tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/gabon-11804/articles
Gabon – The Conversation
2023-09-21T13:27:45Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213664
2023-09-21T13:27:45Z
2023-09-21T13:27:45Z
How well you do at school depends on how much your teachers know: insights from 14 French-speaking countries in Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548527/original/file-20230915-27043-8dgaeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Almost half of all sixth-grade students in Niger struggle to read a simple sentence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olympia De Maismont/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made remarkable progress towards reaching universal school enrolment in the past 25 years. Across the region, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=ZG">8 in 10 children</a> of primary school age are now enrolled in school, and in countries such as <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=ZG-BJ">Benin</a> and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=ZG-MG">Madagascar</a> this figure stands at almost 10 in 10 children. </p>
<p>However, it is becoming increasingly clear that many children in the region are <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2018">learning very little in school</a>. This <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/09/26/world-bank-warns-of-learning-crisis-in-global-education">“learning crisis”</a> means that it will be difficult to reach the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal4">United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal</a> of quality education for all by 2030.</p>
<p>Importantly, the learning crisis does not affect all countries equally. For example, a <a href="https://pasecconfemen.lmc-dev.fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/08/RapportPasec2019_Rev2022_WebOK.pdf">recent study</a> found that whereas almost half of all sixth-grade students (who are on average about 13 years old) in Niger have difficulties reading a simple sentence, only one in 10 sixth-grade students in neighbouring Burkina Faso has such problems. This raises the question of what explains these international learning gaps.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775723000845">recent study</a>, my co-authors Natalie Irmert, Mohammad H. Sepahvand and I tried to answer this question. We hypothesised that differences in teacher quality between countries play a role. Using comparable data from 14 countries in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, we found that differences in teachers’ subject knowledge – that is, teachers’ mastery of the material they are expected to teach in a given subject – explain more than a third of the international variation in student learning. </p>
<p>This implies that the very low levels of learning in some countries’ schools are to a large extent due to a lack of knowledgeable teachers.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our study was made possible by the recent release of data from the <a href="https://pasec.confemen.org/en/">PASEC 2019 assessment</a>. The assessment measured sixth-grade students’ reading and maths skills in 14 French-speaking African countries in a comparable way. Importantly for our purposes, it also measured the knowledge of these students’ teachers in the same two subjects. The assessment revealed very large differences in the average reading and maths skills of students between countries. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/collaboration-is-helping-teachers-in-rural-cameroon-fill-knowledge-gaps-101920">Collaboration is helping teachers in rural Cameroon fill knowledge gaps</a>
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<p>In our study, we examined whether these international differences in student skills were driven by gaps in teachers’ subject knowledge. We hypothesised that this might be the case based on <a href="https://economics.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/4-15-22-Smith.pdf">previous research</a> from individual countries which shows that teacher quality is a key driver of learning.</p>
<p>Our results showed student skills and teachers’ subject knowledge were indeed positively correlated: better teacher knowledge tended to go hand in hand with better student skills. </p>
<p>However, this did not necessarily mean that teachers’ subject knowledge caused learning. For example, countries with more knowledgeable teachers might also invest more into school buildings. In this case, the positive correlation between teacher knowledge and student skills could simply reflect the better learning conditions due to improved school buildings.</p>
<h2>Explaining the differences</h2>
<p>To be sure that our correlation reflected a causal effect of teacher knowledge, we used a statistical trick: we compared each country’s student skills and teacher knowledge in reading to its student skills and teacher knowledge in maths. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/girls-thrive-with-women-teachers-a-study-in-francophone-africa-95297">Girls thrive with women teachers: a study in Francophone Africa</a>
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<p>This meant that we could keep all factors that did not differ between the two subjects, such as the quality of school buildings, constant. If better teachers’ knowledge in reading relative to maths tended to go hand in hand with better student skills in reading relative to maths, we could be certain that the effect of teacher knowledge was causal.</p>
<p>The figure below shows that this was indeed the case: for example, Burundi’s teachers scored relatively low on the reading test relative to the maths test, and consequently its students did worse in the reading assessment than in the maths assessment. In contrast, Gabon’s teachers were relatively more knowledgeable in reading, and therefore its students also performed better in the reading test. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548809/original/file-20230918-27-uajxga.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Teachers’ subject knowledge boosts student skills.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775723000845">Authors supplied</a></span>
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<p>Overall, differences in teachers’ subject knowledge could explain a third of the differences in student learning between the 14 countries. Our data did not allow us to conclude which factors explain the remaining two thirds of these differences.</p>
<h2>Implications for policy</h2>
<p>Our results show that teacher quality, and especially teacher subject knowledge, is a crucial driver of cross-country differences in learning. This is an important insight for policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa who are trying to solve the “learning crisis”: it shows that there is a large payoff to recruiting more knowledgeable teachers.</p>
<p>Additionally, in-service training that improves the knowledge of already employed teachers could lead to large gains in student learning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Bietenbeck receives funding from Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius stiftelse samt Tore Browaldhs stiftelse. </span></em></p>
Overall, differences in teachers’ subject knowledge could explain a third of the differences in student learning between the 14 countries.
Jan Bietenbeck, Associate Professor of Economics, Lund University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213048
2023-09-12T12:27:00Z
2023-09-12T12:27:00Z
US response to Gabon and Niger coups suggests need for a new West Africa policy in Washington
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547570/original/file-20230911-8175-ma4a9g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C56%2C2524%2C1673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Niger's pro-coup National Council for Safeguard of the Homeland celebrate</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-nigers-national-concil-for-safeguard-of-the-news-photo/1657635765?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent coups in the West African nations of Gabon and Niger <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/blindsided-hours-coup-niger-us-diplomats-said-country-was-stable-rcna99708">caught U.S. diplomats a little off guard</a>. They also indicate Washington may need to reassess its policy in the region or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant to the new governments.</p>
<p>Despite following similar overthrows of governments <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62037317">in Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/5/coup-in-burkina-faso-what-you-need-to-know">Burkina Faso</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/chads-covert-coup-and-the-implications-for-democratic-governance-in-africa-159725">and Chad</a> in recent years, the U.S official reaction to the coups in Gabon and Niger has come across to <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/us-africa/">some observers as makeshift and uncertain</a>.</p>
<p>In Niger, U.S. diplomats have resisted referring to the overthrowing of President Mohamed Bazoum in July as a coup. Doing so would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/us/politics/biden-niger-coup-aid.html">mandate the cutting off of military and economic assistance</a> to the country, in which America has sizable military bases. Nonetheless, Washington <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/niger-us-seeks-hang-best-counterterrorist-outpost-west-102008004">later threatened to cut millions of dollars in aid</a>. In Gabon, America acknowledged the coup, which brought down President Ali Bongo Ondimba, and called for the restoration of a democratic process.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/history/amin_julius_a.php">scholar of U.S—Africa relations</a>, and my forthcoming book, “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Sixty-Years-of-Service-in-Africa-The-US-Peace-Corps-in-Cameroon/Amin/p/book/9781032584836">Sixty Years of Service in Africa: The U.S Peace Corps in Cameroon</a>,” examines the nature of U.S.-Africa relations. From my position, Washington’s reaction to coups suggests U.S. policy is out of step with the needs of the region. It is reactive rather than proactive, and based on notions that prioritize Washington’s security needs over the aspirations of the countries of West Africa. It also risks <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/china-russia-cooperation-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">diminishing U.S. influence in West Africa</a> at a time when rivals – Russia and China – are expanding links.</p>
<p>Such signs are already evident. When U.S Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with the military junta in the Nigerien capital of Niamey in early August 2023, she was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/07/niger-coup-leaders-refuse-to-let-senior-u-s-diplomat-meet-with-deposed-president-00110207">denied access to the deposed leader</a>. </p>
<h2>The contours of US policy in Africa</h2>
<p>U.S. policy toward Africa was shaped – and is still scarred – by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2001/03/01/rethinking-u.s.-policy-in-africa-pub-834">Cold War considerations</a> and European colonial ideologies. </p>
<p>From nationalist struggles to earning their independence, African people were often <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195396096.001.0001">dismissed by U.S. diplomats</a> as backward, incapable and inferior. Washington’s policy often treated African nations as junior partners to Europe and often <a href="https://archive.org/details/jfk-ordeal-in-africa">deferred to former colonial powers on issues concerning the former colonies</a>. </p>
<p>These perceptions of Africa and its people have endured, so it was not surprising when former President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/11/politics/immigrants-shithole-countries-trump/index.html">dismissed African nations as “shithole”</a> places dominated by chaos, violence and poverty.</p>
<p>Such thinking and American policy have largely failed to understand the rapid changes taking place on the continent, I believe. African people are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/19/us-africa-leaders-summit-china-russia-competition-scramble/">no longer prepared to be lectured</a> to about who to engage with in their development. Yet American officials <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-09-08/niger-gabon-coups-the-us-must-tread-more-carefully-in-africa?embedded-checkout=true">stand accused of being too slow</a> to recognize this shift.</p>
<h2>Openings for China and Russia</h2>
<p>Such sluggishness has created avenues for China and Russia to move into the Sahel region and East Africa. </p>
<p>China’s serious advancement in the continent <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf">began at the Bandung Conference</a> in 1955, where its leaders aligned themselves with African nationalists, emphasizing dogmas of “win-win partnership,” “equality and mutual benefit” and “<a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20509374.htm">mutual respect for sovereignty</a>.” Today, China’s premier makes frequent visits to Africa, while the country invests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/02/chinese-firms-african-labor-are-building-africas-infrastructure/">billions of dollars in the region</a> on infrastructure and other projects. </p>
<p>Like China, Russia engaged Africa gradually. In 1958, Russia’s ignorance of the continent was revealed <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/title/?id=20981">when it included snow plows</a> among its aid package to Guinea, a country located in tropical Africa. But today, African leaders <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">overwhelmingly participate in the Russia-Africa Summits</a> that have taken place in 2019 and 2023, during which Moscow has aid and trade deals and pledged to become an alternative to Western influence.</p>
<p>And Russia has <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-still-progressing-africa-whats-limit">surpassed China in arms sales to Africa</a>, accounting for 40% of its major weapon shipments. It supplies about 30% of the continent’s grain, and African leaders are increasingly seeing Russia as a counter to the action of other powers, such as France.</p>
<p>Russia and China can easily flatter African leaders with gifts, money, support and state visits, making them feel respected. Both nations have a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/03/16/south-africas-love-affair-with-russia">long history of siding with African nationalists</a> on anti-colonial struggles and in opposing South Africa’s Apartheid.</p>
<p>More recently, at the U.N. vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many African nations <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">either remained neutral or abstained or opposed the U.S. position</a>.</p>
<p>Already, there have been suggestions that the coups may be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66562999">exploited to serve the interests of Russia</a> <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/niger-chinas-path-stability-may-093000342.html">and China</a>. The Wagner Group, a pro-Russian mercenary group, was supportive of the coup in Niger, seeing it as an opportunity to enhance Russia’s involvement there <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66436797">as it did in Mali</a>. Officially, China has said it remains <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/niger-coup-can-blight-chinese-investments-in-africas-sahel-region/articleshow/102688818.cms">concerned about the impact of the coups</a> but stuck to its position of not interfering in other nations’ internal affairs. </p>
<h2>Where does the US go from here?</h2>
<p>Africa’s shifting allegiance to Moscow and Beijing comes at the expense of Washington’s influence – and that could hurt U.S. economic and strategic interests.</p>
<p>The Sahel region and the rest of Africa is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32091/chapter/268011948">home to immense and valuable resources</a>, most notably cocoa, coffee, timber, cotton, diamond, gold, manganese, cobalt, uranium, titanium and coltan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit stands in front of a map of Africa." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547564/original/file-20230911-17-npzv0a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Barack Obama was the last U.S. president to make an official state visit to Africa, in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-delivers-a-speech-at-the-african-news-photo/482183512?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The Sahel region is also of huge strategic importance in the battle against Boko Haram and other extremist organizations. The continent, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/africa-can-play-a-leading-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/">is crucial in the struggle</a> to safeguard the environment and addressing climate change. It also contains some of the the fastest-growing nations in the world. Nigeria is set to <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf">double its population to 375 million by 2050</a> – and in the process potentially overtake the U.S.</p>
<p>It is for good reason, therefore, that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/secretary-blinken-visits-kenya-nigeria-senegal/6343059.html">noted in 2021 that</a> “Africa will shape the future … of the world.”</p>
<p>But for too long, America has fallen back on discarded notions to shape its African policy rather than look to the continent’s future. By focusing on its own security needs, America has, in my view, failed to understand that alleviating the political, economic and social conditions of locals remains a vital part of the struggle. In Niger, for example, America spent millions of dollars via the government and the U.S. military’s Africa Command, yet 43% of its people <a href="https://concernusa.org/news/poverty-in-niger/">still live in poverty</a>. And to them, resolving problems including chronic unemployment, poor governance and weak democratic institutions is more important than military spending. </p>
<p>U.S. policy risks becoming increasingly ineffectual if it fails to better focus on alleviating conditions that create political unrest, rather than just reacting when it happens. For example, America <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/10/the-u-s-should-bid-biya-goodbye-cameroon-security-foreign-policy-yaounde/">can better pressure the continent’s autocrats</a>, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, to institute genuine democratic reforms and make way for new leadership. </p>
<p>The Biden administration pledged at 2022’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/15/u-s-africa-leaders-summit-strengthening-partnerships-to-meet-shared-priorities/">invest US$55 billion</a> in the continent over a three-year period.</p>
<p>But while Secretary Blinken has endorsed an equal partnership with African nations, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-africa-policy-biden-administration/2021/11/19/cc11c95c-4933-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html">past practices of marginalizing the continent continue</a>. Joe Biden has not visited sub-Saharan Africa as president – nor did his predecessor. You have to go <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/26/president-obama-travels-kenya-and-ethiopia">back to 2015</a> for the last time a U.S. president – Barack Obama – set foot on sub-Saharan Africa as part of an official state visit. </p>
<p>To many on the continent, that speaks volumes about Washington’s priorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
No US president has set foot on sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 – and it hasn’t gone unnoticed.
Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/212809
2023-09-05T13:40:23Z
2023-09-05T13:40:23Z
Gabon coup has been years in the making: 3 key factors that ended the Bongo dynasty
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> that put an end to the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56-year hold</a> on power in Gabon has been many years in the making. </p>
<p>Its roots can be traced back to when deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/29/gabon-president-ali-bongo-hospitalised-in-saudi-arabia">suffered a stroke</a> in 2018. </p>
<p>The political crisis caused by Bongo’s illness and the opaque manner in which he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/gabonese-president-ali-bongo-defies-illness-father-s-shadow-4c2dba69">continued</a> to hold the reins of power through close family members during his convalescence created tensions within the power circles. </p>
<p>On one side were critics who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-cabinet-idUSKCN0RC0I720150912">demanded</a> his resignation and sought to end the Bongo dynasty’s grip on power in the oil rich Central African country. These critics were mostly responsible for the emergence of <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/01/albert-ondo-ossa-everything-must-be-done-so-that-general-oligui-nguema-hands-over-power-to-me_6119686_124.html">Albert Ondo Ossa</a> as a consensus opposition presidential candidate at the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>On the other side were loyal members of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a>. The party was founded by former <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">president Omar Bongo</a>, who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009. In this group were party members who continued to play an institutional charade of cabinet meetings and rubber-stamp legislation that masked the troubling absence and incapacitation of Ali Bongo. </p>
<p>The group also includes powerful clan members inside the Bongo dynasty jockeying for position and wealth in the uncertainty surrounding Ali Bongo’s health.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.ags.edu/international-relations/agsird-faculty/douglas-a-yates">political scientist</a> specialising in African politics and the politics of the oil industry in Africa, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240810975_The_Rentier_State_in_Africa_Oil_Rent_Dependency_and_Neocolonialism_in_the_Republic_of_Gabon">researched</a> the implications of oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in Gabon.</p>
<p>My view is that the corrupt oil-rentier dynastic regime that ruled Gabon for the past half century was brought to an end by a combination of three factors. They are Ali Bongo’s illness; the contagion effect of other recent successful coups in Africa; and the power tussle between General Brice Oligui Nguema (the coup leader, who is said to be Bongo’s distant cousin) and Sylvia Bongo Ondimba, Ali Bongo’s wife. The former first lady was believed to be preparing her son, Noureddine Bongo, to succeed his father. </p>
<h2>Factors in favour of coup</h2>
<p>Before the coup d’état there was little hope that Ali Bongo Ondimba would lose his third re-election bid. </p>
<p>His party had over <a href="https://data.ipu.org/node/62/elections?chamber_id=13398">80%</a> of the seats in the legislature, control of regional and municipal governments, and a hold on the courts and the security apparatus of the state. </p>
<p>Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election, which the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%. That was before the military struck. </p>
<p>One of the factors that encouraged the military intervention in Gabon is the contagion effect of recent successful coups in Africa. A series of coups in Mali (2020), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) appear to have demonstrated to Gabon’s military that not only was a successful coup possible, it was acceptable. </p>
<p>After the coup, crowds came out in Libreville and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">danced</a> in the streets. </p>
<p>The second factor is a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/1/has-gabons-all-powerful-bongo-dynasty-really-lost-its-55-year-grip">power tussle</a> between the coup leader, Nguema, and Sylvia Bongo. The deposed president’s wife is widely believed to have grown in influence after her husband suffered a stroke in 2018. Nguema was relieved of his duties as head of the president’s security.</p>
<p>If it is true that Sylvia was preparing her son to succeed his father, Noureddine would have been the third generation of the Bongo family to rule Gabon. Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46885467">succeeded</a> his father in 2009. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Prior to the 30 August coup, the only thing that seemed to have united the numerous opposition parties in Gabon (who barely managed to rally around a joint candidate just nine days before the 26 August poll) was the desire to remove Ali Bongo from office. </p>
<p>Now that a coup appears to have achieved that, it will be difficult for Albert Ondo Ossa to take office.</p>
<p>Given what appears like the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/08/31/US-urges-Gabon-military-to-preserve-civilian-rule-">willingness</a> of France and the United States to accept this palace coup, the only question is whether Nguema will lead a transition to civilian rule, hold elections, refuse to present himself for office, or become the next member of the Bongo clan to rule.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Ali Bongo’s illness, the contagion effect of other recent successful coups and palace power tussles are factors responsible for Gabon’s recent coup.
Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/212730
2023-09-01T15:07:57Z
2023-09-01T15:07:57Z
Coup in Gabon: Ali Bongo the eighth west African leader to be ousted by military in two years
<p>Gabon’s prime minister, Ali Bongo, has become the latest in a string of African leaders to be <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66652015">ousted by a military coup</a> in recent years. Bongo, who had just won a third term in power, was ousted by a junta of senior officers who have named <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66666585">General Brice Oligui Nguema</a> – the former head of the presidential guard and Bongo’s cousin – as the country’s new “interim president”.</p>
<p>The coup in Gabon is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/recent-coups-west-central-africa-2023-08-30/">eighth in west and central Africa since 2020</a>, and the second – after Niger – in as many months. He is being held under house arrest from where he made an emotional plea for help for him and his family from international “friends of Gabon” to “make noise”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Deposed Gabonese president, Ali Bongo, makes an emotional plea for help after being placed under house arrest.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup appears to have brought an end to his family’s <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/30/timeline-gabon-since-independence-in-10-dates/">55-year hold on power in Gabon</a>. His father, El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, was president for almost 42 years from 1967. When he died in hospital in 2009, his son won the presidency in an election criticised at the time as little more than a dynastic handover.</p>
<p>News of Bongo’s removal from power was greeted by many with jubilation, with crowds taking to the streets in support of the military junta. There has long been talk of corruption in Gabon, with many believing that revenues from the country’s considerable oil wealth are not being distributed evenly, leaving many in poverty.</p>
<p>Gabon, a <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/3520.htm">member of Opec</a>, produces more than 200,000 barrels of oil a day, but – despite having one of Africa’s highest incomes per capita – more than one-third of the population of 2.3 million are thought to be living below the poverty line, according to the UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/MPI/GAB.pdf">Development Programme</a>. </p>
<h2>Contested election</h2>
<p>The result of the August 26 election, which appeared to hand Bongo his third term in power, was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66620070">widely disputed</a>. Before polls even closed there were complaints that many of the polling stations did not have papers bearing the name of Bongo’s main opponent, former university professor and one-time education minister, Albert Ondo Ossa. </p>
<p>There were reported long delays in polling stations being opened, the internet was shut down, and a curfew was imposed as polls closed. It took three days for the electoral authorities to announce that Bongo had won with 64.3% of the vote compared with 30.8% for Ossa. The coup is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/a-coup-in-gabon-who-what-and-why">reported to have taken place</a> within an hour of the results being announced.</p>
<p>This was not an attempt to unseat Bongo. In 2016, there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20160831-gabon-bongo-wins-presidential-election-commission-ping">outbreaks of violence</a> which resulted in more than 50 deaths after an extremely tight election result which Bongo won by 49.8% of the vote against his main opponent, Jean Ping with 48.2%. </p>
<p>There was also a coup attempt in January 2019, when a group of army officers tried to take power while Bongo was undergoing treatment for a stroke in Morocco. The 2019 botched coup attempt was an <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190108-gabon-botched-coup-ali-bongo-disputed-elections">early signal</a> of Bongo’s weakening grip on the military. He responded in December 2019 by arresting his chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, on corruption charges.</p>
<p>But this time, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/8/30/photos-hundreds-celebrate-in-gabons-capital-after-soldiers-seize-power">loud celebrations</a> in the capital Libreville would seem to indicate that, for now at least, the military junta enjoys a level of popular support.</p>
<p>Any unrest is likely to be met with a military clampdown. Gabon’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/gabon/">human rights record</a> has been mixed, with reports of abuse and violence, especially <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/gabon/report-gabon/">against dissident voices</a> after the 2016 election. All of which have serious consequences for governance and stability in the short to long term, both in Gabon and across the region. Under Bongo, Gabon had a Freedom House score of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/gabon/freedom-world/2023">20 out of 100</a>, reflecting the tight grip held by Bongo through his control of the military. Now the military has control.</p>
<h2>International reaction</h2>
<p>The African Union has responded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/african-union-meets-on-gabon-situation-after-military-coup">suspending Gabon’s membership</a> and, if the EU and other western countries react the same way as they have to other recent coups, sanctions are likely to be imposed. France, which has maintained close economic, diplomatic and military ties with Gabon, and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed">400 soldiers stationed in the country</a>, has roundly condemned the coup and called for the election result to be respected, as has the UK. The US has called the events in Gabon “deeply concerning”, while the EU has said the coup would be discussed by ministers this week, according to its top diplomat, Josep Borrell, who said: “If this is confirmed, it’s another military coup, which increases instability in the whole region.”</p>
<p>Gabon is not a member of west Africa’s regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). But the events in Libreville will put pressure on the regional body which is already discussing ways to reverse the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">recent coup in Niger</a> which occurred barely a month ago. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of central and west African countries." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545954/original/file-20230901-23-bwksbt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Troubled region: political instability is rife across central and west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/west-central-africa-political-map-capitals-212454859">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup puts France in a difficult position, given its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/31/gabon-crisis-is-another-challenge-to-frances-african-strategy">close relationship with Ali Bongo</a>, and it might feel pressure to intervene militarily, given that Ecowas already has its hands full with Niger. French influence in a region it once saw as its imperial backyard has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/analysis-france-losing-its-diplomatic-grip-on-west-africa-hsxhq6k0v">taken a battering</a> in the past two years with coups in francophone countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger.</p>
<p>Russia, on the other hand, has been steadily <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135#:%7E:text=Russian%20military%20advisers%20arrived%20in,2022%2C%20it%20delivered%20arms%20shipments.">trying to strengthen its influence in the region</a> and might see an opportunity to gain further influence by supporting Gabon’s military junta. China, too, is keen to play a growing role in the region – although Beijing tends mainly to concentrate on building economic ties on the resource-rich continent.</p>
<p>But the aftermath of recent events in Libreville will no doubt be watched most closely by the various other longstanding rulers in the region whose democratic mandate might be weaker than their dependence on their armies or foreign mercenaries to keep them in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Ali Bongo is the latest in a string of leaders to be ousted in military coups since 2020.
Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/212672
2023-09-01T08:57:49Z
2023-09-01T08:57:49Z
Gabon coup: Bongo’s rule ended by failed promises and shifting alliances
<p><em>The Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 year hold</a> on power in Gabon was abruptly brought to an end with a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/gabon-coup-military-ali-bongo-house-arrest/a-66668078">military coup</a> on 30 August. The military takeover happened hours after election results were announced that gave Ali Bongo Ondimba <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">a third term</a>. Gyldas Ofoulhast-Othamot, a professor of public and international affairs with <a href="https://www.academia.edu/36832992/The_Quick_Rise_and_Fall_of_the_Developmental_State_in_Gabon_2009_2016">published research on Gabon</a>, explains factors that may have contributed to the ouster.</em></p>
<h2>Did Gabon’s recent election stack up as ‘free and fair’?</h2>
<p>The presidential election on 26 August was the sixth since the formal end of the one-party state in 1990. Like the others, it was contentious from the start. </p>
<p>The particular issue this time was that three elections (presidential, parliamentary and local) took place at once. This had never been done before. In the context of autocratic and dynastic rule in Gabon, it was bound to be problematic. </p>
<p>It’s no surprise that the poll was reported to be <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ousting-gabons-unpopular-leader-smokescreen-soldiers-seize-power-102825125#:%7E:text=The%20head%20of%20Gabon's%20elite,and%20a%20lack%20of%20transparency.">chaotic</a>. It appears to have been a mixture of ineptitude and wilful incompetence and chaos. Polls opened late. Some opposition ballots were said to be missing. As a result voting had to be extended in some areas. </p>
<p>Finally, immediately after the vote, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-vote-president-bongo-seeks-extend-56-year-family-dynasty-2023-08-26/">internet</a> was cut and a curfew put in place, rarely a sign of a regime confident that it has won at the polls.</p>
<p>The many <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/revision-gabonese-constitution-between-contestation-modernization-and-inconsistencies">constitutional</a>, legal and electoral changes before and after the elections severely undermined the integrity of the vote. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most contentious change was the last-minute addition of the single ballot. This meant that voters who selected a member of parliament automatically voted for the presidential candidate in the same party – even if it wasn’t their first choice.</p>
<p>Collectively, all the changes seemed designed to give the incumbent the advantage. They made for flawed elections. </p>
<p>Finally, the result, which gave Ali Bongo Ondimba the victory with over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">64%</a> of votes cast, was announced while people were asleep. No advance notification was given as it had been in previous contests. </p>
<p>All signs were that it was a rigged election. </p>
<p>The leaders of the junta used that as a justification for their takeover.</p>
<h2>What are the weaknesses in Gabon’s political makeup?</h2>
<p>Gabon <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20230830-the-republic-of-gabon-in-dates">became independent</a> from France on 17 August 1960. That’s 63 years ago. Except for its first president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leon-Mba">Leon M’ba Minko</a> (1960-1967), the Bongo family has governed the country for 56 years – (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">Omar Bongo Ondimba from 1967 to 2009</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-46074728">Ali Bongo Ondimba</a> from then on until 30 August 2023). </p>
<p>Political domination by a single family is the country’s main weakness. The political system has been tailored to serve the interests of one family only and its domestic and foreign allies. </p>
<p>In this context, it becomes difficult to engineer the types of reforms necessary for a country to modernise and regenerate itself. </p>
<p>Bongo’s father maintained control through patronage and balancing the involvement of various societal (ethnic) groups. But in the 1990s this became more difficult because of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/51a316ff18.html">return of multipartyism</a> and a decline in oil reserves which made patronage more challenging. </p>
<p>In some ways, Ali Bongo Ondimba’s attempt to go beyond the political equilibrium created by his father doomed him. He promised reforms and a state that would improve the lives of all the people. But he failed to deliver. </p>
<p>With ever shifting domestic elite alliances and popular demand for better living conditions and for the Bongo regime to end, it was only a matter of time before the military switched sides. It was that or continued repression with the potential for more blood being spilled, as happened in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">2016</a>.</p>
<h2>What about the economy? How are ordinary people faring?</h2>
<p>Well endowed in natural resources, Gabon is regarded by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=GA">GDP per capita of US$8,820</a>. This is among the <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/gabon-market-overview#:%7E:text=Gabon's%20per%20capita%20GDP%20of,not%20reflect%20its%20relative%20wealth.">highest</a> in sub-Saharan Africa. Gabon used to be called the “<a href="https://bondsloans.com/news/gabon-a-step-in-the-right-direction">Kuwait of Africa</a>” because of its oil and natural resources wealth and its small population of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2.3 million</a>. </p>
<p>But its population remains poor. Only a small elite has benefited from the country’s wealth. Unemployment is said to be as high as <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=GA">37%</a>, with <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/08/gabon-report-slams-record-of-ali-bongos-second-term//">35%</a> of Gabonese living below the poverty line of US$2 a day.</p>
<p>When Ali Bongo Ondimba came to power in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-president-ali-bongo/a-46983878">2009</a>, he <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/GAB">promised</a> economic reforms. But by 2016, economic stagnation was still the norm. <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2023/07/gabon-power-outage-causes-flight-delays-at-leon-mba-international-airport-in-libreville-as-of-july-25">Power cuts are frequent</a>, running tap water has become a rare commodity, and inequalities have increased.</p>
<h2>What history does the military have in the country’s affairs?</h2>
<p>This is the third coup in Gabon’s history. </p>
<p>The first was in <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/gabon-latest-in-a-series-of-coups-in-africa/2979571">1964</a> under President Leon M’ba Minko. France intervened to reinstate him. </p>
<p>The last two coups have been under Ali Bongo Ondimba. In 2019, it was led by junior officers and was short-lived. Nevertheless, it exposed the frailties of his regime, especially after he suffered a stroke in Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>This time it appears that the military brass are all in, at least those who matter in the Republican Guard (GR in French). </p>
<p>In my view the military has been central to the Bongo regime maintaining its power for all those years. </p>
<p>For instance, in 1993 and 2016 when the Bongo regime was under duress, only military intervention and repression of opposition groups ensured its survival. </p>
<p>Also, the loyalty of the members of the state security and defence apparatus has always been well rewarded. The Republican Guard, the most equipped and well financed of all the armed forces, exemplifies that. </p>
<p>The difference now is that it has decided to be king rather than staying behind the scenes as the kingmaker. </p>
<p>Its aims are not clear yet – democratic and republican or authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>What difference is this coup likely to make?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/who-is-brice-oligui-nguema-alleged-coup-leader-in-gabon">General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema</a>, the leader of the junta, does not appear to be related to the Bongo family. </p>
<p>He entered the Bongo circle through his relationship with the long-time former commander of the Republican Guard, André Oyini. Over time, he rose through the ranks to become Omar Bongo Ondimba’s last military aide. </p>
<p>Given that proximity to the Bongo family, it looks like a palace revolution rather than true political change. Ali Bongo Ondimba was the heir of a political system built by his father since the 1960s. That system has not collapsed overnight. </p>
<p>Yet the junta, and more generally the security and defence forces, will have to take into account political, economic and social decay and popular aspirations when deciding the path forward. If not, instability will become the norm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot is not affiliated with any political organizations either in the U.S. or Gabon. However, in the two most recent presidential elections, as a private citizen of Gabon, he endorsed both Jean Ping (2016) and Albert Ondo Ossa (2023).</span></em></p>
Failed developmental promises, ever shifting domestic elite alliances and popular demand for better living conditions contributed to the military removal of Gabon’s Ali Bongo Ondimba.
Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Assistant professor of political science, St. Petersburg College
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/211537
2023-08-17T15:47:46Z
2023-08-17T15:47:46Z
Gabon: how the Bongo family’s 56-year rule has hurt the country and divided the opposition
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542667/original/file-20230814-15-yo99yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gabon President Ali Bongo Ondimba speaks during a trade conference in London in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> appears set to end the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years hold</a> to power in Gabon. A group of senior military officers <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/military-announce-coup-in-gabon-as-senior-officers-seize-power-after-presidential-election-12950578">announced</a> that they had seized power shortly after President Ali Bongo Ondimba was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">declared winner</a> of the country’s recently held presidential poll.</p>
<p>The coup leaders claimed the 26 August general election was not credible. They announced a cancellation of the election result, closure of all borders and dissolution of all state institutions including the legislative arm of government.<br>
Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election that the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%.</p>
<p>Ali Bongo, (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">son of former president Omar Bongo who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009</a>) contested the election on the platform of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a> (PDG), founded by his father. The party has monopolised power in the oil-rich central African country for more than half a century.</p>
<p>The Bongo family has held onto power for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years</a>. It has done so through single-party government, corruption in the mining and oil sectors, and political kinship. According to some estimates Ali Bongo personally controls <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/8-richest-dictators-history-172424055.html">US$1 billion</a> in assets, much of that secreted overseas, making him the richest man in Gabon. </p>
<p>In addition, the constitution has been <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/revision-gabonese-constitution-between-contestation-modernization-and-inconsistencies">changed several times</a> in the past decades to ensure the Bongos’ continued rule. </p>
<p>First, term limits were removed from the constitution in 2003, ensuring that Bongo could serve as president for life. </p>
<p>Second, traditional two-round ballots were changed into single-round ballots, also in 2003. This was to ensure that Bongo’s opponents could not rally around a single challenger in a run-off. </p>
<p>Third, instead of requiring that the winner obtain a majority, all that is needed for Bongo to be re-elected is a plurality. This means a majority could be less than 50%, as long as the winner has the most votes. Had he been required to win a majority of votes, Ali Bongo, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">49.8%</a> in the 2016 election, would not be president today.</p>
<p>Fourth, in April 2023, the presidential term was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230407-gabon-reduces-presidential-term-to-five-years-before-elections">reduced</a> from seven to five years, ensuring the presidential elections would occur at the same time as legislative and local elections. </p>
<p>In the past, after presidential elections, opposition parties would organise against Bongo’s ruling party to capture seats in the legislative and local elections. The change makes it much more likely that all the institutions of government power will be taken by Bongo and his party in one single election. </p>
<p>Bongo’s party increased its seats in the national assembly, holding 63 out of 120 seats in 1990 and most recently 98 out of 143 in 2018. The ruling party has also increased its seats in the senate from 52 out of 92 in 1997, to 46 out of 67 in 2021.</p>
<p>The continuous rule by the Bongos has not been good for a country of just <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2.3 million</a> people. Gabon is a resource-rich country and was once heralded as the “<a href="https://bondsloans.com/news/gabon-a-step-in-the-right-direction">Kuwait of Africa</a>”. Because of its small population and large oil reserves, per capita income is at least <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Gabon/gdp_per_capita_ppp/#:%7E:text=GDP%20per%20capita%2C%20Purchasing%20Power%20Parity&text=The%20average%20value%20for%20Gabon,2022%20is%2013949.16%20U.S.%20dollars.">US$13,949.16</a>. In neighbouring Cameroon, per capita income is only <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/gdp-per-capita">US$3,733</a> </p>
<p>But Gabon’s “average” is belied by a population where a third of the citizens live below the poverty line and unemployment stands at about <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=GA">37%</a> among young people.</p>
<h2>Dynastic republic</h2>
<p>Gabon is not a monarchy but a “dynastic republic”.</p>
<p>In dynastic republics, presidents have concentrated power in their hands and established systems of personal rule. They transmit state power through nepotism to their family and kin. This includes sons and daughters, wives and ex-wives, brothers and sisters, half-siblings and step-siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, in-laws, illegitimate children and so on. </p>
<p>Under this system, the classical ideal of a legal-rational state – where position and rank are distributed based on merit in the name of the rational (efficient and effective) functioning of government -– is corrupted. </p>
<p>In all dynastic republics around the world – including Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Syria, Azerbaijan, North Korea, Turkmenistan and most recently Cambodia –- an institutionalisation of traditional family power through the modern vehicle of a single ruling party has been critical.</p>
<p>In Gabon, this is the Parti Démocratique Gabonais. The party holds the presidential palace and has a majority in the national assembly (98/143 seats) and in the senate (46/67 seats). It also controls the courts, and the regional and municipal governments. </p>
<p>It is critical to understand that no man rules alone. Only with a large party apparatus can a man and his family rule a republic with millions of people.</p>
<p>But why has the rule by one man and his family been tolerated? </p>
<p>The answer is the political elite need him to keep their own positions.</p>
<p>The economist <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107671/1/81962733X.pdf">Gordon Tullock</a> hypothesised back in 1987 that dynastic succession appeals to non-familial elites who are wary of a leadership struggle. In 2007, professor of government <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231991883_THE_RESILIENCE_OF_RULING_PARTIES_Jason_Brownlee_Authoritarianism_in_an_Age_of_Democratization_Cambridge_Cambridge_University_Press_2007_Pp_xiii_264_2399">Jason Brownlee</a> tested this theory by looking at 258 non-monarchical autocrats. He found that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>in the absence of prior experience selecting a ruler through a party, regime elites accepted filial heirs apparent when the incumbent had arisen from a party and his successor predominantly emerged from that organisation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Dictator_s_Handbook.html?id=UBY5DgAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Bruno Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith</a> argue that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>essential supporters have a much greater chance of retaining their privileged position when power passes within a family from father to son, from king to prince, than when power passes to an outsider.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Omar Bongo founded the PDG in 1967 as a de jure one-party system. After constitutional reforms in 1990, he permitted the existence of opposition parties. But because he never held free or fair elections, the democratic opposition has never managed to wrest power from either the Bongos or their ruling party.</p>
<p>In the past, elections in Gabon were followed by protests, which were followed by security force crackdowns and ultimately silence. But the 2023 election may turn out to be different as it appears to have been followed by a military coup.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated on 30 August to reflect the coup in Gabon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Gabon is resource rich, but the Bongo family’s continuous rule has been bad news for the country of 2.3 million people.
Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/192412
2022-11-13T05:29:42Z
2022-11-13T05:29:42Z
Climate change and wildlife: 3 studies that reveal the devastating toll on Africa’s animals
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494441/original/file-20221109-10877-26vl2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The carcass of a Grévy's zebra, an endangered species which exists only in the northern part of Kenya, where drought is ongoing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by FREDRIK LERNERYD/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change has produced a number of threats to wildlife. Over time, changing rainfall patterns have transformed habitats and forced animals to move. Increasing <a href="https://theconversation.com/daytime-sightings-of-elusive-aardvarks-hint-at-troubled-times-in-the-kalahari-148120">temperatures</a> are causing mass die-off events during <a href="https://theconversation.com/vulnerable-lizard-species-gets-hot-and-bothered-in-rising-temperatures-171052">heat</a> waves and making it hard for animals to find food. </p>
<p>Drought is <a href="https://theconversation.com/saving-east-africas-wildlife-from-recurring-drought-183844">recurring</a> in parts of the continent. The increased frequency means there’s little or no time to recover before the next one occurs. The wildlife in some of these regions lives alongside people who are also struggling to survive and keep their livestock alive. This puts people and wildlife into conflict as they compete for diminishing sources of water and food. </p>
<p>Climate change can also strongly influence the physiology, behaviour and breeding success of animals. </p>
<p>Academics writing for The Conversation Africa have covered some of these issues. Their articles and research sound a warning bell on the effects of climate change on wildlife. Here we share three of these important reads. </p>
<p>_</p>
<h2>Drought takes a toll on East Africa’s wildlife</h2>
<p>Over the past two decades, the Horn of Africa – specifically Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya – has experienced more intense and frequent droughts. Drought adds to the pressure on resources like water and pasture. This makes livestock and wildlife more susceptible to malnutrition, disease, mass mortalities and competition with each other over resources. </p>
<p>Kenyan scientist and conservationist Abdullahi Ali has worked for over 15 years along the volatile Kenya-Somalia border region. He’s seen at first hand the devastating effect that these droughts have on wildlife and habitat. For instance, based on monitoring herds, he’s recorded the deaths of 30 endangered hirola (about 6% of the global population) as a direct consequence of drought over the past year. </p>
<p>Ali <a href="https://theconversation.com/saving-east-africas-wildlife-from-recurring-drought-183844">is concerned that</a> droughts are recurring. Their increased frequency means there’s little or no time to recover before the next drought. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/saving-east-africas-wildlife-from-recurring-drought-183844">Saving East Africa's wildlife from recurring drought</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Warmer temperatures, fruit trees and forest elephants</h2>
<p>Gabon is home to some of the highest densities of forest elephants. Many of them live in Lopé National Park, a 5,000km² protected area. </p>
<p>Ecological experts Katharine Abernethy, Emma Bush and Robin Whytock have <a href="https://theconversation.com/fruit-famine-is-causing-elephants-to-go-hungry-in-gabon-152757">observed</a> a significant drop in the physical condition of these elephants – an 11% decline since 2008.</p>
<p>This corresponds with a massive collapse in tree fruiting events. Elephants are much less likely than before to find ripe fruit. On average, elephants would have found ripe fruit on one in every 10 trees in the 1980s, but need to search more than 50 trees today. </p>
<p>The collapse in tree fruiting events is attributed to warmer temperatures. Lopé tree species depend on a critical drop in night-time temperatures during the long dry season to trigger flowering. In years when temperatures in the dry season did not dip below 19ºC these species produced no fruit. </p>
<p>So, even where forest elephants and other large animals are relatively well protected from threats such as hunting, global human pressures – such as the climate crisis – could affect their survival. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fruit-famine-is-causing-elephants-to-go-hungry-in-gabon-152757">Fruit famine is causing elephants to go hungry in Gabon</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The loss of the Kalahari’s hornbills</h2>
<p>For birds in arid zones, rising temperatures pose a significant problem. They usually breed in response to rainfall, which often occurs during the hottest time of the year. And birds are mostly active during the day, when they are exposed to the sun’s heat. This is when their vital processes for reproduction take place – such as territorial defence, courtship, finding food for their young and attending the nest.</p>
<p>Ornithology expert Nicholas Pattinson <a href="https://theconversation.com/hotter-kalahari-desert-may-stop-hornbills-breeding-by-2027-183937">assessed</a> the effects of air temperature and drought on the breeding output of southern yellow-billed hornbills in southern Africa’s Kalahari Desert over a decade, from 2008 to 2019.</p>
<p>His study found that breeding output fell when air temperatures rose in the breeding season. Breeding attempts all failed when average daily maximum air temperatures exceeded 35.7°C. </p>
<p>In the Kalahari, air temperatures have already risen more than 2°C in a few decades. At this rate, by 2027, these birds will not breed at all at this site. They will quickly become locally extinct.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hotter-kalahari-desert-may-stop-hornbills-breeding-by-2027-183937">Hotter Kalahari desert may stop hornbills breeding by 2027</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Changing habitat ranges, competition for food and water, and biological effects of climate change all pose threats to wildlife.
Moina Spooner, Assistant Editor
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/178233
2022-03-06T08:20:53Z
2022-03-06T08:20:53Z
A first for large African mammals: DNA used to count Gabon’s endangered forest elephants
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449452/original/file-20220302-27-1czm437.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African forest elephants.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GUDKOV ANDREY/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Across the African continent the populations of both species of African elephants – forest and savanna – have been declining due to habitat loss, poaching and human-wildlife conflict. </p>
<p>Forest elephants <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/181007989/204404464">are listed</a> by the International Union for Conservation of Nature as “Critically Endangered” – a category for species that have declined over 80% within three generations. And it has <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/181008073/204401095">listed savanna elephants</a> as “Endangered” – indicating a decline of over 50% within three generations.</p>
<p>But there <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308648066_African_Elephant_Status_Report_2016_an_update_from_the_African_Elephant_Database">remains some areas</a> where there is both high quality habitat and stable elephant populations. These <a href="https://peerj.com/articles/2354/">include</a> Gabon, the northern Republic of Congo, northern Botswana, northern Tanzania and northern Kenya. </p>
<p>Gabon holds <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469">roughly half of all forest elephants</a>, which occur across almost the entire country’s area (about 250,000km2). It is the principal stronghold of a species <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspb.1993.0042">that once numbered in the millions</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-decisions-by-global-conservation-group-bolster-efforts-to-save-africas-elephants-158157">New decisions by global conservation group bolster efforts to save Africa's elephants</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Securing this stronghold is vitally important to the species’ future. Given <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0192777">the slow rate</a> of forest elephant reproduction recruitment species recovery in more depleted areas will be slow.</p>
<p>To ensure good decision-making for wildlife conservation, it’s important to know how many elephants there are. Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers all need data they can trust when designing new protected areas, managing existing ones, and creating national and international conservation laws and strategies.</p>
<p>We set out to answer the question: How many forest elephants are in Gabon right now? </p>
<p>Elephant surveys within Gabon since 2004 have covered just under a quarter of the nation’s elephant habitat, but over the last decade (since 2011) only 14% of the habitat has been surveyed. </p>
<p>Thanks to a collaborative approach between the <a href="https://www.wcs.org/">Wildlife Conservation Society</a>, the Gabonese National Parks Agency and <a href="https://vulcan.com/">Vulcan Inc</a> (a philanthropic foundation), we were able to plan and implement our <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2351989421004443">nationwide, systematic population survey of forest elephants in Gabon</a> using DNA from fresh elephant dung. </p>
<p>This was the first national DNA-based assessment of any free-ranging large mammal in Africa.</p>
<h2>Counting elephants</h2>
<p>Our first aim was to collect as many dung samples as possible. We then assigned each dungpile to an individual elephant using DNA analysis. </p>
<p>Our survey covered 18 plots, each at about 2,000km2 in size, which were spaced across the entire country. We looked for fresh elephant dung within each of sites, walking for about three weeks per site – a total of almost 8,300 km, a distance which is the equivalent of Canada to Gabon! </p>
<p>We collected samples from just over 4,000 fresh dungpiles, which after DNA analysis, were found to have been deposited by almost 1,760 individuals (of which almost 70% were from females). </p>
<p>Our results estimated that there are 95,110 forest elephants in Gabon. Our population estimation method depends on a proportion of individual elephants being “captured” more than once, a method formally known as <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10336-010-0583-z">spatially explicit capture-recapture</a>. We also estimated that they lived at an average population density of 0.38 per km2, or roughly one elephant per square mile.</p>
<p>Elephant densities were highest in relatively flat areas with a high proportion of reasonably intact lowland tropical forests. They were not found in high densities near the national border. </p>
<p>Interestingly, human presence and activity did not appear to be strong predictors of elephant density. By contrast, <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469">elsewhere in Central Africa</a> elephants avoid roads, villages, and populated areas. This is probably because Gabon has lower levels of elephant poaching than other countries. Gabon also has one of the lowest human population densities in Africa and <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=GA">over 90% of the population live in towns and cities</a>. In the very lightly populated rural regions, there may be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2351989421004443">roughly one elephant for every twenty inhabitants</a>. </p>
<h2>Human-elephant conflict</h2>
<p>As key species in their ecosystem, forest elephants provide unique ecological services related to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2009.00512.x">seed dispersal</a>, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ecog.01641">trampling</a> and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecog.03309">nutrient cycling</a>. This is why they are called “ecosystem engineers” and “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1146609X11000154">mega-gardeners</a>”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-019-0395-6">More recent work</a> has shown the link between elephants and carbon sequestration. This is because tree species whose seeds are dispersed by elephants tend to be much larger, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/srep13156">with higher wood density</a> <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12914">and higher carbon content</a> than tree species dispersed by other methods, such as by monkeys or the wind.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, despite their importance, there have been increasing reports of human-elephant conflict (crop-raiding) in some areas. This has become a highly charged political issue, as farmers blame their crop damage on elephant protection, which undermines conservation efforts. </p>
<p>Since 2012 there have been studies in Gabon along the <a href="http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6399/1/EmilieFairet_Thesis_Finaldraft_08022013.pdf?DDD5+">coast</a>, a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00565.x">national review</a>, and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/19400829211026775">more recent</a> reports and <a href="http://ncr-journal.bear-land.org/article/133">investigations</a> into <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0155690">appropriate methods</a> for elephant conservation. </p>
<p>Having acknowledged the updated forest elephant estimates provided in our study, the Gabonese government initiated a series of national meetings in December 2021. The aim was to outline a <a href="https://www.savetheelephants.org/about-elephants-2-3-2/elephant-news-post/?detail=human-elephant-conflict-lee-white-determined-to-mitigate-the-crisis-gabon">national strategy plan</a> that addresses the concerns of the local communities affected by elephants.</p>
<p>This is a welcome step forward. Our study provides a useful baseline with which to regularly monitor <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/blog/2021/gabon-leads-africa-in-the-preservation-and-conservation-of-fores.html">Gabon’s ambitious environmental and development policy goals</a>.</p>
<p><em>Alice Laguardia was the lead author of this research study.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178233/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiona Maisels works for the Wildlife Conservation Society (Global Conservation Program), and is affiliated with the University of Stirling, Scotland. She is a member of the IUCN African Elephant Specialist Group and one of the 2021 African Elephant Red List team.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice Laguardia works for the Wildlife Conservation Society.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gaspard Abitsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
This was the first national DNA-based assessment of any free-ranging large mammal in Africa.
Fiona Maisels, Wildlife Conservation Society, African Elephant Specialist Group (IUCN) and Honorary Professor, University of Stirling
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/167392
2021-09-12T08:22:02Z
2021-09-12T08:22:02Z
Marburg in Guinea: the value of lessons from managing other haemorrhagic outbreaks
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419655/original/file-20210906-15-jcxilr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A photo taken in August 2015 of disinfected gloves and boots at an Ebola treatment centre in Conakry, Guinea. Lessons are being drawn to manage the Marburg virus.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cellou Binani/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the COVID-19 pandemic rages on in Africa amid insufficient vaccination rollout, viral haemorrhagic fever has again raised its head. This adds to public health turmoil on the continent where resources to respond to emerging and re-emerging epidemic prone zoonotic diseases remain limited.</p>
<p>In the first week of August 2021, a Marburg <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/west-africas-first-ever-case-marburg-virus-disease-confirmed-guinea">virus disease outbreak</a> was declared in south-western Guinea. This was the same area in which the recent outbreak of Ebola virus disease occurred and only weeks after the end of the Ebola outbreak was <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/ebola-outbreak-guinea-declared-over">declared</a>.</p>
<p>To date, 14 outbreaks of Marburg virus disease have been reported since 1967. These have been mostly in <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/25-october-2017-marburg-uganda-en">sub-Saharan Africa</a>. The most recent case in Guinea is the first <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/west-africas-first-ever-case-marburg-virus-disease-confirmed-guinea">reported</a> in West Africa. However, evidence of Marburg virus circulation has been reported from countries where Marburg virus disease cases have not been diagnosed to date. These include <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28710694/">Gabon, Zambia, and Sierra Leone</a>. </p>
<p>The first recognised outbreak of Marburg virus disease in Africa occurred <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20407721">in 1975 in South Africa</a>. It was an imported case from Zimbabwe. Imported cases from Uganda were reported in 2008 in the US and the Netherlands and one laboratory infection was diagnosed in Russia in 2004. To date the largest and deadliest outbreak occurred in Angola in 2004–2005.</p>
<p>Recurrent outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers are a major burden on countries such as Guinea where health care systems are already under threat.</p>
<p>Fortunately, many African countries are experienced in managing outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers. Guinean health authorities have been able to respond rapidly and implement measures <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/guinea/defeating-ebola-guinea-through-better-experience">learnt during the Ebola</a> outbreak to control the spread of Marburg. This has included rapid deployment of multidisciplinary teams, diagnosis, contact tracing, isolation and treatment of patients. </p>
<p>The existence of treatment centres greatly facilitated rapid treatment of suspected cases and confirmed cases, and medical expertise improved patient care. </p>
<h2>Marburg virus</h2>
<p>Marburg virus belongs to the same family as the Ebola viruses. It causes sporadic, but often fatal disease in humans and non-human primates. Studies implicate the Egyptian rousette bat, <em>Rousettus aegyptiacus (Pteropodidae family)</em>, as the prime reservoir host. Entering the roosting habitats, including caves and mining activities have been associated with Marburg virus transmission to humans.</p>
<p>The virus is transmitted by direct contact with the blood, bodily secretions and/or tissues of infected persons or wild animals, for example monkeys and bats. It can also be transmitted through contact with surfaces and materials like bedding or clothing contaminated with these fluids. </p>
<p>The incubation period varies from 2 to 21 days. Symptoms include fever, malaise, body aches, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, and internal haemorrhaging (bleeding). </p>
<p>Marburg virus can be difficult to distinguish from other tropical common febrile illnesses, because of the similarities in the clinical presentation. Based on the laboratory confirmed cases, infection with Marburg virus can result in death in 23% to 90% of patients.</p>
<p>There is no specific antiviral treatment or preventative vaccine. Supportive care includes intravenous fluids, replacement of electrolytes, supplemental oxygen, and replacement of blood and blood products may significantly improve the clinical outcome.</p>
<p>Marburg virus can spread easily between people if appropriate preventive measures are not in place. These include personal protection, barriers nursing, safe management of funerals, case finding, contact tracing, isolation and treatment of patient.</p>
<p>The virus is potentially prone to cause formidable epidemics with serious public health consequences.</p>
<h2>Important steps</h2>
<p>The area in Guinea where the case of Marburg virus disease was detected shares close borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia. The movement of people locally and across borders could lead to the potential spread. That’s why the following steps are key:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the deployment of well-prepared response teams <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/ebola-and-marburg-virus-disease-epidemics-preparedness-alert-control-and-evaluation">at national and district level</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>surveillance and coordinated efforts within and between countries. </p></li>
<li><p>surveillance at points of entry.</p></li>
<li><p>contact tracing and active case finding in health facilities and at the community level.</p></li>
<li><p>investigations aiming at identification of the source of the infection.</p></li>
<li><p>laboratory testing without delay.</p></li>
<li><p>community engagement. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>It is also vitally important to educate the public and raise community awareness about the risk factors and the protective measures individuals can take to reduce their exposure. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>avoiding close physical contact with someone who is thought to have contracted the virus.</p></li>
<li><p>the transfer of any suspected case to a health facility for treatment and isolation.</p></li>
<li><p>the immediate and safe burial of people who have died from the virus.</p></li>
<li><p>the use of infection prevention and control precautions by health-care workers caring for patients with suspected or confirmed Marburg virus disease. This is to avoid any exposure to blood and/or bodily fluids, as well as unprotected contact with a possibly contaminated environment.</p></li>
<li><p>wildlife to be handled with gloves and appropriate protective clothing to reduce the risk of spread.</p></li>
<li><p>animal products (blood and meat) to be cooked thoroughly before eating. Raw meat should be avoided.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Community involvement is essential to respond effectively and control an outbreak. This must be supported by primary health care systems to gain greater participation and commitment.</p>
<h2>What needs to be fixed</h2>
<p>A number of factors get in the way of researching, responding to and controlling zoonotic diseases in Africa. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>insufficient and un-coordinated surveillance and research programmes. </p></li>
<li><p>limited regional capacity to develop new and improved diagnostic assays. </p></li>
<li><p>shortage of maximum containment facilities.</p></li>
<li><p>lack of strategic biobanks for long-term and secure storage of reference clinical materials, strains and pathogen biodiversity.</p></li>
<li><p>lack of regional External Quality Assurance programmes for dangerous endemic viral and bacterial pathogens.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A timely, streamlined, well-funded and efficient disease reporting and surveillance system is essential to monitor the threat of potential epidemics. To strengthen the efficiency of responding quickly, each nation must improve its own capacity in disease recognition and laboratory competence. </p>
<p>We also need innovative African-driven approaches to make the necessary quantum leap in the development of scientific capacity for surveillance and control of infectious diseases. </p>
<p>Global initiatives aiming at improving health security, emergency preparedness and health systems are also important. However, a great deal of work is needed at the higher level of national governance to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Groome receives funding from the South African Medical Research Council and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prof Janusz T. Paweska received funding from the CDC Global Disease Detection Program for investigating the occurrence of zoonotic pathogens in South African bat populations, from the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation for experimental infections of bats with Ebola and Marburg viruses and for Marburg virus transmission study by bat-associated ectoparasites, and from the South African Medical Research Council for investigating the molecular epidemiology of Ebola virus disease in West Africa and the development of diagnostic capacity.</span></em></p>
Many African countries are experienced in managing outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers and many of the lessons learnt from the Ebola can be applied to the Marburg outbreak.
Michelle J. Groome, Head of the Division of Public Health Surveillance and Response, National Institute for Communicable Diseases
Janusz Paweska, Head of the Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases, National Institute for Communicable Diseases
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165469
2021-08-05T15:11:51Z
2021-08-05T15:11:51Z
African governments have developed a taste for Eurobonds: why it’s dangerous
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/414549/original/file-20210804-19-npzrgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>International financial markets have opened a window for African governments to diversify their funding sources from traditional multilateral institutions and foreign aid. For example, they can now borrow through issuing Eurobonds – these are international bonds issued by a country in a foreign currency, usually in US dollars and euros.</p>
<p>South Africa was the first to issue Eurobonds in 1995. To date, 21 African countries have sold Eurobonds worth a combined total of over <a href="https://www.bondvigilantes.com/insights/2020/01/can-africas-wall-of-eurobond-repayments-be-dismantled">US$155 billion</a> on international bond markets <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14127.pdf">since 2006</a>, when Seychelles become the second African country to join the Eurobond market. There is appetite for more. </p>
<p>Eurobonds borrowing is done through commercial terms. The interest rates, term of bond and coupon payments are determined by market conditions. Because of poor credit ratings and <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-09-08-ignorance-and-the-perception-of-negative-risk-has-africa-paying-a-high-premium/">perceptions of high risk</a>, African bonds are classified as high yields. They’re risky, but they offer high returns. Investors are still scrambling for Africa’s high yield bonds. </p>
<p>Eurobonds are costly for governments. The high yields demanded by investors means high interest cost to governments. But they are attractive to governments because investors buy them without preconditions. Unlike multilateral concessionary loans that come with policy adjustment conditionalities, governments have total discretion in how to use the proceeds. </p>
<p>They are, however, offered at high interest rates, high coupon payments and shorter debt maturities. This means the government has a shorter period to use the costly funds and will also be paying periodic interest. The <a href="https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2021/03/09/aeo_2021_-_chap2_-_en.pdf">average tenor</a> for Africa’s bonds is 10 years, with interest of 5% to 16%. </p>
<p>This is unsustainable and has already led to more fiscal strain. Interest repayment is the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2a2b402c-c7b4-11e8-ba8f-ee390057b8c9">highest expenditure portion</a> and remains the fastest growth expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa’s fiscal budgets. For example Kenya, Angola, Egypt and Ghana are paying 20%, 25%, 33% and 37% of their collected tax revenue towards <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.INTP.RV.ZS">interest repayments</a>.</p>
<p>Investors are not interested in Eurobonds issued by other regions because they offer very low interest rates.</p>
<h2>Flavour of the last five years</h2>
<p>The Eurobond rush spiked in 2017, when US$18 billion bonds were issued in one year. By the end of 2019, the outstanding Eurobonds on the continent were <a href="https://www.bondvigilantes.com/insights/2020/01/can-africas-wall-of-eurobond-repayments-be-dismantled">totalling US$115 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Over the past two years, 10 countries have issued bonds totalling US$19.8 billion. It would have been more without the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which priced out issuers. Ghana and Egypt sold a combined US$7.1 billion while Morocco issued €2.5 billion in 2020 to support their fiscal budgets. </p>
<p>Ghana and Egypt returned to the market, issuing a total of US$7 billion in the first half of 2021. Their debt-to-GDP ratios have <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/government-debt-to-gdp?continent=africa">now risen to 78% in Ghana and 90% in Egypt</a>. Kenya also joined to issue US$1 billion, pushing its debt-to-GDP ratio to 66%.</p>
<p>Any debt-to-GDP ratio above 60% in developing countries is considered imprudent according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Monetary Co-operation Program’s threshold. Beyond the threshold, a country will be at high risk of <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/ghana-will-not-default-in-repaying-debt-but-classified-as-highly-debt-distress-country-imf/">debt default</a>.</p>
<h2>Signs of unsustainability</h2>
<p>The ability to borrow through financial markets is viewed by investors as a sign of competitiveness. Financial markets provide a platform for governments to borrow mainly for capital spending, but not too excessively. In Africa, this has not been the case. </p>
<p>The following are some key indications of why African governments must consider discontinuing excessive Eurobond borrowing:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>African governments have been on a Eurobond issuing spree, piling on debt without evaluating the exchange rate risks and the real costs of repaying the debts. The IMF <a href="https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/Views/DisplayPublication.aspx?type=document&IdPdf=41794">has identified</a> 17 African countries with outstanding Eurobonds as near or <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/ft/dsa/DSAlist.pdf">under debt distress</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Debt servicing is consuming an average of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/africa_sovereign_debt_sustainability.pdf">more than 20% of government revenue</a>, leaving very few resources for other developmental needs.</p></li>
<li><p>All the Eurobonds issued over the past three years were spent of non-productive short-term recurring expenditure and repayment of maturing bonds. Issues by Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Morocco, Gabon, Ghana and Egypt raised funds to support budget deficit and bond refinancing. </p></li>
<li><p>The majority of issued Eurobonds are of short- to medium-term duration, but their proceeds are used to finance long-term projects. In some cases, these are loss-making projects, or the funds are <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/news/article/2001322533/eurobond-money-earned-but-no-project">unaccounted for</a>. Ethiopia’s 10 failed mega sugar projects and the Kenyan loss-making Standard Gauge Railway were both funded from Eurobonds.</p></li>
<li><p>Foreign exchange reserves are generally depleting in most African governments while they accumulate debt that needs repayments in foreign currency. Adequate forex reserves are important for government to meet its international finance obligations.</p></li>
<li><p>Tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa has been <a href="https://www.ey.com/en_gl/tax/why-tax-collection-remains-a-challenge-in-sub-saharan-africa">shrinking over</a> the past 15 years in both real and absolute terms, because of weakening fiscal capacity. In a number of economies, the tax revenue collection is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS">below the minimum</a> desirable <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2019/09/09/mobilizing-tax-resources-to-boost-growth-and-prosperity-in-sub-saharan-africa">tax-to-GDP ratio of 15%</a>. Such fiscal capacity is inadequate even to finance basic government budget.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The continued borrowing from financial markets has led to high debt accumulation. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, some <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/ugandas-president-calls-africas-debt-cancelled-free-cash-virus/">called</a> for debt cancellation for <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-12-19-debt-forgiveness-will-top-the-african-agenda-in-2021/">highly indebted poor nations</a>. The G20 and the Paris club creditors also called for multilateral debt relief to be <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/sovereign-debt">extended to private creditors</a>. </p>
<p>In my view this continuous borrowing is unsustainable. It can only increase the fiscal fragility of African governments. It will be irresponsible to accumulate unsustainable debt for short-term gains to be repaid by future generations.</p>
<h2>High bond appetite</h2>
<p>Despite clear signs that Eurobond borrowing is unsustainable, governments continue to flood the market with new bond issues. In some countries, the new bonds are issued at higher interest rates than the previous issues. Some authorities are beginning to acknowledge that their Eurobond borrowing is driving debt stock <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1095622/finance-minister-blames-issuance-of-eurobond-covi.html">to unsustainable levels</a>. </p>
<p>The common misconception around oversubscription of all bonds issued by African governments has not helped. High appetite for Africa’s bonds is viewed as a success story. But attention isn’t being paid to the high yields demanded by investors for purchasing them. </p>
<p>Investors will continue to purchase the bonds as long as they are offered at the interest they need.</p>
<p>But there are no checks and balances. The funds from Eurobonds have no conditionalities nor any lines of accountability. Unlike multilateral loans, governments <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/25589487-78ba-4892-9fcf-cfe8556861b7">are not required</a> to provide detailed information about the specific use of proceeds nor account for whether the money was used for the purpose it was raised for. This magnifies the risk of fiscal indiscipline. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23322039.2016.1225346">Studies have shown</a> that some governments opt for irresponsible borrowing to finance unprofitable programmes to further their political interests.</p>
<h2>Solution</h2>
<p>It is inevitable that with the rising debt, if uncurbed, Africa will soon fall into another debt trap. Recent <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/african-countries-face-growing-risk-of-debt-defaults-afdb-warns-100212">default warnings</a> must not be ignored. </p>
<p>There is a need to change the structure and form of borrowing. It is time to reconsider concessionary loans - soft loans with below-market rates of interest and other favourable terms - from multilateral institutions again. If governments cannot exercise financial discipline, committing to reducing government deficits and debt accumulation, they should be encouraged to instead seek financial support from the multilateral institutions. Despite their weaknesses, funding from the multilateral institutions remains a cheaper option in helping economies to stabilise. </p>
<p>In addition, instead of borrowing more, governments must focus on mobilising greater domestic resources through effective tax administration and broadening the tax base. Increasing tax revenues will pay off budget deficits and public debt in the medium term.</p>
<p>Issuing Eurobonds without implementing structural reforms will only worsen fiscal challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize is the Lead Expert researcher with the African Union - African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on supporting countries on their engagements with international credit rating agencies.</span></em></p>
Eurobonds are costly for governments. But they are also attractive because investors buy them without preconditions.
Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/163017
2021-06-23T13:59:29Z
2021-06-23T13:59:29Z
How forest elephants move depends on water, humans, and also their personality
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407241/original/file-20210618-18-q5a8ul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African forest elephant in Lekoli River, Odzala-Kokoua National Park, Cuvette-Ouest Region, Republic of the Congo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African forest elephants roam the dense rainforests of West and Central Africa where they subsist largely on a diet of fruit. They <a href="https://conbio.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cobi.13035">shape forests</a> by dispersing fruit and seeds, browsing, and creating an extensive trail network. </p>
<p>But because it’s difficult to track animals in thick forest, little is known about the movements of the African forest elephant. This is troubling as poaching of forest elephants for their ivory as well as habitat fragmentation have decimated their populations over the past two <a href="https://www.cell.com/current-biology/comments/S0960-9822(17)30024-6">decades</a>. Their numbers have reduced from 700,000 to fewer than 150,000.</p>
<p>On top of this, climate change might be reducing the availability of fruit in the forest, potentially leading to elephant <a href="https://theconversation.com/fruit-famine-is-causing-elephants-to-go-hungry-in-gabon-152757">famine</a>. </p>
<p>Knowing how they move can help us to better protect them.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0199387">Gabon</a>, holds 50% of Africa’s remaining forest <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469">elephants</a>. In 2017, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/PARCSGABON/">Gabon Parks Agency</a> initiated an elephant GPS collaring programme to improve the understanding of forest elephant movements and guide their management. </p>
<p>We supported the Gabon Parks Agency’s collaring programme, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-91627-z">providing scientific advice</a> on study design, analysing data, and reporting on elephant movements.</p>
<p>Over six missions in four years, Dr Pete Morkel and his field team from the Gabon Parks Agency darted and affixed satellite collars on over 96 forest elephants. This happened in and around seven national parks.</p>
<p>We used this dataset of forest elephant movements – the largest ever assembled – to assess the factors influencing elephant movement behaviour. </p>
<p>Specifically, we asked the questions: to what extent do characteristics – like sex, habitat quality and human activity – determine the distance they move, their home range size, their exploratory behaviour, and their daily activity.</p>
<p>We found that all of these characteristics affected elephant behaviour. We also found that individual elephants consistently moved in different ways from each other. This told us that they have personalities.</p>
<p>These insights can provide clues into how elephants can be better managed to conserve their populations and to reduce conflict with humans, particularly crop raiding by elephants. </p>
<h2>Drivers of elephant movement</h2>
<p>We found that, on average, elephants moved nearly 2500 km a year. </p>
<p>In terms of intrinsic characteristics, sex was a key driver of elephant movement behaviour. </p>
<p>Males generally had larger home ranges and were slightly more active at night than females. They also spent less time in exploratory movements, these are long, persistent movements to new locations. </p>
<p>Food availability didn’t seem to affect movement behaviour. It might be that the rainforest habitat provided ample forage for elephants. However, we suspected that our measure of vegetation density was too coarse and didn’t capture availability of <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2020.00096/full">important diet items</a>, like fruit and bark.</p>
<p>Water was key to elephant movements. Forest elephants, like savanna elephants, can lose up to 10% of the water in their bodies in a single hot <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/11/elephants-can-lose-two-bathtubs-full-water-single-day-when-it-gets-hot#:%7E:text=When%20the%20weather%20is%20warm,recorded%20in%20a%20land%20animal">day</a>. We saw that forest elephants didn’t stray too far from water sources, such as rivers. During high rainfall, elephants moved longer distances and made more directed, exploratory movements. </p>
<p>Elephants also altered their movement behaviour in response to human activity. In areas of higher <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/sdata201667">human disturbance</a>, elephants moved less, had smaller home ranges, were less active during the day, and exhibited fewer exploratory movements. Like animals <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6374/466">worldwide</a>, elephants shortened their movements to avoid human-modified landscapes.</p>
<p>While environmental and human drivers explained some of the variation in elephant movements, much of the variation was explained by the individual identity of the elephant. </p>
<p>Exploring further, we found elephant personalities to vary between “idlers” to “explorers”. We identified individual differences in the relationships between movement behaviours, consistent with the concept of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0006320717301556?via%3Dihub">“behavioural syndromes”</a>. In other words, an elephant that moved farther in a month also tended to have a larger home range and exhibited more exploratory behaviour.</p>
<p>Some forest elephants liked to explore, and others liked to stay put a bit more. And within these, there was enormous individual variation. </p>
<h2>Forest elephant conservation</h2>
<p>Our study offers some answers for elephant management, but also highlights complicating challenges. </p>
<p>For instance, the design of protected areas and habitat corridors must recognise that elephants may be reluctant to use habitat too far from perennial water sources or do so only in the wet season. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, elephant habitat should be protected from human disturbance, although further investigation into the types of human activities that most affect elephants is still necessary.</p>
<p>Variation in individual elephant behaviour – their personality – might complicate the development of general strategies for conservation if elephants respond in different ways to management. </p>
<p>Then again, it also accentuates the importance of conserving such a wide-ranging, intelligent and socially-complex species.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Studying how elephants move can give clues into how they can be better managed to conserve their populations.
John Poulsen, Associate Professor of Tropical Ecology, Duke University
Christopher Beirne, Postdoctoral Researcher, University of British Columbia
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/158157
2021-03-31T14:05:20Z
2021-03-31T14:05:20Z
New decisions by global conservation group bolster efforts to save Africa’s elephants
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392576/original/file-20210330-23-1e2hw59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African forest elephant in the Odzala-Kokoua National Park, Republic of the Congo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by: Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two big decisions have been made in the last few weeks in relation to African elephants that will have major implications for the survival of the giant mammals.</p>
<p>The first is that a <a href="https://www.iucn.org/ssc-groups/mammals/mammals-a-e/african-elephant">global body</a> devoted to the conservation of elephants in Africa <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/oryx/article/african-forest-and-savannah-elephants-treated-as-separate-species/82D0F321A09B7F72D042B5B881D71484">recognised</a> the African elephant as two species: forest and savanna. Previously they had been considered a single species. This matters because their individual populations are smaller than when recognised as a single species, and because they face shared as well as unique threats.</p>
<p>Secondly, in March, the International Union for Conservation of Nature updated its <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/">Red List</a>, and moved African elephants into <a href="https://www.agci.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/lib/main/05S3_RAkcakaya_0722.pdf">more threatened classifications</a>. As a single species, African elephants were previously listed as “Vulnerable”, because there had been a reduction of more than 30% of the population in the past three generations.</p>
<p>But the body has now listed <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/181007989/181019888">forest elephants</a> as “Critically Endangered” – a category for species that have declined over 80% within three generations. And it has listed <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/181008073/181022663">savanna elephants</a> as “Endangered” – a decline of over 50% within three generations.</p>
<p>Highlighting the African forest elephant as a distinct species and listing it as “Critically Endangered” will change how these animals are studied and conserved. Ecologists and conservationists can focus on understanding their unique ecology and addressing the specific threats they face from human pressure.</p>
<h2>Species split</h2>
<p>Genetic studies show that African savanna elephants and forest elephants <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-animal-022114-110838">split into two species between 5 million and 6 million years ago</a>. There are <a href="https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/2019-03-15-final-taxanomy_report-african-elephant-sg.pdf">some hybrid areas</a>, where the forest and savanna elephants meet, but the numbers are few and they’re mostly found in the border zone between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.</p>
<p>African forest elephants are found in <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/181007989/181019888">20 countries</a>, where they live in forests and in forest-savanna mosaics, with most found in Central Africa. By contrast, savanna elephants are found in 23 countries and live in a variety of habitats, from deserts to open and wooded savannas, and even some forests. The <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/7a8w3kk6r9hzm0r/AfESG%20African%20Elephant%20Status%20Report%202016.pdf?dl=1">largest populations</a> are in Southern and Eastern Africa.</p>
<p>Forest elephants differ from savanna elephants in their shape, behaviour and ecology. Forest elephants are smaller than savanna elephants, with much smoother skin. Forest elephant tusks are slim, parallel, and often downwards-pointing, presumably to better pass between the trees. Savanna elephant tusks diverge widely. Forest elephants have rounded ears; savanna elephant ears resemble the shape of the African continent. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2002ForestElephantDistribution.pdf">diet of forest elephants is dominated by fruit</a>. This means that they are <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2009.00512.x">hugely important seed dispersers</a> of forest trees, but they will also eat grasses, foliage and even tree bark. <a href="https://www.worldwildlife.org/species/savanna-elephant">Savanna elephants</a> graze on grasses and, depending on the season, feed on a wide variety of trees, shrubs and fruits. </p>
<p>Forest elephants also have a <a href="https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1365-2664.12764">much slower</a> reproductive rate than savanna elephants, so cannot bounce back from population declines as quickly as savanna elephants can. <a href="https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1365-2664.12764">Forest elephants</a> can only double their population in 60 years under current conditions. That doubling rate is about three times slower than savanna elephants.</p>
<h2>Forest elephants</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/pdf/181019888/attachment">new assessment</a> of forest elephants used results of over 300 surveys going back to 1974. Estimated population decline was 86% between 1990 and 2015, putting forest elephants squarely into the “Critically Endangered” category. </p>
<p>The decline of forest elephants has been <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469">driven by</a> ivory poaching. This has affected both forest and savanna elephants for centuries, but has been greatly exacerbated by the introduction of modern weapons and, in the last 30 years or so, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/476282c">the rise in the price of ivory</a>. </p>
<p>However, forest elephants are elusive and live in remote, often inaccessible habitat. This means they’ve received little attention compared to savanna elephants.</p>
<p>Their new endangered status highlights the need for conservation management that fits with their unique ecology and habitat requirements. </p>
<p>Understanding their behaviour is fundamental to protecting them. For instance, some savanna elephant populations buffer seasonal changes in resource availability <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/103/2/371/">by migrating</a>. But it appears that forest elephants <a href="https://www.savetheelephants.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2002ForestElephantDistribution.pdf">do not respond in the same way</a>. Instead, they are “nomadic” within their very large home ranges, searching for the most productive fruit patches.</p>
<p>We also <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6521/1219.abstract">know</a> that fruiting events are decreasing in some African forests due to changes in the climate. This renders forest elephants highly vulnerable to a reduction in their food supply.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fruit-famine-is-causing-elephants-to-go-hungry-in-gabon-152757">Fruit famine is causing elephants to go hungry in Gabon</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Better protection</h2>
<p>There are certain steps which can be taken to better protect forest elephants. </p>
<p>Some well-protected national parks and <a href="https://fsc.org/en">Forest Stewardship Council</a>-certified logging concessions have <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0010294">stable and safe elephant populations</a>. Most of these sites are in Gabon and the Northern Republic of the Congo, with a few in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Gabon in particular has conserved its forest elephants relatively well, and half of all African forest elephants are now found there. The country has a <a href="https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?205430/Gabons-President-destroys-ivory-and-commits-to-zero-tolerance-for-wildlife-crime">zero tolerance approach</a> towards ivory trafficking, including penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. There’s also a specialised wildlife crime court and, in 2021, Gabon’s National Parks Agency built the first wildlife DNA forensics laboratory in Central Africa. DNA analysis of seized ivory provides critical evidence to increase prosecutions. It also helps scientists identify poaching hotspots and <a href="https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/9/eaat0625">trade routes</a>.</p>
<p>The most urgent measure required to stop forest elephant decline is effective anti-poaching within the range states. Anti-trafficking work along the supply chain, from hunters through to ivory traffickers and dealers, is also vital. </p>
<p>In the immediate term, elephants can only be protected by shutting down these networks and reducing or eliminating the demand for ivory – a material of no intrinsic value. </p>
<p>But monitoring threats to forest elephants is challenging. This makes scientific research a key tool which can be used to better guide their protection. This includes counting forest elephants, understanding their distribution and movements, detecting threats and monitoring population trends. </p>
<p>In the long term, three main strategies are required to protect forest elephants. These are strong international policy agreements and implementation to tackle climate change and habitat degradation; ensuring that national and regional land-use planning maintains elephant habitat connectivity; and engaging local communities who live alongside elephants. These measures will maximise the chances of protecting elephants and other species in the Central African forests at a time of rapid environmental change.</p>
<p><em>Dr Stéphanie Bourgeois, who leads elephant conservation research for the National Parks Agency of Gabon, contributed to the writing of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158157/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robin Whytock was funded by the European Union's 11th FED ECOFAC6 program grant to the National Parks Agency of Gabon. He is currently employed by the University of Stirling and is funded by the UKRI-GCRF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiona Maisels works for the Wildlife Conservation Society (Global Conservation Program), and is affiliated with the University of Stirling, Scotland. She is a member of the IUCN African Elephant Specialist Group and one of the 2021 African Elephant Red List team.</span></em></p>
The International Union for Conservation of Nature has made two big decisions related to the conservation of the African elephant.
Robin Whytock, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Stirling
Fiona Maisels, Wildlife Conservation Society, African Elephant Specialist Group (IUCN) and Honorary Professor, University of Stirling
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/152757
2021-02-08T14:14:30Z
2021-02-08T14:14:30Z
Fruit famine is causing elephants to go hungry in Gabon
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379911/original/file-20210121-17-17htq8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Forest elephants in Gabon</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">zahorec/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The behaviour and life cycles of the largest animals on the planet are <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-14369-y">incredibly important</a> for the healthy functioning of our planet’s life support systems. Unfortunately, many big species now face extinction due to their value in the illegal wildlife trade, vulnerability to habitat degradation and because they often come into conflict with humans.</p>
<p>The African tropics host many of these remaining megafauna or large animals like gorillas, elephants and hippos, but they are now losing ground. African forest elephants, for instance, have a population <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0059469">just</a> 10% of their potential size, occupying 25% of their potential range.</p>
<p>Knowing how much influence these large animals have on the functioning of our world – and how vulnerable they are to extinction – it’s more important than ever to monitor and restore the health of their remaining populations and the safe havens that support them.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379906/original/file-20210121-21-zawy4a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Forest elephants drinking in the Djidji river, Ivindo National Park, Gabon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Malcolm Starkey</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We wanted to know how elephants are faring in Lopé National Park, a 5000 km² protected area in the heart of Gabon. Researchers at the site have observed some of the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10021-019-00424-3">highest densities</a> of forest elephants ever recorded.</p>
<p><a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1147">Lopé National Park</a> has a rich diversity of wildlife, including forest elephants, <a href="http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/4/eaar2964">chimpanzees, gorillas</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0952836902001267">mandrills</a>. Many of these wildlife species rely on wild forest fruits for food. </p>
<p>In our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abc7791">recently published paper</a> we analysed 32 years of valuable data about tree behaviour and found that – between 1986 and 2018 – there was a massive collapse in fruiting events.</p>
<p>This has resulted in a fruit famine and, based on a body condition score applied to archived photographs, an 11% decline in the physical condition of the elephants at our study area since 2008. </p>
<p>The implications of this finding are that even where forest elephants and other megafauna are relatively well protected from external threats such as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160498">hunting</a>, global human pressures – such as the climate crisis – could affect their survival. </p>
<p>A collapse in fruiting also means that the forests themselves may be undergoing significant change, with some trees species possibly reproducing slower than required to support a healthy population.</p>
<h2>Long-term research in Lopé National Park</h2>
<p>In 1986, pioneer primatologist Caroline Tutin <a href="https://carta.anthropogeny.org/users/caroline-tutin">started monitoring</a> food resources for wildlife at Lopé by recording monthly observations of flowers, fruit and leaves in the canopies of hundreds of marked trees. </p>
<p>Field researchers at the site still continue to record these <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/btp.12543">observations</a> each month. This effort has resulted in the longest unbroken record of individual tree reproduction in the tropics, representing a priceless resource for monitoring environmental change.</p>
<p>Our analysis found that there was an 81% decline in the probability of encountering ripe fruit. This means that, on average, elephants and other animals would have found ripe fruit on one in every 10 trees in the 1980s, but need to search more than 50 trees today. We found matching declines in flowering too, indicating that the problem is not pollination or fruit maturation but something earlier on in the chain of fruit production.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379908/original/file-20210121-23-1w1vwdf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1166&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Omphalocarpum procerum with large fruits held directly on the stem at Lopé NP. Elephants are the only animal that can break open the fruit and disperse the seeds.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Nils Bunnefeld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once we knew about this we had two questions: What is causing this decline? And what impact is this decline having on the many wildlife species that depend on fruit?</p>
<h2>Drop in physical condition</h2>
<p>Elephants are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/5217">the largest</a> fruit-eating animals in the Central African forest ecosystem. They have an average biomass of over 3.5 tonnes at our site, meaning they require large amounts of food to satisfy their nutritional needs. They have a broad diet that includes fruit, grass, other vegetation and even tree bark, but previous <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2028.1993.tb00532.x">research</a> at Lopé showed that fruit is dominant in their diet.</p>
<p>We collated a large photographic database of elephants dating back to 1997 (80,000 images) and invited experts in forest elephant ecology to assess the body condition of elephants in these images using a systematic scoring system. Using these newly-derived data we found an average 5% drop in physical condition of forest elephants at Lopé since the beginning of the photographic record in 1997, and a more concerning 11% decline since 2008. </p>
<p>We don’t yet know the consequences of this decline in body condition for elephant populations, but the effects are unlikely to be benign, especially when coupled with other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12679">pressures</a> such as illegal hunting in the wider region.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379909/original/file-20210121-17-fkibal.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Elephants searching for food at the forest edge in Lopé National Park.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Anabelle Cardosso</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Is this climate change?</h2>
<p>Incredibly, before the climate crisis had become widely accepted as a threat to species and ecosystems, the changes illustrated in our paper were predicted by Caroline Tutin. In 1993 she <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2559296#metadata_info_tab_contents">discovered</a> that some Lopé tree species depend on a critical drop in night-time temperatures during the long dry season to trigger flowering. In years when temperatures in the dry season did not dip below 19ºC these species produced no fruit and in an unusual year when this same drop in temperature occurred outside the dry season, some of these species produced fruit out of season. </p>
<p>Tutin suggested that as temperatures continued to increase – due to climate change – species such as these would be likely to reproduce less often if they missed out on this critical temperature to trigger flowering. </p>
<p>We don’t yet know for sure if this decline in fruiting is caused by climate change. However, <a href="https://peerj.com/articles/8732/">our previous work</a> shows that global warming has resulted in an increase of almost 1ºC in average night-time temperatures in Lopé during the study period.</p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>The fruit famine witnessed at Lopé National Park could be happening across the African tropics but we have no concrete evidence because unfortunately long-term ecological data like these are very rare. </p>
<p>Maintaining support for consistent long-term monitoring is challenging and severely underfunded, <a href="https://www.nature.com/news/stormy-outlook-for-long-term-ecology-studies-1.16185">even in</a> richer parts of the world, despite the fact that this information is desperately needed to allow countries to prepare for and respond to environmental changes. </p>
<p>The year 2020 was supposed to be a turning point for the climate and biodiversity crises with both the <a href="https://www.cbd.int/article/Summit-on-Biodiversity-2020">UN Summit on Biodiversity</a> and <a href="https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/video/climate-ambition-summit-2020">UN Climate Ambition Summit</a> scheduled to take place at the end of the year, but COVID-19 rightly took over the international agenda. However, with ever-increasing global temperatures and the approach of a <a href="https://ukcop26.org/">key UN Climate Change Conference</a> (COP26) in 2021, it’s vital that the world takes stock of the environmental situation. </p>
<p>We must make a concerted plan to transform the way we manage forests, food, fisheries and climate if we are to move towards a healthier and more sustainable world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Bush receives funding from Total Gabon (programmes on Green Gabon and Climate Change via the National Parks Agency) and the University of Stirling.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katharine Abernethy received funding that contributed to this research from Total Gabon (programmes on Green Gabon and Climate Change), the International Medical Centre in Franceville (CIRMF) and the University of Stirling. She is affiliated with the Gabon National Parks Agency and the National Centre for Scientific Research in Gabon. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robin Whytock was funded by the European Union's 11th FED ECOFAC6 program grant to the National Parks Agency of Gabon. He is currently employed by the University of Stirling.</span></em></p>
In Gabon’s Lopé National Park, between 1986 and 2018, there’s been a massive collapse in tree fruiting events.
Emma Bush, Scientist, Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh
Katharine Abernethy, Professor, University of Stirling
Robin Whytock, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Stirling
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/141540
2020-07-29T13:25:35Z
2020-07-29T13:25:35Z
Gabon’s large trees store huge amounts of carbon. What must be done to protect them
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345745/original/file-20200706-25-kyzn6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ivanov Gleb/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Large trees are the living, breathing giants that tower over tropical forests, providing habitat and food for countless animals, insects and other plants. Could these giants also be the key to slowing climate change?</p>
<p>The Earth’s climate is changing rapidly due to the buildup of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere as a result of human activities. Trees absorb carbon from the air and store it in their trunks, branches, and roots. In general, the larger the tree, the more carbon it <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12914">stores</a>.</p>
<p>Globally, tropical forests remove a <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2035-0">staggering</a> 15% of carbon dioxide emissions that humans produce. Africa’s tropical forests – the second largest <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2035-0">block</a> of rainforest in the world – have a large role to play in slowing climate change.</p>
<p>But large trees are in trouble <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-end-of-big-trees-11217">everywhere</a>. I carried <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geb.13150">out research</a> to examine the distribution, drivers and threats to large trees in Gabon. Gabon <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rse.2013.09.015">has</a> 87% forest cover and is the second most forested country in the world. </p>
<p>By carrying out this project, I was able to identify areas with a wealth of large trees (and therefore key carbon stores and sinks), what needed to be done to better protect them and eventually recommend those areas as a priority for conservation. </p>
<h2>National inventory</h2>
<p>In 2012, the government of Gabon began a national inventory of its forests to measure the amount of carbon stored in its trees – one of the first nationwide efforts in the tropics. </p>
<p>An inventory of this scale isn’t easy, especially in a heavily forested country. Technicians from Gabon’s National Parks Agency travelled to every corner of the country, sometimes hiking more than two days crossing swamps and traversing rivers, to measure the diameter and height of trees in plots a bit larger in size than a soccer field.</p>
<p>Using Gabon’s new inventory of 104 plots, we calculated the amount of carbon in 67,466 trees, representing at least 578 different species. We did this by applying equations to the tree measurements. </p>
<p>The results indicated that the density of carbon stored in Gabon’s trees is among the highest in the world. On average, Gabon’s old growth forests harbour more carbon per area than old growth forests in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0295">Amazonia</a> and Asia.</p>
<p>Most of this carbon is stored in the largest trees – those with diameters bigger than 70cm at 1.3 meters from the ground. Just the largest 5% of trees stored 50% of the forest carbon. In other words, 3,373 trees out of the 67,466 measured trees contained half of the carbon. </p>
<h2>Drivers of forest carbon stocks</h2>
<p>Next, we examined the drivers of carbon stocks. What determines whether an area of forest holds many large trees and lots of carbon? Do environmental conditions or human activities have the largest impact on forest carbon stocks?</p>
<p>Environmental factors – such as soil fertility and depth, temperature, precipitation, slope and elevation – often influence the amount of carbon in a forest. During photosynthesis, trees harness energy from the sun to convert water, carbon dioxide, and minerals into carbohydrates for growth. Therefore, forests with low levels of soil minerals or that receive little rainfall should store less carbon than areas with abundant minerals and water. </p>
<p>Human activities – like agriculture and logging – also influence carbon stocks. Cutting down trees for timber, to clear land for farming, or for construction reduces the amount of carbon stored in forests.</p>
<p>We examined the amount of carbon in each tree plot in relation to the environmental factors and human activities associated with the plot. Surprisingly, we found that human activities, not environmental factors, overwhelmingly affect carbon stocks. </p>
<p>The impact of human activities on forest carbon was largely unexpected because of Gabon’s high forest cover (the second highest of any country) and low population density (9 people per square kilometer), 87% of which is located in <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/gabon-population/">urban areas</a>. If human impacts are this strong in Gabon, what must their effects be in other tropical nations? </p>
<p>Although we don’t know for sure, we believe past and present swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture is the principle cause for low carbon stocks in some areas. Forests close to villages had lower levels of carbon, probably because forest clearing for farming converts old growth forest to secondary forest. </p>
<p>Interestingly, forests in logging concessions held similar amounts of carbon as old growth forests. It is too early to conclude that timber harvest doesn’t reduce carbon levels by cutting large trees, but this finding gives hope that logging concessions can be managed sustainably to conserve carbon stocks.</p>
<p>Importantly, forests in national parks stored roughly 25% more carbon than forests outside of parks. Thus, protecting mostly undisturbed forests can effectively conserve carbon and biodiversity.</p>
<h2>Saving Gabon’s giants</h2>
<p>The critical role of humans in diminishing carbon stocks is both a blessing and a curse. One one hand, the future of forests are in our hands, giving us the power to choose our fate. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the responsibility to act collectively to secure these resources while considering the interests of the countries that host them.</p>
<p>Gabon is taking laudable actions to conserve its forests, including a protected area network of <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2005/09/gabon-sets-aside-10-percent-of-country-as-protected-parks/">13 parks</a>. In addition, Gabon is reforming its logging sector and developing a nationwide <a href="https://www.cafi.org/content/cafi/en/home/partner-countries/gabon.html">land use plan</a>. These actions are a great start, yet continued action is necessary to curb the effects of swidden agriculture and ensure that growing industrial agriculture does not reverse Gabon’s achievements.</p>
<p>Intact forests can pay returns. Norway recently committed to paying Gabon <a href="https://www.sustainability-times.com/environmental-protection/norway-to-pay-gabon-150-million-to-protect-rainforests/">$150 million</a> for stewardship of its forests. Conservation of forests requires sacrifice by the Gabonese people. Yet, this payment demonstrates that Gabon’s large trees are a national asset that can contribute to its development as well as an international resource requiring collective action to conserve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141540/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Poulsen receives funding from the National Science Foundation and the US Fish & Wildlife Service.</span></em></p>
In general, the larger the tree, the more carbon it stores.
John Poulsen, Associate Professor of Tropical Ecology, Duke University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/136863
2020-04-30T12:25:28Z
2020-04-30T12:25:28Z
Why downgrading countries in a time of crisis is an exceptionally bad idea
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331371/original/file-20200429-51495-5e3t30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The street market at Mont-Bouët in Libreville, Gabon. The country was one of 10 on the continent downgraded this year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A number of rating agencies have downgraded emerging market economies during the COVID-19 pandemic. Their actions have raised the question: <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-06-fitch-downgrade-pours-more-salt-into-the-gaping-wound-that-is-the-sa-economy/">why</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/a-trio-of-downgrades-spell-default-danger-for-emerging-markets">do so</a> during a crisis? </p>
<p>This is not the first time ratings agencies have adopted a procyclical approach – that is, one in which bad news is simply piled on bad news.</p>
<p>During the 2008 global financial crisis, ratings agencies were accused of aggressively <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/credit-rating-controversy">downgrading countries</a> whose economies were already strained. Reports by the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/external_publishers/ex_pub3_en.htm">European</a> and <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf">US</a> Commissions found evidence that their decisions worsened the financial crisis.</p>
<p>Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has also <a href="https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8QF93PN">accused rating agencies of aggressively downgrading</a> countries during the <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/asian_financial_crisis">1997 East Asian financial crisis</a>. The downgrades were more than what would be justified by the countries’ economic fundamentals. This unduly added to the cost of borrowing and caused the supply of international capital to evaporate.</p>
<p>In addition to the issue of timing, the <a href="https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary_356.pdf">effectiveness</a> and <a href="https://ukdiss.com/examples/problems-of-the-credit-rating-agencies.php">objectivity</a> of the rating methodology continues to be questioned by <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156043/adbi-wp188.pdf">policymakers</a>. Their methodological errors in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349003">times of crisis</a>, together with the unresolved problem of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-credit-rating-agencies-are-still-getting-away-with-bad-behaviour-117549">conflict of interests</a>, leave both issuers and investors vulnerable to losses. </p>
<p>The procyclical nature of ratings needs to be put under check to avoid market panic. The devastating effects they add on economies that are already strained has to be challenged. The coronavirus pandemic is yet another episode to prove this.</p>
<h2>Questionable decisions</h2>
<p>Ten African countries have been downgraded since the COVID-19 pandemic started – Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius and Zambia.</p>
<p>These decisions were based on <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/coronavirus-will-hit-africa-hard-25716">expectations</a> that their fiscal situations would deteriorate and their <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/24952/africa-faces-a-coronavirus-catastrophe/">health systems</a> would be severely strained by the pandemic. </p>
<p>But, in my view, the downgrade decisions reflect monumental bad timing. I would also argue that, in most cases, they were premature and unjustified.</p>
<p>Since international rating agencies have tremendous power to influence market expectations and investors’ portfolio allocation decisions, crisis-induced downgrades undermine macroeconomic fundamentals. Once downgraded, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, even countries with strong macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorate to converge with model-predicted ratings. Investors respond by raising the cost of borrowing or by withdrawing their capital, aggravating a crisis situation.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>South Africa was <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-South-Africas-ratings-to-Ba1-maintains-negative-outlook--PR_420630">stripped</a> of its last investment grade by Moody’s. The rating agency cited a rising debt burden of 62.2%, which was estimated to reach 91% of GDP by fiscal 2023; and structurally weak growth of less than 1%, which was estimated to shrink to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020">-5.8%</a>. It was hoped that Moody’s would <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/South-Africa/could-coronavirus-give-sa-another-breather-from-moodys-junk-status-20200326">delay its rating action</a> to see the impact of the coronavirus onshore and the country’s policy responses. The procyclical effect of the downgrade magnified the impact of the lockdown. Fitch further pushed it <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/islamic-finance/fitch-downgrades-south-africa-to-bb-outlook-negative-03-04-2020">deep into junk</a> a week later. </p></li>
<li><p>Fitch cut Gabon’s sovereign rating to CCC from B on <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/fitch-downgrades-gabon-to-ccc-on-debt-repayment-risks-57907795">3 April 2020</a>. The rationale for the downgrade was that agencies expected the risks to sovereign debt repayment capacity to increase due to liquidity pressure from the fall in oil prices.</p></li>
<li><p>Moody’s revised Mauritius’s sovereign rating outlook from Baa1 stable to negative on <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-changes-the-outlook-on-Mauritiuss-rating-to-negative-from--PR_420034">1 April 2020</a>. Moody’s said the downgrade was driven by the expectation of lower tourist arrivals and earnings due to the coronavirus. Both would have a negative impact on the country’s economic growth.</p></li>
<li><p>Nigeria was downgraded by S&P from B to B- on <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/fitch-downgrades-nigeria-amid-oil-price-slump-pandemic-shock-57921342">26 March 2020</a>. The reason was that COVID-19 had added to the risk of fiscal and external shock resulting from lower oil prices and economic recession. Yet the investment grades of Saudi Arabia and Russia were spared.</p></li>
<li><p>S&P also downgraded Botswana – one of the most <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13040376">stable economies in Africa</a> – which had an A rating. The agency <a href="https://www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=64900&ArticleTitle=Market+Slump+Prompts+Botswana+Downgrade">cited</a> weakening fiscal and external balance sheets due to a drop in demand for commodities and expected economic deceleration because of COVID-19. Botswana’s downgrade came four days after it went into a lockdown and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/botswana-no-covid-19-cases-closes-borders-after-death-zimbabwe">before it had recorded a confirmed</a> case of COVID-19. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These downgrades deep into junk impose a wave of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-03/a-trio-of-downgrades-spell-default-danger-for-emerging-markets">other problems</a>, worse than COVID-19. They cut sovereign bond value as collateral in central bank funding operations and drive interest rates high. Sovereign bond values are grossly discounted, at the same time escalating the cost of interest repayment instalments, ultimately contributing to a rise in the cost of debt. A wave of corporate downgrades also follows because of the sovereign ceiling concept – a country’s rating generally dictates the highest rating assigned to companies within its borders.</p>
<h2>Solution</h2>
<p>In response to the procyclical COVID-19 induced downgrades, African countries need to implement these four measures. </p>
<p>First, to curb the procyclical nature of rating actions that disrupt markets by triggering market panic, the timing of rating announcements needs to be regulated. Regulators of rating agencies such as the <a href="https://www.fsca.co.za/Pages/Default.aspx">Financial Sector Conduct Authority</a> in South Africa have the power to determine the timing of rating. In times of crisis, rating agencies should defer publishing their rating reviews as markets have their way of discounting risk when fundamentals are conspicuously changing. </p>
<p>Second, the rules of disclosure and transparency should be enhanced during rating reviews. Rating methodologies, descriptions of models and key rating assumptions should be disclosed to enable investors to perform their own due diligence to reach their own conclusions.</p>
<p>Third, in collaboration with other market regulatory bodies in the financial markets, transactions that unfairly benefit from crisis-driven price falls should be restricted. This includes short-selling of securities – a market strategy that allows investors to profit from securities when their value goes down.</p>
<p>Lastly, African countries need to develop the capacity for rigorous engagement with rating agencies during rating reviews and appeals. They need to make sure that the agencies have all the information required to make a fair assessment of their rating profiles.</p>
<p>The African Union and its policy organs need to fast track the adoption of its continental policy framework of mechanisms on rating agencies’ support for countries. This will assist them to manage the practices of rating agencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize consults for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on support to African Union (AU) member states on credit rating agencies.</span></em></p>
Downgrades have a devastating effect on economies that are already strained. The decision to downgrade during a crisis like the coronavirus pandemic must be challenged.
Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/129160
2019-12-27T14:23:18Z
2019-12-27T14:23:18Z
Countries to watch in 2020, from Chile to Afghanistan: 5 essential reads
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307993/original/file-20191219-11914-a47ix3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4079%2C2715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Anti-government protesters in Chile defend themselves against a police water cannon, Santiago, Nov. 15, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Chile-Protests/78c38eaebd6e417b9c67c5ef12bb8969/211/0">AP Photo/Luis Hidalgo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Where will the world’s attention turn in 2020? </p>
<p>The United States’ impeachment trial of Donald Trump and the United Kingdom’s long-awaited Brexit are sure bets. And after the U.S. military withdrawal from northern Syria in October, Bashar al-Assad may well win his civil war this year.</p>
<p>Many other countries will see pivotal events in 2020, too. Here are five countries to watch. </p>
<h2>1. Venezuela</h2>
<p>This year will bring new depths of misery to Venezuela, which is suffering the worst economic collapse ever seen outside war. </p>
<p>“Most Venezuelans today are desperately poor,” explains St. Mary’s College professor Marco Aponte-Moreno, citing a U.N. statistic that 90% of the people in the South American country live in poverty – double what it was in 2014.</p>
<p>The increasingly severe U.S. economic sanctions passed last year, aimed at crippling the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-reasons-why-trumps-venezuela-embargo-wont-end-the-maduro-regime-121538">only making life harder for poor Venezuelans</a>, Aponte-Moreno writes.</p>
<p>Most Venezuelans today rely on monthly government food delivery to survive. </p>
<p>“If the government runs out of money, poor people will feel it the most – not the government officials,” writes Aponte-Moreno. </p>
<p>It is unclear when Maduro’s rule will end. Last year, his government survived several coup attempts and opposition leader Juan Guaidó’s effort to wrest power from Maduro to become Venezuela’s “rightful” president was backed by 60 countries. </p>
<p>“Maduro has few international allies,” says Aponte-Moreno. “But China and Russia continue to be Venezuela’s most powerful international boosters and have bailed out Maduro by giving his government massive loans.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307990/original/file-20191219-11946-1ubbq23.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children bathe with buckets of water in La Guaira, Venezuela, Aug. 17, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Venezuela-Political-Crisis/37e63708c8c54728a3556bb75685d8c1/24/0">AP Photo/Leonardo Fernandez</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2. Gabon</h2>
<p>Sixty years ago, Gabon was among 17 African countries to declare their independence from colonial rule. Now, many Gabonese are <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-its-ruling-dynasty-withers-gabon-a-us-ally-and-guardian-of-french-influence-in-africa-ponders-its-future-110076">hoping to enter a new era</a>: democracy.</p>
<p>Gabon’s longtime president Ali Bongo Ondimba, whose family has run the central African country since the late 1960s, is frail after an apparent stroke. The 60-year-old narrowly survived a military coup last January. </p>
<p>These events have “created a strong national sentiment that Gabon’s five-decade Bongo dynasty is on its last legs,” writes University of Tampa political scientist Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot.</p>
<p>Political upheaval is rare in Gabon, an oil-rich country of 2 million. But stability is not the same as democracy. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307991/original/file-20191219-11896-h7otj1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A military ‘coup to restore democracy’ in Gabon in Jan. 2019 failed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Gabon-Coup/c0fec374c0c049ed8df0f7c6291bc8d7/13/0">Gabon State TV via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“Gabon has had just three presidents” since 1960, writes Ofoulhast-Othamot. “The current president’s father – Omar Bongo Ondimba – ruled Gabon with an iron fist for 42 years,” allowing oil wealth to enrich a tiny elite and dutifully maintaining the country’s loyalty to France. </p>
<p>Surveys show 87% of Gabonese feel that the country is headed in the wrong direction under Bongo.</p>
<p>Gabon’s next presidential election isn’t until 2023. But, Ofoulhast-Othamot predicts, “Bongo’s time in office may run out sooner.” </p>
<h2>3. Chile</h2>
<p>Chile is one of several South American countries to see massive, sustained demonstrations in recent months. Weeks after declaring “war” on protesters, Chilean president Sebastián Piñera relented to their demands to reinvent the country’s constitution.</p>
<p>Chile’s current constitution was written under Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the dictator who ruled the country from 1973 to 1990. Pinochet is reviled for overseeing several thousand extrajudicial executions, torture and forced disappearances. </p>
<p>He also left the country with social and economic policies now “<a href="https://theconversation.com/chiles-political-crisis-is-another-brutal-legacy-of-long-dead-dictator-pinochet-126305">ripping Chile’s social fabric apart</a>,” writes Drake University’s Paul Posner, who studies inequality in Chile.</p>
<p>Pinochet took free market economics to unprecedented extremes in Chile, eviscerating labor rights and ending government funding of the country’s retirement and health care systems.</p>
<p>“These neoliberal reforms came with strong support from the U.S. government,” notes Posner. </p>
<p>Shifting responsibility for providing social services from the state onto the private sector made Chile an economic dynamo. It has grown by around 4.7% annually since 1990. </p>
<p>But that prosperity was unevenly distributed. Unemployment among poor Chileans is 30%, private health care is exorbitantly expensive and even middle-class Chileans can’t afford to retire.</p>
<p>This year, Chileans will vote on a new constitution meant to address these severe social and economic inequities. </p>
<p>“Raised in democracy, Chile’s young protesters expect a fairer share of the country’s wealth,” writes Posner. “And they’re not old enough to fear an authoritarian crackdown for proclaiming their rights.”</p>
<h2>4. Afghanistan</h2>
<p>Eighteen years into the United States’ disastrous war in Afghanistan, renewed negotiations with the Taliban militant group are raising the possibility of peace.</p>
<p>But that will take more than an accord, says peace-building expert Elizabeth Hassemi, a faculty lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.</p>
<p>“History shows that <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-negotiations-resume-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">economic growth and better job opportunities are necessary to rebuild stability after war</a>,” she writes.</p>
<p>Hassemi believes Afghanistan’s “abundant natural resources” could help the country along its path to recovery. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307995/original/file-20191219-11914-jzt5tl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghanistan is open for business, Kabul, Sept. 8, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan-Daily-Life/b13b4f95db6d4fe7b726c359dbaff1d9/25/0">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Afghanistan produces coveted cashmere, pine nuts and saffron, and the craggy mountains of Panjshir Province hide emeralds of renowned color and purity. In a more stable Afghanistan, says Hassemi, agricultural and mineral exports could bring substantial income to rural areas long held by the Taliban. </p>
<p>“A Taliban accord is necessary to end the Afghanistan war,” Hassemi says. “But creating meaningful jobs and sustainable economic growth will help create a durable peace.”</p>
<h2>5. Mexico</h2>
<p>Thirteen months into Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s presidency, <a href="https://theconversation.com/cartel-sieges-leave-mexicans-wondering-if-criminals-run-the-country-126986">cartel violence in Mexico has never been worse</a>.</p>
<p>“Recent deadly attacks by criminal organizations have instilled fear across Mexico,” writes Angélica Durán-Martínez, of University of Massachusetts Lowell. </p>
<p>These include two shootouts between cartels and police that killed 30 people in October 2019, a deadly 12-hour criminal assault on Culiacán, Sinaloa, that forced Mexican security forces to release the son of drug kingpin Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and the November massacre of nine Mormon women and children in northern Mexico. </p>
<p>López Obrador campaigned on novel strategies to “pacify” Mexico. He proposed pardoning low-level drug traffickers who leave the business, legalizing marijuana and holding trigger-happy soldiers responsible for committing human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Today, those proposals remain largely untested. And with <a href="https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2019/12/03/2019-cerrara-con-36-000-homicidios-y-solo-1-de-cada-10-se-castiga-reportes">36,000 murders reported last year</a> – 90% of which went unpunished – 2019 was the bloodiest year in modern Mexican history.</p>
<p><em>This story is a round-up of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
There’s much more going on in the world than the Trump impeachment and Brexit. Here are five momentous global stories to track in 2020.
Catesby Holmes, International Editor | Politics Editor, The Conversation US
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/127032
2019-11-18T14:28:00Z
2019-11-18T14:28:00Z
Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea needs a radical rethink
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301921/original/file-20191115-66945-1tojfeo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ivorian sailors participate in an anti-piracy hostage rescue scenario with the Ghanaian Navy during Exercise Obangame Express. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Bonita had been anchored off Benin for several days, waiting for a berth in the port of Cotonou. On November 2, 2019 the crew had a traumatic awakening. Armed men boarded the vessel and <a href="https://beninwebtv.com/en/2019/11/benin-09-persons-kidnapped-in-a-ship-attack-at-cotonou-port/">kidnapped nine crew members</a>. Only two days later, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pirates-attack-greek-oil-tanker-off-togo/a-51108398">four seafarers were kidnapped</a> from the Elka Aristotle, which was anchored off Lomé in neighbouring Togo.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, these were not the only attacks off the coast of West Africa in which seafarers were kidnapped. Nevertheless, the patterns are changing, with <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">gradual signs of improvement</a>. In addition, attacker success rates in the region have declined from <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">80% over ten years ago to just under 50% in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>Another change has been the fact that attacks have become more visible. This is at least partly due to increased cooperation among countries in West and Central Africa. They adopted the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code of Conduct</a> in 2013, aimed at fighting illicit activities at sea. Implementation has been slow, yet navies and maritime agencies in the region have become much more active in collecting relevant information.</p>
<p>Based on my research into maritime security in the region, I have become increasingly convinced that sustainable improvements are impossible when the focus is solely on piracy. In many cases, kidnappings of seafarers are an extension of land-based problems – such as fuel smuggling and illegal migration – and have to be tackled as such.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-states-dont-prioritise-maritime-security-heres-why-they-should-77685">African states don't prioritise maritime security – here's why they should</a>
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<p>In my view, <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190108-call-for-gog-counter-piracy">demands by the shipping industry</a> for international navies to become more involved in counter-piracy operations won’t lead to lasting solutions. These can only be successful if they are designed based on regional requirements and take on board regional initiatives aimed at tackling a multiplicity of social problems, rather than just one.</p>
<h2>Links to crime on land</h2>
<p>High-profile attacks – such as the recent kidnappings – are generally carried out by criminal groups based in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">Kidnappings on land have been a long-standing problem</a> for security forces there. Collecting ransoms has become a lucrative business model which requires foot soldiers, access to camps for holding hostages, and negotiators with the necessary skills. All these things can be found in the Niger Delta, where the lines between armed insurgents and organised criminals are often fluid. </p>
<p>For countries like Benin, Togo and Cameroon where Nigeria-based criminals have taken hostages from merchant ships this year, the situation is a concern. Ports in these countries are crucial for economic growth and development in terms of customs revenues. For example, <a href="https://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/story-story-kin-apr-2015-unlocking-a-regional-trade-bottleneck-in-benin">more than 40%</a> of Benin’s government revenues are collected in Cotonou’s port. Ensuring adequate security for maritime trade is therefore a strategic concern in Benin. Hence the government’s <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/07/c_138536961.htm">quick announcement</a> of improved security measures for ships anchoring off Cotonou.</p>
<p>Most kidnappings still take place off the Nigerian coastline. The established pattern is one of hostages being taken and then released several weeks later for a ransom payment. This is according <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">to analysis done</a> by the Danish security intelligence company Risk Intelligence.</p>
<p>The fact that there are more cases off the Nigerian coastline points to my contention that this criminal behaviour is closely linked to land-based criminal activities – such as fuel smuggling – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tracing-the-flow-of-nigerias-stolen-oil-to-cameroon/a-45918707">widespread in the area</a>.</p>
<p>When such incidents are analysed through a narrow piracy lens, efforts of navies and law enforcement agencies -– which are already suffering from a lack of resources –- are likely to be misguided. The narrow view might mistakenly focus, for example, on the capacity to respond at sea.</p>
<p>The problem of wrong analyses is made worse by international actors, for example the US and European governments, the European Union or international organisations. They often put a strong emphasis on combating piracy and provide financial or technical assistance to partners in West and Central Africa. But they rarely focus on illegal fishing, fuel smuggling or illegal migration. All these activities have been linked to attacks against merchant ships or fishing vessels. </p>
<h2>Broader understanding needed</h2>
<p>Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea requires a broad understanding of maritime security. Acknowledging links between, for example, piracy and illegal fishing is vital for regional governments and external partners. On the most basic level, illegal fishing destroys fishers’ livelihoods, forcing some into piracy simply to earn an income. </p>
<p>A good example is the EU’s contradictory stance. On the one hand, it provides <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/52490/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">€29 million</a> to support West Africa’s Integrated Maritime Security project. On the other hand, EU countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-targets-fragile-west-african-fish-stocks-despite-protection-laws-125679">contribute to the depletion of fish stocks across West Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Countries around the Gulf of Guinea also have to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-states-dont-prioritise-maritime-security-heres-why-they-should-77685">increase their efforts</a>. Laws regulating maritime operations are often deliberately opaque, disguising a lack of enforcement capacity and enabling corruption. Increasing transparency would highlight shortcomings and problems caused by insecurity at sea –- somewhat embarrassing for any government, but necessary to address these issues.</p>
<p>Recent efforts in Nigeria, including a large conference in October that led <a href="https://globalmaritimesecurityconf.com/2019/10/11/communique-for-the-global-maritime-security-conference-2019/">to the Abuja Declaration</a>, are a step in the right direction. The declaration highlighted shortcomings of countries around the Gulf of Guinea related to ocean governance and law enforcement at sea. Concrete actions have to follow.</p>
<p>More transparency could also help to improve relationships between the maritime industry and security agencies in the region. Lack of trust and limited cooperation have often hindered thorough investigations, feeding a simple narrative of piracy without a broader look at other maritime security challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>
Feeding a simple narrative of piracy without a broader look at other maritime security challenges hinders progress in dealing with it.
Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of Greenwich
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/117630
2019-05-23T14:44:01Z
2019-05-23T14:44:01Z
Chimpanzees spotted smashing open and eating tortoises for the first time
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276096/original/file-20190523-187153-ton3pk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erwan Theleste</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>All chimpanzees eat animals at least sometimes, including anything from ants and termites to bushpigs and even baboons. Monkeys, in fact, are typically the most frequent item on the menu, and in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ajp.20965?referrer_access_token=QowCYzHQHWigwMuhWT8A8k4keas67K9QMdWULTWMo8OpL6jAxh2k48bVOpdvT89-vzIe-KzLDrYHTJxWMSuHW12yHp8KGKR7TGX2WLhb98vjaT3Cr1lwK2olki1XlIxQ-xXdSgHBT0XC3kAFgc8__w%3D%3D">some cases</a> chimpanzees can eat so many monkeys they threaten to wipe out entire populations. One group in Senegal even hunts tiny, mouse-like primates known as bushbabies by using <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/abs/10.1098/rsos.140507">spear-like tools</a> to first probe the holes the bushbabies hide in during the day, before reaching in to grab their prey.</p>
<p>So chimpanzees are rightly known as resourceful eaters. But until now scientists had never observed them <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284183115_Why_don't_chimpanzees_eat_monitor_lizards">eating reptiles</a>.</p>
<p>That has all changed, thanks to a group of wild chimpanzees in Loango National Park along the Atlantic coast of Gabon in Central Africa. These chimps have recently become used to the presence of humans, which means scientists can now see them act exactly as they would in nature. And, writing in the journal Scientific Reports, a group of researchers say they have already observed behaviour <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-43301-8">not previously seen in chimpanzees</a>. </p>
<p>These chimpanzees regularly catch, kill and consume tortoises that have been grabbed from the forest floor. For people like us, who also research chimpanzee behaviour, the discovery is particularly exciting because the animals obtain the tortoise meat by pounding the shell repeatedly onto a tree trunk until it cracks. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/C1tpllWtBVk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Thought pistachio nuts were hard to open? Try eating tortoise.</span></figcaption>
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<p>This sort of “percussive foraging” – the pounding of certain food items until a breaking point – has been seen in chimpanzees elsewhere, but never to obtain meat. For instance chimps in Senegal have been observed <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265207049_Percussive_technology_chimpanzee_baobab_smashing_and_the_evolutionary_modeling_of_hominin_knapping">pounding baobab shells</a> to extract the softer fruit-covered seeds inside. From Sierra Leone to the Ivory Coast, <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rstb.2014.0351">Western chimpanzees</a> use stone and wooden hammers to crack open encased nuts from protective outer shells. </p>
<p>Broadly, this sort of pounding has been suggested as the first step towards more complex tool use that allowed early human ancestors to flourish. The question of why other chimpanzee communities do not do this too, despite the clear benefits of obtaining otherwise protected nuts, seeds – and now meat – remains unanswered. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/sIoAdrCS1Ts?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The reward is a tasty tortoise, helpfully served in a bowl-shaped shell.</span></figcaption>
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<p>This newly discovered percussive behaviour in chimpanzees leaves a significant damage pattern on the tortoise shell and potentially damages the anvil on which it was cracked. The evidence left behind is therefore of interest to us <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature08188">primate archaeologists</a> who use archaeological techniques to understand the physical remains of non-human primates. Our work in this emerging discipline relies on material artefacts – shattered tortoise shells, for instance – to reconstruct contemporary primate behaviour in the same way we do for early hominins. </p>
<p>We have long assumed that reconstructing hominin meat-eating behaviour was dependent on our finding fossilised stone tools and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02438066">cut marks</a> left on processed animal bones. To this select list we can now add tortoise shell. Previously, scientists had looked at <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047248414000566">fractured turtle remains</a> and argued the animals may have been an important part of early human diets, but the Loango chimpanzees provide us a glimpse of the role this meat may have played for our early ancestors. </p>
<p>The new findings also reveal something even more remarkable. Among their observations, the researchers describe another novel behaviour, the storage of one of the tortoise shells in the fork of a tree that is later retrieved and consumed by the same male chimpanzee. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276120/original/file-20190523-187182-1qavvqo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chimpanzee eating part of a small antelope.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Camille Giuliano/Anne-Sophie Crunchant/GMERC</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such “<a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/abs/10.1098/rstb.2008.0301">future-oriented cognition</a>” has long been considered uniquely human, but experimental evidence suggests other species, including apes and <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/357/6347/202">some birds</a>, may possess it as well. If chimpanzees can indeed anticipate a future state (I will be hungry) as being different than their current one (I am not hungry), then a more nuanced interpretation of their cognition is required. Indeed, a careful study of the species may uncover many more examples of this future planning.</p>
<p>It is now clear that with every new wild chimpanzee community that becomes used to humans, scientists observe new and unexpected behaviour – some of which challenges our understanding of evolution and what it means to be human. Furthermore, the difference in behaviour from group to group highlights the extraordinary cultural diversity among our closest living relatives. </p>
<p>The opportunity for comparisons with our own evolution has become a run against time as the human infestation of the planet threatens wild primate populations worldwide. We know that the presence of humans directly destroys not only the habitat and lives of primates but also leads to the loss of <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/lookup/doi/10.1126/science.aau4532">behavioural diversity</a>. Conserving the last remaining populations of wild apes has become urgent, otherwise our fellow primates will disappear forever. With their extinction will disappear a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-chimpanzee-cultural-collapse-is-underway-and-its-driven-by-humans-113133">part of their own heritage</a> and a window back to our own evolution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The discovery sheds light on how early humans evolved larger brains and the ability to eat meat.
Lydia Luncz, Research Fellow, Primate Models for Behavioural Evolution Lab, University of Oxford
Alexander Piel, Lecturer in Animal Behaviour, Liverpool John Moores University
Fiona Stewart, Visiting Lecturer in Primatology, Liverpool John Moores University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/110076
2019-04-01T10:39:03Z
2019-04-01T10:39:03Z
As its ruling dynasty withers, Gabon – a US ally and guardian of French influence in Africa – ponders its future
<p>The fragility of one of the world’s longest-lasting political dynasties was exposed when the military attempted a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-coup/gabon-thwarts-military-coup-attempt-in-presidents-absence-idUSKCN1P10FE">coup in Gabon in January</a>.</p>
<p>The coup, orchestrated by junior members of Gabon’s military, failed to unseat Ali Bongo Ondimba, whose family has run the central African country since the late 1960s. And Gabon’s next presidential election isn’t until the summer of 2023. </p>
<p>Bongo’s time in office may run out sooner. </p>
<p>The 60-year-old strongman has been effectively unable to rule since suffering <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1N31VY-OZATP">an apparent stroke</a> in October 2018, during Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative – often called “Davos in the desert.” </p>
<p>His evident frailty in recent TV appearances, coupled with the failed coup and lack of an obvious heir, has created a strong national sentiment that Gabon’s five-decade Bongo dynasty is on its last legs.</p>
<h2>One of France’s last neocolonial outposts in Africa</h2>
<p>Political upheaval is rare in Gabon, a diminutive central African nation about the size of the state of Colorado, with a population of <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2 million</a> and a lucrative oil industry. </p>
<p>Except for a short-lived military coup in 1964, Gabon has been regarded as a bastion of stability in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/#!/conflict/violence-in-the-central-african-republic">troubled central Africa</a>, <a href="http://ut.academia.edu/GYLDASOFOULHASTOTHAMOT">where my research is focused</a>. Oil wealth and the Bongo dynasty’s French backing has contributed to Gabon’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-corrupt-nepotist-who-ruled-gabon-for-40-years-1700197.html">security</a>, and in recent years Bongo has used this stability to turn Gabon into a key <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/meet-ali-bongo-ondimba-obamas-man-in-africa/">U.S. ally</a> in the region.</p>
<p>But stability is not the same as democracy. </p>
<p>Since winning independence from France, in 1960, Gabon has had just three presidents. The first was Léon M’ba, who ruled from independence until 1967. The current president’s father – Omar Bongo Ondimba – assumed power <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/524984?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents">after M'ba died</a>. </p>
<p>Omar Bongo went on to rule Gabon with an iron fist for 42 years. To stay in power, he oversaw changes that ensured that the country’s nascent electoral system never became <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2009-2-page-126.htm">independent, free or fair</a>. </p>
<p>During his rule, the elder Bongo helped to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713675627?casa_token=J8_PMc81kmsAAAAA:74wMxqVYPCQvFxZdf3ttPvD9H7lRvVeu3TzuD65L8EZST9WXaMpw_TH3LrXAlyI78DGWFS_jx_COkQ">keep French political influence</a> and <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gb-forrel-fr.htm">military might</a> alive in Africa by signing several mutual defense treaties with France. His policies benefited the “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0963948052000341196">Françafrique</a>” – a now-<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/opinions/francafrique-a-brief-history-of-a-scandalous-word/">disparaged term</a> describing France’s “special” relationship with its former colonies on the continent, which has included supporting dictators who protect its economic interests.</p>
<p>Omar Bongo ensured that Gabon remained a “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161015?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">neocolonial enclave</a>,” as anthropologist Michael Reed wrote in 1987 in the Journal of Modern African Studies. </p>
<p>“Gabon’s very identity is inseparable from France,” Reed argued, “and the latter’s continued claim to ‘major power’ status, in which Africa is crucial, requires Gabon’s assistance.” </p>
<p>President Ali Bongo Ondimba, who assumed power after his father died in 2009 – in yet another election marred by <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/gabon">irregularities</a> – inherited his father’s fealty to France. </p>
<p>Gabon still routinely aligns itself with French interests in Africa. During Libya’s 2011 political upheaval, for example, Ali Bongo <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-07-01/african-union-refuses-arrest-gaddafi">broke with the African Union</a> and called for the embattled President Muammar Gaddafi <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/11/us-think-tank-hails-african-leader-accused-of-stealing-an-electi/">to step down</a>. France and other Western powers sought to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20110430-libya-muammar-gaddafi-offers-ceasefire-refuses-to-leave">dislodge the authoritarian Gaddafi</a>, while African nations supported Gaddafi, promoting “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2012.761463?src=recsys&journalCode=cjca20">African solutions to African problems</a>.”</p>
<h2>A stable non-democracy</h2>
<p>The rise of Ali Bongo – who was minister of defense during the latter part of his father’s reign – was contentious even within his own Gabonese Democratic Party.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266557/original/file-20190329-70999-1vckduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gabon is an island of peace in the often unsettled central Africa region.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bongo was forcefully challenged by a senior former party member in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/24/gabon-court-rules-president-ali-bongo-rightful-winner-of-september-election">2016 presidential election</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-jean-ping-gabons-presidential-challenger-494551">Jean Ping</a>. Boosted by the failure of Bongo’s reform agenda to <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gabon-politics-insight/gabons-bongo-struggles-to-transform-african-oil-republic-idUKKBN0ET1W720140618">transform Gabon into an emerging economy</a>, Ping almost convinced the Gabonese people that the Bongo dynasty had to go.</p>
<p>In the end, Bongo beat <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/who-jean-ping-gabons-presidential-challenger-494551">Ping</a>, a former head of the African Union Commission, by fewer than 6,000 votes, with 50.66 percent of the vote. Ping, along with many local and foreign observers, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gabon-election-election-idUSKCN11C112">considers the results of that race</a> fraudulent.</p>
<p>The 2016 presidential election was damaging for the Bongo dynasty. It was the first time that the opposition to the Bongo family coalesced around a single, credible candidacy. </p>
<p>Ever since then, once peaceful Gabon has experienced <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/01/09/a-libreville-un-putsch-rate-revelateur-du-malaise-gabonais_5406573_3212.html">political crises</a>. Ping’s party <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-votes-for-first-time-since-violence-marred-2016-election-20181006-2">boycotted last year’s municipal elections</a>, and his half of the electorate considers Bongo an illegitimate president. </p>
<h2>Rich and poor</h2>
<p>Gabon has also been in an <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gaulme_crisis_oil_producing_countries_gabon_congo_2018.pdf">economic and fiscal crisis</a> since 2014. </p>
<p>Between 2014 and 2016, government revenues decreased substantially due to the <a href="http://africa-me.com/gabon-economic-crisis-government-fuels-investor-mistrust-expropriation-veolia-seeg/">fall of global oil prices</a>. Last year, the International Monetary Fund agreed to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-economy-imf/gabons-economy-to-recover-in-2018-needs-progress-on-reforms-imf-says-idUSL8N1TS374">bail out Gabon’s government in exchange for</a> structural reforms, including a <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180626-gouvernement-gabonais-reduire-train-vie-etat">three-year hiring freeze in the public sector</a>.</p>
<p>Inequality is also <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient">very high</a> in Gabon. Historically, its oil wealth <a href="http://www.ga.undp.org/content/gabon/fr/home/countryinfo/">has not financially benefited most of its people</a>, who remain quite poor.</p>
<p>Gabon places <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">110 out of 189 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index</a>, which assesses longevity, education levels, poverty, social equality, maternal death and other measures of well-being. That is higher than <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">immediate neighbors like Cameroon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea</a>, but lower than expected for a middle-income country whose government runs on oil money.</p>
<p>The African island of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mauritius/overview">Mauritius</a>, for instance, whose gross domestic product is similar to Gabon’s – which was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=GA-MU">US$15 billion in 2017</a> – fares far better. It ranks 65th worldwide on the UN’s human development index. </p>
<h2>A future yet to be written</h2>
<p>Surveys show that 87 percent of Gabonese feel that the country is <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/despite-overwhelming-discontent-gabonese-want-democracy-and-reject-military-rule-survey-shows">headed in the wrong direction</a>. They blame Ali Bongo for that, though 71 percent reject any attempt to install a military dictatorship.</p>
<p>Despite attempts by the Gabonese Democratic Party to reassure the public that Bongo’s health is improving, it is <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/gabonNews/idAFL5N20K387">unclear if he will ever recover enough to again lead Gabon</a>. </p>
<p>For now, an amendment of the constitution by Gabon’s constitutional court in November 2018 has ensured that the president remains – at least nominally – <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/gabon-constitutional-court-amends-constitution-address-presidents-absence">in charge</a> while recovering from the stroke.</p>
<p>When Bongo dies or is rendered incapacitated – a scenario that, in my assessment, is already well underway – the Bongo dynasty will end.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot is not affiliated with any political organization, but he was a supporter of Jean Ping in Gabon's 2016 presidential election.</span></em></p>
Gabon’s strongman president, Ali Bongo, is barely clinging to power after contested elections, a stroke and a coup attempt. The Bongo family has run this stable central African nation for 52 years.
Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Adjunct professor, Political Science and International Studies, University of Tampa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/102217
2019-01-28T13:33:47Z
2019-01-28T13:33:47Z
How a partnership is closing the door on “parachute” research in Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234623/original/file-20180903-41723-1erdmr0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When the wheels of partnership turn smoothly, Africa can benefit enormously.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EtiAmmos/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30239-0">growing condemnation</a> of “parachute research” among the global scientific community. This refers to the practice of scientists and research groups from the global north conducting research and collecting data in poorer parts of the world, publishing their findings in prestigious journals – and giving little or no credit to their local collaborators.</p>
<p>The respected journal Lancet Global Health recently published <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30239-0">an editorial</a> damning the approach. It drew immediate reactions from all over the world. James Smith from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine acknowledged the problem. But, he <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30315-2">cautioned</a>, researchers from developed countries have a role in shaping health discussions through high impact publications.</p>
<p>A group of malnutrition researchers based at the University of Malawi’s College of Medicine, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30324-3">weighed in</a> to share their experience. They’ve established a body, the <a href="http://chainnetwork.org/">Childhood Acute Illness and Nutrition Network</a>. It emphasises north-south collaboration and works to avoid “parachute” research. </p>
<p>More recently, Professor Jimmy Volmink and colleagues <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673618323456?via%3Dihub">expressed concern</a> about equity in collaborations between global health researchers in low-income and middle-income countries and academics in high-income countries. They noted that these partnerships often result in disproportionate benefits for the northern partners who assume more prominent authorship positions in joint publications. </p>
<p>For the past 15 years my colleagues and I have been <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(18)30342-5">doing work</a> that we believe is important in this debate. We are involved in <a href="http://www.edctp.org/">an organisation</a> that focuses on partnerships. We believe that our model of global health partnership and international collaboration is closing the door to parachute researchers and those who pursue a parasitic rather than symbiotic approach to research in and about Africa.</p>
<p>We are not suggesting that researchers from the global north ought to stay out of Africa. Their contributions and the reach they enjoy into high impact journals can help the continent enormously. The problem arises when local researchers are sidelined and when no capacity building or skills development occurs. It’s also problematic when data is not shared with local researchers to further their work in communities.</p>
<p>These are some of the lessons we’ve learned in the 15 years since the <a href="http://www.edctp.org/">European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership</a> (EDCTP) was established by the European Union. </p>
<h2>Setting up a partnership</h2>
<p>The partnership was a response to the global health crisis caused by three major poverty-related diseases: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Our scope has increased significantly to include neglected infectious diseases, emerging infections, diarrhoeal diseases and lower respiratory tract infections. </p>
<p>Today there are 30 participating states, 16 of which are in Africa. These include Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. </p>
<p>With a significant investment of €683 million from the European Union, matched by our participating states, this partnership model represents one of equality and inclusiveness. Each participating state is represented in the General Assembly, which governs the organisation.</p>
<p>The partnership is in its second phase. Over the past five years EDCTP has invested €447.6 m in 193 grants related broadly to clinical trials and career development have been funded. What’s important is that 62% of the funding has been allocated to 226 institutions in Africa. This is valuable because more resources are needed to strengthen Africa’s generally weak research infrastructure and technical capacity.</p>
<p>On the career development front, our fellowship recipients must be a resident of, or be willing to relocate to, a sub-Saharan African country. And when it comes to clinical trials, collaboration is not just expected: it’s a rule. A minimum of three independent research institutions – two in European partner states and one in Africa – must be involved in any project that’s considered for funding.</p>
<p>This eligibility criteria encourages European institutions to establish collaborations with those in Africa. </p>
<h2>Positive shifts</h2>
<p>There have been really encouraging shifts over the past 15 years that suggest genuine collaboration is happening. When we first started, more than 70% of the African institutions involved in successful applications were from countries with well-established health research institutions. These included South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. And the principal investigators from Africa were mostly men.</p>
<p>However, the situation is changing. More recent successful grant applications have been more inclusive. Central and West African institutions are featuring more frequently. And a greater proportion of principal investigators from the continent are women. </p>
<p>The collaboration our partnership demands has produced great results in the real world. In 2017, we funded two large consortia to conduct research about emerging and re-emerging epidemics. They also provided capacity development to prepare African researchers to respond effectively to disease outbreaks.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.alerrt.global/">Both</a> <a href="http://regist2.virology-education.com/presentations/2018/ICREID/19_pandora.pdf">consortia</a> involve more African than European organisations. One is led by a woman researcher from the Republic of Congo.</p>
<h2>Benefits for all</h2>
<p>Of course, not all research collaboration can be identical. But our experiences suggest that a few things are necessary to ensure everyone benefits genuinely from the results of collaborative research. </p>
<p>These include good data collection and data sharing infrastructure. Proper training for researchers from the global south in data collection and analysis is also crucial. So too, is fair representation of research partners from various research sites in both publications and subsequent meetings where the results and implications of the research are discussed.</p>
<p><em>Shingai Machingaidze, EDCTP Project Officer and a PhD student at the University of Cape Town, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moses John Bockarie works for EDCTP. He previously received funding from the UK Department for International Development. He is hosted by the SAMRC.</span></em></p>
It’s all too common for local scholars to be sidelined in what are supposed to be genuine research partnerships.
Moses John Bockarie, Adjunct professor, Njala University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/96796
2018-05-17T12:44:23Z
2018-05-17T12:44:23Z
Presidential term limits: slippery slope back to authoritarianism in Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219387/original/file-20180517-155564-upsa5z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi's Pierre Nkurunziza is one of many authoritarian African leaders.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AMISOM Public Information/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is mounting concern in Africa about a lack of leadership as well as an increasing trend of hard-won democratic rights being reversed. One way this is being done is through presidential term limits being abandoned, or extended. This in turn is leading to a reemergence of authoritarian politics, and political violence.</p>
<p>Extending or abolishing term limits is not unique to the continent. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin won a fourth term <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/world/europe/election-russia-putin-president.html">in March 2018</a> after changes to the constitution and some nimble political footwork. And the Chinese parliament <a href="https://www.independent.ie/.../china-abolishes-presidential-term-limits-36692282.html">recently voted</a> to abolish term limits allowing for the possibility of President Xi Jinping becoming president for life. Given that Russia and China play an influential role on the African continent these events don’t bode well for the future of presidents sticking to term limits on the continent.</p>
<p>Burundi is a case in point. A poll <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-peril-burundis-referendum-will-cement-nkurunzizas-grip-on-power-96544">is being held</a> to amend the constitution to extend presidential term limits from five to seven years. Incumbency would be restricted to two consecutive terms. But the amendment doesn’t apply retroactively which means that President Pierre Nkurunziza could possibly remain in office until 2034. If he lives that long (he’s 55-years-old), and given that he assumed the position in 2005, this would make him president for 29 years.</p>
<p>Burundi is far from alone. Rwanda, Togo, Gabon, Uganda, Chad, Cameroon, Djibouti, Republic of Congo, Sudan, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have all fiddled with term limits. They’ve done this by abolishing, amending or ignoring them, or by simply not holding elections. Other countries such as Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, and Morocco <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/">have never</a> introduced term limits. </p>
<p>Some bids to remove or extend term limits and have failed. These include Frederick Chiluba in 2001 and more recently Edgar Lungu in Zambia, Olusegun Obesanjo of Nigeria (2005), Mamadou Tandja of Niger(2009-2010) and Blaise Compaore of Burkino Faso (2014).</p>
<p>Noteworthy is the fact that many West African countries actually adhere to term limits. This was recognised recently when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf received the Mo Ibrahim <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize/">leadership prize</a> after duly serving her constitutionally mandated term. </p>
<p>The upward trend of amending or abolishing constitutional term limits is likely to increase if organisations like the African Union (AU) don’t deal with the problem. In many countries citizens showing their disapproval, have been met with repression and violence. Large-scale political violence is likely to be the consequence if the trend persists. </p>
<h2>A rolling back of rights</h2>
<p>Africa went through a wave of democratisation from the 1990s. Citizens took to the streets demanding democratic rights. In many countries, the uprisings ended decades of one-partyism and personal rule. The key demands were for multi-party democracy, constitutionalism and that democratic norms and standards be institutionalised. </p>
<p>It’s in this milieu that countries adopted a bill of rights, the rule of law, checks and balances and term limits. Presidential term limits were deemed necessary for a number of reasons. The view was that <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/10/05/how-and-why-term-limits-matter">they would enable</a> better governance, equal opportunity to serve in government, curb patronage politics as well as end authoritarianism. These norms and standards were also seen as a way to stabilise countries <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-688342-ptx9ooz/index.html">politically</a>.</p>
<p>It certainly seems that these constitutional gains are being eroded by heads of state seeking to prolong their stay in power. There also appears to be little concerted attempt by bodies such as the AU to stop the erosion of hard-fought for democratic rights.</p>
<p>The AU’s silence may be because of ambiguity in norms and policy, and because of its leadership. The AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was ratified in 2012, rejects unconstitutional changes of government. But it doesn’t say anything specifically about abolishing term limits. <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf">Article 23 (5)</a> notes that countries will have appropriate sanction imposed on them if there are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principals of democratic change of government</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But it doesn’t spell out what type of amendments are being referred to. </p>
<p>The second factor has to do with the fact that many holding leadership positions at the AU are the same men who have amended or abandoned term limits – or come from the countries that have done so. This suggests the organisation won’t be tackling the “third termism” trend any time soon.</p>
<h2>Spurious reasons for extending stays</h2>
<p>A number of arguments have been put forward by leaders seeking to extend, or simply abandoning, term limits.</p>
<p>One is that term limits prevent <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Mugabe-slams-two-term-limit-on-African-leaders-20150614">people’s choice</a> of president. Another is that African leaders have much more to do to bring about development and therefore need more time. A third is that they have the sovereign right to govern and change constitutions as they see fit. And finally, the strongman argument around a president’s ability to keep the country united and to create peace and stability.</p>
<p>Rwanda is a case in point. President Paul Kagame <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/05/rwandas-paul-kagame-landslide-poll-win-around-98-votes/">received 99%</a> of the vote in August 2017. There’s no gainsaying that there have been remarkable achievements in rebuilding a post-genocide Rwanda. But if there isn’t anybody (and this is doubtful) capable of challenging Kagame after 18 years of rule, then he hasn’t created an environment for democratic leadership to emerge. </p>
<p>We should also be wary of election results that yield 99% support as this smacks of the heyday of one-man and one-party rule.</p>
<h2>The curse of third terminism</h2>
<p>As Africans prepare to celebrate Africa Day on the 25th of May, we need to keep in mind the ideas that inspired <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau">formation</a> of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and the <a href="https://au.int/en/history/oau-and-au">African Union</a> in 2001. These were the Pan-African ideals of political and economic integration, solidarity, unity, dignity, justice and equality for all. </p>
<p>The growing trend of “third termism” is likely to prevent African countries from reaching these goals yet again as the interests of individuals are placed above those of citizens and countries.</p>
<p>Africa needs visionary and courageous leadership, not benevolent or autocratic rulers. It needs leaders that can create the enabling environment for democracy, peace, and development to thrive and endure, and for citizens to live to their fullest potential. </p>
<p>Africa also needs citizens who will hold leaders to account and who will contribute to the realisation of the vision of a democratic pan-African future.</p>
<p>As Africans we don’t have to make a choice between democracy and development. We deserve both.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
More leaders in more African countries will abolish term limits unless organisations like the African Union take action.
Cheryl Hendricks, Professor of Political Science, University of Johannesburg
Gabriel Ngah Kiven, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations , University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/92527
2018-04-03T14:58:00Z
2018-04-03T14:58:00Z
Caught on camera: large mammals are back in Gabon’s Batéké Park
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212005/original/file-20180326-159063-xqr083.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Male mandrills may venture out further than previously thought.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Monitoring mammal species is a crucial conservation tool. This is particularly true in ecological transition zones – geographical areas in which different habitats, like grassland and forest, meet and merge into one another. </p>
<p>These zones are frequent hotspots of mammal species diversity because they do not only contain species typical for specific habitat types, but often also additional highly adaptable species. But in zones of ecological transition animals can find themselves at the edge of the habitat type most suitable to them. The result is that there are often fewer of them and they have reduced genetic variability. This makes them less resilient than core populations. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212449/original/file-20180328-109172-1m4c7eu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Bateke Plateau National Park is situated at the transition between forest and savannah habitats. It provides breathtaking views of narrow stretches of forest along the Mpassa river reaching out into the savannah.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniela Hedwig</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As such, with ever increasing levels of human encroachment and poaching, these zones need special attention by conservationists to guarantee the survival of populations inhabiting in these.</p>
<p>A good example is the stunning, but largely overlooked, Batéké Plateau National Park in southeastern Gabon. In 2015, a systematic camera trap based monitoring programme was started by <a href="https://www.aspinallfoundation.org/">The Aspinall Foundation</a> and the <a href="https://scienceparcsgabon.weebly.com">Gabonese National Parks Agency</a>. Since 1998 they have worked together to facilitate the reintroduction of the western lowland gorilla in the national park. Data were collected in collaboration with <a href="https://www.panthera.org/">Panthera</a>, an international NGO dedicated to the conservation of the world’s wild cats and <a href="http://panafrican.eva.mpg.de/">the Pan African Program of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology</a>, which conducted a survey investigating the behaviour of chimpanzees in the park.</p>
<p>The park is situated at the transition between the Gabonese rain forest and the savannah-dominated Batéké Plateau of the Republic of the Congo. It provides breathtaking views of narrow stretches of forest along the banks of the Mpassa River (so called gallery forests) meandering into the savannah. The park once teamed with wildlife. But the bushmeat and illegal ivory trade along with organised eradication of large carnivores had taken its toll on the mammal species in the area.</p>
<p>Those that remained appeared to be restricted to the gallery forests. Some were thought to be close to extinction. For example, for decades it was assumed that mammals like lion were extinct in the park. But the results from the camera trap monitoring project give reason for hope that wildlife is returning to the park. And captured footage provides intriguing insights into the Batéké mammal species community.</p>
<h2>Astonishing findings</h2>
<p>The monitoring programme found 12 mammal species that are threatened with extinction according to the <a href="http://www.iucnredlist.org">International Union for Conservation of Nature.</a>. These include chimpanzee, leopard, elephant, giant pangolin and western lowland gorilla, which were reintroduced to the park since 1998.</p>
<p>Notably, the camera traps captured species thought to be long extinct or even not occurring in the area. For example, camera footage in 2015 marked the first definitive proof of lion in Gabon. Until then the assumption had been that the last specimen was shot in 1996. Potential paw prints were <a href="https://www.earthtouchnews.com/conservation/conservation/take-two-gabons-lone-lion-makes-another-on-camera-appearance/">spotted in 2004</a>. Non-invasive efforts were made to collect hair samples. Genetic analysis showed that this single male lion might be a survivor of the <a href="http://lionalert.org/alert/lions_in/Gabon">historic Batéké lion population</a>.</p>
<p>Another example involves footage of several young mandrills. This suggests that emigrating males of this species may venture out further than previously thought in search for new groups and females. According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature, the distribution of mandrills in Gabon is restricted to the east <a href="http://eol.org/pages/310920/hierarchy_entries/57452495/details">by the Ivindo and Ogoue Rivers</a>. Combined with interviews with local people, which reported that mandrills were once present in the north of the park, current observations suggest that the current species distribution must be redefined. </p>
<p>More recently, another spectacular discovery took place in 2017. Camera traps captured a spotted <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2018/01/camera-trap-captures-spotted-hyena-in-gabon-national-park-the-first-in-20-years/">hyena</a> in Batéké for the first time in two decades.</p>
<p>These astonishing findings illustrate that large mammals are returning to the Batéké Plateau National Park after two decades of conservation efforts, initiated by The Aspinall Foundation’s gorilla reintroduction programme. Today, Batéké appears to be the only park within the network of protected areas in Gabon where the savannah-dwelling serval, jackal and bush duiker exist together. It’s also the only park with four species of wild cats. The national park is also rare because it holds large carnivores like lion and spotted hyena. But illegal hunting remains a threat, particularly in the southeast of the park. </p>
<p>Intriguingly, the findings also showed that the species diversity wasn’t as great as might have been expected. With 36 medium to large sized mammal species, the park appears to host a smaller number of species than the forested protected areas of Gabon and Congo. To investigate this, researchers took a closer look at the mammal species in the gallery forests.</p>
<p>As the gallery forests reach out into the savannah, they may degrade and become less suitable for species that are highly adapted to living in a forest habitat. But the researchers did not find a smaller number of species in the gallery forests further in the savannah compared to those closer to the continuous Gabonese rain forest. </p>
<p>However, it may be possible that the narrow gallery forests are simply too small to provide sufficient forage to support certain species. This might explain the striking absence of mangabey and colobine primate species, which are characteristic for the African rain forest. Future studies will need to take into account factors like altitude, climate and soil composition influencing plant productivity and food availability, to understand the local variation in species richness.</p>
<p>In the meantime, it’s crucial that the Batéké Plateau National Park is rigorously protected to guarantee the continued survival and recovery of the fragile community of mammals.</p>
<p><em>This article was co-authored by Tony King of The Aspinall Foundation.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92527/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniela Hedwig has previously been employed by The Aspinall Foundations. Tony King is currently employed by The Aspinall Foundation. </span></em></p>
Camera traps in the Batéké Plateau National Park in Gabon are showing some interesting finds.
Daniela Hedwig, Postdoc with the Elephant Listening Project at BRP, Cornell University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/91690
2018-02-13T13:16:18Z
2018-02-13T13:16:18Z
With a busy election schedule, Africa needs a reversal of the old order
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206165/original/file-20180213-44660-yvjtjz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Democratic Republic of Congo's President Joseph Kabila. Time to step aside.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kenny Katombe</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The winds of change may blow in several directions across Africa this year as a host of countries prepare for elections. But a change in power isn’t always synonymous with change in governance. In Africa, very often, a new face in power doesn’t signal change of the system of governance.</p>
<p>The continent is set for a busy 2018 electoral year. In the past presidential, legislative, or local elections, or a combination, have had a destabilising if not devastating effect due to pre and post-election transparency issues and accompanying protests, violence and political instability. But when conducted well, elections have also brought hope for a better future. Ghana and Benin are good examples. </p>
<p>The year ahead won’t be any different. On the one hand the expected end of Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might bring momentous change to the country. On the other it’s more difficult to foresee better days for South Sudan. Others might also depart before elections. </p>
<h2>Early departures?</h2>
<p>In Pretoria President Jacob Zuma <a href="https://theconversation.com/zuma-finally-falls-on-his-sword-but-not-before-threatening-to-take-the-house-down-with-him-91910">resigned</a> on February 14. He had come under increasing pressure to do so following the December election of Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f727f130-e3e7-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da">as president of the African National Congress</a>, and the future president of the country. </p>
<p>And seven years after the Jasmine Revolution that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html">ousted the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a>, Tunisians are back on the streets. The wave that took away Ben Ali now threatens to sweep the government of Beji Caid Essebsi.</p>
<h2>Presidential seats at stake</h2>
<p>The DRC has added more instability to its already complex situation. The country has been embroiled in a political and institutional crisis since Joseph Kabila extended his term in office, after failing to amend the constitution <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/dr-congo-president-can-remain-in-office-without-a-vote-court">to remove the disposition preventing him from running for a third term</a>. He has twice postponed presidential elections, despite signing the December 2016 agreement whose main clause was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/deal-finalised-peaceful-political-transition-drc-161231182050153.html">to have presidential and legislative elections held by December 2017</a>.</p>
<p>Kabila’s failure to hold elections by the December 2017 deadline has led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/31/congo-security-forces-shoot-two-dead-during-protest-against-president">mounting national protests</a>, which <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/drc-protesters-killed-anti-kabila-protests-180121105558348.html">the regime has crushed</a>. Increasing national and international pressure might see Kabila out in 2018 unless he amends the constitution.</p>
<p>In Cameroon, Paul Biya, 85, in power since 1982, should be up for <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">reelection in October</a>. Although there is no indication that he will relinquish power, he has <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20171003-eye-africa-cameroon-anglophone-unrest-kenya-election-protest-oromo-festival-ethiopia">faced dissensions and separatist claims from so-called anglophone Cameroon</a> and is believed to have ill-health. The current lack of succession plans if Biya does not run, <a href="https://www.proshareng.com/news/Reviews%20&%20Outlooks/Cameroon---Risks-Will-Rise-On-Upcoming-Election/36227">leaves room for speculation and uncertainty</a>. </p>
<p>In Madagascar, concern reigns in the run-up to the presidential <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">election at the end of this year</a>, which should see incumbent Hery Rajaonarimampianina face up his two predecessors Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina. The island, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13861843">with a tumultuous history, has been prey to institutional instability since 2001</a>. There are fears this will happen again.</p>
<p>Three countries, South Sudan, Libya and Mali, plagued by instability for some years, <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">are expected to hold presidential elections this year</a>. Strong uncertainties prevail in South Sudan and Libya where negotiations for peaceful settlements have yielded little tangible results. In Mali the government doesn’t control large parts of its territory and <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170928_sg_report_on_mali_september_eng.pdf">is not immune to terrorist attacks</a>.</p>
<p>No surprise will come from Cairo where, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/24/egypt-heading-towards-elections-president-sisis-name-ballot/">will certainly be reelected president of a country</a> he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/former-egyptian-general-arrested-by-military-after-announcing-presidential-bid-sami-anan">now controls unchallenged</a>.</p>
<h2>Longevity and power sharing dilemmas</h2>
<p>In West Africa, Togolese Faure Gnassingbé appears as a poor student in the field of democracy. He came to power in 2005 in a quasi-dynastic political ‘transition’, replacing his father, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">who had been in power for 38 years</a>. Reelected in 2015, he has, since August 2017, faced massive and sustained popular <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togo-protests-crisis-171019163543710.html">protests</a> demanding institutional reforms and the end of his family’s 50-year rule.</p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States is trying, through negotiations, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/nigerias-president-warns-togo-about-political-instability-20180208">to restore calm</a>. An uneasy situation is emerging given that Faure is the current chairman of <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/06/04/togolese-president-faure-gnassingbe-is-new-ecowas-chairperson/">the organization until June 2018</a>. But if he completely loses the support of his peers, he might be on his way out. Legislative elections are scheduled to take place by July.</p>
<p>Like Togo, Gabon experienced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">similar ‘transition’</a> from father Omar Bongo, who died in power in 2009 after 42 years of rule, to his son Ali Bongo, who replaced him that year. Once a haven of peace in an unstable Central African region, Gabon has tumbled into a serious crisis since the highly contested presidential election in 2016 which was <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-mulls-amnesty-for-post-election-violence-20170914">marred by widespread fraud and deadly repression</a>. Jean Ping, leader of the opposition and former chairperson of the African Union Commission, continues to claim victory.</p>
<p>The hardening of the Libreville regime has recently resulted in a constitutional amendment that the opposition characterises as a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/gabon-president-defends-constitutional-change-after-parliament-gives-okay-20180111">‘monarchisation’ of power</a>. Legislative elections planned this year will certainly be a turning point for the country.</p>
<p>In Guinea Bissau, the power of José Mario Vaz is in troubled waters, with the appointment of a seventh prime minister <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/guinea-bissau-president-names-new-prime-minister-0">since 2014</a>. The opposition has decried the president for overstepping his constitutional prerogatives by monopolising power, in violation of the Conakry agreement signed in 2016, <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-mission-to-guinea-bissau-to-assess-the-implementation-of-conakry-and-bissau-agreements/">under the aegis of the regional west African body</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ecowas-threatens-guinea-bissau-sanctions-as-crisis-drags-20171217">Vaz runs the risk of sanctions</a>, in which case he would definitively lose the support of the organisation and the protection of <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/ecomib.htm">the regional troop deployment</a>. This would precipitate his departure and could plunge the country into chaos, in a state that has <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/04/2012414125957785808.html">mostly known military coups and instability</a>. Legislative elections are expected to take place this year.</p>
<p>In Chad, the crisis that has affected resource-dependent countries has <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/08/chad-suspends-10-parties-for-disturbing-public-order/">plagued the economy</a>. This is coupled with Idris Deby’s stronghold on power and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr20/7045/2017/en/">his repressive methods</a>. Despite facing civil unrest, he is unlikely to be shaken even though the country <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/01/civil-unrest-chad-idriss-deby/">is expected to hold legislative elections this year</a>.</p>
<h2>Ghana setting the pace</h2>
<p>Over the past 20 years, since the John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor presidency, Ghana has epitomised democracy south of the Sahara (aside from South Africa). Its institutional stability and peaceful transitions of power are commendable.</p>
<p>What the continent <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/world/africa/12prexy.html">needs most are strong institutions</a>, which will only come about with a regeneration of its leadership as well as its political class. This renewal must be rooted in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTNk4q6zRw8">paradigm shift</a> as embodied with determination, class and panache by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PNJjpw-Qb4">Ghanaian president Nana Akufo Addo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed M Diatta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Africa needs strong institutions. But they can only be built if there’s a change in leadership.
Mohamed M Diatta, Ph.D. Candidate & Lecturer in Political Science-International Relations, Sciences Po
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/84727
2017-10-03T12:16:02Z
2017-10-03T12:16:02Z
Gabon’s political force is its thriving hip-hop scene
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187574/original/file-20170926-17414-bikw6d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Duo Movaizhaleine and artist Wonda Wendy take a minute's silence to honor the dead during a concert in Paris, February 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Silber Mba </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Gabon as in <a href="http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_CEA_209_0143--masculine-strength-and-rap-music.htm">other African states</a>, rap has become instrumental in constructing political identity.</p>
<p>On August 17, Gabon celebrated 57 years of independence with a massive <a href="http://news.alibreville.com/h/74818.html">free concert</a> in the capital, Libreville. The aim: to promote national unity in a festive fashion. An impressive lineup of local hip hop stars – including Ba'Ponga, Tris, Tina and Ndoman – were invited to draw in the younger crowds.</p>
<p>The celebrations held particular significance in light of another, darker anniversary. Last year on August 31, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">shockingly violent</a> crisis erupted following President Ali Bongo’s <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/09/09/presidentielle-gabonaise-comment-truquer-une-election-pour-75-000-euros_4995385_3212.html">contested electoral victory</a>.</p>
<p>One year on, the country is <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/468781/politique/gabon-un-an-apres-la-presidentielle-un-pays-en-situation-delicate/">still feeling</a> the social, political and economic effects, as is its rap scene.</p>
<h2>Violent demonstrations</h2>
<p>In the early 1990s, Gabon’s government was shut down by violent demonstrations and a general strike. It forced dictator Omar Bongo, who <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2009-2-page-126.htm">had been in power since 1967</a>, to set up a national conference reestablishing a multiparty system and granting greater freedom of expression.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘African revolution’, one of V2A4’s first hits, explicitly mentions the misappropriation of public funds.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Against the backdrop of this popular uprising, the youth of Libreville began writing rap music. Inspired by American hip hop artists like Public Enemy and NWA, and French rappers like NTM and Assassin, they expressed their need for escape, freedom and change.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Si'Ya Po'Ossi X bluntly describes daily life in the ‘mapanes’, poor urban areas where the majority of people live.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet this subversive scene hasn’t been totally exempt from the kinds of ties between music and politics that have existed since the onset of African independence in the 1960s. In fact, some protest rappers have links to the “system” through family ties with political elites. V2A4, for example, is made up of the son of the Interior minister (a close relative to former president Omar Bongo) and the child of a local businessman. Both study in France and live off the wealth of the “system”.</p>
<h2>Bling Gabon style</h2>
<p>From the 2000s on, inspired by <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-gangsta-rap-2857307">gangsta rap</a>, video clips have started to feature more gold chains, souped-up cars, women in suggestive poses and virile displays of masculinity.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The rapper Kôba is an icon of bling culture in Gabon.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ushered in by bling style rapper Kôba, a new generation of rappers began to write songs that deviated from the protest-driven hip hop of their predecessors. This trend was encouraged by the appearance of new record labels, with close ties to the government and elites, further reinforcing the link between music and politics.</p>
<p>This fusion between music and politics reached new highs during the 2009 election. Presidential candidate Ali Bongo used the popularity of rap artists to attract youth support and distinguish himself from his father, Omar, who had died in June that year.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Presidential candidate Ali Bongo on stage with rap stars from Hay'oe, who supported his campaign.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following his election in 2009, Ali Bongo brought new faces from the world of hip hop into the government. Due to these kinds of affiliations, Bongo’s semi-authoritarian regime has exercised particularly tight control over the hip hop scene, in particular via the media.</p>
<h2>Without jobs</h2>
<p>Right from the start, Bongo’s first seven-year term in office was <a href="https://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=POLAF_144_0157">marked</a> by a decline in living standards and social infrastructure and continuing high unemployment levels – more than 20% of the population, and 35% of young people are <a href="http://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/feature/2015/03/31/gabons-unemployment-conundrum-why-economic-growth-is-not-leading-to-more-jobs">without jobs</a>. This, while the Bongo family’s spending has <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2015/08/20/ali-bongo-seme-a-tout-va-la-fortune-de-papa_1366491">reached outrageous highs</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://gabonreview.com/blog/musique-f-a-n-g-entre-nouveau-single-diatribe-contre-censure/">Censorship</a>and the co-option or <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/12/20/gabon-des-manifestants-reclament-le-depart-du-president_4544324_3212.html">silencing of opposition</a> have become increasingly common. Dissenting hip hop artists now have to find alternative ways to spread their messages.</p>
<p>Most subversive rap is now produced abroad, with several well-known Gabonese rappers making their music in China, South Africa, the US or France. These artists-in-exile form a highly political network. Their songs reach the streets of Libreville through social media, becoming calls for political debate and action.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The title ‘Mister Zero’ was recorded in south of France by rapper Saik1ry who condemned Ali Bongo’s disastrous record, now an anthem at opposition demonstrations. </movie
Back home, many artists continue the fight in spite of censorship. In 2015, outspoken rapper Keurtyce E became the first to release a song openly opposing the current regime.
Keurtyce directly threatens the President in his song ‘We’ll make a fresh start’
Beyond the lyrical content of these songs, Gabonese artists ingeniously use the musical arrangements to subversive ends.
Clever use of sampling
Sampling, cutting and looping allow artists to anchor their music within the local context, by using samples from traditional instruments or famous local songs, for instance. These techniques also carry political meaning, with artists mixing in lyrics, musical samples or slogans from activist musicians who they see as their ideological forebears.
Pierre-Claver Akendengué, for example, an icon of 1960s pan-Africanism and resistor to the authoritarian regime during the one-party system, remains a major source of inspiration for Gabonese musicians today.
The chorus from Movaizhaleine’s song ‘Aux choses du pays’ (To the stuff of our country) is adapted from the music of Akendengué.
Rapper/producer Lord Ekomy Ndong recently demonstrated another means of subversion. In a new song in which he samples excerpts from a speech by President Ali Bongo, juxtaposed with the words of social media activists, to condemn corruption and misappropriation of public funds.
Subversion through juxtaposition by Lord Ekomy Ndong.
Flareups on social media
During last year’s election, a great rift appeared in the rap scene between supporters and opponents of the president. A series of flareups on social media and diss-and-response songs deepened the divide.
Bongo had his praise singers:
On the one side, rappers aligned with the Bongo family, involved in rallies and producing songs to support the incumbent party.
But Bongo’s opponents were as vocal:
On the other side, protest rappers, denounce increased corruption and poverty since Bongo has taken office.
Rappers who had previously cooperated with Bongo joined opposition movements to demonstrate their disappointment with government failures. It intensified after troops opened fire on demonstrators following the release of the election results. Several people were killed and numerous others disappeared.
Just two months after this crackdown, Kôba, former poster boy for the system, released the song “Odjuku”. The title is a reference to Bongo’s supposed Nigerian biological father. The rapper reignited the controversy surrounding the president’s origins and joined other artists in declaring “On ne te suit pas” (We don’t follow you).
Kôba,‘Odjuku’
Forgetting the quagmire
One year on, the government is trying to make people forget its quagmire with events such as the massive August 17 free concert.
Yet, the protest movement is still active: demonstrations continue within striking government departments and at Libreville University. In the streets of Paris and New York, Gabonese expats rally together.
LestatXXL/Lord Ekomy Ndong ‘Sur mon drapeau’ (By my flag)
Through their songs, rappers like Lestat XXL and Lord Ekomy Ndong, commemorate the sorrowful anniversary of the 2016 repression:
Here no one will forget. We’ll hoist up the flame…
No red on my flag. Nothing will ever be the same.
<em>Alice Aterianus-Owanga is the author of “Rap Was Born Here! Music, Power and Identity in Modern Gabon”, published by Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, September 2017.</em>
<em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for Fast for Word.</em></span></figcaption>
</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice Aterianus-Owanga received funding from French Minister of Higher Education and research for this research, and she is currently receiving fundings from the Swiss National Fund for research. </span></em></p>
Rap has become instrumental in constructing identity and radically reshaping relations to politics in Gabon and other African states.
Alice Aterianus-Owanga, Postdoctoral researcher in Anthropology, Université de Lausanne
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/74379
2017-04-03T14:11:22Z
2017-04-03T14:11:22Z
Chimpanzees hunting for honey are cleverer than we thought
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163428/original/image-20170331-16266-1gmqa09.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chimpanzees performed a specific technique with a stick to extract underground bees nests.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chimpanzees are the closest <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2012/06/bonobos-join-chimps-closest-human-relatives">living relatives</a> to humans. Because of this they can offer invaluable insights into understanding the evolutionary roots of how humans developed their cognitive and technological abilities. </p>
<p>Years of data taken from studies conducted on wild apes suggests that chimpanzees could have something similar to what we call <a href="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v399/n6737/abs/399682a0.html">“culture”</a> in humans. Biologists define “culture” as a set of behaviours – such as dietary habits, technical solutions, and communication systems – that individuals of one group share and that are distinguishable between groups. These behaviours are passed on from one individual to another not genetically, but socially by, for example, observing other individuals. These findings have led to a lively <a href="http://synergy.st-andrews.ac.uk/lalandlab/files/2015/08/laland_TREE_2006.pdf">debate about “culture”</a> in animals. </p>
<p>One way of understanding the evolution of “culture” among animals is by <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.21036/LTPUB10348">documenting and analysing</a> the behaviour of wild chimpanzees. </p>
<p>We have completed a <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/btp.12354/abstract">study</a> that adds to this body of knowledge. We used camera traps (a non-invasive approach) to monitor the behaviour of members of a community of chimpanzees in the forests of Loango National Park in Gabon. What we caught on camera was that they performed a specific technique to extract underground bee nests. </p>
<p>We were able to directly observe how chimpanzees access a high quality food resource that would otherwise be inaccessible. Our research confirmed <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhevol.2009.04.001">earlier observations</a> that chimpanzees use wooden tools to dig out the bee nests and access the honey. This allowed them to achieve similar levels of success as other, more skilled, diggers such as honey badgers and forest elephants, with whom they compete for honey. </p>
<p>Our study adds new knowledge to understanding the behavioural ecology of three species that inhabit a wide range of habitats across Africa. </p>
<h2>What the cameras captured</h2>
<p>Loango National Park provides an exceptional location to study chimpanzees. The park is made up of a unique combination of coastal forest, mangroves, savannas patches, rain-forest and swamps. The local fauna reflects the richness of the habitat, and includes buffaloes, forest elephants, red river hogs, monkeys, duikers and hippos.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.eva.mpg.de/primat/research-groups/chimpanzees/field-sites/loango-chimpanzee-project.html?Fsize=0%2C%20%40">Loango Ape project</a> was initiated in 2005 to investigate various aspects of the behavioural ecology of central African chimpanzees and western lowland gorillas. Both species inhabit the same area at this unique field site. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163463/original/image-20170331-31750-pxm2nj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The chimpanzees were as successful at extracting the honey as the honey badgers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">MPI EVA / Loango Chimpanzee Project- Anne-Céline Granjon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Before the cameras were set up, researchers started by looking for signs of apes. They soon came across wooden sticks next to holes dug into the ground, often associated with honeycombs. To expert eyes the sticks suggested that they were being used to extract honey, possibly by chimpanzees. </p>
<p>Honey is an extremely valuable food source for animals because it has a high concentration of sugar and other natural elements. </p>
<p>Thanks to the non-invasive approach we used, it soon became clear that chimpanzees were not the only consumers of the honey from the underground bee nests. It turned out that they had to compete for this resource with honey badgers and, surprisingly, forest elephants.</p>
<h2>Competition for the honey</h2>
<p><a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0266467412000612">Previous studies</a> carried out at the same site showed that chimpanzees could be excluded from certain feeding areas because of competition with other species, particularly elephants. This prompted us to take a closer look at the interactions among the apes and the other consumers of the underground bee nests.</p>
<p>We found that chimpanzees weren’t affected by the previous visits of elephants, but that they refrained from digging after honey badger visited a bee nest. <a href="http://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/29895">Honey badgers</a> are known to be fierce fighters, which could explain the chimpanzees behaviour. In fact, this strategy could help chimpanzees to prevent risky encounters with this competitor.</p>
<p>Another challenge for the apes is that the honey is buried deep in the ground – some nests were a meter underground, giving honey badgers and elephants an advantage. Honey badgers are well adapted to digging while elephants are physically strong. Despite this, the chimpanzees we watched were as successful at extracting the honey as the honey badgers, likely thanks to the tools they used which improved their ability to dig. </p>
<p>The use of tools therefore helped chimpanzees access a high quality food resource they would otherwise have found inaccessible.</p>
<p>Overall, our study provided new, fascinating observations about the behaviour of wild chimpanzees. We showed that chimpanzees can apply a complex technique using tools to access a hidden resource. We also showed that they changed their behaviour to avoid risks, such as encountering potentially dangerous competitors. </p>
<p>These results provide more evidence about the range of technological and behavioural strategies that chimpanzees are able to perform in their natural environment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74379/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vittoria Estienne works for the Department of Primatology at the Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig (Germany). She receives funding from the Max Planck Society. The Loango Ape Project is run by Tobias Deschner (Loango Chimpanzee Project) and Martha Robbins (Loango Gorilla Project) and supported in Gabon by the Agence Nationale des Parcs Nationaux (ANPN), by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique of Gabon (CENAREST), and by the staff of the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). Data collection was possible thanks to the help of C. Orbell, Y. Nkoma, U. Bora Moussouami, L. Rabanal, and all other field assistants of the Loango Ape project. </span></em></p>
New, fascinating observations about the behaviour of wild chimpanzees showed that they can apply a complex technique to access honey.
Vittoria Estienne, Doctoral student Department of Primatology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.