tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/jack-straw-8004/articlesJack Straw – The Conversation2018-06-29T11:24:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/991162018-06-29T11:24:49Z2018-06-29T11:24:49ZThe stain of Britain’s part in torture and rendition will never wash away<p>The <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-reports/special-reports">long-awaited reports</a> of the investigation by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) into Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition between 2001 and 2010 have finally been published. We ourselves have been researching the UK’s part in rendition and torture for years and gave evidence to the committee – and these reports are much harder hitting than we had expected.</p>
<p>Chaired by MP and QC Dominic Grieve, the ISC’s investigation has revealed that the extent of UK involvement in prisoner abuse was even greater than <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066116653455">we had previously documented</a>. The reports also highlight serious weaknesses relating to the training of security personnel, and governance and oversight of their conduct. Many of the ISC’s conclusions corroborate our own research findings, and we were pleased to see a number of issues we raised when we gave evidence to the ISC in January 2017.</p>
<p>As we have argued for years now – and as we told the ISC – British complicity in torture was <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066116653455">deep, wide and sustained</a>. Government ministers have always denied this – the former foreign secretary, Jack Straw <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/uc768-i/uc76802.htm">famously stated</a> that only conspiracy theorists should believe the UK was involved in rendition. That position is now more untenable than ever. It is clear from the ISC reports that UK officials knew about the US programme immediately after 9/11 and worked to support their allies in ways which enabled continued “plausible deniability”.</p>
<p>The report’s findings are unambiguous. In more than 70 cases – far more than have ever been identified before now – British intelligence knew of, suggested, planned, agreed to, or paid for others to conduct rendition operations. Some of the details are excruciating – one MI6 officer was present while a prisoner was transferred in a coffin-sized box. In literally hundreds of further cases, UK officials were aware of detainees being mistreated by their allies, continued to supply questions to be asked of detainees under torture, and received intelligence from those who had been tortured.</p>
<p>While names and locations have been redacted in these reports, our own <a href="https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/">years of investigation</a> enable us to fit new facts into our broader picture of post-9/11 torture. It is likely that we will be able to identify some of the important detail left out by the reports. In many cases, these omissions resulted from the government refusing to allow the ISC to interview intelligence officers with knowledge of British involvement. In the absence of a full judge-led inquiry, our fact-finding work remains crucial, and we are committed to doing what we can.</p>
<p>We also know enough from the victims themselves, in their own words, about the human toll of this form of state violence. If you are being beaten up, electrocuted, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rectal-feeding-is-rape-but-dont-expect-the-cia-to-admit-it-35437">raped</a>, or subjected to mock execution, you tend to say whatever it takes to make it stop. Small wonder that intelligence received under torture is notoriously of <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-claims-torture-works-but-what-does-the-science-say-70236">limited value</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that the UK attempted to keep its hands clean by involvement from afar makes the situation no better. When the reports were released, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-written-statement-isc-detainee-reports">Theresa May</a> stated that “intelligence and Armed Forces personnel are now much better placed” to deal with detainee-related work and that the necessary lessons have been learned. But in our evidence to the ISC, we also raised a number of concerns about the adequacy of today’s training and the strength of current guidance, which ostensibly prevents a return to the early years of the “War on Terror” – and we are not convinced.</p>
<h2>No stone unturned</h2>
<p>In our testimony to the ISC, we pointed to flaws in the so-called “<a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62632/Consolidated_Guidance_November_2011.pdf">Consolidated Guidance</a>” issued to all security agencies and the military from 2010. The ISC has taken this seriously. In their conclusions, it concludes that the guidance is by no means “consolidated”, and that “it is misleading to present it as such”. The ISC points to “dangerous ambiguities in the guidance”, noting that “individual ministers have entirely different understandings of what they can and cannot, and would and would not, authorise”.</p>
<p>We encouraged the ISC to examine how frequently agency or Ministry of Defence personnel had followed the guidance, and to establish how frequently concerns about prisoner abuse were reported up the chain of command. This the ISC has done. Frustratingly, corresponding data is redacted from the final release. Nevertheless, the ISC’s conclusions indicate that record keeping on these matters is weak, and that there are considerable risks that cases which should be reported upwards are not. </p>
<p>This is exacerbated by the fact that “there is no clear policy and not even agreement as to who has responsibility for preventing UK complicity in unlawful rendition”. And as the ISC reports, the government “has failed to introduce any policy or process that will ensure that allies will not use UK territory for rendition purposes”.</p>
<p>We have long argued that the Consolidated Guidance does little more than provide a rhetorical, legal and policy scaffold, enabling the UK government to demonstrate a minimum procedural adherence to human rights commitments. As the ISC quite rightly concludes, there is an urgent need for review and fundamental reform of the Consolidated Guidance. The government must also establish much more robust oversight, training and accountability mechanisms.</p>
<p>We would also argue, in the strongest possible terms, that only a judge-led inquiry with full powers of subpoena will enable the public to know what was done in their name. Without this it will be even harder to achieve full accountability and to identify current forms of UK complicity in human rights abuses. With the anti-torture norm being eroded at the very top of the US government once again, these risks are very present and real.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Raphael received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for his work on secret detention, rendition and torture in the 'war on terror'</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Blakeley received funding from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council for her work on the CIA's rendition, detention and interrogation programme. She gave evidence to the UK Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee in closed session in January 2017, alongside Dr Sam Raphael. </span></em></p>Twin reports from a UK Parliament committee go further than ever in condemning Britain’s complicity in the worst of the War on Terror.Sam Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of WestminsterRuth Blakeley, Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/622522016-07-19T08:40:52Z2016-07-19T08:40:52ZHow Tony Blair, Jack Straw and Lord Goldsmith come out of the Chilcot Report<p>Seven years after the Iraq Inquiry (known as the Chilcot Inquiry) began its work, its <a href="https://theconversation.com/chilcot-roundup-the-fallout-from-the-uks-iraq-inquiry-62251">report</a> finally provided a critical but balanced analysis. At 2.6m words, it at last provides as thorough a document as we’ve had of how Britain’s leading politicians and officials behaved in the lead up to the Iraq War. </p>
<p>While the report criticises numerous individuals for their role in the military venture, in light of an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-parliaments-36763594">extended parliamentary debate</a> on the report’s findings, it’s worth focusing on three of the key British players who come within Chilcot’s cross-hairs: an overambitious prime minister, a loyal but reticent foreign secretary, and an attorney general upon whose legal advice the invasion hinged.</p>
<h2>The prime minister: Tony Blair</h2>
<p>Though the report does not conclude that Blair deliberately lied about the basis for war, it makes a number of damaging criticisms of him across a range of areas. In Iraq War-era parlance, there is no “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01/10/wbr.smoking.gun/">smoking gun</a>” – but there are many spent cartridges. </p>
<p>The three key areas are <a href="https://theconversation.com/chilcot-scolds-britains-intelligence-community-for-its-role-in-the-iraq-war-62078">intelligence</a>, the cabinet, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/there-was-a-post-invasion-plan-for-iraq-but-the-west-has-learned-nothing-from-its-failure-62004">post-conflict planning</a>.</p>
<p>The notion that Iraq posed a threat to Western interests was a crucial aspect of the case for war, but Chilcot suggests that the threat was neither imminent nor based on indisputable evidence. The animating theme of his account is groupthink; Blair (and others around him) became convinced that Iraq had WMDs, and intelligence that was qualified, contingent or limited somehow ended up being considered as concrete. </p>
<p>This attitude is epitomised by Blair’s presentation of the later-discredited <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/html/full_dossier.stm">September 2002 dossier</a> on Iraqi WMDs. The inquiry found that Blair’s foreword to the dossier, which claimed the intelligence established “beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons and was still pursuing the development of nuclear weapons, was unsustainable – as was his accompanying parliamentary statement that Iraq’s programme was active, detailed and growing.</p>
<p>Blair’s personal belief about the strength of intelligence regarding Iraqi WMDs is stressed by various key aides. Chilcot seems to imply that a form of groupthink was at play here. Yet the consequences were the same, even if they resulted from Blair’s self-deception rather than a deliberate deception of the public.</p>
<p>Chilcot also reveals failures of cabinet government that inevitably fall under Blair’s remit. The evidence gathered by the inquiry does suggest that Blair’s particular premiership style sidelined cabinet in the lead up to war. </p>
<p>In his evidence the then cabinet secretary, Lord Turnbull, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12282360">suggested</a> that substantive discussion and decision-making in cabinet was limited, and that ministers ended up sharing responsibility for a policy in which they had little meaningful input. The report suggested that a more informed cabinet debate could have meant policy was tested and potential problems identified.</p>
<p>Blair comes in for the most caustic criticism on the war’s “wholly inadequate” post-conflict planning. The report highlighted the prime minister’s startling optimism and complacency about the post-conflict phase, even after being warned of foreseeable risks such as internal Iraqi conflict and “rudimentary” US planning. </p>
<p>The report listed a catalogue of specific failures: to establish clear ministerial oversight of post-conflict planning, to consider alternative or worst case scenarios, and to press the US for firm assurances about this phase.</p>
<h2>The foreign secretary: Jack Straw</h2>
<p>While much of the report’s attention is naturally focused on Blair, his then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, also comes in for considerable criticism. </p>
<p>While he’s acknowledged to have had serious reservations about the conflict, which he feared could be “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-iraq-war-inquiry-jack-straw">a long and unsuccessful war</a>”, Chilcot implicated Straw in several crucial decisions. </p>
<p>One particularly illustrative episode concerns the construction of the message that it was Iraq, and not North Korea, Libya or Iran, that posed the most urgent threat to the West. When a draft paper outlining these countries of concern was circulated in March 2002, Straw <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/chilcot-report-intelligence-was-exaggerated-and-omitted-to-justify-iraq-war-inquiry-finds-a7122481.html">commented</a> that the paper needed to “show why there is an exceptional threat from Iraq”, saying that it didn’t quite do that yet. </p>
<p>The report found that he followed this by deciding that it was necessary that the UK issued a paper on Iraq before those other countries, and only when he was advised that the evidence would not sufficiently affect public opinion did he pull back.</p>
<p>The Straw this episode describes is very different to the deliberative and thoughtful politician who gave evidence to the inquiry in public. Instead, the report portrays a determined foreign secretary who rejected legal advice from senior Foreign Office lawyers that the war would be illegal without a further UN Security Council resolution.</p>
<p>Perhaps even more damning are Chilcot’s findings on Straw’s role in the key diplomatic period of early 2003, and in particular on the failure to influence post-conflict planning. </p>
<p>Going into the conflict, the UK had envisaged the UN taking a central role in running post-conflict Iraq, but that plan evidently met with major opposition from the US. The report directly criticises Straw for his failure to consider different options available to the UK should the plan for a UN-led post-conflict Iraq fall through. </p>
<p>The report also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-iraq-war-inquiry-jack-straw">specifically cited</a> the missed opportunity of “making UK participation in military action conditional on a satisfactory post-conflict plan”. This is particularly damning in a report that includes the wider statement that “most of what went wrong stemmed from a lack of preparation”.</p>
<h2>The attorney general: Lord Goldsmith</h2>
<p>Though the report doesn’t single out Lord Goldsmith for major criticism, it still alludes to selected shortcomings. These are particularly important since Goldsmith was a crucial player, and the deployment of UK troops depended upon his legal approval. </p>
<p>The evidence gathered by the inquiry is replete with fascinating detail about the processes surrounding the creation of Goldsmith’s advice, and offers ample basis for the criticism that the legal process in the run up to war was “far from satisfactory”. </p>
<p>Overall, Goldsmith’s Iraq-era conduct reads nearly like a tale of two different lawyers. Throughout 2002 and until the end of January 2003, it seemed he was a fearless lawyer speaking truth to power. He repeatedly advised Blair that the use of force in Iraq (as things stood) would not be internationally lawful. Despite being repeatedly discouraged by key insiders (including Straw and Number 10 aide Jonathan Powell) from providing written legal advice, Goldsmith did so on two occasions, in July 2002 and January 2003. He has <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/goldsmith-why-i-changed-my-mind-on-iraq-1881329.html">claimed</a> his advice was “not terribly welcome”. </p>
<p>Yet Goldsmith’s assertiveness during this period varied a lot. Elsewhere in the report, Chilcot found that he could have expressed his views more forcefully during the UN resolution 1441 negotiations from which he was marginalised.</p>
<p>Then there was the Goldsmith who ultimately fell into line and provided the legal “green light” for a war ordered by the prime minister who appointed him. There has long been speculation as to whether Goldsmith was pressured by key players to change his advice, but the report does not reveal any evidence of this. </p>
<p>For his part, Goldsmith <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8481759.stm">admitted in his evidence to Chilcot</a> that he changed his view of the law between mid-February and March 2003 as a result of papers exchanged and discussions held with US negotiators, who gave him information about the negotiating background to UN Security Council Resolution 1441. </p>
<p>Goldsmith’s advice of March 7 2003 stated that there was a reasonable case that war would be legal, though his argument was complex and contained important qualifications. Yet over the next few days, this tentative advice was redrafted into a much briefer and less equivocal statement of law. It was this version upon which both cabinet and parliament based their decisions to go to war. </p>
<p>Chilcot claims that Goldsmith’s full advice should have been provided to cabinet given the gravity of the decision. He is also critical of the fact that this advice required Blair, rather than the UN Security Council, to confirm that Iraq was in “material breach” of UN resolutions.</p>
<p>Chilcot seizes on a final, bitter irony: that the invasion was the only phase of the Iraq venture that could arguably be deemed a “success”, since a decisive victory was achieved within six weeks. Yet this feat, such as it is, will be forever overshadowed by the high-risk political manoeuvres and constitutional subversion leading up to military engagement, and the woeful, avoidable failures to plan for its aftermath. </p>
<p>And now Chilcot’s all-but-definitive document is being properly processed, it seems Blair, Straw and Goldsmith’s names will forever top the British side of the ledger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the world picks over the Iraq Inquiry’s final report, three fascinating character portraits have emerged.Rebecca Moosavian, Senior Lecturer, Northumbria Law School, Northumbria University, NewcastleConall Mallory, Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria Law School, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/385642015-03-10T16:26:28Z2015-03-10T16:26:28ZTory uses dodgy calculations to argue MPs need £225,000 a year<p>Conservative politician Adam Afriyie has made his contribution to the debate about parliamentarians living far from reality by proclaiming that it is “almost impossible to operate on the salary that is given to MPs if you come from a middle-income family”.</p>
<p>This comes after a scandal that saw senior parliamentarians Jack Straw and Malcolm Rifkind peddling their influence for cash. Rifkind argued that he couldn’t possibly get by on his <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cash-for-access-scandal-sir-malcolm-rifkind-says-unrealistic-for-mps-to-live-on-67000-10064438.html">£67,000 income</a>. </p>
<p>Afriyie’s claim is arguable in principle and desperately unwise in practice as far as public trust goes. During an interview with <a href="http://www.chatpolitics.org/portfolio/adam-afriyie/">Chat Politics</a> he suggested that members of parliament should be compensated to the tune of £225,000. This is the figure he arrived at by uprating the first salary paid to MPs in 1911 – which was £400 – to today’s prices.</p>
<p>Afriyie used an online tool called <a href="http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/relativevalue.php">Measuring Worth</a> to make his calculations but even this gives only a ballpark figure. In fact, the tool suggests that £400 in 1911 money would be valued anywhere between £35,540 and £284,500. Afriyie appears to have opted to look to the higher end of the scale when appealing for more money.</p>
<p>Either way, in 1911 the average industrial worker’s wage was £250 – just over half an MP’s salary; today it is <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10173107/MPs-pay-rise-how-politicians-pay-has-risen-quicker-than-the-workers.html">rather less</a> than half of MPs’ current take-home pay.</p>
<p>Comparisons over time like this are notoriously difficult to make in a meaningful way. I did my own calculations using the <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/">National Archives Currency Converter</a> and came up with £22,800 in 2005 prices for £400 in 1910 prices. That gives us an outcome much nearer to the average income of constituents – and a significant pay cut for the MPs.</p>
<p>In Afryie’s defence it might be argued that he also proposed that expenses should be subsumed into this larger salary for MPs. But this and his apparent decimal error betray the real problem.</p>
<p>MPs such as Afriyie appear to think that £225,000 is an ordinary sum of money, and regard their current pay – which weighs in at well over twice the national average income – as inadequate. They also draw no distinction between expenses and pay.</p>
<p>How many times have defensive MPs like <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MrFV4c_sVY">Eric Pickles</a> insisted that their expenses claims are legitimate because they “put the hours in”? The expenses regime should be much more generous and rigorous to match those in other democratic countries. It is for costs legitimately incurred in representing constituents; the salary is for the hours of work.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/74318/original/image-20150310-13564-44j7p0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">1911: Plenty of money to pay MPs, apparently not so much for cleaners.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rifkind <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cash-for-access-scandal-sir-malcolm-rifkind-says-unrealistic-for-mps-to-live-on-67000-10064438.html">defended his position</a> on MPs’ pay by arguing that only by offering high salaries can parliament attract quality representatives. But that is not why MPs were originally paid. The original idea in 1911 was to make it possible for those who could not afford it independently to represent their fellow citizens. It was not to attract those who are already well-resourced away from work they prefer.</p>
<p>MPs have already awarded themselves a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29098334">9% pay rise</a> this session. Some continue to offer apologias or mitigation for MPs seeking extra sums “under the radar” like Straw because they feel impoverished and even, with Rifkind, claim they do not receive a salary at all.</p>
<p>In August last year Mark Simmonds, the Foreign Office minister responsible for Africa, resigned saying that he couldn’t keep his family on the £110,000 he (and, as his secretary, his wife) received from public funds.</p>
<p>That a Parliament full of people accustomed to high incomes fails to recognise smaller sums of money is not surprising. That intelligent MPs have not learnt the lessons of the expenses scandal is more disturbing.</p>
<p>Afriyie, as it happens, is already a multi-millionaire who continues to receive multiples of his MP’s salary as a company director. The comparatively modest wages of his day job do not seem to have weakened his widely-rumoured <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/31/adam-afriyie-pm-in-waiting">ambitions within the Conservative Party</a>.</p>
<p>Everything from surveys of public opinion to party membership figures to election results and turnout tells us that the public remains somewhere between sceptical and angry towards the established parties as a group.</p>
<p>The Hansard Society’s annual <a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Audit-of-Political-Engagement-11-2014.pdf">Audit of Political Engagement</a> showed by 2012 that voter confidence in the political system and likelihood of voting had dropped to their lowest levels in the ten-year history of the audit.</p>
<p>Recent events will only have served to persuade the public they are right in their suspicions about the political class. The remuneration of MPs may need amendment, in one direction or the other; but their public relations need much more urgent work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38564/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Cole is a Visiting Fellow of the Hansard Society</span></em></p>Multi-millionaire Adam Afriyie think he’s worth a lot more than you pay him.Matthew Cole, Teaching Fellow, Department of History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/380142015-02-25T17:41:54Z2015-02-25T17:41:54ZJack Straw and the sticky business of sugar lobbying<p>In the midst of a scandal about offering political access for cash, former Labour foreign secretary Jack Straw has said he worked to influence EU sugar policy on behalf of commodities merchant ED&F Man. He then seemed to imply that doing so was no big deal, talking openly about handling negotiations with EU representatives and the prime minister of Ukraine as a paid consultant for the company <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02kmtz0">“under the radar”</a>.</p>
<p>Straw’s lobbying related to a practice called “tolling” and laws that had been brought in to prevent it in Ukraine. And the scandal that now surrounds him gives us a glimpse into the complex world of sugar regulation and lobbying in Europe.</p>
<p>Over the years, EU sugar policy has been shaped as much by politics as by economics. Indeed, the political dimension arises partly because of the economics. Sugar is derived from two sources: sugar beet, grown in temperate climates like European countries, and sugar cane, grown in tropical climates.</p>
<p>Sugar cane has low production costs but sugar beet is much more expensive to produce. Moreover, beet production tends to occur in a few specific locations in a country, with processing facilities close to where the beet is grown. These processing facilities also need to run at high levels of capacity utilisation to be profitable.</p>
<p>These high processing costs and highly localised production (where high quality rural jobs are located) result in a very strong political lobby for support and protection of the sugar industry in the EU – and indeed in the US too.</p>
<p>And while other parts of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy have been reformed over many years, sugar policy reform only arrived in 2004. This reform came on the back of a <a href="http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/R/NIJIYPA7ID1MUVTJHPMGMSLJNLXYYHJAX49N7BGG3GN9GRNSPD-02849?func=results-jump-full&amp;set_entry=000013&amp;set_number=000826&amp;base=GEN01-IRP01">build-up of multiple pressures</a> and fierce lobbying from both those who wanted to maintain the status quo, retaining production quotas and high prices within the EU; and those who wanted to liberalise the market, reduce prices and phase out production quotas.</p>
<p>One consequence of the reforms was that countries with less efficient sugar production saw their industries shrink considerably. They faced pressures similar to the challenges reported in Moldova after the Ukrainian policy change, where higher cost producers lost out to producers from countries with more efficient, lower-cost, producers.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, under the <a href="http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/trade-negotiations-insights/news/after-the-sugar-protocol">Sugar Protocol of the Lomé Convention</a>, a group of former (mainly British) colonies enjoyed privileged terms for exporting sugar to Europe for many years.</p>
<p>But the EU ended up with an oversupply and had to export an equivalent quantity of sugar derived from EU-grown beet, to keep the EU market in some sort of balance. </p>
<p>Tolling is, in essence, the practice of processing imported cane rather than sugar beet, in the sugar beet off season – usually to export it again. This can include sugar cane from tropical countries. The practice helps maintain a high level of capacity utilisation at the processing plant and thus helps ensure profitability. Moreover, it appears to offer <a href="http://www.apd-ukraine.de/images/PP_33_Position_paper_on_Tolling_in_sugar_eng.pdf">great potential</a> for Ukraine’s sugar industry.</p>
<h2>Straw man</h2>
<p>The fact of the matter is, Straw has claimed lobbying success in a policy area that has always been highly politicised. And in fact, the policy changes he has boasted about are not particularly unusual in the world of sugar. It is not unheard of for a company to import sugar cane to process during the sugar beet off-season in order to maintain profitability, even if it is not a universal practice.</p>
<p><a href="https://jonworth.eu/jack-straw-and-brussels-lobbying-what-he-changed-and-how-and-who-he-met/">According to at least one blog</a>, it appears that Straw’s lobbying successes were exaggerated – mind you, for £5,000 a day, I too might be tempted to over-egg the pudding.</p>
<p>It is probably fair to say that Straw’s position as an MP helped him get direct access to the Ukrainian prime minister to talk sugar. It may well be that he, not alone but with the British ambassador, played a role in a specific policy decision.</p>
<p>But this policy reversal enabled ED&F Man to continue doing something that is not uncommon for companies in the sugar processing industry to do anyway. Indeed, given the widespread practice of tolling, the motives behind the original Ukrainian policy change to ban tolling are not at all clear.</p>
<p>Accessing senior officials at the European Commission is more straightforward than getting to prime ministers. As an academic, I have interviewed very senior policy officials in Brussels over the years. I doubt that Straw’s position as an MP was a key deciding factor in him getting in to meet someone, especially in the context of the Brussels-focused lobbying machine that is part and parcel of modern political life. And given the decision-making structures of the EU, it seems likely that the impact of one meeting on EU policy is on the slim side of modest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Ackrill has received funding from The Leverhulme Trust (2007) and the UK Economic and Social Research Council (2009). These were to support academic research projects related to EU sugar policy.</span></em></p>The former foreign secretary may have over-egged the pudding when talking up his influence on EU policy.Robert Ackrill, Professor of European Economics and Policy, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/379912015-02-24T14:06:41Z2015-02-24T14:06:41ZStraw and Rifkind brought down by sting journalism, but what it revealed still stinks<p>In Glasgow, one of the old tabloid wheezes used to be for editors to hire a vacant shop in one of the less salubrious quarters of the city, nail a sign announcing a new business operating on a variant of the pawn-shop model, add a few CCTV cameras and undercover journalists as staff, then sit back and wait for the customers and stories to roll in. </p>
<p>In short order, various gentlefolk would lurch into the premises carting whatever items in their vicinity couldn’t be paid for, nailed down or missed, in the hope of converting them into cash. </p>
<p>Within days, the whole sad gutter opera was played out in the national press with mug shots and photos of the “goods” being printed for all to devour. The piece usually ended on an ominous yet oddly hopeful note, telling readers that a “dossier was handed to the police last night”. </p>
<p>The model of an accepted criminal wrong had been corrected by the intervention of the accepted model of the tabloid investigative journalism right. Justice prevailed. Everyone could sleep easy. </p>
<p>The problem for me with the sting was that we never sorted out the really bad from the totally desperate. It was the fast-food equivalent of investigative journalism – lots of calories, no real substance. But neither side would learn: the stunt was – and is – repeated regularly. </p>
<h2>Politicians for hire</h2>
<p>Channel 4 did a fine Dispatches documentary five years ago, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/7500906/Stephen-Byers-Patricia-Hewitt-and-Geoff-Hoon-suspended-over-lobbying-allegations.html">catching former cabinet ministers</a> Stephen Byers, Patricia Hewitt and Geoff Hoon apparently flogging their access, cache and lobbying powers. Knuckles were rapped and careers bruised. </p>
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<p>Now five years on, Channel 4 and The Daily Telegraph <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/investigations/11411007/Jack-Straw-and-Sir-Malcolm-Rifkind-in-latest-cash-for-access-scandal.html">teamed up</a> to do the same again. Predictably – and in line with the Glasgow pawn-shop sting – a ragged but compelling programme ensued. </p>
<p>The undercover reporters created a fake communications agency called PMR, which they claimed was based in Hong Kong. A total of 12 MPs with “significant outside interests” were invited to apply for jobs with the agency, which had “plenty of money” and wanted to hire “influential British politicians to join its advisory board”.</p>
<p>According to Channel 4: “Half of those approached didn’t respond. One said he wanted to check us out in Hong Kong so we took it no further. And another said he just wasn’t that interested. Of the others, two stood out – Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Jack Straw.”</p>
<p>This was a shock since Rifkind and Straw are regarded as pair of polished old foxes who squeak with apparent probity when they walk. They wear the patina of certain old buffers from Belgravia, fully paid-up members for life of the “Turn left when you board the plane for First Class, sir” club. </p>
<h2>On camera</h2>
<p>The programme started with shaky footage from a digital pinhole camera of Malcolm Rifkind sitting in a rather bare office, vaguely laying on the charm for his guests. </p>
<p>Speaking in a less cascading Edinburgh soft-brogue than normal he quickly cut to the chase in language everyone could understand: “I am self-employed, so nobody pays me a salary. I have to earn my income, but when I am not doing something I can do what I like.” </p>
<p>He described his fees for a half day’s work as “somewhere in the region of £5,000 to £8,000, something like that”.</p>
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<p>Jack Straw was rather more elliptical in his reply when the journalists came calling to his parliamentary abode: “I am an adviser to a firm you probably won’t have heard of, but it’s one of Britain’s biggest soft commodity traders,” he said. “I got in to see the relevant director general and his officials in Brussels … and we got the sugar regulations changed.” </p>
<p>“It’s public that the regulations have been changed, but the best way of dealing with these things is under the radar.”</p>
<p>With regard to fees, he said: “Normally, if I’m doing a speech or something it’s £5,000 a day, that’s what I charge.” </p>
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<h2>Pre-emptive strikes</h2>
<p>Before the programme was even broadcast the two old sluggers <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cash-for-access-scandal-jack-straw-called-mps-in-previous-sting-stupid-for-being-suckered-in-10063890.html">had taken to</a> Radio 4 to start chucking counter-versions, explanations and official statements into the mix in the hope of defending themselves. In summary, both claimed they’d done nothing wrong, that they’d been set up and anyone offended should read the rules … really read them. </p>
<p>By the day’s end they’d been suspended from their parties and told they’d be subject to scrutiny. Like the Glasgow-sting wheeze, this all felt wearily, achingly, numbingly familiar. And that’s a shame. </p>
<p>There was a time when MPs so obviously operating in the grey area between rules, guidelines and laws and caught on camera would have resigned in utter disgrace in a heartbeat – albeit Rifkind <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/feb/24/malcolm-rifkind-under-pressure-to-resign-as-isc-chair-politics-live-blog">has since said</a> he will step down as an MP and resigned his position as chair of the Intelligence Select Committee (ISC). They would have recognised the perception had doomed them because reputation and the friends it earned was jealously guarded for the best of reasons and not traded on lightly. </p>
<p>Given Rifkind’s position on the ISC, you’d have assumed he’d have avoided anyone from China like the plague simply because of obvious dangers. Equally Jack Straw, regarded as at the very least a fairly fortunate Blair/Iraq-era survivor, might have laid low this side of the general election to ensure a smooth slide across the palace of Westminster to don the robes in the Lords. </p>
<p>Yet there they were, giving us a glimpse into their expensive yet curiously dead-eyed little world, where a flood of cash seemed needed in the most pedestrian of ways to fund their future retirement.</p>
<p>Now that Rifkind has gone, all eyes will be on Straw – who was already standing down as an MP in May. He may fight like hell by claiming he was the victim of journalistic entrapment. It’s the clever strategy and it worked for a company many years ago in the US <a href="http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-spring-2012/landmark-food-lion-case">who sued</a> a TV network when they were caught by undercover reporters flogging rancid food. The jury agreed the journalists were the liars in the case and awarded millions to the food company. Public interest investigative journalism came second. </p>
<h2>How they think they should live</h2>
<p>I suspect many fellow MPs would have been wary of knifing Rifkind and Straw. It’s a common gripe in the corridors of the Commons that MPs’ salary of £67,000 or thereabouts is miserly compared to the average US senator being paid $174,000 (around £113,000).</p>
<p>The complaints were louder before the expenses scandal blew up, but rest assured they can still be heard. People can get used to living in London fast and it takes big bucks. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/72894/original/image-20150224-32238-ex6l5b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Westminster: bent world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/pabloeivissa/9373023312/in/photolist-fhgchd-bJyz1p-5WWN6P-9z3YXW-kAwPgk-qC6J1V-fKDhdN-dhEpyW-ofrnmk-7cGabu-f41zTN-kQ3gsy-dfaeyG-dfu3GY-bCQM7Y-eAEJcQ-gp5w9C-afidi6-aecax7-sCNhS-namsCZ-4K6rbQ-asHjpq-cz1X9o-4mLXY4-4riJsD-pk2Ezu-6a3byV-9D1wt5-bVTuN5-fSfVTh-cwFEx7-pJRsYX-avme4b-df9kDb-dfvKaU-df9JX-9Y9uz9-9RqvJw-f41nMW-swkcD-nunR2r-7JxhYm-9MvFME-a4cRLj-foskyp-bHfXSR-nLZqqe-6vLg3s-4g2Ck3">Pablo Andres</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>After watching the documentary I recalled that a good few years ago, I met someone very close to a former prime minister. The meeting was formal and parts were agreed to be off the record. I asked this highly placed source what the former PM’s plans were. </p>
<p>The source gloomily replied that the PM had to scan the horizon for lucrative income streams because as a former resident of Number 10 and international statesman, people expected him to live a certain way and that cost a lot of money. </p>
<p>My source shrugged, threw his hands up and looked sad. Only later was I stuck by the fact there was never, not even for a second, any hesitation in considering this as the only option. All behaviour, it was inferred, even that involving meetings which might be perceived as bordering on the dodgy and even a bit pathetic, was deemed worthy of consideration. </p>
<p>Austerity for those at the very, very top was never remotely countenanced.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eamonn O'Neill is a regular contributor to BBC Scotland</span></em></p>It may not have been the best investigative journalism, but just because they are easy targets doesn’t mean it’s a pointless exercise.Eamonn O'Neill, Lecturer, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/379502015-02-24T06:31:40Z2015-02-24T06:31:40ZDo as we say, not as we do: UK preaches clean politics despite cash-for-influence scandals<p>With both Malcolm Rifkind and Jack Straw now <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cash-for-access-scandal-sir-malcolm-rifkind-says-unrealistic-for-mps-to-live-on-67000-10064438.html">suspended</a> from their political parties for apparently offering influence for money, questions are being asked about whether members of parliament should be allowed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-question-about-malcolm-rifkind-is-where-he-finds-the-time-to-moonlight-37932">sell their services</a> to people or groups.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the UK <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/anti-corruption-strategies-by-country">pushes other countries</a> to stamp out corruption of all kinds. The UK does in fact have a long history of trying to clamp down on unethical behaviour by people in public office. The trouble is that the laws brought in to stop it are not properly enforced. </p>
<p>There is nothing wrong in principle with trying to influence politics – and even using money to do it. Lobbying has always been an accepted part of politics. We tend to think of corporations as the main influencers in this respect but lots of organisations do it, from single-issue lobby groups to campaign groups, to non-governmental organisations to trade unions.</p>
<p>They all use money to influence the media and politicians. They spend their budgets on putting together briefing papers and other materials to lobby and persuade the people who can make changes that benefit them. Problems arise when the relationship becomes a direct transaction though. When money changes hands between lobbyists and politicians for a specific purpose, it starts to look bad. There are laws against this – and for good reason.</p>
<p>In the 18th and early 19th centuries Britain was notorious for its corruption. In the 1850s, <a href="http://www.civilservant.org.uk/northcotetrevelyan.pdf">reforms</a> were brought in to clean up the relationship between civil servants and business. But even though there was, from then on, a law making misconduct in public office an offence, a series of scandals ensued. Local government remained notorious for cases of corruption. </p>
<p>Many felt more legislation was needed and so the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/52-53/69/contents">Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act </a> was created in 1889 (aimed at local government), followed by the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Edw7/6/34">Prevention of Corruption Acts</a> in 1906 and 1916. These acts criminalised a series of actions which involved public officers acting dishonestly, acting against the public interest and engaging in offences such as bribery (either doing or not doing something – even if it is something that is part of your public role – in return for money or some other such reward).</p>
<p>These Acts were updated in the 2010 Bribery Act, this was partly to reflect the fact that public officials working in a neo-liberal democracy might find themselves in a sensitive position. In a system that allows a state to privatise or contract out many of its functions to private interests, from criminal justice to IT to railways to health services, corporations become very powerful.</p>
<p>Civil servants and MPs may be in charge of, or know about, government contracts, privatisations, upcoming regulations and other information which may be of great monetary value. They may also be senior, long-serving figures who have a wide range of contacts and so can find out about and influence these things if they put their minds to it.</p>
<p>This <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1995.tb00824.x/abstract">interface between public and private</a> has long created risks of unethical activity and, if anything, has become increasingly murky over the past few years. While Rifkind and Straw deny breaking any rules, they were filmed by journalists offering to use the contacts they have made in office to further the interests of a fictitious company in exchange for cash. Their parties have taken a dim view of their actions – and voters will no doubt feel the same way.</p>
<p>The issue here is who was offering or asking for cash for what services. One of the other MPs <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/cash-access-jack-straw-sir-malcolm-rifkind-undercover-video">approached by the undercover journalists</a> said his contacts were not for sale, so he clearly understood what the journalists were asking for.</p>
<p>The issue is, are MPs taking or offering to take money from a private party to act in their role and capacity as MPs? In other words are they as public officials taking money to act for a private rather than a public interest? This is now something for the parliamentary and party authorities to investigate. However the undercover filming looks sleazy, so in addition to any rules they may or may not have broken, the perception of these MPs is they have been caught doing something which looks bad when exposed to the light of day. </p>
<p>Nor are these two former foreign secretaries the first to make such promises. Politicians from all sides of the house have been caught offering to sell their name and influence to lobbyists. And all this goes on while the British government, through its aid arm, the Department for International Development, lectures and advises governments across the world about the need to curb corruption.</p>
<p>It is essential that politicians and other public officials do not commit acts of corruption or behave unethically. But it is just as important that they are not seen to be corrupt and unethical.</p>
<p>The British public has, over the past ten years, been exhorted by politicians and public officials to pay their taxes, work harder, take responsibility for their children, take responsibility for the environment and back UK government military action everywhere from <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/afghanistan">Afghanistan</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/libya">Libya</a>.</p>
<p>Yet again, it seems that behind this curtain of moral urging, questionable relationships between public officials and corporations are taking place. The UK needs to demonstrate to the world that, in the jargon, its own “good governance” is good enough. However the problem in the UK is not the lack of legislation – it is the lack of enforcement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37950/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The relationship between politicians and businesses has become murky in the past decade.Jon Moran, Reader in Security, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/140612013-11-15T13:47:07Z2013-11-15T13:47:07ZGet ready for more scare tactics on EU immigrants<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/35315/original/nqj586w5-1384448549.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">England: not so pleasant land if you're a migrant.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Freefoto</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Brace yourself for more dire warnings about how Britain will be flooded next year by hordes of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania. This week’s <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article3921062.ece">story in The Times</a> quotes figures from the Office for National Statistics which has calculated that 121,000 people from the two EU member states worked in Britain between July and September this year. The newspaper predicts that “thousands more are expected to head to Britain from January” – and quotes former home secretary David Blunkett predicting that riots would greet an “influx of Roma” to this country.</p>
<p>There is an obvious problem here: when we talk about “Roma”, it’s not clear who we mean. The UK has no distinct census category for them; while 57,000 people ticked the box marked “Gypsy/Traveller” in 2011, we have no way of knowing how many of those people might have been Roma from Central Europe. Many Roma will self-identify instead as Romanian, Bulgarian, Czech, or a different nationality. This leaves us to simply ascribe Roma identities to people we think fit the description. As a result, many estimates of the Roma population are based principally on highly inaccurate racial profiling.</p>
<p>This is indicative of the climate of fear that surrounds the “threat” of more East European immigration. Until a few years ago, few people in the UK knew much about Romanians or Bulgarians beyond post-Ceauşescu AIDS babies or cheap Black Sea holidays. Now we’re told to prepare not just for a new wave of Romanians and Bulgarians, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sep/20/nigel-farage-sets-challenge-immigration">but a new wave of crime</a> that they will inevitably bring with them. Romanians and Bulgarians are the new unwanted children from the other side of Europe, who threaten not only to derail Britain’s fragile economic recovery but also to unravel the very cultural fabric that knits the country together.</p>
<h2>Hordes, floods and swamps</h2>
<p>Romanians and Bulgarian migrants are widely depicted as a nightmarish threat – as a horde of unscrupulous benefit scroungers waiting to flood in and take jobs from honest British workers while threatening our way of life.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/35307/original/bppyh967-1384443349.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Letting them in: Jack Straw has re-entered the EU migration debate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dave Thompson/PA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This begs the question: how many is a horde? We don’t know. As Jack Straw’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/13/jack-straw-labour-mistake-poles">comments</a> in recent days have shown, predicting future patterns of immigration is a complex business. And even as Straw pointed to <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/immigrants-boost-theeconomy-says-niesr-8921634.html">recent research</a> which showed that Polish immigrants were less, not more, likely to claim benefits than UK citizens, his comments will only fuel grandiose predictions about the coming influx. </p>
<p>Nigel Farage, for his part, tells us we should expect <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22280749">“several hundred thousand”</a>, echoing a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10011412/BBC-accused-of-spinning-figures-on-Romanian-and-Bulgarian-migrants.html">BBC study</a> which claimed 350,000 Romanians and Bulgarians could be “looking for work” in the UK next year. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182304/Migration_FOI.pdf">official estimates</a> of the numbers expected from Romania and Bulgaria predictably give much lower figures. </p>
<p>Most of these estimates, however, are highly problematic. Crucially, they privilege “push” factors (the notion that Romanians and Bulgarians want to leave home because the situation is so dire) over “pull” factors (the relative health of the economy in the UK), despite the fact that circumstances have dramatically changed since the mid-2000s: the million or so East Europeans who came to Britain after 2004 did so because there were lots of jobs available then. Given that far fewer are available now, we would surely expect fewer migrants to make the effort to come to try to get them. </p>
<p>But this remains a political numbers game: large, often inflated figures – presented with the help of liquid metaphors; floods, deluges, swamps, and streams – raise and amplify the scale of migration beyond our ability to rationally anticipate it and its consequences. Inaccurate and bloated predictions serve not to prepare us better for the arrival of new migrants but to redirect our attention to forestalling that arrival at any cost.</p>
<h2>Evidence versus rhetoric</h2>
<p>Back in 2007, Gordon Brown was quick to <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7097837.stm">take a leaf out</a> of the <a href="http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/national/so-good-they-cant-help-stealing-them-labour-expenses-crook-half-inches-another-bnp-pol">BNP playbook</a> when he pronounced: “British jobs for British workers!” – ignoring that EU citizens have the <a href="http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/abroad/">same employment rights</a> as British citizens. If we really want British jobs for British workers, we’ll have wait to to vote for them in the 2017 EU referendum.</p>
<p>Yet still, last year, the press jumped on a report of the <a href="http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/27-analysis-migration/01-analysis-report/analysis-of-the-impacts?view=Binary">Migration Advisory Committee</a> which summarised an array of studies of the impact of migration on the labour market. A single one of those studies noted an “association” between non-EU migration and job losses for British workers; but that this single finding was in fact heavily qualified mattered not to the headlines.</p>
<p>The fact is that East Europeans <a href="http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm67/6741/6741.pdf">filled a gap</a> at the low end of the employment market in 2004 - and continue to do so.</p>
<p>Another argument has it that those immigrants who aren’t taking our jobs must be claiming our benefits. But again, as EU citizens, these migrants have a legal entitlement to benefits, just as Britons have in other EU countries. There is a lot of rhetoric about “benefit scrounging” and “benefit shopping”, but this rhetoric is rarely backed by evidence - and as Jack Straw himself <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/immigrants-boost-theeconomy-says-niesr-8921634.html">mentioned</a>, the evidence that exists points the other way entirely. In fact, while post-1999 immigrants from the EEA have been credited with a net contribution to the economy, Brits themselves <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24813467">received</a> 11% more in benefits than they paid in taxes.</p>
<p>This evidence is consistent with the overall demographic profile of East European immigrants. They are disproportionately young, well-educated, and possessed of relevant skills – in other words, eminently employable. This is not the profile of a benefit scrounger; it’s the profile of a worker.</p>
<p>After the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22441280">Queen’s speech</a> last May, Cameron told MPs that he wanted to put an end to migrants coming to Britain and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22437884">“expecting something for nothing”</a>. For 10 years now, East Europeans have been taking jobs well below their qualifications, <a href="https://theconversation.com/revealed-immigrants-put-34-more-into-public-finances-than-they-take-out-19845">paying into the system more than they’ve been taking out</a> and generally doing their share to help this country inch along through an anaemic economic recovery. </p>
<p>If anyone’s getting something for nothing, it would seem that it would be Mr Cameron.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/14061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views expressed in this article are based in part on research supported by the ESRC (grant number RES-000-22-33-58).</span></em></p>Brace yourself for more dire warnings about how Britain will be flooded next year by hordes of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania. This week’s story in The Times quotes figures from the Office for National…Jon Fox, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.