia – and our neighbours – think we would use the new capabilities in pursuit of national interests.</p>
<p>But it would also be more expense on top of what is already a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">very expensive project</a>, and represent a trade-off in capabilities.</p>
<p>The Abbott government <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2014/04/23/prime-minister-and-minister-for-defence-joint-media-release-f-35-joint-strike-fighters-to-transform-australias-air-combat-capability/">recently committed</a> A$12.4 billion for an extra 58 JSF to add to the 14 already ordered.</p>
<p>The task for Defence is to weigh the complicated costs and benefits of acquiring jump jets, not just in terms of strategic value and capabilities, but additional acquisition and sustainment costs.</p>
<h2>Three choices</h2>
<p>There are three main variants of the F-35:</p>
<ol>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35a-ctol-variant.html">F-35A</a> Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variant will be used by air forces, including the US Air Force, and is the version intended for the <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/F-35A-Lightning-II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">RAAF</a></li>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> is the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) or jump jet variant, which will be used by the US Marines and the Royal Navy</li>
<li>the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html">F-35C</a>, designated a CV variant (a US Navy designation for fixed wing carrier aviation) or Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) variant, is the naval variant for use on aircraft carriers.</li>
</ol>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50252/original/cbtnmbwc-1401871902.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-35A, F-35B and F-35C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lockheed Martin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some of the broad strategic issues involved involved with the F-35B proposal have been outlined by Bond University’s expert in international relations, Malcom Davis, in a <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35b-jsf-for-the-adf-a-viable-option-in-the-2015-white-paper-part-1/">couple</a> of <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/f-35b-jsf-for-the-adf-a-viable-option-in-the-2015-white-paper-part-2/">posts</a> on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s blog.</p>
<p>But there a range of other issues which greatly complicate the issue and will need to be considered.</p>
<h2>Reduced weapons capacity</h2>
<p>The F-35B STOVL variant has a <a href="http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/">reduced range and payload</a> because the jump jet propulsion system takes up space that would otherwise be used for fuel. </p>
<p>All three F-35 variants have two internal weapons bays, each of which can carry two air-to-air missiles, or one air-to-air missile and one air-to-surface missile or bomb. It can also carry weapons on pylons under its wings, but this greatly reduces its stealth characteristics. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/50253/original/s75dcc2v-1401871937.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">F-35B Lightning II weapons stations.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the F-35B will still be able to carry the same air-to-air missiles as the F-35A in the internal bays, the capacity for air-to-surface missiles is reduced from 2,500lbs to 1,500lbs (1,130kg to 680kg).</p>
<p>This would be a problem for Australia as the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (<a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/jassm.html">JASSM</a>), which reached Final Operational Capability (FOC) with the RAAF <a href="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australia-chooses-jassm-missiles-on-f18s-for-longrange-strike-updated-01966/">last week</a>, weighs around 2,250lbs (1,020kg).</p>
<p>While new stand-off missiles Australia is interesting in purchasing such as the Joint Strike Missile (<a href="http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/Selected-topics/kampfly-til-forsvaret/Joint-Strike-Missile-JSM---A-Considerably-Strengtened-Norwegian-Threshold-Against-War-and-Conflict.html?id=760245">JSM</a>) Norway is developing for its F-35As weigh only around 900lbs (408kg), it still <a href="http://breakingdefense.com/2014/07/norway-joint-strike-missile/">cannot fit</a> in the F-35Bs internal weapons bays.</p>
<h2>Where to take off and land a jump jet?</h2>
<p>Another issue requiring serious consideration is that the temperature and force of the STOVL propulsion system limits where the F-35B can take off and land.</p>
<p>The ADF would require additional resources to support the STOVL variant beyond that of the CTOL version. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZD-J1KksHUQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">F-35B – taking STOVL to a new level.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2011, defence writer Bill Sweetman highlighted the “basing flexibility” issue, <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/new-threat-f-35-joint-strike-fighter">noting</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[US] Navy construction specifications continue to warn that the F-35B will impose temperatures as high as 1700F (926C) (several hundred degrees higher than a Harrier exhaust) on vertical-landing pads, with a transonic exhaust velocity.</p>
<p>This is enough to cause standard concrete to “spall” – that is, shed surface flakes in a near-explosive manner – with a 50% chance of damage on the first landing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In addition, Sweetman writes that the US Office of Naval Research had a program to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] develop a cooling system for the decks of LHD- and LHA-class ships that will carry F-35Bs, reflecting concerns that thermal expansion and contraction and consequent buckling will cause fatigue and premature failure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For the UK at least, these issues are still under consideration and yet to be finalised. Writing last week, Sweetman <a href="http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-f-35b-vertical-landings-doubt-uk">noted</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[…] there are no plans for the F-35B to perform [vertical landings] in the UK, because the program staff has not finished testing the matting that is needed to protect the runway from exhaust heat. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Issues for Australia</h2>
<p>These are just two of the myriad of issues the ADF will have to consider but they are indicative of the complexity of defence procurement decision making.</p>
<p>The danger is, that like the <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/27/1023864632200.html">2002 decision</a> to acquire the F-35 and effectively cancel the competition, political imperatives will short-circuit a rigorous assessment process.</p>
<p>Rather than simply representing a simple purchase of additional capabilities, acquiring F-35Bs represents a trade-off in capabilities and certainly additional costs. Defence will be calculating an estimate of the extra costs in the coming months, and will depend on precisely what Defence wants to do with the aircraft and ships.</p>
<p>The key question is whether the balance of the capability trade-off offer is of strategic benefit to Australia, and whether this benefit is worth the additional financial costs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from the University of New South Wales.</span></em></p>Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) officers confirmed during Senate estimates this week that Prime Minister Tony Abbott had ordered Defence to examine options for Australia to acquire the jump jet version…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/260882014-04-30T06:12:19Z2014-04-30T06:12:19ZThe F-35 JSF: what is a fifth-generation fighter aircraft?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47352/original/pwv8rqf8-1398829568.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The three variants of the F-35 Joinst Strike Fighter described as fifth-generation aircraft</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/">Joint Strike Fighter</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Any conversation about <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-joint-strike-fighter-is-it-the-right-aircraft-for-australia-25911">Australia’s commitment</a> to the <a href="https://www.f35.com/">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> refers to it as a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. But what exactly is a fifth-generation aircraft, and why is it important?</p>
<p>Both the Prime Minister <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-04-23/f-35-joint-strike-fighters-transform-australias-air-combat-capability">Tony Abbott</a> and Defence Minister <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/delivery-of-the-first-australian-made-f-35-jsf-vertical-tail">David Johnston</a> spoke of the JSF’s “fifth-generation” capability as Australia now plans to buy a further 58 aircraft.</p>
<p>The political mantra of the importance of a fifth-generation aircraft begs the question: What does it mean?</p>
<h2>Is there a definition?</h2>
<p>Despite its common usage, the definition of fifth-generation is not clear and is contested but it can serve a political purpose as defence writer Giovanni de Briganti [pointed out](http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/135080/f_35-reality-check-10-years-on-(part-1%29.html):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Politicians know next to nothing about defense, so being able to pepper their sentences with expressions like “the only fifth-generation aircraft” gives them instant credibility in the eyes of the trusting public, and leaves other politicos with no come-backs, especially if it is followed up with references to the moral obligation of “buying the best equipment for our military”.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/saab-s-new-gripen-future-fighters">report</a> says Lockheed Martin labelled the F-35 a “fifth-generation” fighter in 2005, borrowing the Russian term to describe the <a href="http://www.f22-raptor.com/">F-22 Raptor</a>. Previously, and even up to 2009, the JSF was <a href="http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30563_20090217.pdf">referred to</a> as a new or next-generation aircraft.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/y44lftPGWvM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">How long before fifth generation is mentioned in this Lockheed Martin video?</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As well as a political tool the term fifth-generation is also a powerful marketing tool, at least according to critics such as representatives from Eurofighter whose <a href="http://www.eurofighter.com/">Typhoon</a> fighter has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-10726346">lost many procurement battles</a> with the JSF.</p>
<p>It is a distinct advantage for Lockheed Martin to define the characteristics of fifth-generation aircraft as it shapes the requirements for countries who may purchase it. In this way, the manufacturer produces suit the fifth-generation requirements of the countries who wish to buy them.</p>
<p>The marketing argument is implicitly supported by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, who <a href="http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_201204_02_e.pdf">used a critical definition</a> of fifth generation aircraft:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fighter jets that, according to manufacturers, incorporate the most modern technologies, such as stealth, advanced radar, and integrated avionics. There is no accepted or objective definition of fifth-generation capability.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The fourth-generation</h2>
<p>Even defining fourth-generation aircraft as a starting point is difficult and the terms fourth-plus or 4.5 generation have been used to encompass fourth-generation aircraft with fifth-generation capabilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47367/original/cb8nybn5-1398836512.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The JSF in still in production.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13377/8452977387_4fe1e918f7_o__high.jpg">Lockheed Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Generally, fourth-generation aircraft are those developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with more advanced radars and avionics (aerospace electronics), including fly-by-wire (computer interfaced) controls, improved manoeuvrability, and multi-role capabilities.</p>
<p>The US <a href="http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/military_act_2009.pdf">FY2010 Defense Authorization Act</a> defined 4.5 generation as current aircraft, including the <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/f15/index.page">F-15</a>, <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f16.html">F-16</a> and <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/fa18ef/">F/A-18</a>, that have advanced capabilities, including active electronically scanned array radar, high capacity data-links and enhanced avionics, and have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.</p>
<p>Currently, Australia has 71 fourth-generation F/A-18 Hornets, and 24 4.5 generation F/A-18F Super Hornets.</p>
<p>To examine the concept of fifth-generation aircraft, the <a href="http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30563_20091127.pdf">definition provided by</a> the US Congressional Research Service is useful, although it lacks precision:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fifth-generation fighters combine new developments such as thrust vectoring, composite materials, supercruise (the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners), stealth technology, advanced radar and sensors, and integrated avionics to greatly improve pilot situational awareness.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many fourth-generation aircraft have some of these features but it is generally considered that for an aircraft to truly be fifth-generation it must include all of these characteristics.</p>
<p>For example, the American <a href="http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/B2SpiritBomber/Pages/default.aspx">B-2 Spirit</a> strategic bomber and <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/100years/stories/f-117.html">F-117 Nighthawk</a> strike fighter are both stealth aircraft but they are not fifth-generation aircraft as they lack advanced radars and other avionics.</p>
<p>Some <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">reports say</a> the JSF is “not technically a supercruising aircraft” but it can “maintain Mach 1.2 for a dash of 150 miles without using fuel-gulping afterburners”.</p>
<p>Only the short take-off and vertical landing version of the aircraft (the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a>, which Australia is not acquiring) will have thrust vectoring, which can greatly improve manoeuvrability for dogfighting.</p>
<p>The JSF is less manoeuvrable than some fourth-generation aircraft, particularly the Russian <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/">Sukhoi</a> fighters, but this deficiency is negated through stealth.</p>
<h2>What about stealth?</h2>
<p>Stealth allows a pilot to shoot at another aircraft without the enemy having the ability to shoot back because they cannot see them. To make definitions even more complex, stealth is not an absolute term as it too can be contested.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47365/original/fxzvg8cp-1398835346.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A low profile from the front helps the JSF stealth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/">Joint Strike Fighter</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Stealth refers to the inability of the enemy to detect the aircraft, commonly by radar. The smaller the radar cross section of an aircraft, the more difficult it is to detect and the more stealthy it is considered to be.</p>
<p>This level of radar stealthiness is determined by the outside of the aircraft, the design of the body and what it is made of or covered with.</p>
<p>All modern combat aircraft are designed with a low radar cross section in mind and for this reason competitors of the JSF describe their aircraft as stealthy but they are not as stealthy as the JSF.</p>
<p>The F-22 Raptor is probably the only operational aircraft stealthier than the JSF. But the radar cross section of the JSF is at its lowest when directly facing a radar. It then increases as the aircraft turns away from the radar presenting more of its side rather than front.</p>
<p>Internal weapons bays ensure stealth is not compromised when carrying weapons internally but it would be comprised when the JSF carries weapons on its wings.</p>
<p>The US has kept the details of the electronic weapon capabilities a closely guarded secret but there is a question as why Australia is investing in Boeing <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/military/ea18g/index.page">EA-18G Growler</a> which is 4.5-generation electronic warfare aircraft with the JSF soon to enter Australian service.</p>
<h2>Look around for the enemy</h2>
<p>The JSF will provide parallelled situation awareness, <a href="http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/UploadedFiles/General/Defining_a_5th_Generation_Fighter_-_Dubai_Air_Chiefs_Conference_-_12_Nov_11.pdf">allowing the pilot to virtually</a> “look through the floor of the fighter or behind the aircraft”. Networking will also allow the pilot to see information provided by other aircraft, ships or ground units.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47359/original/n56bdht5-1398832957.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Look around - The JSF includes a 360-degree visual display system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/lockheedmartin/5631844597">Flickr/Lockheed Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The JSF has an electro-optical distributed aperture system which, when coupled with the advanced helmet, provides the pilot with <a href="http://www.northropgrumman.com/capabilities/anaaq37f35/pages/default.aspx">360 degree spherical situational awareness</a>.</p>
<p>As well as collecting information from onboard and remote sources – and fusing it gives the pilot broad battlespace awareness – the JSF can automatically <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">collect vast amounts of data</a> on enemy forces, including targeting information, and transmit it to other friendly forces in the air and on the ground.</p>
<h2>Is it the next generation?</h2>
<p>So using the term fifth-generation offers the benefits of simplicity and authority where the characteristics of modern combat aircraft are broad ranging and complex.</p>
<p>But it is not a useful term when trying to analyse how well suited the JSF is to Australia’s strategic needs. The term denotes an improvement over older technology, inferring improved capability, but does not describe the technology’s usefulness in strategic environments, or cost effectiveness.</p>
<p>An effective public debate is made difficult when a catch-all slogan is commonly used, but where a technically informed analysis is needed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from UNSW.</span></em></p>Any conversation about Australia’s commitment to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter refers to it as a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. But what exactly is a fifth-generation aircraft, and why is it important…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259072014-04-29T06:37:55Z2014-04-29T06:37:55ZWhat do we need of a military fighter aircraft?<p>Now the Australian Government has committed to a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">further 58</a> F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (<a href="http://www.jsf.mil/">JSF</a>) aircraft it is time to ask whether this is a good idea, will we be getting value for money – and will the JSF carry out the roles Australia needs them for?</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">Defence White Paper 2009</a> stated that our military strategic aim is to achieve and maintain air superiority and sea control in places of our choosing.</p>
<p>This is particularly important for Australia since it is an island continent with vast areas of ocean, a very long coastline and a ring of land-sea borders to worry about.</p>
<p>To control “places of our choosing”, as the white paper recommends, the marine and air services need to “enable the manoeuvre and employment of joint ADF [Australian Defence Force] elements” in the operational environment.</p>
<p>More specifically Australia’s defence aircraft need to meet a range of future air and surface threats:</p>
<ul>
<li>it would be nice if it was able to win air-to-air combat</li>
<li>it should be capable of having first strike capability, so it can hit bad guys before they hit us</li>
<li>it should be able to support ground troops, air and sea forces, and future coalition forces, and do a multitude of tasks all within one mission</li>
<li>it needs to be affordable to acquire and maintain and upgrade throughout its life</li>
<li>it needs to fit our intended schedule of new acquisitions and retirements of current air platforms.</li>
</ul>
<h2>A big ask</h2>
<p>The intention of the US was to leverage the same technologies as those developed for the <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f22.html">F-22</a> to construct a single air-frame that could be modified to carry out the specific functions of the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/aWji8AcOYGA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">F-35 Flight Test Intentional Departure.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If you were ever inspired to modify a house you may have found that the cost is equivalent to buying a whole new house, and you end up with … well … a modified house, not a new one.</p>
<p>So how does this impact Australia, I hear you ask. After all, we have opted for just one variant of the JSF – the basic conventional take-off and landing <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35/f-35a-ctol-variant.html">F-35A</a> bargain basement version. None of this <a href="http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html">F-35B</a> vertical take-off nonsense for us.</p>
<p>The problem is that the issues involved in getting the multiple variants to work in the first place impact on the cost and schedule – we pay more, and we wait longer. The first aircraft are not expected in Australia until 2018 with 72 to be operational by 2023. But this is not a problem if performance is sufficiently quantum-leap-ish. So is it?</p>
<p>The A$12.4 billion JSF program is intended to replace the Australian fighter fleet of <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/FA-18F_Super_Hornet/?RAAF-4dRvdvKuGAokY31UEml0P+KGoMiO8n/o">F/A-18F Super Hornets</a>, termed <a href="http://www.fighterworld.com.au/az-of-fighter-aircraft/five-generations-of-jets">fourth-generation fighters</a>. This new aircraft with increased technology is <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future_Acquisitions/F-35A_Lightning_II/?RAAF-ZRnYQhJUh1u0e44uR32olOT1rt+Ym4K3">a fifth-generation fighter</a> with all sorts of good stuff such as stealth, comprehensive situation awareness, network-centricity, stand-off capability and so on.</p>
<h2>The bad guys</h2>
<p>The intention is to give us a “<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/strategic-insights-9-is-the-jsf-good-enough/SI_JSF.pdf">decisive combat edge</a>” over the bad guys, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston said in 2004 when he was Air Force chief. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47191/original/j7c3mt45-1398732290.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian Sukhoi Su-35 – is it better than the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.sukhoi.org/img/gallery/wallpaper/su35/13_11_08_27_sm.jpg">Sukhoi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Who, you would like to know, are the bad guys? It had better not be the Russians because their latest Sukhoi Flanker variants, such as the <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/Su-35/">Su-35BM or Su-35-1</a>, would <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/sukhoi-su-35-competes-with-the-f-35-2013-4#military-jets-are-divided-into-generations-and-the-aircraft-of-the-immediate-future-is-the-5th-but-none-have-yet-made-it-into-combat-despite-years-in-development-1">outclass the JSF</a>, all else being equal – despite of <a href="http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-lockheed-claims-f-35-kinematics-better-than-or-equal-to-typhoon-or-super-382078/">claims to the contrary</a> by people involved in the F-35 program.</p>
<p>Our F-35A variants may have better luck against typical fighter aircraft employed by regional forces in South East Asia or Africa where older variety fighters are in use or being purchased. India, Algeria, Malaysia and Indonesia operate fourth-generation fighters as well as older models.</p>
<p>But Indonesia is <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140210/DEFREG/302100030/Indonesia-May-Replace-F-5s-Su-35s">considering purchasing</a> a more advanced SU-35 among other possible options. As long as our potential foes opt for fourth-generation fighters with outdated technologies (and not too many of them at one time) we should have a chance of competing against them with some advantage. But why should they hold back?</p>
<h2>The F-35 JSF in action</h2>
<p>Where can the JSF operate? The range of just over 1,000km (2,000km return) doesn’t get us very far around Australia. This has been addressed by purchasing a fleet of five <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/KC-30A/?RAAF-mqVOdY4RK4Yc3QG06xtPhhp7asTRVUyC">air-to-air refuelling tankers</a>, so the JSF can go a fair bit further, remembering that Australia has no access to aircraft carriers to provide floating airports.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47266/original/y9j8h3yr-1398752042.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Does the F-35 JSF have what is needed?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/">Joint Strike Fighter</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also a fleet of six airborne <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/DMO/aewc/index.cfm">early warning and control</a> aircraft designed to provide external situational awareness data. This combined with satellite communications, all-around sensors and a heads-up display to provide the pilot with information in an easily digestible form, means they will have a fair idea of what’s going on.</p>
<p>All good so long as the enemy isn’t sneaky, overpowering in numbers, or overpowering with more advanced technologies.</p>
<p>In considering the land-support side of the equation, for instance, the enemy could be sneaky by using man-transportable infrared rocket launchers. These are now much more sophisticated than they used to be - and hard to defeat - especially as the JSF tends to glow in the infrared.</p>
<p>Radio frequency–targeting from the ground isn’t so dangerous, since such systems are expensive, stationary and vulnerable to radio frequency-seeker missiles.</p>
<h2>Consider the alternatives</h2>
<p>Was there a choice? Australia could have opted for larger numbers of cheaper fourth-generation aircraft, as has been done by our regional neighbours, or it could have gone for a top-flight machine, such as the US F-22 Raptor.</p>
<p>The thinking goes that a step-advantage could not be gleaned over neighbours by resorting to fourth-generation aircraft, while for the same budget as forecast for the 100 JSF aircraft initially recommended by the white paper, only 30 F-22 could be purchased.</p>
<p>As a couple of squadrons of F-22 cannot achieve the strategic aims of fighting in two separated geographic locations, it looks like we are stuck with the JSF.</p>
<p>The JSF is a good aircraft, not necessarily the best – nor is it the worst. Whether it meets our demands depends on what it comes up against in a hostile situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25907/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Russell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Now the Australian Government has committed to a further 58 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft it is time to ask whether this is a good idea, will we be getting value for money – and will the JSF…Stephen Russell, Lectures in systems engineering , University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259112014-04-28T06:56:27Z2014-04-28T06:56:27ZThe Joint Strike Fighter: is it the right aircraft for Australia?<p>The Australian Government’s <a href="https://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2013/09/02/coalitions-policy-stronger-defence">mission</a> to upgrade the defence force fleet of ageing aircraft with the <a href="http://www.jsf.mil/">F-35 Joint Strike Fighter</a> has been controversial since it began more than a decade ago.</p>
<p>Australia formally began looking for options to replace its <a href="http://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Aircraft/FA-18AB_Hornet/?RAAF-9SSttIt/E93/3lV4LgVxgxc0y4P09YW2">F/A-18</a> and <a href="http://www.raafamberleyheritage.gov.au/f-111.aspx">F-111</a> aircraft in May 1999 with the creation of project AIR 6000 – <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/about/domains/nacc.cfm">New Air Combat Capability</a>.</p>
<p>Phase 2, a Project Definition Study, was to commence in the 2002/03 financial year with a final decision expected around 2005/06.</p>
<p>But when Australia signed up to the System Development and Demonstration phase of the JSF program in June 2002, then-Defence Minister Robert Hill effectively <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/27/1023864632200.html">ended the selection process</a> for Australia’s new combat aircraft.</p>
<p>At that stage the primary contenders included the European Eurofighter <a href="http://www.eurofighter.com/">Typhoon</a>, the French Dassault <a href="http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/defense/rafale/introduction/">Rafale</a> and the Swedish Saab <a href="http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Gripen-Fighter-System/">Gripen</a>.</p>
<p>The government’s decision was a surprise to nearly everyone, including JSF manufacturer Lockheed Martin, rival manufacturers and the Pentagon. While many other nations had joined the JSF program in 2002, Australia was the only one to end their selection process at that time. </p>
<p>Now Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s pledged to spend <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236">A$12 billion</a> on a further 58 aircraft to bring the total to to 72.</p>
<p>The JSF has an impressive list of capabilities and weapons including:</p>
<ul>
<li>low observable stealth</li>
<li>integrated sensors, information and weapons systems</li>
<li>powerful and comprehensive integrated sensor package for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions</li>
<li>advanced electronic warfare capabilities</li>
<li>a 25mm GAU-22 internal gun</li>
<li>four internal and six external weapon stations which can carry a combination of air-to-air, air-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, and precision guided bombs.</li>
</ul>
<p>But whether the JSF is the right aircraft for Australia has been continuously questioned. The government and Australian Defence Force maintain it is the right aircraft because it provides Australia with a <a href="https://www.f35.com/news/detail/delivery-of-the-first-australian-made-f-35-jsf-vertical-tail">technological edge</a> in our region. But this only raises further questions.</p>
<h2>An edge over whom?</h2>
<p>Two defence white papers from 2000 and 2009 recognised that the conventional military threat to Australia is relatively low, with the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009 white paper</a> stating:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is a broad consensus that the present strategic environment is relatively benign.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of the countries in our region, Indonesia has a growing military capability, and has had serious political tensions with Australia over many decades.</p>
<p>Over the past decade Indonesia has acquired advanced Russian Sukhoi <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/su27sk/">Su-27</a> and <a href="http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/su30mk/">Su-30</a> fighters. Its plans to acquire more have led to concerns regarding Australia’s air superiority capabilities.</p>
<p>While these aircraft are superior to Australia’s F/A-18 Hornets in many ways they have not been considered a major threat to Australia because of the standards of training and doctrine for Indonesian pilots, and levels of aircraft readiness.</p>
<p>Indonesia is currently in the process of significantly <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/moving-beyond-ambitions-indonesias-military-modernisation/Strategy_Moving_beyond_ambitions.pdf%20its%20military">expanding and modernising</a>, but it remains largely ill-equipped and ill-prepared for modern military operations.</p>
<p>Analysts such as <a href="http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-a-stronger-indonesian-military-is-good-for-australia-but-is-still-a-long-way-off/">Ben Schreer</a> and <a href="http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/node/34">Alan Stephens</a> have suggested that Indonesia’s military modernisation offers opportunities for increasing Australia’s security.</p>
<h2>A technological edge in what timeframe?</h2>
<p>The JSF does offer significant technological advantages at the moment and probably out to at least 2020. But Australia and the US plan on operating the JSF until 2050 and it is here that a capability edge becomes more uncertain.</p>
<p>While the JSF was designed to be upgradeable – and regular software upgrades are a major part of the ongoing sustainment of the aircraft – future improvements will be limited by the hardware and the physical characteristics of the aircraft.</p>
<p>Although some broad technological developments fundamentally change the nature of warfare (such as with the invention of gunpowder or the aircraft) smaller incremental changes generally only provide short-term advantages with counter-measures developed over time, and developing increasing quickly in the 21st century.</p>
<p>Also, technology itself does not always provide advantages. During the Vietnam War, early US F-4 Phantoms lacked guns as air-to-air missiles were considered the best way of destroying enemy aircraft, limiting their dominance over technologically inferior, but more agile and gun armed North Vietnamese MiG fighters.</p>
<p>The argument here is not that the days of dogfighting are back, but rather to point out that there are historical precedents that illustrate the limitations to technological advantages.</p>
<p>While the JSF is less manoeuvrable than less advanced aircraft, probably making it less capable within visual range, it’s argued that this is not relevant as stealth and advanced missiles will allow JSFs to take down enemy aircraft well before they enter visual range.</p>
<p>Australia has paid a large premium for <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/tony-abbott-to-approve-australias-biggest-ever-military-purchase-of-stealth-fighter-jets/story-fncynjr2-1226851684344">radar stealth</a> in the JSF but it is not a permanent solution. A US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter was <a href="http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-26-serb-stealth_x.htm">shot down</a> in 1999 by an innovative Serbian commander who modified his obsolescent anti-aircraft missile battery.</p>
<p>In 2012 the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathon Greenert, explored the <a href="http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course">limitations of stealth</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The rapid expansion of computing power also ushers in new sensors and methods that will make stealth and its advantages increasingly difficult to maintain […] It is time to consider shifting our focus from platforms that rely solely on stealth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Israel’s air force also believes any stealth protection of the JSF will be good for only <a href="http://aviationweek.com/awin/israel-us-agree-450-million-f-35-ew-work">five to 10 years</a>.</p>
<h2>For what purpose?</h2>
<p>In defending the JSF against Russian and Chinese competitors, Prime Minister Abbott <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-04-23/joint-press-conference-canberra">said</a> that in the judgement of the US and the other Western powers it was a “very, very effective aircraft”.</p>
<p>How the US plans to use the latest <a href="http://www.fighterworld.com.au/az-of-fighter-aircraft/five-generations-of-jets">fifth-generation fighters</a> such as the JSF sheds light on Australia’s strategic thinking in acquiring them.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR871.pdf">Rand report</a> noted the importance of any fifth-generation aircraft to operate in hostile environments featuring integrated air defence system that include advanced surface to air missile systems, jamming and other electronic attack modes.</p>
<p>Senior US generals have also <a href="http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66911">indicated</a> the importance of allowing the US to strike any target in the world at any time.</p>
<p>To operate successfully in a contemporary hostile environment, older technology strike aircraft would need the support of a range of defensive and offensive electronic warfare aircraft, as well as other aircraft to suppress enemy air defences.</p>
<p>But the JSF can perform <a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx">all of these roles</a> in the one aircraft. </p>
<p>China’s military modernisation and strategic developments are designed to deter a US attack, and the JSF is a key component in overcoming Chinese defences.</p>
<h2>What other options are there?</h2>
<p>The suitability of other options depends on evaluating and prioritising a range of factors, including price and cost effectiveness, timeframes, the strategic environment, operational needs and capabilities available.</p>
<p>As well as the European aircraft mentioned previously, Australia’s current F/A-18F Super Hornets possess many advanced technologies. There is also a range of aircraft that would fit in the fifth-generation category currently being developed in China, Russia, Japan, India and Turkey.</p>
<p>While not all of these will ultimately be produced, the future is likely to see a range of technologically advanced aircraft made available to customers in Australia’s region. The suitability of the JSF for Australia in the long term will, to some degree, be dependent on the capability of these aircraft.</p>
<p>The JSF may well be a safe bet for Australia. It has its problems and does not meet the expectations of a decade ago, but it provides some certainty, at least in the short term.</p>
<p>Predicting Australia’s strategic needs for the next 35 years is a daunting exercise, but the financial cost burden of acquiring and sustaining the JSF may reduce Australia’s strategic flexibility to change its force structure in the coming decades.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven L. Jones receives PhD scholarship funding from UNSW.</span></em></p>The Australian Government’s mission to upgrade the defence force fleet of ageing aircraft with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been controversial since it began more than a decade ago. Australia formally…Steven L. Jones, PhD candidate, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/259272014-04-24T11:20:47Z2014-04-24T11:20:47ZThe best security money can buy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47006/original/f7tfmv5q-1398335372.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">original</span> </figcaption></figure><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/47007/original/gs7ddzqr-1398335430.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Alan Porritt</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The news that Australia is about to spend $24 billion on a new generation of fighter aircraft has been greeted with remarkably little critical comment or analysis. It is hard to imagine that any other public policy initiative on this scale would have been greeted with quite such equanimity. </p>
<p>But when the defence of the nation is at stake, no-one wants to risk looking like an unpatriotic strategic illiterate – especially on Anzac Day.</p>
<p>It is, however, possible to make two predictions with some confidence. First, if history is any guide, the budget for these planes will inevitably blow out. As yet unresolved technical difficulties with the supposedly state of the art Lockheed Martin F35 Joint Strike Fighter almost guarantee this. Canada and Turkey also look like pulling out of the project, pushing up the cost for other buyers. </p>
<p>The second prediction is this: it is as near to certain as anything can be that they will never be used in anger.</p>
<p>This is a good thing, no doubt, and the plane’s admirers will no doubt claim that this is testimony to its deterrent effect. But would things have been different without the new fighters and the eye-watering outlay they involve at a time of alleged austerity? </p>
<p>Strategic hard heads and technical experts, of whom there seem to be no shortage at such times, will claim that national security is simply too important to be left to chance, and no price is apparently too great to pay in ensuring it. </p>
<p>And yet, this is not quite as axiomatic or self-evident as they would have us believe. Not every country subscribes to this logic or feels as impelled by what Edward Luttwack describes as the “the Anglo-Saxon trait of bellicosity”.</p>
<p>New Zealand, for example, has not only been expelled from the ANZUS alliance with Australia and (more importantly) the US, but it has essentially abandoned the idea of having an independent and effective air defence capability altogether. </p>
<p>Does anyone seriously think that their security has been materially diminished as a consequence? Are hostile powers queuing up to invade and take advantage of its weakened state? Hardly. </p>
<p>Successive New Zealand governments have made the entirely rational calculation that they are a small nation, a long way from potential areas of conflict, with limited national resources that might be better directed toward national development rather than defense. </p>
<p>Even if argument is made that New Zealand somehow freeloads on the back of Australia’s military spending and benefits from the defense of its supposedly vulnerable north, does this make their calculation of their particular national circumstances and interests any the less rational or wise?</p>
<p>Australia is not New Zealand and a different strategic calculus potentially applies, but is it one that merits this sort of expenditure and this sort of equipment? In what possible circumstances could the possession of 70 or even 100 F-35s make a decisive difference without which Australia’s national security would be unambiguously compromised? </p>
<p>Would contributing to a regional arms race really underwrite our long-term security or would it actually make conflict more likely, as the timely example of World War One reminds us?</p>
<p>Plainly, no-one is thinking about invading Australia. As has been frequently noted, only the US has the capacity to do so in any foreseeable circumstances, and they are actually “invading” as a consequence of enthusiastic bipartisan invitation. In this regard, the hard heads are undoubtedly correct: with American bases in Australia the already remote possibility of foreign aggression toward Australia becomes even less likely.</p>
<p>So if there is widespread agreement that the defence of Australia is not at stake, why the need for such (potentially) lethal fire power? The logic underpinning Australian strategy revolves around the alliance and the need to “do our bit”. </p>
<p>Given that the US is planning to buy something like two and a half thousand of these planes, Australia’s contribution to any military effort will, as ever, be largely tokenistic and make no difference to the outcome of any actual conflict.</p>
<p>Much the same could be said about the equally ruinous proposed expenditure on new submarines. But whether we buy 12, 20 or 100, it is worth thinking about the precise circumstances in which such weapons systems would make a decisive difference or change the behaviour of potential adversaries.</p>
<p>Playing up the possible benefits to Australia’s beleaguered manufacturing sector is a bit rich from a government that normally has no time for industry policy, but it is, at least, a potentially tangible benefit. The same can’t be said about their ostensible strategic rationale.</p>
<p>Tony Abbot has justified this massive expenditure on the basis that we “don’t know what may be around the corner”. Actually, we do. It’s called climate change and it’s coming to a country near you - with potentially apocalyptic consequences for our collective security.</p>
<p>If the government really is serious about addressing clear and present dangers, this might be a good place to start. $24 billion is just the sort of money that might help to underwrite our long-term economic and environmental security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/25927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The news that Australia is about to spend $24 billion on a new generation of fighter aircraft has been greeted with remarkably little critical comment or analysis. It is hard to imagine that any other…Mark Beeson, Professor of International Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/200022013-11-13T06:12:46Z2013-11-13T06:12:46ZCostly to keep afloat: Britain’s waning warship industry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34797/original/9x5n25pv-1383920423.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Made in the UK: nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard and Type 45 frigate HMS Dragon</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MOD/Tam McDonald</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The controversy over the BAE Systems <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-24831779">decision on warship building</a> has been dominated by myth, emotion and pleading. Arguments are raging about English versus Scottish jobs, about shipbuilding as a key component of the UK defence industry, and about the loss of “essential” skills. Economists can help improve the debate by critically evaluating the arguments and identifying some of the basic economics of the BAE decision.</p>
<p>The UK warship industry comprises both surface warships and submarines. BAE is the UK monopoly supplier of both, but the current announcement only refers to surface warships, and to the yards at Portsmouth and on the Clyde where these are built. </p>
<p>Submarines, meanwhile, are made at the BAE yard at Barrow-in-Furness. This is a unique facility in that it builds nuclear-powered submarines in small numbers for a single customer, the Royal Navy. There is sufficient submarine work ahead to maintain Barrow to around 2025 – and beyond, if a new submarine deterrent system is ordered.</p>
<p>But even with Barrow’s future relatively assured, the UK warship industry cannot ignore the defence economics problem: falling defence budgets, costly equipment and rising unit costs.</p>
<h2>Not cheap</h2>
<p>Modern surface warships are not cheap. Type 45 destroyers cost almost <a href="http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ddg-type-45-britains-shrinking-air-defense-fleet-04941/">£1 billion</a> per ship; aircraft carriers cost at least <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24833555">£3 billion</a> per vessel; and Astute submarines each cost over <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8079977/HMS-Astute-Royal-Navys-world-beating-1.2bn-nuclear-submarine.html">£1 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, unit costs are rising in real terms; for example, while the current Type 45 costs £1 billion per unit, the Type 23 frigate, had a unit cost in 1989 of just <a href="http://www.dasa.mod.uk/publications/finance-and-economics/defence-economic-papers/intergenerational-equipment-cost-escalation/2012-12-18/18_december_2012.pdf">£183 million</a> (or just under three times as much in today’s prices).</p>
<p>These higher unit costs, along with falling defence budgets, mean fewer warships are being bought by the Royal Navy. Quite simply, the UK therefore needs fewer shipbuilding yards. In 1980, the Navy <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP00-99">operated</a> 66 destroyers and frigates; by 2012, this number had fallen to <a href="http://www.dasa.mod.uk/publications/UK-defence-statistics-compendium/2012/chapter-4-formations-vessels-aircraft-and-vehicles/2012-chapter-4-formations-vessels-aircraft-and-vehicles.pdf">18 vessels</a>, and the future requirement for the Type 26 is <a href="http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2013/September/11/130911-Type-26">13 ships</a>.</p>
<p>The defence economics problem means that difficult choices about the UK warship industry and the defence industrial base cannot be avoided. Something has to go – the only question is what.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/34800/original/znnmr6w4-1383923488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=604&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Billion-pound baby: the new Type 45 frigate HMS Daring.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">LA(Phot) Keith Morgan/MoD</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How the industry can survive</h2>
<p>Retaining a British warship industry is not costless. Its resources have potential alternative uses in other sectors; it might be more efficient to re-allocate resources to other higher value activities elsewhere in the economy. Much depends on society’s willingness to pay for such an industrial capability.</p>
<p>There are also other ways of retaining the industry. Some of the facilities could be mothballed and re-opened at some future date. This would require skilled labour for any future re-generation, and recruiting and training such labour will incur costs and take time; still, the costs of such an option need to be explored, and some skilled labour is generally available within the broader UK economy. While more specialised design skills for surface warships might be more difficult to obtain, they are usually only required in small numbers, and could be retained at reasonable cost by working on prototype designs.</p>
<p>Most importantly, preserving the industry’s current yards and industrial structure is not the only way to retain it. On the contrary, the introduction of supplier competition could play a major role. For instance, competition for the new Type 26 combat ships will lead to new designs, lower prices and novel forms of industrial organisation. </p>
<p>While a truly competitive industry would allow foreign firms to submit designs, a requirement that warships be built in the UK could still be imposed. A new manufacturer could act as systems integrator, and sub-contract the warship assembly to a UK yard. There are a number of yards owned by BAE, Babcock and others, including yards building oil platforms, which are potentially suitable for sub-contracted warship assembly.</p>
<h2>The politics of warship building</h2>
<p>Critics of the BAE decision have criticised it for being politically motivated. This should not be surprising. All defence procurement decisions are political, because they are ultimately made by governments. As the warship industry’s major buyer (for some ships, the only buyer), government necessarily determines the industry’s size, structure, performance and ownership.</p>
<p>Traditionally, UK Governments have required all Royal Navy warships to be built in the UK, mainly to guarantee security of supply. This is a unique commitment which does not apply to any other sectors of the UK’s defence industrial base, even highly sensitive ones: for example, the missiles for the British nuclear deterrent are imported from the USA. </p>
<p>Nor does commitment to domestic production and buying reflect the international competitiveness of the UK’s warship industry, which has not been particularly successful in export markets (unlike our aerospace industry, for instance). Nor is the warship industry a major employer in the grand scheme of the economy. If the case for retaining it is based on jobs, there are other industrial sectors that could offer more employment opportunities when given the same Government attention and support.</p>
<p>In short, to make informed decisions about the future of the domestic warship industry, we must answer a number of often ignored but vital questions. What, exactly, are the aims of our current policy, and what are the alternatives? Is the price of buying British warships a smaller and weaker Royal Navy? And could we buy our warships at a lower overall cost from foreign sources of supply?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/20002/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Keith Hartley has receives funding from
European Defence Agency (past funding)
DSTL. (past funding)</span></em></p>The controversy over the BAE Systems decision on warship building has been dominated by myth, emotion and pleading. Arguments are raging about English versus Scottish jobs, about shipbuilding as a key…Keith Hartley, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/68512012-05-10T05:53:49Z2012-05-10T05:53:49ZPreparing for peace: it’s time to rethink defence spending<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/10502/original/n4c9jmhj-1336616025.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Does Australia really need 12 Joint Strike Fighters?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Joely Santiago</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The most interesting question relating to the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-04/defence-fraternity-questions-military-spending-cuts/3989888">cuts in defence spending</a> announced in the budget is whether they signify the early stages of rethinking security strategy.</p>
<p>Of course they should, because there has been widespread recognition that the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009 Defence White Paper</a> was both confused and misjudged. Naturally this was not universal: many single-minded defence commentators were delighted with the unprecedented plan to increase real Australian military spending by 2% or 3% each year for the next decade. </p>
<p>No other area of Commonwealth outlays had ever been given such a ludicrously large promise for so long. The plan was irresponsible, both because of its size and also because it took no account of changing circumstances, strategic or fiscal.</p>
<h2>The right cuts</h2>
<p>The first <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2009-10/content/overview/html/index.htm">budget</a> after the White Paper increased outlays on the Defence Department by <a href="http://www.adbr.com.au/download/2009/2009-10%20Defence%20Budget%20Report.pdf">$1.5 billion</a>, more than 50% more than the total outlays on diplomacy through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. </p>
<p>Last year’s <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2011-12/">budget</a> recognised that Defence had to accept fiscal restraints also being imposed on other departments and there were small cuts. <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/07/04/A-bloody-blizzard-for-Defence.aspx">Graeme Dobell</a> wrote shortly after that announcement that “The implicit reason for the demise of the 3% rule is that Defence is so bloated it can’t eat fast enough to get through all the cash it is being fed.”</p>
<p>The cuts for next year are more substantial, at $970m. More in the following three years total $5.5 billion over the four years. These sound like large amounts but the cut next year is only 3.4% of total defence resourcing. The forward estimates show military spending is expected to resume rising by over $2 billion a year in 2014-15 and afterwards. It seems present plans are that Defence will not suffer from much austerity. </p>
<p>More than half the cuts in 2012-13 are in capital works. Other substantial cuts are through reducing the number of civilian employees by 1000 during the next two years, in administration costs and reduced use of consultants. These are entirely sensible as the civilian component of Australia’s defence establishment is often criticised for being excessively large when compared to similar countries.</p>
<h2>Rethinking Joint Strike Fighters</h2>
<p>On 3 May this year, Julia Gillard and Stephen Smith announced a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/drive/federal-government-announces-defence-cuts/3989966">two-year delay</a> in committing to order 12 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), saving a total of about <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/australia-delays-delivery-of-12-f-35-joint-strike-fighters-by-2-years-as-cost-saving-measure/2012/05/02/gIQAY0phxT_story.html">$1.6 billion</a>. Two are already ordered for testing and training purposes. </p>
<p>Smith said this delay is about the same as that of the US Government. Neither the PM nor the Minister hinted at any reconsideration of the commitment to purchasing the Fighters. Still, the initial plan to purchase a total of 100 was not reiterated. This at least leaves room for reconsideration of the number to be purchased, but the whole program should be questioned. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.economist.com/node/18958367">The Joint Strike Fighter</a>, the Lockheed Martin F-35, is the most expensive military-industrial project in history. The initial plan was to develop a radar-dodging stealth plane which could replace four types of fighters and bombers. The US planned to buy 2400; it was expected to be the principal fighter for 50 years; and to generate major sales to allies starting in 2010. </p>
<p>In 2010, then US Secretary of Defense <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/18958487">Robert Gates said</a> that “the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature and the system is reliable”. Senator John McCain calls the project “<a href="http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/?p=693">a train wreck</a>”. </p>
<p>The average price of each plane has doubled and is still growing. None is expected in service until 2016. Program costs had risen to $380 billion by the middle of last year. The F-35 is likely to cost a third more to operate than existing fighters. Yet it only has a range of about 1000 km. </p>
<p>At a time when all US government spending has to be cut, some analysts suggest the program should be abandoned. This possibility is made even more attractive by recognition that the technology of pilotless drones is already sufficiently sophisticated to replace all piloted fighter planes at a fraction of the cost.</p>
<p>The debate continues in the US and so it should in Australia. Continued commitment to purchasing large numbers of still unproven, hugely costly and probably outdated JSFs just because the Australian Air Force wants to retain interoperability with the US might well involve squandering tens of billions of dollars. A rigorous, comprehensive and impartial study is required.</p>
<h2>How many submarines does Australia need?</h2>
<p>Every aspect of the other huge military investment project announced in 2009, the plan to design and build 12 new submarines in Australia, should also be sceptically reviewed. Are foreseeable threats to Australia seriously likely to require this type of defence? Or is this an example of worst-case fantasy among defence planners whose predisposition is to imagine the most threatening possibilities imaginable?</p>
<p>If acquisition of a few new submarines is considered to be justified, are 12 needed? Why do they have to be built to an Australian design, which would probably maximise the cost? Could an existing design from Japan or a European country be adopted or adapted for conditions in Australian waters? What are the lessons from the difficulties in crewing the existing <a href="http://www.asc.com.au/aspx/submarines_collins_class_submarines.aspx">Collins class submarines</a>? </p>
<p>It is unlikely that the $214 million announced by Julia Gillard to prepare for the decision on submarine design and workforce requirements will lead to consideration of some of these difficult questions. But the taskforce working on a new defence White Paper must do so if they are going to prepare a persuasive document.</p>
<h2>Peacetime thinking</h2>
<p>Preparation of a new defence White Paper is fully justified by the inadequacies of the 2009 version, by the evolution of the strategic situation, of technology and of the fiscal constraints. </p>
<p>Defence does not have a paramount claim on public funds in a time of relative peace. Community preferences are for improvements in health and education services, infrastructure and opportunities for employment. </p>
<p>It is therefore necessary for defence to be considered in the context of financial constraints and of over-riding foreign policy priorities. Australian’s security will be best served by more effectively balancing diplomatic and military spending.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/6851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Langmore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The most interesting question relating to the cuts in defence spending announced in the budget is whether they signify the early stages of rethinking security strategy. Of course they should, because there…John Langmore, Professorial Fellow, Melbourne School of Government , The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/47022012-01-16T13:48:41Z2012-01-16T13:48:41ZIn deep water: where now for the Collins class submarines?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/6638/original/5n3976h5-1324420648.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are Australia's Collins class a feat of engineering genius or an expensive boondoggle?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">iStock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2011 Minister for Defence Stephen Smith announced a <a href="http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/08/24/minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-release-of-terms-of-reference-for-submarine-sustainment-review/">review on the Sustainment of Australia’s Collins Class submarines</a>. </p>
<p>The review is led by John Coles, an independent expert from BMT Defence Services in the UK. An <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/publications/Coles_Rpt_Ph1.pdf">interim report</a> has just been released (while the final report is due by April 2012).</p>
<p>There have been a number stories published in the press (<a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/not-a-single-submarine-seaworthy/story-fn59niix-1226072631716">led by <em>The Australian</em>‘s Cameron Stewart</a>) on the issues with the submarine fleet.</p>
<p>Australia’s Collins Class submarines are the most expensive in the world. The fleet of six submarines costs taxpayers <a href="http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/costs-sinking-our-submarine-fleet/story-fn6ck51p-1226167951592">$630 million a year to maintain, or $105 million for each submarine</a>. In comparison, the US Navy Ohio – a nuclear submarine which holds three times more crew and is five times bigger costs about $50 million a year (see figure below).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6637/original/nd8q75jk-1324420237.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Are the Collins class submarines value for money?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courier Mail</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 2007-08 performance outcome for the Collins fleet shows that it <a href="http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/more-news/collins-class-submarines-most-expensive-ever-to-go-to-sea/story-fn7x8me2-1226167908219">achieved only 64% of its mission capability</a> and, according to opposition Defence spokesman David Johnston, the fleet <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/opposition-claims-collins-class-submarines-affect-defence-reputation/story-e6frg8yo-1226137272614">rarely features more than two operational submarines</a> at the same time.</p>
<p>In June 2011, The Australian published a story claiming there was <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/not-a-single-submarine-seaworthy/story-fn59niix-1226072631716">not a single Collins-class submarine that was seaworthy at the time</a> while <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/urgent-sub-defects-shame-navy/story-fn59niix-1226073264403">40 serious defects were discovered</a> on one of the submarines.</p>
<p>Understanding the need for a new and more efficient fleet, the <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf">2009 Defence White Paper</a> calls for 12 large submarines which could <a href="http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/submarine-program-worth-70-billion/story-e6frea6u-1226143010584">cost up to $35 billion and could be built in South Australia</a>, according to the Defence Industries Minister. At first, off-the-shelf submarines were considered. However, the <a href="http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/costs-sinking-our-submarine-fleet/story-fn6ck51p-1226167951592">French-Spanish Scorpene class boat and the Spanish S-80 submarine have been ruled out</a> as Defence argued that they did not meet requirements Australia’s broad needs. </p>
<p>Some defence experts do believe that the <a href="http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/collins-class-submarines-a-triumph/story-e6freo8c-1111116321177">Collins-class submarines are a naval engineering triumph and a showcase of Australia’s expertise</a>. According to Derek Woolner, an expert on defence procurement projects based at ANU, the Collins-class submarines represent one of the few military projects that was delivered close to budget and an average of 26 months behind schedule, one of the shortest delays with military purchases. It is also a unique concept with no other engineering design of its kind anywhere in the world.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/6739/original/y56z3qvt-1324510442.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">We may have the submarines, but do we have enough submariners?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Defence</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the technical issues surrounding the submarines are further strained by internal conflicts within Defence’s engineering workforce. In October 2011, the engineering union APESMA (Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists & Managers Australia) conducted a careers intentions survey at a key Defence workplace that underpins the maintenance of the current Collins class submarines and the expertise for the future submarine program. </p>
<p>The survey found that 80% of engineering staff plan to leave within five years if engineering issues (related to work and pay conditions) are not addressed soon. There is already deep concern that Australia’s existing engineering defence workforce <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/nuclear-or-not-well-need-prefab-subs/story-e6frg6z6-1226002430804">lacks the expert technicians to deliver</a> the fleet of 12 new submarines, and may need to partner with another nation to fill the gaps.</p>
<p>This view is shared by the review panel, as included in <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/publications/Coles_Rpt_Ph1.pdf">the interim report</a>:</p>
<p>“<em>In Canberra, it is difficult to find more than a couple of individuals with any serious claim to submarine domain knowledge; in SA and WA the participants are critically dependant on a few key experienced individuals. The impression we gained was of an organisation surviving from day to day, with no spare capacity to think about the future. Without a clear plan to resolve this situation, it will be just a matter of time before the program grinds to a halt or the risk of a serious incident reaches unacceptable levels.</em>”</p>
<h2>Why is it so hard to get it right?</h2>
<p>In his excellent <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-australias-defence-procurement-is-lacking-military-precision-2136">piece in The Conversation</a>, Derek Woolner explains that acquiring military equipment is a complex process in itself. It’s a fine balance between understanding the complicated technical nature of the equipment, evaluating the risks involved, taking into account the large time frames and possible delay. The political games outside and within Defence don’t help either. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=316">Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released a report</a> last month about the risks involved when acquiring military equipment. It looks at three possible views to evaluate risks: </p>
<ul>
<li>the use of commercial investment analysis that could be used by the military<br></li>
<li>the desperate need of qualified project managers to make the right decisions when evaluating and agreeing to take on more projects and the input that the private sector can provide.</li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/publications/Coles_Rpt_Ph1.pdf">interim review</a> provided a much-needed glimpse into the way Defence operates when it comes to the Collins-class submarines. </p>
<p>It showed us that the situation is complex with many stakeholders at play. Defence has pledged to implement some of the recommendations <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/Submarine_Sustainment_Review_Phase_1_Report,_The_Coles_Review">immediately</a>. The maintenance and design of the existing and new submarines is clearly an engineering project of gigantic size. </p>
<p>But as John Thornton so elegantly <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-the-collins-class-what-next-for-australias-submarines-2499">puts its</a>: “If ever a project required a Team Australia approach, this is it.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/4702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hamza Bendemra is a member of APESMA's ACT branch committee.</span></em></p>In 2011 Minister for Defence Stephen Smith announced a review on the Sustainment of Australia’s Collins Class submarines. The review is led by John Coles, an independent expert from BMT Defence Services…Hamza Bendemra, Former Research Engineer, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.