tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/kuwait-6531/articlesKuwait – The Conversation2023-12-05T16:56:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188532023-12-05T16:56:48Z2023-12-05T16:56:48ZWarfare ruins the environment – and not just on the front lines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563364/original/file-20231204-17-mbv0cy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C486%2C4061%2C2212&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/russian-battle-tank-t72-b3-dramatic-1955971672">RoProy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of December 6 1917, a French cargo ship called SS Mont-Blanc collided with a Norwegian vessel in the harbour of Halifax in Nova Scotia, Canada. The SS Mont-Blanc, which was laden with 3,000 tons of high explosives destined for the battlefields of the first world war, caught fire and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Halifax-explosion">exploded</a>.</p>
<p>The resulting blast released an amount of energy equivalent to roughly 2.9 kilotons of TNT, destroying a large part of the city. Although it was far from the front lines, this explosion left a lasting imprint on Halifax in a way that many regions experience environmental change as a result of war.</p>
<p>The attention of the media is often drawn to the destructive explosions caused by bombs, drones or missiles. And the devastation we have witnessed in cities like Aleppo, Mosul, Mariupol and now Gaza certainly serve as stark reminders of the horrific impacts of military action.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/su14127138">research</a> is increasingly uncovering broader and longer-term consequences of war that extend well beyond the battlefield. Armed conflicts leave a lasting trail of environmental damage, posing challenges for restoration after the hostilities have eased.</p>
<p><strong>Research interest in the environmental impacts of war</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A figure showing the rising trend of publications on military-caused soil pollution since the 1990s." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Interest in the topic of military-caused soil pollution increased in the first half of the 2000s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/12/7138#">Stadler et al. (2022)/Sustainability</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Toxic legacies</h2>
<p>Battles and even wars are over relatively quickly, at least compared to the timescales over which environments change. But soils and sediments record their effects over decades and centuries. </p>
<p>In 2022, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ejss.13297">study</a> of soil chemistry in northern France showed elevated levels of copper and lead (both toxic at concentrations above trace levels), and other changes in soil structure and composition, more than 100 years after the site was part of the Battle of the Somme. </p>
<p>Research on more recent conflicts has recorded the toxic legacy of intense fighting too. A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15569543.2019.1684949">study</a> that was carried out in 2016, three decades after the Iran-Iraq war, found concentrations of toxic elements like chromium, lead and the semi-metal antimony in soils from the battlefields. These concentrations were more than ten times those found in soils behind the front lines. </p>
<p>The deliberate destruction of infrastructure during war can also have enduring consequences. One notable example is the first Gulf War in 1991 when <a href="https://ceobs.org/what-the-environmental-legacy-of-the-gulf-war-should-teach-us/">Iraqi forces</a> blew up more than 700 oil wells in Kuwait. Crude oil spewed into the surrounding environment, while fallout from dispersing smoke plumes created a thick deposit known as “tarcrete” over 1,000 sq km of Kuwait’s deserts.</p>
<p>The impact of the oil fires on the air, soil, water and habitats captured <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/dec/11/the-sound-of-roaring-fires-is-still-in-my-memory-30-years-on-from-kuwaits-oil-blazes">global attention</a>. Now, in the 21st century, wars are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.157932">closely scrutinised</a> in near real-time for environmental harm, as well as the harm inflicted on humans.</p>
<h2>Conflict is a systemic catastrophe</h2>
<p>One outcome of this scrutiny is the realisation that conflict is a catastrophe that affects entire human and ecological systems. Destruction of social and economic infrastructure like water and sanitation, industrial systems, agricultural supply chains and data networks can lead to subtle but devastating indirect environmental impacts. </p>
<p>Since 2011, conflict has marred the north-western regions of Syria. As part of a research project that was led by my Syrian colleagues at <a href="http://shamuniversity.com">Sham University</a>, we conducted soil surveys in the affected areas. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1039/D2VA00333C">findings</a> revealed widespread diffuse soil pollution in agricultural land. This land feeds a population of around 3 million people already experiencing <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/syrian-arab-republic">severe food insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>The pollution probably stems from a combination of factors, all arising as a consequence of the regional economic collapse that was caused by the conflict. A lack of fuel to pump wells, combined with destruction of wastewater treatment infrastructure, has led to an increased reliance on <a href="https://www.algherbal.com/archives/5076">streams contaminated by untreated wastewater</a> for irrigating croplands. </p>
<p>Contamination could also stem from the use of low-grade fertilisers, unregulated industrial emissions and the proliferation of <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/04/24/dying-to-keep-warm-oil-trade-and-makeshift-refining-in-north-west-syria/">makeshift oil refineries</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, the current conflict in Ukraine, which prompted international sanctions on Russian grain and fertiliser exports, has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fs41598-023-43883-4">disrupted agricultural economies worldwide</a>. This has affected countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Nigeria and Iran particularly hard. </p>
<p>Many small farmers in these countries may have been forced into selling their livestock and abandoning their land as they struggle to buy the materials they need to feed their animals or grow crops. Land abandonment is an <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abm8999">ecologically harmful</a> practice as it can take decades for the vegetation densities and species richness typical of undisturbed ecosystems to recover.</p>
<p>Warfare can clearly become a complicated and entangled “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.166131">nexus</a>” problem, the impacts of which are felt far from the war-affected regions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A field of rapeseed flowers in Ukraine, mimicking the Ukraine flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A field of rapeseed flowers in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/field-colza-rapeseed-yellow-flowers-blue-2131379587">Delpixel/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conflict, cascades and climate</h2>
<p>Recognising the complex, cascading environmental consequences of war is the first step towards addressing them. Following the first Gulf War, the UN set up a compensation commission and included the environment as one of six compensable harms inflicted on countries and their people. </p>
<p>Jordan was <a href="https://uncc.ch/hashemite-kingdom-jordan">awarded</a> more than US$160 million (£127 million) over a decade to restore the rangelands of its Badia desert. These rangelands had been ecologically ruined by a million refugees and their livestock from Kuwait and Iraq. The Badia is now a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140196320302378">case study</a> in sustainable watershed management in arid regions. </p>
<p>In the north-west region of Syria, work is underway to assess farmers’ understanding of soil contamination in areas that have been affected by conflict. This marks the first step in designing farming techniques aimed at minimising <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-cholera-outbreak-situation-report-no-20-issued-23-october-2023">threats to human health</a> and restoring the environment.</p>
<p>Armed conflict has also finally made it onto the climate agenda. The UN’s latest climate summit, <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/schedule">COP28</a>, includes the first themed day dedicated to “relief, recovery and peace”. The discussion will focus on countries and communities in which the ability to withstand climate change is being hindered by economic or political fragility and conflict.</p>
<p>And as COP28 got underway, the Conflict and Environment Observatory, a UK charity that monitors the environmental consequences of armed conflicts, <a href="https://ceobs.org/what-to-expect-on-militarism-conflict-and-climate-at-cop28/">called for</a> research to account for carbon emissions in regions affected by conflict. </p>
<p>The carbon impact of war is still not counted in the <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake">global stocktake</a> of carbon emissions – an essential reference for climate action. But far from the sound and fury of the explosions, warfare’s environmental impacts are persistent, pervasive and equally deadly.</p>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Bridge works voluntarily with the Council for At-Risk Academics (Cara) to support their Syria Programme, which funded some of the work described in this article.</span></em></p>War is often described as long periods of waiting punctuated by short periods of terror – for the environment, the reverse is true.Jonathan Bridge, Reader / Associate Professor in Environmental Geoscience, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1444112020-09-01T16:51:45Z2020-09-01T16:51:45ZWhy the Gulf monarchies have survived<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355671/original/file-20200901-24-tot2o8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2046%2C1196&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi King Salman accompanies Kuwait's emir, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, left, during the 40th Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Amr Nabil)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the <a href="https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/arab-spring-egypt">Arab Spring</a> protests erupted in 2010, many <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/13/yes-the-gulf-monarchs-are-in-trouble/">political pundits predicted</a> the uprisings would ripple through the entire region and ultimately reach the oil-rich Gulf states, sweeping away monarchies.</p>
<p>But ultimately, the Gulf monarchies of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates — and to a lesser extent, Bahrain — were the least affected by the Arab Spring. These six Gulf monarchies <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2012/04/understanding-the-resilience-of-monarchy-during-the-arab-spring/">were more successful in weathering the political storm</a> than their republican neighbours, which in some cases <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/arab-spring-five-years-on/">were plunged into civil wars</a> with a heavy humanitarian and economic toll.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing a head scarf and sunglasses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355425/original/file-20200830-20-1c0tyje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Haitham bin Tariq Al Said is seen in this November 2016 photo. He was named Oman’s new sultan earlier this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kamran Jebreili)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I spent a good deal of my life in the region and during the uncertain times of the Arab Spring, so curious colleagues ask me how the Gulf monarchies continue to hold on. In response, I draw not on my memories but on my political training. And I believe there are lessons to learn from the durability of these regimes that could enhance global efforts to understand the region and build sustainable peace in the Middle East.</p>
<h2>Most Middle East countries are oil-rich</h2>
<p>I generally scoff at the argument that Gulf monarchies have only managed to navigate the tricky waters of the region’s geopolitics and avoided a mass exodus of their citizens because of their oil wealth. <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/06/21/how-oil-transformed-the-gulf">This popular wisdom holds</a> that <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/petrodollars.asp">petrodollars</a> allow the Gulf monarchies to coax people into submission, and that’s why they endure.</p>
<p>Missing from this assessment is acknowledgement that the Gulf monarchies <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/mena/04econ.htm">aren’t the only countries in the broader region with ample hydrocarbon riches</a>. Yet petrodollars in the broader region that often benefited citizens of those countries didn’t prevent public anger or major challenges to authority.</p>
<p>Brief comparisons between the Gulf monarchies and other oil-producing countries in the region reveal other common ground besides oil, such as culture and religion. Yet their respective trajectories since the 1950s — Gulf monarchies modernized quickly, while other oil-exporting countries (for example <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14546763">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14118856">Algeria</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542438">Iran</a>) have undergone political crises, coups and even regime change. That’s only added to the sense that Gulf monarchies and other oil-producing countries in the region are heading in different directions. </p>
<p>So oil alone doesn’t explain the longevity of the Gulf monarchies. Other factors help explain their success.</p>
<h2>Monarchies accepted in Gulf region</h2>
<p>First and foremost is whether people in the Gulf region see monarchy as a legitimate form of government. In Western political thought, elections represent one of the key benchmarks for judging the legitimacy of government. This is the foundation of participatory democracy. </p>
<p>By this token, only leaders from presidential republics pass muster in terms of Western legitimacy. After all, these countries hold regular presidential elections. </p>
<p>But are those elections themselves legitimate?</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man gestures in a dark suit and red tie gestures while speaking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355428/original/file-20200830-24-yu02ml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Elliott Abrams, now the State Department Special Representative for Venezuela, speaks recently on Capitol Hill in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)</span></span>
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<p>In 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring, Elliott Abrams, deputy national security adviser to former U.S. President George W. Bush, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rid-ding-syria-of-a-despot/2011/03/25/AFSRRVYB_story.html">wrote that</a> “Arab monarchies … are more legitimate than the false republics.” This assessment raises two critical issues.</p>
<p>The first is the reliability of elections in the Gulf. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/02/syria-election-vote-for-assad-or-else">Presidential elections in Middle Eastern republics</a> have often <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/20/why-irans-rigged-elections-matter/">been fraudulent</a>. It would make a mockery of democracy to consider these elections proof of legitimacy.</p>
<p>The second concerns the compatibility between society and its political institutions. This is one of the pillars of stability in any society. Hereditary monarchies like the ones in the Gulf aren’t a novelty for the native cultures of the region. These monarchies therefore derive legitimacy from the fit between their royal institutions and the cultural norms of their people. This is a <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20Weber%2C%20that%20a,virtue%20of%20which%20persons%20exercising">traditional form of political legitimacy</a>.</p>
<p>With their emphasis on tradition, hierarchy, loyalties and social alliances, monarchies are accepted by many of the cultures of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21534764.2014.971647">the Arabian Peninsula</a>. The Gulf monarchies were borne out of their own socio-cultural heritages, and this gives them more legitimacy.</p>
<h2>Ruling at a distance</h2>
<p>This legitimacy however sets certain limits on executive authority and places demands on the monarchs, who are expected to be arbiters between competing interests — benevolent stabilizers, so to speak. In fact, problems have arisen when monarchs fail to project this image or perform this role. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa in mid-sentence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355673/original/file-20200901-16-6iznls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa is seen in this May 2017 photo in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An example is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/25/nine-years-after-bahrains-uprising-its-human-rights-crisis-has-only-worsened">Bahrain’s mass protests in 2011</a>, when many citizens felt their king showed little commitment to the principles of compromise and moderation that had largely characterized his predecessors’ reign.</p>
<p>The arbiter status gives the monarchs respect and authority, which enables them to rule at distance.</p>
<p>This has helped them maintain power with less reliance on force than their non-monarchy neighbours, which base their claims for legitimacy on political ideology like nationalism and independence. More often than not, these ideologies don’t resonate with people. This poses a major challenge to their ability to maintain power, so the republics rely more on force and security to maintain power. </p>
<p>This best expresses itself in Syria, where <a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime">the Al-Assad regime</a> has ruled for decades through a network of overlapping security agencies to enforce questionable legitimacy.</p>
<p>That’s why the regional republics <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/kings-for-all-seasons-how-the-middle-easts-monarchies-survived-the-arab-spring/">were hit harder by the Arab Spring</a>. Popular uprisings there were fuelled by greater discontent.</p>
<h2>Creating stability</h2>
<p>This has spared the Gulf monarchies from frequent legitimacy crises and allowed them to divert resources to other aspects of governance, like building <a href="https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5g50071k&chunk.id=d0e3492&toc.depth=100&toc.id=0&brand=ucpress&query=qatar">state capacity</a>. This refers to the ability of governments to employ administrative and technical processes, rather than force, to address societal challenges and create stability.</p>
<p>State capacity is bound with a country’s investment in education and human capital, which in turn create a capacity for informed decision-making. This is evident in the volume of publications by Gulf universities. Despite the relative youth of universities in Gulf monarchy states — most of them were founded in the mid-1970s — they outperform their counterparts in Arab republics in terms of quantity of publications.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A table shows the number of published documents among Gulf State universities." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=172&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=172&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=172&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/355550/original/file-20200831-18-1op0bgv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=216&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Number of published documents from Clarivate Analytics Web of ScienceTM: InCites Dataset (Retrieved August 2020)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The future success of the Gulf monarchies probably hinges on further investment in education. </p>
<p>Doing so will enhance the quantity and quality of intellectual activity and produce citizens who can share power, steer economies in response to societal and technological challenges and guarantee long-term stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Adam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gulf monarchies emerged from the Arab Spring relatively unscathed, while some Middle East republics were devastated by civil war. Here’s how they managed — and how education may have played a part.Edmund Adam, PhD candidate of Higher Education (Comparative, International and Development Education) at OISE, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1020902018-08-27T10:46:13Z2018-08-27T10:46:13ZQatar’s $15 billion snub of Trump over Turkey puts another key US relationship in Middle East at risk<p>The U.S. and Qatar have been key allies for decades, with close military and economic ties. Qatar is home to the United States’ biggest base in the region, and in turn the U.S. has pledged to protect the small, oil rich country that juts out into the Persian Gulf. </p>
<p>But the relationship is being tested like never before by the latest example of Qatar snubbing the interests of Uncle Sam – or, put more generously, its maverick foreign policy.</p>
<p>The U.S. recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/us-sanctions-turkey-pastor.html">placed severe sanctions</a> on Turkey’s economy for refusing to release an American pastor detained for almost two years, sparking a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-collapse-shows-just-how-vulnerable-its-economy-is-to-a-crisis-101556">currency crisis</a>. Qatar was the first, and so far only, nation to offer Turkey tangible aid in the form of a US$15 billion investment and other types of financial assistance. </p>
<p>Although the Gulf country has long pursued policies out of step with the U.S., such as maintaining good relations with Iran and aiding <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-leadership-exprimeminister/former-qatari-pm-drove-bold-maverick-foreign-policy-idUSBRE95P12Y20130626?mod=related&channelName=worldNews">various groups that the U.S. considers terrorists</a>, its very visible support for Turkey in the dispute poses a direct challenge to the Americans. And while the U.S. has in the past practiced patience with its sometimes wayward ally, President Donald Trump is often willing to toss out the rulebook and has previously <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/qatar-panic-buying-as-shoppers-stockpile-food-due-to-saudi-blockade">lambasted</a> Qatar on Twitter. </p>
<p>As a longtime observer of the region’s complicated economic and political developments, I believe that Qatar’s interjection in the U.S.-Turkey crisis raises two important questions: Why is Qatar willing to risk its close relationship with the U.S.? And why has the U.S. let it get away with this behavior for so long? </p>
<h2>Punching above its weight</h2>
<p>A country of just <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/qatar/population">320,000 citizens</a> – as well as 2.32 million expatriate residents – Qatar has a habit of using its massive oil and natural gas reserves to exert influence in the Middle East and beyond. Such a <a href="https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/53181">hyperactive foreign policy</a> is very unusual for a small state like Qatar. </p>
<p>Qatar made its offer to Turkey during a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/qatari-emir-vows-15bn-investment-turkey-erdogan-meeting-180815152545652.html">recent visit</a> by Qatari leader Sheikh Tamim Al Thani to Ankara. The announcement helped stem the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-collapse-shows-just-how-vulnetrable-its-economy-is-to-a-crisis-101556">rout</a> in the lira, which <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=TRY&To=USD">lost a third of its value</a> in a month. It was followed by a so-called <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/qatar-turkey-central-banks-ink-currency-swap-deal-180820072749514.html">currency swap agreement</a> that will allow Turkey to bypass the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade and financial transactions with Qatar.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1002081/iran-trump-us-turkey-lira-dollar-world-war-3">Iran</a> and several Arab countries including <a href="https://gulfnews.com/news/mena/turkey/kuwait-denies-injecting-1-6b-to-back-lira-1.2266062">Kuwait</a> have expressed opposition to the U.S. sanctions, none so far has offered tangible financial support similar to Qatar’s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the U.S. is trying to put economic pressure on Turkey in hopes it spurs the release of the American pastor, who has been detained for nearly two years on allegations he supported the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/middleeast/turkey-failed-coup-explainer/index.html">failed July 2016 coup</a>. Qatar’s aid clearly counteracts that pressure. </p>
<p>So far, the U.S. hasn’t publicly reacted to Qatar’s actions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233540/original/file-20180824-149484-8les3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. sanctions prompted a currency crisis in Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey/3f5cdaf4ae8e4e128190cf3219fc2b17/44/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Allies aiding adversaries</h2>
<p>This gesture of support for Turkey is not the first time that Qatar has taken a stand that conflicts with U.S. foreign policy objectives. </p>
<p>On several occasions in the past two decades, the U.S. has expressed concern about Qatar’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qatar-leadership-exprimeminister/former-qatari-pm-drove-bold-maverick-foreign-policy-idUSBRE95P12Y20130626">support for various Islamist and extremist groups</a>, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its relations with Iran. In May U.S. officials issued a warning after a <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/stop-funding-pro-iranian-militias-us-warns-qatar-1.729810">newspaper reported</a> evidence of clandestine contacts between Qatar and Iran’s revolutionary guards and other groups it supports.</p>
<p>This behavior may seem puzzling because ever since its creation as an independent state in 1971, Qatar <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm">has relied on the United States</a> for its external security. </p>
<p>At the same time, Qatar hosts about 10,000 U.S. military personnel at <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/1/30/qatar-plans-massive-expansion-of-us-military-base">Al Udeid Air Base</a>, home of the U.S. Air Force Central Command, which is used to conduct operations in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. </p>
<p>The United States also maintains strong economic relations with Qatar as its <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm">largest foreign investor</a> – particularly in oil and natural gas production. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233536/original/file-20180824-149490-o0sy32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">All smiles as Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Muslim-Summit/2dda6e158fb344e296f909393723b097/7/0">Presidential Press Service/Pool via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Qatar’s possible rationale</h2>
<p>So why would Qatar risk jeopardizing the relationship by aiding Turkey so publicly?</p>
<p>One possible explanation is that Turkey itself has become an important strategic and economic partner. </p>
<p>The two signed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/171227051912500.html">military cooperation agreement</a> in 2014, which allowed Turkey to maintain a small base in Qatar. When fellow <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-relations-gulf-cooperation-council/">Gulf Cooperation Council states</a> Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates broke diplomatic relations with Qatar in 2017 and imposed a trade embargo, Turkey increased the number of its troops at the base to deter military action. </p>
<p>This was important to Qatar because the U.S. seemed to be showing <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/06/06/trump-sides-with-saudis-other-arab-nations-against-qatar.html">more support</a> for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the standoff, a perception reinforced by highly critical <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/qatar-panic-buying-as-shoppers-stockpile-food-due-to-saudi-blockade">tweets from Trump</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872062159789985792"}"></div></p>
<p>Qatar’s recent expansion of trade with Turkey also helped it survive the embargo as Turkish consumer goods flowed in, leading to a surge in <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180117-qatar-turkey-trade-grows-by-30-per-cent-since-gulf-crisis">trade</a> between the two countries.</p>
<p>Bilateral investment between Qatar and Turkey has also increased in recent years. Qatar <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/8/16/turkeys-erdogan-thanks-qatar-emir-for-15bn-investment-pledge">has nearly $20 billion in investments</a> in Turkey, and a large number of Turkish construction firms are active in Qatar. </p>
<p>Another possible explanation is that Qatar’s leaders simply believe that the U.S. needs Qatar more than Qatar needs the Americans. The rationale is that the American military bases there are vital to its ability to project power in the region. Meanwhile, Qatar’s significant reserves of oil and gas make it a valuable economic partner.</p>
<p>As a result, Qatar may believe the U.S. will continue to show a high level of patience, even in the face of support for Turkey. </p>
<h2>US patience running thin?</h2>
<p>It is true that the United States has tended to be patient with Qatar’s maverick foreign policy, including over Iran.</p>
<p>But Qatar’s government would be wise to have a realistic understanding of the erratic and unpredictable nature of American foreign policy under the Trump administration. Just as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan <a href="https://www.albawaba.com/news/erdogan-accuses-us-stabbing-turkey-back-sending-lira-tailspin-1173240">was shocked</a> by Trump’s sudden impositions of harsh sanctions this month, Qatar might also face a similar American reaction for going too far in its support for Turkey, or getting too close to Iran. </p>
<p>In addition, Qatar must keep in mind that Turkey could never replace the U.S. as a partner both in terms of military protection or the advanced American oil and gas technology it receives. </p>
<p>In other words, if Trump is willing to risk the United States’ relationship with Turkey so easily, Qatar should not assume that it is immune from his wrath – or could find as useful an ally. Perhaps a better strategy for Qatar is to maintain a balance between its two important allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102090/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Qatar’s decision to aid Turkey in the face of American sanctions against the country may finally be a snub too far for its close relationship with the US.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/935182018-03-26T12:57:35Z2018-03-26T12:57:35ZAl-Sisi poised for empty victory in Egypt as signs of unrest grow across the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211353/original/file-20180321-165568-19ehdkk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protester mocking President al-Sisi. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/22422195819">Alisdare Hickson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Egyptians are voting in presidential elections on March 26-28. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who grabbed power in 2013, is set to win another term by a landslide. Yet this is far from a sign of strength: opposition candidates <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-sisi/sisi-says-he-wanted-more-challengers-in-egyptian-election-idUSKBN1GW33P">have been</a> silenced, and even pro-government media <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/3/18/egypt-muffles-press-with-fake-news-charges">are being</a> purged of the slightest undertone of dissent. </p>
<p>Al-Sisi’s grip on power may appear firm, but his country’s <a href="http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Interface-4-1-Teti-and-Gervasio.pdf">problems</a> can’t be thrown into jail like his opponents. His predecessors <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12301713">Hosni Mubarak</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhu-YgCyPz4">Anwar Sadat</a> learned this the hard way.</p>
<p>Yet don’t expect much hand-wringing from the West about Egypt’s stability in the coming days – despite its having been through <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution">a revolution</a> and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/23/egypt-spring-2014-counter-revolution">coup</a> already this decade. Governments and other strategists only appear to worry about countries in this region once discontent turns “hot” – like in Syria, Yemen, Libya or Iraq. </p>
<p>Our research <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320170921_Sinkholes_of_Insecurity_The_Structural_Causes_of_Weaknesses_in_Six_Arab_Countries_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_11">shows that</a> this may be a serious and costly mistake. The whole region is suffering from exactly the same deep-seated problems as before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/recovery-from-the-arab-spring-will-take-a-generation-or-more-20522">Arab Spring</a> of 2010-11. In Egypt and various other apparently stable countries, there are very high levels of discontent that could easily boil over. </p>
<h2>Then and now</h2>
<p>The uprisings earlier in the decade were not simply demands for Western-style democracy. Protesters may have been disillusioned by all the election rhetoric from these authoritarian regimes in democratic clothing, but they were primarily disgusted by corruption, abuse of power and economic inequality. They wanted governments that would <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315837128_What_do_the_People_Still_Want_Conceptions_of_Democracy_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_1">address these concerns</a> rather than lining their own pockets and those of their cronies. </p>
<p>Unfortunately little has changed, as newly released <a href="http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files">opinion polls show</a> for Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia – with upwards of 1,000 people surveyed in each country. While citizens worry about issues their governments prioritise, such as security, terrorism and religious extremism, their main concerns are the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319690438">same as</a> in 2010 – decent jobs, inflation, inequality and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315713451_The_Integrity_of_States_Corruption_in_the_EU%27s_Southern_Neighbourhood_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_6">corruption</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Top two challenges by country</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211371/original/file-20180321-165554-1v75lym.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>People don’t believe their governments are responsive to their <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315837128_What_do_the_People_Still_Want_Conceptions_of_Democracy_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_No_1">priorities</a>. Fewer than one third of Egyptians think so, while in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan that figure drops to a quarter or less. In Lebanon it is a mere 7%. </p>
<p>Across all six countries an astonishing 85% or more think their governments are not making a serious effort to tackle corruption. Meanwhile, 75% or more are not satisfied with their governments’ efforts to create jobs or fight inflation. </p>
<p><strong>Views on economy, corruption and terrorism</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211586/original/file-20180322-54872-1ao4zxu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The discontent is worst in Lebanon, where fewer than 5% of people approve of the government’s work. Even the performance on internal security – the one area where citizens in the other five countries are relatively satisfied – was considered adequate by only a quarter of Lebanese respondents. </p>
<p>This region-wide disenchantment translates into low confidence in parliaments and political parties, the key institutions which ought to be representing citizens’ interests. Confidence varies from country to country: Lebanon again scores poorly. Egypt fares better than others, but this owes more to intense government propaganda than any real effectiveness. </p>
<p><strong>Trust in state institutions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=284&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211402/original/file-20180321-165550-9fo401.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Citizens also don’t feel they have the civil and political rights necessary to legitimately express their grievances and push their governments for reforms. When people are unable to adequately express their unhappiness, it inevitably increases the potential for radicalisation. </p>
<p><strong>Views on civil rights</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=276&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211405/original/file-20180321-165547-54d46s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arab Barometer, 2016.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Little changed</h2>
<p>As a result of the Arab uprisings, governments fell in <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245">Tunisia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-years-on-the-spirit-of-tahrir-square-has-been-all-but-crushed-53461">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/explained-how-the-arab-spring-led-to-an-increasingly-vicious-civil-war-in-yemen-55968">Yemen</a> and eventually <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/23/gaddafi-last-words-begged-mercy">Libya</a>, while there were more limited political changes in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482679">Jordan</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19401680">Kuwait</a>. Governments in other countries announced political concessions, including <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-d-hirst/morocco-constitution_b_884430.html">Morocco</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-algeria-really-spring-cleaning-its-deep-state-51615">Algeria</a>, <a href="http://www.mepc.org/oman-forgotten-corner-arab-spring">Oman</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-executions-business-as-usual-in-a-post-arab-spring-world-52690">Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>Yet since the issues which drove many of these protesters to the streets have not been addressed, their governments remain vulnerable both to mass mobilisation and to less obvious forms of radicalisation – as recent protests <a href="https://theconversation.com/tunisia-is-back-on-a-knife-edge-heres-why-90245">in Tunisia</a> show. </p>
<p>Western policymakers and academics concerned with security are at risk of missing this. They do not seem to have learned the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1370559/Lessons_from_the_Arab_Uprisings">lessons</a> of the Arab uprisings. Absent armed conflict, they <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315836965_From_Ring_of_Friends_to_Ring_of_Fire_Challenges_to_Stability_and_Legitimacy_in_MENA_States_Arab_Transformations_Policy_Brief_4">still tend</a> to dismiss the importance to stability of social cohesion, inequality and poor political representation.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=777&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211354/original/file-20180321-165564-1iolb47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=976&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sisi or Sisiphus?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi_in_2017.jpg#/media/File:Abdel_Fattah_el-Sisi_in_2017.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We must therefore <a href="http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061014">reassess the stability</a> of countries like Egypt. We must stop assuming their leaders will forever be able to simply repress dissent, and stop assuming that such repression doesn’t come with costs and risks, both human and political. </p>
<p>These countries are in fact security “sinkholes”: regimes whose foundations erode while apparently seeming stable, often to the point of collapse. Far from being a sign of strength or stability, remaining deaf to the needs of the people make things worse in the long run. </p>
<p>As al-Sisi makes his inevitable victory speech, we would be wise not to ignore these warning signs. Until we learn that conflict must be dealt with at its roots, history is liable to just keep repeating itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93518/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pamela Abbott received funding from the European Commission 7th Framework Programme for the ArabTransformations Project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Teti received funding from the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme for the ArabTransformations Project. He is affiliated with the European Centre for International Affairs. </span></em></p>Public disaffection in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries betrays deep-seated tensions beneath the surface.Pamela Abbott, Director of the Centre for Global Development and Professor in the School of Education, University of AberdeenAndrea Teti, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/860212017-10-23T13:59:35Z2017-10-23T13:59:35ZKuwait’s economic interest in mediating the Qatar-Gulf crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191375/original/file-20171023-1722-nadm0a.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kuwait does not want to experience another financial crisis.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A blockade against Qatar by its Gulf neighbours is now in its fifth month. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/06/the-persian-gulf-crisis-over-qatar-explained/?utm_term=.604efdc95847">severed socio-economic ties with Qatar</a> as punishment for its alleged support of terrorism and interference in their affairs. As well as <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/business/markets/qatar-stocks-drop-to-19-month-low-on-regional-tensions-1.627582">hurting Qatar’s economy</a>, economists have argued that this is bad news for the entire Gulf, which will face the threat of lowered interest from foreign investors, trade restrictions and a drop in tourism, challenging regional ambitions to diversify away from oil dependence.</p>
<p>There is one country working hard to mediate the situation, however, and that’s <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-crisis/kuwait-qatar-hold-talks-in-doha-1.2109427">Kuwait</a>. The small, oil-rich state has no vested interest in the crisis, but lots to gain from acting as a mediator. It knows best that a protracted blockade could threaten a second depression across the Gulf. After all, the first such depression originated from Kuwait’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25062213?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">unregulated stock market</a>, amid high oil prices and the thirst for speculative spending by Kuwaitis with new-found wealth.</p>
<p>The early 1980s saw oil riches overflow into Kuwaiti accounts. A new class of wealth was emerging, itching for investment opportunities that would parallel the rush of oil prices, with its rapid money-making machinery. At the time, the government-run Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) was heavily regulated, with limited companies and even more limited trading options. It begged the question: if oil could transform Kuwait’s tired buildings into modern glass high rises, why couldn’t that same wealth create an unrestricted trading environment?</p>
<h2>The camel market</h2>
<p>By 1981, demand had created the mirage of certain wealth in the new and exciting Souk al-Manakh stock market. As explained <a href="http://rapidcityjournal.com/business/columnists/john-quinn-souk-al-manakh-s-omens-for-u-s/article_61e42d70-06df-11df-8545-001cc4c002e0.html">by economist John Quinn</a>, this unregulated stock market was housed in “a modest old building once used for camel trading” and would become “ground zero for the largest bubble [to burst] in the history of the entire Middle East”. </p>
<p>A previous speculation crash on the KSE in 1977 prompted officials to ban the creation of new Kuwaiti trading companies, so eager Kuwaiti traders registered their firms in future blockaders Bahrain and the UAE, using Kuwaiti funds and legal loopholes to trade with their own stock exclusively on the Souk al-Manakh. With unregulated excess liquidity, the roulette wheel started to spin. Under pure speculation and excessive use of postdated checks, stock soared. New wealth, created from nothing, lured bigger players to gamble unchecked, creating greater demand for new stock companies. The roulette wheel continued to spin. Everyone was a winner.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/191273/original/file-20171022-13966-10rx636.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shuttered: the Souq al-Manakh, Kuwait City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nicolai Due-Gundersen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From 1979-82, 165 new firms sprang up to fuel the fire of speculative buying. At its height, Souk al-Manakh shares saw a 100% price increase within weeks and enjoyed traded shares of up to US$3.5 billion <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25062213">against the KSE’s US$837m</a>. In a culture where your word was your bond, postdated checks were accepted en masse, with buyers and sellers knowing that share prices would jump in time to cover debt owed. Greed was good. Collapse was inevitable.</p>
<p>By August 1982, the mirage of quick wealth became a sandstorm. The default of one large trader wiped Manakh shares of up to 98% of their worth. The collapse was felt by a 53% loss in value of KSE shares. Real estate prices dropped by 44%. </p>
<p>Lack of regulation meant that the government had no initial knowledge of how much damage had been done. External evaluation assessed the remnants of the souk. The conclusion was that the camel market was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25062213?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">never a network of structured traders</a> but an entangled web of “two-way IOU notes and postdated checks”. In total, the crisis created debts of US$94 billion – over four time’s Kuwait’s GDP. Of these debts, 95 involved just 18 traders.</p>
<p>Knowing that a slow response would cause a drop in government confidence and paralyse the economy, officials convened arbitration panels. Travel restrictions were imposed on debtors and a US$2 billion emergency fund was established to mitigate the crisis. Foreshadowing the effects of the blockade, the collapse of Kuwait’s camel market provoked a drop in foreign investment and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/25/business/kuwait-in-bailout-effort-after-market-collapes.html?mcubz=0">a drain of capital from Kuwaiti to foreign accounts</a>. Bahrain and the UAE established their own boards to assess the damage to their own economies.</p>
<p>Ironically, Qatar seemed protected from Kuwait’s stock market collapse. Doha did not establish its own stock market until 1997, avoiding entanglement with the disastrous souk. The oil price drop succeeding Kuwait’s crash was more of a concern to Qatar than the collapse of its neighbour’s speculative bubble. Qatar tightened financial regulation and reduced spending on infrastructure <a href="https://artscimedia.case.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/14182253/Moore-Regime_crisis.pdf">but maintained welfare generosity</a>.</p>
<p>The Souk al-Manakh collapse acts as a reminder of how one Gulf state can affect another. Kuwait knows better than its neighbours that financial and political shocks can stifle foreign investor confidence in the entire region. At a time when Kuwait is attempting to <a href="https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/reforms-aim-open-kuwaiti-market-foreign-investors">open its official stock exchange</a> for global investment and finally leave the Souk al-Manakh scandal behind, its ability to mediate the Qatar blockade is more important than ever. No one knows how long the siege will last. The only certainty is that the Gulf cannot profit from speculation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86021/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolai Due-Gundersen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kuwait has first-hand experience of how financial and political shocks can stifle investor confidence in the entire region.Nicolai Due-Gundersen, PhD Candidate and Political Analyst, Kingston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793852017-06-15T09:39:47Z2017-06-15T09:39:47ZQatar and the art of ‘brotherly’ diplomacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173806/original/file-20170614-31550-vca7h8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IvanKurmyshov/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most political upheavals in history are known to have thrown up a specific word or expression that defines the core values of that event. “Guillotine” characterised the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/french-revolution">French Revolution</a>, while the American War of Independence had “<a href="http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h640.html">representation</a>” at its core, as Americans demanded to be represented in the British parliament that was taxing them. The 20th century rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, meanwhile, was the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War">Cold War</a>”. </p>
<p>During the <a href="https://theconversation.com/qatar-must-choose-whether-to-bow-to-saudi-pressure-or-defy-it-78856">ongoing diplomatic crises</a> in the Middle East, however, the word that has been bandied about most is “brotherly”. But is all this brotherly love genuine – or is it a case of keeping your enemies closer than your friends?</p>
<p>The ruling houses in the region describe their bilateral and multilateral relationships in the context of fraternity. So when Saudi Arabia cut all land, air and sea contacts with Qatar, it <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-saudiarabia-idUSKBN18W09H?il=0">called upon</a> “all brotherly countries and companies to do the same.” </p>
<p>A week into the diplomatic and economic isolation of Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s top diplomat – foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir – said Qatar is a “<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4580824/Saudi-FM-says-brother-state-Qatar-act-end-crisis.html">brother state</a>” and a “a partner” and that punitive steps against the emirate were “well-intentioned”. Interestingly, when Qatar defended its position and condemned its diplomatic isolation by fellow neighbouring nations, it also did so in the context of brotherhood. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/gulf-diplomatic-crisis-qatar-reaction-full-170605071246160.html">said</a> the blockade was “fabricated in order to take action against a brotherly GCC nation”.</p>
<p>So what was Qatar’s supreme error? It is alleged to have been providing financial and tactical support to the transnational Sunni Islamic political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. And this move was at the cost of “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism">other brotherly states</a>” in the Middle East. </p>
<p>While the crisis was boiling, Qatari foreign minister Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Thani, told the news channel Al Jazeera in an interview: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not launch measures to escalate toward our brotherly nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At the same time, however, Doha was frantically in touch with Turkey to prepare a bulwark against this “brotherly assault”. Turkey used the occasion to its advantage while reaching out to a “brother” in need. It promptly convened a special session of parliament and committed a strong contingent of troops to its military base in Qatar. </p>
<p>In the meantime, to deescalate the growing tension between Qatar and its neighbours, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, made a “<a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1110916/middle-east">brotherly visit</a>” to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<h2>Hot air and hypocrisy</h2>
<p>So what does all this “brotherly” love mean in the context of contemporary political Islam? What exactly do they mean by “brotherly” when these states try to do business with each other? And why call a blatant encircling of a state’s sovereignty a “brotherly” act? </p>
<p>The use of the terms “brother” and “brotherly” is deeply problematic in Islamic realpolitik. While commonly used, it is a deeply ambiguous term. At one extreme, it can mean a genuine fraternal concern – but at the other it may be nothing more than a lot of hot air and outright hypocrisy. In the region’s contemporary diplomatic doublespeak, “brotherly” can mean shoving the dagger into your “brother” when you are at an advantage. Lest we forget, Middle Eastern statecraft has often dabbled in such Machiavellianism. </p>
<p>In the medieval Islamic world, “brotherly” implied fratricide. The Ottoman Turkish rulers were supreme in the art of bumping off their “blood brothers”. Interestingly, in the 15th century, Mehmed the Conqueror passed a Law of Fratricide that <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/feature/2015/08/07/the-history-of-fratricide-in-the-ottoman-empire--part-1">stipulated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whichever of my sons inherits the sultanate, it behooves him to kill his brothers in the interest of world order (nizam-i alem).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Following that principle, upon ascending the throne, one of Mehmed the Conqueror’s great grandsons, Mehmet III, killed 19 of his brothers and half-brothers and buried them next to his father. </p>
<p>In the semantics of current Middle Eastern diplomacy, one word that has not found any voice is unbrotherly. If being unbrotherly means conducting oneself in a way which is “not characteristic of or befitting a brother” then Qatar fits the bill (at least in the current climate of accusations). But it’s unlikely you will hear that from the lips of the sovereign states boycotting Qatar. To paraphrase Saudi foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir: You have to be able to tell your friend or your brother when they are doing the right thing and when they are doing the wrong thing.</p>
<p>So in the dog-eat-dog world of contemporary Middle Eastern politics, the term “brotherly” has very little real meaning. It is a convenient cloak to mask hypocrisy. “Brotherly” in this landscape is all about carrying a big dagger. But most important of all, it is about being able to wield that dagger at the opportune moment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalendu Misra receives funding from British Academy. </span></em></p>What’s so ‘brotherly’ about a major diplomatic spat?Amalendu Misra, Senior Lecturer, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439642015-06-27T16:30:12Z2015-06-27T16:30:12ZDay of terror reminds us that extremism must be a problem shared<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86616/original/image-20150627-1431-xy3ig8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Nearly 100 people are dead and many more injured after three <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-in-tunisia-tourist-deaths-on-the-beaches-of-sousse-will-kick-start-a-crisis-43957">terrorist attacks that unfolded within hours of each other</a> on June 26. Among the victims were Shi'a worshippers at the Imam Sadiq Mosque in <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-islamic-state-attacked-a-kuwait-mosque-during-ramadan-43973">Kuwait</a>, tourists at a beach resort in <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-in-tunisia-tourist-deaths-on-the-beaches-of-sousse-will-kick-start-a-crisis-43957">Tunisia</a> and employees at a gas plant in [Lyon](<a href="https://theconversation.com/shoestring-surveillance-and-a-shattered-social-model-latest-france-attack-puts-hollande-in-a-bind-43950">http://www.voanews.com/content/terror-attack-france-gas-factory/2838039.html</a>, France. </p>
<p>The attacks coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which started on June 18, and the anniversary of the establishment of Islamic State’s caliphate, which was proclaimed on June 29 2014 – the first day of Ramadan that year.</p>
<p>While there is <a href="http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/us-says-tunisia-france-and-kuwait-terror-attacks-not-coordinated/ar-AAcc4ra">no evidence</a> that the attacks were closely coordinated, Islamic State has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/26/africa/tunisia-terror-attack/index.html">claimed responsibility</a> for those in Kuwait and Tunisia. The third, in France, appeared to have been inspired by the fundamentalist group, not least because an IS <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/473e1866-1be5-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html#axzz3eEzTxIKp">flag</a> was found near the body of the man who died.</p>
<p>They exemplify the two categories of terrorism connected to IS and al-Qaeda – the increasingly rival, main international terrorist franchises of our age. </p>
<p>One is the so-called “lone-wolf” attack, carried out predominantly in Western countries. There is a recent <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33288542">history</a> of such attacks in France, including the killings at the offices of Charlie Hebdo. But lone-wolf attacks have also occurred elsewhere – the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/boston-marathon-bombing/">Boston Marathon bombing</a> in 2013, the shooting at an exhibition in <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f90ea896-f316-11e4-b98f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3eEzTxIKp">Garland, Texas</a> in 2015, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/29/drummer-lee-rigby-woolwich-postmortem">murder of Lee Rigby</a> in the UK in 2013, and the hostage crisis at a <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sydney-hostages-police-raid-downtown-cafe/">Sydney cafe</a> in 2014 also fall into this category.</p>
<p>The other type are attacks carried out by so-called affiliated groups or local branches. These predominantly take place across the Middle East and North Africa. They are variably aimed at Western targets, Shi'a communities, or local governments. Examples include the attack on an <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/16/world/africa/algeria-attack/index.html">Algerian gas field</a> in 2013, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24191606">Westgate Shopping Mall</a> attack in Kenya in 2013, and the bombing of an African Union military base in Somalia by <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/suicide-bomber-attacks-african-union-base-somalia/2837996.html">al-Shabaab</a> on the same day as the killings in Tunisia, France and Kuwait.</p>
<h2>Rival groups</h2>
<p>As the terror unfolded across Africa, Asia, and Europe, Islamic State forces re-entered <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/isil-24-hour-killing-rampage-kobane-150626144824173.html">Kobane</a> at the Syrian-Turkish border, massacring more than 100 civilians before being forced to retreat by Syrian Kurdish fighters a day later.</p>
<p>A US-led coalition carries out <a href="http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/june-26-military-airstrikes-continue-against-isil-terrorists-in-syria-and-i">airstrikes</a> on an almost daily basis in the area and an unlikely alliance of Iraqi government troops, Iran-backed Shi'a militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, and a range of insurgent groups and government loyalists in Syria are fighting the extremists on the ground. Neither, though, has managed to push Islamic State back territorially or significantly degraded its capabilities. </p>
<p>Al-Qaeda continues to operate mostly through affiliate groups, such as al-Shabaab, AQAP, AQIM, al-Nusrah and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. But it has generally seen its claim to leadership in the global jihad weakened. This is both as a result of counter-terrorism measures, including, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/drones">drone strikes</a> and because of the rising appeal of IS. </p>
<p>This appeal, in part facilitated by a sophisticated <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/isil-wages-skilled-social-media-war/1939505.html">social media campaign</a>, has enabled Islamic State to attract <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-onley/why-foreign-fighters-are-_b_5953066.html">followers</a> from abroad and locally. It has created its own branches outside areas it controls, which have carried out attacks, for example in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11485080/Dozens-killed-in-Yemen-Shia-mosque-bombings.html">Yemen</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/11186153/Libya-has-become-the-latest-Isil-conquest.html">Libya</a>. But it has also proved adept at inspiring lone-wolf attacks. </p>
<h2>One global problem</h2>
<p>While it is important to note differences, and rivalries, between al-Qaeda and Islamic State, it is equally important to consider the cumulative nature of the threat that their activities pose locally, regionally and globally.</p>
<p>Terrorist attacks increased by <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239403.htm">35%</a> between 2013 and 2014, and fatalities by 81%. By far the largest number of these attacks and fatalities were caused by Islamic State and two al-Qaeda affiliates, the Taliban and al-Shabaab. The fourth most deadly terror group was Nigeria-based Boko Haram, and the only non-Islamist terror group in the top-five were India’s Maoists.</p>
<p>While there was an increase in activity by the Taliban and al-Shabaab, the surge by Islamic State was of a different magnitude: its total attacks rose from 429 in 2013 to 1,083 in 2014, resulting fatalities increased from 1,752 to 6,286. </p>
<p>One obvious conclusion from all this is that current strategies to counter the threat from Islamist terror groups are simply not working.</p>
<p>These outrages may have been striking in the sense that they occurred simultaneously across Tunisia, Kuwait, France, Somalia, and Syria, but they are, more worryingly, part of a broader trend.</p>
<p>We are witnessing more attacks that occur across more countries and kill more people (and, importantly, more Muslims than non-Muslims). In that sense, the terrorism espoused by the likes of Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram and grounded in their extremist interpretation of Islam is a truly global problem that requires a global response. It is pointless for world leaders to issue shared statements of condemnation while continuing to pursue otherwise nationally-centred responses to the problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. He is a past recipient of grants from the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme and the EU's Jean Monnet Programme.</span></em></p>Attacks in France, Kuwait and Tunisia come against a backdrop of increasing extremist violence across the world.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439732015-06-27T13:58:47Z2015-06-27T13:58:47ZWhy Islamic State attacked a Kuwait mosque during Ramadan<p>June 26 2015 saw three violent terrorist attacks across three continents. In Tunisia, gunmen <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-in-tunisia-tourist-deaths-on-the-beaches-of-sousse-will-kick-start-a-crisis-43957">opened fire</a> on tourists on a beach in Sousse; in France, a man <a href="https://theconversation.com/shoestring-surveillance-and-a-shattered-social-model-latest-france-attack-puts-hollande-in-a-bind-43950">beheaded his employer</a> and attempted to blow up a gas plant; and in Kuwait, a suicide bomber <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/islamic-state-claim-responsibility-deadly-blast-kuwait-city-mosque">attacked a mosque</a> during the holy month of Ramadan. This is the latest in a series of attacks across Gulf states that are attempting to further schisms between Sunni and Shia Muslims.</p>
<p>Abu Suleiman al-Muwahhid, <a href="http://m.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/daesh-claims-responsibility-for-mosque-explosion-in-kuwait-1.1541081">named</a> by Islamic State sources as the suicide bomber who targeted the Imam Sadiq mosque, apparently opposed its promotion of Shia Islam; IS referred to the mosque on Twitter as a “temple of the apostates”. The attack took place just after the midday Friday prayers, when the mosque was at its busiest.</p>
<p>The bombing left 27 dead and more than 200 injured, making it the worst attack to hit Kuwait in many years. It was also the first time a mosque had been targeted in the country’s history.</p>
<p>Saudi-based Wilayat Najd, the latest in a line of groups to to declare affiliation to IS, has taken <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/kuwait/11701322/Kuwait-attack-Islamic-State-suicide-bombing-at-Shia-mosque-kills-13-live.html">credit</a> for the attack. The group had previously <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/world/middleeast/suicide-bombing-saudi-arabia-shiites-sunnis-yemen-mosque.html?_r=0">claimed responsibility</a> for attacks on two Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia in Dammam and Qatif. </p>
<h2>A widening chasm</h2>
<p>Like other Gulf states, Kuwait has a large Shia population. The group accounts for as many as a third of the country’s 1.3m citizens. This attack is seemingly an effort to challenge national unity in a state in which Sunni and Shia often live side by side. But it also highlights the <a href="http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1614.pdf">sectarian schism</a> widening across the Gulf region in general. </p>
<p>Regional competition between Gulf states has taken on an increasingly sectarian element since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia (ruled by Sunnis) and Iran (ruled by Shia) has, in particular, shaped the geopolitics of the region.</p>
<p>Their competition generally plays out through certain proxy countries – such as Iraq and Syria – but has of late spilled over into other states, as we’ve seen in this attack in Kuwait.</p>
<p>The tensions have aggravated the divisions between societies that began to emerge after the Arab uprisings – divisions IS and its affiliates seem intent on accelerating.</p>
<p>IS is seeking to delegitimise political rulers across the region. This in part includes identifying hypocrisy from those in charge, particularly in Saudi Arabia, where the ruling family must <a href="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-saudi-chess-match">choose</a> between defending the Shia in the name of national stability or adhering to the vehemently anti-Shia <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabist</a> doctrine taught in schools across the state.</p>
<p>In Kuwait, religious difference does not manifest in political or security issues but the ruling al-Sabah family also needs to acknowledge tensions and stress national unity, even if it is itself Sunni. </p>
<p>IS hopes that by pointing out this apparent hypocrisy, it can build support from Sunni people in the Gulf who might be angered by their leaders’ tolerance for the Shia and wary of open the door to increased Iranian influence in region.</p>
<p>Perhaps one of the other aims, though, is to draw Iran further into the mix. By demonstrating the state’s inability to offer protection for its minorities, it’s possible that IS is seeking to push Shia groups further towards Iran, which is committed to protecting its co-religious kin. This can already be seen in Iraq, where members of the elite Quds Force, are <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-deploys-forces-to-fight-al-qaeda-inspired-militants-in-iraq-iranian-security-sources-1402592470">operating</a> to protect Bagdhad and the important Shia cities of Karbala and Najaf. </p>
<p>The Kuwait attack is, then, the latest move in a game of regional chess. Relations between rulers and ruled are increasingly frayed and the ramifications are region wide.</p>
<p>Caught in the middle of this are the Muslims across the region who are participating in Ramadan, who are the victims of an increasingly existential struggle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed 27 worshippers at a Shia mosque.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439762015-06-27T13:33:54Z2015-06-27T13:33:54ZWhy kill? The dreadful psychology behind acts of terror<p>We have been witnessing a steady surge of killing in the name of religion. Buddhist monks <a href="http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/comment/articles/2015-02/12/ashin-wirathu-audience-with-the-buddhist-bin-laden-burma">chasing and burning Muslims</a> in Burma; Christian extremists attacking Muslims in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/01/un-muslims-ethnically-cleansed-car-2015196546788288.html">Central African Republic</a>; Sunnis <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/saudi-arabia-suicide-bombing-shiite-mosque-attacked-during-friday-prayers-casualties-1934453">slaughtering their Shi’ia counterparts</a> in a clockwork fashion during Friday prayers across the Islamic world. And now the butchering of innocent civilians in the name of religion in a single calendar day in <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-in-tunisia-tourist-deaths-on-the-beaches-of-sousse-will-kick-start-a-national-crisis-43957">Tunisia</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33287136">Kuwait</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/shoestring-surveillance-and-a-shattered-social-model-latest-france-attack-puts-hollande-in-a-bind-43950">France</a>.</p>
<p>Killing comes with a purpose. It can be rational. Those engaged in it have a prior knowledge surrounding the outcome. It is this knowledge that motivates them to undertake that specific action. </p>
<p>Killing in the name of religion has a more sustained rational basis than one could ever imagine. It is the ultimate ideological statement. The purpose here is not the satiation of a private desire. It is more communal. The killer, the suicide bomber, or the butcher enacting his act in front of a recording device are all engaged in an act which they perversely believe their community or religion wants them to do. You kill because you think there are plenty of people out there who would celebrate your act of killing. </p>
<p>Perhaps the ultimate metaphor of the 21st century is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/terribly-effective-islamic-state-propaganda-draws-the-west-into-another-conflict-31801">parading of the hapless victims</a> on their slow march to slaughter. The radical religious killer slaughters not in isolation but in view of the entire world. The upcoming homicide is carefully choreographed. Then it is plastered across the world.</p>
<p>It is ultimately a statement about power. In a religious conservative’s worldview, all religions are a struggle for power – and the ultimate kind of power is violence. Theirs is not a powerful religion if those who have affirmed their faith in this religion are pushed around. Something needs to be done. That asymmetry needs to be countered and combated. Their religion needs to be seen as powerful. Its power has to be felt. It does not matter if the radical has to kill children at <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/11/blast-targets-school-northeast-nigeria-2014111081117467108.html">school in one’s own community</a>. One need not distinguish between an enemy soldier and families on a vacation. </p>
<p>The trigger-happy killings that unfolded before our eyes in Tunisia and Kuwait may be described not as an end in themselves, but as a means to achieve multiple ends. Taken together these killings and those that have come before them are a means to self-empowerment and a tag of honour in the face of humiliation. </p>
<p>In a related context, we are witnessing religious radicals’ actions being undertaken by others – such as the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/girl-aged-12-nigeria-market-suicide-bombing-150624044055589.html">12-year-old suicide bomber</a> in Nigeria who detonated explosives in a market in an attack that bears all the hallmarks of Boko Haram. </p>
<p>We are swiftly moving into a situation where one’s action is being performed for one by someone else – an intermediary – someone who stands between the person wanting the act done and its doing.</p>
<p>In the end, the killing of the innocent will not end all tragedies the radical thinks has befallen their community and religion. Yet, for the moment the killing will do. The victims in this narrative are emissaries and scapegoats, whose violent expulsion from the midst of this world can momentarily resuscitate the killer’s own twisted imagination of their religion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43976/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalendu Misra receives funding from the British Academy and the Nuffield Foundation.</span></em></p>Religious killing is the ultimate ideological statement, but it will not solve the murderer’s grievances.Amalendu Misra, Senior Lecturer, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/358672015-01-05T19:40:57Z2015-01-05T19:40:57ZOil prices: eventually the Gulf states will run out of power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68211/original/image-20150105-13833-149h9qx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The sands of time will turn against the desert oil states.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&searchterm=hourglass&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=149688629">iceink</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Oil prices have now almost halved in six months to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business/market_data/commodities/143908/twelve_month.stm">below $60/barrel</a> thanks to OPEC’s refusal to cut production. This means all the member countries are revising their government spending policies. While countries such as <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-30/oil-at-40-possible-as-market-transforms-caracas-to-iran.html">Iran</a> and <a href="http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/01/venezuelas_president_off_to_china_seeking_help_with_financial_crisis.html">Venezuela</a> face an imminent fiscal crisis, the short-term ramifications for the Arabian peninsula’s oil monarchies are less dramatic. </p>
<p>In the long run, however, their very high dependence on oil poses a more fundamental challenge than for almost any of their rivals. </p>
<h2>The current cash situation</h2>
<p>The large Gulf hydrocarbons producers – Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – have recorded substantial fiscal surpluses for 2014, benefiting from high oil prices earlier in the year. Among these countries of the <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/249154/Gulf-Cooperation-Council-GCC">Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)</a>, Bahrain alone has incurred a substantial deficit. </p>
<p>Yet there is trouble building up for the future: the oil prices at which government budgets break even have on average increased by more than three times since the early 2000s as spending commitments have risen. </p>
<p>According to IMF estimates, break-even now lies above current oil prices for Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with even Kuwait and Qatar now touching it at the current price.</p>
<p><strong>Gulf state breakeven oil prices (US$/barrel)</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68198/original/image-20150105-13855-123orkb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: IMF October 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Steffen Hertog</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar have substantial overseas reserves that are equivalent to several annual budgets, giving them considerable leeway to incur deficits without debt. Bahrain and Oman, both of whom have only small overseas reserves, have less room for fiscal manoeuvre. Bahrain in particular <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/20/fitch-affirms-bahrain-at-bbb-outlook-sta-idUSFit70510920140620">already has</a> government debt of more than 40% of GDP. It has already taken some austerity measures, being the only country among the group in which estimated 2013 spending lay below that for 2012.</p>
<p>Yet governments across the region are well aware that the rapid spending growth of the last decade cannot continue. This approach could see financial reserves exhausted within as little as a decade in the case of Saudi Arabia and between one and two decades for the others. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68239/original/image-20150105-13827-vjqe42.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Gulf states.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_states_of_the_Persian_Gulf#mediaviewer/File:Persian_Gulf_Arab_States_english.PNG">GCC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The 90s precedent</h2>
<p>The last period of low oil prices and fiscal austerity lasted from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s. Gulf governments generally cut project and infrastructure spending first, protecting government salaries and public services such as education and health as long as possible. State employment was not only protected but continued to grow. Saudi Arabia almost completely abandoned capital expenditure in the 1990s, leading to a decay in public infrastructure that was only addressed during the oil boom in the 2000s. </p>
<p>Subsidies followed the same pattern. Budgets for industrial loans were squeezed and utility tariffs for industrial users increased, while subsidies for households remained protected – or tariff increases only targeted larger (and richer) households. To take another Saudi example, the national airline increased ticket prices for business and first class in the early 1990s but protected subsidised prices for economy travellers. </p>
<p>This climate was hard on manufacturers but contractors were the worst affected, rendering tens of thousands bankrupt. The lesson? Mass entitlements to employment, services and subsidies are more politically sensitive than other forms of spending. </p>
<p>The basic parameters of Gulf policies have not shifted since. If anything, popular entitlements have become stronger and citizens have become better organised in claiming them – unlike political dissent, public and private protests in favour of salary increases and state employment or against subsidy reforms are generally tolerated and often effective. Private business by contrast has come under increasing public pressure for failing to provide sufficient jobs for nationals, hence once again making it likely to be the first target of fiscal trimming.</p>
<h2>New fiscal patterns</h2>
<p>Even if oil prices recover, the situation looks like this: current spending will have to keep rising to accommodate the growing number of working-age citizens, many of whom will continue to be employed in government. Expenditure might also have to rise to keep the lid on Arab Spring-style political crises. All this means capital expenditure will have to fall. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68240/original/image-20150105-13855-924rxh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Oil drilling in the Bahrain desert.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/philippeleroyer/3107382334/in/photolist-w6Lrc-duZzwh-nRyvG-4fo4Cf-wpzzM-5JA9vu-bincbc-fH3fj9-7JYA5M-7JYB2i-qwm3e-qwm82-qwmwB-qwmyh-8YKFu7-8YKF6u-8YGDcc-8YKEYo-craMcQ-8HwWtq-gR2Pr2-h6mzPZ-gR2JTo-qwmaf-qwmbH-7PjE3h-fDhAKr-4amV4n-cSVHEf-48sDvp-qwm4L-qwms9-qwm1P-qwmAx-qwmtK-qwm6z-dZEVBU-qwmdo-qwmgK-qwmos-qwmnk-qwmk8-qwmia-qwmeA-qwmqq-8HtN8H-5DgLcQ-5DgFfA-5Dct8t-5Dcp36">Philippe Leroyer</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This might force governments to downsize or even stop some large-scale projects, including some of the infrastructure planned for the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. In the long-run, there is a danger of even essential infrastructure spending being squeezed, as was the case in the less wealthy Gulf countries in the 1990s. This in turn could compromise the region’s strategy of <a href="http://www.bqdoha.com/2014/04/gcc-countries-and-their-diversification-efforts">diversification</a> to reduce dependency on oil, which has targeted everything from petrochemicals and mining to aviation and tourism.</p>
<p>Because the Gulf economies depend particularly heavily on state spending, these reductions will affect economic growth. In the short run, this will mostly impact economic sectors depending on state project spending. In the mid to long-term high break-even prices, locked in through creeping increases in current spending, could make for endemic deficits. In this situation, even current spending would need to plateau and potentially decline to balance the books, meaning stagnation also in the consumer economy.</p>
<h2>Fiscal constraints as policy opportunity</h2>
<p>Like in the 1990s, the falling oil price has prompted signs of a renewed reform debate. Even in Kuwait, generally the region’s reform laggard, the government is now <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/10/kuwait-economy-subsidies-idUSL5N0LA1FE20140210">openly debating</a> the need for fiscal reforms. </p>
<p>One necessary reform is to reduce the subsidies to domestic energy. Energy prices are uniquely low by global comparison, which leads to large-scale over-consumption. Abu Dhabi <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/environment/electricity-and-water-price-increase-in-abu-dhabi-should-increase-efficiency-experts-say">increased</a> electricity and water tariffs last November, albeit foreign residents bore the brunt.</p>
<p><strong>Estimated Gulf energy subsidies as a % of GDP</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=317&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/68202/original/image-20150105-13820-121s9ox.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IMF, 2011 figures</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another option will be to privatise non-essential public assets, which is <a href="https://www.venturesonsite.com/news/oman-announces-2015-budget-with-8-deficit-slant-on-infrastructure-privatization/">already being planned</a> in Oman. The drawback is that stock-market valuations are likely to be depressed exactly when the proceeds would be needed the most. Public companies in aviation, heavy industry, telecoms and banking have also been core tools in the GCC’s diversification strategy, so the rulers will be reluctant to sell them. </p>
<p>The Gulf countries are also likely to increase the pressure on the private sector to employ more citizens. This will be difficult to implement, however, while local labour markets remain open for low-cost immigrant labour – a core plank of the Gulf economic model. </p>
<h2>Other painful reforms?</h2>
<p>Though the IMF <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car060314a.htm">has been saying</a> that Gulf countries need to become less dependent on petroleum for public spending for the past 30 years, taxation remains a political anathema. No government managed to introduce any substantial tax reforms during the 1990s austerity era. A plan for a GCC-wide value-added tax <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/retail/value-added-tax-plan-for-gcc-on-backburner">remains on ice</a> despite years of debate.</p>
<p>A modern tax system takes a long time to build. And since these economies are so dependent on state spending, it is not clear to what extent the private sector has the capacity to generate revenue on its own anyway. As important, introducing broad-based taxes is likely to give rise to political claims on the part of business and general population that the Gulf rulers would try to avoid until it was too late.</p>
<p>In sum, the current oil price drop does not pose an immediate threat to the stability of the Gulf. Even in the case of Bahrain and Oman, their richer neighbours could prevent a politically undesirable economic collapse through grants and loans. And when their overseas reserves are exhausted, they will still be able to delay the inevitable by issuing debt that they can strong-arm local banks to accept.</p>
<p>Yet eventually state spending and economic growth will slow and even reverse. The focus of policy will gradually shift towards more painful but necessary reforms, which could nevertheless be too little too late to stave off a fiscal crisis. And as reality finally begins to catch up with this part of the world, its regional and global power looks likely to decline.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steffen Hertog does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oil prices have now almost halved in six months to below $60/barrel thanks to OPEC’s refusal to cut production. This means all the member countries are revising their government spending policies. While…Steffen Hertog, Associate Professor, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/162642013-07-26T07:03:48Z2013-07-26T07:03:48ZExplainer: Kuwait elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/28062/original/4brjgscj-1374730739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah at the 2012 elections. Kuwait is passing through an unprecedented period of instability, bringing relentless elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kuwaitelections2012</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Parliamentary elections for the 65 member Kuwait’s National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) are set for this <a href="http://world.time.com/2013/07/24/crisis-weary-kuwait-stumbles-toward-new-elections/">Saturday</a>. Over 410 candidates are contesting the 50 seats elected by popular vote in the oldest and most powerful legislature in the Arab Gulf states. </p>
<p>There are a number of reasons why these elections are of interest to Australia. If the election does not create a more settled political environment, popular unrest will further destabilise this tightly controlled dynastic emirate, and erode confidence in any form of democratic process throughout the region.</p>
<p>Kuwait, like many other Middle Eastern countries, is passing through an unprecedented period of instability, often known as the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/02/kuwait-protests-arab-spring">Arab Spring</a>. This instability has taken the form of violent revolution in Egypt and Tunisia and civil war in Libya and Syria. In Kuwait, it has manifested in social unrest, mass demonstrations and a succession of parliamentary elections. </p>
<p>While the rule of the hereditary royal family has not been directly challenged in Kuwait, the Arab Spring has led Kuwaitis to demand a greater share of power and more transparency and accountability from the Emir who controls the state’s finances and budget. Frustration over these issues, which are beyond the reach of parliament, has in recent times led to widespread public disobedience or violence. </p>
<p>There is <a href="http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4408836,00.html">some suggestion</a> that the election turnout may be low. Campaigning and voting is also taking place during the holy month of Ramadan when the people are usually preoccupied with spiritual obligations and related social activities and duties. As a result, the opportunity of candidates to attract voters through political rallies will be limited. </p>
<p>Given the absence of political parties in Kuwait it is difficult to predict the outcome of the election, but there appears to be a lessening of intensity among dissidents and strengthening support for Emir loyalists. It is likely that the new parliament will be younger with more Shi'ites and women among those elected. </p>
<p>Kuwait is unusual among Arab states in the Middle East in that parliamentary elections have been held since its constitution was promulgated in 1962. Women were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4874990.stm">permitted to vote</a> in 2005 and in 2009 <a href="http://www.ndi.org/kuwait">four women</a> were elected to the National Assembly. </p>
<p>However, the struggle toward <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/2013711114227191429.html">democracy</a> has been slow. In the past six years, Kuwait has held six elections (an average of one a year). All the governments elected have been cut short either by decree of the Emir, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, or the state’s Constitutional Court. The Al-Sabah dynasty has ruled Kuwait since independence in 1961, and resumed power on their return after fleeing an attack by Iraq in 1990-91. </p>
<p>The planned election is coming as a result of the developments that began with the dissolution of parliament by the decree of the Emir in December 2011. This came after opposition-led protestors forced their way into parliament and demanded the prime minister step down, forcing him to resign.</p>
<p>Elections were <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-01/kuwait-election-may-deepen-deadlock-bolster-opposition.html">held in February 2012</a>, but Kuwaiti activists — young and old, women and men, secular and Islamists — were far from placated. There are no legalised opposition political parties as we understand them - political parties are not permitted in Kuwait - but there was widespread belief that corruption was rife among elected deputies and government officials. Those protesting included stateless Arabs working in Kuwait who demanded citizenship, work and other benefits available to Kuwaiti citizens. </p>
<p>New elections were held ten months later in <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/02/kuwait-election-turnout-opposition-boycott">December 2012</a>. However, six weeks prior to those elections, the Emir introduced changes to the electoral laws which caused considerable upset. Prior to that time, Kuwaitis could cast four votes for candidates in their (unclearly demarcated) electoral districts, which often resulted in more than one representative for an electorate. The Emir, without any consultation with the public, abolished the four vote rule, essentially introducing “one person, one vote”. The change was widely seen as a way of the royal family manipulating and controlling the election process.</p>
<p>The result was that many conservatives and tribal people who opposed the new electoral law boycotted the December 2012 election which saw a 30-40% vote turnout, the lowest since the first election held in 1963. Three women were elected, as were an increased number of Shi’ites in the predominantly Sunni population. </p>
<p>Opposition spokesmen challenged the electoral law in the Constitutional Court, the country’s highest court and final arbiter in such matters. In mid-June 2013 the court upheld the law, but annulled the results of the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212252435988688.html">December 2012</a> elections. They instructed the Emir to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections — the upcoming election was then scheduled for July 27 by the Kuwaiti Ministerial Council, members of which are chosen by the prime minister who is chosen by the Emir.</p>
<p>It is hoped that the elections will lessen political tensions and produce a much-needed cooperative and stable political environment in Kuwait. The popular unrest, opposition factional turmoil and political instability that have characterised the past few years have significantly unsettled the state. This uncertainty has curtailed the advancement of economic reforms, and the development of desirable social and political infrastructures. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/16264/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Bickerton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Parliamentary elections for the 65 member Kuwait’s National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) are set for this Saturday. Over 410 candidates are contesting the 50 seats elected by popular vote in the oldest and…Ian Bickerton, Associate Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.