tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/dual-use-research-35407/articlesDual use research – The Conversation2017-04-11T01:52:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/759862017-04-11T01:52:07Z2017-04-11T01:52:07ZEnzymes versus nerve agents: Designing antidotes for chemical weapons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164543/original/image-20170408-7394-159yw03.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=134%2C0%2C1547%2C871&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Enzymes, the catalysts of biology, can engulf and break down hundreds of nerve agent molecules per second.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Image: Pymol. PDB 4E3T rcsb.org</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A chemical weapons attack that killed <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39500947">more than 80 people</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.html">including children</a>, triggered the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/middleeast/syria-attack-trump.html?_r=0">recent missile strikes</a> against the Syrian government. The use of illegal nerve agents – apparently by the Assad regime – violated <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule74">international law</a>; President Trump said he was <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/06/statement-president-trump-syria">moved to act by images</a> of the victims’ horrible deaths.</p>
<p>But there’s another path to mitigate the danger of chemical weapons. This route lies within the domains of science – the very same science that produced chemical weapons in the first place. Researchers in the U.S. and around the world, including here at the University of Washington’s <a href="http://www.ipd.uw.edu">Institute for Protein Design</a>, are developing the tools needed to quickly and safely destroy nerve agents – both in storage facilities and in the human body.</p>
<p>Nerve agents, a class of synthetic phosphorous-containing compounds, are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jat/28.5.372">among the most toxic substances known</a>. Brief exposure to the most potent variants can lead to death within minutes. Once nerve agents enter the body, they irreversibly inhibit a vitally important enzyme called acetylcholinesterase. Its normal job within the nervous system is to help brain and muscle communicate. When a nerve agent shuts down this enzyme, classes of neurons throughout the central and peripheral nervous systems quickly get overstimulated, leading to <a href="https://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/types-of-chemical-agent/nerve-agents/#c4118">profuse sweating, convulsions and an excruciating death by asphyxiation</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164556/original/image-20170408-29390-75dm34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">U.S. Marine Corps specialists performing decontamination procedures.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U.S._Marine_Corps_chemical,_biological,_radiological_and_nuclear_(CBRN)_defense_specialists_with_Marine_Wing_Headquarters_Squadron_(MWHS)_3,_3rd_Marine_Aircraft_Wing,_perform_decontamination_procedures_during_130430-M-EF955-271.jpg">Sgt. Keonaona Paulo</a></span>
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<p>Chemical weapons are often associated with wars of the previous century – mustard gas in WWI, Zyklon B in WWII. But the worst variety, nerve agents, were <a href="http://cen.acs.org/articles/94/i41/Nazi-origins-deadly-nerve-gases.html">never deployed in the world wars</a>, though Nazi scientists developed the first generation of these compounds. Gerhard Schrader, the so-called <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2710.2008.00972.x/full">father of nerve agents</a>, didn’t begin life as a Nazi scientist – he was developing new pesticides to combat world hunger when he accidentally synthesized the first organophosphorus nerve agent. Later, he led the research team that produced sarin, or GB, the most toxic of the all the so-called G-series nerve agents. The U.S. government stated with <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/06/press-briefing-secretary-state-rex-tillerson-and-national-security">“very high confidence” that sarin was used</a> in the recent attack near Idlib, Syria.</p>
<p>Beginning in 2013, teams from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons went to Syria and, with help from the Danish, Norwegian, Russian, Chinese and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/602835">U.S. government</a>, <a href="https://www.opcw.org/news/article/destruction-of-syrian-chemical-weapons-completed/">destroyed all declared stockpiles</a> of Syrian chemical weapons. It seems that either not all of Assad’s stockpiles were in fact <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/world/middleeast/werent-syrias-chemical-weapons-destroyed-its-complicated.html?_r=0">declared and destroyed, or that new nerve agents arrived</a> in Syria – either via the black market or chemical synthesis – in the intervening years. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164553/original/image-20170408-7394-1opyv30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Empty sarin containers at Pine Bluff Arsenal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Empty_sarin_containers_at_Pine_Bluff_Arsenal.jpg">U.S. Army</a></span>
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<h2>Clearing chemical weapons</h2>
<p>Twenty-first-century chemists, biochemists and computer scientists are working right now to sap chemical weapons of their horrifying power by designing counter agents that safely and efficiently destroy them. </p>
<p>Sarin sitting in a container – as opposed to in a human body – is relatively easy to destroy. The simplest method is to add a soluble base and heat the mixture to near-boiling temperatures. After several hours, the vast majority – more than 99.9 percent – of the deadly compound can be broken apart by a process called hydrolysis. This is how <a href="https://www.hdiac.org/node/1936">trained specialists</a> dispose of chemical weapons like sarin. </p>
<p>Nerve agents that make their way inside the body are a different story. For starters, you clearly cannot add a near-boiling base to a person. And because nerve agents kill so quickly, any treatment that takes hours to work is a nonstarter.</p>
<p>There are chemical interventions for warding off death after exposure to certain chemical weapons. Unfortunately, these interventions are costly, difficult to dose properly and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7843.2011.00678.x">are themselves quite toxic</a>. The chemical antidotes pralidoxime and the cheaper atropine <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-syria-gas-attack-assad-sarin-chlorine-edit-0405-jm-20170404-story.html">were deployed</a> after recent attacks in Syria, but <a href="http://time.com/4727073/idlib-chemical-attack-sarin-gas-pralidoxime/">doctors in the area worry</a> their dwindling supplies offer little protection against possible future attacks. </p>
<p>For a medical intervention to work after nerve gas exposure, it has to work fast. If a first responder administers a sarin-destroying molecule, each therapeutic molecule must be capable of breaking down through hydrolysis <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.3109/10242429709003196">hundreds of nerve agent molecules per second</a>, one after another. </p>
<p>Enzymes, the genetically encoded catalysts of biology, are up for such a task. Famous enzymes include lactase, which breaks down milk sugars in those who are lactose tolerant. Another known as RuBisCO is vital to the process of carbon fixation in plants. The most efficient enzymes in your body can perform <a href="http://www.vivo.colostate.edu/hbooks/molecules/carbonic_anhydrase.html">a million reactions per second</a>, and do so under chemically mild conditions. </p>
<p>Aside from their astonishing speed, enzymes often display an equally impressive selectivity. That is, they react with only a small number of structurally similar compounds and leave all other compounds alone. Selectivity is useful in the context of the chemical soup that is the cell but problematic when it comes to xenobiotics: those compounds which are foreign to one’s biology. Man-made organophosphates such as sarin are xenobiotics. There are no enzymes that hydrolyze them well – or so we thought.</p>
<p>When farmers spray pesticides, much of it ends up on the ground. Soil bacteria living nearby are challenged by high doses of these potent foreign chemicals. It turns out that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-4571.2010.00175.x">efficient detoxifying enzymes have recently evolved</a> inside some of these microbes as a result.</p>
<p>Scientists have identified and isolated a small number of these enzymes and tested them on a range of nasty compounds, including nerve agents, which are structurally similar to some pesticides. A select few did indeed show hydrolytic activity.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164558/original/image-20170408-29399-hwdml4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Scientists are using computers to design a new generation of proteins to solve 21st-century problems.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UW Institute for Protein Design</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<h2>Improving on the discovery</h2>
<p>Researchers have taken these naturally occurring enzymes as raw material. Then, using <a href="http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/cb4004892">computer modeling and controlled evolution in the lab</a>, we’ve bolstered the efficiency of the originally found anti-nerve agent enzymes. Enzymes that initially showed only modest activity have been turned into potential therapeutics against VX – a chemical cousin of sarin and the most toxic nerve agent of all.</p>
<p>In a proof-of-concept study conducted jointly by researchers in Germany and Israel in late 2014, guinea pigs under anesthesia were exposed to lethal doses of VX, followed by optimized VX-destroying proteins. Low doses of the protein drug, even after a 15-minute delay, resulted in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.toxlet.2014.09.003">survival of all animals</a> and only moderate toxicity.</p>
<p>Despite these promising advances, no enzyme yet exists which is efficient enough for lifesaving use in people. Scientists are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nchembio.777">refining these microscopic machines</a>, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nature19946">new paradigms in computer-aided protein engineering</a> are unlocking the door to this and other applications of biomolecular design. We may be only a few years away from developing the kind of therapeutics that would make chemical weapons a worry of the past. </p>
<p>As the world grieves over the latest attacks in Syria, it is worth keeping in mind the awesome and often complex power of science. In trying to combat hunger, one might accidentally invent liquid death. In studying soil microbes, one might discover a tool to prevent atrocities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75986/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Haydon works at the Institute for Protein Design and receives funding from the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p>Scientists invented chemical weapons; some are now working to destroy them. New biomolecular design techniques let researchers design proteins that can destroy nerve agents in bodies.Ian Haydon, Doctoral Student in Biochemistry, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/703332017-02-03T02:09:53Z2017-02-03T02:09:53ZDefining dual-use research: When scientific advances can both help and hurt humanity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154798/original/image-20170130-7649-4r4cfp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It's not always obvious where a new technology will end up.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nihgov/28603360673/in/dateposted/">NIH Image Gallery</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Scientific research can change our lives for the better, but it also presents risks – either through deliberate misuse or accident. Think about studying deadly pathogens; that’s how we can learn how to successfully ward them off, but it can be a safety issue too, as when CDC <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/news-multimedia/lab-incident/">workers were exposed to anthrax</a> in 2014 after an incomplete laboratory procedure left spores of the bacterium alive. </p>
<p>For the last decade, scholars, scientists and government officials have worked to figure out regulations that would maximize the benefits of the life sciences while avoiding unnecessary risks. “Dual-use research” that has the capacity to be used to help or harm humanity is a big part of that debate. As a reflection of how pressing this question is, on Jan. 4, the U.S. National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine <a href="http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/stl/durc/index.htm">met to discuss</a> how or if sensitive information arising in the life sciences should be controlled to prevent its misuse. </p>
<p>For the new Trump administration, one major challenge will be how to maintain national security in the face of technological change. Part of that discussion hinges on understanding the concept of dual use. There are three different dichotomies that could be at play when officials, scholars and scientists refer to dual use – and each uniquely influences the discussion around discovery and control. </p>
<h2>For war or for peace</h2>
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<span class="caption">WWI infantry wore respirators to protect against mustard gas, a chemical weapon that can be made from common solvents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Australian_infantry_small_box_respirators_Ypres_1917.jpg">Captain Frank Hurley</a></span>
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<p>The first meaning of dual use describes technologies that can have <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(97)00023-1">both military and civilian uses</a>. For example, technologies useful in industry or agriculture can also be used to create chemical weapons. In civilian life, a chemical called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thiodiglycol">thiodiglycol</a> is a common solvent, occasionally used in cosmetics and microscopy. Yet the same chemical is used in the creation of mustard gas, which decimated infantry in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31042472">World War I</a>.</p>
<p>This distinction is one of the clearest to be made about a particular technology or breakthrough. Often when governments recognize something has both civilian and military uses, they’ll attempt to control how, and with whom, the technology is shared. For instance, the <a href="http://www.australiagroup.net/en/">Australia Group</a> is a collection of 42 nations that together agree to control the export of certain materials to countries which might use them to create chemical weapons.</p>
<p>Technologies can also be dual use because there are benefits that were secondary to their development. An obvious example is the internet: The packet switching that underlies the internet was originally created as a means to <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P1995.pdf">communicate between military installations in the event of nuclear war</a>. It has since been released into the civilian domain, allowing you to read this article. </p>
<p>This distinction between military and civilian uses doesn’t always mirror a distinction between good and bad uses. Some military uses, such as those that underpinned the internet, are good. And some civilian uses can be bad: Recent controversies over the <a href="https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-2013/will_the_growing_militarization_of_our_police_doom_community_policing.asp">militarization of police</a> through the spread of technologies and tactics meant for war into the civilian sphere demonstrate how proliferation in the other direction can be controversial.</p>
<p>Dual use in this sense is about control. Both military and civilian uses could be valuable, as long as a country can maintain authority over its technologies. Because both uses can be valuable, dual use can also be used to justify expenditures, by providing incentives to governments to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(97)00023-1">invest in technology that has multiple applications</a>.</p>
<h2>For good or for evil</h2>
<p>In the January meeting at the NAS, however, the key distinction was between beneficent and malevolent uses. Today this is the most common way to think about dual-use science and technology.</p>
<p>Dual use, in this sense, is a distinctly ethical concept. It is, at its core, about what kinds of uses are considered legitimate or valuable, and what kinds are destructive. For example, some research on viruses allows us to better understand potential pandemic-causing pathogens. The work potentially opens the door to possible countermeasures and helps public health officials in terms of preparedness. There is, however, the risk that the <a href="http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/Gain_of_Function_Research_Ethical_Analysis.pdf">same research could, through an act of terror or a lab accident</a>, cause harm.</p>
<p>As of 2007, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity provides advice on regulating “<a href="http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/resources/Framework%20for%20transmittal%20duplex%209-10-07.pdf">dual-use research of concern</a>.” This is any life sciences research that could be misapplied to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment or materiel. </p>
<p>The challenging ethical question is finding an acceptable trade-off between the benefits created by legitimate uses of dual-use research and the potential harms of misuse.</p>
<p>The recent NAS meeting discussed the spread of dual-use research’s findings and methods, and who, if anyone, should be responsible for controlling its dispersal. Options that were considered included:</p>
<ul>
<li>subjecting biology research to security classifications, even in part;</li>
<li>relying on scientists to responsibly control their own communications;</li>
<li>export controls, of the type used by the Australia Group with its concerns about military/civilian dual-use of chemicals.</li>
</ul>
<p>Participants reached no firm conclusions, and it will be an ongoing challenge for the Trump administration to tackle these continuing issues.</p>
<p>The other side of the equation, whether we should do some dual-use research in the first place, has also been considered. On Jan. 9, the outgoing Obama administration released <a href="https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Pages/GainOfFunction.aspx">its final guidance for “gain-of-function research”</a> that may result in the creation of novel, virulent strains of infectious diseases – which may also be dual use. They recommended, among other things, that in order to proceed, the experiments at issue must be the only way to answer a particular scientific question, and must produce greater benefits than they do risks. The devil, of course, is in the details, and each government agency that conducts life sciences research will have decide how best to implement the guidance. </p>
<h2>For offense or for defense</h2>
<p>There’s a third, little discussed meaning of “dual use” that distinguishes between offensive and defensive uses of biotechnology. A classic example of this kind of dual use is “<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker">Project Clear Vision</a>.” From 1997 to 2000, American researchers set out to recreate Soviet bomblets used to disperse biological weapons. This kind of research treads the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2990/1471-5457(2005)24%5B32:USBILA%5D2.0.CO;2">delicate area between a defensive project</a> – the U.S. maintains Project Clear Vision’s goal was to protect Americans against an attack – and an offensive project that might violate the Biological Weapons Convention. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154806/original/image-20170130-7653-puuf5l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Even an assault rifle might be dual use.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:An_Afghan_Local_Police_recruit_fires_an_AK-47_rifle_during_a_weapons_class_in_the_Latif_district,_Ghazni_province,_Afghanistan,_April_1,_2012_120401-N-FV144-121.jpg">MC1 David Frech</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What is offensive and what is defensive is to some degree in the eye of the beholder. The Kalashnikov submachine gun was designed in 1947 to defend Russia, but has since become the weapon of choice in conflicts the world over – <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-13/ak-47-rifle-inventor-mikhail-kalashnikov-regrets-creating-weapon/5198396">to the point that its creator expressed regret for his invention</a>. Regardless of intent, the question of how the weapon is used in these conflicts, offensively or defensively, will vary depending on which end of the barrel one is on. </p>
<h2>Regulating science</h2>
<p>When scientists and policy experts wrangle over how to deal with dual-use technologies, they tend to focus on the division between applications for good or evil. This is important: We don’t necessarily want to hinder science without valid reason, because it provides substantial benefits to human health and welfare. </p>
<p>However, there are fears that the lens of dual use could stifle progress by driving scientists away from potentially controversial research: Proponents of gain of function have argued that graduate students or postdoctoral fellows <a href="http://doi.org/10.1128/mBio.02525-14">could choose other research areas</a> in order to avoid the policy debate. To date, however, the total number of American studies put on hold – as a result of safety concerns, much less dual-use concerns – <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf5753">was initially 18</a>, with all of these being permitted to resume with the implementation of the policies set out on Jan. 9 by the White House. As a proportion of scientific research, this is vanishingly small.</p>
<p>Arguably, in a society that views science as an essential part of national security, dual-use research is almost certain to appear. This is definitely the case in the U.S., where the work of neuroscientists, increasingly, <a href="http://thebulletin.org/when-neuroscience-leads-neuroweapons9962">is funded by the national military</a>, or the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4685481/">economic competitiveness that emerges from biotech</a> is considered a national security priority.</p>
<p>Making decisions about the security implications of science and technology can be complicated. That’s why scientists and policymakers need clarity on the dual-use distinction to help consider our options.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas G. Evans receives funding from the Greenwall Foundation to study the dual-use implications of cognitive neuroscience.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aerin Commins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scientific breakthrough in a vacuum may be free of ethical implications. But many developments can be used for good or evil, or both. There’s a fine balance on what to control and to what extent.Nicholas G. Evans, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, UMass LowellAerin Commins, Ph.D. Student, Global Studies Program, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/690972016-12-01T01:55:26Z2016-12-01T01:55:26ZNeuroscience hasn’t been weaponized – it’s been a tool of war from the start<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148172/original/image-20161130-17791-94aqza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A discipline neither good nor evil.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turning_the_Mind_Inside_Out_Saturday_Evening_Post_24_May_1941_a_detail_1.jpg">Saturday Evening Post/Harris A. Ewing</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>What could once only be imagined in science fiction is now increasingly coming to fruition: <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/drones-brain-thoughts-controlled-bci-brain-computer-interface-brain-controlled-interface-a6996781.html">Drones can be flown by human brains’ thoughts</a>. Pharmaceuticals can <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/08/changing-memories-to-treat-ptsd/379223/">help soldiers forget traumatic experiences</a> or produce feelings of trust to encourage <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/05/15/oxytocin-the-trust-hormone-could-become-new-interrogation-tool">confession in interrogation</a>. DARPA-funded research is working on everything from <a href="http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2015-01-19">implanting brain chips</a> to “<a href="https://swarmlab.eecs.berkeley.edu/projects/4887/neural-dust-ultrasonic-low-power-solution-chronic-brain-machine-interfaces">neural dust</a>” in an effort to alleviate the effects of traumatic experience in war. Invisible microwave beams produced by military contractors and <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/dont-let-militarys-deadly-pain-ray-machine-invade-la-county-jail">tested on U.S. prisoners</a> can produce the sensation of burning at a distance.</p>
<p>What all these techniques and technologies have in common is that they’re recent neuroscientific breakthroughs propelled by military research within a broader context of rapid neuroscientific development, driven by massive government-funded projects in both <a href="https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/">America</a> and the <a href="https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/">European Union</a>. Even while much about the brain <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/science/learning-how-little-we-know-about-the-brain.html">remains mysterious</a>, this research has contributed to the rapid and startling development of neuroscientific technology.</p>
<p>And while we might marvel at these developments, it is also undeniably true that this state of affairs raises significant ethical questions. What is the proper role – if any – of neuroscience in national defense or war efforts? <a href="https://newark-rutgers.academia.edu/AlisonHowell">My research</a> addresses these questions in the broader context of looking at how international relations, and specifically warfare, are shaped by scientific and medical expertise and technology.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_FqcbFHFisQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An Air Force video about military research on the human brain.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Weaponization of a peaceable science?</h2>
<p>To understand the relationship between science and war, academic <a href="http://blpress.org/books/mind-wars/">bioethicists</a>, <a href="https://www.wired.com/2012/02/neuroscience-war/">journalists</a> and <a href="https://royalsociety.org/%7E/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brain-waves/2012-02-06-BW3.pdf">policy advisors</a> alike typically rely on the framework of “dual use.” Starting from the assumption that the purpose of science is to improve human life, this perspective nevertheless admits that many technologies used in peacetime or to help enhance human capacities can also be harnessed to a second use: harming and degrading human capacities as part of a military arsenal. This framework calls attention to the potential misappropriation of sciences and technologies. By acknowledging potential misuses, it aims to help guide policy to limit such possibilities through practical tools such as weapons conventions.</p>
<p>Key to this framework is the concept of “weaponization.” The dual use idea assumes that we should be concerned with how a once “peaceful” science or technology came to be developed and used in war or national security applications. This process is termed the “<a href="http://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_144">weaponization of neuroscience</a>.” </p>
<p>The dual use framework and the weaponization concept may offer some immediate potential practical utility. But, <a href="http://doi.org/10.1177/0305829816672930">as I have written more extensively elsewhere</a>, they’re based on a massively misguided notion both of the history of neuroscience and of what is at stake practically and politically.</p>
<h2>Neuroscience’s roots are both civilian and military</h2>
<p>The dual use framework and weaponization concept assume stark war/peace and military/civilian divides. But in fact, the discipline of neuroscience grew equally and simultaneously out of institutions we typically consider civilian and military.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148175/original/image-20161130-17786-1hbjf91.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research building, site of much early neuroscience work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/medicalmuseum/4424656595">National Museum of Health and Medicine</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p><a href="http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.343">Modern neuroscience</a> was established in the post-WWII period. Like many disciplines developed and funded in that era (such as <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674736825">physics</a>, <a href="http://www.randomhousebooks.com/books/188642/">nuclear medicine</a> and others), the discipline was established through military funding in both “civilian” institutions such as MIT and Harvard and military research institutes such as the <a href="http://wrair-www.army.mil/">Walter Reed Army Institute of Research</a>. That Institute’s Department of Neuropsychiatry <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1985/09/13/psychiatrist-david-rioch-dies-at-85/98593033-39cf-47b5-af14-2d25013b73c9/">originated the idea</a> that researchers should study brain anatomy and physiology at the same time as psychology or psychiatry. Neuroscience was <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001289">funded</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rM6NERF5wP8">shaped</a> to meet the needs of warfare and national security imperatives.</p>
<p>This state of affairs was nothing new: Modern warfare and medical and scientific innovation have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000369">long been symbiotic</a>, including the “invention” of <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/awp339">American clinical neurology</a> through the American Civil War. It’s not possible to say that neuroscience has been “weaponized,” because this presumes a naturally peaceful and nonmilitary origin story that is simply historically inaccurate.</p>
<h2>Simultaneously used for good and ill</h2>
<p>Also, the dual use framework and the concept of weaponization assume a distinct divide between help and harm. People using these concepts are primarily concerned with harmful applications of neuroscience – those that degrade human capacities. Without a doubt, these are of deep concern. Few would deny that we should pay close attention, for instance, to the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20067384">use of neuropharmaceuticals</a> to degrade the combat capabilities of enemies or produce interrogation susceptibility, or related developments.</p>
<p>But the stark divide between help and harm elides the fact that many technologies can do both simultaneously.</p>
<p>One example is the current DARPA-funded development of brain-machine interfaces. These technologies seek to connect the brain directly to machine technologies in order to control them remotely. Of course this may be a boon for veterans and soldiers in need of <a href="http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2013-05-30">better prosthetic devices</a>. But these are the very same technologies (and sometimes the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2015/03/03/a-paralyzed-woman-flew-a-f-35-fighter-jet-in-a-simulator-using-only-her-mind/">same experimental subjects</a>) that are being used to pilot drones for potential use in warfare.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148142/original/image-20161130-17047-1sm1a8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">‘Virtual Iraq’ exposure therapy can help veterans – and prepare them to return to the battlefield.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://archive.defense.gov/homepagephotos/leadphotoimage.aspx?id=10463">Defense Dept. photo by John J. Kruzel</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>By way of a second example, consider military medical and rehabilitative practices. These are assumed to be on the “help” rather than “harm” side of the split. Think, for instance, of <a href="http://doi.org/10.1177/0304375412450842">increasing diagnosis of (mild) traumatic brain injuries in military settings</a>. Treatment of these injuries may do great good in the clinical setting for individuals who receive this care. But these therapies are also part of a system of military medicine aimed at producing war readiness and potential redeployment of soldiers. The good health of soldiers (help) is integral to warfare (harm), suggesting that the help/harm divide is not so stark as the dual use framework assumes.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, it’s not possible to say that neuroscience has been “<a href="http://thebulletin.org/militarization-neuroscience">militarized</a>” or “weaponized.” The dual use framework ignores how embedded neuroscience has always been with war and national defense. In doing so, it leads us to underestimate the political task at hand, both in relation to war and in relation to science. On the side of war, it elides the ethical questions we need to be asking, not only about weaponization, but also about the supposedly benign practices of diagnosis, cure and enhancement. On the side of science, it obscures questions about what research gets funded and praised, and about the opportunity costs of allowing military imperatives to drive scientific inquiry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alison Howell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Maybe you think neuroscience has a peaceable history of benign efforts to improve lives and enhance human capacities. But its origins and development tell a different story – with ethical implications.Alison Howell, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.