tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/disputed-territories-8569/articlesDisputed territories – The Conversation2020-11-13T13:43:01Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1493502020-11-13T13:43:01Z2020-11-13T13:43:01ZGenocide claims in Nagorno-Karabakh make peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan unlikely, despite cease-fire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369190/original/file-20201112-13-15vuilx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C29%2C3235%2C2079&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers patrol the mountainous, disputed border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, on Nov. 8.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/servicemen-walk-towards-the-armenian-border-the-fighting-news-photo/1229530009?adppopup=true">Stanislav Krasilnikov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan/russian-peacekeepers-deploy-to-nagorno-karabakh-after-ceasefire-deal-idUSKBN27Q11R">Russian-brokered cease-fire</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan this week halted fighting over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, where long-standing hostilities <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54314341">reerupted on Sept. 27</a>. </p>
<p>The deal leaves Azerbaijan, which was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh">given Nagorno-Karabakh by the Soviets in 1923</a>, largely in control of the majority-Armenian territory. Leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh, located in Western Azerbaijan close to Armenia, continue to demand independence. </p>
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<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-russia">Thousands have died</a> and an estimated 100,000 have been displaced in Nagorno-Karabakh since September. As the cease-fire took effect on Nov. 10, Azerbaijanis danced in the streets. But <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54882564">angry Armenians</a> stormed the Armenian parliament and office of the prime minister. </p>
<p>Both sides in the conflict have <a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Azerbaijans_Foreign_Ministry_releases_statement_on_Armenia_missile_attack_on_Barda-1627027">claimed that fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh</a> isn’t just about territorial control – it <a href="https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/31/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Al-Arabiya/">is a fight to prevent genocide</a>, a fight for their lives. These grave accusations, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/11/11/shortly-before-ceasefire-experts-issue-a-genocide-warning-for-the-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh/?sh=53240f94d005">while yet unproven</a>, may make a lasting resolution to the conflict much harder.</p>
<h2>Freedom fighting and genocide claims</h2>
<p>Violence first broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1980s, when the region’s ethnic Armenian leaders sought to gain independence from Azerbaijan. There has been intermittent fighting since then, including a bloody war in the 1990s that ended in another <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-05-17-mn-58811-story.html">Russia-brokered cease-fire</a> giving Azerbaijan legal control of the region. </p>
<p>But Armenian leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh declared themselves an independent republic, and have repeatedly tried to secede. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">research on self-determination</a>, I find that genocide is often invoked by secessionist regions as a last-ditch effort to secure outside intervention in their conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">United Nations</a> defines genocide as the destruction or partial destruction of a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” It is a war crime under international law, and countries are supposed to “prevent and punish” it under a 1948 U.N. agreement.</p>
<p>Secessionist leaders often try to rally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/secessionist-minorities-and-external-involvement/58E0E7DB76EB90039C0581F608304078">foreign powers around their cause</a> with arguments based on geopolitical strategy, economic self-interest, religious bonds or shared ideology. Those reasons broadly explain why <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/kurdish-factor-iran-iraq-relations">Iran supports</a> the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/14519">Iraqi Kurds</a> in their quest for greater autonomy, and why the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/sympathy-for-the-palestinians/">Arab states back</a> the Palestinians’ efforts at statehood. </p>
<p>But when all else fails, freedom fighters will highlight their own repression in the starkest of terms to gain international assistance. In war a global campaign for victimhood is the weapon of the weaker side – and genocide claims are the most powerful weapon in this arsenal. </p>
<p>According to my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">more than two-thirds of members</a> in the <a href="https://unpo.org/">Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization</a>, a nongovernmental organization composed of autonomy-minded minority groups like the Kurds, have alleged genocide.</p>
<h2>Genocide makes peace hard</h2>
<p>Genocide may be, as one scholar puts it, the “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2307/1389562?journalCode=spxb">embodiment of radical evil</a>,” but as a war crime it is incredibly difficult to prove. </p>
<p>Under international law, accusers must show perpetrators acted with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” specified groups. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2003/22.html#The%20requirement%20of%20proving%20the%20specific%20intent%20to%20commit%20genocide_T">Demonstrating intent</a> is a tall order. </p>
<p>Armenia knows this as well as any nation. The 1915 Armenian genocide by Turkey is recognized by fewer than <a href="https://www.armenian-genocide.org/recognition_countries.html">three dozen countries</a>. In terms of both law and politics, declaring a deadly military campaign to be genocide – <a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-genocide-in-myanmar-court-order-tries-to-protect-rohingya-muslims-where-politics-has-failed-130530">versus just the atrocities of a bloody conflict</a> – is tricky indeed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rubble of a cement home and photo of a boy with flowers around it" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A house destroyed in an Oct. 17 rocket attack on Gyandzha, outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, that killed a young boy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/photograph-of-the-deceased-russian-boy-artur-mayakov-is-news-photo/1229548313?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Genocide allegations, on the other hand, are more easily come by. But according to my research they don’t bode well for peace. </p>
<p>Genocide claims turn “the other side” into an enemy bent on the destruction of an entire people. Once the public sees a conflict in these terms, history shows, leaders understandably balk at the prospect of <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49KT-6910-00KJ-D1GC-00000-00&context=1516831">sitting down at the negotiating table</a> with that enemy. </p>
<p>Genocide claims also reduce the likelihood of effective outside mediation by winnowing away the pool of “honest brokers” – that is, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27798500?seq=1">objective intermediaries</a>. Opposing parties can and do reject would-be peacekeepers based on their acknowledgment of – or refusal to acknowledge – genocide accusations, my research finds. </p>
<p>In archived coverage of the <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:605K-2V91-DYRH-01PW-00000-00&context=1516831">South Ossetian</a> region of Georgia, for example, local leaders in the 2000s insisted various European and American troops could not serve as peacekeepers since they had not defended Ossetians from an alleged 1992 genocide. </p>
<h2>Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide</h2>
<p>Genocide claims in the Georgia cases did eventually lead to international intervention and separation from Georgia, but not through peaceful negotiations. Instead, South Ossetia, like another <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030">breakaway Georgian state called Abkhazia</a>, gained de facto independence after a brutal Russian military assault on Georgia in 2008. </p>
<p>This mirrored what occurred in Kosovo nearly a decade earlier when Serbian <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/04/kosovos-push-for-serbian-genocide-tribunal-likely-to-fail/">atrocities</a> prompted Western intervention. Western powers recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859">Serbia</a> continues to contest Kosovo’s separation.</p>
<p>In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, genocide claims on both sides are nothing new. In archival research I found media reports showing that Armenian leaders have repeatedly <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-NCK0-0013-F32T-00000-00&context=1516831">reminded foreign powers of the 1915 Armenian genocide</a> when pressing for <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJ4-DBK0-0007-W0Y8-00000-00&context=1516831">outside intervention</a> in their conflict with Azerbaijan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Parade of cars with men waving Azerbaijani flags out the windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C4929%2C3261&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Azerbaijanis celebrate the end of the military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh on Tuesday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/local-people-celebrate-the-end-of-the-military-conflict-news-photo/1229566072?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Azerbaijanis, for their part, retort it is their citizens who should fear genocide. During a 1992 Armenian military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians committed what is now called the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17179904">Khojaly massacre</a>, when at least 613 civilians were reportedly killed. As <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49NB-0J80-01S8-D0TP-00000-00&context=1516831">newspapers from the era</a> reveal, Azerbaijani leaders declared then that without international intervention, Armenians would finish the job.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>It is impossible to determine whether genocide has in fact occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh without in-depth investigations. But the accusations alone may overpower any truce. And as Armenians’ angry reaction to the recent cease-fire demonstrates, peace between the two nations is fragile at best.</p>
<p><em>A photo caption in this story has been changed to reflect that a rocket attack killed a young boy outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Grodsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Each side in the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accuses the other of war crimes. Such allegations attract foreign attention and possibly intervention, but rarely lead to a peaceful solution.Brian Grodsky, Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792422017-06-12T04:24:18Z2017-06-12T04:24:18ZPuerto Rico votes on statehood: Polls and protests<h2>Will the vote matter?</h2>
<p><strong>Charles R. Venator-Santiago, University of Connecticut</strong></p>
<p>The 2017 Plebiscite for the Immediate Decolonization of Puerto Rico was held on June 11. This is <a href="https://theconversation.com/puerto-rico-votes-on-statehood-fifth-times-the-charm-75975">the fifth vote</a> on the political status of Puerto Rico since the United States annexed the island in 1898.</p>
<p>Only 23 percent of the 2,260,804 registered Puerto Rican voters <a href="http://resultados2017.ceepur.org/Noche_del_Evento_78/index.html#en/default/CONSULTA_DESCOLONIZACION_Resumen.xml">participated</a>. This is in stark contrast to the <a href="http://64.185.222.182/REYDI_Escrutinio12/index.html#en/default/OPCIONES_NO_TERRITORIALES_ISLA.xml">last plebiscite</a> held in 2012 – in which 1,363,854 people, or 78.19 percent of registered voters, cast a ballot.</p>
<p>This year’s results were as follows:</p>
<p>The statehood option received 502,616 votes, or 97.18 percent of the votes cast.</p>
<p>The sovereignty/independence option received 7,779 votes, or 1.5 percent.</p>
<p>The current territorial status option received 6,821 votes, or 1.32 percent.</p>
<p>Moreover, this plebiscite was not authorized or certified by the U.S. Department of Justice or Congress, which throws its impact into question. Although the U.S. DOJ did not offer any reasons for not certifying the plebiscite, the most likely reason is a dispute over the language of the ballot, which was the subject of <a href="http://www.noticel.com/uploads/gallery/documents/fa26731a26c7e725e180e729574ed49e.pdf">a memorandum</a> the DOJ sent to the governor of Puerto Rico in April. </p>
<p>Given the low voter turnout and the failure of the U.S. DOJ to certify the plebiscite, Congress is likely to ignore the outcome of this vote – much as it did in 2012.</p>
<h2>Voters fail to turn out</h2>
<p><strong>Carlos Vargas-Ramos, City University of New York</strong></p>
<p>The overwhelming majority of eligible voters in Puerto Rico chose not to participate. </p>
<p>The June 11 vote brought out the second-lowest turnout rate of all electoral contests <a href="http://209.68.12.238/cgi-bin/municipios.pl">conducted in Puerto Rico since 1967</a>. This is unusual in a political system in which turnout in general elections has ranged between <a href="http://209.68.12.238/cgi-bin/eventos.pl">78 and 89 percent of registered voters</a>. Three of the four political parties that participated in the elections of November 2016 called for a boycott of this plebiscite – which seems to have had a large impact. </p>
<p>Moreover, the low turnout in this plebiscite follows on the heels of another historically low-turnout election in 2016, in which only <a href="http://elecciones2016.ceepur.org/Escrutinio_General_77/index.html#es/default/GOBERNADOR_Resumen.xml">55 percent of voters turned out</a>. The results from these elections are but a reflection of not simply the economic crisis Puerto Rico is facing, but of the political crisis it is facing as well.</p>
<h2>Calls for protest and action</h2>
<p><strong>Jossianna Arroyo, University of Texas Austin</strong></p>
<p>Many who boycotted the vote believed the plebiscite’s cost – more than <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/puerto-rico-holds-vote-sunday-statehood-amid-criticism-over-timing-n770496">US$8 million</a> – neglects the needs of <a href="https://www.childtrends.org/left-behind-povertys-toll-on-the-children-of-puerto-rico/">citizens living in precarious economic conditions</a> in Puerto Rico.</p>
<p>After Puerto Rico declared bankruptcy in 2006, the government entered into a process of “debt analysis” and arbitration, directed by a financial control board <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html">appointed by President Obama</a>. The board recommended, among many measures, to cut US$300 million to $500 million from the Puerto Rican state government budget. That would mean a 30 percent cut to the <a href="https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/locales/nota/discutenrecortesde120millonesparalaupr-2288254/">administrative budget</a> of the University of Puerto Rico.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/28/thousands-university-students-go-on-strike-in-puerto-rico.html">March 2017</a>, students, faculty and staff went on strike, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/05/20/529309138/students-at-puerto-ricos-largest-university-continue-strike-amid-shutdown">closing the gates</a> of the 11 public campuses on the island.</p>
<p>Many Puerto Ricans view the government as subservient to this board, some <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/249146-what-a-federal-financial-control-board-means-to-puerto">representatives</a> of which have been connected to Wall Street. <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/249146-what-a-federal-financial-control-board-means-to-puerto">Critics feel</a> these board members may be motivated by a desire to make money, or threaten the island’s sovereignty. While students and faculty protests continue, all campuses are now opened and classes resumed. Still, the fate of the University of Puerto Rico is not clear. Faculty, students and staff are taking matters into their own hands.</p>
<p>On May 24, representatives of the Board of Students met with members of the Financial Control Board to present <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/students-are-now-leading-the-resistance-to-austerity-in-puerto-rico/">a plan to negotiate debt</a> and build a possible consensus for an open and democratic university, which will be able to continue as the top-rated public institution on the island. It was the first time the Financial Control Board met with a collective of citizens. The students believe that the promise of a more democratic future for Puerto Rico will not happen via traditional polls or call to the electorate, but with an active mobilization of all citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some Puerto Ricans voted, but most stayed home amid a looming financial debt crisis and political protests. Will this vote matter?Jossianna Arroyo-Martínez, Chair/Professor of Latin American and Caribbean Literatures and Cultures, Depts. Spanish and Portuguese, African and African Diaspora Studies, The University of Texas at AustinCarlos Vargas-Ramos, Professor of Political Science, City University of New YorkCharles R. Venator-Santiago, Associate Professor of Political Science and El Instituto, University of ConnecticutLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/460602015-08-13T14:52:07Z2015-08-13T14:52:07ZGibraltar’s contested waters: it’s time to settle this unedifying spat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/91798/original/image-20150813-21393-i4eqo0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Testing the boundaries of civility. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/defenceimages/8634313531/">UK Ministry of Defence</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Spain and the UK are at loggerheads once again over who owns the waters around the disputed territory of Gibraltar. Spanish boats have been spotted off the shore in an incident that has left British diplomats bristling.</p>
<p>The latest argument rests on whether the Spanish police’s drugs and money laundering squad broke the law by chasing a suspect into Gibraltarian waters. The British Foreign office made an official complaint on August 9 about maritime and aerial <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33842868">trespass</a>, while Spain of course insists it acted within its rights.</p>
<p>This is but the latest flare-up in a tiff between two apparently grown-up nations that now requires international intervention.</p>
<h2>The right of hot pursuit</h2>
<p>Coastal states do have the <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">undeniable right</a> to follow and arrest ships escaping their territory for the high seas if they are carrying and dumping narcotics.</p>
<p>In this specific case, the Spanish authorities could defend themselves by falling back on this doctrine of “<a href="http://www.law.washington.edu/Directory/docs/Allen/Publications/Article_1989_DoctrineOfHotPursuitpp309-341.PDF">hot pursuit</a>”. But the doctrine is subject to certain conditions that could make a claim tricky. In the first place, pursuit must be continuous and unbroken. This is to be sure that the true offender is apprehended.</p>
<p>Hot pursuit must also cease once the chased vessel enters into the maritime spaces of other sovereign nations. Spain could pursue the suspect vessels to the very ends of the earth in international waters but it ought to have stopped once they entered British or any other sovereign nation’s territorial water space – that is, within 12 nautical miles of <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=s6apAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR3&lpg=PR3&dq=gbenga+oduntan+sovereignty+jurisdiction+and&source=bl&ots=VR2hHLSoie&sig=ldIx6jjpaJOBdLFJLy-XqcYTDtk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBmoVChMIzv3XleujxwIVBo3bCh29cwCG">all sovereign coasts</a>.</p>
<p>The problem, however, is that there are significant issues of sovereignty, jurisdiction and control over Gibraltar, pitting Spain and the UK against each other. Spain contests the UK’s sovereignty over the entire Gibraltarian territory so rejects any suggestion that Gibraltar has a right to any territorial waters at all. As a result Spanish fishing vessels frequently enter the area. So what may appear to be a game of cat and mouse is in a sense actually a necessary dance in international relations.</p>
<p>The disputed territory is a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=wrJmCvFY6ocC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=war+of+spanish+succession&ots=27vQA-rIXo&sig=-wo2eyC0H8tmZL1zO4phgAivPF0">prize of war</a> that has been ruled by Britain since 1713. It continues to robustly resist Spanish attempts to undermine the validity of British jurisdiction in Gibraltar waters. In this high stakes game, prompt diplomatic protests and mild forms of gunboat diplomacy feature prominently.</p>
<p>Vigilance is key to the ultimate success of the claims of all parties involved. Hence within 48 hours of the last trespass allegations, the Spanish ambassador was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26856277">unceremoniously summoned</a> to the Foreign Office. In February 2015 a “formal protest” was issued after a Spanish warship entered British-controlled waters around Gibraltar and disrupted <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26262439">a Royal Navy training exercise</a>.</p>
<p>When the Gibraltar authorities dropped 74 concrete blocks into the disputed waters just off the island’s coast, ostensibly to create an artificial reef and encourage sea-life to flourish, Spain imposed stricter checks at their common border, causing long delays for people trying to get on and off.</p>
<p>Britain and Gibraltar cried foul, arguing that the checks were politically motivated, but the European Commission took the opposite view and ruled that the checks had not broken European law.</p>
<h2>Not the only hard place</h2>
<p>Ironically if Spain wants justice in this matter it must do justice over the other territories it holds dear but which apparently belonged to African nations as well. <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-border-disputes-are-set-to-rise-but-there-are-ways-to-stop-them-44264">Border shenanigans</a> take place in Africa on a relatively frequent basis. </p>
<p>Any lasting resolution to the Spanish and UK sovereignty dispute must take cognisance of another dispute between Spain and Morocco over <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=z7MBCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=gbenga+oduntan+international+boundaries&ots=JceLPierzU&sig=WcN7rvc6-HHkuUC-0BkKA3_gd64">Ceuta, Melilla, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands</a>.</p>
<p>The number of incidents, stand-offs and near military engagements in the Gibrlatar tiff is accelerating, making it ripe for <a href="http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/">intervention under the rules of the UN</a>. To save Europe from a shameful face-off between respectable nations, something ought to be done – and quickly. The imperatives are clear.</p>
<p>Genuine good faith negotiations (probably assisted by the European Union) should be started over the Gibraltar question with an aim to resolve it completely within an appropriate period.</p>
<p>Failing that, an <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/">international court</a> or <a href="http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/?p1=9">arbitral body</a> should be urgently seised of the matter.</p>
<p>A third option exists, but is too horrible to contemplate: the recourse to repeated gunboat diplomacy, skirmishes and <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/597746/russia-nato-war-michael-fallon-ukraine">armed conflict</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gbenga Oduntan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UK is angry at Spain for chasing boats into its territory. Enough already.Gbenga Oduntan, Senior Lecturer in International Commercial Law, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/417022015-05-14T05:50:55Z2015-05-14T05:50:55ZUS patrol in South China Sea may stop China’s mischief in disputed waters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81622/original/image-20150514-28648-7i3jbk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Filipino soldier patrols the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The US is considering sending aircrafts and warships to patrol the disputed area, which is claimed by China and four other Southeast Asian countries. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/RITCHIE B. TONGO / POOL</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States has announced that it is <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/13/us-usa-china-military-idUSKBN0NX2ON20150513">considering sending aircraft and warships</a> to patrol the South China Sea to challenge China’s move in building artificial islands fit for aircraft runways in the disputed waters.</p>
<p>The South China Sea, a historical global trade route believed to be rich in oil and gas, is bordered by the shores of countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia as well as China. </p>
<p>In 1948, China had claimed to own over 80% of the South China Sea, including no-man’s-land Spratly Islands and waters that are within the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. Under the Law of the Sea, countries can have exclusive economic rights over waters within 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. China’s one-sided claim of waters enclosed in what it calls the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nine-dotted_line">Nine-Dash-Line</a> has no international legal standing. </p>
<p>However, in recent years, China has become increasingly aggressive in its ownership claim to the Spratly Islands. Last year, it <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/us-china-vietnam-rig-idUSKBN0FL00Y20140716">towed a deep-sea oil rig</a> to 120 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast, causing tension between the two countries. This year, China is <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-building-airstrip-in-spratly-islands-satellite-images-show-1429188914">creating artificial</a> islands in waters claimed by the Philippines. </p>
<h2>Balancing power</h2>
<p>What would happen if the US sent its warships to the region? </p>
<p>Tension in the South China Sea will escalate intensely if the US sends vessels to patrol the area. The Philippines have also announced <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/12/uk-southchinasea-philippines-navy-idUKKBN0NX06I20150512">plans to build a naval base</a> opposite the disputed Spratly Islands. </p>
<p>However, these developments are inevitable in the face of China’s action. Had it not constructed artificial islands in the Spratlys and respected the 2002 Declaration of Conduct, the US may not have been considering sending its military to the area.</p>
<p>In 2002, 10 Southeast Asian countries that are grouped together in ASEAN, along with China, signed the <a href="http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea">Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</a> (DOC) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. They agreed that territorial and jurisdictional disputes shall be resolved by peaceful means, without using threat or force. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81624/original/image-20150514-28624-1w50pe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aerial view of China’s reclamation in the Spratly Islands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/RITCHIE B. TONGO / POOL</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By reclaiming land in the waters of the Spratly Islands, China breached the agreement – especially the point that parties should exercise self-restraint and not take actions that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability. </p>
<p>If the US decides to send its warships, it will help other nations counterbalance China’s military might in the area, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, smaller countries whose military power is weaker than China’s.</p>
<p>US patrols will also ensure freedom and security of navigation. Many international ships go through the Spratly Islands in transit. Some 40% of world trade goes through this route. If China occupies the islands, it can control this important trade route, allowing it to inspect international ships that pass. The US presence may prevent this from happening.</p>
<h2>Re-establishing US influence in Asia-Pacific</h2>
<p>Another reason for the US to be involved in the South China Sea dispute is to secure its influence over the region. America’s power has long been felt in Southeast Asia, especially since the Vietnam war and the fall of communism in Indonesia in 1965-1966. But with China’s economic and military rise, it has begun to challenge the US sphere of influence, especially in this region where it neighbours smaller and weaker countries. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=713&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=713&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/81621/original/image-20150514-28583-1031aly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=713&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Goran tek-en, Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In terms of economic influence, China is backing the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is seen as competition for the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. In 2013, China has invested around <a href="http://www.asean.org/images/2015/January/foreign_direct_investment_statistic/Table%2027.pdf">US$8.6 billion</a>. The US invested around US$3.7 billion and Australia around US$2 billion. </p>
<h2>US dependant?</h2>
<p>With America’s plan, will the region’s preference to be independent from foreign influence be compromised?</p>
<p>Not necessarily as long as the sending of warships and aircraft is temporary. China’s bullying of smaller ASEAN countries warrants urgent action to pressure it to behave. What is at stake is not only the interests of smaller ASEAN countries, but also international trade.</p>
<p>Indonesia, the largest country in ASEAN and a neutral player in the dispute as China does not claim Indonesia’s part of the South China Sea, could play a part in pushing for a peaceful resolution. </p>
<p>But it is not clear what role Indonesia and ASEAN as an organisation are taking in resolving the conflict. If Indonesia does not want ASEAN to be dependent on the US on this issue, it should take a more pro-active role.</p>
<p>As a middle power, Indonesia should push claimant countries to finalise the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>But this is not enough. As an agreement, the new Code of Conduct may end up like the 2002 Declaration of Conduct. Therefore, Indonesia should encourage all claimant countries to resolve disputes through the forum of an international court of arbitration such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). </p>
<p>Indonesia should also encourage the cessation of all construction and occupation activities on the disputed islands until the dispute is resolved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Faiz Aziz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US is considering naval patrols of disputed parts of the South China Sea in response to China’s creation of artificial islands. Other nations with claims may welcome a temporary US presence.Muhammad Faiz Aziz, Researcher, Indonesian Center for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213992014-01-14T13:59:10Z2014-01-14T13:59:10ZThe politics of getting online in countries that don’t exist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39043/original/r6gbcr4j-1389697820.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nargono-Karabakh. They've got landmarks but no domain name.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Blackwych</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What is the quickest route to international recognition? Aspiring states may try to ally themselves with a great power, lobby national governments, or even try to enlist the support of celebrities, which worked very well in the case of <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/15/george-clooney-obama-sudan-crisis_n_1349905.html">South Sudan</a>. But whatever strategy they choose, the internet has become one of the key arenas in their struggle for recognition.</p>
<p>Separatist movements would historically gain recognition as states if they had managed to gain effective control over the territory to which they laid claim. But this is not how the current international system works.</p>
<h2>Web presence</h2>
<p>The creation of new states is very rare indeed but self-proclaimed states are more common. Abkhazia (Georgia), Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Northern Cyprus (Cyprus), Somaliland (Somalia) and Transnistria (Moldova) have all managed to gain control over territory, often through warfare, and have established governments, parliaments, courts, health and education systems, and other characteristics we usually associate with states. Yet in spite of these successes, most have failed to gain widespread international recognition. Recognition is fundamentally a political decision and these territories therefore try to convince the international public, and their leaders, that they deserve it, and that recognition would serve strategic interests.</p>
<p>Much of this struggle is now being played out online. A big trend is for the de facto governments to create websites from which they espouse the virtue of their territories. On these sites, they tend to claim two things: that they already function as stable, effective entities and that they are democratic.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=206&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=206&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=206&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=259&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=259&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38883/original/v5tc6ww4-1389532683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=259&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Transnistrian ministry of foreign affairs website.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.mfa-pmr.org/en">Transnistria’s foreign ministry</a>, for example, presents the entity as independent and democratic and proceeds to list its many attributes of statehood, including “its own constitution, controlled territory, legislation, market economy, developed financial and tax systems, modern communications infrastructure, army, militia, security service, national flag, coat-of-arms, and anthem”.</p>
<p><a href="http://somalilandgov.com/">Somaliland’s government</a>, which presents itself as “democratic and visionary”, similarly lists Somaliland’s attributes of statehood as a key argument for its recognition and the government points out that there is growing global support for its independence.</p>
<h2>Counter attack</h2>
<p>Their arguments are vehemently opposed by the states to which these territories legally still belong. Countries such as Georgia and Azerbaijan also make frequent use of the internet to counter these messages, and instead describe these entities as illegal breakaway territories founded on ethnic cleansing, controlled by unscrupulous leaders, and dominated by organised crime.</p>
<p>The strategies used by the unrecognised territories can therefore be described as “competitive democratization” or “competitive state-building”. They are trying to convince the world that they are more democratic and more stable than their parent states. Since most of these entities emerged from violent conflicts, they are also keen to demonstrate their peaceful intentions.</p>
<p>The foreign ministry of Nagorno Karabakh for example argues that recognition would promote “stability and long-lasting peace in the region”. In essence, these states are arguing they are the good guys and deserve recognition. That recognition is presented as a pragmatic solution that will lead to more peaceful outcomes.</p>
<h2>Another purpose</h2>
<p>So far, this quest for recognition – whether online or offline – has not been successful. Although the Somaliland government maintains on its website that recognition is its “number one priority”, these websites also serve a different purpose.</p>
<p>Territories hoping for independence present themselves as already functioning states in the hope that they can gain access to the international system and that other states will trade with them, investors will spend their money there and tourists will visit. This would all make survival easier, and more pleasant, even without international recognition.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/39038/original/p8p287j4-1389696252.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nagorno Karabakh. Not on all maps.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Somaliland government website argues that the territory has “one of the most thriving economics in Africa” and the Transnistrian counterpart also highlights the many economic opportunities it can offer and a detailed powerpoint presentation for potential investors. Over in Nagorno Karabakh, several websites try to sell the entity to investors with posts such as <a href="http://www.nkrusa.org/business_economy/ten_reasons.shtml">10 Reasons to Invest</a> and aim to raise money from the Armenian diaspora.</p>
<h2>Domain name game</h2>
<p>Fighting for independence digitally is an innovative approach in what is, for many, a longstanding struggle. But these digital strategies are hampered by a significant problem. A lack of legal recognition offline prevents their progress towards what might be seen as the most important step for online progress – getting a top level domain name. Where the UK uses .co.uk or France uses .fr, there is as yet no equivalent for these entities. Nagorno Karabakh usually borrows Armenia’s, Somaliland uses .com and Transnistria uses .org.</p>
<p>Then there are other, more subtle barriers. Drop-down menus that ask you which country you are in on sites such as Skype and Amazon to do not include these territories and they do not feature on Google maps or similar sources. They are, in many ways, places that don’t exist and although the <em>de facto</em> authorities try to counter this with their own websites, their resources are limited and certainly no match for internet giants like Google and Amazonn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Caspersen receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>What is the quickest route to international recognition? Aspiring states may try to ally themselves with a great power, lobby national governments, or even try to enlist the support of celebrities, which…Nina Caspersen, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.