tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/g20-2017-40433/articlesG20 2017 – The Conversation2017-07-11T01:09:08Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/774422017-07-11T01:09:08Z2017-07-11T01:09:08ZIs the world ready for a strong German leader?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177642/original/file-20170711-5970-lzijrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. President Donald Trump is welcomed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the first day of the G-20 summit.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jens Meyer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What does it take to be elected chancellor of the most populous country in Europe four times in a row?</p>
<p>Germany does not have a system of term limits for heads of state. Candidates for chancellor can seek reelection as long as their party continues to support their candidacy. However, it’s not common. The only postwar German politician to be elected for four consecutive terms was current Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mentor, Helmut Kohl, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/world/europe/helmut-kohl-german-chancellor-dead.html?_r=0">who passed away last month</a>.</p>
<p>Germany’s general election will take place on Sept. 24. Chancellor Merkel is likely to be elected for a fourth term. Her party, the Christian Democratic Union, is currently polling near <a href="http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm">40 percent</a>.</p>
<p>This was not the case just two short years ago. Her decision to open the borders to refugees fleeing along the Balkan Route in 2015 was criticized for being <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article147449994/Es-sind-zu-viele.html">illegal</a> and <a href="http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-12/peer-steinbrueck-angela-merkel-fluechtlinspolitik-kritik">haphazard</a>. The year before, she had faced criticism for her handling of the <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/03/the-greek-warrior">Greek financial crisis</a>. Back then, it seemed Merkel would never survive a fourth election. </p>
<p>Then the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. That vote was followed by President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-america-first-mean-for-american-economic-interests-71931">America First policies</a> and conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. These events have fundamentally changed the global political landscape and created an opportunity for Merkel’s style of leadership to prevail. </p>
<p>Journalists and commentators frequently assert that Merkel has become the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/29/angela-merkel-leader-free-world-donald-trump">leader</a> of the <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/world/2017/05/30/german-chancellor-angela-merkel-now-leader-free-world/102308694/">free world</a>. </p>
<p>Despite negative images of riots in Hamburg during the recent G-20 summit, the German magazine Der Spiegel reports that Merkel’s <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-bleibt-nach-g20-gipfel-in-hamburg-ohne-politischen-schaden-a-1156969.html">campaign</a> hardly took a hit. Instead, the mayor of Hamburg is being criticized. </p>
<p>How is Merkel so politically invincible? As a professor of German studies, I have <a href="http://jschustercraig.com/">blogged</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-berlin-christmas-market-terror-attack-affects-chancellor-merkel-and-europe-70753">commented</a> on Merkel’s political appearances since 2015. One of her political strengths is her understated reaction to international conflicts. The other is her “party-manager” style of governance at home. </p>
<h2>Deliberate approach to conflict</h2>
<p>The G-20 summit was an important show of Merkel’s global leadership. Against this backdrop, Merkel’s slow and steady approach to governing stands in sharp contrast to the charisma of recently elected President Emmanuel Macron in France, the autocratic tendencies of President Vladimir Putin of Russia and the impulsivity of President Trump. </p>
<p>Before the G-20, Merkel stated <a href="http://www.zeit.de/2017/28/angela-merkel-g20-gipfel-interview">in an interview</a> that she acknowledged the vacuum of power left by Trump’s policies. Merkel said, “Apparently the American administration no longer wants to be the peacekeeping power per se for all regions of the world.” She acknowledged that this might be good or bad, depending on the context.</p>
<p>Several weeks before the G-20 Summit, Merkel traveled to South and Central America to shore up trade relations. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40235671">She stopped in Mexico</a> and pledged her support to President Enrique Peña Nieto in upcoming talks on the North American Free Trade Agreement. After that, she traveled to Argentina, where journalists asked her whether this international tour signaled that she was preparing to assume the mantle of the leader of the free world. Merkel <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/angela-merkel-will-nicht-anfuehrerin-der-freien-welt-sein-a-1151308.html">replied</a> diplomatically, saying that “no one alone in this world, no single person and no country alone can solve the problems [we have].” </p>
<p>This rhetoric is similar to previous appearances in which she has emphasized <a href="http://jschustercraig.com/2015/12/17/merkels-speech-at-the-cdu-party-meeting/">European unity</a> and the need for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/europe/france-emmanuel-macron-edouard-philippe.html?_r=0">international partnerships</a>. </p>
<h2>Merkel the party manager</h2>
<p>Back home in Germany, Merkel’s leadership style is described as that of a “<a href="http://dx.doi.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/10.1080/09644000701855168">party manager</a>.” Merkel attempts to keep the many factions of her party in her corner at any one given time. This strategy succeeds because the Christian Democratic Union is a <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380512331341091">“catch-all” party</a>. A catch-all party <a href="http://dx.doi.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/10.1080/09644008.2011.606566">tries to maintain diverse ideological viewpoints</a> so that it can capture the support of a broad swath of the electorate. </p>
<p>In the two-party American system, both the Democratic and Republican parties have functioned as catch-all parties. In the multi-party German system, it is possible to have a political party gain representation in Parliament even with a focused ideology, like the Green Party’s focus on sustainability and social justice.</p>
<p>Merkel’s identity facilitates a party-manager approach because she holds <a href="http://dx.doi.org.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/10.3167/gps.2016.340101">a variety of minority identities</a>. Merkel is female, Protestant in a <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-und-kirche-den-katholiken-geht-das-politische-personal-aus-a-819695.html">previously predominantly Catholic party</a> and grew up in the former East Germany. </p>
<p>As a party manager, Merkel maintains a strategy of keeping all options open as long as possible. In German, her governance style has earned its own verb. “<a href="http://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/kommentare/Merkel-merkelt-wieder-article10304291.html">To merkel</a>” is to deliberate, evaluate a course of action and eventually choose a suitable option at the last possible moment. </p>
<p>This tactic drives her opponents crazy, and Germany’s dominance in the European economy and now global politics <a href="http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/im-gespraech-soziologe-ulrich-beck-ueber-den-merkiavellismus-12027300.html">has strained the country’s relationship </a> with some European partners. </p>
<p>Merkel may not like the title “leader of the free world.” She may also be merkeling, or waiting until the last possible moment to claim it. But with an election campaign that seems assured of success, a variety of international partners pledging their support and an acknowledgment by <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-10/how-chris-uhlmanns-g20-takedown-of-donald-trump-went-viral/8695144">more than just Merkel</a> after the G-20 that President Trump’s policies leave a diplomatic vacuum, all signs point to a very powerful position for the German chancellor after Sept. 24.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johanna Schuster-Craig has received funding from the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange program, and the German Chancellor Fellows program of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. </span></em></p>Merkel’s popularity at home and on the global stage continues to grow as she runs for a fourth term as chancellor.Johanna Schuster-Craig, Assistant Professor of German and Global Studies, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/805172017-07-07T08:50:27Z2017-07-07T08:50:27ZThe G20 summit shows a world divided in its attitudes toward globalisation<p>The theme of this year’s G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany, is “<a href="https://www.g20.org/Webs/G20/EN/Home/home_node.html">Shaping an Interconnected World</a>”. The gathering of 20 world leaders is set to focus on building resilient economies, improving sustainability and assuming responsibility for the prosperity of all countries. But discussions take place in a much more uncertain and potentially divisive environment than previous years. </p>
<p>In particular, they are divided over their attitudes toward globalisation. It is globalisation that has significantly increased the degree of interconnection between the world’s economies. And it is this interconnection that drives the need for international discussion and cooperation – via events such as the G20.</p>
<p>But this last year has seen as a loud backlash against globalisation. There was the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the US on a protectionist ticket. This is ironic given that they are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/04/04/world-economic-outlook-april-2017">two of the world’s biggest economies</a> (at least for the time being). Both have been major drivers of globalisation and have benefited enormously from it. </p>
<p>But now both countries are calling the future of globalisation into question. Two sides have emerged in the debate over whether or not globalisation is a good thing and whether or not nation states should be more protective and inward-looking. </p>
<p>On the one hand, some G20 countries emphasise the benefits of ongoing and increased levels of cooperation between countries and regional trading blocs. These countries, such as Germany and Canada, seek to tackle the issues caused by globalisation at the global scale. This is not a homogeneous group, but there is a broad consensus that the high degree of interconnection between the world’s economies is not easily unpicked, nor is it desirable to try to do so. </p>
<p>On the other hand, some G20 countries feel that economic integration – as a consequence of globalisation – has gone too far. National governments therefore adopt increasingly isolationist and protectionist policies. This involves disengaging from global trade agreements (such as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/theresa-mays-hard-brexit-hinges-on-a-dated-vision-of-global-trade-71442">EU single market</a> or the <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-trade-and-the-tpp-seven-essential-reads-71845">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>) and shifting towards bilateral agreements. For them, globalisation is understood as something that needs to be protected against. Trade relationships are reduced to simplified notions of importing and exporting as opposed to acknowledging that the global economy has shifted significantly towards highly complex and integrated supply chains which deliver our <a href="https://www.equities.com/news/what-parts-make-up-an-iphone">everyday consumer goods</a>.</p>
<p>The US and UK have taken a protectionist turn. In the case of the US, globalisation is seen as a convenient tool to be used to gain advantages for domestic firms in international markets. But the impact of globalisation on the domestic US economy is the focus of debate. In reality, it is difficult to separate “domestic” and “international” economic activities. And there is little meaningful discussion of how these policies will affect the US’s <a href="http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/World_Investment_Report.aspx">dominance of the world’s largest multinational firms</a>. </p>
<p>Several countries have a legacy of resisting many aspects of globalisation. For example, France’s resistance to global pressures <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/labor-market-reform-in-france-ideology-vs-efficiency/a-19408362">to change its labour market laws</a> and attempt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/french-must-drop-useless-barriers-against-other-languages-minister">to protect its language</a> from outside influence. China has shifted its policy from global agreements to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-china-the-potential-driver-of-a-new-wave-of-globalisation-71575">new emphasis on reciprocity</a>. It is still the world’s largest exporter and receives the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp442_e.htm">highest levels of foreign direct investment</a>. </p>
<p>But neither country is willing to reject globalisation as a whole. Similarly, many of the G20’s emerging economies, such as South Africa, Brazil and Mexico, are realistic about the potential downsides of globalisation – but these nations view international cooperation as a mechanism for positive change. </p>
<h2>Increased uncertainty</h2>
<p>Arguably, it is the inability of leading economies to recognise, and respond to, the perils of globalisation that has led to increased uncertainty in the contemporary global economy. The US (and many others) did not heed the warnings <a href="http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/">given by economists like Joseph Stiglitz</a> about capitalism and globalisation. Nor did the UK heed warnings about <a href="http://www.regionalstudies.org/uploads/documents/SRTUKE_v16_PRINT.pdf">regional inequalities</a> and <a href="https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/scale-economic-inequality-uk">income disparities</a>. The UK government’s failure to address post-industrial changes in the poorest regions of the UK have led to the rejection of the status quo by many – as illustrated by the Brexit vote. </p>
<p>These countries have failed to safeguard against the negative impacts of globalisation. Rather than acknowledge this, their policies have swung to a protectionist stance in which other countries’ activities are often blamed for the ills within. </p>
<p>So there is a clear divide in the ways in which members of the G20 are now discussing globalisation. These two sides of the debate are not new and there has always been intense discussion around its positives and negatives. What is new is the shift by those countries who have traditionally gained most from globalisation (such as the US and UK) away from economic integration. The sides of the debate are moving in opposite directions. </p>
<p>It is frustrating that those countries most forcefully imposing isolationist and protectionist policies seem to lack a full awareness of the consequences of their actions. Breakdowns in international cooperation <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/15/whats-the-problem-with-protectionism">increase friction</a> and the chances of conflict between countries – a far cry from the ideals of an “interconnected world”. All should heed <a href="https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2016-g20-praesidentschaftspapier-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">Angela Merkel’s warning</a> in this year’s G20 summit objectives that “the experiences of the crises of the 1930s were a lesson to us that we must not forget”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Johns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Differences in attitudes toward globalisation makes cooperation between the world’s leading economies extremely difficult.Jennifer Johns, Senior Lecturer in International Business and Economic Geography, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/803352017-07-06T07:54:58Z2017-07-06T07:54:58ZG20 summit: who will take the US’s place as a global leader?<p>Global summits were once extraordinary things, marking turning points in international political history. The 1814-15 Congress of Vienna marked the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of Europe’s “long” 19th century, during which Europe’s interactions were regulated by a relatively stable balance of power. The 1945 <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1945-san-francisco-conference/">San Francisco Conference</a> put an end to the 20th century’s world wars and ushered a rules-based, liberal international order under the multilateral stewardship of the UN.</p>
<p>These were truly special affairs, and rare too, what with the logistics and risks of bringing leaders together to meet face-to-face. But revolutions in transportation have made this no longer so, and any national leader’s calendar is now stuffed with summits all year round. They generally don’t exactly define centuries and epochs, and they often barely command enough attention to survive a modern news cycle.</p>
<p>So it’s tempting to consign this year’s G20 summit in Hamburg to the long list of those that don’t amount to much as far as the long gaze of history is concerned. But, in time, it might be remembered as something rather momentous: the summit that marked the symbolic – if not substantive – end of America’s international leadership.</p>
<p>Above and beyond the day-to-day stories of Donald Trump’s mishaps and bizarre behaviour, the American-led international order as we know it is disintegrating. This is a fundamental transition; under Trump, the US continues to retreat from its traditional role as the global guarantor of stability and security, leaving the EU and China to jostle for the mantle of leadership.</p>
<p>Political support for American internationalism began to fray in the mountains of Afghanistan and the deserts of Iraq during George Bush’s tenure in the Oval Office. The ebbing of leadership was authoritatively signalled with Barack Obama’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/80500/edit">apparent inclination</a> to “lead from behind”, especially evident in the West’s Libyan intervention; it was confirmed by his reluctance to enforce his own red line in Syria and to guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Trump’s <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/23/as-promised-trump-pulls-the-plug-on-the-trans-pacific-partnership/">decision to pull the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> and the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/01/trump-pulls-out-of-the-paris-climate-agreement/">Paris climate agreement</a> were the next steps in this slow walk away from global leadership.</p>
<p>So what next – and indeed, who next to lead?</p>
<h2>East and West</h2>
<p>In their different ways, the EU and China are both positioned to fill the vacuum left by America’s abdication. As the host of this year’s summit, Angela Merkel is best able to steer things to Europe’s advantage. This is especially so now she’s accompanied by Emmanuel Macron who is ready and willing to spend his newly-won political capital on shoring up European unity – a job made easier by Brexit, with Britain giving up the position that allows it to play spoiler in Brussels.</p>
<p>Germany’s <a href="https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2016-g20-praesidentschaftspapier-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=">agenda for the summit</a> focuses closely on shoring up the existing multilateral order, keeping the likes of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and so on at the centre of the global governance architecture. The aim is to keep the liberal, multilateral, rules-based order in place, even if America is no longer willing to underwrite it.</p>
<p>But China too is working to clinch the top spot, most notably by continually reaffirming its commitment to the sort of internationalism that was formerly an American hallmark. It’s doubling down on its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-us-backs-away-from-climate-pledges-india-and-china-step-up/2017/06/01/59ccb494-16e4-4d47-a881-c5bd0922c3db_story.html">commitment to the Paris agreement</a>, pursuing its <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-grand-geopolitical-project-threatens-a-new-east-west-divide-in-europe-79477">Belt and Road</a> development agenda with unyielding zeal, and <a href="http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/09/20/content_281475446661058.htm">championing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals</a>. </p>
<p>What’s significant is not that China is taking a lead part on the world’s stage while America stumbles towards the wings, but that in doing so, it’s following the liberal, multilateral, rules-based script rehearsed by America for the past 70-odd years.</p>
<p>Regardless of who is able to steer things their way, all signs suggest that even as America forfeits its privileged position, those willing to take its place are ready to lead according to the same mechanisms – if not principles – that defined the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/trumps-chinese-foreign-policy.html?_r=0">Pax Americana</a>. When the G20 release this year’s communique on July 8, it might be the best clue yet to who will lead the multilateral order – and how.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristen Naylor receives funding from the University of Oxford's John Fell Fund. </span></em></p>It’s the end of the world (order) as we know it.Tristen Naylor, Lecturer in Diplomatic Studies, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.