tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/kosovo-5474/articlesKosovo – The Conversation2024-02-15T16:17:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2233902024-02-15T16:17:04Z2024-02-15T16:17:04ZKosovo: consolidating its statehood remains an uphill struggle 16 years after independence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575352/original/file-20240213-20-g81uw9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5421%2C3715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/flag-kosovo-on-soldiers-arm-collage-1249661251">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia on February 17 2008. It was a day full of joy and hope for a country that <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html">suffered</a> atrocities including ethnic cleansing, genocide and rape at the hands of Serbian forces during the Kosovo War (1998–1999).</p>
<p>The country is now <a href="https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve/">recognised</a> internationally by more than 100 states and has become a member of some international organisations. Kosovo has also established itself as one of the most functional and vibrant <a href="https://www.idea.int/blog/kosovos-democracy-has-come-long-way-it-needs-support">democracies</a> in the Balkans. </p>
<p>But neighbouring Serbia doesn’t recognise Kosovo’s independence and ethnic Serbs living in the country’s north have largely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-kosovos-stand-off-with-serbs-goes-15-years-after-statehood-2023-02-13/">rejected</a> Kosovo’s state authority. So, in 2011, the EU and the US brought the two countries together for talks on normalising relations. </p>
<p>The talks initially yielded some agreements that were hailed as “historic”. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels">Brussels agreement</a> in 2013, for example, defined the conditions for large-scale devolution of northern Kosovo and opened the way to membership of the EU. </p>
<p>But, since then, ambiguous language and a lack of goodwill between Serbia and Kosovo has meant that these intentions haven’t delivered significant changes.</p>
<h2>Accommodating Serbia</h2>
<p>The breakdown in cooperation has been exploited by Serbia to undermine Kosovo’s standing as a sovereign state. Serbia has strengthened its <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/12/07/serbia-strengthening-parallel-structures-kosovo-deputy-pm-says/">parallel structures</a> (a set of Belgrade-run institutions in Kosovo) which are in the country’s Serb-dominated north, lobbied against Kosovo’s bid to join <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/kosovo-fails-in-unesco-membership-bid">Unesco</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-12c2b452f3d644dcabe63bad05040783">Interpol</a>, and orchestrated an aggressive <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/01/05/serbian-president-claims-nine-more-kosovo-recognition-withdrawals/">derecognition</a> campaign against Kosovo.</p>
<p>Instead of normalising relations between Pristina and Belgrade, some people argue that the talks have become a tool for the EU and the US to normalise their relations with Serbia’s president, Alexander Vučić. </p>
<p>Concerned about Serbia’s potential to destabilise the Balkans, Brussels and Washington have adopted a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/14/europe/serbia-vucic-kosovo-balkans-west-intl-cmd/index.html">lenient posture</a> towards Vučić, aiming to pull Serbia away from Russia’s influence. Russia’s war in Ukraine and its potential security implications for the Balkans (where Serbia is considered <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/14047/html/">Moscow’s proxy</a>) has, contrary to any reasonable expectation, amplified this approach.</p>
<p>The Kosovo government’s attempts to extend state control of ethnic Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo, for example, have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/west-kosovo-ban-serbs-dinar/32795252.html">criticised</a> by the EU and US. On February 1, Kosovo’s central bank restricted all cash transactions anywhere in the country to euros, effectively banning the Serbian dinar.</p>
<p>But the EU and US attitude has emboldened Vučić to <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/05/serbs-stage-mass-resignation-from-kosovo-state-institutions/">intensify his efforts</a> to undermine Kosovo. He has used Kosovo Serbs living in the north to stoke tensions and make the country ungovernable. </p>
<p>In June 2023, three Kosovan police officers were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-security-forces-detain-three-kosovo-police-officers-kosovo-official-says-2023-06-14/">detained</a> by Serbian forces who accused them of crossing the border illegally. And tensions boiled over in September when a group of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serbia-radoicic-extradition-impossible/32729208.html">heavily armed men</a> mounted an attack in northern Kosovo, leaving one Kosovan police officer and three gunmen <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66905091">dead</a>. A Kosovan Serb politician called Milan Radoicic has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-release-monastery-attack-radoicic/32622767.html">claimed</a> to be the mastermind of the attack. </p>
<p>The international community condemned the attack and called for further investigations to hold those responsible to account. However, there still hasn’t been any official public assessment of the attack, nor have any sanctions been imposed on Serbia. Meanwhile, the EU has imposed <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/06/14/eu-announces-measures-against-kosovo-over-unrest-in-north/">sanctions on Kosovo</a>, accusing the government of failing to take steps to defuse the crisis in the north.</p>
<h2>Other priorities</h2>
<p>This imbalanced approach to the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is expected continue in 2024. There is <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2024/02/08/ep-adopted-resolution-on-serbia-calling-for-an-investigation-into-december-elections/">growing frustration</a> with Vučić’s autocratic grip in Serbia, but in the view of Brussels and Washington there doesn’t seem to be any better alternative than talking with Belgrade. Vučić is perceived as someone with enough popular legitimacy to sell Serbs a final settlement with Kosovo.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s concerns about the current approach to the dialogue between the two countries are legitimate having seen Serbia’s actions in the past. But it hasn’t much room for manoeuvre.</p>
<p>The stream of countries recognising Kosovo’s independence has stalled. In fact, Israel is the only country to establish <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/02/01/kosovo-establishes-relations-with-israel-breaking-blockade-on-recognitions/">diplomatic ties</a> with Kosovo in the last six years.</p>
<p>Stopping Serbia from sliding further towards autocracy would be the best option for achieving peace, stability and countering Russia’s influence in the Balkans. But that would require time and a total revision of the current dialogue format.</p>
<h2>An uphill struggle</h2>
<p>With a war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict stretching resources and causing political tension, Brussels and Washington will seek to put out any potential flames in the Balkans. The current US and EU administrations are likely to push Kosovo to bend to their demands and give Vučić something that he would be happy to live with.</p>
<p>Pristina has already <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">agreed</a> to some form of self-government for Kosovo Serbs. And, with European Parliament and US elections looming this year, where anti-establishment parties are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/24/anti-european-populists-on-track-for-big-gains-in-eu-elections-says-report">on track for big gains</a>, current leaders may rush to strike an imperfect deal between Kosovo and Serbia.</p>
<p>There’s also a chance that the EU and the US could find themselves being drawn into crisis management elsewhere if war in Ukraine and the Middle East continues to cause ripples way beyond their borders. Kosovo could be caught between meeting the international community’s demands to grant more sovereignty to Kosovo Serbs and a potential abandonment by its western partners if it doesn’t deliver on their requests.</p>
<p>Whichever way Kosovo chooses, the consolidation of its statehood will remain an uphill struggle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Altin Gjeta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kosovo is under pressure from the US and EU to give in to some of Serbia’s demands.Altin Gjeta, PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175172024-01-25T13:18:18Z2024-01-25T13:18:18ZA Western-imposed peace deal in Ukraine risks feeding Russia’s hunger for land – as it did with Serbia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562953/original/file-20231201-26-35fbaf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3808%2C2529&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman with flowers walks past a building fortified with sandbags in the Podil neighborhood of Kyiv, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIX%20Russia%20Ukraine%20War%20Daily%20Life/36cd7048eb8347298d1f560a490b4bd7?Query=ukraine%20daily%20life&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=988&currentItemNo=125">AP Photo/Jae C. Hong</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The conflict in Ukraine will soon be heading into its third year with no sign of a ceasefire. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that many in the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">West are growing impatient</a> <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-endgame-analysis-1.6911021">with the emerged stalemate</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">reluctant to provide</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/18/world/europe/europe-military-aid-ukraine.html">continued military support</a> to Ukraine.</p>
<p>However, wars do come to an end, often with one side making <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-1-settle-now-all-wars-end-negotiating-table">concessions in exchange for peace</a>. And over the course of the Ukraine war, influential voices in the West – be it those of the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/">Henry Kissinger</a>, former President <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2023/03/trump-blurts-out-peace-plan-hand-russia-chunks-of-ukraine.html">Donald Trump</a> or high-ranking NATO official <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ukraine-membership-cede-territory-russia/">Stian Jenssen</a>, to name a few – have raised the prospect of Ukraine having to cede land to Russia in exchange for peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://baker.utk.edu/overview/faculty-and-staff/">expert on Western military interventions</a> in transnational ethnic conflicts, I have seen how well-intentioned peace agreements offered to the perceived aggressor can inadvertently plant the seeds for renewed conflict. This is because such agreements can deliver in peace what the aggressor pursues in war: territory. </p>
<p>Rather than resolve the root cause of conflicts, this can reward <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/revanchist-seeking-revengeand-not-just-with-territory-11642775416">revanchism</a> – that is, a state’s policy to reclaim territory it once dominated – and embolden an aggressor to use war to achieve its aim. This is especially true when the West rewards aggression with generous peace agreements. </p>
<p>Take the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>It has been more than 20 years since the end of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-world-and-yugoslavias-wars">the Yugoslav wars</a>, a series of conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. During these wars, Serbia sought to unify large swaths of territories populated by Serbs and non-Serbs into a “Greater Serbia.”</p>
<p>The wars ended with <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-ten-day-war-slovenian-independence.html">military victories for Slovenia</a> <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/Croatia.pdf">and Croatia</a> over Serbia, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-bpfy.htm">NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo</a>. In the cases of the latter countries, NATO intervention was followed by numerous Western-imposed peace plans.</p>
<p>But two decades on, the region <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/3/are-kosovo-and-serbia-on-the-brink-of-war">borders on renewed conflict</a> as Serbia insists that its survival is dependent on it ability to solely <a href="https://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/2021/Prilog2-StrategijaNacionalneBezbednostiRS-ENG.pdf">represent and protect</a> all Serbs, wherever they live.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and women hold candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562424/original/file-20231129-19-e5zz4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Candles for three killed Serbs in the northern Serb-dominated part of the ethnically divided town of Mitrovica, Kosovo, Sept. 26, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaShootout/99c7b994087c4ba7ac7543d03e180b4b/photo?Query=armed%20attack%20serbia&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=33&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, each war is different, and the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Ukraine are unique.</p>
<p>But I believe the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo show that Western-sponsored treaties, when they sacrifice land for peace, can store up trouble for later – especially when it comes to revanchist nations.</p>
<h2>Russia and Serbia revanchism</h2>
<p>Russian and Serbian revanchism has been evident ever since the countries they once dominated – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively – broke up in the early 1990s.</p>
<p>In 1992, Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/08/02/transdniestria-moldova-and-russia-s-war-in-ukraine-pub-87609">seized Transnistria</a>, the Moscow-backed breakaway part of Moldova that borders southwestern Ukraine, under the pretext of securing peace. The same year, Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm">intervened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia</a>, autonomous regions within Georgia populated by pro-Russia but non-Georgian peoples, to “end the ethnic fighting.” In 2008, Russia expanded further into Georgia. The same scenario recurred in 2014 when Russia sent forces to Crimea and the Donbas to “protect” ethnic Russians from “<a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know">Nazi</a>” hordes.</p>
<p>Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has similarly sought to reclaim its dominance of that region. It has done this under various pretexts. Serbia’s decadelong wars began in 1991 and included fighting in Slovenia purportedly to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/28/yugoslav-army-attacks-slovenia-meets-resistance-at-border-posts/bdf68be0-2013-4ba5-98b6-9c22c5699d81/">keep Yugoslavia together</a>”; in Croatia, it was to protect ethnic Serbs from the “<a href="https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/23666/Serbsxasxvictimsx-xgenocidexinxthexrhetoricxofxSlobodanxMilosevic.pdf?sequence=1">fascist</a>” regime; in Bosnia, Serbia claimed to be preventing the founding of an “<a href="https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1751&context=ree">Islamic state</a>”; and in Kosovo, the stated aim was to fight “<a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/fear-and-loathing-belgrade-what-serbian-state-media-say-about-kosovars">terrorists</a>.”</p>
<p>Yet, a quarter of a century on – and despite hopes that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">the fall of former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000 might usher in a more peaceful era – political elites in Serbia continue to pursue the unification of all Serb-populated lands, or at minimum gain the West’s acceptance of a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serb world</a>” – that is, a sphere of Serbian influence in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro where Serbia dominates.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in uniform gestures." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562426/original/file-20231129-28-hfpodh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kosovo police officer guards a road near the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/KosovoSerbiaTension/c26eccb374754e3db37a3bc2e6a15ce4/photo?Query=serbia%20war&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6098&currentItemNo=46">AP Photo/Bojan Slavkovic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Walking the Balkan path</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bosnia-herzegovina-dayton-accords/">various peace treaties</a> meant to stabilize and bring lasting peace to Bosnia and Kosovo have, to various degrees, failed, due in no small part, I would argue, to the very terms of settlement.</p>
<p>In Bosnia, the U.S.-brokered <a href="https://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Accords of 1995</a> brought the Bosnian War to an end. But it also reorganized the state into two subnational units: the majority-ethnic Serbian Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>
<p>The accords awarded 49% of the recently independent Bosnia’s territory to the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-republika-srpska/a-64373205">Republic of Srpska</a> despite Serbs constituting 31% of the general population and having <a href="https://hmh.org/library/research/genocide-in-bosnia-guide/">committed genocide and ethnic cleansing</a> in pursuit of crafting a Serb state within Bosnia.</p>
<p>Now, the Republic of Srpska seeks to secede and contravene the Dayton Accords through the establishment of <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina-report-2022_en">parallel institutions</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2022-05-11/top-global-official-bosnian-serbs-are-trying-to-secede">the withdrawal of its members</a> from Western-brokered institutions.</p>
<p>In Kosovo, with each European Union-sponsored peace agreement to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, security threats from Serbia escalate, as evidenced by a recent <a href="https://www.state.gov/condemnation-of-violent-attacks-on-kosovo-police/">armed attack</a> led by Milan Radoičiċ, an associate of Serbia’s president. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, what critics see as Western <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement of Serbia’s revanchism</a> has led to further concessions in regard to Kosovo. In contrast to Bosnia, the Kosovo model involves incremental appeasement through various peace agreements – the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf">Ahtisaari Plan</a>, <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/2022">Brussels 1</a> and <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">2 Agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-implementation-annex-agreement-path-normalisation-relations-between_en">Ohrid Agreement</a>, and the <a href="https://usercontent.one/wp/www.burimramadani.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/www.burimramadani.com_EU-Draft_Statue_October-2023.pdf">Draft-Statute proposal</a>. These plans offer political concessions to Serbia in exchange for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<h2>The same fate for Ukraine?</h2>
<p>To suggest that a similar fate to Bosnia or Kosovo <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/27/why-ukraine-should-not-accept-a-dayton-accords-style-peace">may await Ukraine</a> is not beyond the realms of reality.</p>
<p>Any such solution could be an off-ramp to war, but it would hand Vladimir Putin what he wants: control over Russian-speaking people and key strategic territory in Ukraine.</p>
<p>If the West follows either the Bosnia or Kosovo model for peace for Ukraine, the result would likely be the same: First, it would result in the reorganization of Ukraine into two political-administrative units, one under control of a pro-Western government in Kyiv, the other under the influence or direct control of Moscow. Second, it would see the promotion of complex political arrangements, such as ethnic veto powers, dual sovereignty and international representation, that yield institutional dysfunction and political instability. And third, there would be no robust security deployments or guarantees from the U.S. or NATO to deter future Russian aggression.</p>
<h2>From Kosovo to Kyiv</h2>
<p>The current <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">Western support</a> for Ukraine’s defense will likely lead to its heavy involvement in any peace negotiations. </p>
<p>But ultimately, the implications of a Western-imposed peace in Ukraine may, if the past is any indicator, do little to appease Russian revanchism and may, in fact, encourage Russian elites to pursue a similar policy in Estonia and Latvia – states where Russians make up a quarter of the population. </p>
<p>The West may hope that a plan based on land for peace helps Ukraine by stopping the bloodshed, while at the same time appeases Russia and solves a geopolitical problem for the EU and the U.S. </p>
<p>But if the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo are anything to go by, it could on the contrary only whet Russia’s appetite for more territorial claims, and leave Ukraine feeling betrayed.</p>
<p><em>Drita Perezic, a security sector expert with the <a href="https://balkansgroup.org/en/about-us-2/">Balkans Policy Research Group</a>, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elis Vllasi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The fragility of peace settlements in the Balkans provides a cautionary tale. US and EU policymakers may inadvertently make matters worse by acceding to the aggressor’s territorial ambitions.Elis Vllasi, Senior Research Associate & Lecturer in National Security & Foreign Affairs, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194762023-12-12T17:03:39Z2023-12-12T17:03:39ZWhy we should consider a transitional administration for Gaza<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-we-should-consider-a-transitional-administration-for-gaza" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The massacre perpetrated against Israel by Hamas on Oct. 7 opened a new chapter in the tragedy that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. </p>
<p>For more than 75 years, too many opportunities to achieve lasting peace have been squandered, whether through the intransigence of some, the extremist excesses of others, the unbalanced commitment of a third party or even global disinterest in the conflict.</p>
<p>More than 150 members of the United Nations General Assembly, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-sustainable-ceasefire-israel-gaza-1.7056626">including Canada</a>, recently voted in favour of a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/12/middleeast/ceasefire-vote-gaza-israel-un-intl">resolution calling for a ceasefire</a>. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67687628?ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter&ns_campaign=bbc_live&ns_linkname=6578d92a87855b2dac7d421c%26US%20votes%20against%20resolution%2C%20UK%20abstains%262023-12-12T22%3A05%3A31.507Z&ns_fee=0&pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:2e285aa8-1cc6-4cc4-a867-38f595685178&pinned_post_asset_id=6578d92a87855b2dac7d421c&pinned_post_type=share">Ten members voted against</a> the resolution, including Israel and the United States. The U.S. also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-vote-delayed-demand-gaza-humanitarian-ceasefire-2023-12-08/">vetoed a UN Security Council resolution</a> for a ceasefire.</p>
<p>Yet U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/18/joe-biden-gaza-hamas-putin/">recently expressed an intention to resolve the conflict</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Our goal should not be simply to stop the war for today – it should be to end the war forever.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These developments, including an apparent determination by the U.S. to re-engage its efforts to bring about lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians as thousands die in the conflict, requires an examination of what would be the most effective course of action.</p>
<h2>The least bad option</h2>
<p>Obviously, the chances of success may seem remote. But what
are the alternatives? A return to the pre-Oct. 7 status quo would mean accepting the more or less long-term repetition of a new cycle of appalling violence. </p>
<p>Eliminating the threat posed by Hamas cannot be achieved by Israel’s reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, and even less by the disappearance of all Palestinians from the enclave, as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/17/israel-government-right-gaza-endgame-conquest/">suggested</a> by the most radical elements on the Israeli political scene. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-08/palestinian-authority-working-with-us-on-postwar-plan-for-gaza">The return</a> of a moribund and <a href="https://pune.news/international/unpopular-ineffective-palestinian-authority-cant-drive-two-state-solution-97139/">ineffective Palestinian Authority</a> in the wake of Israel Defense Forces military operations in Gaza is not credible and doomed to failure. </p>
<p>Arab countries in the region <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/03/there-might-be-no-day-after-in-gaza-pub-90920">don’t want to assume responsibility</a> for the security and administration of Gaza, while interference by a single major foreign power like the U.S. would constitute a form of imperialism.</p>
<p>Faced with these unthinkable options, the best — or least bad — solution seems to be to consider setting up a transitional administration in Gaza with three objectives: to ensure security, to work towards reconstruction and to lay the foundations for political stability and economic development. </p>
<p>Such a model was successful in the pacification and reconstruction mission in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmiset/background.html">East Timor</a> in 1999 <a href="https://unmik.unmissions.org/mandate">and in Kosovo</a> the same year. The United Nations might even consider reviving its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council">Trusteeship Council</a>, which has been dormant since 1994.</p>
<h2>Requirements</h2>
<p>To ensure legitimacy and a mandate, such an administration would have to rest on two pillars involving the UN Security Council: a regional agreement under Chapter 8 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8">UN Charter</a>, and the implementation of a peace-enforcement force based on Chapter 7 to restore order and ensure security on the other. </p>
<p>Such a multinational approach would give hope to Gazans and reassure the Israeli government that Hamas and other extremist groups cannot return.</p>
<p>In the long term, it could even encourage the emergence of a full and functional administration of the territory, offering the concrete prospect of a political solution to the long-standing dispute with the creation of a future Palestinian state (starting with Gaza and extending to the West Bank).</p>
<p>The success of such an approach, as was the case in the past in Bosnia and Kosovo (involving NATO and the European Union), depends on the creation of a peacekeeping force with a strong mandate from the UN Security Council. </p>
<p>This force would have to be large enough to ensure security and, if necessary, impose peace — meaning at least 50,000 well-armed, well co-ordinated UN troops, with clear rules of engagement, provided by the countries involved (excluding Russia, for obvious reasons) and placed under a single command designated by the council, as was the case during the <a href="https://www.unc.mil/About/About-Us/">Korean War</a>. </p>
<p>This last requirement is necessary to avoid any repetition of the catastrophic scenario of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/0199253102.003.0007">failed intervention in Somalia</a> in 1993. The creation of such a well-integrated and well-organized military structure is absolutely essential to avoid any paralysis in decision-making.</p>
<h2>Economic prospects</h2>
<p>Rebuilding Gaza and offering economic prospects to its inhabitants will obviously require considerable financial resources.</p>
<p>The transitional administration, or even a <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/tc/reform">revamped Trusteeship Council</a>, would need to raise substantial sums of money and report regularly on how these funds are being used (as well as on developments in the security of the region). </p>
<p>These funds could come from the usual western powers, but also from the wealthy Gulf countries, which might be prepared to help Palestinians financially without having to become overly involved politically at the risk of damaging their improving relations with Israel. </p>
<p>International institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the <a href="https://www.undp.org/">United Nations Development Programme</a> would also need to be involved — a task made easier if it happens within a UN-led framework and mission.</p>
<h2>The return of Canada?</h2>
<p>The most cynical or pessimistic may argue that setting up such an initiative is too complex and doomed to failure. </p>
<p>But we propose Prime Minister Justin Trudeau champion this transitional administration, travel the world extolling its merits, pledge strong Canadian participation in the creation of an international peacekeeping force and propose to the Security Council the reactivation of the Trusteeship Council for Gaza.</p>
<p>He should solicit the support of our powerful neighbour and convince the U.S. to invest in command infrastructure for this new mission, which would likely be instrumental in reassuring Israel about the seriousness of such an approach. </p>
<p>Trudeau could enlist the support of Europe and try to win over the leaders of the Global South, including President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (which could also serve to mend fences between Canada and India).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georges-Clemenceau">Georges Clemenceau, head of the French government at the end of the First World War</a>, once said that it’s easier to make war than peace. The protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears witness to this. </p>
<p>But given the mass-scale violence in the region on and since Oct. 7, there’s an urgent need for the world to determine how to build a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.</p>
<p>The horrific and ongoing loss of human life compels us to be ambitious. The security of the Middle East as a whole is at stake, and taking action could also help ease tensions within western societies that are increasingly divided by the conflict. </p>
<p>It also provides Canada an opportunity <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/2677447276">to truly “make a comeback” on the international stage</a>. Helping resolve the conflict is closely tied to Canadian values.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219476/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The best — or least bad — solution to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves setting up a transitional administration in Gaza. Here’s how it could work.Julien Tourreille, Chargé de cours en science politique et chercheur à la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Charles-Philippe David, Président de l'Observatoire sur les États-Unis de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur de science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194342023-12-11T15:50:13Z2023-12-11T15:50:13ZSerbian election: another win for the Serbian Progressive Party will threaten peace in Europe<p>The outcome of Serbia’s parliamentary elections on December 17 will have profound implications for peace in Europe. Though somewhat obscured by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and more recently the crisis in Gaza, tensions in the Balkans have <a href="https://theconversation.com/kosovo-and-serbia-in-crisis-talks-as-regional-tension-escalates-thanks-to-russian-meddling-215038">risen sharply</a> in recent months. Should Serbs reelect the main party of government, the likelihood of regional conflict will increase. </p>
<p>The Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) has been in government since 2012. Formed in 2008, the SPP was initially seen as a pro-EU-integration party that would lead Serbia towards the west. </p>
<p>The SPP, however, became increasingly authoritarian and Serbia is today widely regarded as an example of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/captured-states-western-balkans-turkey">state capture</a>. This is where a small number of influential actors in the public and private sectors have colluded to change rules, sponsor legislation and co-opt institutions to further their own narrow interests at the expense of the broader public interest.</p>
<p>The SPP has, according to the US-based advocacy group, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2023">Freedom House</a>, “steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations”. Press freedom advocates, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/serbia">Reporters Without Borders</a>, recently noted that the dominant state-run media perpetuates “rampant fake news and propaganda” where “journalists are threatened by political pressures”. </p>
<p>Corruption has also <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/corruption-index">increased</a> since 2012 and <a href="https://ocindex.net/country/serbia">the Global Organized Crime Index</a> reported that “criminal networks are widespread”. An in-depth investigation by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/magazine/aleksandar-vucic-veljko-belivuk-serbia.html">the New York Times</a> alleged that Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić – a founding member of the SPP – and his inner circle were closely linked to these criminal gangs. </p>
<p>Since 2012, Serbia’s government has stoked regional tensions to the extent that many fear 2024 may see <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-spectre-of-a-second-war-in-europe-looms-large-with-tensions-extraordinarily-high-in-kosovo-12978280">renewed war</a> with neighbouring Kosovo. </p>
<p>Given Vučić’s past – and that of many of the SPP’s leading figures – this was hardly a surprise. Throughout the 1990s Vučić supported aggressive Serbian nationalism. Just days after the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia in July 1995, he declared: “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PU6t2XWFQD8">Kill one Serb and we will kill 100 Muslims</a>.” </p>
<p>Between 1998 and 2000, he was Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević’s “minister for information” during which time the war in Kosovo erupted. During that conflict, roughly 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were killed and over 90% of the population were displaced. </p>
<p>In 2018 Vučić described Milošević as “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/vucic-s-great-milosevic-evokes-ghost-of-greater-serbia-/29486327.html">a great Serbian leader who undoubtedly had the best intentions</a>”.</p>
<h2>Destabilising Kosovo and Bosnia</h2>
<p>The SPP has stoked nationalist sentiments among Serbs living outside Serbia. Their attempts to redraw the borders of Yugoslavia’s successor states along demographic lines – to create what they call a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serbian world</a>” – would almost certainly lead to war in Bosnia and Kosovo. </p>
<p>Indeed, Vučić <a href="https://thegeopost.com/en/news/vucic-made-gloomy-predictions-for-2024-next-year-will-bring-conflicts-it-will-be-the-most-difficult-in-the-modern-history-of-serbia/">recently stated</a> that 2024 “will bring us much more conflict and unrest than the previous one” specifically highlighting Bosnia and Kosovo as likely to erupt. </p>
<p>Vučić exercises near complete control over the main Serb parties in Bosnia and Kosovo and has encouraged each to undermine the authority of the central government in both states. </p>
<p>Milorad Dodik – the president of the Serb-majority Republika Srpska federation within Bosnia – now openly talks about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-charged-over-defying-peace-envoys-decisions-2023-08-11/">seceding from Bosnia</a>. Kosovo Serbs in favour of integration in Kosovo have been <a href="https://www.cins.rs/en/bombs-and-bullets-fear-and-loathing-in-north-kosovo/">bullied into submission</a> or <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/20/kosovo-serb-politician-murdered-for-political-reasons-brother-says/">murdered</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to regularly vowing to <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2023&mm=11&dd=26&nav_id=117128">never recognise Kosovo’s independence</a>, Vučić <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/06/serbian-president-accused-of-spreading-hate-by-denying-massacre/">has denied</a> that Serb-perpetrated massacres occurred in Kosovo. He has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64099388">threatened Nato troops</a> stationed there and branded the prime minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, as “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-boycotts-eu-summit-calls-kosovo-pm-terrorist-scum/">terrorist scum</a>”. </p>
<p>Vučić and the SPP prime minister, Ana Brnabić, have repeatedly claimed – <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/23/kosovo-serbs-may-feel-insecure-but-theyre-not-ethnically-cleansed/">without supporting evidence</a> – that the government of Kosovo is engaged in “<a href="https://twitter.com/BalkanInsight/status/1706252062248305143">brutal ethnic cleansing</a>” against Serbs. In September, close Vučić ally Milan Radoičić, the deputy leader of the Belgrade-controlled Serbian List party, was part of a militia group that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">attacked the Kosovo Police</a> – killing one officer – in what many believe was a Belgrade-orchestrated attempt <a href="https://www.helsinki.org.rs/press_t85.html">to spark a war</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the SPP’s record, western leaders have sought to maintain that Serbia is, as the US ambassador to Serbia recently stated, “<a href="https://twitter.com/usambserbia/status/1686405557089869824">headed towards the west</a>”. Many have <a href="https://n1info.rs/english/news/a579353-merkel-and-vucic-discuss-kosovo-taxes-dialogue-coronavirus-via-video-link/">posed with Vučić</a>, <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/03/pec-tusk-letter-vucic/">celebrated his electoral victories</a> and “<a href="https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies">turned a blind eye</a>” to his government’s policies at home and abroad. </p>
<p>The logic behind this <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement</a> stems from a determination to coax Serbia away from its traditional ally, Russia. This has evidently failed. </p>
<p>Following the invasion of Ukraine, Serbia <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-aleksandar-vucic-europe-russia-choice/">refused to join</a> western sanctions against Russia, because – Vučić says – Serbs “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/serbia-must-not-be-putins-accomplice/">love Russia</a>”. The country continues to maintain <a href="https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1705272005535183113">close relations</a> with Moscow.</p>
<p>The Serbian government has also cultivated links with other likeminded autocrats throughout Europe – particularly <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/06/26/orbans-alliance-with-vucic-demonstrates-strategic-hungarian-interests-in-the-western-balkans/">Hungary’s Viktor Orbán</a> – who openly reject democratic values. </p>
<h2>Future directions</h2>
<p>There is little to suggest the SPP will change; they have signed an election pact with the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party – led by <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/04/11/vojislav-seselj-hague-tribunal-war-crimes-appeal-verdict-04-11-2018/">convicted war criminal</a> Vojislav Šešelj – and are likely to again seek to form a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia, led by Ivica Dačić. Known as “little Slobo”, he was Milošević’s spokesman in the 1990s. </p>
<p>There are signs that a more progressive movement – the <a href="https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/12/02/evolution-of-the-party-scene-since-2012-who-are-the-members-of-the-serbia-against-violence-coalition/">Serbia Against Violence</a> coalition – will <a href="https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/11/15/first-poll-released-since-the-start-of-the-campaign-finds-sns-at-39-serbia-against-violence-at-26/">increase its share of the vote</a>. It seeks to capitalise on the public anger which boiled over in June when a series of <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/22/mass-protests-demand-political-change-in-serbia">mass protests</a> were held against gun violence and corruption. </p>
<p>But the SPP has sought to steer the election campaign away from domestic concerns – especially the high inflation, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/inflation-cpi">which stands at 8.5%</a> – towards nationalist issues, such as the plight of Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. </p>
<p>In this, it has been successful due to its <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/elections-in-serbia---vu%C4%8Di%C4%87-s-party-now-controls-the-whole-state-system-/49005478">near monopoly</a> over the media in Serbia and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/28/critics-of-serbias-government-targeted-with-military-grade-spyware?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">targeted cyberattacks</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/01/belgrade-opposition-candidate-quits-election-campaign-over-private-video-leak/">smear campaigns</a> against critics of the government. The prospects of the SPP being removed thus appear remote and the spectre of regional conflict looms. </p>
<p>However, this could yet be averted. Despite the SPP’s nationalistic and anti-western rhetoric, realistically, Serbia cannot prosper outside the west. Russia’s ability to support its allies since the invasion of Ukraine has decreased, as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91121">Armenia recently discovered</a> in Nagorno-Karabakh. </p>
<p>Serbia is surrounded by EU and Nato member states and thus vulnerable to western sanctions. As such, a forceful stance by the west would probably compel the SPP to change course and prevent renewed conflict. Whether the west has the unity and will to do so, however, remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Serbia’s nationalist government seeks re-election. If it succeeds, Europe may be poised for renewed war in the Balkans.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2150382023-10-20T12:17:39Z2023-10-20T12:17:39ZKosovo and Serbia in crisis talks as regional tension escalates thanks to Russian meddling<p>Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, and Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/17/kosovo-serbia-leaders-talks-diplomacy?CMP=share_btn_tw%20%22%22">scheduled to meet this weekend</a> for the first time since Nato decided to send about 600 more <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reinforcements-arrive-in-kosovo-for-nato-peacekeeping-mission">peacekeeping troops</a> into the Balkans early in October to mitigate some of the region’s growing tensions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/29/kosovo-serbian-troops-buildup-us-uk">US has already urged Serbia</a> to withdraw its military presence along the border with Kosovo to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/us/politics/white-house-serbia-kosovo.html">de-escalate tensions</a>. On October 18 <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0437_EN.html">the EU parliament</a> passed a resolution that also condemned the Serbian army’s military build-up at the border with Kosovo and urged Vučić to avoid any further action.</p>
<p>The meeting follows a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62382069">deadly attack on Kosovo’s</a> police and security force by a paramilitary group of more than 30 heavily armed nationalist <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/serbia-releases-kosovo-serb-politician-detained-over-kosovo-shootout-/7296196.html">militants</a> on September 24.</p>
<p>The attack in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/kosovo-serbia-police-attack-albin-kurti-banjska-vjosa-osmani/">Banjska</a> in northern Kosovo, was led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">Milan Radoicic</a> of the Serbian List, an ethnic Serbian minority political party in Kosovo with close ties to Vučić. The attack raised tensions in the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-spectre-of-a-second-war-in-europe-looms-large-with-tensions-extraordinarily-high-in-kosovo-12978280">western Balkans</a> to an unprecedented level.</p>
<p>Fearing that the latest tensions could lead to complete destabilisation of the region, EU and Nato officials have put together a meeting on October 21 hoping to get Serbia and Kosovo to agree a deal.</p>
<p>Vučić met with Russian president <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/vucic-has-friendly-meeting-with-putin-in-china/">Vladimir Putin</a> on the margins of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a> forum in Beijing on October 18, when he also signed a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-and-china-sign-free-trade-deal/">free trade agreement</a> with Chinese president Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>Vučić’s meetings with <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/vucic-has-friendly-meeting-with-putin-in-china/">Putin</a> and <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-signs-free-trade-deal-with-china/">Xi</a> have sparked further concerns that Serbia is moving away from seeking EU membership and closer to <a href="https://chinaobservers.eu/why-serbia-refuses-to-stick-to-the-eus-line-on-china/">China</a> and Russia. </p>
<h2>Putin’s influence in the western Balkans</h2>
<p>Vučić has not imposed <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/03/10/vucic-cant-swear-serbia-will-not-join-sanctions-on-russia/">sanctions on Russia</a> following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine – something that all other countries in the Balkans have done. Meanwhile, Putin has courted support in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89600#:%7E:text=Russia's%20invasion%20of%20Ukraine%20has,to%20join%20anti%2DRussian%20sanctions.">region</a> to counterbalance the influence of the EU and Nato, particularly since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>Shortly after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">Radoicic</a> took responsibility for carrying out the deadly attack in north Kosovo, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-troops-buildup-russia-ukraine/32619334.html">Russian broadcasters</a> reported on the event saying that Serbia was “taking back” its land and comparing Serbian paramilitary actions with Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. In addition, some <a href="https://x.com/RussianEmbassyC/status/1707865742413009369?s=20">Russian embassy officials</a> said on their X/Twitter accounts that “Kosovo is Serbia”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of western Balkans" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/555230/original/file-20231023-27-gceleu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tension: the western Balkans region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">StringerAL/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s close political allies in the western Balkans, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/14/europe/serbia-vucic-kosovo-balkans-west-intl-cmd/index.html">Vučić</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-meets-bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-hails-rise-trade-2023-05-23/">Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik</a> appear to have encouraged the regional friction.</p>
<p>In July 2023, the US treasury department announced it was imposing sanctions on Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). The treasury’s announcement alleged that Vulin was using his official position as the country’s top spy and links with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Serbian-Paramilitaries-and-the-Breakup-of-Yugoslavia-State-Connections/Vukusic/p/book/9781032044453">paramilitary groups</a> and nationalist militants to carry out <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/07/11/treasury-sanctions-serbia-spy-chief-00105637">destabilisation efforts</a> on behalf of Russia</p>
<p>Meanwhile, it has recently been reported that Russia is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/russia-recruits-serbs-in-drive-to-replenish-military-forces-in-ukraine#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20accounts%20provided%20by,nationals%20to%20bolster%20the%20army.">recruiting</a> ethnic Serbs and their <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Serbian-Paramilitaries-and-the-Breakup-of-Yugoslavia-State-Connections/Vukusic/p/book/9781032044453">paramilitary groups</a> to join its military in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Rocky road to agreement</h2>
<p>In March, Vučić and Kurti agreed to implement an <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-eu-proposal-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">agreement on a pathway to normalisation of relations</a> between the two countries at a meeting in Ohrid, North Macedonia, set up by the EU. But <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-wants-normalise-ties-with-kosovo-will-not-sign-any-agreement-2023-03-19/">Vučić subsequently refused to sign it</a>, saying that: “I don’t want to sign any international legally binding documents with Kosovo because Serbia does not recognise its independence.”</p>
<p><a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">Vučić’s</a> public narrative about Kosovo since March has increasingly used military terminology. Across Serbia, increasing numbers of murals have appeared bearing the Russian and Serbian flag colours have been painted with the phrases “<a href="https://x.com/fbieber/status/1709842190820856045?s=20">When the army returns to Kosovo</a>” and with “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-ethnic-serbs-z-symbol-russia/32437410.html">Z</a>” symbol, which have come to represent Russia’s war in Ukraine</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Normalisation-between-Serbia-and-Kosovo-must-come-from-within%7E527b3c">Ohrid agreement</a>, endorsed by the EU and the US, which they hope Serbia and Kosovo will finally sign this weekend, falls short of what either country seeks. For example, the agreement makes no reference to when Serbia will be able to join the EU. Similarly, it makes no reference of when the five <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C17/">EU member states</a> (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) who have yet to recognise Kosovo’s independence, will do so and open the path for Kosovo to integrate into the EU and Nato.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">agreement</a> essentially throws a lot of money at Kosovo and Serbia to persuade them to end their conflict by offering substantial investments from the EU and US in both countries. Given Serbia’s recent free-trade agreement with China, there are fewer incentives for Vučić to sign the agreement in its current form.</p>
<p>To stop these recurring crises between Serbia and Kosovo, the current version of the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-politics-of-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-change-the-conversation-in-kosovo-and-serbia/">agreement</a> must be redrafted. First and foremost, the EU must state when Serbia and Kosovo might join the EU. Membership is a powerful incentive for a peace deal. Secondly, to be regarded as a reliable ally in the western Balkans, the EU needs to come up with a common position on Kosovo. </p>
<p>The refusal of the five EU countries <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-European-Union-and-Everyday-Statebuilding-The-Case-of-Kosovo/Ilazi/p/book/9781032360621">to recognise Kosovo</a> indirectly advances both the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/violence-in-north-kosovo-how-the-eu-and-the-us-can-break-the-cycle/">cycle of violence</a> and Putin’s goal of destabilising the western Balkans.</p>
<p>This weekend’s meeting could not be more important in trying to settle the long-standing tension between Kosovo and Serbia, but the likelihood of success presently remains distant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A key meeting is being held in the Balkans as the EU and US seek to resolve regional tension, partly stoked by pro-Russian forces.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151052023-10-16T22:13:29Z2023-10-16T22:13:29ZHow Serbia-Kosovo tensions hang like a spectre over the European Union<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/how-serbia-kosovo-tensions-hang-like-a-spectre-over-the-european-union" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/one-police-officer-killed-another-injured-kosovo-gunfire-pm-kurti-2023-09-24/">An armed band of Serb militants</a> recently ambushed police in Kosovo. In the resulting firefight and retreat, four people — including a police officer — died from their wounds. </p>
<p>The incident sparked official recriminations from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0p1s8gZCnI">both Kosovo</a> <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/blaming-serbia-is-always-easier-vucic-says-about-kosovo-terrorist-attack/">and Serbia</a>, culminating in Serbia <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/30/europe/kosovo-tensions-military-buid-up-explainer-intl/index.html">moving its armed forces</a> towards the countries’ shared border only to subsequently withdraw them due to pressure from the United States.</p>
<p>Tensions between the two countries are nothing new. Serbia and Kosovo were previously united under Yugoslavia. The collapse of the country in the 1990s, however, caused Kosovo to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/kosovo-eyes-independence">push for independence</a>. </p>
<p>Kosovar forces, backed by NATO, expelled the remnants of the Yugoslav army in 1999. Kosovo, however, remains central to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/why-kosovo-central-serb-national-epic">Serbian national identity</a> and Serbia has never truly reconciled itself to Kosovo’s independence.</p>
<p>While Serbia’s withdrawal of military forces from the Kosovo border has seemingly solved the crisis for now, it still has the potential to escalate. </p>
<p>Despite European Union and American pressure, Serbia <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/europe/serbia-releases-from-custody-a-kosovo-serb-leader-suspected-of-a-role-in-ambush-of/article_6f84a87e-f8b0-50ed-a21d-7dbb39810d24.html">subsequently released</a> one of the alleged organizers of the attacks. Serbia, in other words, is indirectly condoning the action of the Serb militants.</p>
<h2>Failure to act</h2>
<p>Serbia’s ability to do so directly speaks to the EU’s failure in the Balkans. The U.S. and the EU have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-eu-must-join-us-in-renewed-western-balkans-talks/a-50373495">largely neglected</a> the region, hoping that the allure of EU integration would be enough to placate Serbia and other countries.</p>
<p>It has not, and this failure now threatens to undermine the EU.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-north-macedonia-is-the-european-unions-latest-self-inflicted-wound-186898">Why North Macedonia is the European Union's latest self-inflicted wound</a>
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<p>In the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict">1999 war in Kosovo</a>, EU leadership hoped Serbian politicians would abandon their nationalist policies of the 1990s.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/yugoslavia-milosevic-revolution-2000">overthrow of former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic</a> in 2000, and the EU identifying Serbia as a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163">candidate for expansion to join the union</a> in 2003, provided Serbian politicians with an alternative policy to the nationalism of the past.</p>
<p>Serbia officially submitted its <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/serbia/">application to ascend to EU member status</a> in 2009. Unfortunately, Serbia’s progress towards that goal has been painfully slow. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17846376">Slovenia</a> <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles/croatia_en">and Croatia</a>, two other former Yugoslav states, ascended to the EU in 2004 and 2013, respectively. From formal submission to full member status took each country 10 years or less. </p>
<p>Serbia’s application, now in its 14th year, shows no sign of being formally processed as it <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Serbia%20Report%202022.pdf">fails to meet</a> many of the judicial, economic and political standards the EU requires for membership.</p>
<p>Serbia has made several gestures towards achieving EU membership. Most notably, it <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/serbia-kosovo-agree-on-implementation-of-eu-plan-to-normalize-relations">agreed to a plan</a> to normalize relations with Kosovo. For many Serb nationalists, the question of Kosovo’s independence <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819">elicits visceral reactions</a> due to Kosovo’s prominence in Serb nationalist identity.</p>
<h2>Fast-tracked</h2>
<p>Neither the EU nor the international community should ignore the need for Serbia to continue to reform in order to meet those requirements.</p>
<p>The EU, however, has a long tradition of sidestepping requirements when it sees long-term benefits from rapid integration.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/world/europe/greece-admits-faking-data-to-join-europe.html">Greece</a>, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eur510022006en.pdf">Estonia</a> and other countries were admitted to the EU despite arguably failing to meet its standards. That’s because the EU has admitted nations due to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/07/26/how-exactly-do-countries-join-the-eu/">ideological reasons</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/why-is-greece-in-the-eu-grexit/">perceived political benefits</a> of admitting them.</p>
<p>In Serbia, EU membership remains a distant possibility that will probably only benefit future generations. Today, Serbians are seeking alternate ideologies that promise more immediate returns. </p>
<p>Given the EU’s association with liberal democracy and globalism, some Serbs are embracing populism and <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819">anti-western nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>It’s important to note that this isn’t the same type of nationalism embraced by Serbs in the 1980s and 1990s. The current strain of Serb nationalism, instead, has been fuelled by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-election-ultranationalists-idUSKCN0XF0LR">EU demands</a> on Serbia and the slow pace of ascension.</p>
<p>Serbia’s current leader, President Aleksandar Vučić, vividly illustrates the failure of EU policies towards Serbia. A former minister under Milosević, Vučič branded himself <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2014/07/11/serbia-comes-in-from-the-cold-with-eu-ambitions.html">pro-European</a> in the early 2010s.</p>
<p>During Vučić’s leadership, he has consistently advanced pro-EU reforms and <a href="https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/4/washington-agreement-between-kosovo-and-serbia">strengthening ties with Kosovo</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the EU hasn’t reciprocated Vučić’s gestures beyond vague encouragement. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/eeb179ae-9c13-11ea-871b-edeb99a20c6e">Neglect by the EU</a> has, in turn, made Serbia and Vučić less susceptible to international pressure. This has been obvious when observing the EU’s relations with Serbia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<h2>EU’s failure to focus on Serbia</h2>
<p>EU policymakers hoped Serbia would <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-europe-serbia-european-union-6deaa57230993b02e7a67f57693bf7f2">join the sanctions</a> against Russia. Instead, Serbia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-says-agreed-3-year-gas-supply-contract-with-putin-2022-05-29/">reached an agreement</a> with Russian energy giant Gazprom in May 2022 to meet domestic Serbian needs.</p>
<p>EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell is now threatening Serbia with punitive measures if it <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-slams-kosovo-serbia-for-not-taking-steps-to-lower-tensions/2995335">does not stop</a> provocations over Kosovo.</p>
<p>The problem with such threats, however, is that they lack substance. The EU, with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/05/world/europe/poland-eu-rule-of-law-judicial-overhaul.html">larger internal</a> <a href="https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/index_en">and international</a> concerns, is limited in its ability to apply pressure. </p>
<p>The recent outbreak of war between <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-10-10-23/index.html">Israel and Hamas</a> will only make the EU’s ability to focus on Serbia more difficult.</p>
<p>Likewise, there is no positive incentive for Serbian politicians to adhere to EU requirements. Serbian politicians want the EU to accelerate talks about Serbia’s entry into the union. The EU, however, has demonstrated that the chance of real progress on this matter is remote. </p>
<p>This reality has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-vucic-davos-world-economic-forum-european-union-membership/">dampened enthusiasm</a> from Serbians about the prospect of joining the EU.</p>
<h2>Hungary backs Serbia</h2>
<p>The EU’s problem is that its domestic and international problems not only limit the ability to deal with Serbia, but Serbia-Kosovo tensions magnify the EU’s own issues. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, for example, has already stated his country — an EU member — would <a href="https://www.timeturk.com/en/hungary-s-premier-rules-out-eu-sanctions-on-serbia/news-84102">veto any sanctions</a> against Serbia.</p>
<p>Serbia’s provocations against Kosovo also provide Russia with a potential wedge issue in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/6/putin-says-ukraine-would-last-a-week-if-western-military-support-stops">its efforts to divide</a> the EU, as demonstrated by Orban’s statement.</p>
<p>EU support for Ukraine is already facing challenges from <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-president-caputova-says-no-military-package-ukraine-aid-after-elections-results/">members like Slovakia</a>. The EU’s failure to deal with Serbia in the past will only stoke such challenges, and further inhibit the organization’s ability to respond to crises like Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The U.S. and the EU have neglected the Balkans, hoping that the allure of EU integration would be enough to placate Serbia and other countries. It was not.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134292023-09-13T16:12:02Z2023-09-13T16:12:02ZThe signs that the EU has completely changed its perspective on adding new members since Russia invaded Ukraine<p>In her annual address on the state of the European Union, Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has given her strongest signal yet of the intention to add Ukraine and other nations as member states. Her speech was the latest sign that Brussels is thinking completely differently about EU enlargement since the start of the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The way in which von der Leyen has changed her tone on the addition of new EU member states also reflects the shift away from emphasising only the economic or legal roles of the EU. Replicating the practices of more established democracies, the annual state of the union speeches, which began in 2010, have increasingly invoked notions of the EU as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2022.2149177">state-like, federal entity</a>.</p>
<p>In her first years as president of the Commission, von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_1655">said little</a> in her <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701">annual speeches</a> about adding new members. This reflected a certain accession fatigue that came following the admittance of a large number of eastern European states that ended up being <a href="https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/831226/a569592c0a71b7c5c2494f6acace6a75/mL/2020-04-eu-haushalt-finanzierung-data.pdf">the net beneficiaries of the EU budget</a> after the 2007/2008 economic crash. </p>
<p>There was also reticence about renegotiating <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN05147/SN05147.pdf">the Lisbon Treaty</a>, which forms the constitutional basis of the EU. That would be a protracted and politically difficult process requiring unanimity among member states. Such a change might be necessary to bring in new member states.</p>
<p>Von der Leyen signalled her “strong commitment” to adding new members in the past but this only pertained to the potential membership of Albania and North Macedonia. And she certainly did not frame this commitment as paramount to European democracy or unity. Nor was there any explicit reference to the accession of post-Soviet states.</p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought a change. That same year, von der Leyen <a href="https://state-of-the-union.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/SOTEU_2022_Address_EN.pdf">spoke of the conflict</a> as a showdown between “autocracy and democracy”. She explicitly stated that the western Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are “part of our family” and that their “future is in our union”.</p>
<p>Even then, however, the emphasis was on economic support and access to the single market and its perks, such as EU roaming. This is in line with the policies and rhetoric of most EU leaders through the 2010s, many of whom advocated for a multi-speed EU and promised these countries <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html">everything</a> <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html">but</a> <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.html">EU membership</a>.</p>
<h2>A geopolitical union</h2>
<p>Now, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4_eRV7r5QI">in 2023</a>, even further change is afoot. Von der Leyen is overtly presenting the EU as a geopolitical union that will take a proactive approach to adding new members rather than allowing debates to rattle on without direction. </p>
<p>The “merit-based” principle of EU accession will continue to apply but there is a key shift in perspective. Von der Leyen is now positioning further enlargement as a “catalyst for success” for the EU itself, rather than focusing on the benefit it brings to new member states. She now envisions a “union complete with over 500 million people living in a free, democratic and prosperous” EU.</p>
<p>Von der Leyen has a <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/09/12/ursula-von-der-leyen-s-three-tiers-of-challenges-pub-90530">long-term ambition</a> to move away from the idea that bringing in more member states must come at a cost to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2016.1264083">depth of integration</a> between nations. In this year’s state of the union she drew parallels to the 2004 big boom enlargement, which brought in 10 new member states at once, including Poland and Slovenia. </p>
<p>She reminded her audience that this had been called the “European Day of Welcome” and called on them to look ahead to the next set of of such days. She even insisted that the bloc cannot afford to wait for EU treaty change to become a “team” of more than 30 nations, urging her audience to think about how enlargement can be achieved without this <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/revision-of-eu-treaties.html">lengthy process</a> being fully completed. </p>
<p>Signalling Europe’s readiness to “once again think big and write our own destiny”, she introduced a “series of pre-enlargement policy reviews” – a significant shift from previous practice.</p>
<p>It is also worth noting how this discussion is now playing out in far more emotional terms than it has in the past. This was perhaps most apparent in von der Leyen’s articulation of her vision itself but was evident in the run up to her speech, which saw <a href="https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4305963/eu-enlargement-what-think-tanks-are-thinking/5116171/">much excitement</a> build around what she might have to say on enlargement. </p>
<p>In May 2023, she had <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_299">talked of</a> the EU taking “responsibility to bring the aspiring members … closer”. And now, in September, she invoked the personal story of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/ukrainian-author-victoria-amelina-critically-injured-in-kramatorsk-strike">Victoria Amelina</a>, a Ukrainian author killed in an airstrike. This highly charged moment created a sense of European ethos and became the zenith of her speech, triggering a standing ovation by members of the European Parliament.</p>
<h2>A sea change</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine has prompted a re-evaluation of von der Leyen’s original approach to EU enlargement. During the course of 2022, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Moldova have all become EU candidates, and negotiations about accession began with Albania and North Macedonia at a pace that was unimaginable prior to the outbreak of the conflict.</p>
<p>This year’s state of the union is another significant step in this respect. It was the first to frame Ukraine as a genuine candidate country for membership. Enlargement is no longer framed as a secondary, distant and primarily economic objective but an urgent political act of justice and solidarity and a necessary step to restore the security of the EU and even that of Europe more broadly.</p>
<p>Others have made moves to present the EU as a political rather than economic union in the past but have met with limited success. Von der Leyen’s words on the “call of history” to expand the EU due to geopolitical imperatives were met this time with applause rather than scepticism.</p>
<p>After years of effective hiatus, enlargement policy is back on the EU’s agenda. The addition of new member states is no longer a distant dream but a salient and current aspiration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s 2023 state of the union speech saw her press for expansion for the union’s own good.Nora Siklodi, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of PortsmouthNándor Révész, Lecturer in Politics, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2075912023-06-13T12:56:21Z2023-06-13T12:56:21ZSilvio Berlusconi had a complex relationship with US presidents: Friend to one, shunned by another<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531504/original/file-20230613-15-3b421j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C122%2C2048%2C1321&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Things looking up for the Bush-Berlusconi relationship.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-george-w-bush-and-italian-prime-minister-silvio-news-photo/119806434?adppopup=true">Philippe Desmazes/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the administration of Geroge W. Bush needed an ally to help sell its <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">proposed invasion of Iraq</a> to a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/">skeptical European audience</a>, Silvio Berlusconi stepped forward.</p>
<p>It wasn’t that the Italian prime minister was particularly concerned over the threat of Saddam Hussein’s <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7634313">imagined</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/">weapons of mass destruction</a> to his country, or the region – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/31/italy.usa">he wasn’t</a>. But it was a chance for the former businessman to burnish his credentials as an international statesman and to draw the U.S. closer into Italy’s orbit.</p>
<p>Indeed, strengthening U.S.-Italian relations was the key driver of Berlusconi’s foreign policy, as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=BEzB1hYAAAAJ&hl=en">I learned</a> while interviewing Berlusconi government officials for my 2011 book “<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Americas-Allies-War-Kosovo-Afghanistan/dp/0230614825">America’s Allies and War</a>.” The fact that Berlusconi couldn’t repeat the trick some years later when Barack Obama came to power was in large part entirely of his own making – he reportedly never recovered in the eyes of Obama from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama">comments widely seen as racist</a>. Eventually, Berlusconi would again fall in line with Washington’s interventionist foreign policy – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">this time in Libya</a> – but by then the damage had been done. Fair to say, the legacy in regards to U.S.-Italian relationship left by Berlusconi – who <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/former-italian-pm-silvio-berlusconi-has-died-italian-media-2023-06-12/">died on June 12, 2023,</a> at 86 – is mixed, a tale of two halves.</p>
<h2>A friend in need</h2>
<p>Italy never had the “<a href="https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/us-uk-special-relationship">special relationship</a>” that the U.K still claims to possess in regards to Washington. Nor did it have the clout of post-war France and Germany, whose economies were more central to the well-being of the European Union. Moreover, Italy’s political instability – it is currently on its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/21/italy-is-set-for-its-68th-government-in-76-years-why-such-a-high-turnover">69th goverment since 1945</a> at a rate of one every 13 months or so – makes it more difficult to establish lasting bilateral political relationships.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, by the time Berlusconi came to power for a second time in 2001 – following a one-year stint as prime minister between 1994 and 1995 – Italy had gone some way to ingratiating itself with successive U.S. administrations. In 1990, Italy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-64980565">supported President George H.W. Bush’s military operation</a> in the Persian Gulf, joining a coalition of 39 countries opposing Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and sending fighter jets to support the subsequent aerial bombing campaign.</p>
<p>Then in 1999, Italian jets participated in airstrikes and Italian bases served as the main launching site for U.S. and NATO jets during the alliance’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/kosovo/">military operations in Kosovo</a>.</p>
<p>But the war in Iraq was different. By fall of 2002, George W. Bush had <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/04/this-day-in-politics-sept-4-2002-805725">made it clear</a> that he intended to invade. But by then, the U.S. had lost some of the near-unanimous international support that it was afforded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Europe was divided. The public was <a href="https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/185298">very much against invasion</a>. But governments had to weigh political consequences at home, with the benefits of supporting the world’s largest economy.</p>
<p>Outside of the U.K, Berlusconi was Bush’s biggest European ally. Shrugging off <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/world/threats-and-responses-italy-florence-wary-as-opponents-of-war-stage-a-huge-march.html">massive street protests in Italian cities</a>, the opposition of many within the Italian parliament and public opinion that put support for the invasion <a href="https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_140583_smxx.pdf">as low as 22%</a>, Berlusconi went to bat for Bush’s war. </p>
<p>Unlike the U.K. – and to a lesser extent Australia and Poland – Italy did not directly participate in the invasion itself. But by April of 2003, Italy agreed to <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/italy-and-the-new-iraq-the-many-dimensions-of-a-successful-partnership-121530">send a contingent of 3,000 troops</a> to help stabilize Iraq. Explaining his rationale to the New York Times in 2003, Berlusconi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/05/world/berlusconi-urges-support-for-us-on-iraq.html">said it was “absolutely unthinkable</a>” to decline Bush’s request for an Italian military presence given how the U.S. had come to Europe’s aid after World War II.</p>
<p>Even sending that peace mission was controversial in Italy, especially after 17 Italian soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/12/international/middleeast/at-least-26-killed-in-a-bombing-of-an-italian.html">were killed in a November 2003 attack</a>. in Iraq. Indeed, with elections around the corner, in 2005 Berlosconi announced <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7337476">Italian troops would withdraw</a> from the war-torn country.</p>
<h2>Surplus to US requirements</h2>
<p>Sticking his neck out for Bush’s war won Berlusconi friends in Washington. During the Bush’s administration, the Italian prime minister <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/visits/italy">visited the U.S. on 11 occasions</a> and was invited to <a href="https://www.upi.com/News_Photos/view/upi/4da5ea3a0de9b336906cb83e3c71663a/ITALIAN-PRIME-MINISTER-BERLUSCONI-ADDRESSES-JOINT-SESSION-OF-CONGRESS/">address both houses of Congress</a> – a rarity for overseas leaders.</p>
<p>The deployment of Italian troops both in Iraq and also Afghanistan – where some 4,000 Italians were sent <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Davidson_AlliesCostsofWar_Final.pdf">and 48 died</a> – helped stabilize the U.S.-Italian ties.</p>
<p>It wasn’t a one-way relationship. In return for military support, Berlusconi benefited from his elevated role in trans-Atlantic relations, being able to sell himself as a major international player at home. And remaining friendly with the world’s biggest economy is also prudent for a country <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/business/italy-economy.html">prone to economic instability</a>.</p>
<p>So while he was ejected from office in Italy in 2006, he departed with a legacy of building up Italy’s standing with leaders in the U.S.</p>
<p>And then came the Obama years. Berlusconi <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/15/italy1">returned to power in 2008</a>, the same year that Obama was elected to his first term in office. But even before Obama could be sworn in, the Italian prime minister had soured the relationship, referring to the U.S. president elect as “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/italy-barackobama">young, handsome and tanned</a>.”</p>
<p>It may have been meant as a compliment, but it certainly came across as at best off-key, at worst racist.</p>
<p>Such eyebrow-raising remarks were, of course, not uncommon for Berlusconi, who gained a reputation for <a href="https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/silvio-berlusconis-most-controversial-distasteful-101700715.html">saying at times outrageous things</a>. But the incident didn’t bode well for bilateral relations.</p>
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<img alt="A glum looking man looks off to the side next to a similarly downcast man shuffling papers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531505/original/file-20230613-29-awxc1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-meets-with-italian-prime-minister-news-photo/88501434?adppopup=true">Win McNamee/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Conversations I have had with officials in Obama’s White House and State Department and others in Washington suggest that it wasn’t primarily about Berlusconi’s comments; there was a feeling that by the late 2000s he wasn’t reliable and had little to offer.</p>
<p>There was, however, one last U.S.-led foreign intervention that the aging Italian prime minister could play a role in. In 2011 a coalition of NATO countries were entrusted to implement a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm">U.N.-sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya</a>, amid claims of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/18/muammar-gaddafi-war-crimes-files">civilian attacks by Moammar Gaddafi’s regime</a>. Berlusconi – mindful of Italy receiving a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-libya/gaddafi-hails-italy-for-overcoming-colonial-past-idUSTRE5593OO20090610">quarter of its oil from Libya</a> and reliant on the country to implement a deal aimed at preventing African immigrants arriving on Italian shores – resisted.</p>
<p>But after Obama threw his wholesale support behind NATO’s intervention, Berlusconi acquiesced and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13188951">joined Italy’s allies in the military coalition</a>. To Berlusconi, not being aligned with the U.S. was one thing; opposing Washington’s wishes entirely was a step too far.</p>
<h2>A precursor of the populist premier</h2>
<p>Much comment has been made over the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/berlusconi-italy-trump-president/587014/">similarities between Berlusconi and another U.S. president</a>: Donald J. Trump. No doubt, the pair share commonalities – businessmen whose forays into politics were marked by right-wing populism and many, many scandals.</p>
<p>But Berlusconi’s legacy as an Italian leader on trans-Atlantic relations is best seen through the lens of Trump’s two predecessors. And it is a very mixed legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Davidson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former Italian prime minister died on June 12, 2023, at the age of 86. Throughout his terms in office he cultivated closer ties with the US – with mixed results.Jason Davidson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Mary WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067422023-06-07T12:24:51Z2023-06-07T12:24:51ZThis course studies NGOs aiming to help countries recover from mass atrocities and to prevent future violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530156/original/file-20230605-23-e0xtco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C293%2C3856%2C2311&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A witness cries while giving testimony in a trial against former Guatemalan dictator Gen. José Efraín Ríos Montt in 2013. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ana-de-leon-cries-while-giving-testimony-as-witness-in-the-news-photo/165201899">Johan Ordonez/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em></p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>“Introduction to Nongovernmental Organizations”</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>I’ve long studied mass atrocities perpetrated against people based on their religion, ethnic background, political views or simply some aspect of their identity. Over the past decade, I came to realize that what I’d learned from history classes and news media about the Nazi Holocaust, the Cambodian killing fields, the genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda, and the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s taught me what happened and why. I didn’t know, and wanted to learn, what could have been done to prevent that violence and what happened afterward to prevent it from happening again. </p>
<p>I learned that nonprofits play a critical role in preventing mass atrocities and helping communities recover from them. I developed this course to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2023.2201806">teach students about the nongovernmental organizations</a>, as these groups are called outside the United States, that do this work.</p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>It focuses on five countries with a history of mass atrocities – or the risk of experiencing them in the future – and the often difficult <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/">work NGOs do</a> in those places. Students learn about the history of conflicts and the potential for future identity-based violence in nations like Myanmar, Colombia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland and South Africa.</p>
<p>In addition, students regularly meet with staff from NGOs in each of those countries to learn what they do to address past violence and prevent it in the future. </p>
<p>Two examples are <a href="https://www.cbmitrovica.org/">Community Building Mitrovica</a> in Kosovo, and the <a href="https://www.districtsix.co.za/">District Six Museum</a> in South Africa. Community Building Mitrovica operates in a city with a population that’s evenly divided between Albanians and Serbs. It delivers programs that increase understanding and enhances the capacity of the two ethnic groups to live together peacefully.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s District Six Museum tells the story of the displacement of residents and the destruction of the District Six neighborhood under apartheid while also working to rebuild that community in post-apartheid South Africa. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C55%2C4575%2C2900&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman walks past displays outside a museum." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C55%2C4575%2C2900&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The District Six Museum commemorates a Capetown neighborhood South Africa’s Apartheid government demolished in 1966.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photograph-taken-in-the-city-centre-of-cape-town-on-news-photo/1199755969?adppopup=true">Rodger Bosch/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Systematic identity-based violence is more common than you might think. Mayans in <a href="https://theconversation.com/guatemalas-history-of-genocide-hurts-mayan-communities-to-this-day-97796">Guatemala</a> were victims of genocide in the 1970s and 1980s, as were Indigenous women in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canada-committed-genocide-against-indigenous-peoples-explained-by-the-lawyer-central-to-the-determination-162582">Canada</a> over the past 100 years. Repressive governments in <a href="https://theconversation.com/operation-condor-why-victims-of-the-oppression-that-swept-1970s-south-america-are-still-fighting-for-justice-186789">Argentina, Chile and Uruguay</a> assassinated political opponents in the 20th century. <a href="https://theconversation.com/ugandas-anti-homosexuality-law-is-a-patriarchal-backlash-against-progress-206681">Uganda in May 2023 enacted a law that criminalized homosexuality</a>, making <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/mar/14/lgbtq-crackdowns-uganda-environment-hostile">LGBTQ people fear they too could become victims of identity-based violence</a>.</p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>Threats of violence against groups due to their identity persist in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-republican-transgender-laws-pile-up-setting-2024-battle-lines-2023-05-18/">the United States</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/trans-rights-lgbt-latin-america-brazil-bolsonaro/">globally</a>. Recent political attacks on transgender and other LGBTQ people reflect this threat. NGOs are using their knowledge and skills to stave off the threat of violence against them. </p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<p>“<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CT50KiRsTbA&ab_channel=PBSNewsHour">PBS NewsHour</a>”: A segment on the trial of former Guatemalan President José Efraín Ríos Montt for genocide, and the role of NGOs in bringing him to trial.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/research/program-for-the-advancement-research-on-conflict-collaboration/e-parcc/cases-simulations-syllabi/cases/kifaya-enough-dangerous-speech-for-south-sudanese">#KIFAYA</a>: A case study of young South Sudanese activists from different ethnic groups who created a music video sung in several local languages to call for an end to interethnic violence and hate speech.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.iheart.com/podcast/1119-the-missionary-61230211/">The Missionary</a>”: A podcast that tells the story of the harm people from wealthy nations can do when they lack the skills and local knowledge to do NGO work outside their home countries. This podcast focuses on a U.S. woman accused of providing medical care in Uganda without any training. </p>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>Students ideally acquire a deeper appreciation of the hard work required to address the underlying causes of mass atrocities and identity-based violence. They learn about people who have dedicated their professional lives to reducing the threat of violence – and their successes and failures. I hope it motivates some of them to work in this field, either through volunteering or their professional careers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention at Binghamton University, which sponsored the development of this course, receives funding from an alumnus to underwrite the cost of the stipends the course provides to participating NGOs.</span></em></p>College students learn about people who have dedicated their professional lives to reducing the threat of violence – and their successes and failures.David Campbell, Professor of Public Administration, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2066802023-05-31T12:55:48Z2023-05-31T12:55:48ZKosovo government must take most of the blame for the latest violence, but any long-term solution will require a constructive response from Serbia as well<p>Renewed <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/northern-kosovo-ethnic-albanian-mayors-kfor-serbs/32432330.html">violence in northern Kosovo</a> reminds us that parts of the western Balkan region have a long way to go on the route to recovery from the wars of the 1990s that broke up the former Yugoslavia. Despite decades of western stabilisation efforts, the region remains mired in multiple <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2023.2182994">inter-linked conflicts</a> that are manipulated and exploited by local politicians. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kosovo-ethnic-tensions-have-created-a-political-volcano-that-could-erupt-anytime-197629">Kosovo: ethnic tensions have created a political 'volcano' that could erupt anytime</a>
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<p>The latest flare-up <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-kosovo-tensions-police-clash-serb-majority-north/32430434.html">was triggered</a> when recently elected ethnic Albanian mayors tried to assume office in three ethnic Serb majority towns in the north of Kosovo. A heavy police presence sought to secure the mayors’ access to municipal buildings in Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok by trying to disperse crowds of local Serb protesters. </p>
<p>But this is only the latest in a set of worrying developments in relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and between Kosovo and Serbia. Last November, the mayors of four ethnic Serb majority towns <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/11/05/serbs-resign-from-all-institutions-in-kosovo/">resigned</a>. They were joined by local councillors, ethnic Serb members of Kosovo’s parliament, the judiciary and Kosovo’s police. </p>
<p>This mass resignation was coordinated by the Serb List, Kosovo’s most influential ethnic Serb political party, and led to the further strengthening of <a href="https://www.evropaelire.org/a/institucionet-paralele-te-serbise-qe-pritet-ti-menaxhoje-asociaiconi/32331435.html">existing</a> parallel administrative structures, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/07/kosovo-serbs-continue-mass-resignations-from-state-institutions/">funded by Belgrade</a>.</p>
<p>The mass resignation <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/07/kosovo-serbs-continue-mass-resignations-from-state-institutions/">was a protest</a> triggered by attempts to force ethnic Serb drivers to adopt official <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-nato-and-the-eu-can-turn-kosovo-border-crisis-into-an-opportunity-to-put-more-pressure-on-russia-188078">Kosovo number plates</a>. But above all, ethnic Serbs were unhappy about the endless delays in establishing self-governance arrangements for their municipalities as agreed by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue_en">EU-mediated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue</a> in 2013 and reconfirmed in 2015. </p>
<p>After considerable <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/12/08/eu-us-civil-society-query-conditions-for-north-kosovo-elections/">delays</a> new local elections were finally held on April 23. Boycotted by ethnic Serbs, average <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/preliminary-results-vetevendosje-and-pdk-candidates-win-snap-elections-in-northern-municipalities/">turnout</a> across the four municipalities was just under 3.5%.</p>
<h2>The west’s response</h2>
<p>With the democratic legitimacy of the newly elected mayors in significant doubt, the EU issued a strongly worded statement immediately after the elections. It <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/kosovo-statement-spokesperson-elections-north_en">noted</a> that the elections “do not offer a long-term political solution” for the four municipalities. </p>
<p>Throughout the following four weeks, western diplomats sought to avert further escalation – but to little avail. They finally vented their frustration on May 26 in a <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-violence-in-the-north-of-kosovo/">joint statement</a> by the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quint_(international_organization)#:%7E:text=The%20Quint%20is%20an%20informal,OECD%20and%20the%20G7%2FG20.">Quint</a> (the US, France, Italy, Germany and the UK). The statement condemned “Kosovo’s decision to force access to municipal buildings in northern Kosovo despite our call for restraint”. It also demanded that “Kosovo’s authorities … immediately step back and de-escalate, and … closely coordinate with EULEX and KFOR [the EU’s civilian mission to support rule of law and Nato’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo].” It is hard to imagine a more unambiguous allocation of blame for the escalating violence.</p>
<p>In an indication of how serious the situation is considered to be, Nato has decided to deploy an additional 700 troops to Kosovo, beefing up KFOR’s current force of 3,700 soldiers.</p>
<p>Perhaps even more significantly, the US, traditionally Kosovo’s strongest western ally, has cancelled Kosovo’s further participation in the <a href="https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/DefenderEurope/">Defender Europe 23</a> joint military drills. And the US ambassador to Pristina, Jeff Hovenier, was <a href="https://xk.usembassy.gov/press_roundtable/">unequivocal</a> in his condemnation of the lack of responsiveness on the part of Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, to de-escalate the crisis in the north. He left little doubt that the US was running out of patience with the Kosovo government and was considering further punitive measures.</p>
<h2>Entrenched divisions</h2>
<p>The deeper problem here is that this particular crisis is embedded in the long-running dispute over Kosovo’s status. Once an autonomous province within the Serbian republic of the former socialist federation of Yugoslavia, its status is far from resolved. The conflict between Serbs and Albanians goes back for decades and builds on selective memories of a supposedly centuries-old confrontation between different ethnic groups. </p>
<p>It reached a tipping point in the late 1990s, which necessitated the 1999 Nato intervention and eventually led to the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008. While recognised today by some 100 countries around the world, it remains opposed by Serbia, China and Russia. In addition, Kosovo is not recognised by five EU member states, four of which are Nato members. </p>
<p>For more than a decade, the EU mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade has attempted to resolve this conflict, by nudging the parties towards concessions and compromises. Two key sticking points remain: Serbia giving up on blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organisations and Kosovo’s acceptance of local autonomy for ethnic Serbs in areas in which they form a majority of the population. A <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-eu-proposal-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">proposal</a> by the EU at the end of February to resolve these two issues remains contested between the two sides.</p>
<p>The dead end that EU efforts appeared to have reached was thrown into further sharp relief when the Kosovo government failed to move forward on implementing local self-governance arrangements for ethnic Serbs. To make matters worse, it but also appeared to curtail what little existed by its ill-judged attempts to impose the newly elected mayors with their highly questionable democratic legitimacy.</p>
<p>This is not to argue that Serb shadow authorities in northern Kosovo are any more legitimate or stabilising. On the contrary. The current situation requires de-escalation by the Kosovo authorities, but the deeper underlying problems in relations between Pristina and Belgrade require a more comprehensive and inclusive solution that reflects the interests of Kosovo, Serbia and Kosovo Serbs. </p>
<p>As the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, poignantly <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/kosovo-statement%C2%A0-high-representative-josep-borrell-ongoing-confrontations%C2%A0_en">noted</a> on May 30: “There has been enough violence – there has been too much violence. We have too much violence in Europe already today – we cannot afford another conflict.” </p>
<p>But appeals to rationality are unlikely to impress the self-serving politicians across this part of the western Balkans. So it remains unclear whether the combined west can muster the leverage necessary to not merely contain the current violence, but to forge the path to a stable future for the people of Kosovo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206680/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Once again ethnic tensions have boiled over in Kosovo.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2036302023-04-19T11:22:09Z2023-04-19T11:22:09ZWar crimes trial of Hashim Thaçi, the ‘George Washington of Kosovo’, will do little to reduce tensions in the Balkans<p>Hashim Thaçi, the former president of Kosovo and a founding member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), has been described as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35984823">“one of the key figures”</a> in the country’s recent history. He was elected as prime minister in January 2008 and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/1830796.html">declared Kosovo’s independence</a> a month later. </p>
<p>Joe Biden, as US vice-president, referred to Thaçi as <a href="https://kryeministri.rks-gov.net/en/blog/vice-president-joseph-biden-hashim-thaci-is-kosovos-george-washington/">“Kosovo’s George Washington”</a> when he visited the White House in 2010. Fast forward to April 2023 and Thaçi – with three other former KLA leaders (<a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/11/kosovo-guerrilla-turned-politician-pleads-not-guilty-to-war-crimes/">Rexhep Selimi</a>, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/tag/kadri-veseli-05-18-2017/">Kadri Veseli</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/tag/jakup-krasniqi/">Jakup Krasniqi</a>) – is standing trial in a special court in The Hague. He is the most senior member of the KLA to be prosecuted.</p>
<h2>The charges</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.scp-ks.org/en">Specialist Kosovo Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office</a> were created in 2015 by an international agreement, ratified by the Kosovo Assembly, as a hybrid instrument of justice with international judges, prosecutors and court staff operating within the framework of Kosovo law. They have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes under Kosovo law during the period from January 1 1998 to December 31 2000.</p>
<p>Thaçi and his three co-defendants are each charged with <a href="https://www.scp-ks.org/en/opening-trial-hashim-thaci-kadri-veseli-rexhep-selimi-and-jakup-krasniqi-kosovo-specialist-chambers">six counts of crimes against humanity</a> (including persecution, torture and murder) and four counts of war crimes (including illegal and arbitrary arrest and detention, cruel treatment and murder).</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://repository.scp-ks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e980e32167&doc_type=stl_filing_annex&lang=eng">operative indictment</a> against the four men, they were part of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and “shared the common purpose to gain and exercise control over all of Kosovo by means including unlawfully intimidating, mistreating, committing violence against, and removing those deemed to be opponents”. </p>
<p>These “opponents” allegedly included ethnic minorities (Serbs, Roma and others), as well as ethnic Albanians who did not support the KLA. The operative indictment also refers to the defendants’ <a href="https://repository.scp-ks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e980e32167&doc_type=stl_filing_annex&lang=eng">superior responsibility</a>, by virtue of their senior leadership positions within the KLA, for crimes committed by persons under their control and members of the JCE.</p>
<h2>Organ trafficking allegations</h2>
<p>Thaçi has pleaded not guilty and stated that he <a href="https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-65142903">expects to be acquitted</a> of all charges. His fellow defendants have also <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/10/senior-kosovo-politician-denies-war-crimes-at-hague-court/">denied any guilt</a> in what Krasniqi said was “a joint liberation enterprise and state-forming enterprise”. Selimi told the court that he “fought against the Serbian occupier who only brought evil to my country – murder, displacement, humiliation and genocide”. Veseli has <a href="https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/war-crimes-trial-kosovo-ex-030654513.html">also denied the charges</a>.</p>
<p>One of the accusations against Thaçi and his co-defendants is that they were involved in the trafficking of human organs. But the indictment against Thaçi and his co-defendants does not include any <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/hashim-thaci-war-crimes-tribunal-hague-kla-commander-kosovo">reference to this</a>.</p>
<p>The organ trafficking claims were first made in 2008 and investigated by <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo_organ_trafficking_thaci/2250583.html">Dick Marty</a>, a Swiss politician and former prosecutor. Marty’s <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12608/html#_TOC_N0EA39C88N088F3B5C">report for the Council of Europe</a>, published in January 2011, challenged “the much-touted image of the KLA as a guerrilla army that fought valiantly to defend the right of its people to inhabit the territory of Kosovo”. </p>
<p>It also found evidence of a “subset of captives” who were “taken into central Albania to be murdered immediately before having their kidneys removed in a makeshift operating clinic”. </p>
<h2>Reactions to the trial</h2>
<p>There is predictably strong opposition to the trial among Kosovo Albanians. Thousands of protesters have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-protesters-come-out-support-thaci-war-crimes/32346153.html">taken to the streets of Priština</a>, holding placards with the images of the men and slogans such as “Freedom has a name” and “Don’t equate victims with criminals”. Demonstrators have also gathered <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/04/03/albanians-rally-for-liberators-outside-hague-war-crimes-court/">in front of the courtroom</a> in The Hague.</p>
<p>According to a senior legal advisor at the Kosovo Law Institute, it is important that the trial is understood as a case “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ex-kosovo-guerrilla-chief-president-thaci-faces-war-crimes-trial-monday-2023-03-31/">against a few individuals</a> of the former KLA and not a trial against the KLA or the values that the people of Kosovo represent”. Many Kosovo Albanians, however, are unlikely to make this distinction, instead viewing the trial as an indictment of the entire Kosovo Albanian war effort. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-croatia-protests-warcrimes-idUSTRE73F18A20110416">protests erupted in Croatia</a> in 2011 against the international trial and conviction (overturned on appeal in 2012) of the former Croatian war generals <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/cis/en/cis_gotovina_al_en.pdf">Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač</a> at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (created by the UN security council in 1993).</p>
<h2>Witness fears</h2>
<p>The fact that Thaçi and his co-accused enjoy huge support and popularity could deter some witnesses from giving evidence against them. In his opening statement at the trial, acting specialist prosecutor <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWI9OK17_Qs">Alex Whiting pointed out</a> that “most of the victims of the accused were fellow Kosovar Albanians”. </p>
<p>Previous experience suggests it might be hard to get witnesses to come forward. The 2008 ICTY <a href="https://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/cis/en/cis_haradinaj_al_en.pdf">trial judgement</a> against <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/case/haradinaj">three other former members of the KLA</a> (Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj) reported “significant difficulties in securing the testimony of a large number of witnesses”. It added that “many witnesses cited fear as a prominent reason for not wishing to appear before the Trial Chamber to give evidence”.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12608/html#_TOC_N0EA39C88N088F3B5C">Council of Europe report by Dick Marty</a> referred to the relevance of Kosovo Albanian society being “still very much clan-orientated”. It also emphasised the “fear, often to the point of genuine terror, which we observed in some of our informants as soon as the subject of our inquiry was broached”.</p>
<p>The trial of Thaçi and his co-defendants is expected to last for <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/03/20/prosecution-case-in-kosovo-ex-guerrillas-trial-could-take-six-years/">up to six years</a>. More than 20 years after the alleged crimes were committed, there is the possibility, at least for some of the KLA’s victims, of some sort of resolution – however tardy, imperfect and incomplete. </p>
<p>But even if the accused are ultimately found guilty, it is safe to say that any conviction will have little impact on how these men are widely viewed in Kosovo and neighbouring Albania. </p>
<p>Evidence given at the trial may well provide a fuller picture of these historic events, but it will not dislodge existing narratives. Competing interpretations of the past are – and will remain – one of the long-term legacies of the war in Kosovo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203630/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janine Natalya Clark previously received funding from the European Research Council (2017-2022).</span></em></p>The trial of the former Kosovan president and several others highlights the sharp and enduring divisions and differing interpretations of history.Janine Natalya Clark, Professor of Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976292023-01-17T18:34:03Z2023-01-17T18:34:03ZKosovo: ethnic tensions have created a political ‘volcano’ that could erupt anytime<p>After US state department counsellor Derek Chollet recently visited Kosovo in a bid to calm tensions flaring in the north of the country, he said Washington’s priority was to prevent <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/404b3e47-b9fe-4b52-926d-10ad8244e02e">“violence metastasising”</a> (spreading) between Serbs and Albanians.</p>
<p>“The last thing any of us wants right now is a crisis in this part of the world given that we have the biggest crisis since the second world war not too far away,” Chollet told journalists. He added that: “We don’t want to be in a crisis diplomacy. First, licence plates, then barricades, we don’t want something else next week.”</p>
<p>The US diplomat was referring to a crisis late last year over <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63711841">car license plates</a> in north Kosovo, which borders Serbia. More than a decade after Kosovo – formerly an autonomous province of Serbia – unilaterally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia-idUSHAM53437920080217">declared independence</a>, Serbia has never recognised Kosovo as a sovereign state. </p>
<p>Serbs living in the north of Kosovo, similarly, do not acknowledge Kosovo’s independence and overwhelmingly regard themselves as part of the Republic of Serbia. Many have therefore continued to use car license plates issued in Belgrade. Last November, the Kosovo government began the implementation of a plan to outlaw these license plates, triggering the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/22/number-plate-row-in-kosovo-threatens-to-spark-civil-unrest-serbia">mass resignation</a> of Serbs from state jobs.</p>
<p>Although Serbia and Kosovo subsequently <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-kosovo-reach-deal-license-plate-dispute/32146641.html">reached an EU-mediated agreement</a>, the situation flared up again following the arrest on December 10 of Dejan Pantić, a former Serb police officer, who was charged with organising a “<a href="https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/kosovski-ministar-policije-bivsi-policajac-kp-pantic-uhapsen-jer-je-ucestvovao-u-napadima-na-prostorije-cik/">terrorist act”</a> against the Central Election Commission (CIK) and Kosovo Police. Kosovo authorities claimed that Pantić had attacked CIK officials and police. Serbs responded by <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serb-roadblocks-protests/32195430.html">erecting barricades</a> and blocking several main roads.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, called on Nato forces stationed in the country to remove the <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=27&nav_id=115134">“warlike barricades”</a> and insisted that Kosovo authorities would dismantle them if Nato failed to do so. Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, put Serbia’s armed forces on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/27/serbia-puts-troops-on-high-alert-as-tensions-with-kosovo-rise">highest state of alert</a>, maintaining that this was necessary to “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kosovo-serbia-roadblocks-mitrovica-kfor-aleksandar-vucic-b2252058.html">protect our people</a> [in Kosovo] and preserve Serbia.” </p>
<p>The crisis was defused after Kosovo authorities agreed on December 28 to <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=28&nav_id=115142">release Pantić</a> from prison and gave assurances that Serb protesters <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/north-kosovo-joint-statement-spokesperson-eu-high-representative-and-us-state-department_en">would not be prosecuted</a>. Vučić responded by calling on Serbs in the north to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-urges-serbs-kosovo-remove-barricades-official-2022-12-28/">remove the barricades</a>, which they agreed to do.</p>
<h2>Exploiting the crisis</h2>
<p>While the situation in the north was certainly volatile, the risk of outright conflict was arguably small – and remains so, despite sporadic acts of violence. Serbia is an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm">EU candidate</a> and Kosovo <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm">wants to follow suit</a>. Neither country has anything to gain from renewed bloodshed. </p>
<p>But this hasn’t stopped leaders on both sides ramping up tensions for their own ends.</p>
<p>Serbia’s prime minister, Ana Brnabić, told the Serbian parliament on December 21: “We are on the <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=21&nav_id=115103">brink of an armed conflict</a> thanks to [Kosovo’s capital] Priština’s unilateral moves.” </p>
<p>She also called on civil society organisations to “speak out about <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=21&nav_id=115103">the torture</a> experienced by Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija”. After Serbs in the north agreed to take down the barricades, Brnabić thanked both them and Vučić for “finding the strength to respond to <a href="https://www.vreme.com/vesti/pocelo-uklanjanje-barikada-na-kosovu-svi-su-pobedili/">brutal terror and aggression</a>.”</p>
<p>Vučić has referred to Kurti as a “<a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=01&nav_id=114974">terrorist scumbag</a>” and warned: “If the <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=12&dd=29&nav_id=115147">terror continues</a>, we will close the north of Kosovo forever to the institutions of Priština.” </p>
<p>Meanwhile political leaders in Kosovo frequently misrepresent Serbs in the north as “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serb-roadblocks-protests/32195430.html">criminal persons/groups</a>.” Extremist elements have been active in the north, including members of the <a href="https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/svijet/eskalacija-napetosti-ultradesnicari-uzvikuju-kosovo-je-srce-srbije-kfor-podigao-bodljikavu-zicu-152874">Narodne Patrole</a>, a Serb nationalist organisation with connections to the <a href="https://www.danas.rs/svet/region/vagnerovci-pozvali-patriote-iz-srbije-crne-gore-i-republike-srpske-idemo-da-oslobodimo-jarinje-ne-dozvolimo-da-braca-i-sestre-ostanu-sami/">Russian mercenary Wagner Group</a> which is fighting in the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>But focusing only on extremists ignores the valid concerns of Kosovo Serbs in the north, who have little trust in the government in Priština to protect their rights. Moreover, men and women of all ages have taken part in recent protests, as <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbs-protest-northern-kosovo/32189515.html">video footage</a> shows, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aIUpbx_YYnk">thousands of Kosovo Serb women have called for calm</a>.</p>
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<p>Political leaders in Kosovo have also been keen to stress Vučić’s relationship with Putin to argue that Russia is behind the recent crisis in northern Kosovo and has an “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/20/kosovo-pm-albin-kurti-says-russia-is-inflaming-serbia-tensions-as-ukraine-war-falters">interest in spillover</a>”. </p>
<p>This is unlikely. For one, Putin has his hands more than full in Ukraine. Furthermore, the instability in Kosovo goes back decades to the late 1980s when Kosovo’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2019/mar/20/how-milosevic-stripped-kosovos-autonomy-archive-1989">autonomous status was revoked</a>. This ultimately led to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. </p>
<p>Kurti’s assertion that Russia has “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/20/kosovo-pm-albin-kurti-says-russia-is-inflaming-serbia-tensions-as-ukraine-war-falters">a client who’s in Belgrade</a>” is also wide of the mark. It misrepresents the Serbian leadership as Putin’s lackeys and ignores the fact that Vučić has his own interests with respect to Kosovo and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/23745118.2022.2058755?needAccess=true&role=button">politically benefits</a> from instability there. Tensions in Kosovo help Vučić to win political points in Serbia and he frequently argues that <a href="https://www.danas.rs/vesti/politika/sonja-biserko-srbi-ce-se-vratiti-u-kosovske-institucije-vucic-manipulise/">Germany and Britain</a> are behind everything that Kurti does. </p>
<h2>The way forward?</h2>
<p>Kurti has used the war in Ukraine to try and accelerate Kosovo’s EU membership, and Kosovo formally submitted a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-submits-eu-membership-application-2022-12-15/">request to join the EU</a> on December 15. But the issue of Kosovo’s (and Serbia’s) membership of the EU cannot begin to be resolved until northern Kosovo is stabilised. </p>
<p>This will mean respecting the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue_en">Belgrade-Priština Dialogue</a> process, established as part of the 2013 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels">Brussels agreement</a>. Under this, Kosovo and Serbia agreed to create an <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/text-leaked-copy-serbia-kosovo-agreement-brussels/24963542.html">association of Serb majority municipalities</a> as a mechanism to protect the rights of the Serb minority in Kosovo. Ten years on, this has still not been formed. </p>
<p>No doubt with Kosovo’s membership application in mind, the EU’s high representative, Josep Borrell, recently called on Kosovo to “<a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/kosovoserbia-statement-high-representative-recent-developments_en?s=51">start immediately</a>” the process of establishing the association. This is to be welcomed. Without a progressive dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, and a solution to the issues in northern Kosovo in particular, the hostilities between the two countries will continue to simmer and Kosovo will remain like a volcano at risk of politically erupting every few years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janine Natalya Clark's most recent research (focused on resilience and conflict-related sexual violence) was funded by the European Research Council under grant number 724518. </span></em></p>Leaders on both sides are ramping up hostility for their own ends.Janine Natalya Clark, Professor of Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973722023-01-13T16:17:12Z2023-01-13T16:17:12ZSerbia and Kosovo: why the EU is intent on resolving border tension stoked by the Ukraine war<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine serves as a sombre reminder that Europe’s unresolved issues can reignite. Given the rising tension in the Balkans, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/10/10/belgrade-pristina-confirm-german-french-proposal-for-kosovo-deal/">Germany and France</a> have made settling the unresolved problems between <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/us-favors-eu-plan-for-kosovo-serbia-supported-by-france-germany-state-department/2786393">Serbia and Kosovo</a> a top priority for 2023. </p>
<p>This is particularly important after a confrontation in December 2022 over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/22/number-plate-row-in-kosovo-threatens-to-spark-civil-unrest-serbia">licence plates in northern Kosovo</a> stoked fears of a renewed conflict in the Balkans. Some ethnic Serbs do not acknowledge Kosovo’s independence, and therefore thousands of residents in northern Kosovo refuse to use Kosovan licence plates. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict">Kosovo</a> declared its independence in 2008, but Serbia continues to claim the territory.</p>
<p>The necessity of finding a lasting settlement in 2023 that may result in mutual recognition between the two states has, however, generated significant concerns due to the worries of another bloody war in Europe. Russian president Vladimir Putin has attempted to escalate tensions <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-stoking-serbia-kosovo-tensions-distract-from-ukraine-pristina-besnik-bislimi/">between Serbia and Kosovo</a> to draw attention away from his war in Ukraine, and to solidify his relationship with Serbia. </p>
<p>In December 2022, for example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/world/europe/serbia-vucic-russia.html">Serbian president</a> (and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87959">Putin’s proxy in the Balkans</a>) Aleksandar Vučić openly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/kosovo-ap-serbia-aleksandar-vucic-balkans-b2252927.html">endorsed roadblocks</a> near the main border crossing between Kosovo and Serbia, which was ironically <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64117730">blocked by trucks</a> gifted by the EU.</p>
<p>At the end of 2022, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/262-relaunching-kosovo-serbia-dialogue">France and Germany</a> appointed their own special envoys to engage with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/01/serbia-must-choose-between-eu-and-russia-says-germany">Serbia and Kosovo</a> and they are leading the EU-facilitated dialogue to resolve the dispute between the two countries. The <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/10/10/belgrade-pristina-confirm-german-french-proposal-for-kosovo-deal/">Franco-German</a> proposed agreement has <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/leak-franco-german-plan-to-resolve-the-kosovo-serbia-dispute/">nine articles</a> and is based on a document known as the <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34477/EUDO_CIT_2015_03-Kosovo.pdf;sequence=1">basic agreement</a> from 1972. This was influenced by the German experience in resolving sensitive border issues following the second world war.</p>
<p>German chancellor Olaf Scholz and French president Emmanuel Macron believe that the French and German experiences in resolving highly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-german-reunification-can-teach-kosovo/">sensitive issues after WWII</a> can help <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/09/06/macron-and-scholz-wrote-to-vucic-speed-up-dialogue-between-kosovo-and-serbia/">Serbia and Kosovo</a> normalise relations. They have proposed that Serbia and Kosovo set up <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/leak-franco-german-plan-to-resolve-the-kosovo-serbia-dispute/">permanent missions</a>, which are like embassies but operate at a lower level, as a starting point. </p>
<p>The most important part of the Franco-German proposal is that “<a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/closing-the-gap-why-kosovo-and-serbia-should-view-political-cooperation-as-an-opportunity/">Kosovo and Serbia</a> must foster good neighbourly ties with each other based on equal rights”. This puts all sides on an equal footing. The <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/leak-franco-german-plan-to-resolve-the-kosovo-serbia-dispute/">Franco-German</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-apply-eu-membership-by-year-end-president-2022-12-06/">proposal</a> offers <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-prospect-of-eu-membership-in-exchange-for-giving-up-kosovo/">financial rewards</a> with a deadline of spring 2023 and guarantees that France and Germany will strive for both Serbia and Kosovo’s entrance to the EU.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/politics/shasha-franco-german-plan-closer-kosovos-views-12-12-2022">Kosovo</a> has so far been more receptive to the Franco-German approach since it removes a roadblock to membership of the Council of Europe, the <a href="https://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=153002">UN</a> and the EU by allowing <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/kurti-hails-franco-german-plan-says-serbia-wants-to-sabotage-it/">Kosovo</a> to be recognised by five EU countries. Although the Franco-German proposal provides major EU investment in Serbia and the possibility of a quick entrance to the EU, Serbia has been less receptive.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why-192472">Ukraine war: Serbia is shifting closer to Russia – here's why</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-france-germany-kosovo-eu-entry/32071236.html">President Vučić of Serbia</a> opposed the Franco-German proposal as it implies that Serbia will eventually have to <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-prospect-of-eu-membership-in-exchange-for-giving-up-kosovo/">recognise Kosovo’s independence</a>. It contradicts the foundation of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/how-aleksandar-vucic-became-europes-favorite-autocrat/">his political career</a>, when <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-france-germany-kosovo-eu-entry/32071236.html">he stated opposition to</a> Kosovo’s independence. A recent poll found that a majority of Serbs are <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/22/for-first-time-a-majority-of-serbs-are-against-joining-the-eu-poll">against joining the EU</a>.</p>
<p>The French and Germans are betting on showering Serbia with money in exchange for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/apr/21/serbia-sliding-towards-autocracy-as-president-secures-second-term">President Vučić</a> not threatening another border conflict or war in Europe.</p>
<h2>The conflict’s history</h2>
<p>Since Serbia’s brutal <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline.shtml">war in Kosovo in 1998-1999</a> and Kosovo’s 2008 proclamation of <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141">independence from Serbia</a>, which had the support of the US and EU, the relations between the two countries have remained strained. Since 2011, when the EU tried to start <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Foreign+Affairs+Review/22.4/EERR2017039">a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo</a>, little concrete progress has been <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-kosovo-serbia-dialogue-how-the-eu-can-lead/">made</a> between the two countries. In exchange for mutual recognition, the EU has suggested that both countries become <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/conditions-for-peace-the-eus-role-in-the-dialogue-process-between-kosovo-and-serbia/">members of the union</a>.</p>
<p>One stumbling block is that most EU nations are opposed to further EU <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/06/20/what-has-stopped-eu-enlargement-in-western-balkans-pub-87348">enlargement in the Balkans</a>, and <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/the-explainer-the-eus-kosovo-refuseniks/">five EU members do not recognise Kosovo</a>: Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/way-out-balkans-morass-restoring-us-and-eu-leverage-serbia-kosovo-dialogue">EU’s ability</a> to act as a credible mediator between Serbia and Kosovo has been weakened because there is <a href="https://www.europeanforum.net/headlines/eu-summit-offers-no-clear-accession-timeline-for-western-balkan">no detailed timeline</a> for <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2022/the-eu-as-a-promoter-of-democracy-or-stabilitocracy/3-stabilitocracy-formation-in-practice-lessons-from-the-western-balkans/">the two countries to join</a>.</p>
<p>The EU has lost its some of its <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee25d408-91e7-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271">credibility</a> in the Balkans, due to its broken promises to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/35a61deb-3c65-4442-b6eb-942677a179f8">North Macedonia</a>. The EU originally said it would begin accession negotiations in 2018 but did not do so until 2022, and then only as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Ukraine war has refocused EU attention on the Balkans generally, but in reaching for <a href="https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies">more stability in the region</a> it must not abandon agreements on the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-020-00148-w">rule of law, human rights, and democracy</a>. This would only serve to empower <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejcl/8/4/article-p271_271.xml">autocrats in the Balkans</a> like Serbia’s leader.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197372/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia’s backing of Serbia during the Ukraine war is aggravating tensions with its neighbour Kosovo.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1905102022-09-23T11:03:57Z2022-09-23T11:03:57ZTo reach net zero the world still needs mining. After 26 years, here’s what I’ve learned about this ‘evil’ industry<p>On the wooded hill above the Stan Terg lead and zinc mine in Kosovo, there is an old concrete diving platform looming over what was once an open-air swimming pool. Before the break-up of Yugoslavia, people who worked at the mine would bring their families here to swim, sunbathe on the wide terrace with its view across the valley, and picnic among the trees. Now the pool is slowly disappearing into the forest, the view obscured by birch saplings.</p>
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<p>I am with Peter*, an Albanian mine worker who used to come up here with his friends before the <a href="https://borgenproject.org/the-kosovo-war/">war began</a> in 1998. Back then, Serbs and Albanians would use the pool and nearby tennis courts together, but there are no Serb mining families here now. Two decades on, the ruination in the landscape still seems unsettling – a reminder for Peter that something valuable has been lost. “I don’t know what the hell happened here,” he says.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485294/original/file-20220919-20-disl7s.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The abandoned swimming pool and diving board at Stan Terg in Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bridget Storrie</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>As we walk along a winding path he points to a cluster of blue flowers, little starbursts of colour nestled in the dead bracken. “That’s a sign there are metals underneath,” he tells me. They are a quiet reminder of the ore-rich rock that continues to disrupt life in this <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62382069">uneasy corner of Kosovo</a>.</p>
<p>Mines like Stan Terg seem to lurk in the public imagination as remote places that are dangerous, dirty, damaging, violent and destructive. They pollute streams, corrupt politicians, degrade communities and explode indigenous artefacts. </p>
<p>Or they are places where bad people go – those who exploit and extract at the expense of others, human and nonhuman, and are not concerned about the cost. We seem to prefer not to think about them unless we have to.</p>
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<p><strong><em>This story is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> and is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects to tackle societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<p>And yet, we can’t live our modern lives without mining. We may slowly be turning our backs on fossil fuels, but what about all the other geological resources with which our lives are entangled? The mined ore in our mobile phones – those palm-size assemblages of cobalt, lithium, copper, manganese and tungsten. The lead and zinc in our car batteries, the aluminium in our bicycles, the steel in our buildings, and the copper in the hidden networks of cabling that hold our worlds together.</p>
<p>The problem of mining is one for all of us. But what sort of problem is it?</p>
<h2>Mining and me</h2>
<p>My first encounter with mining came when I worked as a television news journalist for ITN in Moscow. It was 1993, and I was travelling with two colleagues across Russia doing some filming ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. We had spent the day in a dilapidated helicopter tracking the Trans-Siberian Express as it wound its way through the birch forests below us. The day ended with an emergency landing in a snow field and a lift back to the town of Irkutsk in a truck.</p>
<p>That evening, we met a group of British men in a gloomy hotel bar. None of them spoke Russian or seemed to have travelled far from their beer glasses. It turned out they were mining engineers on their way to some remote operation further north, pulled to the heart of Siberia by whatever strange thing that mine promised them. Money? Promotion? Easy sex? Theirs wasn’t a world I wanted to be part of.</p>
<p>Little did I know. Two years later, overwhelmed after the war in Chechnya, undone by a conflict with a colleague and reeling from a failed relationship, I fell out of my journalistic life and landed in a small seaside town in Namibia with a baby daughter and a man I’d married but barely knew. He was a mining engineer who drove 60 kilometres inland each morning to the uranium mine that had operated there since 1976.</p>
<p>Suddenly everything about my life – where I lived, who I met, what I did, how I felt – was mediated by a vast, contentious, spiralled hole in an ancient desert that most people preferred not to think about. I was a white mining wife sucked into a strange world of bake sales, coffee mornings and housing officers who matched the quality of homes offered with the importance of our husbands’ jobs. We were not at the top of the pile.</p>
<p>On our first weekend, my husband’s throat was cut by three young men trying to break into the small, terraced house we had been allotted. He saved his own life by drawing on his training with the Royal Marines, holding his slashed neck together, keeping his pulse low and only collapsing when he made it into the back of the ambulance.</p>
<p>The police told us the men were from Angola, drawn to this area because of the uranium and the wealth it had created. You can’t live near a mine without being aware of the inequalities it encourages.</p>
<p>Since those early days in Namibia, we have moved from mine to mine around the world, making and remaking our lives in the US, South Africa, Australia, Canada, Mongolia, Serbia, then back to Canada again. With each move, I have thought more about the complexities, controversies and conflicts that surround resource extraction. Were we making our own lives at the expense of others?</p>
<p>Whether it’s uranium in Namibia, lead and zinc in Kosovo or <a href="https://londonminingnetwork.org/2022/01/mongolian-herders-protest-at-rio-tintos-oyu-tolgoi-mine/">copper in the Gobi desert</a>, all geological entities become disruptive once they are mapped out and given value. Earlier in 2022, Rio Tinto – the world’s second-largest metals and mining corporation – had its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/serbian-government-revokes-rio-tintos-licences-lithium-project-2022-01-20/">exploration licences revoked by the government of Serbia</a> after thousands of people took to the streets, demanding that the development of a lithium mine should stop on environmental grounds.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters release flares from a city bridge" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485569/original/file-20220920-21-47lx2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-Rio Tinto protest in the Serbian capital Belgrade, December 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/belgrade-serbiadecember-2021-protestants-serbia-bloking-2086194934">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We left Belgrade in 2018, before the project became controversial, but for seven years we had been deeply involved with the complexities of mining in the Balkans. My husband led the Rio Tinto team in Serbia, and I was <a href="https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10125631/">working on my PhD research</a> at Stan Terg exploring the relationship between mining, conflict and peace. We would be on the wrong side of public sentiment if we lived and worked there now. That’s an uncomfortable feeling – not because it makes me think my association with mining puts me on the moral low ground, but because it’s frustrating.</p>
<h2>No easy answers</h2>
<p>The mining industry is changing, driven not just by international standards and external pressures but by internal forces too. I’ve met botanists, ornithologists, ecologists, archaeologists, former teachers, people who used to work for NGOs, and a host of others in the industry who are all, in their own ways, wondering how to improve things. That’s not to argue that power rests in their hands, but there is more in common between some of the people who work within mining and those who oppose it than might be imagined.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Anti-mine protesters march along a street behind a large banner" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485586/original/file-20220920-12-mb087y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indigenous communities of the Salinas Grandes in Argentina protest against lithium mining on their territory.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/san-salvador-de-jujuy-jujuyargentina-05242019-1407210869">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The frustration is that focusing entirely on the environmental and social harms caused by mining risks avoiding the true extent of the challenge mining presents us with, and the complex ways we are all tied up in it because of our consumer appetites. </p>
<p>If building a lithium mine is unacceptable in Serbia as a means to satisfy our demands, what does that mean for the lithium-rich salt flats in Chile and the Indigenous groups living there who are concerned about the <a href="https://www.mining.com/how-to-accurately-determine-the-impact-of-lithium-mining-on-water-sources/">impact of mining on their water sources</a>? Or for the lithium <a href="https://www.renewablematter.eu/articles/article/ukraine-all-lithium-reserves-and-mineral-resources-in-war-zones">under Mariupol in Ukraine</a> that was attracting international attention before the war?</p>
<p>When Serbia’s tennis hero Novak Djokovic tweeted photos of the protests along with a declaration that we need “clean air”, I wanted to rest my forehead on my desk. He’s right, of course we need clean air. But the lithium required to achieve it must urgently come from somewhere.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1467259910052274185"}"></div></p>
<p>The problem is in many sectors we need more mining, not less, for the transition to a zero carbon future. The <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/05/11/mineral-production-to-soar-as-demand-for-clean-energy-increases">World Bank has predicted</a> that the production of graphite, lithium and cobalt will have to increase five-fold by 2050 if climate targets are to be met, and the demand for lithium-ion batteries already has analysts describing lithium as “<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/china-lithium-mining-production/">white oil</a>”. </p>
<p>In April 2022, US president Joe Biden used a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/quick-payoff-unlikely-in-biden-order-to-boost-lithium-mining-/6552021.html">cold war-era law</a> – the 1950 Defense Production Act – to boost the production of lithium in the US, along with nickel and other minerals needed to power our electric vehicles. </p>
<p>Similarly, copper is integral for key <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/gs-research/copper-is-the-new-oil/report.pdf">large-scale decarbonisation technologies</a> such as offshore wind projects. Working out how to source these materials has been made more urgent by the war in Ukraine, and the need to <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/theimpactofsanctionsonuktradewithrussia/june2022">reduce dependency</a> not only on Russian oil and gas but on its minerals and metals too.</p>
<p>After 26 years, I have learned that all mining operations – actual and potential – require us to pay attention to what is most difficult about our lives: how what we consume relates to the future of the planet and the lives of those we share it with. The problem of mining is not just one of how we should extract, but how we should live. </p>
<h2>A story of optimism and attachment</h2>
<p>The people I met at Stan Terg in 2018 told me a story about mining that was not just about dirt, degradation and pollution, but also their enduring attachment to the mine and what it promises. </p>
<p>Stan Terg is the oldest mine within the huge, decaying <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trep%C4%8Da_Mines">Trepča industrial complex</a> – an ecology of mines and related infrastructure concentrated in the northern part of Kosovo. This small mine tucked away up a wooded valley, ten kilometres north-east of the town of Kosovska Mitrovica, was first developed by a British mining company in the 1920s, shortly after Serbia’s reconquest of Kosovo.</p>
<p>When the British travel writer <a href="http://www.theheroinecollective.com/rebecca-west/">Rebecca West</a> visited here <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Lamb_and_Grey_Falcon">in 1937</a>, she was enchanted by the English-style mining cottages with their unguarded front gardens and windows facing the road, reflecting the setting sun. To West, these houses expressed confidence that the mine would bring not only prosperity but also peace to this troubled region. Its Scottish general manager employed both Serbs and Albanians and was certain they would work well together. “This country,” he told West, “is getting over its past nicely.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485289/original/file-20220919-14-wboteo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stan Terg is the oldest mine in the huge Trepča industrial complex in northern Kosovo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bridget Storrie</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nearly 90 years later, the ruins of the houses that delighted West still exist above the Stan Terg mine, but they are pitted with bullet holes. While the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html">war between Serbia and Kosovo</a> in the late 1990s was not (ostensibly) over natural resources, a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/1a2c245317a99107c18339028304a797">strike by the Albanian mineworkers</a> at Stan Terg in 1989 was part of the political upheaval that preceded the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and ultimately led to Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. </p>
<p>Now this part of Kosovo is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/1/kosovo-delays-planned-serbian-border-rules-after-tensions-rise">uneasily divided</a>. Four Serb-dominated municipalities close to the border are still <em>de facto</em> ruled by Belgrade. The town of Kosovska Mitrovica, once the bustling, multicultural, industrial heart of this region, has been bisected – Serbs largely to the north of the river Ibar with their language, dinar currency and orientation towards Belgrade; Kosovan Albanians to the south.</p>
<p>But it is not just people who are divided here. Trepča’s smelter, flotation plant and three northernmost mines are also under Belgrade’s control. Settling the future of the complex is an explosive issue: a mining complex that once promised to bring people together is now pushing them apart – lending its geological heft to a conflict that has become intractable.</p>
<p>Yet the Kosovan-Albanian workers at Stan Terg are still optimistic that their mine can change things for the better. “I feel hope when I go down the mine,” one tells me. Another says it is a pleasure to work in the place that will one day make the economy better. A third describes the feeling he had when he returned to the mine after the war once the Serbs had left: “There was no happiness like it. It wasn’t just that I was going to get paid, but Kosovo was going to get stronger too.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-soviet-miner-from-the-1930s-helped-create-todays-intense-corporate-workplace-culture-155814">How a Soviet miner from the 1930s helped create today’s intense corporate workplace culture</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This is not an easy optimism to hold on to, however. It is contradicted by the ruination around us – the destroyed cinema, collapsing hotel and crumbling diving board – and by the mineworkers’ acknowledgement that life is not how they expected it would be. A tearful man worries that he made a mistake when he brought his family back here after the war. Another struggles to breathe because of the damage to his lungs. “The mine produces cripples,” he tells me.</p>
<p>Yet despite the destruction, pollution and disappointment, the mineworkers still insist that the lead and zinc rich rock beneath them is a “gift from God”, and that it will bring them all prosperity in the end.</p>
<p>Talking with these mineworkers, I realise that what is important here is the painful and profound process of creating worlds and hoping they will last; coping with the disappointment when they don’t; and remaining optimistic that a mine will deliver some sort of good life amid the evidence it never has – at least not for long.</p>
<h2>A problem of world-making</h2>
<p>Mining is not just a problem of extraction and the environmental degradation associated with it. It is also a problem of world-making. What sort of worlds do we want our geological resources to create for us? Who are they for? How long will they last? And who, and what, might suffer because of them?</p>
<p>It is tempting to think this problem is a local one – something that happens “over there” on the shores of an Arctic fjord, in the Namibian desert, in a taiga forest in the heart of Siberia, or in semi-recognised geopolitical entities with travel advisories like northern Kosovo. </p>
<p>Yet metals and minerals promise to make the world different for all of us. The lithium in our antidepressants. The stainless steel in the needles of our syringes that deliver vaccines, anaesthetics, Botox. The aluminium in our heat pumps, the copper in our wind turbines, the titanium in the <a href="https://mars.nasa.gov/mer/">Mars Exploration Rovers</a> and the gold in the <a href="https://webb.nasa.gov/content/about/index.html">James Webb telescope</a>. They all bring certain futures into view and allow us to feel confident about them: that we won’t be sad, that we won’t age, that we can achieve <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition#:%7E:text=Currently%2C%20the%20Earth%20is%20already,reach%20net%20zero%20by%202050.">net-zero carbon</a> and look after the planet – even that we can find an alternative world to escape to.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aerial view across an open copper mine to the town beyond" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485587/original/file-20220920-3577-u3g0zr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A copper mine in Erdenet, Mongolia. Global demand for copper is predicted to double by 2035.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.alamy.com/stock-image-benches-of-an-open-pit-copper-mine-of-the-erdenet-mining-corporation-160704509.html?imageid=48CCF882-09B1-4F59-A741-3995D9B18DD7&p=53965&pn=1&searchId=e1f3410eb98871f6533a210e887755e9&searchtype=0">GFC Collection/Alamy</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But they do so at a cost. The global hypodermic needles market is estimated to reach <a href="https://www.digitaljournal.com/pr/hypodermic-needles-market-expected-to-reach-4-5-billion-by-2030">US$4.5bn by 2030</a>. Europe’s aluminium smelters are facing an energy crisis while <a href="https://www.mining.com/web/column-global-aluminum-production-pendulum-swings-back-to-china/">China is ramping up its production</a> based on an increase in coal production. The war in Ukraine is threatening to disrupt titanium supplies. Demand for copper is <a href="https://cleanenergynews.ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/energy-transition-to-drive-doubling-of-copper-demand-by-2035-s.html">predicted to double</a> to 50 million tonnes by 2035, but supply is unlikely to keep up and the net-zero transition might be delayed as a result.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/14/copper-is-key-to-electric-vehicles-wind-and-solar-power-were-short-supply.html">According to Dan Yergin</a>, global vice-chairman of the S&P business intelligence group, we can’t assume that copper and other metals and minerals “will just be there”. New geopolitical worlds are likely to emerge in the rush to acquire them. </p>
<p>Like the miners at Stan Terg, are we attached to an idea of the world that is not the same as the one we live in?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sulfuric-acid-the-next-resource-crisis-that-could-stifle-green-tech-and-threaten-food-security-186765">Sulfuric acid: the next resource crisis that could stifle green tech and threaten food security</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For now, the lithium and borates-rich rock under the Jadar valley in Serbia is being pulled in all directions. People interested in protecting the environment want it to stay in the ground. A local farmer understandably wants to preserve his land. Yet we need to unearth vast of amounts of lithium from somewhere if we are to swap our petrol cars for electric ones.</p>
<p>Meanwhile mining company shareholders expect their dividend cheques, politicians want to be re-elected, people need to feel they are listened to and have some control, and everyone, in their own way, wants to prosper. This geological body, like any other, is asking questions that are hard to answer. Whose future counts? And at what cost?</p>
<h2>At the bottom of their world</h2>
<p>Before leaving Stan Terg I travel down to the bottom of the mine, three-quarters of a kilometre underground. The mineworkers – all men – have told me I cannot properly understand their world unless I experience it.</p>
<p>I watch the wet walls of the mineshaft slip past as we descend, notice the drips of water on my helmet and a deep bass hum coming from somewhere I cannot place. I am travelling back in geological time, past rocks that are increasingly ancient as we descend. For we don’t just possess tiny pieces of Kosovo, Siberia or Alaska in the smartphones in our pockets, but elements of the deep past too – minute reminders that the world we create with them should be enduring.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A mine corridor lit with electric lights" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485591/original/file-20220920-3427-nbxfx6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A different world … Inside the Stan Terg mine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bridget Storrie</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I feel disoriented at the bottom of the mine, but the workers are intimate with this place. They tell me they feel good down here. I watch as they stride off along the tunnel, their boots splashing in the water.</p>
<p>For them, the rock around us is like a human body with veins of minerals and the capacity to expand and contract as if it is breathing. They listen to the noises it makes and understand what it says to them. After so many years, they know the sound of danger.</p>
<p>But this mine also holds their memories of the days when Serbs and Albanians worked together here before the war, and of the trust that emerged between them deep underground. “There are no ethnicities in a mine,” one worker tells me, “just miners.” Another says he’d like to see his old colleagues again, although he knows not everyone would agree with him.</p>
<p>There is optimism here, of sorts: “The problem started in Trepča and the solution will be found here too,” I am told. “If we learn how to develop Kosovo together, peace will happen.” </p>
<p>Yet for all their familiarity with this place, it still has the power to surprise them. Every day they find something ancient and unexpected sparkling in the light of their headlamps. There are thousands of breathtakingly beautiful crystals down here, and none of them are the same.</p>
<p>They are powerful objects, these crystals. I have a collection on my windowsill at home: palm-sized silver and white spines of quartz, pyrite and a host of other materials – disrupting what we think we know about mining, what we might expect to find at the bottom of a lead and zinc mine in the context of conflict, and how people might think and feel when they are down there. There is more to this world, they seem to say, than we might imagine. </p>
<p><em>*Research participant’s name changed to protect their anonymity</em></p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bridget Storrie worked as a consultant for Rio Tinto for eight months in 2010-11. Her husband was a Rio Tinto employee from 1996 to 2022 and has now left the mining industry. </span></em></p>Our prospects of a better, fairer future are inextricably linked with the minerals and metals beneath our feet. Is it time to make peace with the industry that extracts them?Bridget Storrie, Post-Doctoral Teaching Fellow, Institute for Global Prosperity, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880782022-08-03T12:42:52Z2022-08-03T12:42:52ZUkraine war: Nato and the EU can turn Kosovo border crisis into an opportunity to put more pressure on Russia<p>An old dispute over a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/world/kosovo-serbia-balkans-tensions-russia-b2135606.html">decision by the government of Kosovo</a> in September 2021 to enforce the use of Kosovo-issued licence plates for Serbs in the northern municipalities – rather than allowing them to continue to use plates issued by the Serbian government in Belgrade – has flared up again and threatens to escalate into conflict between the two countries. </p>
<p>Local residents in northern Kosovo are also incensed that the Kosovo government now requires – in addition to an ID card – an entry/exit permit for visitors from Serbia. </p>
<p>The decision on number plates was announced, and then <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/21/kosovo-serbia-licence-plate-dispute-proves-hard-to-resolve/">suspended</a>, in October last year after protests from ethnic Serb residents in northern Kosovo – where approximately half of all Kosovo Serbs live, and which has been a <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/10/13/violence-in-north-kosovo-draws-conflicting-reactions/">flashpoint</a> for years. The reinstatement of the policy prompted protesters to build roadblocks, triggering the closure of two border crossings over the weekend. Protesters also allegedly fired at Kosovo police.</p>
<p>The permit system is actually something that both countries agreed back in 2011, and that Belgrade has long insisted on for visitors from Kosovo. The government of Kosovo, however, had so far not implemented this decision. But because of a growing sense of lack of reciprocity from Belgrade, Kosovo’s leaders now seem to have reversed course, possibly to have more bargaining power in so far inconclusive negotiations on freedom of movement arrangements at the Kosovo-Serbia border.</p>
<p>The unrest led to <a href="https://twitter.com/nato_kfor/status/1553852357972316160?s=21&t=FWEa44f8KbSPnCAfkH1PBA">Nato issuing</a> a statement that it was ready to intervene to stabilise the situation. The EU and US also <a href="https://albaniandailynews.com/news/kosovo-agrees-to-delay-new-travel-rules-after-tensions-rise-at-serbian-border">urged calm</a>. As a result, the government of Kosovo has agreed to <a href="https://twitter.com/albinkurti/status/1553873412782788608?s=21&t=ZDOWQX5DZojcQiFpMRr5Ag">delay the implementation</a> of the new rules on licence plates and mandatory entry/exit permits until the beginning of September. </p>
<p>Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, <a href="https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1553828734318395393?s=21&t=Upb8WO1L-rU2bbjOytdWxw">denounced</a> the attempted implementation of the new rules as a violation of <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/17009.pdf">previous EU-mediated agreements</a> on freedom of movement. Unsurprisingly, Russia sided with the Serbian position. Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, <a href="https://tass.com/russia/1487143">accused</a> the government of Kosovo and its western allies of violating the rights of ethnic Serbs and of trying to provoke violence.</p>
<p>But it’s not clear whether Russia had an actual hand in the protests, or merely exploited them in a continuing effort to discredit the west. Tensions in the Balkans are clearly welcome to Russia, and Moscow has previously been accused of fomenting instability and unrest – whether in an <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-the-attempted-coup-in-montenegro-in-2016">attempted coup</a> in Montenegro in 2016, or in the endless saga of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the status of its <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14886.doc.htm">ethnic Serb entity</a>, which is home to approximately one million ethnic Serbs (equivalent to 85% of the region’s total population).</p>
<p>Yet, over time, Russia’s influence in the region <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-and-serbia-partnership-past-its-prime">has waned</a>. The <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/04/kosovo-and-serbia-sign-historic-deal-under-trumps-auspices/">US</a> and the <a href="https://cor.europa.eu/en/events/Documents/CIVEX/6th-enlargement-day/Belgrade-Pristina%20dialogue.pdf">EU</a> have had varying success in mediating agreements between Kosovo and Serbia. Even though these have failed to achieve a full normalisation, they have prevented major ruptures in relations, the recent tensions at the Serbia-Kosovo border notwithstanding.</p>
<p>While Russia’s support for Serbia’s position of non-recognition of Kosovo is politically very important for Belgrade, China has become a more important <a href="https://osce-network.net/publications/detail/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-the-osce">economic partner</a> than Russia. Political support from Beijing, which also refuses to recognise Kosovo’s independence, is apparent from the fact that China has made Serbia its <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/china-balkans/serbia/">regional hub</a> in the western Balkans. </p>
<p>Unlike Russia, China values stability in the region, which is an important transit <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/chinas-belt-and-road-in-the-balkans-in-the-post-covid-19-era/">hub and entry point</a> to EU markets. This is likely to curb Vladimir Putin’s enthusiasm for significant escalation, but not necessarily the Russian president’s ruthless pursuit of an opportunity for destabilisation.</p>
<h2>Constraining Russia</h2>
<p>The priority for western policy in the Balkans should be to further curtail Russian influence. The potential for Moscow to escalate tensions in the region is already limited by the high level of Euro-Atlantic integration that these countries <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-and-western-balkans-towards-common-future_en">have achieved</a> since the break-up of the Soviet bloc in the 1990s. Slovenia and Croatia are members of the EU. Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are official candidate countries in various stages of accession negotiations. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate countries.</p>
<p>At the same time, all the EU member states in the region are also members of Nato. And the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:ps0008&from=ES">EU</a> and <a href="https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor">Nato</a>, respectively, maintain a security presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.</p>
<p>Yet, it is important for the EU and Nato not to be complacent about Russian influence in the Balkans, and not to create openings for the Kremlin to exploit. This requires a clear continuing commitment by Nato to stability in Kosovo and the region more generally. The EU needs to recharge membership negotiations with the region’s candidate countries – including Serbia. EU engagement is also required in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which needs to be infused with new momentum to help both sides make the necessary concessions and compromises to resolve the current crisis and avoid any future escalation. </p>
<p>Russia might be tempted escalate tensions in the western Balkans in an effort to put pressure on the west against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. In the absence, for now, of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the west, deterring it from doing so might necessitate a different kind of signalling to Moscow. There needs to be an unambiguous message that any attempts at destabilisation would not go unanswered, and that Russia itself would be vulnerable to western pressure in Syria, Belarus, and its de-facto statelets in Transnistria in Moldova, and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.</p>
<p>Together with continued military, economic and political support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, such a calibrated western strategy will ensure that the Kremlin does not overplay its hand in the Balkans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188078/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.
</span></em></p>Unrest in the Balkans might be orchestrated by Russia, but the crisis is also an opportunity for the west.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1324032020-08-05T10:56:55Z2020-08-05T10:56:55ZWhat makes a state a state? Why places like Kosovo live in limbo<p>If we look at a map, the world appears neatly organised into a patchwork of states. They are clearly named and have clear borders. Yet, a closer looks reveals a much more complicated picture. Across the globe, groups are in various stages of claiming and gaining independence and recognition. As <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/palestine-google-apple-maps-removal-israel-gaza-strip-a9624251.html">recent controversy</a> surrounding Palestine’s place in Google and Apple navigation tools shows, the map is far from finished. </p>
<p>Take <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/17/twelve-years-in-dependence-leave-kosovo-facing-foggy-future/">Kosovo</a>, which declared independence in 2008 having separated from Serbia following a devastating war in the late 1990s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. More than 20 years after the war – and a decade since the declaration – Kosovo’s statehood continues to divide politicians and the public alike. Recently, Dua Lipa, the famous singer born in London to parents who left Kosovo during the 1990s, sparked controversy when <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53483451">she tweeted</a> a map of “greater Albania” that included Kosovo.</p>
<p>Separating from another sovereign is the default way in which states are born. This is what the independence movement in Scotland seeks to do. It is also how the United States became independent in 1776 and, according to their declaration, “absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown”. The pacific island of Bougainville last year <a href="https://theconversation.com/bougainville-has-voted-to-become-a-new-country-but-the-journey-to-independence-is-not-yet-over-128236">voted in favour of separation from Papua New Guinea</a> paving the way to what is predicted to be a long road towards independence.</p>
<p>While managing to claim control of a territory and its people from a previous sovereign is important, being internationally recognised as the sovereign of that area is also crucial for functioning like other states. </p>
<p>The value of recognition becomes apparent when we look at the way in which the status of states is often based on their participation in internationally recognised families of states, such as the United Nations. South Sudan, which declared independence in 2011, is seen by many as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/24/south-sudan-civil-war-refugees-families-flee-murder-rape-arson-nyal-global-development">the youngest state in the world</a>, because it is the most recent state accepted into the UN. Other declarations of independence since then, such as that of Donetsk and Lugansk in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 or <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-and-kurdistan-find-the-road-to-statehood-filled-with-obstacles-85768">Catalonia in 2017</a> have been ignored internationally and so are not considered to have resulted in new states.</p>
<p>But not everything is black and white. Unlike what many might think, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 is not recognised by almost half of the UN’s members. Crucially, these countries include China and Russia, which are on the UN Security Council and can effectively veto any membership. And yet, Kosovo is a member of the World Bank, the IMF, UEFA and FIFA. It also made <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37009927">a joyous debut</a> at the Rio Olympics. For years – and in order to boost its statehood credentials – Kosovo has been trying to join the Eurovision song contest, but it is <a href="http://esctoday.com/176579/kosovo-rtk-full-ebu-membership-reportedly-blocked/">blocked by Serbia</a>, which is already a member of the European Broadcasting Union – the organiser of the event.</p>
<p>Kosovo is not the only state that seems in a state of limbo. Palestine is also only an observer to the UN, despite being recognised by the majority of the members, as well as being part of other international organisations such as the Arab League. Taiwan is not fully recognised, despite being one of the world’s leading economies. This lack of recognition often creates important problems. For example, the fact that Taiwan is not a member of the World Health Organisation because of its lack of recognition meant that the island was not able share with others potentially valuable knowledge at the early stages of the pandemic.</p>
<p>Kosovo has also had to face a recent trend of states <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=11&dd=07&nav_id=105462">withdrawing their recognition</a>, following an orchestrated effort by Serbia which still refuses to recognise its former province as an independent state. There was <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/09/11/czech-president-stirs-anger-after-asking-if-he-can-withdraw-recognition-of-an-independent">a brief diplomatic crisis when the Czech president</a>, Milos Zeman, suggested that his country might do the same. Serbia has also successfully lobbied against Kosovo’s membership of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serbia-fights-unesco-membership/27320037.html">UNESCO</a> and <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-scores-victory-as-interpol-rejects-kosovo-membership/">Interpol</a>. </p>
<p>This tactic is being used by several states that see independence movements as undermining their sovereignty. China has used its diplomatic clout to convince states to<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/china-extends-influence-in-pacific-as-solomon-islands-break-with-taiwan">de-recognise Taiwan</a>. Morocco makes trade deals with other states on the condition they <a href="http://www.sahara.gov.ma/en/zambia-confirms-withdrawal-recognition-called-rasd/">de-recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara</a>, which Morocco considers as part of its territory.</p>
<p>This trend of de-recognition illustrates very well that what we think of as sovereignty is neither static nor absolute. People in places such as Palestine are halfway to having control of their territories. Some, like Kosovo, have one foot in the international system and one foot out. But, at the same time, independence struggles – such as those in Scotland or Bougainville – or competitions over who has more recognition – like those between Kosovo and Serbia or Taiwan and China – show that sovereignty, a buzzword for politicians, continues to be a prize worth fighting for. It is what defines our world of states and who gets to be a member of it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article has been prepared as part of wider research and advocacy efforts supported by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society in the context of the project ‘Building knowledge about Kosovo’.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agon Demjaha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kosovo, Taiwan, Palestine, Catalonia and Bougainville are all seeking independence, with varying levels of success.George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of BirminghamAgon Demjaha, Associate Professor of Political Sciences and International Relations, State University of TetovaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1348622020-03-27T14:03:41Z2020-03-27T14:03:41ZKosovo’s government just fell – but it’s down to US meddling rather than coronavirus<p>When the government of Kosovo fell on March 25 after losing a no-confidence vote, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-25/pandemic-response-fells-first-european-government-in-kosovo?cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business">some reports</a> suggested it was prompted by the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. This is simply not true. Instead, it was driven by domestic forces desperate to block change, and the US administration’s determination to remove a government unwilling to comply with its demands. </p>
<p>After the October 2019 general election, left-wing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49955689">Vetevendosje emerged</a> as the largest party in Kosovo’s parliament. Vetevendosje’s popularity is built on its agenda for change, including commitments to reduce unemployment and social deprivation, and, most particularly, tackle the corruption which has plagued Kosovo for decades. </p>
<p>Since the end of the conflict with Serbia in June 1999, Kosovo’s two traditionally largest parties – the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) – have engaged in widespread corruption and nepotism. As a result, Kosovo suffers from chronic unemployment and dysfunctional education and healthcare systems. </p>
<p>Kosovo’s powerful Western allies tolerated the corruption so long as the criminal elite, both inside and outside government, obeyed their commands and maintained a semblance of order. This “order” has been narrowly understood as preserving a cold peace with Serbia – thereby enabling the West to present its intervention in Kosovo as a <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539">success</a>. Vetevendosje’s victory threatened this symbiotic relationship. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kosovos-controversial-insurgent-party-worries-the-west-so-much-81229">Why Kosovo's controversial insurgent party worries the West so much</a>
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<h2>Barriers to change</h2>
<p>Although it became the largest party in October, Vetevendosje didn’t enter into coalition government with the LDK until February 2020. This delay was caused by the reluctance of an older faction within the LDK – widely linked to corruption within Kosovo – to accept Vetevendosje’s radical agenda. While LDK’s more progressive wing eventually prevailed, powerful figures in the party – including its leader – were never fully supportive of the coalition. </p>
<p>An additional barrier to the realisation of Vetevendosje’s agenda was Kosovo’s president, Hashim Thaci. Thaci, who is from the PDK, was aghast at the prospect of a government committed to tackling corruption with Vetevendosje’s Albin Kurti as prime minister. In 2010, Thaci was accused of being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/14/kosovo-prime-minister-llike-mafia-boss?INTCMP=SRCH">a powerful figure within Kosovo’s criminal network</a>, something the government at the time <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11996255">denied</a>. </p>
<p>The Vetevendosje-led government was further undermined by the external context. The EU’s credibility within Kosovo has decreased in recent years, owing to the lack of progress on both <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/western-balkans-dateless-accession-perspective/">membership talks</a> and <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/protestors-impose-visa-on-european-commissioner-hahn/">visa liberalisation</a>. As a result, many – most prominently Thaci – called for the US to assume a greater role in brokering a deal with Serbia, seen as key to resolving Kosovo’s disputed international status. </p>
<p>The appointment of Richard Grenell as a US special envoy to the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue in February 2020, was therefore <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/20/trump-moves-grenell-from-balkans-to-national-intelligence/">welcomed by Thaci and his supporters</a> as evidence of a new US commitment. Grenell wasted little time in issuing a series of blunt demands, including that to ensure continued US support, Kurti’s government must <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/02/04/grenell-urges-new-kosovo-government-to-abolish-tariffs-as-soon-as-possible/">immediately remove the 100% tariffs</a> imposed by the previous government on Serbian goods exported to Kosovo. </p>
<p>Kurti agreed to remove the tariffs but in a phased manner and only if Serbia discontinued its campaign to persuade countries to <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/how-can-kosovo-respond-to-serbias-derecognition-campaign/">withdraw their recognition</a> of Kosovo. Kurti also stated that negotiations with Serbia should be led by the government of Kosovo rather than the president, as stipulated by Kosovo’s constitution, and that any future deal should exclude the exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia, a proposal both Thaci and Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/world/europe/kosovo-serbia.html">have intimated their willingness to support</a>. </p>
<p>In response, various political figures in the US – <a href="https://twitter.com/DonaldJTrumpJr/status/1237361127513784322">including Donald Trump’s son</a>, Donald Trump Junior – threatened to discontinue US support for Kosovo and <a href="https://twitter.com/sendavidperdue/status/1237198479056830467">pull US troops out of the NATO-led peacekeeping mission</a> stationed there. These threats frightened Vetevendosje’s coalition partners the LDK, and Thaci, who appealed for compliance with the American demands, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/HashimThaciOfficial/">warning</a> that Kurti was a “devilish … dangerous … liar”.</p>
<h2>Coronavirus response</h2>
<p>The coronavirus pandemic provided those determined to oust Vetevendosje with the opportunity to do so. Despite the government’s implementation of a series of swift measures to deal with the crisis, including school and restaurant closures and curfews, Thaci unilaterally declared that Kosovo should be placed in a state of emergency. In such a situation, <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/political-crisis-deepens-as-mustafa-issues-ultimatum/">the government’s powers shift to Kosovo’s security council</a>, which is chaired by Thaci. </p>
<p>The government rejected this and issued its own set of emergency measures which increased restrictions on people’s movement without transferring power to the president. Thaci then called on the public to ignore the government’s decree. </p>
<p>When Kurti fired an LDK minister who backed the president, the LDK’s old guard demanded that Kurti reinstate the sacked minister and immediately accede to all the American demands or face a vote of no-confidence. The US ambassador to Kosovo <a href="https://twitter.com/USAmbKosovo/status/1242532549206904832">tweeted his support for the motion of no-confidence</a> and Vetevendosje lost the vote when the majority of LDK MPs voted with the opposition. </p>
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<p>Now that the government has fallen, Kosovo enters a period of <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/the-governments-downfall-leaves-kosovo-politics-i-nturmoil/">great uncertainty</a>, although it’s likely that Kurti will continue in a caretaker role until new elections can be held.</p>
<h2>A photo opportunity</h2>
<p>For those in Kosovo whose wealth and power depends upon the maintenance of the status quo – such as the old guard in the LDK, opposition parties, and Thaci – the need to remove Vetevendosje was obvious. For the US, the impetus was different, though equally mendacious. </p>
<p>At the root of the current American interest in Kosovo is the looming US presidential election. Although neither Trump nor his administration have previously shown any interest in Kosovo, a deal between Serbia and Kosovo brokered by his administration is attractive because of the PR value a photo opportunity with Trump, Thaci and Vučić would represent. Hence the US determination to force Kosovo to accept Serbia’s conditions on talks. </p>
<p>The removal of Vetevendosje may make reaching a deal between Kosovo and Serbia more achievable, but <a href="https://www.peacefare.net/2020/03/13/a-bad-deal/?fbclid=IwAR2Qm_JQh8Z8Q4_qDGbr-gn9NbxiBNL_LzPEkosKKID5dzx6FuHd3cR4_Rg">the proposed deal</a> will likely have dire consequences for Kosovo, and the wider region. The vast majority of experts have consistently warned that an exchange of territory on the basis of ethnicity will have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/17/kosovo-serbia-land-swap-ethnic-cleansing">profoundly negative repercussions for peace and stability throughout the Balkans</a>. This warning, however, has evidently been ignored by those both inside and outside of Kosovo, who are desperate to pursue their own narrow self-interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The collapse of the government in Kosovo is a victory for reactionary forces within Kosovo and the self-seeking agenda of the Trump administration.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1173442019-06-05T19:13:33Z2019-06-05T19:13:33ZWhat’s next for the Western Balkans?<p>For the first time since 1999, the two most powerful leaders in the European Union, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, displayed a united leadership concerning the future of the Western Balkans. It is the first major attempt in many years to ease tense relations between Serbia and Kosovo.</p>
<p>On April 29 in Berlin, the Franco-German duo <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/168/the-western-balkans">pledged their support to the region</a> through the reinforcement of the rule of law, security and migration assistance, socio-economic development, and peace and reconciliation efforts. Further talks will take place at the <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/06/03/german-french-diplomats-today-pristina-preparations-paris-summit/">Paris summit on July 1</a>.</p>
<p>The Western Balkans, racked by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399">war and tragedies</a> throughout the 1990s, has recently seen a surge of significant political, social and economic progress. Yet the need for reforms and transformation is still crucial.</p>
<p>This is why heads of state and government from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia, as well as the EU’s foreign policy high representative Federica Mogherini, gathered with Merkel and Macron in Berlin. One of the central subjects at the extraordinary summit will be discussing the road ahead for Kosovo and Serbia and the possibility of their <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-kosovo-agree-to-talks-following-berlin-summit/a-48541196">normalising their relations</a>.</p>
<h2>Kosovo and Serbia at the crossroads</h2>
<p>This summit came at a time of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/macron-and-merkel-try-to-resurrect-serbia-kosovo-talks-at-berlin-summit/">tensions between Kosovo and Serbia</a>. Relations between the two countries collapsed again last year after an initial attempt of a EU-led dialogue for normalisation. One of the main issues at stake has been a possible adhesion of the two countries to the European Union.</p>
<p>Despite an agreement by the two countries to not undermine each other’s prospects to integrate the EU, Serbia has lead continuous campaign against Kosovo’s international recognition, most recently against a bid by the country to <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/11/20/kosovo-s-bid-to-join-interpol-fails-11-20-2018/">join Interpol</a> in November 2018. In retaliation, <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/Kosovo-Serbia-the-normalization-of-relations-depends-on-the-dialogue">Kosovo imposed a 100% tax on goods coming from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina</a>.</p>
<h2>A demonstration of Franco-German diplomacy</h2>
<p>The complex nature of European integration requires leadership and the ability to negotiate agreements, solve disputes, and bring people and countries together.</p>
<p>Chancellor Merkel talking about the summit stated that it was not meant to make decisions but as “an open discussion”, while President Macron <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/30/balkan-leader-summit-in-berlin-aims-to-break-kosovo-serbia-deadlock">stressed the importance</a> of “security and stability in the region, and progress on reforms”.</p>
<p>The meeting was led by Merkel and Macron with the aim of breaking the deadlock in the region. Taking the initiative showed true leadership, and it has been evident that in recent years that both Germany and France are actively engaged into shaping EU policy, and together are becoming a powerful force in global diplomacy.</p>
<p>Among many examples, they <a href="http://theconversation.com/the-un-security-council-in-a-post-brexit-world-france-and-germany-take-the-lead-113078">jointly led the UN Security Council</a>, recently signed a new cooperation treaty in <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/01/08/signature-nouveau-traite-franco-allemand-aix-la-chapelle">Aachen</a> and displayed a shared diplomatic stance on the <a href="https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/ger-fra-situation-ukraine/2213496">Ukraine-Russian tensions</a>.</p>
<h2>A future in the EU?</h2>
<p>The Western Balkan countries believe that their future lies in the European Union – even if the Union is itself entangled in a number of issues such as immigration, security or <a href="http://theconversation.com/the-shadow-of-nationalism-in-the-new-populist-proposals-in-europe-117127">populist movements</a>. To the Balkan countries, it is literally a question of war and peace.</p>
<p>As European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-france-juncker-balkans/western-balkans-need-eu-path-to-prevent-new-wars-juncker-idUSKBN1HO15C">stated on April 17</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“If we don’t succeed in making the Western Balkans new member states, we will again experience the same problems we saw in the 1990s.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As Junker <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en">stated in February 2018</a>: “The Western Balkan countries now have a historic window of opportunity to firmly and unequivocally bind their future to the European Union” and that their integration “is an investment in the EU’s security, economic growth and influence and in its ability to protect its citizens”.</p>
<p>However, an integration also means to meet the goals and agenda set by EU strategies, as he recalls:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“For the countries to meet all membership conditions and strengthen their democracies, comprehensive and convincing reforms are still required in crucial areas, notably on the rule of law, competitiveness, and regional cooperation and reconciliation.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>When peace is threatened by foreign interests</h2>
<p>The ongoing conflict-resolution effort in the region will also contribute to peace and security in Europe. For countries such as Russia, China and Turkey that are working to spread and assert their power, the Western Balkans occupy a strategic space, with a range of opportunities, stiff competition and potential clashes.</p>
<p>Russia’s involvement in the region was particularly pointed out. A May trial revealed the implication of Kremlin military intelligence agents in a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegrin-coup-verdict-a-wakeup-call-to-eu-on-russia-s-rising-role-in-balkan-instability/29933787.html">coup attempt in Montenegro</a> that could endanger the Balkans stability.</p>
<p>In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnic tensions remain the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/29/bosnia-europe-econmy-ethnic-nationalist">main vulnerabilities</a>, a situation that could serve <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-election-complex-ethnic-problems-dodik/29529200.html">foreign agendas</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277888/original/file-20190604-69095-1rvmy49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ethnic distribution in the western Balkans, 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://picryl.com/media/ethnic-distribution-in-the-western-balkans-2008">CIA Cartography Centre/Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The question of Kosovo’s independence shows how foreign states have divergent visions: it is recognised by <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-countries-recognize-kosovo-as-a-country.html">more than 113 countries</a>, including the United States, Germany, France, the UK and Italy, while Russia, China and Serbia, among others, oppose such recognition.</p>
<p>Looking back on the 1990s, the role of an EU–United States alliance to bringing peace in the region was vital. According to observers, it is perhaps <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/04/15/hahn-us-supportive-eu-western-balkans/">as crucial today as ever</a>.</p>
<h2>Starting afresh: the road to Paris</h2>
<p>The Western Balkans summit in Berlin ended with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-kosovo-agree-to-talks-following-berlin-summit/a-48541196">Kosovo and Serbia agreeing to work together</a>. Though the meeting itself was not meant to come up with substantial, concrete results, it sent important messages.</p>
<p>Furthermore, in midst of the debate about the idea for land swap between Kosovo and Serbia – an ethnically based proposition – Angela Merkel torpedoed the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/21/serbia-needs-kosovos-respect-not-its-land/">partition plan</a>. The message conveyed to the summit was that in a free-market region, no ethnic border changes should happen. Multi-ethnic societies are a value to the entire region, as Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative asserted, not a liability.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1122982569295982599"}"></div></p>
<p>Calling the Balkans summit “a courageous step”, Christian Schwarz-Schilling – a former German minister and EU High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina – <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-berlin-balkan-conference-a-surprising-breakthrough-in-the-cards/a-48536697">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Now, the people of the Western Balkans are waiting for their chance to join the European Union as well.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite some changes in the EU parliament after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/27/five-things-we-have-learned-from-the-election-results-across-europe">2019 elections</a>, the pro-European forces will continue to be the majority. However, it is clear that the key word in the coming period is <em>negotiation</em>. Discussions among the political groups in the European Parliament will determine many aspects of the European vision, including the Union’s enlargement question.</p>
<p>Even if the people of the Western Balkans show a strong desire to join the EU, how and when the concrete integration would happen remains an open question. Which path will be chosen, how trust will be built and which actions will follow will much clearer after the <a href="https://www.sudouest.fr/2019/04/30/sommet-des-balkans-pousses-par-macron-et-merkel-la-serbie-et-le-kosovo-prets-a-discuter-6030588-4803.php">July 1 meeting in Paris</a>. Should such a vision fail, the Western Balkans will probably remain just a geographical and historical term with a tragic history and identity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117344/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Valon MURTEZAJ served as Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo (2016-2017).
He was awarded the Officer of National Order of Merit by President of French Republic.</span></em></p>What can be the road ahead for Kosovo and Serbia under the EU patronage?Valon Murtezaj, Professor of international negotiation and diplomacy, IÉSEG School of ManagementLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136692019-03-22T14:00:28Z2019-03-22T14:00:28ZKosovo: disputes continue 20 years after NATO bombing campaign<p>The bombing campaign against Yugoslavia that began on March 24 1999 was the first time NATO went to war. The 78-day campaign, known as <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm">Operation Allied Force</a>, was officially conducted to protect civilians. They had been caught in the middle of the conflict between the secessionist insurgents of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Yugoslavian security forces. The conflict had dramatically escalated in 1998, when the KLA began an armed campaign to end the Yugoslavian (or, more specifically, <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia">Serbian</a>) rule over Kosovo. </p>
<p>Even now, 20 years after the intervention, and despite the military, diplomatic and financial investments of Western powers in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/kosovo-5474">Kosovo</a>, a political agreement on the status of Kosovo is nowhere to be seen. Quite to the contrary, tensions between the unilaterally declared Republic of Kosovo and Serbia – the state it seceded from back in February 2008 – are running high. The interests of both parties appear to be diametrically opposed. Kosovo aims to be recognised as a state by Serbia and, in turn, Serbia’s main national interest is to sabotage the international recognition of its former province. </p>
<h2>‘An excuse to start bombing’</h2>
<p>NATO’s air superiority encountered few obstacles in 1999. The transatlantic military intervention began after negotiations between the members of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the KLA, aimed at giving Kosovo greater self governance, collapsed. Henry Kissinger described the failure of these so-called “Rambouillet talks” as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo">“excuse to start bombing”</a>.</p>
<p>The uninterrupted bombing of Yugoslavia lasted 78 days and involved 38,400 sorties, including 10,484 strike sorties. By the end, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević had capitulated.</p>
<p>In military terms, Operation Allied Force was a clear success. It achieved its major objectives. Perhaps the most important aim was, through the <a href="https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm">Kumanovo agreement</a>, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav/Serbian security forces from Kosovo. NATO troops were subsequently deployed on the ground and remain there to this day. </p>
<p>It should be noted, however, that the bombing was illegal. It was done without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. An international commission convened to investigate the intervention later came up with a fascinating semantic formula to explain this away – the bombing had been <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf">“illegal but legitimate”</a>. </p>
<p>The operation has been romanticised by its supporters. Former Czech President Václav Havel, for example, described it as the first time that states waged war “in the name of principles and values” rather than their national interest. This idealist perspective, however, neglects the fact that the intervention had significant geopolitical motivations. </p>
<p>The operation was fervently supported, and indeed implemented, by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair – leaders who were very much a product of their time. This generation transformed post-Cold War euphoria into military adventurism. Both leaders developed their own “humanitarian” doctrines which advocated intervention – which, in practice, meant war – to protect threatened civilians. They went on to present themselves as humanitarian heroes at home. Others saw their actions as imperialism.</p>
<p>The campaign also resulted in massive collateral damage. There were hundreds of civilian victims. I’ve found that between 80% and 87.5% of the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328098617_Kosovo_and_the_Collateral_Effects_of_Humanitarian_Intervention?_sg=dfsI5FCxkpdq-N2s9gnTobMrwHU2T4FBteB5boyQnbKqtp8f_dybBaXAsLG34fEz7IjGqFYUdKcRVDMySjCNkSfMRarzRSEk-ItIyQMh.UETUL6JKmO_7UVMvlGMuZJ-ksQLiLGLLkRK3TOyV_4bTA38cQBPc7m0mRtsAfgpCbunisHTormUL3CBP25dbfQ">victims of the Kosovo conflict</a> died during or in the aftermath of Operation Allied Force. The KLA took advantage of the power vacuum created by the NATO intervention to carry out <a href="http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=19413&lang=de">revenge killings and abductions against Serbs, Bosniaks, Roma and other minorities</a>. </p>
<h2>The elusive political settlement</h2>
<p>The bombing dramatically shaped the political future of Kosovo. It paved the way towards its (unilaterally declared) independence on February 17 2008 – a move which was encouraged by Washington and some European allies. At first glance, it would seem that this development would solve the crisis in Kosovo. </p>
<p>But Kosovo is far from achieving full international recognition. It is, for one thing, still unable to join the UN, the gold standard when it comes to statehood. Even if enough states did support its bid for membership, Kosovo could face a veto – certainly from Russia and probably from China.</p>
<p>An EU-led agreement signed in 2013 aimed at “normalising relations” between Kosovo and Serbia is in deadlock, sabotaged by the mutual distrust of all parties involved. The term “normalise” is, of course, deliberately vague. For all Kosovo officials I have talked to, nevertheless, the meaning of the term is crystal clear – full mutual recognition.</p>
<p>The problem is that if a solution is not found, further border alterations could be on the cards. That might mean, for example, a potential exchange of territories between Serbia and Kosovo or the unification of the latter with Albania. The aspiration of uniting all Albanians in a single polity continues to attract support among Albanians in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia.</p>
<p>Western policymakers, however, categorically reject any further border alterations – perhaps because it would illustrate their own failure to “settle” the Kosovo case. Further border transformations may even plant the seeds for future sovereignty-driven conflicts. </p>
<p>Decades on, it’s clear that reaching a political settlement after a military intervention can be a nightmare. Certainly much more difficult than launching a bombing campaign.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jaume Castan Pinos is the author of Kosovo and the Collateral Effects of Humanitarian Intervention (Routledge, 2019).</span></em></p>The fallout from this 78-day military campaign continues to be felt.Jaume Castan Pinos, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/934082018-03-19T12:58:42Z2018-03-19T12:58:42ZBritain’s role in the Balkans – why Boris Johnson is about to turn pro-EU<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210514/original/file-20180315-104676-drf5g0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Neil Hall</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Here’s a paradox from Brexit Britain. This summer, at a summit meeting in London organised by the UK’s Foreign Office, a hard Brexiteer – the foreign secretary Boris Johnson – will be the designated advocate of EU membership for the Western Balkan states. A country preparing to leave the EU will preach the accession of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/bosnia-10925">Bosnia-Herzegovina</a>, Albania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro to the European Union. A country seeking to “take back control” from the heavy-handedness of Brussels will advise others to relinquish their sovereignty to that same superstate. What’s going on here?</p>
<p>The London summit in July will host the leaders of the six Western Balkan states and those of Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Austria. It’s part of the so-called <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=berlin+process+balkans&oq=berlin+process+balkans&aqs=chrome..69i57.4952j1j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">Berlin Process</a>, an intergovernmental initiative introduced by Angela Merkel in 2014 whose goal was to help the development of the Western Balkans by focusing on investment, connectivity, infrastructure and regional cooperation, with the ultimate aim of their <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-balkans/eu-opens-door-to-balkans-with-2025-target-for-membership-idUKKBN1FQ1X4">joining the EU</a>.</p>
<p>So far, as part of the process, a <a href="http://www.rycowb.org/">Regional Youth Cooperation Office</a> has been established to “promote the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation between the youth in the region through youth exchange programmes”. An <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/policy-highlights/regional-cooperation/20150828_chairmans_conclusions_western_balkans_summit.pdf">agreement</a> has also been signed for the settlement of bilateral disputes. There is also talk of a Western Balkans Economic Area, where goods, services, investments and skilled workers would be able to move without obstacles. </p>
<p>The Berlin Process includes, from the EU side, the five strongest and most prominent member states. Every summer, the leaders of these countries meet with the leaders from the six Western Balkan countries to reaffirm their commitment to the region’s European integration. They also aim to attract pledges for investment and take a family photo during a highly publicised summit.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210512/original/file-20180315-104663-1u3ht26.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Delegates arrive at the 2017 summit in Trieste.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, following a commitment made in 2014, it’s Britain’s turn to be the host of that summit. The 2018 meeting is an opportunity for the UK to show that it has something substantial to offer to European affairs despite Brexit. After all, every host so far has shaped the agenda by including their own expertise. In Vienna, three years ago it was civil society engagement, in Paris, two years ago, it was climate change. Last year’s summit in <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/international/news/2017-07-12-western-balkans-summit-2017-delivering-region_en">Trieste</a> dealt with the rule of law and the fight against corruption.</p>
<h2>Delicate balance</h2>
<p>Despite its imminent departure from the EU, Britain does still have a useful role to play in the Berlin Process. That might include its security expertise as a strong military nation that remains an enthusiastic member of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nato-786">NATO</a>. With geopolitics becoming increasingly significant for Europe’s foreign policy, the Western Balkans is one of the most vulnerable regions of the continent. From a security perspective, the region is highly exposed to risks on the periphery of Europe. </p>
<p>The security risks in the region include a generic fear of return to the wars of the 1990s among some post-Yugoslav states, the threat of <a href="https://theconversation.com/radicalisation-in-bosnia-old-wounds-reopened-by-an-emerging-problem-63534">Islamic fundamentalism</a>, the rise of organised crime, geopolitical and geo-economic competition from China, Russia, or Turkey.</p>
<p>Then there are the existing bilateral disputes among post-Yugoslav states. All have unresolved border issues – some of them subject to international arbitration. And all these disputes affect stability. None of the states have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve these issues, but any security assistance from abroad to one country may be seen to antagonise the interests of the neighbouring country.</p>
<p>Focusing so heavily on the issue of security can also actually harm political progress. People in the region increasingly experience a backsliding of democracy. </p>
<p>As a recent House of Lords <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/53/53.pdf">report</a> noted, there is “serious concern that gains made towards good governance and the rule of law are in danger of being lost as countries in the region turn to authoritarian leadership, nationalistic politics and state capture”. And a recent <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/balkan-countries-still-facing-old-human-rights-issues-01-18-2018">report</a> by Human Rights Watch found that most countries in the region still face serious challenges in upholding human rights standards.</p>
<p>Because the primary concern has, for so long, been security in the Western Balkans, such anxieties have, for the most part, fallen on deaf ears in Western capitals. Geopolitical concerns have allowed local leaders and governments to enjoy lax political conditionality for the sake of security and stability – what has been labelled “stabilitocracy”. As a result, liberal politics have deteriorated and advances made during the 2000s have eroded.</p>
<p>It’s important that any security agenda embraces democracy, human rights, and rule of law – the “holy trinity” of political transformation, which itself is a necessary condition for security and stability in the region. That should be the common goal of both the Berlin Process and the European Commission, the latter having recently adopted a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf">new enlargement strategy</a> for the Western Balkan candidate states. The biggest challenge for Johnson and the Foreign Office, on this particular occasion, is to find ways to cooperate effectively with the European Union, aiming at the inclusion of the Western Balkan countries in the European family, at a time when the UK is excluding itself from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adis Merdzanovic receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Othon Anastasakis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The foreign secretary will host a summit in London this summer on helping Balkan states join the EU.Othon Anastasakis, Program Director and Senior Research Fellow in South East European Studies, St Antony's College, University of OxfordAdis Merdzanovic, Postdoctoral Researcher, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/918692018-02-16T09:36:21Z2018-02-16T09:36:21ZKosovo is still locked out of the EU ten years after declaring independence – why?<p>As Kosovo prepared to celebrate the ten-year anniversary of its declaration of independence, it was hit with a bitter blow: on February 6, the EU Commission released its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-commission-european-parliament-council-european-economic-and-social-committee-a-0">strategy</a> for the accession of the Western Balkans, which made it clear that Kosovo’s prospects of joining the EU are remote. Reeling from high unemployment, perennial corruption and a series of recent crises, the people of Kosovo badly needed a boost – instead the EU’s strategy delivered a slap in the face.</p>
<p>Given Kosovo is a small, landlocked country with limited natural resources, membership of the EU has naturally always been one of its top priorities. In its 2008 <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249677.stm">declaration of independence</a>, Kosovo expressed its wish “to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies” and “our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union”. </p>
<p>Kosovo’s population is the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-balkan-membership-new-strategy-tough-love/">most keen to join the EU</a> of any in the the Western Balkans, with 90% in favour; in Serbia, only 26% support membership. Kosovars are also exceptionally hopeful about membership, with 37% convinced their country will probably join the EU by 2020. Yet despite its people’s high hopes, the country’s chances of joining have not improved since 2008.</p>
<p>At the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, the EU <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm">reiterated</a> “its unequivocal support” to the Western Balkans, and declared: “The future of the Balkans is within the European Union.” But, since then, only Croatia has joined. The commission’s recent <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-commission-european-parliament-council-european-economic-and-social-committee-a-0">report</a> on the region suggests that Serbia and Montenegro may be ready to join in 2025 and it is encouraging but decidedly vague about the prospects of Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo, it says: “has an opportunity for sustainable progress through implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and to advance on its European path once objective circumstances allow”. Those opaque words will raise few people’s spirits.</p>
<h2>Jumping through hoops</h2>
<p>One of the major barriers to Kosovo’s membership is the intransigence of other European states. Five EU members still do not recognise Kosovo’s independence: Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and Romania show no sign of softening – and Spain’s opposition has <a href="https://euobserver.com/enlargement/140771">hardened</a> thanks to recent events in Catalonia.</p>
<p>Full membership would also demand that Kosovo accede to various unwelcome demands from abroad. These include a new <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fjona-krasniqi/kosovo-montenegro-border-agreement-what-you-need-to-know">border demarcation with Montenegro</a>, a <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-serbia-normalization-agreement-key-benchmark-eu-accession/">normalisation agreement</a> with Serbia and, at the behest of Kosovo’s five powerful Western sponsors – the so-called <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/west-warns-kosovo-against-undermining-war-court-01-05-2018">Quint</a> – its co-operation with the <a href="https://www.scp-ks.org/en">Specialist Chambers</a> established to investigate criminality perpetrated by the KLA during the conflict with Serbia. </p>
<p>It feels to many like <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/decade-shattered-dreams/">Kosovo is being asked to jump through hoops</a> just to facilitate the membership ambitions of its neighbours and the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539">self-image</a> of its external patrons. The fact that Kosovo is the only Western Balkan nation whose citizens <a href="http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=444">still require a visa</a> to travel to the Schengen area is a particularly acute source of frustration.</p>
<p>All told, Kosovo’s celebrations of a decade of independence are tinged with ambivalence, if not <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/sow-eats-farrow/">despair</a>. To be fair, the news isn’t all bad: since 2008, there has been notable progress on a <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/small-moments-victory-kosovo/">range of social issues</a>, and the country’s civil society is developing fast. Kosovo has joined the World Bank and the IMF – and earlier this month finally got to use its own <a href="https://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2017/02/06/kosovo-begins-using-new-dialling-code/">telephone dialling code</a>. Kosovo has also been admitted to UEFA, FIFA and the International Olympic Committee. </p>
<p>But its bids to join Interpol and UNESCO both failed and its application to debut at the 2018 Eurovision Song Contest was also <a href="https://eurovoix.com/2017/09/28/kosovo-not-debut-eurovision-2018/">refused</a>. International recognition of Kosovo has also seemed to be going into reverse of late; Serbia is <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=01&dd=08&nav_id=103213">trumpeting</a> mixed signals from a number of states – among them Guinea-Bissau, Suriname and Egypt – as evidence that the tide is turning in Belgrade’s favour. Even the vice-chancellor of Austria, which does currently recognise Kosovo, recently <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02&dd=12&nav_id=103466">suggested</a> that this is “a matter for Serbia alone”.</p>
<h2>Who’s to blame?</h2>
<p>Kosovo declared independence from Serbia unilaterally and, as such, its independence has always been contentious. It is also hardly a model EU candidate state – it suffers from endemic corruption, cronyism and organised crime and, for all the emphasis on “multi-ethnicity” in the 2008 constitution, it remains sharply divided along ethnic lines. The education system is notably <a href="https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2015-results-in-focus.pdf">poor</a> and, according to the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo/overview">World Bank</a>, while Kosovo’s economic growth has outperformed its neighbours: “the current growth model relies heavily on remittances to fuel domestic consumption”.</p>
<p>Kosovo’s assorted problems are by no means unique. But even though Kosovo has been afforded an unparalleled degree of support by Western states – and indeed the EU – since Belgrade’s rule was suspended in mid-1999, it simply has not made the progress its external supporters promised. </p>
<p>Kosovo itself is not to blame for this. Its key sponsors – the very states who actively encouraged it to unilaterally declare independence – have for too long tolerated, and at times facilitated, the activities of a corrupt elite. They have periodically engaged in their own brand of <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/un-promises-community-assistance-no-compensation-poisoned-roma-kosovo/">mismanagement</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/judge-quits-eu-kosovo-mission-alleging-corruption/">corruption</a>, and made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/sep/02/kosovans-blair-true-hero">promises</a> they were in no position to keep. </p>
<p>Kosovo’s current predicament is therefore an indictment of the Western powers who have intervened to “help” it. And the costs of their failures are now being borne by Kosovars themselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Europe’s youngest state badly wants into the EU, but the hurdles in place are high.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/856612017-10-18T23:38:31Z2017-10-18T23:38:31ZWhy the European Union’s hands are tied over Catalonia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190913/original/file-20171018-32358-1nv09n0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A young girl wearing the Spanish flag (right) walks with another young girl wearing an 'estelada,' or independence flag.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent weeks, the dispute over Catalonia’s quest for independence from Spain has captivated the attention of many parts of the world.</p>
<p>There is concern about further outbreaks of violence if the government in Madrid and the Catalonian independence movement cannot resolve their differences. This has led commentators to call for the European Union <a href="https://theconversation.com/crisis-in-catalonia-what-the-eu-must-do-now-85377">to step in</a> and mediate. But such hopes are not well founded.</p>
<p>The EU has neither the tools nor the will to tackle the separatist crisis in Spain. </p>
<p>Here’s why.</p>
<h2>Bad timing</h2>
<p>First, the conflict over Catalonia’s status comes at a less than ideal time for the EU. Officials in Brussels are consumed with thorny negotiations over the United Kingdom’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40788669">withdrawal from the EU</a>, the continuing flow of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41413303">migrants to Europe</a>, and challenges to the rule of law in <a href="http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungary-pub-72988">Poland and Hungary</a>, to name just a few issues. There is crisis fatigue in the EU and limited enthusiasm for trying to put out another fire.</p>
<h2>A member state club</h2>
<p>Second, the EU is not equipped, for legal and political reasons, to tackle separatist disputes like the one in Catalonia. As journalist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/03/eu-catalonia-brussels-spain">Natalie Nougayrède</a> points out, the EU cannot dictate how member states organize themselves or interact with their regions. Article 4.2 of the <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-provisions/5-article-4.html">2009 Lisbon Treaty</a>, which revised the key constitutional treaties of the EU, states that the EU will not interfere with key state functions such as “territorial integrity” or “maintaining law and order.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190914/original/file-20171018-32358-4bp8pc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pro-independence supporters hold a European Union flag during a rally in Barcelona, Spain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Francisco Seco</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This means member states still largely dictate the policies of the EU and the member states have shown no willingness to back the Catalan separatists. This stems, in part, from a feeling of solidarity with the state of Spain. Some of the major powers in Europe are also distracted by major domestic challenges, be it Brexit for the United Kingdom, reforming the labor market in France or negotiating a new coalition government in Germany. </p>
<p>But ultimately, member states are worried about creating a precedent. Providing support for the independence movement in Catalonia, which is in open conflict with the Spanish government, could embolden other separatist forces <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/world/europe/catalonia-independence-referendum-eu.html">across the continent</a>, such as the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-21/belgium-s-separatists-reawaken-as-nationalism-stalks-europe">Flemish in Belgium</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/corsican-separatists-to-end-military-operations-in-october">Corsicans in France</a> or the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/europe/italy-lombardy-veneto-referendum-autonomy.html?_r=0">Lombards in Italy</a>.</p>
<p>In that sense, Kosovo provides a telling reminder of the general reticence toward secession movements among EU member states. Although it unilaterally declared independence nine years ago, five members of the EU – Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Romania and Cyprus – still refuse to this day to formally recognize the sovereignty of <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/the-race-for-eu-membership-neighborhood-turkey-uk-european-commission/">the Balkan country</a>.</p>
<h2>Limited mediation prospects</h2>
<p>Third, even acting as a mediator in Catalonia’s dispute would be a stretch for the EU. This is not for a lack of experience or success. For example, in the Balkans, the EU managed to broker a <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-and-serbia-may-seal-eu-deal">major agreement in 2013</a>, which allowed Serbia and Kosovo to normalize relations. It also intervened in the midst of a 2015 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/europe/macedonia-government-is-blamed-for-wiretapping-scandal.html?_r=0">political crisis in Macedonia</a>, following revelations that the government had illegally wiretapped many opposition figures. The <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5372_en.htm">2015 Prižno agreement</a>, mediated by the EU, proposed a roadmap to de-escalate the situation.</p>
<p>But, what worked in that one region cannot be easily applied to the Catalan case. While the major protagonists in the Balkans welcomed EU assistance, Spain regards the current dispute as a purely domestic matter. Whereas the EU had some leverage in the Balkans, either through its financial aid or the promise of potential membership, it lacks similar clout regarding Spain and Catalonia. </p>
<p>The EU would have little to offer the Catalan separatists to encourage them to compromise. The EU’s so-called “<a href="https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21730163-embracing-catalonia-holds-no-appeal-europes-leaders-eu-will-not-help-catalan">Prodi doctrine</a>,” named after the former President of the European Commission, clarifies that any region breaking away from an EU member state would be automatically kicked out, and would then have to go through the lengthy application process to have a chance to rejoin.</p>
<h2>Toothless on the rule of law</h2>
<p>Fourth, focusing on the rule of law and upholding democratic norms could also prove challenging for the EU in this case. Certainly, some European leaders condemned the heavy-handed response of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/world/europe/catalonia-independence-referendum-eu.html?_r=0">the Spanish police</a> during the Oct. 1 vote in Catalonia, which left hundreds injured. But EU officials equally highlighted that the referendum was clearly illegal, not in line with good referendum practices and in violation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-eu-is-right-to-back-spain-against-catalan-separatism-85041">the Spanish constitution</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, there is no sign currently that the EU is considering punishing the Spanish government for its use of force in reaction to the vote. But even if the situation worsened, and Spain once again resorted to excessive force, the EU lacks effective tools to hold member states accountable for not living by fundamental democratic values. As scholars <a href="http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungary-pub-72988">Heather Grabbe and Stefan Lehne explain</a>, member states are reluctant to allow too much oversight from the EU when it comes to monitoring the rule of law. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-european-union-and-comments/title-1-common-provisions/7-article-7.html">Article 7 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty</a> lists possible sanctions that the EU could pursue if a member state does not respect key values. These include suspending a country’s voting rights. But Article 7 requires a high threshold of support among member states for its activation and implementation. Indeed, you need the support of at least 80 percent of the member states, as well as the consent of the European Parliament, to even officially determine that a country may be at risk of breaching key EU values. It is no surprise then that Article 7 has not been used to this day.</p>
<p>This is not to say that the EU should stay on the sidelines. Offering informal mediation advice, keeping in close contact with the Spanish government and the Catalan separatists, and constantly calling for a peaceful <a href="http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_CMM_4.10.17__0.pdf">solution to this dispute</a>, would not hurt. But, the key to a long-term solution, whether amendments to the Spanish constitution that would allow referendums or strengthening Spain’s Senate as a representative of the country’s regions, rests with the Spanish actors. The EU has enough on its plate as it is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert explains why the EU is ill-equipped to handle a problem like Catalonia.Garret Martin, Professorial Lecturer, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/850972017-10-04T19:13:19Z2017-10-04T19:13:19ZPassion and pain: why secessionist movements rarely succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188695/original/file-20171004-12163-120qaih.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Catalans protest the Spanish government crackdown after voting for independence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Yves Herman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Calls for “independence” have been increasingly heard on the streets of Barcelona in recent days. Those powerful emotions can drive people to extremes, which in some cases include killing and dying. Yet for the high price often paid, independence movements are rarely successful and their outcomes are usually less than hoped for.</p>
<p>Catalonia’s recent vote for independence provoked a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/catalonia-holds-general-strike-protest-referendum-violence">heavy-handed response</a> from the government in Madrid. This has, in almost textbook style, conversely increased support for independence.</p>
<p>The Spanish government’s response was wrong if the intention was to secure Catalonia’s loyalty, but perhaps the right response if the intention was to shore up falling nationalist support elsewhere.</p>
<p>Independence movements commonly start with a small number of idealists, yet quickly grow when central governments respond with repression. In such circumstances, the desire for “freedom” takes root and flourishes. So the first responses of central governments to secessionist movements are critical to their outcome.</p>
<p>There are currently well over 100 secessionist movements, including four in the Philippines, dozens in India, around eight in Myanmar, and several dozen in Africa. Many of these have produced bloodshed and trauma well in excess of possible practical gains. Yet, despite their numbers, very few secessionist movements are ultimately successful, while the costs for governments imposing a nominal unity can be high for all involved.</p>
<p>With high risks and limited chances of success, secessionist movements are rarely about pragmatism and more about fervour. Even with popular support, these movements rarely have the political or military capacity to impose their will on the state from which they intend to secede. </p>
<p>Such limited examples of secessionist success that there are have relied on either external intervention – such as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16207201">Bangladesh</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18kosovo.html">Kosovo</a> – or agreement by a weakened parent state, such as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36358235">Eritrea</a> and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/10/world/africa/south-sudan-fast-facts/index.html">South Sudan</a>. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14919009">Timor-Leste achieved independence</a> on the back of both factors.</p>
<p>Having overcome daunting odds of achieving independence, the success of post-secessionist states has, on balance, been poor. Bangladesh has struggled between periods of incapable civilian government, military coups and a state of emergency. Since independence in 1991, Eritrea has been an authoritarian one-party state with no political activity allowed.</p>
<p>Kosovo has been marked by divisive ethnic politics, while South Sudan has been wracked by ethno-political fighting since independence in 2011. Timor-Leste is a successful democracy, yet survived intact only due to international intervention ending civil conflict in 2006.</p>
<p>Of the world’s separatist movements, the most recent and notable, next to Catalonia, is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/world/middleeast/kurds-independence-referendum-explainer.html">Kurdistan</a>. A Kurdish state would have a potentially sound oil-based economy and a very capable military.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong><em>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalans-and-kurds-have-a-long-battle-ahead-for-true-independence-85080">Catalans and Kurds have a long battle ahead for true independence</a></em></strong></p>
<hr>
<p>Yet even an independent Kurdistan would require access to trade routes to export oil. This is currently blocked by its parent state, Iraq, and suspicion or hostility from neighbouring Turkey, Syria and Iran. Kurdistan may continue to pursue independence, but it would likely have a more viable economic future as an autonomous state in a federated Iraq.</p>
<p>Even when successful, the cost of independence can be high. It can bring destructive wars, lack of economic activity and independence leaders failing to translate as wise politicians and capable administrators. The skills needed to win independence are not those required to rebuild and run a successful state.</p>
<p>So the record of successful secessionist movements is, overall, poor. The rhetoric of freedom and reward is more usually reflected in little of either.</p>
<p>Catalonia is luckier than most, having an experienced set of politicians and administrators. It also has, for now at least, an intact infrastructure and a vibrant economy. Its chances of success, should Madrid let it go, would be better than most.</p>
<p>Yet what is now more practically needed in Catalonia, and for most other secessionist movements, is a relatively high level of regional autonomy. Loosening the ties that bind can ease tensions and make states more stable, if in federated or similar form, rather than being tightly controlled and therefore resented.</p>
<p>Spanish President Mariano Rajoy’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/20/spain-guardia-civil-raid-catalan-government-hq-referendum-row">threat to revoke Catalonia’s autonomy</a> is, therefore, precisely the wrong response for a leader wishing to quell secessionist demands. It was, after all, Spain’s Constitutional Court’s decision to restrict Catalonia’s existing autonomy that sparked the present calls for independence.</p>
<p>Spain’s governing People’s Party may strengthen its faltering support base by appealing to a wider nationalist sentiment in favour of state unity and imposing control over Catalonia. But imposed control will likely prompt further and more deeply entrenched separatist sentiment.</p>
<p>Given their vast differences, the fate of the handful of successful separatist movements cannot be used as indicators of an independent Catalonia’s future. But the drivers of separatism, and impediments to achieving independence, are shared.</p>
<p>Catalonia has been at the forefront of Spain’s domestic battles, and it could be that the current push for independence will spark another. Should it come to this, the cost of such conflict would exceed any possible benefits, for both Catalonia and for Spain.</p>
<p>The question, then, is how Spain’s national government and the Catalan independence movement can step back from a showdown. Failure to do so may mean the consequences become irretrievable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Damien Kingsbury is married to Timor-Leste’s Honorary Consul in Victoria, Rae Kingsbury. He was advisor to the Free Aceh Movement in the successful 2006 Helsinki peace talks, and has advised a number of other separatist movements.</span></em></p>Despite the passionate for which they are usually fought, independence movements are rarely successful and their outcomes less than hoped for.Damien Kingsbury, Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816942017-08-01T17:30:21Z2017-08-01T17:30:21ZIslamic State: the West must embrace local state ownership of the region’s conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180376/original/file-20170731-5295-cfgm53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The offensive to retake Mosul from Islamic State has damaged thousands of structures in the historic Old City.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Has the Middle East – now beset by inter-nation, inter-Muslim and inter-ethnic conflict – been engulfed in a war without end unleashed by the barbarism and terror of Islamic State <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-versus-daish-or-daesh-the-political-battle-over-naming-50822">(ISIL)</a>?</p>
<p>ISIL murders both other fundamentalist Sunni Muslims as well as Shia Muslims; Saudi Arabia is combating Iran; Turkey belatedly fights ISIL while attacking the Kurds. And the US and Russia, their bombs raining down on Syria, have been sucked into this maelstrom, sometimes in uneasy alliance against ISIL, sometimes supporting their own factions in direct opposition to each other.</p>
<p>The Syrian crisis is apocalyptic – a disaster of biblical proportions, with more than <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-refugees-idUSKBN1710XY">five million refugees</a>. The acts of unspeakable brutality carried out by ISIL are quite deliberate. They help create the myth that it’s omnipotent.</p>
<p>But tragically, headline grabbing British, European and American soundbites over Syria have substituted for a proper understanding of the conflict. </p>
<p>Since 9/11, the West has had a pretty poor success rate for its interventions in Muslim countries. Yet indulging in the fictitious luxury of isolationism — doing nothing in the face of genocide as it shamefully did over <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-important-that-the-world-still-reflects-on-rwandas-genocide-75751">Rwanda in 1994 </a>– is indefensible.</p>
<p>Instead, countries like Britain should act carefully and not bombastically. They should make common cause with both Saudi Arabia and Iran to confront a common ISIL enemy. They should also seek to dissuade Turkey from its sectarian role, encouraging a realignment of Middle East politics to overcome its violently corrosive fault lines.</p>
<p>That may be the only way to prevent the continuing war and terror.</p>
<h2>Western intervention</h2>
<p>Tony Blair’s Labour government was right to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/18/sierra-leone-international-aid-blair">intervene and save Sierra Leone</a> from savagery in 2000 and also to prevent the genocide of Muslims in <a href="http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/former-yugoslavia-and-the-role-of-british-forces">Kosovo in 1999</a>. But very few, even those supporting it at the time, dispute that Blair’s 2003 support of Bush in Iraq has led to disaster.</p>
<p>Now, Britain is helping defend, with – unusually – Iran on the same side, a fledgling Iraqi government. The current Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider Al-Abadi, has promised inclusive Shia-Sunni rule quite different from the Shia sectarianism of his Western backed predecessor Al-Maliki. But he is weak and Sunni-influenced sectarianism remains rife in Iraq.</p>
<p>Nevertheless there is a real danger that, by stepping in at all, western powers risk freeing Middle East governments – and their militia proxies – to pursue other sectarian agendas to the detriment of the anti-ISIL campaign.</p>
<p>The West must be very determined to ensure that there is regional ownership of – and responsibility for – tackling the ISIL problem. Otherwise the conflict becomes the very one ISIL craves: with the “infidels” of the West.</p>
<h2>But what is ISIL?</h2>
<p>Although in 2014 ISIL seemed to have sprung out of nowhere, its emergence from Al-Qaeda in Iraq came from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions">Syria in 2011</a> when President Bashar al-Assad unleashed a campaign of butchery against protesters peacefully demanding the democratic values of the <a href="https://global.britannica.com/event/Jasmine-Revolution">Arab Spring</a>.</p>
<p>ISIL contains many foreign fighters from across the Arab and Islamic world. But its leadership included several senior ex-Saddam Hussein army and intelligence officers of legendary cruelty – a powerful mix of extremist ideology and professional military expertise.</p>
<p>Yet within Iraq, the goals of the ex-Saddam Sunni Baathist leadership and ISIL are very different. It was a marriage of convenience which subsequently deteriorated. ISIL’s objective is an Islamic State stretching from Iraq to Syria. By contrast, its Sunni Iraqi allies either wanted to overthrow what is a Shia dominated government to regain the Sunni supremacy they lost when Saddam was removed, or favoured a semi-autonomous region, like the Kurds.</p>
<p>ISIL is medieval both in its barbarism and in its fanatical religious zeal. But, at the same time, it is a product of a deep seated sense of Sunni disenfranchisement from the autocracies in the region. Unless that political malaise is addressed, ISIL – and groups like it – will continue to feed off popular resentment.</p>
<p>ISIL’s members possess a devout belief that the sole truth is possessed by the conservative <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabi sect</a> dating from the 18th century within the Sunni strand of Islam. The rise of a new caliphate has long been the stated aim of global Jihadi terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. But the rigidly extreme Wahhabism specific to ISIL makes them an even more potent threat than Al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Unlike Al-Qaeda, ISIL have run the necessary trappings of a state in the areas that they have captured – courts, schools and a degree of welfare support. This can bring local people used to an unregulated, chaotic and often violent power vacuum on side.</p>
<p>Aside from being the bloodiest, ISIL was also, allegedly, the world’s richest terrorist organisation. In 2014 it had reserves of over <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions">USD$2 billion</a> according to British intelligence. </p>
<h2>What makes ISIL so dangerous?</h2>
<p>Sunni support for ISIL was encouraged not just by the disastrously anti-Sunni sectarianism of the previous Iraq’s Al-Maliki, a Shia, but by the butchery of Assad, also Shia-aligned.</p>
<p>Because the Al-Maliki regime openly persecuted Sunnis, ISIL’s call to arms resonated with those who normally wouldn’t support its extremism. This is one of the reasons the Iraqi army folded at the sight of the oncoming ISIL hordes in 2014.</p>
<p>Adding to the toxic mix in Iraq has been the presence of up to a million fighters belonging to disparate Shia militias, some directly funded by Iran, of which local Sunnis are deeply suspicious.</p>
<p>There are other groups who would also look favourably on an ISIL-led caliphate spreading their way. These include Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia for example. </p>
<h2>What can be done about ISIL?</h2>
<p>In proudly publicising its own atrocities ISIL seeks to goad the West into reacting emotionally, not strategically, on the basis of a hypothetical threat when the real threat is in the region.</p>
<p>Yet for all their blood lust, capabilities and wealth, ISIL has been no match for the military, drone, surveillance and intelligence capacities of NATO. Nor Russia’s ferocious air power. </p>
<p>Iran’s de facto, if covert, blessing for Western military strikes against ISIL, especially in Iraq, might have opened an opportunity for future engagement and collaboration. This could be transformative for the whole region, including Israel/Palestine.</p>
<p>But US President Donald Trump’s bitter opposition to the nuclear deal with Tehran, his bellicose rhetoric and his Saudi favouritism, threatens that.</p>
<p>Across the region, Iranians as Shiites sponsor Hezbollah and other militias. Saudis and Qataris as Sunnis sponsor Al Qaeda and other Jihadists – including ISIL – helping unleash a monster.</p>
<p>But, unless the US and Europe are prepared to embrace local state ownership of the region’s conflicts and to put the onus on those states to find a solution, there’s no prospect of peace and stability in the Middle East.</p>
<p><em>This is an edited version of a speech delivered by Lord Hain, a former British anti-apartheid leader, MP, and cabinet minister. He is now Visiting Adjunct Professor at Wits Business School.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81694/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Hain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The West needs to push for local action against Islamic State’s reign of terror in the Middle East. States in the region must find solutions to the conflicts to bring peace and stability.Peter Hain, Visiting Adjunct Professor at Wits Business School, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812292017-07-20T07:32:23Z2017-07-20T07:32:23ZWhy Kosovo’s controversial insurgent party worries the West so much<p>The results of Kosovo’s recent general election were a huge surprise: <a href="http://www.vetevendosje.org/">Vetëvendosje</a> (“Self-determination”), up to now a small opposition party, won 32 seats, making it the largest party in parliament. This put a sudden end to the political duopoly exercised by Kosovo’s two dominant parties, the <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/pdk-forms-war-faction-coalition-haradinaj-pm-candidate/">PDK</a> and the <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/cracks-widen-in-ldk-ahead-of-kosovo-election-05-26-2017">LDK</a>, under whose rule the country fell prey to persistent corruption and economic stagnation. </p>
<p>During those dismal years, <a href="http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library/democratic_governance/public-pulse-11/">apathy set in</a> among the electorate – but Vetëvendosje has put an end to that. As <a href="http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=06&dd=14&nav_id=101541">Albin Kurti</a>, the party’s nominee for prime minister, told me: “We cannot just give people hope, but we can give them courage.”</p>
<p>Evidently this strategy has paid off. But while the new public enthusiasm that carried Vetëvendosje to victory might seem welcome, not everyone in Kosovo is happy about it.</p>
<p>Under the terms of a widely criticised 2014 ruling by Kosovo’s constitutional court, if a coalition formed before the election collectively wins the largest number of seats, it has the automatic right to first try to form a parliamentary majority. A coalition comprising the country’s so-called “<a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-trio-aiming-new-government-05-19-2017">war wing</a>” parties collectively won 39 seats, and is now frantically trying to pull together a parliamentary coalition. To do so, it will need the support of various smaller parties who represent Kosovo’s minority communities.</p>
<p>But even if this effort comes off, any government comprising such a motley crew of parties is unlikely to last very long. That means there’s a strong possibility that Vetëvendosje will be in government in the near future – a prospect that many Western ambassadors in Kosovo have historically hoped to avoid.</p>
<p>For many years, key Western representatives in Kosovo declined to engage with Vetëvendosje because of the tactics they <a href="https://xk.usembassy.gov/ambassador-delawies-interview-express/">employed</a>, particularly the use of tear gas to obstruct parliament. But since the latest election, the party’s leaders have been invited to discuss their governance plans at a number of foreign embassies in the capital, Pristina. This represents a dramatic change of tack on the part of the international community, and one they have essentially been reluctantly forced to make. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, even after the election, Vetëvendosje has still been portrayed by some international commentators as a party of “anti-Serb nationalists”, “violent leftists” and/or “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/kosovo-lurches-to-nationalism-as-brussels-lets-down-its-friends/">populists</a>”. The reality, however, is quite different. </p>
<h2>Rising up</h2>
<p>Vetëvendosje was set up in 2004, and it soon made some very powerful enemies. The group engaged in direct action, including street protests and the obstruction of parliamentary procedures, and openly criticised the alliance between Kosovo’s corrupt political elite and its international partners. These efforts to hold the international community accountable for colluding in criminality immediately earned the party negative press. </p>
<p>The charge that Vetëvendosje is “violent” is <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/basic-facts-vetevendosje/">a misrepresentation</a>. It’s true that the party has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/11/kosovo-parliament-buys-scanners-to-stop-mps-bringing-teargas-to-work">set off tear gas</a> in parliament, but it was <a href="http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/midst-tear-gas-and-arrests-kosovo-assembly-holds-session-02-19-2016">not the only party</a> to do so. It’s also true that some Vetëvendosje protests have descended into clashes with the police, but many past and present movements in the West – from the suffragettes to Black Lives Matter – have found themselves on the receiving end of heavy-handed policing after engaging in direct action protests.</p>
<p>Then there’s the “anti-Serb nationalists” charge. Critics who make this claim usually cite Vetëvendosje’s opposition to a <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Kosovo/Kosovo-the-Association-of-Serb-Municipalities-163867">2015 deal</a> giving more autonomy to Kosovo’s Serbian municipalities. Vetëvendosje argues, however, that it opposes the deal not out of hostility to Serbs in Kosovo, but because of what it considers the Serbian government’s growing influence in Kosovo. As Kurti explained to me: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>What’s happening in Kosovo is the same process that happened in Bosnia in the early 1990s, which led eventually to the formal recognition of <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21707877-banned-vote-separate-bosnian-serb-national-day-has-some-people-talking-war-referendum">Republic Srpska</a> as a separate entity. We oppose this erosion of Kosovo’s sovereignty by Serbia.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Additionally, since 2013, Vetëvendosje has run the Pristina municipality, which includes the village of Bërnica. As newly elected Vetëvendosje MP Fitore Pascolli told me: “In Lower Bërnica, Serbs are in the majority and they have no problem with us. We have worked with them on improving their infrastructure and public services. They recognise that we are not against them.”</p>
<h2>Image management</h2>
<p>Behind the hyperbole, the real bone of contention is that Vetëvendosje has consistently criticised the states and international bodies still present in Kosovo – the so-called “internationals” – for their unaccountable powers, excessive interference in domestic politics, and particularly their failure to tackle high level criminality perpetrated by Kosovo’s political elite. </p>
<p>The internationals have variously tolerated and colluded in Kosovo’s corruption largely out of concern for their own reputations. It is certainly true that having intervened in 1999, and then engaged in a state-building operation unprecedented in scale, many Western states have significant political capital invested in <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539">declaring Kosovo a “success”</a>. Renewed violence would be a PR disaster. </p>
<p>The internationals, says Kurti, have therefore “implemented a pre-conflict rather than a post-conflict administration. Their primary aim has been to maintain ‘order’, even if it comes at the expense of integrity and good government. They have worked with an elite who agreed to stop violence so long as they are free to engage in their corrupt activities.”</p>
<p>Kurti is not alone in this view. A <a href="http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/20101218_ajdoc462010provamended.pdf">Council of Europe report</a> stated that the international presence “undoubtedly” knew about and tolerated the activities of Kosovo’s “mafia-like structures of organised crime”.</p>
<p>Vetëvendosje’s success should be welcomed by those who support people power and progress in Kosovo. That so many representatives of Western democracies have sought to isolate and demonise the party is a shameful indictment of their priorities, and evidence of their complicity in the persistent misrule that Kosovo has endured. But this latest election has made clear that the era of apathy is over – and that marginalising Vetëvendosje is no longer an option.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After years of propping up corrupt parties in the name of ‘order’, Kosovo’s international backers have a very different partner to deal with.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.