tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/opinion-polls-9523/articlesopinion polls – The Conversation2024-01-29T13:35:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215592024-01-29T13:35:55Z2024-01-29T13:35:55ZWhat latest polling says about the mood in Ukraine – and the desire to remain optimistic amid the suffering<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571640/original/file-20240126-17-vrbts6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C19%2C6376%2C4238&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainians observe a minute of silence in Kyiv on Oct. 1, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-people-observe-a-minute-of-silence-on-the-day-of-news-photo/1700249608?adppopup=true">Libkos/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ukrainians have endured war for nearly two years. Since the Russian invasion of Feb. 24, 2022, more than <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">6.3 million Ukrainians</a> have fled the country, while <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/">an estimated 3.7 million are internally displaced</a>.</p>
<p>The war has had <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">damaging geopolitical</a> and <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/751427/EPRS_ATA(2023)751427_EN.pdf">ecological consequences</a>. But it is ordinary Ukrainians, those who stayed to endure and fight, who experience its strains and horrors daily.</p>
<p>As the war enters its third year, what is the mood among these Ukrainians? As a <a href="https://spia.vt.edu/people/Faculty/bios/toal.html">political geographer</a> who has worked with colleagues on surveys in the region for years, I know that <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/polling-during-war">measuring public opinion in wartime Ukraine</a> presents many challenges.</p>
<p>Nearly 1 in 4 Ukrainians have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/21/russia-ukraine-refugees-displaced-war-un-numbers/">had to move from their homes</a>. And while the 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line has largely stabilized, missile and drone attacks are a daily occurrence. Patriotic feelings are high, and so also is distrust, especially in places formerly occupied by Russia.</p>
<p>Most public opinion research today in Ukraine is conducted by telephone interview. Survey companies make calls to randomly selected functioning numbers and ask citizens over the age of 18 to participate.</p>
<p>Response rates can be low. Nonetheless, survey companies manage through persistence.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ndi.org/publications/opportunities-and-challenges-facing-ukraine-s-democratic-transition-1">latest survey</a> by the <a href="https://www.ndi.org/">National Democratic Institute</a> released on Jan. 26 provides insight into how Ukrainians are coping. Administered by the reputable <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/">Kyiv International Institute of Sociology</a>, this telephone survey recorded the views of 2,516 Ukrainians from Nov. 14-22, 2023. Four findings stand out:</p>
<h2>1. Costs in lives and mental health are high</h2>
<p>Since the outset of the war, the National Democratic Institute has asked Ukrainians if they have experienced the loss of family and friends from the war. In May 2022, one-fifth of respondents indicated that they had. In November 2023, almost half said they had lost loved ones, with higher rates among middle-aged and young respondents.</p>
<p>The mental health costs to Ukrainians of war are considerable. Many are forced to flee to shelters at all hours. Almost three-quarters of women and half of male respondents report a deterioration of their mental health, according to the latest poll. </p>
<p>Lack of sleep is the single largest reported health cost of the war. But lost income, deteriorating physical health and family separation are also commonly reported.</p>
<p>Any post-war Ukraine will be a society where significant parts of the population are living with physical and mental disabilities. Human rehabilitation needs are already considerable and will grow.</p>
<h2>2. More Ukrainians are willing to negotiate</h2>
<p>Since the war began, the National Democratic Institute survey has asked if Ukraine should engage in negotiations with Russia to try to achieve peace. </p>
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<p>A majority (59%) said yes just a few months into the war in May 2022. But, by August 2022, in the wake of accumulating Russian assaults and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas">alleged war crimes</a>, sentiment had flipped with a majority against. By January 2023, the share of those in favor had dropped 30 points to a low of just 29%.</p>
<p>Since then, this percentage has climbed upward. In November 2023, it rebounded to 42%. </p>
<p>As it stands, the majority of Ukrainians are opposed to seeking negotiations with Russia. Talks, in any case, are not on the agenda. In the current war climate, there appears little prospect of negotiations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia at a time when it is deepening the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-approves-big-military-spending-hikes-russias-budget-2023-11-27/">militarization of the state</a>, economy and society.</p>
<p>Academic research, largely based on the U.S. experience since World War II, suggests that <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Costly-Calculations-Theory-Casualties-Politics-ebook/dp/B095KD43M3">as casualties increase</a>, public support for war declines. </p>
<p>Wars of defense against an invasion appear to be different, with greater public tolerance of loss because the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/how-ukrainians-living-front-view-war-victory-and-peace">conflict is perceived as necessary and just</a>.</p>
<p>But as Ukraine drives to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-asks-additional-450000-500000-people-be-mobilised-zelenskiy-2023-12-19/">recruit 450,000 to 500,000 new soldiers</a> to replace its fallen and wounded, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-ukraine-desperately-needs-new-soldiers-as-war-with-russia-approaches/">this proposition will be significantly tested</a>.</p>
<h2>3. Resistance to land concessions continue</h2>
<p>From the outset of the war, Ukrainians have been surveyed to elicit what they would accept as the price of peace. The question is difficult for Ukrainians who rightly feel victimized.</p>
<p><a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1301&page=2">Research by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology</a> since the outset of the war reveals overwhelming sentiment among Ukrainians against territorial concessions for immediate peace.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/08/30/ukraine-survey-ceasefire-war/">own research with social psychologist Karina Korostelina</a> in front-line southeastern Ukrainian cities revealed the overwhelming belief that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is sacred.</p>
<p>But so too, of course, is human life. Ukrainians are understandably divided over what should be prioritized: preserving territory or preserving lives. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-most-people-refuse-to-compromise-on-territory-but-willingness-to-make-peace-depends-on-their-war-experiences-new-survey-185147">Wartime experiences also matter</a>. Earlier research suggested that those most affected by the war through displacement and most concerned about their immediate security are more likely to prioritize a cease-fire.</p>
<p>Russia occupies approximately 18% of Ukraine today, a figure composed of territories it controlled before February 2022 (Crimea and the Donbas) and territories it subsequently seized and retained. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html">Some, but not much, territory</a> has shifted hands this last year. </p>
<p>To most Ukrainians, it is unacceptable to hold only the territory it currently controls as the price for peace – 71% strongly reject this, another 13% less strongly in the survey.</p>
<p>Only 12% see peace based on current territorial control as acceptable. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a majority declare it is fully unacceptable to return to the pre-2022 borders. Slim majorities also say it is unacceptable that Ukraine renounces its <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraines-push-for-nato-membership-is-rooted-in-its-european-past-and-its-future-209839">aspirations to join NATO</a> and the European Union as the price of peace.</p>
<p>These attitudes restrain Ukraine’s leadership, as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/26/ukraine-war-plan-biden-defense/">U.S. officials signal that they do not foresee</a> Ukraine retaking lost territory in 2024. Right now, it is safer politically to fight than confront an ugly peace.</p>
<h2>4. Ukrainians expect a long war but remain optimistic</h2>
<p>Ukrainians do not think the conflict will end any time soon, with 43% saying that war will go on for an additional 12 months, at least. A third responded that they simply do not know when the conflict will end. </p>
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<p>In May 2022, just a few months into the conflict, 1 in 4 Ukrainians thought the war would end within three months. In November 2023, only 3% had that expectation. </p>
<p>War, paradoxically, generated a surge of optimism about Ukraine’s future as Ukrainians processed suffering into hope. That sentiment remained high in November 2023, with 77% of respondents saying they were optimistic about the country’s future, though fewer Ukrainians said that they were “very optimistic.” Data on this important metric in 2024 will be revealing.</p>
<h2>The desire to resist</h2>
<p>Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/25/ukraine-fatigue-why-im-fighting-to-stop-the-world-forgetting-us">war fatigue</a> is growing among the country’s Western backers. But no group is more tired of this war than Ukrainians. The costs being paid by ordinary Ukrainians are enormous in terms of lives lost, settlements destroyed, environments poisoned and futures compromised.</p>
<p>And these costs come across in public opinion surveys. But so too does an enduring desire to have their war resistance mean something, to have it affirm Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerard Toal receives funding from the US National Science Foundation and the Norwegian Research Council. He is a member of the advisory board of KonKoop, a research network of scholars researching conflict and cooperation run by the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), an independent, international, publicly funded research institute based in Berlin.</span></em></p>As war drags on, more Ukrainians say that they are prepared to negotiate – but the majority still reject any deal with Russia.Gerard Toal, Professor of Government and International Affairs, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2132812023-09-15T15:04:24Z2023-09-15T15:04:24ZBidenomics: why it’s more likely to win the 2024 election than many people think<p>Joe Biden has come out fighting against perceptions that he is handling the US economy badly. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-biden-delivers-remarks-on-the-economy-and-potential-government-shutdown">During an address</a> in Maryland, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cc294503-6c8f-479a-a998-1282994554e1">president contrasted</a> Bidenomics with Trumpian “MAGAnomics” that would involve tax-cutting and spending reductions. He decried trickle-down policies that had, “shipped jobs overseas, hollowed out communities and produced soaring deficits”. </p>
<p>Changing voters’ minds about the economy is one of Biden’s biggest challenges ahead of the 2024 election. Recent <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/04/biden-2024-election-poll-trump-economy-old-age-concerns-inflation.html">polling data</a> suggested 63% of Americans are negative on the US economy, while 45% said their financial situation had deteriorated in the last two years. </p>
<p>Voters are also downbeat about Biden. In a recent <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/democrats-sound-alarm-about-joe-bidens-abysmal-poll-numbers-1825846">CNN poll</a>, almost 75% of respondents were “seriously” concerned about his mental and physical competence. Even 60% of Democratic and Democratic-leaning respondents were “seriously” concerned he would lose in 2024. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/eA21P0nWu6I?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>This appears a great opportunity for Donald Trump. He’s the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/us/politics/2024-poll-nyt-siena-trump-republicans.html">clear favourite</a> amongst Republican voters for their nomination, assuming <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-indictments-details-guide-charges-trial-dates-people-case/">recent indictments</a> don’t thwart his ambitions. </p>
<p>Trump won in 2016 by capitalising on Americans’ economic discontent. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/aug/29/biden-is-turning-away-from-free-trade-and-thats-a-great-thing">Globalisation is estimated</a> to have seen 5.5 million well paid, unionised US manufacturing jobs lost between 2000 and 2017. The “small-government” approach since the days of Ronald Reagan <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/bpjevoice/v_3a16_3ay_3a2019_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a21_3an_3a1.htm">also exacerbated inequality</a>, with only the top 20% of earners seeing their GDP share rise from 1980-2016. </p>
<p>Trump duly promised to retreat from globalisation and prioritise domestic growth and job creation. “Make America Great Again” resonated with many voters, especially in swing manufacturing states such as Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. Winning these “rust-belt” states was crucial to Trump’s success. </p>
<p>These will again be key battlegrounds in 2024, but the economic situation is somewhat different now. There may be more cause for Democrat optimism than the latest polls suggest. </p>
<h2>What is Bidenomics?</h2>
<p>When Biden won in 2020, <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2021/4/29/ro_khanna_joe_biden_100_days">he too</a> recognised that the neoliberal version of US capitalism was failing ordinary Americans. His answer, repeated in <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-live-biden-delivers-remarks-on-the-economy-and-potential-government-shutdown">his Maryland speech</a>, is to grow the economy “from the middle out and the bottom up”. To this end, Bidenomics is centred on three key pillars: smarter public investment, growing the middle class and promoting competition. </p>
<p>On investment, Biden’s approach fundamentally challenges the argument by the right that increasing public investment “crowds out” more efficient private investment. Bidenomics argues that targeted public investment will unlock private investment, delivering well paid jobs and growth. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it">2022 Inflation Reduction Act</a> (IRA) has helped raise US capital expenditure nearer its <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/united-states/investment--nominal-gdp">long-term trend</a>, although there’s a way to go. But what is really distinctive is the green-economy focus. </p>
<p><strong>US public investment as a % of GDP</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing US public investment as a % of GDP" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548267/original/file-20230914-15-jab4s8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/united-states/investment--nominal-gdp">CEIC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.crfb.org/blogs/whats-inflation-reduction-act">Almost 80%</a> of the US$485 billion (£390 billion) in IRA spending is on energy security and climate change investment, through tax credits, subsidies and incentives. Much of the <a href="https://think.ing.com/opinions/one-year-later-inflation-reduction-act-is-closer-to-reshaping-the-us-clean-energy-industry/">investments announced</a> into manufacturing electric cars, batteries and solar panels, and mining vital ingredients like cobalt and lithium, are in the <a href="https://x.com/faisalislam/status/1651118395847331840?s=20">rust belt</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Biden’s <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-chips-and-science-act-heres-whats-in-it">2022 Chips Act</a> is a US$280 billion investment to bolster US independence in semiconductors. With both acts backing domestic investment, the strategy concedes Trump’s point that globalisation failed blue-collar America. This is underpinned by other protectionist measures such as Biden’s <a href="https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2022/3/biden-administration-amends-buy-american-rules">“buy American” policy</a>. </p>
<p>A whole series of measures aim to boost the middle classes. These include increasing workers’ ability to collectively bargain, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/30/biden-labor-department-over-time-00113457">and widening</a> the maximum earning threshold for workers entitled to overtime pay from US$35,000 to US$55,000 – taking in 3.6 million more workers. As for promoting competition, measures include banning employers from using <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/01/ftc-proposes-rule-ban-noncompete-clauses-which-hurt-workers-harm-competition">non-compete clauses</a> in employment contacts.</p>
<h2>The results so far</h2>
<p>It’s too early to judge these policies, but the US economy has been relatively impressive under Biden. Over 13 million new jobs have been created, though much of this can be perhaps attributed to workers resuming employment after COVID. Unemployment is below 4%, a <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE">50-year low</a>, though similar to what Trump achieved pre-COVID. </p>
<p><strong>Total US jobs</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph of the total number of non-farm jobs in the US" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548271/original/file-20230914-15-b7q2cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This shows the total number of non-farm jobs in the US.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS">St Louis Federal Reserve</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2023">IMF predicts</a> the US economy will grow 1.8% in 2023, the strongest among the G7. The US also has the group’s <a href="https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/consumer-prices-oecd-updated-3-august-2023.htm#:%7E:text=Year%2Don%2Dyear%20inflation%20in%20the%20G7%20fell%20to%203.9,inflation%20saw%20a%20marked%20decrease.">lowest inflation rate</a>, although <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f86b0071-17f6-467e-80fe-615608ff94d6">it rose</a> in August. On the closely watched core-inflation metric, which excludes food and energy, the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/consumer-prices-oecd-updated-5-september-2023.htm">US is mid-table</a>, though <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f86b0071-17f6-467e-80fe-615608ff94d6">improving</a>. </p>
<p>The federal deficit, the annual difference between income and outgoings, is heading in the wrong direction. It deteriorated under Trump, ballooned during COVID then partially bounced back, but is forecast to <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/09/08/why-americas-deficit-doubled">widen in 2023</a> to 5.9% of GDP or circa US$2 trillion. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing the US federal deficit over time" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=265&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=265&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=265&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548280/original/file-20230914-27-thfqmt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S">St Louis Federal Reserve</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ratings agency Fitch <a href="https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/fitch-downgrades-united-states-long-term-ratings-to-aa-from-aaa-outlook-stable-01-08-2023">recently downgraded</a> the US credit rating from AAA to AA+. Fitch says the US public finances will worsen over the next three years because GDP will deteriorate and spending rise, and that the endless political battles over the US debt ceiling have eroded confidence.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the other major ratings agencies <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/rating">have not made</a> similar downgrades, and the widening deficit is mostly not because of Bidenomics. <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/09/08/why-americas-deficit-doubled">Tax receipts</a> are substantially down because the markets have been less favourable to investors, while surging interest rates have increased US debt interest payments. </p>
<p>Overall, the economics signs are arguably moving in the right direction. An <a href="https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/the-critics-of-bidenomics-are-being-proven-wrong#:%7E:text=Now%2C%20reality%20has%20taken%20these,record%20employment%20amidst%20plummeting%20inflation.">article</a> co-written by business professor Jeffrey Sonnefeld from Yale University in the US, advisor to Democrat and Republican administrations, compares Bidenomics to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/New-Deal">New Deal</a>. It argues:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The US economy is now pulling off what all the experts said was impossible: strong growth and record employment amidst plummeting inflation … the fruits of economic prosperity are inclusive and broad-based, amidst a renaissance in American manufacturing, investment and productivity.</p>
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<p>The Democrats know they must make this case to win in 2024. To compound Biden’s Maryland speech, there are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cc294503-6c8f-479a-a998-1282994554e1">plans for</a> an advertising blitz in key states. Of course, the party may yet back another candidate, if they are thought more likely to win – currently Biden and Trump are <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">neck and neck</a>. </p>
<p>One consolation to the Democrats is that voters’ gloom is partly related to interest rates, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/interest-rate#:%7E:text=In%20the%20long%2Dterm%2C%20the,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models.">which are probably</a> close to peaking. Anyway, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx">recent polling</a> suggesting voters view the economy as the paramount issue is arguably good news: it means that Republican efforts to shift the narrative towards the culture wars are less likely to win an election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Conor O'Kane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent opinion polls show American are very gloomy on both the economy and Biden.Conor O'Kane, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119442023-08-22T16:20:59Z2023-08-22T16:20:59ZUS election 2024: beware polling predictions as they can be wrong – but here’s an approach which has often been on the money<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543785/original/file-20230821-27-z0zq0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C20%2C4584%2C2852&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/us-presidential-race-names-presidents-donald-1766199932">Drop of Light/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite the avalanche of legal indictments, Donald Trump remains favourite to win the Republican nomination for the 2024 US presidential election. According to a poll reported by the website <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/latest_polls/">Real Clear Politics on August 19</a>, he has a 41% lead over his main rival Ron DeSantis, the governor of Florida, in the Republican nomination race. His lead over the other Republican hopefuls such as former vice president Mike Pence is even larger.</p>
<p>If he does win the Republican nomination the question is: can he win the presidential election in November next year? Real Clear Politics also reported a poll showing that he is running neck-and-neck with Joe Biden, each having 44% in voting intentions. If the election took place tomorrow, he would have a real chance of regaining the presidency.</p>
<h2>Forecasting presidential elections</h2>
<p>There is a lively community of political scientists using a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00178.x">variety of different methods</a> to forecast elections, with many focusing on the US. Most forecasting models use polling data, but since we are 15 months away from the presidential election, current polling should be treated with caution. This is because it reflects public opinion before the full-scale campaign has even begun.</p>
<p>It should be noted that US pollsters have had a <a href="https://fortune.com/2022/11/16/pollsters-got-it-wrong-2018-2020-elections-statistical-sophistry-accuracy-sonnenfeld-tian/">mixed record</a> in forecasting elections. This was particularly true in 2016, when pretty much everyone predicted a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html">Hillary Clinton victory</a>.</p>
<p>But there have been successes as well as failures. For example in the 2008 election, statistician and pollster <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/contributors/nate-silver/">Nate Silver</a>, accurately predicted the winner in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10silver.html">49 of 50 states</a>. Equally in the 2020 election, statistician Andrew Gelman working with the Economist magazine successfully <a href="https://projects.economist.com/us-2020-forecast/president">called it for Joe Biden</a>. But it is instructive that neither of these forecasts relied solely on polling data.</p>
<h2>Electoral college</h2>
<p>In the past, most US forecasting models have tried to predict vote shares in presidential elections – but this produces an additional source of error. The election is determined by who wins the electoral college, not the popular vote. In the 2016 election Clinton won a larger vote share than Donald Trump but lost the contest in the electoral college.</p>
<p>The electoral college was created by the US founding fathers, with delegates chosen to reflect voting support for the candidates in each state. There are 538 delegates altogether, made up of 435 from the constituencies in the House of Representatives plus two from each of the 50 states and three from Washington DC. A candidate must get the support of at least 270 to win.</p>
<p>The idea behind the electoral college was to create a firewall between the voters and the presidency and fill it with representatives elected by each state who then cast their votes according to the popular vote in their state. The concern was to prevent demagogues from becoming president resulting from a wave of voter enthusiasm for a particularly extreme candidate. Ironically, in the 2016 election it worked in reverse, delivering victory to Donald Trump who had lost the popular vote.</p>
<h2>A forecasting model</h2>
<p>There is an approach which does not rely on polls. Instead, it looks at voting in previous presidential elections to see what this tells us about the 2024 contest. The analysis uses a century of elections from 1920 to 2020, and a relatively simple model has a good track record in predicting elections over this period. It uses two variables to predict the Republican share of the delegates in the Electoral College, using a technique called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regression_analysis">multiple regression</a>. The forecasts and the outcomes appear in the chart below.</p>
<p>The first and most important predictor in the model is the state of the economy, with an incumbent being rewarded for a good record on economic growth and punished for a poor one. The logic of this is simple: the voters will throw out an incumbent who fails to deliver prosperity and choose their rival instead.</p>
<p><strong>Forecast and outcomes of the Republican share of the electoral college votes in US presidential elections 1920 to 2020</strong></p>
<p>The second predictor is the ideological position of the Democrat candidate in the election. If they are very left wing, that will boost support for the Republicans, but if they are centre-left, this will reduce Republican support. Interestingly enough, the Republican candidate’s ideological position does not affect the party’s share of the Electoral College vote.</p>
<p>To give an example, the Democrat candidate in 1952, Adlai Stevenson, was very left-wing and he lost to Republican candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Some 40 years later in 1992, centre-left Democrat Bill Clinton beat the incumbent Republican president George Bush senior.</p>
<p>The data for measuring ideology comes from the <a href="https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/">Manifesto Project</a>, an international research programme. Its researchers use a technique called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_analysis">content analysis</a> to translate the policy proposals made by party candidates in their election manifestos into scores on a left-right ideological scale.</p>
<p>The model takes into account unusual events occurring over the period that can distort the results if they are ignored. One is Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal”, which shattered support for the Republicans in the 1936 election when the latter party won only eight electoral college delegates. Another unusual event was the Watergate scandal, which led to the resignation of Republican president Richard Nixon prior to the 1976 election. Finally, Donald Trump was badly damaged by the COVID crisis in 2020.</p>
<p>The forecast for the 2024 presidential election appears in the chart. The prediction is that the Republicans will win 47% of the representatives in the Electoral College (253), and the Democrats 53% or 285. Needless to say this is uncertain since the model is not a perfect fit to the data and so subject to errors. In addition there are still 15 months to go until the election and, judging by the febrile state of US politics at present and the trials (if not the tribulations) of Donald Trump between now and next November, there’s a high level of unpredictability involved. But for now it looks like Joe Biden will be a two-term president.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley has received funding from the British Academy and the ESRC. </span></em></p>This method of predicting results has been shown to be accurate over 100 years of US presidential elections.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087382023-08-01T19:00:16Z2023-08-01T19:00:16ZHow to read the political polls: 10 things you need to know ahead of the NZ election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540317/original/file-20230801-271165-dv17h2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C0%2C4882%2C3603&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The closer we come to election day on October 14, the more media focus we’ll see on political polls. Poll results are often used to project the makeup of parliament, despite them being snapshots of the polling period rather than reliable predictions.</p>
<p>Indeed, the accuracy of past political polls in New Zealand has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-election-year-nz-voters-should-beware-of-reading-too-much-into-the-political-polls-198508">open to question</a>. And the way results are framed can sometimes <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/mediawatch/audio/2018899215/poll-analysis-unhitches-itself-from-reality">cause more confusion</a> than provide useful context.</p>
<p>No poll is perfect. But understanding the quality of a poll and the results it produces requires knowing something about how the poll was designed and carried out. </p>
<p>We recently completed a <a href="https://osf.io/pjzfb">guide to understanding public opinion polling in New Zealand</a> that describes the important features of polls to look out for. These factors determine their quality and should be considered when making conclusions about the results.</p>
<p>Technical details (sample size, margin of error and so on) about a given poll are usually available. So what information is important to consider? Here are ten things to think about when evaluating a political poll.</p>
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<h2>1. Sample size</h2>
<p>Contrary to common misconceptions, good quality results about the New Zealand population can be obtained from polls with as few as 500 to 1,000 participants, if the poll is designed and conducted well. </p>
<p>Bigger samples lead to less random variation in the results – that is, the differences between the results from a sample of the population compared with the whole population. But bigger samples are more expensive to collect, and they don’t make up for poor sampling design or polling process.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/this-election-year-nz-voters-should-beware-of-reading-too-much-into-the-political-polls-198508">This election year, NZ voters should beware of reading too much into the political polls</a>
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<h2>2. Target population</h2>
<p>It should be clear which group of people the results are about. Results about sub-groups (for example, women in a certain age group) should be treated more cautiously, as these are associated with smaller samples and therefore greater error.</p>
<h2>3. Sampling method</h2>
<p>Sampling design is crucial. It determines how well the poll sample matches the target population (such as people intending to vote). Polls should be conducted with an element of choosing people at random (random sampling), as this achieves the best representation of the population. </p>
<p>Polls that allow for self-selection and that do not control who can participate – such as straw polls on media and social media sites – will end up over-representing some groups and under-representing others. This leads to biased, inaccurate results.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/election-polls-are-more-accurate-if-they-ask-participants-how-others-will-vote-150121">Election polls are more accurate if they ask participants how others will vote</a>
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<h2>4. Sample weighting</h2>
<p>When characteristics about the population and the sample are known – such as the percentage of women, age or region – “weighting” increases the contribution of responses from groups under-represented in the sample to better match the population of interest. </p>
<p>This is achieved by making responses from under-represented respondents count more towards the results of the total poll. </p>
<p>Weighting cannot be used, however, to correct unknown differences between the poll sample and the total population. The distribution of population characteristics, like gender and age, are known through the census, and can be adjusted in the sample with weighting. </p>
<p>But we don’t have known population characteristics for other things that may affect the results (such as level of interest in politics). Good sampling design, including elements of random sampling, are the best way to ensure these important but unknown characteristics in the poll sample are similar to the whole population. </p>
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<h2>5. Poll commissioner and agency</h2>
<p>Knowing who paid for the poll is useful, as there may be vested interests at play. Results could be released selectively (for example, just those favourable to the commissioning organisation). Or there may be a hidden agenda, such as timing a poll around particular events. </p>
<p>Equally, we can be more confident in poll results when the polling agency has a strong track record of good practice, particularly if they follow national and international <a href="https://www.researchassociation.org.nz/political-polling">codes of best practice</a>.</p>
<h2>6. Poll timing</h2>
<p>Knowing when the poll was conducted, and what was happening at the time, is important. Poll results describe public opinion at the time the poll was conducted. They aren’t a prediction of the election outcome. </p>
<h2>7. Margin of error</h2>
<p>Margins of error are a natural consequence of taking a sample. The margin depends on both the size of the poll sample or sub-sample, and the proportion of the sample selecting a given option. The margin of error is largest for a proportion of 50% and smaller at more extreme values – such as 5% and 95%.</p>
<p>This makes knowing the margin of error for smaller results very important. Minor parties, for example, may be close to the 5% threshold for entering parliament. Knowing the margin of error therefore provides a more accurate picture of where they stand relative to this important threshold.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-a-margin-of-error-this-statistical-tool-can-help-you-understand-vaccine-trials-and-political-polling-151833">What is a margin of error? This statistical tool can help you understand vaccine trials and political polling</a>
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<p>Considering the margin of error is also vital for assessing changes in poll results over time, and differences within polls. </p>
<p>But the margin of error does not account for other sources of error in poll results, including those due to poor sampling methods, poorly worded questions or poor survey process. </p>
<p>The total error in a political poll consists of these other sources of error as well as the sampling error measured through the margin of error. Unless a poll is perfectly conducted (which is highly unlikely), the total survey error will always be larger than the margin of error alone would suggest.</p>
<h2>8. Precise question wording</h2>
<p>Responses to a poll question can <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/162815/support-euthanasia-hinges-described.aspx">vary markedly</a> depending on how it is asked. So, pay attention to what specifically was asked in the poll, and whether question phrasing could influence the results.</p>
<h2>9. Percentage of ‘don’t knows’</h2>
<p>Large percentages of “don’t know” responses can indicate questions on topics that poll respondents aren’t well informed on, or that are difficult to understand. For example, the percentage of “don’t know” responses to preferred prime minister questions can be <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/660935260/July-2023-1News-Verian-Poll-Report#">as high as 33%</a>.</p>
<h2>10. The electoral context</h2>
<p>The composition of parliament is determined by both general and Māori electorate results. Pay attention to the Māori electorates, where polls are often harder to conduct. </p>
<p>Māori electorate results are important, as candidates can <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/election-results-2020-maori-party-back-in-parliament-as-rawiri-waititi-wins-waiariki/U2KUOHTTTYXCW3WMSN4U7IH25E/">win the seat</a> and bring other MPs (proportionate to their overall party vote) in on their “coat tails”.</p>
<h2>Finally – watch the trends</h2>
<p>Making sense of polls can be challenging. Readers are best placed to interpret the results alongside other polls, past and present. Keeping margins of error in mind, this helps determine the overall trend of public opinion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208738/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Satherley works for iNZight Analytics which designs and undertakes research, but not market or polling research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Sporle works for and owns shares in iNZight Analytics and Matau Analytics which design and undertake research, but not market or polling research. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lara Greaves consults to iNZight Analytics and works for/owns share in Demos and Data which both design and undertake research, but not market or polling research. She is a member of the Independent Electoral Review panel (this article in no way represents the views of the panel). </span></em></p>Political polls can make for dramatic headlines. But they are a snapshot of when they were taken, not a predictor of election outcomes. Follow these expert tips to make sense of the stats.Nicole Satherley, Honorary Academic in Psychology, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauAndrew Sporle, Honorary Associate professor, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLara Greaves, Associate professor, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2045242023-04-26T14:09:15Z2023-04-26T14:09:15ZWhy a Biden-Harris reelection ticket makes sense for the Democrats in 2024<p>After months of speculation, the US president, Joe Biden, has confirmed his intention to seek reelection in 2024. In his <a href="https://twitter.com/JoeBiden/status/1650801827728986112?s=20">video announcement</a>, Biden promised to stand up against “MAGA extremists” and called on Americans to give him the chance to “finish the job”, saying:</p>
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<p>When I ran for president four years ago, I said we are in a battle for the soul of America. And we still are. This is not a time to be complacent. That’s why I’m running for reelection.</p>
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<p>The Republican party countered immediately, showing an AI-generated <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLMMxgtxQ1Y">video</a> on the GOP <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3o7kbpTUQ5-0WTMIp8sVwA">YouTube</a> channel that depicted a dystopian future if Biden was reelected, using fake reports of increasing crime rates, illegal immigration and financial chaos.</p>
<p>There seems to be little enthusiasm for a second Biden term among Americans. His Gallup <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/329384/presidential-approval-ratings-joe-biden.aspx">job approval rating</a> at the end of his third year in office was just 40% – below Ronald Reagan’s (41%) in 1983 and only a point above Donald Trump’s in 2019 (39%).</p>
<p>According to a recent <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/democrats-biden-reelection-bid-acceptance-more-than-excitement-poll-2023-04-24/">CBS News poll</a>, almost half (45%) of Democrats think that Biden shouldn’t run. A huge 86% of those who thought he shouldn’t run stated that their main cause of concern was Biden’s age, while 77% felt it was time for someone new.</p>
<p>However, a slew of opinion polls assembled by the influential US politics blog <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-primary-d/">FiveThirtyEight</a> have found that Biden would beat any of the other Democrat politicians touted as possible nominees.</p>
<h2>The age-old question</h2>
<p>Born on November 20 1942, Biden would be 82 at the start of a second term and 86 by its end – the oldest person to be elected president and serve in the office. One focus group of swing voters deemed Biden too old, with a panellist <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/18/1157955440/biden-age-2024-election">saying</a>: “Give that man a break!”</p>
<p>But columnist Abhi Rahman <a href="https://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/other-voices/article273801215.html">has argued</a> that Biden’s age should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, and that he has the potential to make significant ground for Democrats in the next election, much like Reagan <a href="https://www.270towin.com/1984_Election/">did in 1984</a> – another president whose age was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/11/us/reagan-criticizes-comments-on-age.html">raised as a concern</a> by his opponents.</p>
<p>Just like Biden, even Reagan’s own party was <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0623/062345.html">worried about his age</a> before his first election in 1980, at the (relatively) youthful age of 70. Republican leaders’ worries about whether Reagan would be able to “maintain his energy level” throughout his presidency were <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/i-hope-there-s-age-limit-jimmy-carter-says-he-n1055836">underlined by a claim</a> by former president Jimmy Carter that he could not have dealt with the challenges of the office at the age 80.</p>
<p>Republicans are less likely to point to Biden’s age as an issue. Trump, currently the likeliest candidate to be the Republican nominee, has said that <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/3553096-trump-says-life-begins-at-80-amid-questions-about-bidens-age/">Biden’s age is not an issue</a> – which is unsurprising given that Trump will be almost 79 at the next election.</p>
<p>Instead, Republicans have focused on the issues that continue to challenge the Biden administration: <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/23/us/politics/republicans-inflation-federal-reserve-powell.html">inflation</a> and <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/04/23/house-republicans-deliver-on-commitment-to-secure-the-border-because-biden-never-will/">immigration</a> concerns at the <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/19/house-republicans-mayorkas-southern-border-00092808">southern border</a>.</p>
<p>While Democrats are not entirely happy with Biden running again because of his age, it is unlikely anyone will pose a significant threat to his nomination. Carter was the last incumbent to be <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/686186156/how-ted-kennedys-80-challenge-to-president-carter-broke-the-democratic-party">challenged for the nomination</a> when Senator Edward Kennedy threw his hat into the ring in 1980. Kennedy was unsuccessful then and his nephew, Robert F Kennedy Jr, poses no serious challenge to Biden with his <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/19/politics/robert-f-kennedy-jr-2024-announcement/index.html">current campaign</a> for the nomination.</p>
<h2>Running mate</h2>
<p>Biden’s confirmation of his intention to run included his selection of the vice-president, Kamala Harris, as his running mate. <a href="https://www.govexec.com/management/2023/02/could-biden-choose-new-running-mate-2024/383354/">Questions had been raised</a> about whether Biden might have chosen someone else for the ticket. Instead, he has identified Harris as his nominated successor, an issue that had <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/01/30/harris-democrats-worry/">concerned</a> many Democrats.</p>
<p>In her <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-harris-officially-announce-2024-re-election-campaign">statement</a>, Harris called the 2024 election “a pivotal moment in our history” and told Americans that she and the president “look forward to finishing the job, winning this battle for the soul of the nation, and serving the American people for four more years in the White House”.</p>
<p>Harris’s selection is important. As columnist Thomas Friedman <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/25/opinion/kamala-harris-joe-biden-2024-reelection.html">wrote in the New York Times</a>, Biden’s age – and possible failing health while in office – means Americans are voting as much for the vice-president as they are Biden, “more than in any other election in American history”.</p>
<p>But why break a winning formula? Recent <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/desantis-trails-far-behind-trump-republican-support-2024-presidential-nomination">polls indicate</a> that a Biden-Harris ticket currently offers the best possible chance for a Democrat victory against either Trump or Florida’s governor Ron DeSantis.</p>
<p>Unlike Trump, Biden has portrayed himself as a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2020/11/07/biden-president-for-all-americans">president for all Americans</a>, not just those who voted for him. His public courting of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/business/economy/biden-infrastructure-senate-republicans.html">Republican collaboration</a> on the passing of his landmark infrastructure bills made small steps to bridging the partisan gap in American politics. This may provide a bridge for the Democratic party of tomorrow to appeal to some Republicans.</p>
<p>Such bipartisan appeal gains even more importance when considering that the 2024 presidential election may be the end of a cycle – the passing of the old guard.</p>
<p>The 2028 election will require a new generation of political leaders to step into the vacuum. If he wins in 2024, Biden will <a href="https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxii">constitutionally</a> be unable to stand, having had two terms in office. If Trump loses for a second time, he will not be trusted with the nomination again. And if Biden loses, it is unlikely he will run at the age of 86.</p>
<p>Increasingly politically active millennial voters, who turned out in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/11/10/1135810302/turnout-among-young-voters-was-the-second-highest-for-a-midterm-in-past-30-years">high numbers</a> in the 2022 midterms, have the potential to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c361e372-769e-45cd-a063-f5c0a7767cf4">change</a> the political landscape of the 2028 election, and are becoming the target audience of the next set of presidential candidates. Who these will be is currently a mystery, but contenders will likely be jockeying for the box-seat between 2024 and the next election. </p>
<p>Until then, it appears almost certain that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/bernie-sanders-biden-endorsement-2024-d8f0772b117e2bf83e1062708ea651c0">Democrats</a> will put their faith in the Biden-Harris ticket for one more term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If elected, Biden would be the oldest person to occupy the White House. But he’s by far the most popular candidate the Democrats have.Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2012082023-04-03T13:58:54Z2023-04-03T13:58:54ZIs democracy on the ballot in west Africa? What the latest data tells us<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517912/original/file-20230328-3878-ant9ns.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An armed soldier at a polling station during the counting of votes in March 2018 in Freetown.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy indices compiled by respected organisations have suggested that around the world, there’s an increase in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1807517?casa_token=re8ZmTaZE4wAAAAA%3AdzWUBVAZJFyRhINEJuzo0lrnyAbXPpthLADY1pFq1IPp1zPJpolum7Wu7NjvJ6xDbJBnzPj30ko-MA">authoritarianism</a> or <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/815935">democratic backsliding</a>. </p>
<p>These indices typically draw from expert evaluations. They seldom consider the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2021.2010709?casa_token=PukMEdExpL4AAAAA%3AULqU_U0IB_HLahLSVrvAGuA0DFAsdsUJYy8HvKDsBX9k_bcTLU5vJGvNZOZute0SBvvVnosXQj_TBw">opinions of citizens</a> in the countries concerned. So they may miss <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/publications/mapping-state-capacity-africa-professionalism-and-reach/">important parts</a> of the democratic story. </p>
<p>One way to evaluate potential democratic backsliding is to examine nationally representative public opinion data. We’ve done so for three west African countries that have yet to hold elections in 2023: Sierra Leone (June), Liberia (October) and Togo (December).</p>
<p>Drawing on recently collected data from <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, a non-partisan research network, we identified four themes prevalent in citizens’ attitudes about the democratic process. First, most citizens favour elections over alternative ways to select leaders. Second, they see their previous election as having been flawed. Third, citizens expect elections to feature violence. And fourth, they want candidates to focus on making the country better. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society through nationally representative face-to-face interviews with 1,200 citizens in almost 40 African countries. For this analysis, we relied on the most recent results from 2022 (Togo in March; Sierra Leone in June-July; Liberia in August-September). We also used data going back to 2008 when describing longitudinal trends. </p>
<h2>Demand for elections</h2>
<p>First, a large majority of citizens in all three countries agreed that their national leaders should be chosen through regular, honest and open elections (see figure 1). Around 9 in 10 Liberians (92%) and Sierra Leoneans (89%) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, while around 3 in 4 Togolese did. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517901/original/file-20230328-22-9i6h5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors’ illustration</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A rather small minority preferred a non-democratic alternative. Indeed, Liberia and Sierra Leone valued elections more than most other Africans. Togolese were close to the continental average compared to 31 other African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer. </p>
<p>Strong popular support for democratic institutions and processes is a key condition that many scholars have highlighted as a <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Policy%20paper/ab_r5_policypaperno11.pdf">bulwark</a> against a country developing a more <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183pnr2">authoritarian political culture</a>. </p>
<h2>Free and fair elections</h2>
<p>Second, a minority of citizens believed the last national elections in their country had been fraught with major problems or had been entirely unfree and unfair. </p>
<p>There was, however, variation across these countries. As the table below shows, Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s citizens reported fairly positive perceptions of their last national elections. Most (86% and 82%) said that the most recent elections had been free and fair or only had minor problems, respectively. Only 59% of Togolese said the same. The improvement over time in Liberia, and the comparatively low position of Togo, both offer key lessons for democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>In Liberia, the newfound trust in electoral quality is likely due to former footballer George Weah’s victory in the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/former-football-star-george-weah-wins-liberian-presidential-election/a-41963531">2017 elections</a>, ending 12 years of United Party rule by garnering 63% of the vote.</p>
<p>More importantly, Weah’s triumph brought about the country’s first peaceful transfer of power since 1944. This is a second important condition that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010414014543614?casa_token=qXGZrgcFtRgAAAAA:HKyFZMtbQeqMR5s0Q8hRxJUAINaFwGyolPa123H9ndtKp93MEYCFbUAJrYrtlT8K-7j6WSLZ91AEmw">scholars</a> frequently <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16894">identify</a> as crucial to democratic endurance. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517903/original/file-20230328-24-jmzftw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors’ compilation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The more negative perceptions among the Togolese may pick up on disillusionment with the continued rule of the <a href="https://africa-integrity.com/gnassingbe-dynasty-set-to-continue">Gnassingbé dynasty</a>. (The father and son have been in office since 1967.) And the 2015 contest was flawed. The opposition challenger labelled it a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32518335">“crime against national sovereignty”</a>. </p>
<p>Opposition parties and figures regularly decry the institutional advantages of the ruling party, such as drawing electoral district boundaries in a way that favours itself, and the lack of presidential term limits. Opposition efforts at electoral reform have been dismissed and met with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18439872">state-sanctioned repression</a>. </p>
<p>Togo’s poor institutional design likely handicaps the opposition before any ballots are cast. This may be contributing to its citizens’ more negative evaluations of the electoral quality. </p>
<p>These institutional barriers figured prominently in the country’s major opposition parties’ decisions to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/07/why-did-14-opposition-parties-just-boycott-togos-legislative-election/">boycott the 2018 legislative elections</a>. </p>
<h2>Electoral violence</h2>
<p>Third, and perhaps most worrying, is that a majority of survey respondents in three of the four west African countries believed that multiparty electoral competition led to violence often or always. </p>
<p>Some of these countries have a history of political violence. Togo erupted into violence with scores of deaths around its <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/500-killed-in-togo-electoral-violence-un-254481">2005 elections</a>. Sierra Leone experienced an <a href="https://acleddata.com/2020/12/16/when-emerging-democracies-breed-violence-sierra-leone-20-years-after-the-civil-war/">increase in political violence</a> in the 2010s. </p>
<p>What should worry election observers, civil society actors and democratisation scholars is that rather than blaming government’s use of force, citizens appear to view multiparty competition as the cause of violence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517905/original/file-20230328-14-wk9ua5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 3.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors’ compilation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Solutions for citizens’ most pressing issues</h2>
<p>Fourth, citizens in these countries said they would evaluate governing parties on their ability to provide solutions to the countries’ most pressing problems.</p>
<p>The figure below illustrates that routine concerns like economic management, the supply of public goods and infrastructural quality weigh heavily on citizens’ minds.</p>
<p>Politics in these countries has largely been free of the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Ethnic-Groups-Conflict-Updated-Preface/dp/0520227069">divisive appeals</a> along ethnic or religious lines that have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/16/ethiopias-invisible-ethnic-cleansing">resulted in violence</a> elsewhere on the continent. So presidential incumbents running for reelection in <a href="https://twitter.com/PresidentBio/status/1623741887059308544">Sierra Leone</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/31/liberia-president-george-weah-to-seek-second-term-in-october-poll">Liberia</a> will have to take responsibility for their nations’ successes and failures. These issues are likely to feature heavily on the campaign trails in the coming months. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517906/original/file-20230328-14-9f91qg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=928&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 4.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors’ compilation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For the democratic optimist, these public opinion surveys offer hope. In these countries, citizens are likely to base their voting decisions on their living conditions. They will consider whether their basic needs are being met, and will appraise ruling parties’ economic management. This reflects democratic mechanisms at work, rewarding or punishing incumbents for their performance. </p>
<p>Several concerns for democracy’s consolidation remain, however. Perhaps most troubling for the prospects of democratic competition, a majority of citizens fear outbreaks of electoral violence. This raises the stakes for ordinary citizens to cast their vote. </p>
<p>What happens between now and the elections will likely determine outcomes like voter turnout, voter decisions and whether violence engulfs these countries. </p>
<p>Institutional reforms, whether before or after the elections, would go some way to enshrine democracy in these countries. But it would require a political change of heart by those who are likely to benefit from the uneven playing field in the short run.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthias Krönke works for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Isbell works for Afrobarometer. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Nyenhuis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Though public opinion surveys offer some hope, there are several concerns for democracy’s consolidation in West Africa.Robert Nyenhuis, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, California State Polytechnic University, PomonaMatthias Krönke, PhD student in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape TownThomas Isbell, Post-doctoral research fellow, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1933782022-11-07T13:33:50Z2022-11-07T13:33:50ZHow a divided America, including the 15% who are ‘MAGA Republicans,’ splits on QAnon, racism and armed patrols at polling places<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493589/original/file-20221104-15-ltg96s.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C6%2C1361%2C720&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Arizona election officials released this image as one example of armed people watching ballot drop boxes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItGCRaEN69o">Maricopa County Recorder's Office via CBS News</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>There is much talk about political violence in America these days. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=_HTdGmgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Garen Wintemute</a>, a University of California, Davis, scholar who researches firearm violence, has recently led a nationwide survey research project on political violence. The Conversation U.S. asked him for a portrait of what Americans think about political violence as the midterm elections approach.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the landscape of political violence in the US today?</h2>
<p>There have been <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-rise-of-political-violence-in-the-united-states/">several studies</a> in recent years, with <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/624156/how-civil-wars-start-by-barbara-f-walter/">different designs, methodologies</a> and measures of violence. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2022/03/08/they-are-preparing-war-an-expert-civil-wars-discusses-where-political-extremists-are-taking-this-country/">expert assessment</a> is that taking them as a whole, it’s clear that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/11/gop-political-violence-militias-jan-6-democratic-breakdown/">in general</a> Americans’ support for <a href="https://www.americansurveycenter.org/research/after-the-ballots-are-counted-conspiracies-political-violence-and-american-exceptionalism/">political violence</a> <a href="https://www.covidstates.org/reports/americans-views-on-violence-against-the-government">has been increasing</a>.</p>
<p>Some of that research has found that Republicans’ support for political violence is <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo163195227.html">growing faster</a> than it is among Democrats.</p>
<p>In recent years, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/domestic-terrorism-data/">most political violence</a> has <a href="https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/new-adl-data-far-right-extremists-responsible-for-overwhelming-majority-of">emanated from the right</a>. But many of those studies have not asked respondents whether they are personally willing to engage in violence.</p>
<p>In two studies in late 2022, we examined people’s general thoughts about political violence and some aspects of their willingness to engage in it themselves. One of the studies looked at <a href="https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/n9b36">Americans across the political spectrum</a>. The other focused on Republicans, with specific attention on <a href="https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/q9ect">people we classified as “MAGA Republicans</a>,” whom we defined as people who had voted for Donald Trump in 2020 and agreed either strongly or very strongly that the 2020 election had been stolen from him.</p>
<h2>How are Americans divided politically?</h2>
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<p>In both of our studies, we asked respondents for their general party affiliation, offering them five initial options: “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” “Another party” or “No preference.” </p>
<p>People who answered “Republican” or “Democrat” were asked whether they characterize themselves as “strong” or “not very strong” supporters of that party. People who answered “Independent,” “Another party” or “No preference” were asked which major party they believe they are closer to, and we described those people as “leaning” to one party or the other.</p>
<p>In our study focusing on Republicans, we pulled out those who voted for Trump in 2020 and believed the election was stolen into a separate group we called MAGA Republicans.</p>
<p>In general, we found that 55% of Americans do not identify with the Republican Party and 45% of them do. But we also found that 15% of Americans – about one-third of all Republicans – are MAGA Republicans.</p>
<h2>What percentages of these groups hold extreme or racist beliefs?</h2>
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<p>We found that Republicans in general were more likely than Democrats to hold views seen as extreme or racist by experts. For instance, we asked about the widely debunked <a href="https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2021/embedded-within-a-mass-delusion-the-challenge-of-reporting-on-qanon/">QAnon mass delusion</a> that the U.S. is controlled by a group of <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/qanon-most-dangerous-multiplatform-game/">Satan-worshipping pedophiles</a>.</p>
<p>Just over a quarter of MAGA Republicans said they agreed strongly or very strongly with the QAnon beliefs. Another quarter of them said they somewhat agreed with those views. That was a significant departure even from other Republicans, even strong ones – among whom roughly 80% said they disagree with QAnon beliefs.</p>
<p>But when it came to racist views, such as the idea that anti-white discrimination “is as big a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities” and that “native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants” in the U.S., most Republicans agreed to some degree.</p>
<h2>What percentages of these groups see political violence as likely to occur?</h2>
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<p>On several fronts, Republicans tend to expect political violence more than Democrats, including anticipating “true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” and even expecting that a civil war will erupt “in the next few years.”</p>
<p>More MAGA Republicans hold these views than other Republicans.</p>
<h2>What percentages of these groups endorse political violence for at least some objectives?</h2>
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<p>To more deeply understand people’s views about potential political violence, we offered them 17 different political objectives and asked, in a series of questions, whether achieving each objective would justify violence. </p>
<p>Some of them were openly partisan objectives we would expect people on the political right to support, while others were politically neutral, or more generally supported by people on the political left. </p>
<p>These were the 17 objectives: </p>
<ul>
<li>To return Donald Trump to the presidency this year</li>
<li>To stop an election from being stolen</li>
<li>To stop people who do not share my beliefs from voting</li>
<li>To prevent discrimination based on race or ethnicity</li>
<li>To preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions</li>
<li>To preserve the American way of life I believe in</li>
<li>To oppose Americans who do not share my beliefs</li>
<li>To oppose the government when it does not share my beliefs</li>
<li>To oppose the government when it tries to take private land for public purposes</li>
<li>Stop voter fraud</li>
<li>Stop voter intimidation</li>
<li>Reinforce the police</li>
<li>Stop police violence</li>
<li>Stop illegal immigration</li>
<li>Keep borders open</li>
<li>Stop a protest</li>
<li>Support a protest</li>
</ul>
<p>Almost half of strong Republicans and more than one-third of less dedicated Republicans said violence would be justified to achieve at least one of those goals. By contrast, roughly a quarter of Democrats said so. </p>
<p>And 6 in 10 MAGA Republicans said at least one of those goals justified violence.</p>
<h2>What percentages of these groups predict they will be armed in circumstances where they view political violence as justified?</h2>
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<p>Large majorities of Americans of all political stripes say they do not expect to be armed with a gun, even in situations when they view political violence as justified. And almost none of them – even among MAGA Republicans – expect to threaten someone with a firearm.</p>
<h2>What percentages of these groups believe there should be armed patrols at polling places?</h2>
<p><iframe id="eVRV6" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/eVRV6/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
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<p>The vast majority of Americans oppose the idea that armed citizens should patrol polling places on Election Day. The majority of MAGA Republicans object to it, but just under 40% of them say it either should happen or should be considered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193378/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garen Wintemute receives funding from the Joyce Foundation, the California Wellness Foundation, and the Heising-Simons Foundation. The California Firearm Violence Research Center, which he directs, is funded by the State of California.</span></em></p>What deep-dive polls reveal at the political landscape of America as the 2022 midterm election approaches.Garen Wintemute, Distinguished Professor of Emergency Medicine; Director, Violence Prevention Research Program, University of California, DavisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1842212022-06-14T12:29:42Z2022-06-14T12:29:42ZRussians with diverse media diet more likely to oppose Ukraine war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468246/original/file-20220610-16487-m54f49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=312%2C164%2C2906%2C1967&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Telegram users in Russia get access to more information than their compatriots who only watch television.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/telegram-logo-displayed-on-a-phone-screen-and-russian-flag-news-photo/1239204118">Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, public opinion polls have shown Russians overwhelmingly supporting the action, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has called a “special military operation.”</p>
<p>The polls show support ranging from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/08/russia-public-opinion-ukraine-invasion/">58%</a> to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/04/18/1093282038/russia-war-public-opinion-polling">80%</a> – but my statistical analysis of polling data reveals that support might depend on which media sources Russians get their information from.</p>
<p>The main news source for the majority of Russians is government-run television stations. In April, <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2022/05/20/internet-sotsialnye-seti-i-blokirovki/">67% of Russians</a> reported that their main news source was television, according to the <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/">Levada Center</a>, an independent polling institute in Russia. </p>
<p>Russian TV viewers see news programs presenting a single point of view – the government’s – and claiming the Ukrainian military is killing Ukrainian civilians and destroying Ukrainian cities, while also <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/12/media/russian-tv-propaganda-reliable-sources/index.html">claiming the Russia military is suffering no losses</a> and innocent of any alleged war crimes. </p>
<p>Those who get their news from Telegram, an online, independent social media app, see different viewpoints – including the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60608463">London-based BBC News in Russian</a>, as well as fringe conspiracies like the <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/4awe83/qanon-russia-ukraine-war">Russian branch of QAnon</a>. My analysis reveals these Russians, who get a more diverse media diet on their smartphones, are more likely to oppose the war than those who get their news only from TV.</p>
<h2>An online information platform</h2>
<p>Telegram allows users to create public and private groups where everyone can post all types of content or a channel for a single user to post one-way communication in a feed. </p>
<p>Telegram <a href="https://telegram.org/privacy">claims</a> to be a secure platform where encryption and cloud storage make it difficult for authorities to identify the person who posted a message. This high level of anonymity makes Telegram useful for groups fighting oppression, like <a href="https://time.com/6158437/telegram-russia-ukraine-information-war/">pro-democracy opposition groups in Russia, Iran and South Korea</a>. It’s also useful for extremists and terrorists, like the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/26/tech/white-supremacists-telegram-racism-intl/index.html">white nationalism groups</a> and QAnon and other conspiracy-theory believers who have used it.</p>
<p>In March 2022, likely because of its relative privacy and security, Telegram became <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/telegram-surpasses-whatsapp-become-russias-top-messenger-megafon-2022-03-21/">the most popular messaging platform</a> in Russia. Its popularity grew even stronger after <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban">Russia banned Facebook, Twitter and Instagram</a>, and after <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2022/03/06/tiktok-suspends-content-in-russia-in-response-to-fake-news-law/">TikTok shut its Russian operations</a> in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>According to an analysis by Time magazine, the number of subscribers to Russian-language news channels on Telegram <a href="https://time.com/6158437/telegram-russia-ukraine-information-war/">grew from 16 million to 24 million</a> in the month after the invasion. </p>
<h2>Public opinion polling</h2>
<p>After Putin announced the invasion of Ukraine, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/world/europe/putin-approval-rating-russia.html">public support for the military operation and the president</a> grew. </p>
<p>It can be hard to accurately measure public opinion in authoritarian regimes, because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2016.1150284">people are reluctant to express views</a> the government might not approve of. In Russia after the invasion, that task became even more difficult, because of a new law punishing people who spread whatever the government determines to be “<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-expand-laws-criminalize-fake-news/">fake news</a>” – including unfavorable facts or opinions about the military action in Ukraine.</p>
<p>But it’s clear that every poll, whether government-sponsored or independent, shows a high level of public support for the action in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Among them, I identified one poll that showed some more information that proved enlightening. A late March poll by the independent firm <a href="https://russianfield.com">Russian Field</a> asked its nationally representative sample of more than 1,000 respondents not whether they supported the military’s operation in Ukraine, but something just slightly different: “If you could travel in time, would you have changed the decision about the start of the special military operation on Ukraine?” </p>
<p>This avoided directly asking about their support or opposition to a government action, and delivered information other polls missed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People use computers and smartphones amid piles of supplies in a mostly empty building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468245/original/file-20220610-41796-6dog2h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some providing relief efforts in Ukraine also use Telegram, like these volunteers in Kyiv.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/volunteers-distribute-humanitarian-aid-with-the-help-of-a-news-photo/1239395083">Pierre Crom/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Information diet matters</h2>
<p>About 66% of the respondents to the Russian Field poll said they would not have changed the decision about invading Ukraine, even if given the power to do so. That fits with the overall trend of massive public support for Putin’s war.</p>
<p>But the poll also asked respondents to name their primary source of information, and that’s where I found new insights. Not surprisingly, most of the respondents got their information from television. The next most popular sources mentioned were the internet generally, and Telegram, in that order, but very close together in the ranking.</p>
<p>The group that used Telegram was more likely than TV viewers to say they would change the decision about invading.</p>
<p>The difference is not large; however, it is significant from a statistical point of view. And it stayed statistically significant even after accounting for differences in the respondents’ genders, income and ages.</p>
<p>This finding is consistent with the results of a similar analysis I did on different data from a survey in early March: Russian Telegram users are more likely to oppose the war than Russian TV viewers. Unfortunately, in more recent surveys independent research agencies have not asked about respondents’ media sources, though I’m keeping an eye open to see if any future surveys do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ekaterina Romanova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most Russians get their news from government-controlled television. But those who look to Telegram, an online platform, are more likely to have views that break from the official position.Ekaterina Romanova, Ph.D. Student in Mass Communications, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1817052022-05-02T03:26:03Z2022-05-02T03:26:03ZPolls show a jump in the Greens vote – but its real path to power lies in reconciling with Labor<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460702/original/file-20220502-16-7d1jod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C3997%2C2476&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Russell Freeman/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/labor-leads-polling-at-the-campaign-s-halfway-mark-20220501-p5ahiv.html?btis">major poll</a> published yesterday suggests the Greens are set to grow as a political force at this month’s election, showing its primary vote has risen markedly from 10% in 2019 to a current high of 15%.</p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/climate-rises-as-the-no-1-voter-concern-20191115-p53auw">surveys</a> show <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-22/vote-compass-federal-election-issues-data-climate-change-economy/101002116">large numbers</a> of voters see climate change as their biggest concern, and the jump in Greens’ support indicates the issue is determining the way many people plan to vote.</p>
<p>The party goes to next month’s election armed with ambitious, big-spending policies. It strongly <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/greens-expecting-to-hold-balance-of-power-20220410-p5acem.html">fancies its chances</a> in at least five lower house seats and hopes to pick up three more Senate seats.</p>
<p>But for the Greens, the path to real power lies in a hung parliament where they can seek to extract policy concessions from a minority Labor government. The Greens and Labor have a <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/whitlams-children-electronic-book-text">mixed record</a> of working together, but can learn from past experience. So let’s take a closer look at what we can expect from the Greens in a hung parliament.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="rows of cupcakes bearing Greens logo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460708/original/file-20220502-21-8q34bd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The sweet smell of success: The real path to power for the Greens lies in a hung parliament.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Crosling/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Seeking the balance of power</h2>
<p>Opinion polls earlier in the election campaign put the Greens at <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/federal-election-2022-newspoll-and-ipsos-polls-yet-to-see-big-impact-from-campaign/cf47963e-b9b3-4a8c-84c0-f2f70562dbd7">between 11%</a> <a href="https://www.pollbludger.net/2022/04/25/ipsos-55-45-to-labor/">and 13%</a> of the primary vote.</p>
<p>In 2010 they polled <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1112/12rp07">11.76%</a> in the House of Representatives (giving them a shared balance of power) and 13% in the Senate (delivering the balance of power outright).</p>
<p>The 2010 election led to the first federal hung Parliament in 70 years, although these are common outcomes in the states and territories. Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s deal with the Greens in 2010 to form a minority government ended acrimoniously.</p>
<p>Labor leader Anthony Albanese has <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/labor-rules-out-fringe-deal-in-rebuff-to-greens-on-climate-20220207-p59uj9.html">ruled out</a> such a power-sharing deal this time around, as Bill Shorten did ahead of the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/no-deals-major-parties-rule-out-return-to-gillardera-coalition-government-20160510-goqst4.html">2016</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/apr/26/bill-shorten-rules-out-joint-climate-policy-process-with-greens-if-labor-wins-power">2019</a> elections. </p>
<p>But if a hung parliament does eventuate and Labor refuses a power-sharing deal, it would be left clinging to power, vote by vote. In any case, Labor would have to negotiate support from the Greens and independents in order to govern – and offer a swag of policy concessions in return.</p>
<p>The Greens are also a chance of recapturing the balance of power in the Senate, which means their influence after May 21 may still be significant.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/labors-lead-steady-in-newspoll-and-gains-in-resolve-how-the-polls-moved-during-past-campaigns-181953">Labor's lead steady in Newspoll and gains in Resolve; how the polls moved during past campaigns</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The ability to influence policy is key to the legitimacy and relevance of minor parties such as the Greens. </p>
<p>Under the Gillard Labor minority government, the Greens had significant policy <a href="https://greensmps.org.au/articles/10-years-greens-labor-agreement-formula-progressive-change">success</a>. They pushed Labor towards a carbon pricing policy that briefly turned around energy emissions growth, and a <a href="https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2Fde045419-4cf3-4a48-a502-ec68c5e81782%2F0009%22;src1=sm1">dental health</a> package for children and low-income earners. </p>
<p>These signature policies were short-lived though; abolished by Abbott Coalition government after the 2013 election.</p>
<p>Some Green initiatives <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Budget_Office/About_the_PBO">survived</a>, however, such as the Parliamentary Budget Office, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation and the Australian Renewable Energy Agency.</p>
<p>Relations between Labor and the Greens eventually failed once the Gillard government adopted a watered-down <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b97aac1a-8567-11df-aa2e-00144feabdc0">mining tax</a>. The Greens also <a href="https://greensmps.org.au/articles/christine-milne-addresses-national-press-club">decried</a> Labor’s failure to make headway on environmental protection, national heritage, the Great Barrier Reef, Tasmania’s wilderness, the Murray Darling Basin and more.</p>
<p>So what policy demands can we expect from the Greens this time around?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="man and woman shake hands at table" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460710/original/file-20220502-19-3v8d4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relations between Labor and the Greens eventually failed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alan Porritt/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A big policy agenda</h2>
<p>In the case of a hung parliament, the Greens would demand a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/greens-will-demand-coal-gas-moratorium-as-condition-for-support-20220206-p59u54.html">halt</a> to all new coal, gas and oil projects for at least six months while they negotiate with Labor over climate policy. It would also push for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/apr/28/greens-to-push-for-coal-export-levy-if-they-hold-balance-of-power">coal export levy</a> to fund disaster recovery and clean export industries.</p>
<p>In their 2022 electoral platform, the Greens are again aiming high. Their <a href="https://greens.org.au/platform">headline</a> policies include:</p>
<ul>
<li>a treaty with First Nations people</li>
<li>free dental and mental healthcare</li>
<li>wiping out student debt </li>
<li>building one million publicly owned, affordable, sustainable homes</li>
<li>overhauling labour laws to outlaw insecure work and increase wages. </li>
</ul>
<p>Should the Greens hold the balance of power, they would likely also call for the next government to urgently release the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/action-on-environment-report-card-stalls-as-government-slow-to-release-20220406-p5ab75.html">delayed</a> State of the Environment report, and to implement the recommendations from a 2020 independent review into Australia’s <a href="https://epbcactreview.environment.gov.au/resources/final-report">environment laws</a>.</p>
<p>The party’s <a href="https://greens.org.au/platform/enviro#greenaus">environment platform</a> offers the usual extensive suite of policies and detailed measures to address the extinction crisis, green jobs, clean water, caring for country, sustainable agriculture, preventing animal cruelty, eliminating single-use plastics and improving ocean health.</p>
<p>As well as phasing out coal, oil and gas, the Green’s <a href="https://greens.org.au/platform/climate">climate policy</a> includes:</p>
<ul>
<li>banning political donations from fossil fuel companies</li>
<li>installing cleaner, cheaper power for homes and business</li>
<li>assisting workers in the clean energy transition</li>
<li>funding climate resilience</li>
<li>supporting cleaner cars, electricity and manufacturing.</li>
</ul>
<p>Their energy plan allocates A$17.1 billion to electrify Australian homes, $14.8 billion electrifying small businesses and $12.6 billion installing <a href="https://naturalsolar.com.au/solar-news/solar-battery-boom/">small-scale solar</a> batteries.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-it-needs-it-australia-can-draw-on-significant-experience-of-minority-government-62095">If it needs it, Australia can draw on significant experience of minority government</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Where next for the Greens?</h2>
<p>If the polls are right, the Greens are a chance to reclaim the balance of power in the Senate and to share the balance of power in the House of Representatives. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the Greens aspire to <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/pale-labor-needs-greens-says-bob-brown/news-story/aa91d395809e700cceba6d613c7e43c4">replace Labor</a> in government. But as experience in Tasmania and the ACT shows, Greens ministers can successfully serve in Labor cabinets.</p>
<p>For now, the Greens are nipping at the heels of the major parties. The party’s best prospects for realising its policies in national government lie in reconciling with Labor and learning to work in coalition.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/albanese-pledges-to-make-gender-pay-equity-a-fair-work-act-objective-182281">Albanese pledges to make gender pay equity a Fair Work Act objective</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kate Crowley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Greens and Labor have a mixed record of working together, but can learn from past experience.Kate Crowley, Adjunct Associate Professor, Public and Environmental Policy, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1780132022-02-28T01:51:38Z2022-02-28T01:51:38ZLabor maintains big federal Newspoll lead and is likely to win in South Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448778/original/file-20220228-13-1f46875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=83%2C0%2C5309%2C3275&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week’s <a href="https://www.pollbludger.net/2022/02/27/newspoll-55-45-to-labor-6/">Newspoll</a> gives Labor a 55-45 lead over the Coalition, which is unchanged since the previous poll a fortnight ago. </p>
<p>The poll was conducted from February 23 to 26 from a sample of 1,525 people. </p>
<h2>Coalition behind compared to 2019</h2>
<p>Primary votes were 41% Labor (steady), 35% Coalition (up one), 9% Greens (up one), 4% Clive Palmer’s United Australia Party and 3% One Nation (steady).
This is the first time Newspoll has given a breakout result for the United Australia Party during this parliamentary term. The “all others” vote is 8%, compared with 4% in last week’s Essential poll, 11.5% in Morgan and 15% in Resolve.</p>
<p>In this most recent Newspoll, 55% were dissatisfied with Prime Minister Scott Morrison (down one), and 43% were satisfied (up three), for a net approval of -12. Morrison has improved six net points from his late January nadir of -18.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/morrisons-ratings-slump-in-resolve-and-essential-polls-liberals-set-to-retain-willoughby-177606">Morrison's ratings slump in Resolve and Essential polls; Liberals set to retain Willoughby</a>
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<p>Labor leader Anthony Albanese’s net approval jumped seven points to +1. His ratings have been bouncy in the last four Newspolls, at -6, zero, -6 and +1 net approval. Meanwhile, Morrison leads Albanese by 42-40 as better prime minister (it was 43-38 last fortnight). </p>
<p>With a federal election expected in May, analyst Kevin Bonham says that at about the same time before the 2019 vote, the Coalition polled 47% two party three times in a row, compared to 44%, 45% and 45% this year. This does not mean the Coalition will lose, but they are further behind this time.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1497897328631418881"}"></div></p>
<h2>Resolve poll</h2>
<p>Last week’s Resolve poll <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/clive-palmer-gains-edge-over-pauline-hanson-s-one-nation-in-a-growing-contest-for-disaffected-voters-20220222-p59yhs.html">also had the UAP</a> at 4%. The other primary votes were 35% Labor, 33% Coalition, 10% Greens, 3% One Nation, 10% independents and 5% others.</p>
<p>In other Resolve questions, 65% (up seven since November) wanted to restart Australia’s migration at a lower level than the 160,000 per year before COVID-19.
Just over half of those surveyed (53%) thought their income would <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/voters-worry-about-falling-wages-back-lower-migrant-intake-20220222-p59yo7.html">fall behind inflation</a> this year.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/wage-price-index-australia/dec-2021">Australian Bureau of Statistics</a> wages rose 0.7% in the December quarter and 2.3% for the full 2021 year. But this means real wages fell 1.2% in 2021 with an <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/consumer-price-index-australia/latest-release">inflation rate</a> of 3.5%. As <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/cost-of-living-pressures-increase-sluggish-wage-growth-may-delay-rate-rises-20220223-p59yv6.html">The Age reported</a> real wages have fallen 0.8% since the 2019 election, the first time this century they have fallen in a parliamentary term.</p>
<h2>Labor ahead in South Australia</h2>
<p>The South Australian state election is coming up on March 19. A <a href="https://www.pollbludger.net/2022/02/26/newspoll-53-47-to-labor-in-south-australia-2/">Newspoll</a> conducted February 18 to 24 from a sample of 1,015, gave the Labor opposition a 53-47 lead over the Liberal incumbents. This compares to the 51.9 to 48.1 lead the Liberals had over Labor at the 2018 election. Primary votes were 39% Labor, 37% Liberals, 10% Greens and 14% for all others.</p>
<p>Premier Steven Marshall had a 48% satisfied, 47% dissatisfied rating (net +1), while Labor leader Peter Malinauskas was at net +20. Unusually for opposition leaders, Malinauskas led as better premier by 46-39. </p>
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<img alt="SA Premier Steven Marshall talks as Scott Morrison looks on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448780/original/file-20220228-26-uzkuz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Premier Steven Marshall is facing an uphill battle to win the SA state election in March.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roy Vandervegt/AAP</span></span>
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<p>At the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/sa/2022/guide/preview">2018 election</a>, the Liberals won 25 of the 47 lower house seats, Labor 19 and independents three. Three Liberals have since gone to the crossbench, so Marshall goes into the election with a minority.</p>
<p>In the upper house, 11 of the 22 seats will be elected by statewide proportional representation with preferences. The 11 seats up are five Liberals, four Labor, one Green and one Advance SA. The total upper house is currently nine Liberals, eight Labor, two SA-Best, two Greens and one Advance SA.</p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.pollbludger.net/2022/02/21/south-australian-election-guide-4/">Poll Bludger</a> writes, only votes cast on election day can be counted on the night in SA. These votes will likely be a low proportion of the overall turnout. It won’t be possible to call the result on election night unless it is very decisive.</p>
<h2>Coalition and Labor almost tied in NSW</h2>
<p>A NSW state <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/nsw/labor-s-chris-minns-becomes-preferred-nsw-premier-as-perrottet-suffers-poll-hit-20220223-p59z2r.html">Resolve poll</a> for The Sydney Morning Herald has given the Coalition 37% of the primary vote (down four since November), Labor 34% (up three), the Greens 8% (down two), the Shooters 2% (steady), independents 13% (up one) and others 6% (up two).</p>
<p>As usual Resolve did not give a two party estimate, but <a href="https://twitter.com/kevinbonham/status/1496612997589995520">Bonham</a> says for Labor it’s about 50-50 at worst and they could be ahead.</p>
<p>Labor’s Chris Minns led incumbent Dominic Perrottet as preferred premier by 32-29 (it was 34-23 to Perrottet in November). Bonham says this is the first time the Labor leader has led a NSW preferred/better premier poll that allowed an undecided option since the 2011 Coalition landslide.</p>
<h2>NSW byelections final results</h2>
<p>Four <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/elections/nsw/2022/guide/bega">NSW state byelections</a> were held on February 12. All votes are now counted. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mixed-nsw-byelection-results-do-not-imply-voters-in-a-baseball-bat-mood-176879">Mixed NSW byelection results do not imply voters in a 'baseball bat' mood</a>
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<p>In Bega, Labor’s two party result was 55.0% – a 12.0% swing to the ALP. In Strathfield, it was 55.8%, with a 0.8% swing to Labor. In Monaro, the Nationals’ two party was 55.2%, with a 6.4% swing to Labor. </p>
<p>In Willoughby, the Liberals won 53.3% of the two-candidate vote against an independent. This is compared to 71.0% in 2019, when former premier Gladys Berejiklian easily defeated Labor.</p>
<h2>Labor preferred in Queensland</h2>
<p>The Courier Mail has also published the first <a href="https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/qld-politics/lnp-closing-the-cap-on-labors-lead-in-the-polls-annastacia-palaszczuk-viewed-less-favourably/news-story/456de963cc25e13c2de2bc41a025a4f1">Queensland state YouGov</a> poll since the October 2020 election. </p>
<p>It gave Labor a 52-48 lead over the Liberal National Party (compared to 53.2-46.8 to the ALP at the election). Primary votes were 39% Labor, 38% LNP, 10% Greens and 8% One Nation. </p>
<p>Labor Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk had a 50% satisfied, 36% dissatisfied rating (net +14).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Latest results show Labor ahead of the Coalition federally as well as in South Australia, Queensland and possibly NSW.Adrian Beaumont, Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1754562022-01-24T17:39:03Z2022-01-24T17:39:03ZJoe Biden: a report card on the US president’s first year in office<p>When Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th US president in January 2021, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/06/30/behind-bidens-2020-victory/">51.3%</a> of American voters heaved a sigh of relief – along with much of the world. After four tumultuous and unscripted years of Donald Trump, restoration of calm via his experienced successor seemed welcome. And if Biden was known for a propensity to sometimes misspeak, it seemed little more than a quaint shortcoming, certainly compared with the previous occupant of the White House.</p>
<p>Fast forward to the first anniversary of the Biden administration, and international news headlines shout otherwise. Speaking on January 19 about the highly volatile situation in Ukraine, Biden referred to how America and allies might respond to a “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/19/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-6/">minor incursion</a>” by Russia. Both the president and his press secretary moved quickly to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/19/biden-ukraine-russia-527440">make a clarification</a>, if not fully successfully, to clean up the fallout. A disunited western response to Russian aggression is not a diplomatic win for the administration. </p>
<p>Nor was the chaotic US departure from Afghanistan in August 2021. Long since planned, this move had the support of the voting public but the mishandling was both a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/bidens-chaotic-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-is-complete">humanitarian and PR disaster</a>, and a political blow to the administration and to US primacy in the region. The grave consequences for Afghanistan are ongoing.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing Joe Biden's approval ratings since January 2021 plotted as lines showing %age approve and %age disappeove." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/442019/original/file-20220121-17253-11a55t5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Other domestic challenges, notably <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-16/biden-s-job-on-inflation-found-lacking-by-majority-in-cbs-poll">rising inflation</a>, have added to popular discontent. Furthermore, the administration has been stymied in its efforts to get Congress to enact the so-called <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-back-better/">Build Back Better</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-59946927">Voting Rights</a> legislation. </p>
<p>In both cases the frustration is exacerbated by the fact that action has been thwarted because of the decisions of two <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-brace-for-likely-defeat-of-voting-rights-push-due-to-gop-filibuster/2022/01/19/2f9a734c-792d-11ec-bf97-6eac6f77fba2_story.html">Democratic Senators</a>. The president’s Republican opponents, meanwhile, rejoice at his stalled agenda.</p>
<p>Hence, drawing a negative conclusion on this busy and difficult year seems reasonable. And yet, there has been progress and amidst the prevailing “peril”, there is promise. In fact, there are numerous good news stories and accomplishments by the administration which can get lost in the media vortex. The president has not excelled at accentuating these positives, something crucial to get right in this age of hyper-scrutiny.</p>
<h2>On the plus side</h2>
<p>So, what positives can be included on the Biden report card? Team Biden arrived at the White House with a 200-page plan to “beat” COVID-19. The delta and omicron variants complicated this picture and dealing with an evolving virus in a nation awash with fake news was always going to be fraught.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, 500 million vaccines were administered during Biden’s first year in office leading to 75% of US adults receiving at least one dose. While the administration cannot be blamed for slow take-up by those who have fallen prey to misinformation, its efforts effectively to force vaccinations on large companies were <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/13/politics/supreme-court-vaccine-mandate-covid-19/index.html">rebuked by</a> the supreme court.</p>
<p>Crucially, the economic story is not just about inflation (which in any case is the Federal Reserve’s primary responsibility). Between January and December 2021, the unemployment rate fell from 6.3% to 3.9% and a record 6.4 million jobs have been added to the economy. This points to a sustained recovery. Such a good news story could be of benefit to the Democrat party and at least limit the electoral damage as they head towards what may be bruising mid-term elections later in 2021. </p>
<h2>The need to ‘cut through’</h2>
<p>So, whether it’s the economy or the pandemic which dominates voter priorities in November, there is a positive story to tell. The president himself acknowledged in his one-year speech that he needs to “get out of this place more often” and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/white-house-plots-public-reset-biden-s-agenda-flails-n1287619">engage with</a> the public. </p>
<p>He also has some other successes, which voters clearly approved of, not least legislative accomplishment in the shape of the US$1.9 trillion (£1.4 trillion) <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-celebrates-passage-covid-aid-bill-rose-garden-event-n1261008">American Rescue Plan</a>. There are further aspects of the Build Back Better agenda that have support among the public, particularly those <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-like-whats-in-the-build-back-better-act-theyre-lukewarm-on-the-bill-itself/">relating to healthcare</a>, despite the hefty price-tag that comes with the legislation. Here again, messaging is crucial. The president needs to focus on what is possible and deliver on his campaign promise of being a negotiator. </p>
<p>On some issues, notably voting rights legislation, he is caught between a rock and a hard place as he is denounced by progressives for not acting decisively enough, yet the legislative reality is that the <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/01/13/joe-biden-senate-democrats-voting-rights-legislation/6510371001/">votes are not</a> there. There may yet be space for progress on Build Back Better and here is where Biden’s second year could move on from the “peril” and deliver on the “promise”. </p>
<p>The political landscape is scorched in many places but there are some areas of potential growth. <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/bill-clinton-splits-with-obama-on-syria-092683">In the words</a> of former president Bill Clinton, “sometimes it’s best to get caught trying”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s been a tough year for the 47th US president.Clodagh Harrington, Associate Professor of American Politics, De Montfort UniversityAlex Waddan, Associate Professor in American Politics and American Foreign Policy, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1671232021-10-08T03:34:49Z2021-10-08T03:34:49ZIndonesians’ support for the death penalty declines with more rigorous survey methods<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422526/original/file-20210922-25-1r4lylq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C112%2C2995%2C1881&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A vigil in protest against the death penalty in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Muhammad Adimaja/Antara Foto</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Indonesia, like its regional neighbours in Southeast Asia, has supported capital punishments for decades, particularly for drug-related offences. </p>
<p>This firm stance has been justified by evidence from national polls <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2021/04/20/death-penalty-false-cure-for-ailing-indonesian-justice-system.html">indicating</a> the public supports the death penalty. </p>
<p>However, these polls were <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/key-domino-indonesia-death-penalty-politics">not conducted using rigorous methodologies</a>. This means the results cannot be relied upon. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/investigating-attitudes-to-the-death-penalty-in-indonesia-part-two/">Our latest survey</a> uses a more thorough and rigorous methodology. It found the public has little faith in the harshest penal responses. Although the majority (69%) favoured retention of the death penalty, only 35% felt “strongly” in favour of it. </p>
<p>The data indicate that respondents’ support for the death penalty declines when they learn more about the scope and administration of the death penalty. </p>
<p>Thus, if a country’s decision to retain the death penalty is based on a reference to democratic will, policymakers should draw only on rigorous and independent empirical research. </p>
<h2>Fragile and malleable support</h2>
<p>We worked with <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en">IPSOS</a>, a leading international market research company, to conduct a public opinion survey. It involved a stratified random probability sample of 1,515 respondents in Aceh, Bali, Greater Jakarta, North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, West Java and Yogyakarta.</p>
<p>While support for capital punishment was high in general, we found it is based on an assumption that the death penalty is carried out fairly and proportionately. When people learn it is not, support diminishes. </p>
<p>When given the choice of alternative sentences, such as life in prison without parole, support for the death penalty fell to just 25%. </p>
<p>Further rigorous questioning suggests initial support reflects gut reactions to an emotive topic – a desire to see wrongdoers punished – rather than well-informed opinions. </p>
<p>Importantly, respondents lacked knowledge about the death penalty. Only 2% considered themselves very well informed. Only 4% said they were very concerned about the issue. </p>
<p>When reflecting on specific and realistic cases, their support decreased further. </p>
<p>For example, when given details about a man who shot dead a shop owner during a robbery, 40% of respondents thought he deserved the death penalty. But when told the man had no previous convictions, support for the death sentence decreased to only 9%. </p>
<p>Likewise, 50% thought a “kingpin” drug trafficker deserved the death penalty. For a similar case where the defendant was poor and uneducated, simply a drug mule, this dropped to just 14%. </p>
<p>More than half of those who supported capital punishment did so because they believed it deterred serious crime. Over a third would support abolition if religious leaders did. </p>
<p>But when questioned about preferred measures to reduce such crime in Indonesia, respondents showed little trust in capital punishment. They had more faith in effective policing, poverty reduction or therapeutic interventions, such as healthcare treatments for drug addiction.</p>
<p>Asked which measures would be most effective to reduce drug crime, only 9% of the public suggested increasing death sentences, with only 6% suggesting more executions. </p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/busting-the-myths-of-the-death-penalty-104716">Busting the myths of the death penalty</a>
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<h2>The need for better methods for opinion polls</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2021/04/20/death-penalty-false-cure-for-ailing-indonesian-justice-system.html">Indonesian opinion polls</a>, though infrequent, indicate around 75% support for the death penalty. A poll by Indo Barometer in 2015 found 84% supported the death penalty for drug dealers. </p>
<p>Superficial surveys may give us an idea of shifting opinions over time. However, they cannot measure strength of opinion, knowledge about the topic, or how the public might feel about whether particular types of offences or offenders should be subject to capital punishment. </p>
<p>Such polls also cannot elicit nuanced responses to particular features of cases involving, for example, strong aggravating or mitigating features. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bjcl.org/assets/files/23.3-Hood.pdf">Comparative analysis of public opinion research</a> from eight countries demonstrates that reliable data on public opinion can only be produced by rigorous, methodologically sophisticated surveys. This includes surveys of the kind commissioned by The Death Penalty Project in <a href="https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/the-death-penalty-in-malaysia/">Malaysia</a>, <a href="https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/public-opinion-on-the-mandatory-death-penalty-in-trinidad/">Trinidad</a> and <a href="https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/12-years-without-an-execution-is-zimbabwe-ready-for-abolition/">Zimbabwe</a>.</p>
<p>Rigorous and independent empirical research that teases out the nuances of public support is necessary if retention is to be justified by reference to democratic will. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-indonesia-should-stop-sending-drug-users-to-prison-101137">Why Indonesia should stop sending drug users to prison</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>This strong empirical research is particularly important for drug trafficking in Indonesia, given the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/ATS/2020_ESEA_Regonal_Synthetic_Drug_Report_web.pdf">high levels of national and international concern</a> about the harms caused by drugs.</p>
<p>Our findings demonstrated that when people are presented with accurate information about the retention and use of the death penalty, high initial support declines dramatically. </p>
<p>It seems the more informed the public are regarding the death penalty and its administration, the less they support it. </p>
<p>Support also reduces when people are presented with mitigating circumstances or when considering alternatives such as life in prison. </p>
<p>In light of this and the ongoing revisions to the Criminal Code, it is a good time to reflect on the criminal justice response to drug trafficking in Indonesia. This also has implications for neighbouring jurisdictions in the “golden triangle” of Southeast Asia that are similarly affected.</p>
<p>Indonesia should develop evidence-based policy on drug and crime control efforts and it should do so without assuming the public demands capital punishment. </p>
<p>Public opinion often is highly sensitive to new information, especially when that information is tailored to specifically address the public debate. Public opinion should be carefully measured if it is to inform public policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Hoyle has conducted research with The Death Penalty Project for the past five years. The Report discussed in this article was made possible by funds awarded to The Death Penalty Project from the European Commission, the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the University of Oxford, and UK Research and Innovation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parvais Jabbar is co-founder and co-executive director of The Death Penalty Project, a legal action NGO based in London that works to protect the human rights of those facing the death penalty.
</span></em></p>Indonesian public support for the death penalty declines when they learn more about its scope and administration.Carolyn Hoyle, Director of the Centre for Criminology, University of OxfordParvais Jabbar, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Director of the Death Penalty Project, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1620582021-07-09T10:30:00Z2021-07-09T10:30:00ZBAME groups are underrepresented in polls of public opinion – here’s why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409309/original/file-20210701-23-af8r8o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Graphic farm / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The question of systemic racism in Britain has been impossible to avoid over the past year. But what about the more basic question of ensuring that ethnic minority voices are heard?</p>
<p>People from Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) backgrounds make up <a href="https://diversityuk.org/diversity-in-the-uk/#:%7E:text=In%202018%20about%2013.8%25%20of,Minority%20Ethnic%20(BAME)%20background.">14%</a> of the UK. However, BAME participants are often hugely underrepresented in “nationally representative” polls, with BAME representation ranging <a href="https://www.icmunlimited.com/our-work/icm-voting-intentions-general-election-2019-poll-5/">below 10%</a>, and sometimes even <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-06/fault-lines-in-the-uks-culture-wars-kings-ipsos-mori-jun-2021.pdf">5%</a> or <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/covid-19-impact-lockdown-older-generations">lower</a>. </p>
<p>Even more common is the problem of non-reporting. Many UK polls that sample the general population also appear to exclude any mention of ethnicity. This is the case whether the topic is health (recent polls on coping with <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/loved-ones-struggle-keep-touch-during-latest-lockdown">lockdown</a>, vaccination <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/almost-half-britons-want-teachers-and-nursery-workers-be-vaccinated-next">priorities</a>, or NHS staff <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/health/articles-reports/2021/02/24/covid-winter-months-see-increase-mental-health-pro">wellbeing</a>), politics (government approval <a href="https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/gb-voting-intention-22-february-2021/">ratings</a>, the <a href="https://comresglobal.com/polls/budget-2021-snap-poll/">budget</a> and <a href="https://www.opinium.com/resource-center/uk-voting-intention-11th-february-2021/">voting</a> intentions), and even <a href="http://www.deltapoll.co.uk/polls/immigration-priorities">attitudes</a> towards immigration or <a href="https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/majority-of-public-believes-protests-during-pandemic-are-not-defensible/">race</a> (including whether it’s acceptable to make <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/arts/trackers/do-brits-think-its-acceptable-to-make-jokes-about-black-people">jokes</a> about race). In these cases, it is not clear whether ethnic representation was adequate because there is no indication that ethnicity was measured at all.</p>
<p>Such polls are often reported widely in the media, and so provide important social cues for how we understand public opinion. In one recent example among many, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/may/30/tory-poll-lead-shrinks-following-cummings-broadside-against-johnson">The Guardian</a>, <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1443246/boris-johnson-keir-starmer-labour-tories-poll-batley-and-spen-dominic-cummings-coronavirus">The Express</a>, and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-opinion-poll-tory-b1856461.html">The Independent</a> all reported a large drop in public approval for Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party, as well as figures such as “43% of the public want to postpone the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions”, based on a <a href="https://www.opinium.com/resource-center/uk-voting-intention-27th-may-2021/">report</a> that had no mention of ethnic representation. </p>
<p>An analysis including ethnicity might have revealed even higher support among some ethnic minorities for postponing lifting of restrictions, and differences in public approval. Or perhaps not – but the twin problems of underrepresentation and underreporting illustrates the way BAME perspectives and opinions can be marginalised, with far-reaching consequences for how we understand the “voice” of the nation.</p>
<h2>Nationally unrepresentative?</h2>
<p>A basic methodological requirement for an opinion poll is a “nationally representative” sample – that is, the people surveyed fairly reflect the national population. </p>
<p>Typically, this means a survey would be expected to match the population that participants are drawn from in terms of age, gender, socio-economic status, voting preferences and geographic spread. In other words, a survey wouldn’t be considered robust if it had half as many women as men, excluded certain age groups, counted only Conservative voters or canvassed only wealthy professionals. But many surveys of public opinion often do not even report ethnicity, and those that do often have far fewer ethnic minority respondents than they should.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Children on a school trip" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409490/original/file-20210702-25-t0r8dj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">About a third of British school children are BAME.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Altosvic / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To account for low numbers, data is sometimes weighted for ethnicity. This makes sense when used to adjust for minor discrepancies, but is an inadequate approach for boosting a sample that is simply too small. Correcting larger disparities through weighting (for instance, pretending the answers of two respondents represent those of 20 respondents) adds error, and risks producing inaccurate results. </p>
<p>There are a few reasons why ethnic minorities may be more difficult to reach for polling. BAME groups are on average <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/age-groups/1.6">younger</a>, less likely to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/pms-race-disparity-audit-finds-work-and-home-ownership-divide">own their home</a>, and therefore potentially more transient and difficult to reach by post or telephone than white British groups. In recent years, response rates for telephone polls have <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology/">declined steeply</a> to less than 10% in inner city areas, which often have more BAME people. Other factors such as <a href="https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/english-language-skills/latest#by-ethnicity">language barriers</a> and <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/document/read?vid=1149ab89-822b-4d60-9883-171e4f0e0502">mistrust</a> may also have a role. </p>
<p>However, these challenges are not insurmountable. Official census exercises have samples that reflect the ethnicity of the population, as do large longitudinal nationwide surveys such as the <a href="https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk">British Social Attitudes</a> survey, some government <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/996575/Climate_change_and_net_zero_public_awareness_and_perceptions_summary_report.pdf">research papers</a> on public opinion, and dedicated surveys that focus <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/03/16/ethnic-minority-feel-unsafe-voting-in-person">explicitly</a> on ethnic minorities. </p>
<p>Truly representative samples can be obtained when there is an imperative to do so, but this does not appear to be the default. The consequence is that BAME populations are underrepresented in polls which may then be used to inform decisions. The resulting mirror that we hold up to society is one that is distorted, and potentially blind to the opinions of key sections of British society.</p>
<h2>Polling on climate change</h2>
<p>Our backgrounds are in environmental psychology, and we have been involved in teams commissioning and analysing surveys of public opinion on climate change. Climate change is an issue that highlights the importance of BAME representation in surveys.</p>
<p>Climate change has a well-established racial justice dimension and people of colour are <a href="https://us.boell.org/en/2021/03/19/racism-and-climate-injustice-0">hardest hit</a> globally. Even in the UK, not everyone suffers <a href="https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/climate-change-and-social-justice-evidence-review">equally</a>. Although domestic data is difficult to find, there is clear evidence that many ethnic minority groups are more likely to experience <a href="https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/2020%20reports/The%20Colour%20of%20Money%20Report.pdf">social deprivation</a>, leaving them less able to respond to climate change, are more likely to live in areas exposed to dangerous <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110710192634/http:/www.endsreport.com/docs/20090820a.pdf">air pollution</a>, have inadequate access to <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/828552/Monitor_Engagement_Natural_Environment_2018_2019_v2.pdf">green spaces</a> and increased risk of overheating.</p>
<p>For all of these reasons, BAME representation in opinion polls is not simply a question of whether people with different coloured skin would answer survey questions differently. The experiences of minority ethnic groups potentially provides a profoundly different set of perspectives, which surveys of public opinion on topics as critical as the climate crisis must aspire to capture.</p>
<p>The first step towards positive change is an acknowledgement that we have not been doing enough to ensure that survey samples are representative of British ethnicity. This is more than just a methodological oversight – it presents a moral challenge to the credibility of many social science surveys.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susie Wang receives funding from the European Climate Foundation, and has in the past received funding from the KR Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Corner has in the past received funding from the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC), Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), the European Climate Foundation and the KR Foundation </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Ogunbode receives funding from the British Academy and UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy through the Global Challenges Research Fund.</span></em></p>14% of the UK population often make up a much smaller proportion of people of people polled.Susie Wang, Research Associate, University of GroningenAdam Corner, Honorary Research Fellow in Psychology, Affiliate of the centre for Climate Change & Social Transformations (CAST), Cardiff UniversityCharles Ogunbode, Assistant Professor in Applied Psychology, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1560202021-03-05T13:13:04Z2021-03-05T13:13:04ZSupport for QAnon is hard to measure – and polls may overestimate it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387066/original/file-20210301-17-1izk1qh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C5029%2C3353&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It's not clear exactly how many people believe or follow QAnon.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/FacebookQAnon/ab23d0c7f20047a3a9904b90ac258454/photo">AP Photo/Matt Rourke</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s hard to know how many people actually believe the key tenets of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html">QAnon’s claims</a>, including that devil-worshipping, cannibalistic pedophiles are somehow running the world. Its adherents have caused violence and insurrection, as happened at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, and had raised concerns about a second attack on March 4. Both the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/420379775-fbi-conspiracy-theories-domestic-extremism.pdf">FBI</a> and the <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/national-terrorism-advisory-system-bulletin-january-27-2021">Department of Homeland Security</a> have released bulletins warning of the possibility of future violence from domestic terrorists, potentially including QAnon followers.</p>
<p>If lots of people follow QAnon, is it the case that – as one pollster put it – a significant portion of the American electorate has gone “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/12/30/951095644/even-if-its-bonkers-poll-finds-many-believe-qanon-and-other-conspiracy-theories">bonkers</a>”?</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=CjtVXhEAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">a researcher</a> who analyzes surveys and polls to learn about Americans’ thinking and behavior, I try to remember that surveys alone can’t necessarily provide the entire picture of public sentiment, especially about a potentially dangerous internal threat.</p>
<h2>How much support does QAnon have?</h2>
<p>There has been a lot of polling about QAnon, aimed at figuring out how much fear it is reasonable to have about the Americans who have <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/drumoorhouse/qanon-mass-collective-delusion-buzzfeed-news-copy-desk">abandoned themselves</a> to <a href="https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2021/embedded-within-a-mass-delusion-the-challenge-of-reporting-on-qanon/">darkly fantastic</a> <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/psych-unseen/202009/the-allure-qanon-cult-conspiracy-and-role-playing-game">speculation</a> with a demonstrated potential for violence.</p>
<p>One such project is here at <a href="http://osome.iu.edu">Indiana University’s Observatory on Social Media</a>, where we have been studying how falsehoods and conspiracy-type ideas spread online and <a href="http://osome.iu.edu/research/survey/files/FinalSummary_UnsupportedNarratives_OSoMe.pdf">how much people say they believe them</a>. </p>
<p>We found wide support, sometimes over 50% and highly partisan-motivated, for many falsehoods such as unfounded concerns about Joe Biden’s cognitive abilities and unsupported fears about fraud during mail-in voting. But the spread of ideas online, and people’s endorsement of them in polls, doesn’t give the whole picture.</p>
<p>A September 2020 <a href="https://civiqs.com/reports/2020/9/2/report-americans-pessimistic-on-time-frame-for-coronavirus-recovery">poll by the left-leaning Daily Kos</a> and the online polling company Civiqs found that 56% of Republicans “believed” QAnon. Republicans are <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx">roughly one-quarter of American adults</a>. Though Daily Kos may overstate positions it thinks would look bad for Republicans, the 56% of Republicans who “believed” QAnon could amount to about 14% of the country.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/7214126/final200625-NBCWSJ-September-Poll.pdf">NBC News polls</a> that same month found that more than half of registered voters had no idea what QAnon was, and that only 3% of the respondents had a positive view of it.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/npr-misinformation-123020">December poll of Americans from the polling firm Ipsos</a> asked whether people thought specific QAnon teachings were true and found that 17% thought the core belief was true – that “a group of Satan-worshipping elites who run a child sex ring are trying to control our politics and media.”</p>
<p>By January, as QAnon was getting more attention in the media, a <a href="https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/10/20/half-trump-supporters-believe-qanon-theory-child-s">YouGov poll</a> found that 37% of registered voters in the U.S. had heard of QAnon. Yet of those, only 7% believed its allegations were true – or about 2.5% of American voters.</p>
<p>A late January <a href="https://assets.morningconsult.com/wp-uploads/2021/02/01222231/2101102_crosstabs_MC_TECH_QANON_Adults_v1.pdf">Morning Consult poll</a> found that QAnon believers were “<a href="https://morningconsult.com/2021/02/02/qanon-beliefs-polling">jumping ship</a>” after the Capitol riots, with 24% of Republicans saying they believed QAnon’s claims, a decrease from the October result of 38%.</p>
<p>So, a fair number of people have heard of QAnon – which is not a surprise, given the news coverage – but the number of people who thought its key claims were true may have peaked in December 2020 and may now be closer to smaller preelection levels of support. Even given that there can be large differences in how survey researchers ask questions, these variations are notable.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Romanian QAnon followers" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387067/original/file-20210301-17-5eyies.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">QAnon has followers around the world, including these people in Romania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakRomaniaQAnon/1b20e511df034f428b889337166f8e9b/photo">AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What don’t surveys reveal?</h2>
<p>As useful as survey data is, it is difficult to go from that to more nuanced questions, like what portion of respondents are true believers, versus which of them might act on that belief – and which of them are giving quick answers that seem to fit with their current thoughts or beliefs. As a result, surveys cannot replace the real forensic work that is needed to know how many QAnon “members” there really are.</p>
<p>There isn’t a formal QAnon organization to ask for its membership numbers, the way there is for a political party or even a charity that tracks how many donors give money each year. In many ways, it is an online group from which people can come and go at any moment. Nevertheless, it’s possible to look at some indicators of how many people might closely associate themselves with QAnon.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/qanon-and-conspiracy-beliefs-full_toplines.pdf">September 2020 Tufts study</a> found that 3.4% of survey respondents self-identified as members of a QAnon Facebook group. At that time, Facebook was starting to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-bans-qanon-across-its-platforms-n1242339">remove QAnon</a> profiles, eventually reaching 78,000 removals. <a href="https://www.joeuscinski.com/uploads/7/1/9/5/71957435/qanon_2-4-21.pdf">Other recent research</a> tells us that “support for QAnon is meager and stable,” revealing a “vast chasm between news coverage and polling data.”</p>
<p>So far the research hasn’t truly revealed a clear picture of how many QAnon followers there are. But important decisions are now being made about the perceived threats, such as whether there should be a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/22/no-we-do-not-need-new-law-against-domestic-terrorism/">domestic terrorism law</a>, whether the <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/27/22251093/section-230-civil-rights-groups-letter-biden-harris-congress-defense">Communications Decency Act should be changed</a> and larger questions about how <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54901083">social media and the public sphere should be regulated</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not enough to use poll data to make these decisions. Americans need more information about the actual extent of the threats, as well as time to discuss whether proposed responses are proportional and likely to be both constitutional and effective. That information could come from police investigations, an independent investigative commission or other forensic work to evaluate the scope of the threat.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Shanahan receives funding from the Knight Foundation. </span></em></p>How many Americans really have lost touch with reality?James Shanahan, Dean of the Media School, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1510452020-11-30T15:34:59Z2020-11-30T15:34:59ZDonald Trump: how COVID-19 killed his hope of re-election – new research<p>When Donald Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54381848">tested positive for COVID-19</a> on October 2 and was hospitalised a day later it was widely assumed this would put a major crimp in his re-election campaign. In the event, the US president recovered quite quickly and returned to the campaign trail with gusto after a typically bullish photo-op as he arrived back at the White House. </p>
<p>But survey evidence – initial findings from which are published here for the first time – shows that, despite having apparently triumphed over the virus, he did not escape the grasp of COVID-19 and that his handling of the pandemic played a crucial role in his defeat in the November 3 election.</p>
<p>COVID-19’s horrific toll on human life and its devastating effects on millions of people’s economic and psychological wellbeing have become omnipresent realities. So it’s hardly surprising that the University of Texas at Dallas’ <a href="https://cometrends.utdallas.edu/pre-election-survey/">national Cometrends survey</a>, which was conducted in the two weeks before the presidential election, indicates that the pandemic was the dominant issue on many voters’ minds. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graph showing key issues in US election 2020" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371742/original/file-20201127-23-1q0h8na.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graph 1: Important issues facing the country, October 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Cometrends October 2020 pre-election survey</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the first graph, above, shows, 62% of 2,500 respondents cited the COVID crisis as one of the top three issues facing the country, while 39% said it was the single most important. No other issue – not even the ailing economy – was chosen as most important by one person in five. </p>
<p>The salience of the pandemic as an issue was a major problem for Trump because an overwhelming number of voters judged that he had mishandled the crisis. As the second graph, below, shows, two-thirds of the Cometrends survey respondents said that they disapproved of the president’s response, while only one person in four approved. When given another chance to comment on his pandemic performance later in the survey, 51% said it had been “bad” or “terrible” and only 38% said “good” or “excellent”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graph showing Trump's approval ratings on various key issues" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371743/original/file-20201127-23-9j1f7k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graph 2: Approval of Trump’s job performance on most important issue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Cometrends October 2020 pre-election survey</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These dismal ratings for the president on coronavirus were quite opposite to those for the economy – among people who thought the economy was the most important issue, 69% approved of the job the president was doing and only 25% disapproved. Although this was good news for Trump, only a relatively small minority (17%) of voters gave the economy top billing as their most important issue. Moreover, he could not rely on various other issues to improve his job approval rating – across all issues other than the pandemic, only 41% approved of the president’s performance compared with 50% who disapproved. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Graph showing probability of voting for Trump on each key issue" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/371744/original/file-20201127-17-1nb02mg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graph 3: Probability of voting for Trump by importance of COVID-19 issue.
with statistical controls for other issues, partisanship, ideology and demographics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Cometrends October 2020 pre-election survey</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The third graph, above, shows clearly that if electors were not that concerned about the pandemic they were more likely to vote for Trump as president. But if they gave the issue the top priority they were much less likely to do so. The graph illustrates the impact of COVID-19 on voting for the president, while at the same time statistically taking into account a number of other factors that influence voting behaviour.</p>
<p>The latter include attitudes to the economy, the environment, healthcare, law and order and race relations, as well as other important measures such as identifications with the Democratic and Republican parties, liberal-conservative ideological views and socio-demographic characteristics. The probability of voting for Trump is only 42% among voters who thought COVID-19 was the most important issue but 53% among those who prioritised some other issue in the top three.</p>
<p>This pattern is the opposite for that of the economy. More than three-quarters of voters who gave top priority to the economy supported Trump. That number fell to less than one in three among those for whom economic conditions were not a major concern. </p>
<p>These numbers are nearly identical to those for the large group of potential swing voters who think of themselves as political independents and have no attachment to either of the parties. Independents giving top priority to the pandemic made up nearly 13% of the voters in the Cometrends survey and, other things being equal, the probability of them voting for Trump was very mediocre, at just slightly over 40%.</p>
<h2>Game-changing virus</h2>
<p>As he was preparing for the 2020 campaign, Trump repeatedly emphasised that his case for re-election was strengthened by his demonstrated ability to deliver economic prosperity. Soaring stock prices and record low unemployment numbers for many groups of voters including ethnic and racial minorities, women and young people were helping the president to make his case. Then the pandemic came along and profoundly changed America and the election-year issue agenda. </p>
<p>As the election date of November 3 approached, most people focusing on the economy as the number one priority continued to give Trump high marks. But these people were now a distinct minority of the electorate. COVID-19 had become the dominant issue for millions of Americans and our survey evidence strongly indicates that most of them judged Trump very harshly for how he was handling the crisis. In many cases, those adverse judgements translated into votes for Trump’s opponent, Joe Biden. </p>
<p>Trump may have recovered physically from COVID-19. But his prospects of re-election took a body blow that he would not recover from.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Whiteley receives funding from the British Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harold D Clarke has received funding from the National Science Foundation (US).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karl Ho receives funding from Hong Kong Research Grants Council, Taiwan Ministry of Education, Taiwan Fellowship. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marianne Stewart receives funding from National Science Foundaton (US). </span></em></p>A survey of US voters shows that – on their most important issue, COVID-19 – the US president fared particularly badly.Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexHarold D Clarke, Ashbel Smith Professor, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at DallasKarl Ho, Associate Professor of Instruction, University of Texas at DallasMarianne Stewart, Professor of Political Science, University of Texas at DallasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1501212020-11-18T13:24:33Z2020-11-18T13:24:33ZElection polls are more accurate if they ask participants how others will vote<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369666/original/file-20201116-17-1bjmv2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C61%2C5835%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People have information on how they'll vote, but also about how others in their community may vote.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USElection2020WisconsinMisinformation/52a5b75dca5245b48ebc25f296547302/photo">AP Photo/Wong Maye-E</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most public opinion polls correctly predicted the winning candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential election – but on average, they overestimated the margin by which Democrat Joe Biden would beat Republican incumbent Donald Trump. </p>
<p>Our research into polling methods has found that pollsters’ predictions can be more accurate if they look beyond traditional questions. Traditional polls ask people whom they would vote for if the election were today, or for the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/78/S1/233/1836783">percent chance</a> that they might vote for particular candidates.</p>
<p>But our research into <a href="https://priceschool.usc.edu/people/wandi-bruine-de-bruin">people’s expectations</a> and <a href="https://www.santafe.edu/people/profile/mirta-galesic">social judgments</a> led us and our collaborators, <a href="https://www.santafe.edu/people/profile/henrik-olsson">Henrik Olsson</a> at the Santa Fe Institute and <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dprelec">Drazen Prelec</a> at MIT, to wonder whether different questions could yield more accurate results.</p>
<p>Specifically, we wanted to know whether asking people about the political preferences of others in their social circles and in their states could help paint a fuller picture of the American electorate. Most people know <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000096">quite a bit about the life experiences of their friends and family</a>, including how happy and healthy they are and roughly how much money they make. So we designed poll questions to see whether this knowledge of others extended to politics – and we have found that it does.</p>
<p>Pollsters, we determined, could learn more if they took advantage of this type of knowledge. Asking people how others around them are going to vote and aggregating their responses across a large national sample enables pollsters to tap into what is often called “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/175380/the-wisdom-of-crowds-by-james-surowiecki/">the wisdom of crowds</a>.”</p>
<p><iframe id="Lo86h" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Lo86h/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>What are the new ‘wisdom-of-crowds’ questions?</h2>
<p>Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election season, we have been asking participants in a variety of election polls: “<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-018-0302-y">What percentage of your social contacts will vote for each candidate?</a>” </p>
<p>In the 2016 U.S. election, this question predicted that Trump would win, and did so more accurately than questions asking about poll respondents’ own voting intentions. </p>
<p>The question about participants’ social contacts was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v9WSmM8VeQ0">similarly more accurate</a> than the traditional question at predicting the results of the 2017 French presidential election, the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election, the 2018 Swedish parliamentary election and the 2018 U.S. election for House of Representatives.</p>
<p>In some of these polls, we also asked, “What percentage of people in your state will vote for each candidate?” This question also taps into participants’ knowledge of those around them, but in a wider circle. Variations of this question have worked well <a href="https://academic.oup.com/poq/article/78/S1/204/1836551">in previous elections</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="ZO25h" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ZO25h/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How well did the new polling questions do?</h2>
<p>In the 2020 U.S. presidential election, our “wisdom-of-crowds” questions were once again better at predicting the outcome of the national popular vote than the traditional questions. In the <a href="https://election.usc.edu">USC Dornsife Daybreak Poll</a> we asked more than 4,000 participants how they expected their social contacts to vote and which candidate they thought would win in their state. They were also asked how they themselves were planning to vote. </p>
<p>The current election results show a <a href="https://cookpolitical.com/2020-national-popular-vote-tracker">Biden lead of 3.7 percentage points</a> in the popular vote. <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/national/">An average of national polls</a> predicted a lead of 8.4 percentage points. In comparison, the question about social contacts <a href="https://osf.io/j54rz">predicted a 3.4-point Biden lead</a>. The state-winner question predicted Biden leading by 1.5 points. By contrast, the traditional question that asked about voters’ own intentions in the same poll predicted a 9.3-point lead. </p>
<h2>Why do the new polling questions work?</h2>
<p>We think there are three reasons that asking poll participants about others in their social circles and their state ends up being more accurate than asking about the participants themselves.</p>
<p>First, asking people about others effectively increases the sample size of the poll. It gives pollsters at least some information about the voting intentions of people whose data might otherwise have been entirely left out. For instance, many were not contacted by the pollsters, or may have declined to participate. Even though the poll respondents don’t have perfect information about everyone around them, it turns out they do know enough to give useful answers. </p>
<p>Second, we suspect people may find it easier to report about how they think others might vote than it is <a href="https://healthpolicy.usc.edu/evidence-base/could-shy-trump-voters-discomfort-with-disclosing-candidate-choice-skew-telephone-polls-evidence-from-the-usc-election-poll/">to admit how they themselves will vote</a>. Some people may feel embarrassed to admit who their favorite candidate is. Others may fear harassment. And some might lie because they want to obstruct pollsters. Our own findings suggest that Trump voters might have been more likely than Biden voters to hide their voting intentions, for all of those reasons. </p>
<p><iframe id="CpNcN" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/CpNcN/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Third, most people are influenced by others around them. People often get information about political issues from friends and family – and those conversations <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1995-98606-000">may influence their voting choices</a>. Poll questions that ask participants how they will vote do not capture that social influence. But by asking participants how they think others around them will vote, pollsters may get some idea of which participants might still change their minds. </p>
<h2>Other methods we are investigating</h2>
<p>Building on these findings, we are looking at ways to <a href="https://osf.io/zv726">integrate information from these and other questions</a> into algorithms that might make even better predictions of election outcomes. </p>
<p>One algorithm, called the “<a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/306/5695/462">Bayesian Truth Serum</a>,” gives more weight to the answers of participants who say their voting intentions, and those of their social circles, are relatively more prevalent than people in that state think. Another algorithm, called a “<a href="https://osf.io/gp96y/">full information forecast</a>,” combines participants’ answers across several poll questions to incorporate information from each of them. Both methods largely outperformed the traditional polling question and the predictions from an <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/national/">average of polls</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Our poll did not have enough participants in each state to make good state-level forecasts that could help predict votes in the Electoral College. As it was, our questions about social circles and expected state winners predicted that Trump might narrowly win the Electoral College. That was wrong, but so far it appears that these questions had on average lower error than the traditional questions in predicting the difference between Biden and Trump votes across states.</p>
<p>Even though we still don’t know the final vote counts for the 2020 election, we know enough to see that pollsters could improve their predictions by asking participants how they think others will vote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work has been partially supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (MMS 2019982 and DRMS 1949432). The NSF had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, or preparation of reports. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wändi Bruine de Bruin additionally receives funding from the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (The Swedish foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences). She is affiliated with the University of Southern California's Center for Economic and Social Research, which conducted the USC Dornsife 2020 Election Poll.</span></em></p>People know a lot about their friends and neighbors – and pollsters can learn from that information, if they ask.Mirta Galesic, Professor of Human Social Dynamics, Santa Fe Institute; External Faculty, Complexity Science Hub Vienna; Associate Researcher, Harding Center for Risk Literacy, University of PotsdamWändi Bruine de Bruin, Provost Professor of Public Policy, Psychology and Behavioral Science, USC Price School of Public Policy, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1499842020-11-17T18:50:32Z2020-11-17T18:50:32ZHow can Australia reduce the risk of another ‘systemic polling failure’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369693/original/file-20201116-17-1e5ia53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C0%2C4372%2C2723&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Crosling/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Election polling has had a torrid time in recent years. </p>
<p>Prominent examples of the polls performing below expectations include the United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32751993">2015 general election</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-eu-referendum-pollsters-wrong-opinion-predict-close">2016 Brexit referendum</a> and the United States’<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/why-2016-election-polls-missed-their-mark/"> 2016 presidential election</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-did-we-get-the-result-of-the-us-election-so-wrong-68566">How did we get the result of the US election so wrong?</a>
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<p>The dust is yet to settle on how well the polls performed in the recent US election, but the highly respected <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/understanding-how-2020s-election-polls-performed-and-what-it-might-mean-for-other-kinds-of-survey-work/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=6aa128c09b-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_11_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-6aa128c09b-400186849">Pew Research Center</a> is reporting that by the end of counting, the polls will likely have overestimated the Democratic advantage by about four percentage points. </p>
<p>Closer to home, we saw the below par <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-19/federal-election-results-how-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong/11128176">performance of national election polls</a> during the 2019 federal election. All of these showed Labor had the support of the majority of Australian voters. </p>
<p>Yet, the Coalition went on to <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook46p/FederalElection">win with 51.5%</a> of the vote compared to Labor with 48.5%, almost the mirror opposite of what the final polls found. </p>
<p>After the election, the polls attracted <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/time-to-stop-polling-and-start-listening-why-we-got-election-so-wrong-20190519-p51ovv.html">widespread criticism</a>. </p>
<p>In response, the <a href="https://www.amsro.com.au/">Association of Market and Social Research Organisations</a> and the <a href="https://www.statsoc.org.au/">Statistical Society of Australia</a> launched a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/11/opinion-poll-failure-at-australian-federal-election-systematically-over-represented-labor">joint inquiry</a> into the performance of the polls, which I chaired. </p>
<p>This involved trying to obtain primary data from the pollsters, assembling the sparse information in the public domain and finding additional data sources to inform our report.</p>
<h2>What went wrong in 2019?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.amsro.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Inquiry_into_the_Performance_of_the_Opinion_Polls_at_the_2019_Australian_Federal-Election-Final_report.pdf">inquiry found</a> Australian election polling had a good track record, by and large. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Australians line up outside a polling booth on Election Day 2019." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369694/original/file-20201117-21-1orj1l9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australia suffered a systematic ‘polling failure’ in the lead up to the 2019 federal election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Across the ten federal elections since 1993, Australian pollsters had a 73% success rate in “calling the right result” with their final polls. The comparable success rate of US pollsters over a similar period was 79%, according to <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-polls-are-all-right/">fivethirtyeight</a>. </p>
<p>Australian pollsters had an even better track record in more recent times with 25 out of 26 final polls from 2007 to 2016 calling the right result, a phenomenal 96% success rate.</p>
<p>So what went wrong in 2019? With limited cooperation from the pollsters themselves, the inquiry identified a number of factors. </p>
<p>Conditions for polling, as reflected in response rates for surveys, got a lot harder. The report documents a decline in response rates for typical telephone surveys from around 20% in 2016 to 11% in 2019, with the polls likely to be achieving much lower response rates than this. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/outrage-polls-and-bias-2019-federal-election-showed-australian-media-need-better-regulation-117401">Outrage, polls and bias: 2019 federal election showed Australian media need better regulation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This recent fall in response rates was part of a longer term decline, coinciding with the increasing take-up of lower cost polling methodologies (predominately online and robopolling) and pressure on polling budgets. </p>
<p>It also seemed to be the case — perhaps lulled into complacency by a long period of relative success and a mistaken belief that compulsory voting made Australia different — that our pollsters did not heed the lessons emerging from the polling reviews into 2015 UK and 2016 US elections. These identified unrepresentative samples (<a href="http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/3789/1/Report_final_revised.pdf">in the UK</a>) and the failure of many polls to adjust for the over-representation of college graduates (<a href="https://www.aapor.org/Education-Resources/Reports/An-Evaluation-of-2016-Election-Polls-in-the-U-S.aspx">in the US</a>) as primary reasons for poll inaccuracies.</p>
<h2>Systemic polling failure in Australia</h2>
<p>The inquiry found no compelling evidence for the “<a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/shy-voters-probably-arent-why-the-polls-missed-trump/">shy conservative</a>” theory — that people were afraid to admit their true intentions to pollsters — as a possible explanation for the performance of the polls in 2019. It also found no compelling evidence of pollsters being deliberately misled by respondents, or a comprehensive late swing to the Coalition that may have been missed by the polls.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Scott Morrison high fives supporters on election night 2019." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369695/original/file-20201117-13-1acc8i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Scott Morrison said he ‘believed in miracles’ when he claimed victory, but the polls were also wrong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But we did find the polls most likely over-represented people who are more engaged in politics and almost certainly over-represented persons with bachelor level degrees or higher. </p>
<p>Both of these factors are associated with stronger levels of support for the Labor Party and were not reduced by sample balancing or weighting strategies. </p>
<p>So, the performance of the polls in 2019 had the hallmarks of a systematic polling failure rather than a one-off polling miss. The pollsters were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/21/as-pollsters-we-are-rightly-in-the-firing-line-after-the-australian-election-what-happened">stung into action</a> with several announcing their own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/may/24/sydney-morning-herald-and-age-to-stop-running-ipsos-poll-after-surprise-election-result">internal reviews</a>. They also launched an <a href="https://prwire.com.au/print/australia-s-leading-pollsters-come-together-to-launch-the-australian-polling-council">Australian Polling Council</a>,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>with the aim of advancing the quality and understanding of public opinion polling in Australia.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What needs to change</h2>
<p>With the next federal election possible as soon as <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/NextElection">August 2021</a>, the need for reform of polling standards in Australia is urgent. </p>
<p>The main recommendations from our inquiry are as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>a code of conduct</strong>: the development of the code could be led by the pollsters, but also informed by other experts, including statisticians, political scientists, the Australian Press Council and/or interested media outlets. Disclosure requirements for pollsters would be fundamental here — as well as how these are monitored, and how compliance is ensured. The code should be made public so it can hold pollsters, and those reporting on the polls, to account. It would make polling methods, and their limitations, more transparent. This will help foster more realistic expectations of polling.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>methodology</strong>: pollsters need to investigate and better understand the biases in their samples and develop more effective sample balancing and/or weighting strategies to improve representativeness. Weighting or balancing by educational attainment seems promising, and the report suggests several other variables for further experimentation such as health status, life satisfaction and past voting behaviour.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>conveying uncertainty</strong>: currently, polls are usually published with a “margin of error”. This isn’t good enough — it is often inadequately calculated and inadequately reported. Pollsters need to use more robust methods for conveying the variability associated with their results. In addition, pollsters should routinely report the proportion of respondents who are “undecided” about their vote choice and identify those who are only “leaning” towards a particular party.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>get media outlets onside</strong>: Australian media organisations should comply with and actively support any new code of conduct.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>provide educational resources</strong>: educational resources about polling methods and standards should be developed and made available to journalists, academics and others who use the results.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Election polling plays such an important role in informing decisions and shaping expectations ahead of elections. Time is running out to learn the lessons of 2019. Rapid implementation of <a href="https://www.amsro.com.au/amsro-polling-inquiry/inquiry-members/">our recommendations</a> is vital.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Darren Pennay's employer, The Social Research Centre, is a member of the Association of Market and Social Research Organisations. </span></em></p>With the next federal election possible as soon as August 2021, the need for reform of polling standards in Australia is urgent.Darren Pennay, Campus Visitor, ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1492942020-11-02T15:46:01Z2020-11-02T15:46:01ZBiden or Trump? Betting markets are more cautious than polls in predicting the 2020 US election<p>The world is gripped by fevered speculation regarding the outcome of the US presidential election. Will there be a second term for Donald Trump, or will Joe Biden best him at the polls? In a <a href="https://twitter.com/BetfairExchange/status/1321477871286788101">recent tweet</a>, betfair.com, a British online gambling company, showed that more money has already been bet on this election on its exchange than on the 2019 Grand National horse race, the 2018 men’s football World Cup final and the Conor McGregor vs Floyd Mayweather boxing match combined.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1321477871286788101"}"></div></p>
<p>While we’ll know a lot more once the ballots begin to be counted (although this, in itself, could be a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4f3932a-3e0e-49ae-9a19-415cdb80de19">protracted and contentious process</a>), there is currently a very wide array of opinion about what the most likely result will be.</p>
<p>Traditionally, both media coverage and scholars have focused on public opinion polls in evaluating likely election outcomes. Here, Biden has a commanding lead of 7-8% nationally, when you aggregate across various polling companies. In fact, sites such as <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_biden-6247.html">Real Clear Politics</a> and <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/">FiveThirtyEight</a> show a remarkable stability in Biden’s polling advantage in recent months, in what has often felt like a chaotic and unpredictable campaign.</p>
<p>As we discuss in our weekly podcast (which can be found <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/horse-race-politics/id1532952719#episodeGuid=2ea04eea-5d30-4a8a-a43b-47be62f50fd3">here (Apple)</a> or <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/5VOeuVDnKwVNecCwMmzgS2?si=kNViBjTBShml_muG9_yb2w">here (Spotify)</a>), many polling analysts have pointed out, Biden’s polling lead is <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/why-trump-vs-biden-lot-2016-why-it-s-not-n1243801">larger and more consistent</a> than Hillary Clinton’s in 2016. There are far <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2020/10/27/trump-biden-undecided-voters-polling/">fewer undecided voters</a> (estimated at about 3% in this cycle as opposed to 11% in 2016), and, of course, there’s been a <a href="https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/index.html">massive upturn in early voting</a>. Crucially, Biden also holds (admittedly narrower) polling leads in the “battleground” states that will be crucial to the election outcome.</p>
<p>Forecasters who use polls to create an estimate of the likelihood of election results are therefore bullish about Biden’s chances – with FiveThiryEight giving the Democratic nominee an <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-election-forecast/?cid=rrpromo">89%</a> chance and the The Economist forecast going as high as <a href="https://projects.economist.com/us-2020-forecast/president">95%</a>.</p>
<p>But the election gamblers are considerably more cautious. When you translate the odds available for Biden across a range of gambling companies into probabilities, they give him <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/elections/betting_odds/2020_president/">a 64%</a> chance. While this has ticked up as the campaign has unfolded (and particularly following Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis) there remains a striking discrepancy. Why is this the case?</p>
<h2>Can polling be trusted?</h2>
<p>Fundamentally, the difference comes down to doubts about the validity of polling as a means of ascertaining voting intention in this election. While the electoral college gives Trump an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2020/oct/28/electoral-college-explained-how-biden-faces-an-uphill-battle-in-the-us-election">in-built advantage</a>, this is taken into account in poll-based forecasts. Furthermore, while polling error is also factored in, many people are betting that the polls are systematically biased against Trump.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/522957-dont-believe-the-polls-trump-is-winning-bigly">recent article</a> in The Hill explained, there are several mechanisms that could create such an outcome. In the first place, there is something called <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444316568.wiem02057">social desirability bias</a>, which arises when a certain survey answer is perceived to be potentially offensive to the interviewer. With American politics as highly polarised as they are, voters might be “shy” about admitting their true intention to vote for Trump.</p>
<p>Second, there is a wider process in play whereby the polling industry is increasingly being conflated with the “lamestream media” in <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/15/trump-glide-reelection-republican-officials-316457">American political discourse</a>. This might lead to a refusal of some likely Trump voters to participate in polling, and may encourage others to seek to “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/504896-are-trump-supporters-punking-the-polls">punk</a>” pollsters by deliberately misleading them.</p>
<p>In such a scenario, it is extremely difficult to know how much the polls can be trusted – and this, alongside the memory of the way the 2016 election result was so wrongly predicted, helps to explain the relative caution of the betting markets.</p>
<p>It also shows us just how much is at stake in this campaign for the polling industry. In order for the election to be close run, or for Trump to win, the polls would have to be systematically biased against him to the tune of about 5% nationally. The very consistency of polling would, in retrospect, be damning for pollsters, and massively diminish the allure of polling in both future election races and day-to-day political coverage.</p>
<p>It is likely that polling companies are aware of this, which throws up a further possibility – what if Biden’s support is being systematically underestimated? With pollsters incentivised to seek out and weight Trump supporters in their analysis – while likely to face little recrimination for underestimating Biden’s support – this is not as unlikely as it may seem.</p>
<p>So where does this leave us? Well, as the baseball-playing philsopher Yogi Berra is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/aug/07/corrections-and-clarifications">often quoted as saying</a>: “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”</p>
<p>One key consideration is that even the most bullish forecasts for Biden are not absolute, and they leave (admittedly narrow) scope for Trump to win. Biden has certainly run a frontrunner’s campaign, largely aiming to avoid mistakes and lately focusing his <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/27/politics/2020-election-biden-trump/index.html">campaign activities on traditionally “red” states</a>. In a few short days, we’ll discover whether this was smart strategy or electoral hubris.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149294/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Wall received funding from the AHRC to investigate gambling odds as a means of electoral analysis. Full details can be found at this link: <a href="https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FL010011%2F1">https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FL010011%2F1</a> </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Thomas receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Allaina Kilby does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Punters are more cautious than the polls, suggesting this election might be closer than the media is reporting.Matt Wall, Associate Professor, Political and Cultural Studies, Swansea UniversityAllaina Kilby, Lecturer in Journalism, Swansea UniversityRichard Thomas, Senior Lecturer, Media and Communication, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1442662020-08-14T12:13:15Z2020-08-14T12:13:15ZPolitical forecast models aren’t necessarily more accurate than polls – or the weather<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352767/original/file-20200813-14-llrk3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C0%2C5101%2C3406&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As the old joke goes, it's difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/fortune-teller-royalty-free-image/97765404">Tetra Images via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the presidential election approaches, everyone wants to know who will win. </p>
<p>But nobody wants to wait until the election is actually over and the votes are all counted up and double-checked. </p>
<p>In an effort to predict the winner weeks, or even months, in advance, pollsters take to the phones and the internet, and academics take to spreadsheets of statistics.</p>
<p>Some of these analysts boast impressive track records, but take caution from a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3y3BVcEAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">political scientist who delves into the data</a> frequently: These methods may not necessarily be more accurate than any other method of predicting the future. For some, it’s not so different from consulting Ouija boards and reading tea leaves.</p>
<h2>The next Nostradamus?</h2>
<p>Several political analysts have made names for themselves as predictors of election outcomes.</p>
<p>In the wake of the 2016 election, one political predictor, <a href="https://arts-sciences.buffalo.edu/political-science/faculty/department-faculty/james-e-campbell.html">James Campbell at the University at Buffalo</a>, a longtime professor of political science, said forecasting models had been more accurate than the widely swinging public opinion polls. He listed several examples, along with <a href="http://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/how-accurate-were-the-political-science-forecasts-of-the-2016-presidential-election/">how well they had predicted the election’s outcome</a>.</p>
<p>One of the people on his list was <a href="https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/people/_faculty/Norpoth_Helmut.php">Stony Brook University political scientist Helmut Norpoth</a>, who back in March 2016, eight months before Election Day, had declared there was a <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/professor-doubles-down-on-prediction-model-showing-trump-having-91-percent-chance-of-winning-election-despite-polls">91% chance that Donald Trump would win</a>. He claims to have a system capable of predicting the winner of <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/professor-who-accurately-predicted-25-out-27-elections-predicts-trump-2020-win-1516609">every election outcome but two</a>, all the way back to 1912.</p>
<p>Instead of relying on polls, Norpoth’s analysis, called “<a href="http://primarymodel.com/">The Primary Model</a>,” looks at the results of primary elections. For 2020, he observes that Trump won the New Hampshire and South Carolina primaries by wide margins, and therefore predicts the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/professor-who-accurately-predicted-25-out-27-elections-predicts-trump-2020-win-1516609">president will do better than Biden</a>, who split those primaries with Bernie Sanders.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/lichtman.cfm">American University historian Allan Lichtman</a> was another star political forecaster, who called the 2016 election for Trump <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/09/23/election_forecasting_guru_allan_lichtman_predicts_donald_trump_will_win_2016_election.html#!">in September 2016</a>. He has identified 13 factors he calls “<a href="https://www.american.edu/cas/news/13-keys-to-the-white-house.cfm">keys to the White House</a>,” which include whether one candidate is an incumbent, whether the nomination was contested, whether there is a third party challenge, and Lichtman’s own assessment of the national economic conditions, the presence of a major scandal or major policy changes, as well as his views of the candidates’ charisma. </p>
<p>Lichtman claims he has been <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/05/biden-will-beat-trump-says-historian-who-predicted-every-race-since-1984.html">right about every presidential election since 1984</a>, and says he <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/510754-professor-with-history-of-correctly-predicting-elections-forecasts-that">predicts Trump will lose to Biden in 2020</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person standing in front of a lake with trees and mountains in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352805/original/file-20200813-18-v9x5re.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Could the clouds have anything to do with who wins the presidency?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/hiker-in-grand-teton-national-park-usa-royalty-free-image/1055707216">benedek via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Is it a nice day in Wyoming?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.pomona.edu/directory/people/gary-n-smith">Pomona College economist Gary Smith</a> warns that these sorts of methods are not necessarily as robust as they may seem. Statistically speaking, he notes, “<a href="https://mindmatters.ai/2020/07/election-models-predicting-the-past-is-easy-and-useless/">any 10 observations can always be predicted perfectly</a> … with nine … explanatory variables.”</p>
<p>To demonstrate this, he used <a href="https://mindmatters.ai/2020/07/election-models-predicting-the-past-is-easy-and-useless/">the high temperature on Election Day in five small cities</a> across the country to create a prediction for the 2016 election, which matched up very well – at least from 1980 to 2016.</p>
<p>That and other examples he provides are reminders that with enough data, “<a href="https://www.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations">spurious correlations</a>” are everywhere – such as the famous example that from 2000 to 2009, the <a href="https://www.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations">divorce rate in Maine</a> was very closely matched to the per-capita consumption of margarine in the U.S.</p>
<p>NFL fans may recall the “<a href="http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1856094_1856096_1856102,00.html">Washington Rule</a>,” which claimed that if the Washington, D.C., football team won its last home game before Election Day, the party in the White House would keep it. Sportswriters claimed it would predict every election from 1940 to 2000 – but since then, it has only gotten the 2008 result correct, and has been largely discarded. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart with two lines that don't match initially, but then match up quite closely." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352820/original/file-20200813-14-w9v5zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">From 1980 to 2016, the average temperature in five particular U.S. cities on Election Day matched up very well with the percentage of the popular vote that the party currently in the White House received.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mindmatters.ai/2020/07/election-models-predicting-the-past-is-easy-and-useless/">Gary Smith, Mind Matters</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Hindsight in 2020 is 20/20</h2>
<p>Of course, scholars’ political forecasting models do incorporate information that could be linked to the elections. For instance, I believe that party unity, economic performance, scandals and incumbency are some of the most important factors in how elections turn out.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>But economist and weather-based prognosticator Smith is correct when he points out that some of these systems “<a href="https://mindmatters.ai/2020/07/election-models-predicting-the-past-is-easy-and-useless/">predict past elections astonishingly well</a> and then do poorly with new elections and must be tweaked, after the fact, to ‘correct’ for these mispredictions.” In fact, both Lichtman and Norpoth have <a href="https://news.stonybrook.edu/facultystaff/maverick-modeller-helmut-norpoth-predicts-another-win-for-trump/">made changes</a> to their analysis methods <a href="http://primarymodel.com/2008">over time</a>. </p>
<p>They may need more tweaks in 2020, in part because they leave out factors that haven’t been important in the past, but might be vital now. For instance, election officials across the country are expecting a flood of mail-in ballots and early voting. The New York Times finds that a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/11/us/politics/vote-by-mail-us-states.html">record 76% of Americans</a> can vote by mail, and Gallup polling says <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/310586/americans-favor-voting-mail-option-november.aspx">64% of Americans support voting by mail</a>. Those figures are far beyond even the <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-coronavirus-could-change-how-we-vote-in-2020-and-beyond/">40% of votes cast in those ways</a> in the 2016 election. In the past, when new methods of voting have emerged, <a href="https://time.com/4305508/paper-ballot-history/">outcomes have been harder to predict</a>.</p>
<p>The forecasts may be interesting, and – like the polls – often grab headlines, but you probably don’t want to bet too much money based on what they say.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John A. Tures does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Can political prediction models pick the election winner better than the polls, the weather or Washington’s football team?John A. Tures, Professor of Political Science, LaGrange CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1174052019-05-21T05:46:09Z2019-05-21T05:46:09ZHere’s how to make opinion polls more representative and honest<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275544/original/file-20190521-69178-16va172.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Better opinions polls are more expensive because pollsters need to spend more effort getting a representative and honest sample of voters.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/people-operations-center-talking-on-landline-688716088?src=_nGWBGsjTEP3jo0jLlZ9Gg-1-44">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2012, US statistician Nate Silver correctly predicted the results of all 50 states in the US presidential election <a href="https://mashable.com/2012/11/07/nate-silver-wins/">with 100% accuracy</a>.</p>
<p>Compare this with the <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/">shock result of the 2016 Trump election</a>, and now the 2019 Australian election, when nearly all Australian opinion polls incorrectly predicted that Bill Shorten’s Labor Party would defeat Scott Morrison’s Coalition <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-19/federal-election-results-how-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong/11128176">on a two-party preferred basis</a>. </p>
<p>How did the pollsters get it so wrong? More importantly, how can we ensure we get a more accurate result next time?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/state-of-the-states-queensland-and-tasmania-win-it-for-the-coalition-117398">State of the states: Queensland and Tasmania win it for the Coalition</a>
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<h2>What opinion polls must do</h2>
<p>A good opinion poll must do two difficult things:</p>
<ol>
<li>it must find a large and representative sample of Australian voters</li>
<li>it must get those voters to honestly divulge who they will vote for. </li>
</ol>
<p>If both of these things happen, statistical theory gives us confidence that the poll will be reliable. </p>
<p>To add to the difficulty, we don’t just need <em>good</em> opinion polls we need <em>excellent</em> opinion polls, because even a small error could mean predicting the wrong winner.</p>
<p>For example, if a government ministry wanted to know what percentage of people had done volunteer work in the last year, it probably wouldn’t matter for their purposes if they commissioned two polls which gave estimates of 48% and 52%. But this variation is unacceptable for electoral opinion polls, which need a small margin of error to accurately predict the winner.</p>
<h2>How to get a representative sample</h2>
<p>A good representative sample will be the whole Australian voting population, but in microcosm. If there are 16 million eligible voters, then a representative sample of 1,600 would mean that each sampled voter represents 10,000 people just like them.</p>
<p>Using relatively small samples is a cheap way to estimate the bigger picture of the election, without resorting to expensive surveys like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-numbers-say-and-dont-say-in-the-same-sex-marriage-survey-87096">Australian same-sex marriage survey</a>. </p>
<p>With a large and representative sample, statistical theory tells us that we will get close to the real result with a narrow margin of error. But the opinion polls in this election consistently predicted the wrong winner, meaning there was something wrong with the samples.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coalition-wins-election-but-abbott-loses-warringah-plus-how-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong-116804">Coalition wins election but Abbott loses Warringah, plus how the polls got it so wrong</a>
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<h2>The problem of disruptive technology</h2>
<p>Opinion polls are usually implemented by pollsters calling landlines, sometimes calling mobile phones, robo-dialling and internet surveys.</p>
<p>In the recent past when almost every Australian had a landline phone, it was far easier to get a representative sample of voters by randomly calling numbers or randomly sampling from the White Pages. The randomness is key, because it destroys bias by giving every eligible voter the same chance of being surveyed. This in turn avoids favouring particular groups.</p>
<p>Modern methods of communication have spoiled the representativeness of landlines – <a href="https://www.acma.gov.au/-/media/Research-and-Analysis/Report/pdf/Communications-report-2016-17-pdf.pdf?la=en">36% of Australian adults now use a mobile only</a>. And because older Australians are more likely to keep their landline, this biases any sample that uses landlines alone.</p>
<p>Far more Australians have a mobile phone than a landline – so why not use these instead? One reason is that some people have two mobiles – business and personal – so the poll would over-represent working Australians. And with fewer older people having mobiles, this approach would also over-represent younger Australians.</p>
<p>Even if we had a perfectly representative sample of phone numbers, we can expect a large number of people not to answer or hang up, which creates another bias because the poll then over-represents people with more time and those who are more politically engaged.</p>
<h2>How to get honest answers</h2>
<p>Opinion polls have been wrong before. Two examples are the 1992 and 2015 elections in the UK, where the polls wrongly predicted a good result for Labour. The post-mortem of these failings came up with the theory of the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shy_Tory_factor">Shy Tory factor</a>”, where people were too embarrassed to admit to pollsters that they were voting for the Tories (the Conservative right-wing party). </p>
<p>Plenty of Australians are not embarrassed to tell anyone who they will vote for, but even the proportion of shy voters is small, then they could still derail the accuracy of the poll.</p>
<p>A number of Australian voters have admitted to giving fake answers to telephone polls because they were annoyed by the call. Even a small percent of annoyed people could ruin an otherwise well-designed opinion poll. </p>
<p>Another theory – put forward by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/20/mathematics-does-not-lie-why-polling-got-the-australian-election-wrong">Australian Nobel Laureate Brian Schmidt</a> – is that the pollsters listened to each other more than they did the public. This is known as “herding”, where poll results that seemed to far from the norm were shepherded towards a groupthink. </p>
<p>An analysis of the numbers does show a <a href="https://marktheballot.blogspot.com/2019/05/why-i-am-troubled-by-polls.html">striking lack of variability in the many recent polls</a>.</p>
<h2>How to get better polls</h2>
<p>Better opinions polls are more expensive because pollsters need to spend more effort getting a representative and honest sample of voters. Some of the quick and easy polls that are currently used are primarily aimed at generating news stories, with accuracy as a secondary goal. </p>
<p>Poll accuracy could be increased by paying people to participate, and paying them more if, as a group, they get the result right. This is an untested idea, but it could create a strong incentive for people share their true intentions.</p>
<p>The same argument could also improve the pollsters’ strategies. That is, create financial rewards for getting things right, or penalties for getting them wrong. However, <a href="https://www.aapor.org/getattachment/Education-Resources/Reports/AAPOR-2016-Election-Polling-Report.pdf.aspx">with shrinking budgets at news outlets to finance polling,</a> there is no reason to believe that this problem is going to fix itself.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/going-up-monday-showed-what-the-market-thinks-of-morrison-117396">Going up. Monday showed what the market thinks of Morrison</a>
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<h2>Polling is a difficult job</h2>
<p>An opinion poll targets the shifting opinions of an ever-changing population. Voters are often difficult to reach or recalcitrant. Yet much of the population is likely unhappy with the polls. They may never pay heed to polls again, or refuse to participate in them, which will ironically make the pollster’s job even harder. </p>
<p>Election opinion polls are like penalty shoot-outs at a World Cup final: there’s huge pressure to get it right and we remember the big misses most of all. But come the next World Cup we’re back watching the penalties, because nobody has come up with a better system to assess the national mood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Barnett receives funding from The National Health and Medical Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Sisson is Professor, Future Fellow and Head of Statistics at UNSW. He is a past-President of the Statistical Society of Australia and a Deputy Director of the Australian Centre of Excellence in Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers. He is a member of the Methodology Advisory Committee of the Australian Bureau of Statistics.</span></em></p>You could compare election opinion polls to penalty shoot-outs at a World Cup final: there’s huge pressure to get it right and we remember the big misses most of all.Adrian Barnett, Professor of Statistics; President of the Statistical Society of Australia, Queensland University of TechnologyScott Sisson, Professor, Future Fellow and Head of Statistics at UNSW, and a Deputy Director of the Australian Centre of Excellence in Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers (ACEMS), UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1033432018-10-02T20:05:20Z2018-10-02T20:05:20ZAustralia’s obsession with opinion polls is eroding political leadership<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238863/original/file-20181002-85635-dnxsyc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm Turnbull's days were numbered as the Newspoll losses continued to mount.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In its early days, political opinion polling’s leading advocate, George Gallup, sold it as an essential tool for democracy. He believed polling made for better representation <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/28/us/an-appreciation-the-man-who-made-polling-what-it-is.html">because it allowed politicians to take the people’s “pulse”</a>.</p>
<p>But opinion polling didn’t so much enhance democracy as <a href="http://time.com/4568359/george-gallup-polling-history/">remake it</a>. </p>
<p>Thanks to Gallup, polls have become so ubiquitous in modern-day politics that we’re now convinced they can accurately predict elections. (Even though Donald Trump’s surprising victory in the 2016 US presidential election <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/trump-hillary-clinton-why-polls-wrong-2017-5?r=US&IR=T">suggests otherwise</a>.) Gallup ran his <a href="https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/169682/years-ago-first-gallup-poll.aspx">first poll in the US in 1935</a> and in <a href="http://www.flinders.edu.au/sabs/sis-files/history/FJHP/Volume%2028/Simon%20King%20from%20FJHP%20Vol%2028%202012.pdf">Australia in 1941</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, opinion polling has changed every liberal democracy by turning politics into a contest between two sales teams trying to synthesise a product they believe voters want and diluting what was once the key role of politicians: to provide leadership.</p>
<h2>Polls driving the news cycle</h2>
<p>In Australia, this can be seen in the <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/ginarushton/australia-just-got-its-sixth-prime-minister-in-11-years">revolving door</a> of prime ministers over the past decade. Polling isn’t the sole reason for this political instability, but it’s played an important part.</p>
<p>Obsessive poll-watching has become standard practice for politicians, as well as the journalists who cover them. This is partly because polls have become news stories in themselves, and not just at election times. A new poll is “news” because it provides the latest measure of the mood of the electorate, which is what everyone wants to know.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-what-are-the-opinion-polls-and-how-accurate-are-they-57973">Election explainer: what are the opinion polls and how accurate are they?</a>
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<p>The weekly countdown of Malcolm Turnbull’s losses in the Newspoll is a case in point. Because Turnbull arbitrarily set a threshold of 30 Newspoll losses as his justification to <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/malcolm-turnbull-haunted-by-losing-30-newspolls-in-a-row-reason-for-move-on-tony-abbott/news-story/07dbb27d98720f9f35df76ee7af3e591">challenge the leadership of Tony Abbott</a>, the media fixated on the same arbitrary threshold during his time in office. </p>
<p>When Turnbull lost his 30th straight Newspoll, the media <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-sound-and-the-fury-of-30-newspoll-losses-20180408-p4z8fe.html">made it feel</a> like a death knell. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"983074873944625153"}"></div></p>
<p>Before Abbott, Julia Gillard was dumped for Kevin Rudd because <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/rudd-saved-labor-leaked-polling-shows-20130921-2u6my.html">internal Labor polling</a> predicted he could swing crucial votes Labor’s way and save the party from a disastrous defeat in the 2013 election. </p>
<p>In her parting shot to her party, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/13/julia-gillard-labor-purpose-future">Gillard made clear</a> what she felt had contributed to its decline in leadership:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…real thought has to be given to how to make any leadership contest one in which candidates have to articulate why they want to lead Labor and the nation. … The identification of the top new ideas – not just who is top of the opinion polls.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As soon as Scott Morrison was picked to replace Turnbull, all eyes turned again to the polls to see how the electorate would respond. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://theconversation.com/labor-leads-54-46-in-newspoll-that-shows-slight-improvement-for-government-103746">latest Newspoll</a>, the Coalition had closed the gap with Labor somewhat, but still trailed overall 46-54%. The Fairfax-Ipsos poll <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/fairfax-ipsos-poll-scott-morrison-ahead-of-bill-shorten-on-leadership-qualities-but-lags-behind-malcolm-turnbull-20180916-p5044t.html">showed similar numbers</a>.</p>
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<p>The slightly good news for Morrison: he led Bill Shorten as better prime minister 45-32%. But as many commentators have pointed out, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/peter-van-onselen/scomomentum-in-the-newspoll-dont-be-deluded/news-story/acfa3fe32ea9b5dc3a488d91c4ebfbbf">this isn’t much of an improvement</a> on where Turnbull was a few weeks ago. </p>
<p>So, not much has changed for the Liberals and it appears not much will – they’re stuck with Morrison now. Some are probably asking themselves now if the spill was worth it, particularly with so many marginal seats in play in the next election and the Coalition sitting on a one-seat majority.</p>
<h2>The impact on decision-making</h2>
<p>A less visible effect of polling has been the impact it’s had on conversations inside the major parties. </p>
<p>In some regards, policymaking is no longer based solely on a leader’s principles and what the party stands for. It’s about which policies are most likely to keep the party ahead in the opinion polls.</p>
<p>It’s becoming increasingly unlikely for the inner core of senior politicians who run the parties to push through a necessary, but unpopular, policy with the goal of changing the minds of voters who don’t agree with it.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-political-opinion-polls-affect-voter-behaviour-60554">How political opinion polls affect voter behaviour</a>
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<p>Take Australia’s contentious asylum seeker policy, for instance. Following record numbers of boat arrivals in 2012, many polls were taken to gauge the public’s opinion on the Gillard Labor government’s handling of the issue. </p>
<p>The results showed a high degree of confusion. As many as one in five respondents <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-the-australian-public-really-think-about-asylum-seekers-8522">reported uncertainty</a> in a number of surveys. When that happens, a minor change in a poll’s wording can shift the results in major ways.</p>
<p>But those who wanted to turn back the boats were far more entrenched. In a <a href="http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/mapping-social-cohesion-national-report-2012.pdf">2012 survey by the Scanlon Foundation</a>, 26% of respondents favoured “turning the boats back” as a solution to the crisis. Other polls showed that <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/most-blame-government-for-boat-people-deadlock-20120701-21b3t.html">voters overwhelmingly blamed the government</a> for the impasse.</p>
<p>There was an opportunity for our leaders to step in with a solution that would bring together the 74% of people who didn’t support a “turn back the boats” policy.</p>
<p>But faced with negative headlines and an unhappy electorate – only 6% of respondents in the Scanlon survey thought the government was doing a good job on asylum seeker policy – it was far more expedient for the government to take a hard line than to craft and sell a more nuanced approach that would address people’s concerns and provide a more humane outcome for asylum seekers.</p>
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<h2>Potential problems with polling</h2>
<p>Another troubling aspect of polls is that the numbers are less real than they are made to look. Hard as they try, pollsters are increasingly having a harder time finding a <a href="https://www.daa.com.au/articles/analytical-ideas/political-polls/">representative sample</a> of people to survey.</p>
<p>According to Cliff Zukin, the former president of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/opinion/sunday/whats-the-matter-with-polling.html">election polling is nearing a crisis</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Two trends are driving the increasing unreliability of election and other polling in the United States: the growth of cellphones and the decline in people willing to answer surveys. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Pew Research Centre, for example, <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/2017/05/15/what-low-response-rates-mean-for-telephone-surveys/">reported</a> that 36% of those called in the US would agree to be polled in 1997 and only 9% agreed in 2016.</p>
<p>Many pollsters believe that IVR (interactive voice response), or robopolling, is the future. This automated software allows pollsters to make a higher volume of calls to compensate for the higher numbers of<br>
<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/how-robo-calls-work-the-cheap-and-easy-way-to-poll/article13656102/">hang-ups</a>. Robopolling is also much cheaper.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-election-how-did-the-polls-get-it-so-wrong-68500">US election: how did the polls get it so wrong?</a>
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<p>In Australia, Newspoll stopped surveying people by landline phones in 2015 and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/new-galaxy-newspoll-to-rely-on-robopolling-and-online-data-20150508-ggx48a.html">shifted</a> to a mixed methodology of robopolling and online surveys. The new Newspoll <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-what-are-the-opinion-polls-and-how-accurate-are-they-57973">was found</a> to be less prone to random fluctuations, but appeared to lean a little to Labor, relative to other polls.</p>
<p>Ipsos still relies on live phone polling, both land lines and mobiles. While Ipsos’ polling results are generally <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/politics/polling-the-polls--the-ultimate-guide-to-the-growing-sport-of-political-polling-20160224-gn2i4d">well-regarded</a>, some analysts <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-explainer-what-are-the-opinion-polls-and-how-accurate-are-they-57973">have found</a> them to underestimate Labor and overestimate the Greens.</p>
<p>Despite all these questions about the accuracy of polls in the mobile phone era, however, they did appear to provide an <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2016/07/25/how-accurate-were-australian-election-polls/">accurate prediction</a> of the 2016 general election in Australia.</p>
<p>While this is perhaps reassuring, it will only continue to fuel their appeal. As journalist Gay Alcorn <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/18/australia-is-obsessed-with-opinion-polls-why-do-we-take-them-so-seriously">put it</a>, Australia’s obsession with polling is not only dispiriting, but corrupting for our politics:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What’s sad is that we know it, but find it impossible to rise above it.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103343/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Cook does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Policymaking is no longer based solely on what a party stands for. Now, it also matters how a decision is going to play in the opinion polls – and that’s a problem for our political system.Ian Cook, Senior Lecturer of Australian Politics, Murdoch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011532018-08-09T04:56:06Z2018-08-09T04:56:06ZOther people are having way, way less sex than you think they are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231132/original/file-20180808-191041-evwqcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Research shows we think young people have a lot more sex than they do in reality – and men have a particularly skewed view of the sex lives of young women.</p>
<p>As part of Ipsos’ long-running <a href="http://www.perils.ipsos.com">studies on misperceptions</a>, to be released in a new book, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Perils-Perception-Wrong-Nearly-Everything-ebook/dp/B0792KQZFZ">The Perils of Perception</a>, we asked people in Britain and the US to guess how often people aged 18-29 in their country had sex in the past four weeks.</p>
<p>The average guess about young men in both countries is that they had sex fourteen times in the last month, when the actual number is just <a href="http://www.natsal.ac.uk/home.aspx">five in Britain</a> and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/index.htm">four in the US</a>, according to detailed surveys of sexual behaviour.</p>
<p>Our guess would mean that, on average, young men are having sex every other day – around 180 times a year – compared with the more mundane reality of around 50 times. But that’s not the most remarkable error in our guessing. Men are even more wildly wrong when they guess about young women’s sex lives, in both the US and Britain.</p>
<p>Men think British and American young women are having an incredible amount of sex – 22 times a month in Britain, and 23 times a month in the US. These guesses would be the equivalent of the average young woman having sex every weekday, plus two or three times on one special day each month. In reality, it’s around five times.</p>
<h2>Why we get it so wrong</h2>
<p>As with so many of our misperceptions, the explanations for this will be both how we think and what we’re told.</p>
<p>The survival of our species literally depends on sex. Yet it is a hotbed of misperceptions, because unlike many other core human behaviours, where we can get a better idea of social norms from observation, sex mostly happens behind firmly closed doors (and the sex that is available for general viewing is not a fully accurate representation of the norm).</p>
<p>Because we don’t have access to very much real-life comparative information, we turn to other “authoritative” sources: playground or locker room chat, dubious surveys, salacious media coverage and porn. These provide extreme examples and dodgy anecdotes that distort our views of reality.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230797/original/file-20180806-191025-13db4ah.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Frequency of sex among young people, perception and reality.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ipsos MORI</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>In the same survey, we asked people in three countries to guess how many sexual partners people in their country have had by the time they get to 45-54 years of age. On this, people are actually very accurate at guessing the average number of partners reported by men.</p>
<p>The actual figure in Australia and Britain is an average of 17 partners by the time men reach 45–54. In the US, it’s 19. The average guesses are almost spot-on.</p>
<p>But it gets much more interesting when we compare men and women. First, the standout pattern is with the actual data. The number of partners claimed by women in surveys of sexual behaviour is much, much lower than the number claimed by men.</p>
<p>In fact, women claim to have had almost half the number of sexual partners as men. This is one of the great conundrums of sexual behaviour measurement: it’s seen again and again in high quality sex surveys, but it’s a statistical impossibility.</p>
<p>Given that both men and women are reporting pairings, and they make up roughly equal proportions of the (heterosexual) population, the numbers should roughly match.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230798/original/file-20180806-191035-1nh2qqh.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Number of lifetime sexual partners, perception and reality.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ipsos MORI</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>There are a number of <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sex-by-numbers-what-statistics-can-tell-us-about-sexual-behaviour-by-david-spiegelhalter-fjd0r7cc5s7">suggested explanations</a> for this – everything from men’s use of prostitutes to how the different genders interpret the question (for example, if women discount some sexual practices that men count).</p>
<p>But it seems most likely to be a mix of men’s tendency to be more <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/07/180726161251.htm">rough and ready</a> when they add up, combined with men’s conscious or unconscious bumping up of their figure, and women’s tendency to deflate theirs.</p>
<p>There is evidence of the latter effect from a <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn3936-fake-lie-detector-reveals-womens-sex-lies/">US study</a> among students which split the participants into three groups before asking them about their sexual behaviour. One group of women was left alone to fill out the questionnaire as normal. Another was led to believe that their answers could be seen by someone supervising the experiment. And the third was attached to a fake lie detector machine.</p>
<p>The group of women who thought their answers may be seen claimed an average of 2.6 sexual partners, the standard anonymous questionnaire group said 3.4 on average, while those attached to the useless beeping machine said 4.4 – which was in line with the men in the study.</p>
<h2>Check your figures, American men</h2>
<p>There is one final worrying twist in the US data. Men and women guess very differently for women in the US. American men think that American women have had 27 partners on average, but American women guess only 13, which is much closer to the figure women claim for themselves of 12.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230788/original/file-20180806-191013-1wz0b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Me? I’ve actually got quite a lot of life admin to be getting on with.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">freestocks org unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This ludicrously high average guess among men for US women is largely due to a small number of US men who think that US women have an incredible number of partners. In fact, there were around 20 US men in our sample of 1,000 that went for numbers of 50 or (sometimes way) above, and that skews the data.</p>
<p>Our misperceptions reveal a lot about how we see the world. They are a brilliant clue to our deep-seated biases, as our guesses at what is “normal” are more automatic and unguarded. In this study, these guesses point to some frighteningly wrong views of young people and women, particularly among a small section of men. </p>
<p>As with other misperceptions, the answer is not just to bombard people with more facts to correct these views, but to also deal with the underlying causes – that what we’re told and how we think leads many of us to get so much so wrong.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Perils of Perception – Why We’re Wrong About Nearly Everything is published by Atlantic Books on September 6, 2018.</span></em></p>We all think men are at it way more than they are. But estimates of how much nooky young women are getting are basically ludicrous.Bobby Duffy, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011282018-08-06T14:31:06Z2018-08-06T14:31:06ZUKIP: how press coverage drives public support<p>Researchers have long been concerned with the relationship between media coverage and support for political parties – especially parties with extreme views, whether on the left or on the right. The <a href="https://twitter.com/drjennings/status/1024979357448720384">extensive body of research</a> so far has shown how media coverage largely benefits parties on the right (though it’s unclear why the far left does not similarly benefit) and can increase concerns over related issues, such as immigration.</p>
<p>The role of the media in national political debate has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-mainstream-media-should-stop-giving-extreme-views-a-platform-101040">recently been the focus of discussion</a> following mainstream media appearances from an array of people from the far right of the political spectrum and the perceived normalisation of extreme views. It raises the question of whether this type of media coverage can, perhaps unwittingly, increase support for these same views. And at this particular time, there can be few more pressing questions than the role of journalism and the media in political life.</p>
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<p>In a recent paper published in the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/does-media-coverage-drive-public-support-for-ukip-or-does-public-support-for-ukip-drive-media-coverage/81B77DDCA9B0DE26A8DF18B15158EF16?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=bjpols">British Journal of Political Science</a>, my colleague <a href="http://jmrphy.net/">Justin Murphy</a> and <a href="http://djdevine.net">I</a> revealed research into the dynamics between the poll ratings of the eurosceptic party, UKIP, and media coverage of the party over the period 2004 to 2017. </p>
<p>We used an online database of newspaper articles and <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/voting-intention-great-britain-recent-trends">Ipsos-Mori’s polling data</a> – and controlled for a range of factors, such as concern about immigration, election results and other key moments of UKIP’s coverage. We found that increased newspaper coverage for UKIP did indeed lead to increases in UKIP’s support – but, importantly, there was no evidence that popular support had increased media coverage. So what this means is that – at least in the case of UKIP and the print media – public opinion followed the media rather than vice versa.</p>
<p>From this statistical analysis, we also identified key periods where increased media coverage followed declining or stagnating levels of support – in other words, periods in which media interest in UKIP did not seem to be prompted by any objective party-related activity – an election campaign, for example. Translated into polling activity, we concluded that the maximum increase in UKIP’s poll ratings from this media coverage was a relatively humble 1%. A small but not insignificant amount.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=225&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230751/original/file-20180806-191047-1jbo34z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">What the numbers say: media coverage is indicated by a solid line and polling by a dotted line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">University of Southampton</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What the data tells us …</h2>
<p>The important message from this is about the dynamics of media coverage and support rather than the increase in poll ratings. Our paper, in line with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2012.693933">research from other countries</a> such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, shows that media coverage has a direct influence on support for parties such as UKIP, rather than support causing media coverage. This is problematic for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/08/ofcom-blow-green-party-election-debate-boost-ukips">Ofcom’s claim</a> in 2015 that UKIP’s extensive media coverage in the run up to the election was justifiable based on the party’s poll ratings, precisely because poll ratings may, in part, reflect previous coverage by newspapers.</p>
<p>This should raise some ethical questions on the part the press plays in the public’s discussion of politics. It does not appear, at least in this study, that the coverage of UKIP is proportionate to other objective phenomena like elections – at least not at key moments of UKIP’s growth. It highlights the power of the media in shaping public opinion – and that the media interest in UKIP could well be a function of their own previous coverage rather than movements in public opinion or external factors. </p>
<h2>… and what it doesn’t</h2>
<p>Like all research, the findings need to be put in context. We did not look at media coverage outside of newspapers, such as TV, radio or social media, which became increasingly important over the period of our study. While newspaper coverage – print and online – is likely a good indicator of overall media coverage, we cannot say anything about the role of these other media.</p>
<p>Similarly, we did not look at content, just the amount of press coverage, and so cannot say whether the media was “biased” towards UKIP. On the contrary it’s quite likely that much of the coverage was negative (at least until the later years of the study). This may have played into UKIP’s hands as an anti-establishment party.</p>
<p>We also leave it as an open question of why media coverage leads to UKIP support. There are several plausible mechanisms, explored in other academic research. It may simply be a matter of “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584609.2010.516798%22">more is better</a>” – where more publicity makes people more aware of the party and therefore more likely to vote for it. On the other hand, the periods in which UKIP’s support increases surround events such as European elections, the lifting of work restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers, and, of course, the EU referendum.</p>
<p>Since coverage of issues that a party “owns” <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584600490522743">can increase support</a>, it is possible that coverage increases support as it links to UKIP’s issues, such as Europe and immigration, with cues on the party’s position.</p>
<h2>Media matters</h2>
<p>Despite these limitations, both this study and the vast majority of work preceding it tell us one thing: media matters. This is true even in the UK, a political setting least likely to favour such a relationship – a two-party system that does not facilitate the success of new parties. But it is by no means the most important factor, at least in the case of UKIP. And we still do not really know precisely why media coverage fuels party support.</p>
<p>But most problematically, this research comes with no easy answers as to what we can do about it. And we probably won’t find the answers until we know the mechanism underlying the relationship. Despite not having a single sitting MP, UKIP routinely gets more <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/green-party-jonathan-bartley-complaint-bbc-local-elections-2017-ukip-disproportionate-coverage-a7723626.html">press coverage than the Green party</a>. One potential solution is to avoid chasing extreme positions and rather have coverage that reflects a party’s election results. Until then, articles about how parties increase their support perhaps unknowingly add just one more voter to the polling statistics – without the parties having to do any campaigning at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101128/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Devine receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). He is affiliated with the Open Society European Policy Institute. </span></em></p>Research has shown that UKIP polling is driven by media coverage rather than the reverse.Daniel Devine, PhD Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/964702018-06-01T02:11:33Z2018-06-01T02:11:33ZA survey needs to involve how many people before I’m convinced?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220596/original/file-20180528-80629-1dnjb9a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The survey results are in, but do they say anything meaningful?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/create jobs</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Research studies, opinion polls and surveys all rely on asking a number of people about something to try to extract some pattern of behaviour or predict a result.</p>
<p>But how many people do you need to ask for that finding to have any convincing meaning?</p>
<p>Before any election you’ll always hear some politician casting doubt on opinion polls, saying: “There’s only one poll that matters.” They try to make us believe that those headline-grabbing polls count for nothing compared with the real election poll of those registered to vote.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-statistical-misinterpretation-and-how-to-avoid-them-74306">The seven deadly sins of statistical misinterpretation, and how to avoid them</a>
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<p>But opinion polls are useful because they can give a rapid insight into people’s intentions.</p>
<p>Taking small samples from large populations is a valid statistical technique for getting accurate information about the wider population, for a fraction of the time and cost.</p>
<p>This applies wherever we have large or hard to measure populations.</p>
<p>Examples include quality-control checking in a factory production line, <a href="https://acems.org.au/ACEMS-Peru-jaguar-project">counting jaguars in Peru</a>, and even <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-articles-engage-readers-and-have-practical-uses-in-the-real-world-92346">surveying the readers of The Conversation</a>. </p>
<p>So how big does a sample need to be for its results to be reliable? Well, that depends.</p>
<h2>Margin of error</h2>
<p>All sample estimates have a margin of error, which compensates for the imperfection of the sample compared with the population. For example, a recent Newspoll <a href="https://theconversation.com/mixed-messages-in-post-budget-newspoll-and-fairfax-ipsos-96522">put Labor 2% ahead</a> of the Coalition on a two-party preferred basis.</p>
<p>Newspoll <a href="https://theaustralianatnewscorpau.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/web-news-newspoll-14-05-2018.pdf">says it surveyed</a> 1,728 people, with a maximum sampling error of ± 2.4%. This means the largest plausible win for Labor would be 4.4% (2% plus 2.4% margin of error), but it’s also plausible it could lose by 0.4% (2% minus 2.4%).</p>
<p>For this tight race we might want to reduce our margin of error by increasing our sample size. But that will be costly as the gains in accuracy diminish for greater numbers. A sample of roughly 2,400 people would be needed to reduce the margin of error to ± 2%, and a massive sample of 9,600 to reduce it to ± 1%.</p>
<p><iframe id="ZEukW" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ZEukW/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Quality matters as well as quantity</h2>
<p>Survey estimates and their margins of error are only valid if the sampling has been well conducted. If the sampling is biased then larger sample sizes likely just give us high confidence around an inaccurate estimate. </p>
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<p>Survey samples are often biased because they differ from the population in important ways. With 12.6 million respondents, the 2017 same-sex marriage survey is a good example as this clearly <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-numbers-say-and-dont-say-in-the-same-sex-marriage-survey-87096">overrepresented older people</a> who were more likely to return their postal survey.</p>
<p>Fortunately, in this case the bias does not undermine the result, which was a resounding vote for marriage equality. But the estimate of 61.6% in favour of marriage equality, with a tiny margin of error of 0.03%, may not accurately reflect the opinion of the Australian population. </p>
<p>Unrepresentative samples also happen in clinical trials because high-risk patients are often excluded from trials for safety reasons.</p>
<p>One study found that <a href="http://thorax.bmj.com/content/62/3/219.long">94% of people with asthma</a> would have been excluded from the 17 major clinical trials used to write guidelines for doctors about treating the condition.</p>
<p>This is a serious problem, because doctors need to give advice to all of their patients, but the best evidence comes from trials that used generally healthier patients.</p>
<p>Similarly, imagine trying to predict how subscribers to Netflix or Stan will rate movies based on ratings from other similar subscribers. These ratings are likely to be biased, as only people who particularly like or dislike a given movie may bother to rate it.</p>
<p>This is an important problem to solve for online content distributors in order to provide accurate movie recommendations to customers.</p>
<h2>How does the public judge a good sample?</h2>
<p>There are no simple rules for judging a good sample size. Bigger is generally better, but only when the survey has been well conducted.</p>
<p>Some very large samples may have used cheap data collection tools, such as Facebook, and so may be highly skewed. Small surveys of just 25 people can be insightful, especially where efforts have been made to ensure a representative sample and chase people who don’t initially respond. </p>
<p>The Australian Press Council has <a href="http://www.presscouncil.org.au/uploads/52321/ufiles/Final_for_website_at_12-01-18_Opinion_Polls.pdf">guidelines on reporting opinion polls</a>, and here are some questions you can ask yourself when reading about any survey:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Where were the participants found? How typical are they of the whole population of interest?</p></li>
<li><p>How many participants declined to respond? If only 10% of people responded then it is likely an atypical sample who have strong feelings about the survey’s subject. (Think about what surveys you’d likely respond to.)</p></li>
<li><p>Were the survey respondents paid? Payment will increase the response rate, but might also affect respondents’ answers.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Sadly these details are often lacking from the media releases and news reports of exciting findings from surveys, and are also often lacking from published papers.</p>
<p>Survey respondents can also be steered towards desirable answers. For example, <a href="https://www.nature.com/news/1-500-scientists-lift-the-lid-on-reproducibility-1.19970">a Nature survey</a> of 1,576 researchers on the reproducibility crisis asked the question:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Which of the following statements regarding a ‘crisis of reproducibility’ within the science community do you agree with?</p>
<p>(i) There is a significant crisis of reproducibility</p>
<p>(ii) There is a slight crisis of reproducibility</p>
<p>(iii) There is no crisis of reproducibility</p>
<p>(iv) Don’t know.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A majority (52%) of people said “Yes” to a significant crisis, 7% answered “Don’t know” and just 3% “No”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/regression-to-the-mean-or-why-perfection-rarely-lasts-74694">Regression to the mean, or why perfection rarely lasts</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This leaves the question of what is meant by a “slight crisis”, a verdict reached by 38% of people. Did they answer slight because they are close to the “no” or “don’t know” categories, or are they close to considering it a significant crisis? We can’t tell.</p>
<p>The point here is that people were given two options for “yes” and only one for “no”. Yet the study <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/04/27/has-science-lost-its-way.html">was</a> – and <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/claims-reproducibility-crisis-overblown-spark-debate#survey-answer">still is</a> – reported as strong evidence of a crisis in science. </p>
<p>Overall it’s best to read the results of any survey with healthy scepticism. Our survey of the two statisticians who wrote this article showed a 100% agreement with this statement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Barnett receives funding from The National Health and Medical Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Sisson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We are often presented with surveys that claim to show how we all think on a certain subject. But how many people do you need to ask for that finding to have have any convincing meaning?Adrian Barnett, Professor of Public Health, Queensland University of TechnologyScott Sisson, Professor of Statistics at UNSW, President of the Statistical Society of Australia and a Deputy Director of the Australian Centre of Excellence in Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/921262018-03-11T09:02:35Z2018-03-11T09:02:35ZSurvey shows Zuma and ANC’s mutual dance to the bottom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207126/original/file-20180220-116365-livi1q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former South African President Jacob Zuma sings at the ANC National Conference in December. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Opinion polls in South Africa have clearly shown the sharp decline in citizens’ approval of Jacob Zuma’s performance as president over the past three years. What has been less clear is the impact on the governing African National Congress (ANC). He was also the president of the ANC, until his term ended in December and he was <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. </p>
<p>For many years, Zuma was considered a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-03-18-parliament-diary-jacob-zuma-the-teflon-president/#.Wowjk4NubIU">“Teflon” president</a>. He seemed to maintain public support even in the face of controversial decisions and scandals because of his personal appeal as an affable populist. Several surveys placed his <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad66-south-africans-have-lost-confidence-zuma-believe-he-ignores-parliament-and-law">approval ratings in the 60%</a> <a href="https://upjournals.co.za/index.php/Politeia/article/view/3247">to 70%</a>
range throughout his first term in office. Once that image was finally pierced, one might have logically expected his downfall to be equally personal, and not take the party down with him.</p>
<p>But new results from the <a href="http://citizensurveys.com/sa-citizens-survey/">December 2017 South African Citizen Survey</a> demonstrate just the opposite. Asking a widely used measure of party support called partisan identification, a strong predictor of both voter turnout and vote choice, only 32% of those surveyed said they “felt close” to the ANC. This is the worst result recorded in the past 17 years, and statistically tied as the lowest level since 1994.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=310&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209885/original/file-20180312-30975-7u4l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC Identification.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zuma, it seems, pulled the ANC down with him. But this question is not asked very frequently by South African polling organisations. Fortunately, it’s possible to turn to an alternative indicator to get a more fine grained take on recent trends in ANC support. </p>
<p>The South African Citizen Survey also asks respondents to rate how much they “like or dislike” each major political party on a scale of 0 to 10. In mid-2015, 61% of South Africans held a positive view of the ANC. Two and a half years later, only 43% feel this way. More importantly, the proportion who give the ANC a higher score than any other party has shrunk from over one half of the electorate in mid-2015 (55%), to just over one third (37%) in the most recent survey as shown below.</p>
<h2>Presiding over electoral decline</h2>
<p>To be sure, it was already clear from the ANC’s loss of seats in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures in the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-11-the-partys-over-anc-sees-decline-in-support">2009 and 2014 national elections</a> that Zuma was presiding over an electoral decline, however small. This should have become even clearer in 2016, when large numbers of ANC members lost their seats as municipal councillors, positions in executive councils, and mayorships of major metropolitan councils.</p>
<p>Yet many of these losses could have been pinned to the poor performance of the post-2008 economy. Indeed, ever since 1994, the degree of economic optimism (as measured by the proportion of South Africans who expect the economy to improve in the next year) has been a strong predictor of popular support for the ANC.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209886/original/file-20180312-30983-13v78gv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the evidence suggests that over the past year, voter support for the ANC became tied to their views of Jacob Zuma, rather than the economy. While Zuma’s popularity has fallen steadily since at least the end of 2015, the biggest single drop took place in April 2017 when his support levels plummeted by 12 percentage points on the heels of the public firestorm that followed the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/31/zuma-says-reshuffled-cabinet-to-improve-efficiency-and-effectiveness">March cabinet re-shuffle</a> and sacking of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. </p>
<p>Yet, even with the resultant damage to the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-30/south-africa-s-rand-extends-slump-as-zuma-fires-finance-minister">currency and the markets</a>, South Africans began to sense an economic turnaround. By year’s end, 48% expected the economy to get better in the next 12 months, and 59% expected their household living conditions to improve. But peoples’ evaluations of Zuma’s job performance continued to plummet (to just 22%), and the public image of the ANC remained at historically low levels.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209887/original/file-20180312-30969-1w1vujz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">ANC Zuma.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thus, voters finally turned on Zuma, but only after a long string of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/15/south-africa-s-divisive-president-zuma-s-many-scandals">personal scandals</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-must-fuse-fixing-broken-institutions-and-economic-policy-92017">bad political decisions</a>, and public outrage over the use of public money on his private homestead <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Public%20Protector's%20Report%20on%20Nkandla_a.pdf">Nkandla</a>, the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/FULL-TEXT-Statement-by-Public-Protector-on-Nkandla-Report-20140319">“capture”</a> of key state institutions by Gupta-friendly ministers and directors, and cabinet reshuffles. </p>
<p>Yet the ANC continued to shield him from the courts, the <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/motshekga-calls-madonselas-powers-be-amended">Public Protector</a>, and from successive <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-confidence-vote-a-victory-for-zuma-but-a-defeat-for-the-anc-82244">votes of no confidence</a> in parliament. Indeed, the party came very close to electing his <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/president-publicly-endorses-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-for-anc-leader">hand-chosen successor</a>, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as its <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/markets/2017-12-19-ramaphosa-rally-stumbles-on-narrow-victory/">new leader</a> and presumptive national president.</p>
<p>But at some point in the past few months, a sufficient number of party members finally seemed to grasp the fact that Zuma’s continued presence threatened the electoral interests of the party as well as their own political futures, particularly those who appeared downwind on the party list. But it took them a very long time to reach this conclusion, and the party has paid dearly in terms of its connection with the electorate.</p>
<p>Zuma dragged the ANC down with him. Yet many might justifiably argue that it has been a mutual waltz to the bottom: while his behaviour and decisions damaged his own image, the ANC’s tolerance of his sins of governance has tarnished theirs.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa therefore faces a double challenge. Not only must he reestablish a positive connection between the presidency and the people, but he must also transform the battered image of the ANC.</p>
<p><strong>Tables updated 12 March 2018</strong></p>
<p><em>The South African Citizens Survey is based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 1,300 respondents a month. Results are reported quarterly on a total of 3,900 respondents, which produces results with a margin of error margin of error of ±1.5 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. Sampling sites are chosen at random across all provinces, and metro, urban and rural areas, with probability proportionate to population size, based on the latest StatsSA estimates of the population aged 18 and older. Interviews are conducted in English, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans, Sesotho, Sepedi, and Setswana. Weights are applied to ensure the sample represents the most recent national population with respect to province, race, gender, age and area type.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92126/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Mattes is Professor of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Honorary Professor at the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa at the University of Cape Town, co-founder and Senior Adviser to Afrobarometer, and has previously worked as a consultant to Citizen Surveys. He receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation, </span></em></p>Former South African President Jacob Zuma’s bad behaviour damaged his image and the ANC’s.Robert Mattes, Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.