tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/fertility-rate-21630/articlesfertility rate – The Conversation2023-12-21T19:07:56Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199682023-12-21T19:07:56Z2023-12-21T19:07:56ZWhy Taiwan’s falling birth rate has become a national security issue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566794/original/file-20231220-25-ds88ao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Christmas is coming to Taipei and the city is at least partially decked out for the season. In Muzha, on the city’s outskirts, the Catholic church has set up a nativity scene. There is as yet no baby in the manger and the scene looks rather forlorn. That’s somehow appropriate for Taiwan, where there is a dearth of actual babies in cradles. </p>
<p>Over the road from the church are two pet-grooming shops, testimony to the changing composition of Taiwanese households. There are more registered <a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4820340"> cats and dogs</a> in Taiwan than there are <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1305485/taiwan-population-distribution-by-one-year-age-group/">children under ten</a>. As the country heads towards its eighth presidential election, to be held on January 13 2024, it is hitting a <a href="https://tw.stock.yahoo.com/news/%25E7%25A4%25BE%25E6%259C%2583-%25E9%2580%25A335%25E6%259C%2588%25E7%2594%259F%25E4%25B8%258D%25E5%25A6%2582%25E6%25AD%25BB-%25E5%2585%25A8%25E5%25B9%25B4%25E6%2596%25B0%25E7%2594%259F%25E5%2585%2592%25E6%2595%25B8%25E6%2581%2590%25E7%25BA%258C%25E5%2589%25B5%25E4%25BD%258E-085300154.html">new low in births per year</a>.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s fertility rate is one of many things on the minds of the three presidential candidates: front-runner Vice President Lai Ching-te, the candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); close rival Hou Yu-ih, running for the once all-powerful KMT; and Ko Wen-je, candidate for Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), the latest of a series of minor parties to make a splash in the country’s lively electoral landscape.</p>
<p>Ko is a populist who offers disaffected youth an alternative to the two large parties. He effectively politicised the fertility rate when he called a press conference on November 7 specifically to discuss <a href="https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4482466">responses to the declining birth rate</a>. </p>
<p>Apart from announcing his own ten-point plan, notable for its novel pregnancy bonus, he took the opportunity to wax sarcastic about Hou’s planned third-child bonus and to <a href="https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4482562">attack</a> Lai’s record on related policies.</p>
<p><a href="https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4482562">In response</a>, Lai’s team drew attention to Ko’s long history of misogynistic statements such as “unmarried women are like disabled parking spaces” and “[unmarried women] are causing instability and a national security crisis”.</p>
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<p>In fact, all candidates take the problem of the falling birth rate seriously. For three years now, deaths have exceeded births in Taiwan. Only immigration is preventing a real decline in population. </p>
<p>The policies the candidates offer vary more in detail than in substance: the particular amounts of money differ, as do the circumstances under which the money is paid. But in the end, their policies all amount to throwing money at the problem.</p>
<h2>A long-term problem in Taiwan</h2>
<p>The fertility crisis has long been a matter of concern in Taiwan. In a perfect illustration of “be careful of what you wish for”, early population planning targets set by the then-dominant KMT were met and then exceeded in the 1980s. The fertility rate dropped below replacement level in 1983 and has never recovered. </p>
<p>It was identified as an issue of national security in Taiwan’s first national security report, issued in 2006. Since then the issue has been consistently in the news, local and international. <a href="https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=6590&pid=85529">It is associated</a> with several negative economic and social indicators: the gradual increase in the burden of the national debt on each individual; the weakening of domestic demand; the reduced supply of labour; the problem of aged care in a <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/08/23/2003783991">super-aged society</a>. </p>
<p>For all these reasons, politicians take the problem seriously. Nonetheless, the fertility rate is a slow burner in Taiwanese politics – it lacks the immediacy of cross-strait relations, widely held to be the main issue in the current political contest. </p>
<p>But there is a meeting point between the two issues. Already many fewer young men are available for military service in Taiwan than there were a decade ago. The air force in particular is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-04/taiwan-faces-urgent-fighter-pilot-shortage-as-xi-tests-defenses">low on trained personnel</a> and its fighter pilots are exhausted from the constant need to respond to Chinese jets crossing into Taiwanese air space.</p>
<p>This problem is only to some degree balanced by a parallel problem in China, where the fertility rate (<a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/total-fertility-rate/country-comparison/">1.45 in 2022</a>) is also in precipitate decline.</p>
<p>On neither side of the Taiwan Strait does anyone have good ideas about how to reverse the fall. Candidates for the election in Taiwan all promise potential parents enhanced financial support while no doubt fully aware of the <a href="https://ifstudies.org/blog/pro-natal-policies-work-but-they-come-with-a-hefty-price-tag">limited effects</a> of such measures on fertility choices. </p>
<p>In China, President Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Xi-Jinping-blames-women-for-population-decline,-but-the-reasons-are-many-59482.html">advice to women</a> that they should “play their role in carrying forward the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation” seems even less likely to yield results.</p>
<h2>So why are so few people having babies?</h2>
<p>Young women in Taiwan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct4n4m">tend to explain</a> their preference for pets over babies in terms of financial pressures, particularly the cost of housing. Housing is recognised as a serious problem in Taiwan and all contenders for the presidency are promising to help with housing for couples with children. </p>
<p>But in a society where having children is normatively associated with marriage, being married is generally a prerequisite for enjoying even existing benefits. The fertility rate for married couples in Taiwan is reasonably high, two children being standard. The key question appears not to be why don’t women have children? The question is why don’t women get married?</p>
<p>In Taiwan, as in much of East Asia, marriage avoidance has become a marked phenomenon. In 2021, a mere 50% of young Taiwanese between the ages of 25 and 34 <a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4851000">were married</a>. </p>
<p>Of the unmarried group, 70% of the men wanted to get married at some future date. A majority of the unmarried women had no such intention. Similarly, many more unmarried men (61.22%) than unmarried women (42.98%) wanted eventually to have children. </p>
<p>Since housing and raising children are costs for men as well as for women, there is presumably something more to the falling birth rate than simply the financial pressure.</p>
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<p>Analysing the uniformly low and falling birth rates across East Asia, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27041932">Yen-hsin Alice Cheng</a> argues the problem is grounded in the Confucian cultural bedrock of the region. Family and society are rigidly patriarchal. Workplace organisation and wider societal structures are unfavourable to women. </p>
<p>Historical sex ratios at birth reflect, to varying degrees, a default preference for sons, Japan offering the only exception. Government initiatives frequently land on infertile ground, a phenomenon most notable in South Korea where only a small minority of women and a tiny percentage of men have taken advantage of extremely generous parental leave schemes aimed at arresting the declining birth rate.</p>
<p>In this East Asian mix, Taiwan has a more progressive society than China and a less rigid patriarchy than South Korea. It has high numbers of women participating in politics. Voter turnout among women is large, and the current president is a woman: the redoubtable Tsai Ing-wen. Women in <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202302020013">leadership at local level</a> – the all-important position of mayor – outnumber men. The sex ratio at birth has been skewed in recent history but now seems to have settled into a “within normal” range.</p>
<p>Given the relative advantages women enjoy in Taiwan, especially relative to South Korea, it is worth pondering the possible variables for its particularly low birth rate. In a comparative study of mental health in Ukraine, Poland and Taiwan during the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian war, researchers found post-traumatic stress effects among Taiwan respondents were only slightly lower than in Ukraine, with female gender a significant risk factor. Vicarious experience of the war, predicated on the anticipation of conflict in their own country, appears to have prompted a high degree of anxiety in Taiwan.</p>
<p>This finding raises the question of whether, in addition to other social forces informing their life choices, Taiwanese live with an undercurrent of concern about the future of their country. If so, the crisis of national security constituted by the declining birthrate would seem to be part of a vicious cycle, where a lack of security in geopolitical terms is informing decisions about whether or not to marry and have children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219968/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Antonia Finnane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young Taiwanese women in particular seem reluctant to have babies these days – and there may be quite a few reasons for that.Antonia Finnane, Professor (honorary), The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094202023-07-11T16:37:32Z2023-07-11T16:37:32ZDRC has one of the fastest growing populations in the world – why this isn’t good news<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536580/original/file-20230710-16123-co1r02.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The demographic profile of a country matters because it sets its development pace – it creates opportunities and presents risks. For many developing countries, the challenge is to manage a demographic profile that puts pressure on particular cohorts of people. One country that needs to manage this challenge is the Democratic Republic of Congo. Jacques Emina, who has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jacques-Emina">studied demography</a> in the country for the last two decades, unpacks the numbers.</em> </p>
<h2>What are the DRC’s demographic challenges? What’s driving them?</h2>
<p>With <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/population">102 million</a> people in 2023, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-in-africa">fourth most populous country in Africa</a> after Nigeria, Ethiopia and Egypt. It’s the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/">15th most populous</a> country in the world. </p>
<p>It’s estimated that by 2050, the DRC will have <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf#page=9">215 million people</a> and join the world’s 10 most populated countries. This isn’t so surprising, given the size of the country: <a href="https://ins.cd/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ANNUAIRE-STATISTIQUE-2020.pdf#page=30">2.3 million square kilometres</a>, making it the second-largest country in Africa (behind Algeria).</p>
<p>The country’s population reflects higher-than-average growth compared to other countries on the continent. The DRC’s population grew by <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/population-growth-rate">3.3% in 2022</a>. The continent’s average was <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf#page=17">2.5%</a>. The average world population growth rate was <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf#page=17">0.8% in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC’s growing population has serious consequences for the wellbeing of its people. Without policies that take account of the country’s demographic profile – a growing population and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Republic-of-the-Congo/Demographic-trends">a very high number of young people versus working age people</a> – social conditions like poverty and hunger will increase.</p>
<p>There are two main reasons for the high population growth: a decrease in deaths and a high number of births. </p>
<p>Over the past decades, the DRC has seen a consistent drop in <a href="https://data.unicef.org/country/cod/">under-five mortality</a>, though this is still relatively high compared to the world average. In 1995, under-five mortality was estimated at 175 deaths per 1,000 births. This dropped to 87 deaths per 1,000 births in 2018. In the same year the <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-survival/under-five-mortality/">global under-five mortality rate</a> stood at 40 deaths per 1,000 births.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-demographics/#life-exp">Life expectancy in the DRC</a> has also increased from 49 years in 1995 to 62 years in 2023. The current global life expectancy is <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/life-expectancy/">73 years</a>.</p>
<p>When it comes to numbers of births, Congolese women average <a href="https://www.prb.org/international/indicator/fertility/table">6.2 babies</a> in their lifetimes. This is four births more than the global average of 2.3 babies. </p>
<p>The DRC’s fertility rate is driven by four major factors.</p>
<p>Firstly, cultural values encourage people to have children. Large families are celebrated. The country’s most recent <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf">demographic and health survey</a> found that Congolese women on average wanted <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=6">six children</a>; men wanted seven. </p>
<p>Secondly, an early start to childbearing means more years of giving birth. <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=6">More than 30% of girls</a> in the DRC are married before they turn 18. About a quarter of young women give birth by their 18th birthday compared to <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/adolescent-health/">14% worldwide</a>. And <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=5">27%</a> of adolescent Congolese girls aged 15-19 have children. </p>
<p>Thirdly, <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=7">very few women use contraception</a> in the DRC. The percentage of women of reproductive age who use an effective form of modern contraception was estimated at around <a href="https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/media/3646/file/COD-MICS-Palu-2018.pdf#page=107">7% in 2018</a>. This was up from 4% in 2007. </p>
<p>The fourth factor driving population growth is the absence of a national population policy. This typically includes a set of measures designed to influence population dynamics. </p>
<h2>What impact is this having?</h2>
<p>The DRC’s galloping demography has several implications.</p>
<p>The first is a high dependency ratio. This is when there are far more economically dependent people than economically active ones because of the demographic age profile of the country. The economically active population faces a greater burden to support economically dependent people, particularly children. Children under the age of 15 account for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Republic-of-the-Congo/Demographic-trends">41.6%</a> of the DRC’s total population. This indicates that employed people aged 15-64 bear a heavy burden amid <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">low incomes</a>. </p>
<p>The country also faces significant planning challenges. <a href="https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/en/what-we-do/education">School attendance rates</a> increased from 52% in 2001 to 78% in 2018. Nevertheless, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/en/what-we-do/education">7.6 million children aged 5-17 are still out of school</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC lags behind in other key human development measures.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It’s among the five poorest nations in the world. In 2022, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">62% of Congolese (60 million people)</a> lived under the poverty line (less than US$2.15 a day). About one in six people living in extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa lives in the DRC. </p></li>
<li><p>The country has faced <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-interventions-have-failed-to-end-drcs-conflict-whats-gone-wrong-205586">political unrest and armed conflicts</a> for six decades. The <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf">2023 Global Peace Index</a> – which measures the relative peacefulness of nations and regions – lists the DRC as <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf#page=11">one of the least peaceful countries</a> in the world after Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and South Sudan.</p></li>
<li><p>The country has one of the <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/maternal-mortality/">world’s highest maternal mortality ratios</a> at 547 deaths per 100,000 live births. The global average is 223 deaths per 100,000 live births. </p></li>
<li><p>It’s one of the world’s hungriest countries. Its <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/">Global Hunger Index</a> score – which measures and tracks levels of hunger globally – stands at <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/drc.html">37.8</a>, which is tagged as “alarming”. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What interventions are needed?</h2>
<p>A country’s population profile can offer opportunities, or what’s known as a demographic dividend. This is when a high percentage of people are young and there are jobs for them. </p>
<p>But the DRC is missing out on this opportunity and will continue to do so unless it:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>invests in human capital by improving its education and health systems. Most Congolese are <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/can-t-afford-be-sick-assessing-cost-ill-health-north-kivu-eastern">paying out of their own pockets</a> for healthcare. Education is free, but the <a href="https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/education">system is weak</a> due to low budget allocations.</p></li>
<li><p>designs a population policy to guide population dynamics. This would include policies on birth, migration and where people live. These should be linked to an integrated national development policy.</p></li>
<li><p>makes progress on gender equality. This should include increasing the enrolment of girls in high schools, discouraging child marriage and enabling young mothers to attend school.</p></li>
<li><p>improves governance and tackles corruption to promote investment in education, health and employment.</p></li>
<li><p>creates data systems that can underpin evidence-based policies.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacques Emina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Without policies that take account of a growing population with few working-age people, DRC risks seeing an increase in poverty and hunger.Jacques Emina, Professor of population and development studies, University of Kinshasa Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071072023-06-27T12:23:02Z2023-06-27T12:23:02ZSouth Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world – and that doesn’t bode well for its economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534163/original/file-20230626-5418-k0jzlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C7842%2C4032&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An aging population, a tired economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-lady-rests-near-her-street-stall-as-pedestrians-news-photo/1251981087?adppopup=true">Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around <a href="https://www.livescience.com/worlds-population-could-plummet-to-six-billion-by-the-end-of-the-century-new-study-suggests">the world</a>, nations are looking at the <a href="https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/06/20/what-does-a-shrinking-population-mean-for-china">prospect of shrinking</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2023/02/14/aging-boomers-more-older-americans/">aging populations</a> – but none more so than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/22/s-korea-breaks-record-for-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-again">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, South Korea has undergone the most rapid fertility decline in recorded human history. In 1960, the nation’s total fertility rate – the number of children, on average, that a woman has during her reproductive years – stood at just under six children per woman. In 2022, that figure was 0.78. South Korea is the only country in the world to register a fertility rate of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/19/1163341684/south-korea-fertility-rate">less than one child per woman</a>, although others – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-low-fertility-rate-population-decline-by-yi-fuxian-2023-02">China</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/births-in-spain-drop-to-lowest-level-on-record/2614667">Spain</a> – are close.</p>
<p><iframe id="FNa7q" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/FNa7q/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on Asian populations, I know that this prolonged and steep decline will have huge impacts on South Korea. It may <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230102000602">slow down economic growth</a>, contributing to a shift that will see the country <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/south-korea-s-demographic-crisis-is-challenging-its-national-story-pub-84820">end up less rich and with a smaller population</a>.</p>
<h2>Older, poorer, more dependent</h2>
<p>Countries need a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman to replace their population, when the effects of immigration and emigration aren’t considered. And South Korea’s fertility rate has been consistently below that number since 1984, when it dropped to 1.93, from 2.17 the year before.</p>
<p>What makes the South Korean fertility rate decline more astonishing is the relatively short period in which it has occurred.</p>
<p>Back in 1800, the U.S. total fertility rate was <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033027/fertility-rate-us-1800-2020/">well over 6.0</a>. But it took the U.S. around 170 years to consistently drop below the replacement level. Moreover, in the little over 60 years in which South Korea’s fertility rate fell from 6.0 to 0.8, the U.S. saw a more gradual decline from 3.0 to 1.7.</p>
<p>Fertility decline can have a positive effect in certain circumstances, via something demographers refer to as “<a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/fact-sheet-attaining-the-demographic-dividend/">the demographic dividend</a>.” This dividend refers to accelerated increases in a country’s economy that follow a decline in birth rates and subsequent changes in its age composition that result in more working-age people and fewer dependent young children and elderly people.</p>
<p>And that is what happened in South Korea – a decline in fertility helped convert South Korea from a very poor country <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/miracle-maturity-growth-korean-economy">to a very rich one</a>.</p>
<h2>Behind the economic miracle</h2>
<p>South Korea’s fertility decline began in the early 1960s when the government adopted an <a href="https://countrystudies.us/south-korea/47.htm">economic planning program</a> and a <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">population and family planning program</a>.</p>
<p>By that time, South Korea was languishing, having seen its <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf">economy and society destroyed</a> by the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. Indeed by the late-1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1961, its annual per capita income <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796954.003.0006">was only about US$82</a>. </p>
<p>But dramatic increases in economic growth began in 1962, when the South Korean government introduced a five-year economic development plan. </p>
<p>Crucially, the government also introduced a population planning program in a bid to bring down the nation’s fertility rate. This included a goal of getting <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">45% of married couples</a> to use contraception – until then, very few Koreans used contraception.</p>
<p>This further contributed to the fertility reduction, as many couples realized that having fewer children would often lead to improvements in family living standards. </p>
<p>Both the economic and family planning programs were instrumental in moving South Korea from one with a high fertility rate to one with a low fertility rate.</p>
<p>As a result, the country’s dependent population – the young and the elderly – grew smaller in relation to its working-age population.</p>
<p>The demographic change kick-started economic growth that continued well into the mid-1990s. Increases in productivity, combined with an increasing labor force and a gradual reduction of unemployment, produced average annual growth rates in gross domestic product <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gnp-gross-national-product">of between 6% and 10% for many years</a>.</p>
<p>South Korea today is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true">one of the richest countries</a>
in the world with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KR">per capita income of $35,000</a>.</p>
<h2>Losing people every year</h2>
<p>Much of this transformation of South Korea from a poor country to a rich country has been due to the demographic dividend realized during the country’s fertility decline. But the demographic dividend only works in the short term. Long-term fertility declines are often <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2022/12/the-long-term-decline-in-fertility-and-what-it-means-for-state-budgets">disastrous for a nation’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>With an extremely low fertility rate of 0.78, South Korea is losing population each year and experiencing more deaths than births. The once-vibrant nation is on the way to becoming a country with lots of elderly people and fewer workers.</p>
<p>The Korean Statistical Office reported recently that the <a href="https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B8000F&language=en">country lost population</a> in the past three years: It was down by 32,611 people in 2020, 57,118 in 2021 and 123,800 in 2022.</p>
<p>If this trend continues, and if the country doesn’t welcome millions of immigrants, South Korea’s present population of 51 million <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2023/06/602_335593.html">will drop to under 38 million</a> in the next four or five decades.</p>
<p>And a growing proportion of the society will be over the age of 65.</p>
<p>South Korea’s population aged 65 and over comprised under 7% of the population in 2000. Today, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-society">nearly 17% of South Koreans</a> are older people.</p>
<p>The older people population is projected to be 20% of the country by 2025 and could reach an unprecedented and astoundingly high 46% in 2067. South Korea’s working-age population will then be smaller in size than its population of people over the age of 65.</p>
<p>In a bid to avert a demographic nightmare, the South Korean government is <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/south-korea-families-770-month-183500253.html">providing financial incentives</a> for couples to have children and is boosting the monthly allowance already in place for parents. President Yoon Suk Yeol has also <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/28/national/politics/Korea-birth-rate-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230328184849297.html">established a new government team</a> to establish policies to increase the birth rate.</p>
<p>But to date, programs to increase the low fertility rate have had little effect. Since 2006, the South Korean government has already <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">spent over $200 billion</a> in programs to increase the birth rate, with virtually no impact.</p>
<h2>Opening the trapdoor</h2>
<p>The South Korean fertility rate has not increased in the past 16 years. Rather, it has continued to decrease. This is due to what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025482">low-fertility trap</a>.” The principle, set forth by demographers in the early 2000s, states that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4, it is difficult – if not impossible – to increase it significantly. </p>
<p>South Korea, along with many other countries – including France, Australia and Russia – have developed policies to encourage fertility rate increases, but with little to no success. </p>
<p>The only real way for South Korea to turn this around would be to rely heavily on immigration.</p>
<p>Migrants are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/06/19/blog-weo-chapter4-migration-to-advanced-economies-can-raise-growth">typically young and productive</a> and usually have more children than the native-born population. But South Korea has a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/upshot/comparing-immigration-policies-across-countries.html">very restrictive immigration policy</a> with no path for immigrants to become citizens or permanent residents unless they marry South Koreans.</p>
<p>Indeed, the foreign-born population in 2022 was just over 1.6 million, which is around <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220414000692">3.1% of the population</a>. In contrast, the U.S. has always relied on immigration to bolster its working population, with foreign-born residents now <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrants-in-the-united-states">comprising over 14%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>For immigration to offset South Korea’s declining fertility rate, the number of foreign workers would likely need to rise almost tenfold.</p>
<p>Without that, South Korea’s demographic destiny will have the nation continuing to lose population every year and becoming one of the oldest – if not the oldest – country in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Korea’s fertility rate fell below the level needed to sustain a population in the mid-1980s – and it never recovered. It is now below one child per woman during her reproductive years.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1940672022-11-14T13:07:18Z2022-11-14T13:07:18ZAs the 8 billionth person is born, here’s how Africa will shape the future of the planet’s population<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494071/original/file-20221108-26-rjbg6o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In mid-November 2022 the eight billionth person will be born, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion#:%7E:text=On%2015%20November%202022%2C%20the,nutrition%2C%20personal%20hygiene%20and%20medicine">according to the United Nations</a>. In its analysis of this milestone, the UN makes two key observations. The first is that the global population has been expanding at its slowest rate since 1950. The growth rate dropped below 1% in 2020, a trend that is likely to continue. The second is that the growth in population has been due to the gradual increase in human lifespan owing to improvements in public health, nutrition, personal hygiene and medicine. It’s also the result of high and persistent levels of fertility in some countries. According to the UN, just eight countries are <a href="https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022">expected</a> to be behind 50% of the population growth over the next 30 years. Five are in Africa: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Demographers Akanni Akinyemi, Jacques Emina and Esther Dungumaro unpack these dynamics.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the significance of the eight billionth birth?</h2>
<p>It raises concerns – <a href="https://worldpopulationhistory.org/carrying-capacity/">scientists estimate</a> that Earth’s maximum carrying capacity is between nine billion and 10 billion people. </p>
<p>Appreciating these numbers requires an understanding of the distribution and demographic structure of the population. Where are these people across regions, countries, and rural and urban geographies?</p>
<p>There is a potential upside to growing populations. It’s known as a <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/demographic-dividend#0">demographic dividend</a>. Population growth can be a blessing, spurring economic growth from shifts in a population’s age structure. This is a prospect if working-age people have good health, quality education, decent employment and a lower proportion of young dependants. </p>
<p>But realising this dividend depends on a host of things. They include the structure of the population by age, level of education and skills, and living conditions, as well as the distribution of available resources. </p>
<p>The consequences of population growth are socioeconomic, political and environmental. Some of them can be negative. How these unfold is determined by the characteristics of the population and its distribution. </p>
<h2>Why are birth rates so high in five African countries?</h2>
<p>The major factors driving population growth in these countries include low contraceptive use, high adolescent fertility rates and a prevalence of polygamous marriages. There’s also the low education status of women, low to poor investment in children’s education, and factors related to religion and ideas. </p>
<p>The use of modern contraceptives is <a href="https://reproductive-health-journal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12978-022-01332-x#:%7E:text=The%20use%20of%20modern%20contraceptives,%2DSaharan%20Africa%20(SSA);%20%20un_2019_contraceptiveusebymethod_databooklet.pdf">generally low</a> across sub-Saharan Africa. The overall prevalence is 22%. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, however, the uptake of short-acting contraceptives is at 8.1%. In Nigeria, it is at 10.5%. The uptake in Ethiopia is 25%, in Tanzania it’s 27.1% and in Egypt 43%.</p>
<p>For long-acting family planning methods, apart from Egypt with over 20% uptake, the other four countries driving population growth in the region recorded very poor uptake. This low uptake will logically lead to a population explosion. </p>
<p>Some of the factors <a href="https://contraceptionmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40834-021-00165-6">associated</a> with high contraceptive use in Africa are women’s education, exposure to news and mass media, good economic status and urban residency.</p>
<p>The adolescent fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa – while showing a downward trend – is still relatively high. The adolescent fertility rate captures the number of births per 1,000 girls aged 15 to 19. In sub-Saharan Africa, it stands at an average of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT?locations=ZG">98 births per 1,000 girls</a>.</p>
<p>There is a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT?locations=ZG">wide variation</a> in this rate across the five countries: from 52 in Egypt and 62 in Ethiopia to 102 in Nigeria, 114 in Tanzania and 119 in the DRC. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1228319/adolescent-fertility-rate-worldwide/">Outside the continent</a>, the adolescent fertility rate is 21 in Asia and the Pacific, and 26 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the US, it’s at 15, five in France and 42 globally. </p>
<p>The adolescent fertility rate has huge implications for population growth because of the number of years between the start of childbearing and the end of a woman’s reproductive age. A high fertility rate in this age group also has a negative influence on the health, economic and educational potential of women and their children. </p>
<p>Another factor driving population growth in these five African countries is polygamous marriage. Women in polygamous unions living in rural areas with low socio-economic status are likely to have higher fertility rates than women in other areas. </p>
<p>Polygamy is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/04/05/polygamy-in-drc-illegal-but-not-uncommon//">illegal in the DRC</a>. Nevertheless, it’s common. About 36% of married women in <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/polygamy-in-west-africa-impacts-on-fertility-fertility-intentions-and-family-planning/">Nigeria</a>, one-quarter of married women in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-marriage-idINKCN0SL0CP20151027">rural Tanzania</a> and 11% of those in <a href="https://bmcpsychology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40359-022-00753-4#:%7E:text=Regarding%20Ethiopia%2C%20polygamy%20is%20practiced,co%2Dwives%20%5B10%5D">Ethiopia</a> are in polygamous marriages.</p>
<p>Finally, a woman’s education status has a significant impact on fertility. For instance, in Tanzania, women with no formal education have as many as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-marriage-idINKCN0SL0CP20151027">3.3 more children</a> than women with secondary or tertiary education. </p>
<h2>Are rising populations a cause for major concern in these countries?</h2>
<p>Yes. </p>
<p>One of the biggest concerns is the scale of these countries’ development.</p>
<p>The World Bank classifies the DRC among the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">five poorest nations in the world</a>, with nearly 64% of the population living on less than US$2.15 a day. One in six of sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest people is found in the DRC. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, about <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview">40% of the population</a> lives below the poverty line. The west African nation also faces issues of insecurity, poor infrastructure and high unemployment.</p>
<p>Steady population growth in these five countries will exert further stress on already inadequate infrastructure and services.</p>
<p>Also, the age structure of the populations of these five countries reflects high levels of dependency. The population of young people who aren’t in the labour force and that of older people is far higher than of those in their prime ages (18 to 64) who are gainfully employed. </p>
<p>There is also a potential shortage of working-age people with high skills compared with the population of those who depend on them for survival in these five countries. </p>
<p>This is because these countries have a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1121264/median-age-in-africa-by-county/">very youthful population</a>. The median age ranges from 17 in the DRC to 17.7 in Tanzania and 18.8 in Nigeria. There is also the prospect of many young people living in unfavourable socioeconomic realities and poverty.</p>
<h2>In most countries, population growth is the slowest since 1950. Why?</h2>
<p>Most countries, particularly in America, Asia, Europe, Oceania and North Africa, have completed the fertility transition. In other words, they are experiencing below-replacement fertility levels – fewer than two children are being born per woman. </p>
<p>The main drivers of low fertility include the increased use of modern contraceptives, increased age at first marriage and higher numbers of educated women.</p>
<h2>What should the next steps be for African countries with high fertility rates?</h2>
<p>Government policies and programmes need to take into account population growth and align interventions with sustainable use and access to resources. </p>
<p>Governments at regional, national and sub-national levels also need to invest in infrastructure and education. They need to create employment if they are to benefit from a growing population. There is also need to continue investing in family planning. </p>
<p>The age structure of the population is also of concern. The expected growth in population numbers is <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/8billion/8trends">likely to increase</a> the concentration of young people and those of prime ages. With limited socio-economic opportunities for young people, countries are more likely to be subject to the forces of international migration. </p>
<p>The proportion of older people is also likely to increase in the five countries in focus. This increases the need for investment in social security, infrastructure and innovative support for older people. Unfortunately, issues around older people have not gained prominence on the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacques Emina
Population and Health Research Institute
and with
School of Population and Development Studies, University of Kinshasa</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi and Esther William Dungumaro do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Eight countries are projected to be behind 50% of the growth in population over the next three decades. Five are in Africa.Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi, Professor of Demography and Social Statistics., Obafemi Awolowo UniversityEsther William Dungumaro, Associate Professor of Demography, University of Dar es SalaamJacques Emina, Professor of population and development studies, University of Kinshasa Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1840822022-06-29T14:34:56Z2022-06-29T14:34:56Z‘Gain a child, lose a tooth’: old saying holds true for women in northern Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470962/original/file-20220626-19-mjscln.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women who have children over a long time lose more teeth. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mothers-wait-to-have-their-children-immunized-against-a-news-photo/50989067?adppopup=true">Jacob Silberberg/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Childbearing has an impact on the health of women, and the <a href="https://patient.info/doctor/gravidity-and-parity-definitions-and-their-implications-in-risk-assessment#:%7E:text=Parity%20is%20defined%20as%20the,born%20alive%20or%20was%20stillborn">impact</a> grows with the number of times a woman has been pregnant for longer than 24 weeks. Pregnancy and breastfeeding put energy demands on a woman and can cause permanent changes to a mother’s health.</p>
<p>What’s less well known is the relationship between parity and oral health. That’s despite a widespread customary belief that having an increasing number of children results in tooth loss. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9683217/">“Gain a child, lose a tooth”</a>, or “for every child, a tooth is lost” are common proverbs in many societies. The biological basis of these beliefs is still questioned.</p>
<p>There are few studies on parity and tooth loss. In addition, the available results are inconsistent. Nevertheless, increasing number of children in women has been associated with tooth loss in some populations, as seen in studies in <a href="https://bmcoralhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6831-9-18">Uganda</a> and the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2424105/">US</a>. </p>
<p>We decided to <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33340105/#affiliation-2">study</a> this relationship to add to the evidence. Our study of rural women in northern Nigeria looked at how age, reproductive and socioeconomic factors and oral health practices contributed to tooth loss.</p>
<p>We found that women with more than five children lost more teeth than women of the same age who’d had fewer children.</p>
<p>Tooth loss matters because teeth are important for both functional and aesthetic roles. The loss of a tooth affects an individual socially, functionally and psychologically, negatively affecting their quality of life. Tooth loss can affect beauty, self-esteem, mastication, speech and social interaction. </p>
<h2>Tooth loss</h2>
<p>Our study involved 612 women who live in rural northern Nigeria. They were between the ages of 13-65. They all identified as Hausa. We decided on this cohort because women in this area have very high <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33340105/#affiliation-2">fertility</a> rates. Nigeria has a <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR148/04Chapter04.pdf">total fertility rate</a> of 5.7 children per woman. However, in the northwest zone where Hausa and closely related Fulani populations are predominant, <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr222/fr222.pdf">the rate is 7.3</a>. </p>
<p>Sociodemographic status and oral health practices were collected using a questionnaire. All teeth present (excluding third molars) and missing teeth were noted. </p>
<p>Generally, tooth loss experience in the participants was low: an overall prevalence of 14.1%. This means that 14% of women had lost some teeth. The presence of tooth loss in the women differed based on how many children they’d carried beyond 24 weeks, with more tooth loss experienced among women who had had more children. </p>
<p>There was no discernible pattern between tooth loss and number of children among those with fewer than five children. </p>
<p>At five children and above, tooth loss increased with each additional child.</p>
<p>The participants in the study displayed generally similar socio-economic statuses and dental service usage. This reduced the potential effects of other factors such as dietary quality and oral health status that can result in tooth loss. </p>
<p>The results showing a relationship between child bearing and tooth loss were as we had expected. Importantly, the duration of reproduction (the span of reproductive years) was found to be a critical contributor. Women who had children over a longer period of time lost significantly more teeth. </p>
<p>Also, socio-economic status contributed significantly to tooth loss, as women of middle socio-economic experienced significantly greater tooth loss. This was age related, most women in the middle socio-economic class were older while those in the low socio-economic status were younger. </p>
<p>Age played a significant role more generally too. Our study found that age was strongly associated with tooth loss. Tooth loss is typically the culmination of degenerative biological processes rather than an event. The longer the tooth is in the oral cavity, the greater the probability that it is exposed to the factors leading to tooth loss. In addition to the effects of increasing age, women face heightened risks stemming from their reproductive histories. </p>
<h2>Hormones and tooth decay</h2>
<p>Tooth loss is the result of multiple processes involving infection and weakening of the tooth structure or supportive tissues. Diet, hormonal changes, oral hygiene and dental treatment all play a part. In addition, teeth can be lost to trauma and cosmetic cultural practices. Gum disease following tooth decay is a major cause of tooth loss. </p>
<p>Gender-based differences exist in oral health, with more tooth loss in females than males. This is <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20652339/">largely attributed</a> to the role of female sex hormones, pregnancy and reproductive history. Estrogen levels are <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2637066/">higher during pregnancy</a> than during any other period in the life cycle. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16788889/">Pregnancy reduces</a> the buffering capacity of saliva and promotes growth of bacteria that cause tooth decay. </p>
<p>Estrogen and progesterone are known, among others, to inhibit a body’s ability to produce a normal immune response. This is known as <a href="https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/immunocompetent">immunocompetence</a>. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6103927/">The result</a> is faster tooth decay. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>This study highlights the need to give more attention to the oral health of women during the reproductive years, in particular those who have many children. </p>
<p>Generally in Nigeria, the use of dental care service is poor due to limited availability and accessibility of oral health clinics. This affects early treatment of dental problems, which contributes to more tooth loss. Furthermore, dental problems are not considered as life threatening, thus low priority is given to dental care.</p>
<p>We found in our study that pregnancy and maternity made women even less likely to use oral healthcare service. </p>
<p>Oral health should be incorporated into the general healthcare. Dental care should also be made available and accessible to the general public, especially to those in the rural communities. And women’s oral health should be monitored as part of pregnancy support too. </p>
<p>There is need for oral health awareness and education too to identify barriers to dental care services.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184082/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Oziegbe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More attention should be given to the oral health of women during the reproductive years, in particular those who have many children.Elizabeth Oziegbe, Associate Professor of Dentistry, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624942021-07-06T12:09:24Z2021-07-06T12:09:24ZExpanding opportunities for women and economic uncertainty are both factors in declining US fertility rates<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409512/original/file-20210702-25-1cs12vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6470%2C4291&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women have many more work and educational choices than previous generations, which affect their decisions about having children.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/millennial-latina-bicycle-commuting-locking-her-royalty-free-image/1092350028">Justin Lewis/DigitalVision via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The decline in population growth in the U.S. <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-kits/2021/2020-census-apportionment-counts.html">from 2010 to 2020</a> is part of a broader national trend linked to falling birth rates, but also <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-dip-in-the-us-birthrate-isnt-a-crisis-but-the-fall-in-immigration-may-be-161169">immigration changes</a> and other factors. In May of 2021 the scope of that change became clear, with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-birth-rate-keeps-declining-4-questions-answered-128962">record low</a> of <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/vsrr012-508.pdf">55.8 births per 1,000 women of childbearing age</a> in 2020, a <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/vsrr012-508.pdf">4% drop</a> from 2019. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/world/global-population-shrinking.html">Other countries</a> are <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-drop-in-the-us-birthrate-isnt-a-crisis-161169">facing similar slowdowns</a> in population growth.</p>
<p>This shift has been underway in the U.S. for many years. </p>
<p>In the early 1900s, my grandfather grew up in a family with nine children in rural Iowa. They all worked hard to maintain the farm and support the family. Some of the children left the farm to attend college, start families and find work elsewhere. My father grew up in a city and worked as an adult to support his family as the sole income earner. </p>
<p>The next generation, the baby boomers, was raised during a period of economic expansion that accompanied an uptick in fertility – the average number of children born to a woman in her reproductive years. Post-boomer generations have had fewer children, contributing to a <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/birth-rate">50% decline in U.S. birth rates between 1950 and 2021</a>, from 25 births per 1,000 people to 12.</p>
<p>Economic opportunities, social norms and changing gender roles – especially expanding education and employment options for many women – help to explain why fertility has slowed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. That change has repercussions for trends in workforce numbers, employment, health care, housing and education.</p>
<p><iframe id="kwtuf" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/kwtuf/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Explaining the decline in fertility</h2>
<p>Each generation experiences unique circumstances that affect fertility. The overall trend in declining birth rates, however, is largely due to women’s changing roles, employment shifts and advances in reproductive health. </p>
<p>After World War II, the U.S. saw rapid change in gender roles with the expansion of women’s education and entry into the labor force. Starting with the baby boom period from 1946 to 1964, many middle- and upper-class women had increased opportunities to get an education beyond high school, which had typically been the end of women’s formal education.</p>
<p>In 1950, only <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/184272/educational-attainment-of-college-diploma-or-higher-by-gender/">5.2% of women</a> had completed four years of college or more. By 2020, this proportion rose to 38.3%. </p>
<p>In comparison, 7.3% of men completed at least four years of college in 1950 and 36.7% in 2020 – a smaller increase than for women.</p>
<p>Increases in college education and rising employment among women tend to delay motherhood. Women with higher educational levels, especially unmarried women, tend to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/16/us/declining-birthrate-motherhood.html">put off childbearing until their early 30s</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, medical advancements and <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fda-approves-the-pill">federal regulators’ approval of the birth control pill in the 1960s</a> expanded reproductive freedom for women. </p>
<p>This situation contributed to women’s becoming mothers later in their lives. For example, the median age for first-time mothers among women who were born in 1960 was 22.7 years, compared with <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db68.pdf">20.8 years for women born in 1935</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, the teen birth rate was a record low in 2019, with 16.7 births per 1,000 girls and women ages 15 to 19. Birth rates remain higher, however, among Latina and Black teens than teens who are white or Asian. In contrast, the share of women ages 40 to 44 years who have ever had children increased from <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/05/07/with-a-potential-baby-bust-on-the-horizon-key-facts-about-fertility-in-the-u-s-before-the-pandemic/">82% in 2008 to 85% in 2018</a>. Foreign-born women tend to have higher birth rates than U.S.-born women.</p>
<p>Geographic location also reveals important <a href="https://www.thebalance.com/birth-rate-by-state-4684536">differences in the U.S. birth rate</a>. Women in New England have fewer children, partly because of higher levels of education. In contrast, women in the South and Great Plains have among the highest birth rates in the U.S. </p>
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<p>Finally, economic uncertainty affects fertility trends. Economists estimate that a family will spend on average <a href="https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2017/01/13/cost-raising-child">$233,610 per child</a> before they are 18 years old. Financial upheaval during the Great Recession from 2007 to 2009 also contributed to declining birth rates, while the COVID-19 pandemic saw a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/05/07/with-a-potential-baby-bust-on-the-horizon-key-facts-about-fertility-in-the-u-s-before-the-pandemic/">4% decline in fertility rates in 2020</a>, the lowest since 1979.</p>
<h2>A look at the future</h2>
<p>Fewer babies and young people and a growing older population will undoubtedly affect future generations. </p>
<p>Several developed countries in Europe have also experienced declining fertility rates, with widespread social and economic impacts. In Italy, for instance, rapid drops in fertility have led to <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/in-italy-rising-anxiety-over-falling-birth-rates">closing hospitals and schools</a>. In 2019, the average Italian family had 1.2 children, part of a declining trend since the 1960s, when it was more common for families to have four children. As a result, Italy’s percentage of seniors is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/05/asia/japan-birth-rate-2020-intl-hnk/index.html">second only to Japan</a>, with <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/in-italy-rising-anxiety-over-falling-birth-rates">growing concern for future labor supplies</a>.</p>
<p>In the U.S., lower fertility rates translate to fewer working-age people and possible labor shortages in many sectors of the economy. According to the <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020/65-older-population-grows.html">U.S. Census Bureau</a>, the percentage of people age 65 and older has been growing, increasing by one-third since 2010.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3949%2C2955&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman looks at a newborn baby in her arms" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3949%2C2955&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409157/original/file-20210630-21128-k6vbne.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">New babies are one part of a healthy society and economy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/new-mother-looks-lovingly-at-her-newborn-child-royalty-free-image/867572546">Diana Haronis, Moment via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many economists and social scientists recommend a restructuring of work to <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/truth-behind-americas-labor-shortage-122500617.html">support and retain the shrinking number of workers</a>. These recommendations include more flexible work conditions, access to quality and affordable child care, immigration reform and job security. Several of these measures would provide much-needed support for parents and particularly women in the workforce.</p>
<p>Second, living spaces and residential housing may also have to accommodate this growing elderly population with arrangements that include assisted living, retirement communities and ways for people to age in place. These housing changes would help women in particular, who live longer than men. </p>
<p>Third, health services such as insurance, medical care and employment will have to adjust to these demographic shifts as more resources are needed to support an older population.</p>
<p>Finally, declining fertility rates are a growing concern for educators and policymakers. The so-called “<a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-demographic-cliff-5-findings-from-new-projections-of-high-school-graduates">demographic cliff</a>” will inevitably lead to school closings and consolidation, and declining student recruitment and enrollment in the U.S. One projection is that there will be <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-demographic-cliff-5-findings-from-new-projections-of-high-school-graduates">10% fewer college students in 2054</a> than today.</p>
<p>The overall decline in fertility rates has far-reaching effects on society and future generations. In the early 1900s, college education and a career were not options for women like my great-grandmother. Advances in reproductive health and women’s expanding access to education and employment have produced a demographic shift with implications for work, housing, health care and education.</p>
<p>[<em>The Conversation’s Politics + Society editors pick need-to-know stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-need-to-know">Sign up for Politics Weekly</a>._]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ann M. Oberhauser does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Economic opportunities, social norms and expanding education and employment options for many women help explain why U.S. fertility has slowed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.Ann M. Oberhauser, Professor of Sociology, Iowa State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1611692021-06-21T12:19:40Z2021-06-21T12:19:40ZThe dip in the US birthrate isn’t a crisis, but the fall in immigration may be<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407122/original/file-20210617-13-kyqlc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C14%2C4728%2C3687&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Reports of an American “baby bust” may be premature. But the drop in immigration puts the nation's demographic future at risk.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com">Ariel Skelly/DigitalVision via Getty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announced in May 2021 that the nation’s total fertility rate had reached <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/vsrr012-508.pdf">1.64 children per woman in 2020</a>, dropping 4% from 2019, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-birth-rate-keeps-declining-4-questions-answered-128962">a record low</a> for the nation. </p>
<p>The news led to many <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/05/the-coming-covid-19-baby-bust-is-here/">stories</a> about a “<a href="https://time.com/5892749/covid-19-baby-bust">baby bust</a>” <a href="https://theweek.com/articles/982103/doomloop-falling-fertility-rate">harming the country</a>. The fear is that if the trend continues, the nation’s population may age and that will lead to difficulties in funding entitlements like Social Security and Medicaid for seniors in the future. </p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=QN9RQAYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">statistician and sociologist</a> who collaborates with <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4196216">the United Nations Population Division</a> to develop new statistical population forecasting methods, I’m not yet calling this a crisis. In fact, America’s 2020 birth rate is in line with trends going back over 40 years. Similar trends have been observed in most of the U.S.’s peer countries.</p>
<p>The other reason this is not a crisis, at least not yet, is that America’s historically high immigration rates have put the country in a demographic sweet spot relative to other developed countries like Germany and Japan.</p>
<p>But that could change. A recent dramatic decline in immigration is now putting the country’s demographic advantage at risk. </p>
<p>Falling immigration may be America’s real demographic crisis, not the dip in birth rates.</p>
<h2>A predictable change</h2>
<p>Most countries have experienced part or all of a fertility transition. </p>
<p>Fertility transitions occur when fertility falls from a high level – typical of agricultural societies – to a low level, more common in industrialized countries. This transition is due to falling mortality, more education for women, the increasing cost of raising children and other reasons. </p>
<p>In 1800, American women on average gave birth to seven children. The fertility rate decreased steadily, falling to just 1.74 children per woman in 1976, marking the end of America’s fertility transition. This is the point after which fertility no longer declined systematically, but instead began to fluctuate.</p>
<p>Birth rates have slightly fluctuated up and down in the 45 years since, rising to 2.11 in 2007. This was unusually high for a country that has made its fertility transition, and put the U.S. birth rate briefly at the top of developed countries. </p>
<p>A decline soon followed. The U.S. birth rate dropped incrementally from 2007 to 2020, at an average rate of about 2% per year. 2020’s decline was in line with this, and indeed was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.">slower than some previous declines, such as the ones in 2009 and 2010</a>. It put the U.S. on par with its peer nations, below the U.K. and France, but above Canada and Germany. </p>
<p>Using the methods I’ve helped develop, in 2019 the U.N. forecast <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp">a continuing drop in the global birth rate</a> for the period from 2020 to 2025. This methodology also forecast that the overall world population <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/346/6206/234">will continue to rise over the 21st century</a>. </p>
<p>The ideal situation for a country is steady, manageable population growth, which tends to go in tandem with a dynamic labor market and adequate provision for seniors, through entitlement programs or care by younger family members. In contrast, countries with declining populations face labor shortages and squeezes on provisions for seniors. At the other extreme, countries with very fast population growth can face massive youth unemployment and other problems.</p>
<p>Many countries that are peers with the U.S. now face brutally sharp declines in the number of working-age people for every senior within the next 20 years. For example, by 2040, Germany and Japan will have fewer than two working-age adults for every retired adult. In China, the ratio will go down from 5.4 workers per aged adult now to 1.7 in the next 50 years. </p>
<p>By comparison, the worker-to-senior ratio in the U.S. will also decrease, but more slowly, from 3.5 in 2020 to 2.1 by 2070. By 2055, the U.S. will have more workers per retiree than even Brazil and China. </p>
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<p>Germany, Japan and other nations face population declines, with Japan’s population projected to go down by a massive 40% by the end of the century. In Nigeria, on the other hand, the population is projected to more than triple, to over 700 million, because of the currently high fertility rate and young population. </p>
<p>In contrast, the U.S. population is projected to increase by 31% over the next 50 years, which is both manageable and good for the economy. This is slower than the growth of recent decades, but much better than the declines faced by peer industrialized nations. </p>
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<p>The reason for this is immigration. The U.S. has had the most net immigration in the world for decades, and the projections are based on the assumption that this will continue. </p>
<p>Migrants tend to be young, and to work. They contribute to the economy and <a href="https://www.nap.edu/read/21746/chapter/8#260">bring dynamism</a> to the society, along with supporting existing retirees, reducing the burden on current workers.</p>
<p>However, this source of demographic strength is at risk. Net migration into the U.S. <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/12/net-international-migration-projected-to-fall-lowest-levels-this-decade.html">declined by 40% from 2015 to 2019</a>, likely at least in part because of unwelcoming government policies. </p>
<p>If this is not reversed, the country faces a demographic future more like that of Germany or even Japan, with a rapidly aging population and the economic and social problems that come with it. The <a href="https://ifstudies.org/blog/can-uncle-sam-boost-american-fertility">jury is out</a> on whether family-friendly social policies will have enough positive impact on fertility to compensate. </p>
<p>If U.S. net migration continues on its historical trend as forecast by the U.N., the U.S. population will continue to increase at a healthy pace for the rest of the century. In contrast, if U.S. net migration continues only at the much lower 2019 rate, population growth will grind almost to a halt by 2050, with about 60 million fewer people by 2100. The fall in migration would also accelerate the aging of the U.S. population, with 7% fewer workers per senior by 2060, leading to possible labor shortages and challenges in funding Social Security and Medicare. </p>
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<p>While the biggest stream of immigrants is from Latin America, that is likely to decrease in the future given the declining fertility rates and aging populations there. In the longer term, more immigrants are likely to come from sub-Saharan Africa, and it will be important for America’s demographic future to attract, welcome and retain them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161169/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Raftery receives funding from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). </span></em></p>Immigration has historically offset America’s low fertility rate, but the recent dramatic drop in immigration threatens that trend.Adrian Raftery, Boeing International Professor of Statistics and Sociology, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1596922021-06-02T15:07:00Z2021-06-02T15:07:00ZFamily size: why some Nigerian men want more children<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403582/original/file-20210531-28-bh89g7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Men largely determine the fertility rate in Nigeria. These men are drumming for dancers at a festival.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/men-drum-for-dancers-during-the-annual-festival-of-the-news-photo/939233450?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fertility levels remain <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=NG">relatively high</a> in Nigeria. The rate is <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/382212/fertility-rate-in-nigeria/#:%7E:text=The%20fertility%20rate%20is%20the,the%20world%20fertility%20rate%20ranking.">slightly over five children</a> per woman. This is <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/262884/countries-with-the-highest-fertility-rates/">one of the highest</a> fertility rates in the world. With almost seven children per woman, Niger has the highest rate in the world, followed by Mali. </p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/26410397.2021.1893890">studies</a> have suggested targeting men in family planning programmes to reduce fertility levels, particularly in patriarchal societies. This is because men wield excessive power that determines contraception use or non-use.</p>
<p>In Nigeria, which is a patriarchal society, the influence of men on fertility behaviour is seen in many ways. For instance, men usually <a href="https://academicjournals.org/article/article1379759046_Kinanee%20and%20Ezekiel-Hart.pdf">make decisions</a> about the number of children a woman will have. </p>
<p>We conducted <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0272684X19875022">research</a> exploring the contextual factors that influence the attitudes of men towards fertility. These include sociocultural norms, beliefs, preferences and perceptions. Our study involved a range of different ethnic groups in Nigeria. </p>
<p>We collected qualitative data on men’s perceptions about the number of children people were expected to have in their community and the reasons for this. </p>
<p>We also sought to establish who usually wanted to have a high number of children in the family and who determined the number of children among couples. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s population growth is not sustainable. Population growth <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/press/sustainable-development-and-population-dynamics-placing-people-centre">places increasing pressures</a> on resources – such as water, forests and land – contributing to climate change and challenging environmental sustainability. </p>
<p>Among the <a href="https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats8.htm#:%7E:text=Ten%20Countries%20with%20the%20Highest%20Population%20in%20the%20World&text=are%20China%2C%20India%2C%20United%20States,%2C%20Bangladesh%2C%20Russia%20and%20Mexico.">10 largest countries</a> worldwide, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/other/21/21June_FINAL%20PRESS%20RELEASE_WPP17.pdf">Nigeria is growing</a> the most rapidly. Nigeria’s population, currently the world’s seventh largest, is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/other/21/21June_FINAL%20PRESS%20RELEASE_WPP17.pdf">projected</a> to surpass that of the United States and become the third largest country in the world shortly before 2050. Nigeria <a href="https://borgenproject.org/nigerias-struggle-overpopulation/">struggles</a> with its population growth. </p>
<p>Our findings showed some of the beliefs and perceptions influencing male fertility in Nigeria. These include religion, polygamy, socioeconomic status, government policy, peer pressure, culture and sex preference. They also vary across ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Thus, there is a need to take into consideration the unique community structures in subsequent population-oriented social policy reviews and implementation to tackle high fertility behaviour in Nigeria.</p>
<h2>Beliefs and perceptions</h2>
<p>We used qualitative data that involved focus group discussions (12 in all) and in-depth interviews (18 in all) from Osun, Enugu and Zamfara. We interviewed men from the country’s three major ethnic groups – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.</p>
<p>Across the three states the men involved in the discussions showed that they were knowledgeable about fertility. There were hardly any variations across the major ethnic groups. All placed a high value on large family size – more than four children per woman. </p>
<p>We asked the men how many children they wanted to have. Some wanted to have three or four, while some said such the decision was based on God or Allah’s wish for them. </p>
<p>For the most part, the reasons given for wanting a large number of children were to populate the earth, help with farm work, and to provide old-age support, honour and prestige. </p>
<p>A number of beliefs and perceptions that affected decisions around fertility were mentioned.</p>
<p>Religion was one. Religion plays a prominent role in how many children families have Nigeria. About <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/01/the-countries-with-the-10-largest-christian-populations-and-the-10-largest-muslim-populations/">50% of Nigerians identify themselves as Muslims, while 48.1% identify as Christians</a>. Islam promotes large families and encourages early marriage and a polygamous family system. Christianity prohibits the most effective forms of contraception and does not support abortion.</p>
<p>Polygamy: This is more prevalent in the northern region, where more than <a href="https://www.stearsng.com/article/understanding-the-costs-of-polygamy-in-nigeria">a third of married women</a> reported having one or more co-wives. Through polygamy, the man will have multiple children from many wives. </p>
<p>Socioeconomic status: The economic situation of men was a determining factor in fertility behaviour. An example of this was that if the proportion of men with a nonprofessional occupation (like farming) in the community was high, there was a higher likelihood that the men wanted larger families. If the proportion of men who had at least secondary education in the community was low, they were more likely to have larger families. Peer pressure was another factor. </p>
<p>Government policy: Some mentioned that this encouraged families to have at most four children. Nigeria <a href="http://www.bioline.org.br/request?ep02008">launched a policy</a> of four children per woman in 1988 to stem population growth.</p>
<p>Culture: Culture plays a prominent role. Most cultures in Nigeria encourage many children. No culture supports having only a few. Sex preference, to a large extent, also influences the number of children. A <a href="https://www.magonlinelibrary.com/doi/abs/10.12968/ajmw.2009.3.4.44804?journalCode=ajmw">higher premium</a> is placed on male children. This encourages families to have more children until they have boys. </p>
<p>The respondents also articulated the effects of having a large family. These included being unable to adequately cater for the children. This could lead to children being socially disruptive, malnutrition, as well as high maternal and under-five mortality rates. Others mentioned strain on social and health infrastructure, discrimination against girls’ education, youth delinquency such as teenage pregnancy and sexual vices. </p>
<p>Some of the respondents gave reasons for a small family. The main ones included being able to give children quality education and to avoid poverty. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>To control population growth the government needs to design more interventions to improve education, employment opportunities and the economy. </p>
<p>For example, our study shows that the more the men were educated, the fewer the children they wanted to have. </p>
<p>There is also a need for steps to improve the socioeconomic status of men. The government needs to create more job opportunities. Research has shown that areas of high unemployment rates and low socioeconomic status family sizes are larger. </p>
<p>In addition, the government must run campaigns and programmes explaining the social and economic consequences of high rates of fertility. </p>
<p>Finally, the government must take steps to break down the country’s patriarchal family system so that women are given some autonomy. This can be driven by strengthening and promoting social policies that benefit girls and women such as access to education, employment opportunities and political positions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ololade Grace Adewole works in National Centre for Technology Management</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kehinde Oluwaseun Omotoso receives funding from National Research Fund, South Africa.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sola S. Asa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Nigerian government must design more interventions to improve education, employment opportunities and the economy in order to control the country’s population growth.Ololade Grace Adewole, Assistant Chief Planning Officer, National Centre for Technology Management, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityKehinde Oluwaseun Omotoso, DST/NRF SARCHl Chair in Social Policy, University of South AfricaSola S. Asa, Associate Professor of Demography and Social Statistics, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1421742020-07-19T19:51:32Z2020-07-19T19:51:32ZCOVID-19 could see thousands of women miss out on having kids, creating a demographic disaster for Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348068/original/file-20200717-19-smeep0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5431%2C2744&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 lockdowns have led to suggestions there could be a <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/topics/voices/culture/article/2020/05/19/are-we-headed-towards-baby-boom">“coronial” baby boom</a>. </p>
<p>But while a baby boom as a side effect of the devastating pandemic sounds kind of nice, it is probably too good to be true.</p>
<p>What is more likely is that Australians will delay or forego having children because of coronavirus. This could be personally devastating for people and a demographic disaster for the country. </p>
<h2>What are people really up to?</h2>
<p>The pandemic has seen the birth of terms such as “<a href="https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=COVID%20Thirst">corona thirst</a>”, based on the assumption people are having more sex than usual due to all the extra time at home with nothing much to do. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lockdown-lust-lovehoney-survey-uncovers-more-than-half-54-of-american-couples-have-become-more-sexually-adventurous-during-the-covid-19-crisis-301082179.html">United States poll</a> released in June signalled a COVID-induced sexual enlightenment, with 54% of surveyed couples reporting they were being more adventurous in bed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-safest-sex-youll-never-have-how-coronavirus-is-changing-online-dating-134382">The safest sex you'll never have: how coronavirus is changing online dating</a>
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<p>The ABC has also recently reported an increase in <a href="https://amp.abc.net.au/article/12189202">sales at adult stores</a> and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-08/coronavirus-online-dating-apps-social-distancing-hinge-bumble/12128100">strong demand for dating apps</a>. Meanwhile, last month, Chemist Warehouse pointed to a <a href="https://www.triplem.com.au/story/are-we-about-to-experience-a-coronavirus-caused-baby-boom-162643">30% spike</a> in pregnancy test sales. </p>
<p>But despite all the hype, all signs point to fewer babies being born as a result of COVID-19, not more. For one thing, pregnancy test purchases are more likely to reflect women trying to avoid seeing a doctor in person, rather than a prelude to a boom. </p>
<h2>We do not have the necessary ingredients for a boom</h2>
<p>It takes more than sex (or more sex) to have a baby boom. The <a href="https://www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/councilarticles/pdr/PDR041Bongaarts.pdf">necessary ingredients</a> include more people partnering and reduced contraception use among couples and we are not seeing evidence of either of these things. </p>
<p>The fact that gathering places like pubs and bars are either closed or restricted is limiting opportunities to meet people and interact in real life. Decreased rates of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-20/coronavirus-shutdown-leads-to-apparent-drop-in-stis-in-canberra/12264908">sexually transmitted infections</a> point to a reduction in the formation of new relationships, regardless of the increased use of dating apps. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347894/original/file-20200716-19-7qd8c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Social distancing and lockdown has made it difficult for people to meet new partners.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">James Gourley/AAP</span></span>
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<p>And despite all the talk about adventurous sex, it’s also highly unlikely couples will suddenly decide to increase their intended family size. </p>
<p>For one thing, additional, forced time with loved ones <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-coronavirus-lockdown-could-test-your-relationship-heres-how-to-keep-it-intact-and-even-improve-it-134532">tends to strain</a>, not nurture, relationships. Rising domestic violence rates has also show the pandemic has <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/domestic-violence-on-the-rise-during-pandemic-20200712-p55b8q.html">been unsafe</a> for too many others.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/love-lockdown-the-pandemic-has-put-pressure-on-many-relationships-but-heres-how-to-tell-if-yours-will-survive-135824">Love lockdown: the pandemic has put pressure on many relationships, but here's how to tell if yours will survive</a>
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<p>All the uncertainty and socioeconomic scarcity - including the inability to have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-16/coronavirus-shopping-strips-supermarket-shelves-bare/12057924">basic needs, like toilet paper, met</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jul/16/scott-morrison-says-economy-fighting-back-despite-almost-a-million-unemployed">record unemployment</a> - also means even established, happy couples are likely to postpone having children. </p>
<p>It is important to note that birth rates <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/products/451BFD1C377B7908CA2577CF000DEF53?opendocument">dropped dramatically</a> during the Great Depression, from an average of around three births per woman to about two - a substantial decline in terms of magnitude and the time it took to fall. </p>
<p>This offers the most comparable historical event to COVID-19, given the expectation of long-term economic doldrums due to the pandemic. </p>
<h2>Headed for demographic disaster</h2>
<p>Australia’s birth rate of 1.74 births per woman is <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/F41B99AB234B2074CA25792F00161838?opendocument">already in decline</a>, down from 2.02 in 2008. We can expect COVID-19 to exacerbate this trend.</p>
<p>This is a huge worry. Because, if we fall to or below a birth rate of 1.5, this is well below replacement level and places the future tax base at risk. Simply put, we won’t have enough people to work and pay taxes and fund all the roads, hospitals and welfare initiatives we need to function as a country.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/solving-the-population-problem-through-policy-110970">Solving the 'population problem' through policy</a>
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<p>This is a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/underpopulation-problem/585568/">demographic disaster</a>, leading to declining socioeconomic well-being. Future generations will have to cover the bill for far more than we have had to, meaning the Australia they inherit will be worse off. </p>
<p>Even more worryingly, once birth rates fall to around 1.5, they don’t tend to bounce back, because social norms around children and family become ingrained <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-looks-to-relax-two-child-policy-but-it-wont-solve-demographic-problems-102518">even if there are incentives</a> to change.</p>
<p>While countries typically rely on increased immigration to balance <a href="https://theconversation.com/migration-helps-balance-our-ageing-population-we-dont-need-a-moratorium-100030">demographic and workforce needs</a>, this may not be possible in the same way, due to the pandemic.</p>
<h2>The individual impact</h2>
<p>For people who are hoping to have children in the near future, COVID-19 has presented new and no doubt stressful challenges. </p>
<p>Not only is it difficult to meet potential partners, but there have been extra constraints of accessing assisted reproductive technologies. Cancellation of elective surgery during the initial COVID-19 outbreak saw some IVF treatments <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-27/coronavirus-delays-causing-anguish-for-ivf-patients/12093450">postponed</a>.</p>
<p>Melbourne’s worsening pandemic situation is now likely to cause <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/ivf-sector-in-limbo-as-public-hospitals-hit-pause-on-some-elective-surgery-20200716-p55cnl.html">further IVF delays</a>.</p>
<p>Even with the resumption of IVF, prospective parents may have missed their chance to have a family or increase the size of the one they already have.</p>
<h2>Demographic ripples</h2>
<p>Not much is known about childlessness among men in Australia because the census doesn’t include this information and research typically focuses on women.</p>
<p>But we do know that at the <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/2016">2016 Census</a>, roughly 30% of women towards the end of their reproductive years aged between 30-44 years reported not having any children. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/she-wont-be-right-mate-how-the-government-shaped-a-blokey-lockdown-followed-by-a-blokey-recovery-140336">She won't be right, mate: how the government shaped a blokey lockdown followed by a blokey recovery</a>
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<p>Around half of these women would have been <a href="https://amp.smh.com.au/lifestyle/life-and-relationships/it-s-given-me-freedom-three-women-on-being-childless-by-choice-20190814-p52h6v.html">childfree by choice</a>, if the distribution from a 2013 Australian <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262525032_Why_are_childless_women_childless_Findings_from_an_exploratory_study_of_childless_women_in_Victoria_Australia/fulltext/577f64c208ae69ab8823ccd3/262525032_Why_are_childless_women_childless_Findings_from_an_exploratory_study_of_childless_women_in_Victoria_Australia.pdf?origin=publication_detail">qualitative study</a> was applied. </p>
<p>This roughly translates to around a quarter of a million women being childless against their choice, due to not having a partner or requiring assisted reproductive technology (including same-sex attracted women). </p>
<p>The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey also tells us people don’t have as many children as they plan to at the best of times. The number of children adults intend to have typically <a href="https://theconversation.com/family-size-intentions-the-missing-piece-of-australias-fertility-jigsaw-21069">reduces over time</a> as people realise and experience the barriers confronted by parents trying to juggle paid work, family and life.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/347909/original/file-20200716-21-uf5sir.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Families may not be able to expand as they planned, due to coronavirus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
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<p>All these factors, combined with these raw numbers, conservatively suggests thousands of women will be left stranded in their childbearing years. While some of course may still have children down the track, for others, the window for childbearing will close sooner and more definitively because of COVID-19.</p>
<p>For some existing parents, they will not have as many additional children as they hoped for. </p>
<p>This is a heartbreaking individual outcome, as well as one that will send ripples into the nation’s future demography.</p>
<h2>Demographic recovery</h2>
<p>Post-coronavirus recovery requires comprehensive efforts to build and invest in the demographic capital of the nation, now and into the future. </p>
<p>This means we need to help families achieve their intended family size. The provision of <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-a-new-childcare-system-that-encourages-women-to-work-not-punishes-them-for-it-142275">accessible childcare</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-the-coronavirus-supplement-stops-jobseeker-needs-to-increase-by-185-a-week-138417">adequate support</a> for the long-term unemployed and financial supports for <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-05/fertility-adds-ons-a-waste-a-money-according-to-some-experts/11004434?nw=0">people accessing IVF</a> are just starters. </p>
<p>It’s going to be a rough road ahead. Sadly, for many Australians, it will be marked by significant personal heartache, with the ripple effects felt at a population level.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Allen is a council member of the Australian Population Association and author of The Future Of Us.</span></em></p>Despite the hype about a “coronial” baby boom, the pandemic is likely to see many Australians delay or not have children at all.Liz Allen, Demographer, ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1263622019-11-17T05:30:07Z2019-11-17T05:30:07ZWhat’s driving Africa’s population growth. And what can change it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301538/original/file-20191113-77338-17i26en.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mother walking her child home from school in Uganda. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Population growth rates continue to pose lingering challenges to development efforts on the continent. The population of Africa is expected to <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rstb.2010.0133">roughly double by 2050</a>. This will add 1.2 billion people to Africa’s 2019 population of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/population/index.html">1.3 billion people</a>. </p>
<p>What’s driving population growth on the continent, and what can be done to slow the trend, is one of the subjects that will be addressed this week at the <a href="http://uaps-uepa.org/8th-apc/">8th African Population Conference</a> in Entebbe in Uganda. A focus of the debate will be the role of <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/568e/4bc9a69b88f3340e0133299a8e1c6b23327d.pdf?_ga=2.168981537.1279742847.1572539845-1188694526.1572539845%20%22">behavioural nudges</a> – interventions designed to change people’s behaviour – and incentives in achieving demographic transition in Africa. </p>
<p>On the table will be the question: can, and should, incentives and nudges be used to effect changes in fertility patterns on the continent? Some of the issues that will be considered include: the ethical implications of incentivising behaviour; whether incentives and nudges work, and under what conditions; which specific incentives and nudges are recommended; who incentives should target, and why. </p>
<p>These questions can best be answered by considering the key drivers of population growth in Africa. The main one is <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6386713/pdf/pnas.201717288.pdf">high fertility</a> which is driven by <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4011385/pdf/nihms563684.pdf">multiple factors</a>, including high desired family size, low levels of use of modern contraceptives, and high levels of adolescent childbearing.</p>
<h2>The drivers</h2>
<p>The average woman in Africa today has about <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/world-fertility-patterns-2015.pdf#page=3">4.7 children</a>. This varies significantly from 2.5 in southern Africa to between 5.5 and 5.8 in central and western Africa. The average in other parts of the world is 2.2 or less, with a global average of 2.5 children per woman.</p>
<p>One of the reasons women in Africa still have so many children is that the average age at which they become mothers for the first time is more than 4 years earlier than the global average of 26. And adolescent birth rates are very high. In central and western Africa, for example, it is almost <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/world-fertility-patterns-2015.pdf">three times the global average</a>. </p>
<p>The role that an early start in childbearing plays in rapid population growth is generally ignored. This is a mistake because of its multiple effects in increasing population growth. For example, it directly affects fertility through increased duration of exposure to the risk of childbearing.</p>
<p>It also has indirect effects. Firstly, women who start childbearing earlier may have less capacity to decide on, or negotiate, their reproductive outcomes. They may also lack opportunities such as formal education, because it competes with childbearing. </p>
<p>Secondly, the early onset of childbearing leads to shorter inter-generational gaps. This is defined as the age difference between mothers and daughters. This compounds population growth rates. </p>
<p>Delaying the start of marriage and childbearing – which largely occur together in most African countries – could significantly reduce the rate of population growth. This would be the case even without any change in fertility behaviours.</p>
<p>Another driver revolves around family planning. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/family/WFP2017_Highlights.pdf">one in four women</a> on the continent have an unmet need for family planning. Unmet need refers to the proportion of sexually active women who want to stop – or delay childbearing for at least two years – but are not using any modern contraceptive methods. Supporting women to achieve their fertility intentions can significantly reduce population growth. </p>
<p>There’s also evidence that half of the differences in fertility between countries in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions is due to differences in <a href="https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/3801512.pdf">family planning programme efforts and social settings</a>. Changing social settings can significantly improve the impact of making contraceptives more available in reducing population growth.</p>
<p>Ways in which social settings can be changed include providing support for family planning as well as community-based distribution of contraceptive services. Making family planning services available can stimulate use of such services even among <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4356272/pdf/014.pdf">disadvantaged</a>, poor, illiterate and rural women. </p>
<p>Addressing these gaps can help meet women’s needs in Africa and significantly slow population growth rates on the continent.</p>
<h2>The debates about nudges</h2>
<p>Globally, efforts to support changes in individual reproductive behaviour have emphasised the value of individual choice. But in some instances, attempts have been made to induce changes in fertility behaviour through different incentives – and disincentives. </p>
<p>At the extreme are coercive policies. Examples include <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/one-child-policy">the one child policy in China</a> and involuntary sterilisation of mainly poor women in <a href="https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/11/sterilization-in-india-11-women-die-in-a-state-sponsored-attempt-at-family-planning.html">India</a>. But most of the attempts at (dis)incentivising fertility behaviours are more subtle. They can include financial disincentives and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3578697/pdf/nihms-389707.pdf">incentives to promote family planning</a> or <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5434945/pdf/SIFP-47-309.pdf">paying for performance to improve the delivery and uptake of family planning</a>. In some countries, such as Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6662603/pdf/SIFP-49-295.pdf">cash transfer programmes</a> have been tried. </p>
<p>Other attempts, largely <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/568e/4bc9a69b88f3340e0133299a8e1c6b23327d.pdf?_ga=2.168981537.1279742847.1572539845-1188694526.1572539845">nudges</a>, aim to influence fertility behaviour without forbidding any previously available courses of actions, or making alternatives appreciably more costly in terms of time, money, or social sanctions. These interventions also don’t deny individuals freedom of choice.</p>
<p>Using financial incentives and nudges to effect changes are not without concerns. Ethics, for example, are a big issue and continue to be <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1966792.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aea1930144bd87f920a30f26d95f0be03">debated</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that high fertility behaviours are rooted in strongly held religious and cultural beliefs and narratives <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1971973?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">needs to be taken into account</a> by those in authority. </p>
<p>Another ethical issue is around economics of incentives. Incentives can affect differently the decisions that poor and rich families make. It’s therefore important not to impose interventions that force people into <a href="https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/11/sterilization-in-india-11-women-die-in-a-state-sponsored-attempt-at-family-planning.html">impossible situations</a>, as was the case in India.</p>
<p>Governments also face ethical dilemmas because of the contradiction between ensuring protection of the rights of individuals to decide on the number of children to have, and protecting the welfare of the larger community and achieving national development goals that may require slower <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/E_CONF.60_19_Plan.pdf">population growth rates</a>.</p>
<p>It’s imperative that African policy makers use interventions that are effective, practical and ethically sound. Contextual information should be sought before implementing incentive-based – and potentially controversial – programmes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>High fertility is driven by a number of factors including desired family size, low levels of use of modern contraceptives, and high levels of adolescent childbearing.Alex Ezeh, Dornsife Endowed Professor of Global Health, Drexel UniversityGarumma Tolu Feyissa, Researcher Dornsife School of Public Health, Drexel UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1173372019-05-21T10:01:20Z2019-05-21T10:01:20ZA global survey sheds new light on how bad events affect young people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275613/original/file-20190521-23820-c080bv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burnt shacks after a fire in a Mumbai slums. Adolescents are deeply affected by traumatic events in their lives.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The percentage of the world’s population that’s aged between 10 and 24 is growing exponentially. It currently <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/publications/state-world-population-2013">makes up a quarter</a> of the world’s population: that’s 1.8 billion people. So it’s increasingly important to understand how people in this age group are affected by events. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54431bbee4b0ba652295db6e/t/5ce2b9b53fdc1e0001552ec8/1558362550220/ACEs+Paper.pdf">major new study</a> based on surveys done in multiple countries – ranging from Vietnam, China, Bolivia, Egypt, India and Kenya to the UK and the US – across five continents provides groundbreaking insights into the impact that adverse events have on children. The study catalogued the adverse childhood experiences suffered by 1,284 adolescents aged 10 to 14 in “low-income urban settings” around the world. These adverse events include physical and emotional neglect, violence, and sexual abuse. </p>
<p>This is the first global study to investigate how a cluster of adverse childhood experiences work together to cause specific health issues in early adolescence – and have terrible, life-long consequences. </p>
<p>The research found remarkably common experiences with trauma, and very similar impacts, regardless of where the children lived. It found that there was a strong association with both adolescent depression and violence perpetrated by young people. </p>
<p>Other findings included that young girls often suffer significantly. But, contrary to common belief, boys reported even greater exposure to violence and neglect. This makes them more likely to be violent in return.</p>
<p>The study was a major collaboration between the World Health Organisation and the Bloomberg School of Public Health. It aimed to understand more about the development of gender stereotypes in early adolescence and their impact on adolescent health around the world. </p>
<p>The findings buttress a <a href="https://www.geastudy.org/new-blog/bellagioreport">soon to be released report</a> reflecting the assessment of 22 experts from 15 countries. They argue that the world will never achieve gender equality by focusing on girls and women alone and excluding boys and men. This has major implications for both international and national policies.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Overall, the study found that 46% of young adolescents reported experiencing violence, 38% suffered emotional neglect and 29% experienced physical neglect. </p>
<p>Consistent with the <a href="https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/207725">literature</a>, we observed that girls tend to exhibit greater internalising behaviours. These include depression and contemplation. Boys tend to show greater externalising behaviours, such as poor behaviour regulation and aggression.</p>
<p>Boys stood out in several categories. They were more likely to report physical neglect, sexual abuse and violence victimisation. </p>
<p>For both boys and girls, the more adversity they experienced, the more likely they were to engage in violent behaviour. This included bullying, threatening or hitting someone. </p>
<p>But the effect of the adversity was more pronounced for boys than girls: boys were 11 times more likely to be engaged in violence, while girls were four times more likely to be violent. The study also found that, in general, the cumulative effect of their traumas tended to produce higher levels of depressive symptoms among girls than boys. Boys, meanwhile, tended to show more external aggression than girls.</p>
<p>In many countries, adolescent boys are <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0136321">more likely to smoke and drink</a>. They are also more prone to both unintentional and intentional injury and death in the second decade of life than their female counterparts. </p>
<p>Conversely, one quarter of adolescent girls worldwide are married by age 18 years. And two million births annually are to girls aged younger than 15 years, while girls’ secondary school education still lags behind boys (56%-63%). Also, social and vocational opportunities are frequently more constrained for girls.</p>
<h2>The whole story</h2>
<p>But these statistics tell only part of the story. </p>
<p>While the data are cast in terms of gender disadvantage, that disadvantage is not equally distributed across the socioeconomic spectrum. In low- and high-income countries alike, those at the bottom of the ladder are more likely to leave school earlier, have children earlier, and marry earlier. </p>
<p>Poverty and gender inequality together conspire to disadvantage large segments of the adolescent population. To achieve gender equality, we need to redefine the problem as a “gender”, not women’s and girls’, issue. And, as we point out in the report, the evidence is strong that the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>links between gender equality and life satisfaction among adults suggest that men as well as women benefit from high levels of societal gender equality. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Our study offers a unique multinational examination of adverse childhood experiences in early adolescence. Its findings show high rates of exposure experienced by young adolescents in resource poor neighbourhoods in low and middle-income countries. Similarly, it shows strong associations between adverse childhood experiences and both depressive symptoms and violence perpetration. </p>
<p>Interventions are often focused on behaviours (such as violence) or clinical symptoms (such as depression). But this new research suggests there’s a need to understand childhood exposure to adversity. We conclude that adverse childhood experiences should be included routinely in behavioural research of adolescents. </p>
<p>The study also suggests that research, practice, and policy efforts to address adverse childhood experiences in early adolescence may be critical to reducing adolescent morbidities and to achieving the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals and the <a href="https://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/topics/adolescence/framework-accelerated-action/en/">World Health Organisation’s Accelerated Action for the Health of Adolescents</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117337/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert W. Blum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The data suggest that boys experience as much disadvantage as girls.Robert W. Blum, Director, Johns Hopkins Urban Health Institute, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/965232018-07-13T07:03:17Z2018-07-13T07:03:17ZFactCheck: is Australia’s population the ‘highest-growing in the world’?<blockquote>
<p>We’re the highest-growing country in the world, with 1.6% increase, and that’s double than a lot of other countries.</p>
<p><strong>– One Nation leader Pauline Hanson, <a href="https://twitter.com/SkyNewsAust/status/994398072569413633">interview</a> on Sky News Australia, May 9 2018</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>One Nation leader Pauline Hanson has <a href="https://twitter.com/PaulineHansonOz/status/1012137057756430337">proposed</a> a plebiscite be held in tandem with the next federal election to allow voters to have “a say in the level of migration coming into Australia”.</p>
<p>Hanson <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_5782800010001">has</a> <a href="https://www.2gb.com/let-the-people-have-their-say-senator-pauline-hanson-calls-for-plebiscite-on-immigration/">suggested</a> cutting Australia’s <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/20planning">Migration Program</a> cap from the current 190,000 people per year to around 75,000-100,000 per year.</p>
<p>On <a href="https://twitter.com/SkyNewsAust/status/994398072569413633">Sky News</a>, Hanson said Australia is “the highest-growing country in the world”.</p>
<p>The senator added that, at 1.6%, Australia’s population growth was “double [that of] a lot of other countries”.</p>
<p>Are those statements correct?</p>
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
<p>In response to The Conversation’s request for sources and comment, a spokesperson for Hanson said the senator “talks about population growth in the context of our high level of immigration because, in recent years, immigration has accounted for around 60% of Australia’s population growth”.</p>
<p>The spokesperson added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3412.0/">Australian Bureau of Statistics migration data for 2015-16</a> show that Australians born overseas represent 28% of the population, far higher than comparable countries like Canada (22%), UK (13%) or the US (14%).</p>
<p><a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW">World Bank data for 2017</a> show that Australia’s population growth was 1.6%, much higher than comparable countries with immigration programs like Canada (1.2%), the UK (0.6%) and the US (0.7%). </p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>One Nation leader Pauline Hanson was correct to say Australia’s population grew by 1.6% in the year to June 2017. But she was incorrect to say Australia is “the highest-growing country in the world”.</p>
<p>According to the most accurate international data, the country with the fastest-growing population is Oman, on the Arabian Peninsula.</p>
<p>Hanson said Australia’s 1.6% population growth was “double than a lot of other countries”. It is fair to say Australia’s population growth rate is double that of many other countries, including the United States (0.7%) and United Kingdom (0.7%), for example.</p>
<p>Since Hanson’s statement, Australia’s population growth rate for the period ending June 2017 has been revised upwards to 1.7%. But Hanson’s number was correct at the time of her statement, and the revision doesn’t change the outcome of this FactCheck.</p>
<p>In terms of the 35 countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Luxembourg was the fastest-growing country in 2016, with Australia coming in fifth.</p>
<p>Caution must be used when making international population comparisons. It’s important to put the growth rates in the context of the total size, density and demographic makeup of the population, and the economic stage of the country. </p>
<hr>
<h2>How do we calculate population growth?</h2>
<p>A country’s population growth, or decline, is determined by the change in the estimated number of residents. Those changes include the number of births and deaths (known as natural increase), and net overseas migration.</p>
<p>In Australia, both temporary and permanent overseas migrants are included in the calculation of population size.</p>
<p>According to Australian Bureau of Statistics data, Australia’s population <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/3101.0Main%20Features2Jun%202017?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3101.0&issue=Jun%202017&num=&view=">grew by 1.6%</a> in the year to June 2017 – as Hanson said. </p>
<p>Since Hanson’s statement, Australia’s population growth rate for the period ending June 2017 has been <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Dec%202017?OpenDocument">revised upwards to 1.7%</a>. But, as said in the verdict, Hanson’s number was correct at the time of her statement, and the revision doesn’t change any of the other outcomes of this FactCheck.</p>
<p>That’s an increase of 407,000 people in a population of 24.6 million.</p>
<p>All states and territories recorded positive population growth in the year to June 2017. Victoria had the fastest growth rate (2.4%) and South Australia recorded the slowest growth rate (0.6%).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-is-south-australias-youth-population-rising-or-falling-92995">FactCheck: is South Australia's youth population rising or falling?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Is Australia’s population the ‘highest-growing in the world’?</h2>
<p>No, it’s not. </p>
<p>There are <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/a3121120.nsf/home/statistical+language+-+estimate+and+projection">different ways</a> of reporting population data. </p>
<p><em>Population projections</em> are statements about future populations based on certain assumptions regarding the future of births, deaths and migration. </p>
<p><em>Population estimates</em> are statistics based on data from a population for a previous time period. Population estimates provide a more accurate representation of actual dynamics.</p>
<p>World Bank data for 2016 (based on population estimates) provide us with the most accurate international comparison. </p>
<p>According to those data, Australia’s growth rate – 1.5% for 2016 – placed it at 86th in the world. The top 10 countries grew by between 3% and 5%.</p>
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<h2>How does Australia’s growth compare to other OECD countries?</h2>
<p>Comparison of Australia’s average annual population growth with <a href="http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/#d.en.194378">other OECD countries</a> shows Australia’s rate of population growth is among the highest in the OECD, but not the highest.</p>
<p>This is true whether we look at annual averages for five-year bands between 1990 and 2015, or single-year data.</p>
<p>Looking again at the World Bank data, Australia’s rate of population growth for 2016, at 1.5%, was double that of many other OECD countries, including the United Kingdom (0.7%) and United States (0.7%). </p>
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<h2>Permanent v temporary migration levels</h2>
<p>Hanson has <a href="https://www.onenation.org.au/pauline-proposes-peoples-vote-on-immigration/?utm_source=Mailing+Subscribers&utm_campaign=032db92c43-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_01_25_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4f8178d36d-032db92c43-117107263&goal=0_4f8178d36d-032db92c43-117107263&mc_cid=032db92c43&mc_eid=56574ed782">proposed a national vote</a> on what she describes as Australia’s “runaway rates of immigration”.</p>
<p>The senator has suggested reducing Australia’s Migration Program cap from the current level of <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/20planning">190,000 people per year</a> to <a href="https://www.2gb.com/let-the-people-have-their-say-senator-pauline-hanson-calls-for-plebiscite-on-immigration/">75,000-100,000 people per year</a>. The expected intake of <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/20planning">190,000</a> permanent migrants <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2017/November/Behind_the_Numbers_-_the_2016-17_Migration_Programme">was not met</a> over the last few years. Permanent migration for 2017-18 has dropped to <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/duttons-vetting-drive-slashes-20000-from-migrant-intake/news-story/a0510c51e8be5411e421f1792c847a41">162,400 people</a>, due to changes in vetting processes. </p>
<p>The greatest contribution to the growth of the Australian population (63%) comes from overseas migration, as Hanson’s office noted in their response to The Conversation.</p>
<p>The origin countries of migrants are <a href="https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/107/2018/04/Shaping-a-Nation-1.pdf">becoming more diverse</a>, posing socioeconomic benefits and infrastructure challenges for Australia.</p>
<p>Sometimes people confuse <em>net overseas migration</em> (the total of all people moving in and out of Australia in a certain time frame), with <em>permanent</em> migration (the number of people who come to Australia to live). They are <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/MigrationStatistics">not the same thing</a>.</p>
<p>Net overseas migration includes temporary migration. And net overseas migration is included in population data. This means our population growth reflects our permanent population, plus more.</p>
<p>Temporary migrants are a <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3412.0Main%20Features52015-16?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3412.0&issue=2015-16&num=&view=%20%22%22">major contributor</a> to population growth in Australia – in particular, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-18/australia-hosting-unprecedented-numbers-international-students/9669030">international students</a>.</p>
<p>In the <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3412.0Main%20Features52015-16?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3412.0&issue=2015-16&num=&view=%20%22%22">most recent data</a> (2014-15), net temporary migrants numbered just under 132,000, a figure that included just over 77,000 net temporary students.</p>
<p>The international student market is Australia’s <a href="http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-statistics/trade-in-goods-and-services/Pages/australias-trade-in-goods-and-services-2017.aspx">third-largest export</a>.</p>
<h2>Looking back at Australia’s population growth</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-doesnt-have-a-population-policy-why-78183">Population changes</a> track the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/aehr.12068">history</a> of the nation. This includes events like post-war rebuilding – including the baby boom and resettlement of displaced European nationals – to subsequent fluctuations in birth rates and net overseas migration. </p>
<p>We can see these events reflected in the rates of growth from 1945 to the present.</p>
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<p>The rate of population growth in Australia increased markedly in 2007, before peaking at 2.1% in 2009 (after the height of the <a href="https://www.rba.gov.au/education/resources/explainers/the-global-financial-crisis.html">global financial crisis</a>, in which the Australian economy fared better than many others).</p>
<p>Since 2009, annual population growth has bounced around between a low of 1.4% and a high of 1.8%.</p>
<p>The longer-term average for population growth rates since 1947 is 1.6% (the same as it is now).</p>
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<h2>Interpreting population numbers</h2>
<p>It’s worth remembering that a higher annual growth rate coming from a lower population base is usually still lower growth in terms of actual numbers of people, when compared to a lower growth rate on a higher population base.</p>
<p>There can also be significant fluctuations in population growth rates from year to year. So we need to use caution when making assessments based on changes in annual rates.</p>
<p>Economic factors, government policies, and special events are just some of the things that can influence year-on-year population movements.</p>
<p>Other factors we should consider when making international comparisons include the: </p>
<ul>
<li>total size of the population</li>
<li>population density</li>
<li>demographic composition, or age distribution, of the population</li>
<li>economic stage of the country (for example, post-industrialisation or otherwise).</li>
</ul>
<p>Any changes to the <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/discussion-papers/managing-australias-migrant-intake.pdf">Migration Program</a> should be considered alongside the best available research. <strong>– Liz Allen</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Blind review</h2>
<p>The FactCheck is fair and correct.</p>
<p>The statement about Australia’s population growth rate over the year to June 30 2017 is correct. The preliminary growth rate published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at the time of Hanson’s statement was 1.60%; the rate was subsequently revised to 1.68%. </p>
<p>It is also true that many developed countries have lower population growth rates than Australia, but some have higher rates. According to <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/">United Nations Population Division</a> estimates, Oman had the fastest-growing population between 2014 and 2015 (the latest data available).</p>
<p>With regard to misinterpretations of net overseas migration, it should also be stated that some people think this refers to the number of people migrating <em>to</em> Australia. It is actually immigration minus emigration – the difference between the number arriving and the number leaving. <strong>– Tom Wilson</strong></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Conversation FactCheck is accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>The Conversation’s FactCheck unit was the first fact-checking team in Australia and one of the first worldwide to be accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network, an alliance of fact-checkers hosted at the Poynter Institute in the US. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversations-factcheck-granted-accreditation-by-international-fact-checking-network-at-poynter-74363">Read more here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Have you seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">checkit@theconversation.edu.au</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96523/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Allen is a national council member of the Australian Population Association.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Wilson receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>One Nation leader Pauline Hanson said Australia is “the highest-growing country in the world”, with population growth “double than a lot of other countries”. Is that right?Liz Allen, Demographer, ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/947892018-05-08T10:46:50Z2018-05-08T10:46:50ZWhat Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein teaches us about the need for mothers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217974/original/file-20180507-46341-1ckau0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Frankenstein's monster in the Hollywood Wax Museum. The fictional character first appeared in Mary Shelley's novel in 1818.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/763424533?src=H_fynK5q3mYVw9RRdY2D6g-1-0&size=huge_jpg">www.shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Motherhood is getting considerable attention, even if much of the news is concerning. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-rate-is-down-yet-more-women-are-mothers.html">Fertility rates</a> are falling in America as millennials decide not to have children. This should hardly come as a surprise. The cost of raising a child to adulthood has been <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/09/pf/cost-of-raising-a-child-2015/index.html">increasing</a> and <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N">real median household income</a> has only just regained its 1999 level. </p>
<p>At this time, when it could be argued that maternity is in decline, <a href="https://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/frankenstein/MShelley/bio">Mary Shelley’s</a> classic work of literature, “Frankenstein,” celebrating its 200th anniversary this year, invites us to reflect on the deeper importance of mothers in our lives. </p>
<p>Shelley, who published the work at the age of only 19, had many reasons to make motherhood a major theme. Her mother, the feminist <a href="http://knarf.english.upenn.edu/Wollston/bio.html">Mary Wollstonecraft</a>, had died from complications arising from her birth. Shelley’s own attempts at motherhood would result in multiple miscarriages and the deaths of three children. Not surprisingly, mothers in “Frankenstein” are conspicuous by their absence – with disastrous consequences.</p>
<h2>The creation of Frankenstein</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=927&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=927&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217960/original/file-20180507-46335-8wuihg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=927&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Portrait of Mary Shelley.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RothwellMaryShelley.jpg">Richard Rothwell</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Frankenstein tells the tale of young scientist Victor Frankenstein, who is so horrified at the prospect of death that he seeks a means of restoring life to the deceased. He creates an 8-foot-tall humanoid creature, whose appearance renders it loathsome to all and to which he never gives a proper name. Spurned by its creator, the creature develops a desire for revenge and soon takes the lives of everyone dear to Victor. </p>
<p>At numerous points, the novel highlights the devastating effects of maternal absence.</p>
<p>To begin with, mothers in Frankenstein are quite short-lived. Victor Frankenstein’s mother, an orphan, dies of scarlet fever while nursing Victor’s “cousin” and eventual wife, Elizabeth. While on their honeymoon, Elizabeth too is killed by the monster. Justine, the Frankensteins’ housekeeper, is falsely convicted of the murder of Victor’s younger brother, also grows up motherless.</p>
<p>Frankenstein’s most dramatic instance of motherlessness is the monster itself, a human being created by a man alone. Reflecting on this feat, Victor remarks that “no father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely” as he would deserve of the new race of creatures he sought to create. </p>
<p>Simply put, he devises a new way of bestowing life that completely sidesteps the need for conception, pregnancy and childbirth.</p>
<p>Yet Victor had not done away entirely with the need for maternity. For though he had “selected the creature’s features as beautiful,” the moment he beholds it stirring, he recoils. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unbound by any maternal affection or calling, Victor is “unable to endure” the being he had created and rushes out of the room. His creation was never part of him, and he feels at liberty to abandon it.</p>
<h2>When the creator matters more</h2>
<p>The roots of the problem lie largely in the fact that Victor has moved procreation from the domain of the natural – the purview of Mother Nature – to that of the technological. </p>
<p>His quest is a purely scientific one – a study of chemistry, anatomy and the decay of the human body. It is so devoid of any regard for the sanctity of life that Victor came to regard a churchyard as nothing more than a “receptacle of bodies deprived of life,” implying that a living child might be little more than a body not yet deprived of life.</p>
<p>To him, there is nothing mysterious about life and death. The animation of lifeless matter looms before him as nothing more than a daunting but purely technical challenge. He dreams of the power “to renew life” and becomes so engrossed in this one pursuit that his eyes “become insensible to the charms of nature,” including the unfolding of the seasons around him. A “single great object” swallows up “every habit of his nature.” In short, his scientific quest has left him with no appreciation for life’s beauty and mystery.</p>
<p>What long reigned as one of the most mysterious and awe-inspiring experiences in human life – the birth of a human being – has in Victor’s mind become little more than proof of his own greatness:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I was surprised that among so many men of genius who had directed their enquiries toward the same science, I alone should be reserved to discover so astonishing a secret.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>To Victor, the act of creation says much less about the creature than the creator.</p>
<p>Devoid of the feminine, bringing forth new life becomes a completely masculine act, an exercise of mastery and control over a reluctant but ultimately compliant nature. Victor’s cold detachment from his creation contrasts sharply with the experience of childbirth as described by those who have been through it – a description not of conquest but endurance and the unfolding of something that resists control. </p>
<h2>The experience of labor and birth</h2>
<p>Consider this account of labor by the 20th-century activist Dorothy Day in her <a href="http://www.catholicworker.org/dorothyday/articles/583.pdf">essay</a>, “Having a Baby: A Christmas Story”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Where before there had been waves, there were now tidal waves. Earthquake and fire swept my body. My spirit was a battleground on which thousands were butchered in a most horrible manner.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is not difficult to imagine Day having just read Frankenstein’s account of bringing forth new life when she penned these lines about men giving birth: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“‘What do they know about it, the idiots?’ I thought. And it gave me pleasure to imagine one of them in the throes of childbirth. How they would groan and holler and rebel. And wouldn’t they make everybody else miserable around them?” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In Day’s account, gestation and child birth are not like pushing buttons on a control panel but a journey along which the mother is swept – something she does not so much choose as endure. And when it is over, she is presented with a baby fashioned less by her than in her and through her. The form of the baby, from its generic sex to its distinctive features, is a joyful surprise even to the woman who has served as the home of its development for over three-quarters of a year. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217964/original/file-20180507-46353-15dbio9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dorothy Day in a 1916 photo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Dorothy_Day_1916.jpg">Unknown photographer</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Victor, the process is quite different. He too is surprised, but his surprise reflects the fact that, although he has in fact painstakingly selected each of the creature’s features, the end result turns out radically different from what he envisioned. He thought every aspect of the creature was subject to his control, but instead of a superman he has produced a monster. His horror is magnified by the fact that his creature is his product, while Dorothy Day receives her daughter as something more akin to a gift.</p>
<h2>What does a mother add?</h2>
<p>Thanks to “Frankenstein,” we can pose a question the answer to which would have seemed obvious throughout most of the course of human history: What does a mother add? The answer, in simplest terms, is that mothers add to life something that Victor Frankenstein – who treats the whole process of creation as nothing more than a challenge to his own ingenuity – is unable even to recognize, let alone wield: the power of a love that puts creature before creator.</p>
<p>Victor has made something new, but it was never a part of him, and from the moment he lays eyes on it he seeks to disassociate himself from it. Because the creature’s appearance disappoints him, he feels within his rights to turn his back on it – to abandon it to a world utterly unprepared to receive it. The circumstances of the creature’s birth may be monstrous, but it is not yet a monstrosity. Only by depriving it of any semblance of love does Victor create a true monster.</p>
<p>By showing us a world from which mothers are largely absent, Mary Shelley reminds us that the genius of motherhood lies less in biological reproduction than in the capacity to love. Human beings need love to develop and thrive. We honor this capacity of mothers when we say that someone has a face that “only a mother could love.” </p>
<p>Perhaps Victor’s creature would never had developed into a monster in the first place, if only it had enjoyed the love of a mother.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Gunderman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By showing us a world from which mothers are largely absent, Mary Shelley reminds us that the genius of motherhood lies less in biological reproduction than in the capacity to love.Richard Gunderman, Chancellor's Professor of Medicine, Liberal Arts, and Philanthropy, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/929952018-03-17T03:48:45Z2018-03-17T03:48:45ZFactCheck: is South Australia’s youth population rising or falling?<blockquote>
<p><strong>Nick Xenophon:</strong> The key issue here – and what I find most galling and emblematic of what is wrong – is we now have fewer young people in South Australia than we did 36 years ago, when our population was 400,000 fewer.</p>
<p><strong>Jay Weatherill:</strong> And Nick – you’ve done it before. You’ve said that there are fewer young people here than there were in 1982. You know what you need to do to actually reach that conclusion? </p>
<p>You take the high point in 1981 – it falls all the way to 2002. Since 2002 to now, it’s grown by 36,000.</p>
<p>Sure, it’s less than 1981-82 now, but you have to ignore the fact that, under the entire life of this government, it has actually grown, the number of young people has grown.</p>
<p><strong>– SA Best leader Nick Xenophon and Premier Jay Weatherill, speaking at the <a href="https://iview.abc.net.au/programs/sa-votes-leaders-debate/NS1806S001S00">SA Votes: Leaders’ Debate</a>, Adelaide, March 5, 2018</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>In a leaders’ debate ahead of the South Australian election, Premier Jay Weatherill and SA Best leader Nick Xenophon disagreed over the extent to which young people were leaving the state in search of better opportunities. </p>
<p>Xenophon claimed that “we now have fewer young people in South Australia than we did 36 years ago, when our population was 400,000 fewer”. </p>
<p>Weatherill agreed that there are fewer young people in South Australia now than there were in 1981-82, but said that in quoting that figure, Xenophon had ignored “the fact that, under the entire life of this [Labor] government … the number of young people has grown”.</p>
<p>Were the leaders right? And what’s behind these trends?</p>
<h2>Checking the sources</h2>
<p>In response to a request for sources and comment, a spokesperson for Xenophon pointed The Conversation to the 2017 Deloitte report <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/Documents/future-of-cities/deloitte-future-of-cities-make-it-adelaide-280717.pdf">Shaping Future Cities: Make it big Adelaide</a>, which states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fewer people aged between 15 and 34 live in South Australia today than in the mid-1980s, despite the fact that the population has increased by around 340,000 people in that time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The claim Xenophon made during the debate echoed a quote from an <a href="https://sabest.org.au/state-policies/growing-sa/">SA Best policy document</a>, which states that there are “fewer young people – 18-to-34 year olds – living in South Australia today than 35 years ago”, and that this is “emblematic of the state’s decline”. So we’ll take 18-34 as Xenophon’s reference point. </p>
<p>A spokesperson for Jay Weatherill referred The Conversation to a <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/saces/docs/issues-papers/saces-economic-issues-49.pdf">2018 report</a> from the South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, and pointed to Australian Bureau of Statistics data showing that in the 0-24 age group, there was a decrease of 53,395 people between 1982 and 2002, followed by an <em>increase</em> of 36,742 people between 2002 (when Labor was returned to office under) and June 2017.</p>
<p>You can read the full response from Weatherill’s spokesperson <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-response-from-a-spokesperson-for-jay-weatherill-for-a-factcheck-on-young-people-in-south-australia-93431">here</a>. </p>
<hr>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>During a South Australian leaders’ debate, SA Best leader Nick Xenophon and Premier Jay Weatherill provided different narratives about youth population trends. </p>
<p>Xenophon said “we now have fewer young people in South Australia than we did 36 years ago, when our population was 400,000 fewer” – a statistic he said was “emblematic” of employment issues in the state.</p>
<p>Both leaders used different definitions of “young people”.</p>
<p>Using SA Best’s own definition, Xenophon was incorrect. There were more people aged 18 to 34 in South Australia in 1982 than today. However, based on Weatherill’s definition (people 0 to 24 years), and another relevant definition (people 15 to 24 years), Xenophon’s statement is correct.</p>
<p>Weatherill was correct to say that since 2002, “under the entire life of this [Labor] government … the <em>number</em> of young people has grown”. </p>
<p>The <em>proportion</em> of young people in South Australia’s total population (across all three definitions) has declined since the early 1980s, but the decline has slowed since 2002.</p>
<p>However, none of the numbers are a simple reflection of the failure or success of government policies. There are also a number of longer term economic and social trends at play.</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<h2>How do we define ‘young people’?</h2>
<p>There’s no single definition of “young people” – and as you would expect, different definitions provide different outcomes.</p>
<p>During the campaign, the relevant policy document from Xenophon’s SA Best party <a href="https://sabest.org.au/state-policies/growing-sa/">described</a> “young people” as being between the ages of <a href="https://sabest.org.au/state-policies/growing-sa/">18 and 34</a>.</p>
<p>Weatherill used a definition of young people as those aged between 0 and 24. (Keeping in mind that young people aged 0-17 are unlikely to leave the state of their own accord).</p>
<p>Each leader chose to highlight the numbers that best supported their own narrative.</p>
<p>Another way of examining this issue is to look at young people aged 15-24.</p>
<p>This is an age when many young people become independent, and may move away from South Australia to finish their education or find employment. </p>
<p>So here are the age ranges we’ll be looking at:</p>
<ul>
<li>0-24 year olds (Weatherill’s definition)</li>
<li>15-24 year olds (highly mobile demographic), and </li>
<li>18-34 year olds (Xenophon’s definition).</li>
</ul>
<h2>Did the leaders quote their numbers correctly?</h2>
<p>Xenophon said “we now have fewer young people in South Australia than we did 36 years ago, when our population was 400,000 fewer”.</p>
<p>According to Census data, South Australia’s population in 1981 was 1,285,042. In 2016, the Census recorded 1,676,653 people – a difference of 391,611. </p>
<p>Given that Xenophon was speaking in a live debate, rounding this number up to 400,000 is understandable. </p>
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<p>In 1982, there were around 378,000 people aged 18-34 in South Australia, compared to just over 390,000 in 2017. In terms of <em>raw numbers</em>, that’s an increase of around 12,000 people. So on those calculations (using his own definition), Xenophon was incorrect.</p>
<p>However, based on the numbers for 0 to 24 year olds (Weatherill’s definition), and 15 to 24 year olds, Xenophon’s statement is correct.</p>
<p>The <em>proportion</em> of 18-34 year olds also fell from around 28% of the total population in 1982, to around about 23% in 2017.</p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4bzZh/3/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" width="100%" height="500"></iframe>
<h2>Do Weatherill’s numbers stack up?</h2>
<p>Weatherill pointed to 1981 as being a “high point” in youth population in South Australia. </p>
<p>It’s true that in the early 1980s, youth population numbers and youth as a proportion of the total population were higher.</p>
<p>It’s also true that the <em>raw numbers</em> of young people in South Australia then declined until the early 2000s. As the first chart in this FactCheck shows, after 2002 there was growth in the numbers of young people across all three definitions.</p>
<p>(Labor was returned to office in 2002, led by Mike Rann. Weatherill became premier in 2011.)</p>
<p>So, in terms of raw population numbers, Weatherill was correct to say that “under the entire life of this government … the number of young people has grown”.</p>
<p>Using Weatherill’s own definition (0-24 year olds), there was an increase of 36,742 people (in line with his original quote of 36,000). </p>
<p>The <em>proportion</em> of young people across all three definitions has declined since the early 1980s (though that decline has slowed since 2002).</p>
<p>Interestingly, as the chart shows, the decline in the proportion of 0-24 year olds has been greater than the proportions of the 15-24 and 18-34 cohorts, which have stayed relatively static under the four terms of the Labor government.</p>
<p>This is where the numbers tell us a new story – the biggest decline has been in the proportion of younger children. This suggests that <em>falling fertility rates</em> may have been a driver. </p>
<p>As you can see from the chart below, total fertility rates in South Australia did fall between 2008 and 2016.</p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lINMQ/3/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<h2>What’s driving these trends?</h2>
<p>The leaders were discussing these numbers in the context of the viability of South Australia as a place where young people can find work and affordable housing, and preventing the so-called “brain drain” that occurs when young people leave the state in search of opportunities elsewhere. </p>
<p>During the debate, Xenophon (and SA Liberal leader Steven Marshall) painted a picture of increasing numbers of young people leaving South Australia, while Weatherill told the story of youth population growth “under the entire life of this [Labor] government”. </p>
<p>None of the numbers are a simple reflection of the failure or success of government policies that may help to retain youth populations. There are larger historical trends at play.</p>
<h2>Understanding the ‘Baby Boomer’ effect</h2>
<p>We cannot fully understand why South Australia had more young people in the 1980s and 1990s than it does today without looking back to the postwar period of 1946 to 1964 – the years when the “Baby Boomer” generation was born. </p>
<p>The baby boom was particularly pronounced in South Australia, and <a href="https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/128776/sub034-labour-mobility-attachment.pdf">coincided with</a> a strong manufacturing sector that attracted young people from other states, and migrants during a period of high immigration rates (migrants also tend to be young).</p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/YGbv5/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>This convergence meant that the early 1980s was a unique time in South Australian population trends.</p>
<p>The first wave of the Baby Boomers (born in the late 1940s and early 1950s) were having children, and those children would have been counted in the 1981 Census. <em>At the same time</em>, the <em>late</em> cohort of Baby Boomers (those born in the late 1950s and 1960s) would still have been included in the 20-24 year old Census cohort. </p>
<p>This was followed by a “baby bust”, or falling fertility rate. From a peak in the early 1960s, <a href="https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/128776/sub034-labour-mobility-attachment.pdf">family sizes declined</a>, reflecting national trends. </p>
<h2>Economic factors are also at play</h2>
<p>A number of economic events that took place in the early 1990s also had an impact on South Australia’s population profile. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.adelaide.edu.au/saces/docs/issues-papers/saces-economic-issues-49.pdf">2018 report</a> published by the South Australian Centre for Economic Studies (SACES) noted that, in addition to the national recession, South Australia was affected by:</p>
<ul>
<li>the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Bank_of_South_Australia">collapse of State Bank</a> in 1991 </li>
<li>the loss of headquartered companies around the same time, and</li>
<li>the loss of “mass manufacturing” employment, which began in the 1980s and accelerated in the early 1990s.</li>
</ul>
<p>The SACES report found that between 1993-94 and 2001-02, South Australia’s population growth was affected by “sharply reduced overseas immigration and increased outward migration to interstate”. The authors added that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The dominant cohorts of those who left South Australia were young people and young families. </p>
<p>They did not return and they married and/or had children adding to other states’ younger aged profile while depleting our own.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It would be interesting to see how the numbers of international students in South Australia affect the composition of youth populations. People on student visas who are residents of South Australia are captured in Census data, but the data we need to properly analyse this factor are not readily available. <strong>– Helen Barrie</strong></p>
<h2>Blind review</h2>
<p>The author offers a sound consideration of the available evidence.</p>
<p>The proportion of young people in South Australia has declined <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Jun%202017?OpenDocument">since the early 1980s</a> – whether defined as those aged 0-24, 15-24, or 18-34 years.</p>
<p>Despite the decline in the proportion of young people, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bloom-and-boom-how-babies-and-migrants-have-contributed-to-australias-population-growth-78097">population momentum</a> means that the South Australian population is still growing, albeit not as strongly as the Australian population overall. <strong>– Liz Allen</strong></p>
<p><em>The Conversation thanks Liz Allen for providing the data used to create the charts in this FactCheck.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><strong>The Conversation thanks <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-is-fact-checking-the-south-australian-election-and-we-want-to-hear-from-you-92809">The University of South Australia</a> for supporting our FactCheck team during the South Australian election.</strong></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Conversation FactCheck is accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>The Conversation’s FactCheck unit was the first fact-checking team in Australia and one of the first worldwide to be accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network, an alliance of fact-checkers hosted at the Poynter Institute in the US. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversations-factcheck-granted-accreditation-by-international-fact-checking-network-at-poynter-74363">Read more here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Have you seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">checkit@theconversation.edu.au</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Barrie receives funding from Australian Research Council, National Health and Medical Research Council, Department of Health (Federal) and Office for the Ageing (SA). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Allen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a South Australian leaders’ debate, Jay Weatherill and Nick Xenophon disagreed over the extent to which young people are leaving the state in search of better opportunities. We asked the experts.Helen Barrie, Deputy Director of the Australian Migration and Population Research Centre, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/815472017-08-01T20:15:42Z2017-08-01T20:15:42ZAustralians want more children than they have, so are we in the midst of a demographic crisis?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179946/original/file-20170727-25687-1ptwws4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australian women are having two or fewer babies over their life-course.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Robert McGrath</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australians want more children than they actually have, according to newly released data collected as part of the <a href="http://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/2437426/HILDA-SR-med-res.pdf">Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey</a>. </p>
<p>Analysing data over 15 years, the study reports that by age 40, Australian men and women desire 1.5 more children than they actually have. Women are also having children at later ages than previous cohorts: only 30% of Australian men and women report having their desired number of children by age 35.</p>
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<p>The delaying of fertility, which is common in most Western industrial nations, indicates that women are having fewer children later in life. But without adequate planning and preparation on fertility issues, Australia will be left behind.</p>
<h2>What declining fertility rates mean</h2>
<p>Australia’s fertility rate has been below replacement level since the 1970s. Women are having <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/3301.0%7E2011%7EMain+Features%7EFertility+rates?OpenDocument">fewer than two babies</a> over their life course.</p>
<p>Sub-replacement fertility is important for governments. Entitlements are skewed to the old and young, which requires a robust middle-aged workforce to support these dependent populations. </p>
<p>Without two children to eventually support their two ageing parents through tax dollars and direct care, governments have insufficient resources to meet their dependent populations’ economic and care demands.</p>
<p>South Korea has historically had low sub-replacement fertility rates. In response, its government offers women money to have babies. This strategy has proven ineffective: the country’s fertility rate remains at <a href="https://www.google.com.au/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_dyn_tfrt_in&idim=country:KOR:JPN:USA&hl=en&dl=en">1.24 births per woman</a>. </p>
<p>South Korean women cite long work hours and insufficient child care as the main reasons for limiting their family size. Token government contributions are <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/s-korea-short-of-babies-despite-govt-efforts">insufficient to meet these demands</a>. </p>
<p>Japan’s demographic crisis is even more startling. Its population is expected to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/11/japans-population-shrink-third-2065/">shrink by one-third by 2065</a>, jeopardising the country’s long-term <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/japan-fertility-crisis-2017-4?r=US&IR=T">economic and social future</a>. </p>
<p>Without sufficient births or the opening of borders to working-age immigrants, sub-replacement fertility rates will wreak havoc on the economic and social futures of these countries. Is Australia on a similar crash course?</p>
<p>The Australian government has historically had a more open policy on immigration than Japan: it increases the intake of working-aged people to support the economy. Yet <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-18/government-abolishing-457-visas/8450310">current government policy</a> aimed at closing borders suggests this approach might shift. Given our declining fertility rates, this might have long-term economic and social consequences.</p>
<p>Australia also has a very limited welfare state to support working families, while workplace norms emphasise long work hours. Mothers in Australia are most likely to reduce to part-time work when children are preschool-aged: Australian women report some of the highest part-time employment rates <a href="https://data.oecd.org/emp/part-time-employment-rate.htm">in the world</a>.</p>
<p>The Australian workplace has also failed to meet the demands of modern families. Few offer reduced work time and flexible work arrangements to working parents. Australian workers report some of the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS">longest weekly work hours</a> in the world, imposing time demands that are often incompatible with raising children.</p>
<p>The Australian government has also inadequately tackled the economic challenges of working parents through affordable child care and expansive leave. The lack of viable institutional support for working families imposes two options: have fewer children or reduce work time.</p>
<p>In Australia, it appears mothers are doing both. </p>
<h2>A challenge for government</h2>
<p>The shift in the definition of a “good” parent also contributes to having fewer than desired children. </p>
<p>Australian parents today report spending more time with children than in the 1970s, yet <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02614367.2011.573570">most parents report</a> they are not giving children enough time. This has led to the rise of “anxious parenting”, with norms of “good” parents emphasising an unconditional and unrelenting transfer of time, money and energy to their child. In other words, parenting is <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/177514883/The-Ideology-of-Intensive-Mothering">supposed to be intense</a>.</p>
<p>The insatiable time demands of children and work have led to an increase in reports of work-family conflict, and for some <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Greedy_institutions_patterns_of_undivide.html?id=SVpCAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">to describe</a> work and family as “greedy”. While some have long identified the incompatibility of work and family demands, one cannot fully understand the intense time demands children bring until your two-year-old has spilled an entire box of Rice Bubbles on the floor exactly when you are leaving for work.</p>
<p>It is no wonder, then, that people over-estimate the number of children they expect to have.</p>
<p>Children bring great joy, enrichment and hilarity, yet the demands of modern children and work are contradictory. Without adequate policies to support parents, including those who work, the gap between desired and actual births will remain and possibly grow.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/12/want-to-fight-climate-change-have-fewer-children">some have argued</a> that reducing fertility is key to reducing global warming, persistent declining fertility rates will pose important challenges for governments as populations continue to age.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This piece is <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hilda-2017-41279">part of a series</a> on the recent release of HILDA survey data.</em></p>
<p><em>Read more:</em></p>
<p><a href="http://theconversation.com/home-ownership-falling-debts-rising-its-looking-grim-for-the-under-40s-81619"><em>Home ownership falling, debts rising – it’s looking grim for the under 40s</em></a></p>
<p><a href="http://theconversation.com/pokies-sport-and-racing-harm-41-of-monthly-gamblers-hilda-81486"><em>Pokies, sport and racing harm 41% of monthly gamblers: survey</em></a></p>
<p><a href="http://theconversation.com/12-charts-on-what-our-work-and-family-life-looks-like-81897"><em>Men still prefer mothers to stay at home: 12 charts on attitudes to work and family</em></a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leah Ruppanner receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Australia will be left behind without adequate planning and preparation on fertility issues.Leah Ruppanner, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/780972017-07-03T20:09:50Z2017-07-03T20:09:50ZBloom and boom: how babies and migrants have contributed to Australia’s population growth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175788/original/file-20170627-29088-qdwoq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Even without immigration, new data reveals Australia's population would continue to grow. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/anonymous-crowd-people-walking-on-busy-160438778?src=GEDWwODwvjREwVHQZhqhNg-1-1">blvdone/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Population growth has profound impacts on Australian life, and sorting myths from facts can be difficult. This is the second article in our series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-australia-full-39068">Is Australia Full?</a>, which aims to help inform a wide-ranging and often emotive debate.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Population change has long been a topic of public debate in Australia, periodically escalating into controversy. </p>
<p>It is inextricably linked to debates about immigration levels, labour force needs, capital city congestion and housing costs, refugee intakes, economic growth in country areas and northern Australia, the “big versus smaller” Australia debate, and environmental pressures.</p>
<p>Views about the rate of population growth in Australia are numerous and mixed. At one end of the spectrum are those <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2011/10/26/five-reasons-australia-should-stay-small">who are vehemently opposed</a> to further population increases; at the other end <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2011/10/26/five-reasons-australia-should-be-big">are supporters</a> of substantially higher population growth and a “very big” Australia. </p>
<p>Logically, population debates usually quote Australia’s demographic statistics. But there is value in comparing our population growth in the international context. </p>
<h2>Average growth rates compared globally</h2>
<p>Although growth rates have fluctuated considerably from year to year, <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0?OpenDocument">statistics</a> just released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) show that Australia’s population grew by 3.75 million between 2006 and 2016. This indicates an average annual growth rate of 1.7%. </p>
<p>As the chart below shows, this was quite high compared to other countries and global regions. Over the decade, other English-speaking countries such as New Zealand, Canada and the US all experienced growth rates lower than Australia’s. The world’s more developed countries in aggregate grew by an annual average of 0.3%. </p>
<p>The world’s population as a whole increased by an average of <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/">1.2% per year</a>.</p>
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<hr>
<p>According to the UN Population Division, Australia <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/">ranked</a> 90th out of 233 countries in terms of population growth rate over the decade. The countries or territories with higher growth rates were mostly less developed countries, particularly in Africa, and the oil-rich Gulf states. The only developed countries with faster rates of growth were Singapore, Luxembourg and Israel.</p>
<h2>Why Australia’s population growth rate is higher</h2>
<p>There are two main reasons for Australia’s high growth. </p>
<p>Net overseas migration (immigration minus emigration) is one major factor. It has been generating a little over half (<a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0?OpenDocument">56%</a>) of population growth in recent years. </p>
<p>Demand for immigration – to settle permanently, work in Australia, or study here for a few years – is high, and there are many opportunities for people to move to Australia. In the <a href="http://www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/year-at-a-glance/2015-16">2015-16 financial year</a> about 190,000 visas were granted to migrants and 19,000 for humanitarian and refugee entry. Temporary migrants included 311,000 student visas, 215,000 working holidaymaker visas and 86,000 temporary work (skilled) 457 visas. </p>
<p>Over the last five years, <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0?OpenDocument">ABS figures show</a> that immigration has averaged about 480,000 per year and emigration about 280,000. This puts annual net overseas migration at around 200,000. </p>
<p>This is high in international terms. UN Population Division <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Migration/">data for the 2010-15 period</a> reveals Australia had the 17th-highest rate of net overseas migration of any country.</p>
<p>But it is not just overseas migration driving Australia’s population growth. High natural increase (the number of births minus the number of deaths) also makes a substantial contribution. Natural increase has been responsible for a little under half (44%) of population growth in recent years (about 157,000 per year). </p>
<p>Australia has a relatively healthy fertility rate, which lately has averaged almost <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3101.0?OpenDocument">1.9 babies per woman</a>. We also enjoy one of the <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Mortality/">highest life expectancies</a> in the world. </p>
<p>This combination of an extended history of net overseas migration gains, a long baby boom and a healthy fertility rate has resulted in Australia being less advanced in the population ageing transition than many other developed countries. </p>
<p>In particular, relatively large numbers of people are in the peak childbearing ages. This means that even if migration fell immediately to zero the population would still increase. Demographers call this age structure effect “population momentum”.</p>
<h2>Whether Australia’s population is growing too fast</h2>
<p>While Australia’s population growth rate is high in a global context, this does not necessarily mean its population is growing too fast. It all depends on your point of view. </p>
<p>It is important to stress that the overall population growth rate is just one aspect of Australia’s demography. A more comprehensive debate about the nation’s demographic trajectory should consider a broad range of issues, such as:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>population age structure (the numbers of people in different age groups);</p></li>
<li><p>the health and wellbeing of a rapidly growing population at the highest ages;</p></li>
<li><p>population distribution across the country;</p></li>
<li><p>economic growth and development;</p></li>
<li><p>the contributions of temporary workers and overseas students;</p></li>
<li><p>appropriate infrastructure for the needs of the population; and</p></li>
<li><p>environmental management and per-capita carbon emissions.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Progress on issues such as healthy ageing, economic development,and environmental management depend on appropriate strategies to deal with these challenges. Total population numbers will often be relevant to the discussion, but they are only part of the equation.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read other articles in the Is Australia Full? series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-australia-full-39068">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Wilson receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>The latest statistics show Australia’s population growth in the last decade has been significantly higher than in other developed countries.Tom Wilson, Principal Research Fellow, Charles Darwin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/746152017-04-17T19:46:03Z2017-04-17T19:46:03ZWhen it comes to housing affordability debates, everything old is new again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163226/original/image-20170330-8580-vvltyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Barnaby Joyce and Scott Morrison have channelled 1940s-era debates in their comments on housing affordability.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Sam Mooy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As politicians across Australia <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-almost-a-world-leader-in-home-building-so-that-isnt-a-fix-for-affordability-73514">grapple with a fix</a> for housing affordability, you might be forgiven for thinking this was the first time the nation has confronted a crisis in housing. But analysis of documents from the reconstruction period following the second world war finds that, as the war was drawing to a close, concern was building about housing availability and affordability.</p>
<p>Some of the issues, arguments and solutions being presented today are extremely similar to those consuming Australian politicians and policymakers three-quarters of a century ago. </p>
<h2>Housing and fertility</h2>
<p>Treasurer Scott Morrison <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/people-are-delaying-having-children-so-they-can-buy-a-house-scott-morrison-20170312-guwnm1.html">recently asserted</a> that the housing affordability crisis was so severe that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>People are putting off when they buy their house. They are even putting off when they have kids so they can save more. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The links between housing affordability and the fertility of the national population are difficult to make at the best of times. But Morrison is not the first to make this connection. </p>
<p>In 1944, housing reformer Oswald “Oz” Barnett connected the declining national birth rate with a lack of quality and affordable housing. <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1599057?lookfor=author:(Oswald%20Barnett)&offset=17&max=19">He argued</a> that the: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… tragic lack of decent dwellings is rapidly leading us along the road to national race suicide […] One cannot blame a woman for refusing to bring a baby into the world […] nor blame the expectant mother, when her baby does come, for refusing to have another baby until she is able to obtain a house.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, in its second interim report in 1944, the <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2843335?lookfor=commonwealth%20housing%20commission&offset=5&max=343">Commonwealth Housing Commission</a> reasoned that the lack of affordable housing stock available was “one of the major factors in the limitation of families” and the “alarming decline in the Australian birth rate”.</p>
<h2>Rural spaces as the solution</h2>
<p>While rural Australia had its own housing problems – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-housing-affordability-crisis-in-regional-australia-yes-and-heres-why-71808">still does today</a> – it also offered a solution to the problem of a low national birth rate. Sidney Luker, a civil engineer and town planner in New South Wales, <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2319960?lookfor=author:(walter%20bunning)&offset=11&max=13">observed that</a> the decline in the national fertility was “naturally more apparent in the capital cities than in the country”.</p>
<p>His solution? Get people to move to the country via decentralisation policies.</p>
<p>Not only were those living in rural Australia more likely to have children, but life in the country was argued to be naturally superior. Journalist and historian <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/749306?lookfor=title:(War%20Aims%20of%20a%20Plain%20Australia)&offset=1&max=394913">Charles Bean</a> argued that “decentralisation” was necessary for the “health, conveniences and improvement of the big cities”.</p>
<p>Architect, town planner and key contributor to the Commonwealth Housing Commission <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2235723?lookfor=author:(walter%20bunning)&offset=6&max=13">Walter Bunning</a> also believed that decentralisation would improve “housing conditions” and reduce the time workers spent travelling to their places of employment. This would prevent people from becoming a “race of ‘straphangers’” – people spending a long time on transport to and from work.</p>
<p>Such arguments are eerily similar to those we hear today about the costs of congestion that come with affordable housing being on the outskirts of our major cities. </p>
<p>Earlier this year, Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-24/barnarby-joyce-urges-aspiring-home-owners-to-look-beyond-sydney/8209496">argued that</a> home buyers who couldn’t afford property in the major cities should consider moving to regional Australia. He said “there are other parts of Australia” to buy housing. </p>
<h2>Housing affordability and political risk</h2>
<p>Political and policy minds were also focused on fixing housing problems during the 1940s due to the risk of political discontent. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2316916?lookfor=(author:Council%20OR%20author:of%20OR%20author:Social%20OR%20author:Services%20OR%20author:NSW)%20AND%20(title:Report%20OR%20title:on%20OR%20title:Housing)%20AND%20(date:%5B1940%20TO%201950%5D)&offset=1&max=520">Council of Social Services NSW</a> explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Bad housing fosters the growth of anti-democratic opinion – the frame of mind of the ‘have not’. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, <a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/713131?lookfor=author:(Oswald%20Barnett)&offset=1&max=19">Barnett</a> and fellow social housing campaigners Walter Burt and Frank Heath noted “an increasingly bitter contest between […] capitalism [and …] labour”. </p>
<p><a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1599057?lookfor=author:(Oswald%20Barnett)&offset=17&max=19">Barnett</a> argued that this contest was being waged over housing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The fight is centring on the struggles for houses for the people, […] houses that they can rent, or buy, at prices within their capacity to pay.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Politicians and policymakers today have not made a direct connection between problems of housing affordability and the political instability that comes with it. But they are no doubt highly attuned to it. They need only look to the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2010/11/12/5-long-term-consequences-of-the-recession/#5875d93144ec">US</a> and <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/06/10/mind-the-gaps-the-political-consequences-of-the-great-recession-in-europe/">Europe</a> and the part housing has played in contributing to political uncertainty in those places to understand the importance of tackling the problem in Australia.</p>
<p>Important differences exist between the the housing problems of 1940s Australia and those we confront in 2017. However, a historical perspective augments our understanding of contemporary housing debates and policies. It can provide more context and detail on potential ways forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rae Dufty-Jones has received funding from the Australian Research Council and Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute.</span></em></p>It’s not the first time Australia has grappled with concerns about affordable housing. History offers insights that can help inform contemporary debates and policies.Rae Dufty-Jones, Senior Lecturer in Human Geography, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/484702015-10-20T03:46:09Z2015-10-20T03:46:09ZKenya needs a new plan to make contraceptives accessible again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98410/original/image-20151014-15127-x3ywlu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Blister-packs of the contraceptive drug Diane-35. In Kenya, millions of women do not have access to contraception methods. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Regis Duvignau </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Globally, the health community has recognised the importance of contraception in reducing the burden of unplanned pregnancies, encouraging smaller families and empowering women as a move to sustainable development in developing countries. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-contraceptive-services-SSA.html">Research</a> shows there are significantly positive links between contraception and maternal and child survival, household well-being and women reaching their career goals and participating in nation-building.</p>
<p>Contraception also reduces chances of depression and anxiety among family members. And on a personal level, it elevates individual and household happiness levels and ensures higher investment in children.</p>
<p>Despite these vast benefits, the United Nations Population <a href="http://www.unfpa.org">Fund</a> estimates that while over 225 million women globally want to avoid pregnancy, they lack access to safe and effective contraception methods. </p>
<p>In Kenya, 18% of married women and 26% of unmarried women <a href="http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/PR55/PR55.pdf">lack access</a> to effective contraception. Nationally representative <a href="http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr229/fr229.pdf">surveys</a> consistently show that less than 40% of young women and adolescent girls who have had sex have used a contraceptive method. In one <a href="http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR102/FR102.pdf">survey</a> only 29% of young girls who had sex in the month before the survey had used a contraceptive method. </p>
<p>Currently, just more than half of married women in Kenya use modern contraceptives such as intrauterine devices, also known as IUDs, and contraceptive implants under their skin. But the availability of contraceptives remains lowest among those in greatest need: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>poor and rural women and adolescents, </p></li>
<li><p>women without education, and </p></li>
<li><p>those who already have large families. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>There is also a growing need for married teenagers to have access to contraceptives. And there remains critical regional disparities in accessing contraceptives. In some regions only 3% of women use contraceptives. In Kenya, <a href="http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/PR55/PR55.pdf">59%</a> of women live in rural areas.</p>
<h2>The benefits of contraception</h2>
<p>Contraception is more than fertility control. It empowers couples and women to take charge of their fertility and to decide and schedule the number of children they have. </p>
<p>This not only has far-reaching benefits for individuals and couples, it also impacts on their households, communities and the society at large. </p>
<p>A review of the socio-economic benefits of contraception also shows it benefits <a href="http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/social-economic-benefits.pdf">men</a>. It gives them more disposable income, allows better health outcomes for their households, mothers, wives and colleagues. It also results in more satisfying and longer-lasting relationships with their partners.</p>
<h2>The Kenyan crisis</h2>
<p>In the 1960s Kenya was a regional leader in providing contraceptive and family planning services. It launched the first official national family planning programme in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Policy analyst Maura Graff from the Population Reference Bureau noted that the <a href="http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2012/kenya-family-planning.aspx">increased use</a> of contraceptives in Kenya led to a decline in the total fertility rate. It decreased from an average of 8.1 children for each woman in 1978 to 4.7 in 1998. With rapid increases in planned childbearing, family incomes began to rise and the proportion of women earning wages also increased. </p>
<p>But from the mid 1980s, support and funding for family planning in Kenya waned massively. This resulted in major reversals in strategic gains. Contraceptive and family planning services in Kenya have yet to fully recover from this hiatus.</p>
<p>Kenya’s poor contraceptive service system has telling implications. In 2012, half a million induced abortions occurred in the country. In the same year, 70% of the women who were treated for complications after unsafe abortions were not on contraceptives. </p>
<p>Unintended births continue to contribute substantially to population growth in the country. Annually, thousands of Kenyan schoolgirls drop out of school because of unintended pregnancy. Research also shows rising risk of repeat abortion and its dangerous sequel among girls and women in the country.</p>
<p>There are several factors at the heart of Kenya’s contraceptive crisis, including poor political support. </p>
<p>There has also been little commitment to scale up successful family planning and contraceptive provision programmes and interventions. <a href="http://aphrc.org/publications/incidence-and-complications-of-unsafe-abortion-in-kenya-key-findings-of-a-national-study/">Research</a> shows contraception is one of the least frequently taught topics in Kenyan public and private schools. Consistent national communication remains weak. Several political leaders continue to publicly antagonise family planning and contraception.</p>
<p>Few Kenyan women who undergo treatment for unsafe abortion complications receive a contraceptive. This is partly because of the frequent stock-outs of critical contraceptive products which health facilities in Kenya experience.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://aphrc.org/publications/incidence-and-complications-of-unsafe-abortion-in-kenya-key-findings-of-a-national-study/">study</a> showed very few providers in Kenyan public health facilities knew how to perform a <a href="http://www.webmd.com/sex/birth-control/vasectomy-14387">vasectomy</a> or administer long-acting reversible contraceptives, such as an IUD or a contraceptive implant under the skin. </p>
<p>Poverty and longstanding regional inequities also perpetuate the exclusion of many people from accessing effective contraception. </p>
<p>There are several <a href="http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/15/118">myths and misconceptions</a> that circulate about contraception in Kenya. These include fears that some modern contraceptives cause cancer, infertility, and hurt people during sex. There are also widely-held beliefs that contraception facilitates promiscuity and sexual waywardness.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2515408/">Opposition</a> to contraception by the country’s religious right remains fierce. Efforts to directly reach young people with contraceptives are resisted by different interest groups.</p>
<h2>Fixing the problem</h2>
<p>At least two of the new poverty alleviating sustainable development goals underscore the importance of contraception. Planned births, smaller families and access to effective contraception is key to achieving gender equality, women empowerment and a healthy life for all. </p>
<p>We need to raise awareness about contraception and improve public education about sexual and reproductive health. Every pregnancy should be wanted and families should have the number of children they can take care of. Unsafe abortions should be eliminated and girls should not drop out of school due to an unintended pregnancy. </p>
<p>Serving Kenyans who do not have access to contraception would prevent millions of unintended pregnancies, unplanned births, unsafe abortions, miscarriages and maternal and infant deaths. And this is very doable.</p>
<p>Bolstering contraceptive and family planning services in Kenya would require conscientious action from various sectors. This includes politicians, thought leaders, researchers, the media, health providers, educators, activists and development agencies, among others. </p>
<p>The task ahead of Kenya is attainable - but it demands that everybody, not just a section of the country, act.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chimaraoke Izugbara works for APHRC. He receives funding from the Hewlett Foundation and Packard Foundation. He is also affiliated with the University of Gothenburg in Sweden.</span></em></p>Contraception gives women the choice of how many children to have and when to have them. This empowers them - but millions of women in Kenya do not have this choice.Chimaraoke Izugbara, Head of Population Dynamics and Reproductive Health and Director of Research Capacity Strengthening, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.