tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/italy-after-1992-33890/articlesItaly After 1992 – The Conversation2016-12-02T03:48:19Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/687172016-12-02T03:48:19Z2016-12-02T03:48:19ZLooking back at Italy 1992: a country stuck in the centre in 2016<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145636/original/image-20161113-9045-1bm7ol5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Matteo Renzi selfie</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matteo_Renzi">Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the fifth of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
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<p>Inspired by the SBS Network’s premiere of the political drama Italy 1992, this series of articles has been an attempt to rethink Italy’s recent history through the prism of that pivotal year. This fifth and last part comes intentionally hours before the country votes on a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-votes-on-constitutional-reform-but-it-may-not-be-enough-to-save-the-economy-69409">important constitutional reforms</a>. Depending on the referendum outcome, 2016 might turn out to be a year as crucial as 1992. </p>
<p>I will dedicate tomorrow’s column to Sunday’s referendum. Today’s article, however, focuses on the status of the country’s left, how it has changed in the last two decades and why its long-term demise matters, especially at a time when Italy is on the verge of a long and disruptive economic crisis. </p>
<p>As I argued in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">part one</a>, 1992 was an <em>annus horribilis</em>. The Mafia’s strategy of terror and the country-wide corruption scandal known as <em>Tangentopoli</em> (Bribesville) rocked Italy’s democratic foundations. The scandals brought down the so-called First Republic, and set in motion a series of events that had several unintended consequences. </p>
<p>Silvio Berlusconi’s ascent to power was probably the most obvious and to some extent paradoxical effect of the scandal. As I discussed in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">part 2</a>, the media tycoon was a remedy far worse than the disease. </p>
<p>The events of 1992, however, also had a much more unexpected impact on the country’s political sphere: they triggered a long and at times tortured weakening of the Italian left — the main representative of which (the Communist Party) had been, ironically, the only major parliamentary force to survive the Bribesville earthquake unscathed. </p>
<p>Though, unlike Berlusconi’s ascendance to power, the transformation of the Italian left was slow and rather subtle, it was by no means less detrimental to the quality of the country’s democratic system. </p>
<h2>The death of the left</h2>
<p>If the <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-sudden-spring-of-civil-society-67520">sudden spring of civil society</a> in 2002 and the electoral victories of the Five Star Movement (first in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-internet-politics-comes-of-age-67521">2013</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">earlier this year</a>) are, to a certain extent, welcome by-products of Berlusconi’s legacy, the chronic decline of the Italian left came about after a long period of self-inflicted political martyrdom.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">From PCI to PD.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
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<p>It began in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fearing a backlash from its association with the tainted ideology of communism, the Italian Communist Party changed its name to the Democratic Party of the Left. It was the first of many subsequent iterations. </p>
<p>In 1994, the shocking electoral defeat by Berlusconi’s coalition convinced the party to join forces with the political centre at the next general election and support Romano Prodi (a respected politician, yet a former member of the disgraced Christian Democracy party). The move produced two electoral victories (in 1996 and 2006) but pushed the party further away from the leftist political soul that had defined it for decades. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Nanni: Say something vaguely left-wing.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The core of the electorate that had identified itself for years with the party’s left-wing ideology was both excited by the chance of finally governing the country (a goal the old Communist Party had never achieved), but also increasingly puzzled by this series of ideological makeovers, compromises with former rivals and the marked inability (some would call it wilful reluctance) of its representatives to deal effectively with the political anomaly called Silvio Berlusconi. </p>
<p>The electorate’s growing frustration was perfectly captured by the 1998 film April. One of the most iconic scenes depicts the party secretary, Massimo D’Alema (a former member of the old Communist Party), remaining awkwardly silent during an election debate on a TV talk-show while Berlusconi attacks the judiciary. Exasperated, Nanni, the main character in the film, screams: <em>D’Alema di’ qualcosa di sinistra!</em> - I beg you, say something, anything, vaguely left-wing! </p>
<p>The final stage of the Italian left’s journey towards the centre was marked by the birth of the Democratic Party in 2007. The party is mishmash of former communists, but also Christian Democrats and socialists, all of whom are now in government, together with former members of Berlusconi’s coalition. </p>
<p>Berlusconi’s electoral decline has made the Democratic Party the natural port of call for many of those centrist forces that would once have gravitated towards Berlusconi’s centre-right. The party’s appeal for these forces has been strengthened further by the election of a new leader. Elected party secretary in 2013, Matteo Renzi, the young politician who came to be known as <em>Il Rottamatore</em> (The Scrapper) for his willingness to scrap the old political machine for a new one (his own), is at the same time the party’s most valuable asset, because of his alleged appeal to both the younger generations and the centre, but also the living evidence of how far the Italian left has shifted its axis since 1992. </p>
<h2>The new kid on the block</h2>
<p>Renzi’s rise to power was swift and had more than a touch of Machiavellianism. After a decade spent in Florence, first as president of the county and then mayor of the city, he won the leadership contest for his party at the end of 2013 with 68% of the preferences (nearly 2 million votes). Only a few months later, not yet 40, exactly 20 years after Berlusconi’s first electoral success, Renzi became Italy’s youngest prime minister after what many called an internal “coup”.</p>
<p>In February 2014, despite continuing reassurances that he was not after Enrico Letta’s job, Renzi outmanoeuvred the then prime minister and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/italian-pm-enrico-letta-to-resign">forced him to resign</a>. Letta had been in the job for less than a year, but his leadership had been harshly contested from the beginning.</p>
<p>In the post-election stalemate caused by the failure to form a government by the then Democratic Party leader, Pier-Luigi Bersani (a moderate member of the old Communist Party), <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22285883">Letta succeeded</a> in the task only with the support of a much-criticised large multi-party coalition in the parliament. This included the Democratic Party but also members of Berlusconi’s former alliance – the same ones the party had vigorously campaigned against prior to the election.</p>
<p>While Bersani’s victory at the 2012 national primaries for prime minister was seen as confirmation that the old leftist heritage was still alive within the party, Renzi’s ascendance was hailed as a radical change of direction. The press anointed him as the new hope for a country that many still consider to be the <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/3987219">sick man of Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Renzi was young, driven but, overall, despite his attacks against the old caste, a moderate at heart. He was neither as tainted as Berlusconi, nor was he as revolutionary (some would say crazy) as Beppe Grillo, the populist leader of the anti-establishment Five-Star Movement. </p>
<p>Finally, Italy had a clean, respectable and likeable leader with enough stamina and vision to stir the country out of the last decade’s swamp. All Renzi needed to do was to shift further the axis of Democratic Party politics from the left to the centre in order to appease the European Union’s request for austerity, the banks and the global market, hence guaranteeing some breathing space for the country. </p>
<h2>More Berlusconi, than Berlinguer</h2>
<p>Renzi’s new political direction should not come as a surprise. Despite nominally being the leader of the country’s left, he is a centrist who grew up in the ranks of The Daisy (La Margherita), a party whose political roots are the same as the old Christian Democracy party. </p>
<p>Renzi, after all, is not (and does not aspire to be) a new Enrico Berlinguer, the historic leader of the Communist Party who inspired a generation. His funeral in Rome on June 13 1984 was, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v06/n18/paul-ginsborg/berlinguers-legacy">in the words of the historian Paul Ginsborg</a>, “the greatest spontaneous civic demonstration in the history of the post-war Italian Republic”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Berlinguer’s funeral, 1984.</span></figcaption>
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<p>As a leader, Berlinguer was the opposite of what Renzi is now: he disliked the cult of personality, the use of rhetoric, and any excess. He was shy and modest. And yet he was known as <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/12/obituaries/enrico-berlinguer-dies-at-62-leader-of-italy-s-communists.html?pagewanted=all">the great compromiser</a>, the kind of leader who wasn’t afraid of negotiating with his opponents or making dramatic choices.</p>
<p>During the terrorism crisis in the 1970s, the so-called Years of Lead, he cooperated with the Christian Democrats; and when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan he did what his predecessors could have not imagined: he firmly broke away from the Russians, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v06/n18/paul-ginsborg/berlinguers-legacy">denouncing</a> the USSR as “a system that does not permit real democratic participation in the sphere of production or of politics”.</p>
<p>Berlinguer’s leadership was instrumental in bringing the Communist Party out of the dark shadows of Stalinism without destroying it. In fact, without betraying the party’s core ideology, he succeeded in strengthening its political credentials and transformed it into a viable candidate for governing the country. </p>
<p>Renzi’s leadership, his politics and public demeanour are, on the other hand, closer to that of Berlusconi than a leader of the left. Berlusconi himself, half in jest, half in earnest, has called him his natural political heir. </p>
<p>Very much like Berlusconi, Renzi is a charismatic leader, ruthless with his foes, and wise enough to surround himself with a large cohort of faithful lackeys who would never betray him. </p>
<p>He understands the importance of media and knows how to deal with them. TV networks love him. But, unlike Berlusconi, Renzi is also a social media enthusiast with a large personal following online. He uses Twitter and Facebook to reach out directly to the people, to answer their questions and defend himself from their criticism (see <a href="https://twitter.com/matteorenzi?lang=en">#matteorisponde</a> on Twitter). </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Renzi Twitter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter</span></span>
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<p>Renzi is also a skilful salesman of captivating ideas. He has a winning smile that can turn what some would consider insignificant statistics into dazzling feats of statecraft. Half-a-percent growth in GDP can easily become a clear sign of the rebirth of Italy’s economy and, in the process, evidence of the <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/11/15/pil-la-variazione-del-2016-torna-a-08-in-linea-con-le-stime-ribassate-del-governo-renzi-esulta-con-le-riforme-dati-migliori/3193433/.%22%22">government’s policy successes</a></p>
<h2>Alienating the left</h2>
<p>Overall, as prime minister, the 41-year-old former mayor of Florence has certainly been successful in rekindling the hopes of the political centre, but has alienated much of the core left. His policies and reforms have attracted criticism because, as some critics have pointed out, these are either a populist nod to the electorate or share very little with left-wing politics. </p>
<p>The government’s controversial <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/06/03/bonus-80-euro-renzi-una-mancia-elettorale-qualcuno-dice-dallo-a-me/2792175/">80-euro bonus</a> for those who earn less than 1,500 euros per month was attacked as electoral bribery, rather than a true, significant help for families in need.</p>
<p>Renzi’s main reforms have attracted no less criticism. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, Article 18 of the Workers Statute (the protection of which was once a proud domain of the left). Renzi’s “Jobs Act” (the name is a nod to President Obama’s 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act), which passed in 2015, was praised by the European Central Bank, the IMF and many other international bodies. But it was highly criticised by the workers’ unions, by the parliamentary opposition and even by some of Renzi’s party members as an attack on worker rights.</p>
<p>Though the act makes it easier for companies to hire people, it has a neoliberal soul that greatly simplifies dismissal procedures without providing much of a safety net for the newly unemployed. As such, despite Renzi’s defence, many have pointed out that the Jobs Act is not a left-wing policy. It defends the rights of the wealthy, but does little to solve the growing unemployment crisis among young people. In fact, it condemns them only to an eternity of <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/06/10/jobs-act-avvocati-giuslavoristi-piu-facili-i-licenziamenti-e-meno-risarcimenti-per-quelli-illegittimi/3137318/">precarious work</a>.</p>
<h2>Stuck in the centre</h2>
<p>Renzi and his Democratic Party are the symbol of a country stuck in the centre. </p>
<p>While the right, following Berlsuconi’s decline, is undergoing an identity crisis, and the anti-establishment Five Stars Movement is yet to pick a side (happily pillaging votes across the spectrum), the left (and its politics against social inequality) has all but disappeared. It has been mainly cannibalised by a renewed centre that has, rather alarmingly, increasingly come to resemble the infamous Christian Democracy party of old, which ruled Italy for four decades before the 1992 scandal erased it from the electoral map. </p>
<p>During the past two decades, while the communists appeared to be a dying breed, the Italian Christian Democrats, like the mythical Phoenix, have gradually re-emerged from the Bribesville bonfire stronger than ever.</p>
<p>Though the resurgence of the centre is not bad news per se, the prolonged decline of the left deprives the country of a strong, socially conscious political voice, which, especially in time of crisis, is much needed to safeguard the rights of the many against the invasive power of the wealthy few.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
After 1992, the transformation of the Italian left was slow and subtle, but by no means less detrimental to the quality of the country’s democratic system.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/675212016-10-25T19:39:54Z2016-10-25T19:39:54ZLooking back at Italy 1992: internet politics comes of age<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142791/original/image-20161023-15930-1m0435n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">grillo vday</span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the fourth of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
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<p>Television networks played such a major role in shaping public opinion in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">Berlusconi’s Italy</a> that dissent rarely found its way into the limelight. This is not to say that it didn’t exist. But in such a heavily mediated state traditional means of resistance employed by civil society, such as public gatherings, picketing, or even strikes all but <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-sudden-spring-of-civil-society-67520">lost their effectiveness</a> because television networks refused to report them properly.</p>
<p>Consequently, civil society actors were forced to find new ways to connect with each other; to operate and manifest their dissent; to infiltrate the system with the information it censored; and ultimately, if parties kept ignoring them, enter the political fray directly. The Internet provided the ideal space for this new course of action.</p>
<p>Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power, hand in hand with his monopoly of mainstream media, had the unintended consequence of “forgetting” the Internet. Berlusconi and his coalition were exclusively interested in silencing the mainstream media. For them, the voters that counted watched television (most of them) and some (very few) read newspapers. Capturing the Internet was not essential to winning elections. Such rare freedom from Berlusconi’s tight grip on national media subsequently made the Internet the favourite harbour for nonaligned audiences and dissident voices.</p>
<h2>Just a blog</h2>
<p>In 2005, renowned comedian Beppe Grillo exploited the government’s apparent lack of interest in the Internet in his own favour. He used his personal blog (beppegrillo.it) to openly challenge the status quo. The blog’s appeal grew very quickly among the dispersed members of a fragmented and disillusioned civil society that had been pushed to the fringes by the setbacks of the past years. It took only a few months for the blog to establish itself as a new fertile ground through which to defy the government’s monopoly of the media and cultivate viable political alternatives in the process.</p>
<p>Both Grillo’s charisma and following were key to the blog’s swift success. He was already widely popular when he first began blogging. In fact, for many years he was one of the most beloved and most controversial stand-up comedians to ever appear on Italian television. His career began at the end of the 1970s, but it was during the second half of the 1980s that high audience ratings and critical acclaim made him a national TV celebrity. Grillo was not afraid to defy censorship. His satire cut deep into the corrupt practices of prominent Italian politicians and big corporations. Grillo appeared to be uncompromising, and eventually he ended paying for it. Mounting pressure from politicians and advertisers against him forced TV producers to send Grillo into unofficial TV exile. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Grillo on national TV calls the Socialist Party a party of crooks.</span></figcaption>
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<p>By the end of the 1980s, the comedian was no longer welcome on mainstream media. He shrugged, laughed and, apparently without much regret or economic damage, he moved on. He began touring Italy from north to south, consolidating both a very lucrative career of paid shows and a special bond with the public, who for many years could only see him perform live in theatres, sports arenas, and public squares.</p>
<p>When he began blogging in 2005, Grillo’s long-standing popularity with the public as an outspoken, vociferous critic of political and economic corruption made him an instant Internet celebrity. The fact that Casaleggio Associates, one of the most prominent Italian public relations firms, was behind Grillo’s Internet foray was also of no little significance. Grillo, Casaleggio, the Internet and Berlusconi’s weakness for mainstream media were the perfect ingredients to breed new life into Italian civil society and set forth a new radical counter-hegemonic strategy.</p>
<p>Grillo was a fervent critic of the lack of democratic openness in contemporary Italian politics and quickly his blog became the repository of all the information and issues that rarely appeared on mainstream media. The people who read his posts saw in him someone who spoke truth to power. Some of Grillo’s main ideas were the product of the blog’s active discussion. Each post received thousands of comments. The line seemed clear: politicians (and high rank civil servants) should be held accountable for their actions; these actions should be fully transparent; and civil society and the parties should once again be able to talk with each other, openly and constructively.</p>
<h2>Empowering the grassroots</h2>
<p>In 2004, against all odds, Howard Dean, a rather anonymous former Governor of the state of Vermont, became the frontrunner of the US Democratic Party’s primaries for that year’s presidential election, and in turn, an international phenomenon. For a few months during that campaign, Dean and his strategists showed the world that the <a href="https://www.wired.com/2004/01/dean/">combination of Internet media and grassroots</a> could be a game changer in politics. Grillo and his followers mimicked and expanded the strategies adopted by the Dean’s campaign.</p>
<p>Like Dean, Grillo’s community produced a hybrid of offline and online activities. In an age yet to be marked by Facebook and Twitter, the group relied on other tools to organise events and to make their presence known. The offline work and organising framework of the community was (and still is to some extent) strongly facilitated by a direct link with Meetup.com, the online portal that had become the defining tool of Dean’s successful grassroots campaign. The website’s main function is to facilitate social networking by helping people with similar interests find each other through regular face-to-face meetings.</p>
<p>To date, the Meetup.com category “<a href="https://www.meetup.com/topics/beppegrillo/">Friends of Beppe Grillo</a>” is still very active. It has around 160,000 members, with another 60,000 declaring their interest in joining if a group opens in their city. There are over 1,300 groups organising regular meetings in 1,000 cities worldwide. Nowadays, they also use Facebook and Twitter. Back then they relied mainly on Meetup, Skype and YouTube.</p>
<p>The multitude of Meetup groups helped to shape a self-aware and committed grassroots network of activists capable of organising itself beyond geographical boundaries and independently from the blog.</p>
<h2>From Civil to Political society</h2>
<p>From the beginning, Grillo and his followers were very active. Their aim seemed clear: to inject new life in the political parties of the left by rebuilding the communication link between parties and civil society. To achieve their goal, the hybrid community of citizens that followed Grillo started a number of grassroots campaigns, the focus of which ranged from protecting and sustaining scientific research to economic and political issues. By forcing to the fore an open discussion on matters that had been long underrepresented or misrepresented by the partisan mainstream media, the campaigns sought to reinvigorate the public sphere and make the politics of the state more representative of civil society demands.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of cities participating to V-day.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of the many campaigns they initiated in those early years, the 2007 V-Day or Vaffanculo Day protest arguably marked the watershed moment that attracted the most public attention. <em>Vaffanculo</em>, the Italian equivalent of the English “fuck off”, was directed at the politicians in Parliament, who were guilty of ignoring people’s grievances.</p>
<p>Organised on the day commemorating the Italian armistice in World Word II (September 8, 1943), the protest aimed to gather enough signatures in a petition to propose a new law to the Parliament.</p>
<p>The proposed law had three different components: candidates convicted by courts of law should be forbidden from running for public office; political careers should be limited to only two terms; and that the members of Parliament should be directly chosen by the people (and not by political parties, as is routinely done).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">V day bologna.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>V-day was a success both in terms of numbers and media exposure: over two million people gathered in more than 200 cities worldwide, though the final signature tally was only about 350 thousand (apparently the organisation ran out of forms as they had based their calculations on the legal required number to submit a proposal – 50,000 signatures).</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">V-day Signing.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The meetings were set up through the blog and through Meetup.com. In the aftermath of the event, the issue was debated in <a href="http://www2.beppegrillo.it/vaffanculoday/">the pages of the Italian newspapers</a> and on television. It sparked harsh reactions from politicians from both sides of Parliament. Grillo himself was surprised. He hadn’t expected such a big turn-out. “What happened out there” <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/world/europe/12iht-italy.4.7483565.html?_r=0">he commented</a> “was the release of a virus that’s about to attack the political class. But in this case there’s no vaccine”.</p>
<p>V-day was an important step in the gestation process of the civil society that was inspired by Grillo. It showed that the political strength of the movement transcended the limits of cyberspace. The people who gathered in the squares shouting vaffanculo against the political establishment were real, they were citizens with the ability to vote in an election and influence others.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grillo and Prodi.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The protesters’ demands, however, (together with the thousands of signatures that had supported the petition) fell on deaf ears. Beginning with the then Prime Minister Romano Prodi (of the centre-left coalition that had won the 2006 general election), the old political class showed some mild amusement, but largely ignored Grillo and his followers.</p>
<p>The struggle for recognition continued in the following years, through other protests and campaigns. However, the outcome did not change. The Democratic Party (which by the end of 2007 had brought together most of the centre-left parties under one symbol) was not interested. Far from seeing Grillo’s people as part of their core constituency , the Party’s leadership saw them as a nuisance. So Grillo and his nameless movement decided to change tack. If the leaders don’t listen, let’s replace them.</p>
<p>In 2009, after Berlusconi won another election (2008), Grillo decided to run as a candidate for the leadership of the Democratic Party (which many indicated as the main culprit of the Party’s electoral defeat). His candidacy however was scorned and deemed illegal by the Party’s bureaucrats. Grillo was ruled ineligible because he had previously been a member of another party, not to mention because he was too critical towards the Democratic Party.</p>
<p>Neither the Right nor the Left fully understood Grillo’s nameless crowd. They failed to realise that the millions of people following Grillo were not a fluke, and that they were in fact representative of a large section of the electorate that cut across the entire political spectrum. These citizens felt deeply disconnected from the political elites ruling the country. The politicians in Parliament were not their representatives.</p>
<p>Piero Fassino, a former secretary of the Democratic Party of the Left (one of the many iterations of the old Communist party) succinctly summarised the attitude of the country’s official Left towards this new civil society. When asked about Grillo’s intention to stand as a candidate for the Secretary of the Democratic Party, Fassino replied with a dismissive smirk: Grillo’s candidacy is a comical stunt, he is not a serious person. A party is a serious endeavor; it needs committed people. “If he really wants to lead a party, he should leave us in peace and form his own party, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYtLXILmyhI">let’s see how many votes he gets at the election</a>?”</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BYtLXILmyhI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Fassino on Grillo.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fassino’s words were a turning point. They confirmed that dialogue with the Left was impossible. To change the country, the informal civil society organisation grown out of Grillo’s blog must abandon the failed tactic and enter the political fray from the front door, with a bang.</p>
<p>Following a strategy that has since become the norm for most anti-establishment movements <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-movements-could-mark-the-end-of-representative-politics-42369">throughout Europe</a>, (see for instance the Indignados and Podemos in Spain), Grillo and his entourage formed a new political entity, the <a href="http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/">Five Star Movement</a>, to directly compete at elections.</p>
<p>The movement started from the local grassroots level in 2009, concentrating mostly on cities and small constituencies. It won its first but <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/giovanni-navarria/move-aside-now-its-up-to-us-italy%e2%80%99s-political-quake">significant victories</a> in the 2012 round of local elections. But it was in 2013 that the movement really came of age. In the aftermath of that year’s general election, many indicated the Five Star as the virtual winner with over 26% of the national preferences, which translated to 54 Senators and 109 Chamber of Deputies representatives. It was an unprecedented feat for a first timer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Election Results 2013.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The movement’s grassroots work and its use of new communication media played a significant role in its unanticipated success. The new MPs’ experience in Parliament has not been free from controversy. Grillo and other members of Casaleggio Associates have been accused of ruling the movement undemocratically, of dubious selection practices and of political naivety. The movement’s imminent implosion has been predicted many times, but so far, despite a number of important defections, all doomsayers have been proven wrong.</p>
<p>The electoral trend has continued. In 2016, especially, the movement scored another <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">major electoral success</a>. It won 19 out of the 20 Mayoral contests against that very same Democratic Party that had rejected it. Unsurprisingly, recent polls indicate Grillo’s movement as a strong contender to win the next general election in 2018. The results (which include the capital city, Rome) confirm, one more time, that this politicised civil society (inspired by a controversial comedian’s blog) is here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67521/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power, hand in hand with his monopoly of mainstream media, made the Internet the favourite harbour for nonaligned audiences and dissident voices.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/675202016-10-24T03:27:03Z2016-10-24T03:27:03ZLooking back at Italy 1992: the sudden spring of civil society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142779/original/image-20161023-15963-1k7p36g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">cgil manifestazione cgil</span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the third of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Italy is a land of many contradictions. Throughout its characteristic boot-shaped length, the beauty of its innumerable artworks coexists with the ugliness of the many architectural monstrosities. These are often the product of a complex system built on bribes and corruption. The same can be said of its political scene.</p>
<p>The country’s recent history, after all, has witnessed the rise and fall of a number of indigenous monstrosities.</p>
<p>In the first half of the 20th century it was fascism, Benito Mussolini and his two decades of dictatorship. Then, at least since the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portella_della_Ginestra_massacre">Portella della Ginestra massacre</a> in 1947, the Mafia began wreaking havoc throughout the country, both covertly and overtly. Later, the 1970s saw the Red Brigades and their <a href="http://mondediplo.com/1998/09/11negri">politics of terror</a> dominate the front pages of the national newspapers. And, of course, <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power</a> in 1994 represented, arguably, the most comical, contradictory and paradoxical aspect of Italy’s weakness for political anomalies.</p>
<p>However, it seems that the country always manages to produce effective antidotes against its own maladies. This is true from the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ruth-benghiat/post_9362_b_7148902.html">Resistance</a> that fought against fascism, to the anti-Mafia movement that in the city of Palermo, during the 80s and 90s, dared to say no to the racket of organised crime. And from <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">the Magistrates of Clean Hands</a> that shed light on the country’s endemic corruption system to the civil society movements of the early 2000s that publicly rejected Berlusconi’s abuse of power.</p>
<p>Certainly, the strengthening of civil society during the last two decades is probably one of the most unpredicted consequences of Berlusconi’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Civil society</h2>
<p>Civil society is one of those concepts that is not easy to explain. The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio <a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/16437012">argued</a> that one way to define it is through comparison, by coupling it with its antithesis: the state. The former doesn’t exist without the latter. Civil society, therefore, is always represented negatively as “the realm of social relations not regulated by the state” (where the state is defined “narrowly and nearly always polemically as the complex of apparatuses that exercise coercive power within an organised social system”).</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Norberto Bobbio.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This negative definition is, in Bobbio’s view, a legacy of the legalistic language of the Engel/Marxist tradition that used the same term (burgerliche Gesellschaft in German) to indicate both civil and bourgeois society, thus distinguishing the sphere of civil society from the sphere of the political (the state). Civil society is therefore seen as the residual echo, or what remains “once the realm in which state power is exercised has been well defined”.</p>
<p>Bobbio, however, differentiates the term into three different connotations depending on whether the realm of the “non-state” is identified with “the pre-state, the anti-state or the post-state”.</p>
<p>In the first instance, civil society is “the pre-condition of the state”. It is made up of “various forms of association formed by individuals among themselves” to “satisfy” their interests. The state, in this case, serves as a “superstructure” that regulates the “infrastructure” without “hampering” or “preventing” the further development of these organisations.</p>
<p>In the anti-state realm, civil society is understood as the antithesis of or alternative to the state. It becomes the ideal place that breeds and strengthens contestations of power. The state sees it as negative, because civil society’s challenges can force the status quo to collapse.</p>
<p>These two distinctions remind us that civil society is also a critical breeding ground for conflict. The list of possible struggles is long. They can be economic, social, ideological or even religious. Trade unions, community based groups, charities, religious congregations, non-governmental organisations and other advocacy groups are all examples of civil society associations that either work with or against the state. To maintain social harmony, the state and its institutions must always be vigilant and aim to solve possible conflicts originating within the sphere of civil society before they reach breaking point.</p>
<p>However, if the emphasis of the relationship between the two antagonists is on the “post-state”, then civil society is seen as “the dissolution and end of the state”. It embodies, in fact, “the ideal of a society without a state which will spring from the dissolution of political power”. Echoing the neo-Marxist theories of Antonio Gramsci, Bobbio suggests that it is in this stage that “political society” (usually the realm of the state or of political parties) is reabsorbed “into civil society”. This process of reabsorption is not without important consequences. Society is no longer ruled by domination, but by hegemony. Gramsci’s re-interpretation of the concept of hegemony illustrates the inner and often invisible mechanisms through which, in a capitalist state, consent is manufactured and class hierarchies are not only maintained, but also strengthened, all without the use of force.</p>
<p>“Political society” and “civil society” are, in Gramsci’s view, the two constituent and overlapping spheres of the modern state. The first rules by domination (force) while the second exercises power through consent. Hence, Gramsci’s notion of civil society goes beyond the standard understanding that only see it as a cluster of civic organisations whose most important function is to monitor the exercise of power and its excesses. Beyond this view lies a much more complicated picture.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gramsci’s Book Cover.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Gramsci, civil society is also an ideal place, a public sphere where both negotiations of power with the state (in the form of concessions) and more subtly between competing classes (through the media and all other institutions that shape social life, including universities and religious congregations) are articulated in order to legitimise the cultural hegemony of one class over another (for instance, the bourgeoisie over the working class).</p>
<p>This is a form of power that is invisible to the naked eye. It runs through a complex and often concealed web of interconnected spheres of influence that make up society as whole. By ruling via consent rather than strength, the dominant class eliminates the risk of revolution. Thus, Gramsci argued in <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/prison-notebooks/9780231060820">Prison Notebooks</a> that a “counter-hegemonic” strategy is required to provide powerful alternative readings of society that, in turn, can reveal (or replace) the knowledge-based social hegemonic structures that continuously legitimise the status quo.</p>
<p>Gramsci’s re-conceptualisation of civil society makes it not only the sphere where hegemony is exercised, but also the sphere where the power of the state and the dominant class is held accountable and challenged. This role has become more important than ever in Italy in the last two decades.</p>
<h2>A sudden spring</h2>
<p>Traditionally a country with a much weaker inclination towards civic associations (at least when compared to other European countries), Italian civil society found new strength during the Berlusconi era. There are two intertwined reasons that help explain this relatively sudden spring: one has to do with the role of political parties, and the other with that of the state.</p>
<p>One of the main functions of political parties is to be the dialectical link between civil society and the state. They help transform (but also shape and influence) the demands of civil society into the politics of the state. This essential function of parties, however, is not incorruptible. In the case of Italy, the political class’ historical proclivity towards nepotistic and clientelistic practices, coupled with the widespread culture of kickbacks (as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">Bribesville scandal demonstrated</a>), made parties the exclusive delegates of either select interest groups or traditional hierarchies of power.</p>
<p>Indeed, after 1992, the link between political parties and civil society wore past breaking point. Later, especially after the 2001 surprise victory of Berlusconi’s coalition, the situation became worse. Not only did Berlusconi’s monopolistic seizure of the state and its media apparatuses make its government much less responsive to the demands of civil society; but the long series of controversial new policies and constitutional reforms that it proposed were clear threats to the very existence of civil society.</p>
<p>Paradoxically however, as a result of Berlusconi’s anti-democratic clout on Italian politics, along with the weak (and at times almost pathetically condescending) parliamentary opposition of the parties on the Left, civil society was forced to take action. Starting from 2002, civil society movements, more than ever before, became an active presence in Italy’s public sphere.</p>
<p>The catalyst that triggered this resurgence of civic activism was a speech delivered in February of 2002 by Francesco Saverio Borrelli, the General Prosecutor of Milan and one of the leading magistrates of the Clean Hands investigation. In his public address, which officially opened the year’s proceedings for the Court of Justice of Milan, Borelli vigorously criticised the controversial reforms of the judicial system proposed by Berlusconi’s government, which included, among other things, more power for the Ministry of Justice to interfere with court cases, as well as new assessment criteria and disciplinary measures for assessing magistrates’ performances.</p>
<p>The reform was part of a larger attempt to interfere with the Italian justice system. Since taking office, the government had already been very active in proposing and passing a series of laws that directly impacted (delayed or even annulled) many of the ongoing legal proceedings which saw Berlusconi as defendant.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Francesco Saverio Borelli.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Borelli attacked the reforms as lethal attacks on the country’s democratic foundations. He also denounced the Minister of Justice’s controversial decision to withdraw the security details assigned to two judges (who were investigating Berlusconi) as a blatant attempt to pervert the course of justice through the use of tactics that could potentially endanger the lives of the magistrates.</p>
<p>Borelli ended with an impassioned appeal to the people to “<a href="https://youtu.be/SbWoEGaE21A?t=39">resist, resist, resist”</a>. He declared the people’s resistance a collective civic duty, the last bulwark between democracy and the abyss of despotism.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, the magistrate’s words attracted a series of venomous attacks from Berlusconi’s media. They called him and his colleagues a “politicised, corrupt clique” willfully attempting to distort the democratic process by investigating Berlusconi. Like many populists before him, the media tycoon’s retort repeatedly blurred the lines between politics and justice, claiming that he was only accountable to (and therefore could only be judged by) the sovereign Italian people who had elected him, not by a radical faction of “communist” magistrates. Still, Borelli’s appeal injected new vigour into the country’s civil society.</p>
<p>Consequently, in February, several thousand people from all walks of life marched through the city of Florence in defence of the judges. The protest gave birth to a new civil society initiative called the Laboratory for Democracy – Liberty and Justice. This wasn’t an isolated case.</p>
<p>Throughout the year, many more thousands of people joined the <em>Girotondi</em> movement. Taking its name from the Italian equivalent of the children’s game ring-around-the rosie, the movement organised a series of peaceful protests all over Italy. People would join hands in a circle and ring-around courts of justice, the senate, the house of representatives and other important institutional buildings. The idea was very simple, but the symbolism was strong and clear: democracy and its institutions are under attack, and the people must protect them.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Girotondi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The hundreds of thousands who joined the movement were disappointed voters (from both the left and the right) and members of the middle class. Usually highly educated, they felt betrayed by their political representatives who seemed unwilling to defend people’ rights in Parliament and in the country’s Constitution.</p>
<p>The <em>Girotondi</em> movement culminated with roughly a million people gathering in Rome to protest Berlusconi’s controversial reforms that threatened not only the independence of the judiciary but also, among others things, the national education system and workers’ rights.</p>
<h2>We don’t hear, they don’t see</h2>
<p>Yet, despite the flourishing of many new initiatives, civil society seemed powerless. In most cases, the reforms proposed by Berlusconi and his government either succeeded or failed regardless of the protests. In fact, the situation revealed the actual political limits of Italian civil society. It was, on the one hand, overwhelmed by the strength of the existing hegemonic structure; and, on the other hand, its efforts were rendered invisible by the heavily politicised media.</p>
<p>The civil society experience in the early years of the new millennium made even clearer that <em>girotondi</em>, mass mobilisation and strikes, though all fine and noble “tricks of the trade”, were virtually meaningless when the parties and their representatives in parliament were not afraid to ignore them. The power of influencing the ‘political society’ remained firmly into the hands of the parties who seemed to have no fear of losing the next election. Any fear would have been unwarranted anyway, since the system offered no real alternatives. And so, unfortunately, civil society’s bite lacked any teeth.</p>
<p>But even more troubling was the issue of relative invisibility.</p>
<p>Between 2001 and 2005, civil society organisations were instrumental in occupying streets, creating movements and proposing new political platforms. Yet, these attempts never really made it to the fore. Instead, they were ignored or only partially reported by the majority of mainstream media (unless they reached “such mass proportions, as with the European Social Forum’s peace march in Florence in November 2002, that they cannot be ignored” as the historian <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/109-silvio-berlusconi">Paul Ginsborg remarks</a>).</p>
<p>But even when they made the news, information could be twisted or repackaged in line with the government’s strict guidelines. The partial reporting of the 2003 campaign against the Iraq War exemplifies the issue.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-Iraq War Protest in Rome, 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In February of that year, about 3 million people gathered in Rome to protest the war. However, reports of the march were heavily censored. According to <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/the-prime-minister-and-the-press/introduction/?p=913">Roberto Natale</a>, head of the RAI Journalists Union (at the time), RAI’s journalists were instructed not to show the pacifist flag, to downplay the size of the protest and to refer to the protesters not as <em>pacifisti</em> (pacifists) but as the much more negative <em>disobbedienti</em> (disobedient people).</p>
<p>In the early years of the new century, the Italian civil society had finally found the courage to wake up and resist the dangerous direction that their country was being taken. Yet, sadly, thanks’ to the government’s monopoly of media, most Italians weren’t even aware of it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The strengthening of civil society during the last two decades is probably one of the most unpredicted consequences of Berlusconi’s legacy.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667402016-10-09T09:32:42Z2016-10-09T09:32:42ZLooking back at Italy 1992: the rise and fall of King Midas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140964/original/image-20161008-21423-icoxwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the second of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The constitutive elements that built the system of <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">Tangentopoli</a> and paved the way for the subsequent rise of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 did not simply emerge from the corrupted Italian political leadership’s lack of integrity.</p>
<p>Italy 1992 was the product of several different factors, three of which definitely warrant a mention: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the role of the family;</p></li>
<li><p>the practice of clientelism; and </p></li>
<li><p>the politicisation of the media. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>To a large extent, these three factors still play a significant role in contemporary Italy.</p>
<p>The historical role of the family as the centre of individual lives and interests in Italian society was key in the formation of Tangentopoli’s political system. </p>
<p>“Strong and cohesive family units”, as historian Paul Ginsborg <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VEhQd3uzBVsC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">reminds us</a>, have the tendency to look after their own interests, hence developing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… defensive, cynical and even predatory attitudes towards much of the outside world, [and] towards the institutions of the state. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Families often despise public authorities and consider the public sphere simply as a “plundering ground” for their own private interests. Their political choices are not driven by a selfless democratic spirit. They tend to choose what is best for them and for the family over what is best for the many and for the country.</p>
<p>Another important founding element of Italy 1992 was the diffuse political culture of clientelism – that is, as anthropologist Amalia Signorelli puts it, a well-oiled system:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… of interpersonal relations in which private ties of a kinship, ritual kinship, or friendship type are used inside public structures, with the intent of making public resources serve private ends.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Clientelism was at the roots of the development of the Sicilian mafia in the 19th century. And, since the birth of the Republic in 1948, the political class made the mafia’s peculiar practice of clientelism and corruption the rule of the politics of everyday life of the country, rather than the exception.</p>
<p>By 1992, Italy’s rule of law and political ethics had long been bent to accommodate the will of many patrons and the needs of many clients.</p>
<p>Emulating the modus operandi of mafia dons, Italian politicians and civil servants often acted “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VEhQd3uzBVsC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">as a sort of gatekeeper</a>’ of the public good. They were instrumental in allocating favours (such as jobs, contracts, pensions) to "clients, friends and relations in return for fidelity, both personal and electoral”, or money.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mayor Gianni Alemanno.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Contemporary Italian politics is still fraught with widespread practices of clientelism and nepotism. In 2015, to name just one of the many recent scandals, an investigation of the district attorney of Rome uncovered a series of irregularities in the employment procedures used by the mayor, Gianni Alemanno, while he was in office between 2008 and 2013. </p>
<p>Soon after being sworn in, Alemanno, a former minister of agriculture in Berlusconi’s cabinet and a proud fascist, with the city’s finances on the cusp of bankruptcy, decided to appoint in various positions, and by direct nomination, a staggering army of <a href="http://www.ilmessaggero.it/roma/cronaca/atac_parenti_amici_ex_cubista_854_assunzioni_chiamata_diretta-180094.html">850 people</a> – most of which were family members of the mayor or of his allies.</p>
<h2>The role of media</h2>
<p>The presence of a heavily politicised public-service media and the progressive deregulation of the system in the 1980s were also indispensable cogs of the mechanism that sustained both the pre-1992 system and the post-Bribesville Italy.</p>
<p>Berlusconi’s rise to power was firmly anchored in his strategic use of his TV networks, newspapers, and publishing houses in the pursuit of his own personal agenda. His exploitation of the country’s public-service broadcaster, Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), was by no means less significant.</p>
<p>During his tenure, Berlusconi virtually controlled all of Italy’s TV networks. He owned Mediaset (the largest commercial broadcaster in the country), and, serving as prime minister, effectively wielded decisional power over RAI.</p>
<p>Founded (in its current incarnation) in 1954, RAI has developed into a complex state-owned media company comprised of three terrestrial nationwide networks, along with radio stations and satellite and internet TV. Its main revenue is based on a national TV license fee and is governed by a board of administrators elected by the parliament and, after the <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/12/22/news/rai_la_riforma_e_legge_cosa_cambia_e_come-130002293/">2015 reform</a>, by the government.</p>
<p>Historically, RAI’s editorial policy has always reflected the power hierarchies of the political sphere. During the 50s and 60s, it was controlled by the ruling Christian Democracy Party. But since the late 70s it has been subject to the so-called system of lottizzazione: the political partition of the public broadcasting system between the major political parties.</p>
<p>The term lottizzazione was originally used to indicate the “parcelling out” of land, but in contemporary Italy it has become:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… <a href="https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjG9dbmvsTPAhWCopQKHZl3B74QFghKMAc&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.opensocietyfoundations.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fvoltwo_20051011_0.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHv1wSz5ctHx">shorthand</a> for the way that hiring for executive posts, journalists and producers is determined by the political parties, especially the ruling coalition.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Before the political earthquake caused by the corruption scandal of Tangentopoli, RAI 1 was usually the media bedrock of the Christian Democrats. After 1994 Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia kept firm control of the network for many years, even when Berlusconi was technically in opposition in parliament.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">RAI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">RAI</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>RAI 2, on the other hand, has always been the official mouthpiece for the “secular parties”. During the Bettino Craxi era, in the 80s, it was typically the network of the Socialist Party, the Republicans, and the Liberals. During the Berlusconi era it was home to right-wing parties such as National Alliance and the Northern League.</p>
<p>RAI 3, then, has always been the defined garrison of the government’s opposition. For many decades it was represented by the Communist Party (historically the second party in the country for number of votes). Nowadays, regardless of which coalition is governing, RAI 3 is allocated to the Democratic Party and other smaller parties that emerged from the post-1989 transformation of the old Communist Party.</p>
<p>With Berlusconi in power the practice of lottizzazione continued, albeit in a less-democratic fashion. Now the balance often tilted towards Berlusconi’s coalition, while the opposition found itself with less airtime and budget.</p>
<p>So not only did Berlusconi essentially have exclusive access to RAI, he could count also on the support of Mediaset.</p>
<p>During the early 2000s, Mediaset and RAI together accounted, on average, for more than 87% of the daily share of the entire Italian TV audience. This virtual monopoly, coupled with the silencing of the centre-left press via means of political and economic pressure, effectively allowed Berlusconi to establish a firm <a href="http://www.ibs.it/code/9788817002462/travaglio-marco/regime.html">media regime</a> in Italy.</p>
<h2>A shiny and smiley regime</h2>
<p>The regime was instrumental in distributing wealth, granting favours, and helping secure the career of many working in the media sector (such as journalists, directors, editors, actors and publishers). Those who supported Berlusconi and his allies were rewarded with a steady presence in his TV empire (RAI networks included).</p>
<p>On the other hand, the regime was merciless with those daring to oppose it openly. Yet it didn’t have much in common with the infamous regimes of the past. It wasn’t Stalinist; nor was it fascist. The term regime, in fact, should not deceive the reader. </p>
<p>Unlike Mussolini’s, Berlusconi’s new type of regime employed a gentler touch. It wasn’t shrouded in darkness. It prided itself on being shiny and smiley, like its leader. It didn’t even need massive public mobilisation.</p>
<p>To impose his will, the entrepreneur and his cronies did not need force – certainly not of the kind that requires the use of physical violence. Iron clubs or terror were never part of its repertoire. Foes weren’t sent into exile on prison islands, as fascism did regularly.</p>
<p>Unlike Stalin’s, Berlusconi’s regime did not need to carry out pogroms. Punishment was sometimes used, but, ironically for such a staunch anti-communist like Berlusconi, the regime’s style was somewhat Maoist. It didn’t need to be too direct. </p>
<p>Rather than carrying out extended purges of all dissenting voices, it preferred to “educate the many” by shaming publicly only a handful of opponents. It was more productive to “inform” potential critics that toeing the party line was actually in their careers’ best interest.</p>
<p>The regime appeared to follow mainly one simple rule, as perfectly put by talkshow host <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/109-silvio-berlusconi">Maurizio Costanzo</a>, that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Power does not belong to those who talk on television. It belongs to those who permit you to talk on television.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most notorious application of this rule involved two well-known journalists, the late Enzo Biagi and Michele Santoro, and a stand-up comedian, Daniele Luttazzi. </p>
<p>Not only did their shows attract millions of viewers every week, but also lucrative sponsors (who preferred spending their advertisement budget with RAI than with Mediaset). And yet, despite being an indisputable source of revenue and high ratings, in 2002 the three were unceremoniously sacked by RAI’s management, only weeks after Berlusconi had publicly labelled them “criminals” for using their state-funded shows to criticise openly the government’s policies and his image. </p>
<p>Their dismissal was retribution for covering in their shows the shady roots of Berlusconi’s business empire and fact-checking his many preposterous claims on the eve of the 2001 general election (which Berlusconi won nevertheless).</p>
<p>Throughout this era, Berlusconi actively abused his position to muzzle any attempt at in-depth analysis of a series of judicial investigations that threatened to uncover inconvenient truths about him, his businesses and his questionable lifestyle.</p>
<p>But his grip on media (especially on RAI) was not only useful in silencing dissenting voices, it was also chiefly instrumental in manufacturing consent by manipulating information broadcast by mainstream media. </p>
<p>It wasn’t just about censorship. Stories were not entirely swept away under the rug. Usually, they appeared on primetime news, but repackaged to make Berlusconi look good, or blame someone else.</p>
<p>The way in which news programs dealt with the state of Italy’s economy during Berlusconi’s governments is a perfect example of this particular method of tailored broadcast. In 2004, news programs would still attribute the country’s growing economy crisis to the economic repercussions of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001.</p>
<p>A similar approach was used when in the summer of 2009, a professional female escort, Patrizia D’Addario, revealed that Berlusconi had paid her about 2000 euros to spend the night with him at Palazzo Grazioli, the prime minister’s official institutional residence in Rome.</p>
<p>The story was likely to trigger a government crisis. Berlusconi, then a married man, had built his political victories by also capitalising on the support of the Roman Catholic Church. His political platform openly defended the unity of the family and the ban on immoral sexual behaviour.</p>
<p>Supported by strong credible evidences (pictures, videos, and recording of the voice of Berlusconi taken with a mobile phone inside Palazzo Grazioli) the vast majority of the Italian newspapers such as La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera, not controlled by Berlusconi or linked to his allies, gave intense coverage to D’Addario’s revelations.</p>
<p>Similarly, most of the international press (such as The New York Times, The Times of London, and the Spanish El Pais) dedicated ample space to the story. Yet the news went almost unnoticed on the Italian national TV networks. And, when reported, the handling of the story was intentionally deceptive.</p>
<p>RAI 1’s evening news program, for instance, allocated very little time to the story. Instead of opening its broadcast with it, the news editors decided to slot it between other items. The reporter downplayed the importance of D’Addario’s testimony, while hinting the whole story was a fabrication of Berlusconi’s adversaries.</p>
<p>Without giving proper context to the story, the piece began directly from Berlusconi’s defence:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>One more time newspapers are filled with rubbish and lies about me. I will not be influenced by these attacks. And I will continue working, as always, for the good of the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The journalist then continued by parroting Berlusconi’s own words and by using a very dismissive tone. He described the investigation as “one of the many … about the health system”; it was simply about “things of ordinary Italian life”. He then briefly mentioned parties in Berlusconi’s villa, but never acknowledged that D’Addario’s allegations directly involved Berlusconi in the story.</p>
<p>He also suggested obliquely that the instigator of the whole affair might have been Massimo D’Alema, one of the historical leaders of the left, who had hinted to the media some days earlier about a possible political earthquake approaching.</p>
<p>Two members of the opposition were quoted, probably to make the report sound more pluralistic. And then, to reinforce the original point, the journalist concluded with two exponents of Berlusconi’s coalition, who barked out the party line one more time.</p>
<p>In such a regime, information is often twisted by those in power with a candid reassuring smile before an audience of millions, while journalists do not even attempt to mediate or confront the truthfulness of the information given.</p>
<p>For members of Berlusconi’s coalition it was normal to exploit RAI news programs (but also others) to falsely accuse the centre-left coalition of all that was wrong with the country – for instance of causing a 60-billion euros deficit in the national budget, as then-finance minister Giulio Tremonti did.</p>
<p>The system was also instrumental for dictating the government’s agenda to the electors/audience. What types of news were important; what needed packaging; what item came first; what came last – all was dictated from above.</p>
<p>For the 2001 general election, immigration and criminality, for instance, were two of the key issues of Berlusconi’s platform. In the months preceding the election, Tg5, the primetime evening news program of Mediaset’s Channel 5, each night compiled a “war bulletin”. </p>
<p>The program was filled with numerous images of illegal immigrants landing on the coast of Sicily, or with disturbing reports about the rising rate of hideous crimes against middle-class families.</p>
<p>The so-called “crime emergency” was a fixed feature of the evening news before the general election, but it suddenly (almost entirely) disappeared as soon as Berlusconi took office.</p>
<p>The build-up to the 2008 general election followed a similar path. </p>
<p>Even though Berlusconi was officially the leader of the opposition, therefore supposedly with less clout over RAI’s management, the incumbent government of Prime Minister Romano Prodi was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f321fd2-6232-11dd-9ff9-000077b07658">constantly damaged</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… by negative reporting that played up savage crimes allegedly committed by foreigners.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, contrary to what the Italian media reported daily:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Italy’s crime rates [were] below the European average. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet any attempt by Prodi and his cabinet to reassure Italians that crime rates were declining went unheard.</p>
<p>The regime also worked hard toward demonising anyone who dared disputing the truthfulness of Berlusconi’s “facts”. No-one was spared. Not just political opponents, but many of those individuals and institutions that in a democratic environment exist to guarantee justice and fairness fell victim of the system. </p>
<p>Day after day, in Berlusconi’s Italy, the term magistrate became synonym of “deplorable individuals” whose actions were not inspired by the letter of the law, but by their ideological creed. </p>
<p>Judges were portrayed as the “<a href="https://youtu.be/dBDd-O3w1Kk?t=57">metastatic cancer of a democratic society</a>”; the evil demons guilty of attempting to overturn the will of the people by dragging their democratically elected leader, Berlusconi, endlessly and pointlessly from court to court.</p>
<p>The judges’ legal rights and duties, let alone the considerable array of evidence to put Berlusconi on trial, played no part in the story.</p>
<p>During those years, Berlusconi’s grip on power was so strong that Italy was routinely considered the least-democratic country in Europe. In 2006, Freedom House ranked it 80th in the world, immediately after Tonga and Botswana and just before Antigua and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>Commenting on Berlusconi’s media monopoly, the late Indro Montanelli – one of the most respected Italian journalists of the 20th century – remarked bitterly:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If Mussolini could have counted on television networks, he would be still around.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Ciao, ciao Silvio</h2>
<p>That the very same politician who would later claim Clean Hands was a coup orchestrated by communist judges and the finest embodiment of the political archetype the magistrates in Milan had fought against for many years went on to win three of the six general elections held between 1994 and 2013 was indeed an ironic turn of history.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Silvio Berlusconi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Forza Italia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Portrayed by his own media as a God-send, a saviour against the satanic spectre of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrop7qhLKj0">kid-eating Communists</a>”, Italy’s very own King Midas, capable of turning everything he touched in gold (even a failing football club like AC Milan), but relentlessly attacked by others as <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/1939979">being unfit to lead</a>, for years Berlusconi was the expression of a unique – at least for democratic countries – political anomaly.</p>
<p>The 1994 election, but moreso the 2001 and 2008 victories, concentrated in his hands the power of politics, wealth, and media.</p>
<p>It was a quasi-monopolistic power that he exploited, almost exclusively, to his own advantage. During the years, Berlusconi’s faithful lackeys in parliament passed numerous laws (for instance, for reducing the statute of limitations on the crimes he was tried for, or for the decriminalisation of fraudulent bankruptcy) and used many other legal subterfuges to save him from prison and his empire from financial collapse.</p>
<p>His monopoly of the media, his firm grip on the parliament, and his wealth kept Berlusconi in power longer than anyone else before him. He still holds the <a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governi_italiani_per_durata">record</a> for the longest-serving prime minister since Benito Mussolini. </p>
<p>Yet he couldn’t hold onto power indefinitely. In 2011, amid a worrying growing debt crisis, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/berlusconi-poised-to-step-down/2011/11/12/gIQAMJuZFN_story.html">he was forced to resign</a> as prime mminister.</p>
<p>Despite escaping the initial shockwaves of the global economic crisis in 2008, Berlusconi’s leadership had failed to steady Italy’s economy – though the same could not be said about the status of his finally <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/research/do-firms-lobby-politicians-by-patronizing">healthy</a> business empire.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">No Berlusconi Day.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He left behind a country whose disease was “chronic rather than acute”, as shown by the <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/18780831">decade-long insignificant growth of its GDP</a>, barely above 0.25% a year. Only Zimbabwe and Haiti did worse than Italy in the decade to 2010.</p>
<p>Berlusconi’s policies, his monopolistic abuse of the media and his attitude towards the institutions of the state had changed the country radically, but certainly not for the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
This article is part of the Democracy Futures series, a joint global initiative with the Sydney Democracy Network. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies…Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667392016-10-08T04:09:22Z2016-10-08T04:09:22ZLooking back at 1992: Italy’s horrible year<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140962/original/image-20161008-21439-160ikpz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tangentopoli</span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the first of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Last week, the political drama <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_(TV_series)"><em>Italy 1992</em></a> premiered on Australian TV. All ten episodes of the first season are available online on <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/ondemand/program/italy-1992">SBS on Demand</a>. </p>
<p>Following the stories of six fictional characters, the Italian series dramatises the events surrounding the country-wide corruption scandal known as Tangentopoli (Bribesville).</p>
<p>Italy 1992 is a well-crafted, mostly well-acted and rather entertaining drama that manages to capture, quite successfully, the bewilderment of a country on the verge of nervous breakdown.</p>
<p>Beyond its high cinematic values, Italy 1992 principally serves as an eerie and timely reminder of the abysmal lows politicians can reach, as well as the long-term damage populist propaganda, people’s anger, and a compliant media (among other factors) can wreak on a country’s fragile democratic system. </p>
<p>Certainly, the events narrated in the series offer us key insights for understanding contemporary Italy. More than two decades later, is the country really in better shape?</p>
<h2>Annus horribilis</h2>
<p>1992 was one of the worst years in Italy’s recent history. </p>
<p>The country’s spirit hit its nadir between May and July, when the two leading magistrates in the fight against the mafia and their entire security detail <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sicilian-tragedy-world-problem-first-falcone-now-borsellino-two-leading-judges-have-been-murdered-1534567.html">were killed</a> by two separate bombs in Sicily. </p>
<p>The bomb that killed Giovanni Falcone exploded on May 23 near the small town of Capaci, on the highway connecting the cities of Palermo and Trapani. Two months later, on July 19, Falcone’s friend and closest collaborator <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sicilian-tragedy-world-problem-first-falcone-now-borsellino-two-leading-judges-have-been-murdered-1534567.html">Paolo Borsellino</a> died when a car packed with 90kg of <a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semtex">Semtex-H</a> exploded in Via d‘Amelio, in the centre of Palermo. </p>
<p>Under their leadership, the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antimafia_Pool">Anti-Mafia Pool</a> had achieved what many believed impossible: not only bringing hundreds of mafia affiliates to stand trial, but also convicting them to lengthy jail sentences.</p>
<p>While these weren’t the first instances of the Sicilian mob murdering a representative of the state, the scale of the killings of the summer of ‘92 had never been seen before. </p>
<p>Millions were in shock as they saw the images coming from Sicily on TV. There was something deeply unsettling about them; they didn’t fit the picture of a country at peace. Instead, the devastation caused by the two earth-shattering blasts reminded many of a warzone.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=819&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=819&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=819&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bombs in Capaci and Palermo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino were unequivocal acts of ruthless defiance of state authority. The message <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian_Mafia">Cosa Nostra</a> had sent out was loud and clear: you are not untouchable. </p>
<p>Amid growing criticism, the state reacted by deploying an initial contingent of 9000 soldiers to Sicily. This was the start of a massive operation of homeland security that would last for six years and eventually involve more than <a href="http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA414124">150,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers</a>. </p>
<p>Democracy in Italy, many thought, was at risk. </p>
<p>Others, however, believed the greatest threat to Italy’s political status quo did not come from the mafia’s reaction to the state, but rather from the work of another group of judges in the country’s north. </p>
<p>That year, Mani Pulite (Clean hands), an investigation of the District Attorney of Milan, brought to light a deeply corrupt nationwide system that had, for decades, made bribery and kickbacks the tacit code binding together politics and businesses. It showed politicians’ thirst for money and power had no moral compass. The welfare of the people played no part in their decisions. </p>
<p>There were no rules that could not be bent; no controllers that could not be bought. Slip an envelope full of cash into the right person’s pocket (especially if that pocket is a secret Swiss bank account) and you could achieve the impossible: build block of flats on lands subject to landslides; sell contaminated blood supplies to hospitals; pay a judge to turn a blind eye.</p>
<p>The scandal, known as Tangentopoli (Bribesville), caused an earthquake of unprecedented force. It was so powerful and – to a certain degree – so unexpected that the foundations of Italy’s political establishment were (mostly) reduced to rubble, having to be rebuilt from scratch.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the scandal was instrumental in reshaping the electoral map from north to south. Parties that, for half a century, had played a very dominant role in Italian politics were wiped out. </p>
<p>The Christian Democracy Party and the Socialist Party were the most-notable casualties. The two had come, respectively, first and third in the general election of April 1992 (in between them only the Communists). But two years later, when a new general election was called, the Christian Democrats disappeared and the Socialists became irrelevant.</p>
<p>For many, 1992 marked the end of an era. It was a watershed moment. The somewhat glorious past – that had seen the country renounce fascism, abdicate monarchy, embrace democracy and quickly turn the post-second-world-war wreckage into a social and economic miracle (becoming one of the largest economies of the world in the process) – was over.</p>
<p>The Milan magistrates had opened Italian politics’ very own Pandora’s box – only to find out that it contained worse evils than most had imagined, and no apparent trace of hope.</p>
<h2>The Second Republic</h2>
<p>One main character in Italy 1992’s fictionalised story is Leonardo Notte, a slick and cynical ad man who believes his job’s principal duty is understanding how people think and act. </p>
<p>In the third episode of the series, Notte (played by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stefano_Accorsi">Stefano Accorsi</a>) describes the widespread feeling that runs through Italy during that year as an “irresistible wave of schadenfreude”.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stefano Accorsi as Leonardo Notte.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">SBS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The German word perfectly captures the pleasure the common people derived from seeing corrupt politicians and businessmen publicly shamed. Italians wanted revenge against a crooked political class that had let them down. </p>
<p>The daily scandals unearthed by the Milan prosecutors, the violent shockwave of the bomb blasts in Sicily, and the plunging economy enraged the electorate and cleared the way for a new era – the so-called Second Republic – to begin.</p>
<p>At the 1994 general election, two years after the magistrates began their investigation, Italy found itself at a political crossroad. People had the option to either hand power over (for the first time) to the Communist Party, the only major political force that had survived Bribesville’s earthquake unscathed; or choose someone (supposedly) new. </p>
<p>The result revealed history’s quirky sense of humour. The Communists and their ideology, whose disastrous failures were epitomised by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union, lost. </p>
<p>The winner was a newcomer, at least in the political arena: Silvio Berlusconi, the media-tycoon-turned-politician, who has since become more renowned for his many trials (for fraud, false accounting and bribery), his unrepentant philandering and his Bunga Bunga sex parties than for the enlightened value and financial acumen of his neoliberal policies.</p>
<p>For years Berlusconi had been the protégé of Bettino Craxi, the two-time prime minister and the leader of the Socialist Party. But the tycoon’s luck ran out when Craxi became the biggest fish caught in the net of Clean Hands. </p>
<p>Unquestionably, one the most-memorable moments of that period involved Craxi. On April 30, 1993, the day after the House of Representatives had vetoed his indictment, Craxi was confronted while leaving the Hotel Raphael in Rome by a mob of angry people waiving 1000-lire bills and tossing coins at him while mockingly chanting: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Bettino, why don’t you take these ones too?</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Bettino Craxi Leaving Hotel Raphael.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The Socialists’ leader’s rapid fall from grace (he eventually fled to Tunisia to avoid jail, where he remained under the protection of his friend Ben Ali’s government until his death in 2000) forced Berlusconi to take action. </p>
<p>After an unsuccessful search for a suitable candidate to support at the 1994 election, and fearing the worst (the Communists in power while the judges start digging into his dealings with Craxi), Berlusconi had no other choice but to enter the political arena himself. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Berlusconi announces his candidacy for the 1994 election.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Winning the election was his only hope of avoiding jail and protecting his collapsing economic empire. Once elected, Berlusconi brought to government a coalition comprising his own personal party Forza Italia (founded with the spoils of the Christian Democracy Party and the Socialists’ diaspora) and two right-wing parties, the xenophobe Northern League and the fascist National Alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
1992 was one of the worst years in Italy’s recent history: mafia’s bombs, corruption scandals and the rise of Berlusconi to power.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.