tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/mali-4565/articlesMali – The Conversation2024-03-14T13:15:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255172024-03-14T13:15:14Z2024-03-14T13:15:14ZBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger hint at a new west African currency: what it’ll take for it to succeed<p><em>On 11 February 2024, the head of Niger’s ruling military junta, General Abdourahmane Tiani, spoke of the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20240213-niger-hints-at-new-currency-in-step-out-of-colonialisation">possible creation of a common currency</a> with Burkina Faso and Mali. “The currency is a first step toward breaking free from the legacy of colonisation,” he said on national TV, referring to the CFA franc inherited from French colonisation.</em></p>
<p><em>Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, three former French colonies, have experienced military coups in recent years. They’re now all ruled by military regimes. They also formed a new defence alliance, known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">Alliance of Sahel States</a> (AES).</em> </p>
<p><em>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20240226-la-lev%C3%A9e-des-sanctions-contre-le-niger-un-net-changement-de-braquet-pour-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao">has condemned</a> these coups and imposed sanctions on the countries involved. In response, these countries decided to withdraw from Ecowas. However, they remain members of the <a href="https://www.umoatitres.org/en/commission-de-luemoa/">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Uemoa). Uemoa has a common currency, the CFA franc, which is issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).</em></p>
<p><em>The BCEAO and the Banque de France are bound by <a href="https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/banque-de-france/partenariats-afrique-france">cooperation agreements</a> that include the deposit of a portion of foreign exchange reserves at the Banque de France and France guaranteeing the CFA franc.</em></p>
<p><em>Thierno Thioune, an expert on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352717047_Interdependance_entre_Politique_monetaire_et_politique_budgetaire_au_niveau_de_l4UEMOA?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">monetary policies and unions between west African states</a>, analyses the potential implications and feasibility of launching a new currency for the AES member countries.</em></p>
<h2>What conditions must be met for a multilateral currency to work?</h2>
<p>To successfully launch and maintain a multilateral currency, several key factors must be considered.</p>
<p>First, macroeconomic and budgetary policies must be closely coordinated. Rigorous harmonisation of economic and budgetary policies between participating countries is imperative to guarantee the stability of the currency’s value and prevent trade imbalances. This will help maintain the confidence of economic players and promote regional growth.</p>
<p>Second, robust monetary management institutions must be established. Strong institutions responsible for currency management, like a common central bank, are essential. This central bank must have adequate authority to implement an independent and stable monetary policy. This will ensure the preservation of the currency’s value and address cyclical fluctuations. </p>
<p>Third, creating an integrated common market is vital. The unrestricted flow of goods, services, capital and labour is key to driving economic growth and enhancing regional cooperation. The current framework provided by the West African Economic and Monetary Union offers a significant advantage in this regard.</p>
<p>Finally, mechanisms to monitor and resolve crises need to be established. For instance, common reserve funds and <a href="https://www.abc-forex.net/contenu/swap-de-change/swap-devises.php">currency swap arrangements</a> could help address external and internal shocks that may affect the new currency. Currency swaps – when two parties exchange amounts in two different currencies for a certain period at a fixed rate – can be used to manage exchange rate risks and facilitate cross-border financing. </p>
<h2>Are these conditions met in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali?</h2>
<p>It’s difficult to say whether these conditions have been fully met in the three countries. It would mean having a firm understanding of whether these, among other, conditions have been met: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>harmonisation of government policies</p></li>
<li><p>macroeconomic stability through inflation control</p></li>
<li><p>limit on public debt</p></li>
<li><p>maintenance of a balanced current account.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>At this time, it’s hard to say whether these countries have done this. </p>
<h2>Does their monetary union membership make any difference?</h2>
<p>These three countries have been part of the West African Economic and Monetary Union since 1963. In theory, this should give them some experience in coordinating economic and monetary policies through the CFA franc. </p>
<p>They could have experience with infrastructure, like the Central Bank of West African States (which manages the single currency and monetary policy for member states), that would help them with the transition.</p>
<h2>What are the potential gains and risks of the initiative?</h2>
<p>Despite the risks involved, the initiative could bring several benefits. </p>
<p>Establishing a larger monetary zone can foster greater trade integration and improved resource allocation. </p>
<p>It could enhance the country’s “flexibility” in dealing with external partners. </p>
<p>By joining a new monetary union, these three countries could also benefit significantly from increased trade integration, independence from external partners, lower transaction costs and investor attractiveness. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, this initiative also entails risks, particularly with regard to their position within the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas. The latter could perceive the creation of a new currency as a threat to their regional influence. It could cause the fragmentation of existing economic blocs. In addition, the departure of the three countries could weaken the solidity of the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Ecowas in terms of economic and political influence. </p>
<p>There are also risks that the currency could quickly lose value. </p>
<p>The new currency could depreciate against the CFA franc. This could have substantial negative repercussions for exporters to other West African Economic and Monetary Union countries.</p>
<p>Second, without proper formal frameworks to control and manage the new currency, speculation and uncertainty regarding its value may emerge. This is why establishing robust institutions to support the management and supervision of the new currency is crucial.</p>
<h2>How will the new currency affect trade in the zone?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three nations could, temporarily, have a negative impact on their trade with countries within the current bloc. It could even lead to some turbulence in trade with countries outside it.</p>
<p>The transition to a new currency typically introduces a level of uncertainty among economic actors and trading partners, as questions arise about the currency’s value, convertibility and stability. This adjustment phase can lead to a temporary slowdown in trade.</p>
<p>In addition, the introduction of a new currency often requires legislative and regulatory changes, especially regarding foreign exchange operations and customs duties. These can act as administrative and regulatory barriers and result in delays in commercial transactions.</p>
<p>During the transitional period, there may be fluctuations in exchange rates. This will lead to disparities between the old and new currencies. It can affect price competitiveness between exporters and importers and reduce the overall volume of trade.</p>
<p>The perceptions and attitudes of external partners matter when a new currency is announced. Some trading partners may exhibit reluctance or express doubts regarding its reliability and credibility. This could diminish their willingness to continue trading with member countries of the zone.</p>
<h2>Could the move isolate them?</h2>
<p>The creation of a new currency by these three countries may indeed raise questions about their potential isolation. However, such an initiative should not automatically lead to a diplomatic rupture or total marginalisation.</p>
<p>To avoid this, proactive communication, constructive cooperation and balanced, inclusive regional economic integration are key. This will help mitigate the risks of isolation for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in their monetary project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thierno Thioune has received funding from the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) and the Romanian Government for the "Eugen Ionescu" doctoral programme at the University "Dunarea De Jos" in Galati, Romania. CODESRIA also awarded him a prize as part of its thesis grant programme.</span></em></p>Several conditions must be met to ensure the successful launch and operation of a multilateral currency.Thierno Thioune, enseignant-chercheur, directeur du CREA, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de DakarLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238672024-02-22T12:01:17Z2024-02-22T12:01:17ZLearning in two languages: lessons from francophone Africa on what works best<p>Children living in multilingual communities often learn in a language at school that does not match the language they speak at home. This mismatch makes it challenging for them to participate in classroom discussions and learn to read. In turn, this contributes to poor learning outcomes, grade repetition, and dropping out of school.</p>
<p>Bilingual education programmes that include mother tongue languages have become increasingly popular for improving learning outcomes. Bilingual education is associated with better <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1366728908003386">language and literacy skills</a>, reduced grade repetition and school dropout rates across the <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10986/10331">globe</a>. Including mother tongue languages in education also places value on children’s cultural identities, improving confidence, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09500789808666737">self-esteem</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-012-9308-2">learning</a>. </p>
<p>But simply providing bilingual education does not guarantee better learning results. This is the conclusion of a recent <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2023.2290482">paper</a> we published in which we reviewed bilingual programmes in six francophone west African countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. </p>
<p>We found mixed results, across and within countries and programmes.</p>
<p>We identified two sets of factors that constrain or contribute to the quality of bilingual education. These were: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>implementation factors, such as teacher training and classroom resources</p></li>
<li><p>socio-cultural factors, such as perceptions of mother tongue languages in education.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our findings emphasise the need to consider the local context when applying bilingual education programmes. </p>
<h2>Bilingual education in francophone west Africa</h2>
<p>Our research team conducted research in Côte d’Ivoire from 2016 to 2018. We measured children’s language and reading skills in both their mother tongue and in French, and compared outcomes between children attending French-only or bilingual Projet École Intégrée schools. </p>
<p>Children in French-only schools outperformed their peers from bilingual schools on the language and reading <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000723">assessments</a>. Teachers revealed they had better teaching resources and felt better prepared in French-only schools. </p>
<p>We were interested in whether bilingual education programmes in other francophone countries in the region had had similar experiences. In 2022, we searched academic databases for literature in English and French that discussed programme implementation and measured learning and schooling outcomes within bilingual education programmes. We reviewed nine programmes from six countries: Niger, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cameroon. </p>
<p>These countries are former French colonies or territories. French is the official or working language and often the language of instruction in school. However, these countries are highly multilingual. About 23 living <a href="https://www.ethnologue.com/">languages</a> are spoken in Niger, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">39</a> in Senegal, <a href="https://www.languagesoftheworld.info/geolinguistics/linguistic-diversity-in-africa-and-europe.html">68</a> in Mali, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">71</a> in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">78</a> in Côte d’Ivoire and <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1280625/number-of-living-languages-in-africa-by-country/">277</a> in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Our review showed that children can benefit from learning in two languages. This is true whether they are two official languages like in Cameroon’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-019-09510-7">Dual Curriculum Bilingual Education</a> (French and English) schools, or in a mother tongue and French, like in Mali’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/447544">Community Schools</a>. Children can also benefit regardless of whether they are gradually introduced to a language throughout primary school or whether both languages are introduced at the same time.</p>
<p>But a lack of resources, and a failure to take into account local conditions, affected the outcomes. The programmes that resulted in positive schooling and learning outcomes recognised and targeted common school-related and community-related challenges.</p>
<h2>Teacher training and resources</h2>
<p>One common school-related challenge was teachers not having teaching materials in all languages of instruction.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000161121">Pédagogie Convergente</a> programme in Mali, for example, ensured teachers had materials in both French and the mother tongue. Children had better French and maths scores. </p>
<p>But some teachers from the same programme did not always have teaching <a href="https://books.google.ca/books/about/Patterns_of_French_literacy_development.html?id=MoNnAAAAMAAJ&hl=en&redir_esc=y">materials</a> in mother tongue languages. And some children struggled with literacy and writing skills. </p>
<p>Another common challenge was teachers not feeling prepared to teach in all languages, as teacher training often occurred in an official language, like French. The <a href="https://www.adeanet.org/clearinghouse/sites/default/files/docs/interieur_11_burkina_fre.pdf">Programme d’éducation bilingue</a> in Burkina Faso, for example, made an effort to train teachers in the mother tongue language so they felt confident following the bilingual curriculum. </p>
<p>Children in bilingual Burkina Faso schools had higher than average <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050802149275">pass rates</a> on the primary certificate exam, <a href="https://www.memoireonline.com/06/22/12997/m_Le-rapport-des-enseignants-aux-langues-nationales-en-tant-que-mdiums-et-matires-den.html">repeated grades less</a>, and stayed in school more than children in traditional French schools. </p>
<p>Both examples are in contrast to the bilingual schools in Côte d’Ivoire, where teachers lacked materials and training in mother tongue languages. In turn, children demonstrated worse language and reading skills compared to their peers in French-only schools.</p>
<h2>Socio-cultural factors</h2>
<p>We identified common community-related challenges, particularly related to community buy-in and perceptions of mother tongue instruction. </p>
<p>For example, families with higher socioeconomic status were worried that Niger’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050208667760">Ecole Experimentale</a> schools would hinder children’s French proficiency and compromise their entry into secondary school. </p>
<p>Programmes such as the <a href="https://ared-edu.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DC-Senegal-Workshop-Findings_04.2019-FINAL-ENG.pdf">Support Program for Quality Education in Mother Tongues for Primary Schools</a> in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2020.1765968">Senegal</a> worked to combat negative perceptions by educating families about the benefits of bilingual education. Children in the Senegalese programme outperformed their peers in traditional French schools in all school subjects.</p>
<p>The same programmes sometimes experienced different outcomes depending on the community. For example, although children in Burkina Faso’s bilingual schooling showed favourable outcomes, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-021-09885-y">parents</a> felt that French programmes were better suited for continuing to secondary school. </p>
<h2>What does this mean for bilingual education?</h2>
<p>Efforts to provide teachers with the resources they needed, and efforts to foster community support, were both consistently linked with positive schooling and learning outcomes in our review. </p>
<p>However, these efforts might work better in some communities compared to others, due to different resource constraints and socio-cultural differences. Studies that found poorer outcomes also found common challenges present. Therefore, bilingual education has the potential to facilitate positive learning outcomes if efforts are made to overcome common challenges based on communities’ needs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bilingual education can improve learning outcomes but it’s important to consider local context.Kaja Jasinska, Assistant Professor, Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of TorontoMary-Claire Ball, PhD student, Developmental Psychology and Education, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228262024-02-21T12:29:46Z2024-02-21T12:29:46ZFree movement in west Africa: three countries leaving Ecowas could face migration hurdles<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, a recent decision to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) has thrown up questions about how they will navigate regional mobility in future. </p>
<p>Ecowas covers a variety of sectors, but migration is a major one. The bloc’s protocols since 1979 have long been seen as a <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97322-3_2">shining example</a> of free movement on the continent. They gave citizens the right to move between countries in the region without a visa, and a prospective right of residence and setting up businesses.</p>
<p>As multidisciplinary scholars we have previously researched <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/en/political-economy-west-african-migration-governance-wamig-2">migration governance in west Africa</a>, at the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">regional level</a>, and in particular contexts like <a href="https://ecdpm.org/work/what-does-regime-change-niger-mean-migration-cooperation-eu">Niger</a>. </p>
<p>We argue that Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if their departure from Ecowas curtails mobility. But it is likely that informal mobility will continue anyway. </p>
<h2>Why free movement matters</h2>
<p>In September 2023, the three countries created a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a>, named <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sahel-coups-niger-tchiani-mali-burkina-faso-insecurity-e96627c700aa4fcf8d060dd9d2d16667">the Alliance of Sahel States</a>. This indicated their solidarity in dealing with insecurity. </p>
<p>Yet they also depend on neighbouring countries in the region, which puts these three countries in a difficult position.</p>
<p>The three countries that announced their withdrawal from Ecowas are connected in a web of mobility. Notably, Niger, seen as a key transit country for refugees and other migrants on their way to Europe, received <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/migration-and-society/3/1/arms030107.xml">major funds and support</a> from the European Union to prevent onward migration to Libya and beyond. </p>
<p>One central measure was <a href="https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2015/fr/123771">Loi 2015-36</a>, a law which punished people transporting migrants with fines and prison sentences. The law was <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/european-dominance-of-migration-policy-in-niger-31383/">mostly developed</a> by external actors and had detrimental effects on the <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf">local economy</a>. It also made migration journeys across the Sahara desert even <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4138add1-visit-niger-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants">more dangerous</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the law, which <a href="https://www.arnold-bergstraesser.de/sites/default/files/medam_niger_jegen.pdf">arguably violated</a> the principles of free movement under Ecowas, was repealed by the Nigerien coup leaders. </p>
<p>Mali is another major transit country in the region, as well as a country of origin for regional migration. It has a complicated history of <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/72355">migration cooperation</a> with Europe. </p>
<p>Of less relevance to Europe, but more for regional dynamics, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_11">Burkina Faso</a> is at the centre for <a href="https://www.mideq.org/en/migration-corridors/burkina-faso-cote-divoire/">regional migration</a>, often seasonal. Labour migration supports Côte d'Ivoire’s cocoa industry. After withdrawal from Ecowas, such labour migration may be difficult unless people resort more to informal migration. </p>
<p>As we have shown in our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2022.2084452">previous research</a>, informal mobility has always existed along with formal mobility governance. Official border crossing points are often not used, despite the legal requirement to do so. </p>
<p>Hence, leaving Ecowas may increase corruption and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12766">problems of harassment</a> at formal border crossings as well as <a href="https://mixedmigration.org/resource/human-rights-migrants-smuggling-mali-niger/">increased use of mobility facilitators</a>, or “passeurs”. These are people who negotiate passage through formal border crossings and organise journeys through other routes. </p>
<p>The legal gaps that the current situation creates could be very expensive for businesses and individuals. People may in the near future require visas. And for those who have migrated regionally, the right to stay in a country of residency may soon be under threat. </p>
<h2>An immediate exit</h2>
<p>Days after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their withdrawal from <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/">Ecowas</a>, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/02/08/burkina-mali-and-niger-reject-one-year-period-to-quit-ecowas">insisted</a> they were not bound by <a href="https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Revised-treaty-1.pdf#page=53">rules stipulating</a> a one year notice period before their final exit. </p>
<p>The announcement about leaving Ecowas outside the normal regulations was dramatic, but not unexpected. Military governments that took power in a series of coups in August 2020 and May 2021 in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup">Mali</a>, September 2022 in <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> and July 2023 in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">Niger</a> rule the three countries.</p>
<p>Ecowas has exerted political and economic pressure on the three countries to return to constitutional rule, through sanctions and the <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/military-intervention-niger-imperatives-and-caveats">threat</a> of military intervention. </p>
<p>In Niger, for example, Ecowas <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-bazoum-coup-sanctions-ecowas-c7bdfd06559f1cfbfb856bea5b11a55f">closed</a> official border crossings, cut off more than <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-nigeria-cuts-power-supply-ecowas-vows-to-confront-junta/">70% </a> of electricity, and suspended financial transactions with other countries in the region. </p>
<p>International assets <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/31/nigers-planned-51-mln-bond-issuance-cancelled-due-to-sanctions">were frozen</a> and international aid halted. Even before the coup, <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/thousands-children-niger-risk-severe-nutritional-crisis-border-closures-leave-trucks-stranded#:%7E:text=Furthermore%2C%20prior%20to%20the%20political,least%20one%20form%20of%20malnutrition.">3.3 million people</a> in Niger experienced acute food insecurity. </p>
<p>The Ecowas sanctions made daily life even worse and in all likelihood added to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">popularity</a> of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>Similar sanctions were applied in Mali. The population has suffered as a result and the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">effectiveness</a> of the sanctions is questionable. </p>
<p>Sanctions in Burkina Faso included <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa">travel bans</a> against members of the military government.</p>
<h2>Potential ways ahead</h2>
<p>For Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, there are several considerations when it comes to regional mobility in their post-Ecowas era. These may include exploring the provisions of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a>; a return to bilateral agreements with individual neighbours; or relying on the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Monetary union:</strong> The three countries are still part of the <a href="https://www.uemoa.int/en">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> (Waemu), a union around the common currency, the CFA franc.</p>
<p>The regional monetary union also has provisions for free movement of people and goods across its member countries. With this option, access to seaports, a major issue for all three landlocked countries, is ensured through other members of the monetary union, including, for example, Senegal. </p>
<p>On the downside is the fact that a major argument for leaving Ecowas was the perceived role of external influence over the regional bloc. The strong anti-imperialist discourse of the military governments does not bode well for the regional monetary union either. The union is the institutional framework for regional monetary policy over which France <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341798/africas-last-colonial-currency/">continues</a> to exert significant influence. </p>
<p>Burkina Faso has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-may-quit-west-african-currency-union-not-mali-2024-01-31/">announced</a> its intention to leave the monetary union too. </p>
<p>The West Africa Economic and Monetary Union also excludes major trading partners like Nigeria – of major importance to landlocked <a href="https://www.inter-reseaux.org/en/publication/51-special-issue-nigeria/nigerias-role-in-nigers-food-security/">Niger</a> for food supplies. Trade and commerce between Nigeria and Niger provides a lifeline and is among the most intense areas of cross-border activity in west Africa. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the regional monetary union option seems an unlikely alternative.</p>
<p><strong>Bilateral agreements:</strong> Another option for the three countries could be a return to bilateral agreements with individual countries to facilitate free movement. This can be likened to what former Ecowas member <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2014.936696">Mauritania</a>, which left in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2000/12/28/mauritania-pulls-out-ecowas">2000</a>, did. </p>
<p>However, at the moment, given the sanctions, this option is off the cards, and could take many years to work out. </p>
<p><strong>African Union protocol:</strong> At a continental level the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788">African Union Protocol on Free Movement</a> may offer a distant way forward. So far only <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-sl-PROTOCOL_TO_THE_TREATY_ESTABLISHING_THE_AFRICAN_ECONOMIC_COMMUNITY_RELATING_TO_FREE_MOVEMENT_OF_PERSONS-1.pdf">32 countries</a> have signed it and four have ratified it, among them Mali and Niger (Burkina Faso is a signatory). </p>
<p>One way to move forward would be for countries to ramp up ratifications of this document, to ensure that cooperation on free movement can continue whatever happens to Ecowas. </p>
<p>Of course, other countries within Ecowas could also unilaterally open up for visa-free entry like <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/03/rwanda-announces-visa-free-travel-for-all-africans//">Rwanda</a> or Kenya have done, though the process has had its <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/01/09/kenya-backlash-over-new-visa-free-entry-policy-many-describe-as-hectic//">hiccups</a>. </p>
<p>Such visa arrangements are also unlikely to include the rights of residence and establishment guaranteed under the Ecowas framework.</p>
<p>Given the current political context, an institutionalised option seems unlikely in the near future. The most likely option would be that migration will simply continue – informally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Franzisca Zanker received funding from the Mercator Stiftung for a research project "The Political Economy of West African Migration Governace" in 2019 which provided relevant background for this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda Bisong is a policy officer at the ECDPM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Jegen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have much to lose if they cannot migrate to and from neighbouring countries in Ecowas.Franzisca Zanker, Senior research fellow, Arnold Bergstraesser InstituteAmanda Bisong, PhD candidate, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLeonie Jegen, PhD Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232532024-02-14T14:26:07Z2024-02-14T14:26:07ZWagner Group is now Africa Corps. What this means for Russia’s operations on the continent<p><em>In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/hand-grenade-explosion-caused-plane-crash-that-killed-wagner-boss-says-putin">his private jet crashed</a> about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia’s pointman in Africa since the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">began operating on the continent in 2017</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The group is known for <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders</a>. It has had a destabilising effect. Prigozhin’s death – and his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/24/timeline-how-wagner-groups-revolt-against-russia-unfolded">aborted mutiny</a> against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group’s activities.</em></p>
<p><em>What does this mean for Africa? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fvXhZxQAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Alessandro Arduino’s research</a> includes mapping the evolution of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">mercenaries</a> and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current status of the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defence quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-wagner-group-evolves-after-the-death-of-prigozhin/">business as usual</a> – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">Recent reports</a> on the Wagner Group suggest a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20has%20been%20replaced,its%20new%20leader%20has%20confirmed.">transformation</a> is underway. </p>
<p>The group’s activities in Africa are now under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">direct supervision</a> of the Russian ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Wagner commands an estimated force of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Rather%20than%20a%20single%20entity%2C%20Wagner%20is%20a,of%20former%20Russian%20soldiers%2C%20convicts%2C%20and%20foreign%20nationals.">5,000 operatives</a> deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defence ministry has renamed it the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa">Africa Corps</a>. </p>
<p>The choice of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-military-unit-recruiting-former-wagner-fighters-ukraine-veterans-2023-12?r=US&IR=T">name</a> could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-owned-mine-seized-by-russian-mercenaries-in-africa-is-helping/">serve one master</a> – the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia’s ministry of defence will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin’s involvement. The head of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">attempted to use this defence in Mali</a>.</p>
<p>The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/afrika-korps">Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps</a>. Nazi Germany wove myths around his <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/115/4/1243/35179?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic and tactical successes in north Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wagner-group-africa-where-rubber-meets-road-206202">distinctive modus operandi</a> that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin’s reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated network of financing to enhance combat capabilities.</p>
<h2>What will happen to Wagner’s modus operandi now?</h2>
<p>In my recent book, <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones and the Future of War</a>, I record Prigozhin’s adept weaving of disinformation and misinformation. </p>
<p>Numerous meticulously orchestrated campaigns flooded Africa’s online social platforms <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/">promoting</a> the removal of French and western influence across the Sahel. </p>
<p>Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the propaganda arm of the group. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html">admitted</a> to founding the so-called troll farm: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never just been the financier of the Internet Research Agency. I invented it, I created it, I managed it for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a financial perspective, Prigozhin’s approach involved establishing a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581">convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations</a>. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. </p>
<p>This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/how-russia-recruiting-wagner-fighters-continue-war-ukraine">Russian state</a> to support the Wagner Group’s direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine, and across north and west Africa.</p>
<p>My research shows Prigozhin networks are solid enough to last. But only as long as the golden rule of the mercenary remains intact: guns for hire are getting paid.</p>
<p>In Libya and Mali, Russia is unlikely to yield ground due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy and securing its position as a kingmaker in the region. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group’s involvement here was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">primarily linked</a> to Prigozhin’s personal interests in goldmine revenues.</p>
<p>The Russian ministry of defence will no doubt seek to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today’s Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility.</p>
<p>History has shown that Africa serves as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">lucrative arena for mercenaries</a> due to various factors. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts reduces the risks to mercenaries’ lives compared to full-scale wars like in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-720">Ukraine</a></p></li>
<li><p>the continent’s abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As it is, countries in Africa once considered allies of the west are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">viable candidate</a>. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/">develop bilateral ties</a>”. Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.</p>
<p>A month earlier, Russia’s deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who’s been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and north Africa, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">visited Niger</a>. The two countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">agreed to strengthen military ties</a>. Niger is currently led by the military after a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in July 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Where does it go from here?</h2>
<p>There are a number of paths that the newly named Africa Corps could take.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It gets deployed by Moscow to fight in conflicts meeting Russia’s geopolitical ends. </p></li>
<li><p>It morphs into paramilitary units under the guise of Russian foreign military intelligence agencies.</p></li>
<li><p>It splinters into factions, acting as heavily armed personal guards for local warlords. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The propaganda machinery built by Prigozhin may falter during the transition. But this won’t signal the immediate disappearance of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. </p>
<p>Russian diplomatic efforts are already mobilising to preserve the status quo. This is clear from Moscows’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russia-deepens-counter-terrorism-ties-to-sahelian-post-coup-regimes/">backing</a> of the recent Alliance of Sahelian States encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are led by military rulers who overthrew civilian governments a recently announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">plans to exit</a> from the 15-member Economic Community of West African States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>Will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the ruthless modus operandi that propelled it to the spotlight in Africa?Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227202024-02-07T13:27:05Z2024-02-07T13:27:05ZEcowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel<p><em>On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">announced</a> their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation.</em></p>
<p><em>Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.</em></p>
<h2>Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?</h2>
<p>The coastal states in Ecowas fear <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f9c0ca66-8c32-4906-9e22-f2d3fc0e8c67">contagion</a> from both jihadism and political disorder in the Sahel. If the three Sahelian countries leave Ecowas, that risk increases. So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.</p>
<p>Other governments in the region also fear damage to their own democracies – if not from coups, then from anti-western populists. </p>
<p>Guinea already has a military government. Others such as Cameroon, Togo and Sierra Leone may be vulnerable. </p>
<p>With elections ahead in <a href="https://ec.gov.gh/electoral-system/">Ghana</a>, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/senegal-parliament-delays-election-to-december-15-after-chaotic-vote">postponement</a> of the election in Senegal, this year will test democracy in the region.</p>
<p>This schism in Ecowas is also a risk for Africa’s partners in Europe and the US. Recent research in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adad034/7564826?searchresult=1">African Affairs journal</a> showed that resentment of the increased French military presence was a key reason for the Nigerien military backing the coup led by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115">General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> rather than elected <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/what-you-need-know-about-nigers-ousted-president-2023-08-14/">president Mohamed Bazoum</a>. </p>
<p>Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns. They need to expedite the changes necessary to ensure that the multilateral system works for the benefit of small poor countries.</p>
<p>If this doesn’t happen, China’s narrative that the existing system works only to the benefit of “the west” will gain traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>What are the drivers?</h2>
<p>All countries in west Africa face a multilayered crisis. This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/great-recession.asp">2008 financial crisis</a>, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1">COVID</a> and the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine war</a>, the impact of climate change and population growth. </p>
<p>Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens. This is particularly true of the growing number of unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with democracy and are open to violent regime change, whether through jihad or a coup d’etat. </p>
<p>It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region. People who cannot make a living legitimately will find other ways to do so.</p>
<p>Jihadism and banditry have <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/from-global-jihad-to-local-insurgencies/">increased</a> despite western efforts to combat them. Western support has thus lost credibility, even if the real failure is primarily political and economic. </p>
<h2>Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?</h2>
<p>Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma. Do they to stick to their principles and exclude states that have experienced unconstitutional changes of government until they re-establish governments accountable to their citizens? Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club? </p>
<p>Reconciliation efforts by Togo, through its <a href="https://lpsf.africa/lpsf-2023/">Peace and Security Forum</a> in Lomé last November, and by Nigerian Islamic leaders have not borne fruit. Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-communique-on-burkina-faso-mali-niger/">responded</a> by saying that it had not yet received formal notification, which means, according to the regulations, that the countries can only leave in a year’s time. This provides all parties with negotiation time. The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240130/communique-withdrawal-three-ecowas-member-states">AU</a> has also urged negotiation to keep Ecowas together. For its part, Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-notifies-west-african-bloc-ecowas-decision-leave-2024-01-29/">response</a> has been less accommodating.</p>
<h2>What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?</h2>
<p>Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. </p>
<p>They have set out the following <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">justifications</a> for their withdrawal:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists</p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people </p></li>
<li><p>Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments are weak. They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.</p>
<p>It seems to be working. Populations are being <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/burkina-faso/313-armer-les-civils-au-prix-de-la-cohesion-sociale">mobilised and armed</a> to fight the jihadists.</p>
<p>The juntas appear to be donning the mantle of <a href="https://www.thomassankara.net/facts-about-thomas-sankara-in-burkina-faso/?lang=en">Thomas Sankara</a>. The revered former president of Burkina Faso, who seized power himself, is seen as a hero for his opposition to corrupt elites and French influence, his modesty and principles, and his concern for the ordinary Burkinabe. </p>
<p>It also plays conveniently into a narrative that both <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/09/21/china-wants-to-be-the-leader-of-the-global-south">China</a> and Russia are promoting: that current global institutions have been set up to defend neocolonial western interests, that adherence to “western values” (such as democracy and human rights) denies countries their right to develop in their own way; and that only China and Russia are true defenders of the interests of the global south.</p>
<p>Russia is putting its guns where its mouth is. There are an estimated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">1,000</a> Russian troops in Mali – formerly Wagner, now state-run and re-branded the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-deploy-burkina-faso-2024-01-25/">Africa Corps</a> – and the first 100, with more to follow, have arrived in Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>Others are being recruited for Niger. Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion. </p>
<p>The danger is that the Sahelian states could become unaccountable regimes, protected by Russia in return for gold, and living off the illicit trafficking of people and goods across the Sahara. </p>
<p>The migrant trade is already <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54581/niger-migrants-return-to-the-route-towards-the-mediterranean">thriving again in Agadez</a>, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast. And nothing worries European countries more than a dramatic increase in African migration. So they will be watching developments with concern.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their intention to leave Ecowas. This may be a pointer to a deeper crisis in the Sahel region.Nicholas Westcott, Professor of Practice in Diplomacy, Dept of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
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<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
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<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
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<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178072023-12-28T20:38:22Z2023-12-28T20:38:22ZWill the world see more wars or unrest in 2024? Here are 5 hotspots to watch<p>Sadly, 2023 has been a violent one on the global stage. War broke out between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, leading to the deaths of thousands of Palestinians and hundreds of Israelis, including many children on both sides. And the bitter war between Russia and Ukraine continued with no end in sight. </p>
<p>As a result of the focus on these two conflicts, other countries have dropped off the radar for many people. Some of these nations have been dealing with simmering unrest, however, which could erupt in 2024 and seize the global spotlight. </p>
<p>So, where should we be watching in the coming year? Here are five places where I believe civil conflicts or unrest could worsen and potentially lead to violence.</p>
<h2>Myanmar</h2>
<p>Myanmar descended into chaos in 2021 when a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and sparked widespread civil protests that eventually morphed into an armed resistance. </p>
<p>The country, home to <a href="https://www.embassyofmyanmar.be/ABOUT/ethnicgroups.htm">135 ethnic groups</a>, has rarely known peace. For years before the coup, there was a ongoing, low-grade civil conflict between the military and several minority ethnic groups who have long sought control over natural resources in their regions and independence from the state.</p>
<p>This exploded after the coup as ethnic militia groups joined forces with pro-democracy fighters from the Bamar majority protesting the junta.</p>
<p>Their resistance <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/the-myanmar-military-is-facing-death-by-a-thousand-cuts/">escalated in late 2023</a> with a coordinated northern offensive dealing the military its most significant losses in many years. </p>
<p>Insurgents won control of towns and villages on the northeastern border with China, including control over key trade routes. This led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/22/myanmar-fighting-at-its-worst-since-2021-coup-says-united-nations">renewed fighting</a> in western Rakhine state, as well as in other areas.</p>
<p>The tenacity of the resistance of these minority groups, paired with the refusal of the military to compromise, suggests the country’s civil war may worsen considerably in 2024 and regain international attention. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1728638209502880035"}"></div></p>
<h2>Mali</h2>
<p>In Mali, a nation in the turbulent Sahel region of Africa, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur">tensions escalated throughout 2023</a> and now threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war. </p>
<p>Mali has long battled insurgent activity. In 2012, Mali’s government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html">fell in a coup</a> and Tuareg rebels, backed by Islamist militants, seized power in the north. </p>
<p>A United Nations peacekeeping mission was established in 2013 to bring stability to Mali. Then, in 2015, key rebel groups <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150620-rebels-mali-tuareg-peace-deal-algiers-accord">signed a peace agreement</a> with the Mali government. </p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-crisis-un-peacekeepers-are-leaving-after-10-years-whats-needed-for-a-smooth-transition-210210">Mali crisis: UN peacekeepers are leaving after 10 years – what's needed for a smooth transition</a>
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<p>After two more coups in 2020 and 2021, military officers consolidated their power and said they would restore the state’s full territorial control over all of Mali. The regime insisted the UN peacekeeping mission <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-2023/un-mali-we-respect-government%E2%80%99s-decision-mission-withdrawal">withdraw</a> from the country, which it did in June 2023. Subsequently, violence broke out between the military and rebel forces over future use of the UN bases. </p>
<p>In November, the military, reportedly backed by Russia’s Wagner Group, took control of the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-tuareg-rebels-kidal-azawad-d1184c497265601de5d18d306fc398e3">strategic northern town of Kidal</a> which had been held by Tuareg forces since 2012. This undermines the fragile peace that has held since 2015. </p>
<p>It is unlikely the military will regain complete control over all rebel-held areas in the north. At the same time, insurgents are emboldened. With the 2015 peace agreement now all but dead, we can expect increased volatility in 2024. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1729138391545966975"}"></div></p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>In 2019, widespread civil protest broke out in Lebanon against leaders who were perceived not to be addressing the day-to-day needs of the population. </p>
<p>The situation <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanons-crisis-has-gone-from-bad-to-worse-but-is-anyone-listening-169645">continued to deteriorate</a>, with a reshuffled government, escalating economic crisis and a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-port-blast-beirut-blocked-investigation-d4606d6f28e3eb56510eac923611a03c">massive port explosion</a> that exposed corrupt practices. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/14/pr23315-lebanon-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-lebanon">criticised Lebanon in September</a> for a lack of economic reform. The Lebanese government has also failed to reach agreement on appointing a president, a post that has been vacant for <a href="https://www.state.gov/one-year-anniversary-of-lebanons-presidential-vacancy/">more than a year</a>. </p>
<p>This risks undermining the fragile power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon in which the key political posts of prime minister, speaker and president are allocated to a Sunni-Muslim, Shia-Muslim and Christian Maronite, respectively. </p>
<p>Most recently, the war between Israel and Hamas has threatened to spill over to Lebanon, home to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67307858">Hezbollah</a> militant group, which claims to have an army of 100,000 fighters. Importantly, this jeopardises tourism as a key hope for Lebanon’s economic recovery. </p>
<p>These factors may precipitate a more serious economic and political collapse in 2024. </p>
<h2>Pakistan</h2>
<p>Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military has played an <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-a-historical-trail-of-pakistans-powerful-military-enterprise-205749">interventionist role in politics</a>. Though Pakistani leaders are popularly elected, military officials have at times removed them from power. </p>
<p>In 2022, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan fell out of favour with Pakistan’s militant leaders. He was subsequently <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/09/asia/imran-khan-voted-out-pakistan-prime-minister-intl-hnk/index.html">ousted from power</a> in a parliament vote and later arrested on charges that his supporters claim are politically motivated. </p>
<p>Violent demonstrations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/world/asia/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan.html">broke out</a> nationwide after his arrest – a display of anger against the military that was once unthinkable. </p>
<p>Pakistan also faces spillover from instability in neighbouring Afghanistan and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141712">increased terror attacks</a>. These security challenges have been compounded by a struggling economy and ongoing costs from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/aug/05/a-year-on-the-devastating-long-term-effects-of-pakistans-floods-are-revealed">devastating 2022 floods</a>.</p>
<p>Pakistan is expected to hold <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/2/pakistan-to-hold-delayed-elections-on-february-8-electoral-commission-says">parliamentary elections</a> in February 2024, after which the current military caretaker government is expected to transfer power back to civilian rule. Many are watching the military closely. If this transfer of power does not take place, or there are delays, civil unrest may result.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-imran-khans-populism-has-divided-pakistan-and-put-it-on-a-knifes-edge-205392">How Imran Khan's populism has divided Pakistan and put it on a knife's edge</a>
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<h2>Sri Lanka</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-did-sri-lanka-run-out-of-money-5-graphs-that-explain-its-economic-crisis-187352">Sri Lanka faced a debilitating economic crisis in 2022</a> that led to critical fuel, food and medical shortages. Civil protests caused then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. He was quickly replaced by current President Ranil Wickremesingh. </p>
<p>Stability returned in 2023 as Sri Lanka began implementing economic reforms as part of a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund. However, widespread dissatisfaction with political elites and the underlying drivers of the country’s economic hardship have not been addressed. </p>
<p>Elections are also due in Sri Lanka by late 2024. While Wickremesingh, the incumbent, is likely to run for a second term, he has <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/unpopular-sri-lankan-president-consolidates-power-after-victory">low trust</a> with the public. He is viewed as too close to corrupt political elites. </p>
<p>This dissatisfaction could lead to renewed protests – particularly if the economy stumbles again – in a repeat of the situation that led to Rajapaksa’s ousting in 2022.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From Myanmar to Pakistan, these countries have long-simmering conflicts or increasingly dissatisfied publics that could worsen in the new year.Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165552023-12-15T09:07:27Z2023-12-15T09:07:27ZThe Sahara Desert used to be a green savannah – new research explains why<p>Algeria’s <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179/">Tassili N’Ajjer plateau</a> is Africa’s largest national park. Among its vast sandstone formations is perhaps the world’s largest art museum. Over 15,000 etchings and paintings are exhibited there, some as much as 11,000 years old according to scientific dating techniques, representing a unique ethnological and climatological record of the region. </p>
<p>Curiously, however, these images do not depict the arid, barren landscape that is present in the Tassili N'Ajjer today. Instead, they portray a vibrant savannah inhabited by elephants, giraffes, rhinos and hippos. This rock art is an important record of the past environmental conditions that prevailed in the Sahara, the world’s largest <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">hot desert</a>. </p>
<p>These images depict a period approximately 6,000-11,000 years ago called the <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/green-sahara-african-humid-periods-paced-by-82884405/">Green Sahara or North African Humid Period</a>. There is widespread climatological <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332220301007#bib31">evidence</a> that during this period the Sahara supported wooded savannah ecosystems and numerous rivers and lakes in what are now Libya, Niger, Chad and Mali. </p>
<p>This greening of the Sahara didn’t happen once. Using marine and lake sediments, scientists have <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0076514">identified</a> over 230 of these greenings occurring about every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. These greening events provided vegetated corridors which influenced species’ distribution and evolution, including the out-of-Africa migrations of ancient humans.</p>
<p>These dramatic greenings would have required a large-scale reorganisation of the atmospheric system to bring rains to this hyper arid region. But most climate models haven’t been able to simulate how dramatic these events were. </p>
<p>As a team of climate modellers and anthropologists, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-41219-4">we have overcome this obstacle</a>. We developed a climate model that more accurately simulates atmospheric circulation over the Sahara and the impacts of vegetation on rainfall. </p>
<p>We identified why north Africa greened approximately every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. It was caused by changes in the Earth’s orbital <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/precession-of-the-equinoxes">precession</a> - the slight wobbling of the planet while rotating. This moves the Northern Hemisphere closer to the sun during the summer months. </p>
<p>This caused warmer summers in the Northern Hemisphere, and warmer air is able to hold more moisture. This intensified the strength of the West African Monsoon system and shifted the African rainbelt northwards. This increased Saharan rainfall, resulting in the spread of savannah and wooded grassland across the desert from the tropics to the Mediterranean, providing a vast habitat for plants and animals. </p>
<p>Our results demonstrate the sensitivity of the Sahara Desert to changes in past climate. They explain how this sensitivity affects rainfall across north Africa. This is important for understanding the implications of present-day climate change (driven by human activities). Warmer temperatures in the future may also enhance monsoon strength, with both local and global impacts. </p>
<h2>Earth’s changing orbit</h2>
<p>The fact that the wetter periods in north Africa have recurred every 21,000 years or so is a big clue about what causes them: variations in Earth’s orbit. Due to gravitational influences from the moon and other planets in our solar system, the orbit of the Earth around the sun is not constant. It has cyclic variations on multi-thousand year timescales. These orbital cycles are termed <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/211/orbital-cycles/">Milankovitch cycles</a>; they influence the amount of energy the Earth receives from the sun. </p>
<p>On 100,000-year cycles, the shape of Earth’s orbit (or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/eccentricity-astronomy">eccentricity</a>) shifts between circular and oval, and on 41,000 year cycles the tilt of Earth’s axis varies (termed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/obliquity">obliquity</a>). Eccentricity and obliquity cycles are responsible for driving the ice ages of the past 2.4 million years. </p>
<p>The third Milankovitch cycle is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/251/axial-precession-wobble/">precession</a>. This concerns Earth’s wobble on its axis, which varies on a 21,000 year timescale. The similarity between the precession cycle and the timing of the humid periods indicates that precession is their dominant driver. Precession influences seasonal contrasts, increasing them in one hemisphere and reducing them in another. During warmer Northern Hemisphere summers, a consequent increase in north African summer rainfall would have initiated a humid phase, resulting in the spread of vegetation across the region.</p>
<h2>Eccentricity and the ice sheets</h2>
<p>In our study we also identified that the humid periods did not occur during the ice ages, when large glacial ice sheets covered much of the polar regions. This is because these vast ice sheets cooled the atmosphere. The cooling countered the influence of precession and suppressed the expansion of the African monsoon system. </p>
<p>The ice ages are driven by the eccentricity cycle, which determines how circular Earth’s orbit is around the sun. So our findings show that eccentricity indirectly influences the magnitude of the humid periods via its influence on the ice sheets. This highlights, for the first time, a major connection between these distant high latitude and tropical regions.</p>
<p>The Sahara acts as a gate. It controls the dispersal of species between north and sub-Saharan Africa, and in and out of the continent. The gate was open when the Sahara was green and closed when deserts prevailed. Our results reveal the sensitivity of this gate to Earth’s orbit around the sun. They also show that high latitude ice sheets may have restricted the dispersal of species during the glacial periods of the last 800,000 years. </p>
<p>Our ability to model the African humid periods helps us understand the alternation of humid and arid phases. This had major consequences for the dispersal and evolution of species, including humans, within and out of Africa. Furthermore, it provides a tool for understanding future greening in response to climate change and its environmental impact. </p>
<p>Refined models may, in the future, be able to identify how climate warming will influence rainfall and vegetation in the Sahara region, and the wider implications for society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sahara Desert is green and vegetated every 21,000 years. A climate model shows why.Edward Armstrong, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of HelsinkiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166742023-12-06T13:43:37Z2023-12-06T13:43:37ZGhana’s media treats terrorism as a threat from outside – it overlooks violence at home<p>In 2022, 43% of all <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2023-key-findings-in-5-charts/">global terrorism deaths</a> occurred in the Sahel – the region south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent. West Africa had recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">1,800 terrorism attacks</a> as of June 2023, resulting in nearly 4,600 deaths.</p>
<p>The region has also seen a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a>, making countries more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Coastal west African countries worry about terrorism in the Sahel spilling over into their territories. It is against this backdrop that discussions and commentary about terrorism are taking place in Ghana.</p>
<p>I have researched and analysed security and militancy in Africa for a decade. My most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142">recent research</a> examined how terrorism is viewed in Ghana in light of insecurity across the Sahel and the country’s reputation as an oasis of peace in the sub-region.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130921/9781526130921.xml">criticism</a> of the way terrorism is spoken of globally, due to its potential to be divisive and serve as justification for violence by security agencies and the abuse of citizens’ rights.</p>
<p>For this reason, my aim was to assess whether these global perceptions influenced views in Ghana. I also aimed to understand the security implications of the nature of the terrorism discourse.</p>
<p>I found the discourse to be contradictory, dangerous and simplistic. It lacked a coherent theme, except for repeating problematic narratives and platitudes.</p>
<p>One of these narratives was the mistaken idea that terrorism was foreign to Ghana, and now entering the country. Secondly, the discussion equated terrorism with violence involving jihadist groups. While jihadist forms of violence are present in the region, there are <a href="https://prezi.com/j5cptnaaxcsf/the-four-waves-of-terrorism-by-david-c-rapoport-2004/">other types of terrorism</a> too – including <a href="https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/state-terrorism-even-worse-than-the-sub-state-variety/">terrorism by states</a> and their agents.</p>
<h2>Analysing news articles</h2>
<p>I brought a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x">sceptical attitude</a> to the discussion of terrorism in Ghana by critically analysing the titles of 60 online news articles published between 2015 and 2022. </p>
<p>The titles were sampled from a Ghanaweb.com dossier captioned “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=661">Terror attack on Ghana</a>” and accessed between July and September 2022. Ghanaweb.com is the most widely used online news source in Ghana and has existed since the late 1990s.</p>
<p>The titles were selected using two criteria. The first was the use of threat and risk language. Here, I looked for titles that communicated space or place (for example, Sahel, Togo, Burkina Faso), vulnerability (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Porous-borders-fuelling-insecurity-as-Immigration-grapples-with-serious-logistical-constraints-627387">porous borders</a>”), pre-emption (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Terrorist-threat-Be-vigilant-don-t-be-scared-Christian-Council-1549604">be vigilant</a>”), othering (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Citizens-cautioned-against-hosting-strangers-1545251">strangers</a>”) and assurance (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Don-t-panic-over-ISIS-infiltration-Irbard-Ibrahim-617645?gallery=1">don’t panic</a>”). </p>
<p>The other criterion was the assumed authority of the source. I selected titles that cited security officials, analysts with significant media presence, politicians and religious leaders.</p>
<p>The analysis revealed that the character of the discourse was lopsided and gave an incomplete picture of the state of security in Ghana. </p>
<h2>Ghana’s overlooked culture of violence</h2>
<p>The discourse overlooked Ghana’s endemic culture of violence, including acts by militia groups, political assassinations and police brutality.</p>
<p>Recently, several militia groups have been involved in violent events in Ghana, including election violence in 2019 that led to two fatalities and 18 injuries. A security analyst has named <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/security-analyst-names-24-violent-groups-in-ghana/">24 violent groups</a> in the country, with names like Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys, Al Qaeda, Invincible Forces and Delta Forces.</p>
<p>On 16 January 2019, an investigative journalist was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47002878">shot dead</a> in front of his home in an alleged act of political assassination. </p>
<p>In 2020, a sitting MP and government minister fired gunshots during a voter registration exercise – an act <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/hawa-koomson-minister-fires-gun-at-registration-centre-4-arrested.html">she explained</a> was for her protection. In the same year, another MP threatened to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXJ0uzTZkEY">burn down</a> the house of a former president of Ghana.</p>
<p>There are many cases of violence by security agents, including the police <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/seven-shot-dead-by-police-not-armed-robbers.html">killing</a> of seven Muslim youths mistaken for armed robbers. </p>
<p>Ghana’s 2020 elections – its eighth since 1992 – recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/five-killed-in-ghana-election-violence-as-accusations-continue">five deaths</a> and scores of injuries. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford-Gyampo/publication/331152559_Proportional_Representation_as_Solution_to_Winner-Takes-All_Politics/links/5c6815eb92851c1c9de5ab39/Proportional-Representation-as-Solution-to-Winner-Takes-All-Politics.pdf">scholars</a> argue that extra-legal uses of force and violence in Ghana are due to a culture of impunity resulting from a “systemic decapitation of the police by the political elite”.</p>
<h2>Blaming the Sahel</h2>
<p>Despite the above terrorising acts of violence, the terrorism discourse in Ghana creates the predominant impression that terrorism and political violence are now heading towards Ghana from the Sahel.</p>
<p>The fear of the coming terrorists has united “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Everybody-needs-to-be-involved-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-Security-analyst-751355">everybody</a>” in Ghana to protect the country. The list includes community vigilantes, civil society organisations, political parties, business organisations, churches and traditional leaders. The measures to safeguard Ghana include <a href="https://ghanaguardian.com/brief-mps-anti-terrorism-drill-ablakwa">counter-terrorism drills</a>, vigilance, border security, prophecies and prayers.</p>
<p>This collective national effort presents political violence from other countries in the region as if terror events do not exist within Ghana. Commentators say that terrorism is now heading towards Ghana, causing Ghanaians to panic and grow apprehensive. </p>
<p>Three examples show how the terrorism discourse is contradictory and simplistic – hence deceptive.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Accra-safe-but-Ghana-not-out-of-the-woods-ACP-Eklu-753641">Accra safe but Ghana not out of the woods – ACP Eklu</a>” and “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-ready-for-terrorist-attack-National-Security-ministry-661540">Government ready for terrorist attack – National Security ministry</a>”. These claims are contradictory. They mean Accra and Ghana are safe and unsafe simultaneously. </p></li>
<li><p>The “terrorists are in our communities, they are our neighbours, they are our siblings, they are our fathers, they are our mothers”, claims an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adibsaani1/">analyst</a>. This claim is dangerous as it could create unnecessary social and communal tension.</p></li>
<li><p>Ghana is the only country bordering Burkina Faso that has not <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-the-coastal-states-of-west-africa/">experienced a terrorist attack</a>. This claim is simplistic and it is only true if terrorism is defined to mean “jihadist” political violence.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>My conclusion is that any future acts of terrorism and political violence in Ghana will not be anything new. Shooting to kill during elections and firing a warning shot at a polling station are acts of terrorism. Police brutality, election violence and assassinations are also acts of political violence. </p>
<h2>Implications of the discourse</h2>
<p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the so-called global war on terror shape how we think about security, even when those views create dire consequences such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_15">Islamophobia and more violence</a>.</p>
<p>These lopsided narratives can alienate some communities and threaten social cohesion. Worse, they undermine Ghana’s responsibility to address insecurity within the country. </p>
<p>To avoid such problems, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.988452">some</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.976011">scholars</a> have argued that terrorism should be defined to suit specific contexts. I have made a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.321567836600468">similar argument</a> elsewhere that terrorism is a process rather than an event. </p>
<p>This avoids the <a href="https://ombuds.umich.edu/article/danger-single-story">dangers of a single story</a> about terrorism and political violence in general. In particular, it creates a conducive environment for solutions that sustainably secure Ghana and its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the war on terror continue to shape thinking about security.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181312023-12-03T05:47:39Z2023-12-03T05:47:39ZNine out of 10 South African criminals reoffend, while in Finland it’s 1 in 3. This is why<p><em>A very large percentage of South Africans who are released from prison end up being rearrested and being convicted for crimes again. The country has one of the highest recidivism rates <a href="https://www.702.co.za/podcasts/269/tonight-with-lester-kiewit/279121/nicro-the-high-rate-ofoffender-recidivism">in the world</a>. Criminologist Casper Lӧtter sets out his findings in <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/Phronimon/article/view/13232">a recent paper</a> on what can be learnt from Finland’s experience in reducing this trend.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the difference between the two countries’ approaches?</h2>
<p>About 9 out of 10 ex-offenders reoffend in South Africa. Expressed as a percentage of 90% of the prison population of roughly 260,000 at any one point in time, this is one of the highest and most unsustainable in the world. </p>
<p>The US has a rate of recidivism of around <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20439062?origin=crossref">67%</a> while <a href="https://theconversation.com/crime-control-what-south-africa-can-learn-from-china-169269">China</a>, an authoritarian country where mass executions of recidivists are the norm, has a rate between 6% and 8%. </p>
<p>In Finland, a liberal democracy, the rate is a very acceptable 31%.</p>
<p>The primary cause of reoffending in South Africa appears to be the state’s unwillingness or inability to clear up areas of conflict in society which either breed criminality or fuel reoffending. Examples of these are <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-wont-become-less-violent-until-its-more-equal-103116">inequality</a> (a breeding ground for violent crimes), poverty in an otherwise affluent society, chronic unemployment and government <a href="https://us.sagepub.com/hi/sam/the-sage-handbook-of-criminological-theory/book228876">practices</a> that marginalise and stigmatise people. </p>
<p>Not only has the state failed to keep citizens safe from preventable crime and harm, but politicians have also used the issue to campaign on a “tough on crime” ticket.</p>
<p>South Africa also has a harsh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ex-offenders-should-be-made-prison-wardens-in-south-africa-heres-why-162316">stigmatising</a> shaming culture, as opposed to an integrative shaming culture, when it comes to people convicted of crimes. In a <a href="https://theconversation.com/crime-control-what-south-africa-can-learn-from-china-169269">stigmatising</a> shaming culture, ex-offenders often experience discrimination and ostracisation. This drives them away from mainstream culture and its values and towards criminal subcultures. The US has a similar culture. </p>
<p>In an integrative shaming culture, ex-offenders are encouraged to reintegrate into society. They are provided with employment and other opportunities to ease their transition into mainstream society. China and Japan are examples of this. </p>
<p>This approach is also widespread in African cultures, such as those found in Mali, Kenya and even Nigeria. The reason for this? In most African countries with a history of colonialism, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2637640">a connection</a> has been established between imprisonment and slavery. </p>
<p>Significantly, the leading Australian comparative criminologist John <a href="http://johnbraithwaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1999_Crime-Shame-and-Reintegratio.pdf">Braithwaite</a> has argued that stigma is “counter-productive” and fuels reoffending.</p>
<p>Though recidivism (reoffending) is a significant problem in criminology, there are no easy answers on how to fix it. The problem is both complex and nuanced.</p>
<h2>Alternative approaches</h2>
<p>In a <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/Phronimon/article/view/13232">recent paper</a>, I looked at alternatives.</p>
<p>For example, Finland has a hybrid culture. It has a stigmatising shaming culture that is heavily influenced by integrative shaming features. A well-known Chinese proverb proclaims that nuance is everything. These characteristics are evident in the Finnish prison setting as well as the post-incarceration environment. </p>
<p>Strenuous efforts are made to provide ex-offenders with employment opportunities or financial assistance after their release from prison. </p>
<p>And offenders’ concerns are attended to during incarceration. <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/view/239477">Prison protests</a>, such as hunger strikes, are unheard of in Finnish prisons. In South Africa they are common.</p>
<p>But the most glaring characteristic of the Finnish system is an admirable rate of recidivism of about 31% (with deincarceration at 53 individuals imprisoned per 100,000 in the national general population). Deincarceration is the result of efforts to limit recourse to imprisonment as much as possible. In <a href="https://www.702.co.za/podcasts/269/tonight-with-lester-kiewit/279121/nicro-the-high-rate-ofoffender-recidivism">South Africa</a> the rate of recidivism (reoffending) is between 86% and 94%. </p>
<p>So, even though South Africa’s rate of incarceration (the number of convicted criminals who go to prison) is almost five times higher than that of Finland, Finland has only one third of South Africa’s reoffending rate. The question is why, since both these countries exhibit stigmatising shaming cultures.</p>
<p>In my research I identified specific features within the Finnish system that makes it a good model for the South African Department of Correctional Services to follow. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Punishment as a mere loss of liberty. Other features of incarceration, such as <a href="https://perjournal.co.za/article/view/12743">torture</a>, forfeiture of privileges (such as family visits), degrading or insulting treatment and solitary confinement are not evident in the Finnish system. All of these are evident in South Africa. </p></li>
<li><p>Reintegration into society. Offenders are provided, as far as possible, with employment opportunities and other measures to help them return to mainstream society. This helps them survive in a harsh stigmatising shaming culture. </p></li>
<li><p>Promotion of normal humane conditions in the prison environment. Prisons in Finland are not surrounded by barbed wire, and prison wardens are dressed in normal civilian clothing. Everything possible is done to normalise the prison environment.</p></li>
<li><p>Just and respectful treatment of prisoners, upholding their human dignity. Research <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781843926030-5/harm-contemporary-prison-john-irwin-barbara-owen">has shown</a> that treating offenders in humiliating ways damages their sense of self and complicates their integration into society.</p></li>
<li><p>Responsiveness to offenders’ concerns. Understanding their problems allows them to feel they are part of the system and breaks down their resistance to cooperation with authorities. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What lessons can be learnt</h2>
<p>My research shows that South Africa could benefit from Finland’s approach.</p>
<p>South African academic <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Conflict_Management_for_South_African_St.html?id=aie7YgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Gavin Bradshaw</a>, an expert on deep-rooted societal conflict as well as social cohesion, notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Most recent research work on negotiation also supports the fact that integrative approaches are usually far more effective {than power bargaining}.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Recognition of the formerly incarcerated’s basic human needs, as Bradshaw indicates, is bound to have a significant impact on South Africa’s
rates of recidivism. </p>
<p>I found that Finland’s great achievement is a result of recognising the basic human needs of offenders and ex-offenders, thereby eliminating this primary source of human conflict. Those needs include employment, where possible, basic accommodation, dignity, and responsiveness to their concerns.</p>
<p>In a country where 9 out of every 10 offenders reoffend, it is perhaps time to reevaluate <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2023-03-25-is-the-idea-of-rehabilitation-redundant-in-south-africa/">the rehabilitation paradigm</a>. Finland’s experience shows the value of applying sensible conflict transformation perspectives in the management of crime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Casper Lӧtter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Finland’s experience shows the value of applying sensible conflict transformation perspectives in the management of crime.Casper Lӧtter, Research fellow, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162872023-11-09T14:10:40Z2023-11-09T14:10:40ZKora: in search of the origins of west Africa’s famed stringed musical instrument<p>“How come we’ve never heard of this beautiful instrument until now?” This was posted by a first-year college student to my world music course discussion board recently. He voiced what many of his peers probably felt after watching the extraordinary documentary <a href="https://www.womex.com/virtual/piranha_arts_1/event/ballake_sissoko_kora">Ballaké Sissoko, Kora Tales</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://vimeo.com/805181419/7fd122d3aa">film</a> follows <a href="https://www.ballakesissoko.com/en/">Sissoko</a>, a world class musical artist, from his home in Bamako, Mali to a sacred well and baobab tree in The Gambia on the Atlantic coast. In the film, the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTzlFlG86qA">award-winning</a> Sissoko revisits his childhood homeland and traces the origins of the instrument that became his destiny. </p>
<figure>
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<p>Sissoko is a jeli (called a griot by outsiders) – a hereditary oral historian and musician attached to the ruling class. Like generations before him, he plays the <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/501115">kora</a>, a unique kind of harp that’s indigenous to the western African savannah. It has 21 strings and is played with four fingers. And it can create dazzling, dense musical textures as well as thin shimmering veneers that accompany the delivery of deep oral history. It is one of the most sophisticated handmade musical instruments in the world, both in its musical capabilities and the depth of its tradition.</p>
<p>Ballaké Sissoko: Kora Tales is a beautifully made film that should be seen by everyone interested in African culture and history.</p>
<h2>Kora’s global spread</h2>
<p>If you haven’t heard of the kora, it’s not for lack of exposure. Dozens and dozens of kora albums have been released since Gambian <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/jali-nyama-suso-mn0000782773#biography">Jali Nyama Suso</a>’s debut solo album in 1972. The kora has won more Grammy Awards in the World/Global Music category than the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/art/sitar">sitar</a>. An <a href="https://seckoukeita.bandcamp.com/album/african-rhapsodies">album</a> featuring the kora with the BBC Symphonic Orchestra was released in 2023. The reach of the kora beyond western Africa is <a href="https://open.spotify.com/playlist/3hfZqOzSQplKqClwf0gMRn?si=bdcd4e9447e746f3">expansive</a>. It can be heard on recordings by musicians across the world. </p>
<p>I first heard the kora on a 1973 album by Gambian <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/alhaji-bai-konte-mn0000003544">Alhaji Bai Konte</a>. It was an early formative experience that put me on the path towards becoming an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Eric+Charry&btnG=">ethnomusicologist</a>. In the 1980s, Senegalese-American kora player <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1984/04/09/djimo-kouyate/d73afa76-13bc-4cce-82a4-2accdde56373/">Djimo Kouyate</a> inspired me to study regional differences in kora playing in four neighbouring countries. I wound up in Bamako, living three doors down from Ballaké Sissoko, studying with <a href="https://www.discogs.com/artist/991801-Sidiki-Diabat%C3%A9">Sidiki Diabaté</a> (father of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/may/22/toumani-diabate-sidiki-kora-music-industry-family">Toumani</a>), who lived two doors down. That became the basis of my first book in 2000, <a href="https://echarry.faculty.wesleyan.edu/mande-music/">Mande Music</a>.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Constructed from a large half calabash, cowhide, thick wooden neck and leather tuning loops and strings (now nylon), the kora is several centuries old. Precursors go back much further.</p>
<p>It is intimately intertwined with the history of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mande">Mande</a> homeland along the Niger River, slicing through modern-day Mali and Guinea. This chiefdom rose to power in the 1200s when the legendary Sunjata conquered an oppressive king, Soumaoro Kante, with the help of neighbouring allies. Kante owned the primordial bala (also called <a href="https://www.arts.gov/honors/heritage/balla-kouyate">balafon</a>), a magical xylophone, which was passed on to the jeli (griot) of Sunjata. His name was Balla Faséké Kouyaté and his direct descendants guard that very instrument in a hut in northeastern Guinea. </p>
<p>In 2008 Unesco declared the instrument a site of intangible cultural heritage and today a museum is being constructed on the <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/cultural-space-of-sosso-bala-00009">site</a>. At its height, the Mande empire extended across much of western Africa and its mines supplied most of the gold circulating in Europe. A visit to Mecca by Mande king <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Musa-I-of-Mali">Mansa Musa</a> in the 1300s secured his reputation as one of the <a href="https://money.com/the-10-richest-people-of-all-time-2/">wealthiest people</a> in the history of the world. Migrations westward to the Senegambia region led to the development of a related language and culture, Mandinka.</p>
<p>Just as the bala (Mande xylophone) has origins in Mali in the 1200s, the kora has origins in the Kaabu federation of the Senegambian Mandinka in the 1700s. Traditionally, jelis have the exclusive right to play both of these instruments. Many origin stories of musical instruments in Africa refer to a jinn (genie) first bringing it out. So it is with the kora. </p>
<h2>What the film is about</h2>
<p>One of my favourite lines in the documentary comes from Sissoko’s aunt Kadiatou Diabaté, herself a jeli: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This person before you, he was born with the kora. The seventh generation of his lineage. Even if you just touch him, out comes the sound of one of the strings. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Travelling by car, Sissoko leaves his capital city Bamako for a voyage of over 1,000km west to the birthplace of the kora on the Gambian coastline. All of this was part of the Mande empire at its height, as far as the northern reaches of the Niger River at Timbuktu. Sissoko stops at Sibi, where Sunjata is said to have united his armies, made pacts and created the governing constitution of what would become the largest empire in Africa.</p>
<p>The cinematography of the countryside, much of it from aerial drones, is magnificent. Passing through southern Senegal, they cross the Casamance River by boat for a visit with kora master Malan Diébaté. This is kora country and a half dozen kora players appear, singing the praises of Sissoko and his lineage. </p>
<p>They are accompanied by the women in their extended family tapping out a diasporic source of the signature Cuban <a href="https://www.masterclass.com/articles/learn-about-music-clave-rhythm-definition-and-examples">clave pattern</a>. </p>
<p>Diébaté recounts the supernatural origins of the kora, and Sissoko takes off for that very spot, Sanementereng in The Gambia. In one sense all musical instruments are magical, given the impact they may have on our lives. Widespread oral traditions attribute the origins of the kora to this specific place on the Gambian coast. When Sissoko arrives here towards the end of the documentary, at a sacred well and a baobab tree that marks the spot, it is a moving experience.</p>
<h2>Inspiring work</h2>
<p>The writers and directors of the film, Lucy Durán and Laurent Benhamou, have done inspiring work in conveying the beauty of the landscape, the depth and humanity of the tradition, and the artistic persona of Sissoko. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/lucy-duran">Professor</a> of music and former <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/profiles/4TSBr0qL391y8lDnM4NZHVM/lucy-duran">radio presenter</a> Durán has an awesome track record in this part of the world over many decades, from producing early albums by Toumani Diabaté and other Malian artists to <a href="https://www.growingintomusic.co.uk/">Growing Into Music</a>, a pioneering documentary <a href="https://www.growingintomusic.co.uk/mali-and-guinea-music-of/films-of-growing-into-music.html">film series</a> laying bare the process of children learning the musical arts of jelis in Mali and Guinea. </p>
<p>Narrated by French-Malian rap star <a href="https://www.allmusic.com/artist/oxmo-puccino-mn0000502254#biography">Oxmo Puccino</a>, the documentary takes you deep into one of Africa’s great classical traditions through the eyes of one of its great artists. For the eyes, ears and collective cultural memory, this film is a treasure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Charry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The extraordinary documentary Ballaké Sissoko: Kora Tales takes a journey from Mali to The Gambia.Eric Charry, Professor of Music, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120222023-09-05T15:07:08Z2023-09-05T15:07:08ZFrance in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger<p>French west Africa has experienced <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">five coups</a> in the past three years. Underpinning most of these coups is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66406137">hostility</a> towards France, a former colonial authority. Mohamed Bazoum of Niger’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-underlies-the-coup-in-niger/">downfall</a> in July 2023 comes after coups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/7/mali-military-promises-return-to-civilian-rule-in-march-2024">Mali</a> in August 2020, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/">Chad</a> in April 2021, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> in September 2022 and Gabon in September 2023.</p>
<p>The perpetrators of these coups have, among their <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/coups-in-west-africa-is-france-to-blame/">justifications</a>, mentioned the overbearing influence of France and its president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-in-africa-a-cynical-twist-to-repair-the-colonial-past-while-keeping-a-tight-grip-189175">Emmanuel Macron</a>, in their affairs. The influence of France in military affairs and maintenance of dominance in business has been a key cog of the Macron agenda. Unlike other former colonial powers, France still has military <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/06/06/france-will-further-cut-back-military-presence-in-africa_6029304_7.html">bases</a> in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon. </p>
<p>At the same time, Macron has put forward <a href="https://www.nation.sc/archive/259549/macron-embraces-african-entrepreneurship">entrepreneurship</a> as the best form of development assistance. This strategic pivot away from personal relationships with African leaders is rooted in Macron’s <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/03/emmanuel-macron-neoliberalism">neoliberal beliefs</a>. This is a political approach that favours free-market capitalism, deregulation and a reduction in government spending. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.uu.nl/staff/fplgerits">historian</a> who has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">researched</a> the relationship between France and its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Africa, Macron’s neoliberal turn has stripped France of the long-standing myth that it was somehow a more benevolent coloniser because of the cultural links it established with African elites. Macron’s approach has only increased distrust and anger because a large military presence has not been replaced by a <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/new-financial-order-will-help-the-world-overcome-poverty-and-climate-change/#:%7E:text=President%20William%20Ruto%20has%20said,the%20hands%20of%20the%20few.%E2%80%9D">new international economic order</a>, but with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-africa-reset-strategy-francafrique/">small-scale business deals and start-ups</a>. This is not what Africans <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43?ln=en">wanted</a>, but it is what they got.</p>
<h2>Neoliberal values are French values</h2>
<p>Rather than a remaking of the economic and financial infrastructure, Macron has pushed entrepreneurship as development assistance: promoting start-ups and training Africa’s youth. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/fr">Agence Française de Dévelopment</a> (France’s main institution for policy implementation) is still investing in education, agriculture and infrastructure. But what Macron wants observers to notice is that increasingly, French development aid in Africa has to be run by French businesses. </p>
<p>French corporations are no longer making money in secret, as in the era of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/macron-and-the-future-of-francafrique-6781/">Françafrique</a>. This was a period when French presidents supported African dictators to maintain influence. Rather, Macron’s speeches put forward business activities and neoliberal values as French values that benefit the continent. </p>
<p>This reliance on French culture and values can be seen as a continuation of a strategy that started with the French colonial project. Macron’s values, however, are the values of neoliberalism. At home he has pushed through a pension plan to limit French state debt. Abroad, he wants French development policy to be driven by private initiatives. </p>
<p>In light of that strategy, it becomes clear that sentiments among Africans have not become more anti-French. Rather, by elevating economics to a core value of his relationship to Africa, Macron has played into a widely accepted African worldview in which underdevelopment is the product of dependency on Europe and neocolonial exploitation.</p>
<p>Every visitor who talks to cab drivers or vendors in Dakar figures out quite quickly that the French are seen as colonisers first, possible friends second. What has changed is that Macron has unknowingly confirmed African suspicions about his intentions: he never wanted to change economic structures. Instead Africans get bread crumbs in the form of start-up money. </p>
<h2>The free market as the dividing line in west Africa</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is not universally loved on the continent. The belief in the free market as an engine for development has redrawn the battle lines in west Africa. Countries within the regional body Ecowas like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – which have had high economic growth in the past decade – are clashing with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – which have experienced deepening poverty. </p>
<p>While other African countries like Kenya are confronted with similar debates about how to stimulate development – Kenyan president William Ruto famously believes in the “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220913-william-ruto-kenya-s-hustler-in-chief-president">hustler nation</a>” – climate change and terrorism have led to a more combustible mix in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The juntas that have come to power therefore do not only present themselves as caretakers who are trying to do the job politicians will not do. They are also claiming they want a new ideological direction for their countries. <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso</a> has styled himself to be the successor to Thomas Sankara, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">Assimi Goïta</a> has cast himself as a reformer not a revolutionary. </p>
<p>In the past, the fires of African instability and anti-French sentiment were fanned by the French underdelivering on their – sometimes cynical – promises of big structural change. Today, instability is being fed by the opposite. It is African leaders who demand big structural change, but are met with small business efforts to maintain French influence on the cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The French president has struggled to maintain the influence his country gained in Africa through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127072023-09-04T14:40:57Z2023-09-04T14:40:57ZRussia in Africa: Prigozhin’s death exposes Putin’s real motives on the continent<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-prigozhin-plane-crash-may-have-been-caused-deliberately-2023-08-30/">apparent assassination</a> of Yevgeny Prigozhin in the crash of his private jet between Moscow and St. Petersburg represents an inflection point in Russian-African relations. Prigozhin, as leader of the notorious Wagner Group, had been the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/prigozhin-built-an-empire-in-africa-can-it-survive-him-b566755c">point man</a> for Russia in Africa since Wagner first began operations on the continent in 2017. More than a single entity, the Wagner Group is an amalgamation of shell companies deploying paramilitary forces, disinformation and political interference in Ukraine, Syria and Africa. Its leaders have been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/prigozhin-wagner-plane-crash-last-days-2c44dd5c">sanctioned by 30 countries</a> for the group’s destabilising activities.</p>
<p>Prigozhin was believed to be <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/why-putin-wanted-prigozhin-dead">living on borrowed time</a> after he led a short-lived insurrection – part of a power struggle with the Russian military leadership – in June. While he quickly backed down, the action embarrassed Russian president Vladimir Putin and triggered chatter that Putin’s perceived weakness would embolden other challengers to his authority.</p>
<p>Prigozhin advanced Russian influence in Africa by propping up politically isolated and unpopular authoritarian leaders. As a result of Wagner’s support, these leaders were <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/">beholden to Russian interests</a>. Wagner’s backing took a variety of irregular forms, like paramilitary forces, disinformation campaigns, election interference, intimidation of political opponents, and arms for resources deals. Prigozhin <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/27/yevgeniy-prigozhin-wagner-support-russia/">referred</a> to this interlocking set of influence operations as “The Orchestra”, which he conducted.</p>
<p>Wagner deployed forces to Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. It has also been interfering in domestic politics and information narratives in some <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">two dozen African countries</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://africacenter.org/experts/joseph-siegle/">I research</a> the role of governance in advancing security and development as well as the influence of external actors in Africa, including Russia. Democratic transitions and institutions of democratic accountability are among my interests.</p>
<p>The breadth of Russian political interference in Africa points to <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reach-security-and-statecraft-assessment/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-and">Russia’s strategic objectives for the continent</a>. It aims to secure a foothold in North Africa and the Red Sea, undermine western influence, normalise authoritarianism and displace the UN-based international system.</p>
<p>None of these objectives are about making Africa more prosperous or stable. Rather, the continent is primarily a theatre to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests.</p>
<p>Attempting to maintain the lucrative and influential operations of the Wagner Group in Africa after Prigozhin’s death will make it hard for Russia to deny that it uses irregular and illegal actions to extend its influence.</p>
<h2>Maintaining Wagner without Prigozhin</h2>
<p>The Wagner model has seen Russian influence expand rapidly in Africa. That’s despite Russia <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/russia-tries-break-isolation-engaging-africa-37131">investing very little on the continent</a>. Most of Wagner’s costs have been covered through cash and mineral concessions provided by host regimes. By some accounts <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/">revenues from mining operations</a> in the Central African Republic and Sudan generate billions.</p>
<p>It is no surprise that Russia would want to keep the Wagner enterprise going. Tellingly, on the day of Prigozhin’s plane crash, deputy defence minister <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/russian-deputy-defense-minister-meets-with-libyan-commander/2975834">Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in Libya</a> to reassure warlord Khalifa Haftar of Russia’s ongoing support. Yevkurov later visited the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-says-leader-discussed-possible-military-cooperation-with-russian-2023-08-31/">military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso</a> to deliver the same message.</p>
<p>The question will be whether the Russian military has the capacity. Russia needs soldiers in Ukraine. So, it may not have experienced fighters to spare in Africa. It is also an open question whether Wagner troops will agree to sign contracts with the Russian defence ministry, given the way their leader was dispatched.</p>
<p>The Russian government would also need to recreate the multidimensional dealings that made Wagner’s operations effective in shoring up client regimes. For years, Russia has promoted <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/report/russian-hybrid-warfare">hybrid warfare</a> – the fusion of conventional and subversive tools. Synchronising this across multiple African contexts will require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of, however.</p>
<p>Finally, Russia has benefited from the plausible deniability that Wagner has provided while doing Putin’s bidding. In every context in which Wagner forces have been deployed, they have been <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">credibly accused of human rights abuses</a> including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings. In Mali, Wagner is linked to more than 320 incidents of human rights abuses and <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s6">hundreds of civilian deaths</a>. Wagner has also been accused of driving away local communities where it has secured mining concessions, effectively annexing African territory.</p>
<p>By directly taking over the mantle of Wagner operations in Africa, the Russian government can no longer claim ignorance or impotence to do anything about these unlawful and destabilising actions. Russia has largely escaped serious reputational costs for Wagner’s thuggish activities in Africa. But this will change when it owns the repressive tactics Wagner has deployed.</p>
<h2>Reassessments in Africa</h2>
<p>What of Wagner’s African clients? Leaders of these regimes have come to power through extraconstitutional means. They restrict opposition voices and media. They are isolated internationally. Simply put, they cannot survive without Moscow’s support. So, we should not expect a change in receptivity from the military juntas in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, the co-opted leadership in the Central African Republic, or the Libyan warlord, Haftar.</p>
<p>What will be telling is the reaction from other governments on the continent. Some will continue to see value in flirting with Russia as a way of hedging against international criticism.</p>
<p>Russia’s reach in Africa may be exceeding its grasp, however. There is a growing awakening on the continent of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-provides-a-global-stage-for-moscow-to-puff-up-its-influence-209982">how little Russia actually brings to Africa</a> in terms of investment, trade, jobs creation or security. Its deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, political interference and arms for resources deals mean it actually amplifies instability on the continent.</p>
<p>The symbolism of this was vividly brought home in the days before the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">Russia-Africa Summit</a> at the end of July. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-grain-turkey-syria-ac5c945990c2c53eeca37e642ab6c5a7">Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal</a> that had enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to get from Ukraine to Africa and other parts of the world. The deal had eased supply chain restrictions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not only did Russia scuttle the deal: it <a href="https://www.eurasiantimes.com/india-china-turkey-urge-russia-to-resume-black-sea-grain/">bombed the Ukrainian ports</a> that were exporting the grain, wasting 180,000 tonnes in the process. The contempt Putin showed for African interests by this action was hard to ignore.</p>
<p>This disregard, coupled with recognition that Russia offers relatively little to Africa, contributed to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-africa-summit-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-wagner-group/">only 17 African heads of state</a> attending the St. Petersburg summit. By comparison 43 African heads of state attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019.</p>
<p>The way that Prigozhin was eliminated must also give African leaders pause. </p>
<p>Putin speaks often of his desire to create a new international order. Russia’s lawlessness at home and abroad is bringing into sharp focus what his world order would look like. And that’s not a vision many African leaders share.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212707/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is not interested in helping Africa to prosper or achieve stability, but as a theatre for advancing the Kremlin’s geostrategic interests.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124672023-08-30T09:08:34Z2023-08-30T09:08:34ZWagner Group: what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death means for stability in Africa<p>The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin after his <a href="https://theconversation.com/yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-boss-joins-long-list-of-those-who-challenged-vladimir-putin-and-paid-the-price-212181">private jet crashed</a> on August 23 has raised questions about the Wagner Group’s future. Many in the west <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/24/wagner-boss-yevgeny-prigozhin-reported-killed-death-russia-biden-suggests-putin">suspect Kremlin involvement</a> in his death and are asking what will become of the mercenary group without its charismatic leader.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group, often described as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/23/what-we-know-about-the-shadowy-russian-mercenary-firm-behind-the-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-syria/">a private military company (PMC)</a> is a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">state-linked</a> actor with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">close ties to the Russian military</a>. It has involved itself in the internal politics of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">numerous African countries</a>, advancing Kremlin interests while providing the Russian leadership with “plausible deniability”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">The Wagner Group comprises</a> former Russian soldiers, convicts and foreign nationals paid to provide mercenary services. It first emerged in Crimea in 2014 and has since extended its services to many other countries including many in Africa. </p>
<p>The death of the Wagner Group’s charismatic leader, a former close ally of Putin, raises questions about these African operations. Based on credible news reports, these include activities in: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">Equatorial Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Central African Republic (CAR)</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Chad</a>, <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">Mali</a>, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Burkina Faso</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Mozambique</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Madagascar</a>. The group reportedly has more than <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">5,000 operatives</a> across its Africa operations.</p>
<p>A common denominator among these countries is the presence of insurgencies or civil wars, abundant natural resources, corrupt leadership, and unconstitutional governance, among other factors. Many of these states, such as <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Libya-Remains-a-Failed-State-11-Years-After-NATO-Intervention-20220217-0006.html">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/24/sudan-is-heading-towards-complete-state-collapse">Sudan</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/07/mozambique-is-a-failed-state-the-west-isnt-helping-it/">Mozambique</a>, have many of the characteristics of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/failed-states">“failing” or “failed states”</a>. </p>
<h2>Wagner Group in Africa</h2>
<p>Designated by the US government as a “<a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/understanding-us-designation-wagner-group-transnational-criminal-organisation#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20declaring,United%20States.%E2%80%9D%20What%20constitutes%20a">transnational criminal organisation</a>” the Wagner Group offers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">a range of services</a>. These include conducting offensive combat operations, training, ensuring regime security, advising government leadership, and the management and extraction of natural resources. </p>
<p>Described by South Africa-based think tank In On Africa as “<a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2023/07/07/more-than-mere-mercenaries-the-wagner-group-in-africa/">more than mere mercenaries</a>”, the Wagner Group has also discreetly but effectively put stress on Afro-European relations while bolstering autocratic governments. </p>
<p>It has also promoted anti-neo-colonial figures, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/296849/russia-how-yevgeny-prigozhin-funded-kemi-seba-to-serve-his-own-african-ambitions/">such as Kemi Séba</a> (also known as Capo Chichi). Currently based in Moscow, Séba has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-09/niger-coup-prigozhin-wagner-exploits-anti-french-sentiment/102696370">gained celebrity status </a> through his social media presence and TV talk shows which frequently target French foreign policy. </p>
<p>This has helped to popularise and boost anti-French sentiment among francophone countries in west Africa. France has arguably <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/12/emmanuel-macron-france-erased-from-africa-niger-coup/">continued a neo-colonial approach to west Africa</a> and refused to accept that the era of its “<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/16585/">Francafrique</a>” sphere of influence is over, which has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/17/french-mistakes-helped-create-africas-coup-belt">exacerbated instabilities</a> across the region. For instance, the persistence of French <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/07/12/the-cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-in-africa/">control of the CFA Franc</a>, the common currency used among former French colonies, gave it control over their economies and political affairs.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in west Africa furthers Russian interests by challenging French dominance. The group has done this through the reportedly <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-internet-research-agency-disbands/">now defunct</a> <a href="https://blogs.prio.org/2023/03/soft-power-and-disinformation-the-strategic-role-of-media-in-wagners-expansion-in-africa/">Internet Research Agency</a>, known as “Russia’s troll farm”. This organisation orchestrated disinformation campaigns on social media to spread anti-colonial sentiments. </p>
<p>By doing this, it reinforced the <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/anti-french-sentiment-west-africa-reflection-authoritarian-confrontation-collective-west">already strong anti-French sentiments</a> in the Sahel region to discredit France and position Russia as better alternatives. The Internet Research Agency was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14/">directly associated with the Wagner Group</a> via Prigozhin as its founder and owner.</p>
<p>Beyond propping up failed and failing states, the Wagner Group has faced accusations of <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">targeting civilians</a> and committing severe human rights violations in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/24/mali-new-atrocities-malian-army-apparent-wagner-fighters">Mali</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/russian-mercenaries-accused-of-human-rights-abuses-in-car-un-group-experts-wagner-group-violence-election">CAR</a>. </p>
<h2>The circular business of conflict</h2>
<p>In addition to its military activities, the Wagner Group is estimated to have garnered <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">more than US$20 billion</a> (£15.9 billion) from its diverse business dealings, which range from <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746">gold mining in Sudan</a> to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/313233/how-wagner-prigozhin-teamed-up-with-the-cars-diamond-mafia/">diamond extraction in CAR</a>, where it is also reported to be heavily invested in the <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">forestry and timber business</a>. </p>
<p>Since mercenaries tend to thrive in conflicts, they are likely to profit by prolonging the conflicts they become involved in. So the activities of a PMC such as Wagner can exacerbate conflicts by prolonging hostilities, as witnessed in Libya, Mozambique and CAR. </p>
<p><a href="https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/06/when-private-military-operations-fail-the-case-of-mozambique/">For instance</a>, small raids against villages and police units in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where Wagner groups were deployed, escalated into a full-scale terrorist insurgency linked to the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43047/chapter-abstract/361462906?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Islamic State’s Central African Province</a>.</p>
<p>In Libya, meanwhile, Wagner Group units <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/108429/pdf/">first appeared in 2018</a>, according to a submission to the UK parliament, ostensibly to provide technical support for repairing and maintaining armoured vehicles for the Libyan National Army. Since then, the scope of their operations has expanded with increased funding from Russia and the fighting continues.</p>
<p>The involvement of Wagner or other PMCs in these countries almost inevitably leads to the erosion of sovereignty as unstable governments become dependent on the mercenaries for their survival. This situation may cause local leaders to favour the interests of the PMCs, reinforcing their roles as puppet leaders, causing mass exploitation of resources, leading to environmental degradation, poverty, grievances, intensified conflicts – all of which creates further demand for mercenary services.</p>
<p>As long as certain African countries and their leadership remain plagued by corruption, extended terms in office, election manipulations, neo-colonial influences, and looting of the national treasury, coups will remain a persistent concern. Military coups are on the rise again <a href="https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/as-coups-return-to-west-africa-frances-footprint-in-africa-fades/">particularly in west Africa</a>, stimulating an increased demand for mercenary services. As such, Prigozhin’s death is unlikely to significantly affect the Wagner Groups’s African operations. The more pertinent question is what the new leadership will look like and whether it will be more directly state-controlled. </p>
<p>But the use of mercenary companies such as the Wagner Group to help unstable or illegitimate governments hold on to power will not bring sustainable peace. Instead, dialogue, transitional governments reflecting people’s desires, the rule of law, and genuine democracy are essential. Otherwise, Africans will keep demanding positive change by all means.</p>
<p>To maintain popular support in an era of instability, African leaders must be seen to act in their people’s best interests. They must heed popular demands to halt misrule and the misuse of African resources across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Idris Mohammed receives funding from the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development to commission a report on sexual violence in the northwest region of Nigeria. He is a member of conflict research network of west Africa ( CORN West Africa). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia was using the mercenary group to further its foreign policy aims in west Africa. There’s no reason to think Prigozhin’s death will change that.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonIdris Mohammed, Conflict Researcher, Department of Mass Communication, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, SokotoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854482023-08-20T09:27:05Z2023-08-20T09:27:05ZCivilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543212/original/file-20230817-25-4iakmh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The clamour for coups among citizens is rising</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the night of <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/142678/togo-who-killed-sylvanus-olympio-the-father-of-togolese-independence/">13 January 1963</a>, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away. </p>
<p>But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups. </p>
<p>First came <a href="https://theconversation.com/malis-predictable-coup-leaves-an-unclear-path-to-civilian-rule-144774">Mali</a>, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span. </p>
<p>In April 2021, <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Chad</a> followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650">Guinea’s</a> turn. A month later, it was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan</a>. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-military-takeovers-in-west-africa-burkina-faso-coup-highlights-the-links-193972">Burkina Faso</a>, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022. </p>
<p>More recently, a coup was <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">launched in Niger</a>, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger. </p>
<p>All together, that’s more than <a href="https://defishumanitaires.com/en/2019/11/27/the-sahel-is-a-demographic-bomb/">100 million people</a> being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.</p>
<p>Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">Niger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely</a>
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<p>But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589346.2022.2072582">research</a> explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government. </p>
<p>This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.</p>
<h2>Citizen discontent</h2>
<p>I carried out a quantitative analysis using <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule. </p>
<p>Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.</p>
<p>The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">analysed</a>, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/young-africans-show-tolerance-for-military-intervention-a-wake-up-call-afrobarometer-ceo-tells-german-leaders/#:%7E:text=Afrobarometer%20findings%20from%2028%20African,if%20elected%20leaders%20abuse%20power.">Afrobarometer data</a> shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.</p>
<p><a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">Support</a> for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">Freedom House</a> index.) </p>
<p>But there were some exceptions. In <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">South Africa</a>, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.</p>
<h2>Reasons to support military rule</h2>
<p>The analysis points to three conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.</p></li>
<li><p>In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.</p></li>
<li><p>Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.</p>
<p>If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics. </p>
<p>If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos García Rivero is Research Fellow at the Centre for International and Comparative Politics, at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. </span></em></p>Citizen expectations of governments are not being met by most elected leaders.Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de ValènciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111362023-08-08T12:28:33Z2023-08-08T12:28:33ZNiger coup: why an Ecowas-led military intervention is unlikely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541537/original/file-20230807-34367-f6znll.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's coup leaders waving at a crowd of supporters in Niamey on August 6, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hopes are fading for a quick resolution of Niger’s coup or the potential use of force by the <a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">Economic Community of West African States</a> (Ecowas) to free Nigerien president Mohammed Bazoum and restore him to power.</p>
<p>Ecowas leaders gave the Nigerien military junta <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">an ultimatum</a> to cede power within seven days of 30 July or face a military intervention.</p>
<p>The deadline of 6 August came and went, and the putschists remained. Ecowas meets again on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/7/ecowas-calls-for-second-emergency-summit-to-discuss-niger-coup">10 August</a> to discuss the situation in Niger. However, hopes of a Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention in Niger now appears dim. </p>
<p>The first indication that it would be difficult to immediately restore democracy in the country surfaced when <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/thousands-in-niger-rally-in-support-of-coup-leaders">demonstrations</a> in support of the coup started. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-mohamed-bazoum-military-junta-sahel-88ccaa2f004db44601e59475199c5fbe">attack</a> on the French embassy in Niamey was followed by a daily protest in support of the coup. The size of the protest increased daily. </p>
<p><a href="https://indepthnews.net/niger-coup-reflects-anti-french-sentiment-in-the-region/">Anti-France sentiments</a> also increased, with more people supporting the junta. </p>
<p>Niger shares a border with <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/africa/niger/index.php">seven countries</a> in the region, four of which are members of Ecowas. Of those four, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230801-burkina-faso-and-mali-say-intervention-in-niger-would-be-declaration-of-war">Mali and Burkina Faso</a> have been suspended due to similar coups d'etat. </p>
<p>Both countries have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/1/burkina-faso-and-mali-warn-against-foreign-intervention-after-niger-coup">threatened</a> to support Niger if Ecowas tries to use force. The remaining two countries in the bloc bordering Niger are Nigeria and Benin. Outside Ecowas, Chad and Algeria have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230806-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-pressure-mounts-on-niger-coup-leaders-as-ecowas-deadline-approaches">both ruled out</a> participating in any military action and Libya has its own challenges. </p>
<p>The likelihood of a military intervention further diminished when Nigerian legislators <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318122/nigerias-senate-rejects-military-intervention-in-niger-as-ultimatum-to-coup-leaders-expires/">rejected</a> the idea. They argued for the use of “other means” than force. Nigeria is the largest country in the Ecowas bloc and <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/118585-nigeria-ecowas-largest-donor-continually-outsmarted-by-smaller-west-african-countries.html">principal financier</a> of the bloc. </p>
<p>It will be difficult for Ecowas to carry out military intervention without the full support of Nigeria. As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a> I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. I have also previously <a href="https://isij.eu/article/interorganizational-cooperation-and-fight-against-terrorism-west-africa-and-sahel">analysed the role Nigeria plays</a> in regional organisations such as Ecowas and the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Taskforce</a> in the region. </p>
<p>My view is that the unwillingness of Nigeria’s politicians to support military intervention, coupled with growing local support for the junta in Niger, will make the use of force almost impossible. This leaves Ecowas with little or no option than to pursue a diplomatic resolution. </p>
<h2>Why military intervention is unlikely</h2>
<p>There are three main reasons why the use of force is becoming more unlikely.</p>
<p>First, the increasing popularity of the putschists in the country is a cause for concern. The growth of protests in support of the coup is an indication of a wider acceptance than previously envisaged.</p>
<p>Hundreds of youths <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/deadline-arrived-nigers-junta-reinstate-president-residents-brace-102053037">joined</a> military personnel to stand guard at the entrance to Niamey. Some of these youths vowed to join the military to fight any incursion.</p>
<p>Second, politicians in Nigeria and Ghana fear that any military intervention would result in human catastrophe, which would further destabilise the region. Politicians from Nigeria <a href="https://north-africa.com/nigerian-president-tinubu-under-pressure-to-avoid-war-with-northern-neighbor-niger/">argue</a> that any war in Niger will have a serious impact on northern Nigeria, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">region that is already strained</a> by insurgency. </p>
<p>Apart from Islamist terror organisation, <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, which has ravaged the north-eastern part of the country, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2020.1811662">clashes</a> between farmers and pastoralists have also destabilised other parts of northern Nigeria. </p>
<p>Seven Nigerian states share borders with Niger. An attack on Niger would lead to a large influx of refugees into Nigeria. This has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66420693">created anxiety</a> in northern Nigeria. President Bola Tinubu, who took office only recently, will find it difficult to ignore the senators from the region who <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/614494-niger-coup-nigerian-senators-reject-tinubus-request-for-troops-deployment.html">rejected</a> any military intervention.</p>
<p>Third, Niger has fought terrorism in the region and has been a reliable partner. The country is a member of the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> and the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5 Sahel</a>, two key organisations tasked with countering terrorism and fighting trafficking in the region. </p>
<p>A military intervention in Niger which could result in a full blown war would embolden terrorist groups. It will also result in soldiers previously fighting side by side against terrorist groups now fighting against each other.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a>, an Isis affiliate, already operating in the region, an attack on Niger could create a situation similar to what happened in Syria. Isis took advantage of the fighting in Syria to establish a caliphate in 2014.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Since military intervention to restore democracy in Niger is unlikely, diplomacy remains the only solution. </p>
<p>The de facto leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/318026/10-things-to-know-about-niger-coup-leader-general-abdourahamane-tiani/">verge of being removed</a> as leader of the presidential guard before the coup d'etat. Many high-ranking military officers in the country are involved in the mutiny and it is almost impossible they will be able to work with Bazoum again. They could be <a href="https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/adp/ner.html">tried for treason</a>, which is punishable by death in Niger.</p>
<p>As I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20insecurity%20and,labelled%20as%20having%20foreign%20origins.">explained</a> elsewhere, the mutiny was partly a result of the large presence of foreign military troops in the country. It has further weakened the relationship between the Nigerien military and France. </p>
<p>The military junta has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/niger-coup-leaders-end-military-cooperation-with-france-deepening-concerns-over-anti-western-turn-e7fae57e">cancelled</a> military cooperation with France. </p>
<p>If Bazoum is released and restored as president, he will have to remove several military leaders who participated in the coup or renegotiate Niger’s military alliance with France. Both options are fraught with difficulties. </p>
<p>The most likely diplomatic option is for Ecowas to negotiate a short transition window with the military junta. This will include a quick return to democratic rule. </p>
<p>This will calm the tension and give some assurance to partners within and outside the region. With the level of support the junta has received from the Nigerien public and outside the country, Ecowas negotiators must be open to making concessions. </p>
<p>Third party countries with lower stakes in Niger must lead these negotiations and France must be willing to change its relationship with the country to one of mutual benefit. At the moment, Nigeriens see France as an exploiter and are keen to end their long-held relationship. </p>
<p>In all, there’s no easy solution to the impasse in Niger.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A combination of Nigerian and Nigerien factors dim prospects of Ecowas military intervention in Niger.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2106722023-07-29T09:23:19Z2023-07-29T09:23:19ZNiger coup: Military takeover is a setback for democracy and US interests in West Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540017/original/file-20230729-17212-tattnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C17%2C3988%2C2209&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">General Abdourahmane Tchiani, Niger's new leader.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-video-frame-grab-image-obtained-by-afp-from-ortn-t%C3%A9l%C3%A9-news-photo/1559603798?adppopup=true">ORTN - Télé Sahel/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The West African nation Niger is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66324875">under military rule</a> following a coup in which President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown and held captive by members of his own guard.</em></p>
<p><em>On July 28, 2023, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">coup leaders named General Abdourahmane Tchiani</a> as the new head of state, while <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">international observers called for democratic norms</a> to be reinstalled.</em></p>
<p><em>Where the coup leaves the country and what happens next is unclear. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://polisci.ufl.edu/leonardo-a-villalon/">Leonardo A. Villalón</a>, political scientist and West African expert at the University of Florida, for some answers.</em></p>
<h2>How did this coup come about?</h2>
<p>At first it was unclear whether this even was a coup. Although there have been indications of tensions both inside the military and between military and civilian leaders, a coup certainly wasn’t expected. I was in Niger last month, and there was nothing to suggest that a coup was about to take place. And in contrast to what happened in Mali or Burkina Faso in recent years, the coup wasn’t preceded by widespread protests or popular calls for a change in leadership.</p>
<p><iframe id="Qy5vH" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Qy5vH/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>So, when members of the presidential guard seized Bazoum on July 26, it wasn’t immediately clear what was going on, or whether their actions would be successful. The first real test for the coup leaders was whether the rest of the military would back their actions. If they hadn’t, it could have set off widespread fighting in the country. But it has turned out – so far, at least – to be a bloodless coup. After <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">initial wrangling between different factions</a> over who would take control, the country’s generals did back the coup.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the democratically elected president continues to be <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/07/28/niger-president-in-good-health-as-coup-leaders-secure-army-backing/">held hostage under house arrest</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the consequences of the coup?</h2>
<p>Although it has so far been a bloodless coup, the consequences are nonetheless catastrophic for Niger and for the region.</p>
<p>The nation is among the least developed on Earth, with <a href="https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world">high levels of poverty</a> and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">history of instability and coups</a>.</p>
<p>But it has emerged in recent years as a relatively <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/27/explainer-niger-a-linchpin-for-stability-in-africas-coup-belt">stable force in the region</a> and as a key ally for the West in dealing with terrorism and violence that has spiraled since a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html">coup in neighboring Mali in 2012</a>. That event, itself triggered by the NATO intervention in Libya and the fall of Moammar Gadhafi, kick-started a decade of instability in the region.</p>
<p>Yet just two years ago, Niger saw its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56175439">first ever democratic transfer of power</a> from one elected president to the next. The election was by no means perfect, but it was rightly seen as a significant accomplishment. That is why this coup is particularly problematic: It represents a rolling back of the progress made in recent years in slowly building functional state institutions and democratic processes.</p>
<p>The coup also has major consequences for the region. Neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso have broken away from former colonial power France, and the West in general, and moved toward Russia. Meanwhile Chad, another neighbor, is engaged in a problematic effort at a transition to an elected government. Against these countries, Niger represented a civilian-led pragmatic ally in international efforts to stem a tide of jihadist violence in the Sahel region. We have no clear indication at the moment how Niger’s new military leaders will align themselves in this context.</p>
<h2>How does this differ from past coups in Niger?</h2>
<p>That’s the really interesting thing. Niger is often described as prone to coups. But with each previous coup, circumstances have allowed coup leaders to justify their actions as necessary, or at least as justifiable and understandable by some rationale. But that doesn’t appear to be true for this latest takeover by the military. </p>
<p>Niger’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1974/04/18/archives/niger-announces-military-council-colonel-kountie-who-led-coup-is.html">first coup in 1974</a> took place amid a backdrop of terrible drought and famine across the Sahel. That created a level of frustration and disappointment in the shortcomings of the country’s first post-independence government and provided a rationale for the military to overthrow it and to claim legitimacy with a renewed focus on development.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">subsequent coups in Niger</a> – in 1996, 1999 and 2010 – were all triggered by specific political crises. In 1996, the new democratic regime that had been installed in 1993 found itself gridlocked by institutions that made it difficult for the executive and legislative branches to work together. The military justified the coup as a necessary step to unblock this gridlock. Three years later, those coup leaders failed to follow through on their promises and were themselves ousted – and soldier-turned-president <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/04/10/president-of-niger-assassinated/c8287bd2-32c8-42dc-92c4-d38c7218ea0c/">Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara was killed</a> – when they attempted to remain in power by rigging the elections.</p>
<p>As promised by the leaders of the 1999 coup, within a year Niger had adopted a new constitution and elected a new government. Unfortunately, after two terms and 10 years in power, President Mamadou Tandja attempted to extend his mandate beyond the constitutionally allowed limits, triggering a prolonged political crisis. In the end, the military again stepped in, and in 2010 soldiers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/world/africa/19niger.html">attacked the presidential palace</a> and captured Tandja after a bloody gun battle. The military justified this coup as a necessary step to end the crisis and stop the erosion of democracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Billowing black smoke emerges from a building behind a crowd of mostly men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540018/original/file-20230729-22-lpylse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pro-coup demonstrators attack the headquarters of the party of overthrown President Mohamed Bazoum.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-billowing-smoke-as-supporters-of-the-news-photo/1557046635?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>All three of the previous coups in Niger could thus be presented as attempts to “press reset” on Niger’s progress toward democracy. And in each case they were justified by the coup leaders in those terms. </p>
<p>The same cannot be said about the latest coup. President Bazoum has only been in power for two years, and his 2021 election win, although contested, was in the end widely accepted. He came to power on a promise to improve the country’s security, invest in education and fight corruption – and some real <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/28/niger-coup-democratic-region-mali-democracy/">progress has been made</a> in that direction. And there was no obvious political impasse or institutional gridlock on a scale that would have justified a coup.</p>
<p>As such, it seems that this latest coup was very much driven by internal politics and dissatisfaction among parts of the military, rather than any clear triggering crisis.</p>
<h2>How are the coup leaders justifying their actions?</h2>
<p>Beyond a very general claim of “poor governance” and a “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-tensions-presidential-guard-96f8f63b838af5467d4c95ba7b998b32">degraded security situation</a>,” there hasn’t been a clear rationale articulated by those who are now in charge to justify the coup or to legitimize themselves as leaders. This marks a change not only from the coups of Niger’s past but also contrasts with those in neighboring Mali in 2021 and Burkina Faso the following year.</p>
<p>In each of those coups, military leaders claimed that they were ousting deeply unpopular regimes that were deeply corrupt and had proven ineffective at combating instability and violence. They presented themselves as leaders who would mark a break with existing political systems by establishing new alliances. </p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>It is very difficult to see a coherent way out of this. The coup leaders have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/niger-coup-west-africa-wagner-bazoum-c233b0d2becf61ebb00c5705941fc168">suspended the constitution</a> and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230726-niger-soldiers-say-president-bazoum-has-been-removed-borders-closed">closed Niger’s borders</a>. But it isn’t really clear yet what the long-term plan is.</p>
<p>In Mali and Bukina Faso, the ills of those countries were blamed on France, with coup leaders <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">looking to Russia for support</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">accepting support</a> from the Moscow-backed mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>The fear among those in the West – and many inside Niger – is that in the need to articulate a rationale, the new military leaders now will present the Nigerien experiment with democracy itself as a failure and similarly seek support from Russia and the Wagner Group. Wagner’s mercenary boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">offered Niger’s new leaders the support</a> of his men, praising the coup as an anti-colonial struggle.</p>
<h2>How big a blow is this for US interests in the region?</h2>
<p>In recent years, Niger has been the partner of choice for Washington in regards to the Sahel. It is seen as a linchpin in the fight against terrorism in the region, and its importance has escalated significantly as Mali and Burkina Faso turned to Russia.</p>
<p>Neighboring Chad is also a key ally for the U.S. But Chad is problematic, having been led by the autocratic Idriss Déby for 30 years until his death in 2021, only to be succeeded by his son, Mahamat Déby – who is now himself leading a so-called transition that seems designed to keep him in power.</p>
<p>With Chad, the U.S. has had to hold its nose while doing business. Niger, by contrast, was presented as a democratic model and seen as open, pragmatic and friendly toward Washington.</p>
<p>We will have to see how things unfold, but it is clear that this coup could deal a serious setback to U.S. interests in the region. But above all, it is a terrible blow to Niger’s efforts at building stable democratic institutions and to fostering the peace and stability that could better the lives of people living in one of the world’s poorest countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonardo A. Villalón currently receives funding from the Minerva Initiative of the US Department of Defense for a basic social science research project on the impact of climate change in the Sahel.</span></em></p>Niger had been seen as a relatively stable nation in an unstable region. The coup could spark fears in the West that the nation may align interests with Russia and the Wagner Group.Leonardo A. Villalón, Professor of Political Science and African Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102102023-07-26T14:54:12Z2023-07-26T14:54:12ZMali crisis: UN peacekeepers are leaving after 10 years – what’s needed for a smooth transition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539038/original/file-20230724-19-ph4kyq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malians march against the UN peacekeeping force in Bamako in September 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ousmane Makaveli/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UN Security Council voted on 30 June 2023 to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138257">end its peacekeeping mission in Mali</a>, <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en">Minusma</a>, after Mali officially requested its complete withdrawal. Over <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/personnel">11,000 military personnel from 53 countries</a> are expected to leave the country by 31 December 2023. </p>
<p>Minusma was first deployed in Mali in <a href="https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history">April 2013</a> to support the country’s political process and help <a href="https://betterworldcampaign.org/mission/mali-minusma#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Multidimensional%20Integrated,fragile%20transition%20to%20constitutional%20order.">restore peace and stability</a>. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/2012-coup-and-warfare-in-the-north">In mid-2012</a>, the north of the country was under the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/echogeo/13466?lang=en">control of terrorist groups</a>.</p>
<p>Mali’s recent request for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60419799">withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops</a> comes as no surprise. </p>
<p>After a coup in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53830348">2020</a> and another in <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-malis-coup-within-a-coup-161621">2021</a>, the relationship between Malian authorities and Minusma deteriorated. The UN published <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/malian-troops-foreign-military-personnel-killed-over-500-people-during">a report</a> accusing Malian troops and their allies of massacring at least 500 civilians in 2022. It also accused the Malian government of <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads">interfering with operations</a>. </p>
<p>These events prompted some countries to begin withdrawing their soldiers from the peacekeeping mission. In <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads">November 2022</a>, Côte d'Ivoire informed the UN that its 900 soldiers would leave the mission. Three days later, the UK said it would also withdraw its troops. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-troops-to-withdraw-from-mali-what-will-change-in-terms-of-security-209765">UN troops to withdraw from Mali: what will change in terms of security</a>
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<p>I’m a political scientist with a <a href="https://scholar.google.ca/citations?hl=en&user=9T47R7AAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">research focus</a> on security issues in the Sahel, which includes Mali. In my view, for Mali to make a peaceful transition to democracy, two key elements are needed.</p>
<p>First, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">new terrorist threats</a> in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahel">the Sahel</a> require the development of new instruments and approaches to warfare, including a joint fight against Islamist terrorist insurgents. No single country in the region has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350213273_Gestion_des_menaces_terroristes_au_Sahel_et_en_Afrique_de_l'Ouest">the necessary strength</a> to lead the fight against terrorism alone. Mali must coordinate military efforts with its neighbours: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. </p>
<p>Second, Mali must accompany the military aspect of the fight against terrorism with development initiatives to prevent radicalisation. Without these measures, the country and its citizens could face increased instability.</p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>On 3 July 2023, Malian authorities and a Minusma delegation agreed on a <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/minusma-presents-its-withdrawal-plan-to-malian-foreign-minister">withdrawal plan</a>. This will transfer tasks, logistics, security and strategic communication to Bamako by December.</p>
<p>Mali has had measures in place for the withdrawal of UN troops since a new government took over after the 2020 coup. The National Transitional Council approved the creation of a war school in September 2021 to <a href="https://www.maliweb.net/armee/le-mali-cree-son-ecole-de-guerre-2945251.html">strengthen the national security apparatus and train future army cadres</a>. </p>
<p>The intention was to replace foreign troops with local ones in the event of a withdrawal. The <a href="http://news.abamako.com/h/277568.html">first cohort</a> has already completed its training. The second class is nearing graduation. </p>
<p>While the UN’s withdrawal will create a security vacuum, <a href="https://www.lareussitemali.com/mali-la-2eme-promotion-de-lecole-de-guerre-fait-sa-rentree-solennelle/">increasing Mali’s vulnerability to security and terrorism-related challenges</a>, graduates of the war school could help fill this void. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/france-has-started-withdrawing-its-troops-from-mali-what-is-it-leaving-behind-170375">France has started withdrawing its troops from Mali: what is it leaving behind?</a>
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<p>But for this to work, Malian authorities must ensure local soldiers are capable of occupying areas previously under the control of peacekeepers. Additionally, the government will need to provide employment opportunities for the more than 800 civilians working with Minusma, and create new economic activities to fill the gaps left by its departure. This will minimise any additional negative impact on Mali’s <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-intensive-investment/countries/WCMS_327090/lang--en/index.htm">already fragile unemployment rate</a>. Bamako has said <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/3/what-next-for-mali-after-minusma-withdrawal">it’s capable of securing its 23 million citizens</a>, but has yet to detail how it plans to do so. </p>
<p>The government also needs to implement the recommendations of a national conference on <a href="https://modelemali.com/2021/12/30/conclusions-des-assises-nationales-de-la-refondation-de-letat-niveau-national-decembre-2021/">the refoundation of the state</a>. This includes organising credible, fair and transparent elections. A transition agreement adopted by <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/02/21/mali-parliament-approves-new-charter-allowing-a-five-year-democratic-transition//">parliament in 2022</a> gave the transitional government two years to hand power back to civilians. </p>
<p>However, progress on this has already been put to question. Interim president Assimi Goïta recently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">adopted a new constitution</a> that enhances his powers.</p>
<p>The major concern now is whether the military government will honour the transition period and organise elections that would restore power to a democratically elected president by 2024. Delivering this requires <a href="https://www.studiotamani.org/29484-mali-la-cedeao-favorable-a-une-transition-supplementaire-de-12-mois">government measures</a> that restore security throughout the country, foster <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/01/02/mali-peuls-et-dogons-des-freres-devenus-ennemis_1771562/">national reconciliation</a> and promote good governance. </p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>The withdrawal of UN troops from Mali could have negative consequences on the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-troops-to-withdraw-from-mali-what-will-change-in-terms-of-security-209765">security situation</a> and economic growth. It could also complicate <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/09/03/mali-ex-rebels-and-the-government-return-to-talks-after-almost-a-year//">dialogue and negotiation efforts with ex-rebels</a>. </p>
<p>A loss of support and commitment from the international community could lead to a reduction in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/minusma-liquidation-process-unpacked">financial aid and political support</a> in the fight against insecurity. This would have a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/3/what-next-for-mali-after-minusma-withdrawal">direct impact</a> on the country’s – and Sahel region’s – stability.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-peace-talks-successful-the-4-factors-that-matter-206299">What makes peace talks successful? The 4 factors that matter</a>
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<p>The path of constructive dialogue remains an essential condition for a peaceful political transition and the construction of “<a href="http://www.maliweb.net/societe/politique-espoir-mali-koura-salue-le-discours-2993460.html">Mali Koura</a>”, or a new Mali. </p>
<p>Mali needs to reconstruct its society. Its people are <a href="https://www.studiotamani.org/43945-democratie-au-mali-les-aspirations-profondes-du-peuple-n-ont-pas-ete-comblees">thirsty for true democracy and development</a>. The transitional authorities should ensure an end to bad governance, political mismanagement, corruption and nepotism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210210/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mady Ibrahim Kanté does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Constructive dialogue is an essential condition for a peaceful political transition in Mali.Mady Ibrahim Kanté, Lecturer, Université des sciences juridiques et politiques de BamakoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086052023-06-28T08:36:25Z2023-06-28T08:36:25ZWagner debacle in Russia raises red flags for African states and how they manage their security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534398/original/file-20230627-15-qy37yx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">10 tons of ammunition previously laid in civilian settlements by Libyan militia and Wagner group mercenaries . </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hazem Turkia/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The brief rebellion led against the Kremlin by the head of the Wagner mercenary forces in Russia last week sent <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/short-lived-wagner-mutiny-will-undermine-russias-ukraine-invasion/">shock waves</a> across the world. </p>
<p>This was no less true in Africa, where <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">some countries</a> have, over the last decade, turned to the Wagner group for security support.</p>
<p>Many states in Africa are contending with <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/security-challenges-africa-2021-and-beyond">multidimensional insecurity</a>. This includes violent extremism, terrorism, insurgency, banditry, communal clashes, sea piracy, separatist violence, kidnapping and oil theft. Non-state actors have entered the scene as security providers. </p>
<p>As a coordinator of observations of organised crime in central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies based in Dakar, Senegal, I believe the recent events in Russia could have three implications for African countries that depend on non-state armed groups for security. These are: rebellion, increased human rights abuses and insubordination to state military authorities. </p>
<p>African countries engaged with Wagner, and with Russia, should take heed. The aborted Wagner rebellion offers distinct lessons for African countries that have invited mercenary troops onto their soil.</p>
<p>Private armies might sometimes prove effective in the battlefield. And militias might be useful in intelligence gathering. But the inability of state authorities to bring them under control casts serious doubt on their overall usefulness. </p>
<p>African states should rather take full responsibility for their security sector reform. This must include repositioning their military and law enforcement agencies to respond effectively to internal and external security challenges.</p>
<h2>Non-state actors</h2>
<p>African countries have come to depend on non-state actors like Wagner for security in three ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>co-option of militia groups by the state</p></li>
<li><p>the voluntary incursion of vigilante groups into the security space as service providers </p></li>
<li><p>state partnership with private military mercenaries.</p></li>
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<p>As security nosedives, some governments have co-opted militia groups to strengthen the state security architecture. </p>
<p>There are a number of examples.</p>
<p>In 2015 the Nigerian government <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/179208-we-got-new-pipelines-protection-contract-two-weeks-ago-opc-leader.html">awarded</a> a multi-million naira contract to Oodua Peoples Congress, an ethnic militia, to secure oil pipelines. </p>
<p>Seven years later the Nigerian Senate lent legislative support to the <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/11/23/senate-backs-n48bn-pipeline-surveillance-contract-awarded-to-tompolos-company">N48 billion</a> pipeline surveillance contract awarded to Global West Vessel Specialist Limited. This is a private maritime security firm founded and owned by <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/555830-government-ekpemupolo-the-only-government-that-works-in-nigeria-by-osmund-agbo.html">Government Ekpemupolo</a>. He was the former commander of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, popularly known as Tompolo. </p>
<p>These contracts were akin to handing over national assets to armed gangs for protection. They were an affront to the Nigerian constitution, which empowers the law enforcement and security agencies as ultimate providers of security. </p>
<p>Voluntary policing to fill the vacuum left by the state is another example. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">recent study</a> showed that where people feel insecure and unprotected, they find innovative ways of responding to crime. Some rely on private security and others, especially the poor, rely on community vigilantism. Kenya is an example. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/23311886.2023.2174486?needAccess=true&role=button">My recent study</a> showed that vigilantes performed strategic duties in Nigeria’s north-west. They repelled attacks from bandits, rescued kidnap victims and arrested criminals. They also sometimes participated in joint security operations with the police and army. </p>
<p>Borno state has used the Civilian Joint Task Force and hunters to complement military efforts in counter-terrorism operations. They are on <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/zulum-pays-salary-bonus-to-12735-borno-civilian-jtf-members-others/">government’s monthly payroll</a>.</p>
<p>Wagner’s involvement fits into the third category: state partnership with private military mercenaries.</p>
<p>Wagner has been operating in over a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/russias-wagner-groups-presence-in-africa-goes-beyond-libya">dozen countries</a> in Africa.</p>
<p>In Mali, the state opted to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">partner</a> with it for security provision. This was prompted by <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15253.doc.htm">heightened insecurity</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220720-%F0%9F%94%B4-mali-expels-spokesperson-of-un-peacekeeping-mission-minusma">diplomatic rows</a> with the peace-keeping mission and the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-partners-troop-withdrawal-mali/">ejection</a> of foreign counter-insurgency forces.</p>
<p>In the Central African Republic (CAR), the mercenaries <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s4">reportedly</a> started operating in 2018. This was after the government and Moscow <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/wagner-groups-car-mining-operations-help-russia-evade-sanctions/">agreed</a> to exchange Russian military support and weapons for mining concessions. </p>
<p>In late 2020, CAR’s security situation deteriorated ahead of general elections. Wagner’s role switched from support and training to combat. </p>
<p>In 2019 Wagner fighters <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Similarly%2C%20Wagner%20Group%20forces%20deployed,area%20after%20a%20few%20months.">were deployed</a> to Mozambique to help contain Islamist militants operating in the northern Cabo Delgado province.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>The Wagner rebellion in Russia has three possible implications for African countries.</p>
<p><strong>Rebellion:</strong> States in which the Wagner group is operating could witness armed rebellion. In some, the military and police have already ceded critical security operations to the group. For instance, in the CAR, Wagner mercenaries <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/05/wagner-groups-car-mining-operations-help-russia-evade-sanctions/">permeate all levels</a> of the country. </p>
<p><strong>Increased human rights abuses:</strong> There’s the potential for an increase in human rights abuses and impunity. In countries with Wagner footprints, relevant agencies <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/download/IF/IF12389/IF12389.pdf/">are increasingly impeded</a> from monitoring and reporting on abuses in areas of Wagner’s operations. </p>
<p>A human rights investigative mission conducted by the UN in Mali has provided strong evidence that more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/russian-mercenaries-behind-slaughter-in-mali-village-un-report-finds">500 villagers</a> were killed by Malian troops and Wagner mercenary fighters.</p>
<p>In the CAR the <a href="https://acleddata.com/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> has recorded <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s4">180 civilian targeting events</a> involving Wagner mercenaries since December 2020. </p>
<p><strong>Insubordination to military authorities:</strong> The Wagner rebellion unfolded in Russia <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/contracts-wagner-group-russias-defense-ministry-international-law-implications/">partly</a> to resist an attempt by the Russian defence ministry to bring the group under state control. </p>
<p>This bodes ill for most African states in which Wagner operates. In most, the country’s army is subordinate to the mercenary group. The rebellion by Wagner against the Kremlin shows the group can support discordant elements in weaker African states to subvert democracy. </p>
<p>In addition, non-state armed groups could draw their cue from the Wagner group and become unaccountable to the military. </p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>African countries that have invited the mercenary troops in should review their security architecture. This must begin with a decoupling of their security policies and operations from mercenaries and non-state security service providers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oluwole Ojewale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Wagner rebellion in Russia has implications for African countries that depend on mercenaries and non-state armed groups for security.Oluwole Ojewale, Regional Coordinator, Institute for Security StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043382023-05-16T12:40:00Z2023-05-16T12:40:00ZInternational Criminal Court is using digital evidence to investigate Putin – but how can it tell if a video or photo is real or fake?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526317/original/file-20230515-31204-uevzio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A satellite image shows burning homes in Chernihiv, Ukraine, in March 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1239246974/photo/10-maxar-satellite-multispectral-image-view-of-burning-homes-in-residential-area-of-chernihiv.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=_9zuz2w6eePXNPf2UVL4bt7RvCV23e_zm7gUI5WdmI4=">Satellite image (c) 2022 Maxar Technologies.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was reminiscent of wars long past, where a country invades another with little provocation.</p>
<p>But there are many parts of this conflict that are uniquely modern – including how ordinary Ukrainians are capturing and sharing videos and photos <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-sprawling-unprecedented-campaign-to-document-russian-war-crimes/">documenting the mass murder</a> of civilians, which is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml">considered a war crime</a> under international law.</p>
<p>The International Criminal Court – an international tribunal in the Hague, Netherlands, designed to investigate and <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court">prosecute war crimes</a> – is trying to keep pace with this trend. </p>
<p>The ICC, a common acronym for the court, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">issued arrest warrants</a> for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s children’s rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova in March 2023. They are charged with allegedly abducting and deporting <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and">Ukrainian children to Russia</a>. </p>
<p>It isn’t clear what specific evidence ICC prosecutors have gathered to support these charges, but ICC prosecutor Karim Khan has spoken about the “advanced technological tools” the court is using <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-against-president-vladimir-putin">in its ongoing investigation</a>. This could include, for example, satellite imagery or cellphone video filmed by witnesses. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://ronaldniezen.ca/">scholar of international human rights</a> who has studied the ICC’s investigations into war crimes in Mali, West Africa, and how the court’s use of such digital evidence has advanced over the last decade. </p>
<p>The ICC’s current investigation in Ukraine could further cement this shift toward using digital evidence to investigate war crimes – and raises new challenges about verifying the authenticity of these photos and videos. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rows of teddy bears are spread out across the ground, with small fake candles nearby." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526314/original/file-20230515-24759-7g22tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A memorial event in Brussels in February 2023 marked the abduction of Ukrainian children.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1247413127/photo/topshot-belgium-ukraine-russia-conflict.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=2C_Bh-MvAFwOiLDugnG7qhvhf6qsmKsee0zSjw7q0P0=">Nicolas Masterlinck/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>A rise in digital forensics</h2>
<p>War crimes investigations have traditionally relied almost exclusively on witness <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-bosnia-grave/bosnia-digging-up-mass-grave-hidden-for-20-years-by-serb-silence-idUKBRE99L0XI20131022">testimony and mud and bones forensics</a> from crime scenes. </p>
<p>This began to change in 2013, when the ICC investigated Malian jihadist Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, who <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">ordered the destruction</a> of shrines and mosques in Timbuktu during an occupation of this city in Mali. </p>
<p>Video evidence documented the destruction of these holy sites, which are <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/canopy/timbuktu/">UNESCO heritage sites</a>. Al Mahdi’s group took some of these videos, and international media filmed others. </p>
<p>Prosecutors ultimately had such a large trove of video evidence that they organized them into a <a href="https://situ.nyc/research/projects/icc-digital-platform-timbuktu-mali">digital visual platform</a>. </p>
<p>For the first time, the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF">ICC relied heavily</a> on visual digital <a href="https://library.witness.org/product/multiple-elements-crime/">evidence in a prosecution</a>.</p>
<p>The court sentenced Al Mahdi to <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi">nine years in prison</a> in 2016 for destroying <a href="https://qz.com/africa/763207/destroying-history-is-now-being-charged-as-a-war-crime">Timbuktu’s history.</a> </p>
<p>Since then, other <a href="https://leiden-guidelines.com/assets/DDE%20in%20ICL.pdf">international tribunals</a> have accepted digital videos and images as legitimate evidence. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-satellite-images-reveal-devastation-russia-invasion/">Satellite imagery</a>, mobile phone videos and other sources of <a href="https://cyberscoop.com/fbi-ukraine-cyber-war-crime/">digital data</a> can offer powerful supplements to eyewitness <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol41/iss2/1/">accounts of war crimes</a>. </p>
<h2>Is it real or fake?</h2>
<p>With the rise of advanced video editing and artificial intelligence tools, it can be challenging to tell real videos or images from fake ones. If investigators are unable to guarantee that the evidence they download is real, they are unable to proceed with their work.</p>
<p>The University of California Berkeley School of Law’s Human Rights Center raised this point in 2022, when it released a guide on digital evidence intended for international <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf">court investigators, lawyers, and judges</a>. </p>
<p>This guide, known as the Berkeley Protocol, sets standards for legal relevance, security and the handling of digital evidence. This includes guidance for investigators, such as protecting the identity of witnesses who provide digital evidence and awareness of the psychological effects of viewing disturbing content. </p>
<p>There are several stages to a digital investigation, as the guide explains.</p>
<p>The first involves getting the evidence. Investigators sometimes find themselves in a race to download and preserve digital content before a content moderator – a person or an AI-enabled tool – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-socialmedia-rights-trfn/lost-memories-war-crimes-evidence-threatened-by-ai-moderation-idUSKBN23Q2TO">deletes it and it disappears</a>. </p>
<p>Once a video is safely in their possession, analysts have to authenticate it. This complicated process involves establishing where the evidence came from and where else it has been, from the time and place the video was shot to the point when investigators acquired it. </p>
<p>In their analysis, investigators look for things like distinctive buildings or trees that can be easy to spot in other images. Satellite imagery can also help determine exactly where a video was filmed and what direction the camera was pointed. Investigators may also use tools like facial recognition software. </p>
<p>Video images often contain other clues about the time and location of an incident. Things like street signs or sticker graffiti on lampposts can help narrow down where and when an image was filmed and what it shows. </p>
<p>The ICC is now using the Berkeley Protocol in its investigation of Ukraine. If and when the time comes for prosecutors to present digital evidence of Russian war crimes in court, there will be little need for lawyers to argue over its validity. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person stands on rubble and holds up a phone, facing toward an opening in the wall and a street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526318/original/file-20230515-23646-odg5cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Russian soldier patrols a Mariupol theater in Ukraine, bombed by Russian troops in March 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1239934838/photo/topshot-ukraine-russia-conflict.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=yatY8oL5OJwFUDdYl4UZMys0tsKFCkXkZJS-jHYJFUk=">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The digital evidence so far for Ukraine</h2>
<p>It isn’t likely that Putin or Lvova-Belova will be arrested – at least, not any time soon. For now, they are safe by staying within Russia’s borders, since Russia does not abide by the ICC’s arrest warrants or prosecutions. </p>
<p>But the court’s investigation of Russian war crimes is ongoing, and it will rely on the thick trail of digital evidence that journalists, regular citizens and even perpetrators themselves have documented over the course of the Ukraine war.</p>
<p>The Associated Press published images and video in March 2023 of Ukrainian children – who <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukrainian-children-russia-7493cb22c9086c6293c1ac7986d85ef6">may or may not be orphans</a> – being loaded onto buses in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, and others of Ukrainian children eating together in Russia. </p>
<p>Two research agencies that previously consulted for the ICC have also released their own visual investigations of <a href="https://situ.nyc/research/projects/crime-scene-bucha">war crimes in Ukraine</a>, showing digital evidence that <a href="https://theater.spatialtech.info/">Russian artillery attacked</a> a theater in Mariupol where civilians took shelter in March 2022, for example. </p>
<p>Perpetrators, too, are posting evidence of their alleged crimes. Russian <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/18/world/europe/putin-arrest-warrant-children.html">state media</a> has reportedly shown Russian soldiers taking Ukrainian children from a group home into Russian-held territory.</p>
<p>International tribunals are adapting to the new landscape of digital documentation. There are scenes in Ukraine that look eerily like the conflicts of the 20th century, but the current war crimes investigation is unlike anything we have seen before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Niezen received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Digital evidence is becoming a routine fixture for war crimes investigations, including the one focused on Ukraine, changing the landscape for international tribunal investigations.Ronald Niezen, Professor of Practice, Departments of Sociology and of Political Science / International Relations, University of San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.