tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/peace-process-10225/articlesPeace Process – The Conversation2016-10-07T19:30:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/666662016-10-07T19:30:47Z2016-10-07T19:30:47ZSantos has won his Nobel prize, but peace eludes the Colombian people<p>President Juan Manuel Santos may have <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/world/americas/nobel-peace-prize-juan-manuel-santos-colombia.html">won the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize</a>, but that won’t solve the uncertainty and political mess here in Colombia. Indeed, I fear that national reconciliation is even further away now. The recent <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html">No vote in the October 2 peace plebiscite</a> was a reminder that, economic development and democratic processes aside, war and disagreement are ingrained in our nation. </p>
<p>In a <a href="http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/economia/los-problemas-nacionales">1910 conference celebrating Colombia’s centennial</a> called “National Problems,” president <a href="http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/biografias/uribrafa.htm">Rafael Uribe Uribe</a> said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Colombian people are the most polemicist in the world; their nature is prone to aggression, criticism, and jest. In all the world that I have travelled, I have never found a dreamier or more battle-happy race.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I’m reminded of this quote as I reflect on the Nobel prize and the results of the recent plebiscite, in which the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">Colombian people voted down</a>, by a very narrow margin, a peace agreement with the FARC rebels. Are we a country that votes based on division and uncertainty? Do we value passion, arrogance, and vanity over logical argument? </p>
<p>What can be said of a people who, when faced with the possibility of reconciliation – of, at long last, national unity – decide instead to let the country drift along in a cloud of confusion and inconclusive political processes?</p>
<p>My colleague Maria Emma Willis has called Colombia “<a href="http://www.elespectador.com/opinion/el-informe-de-maria-emma-wills-chvc">the country of political knots</a>” – a place where disagreement is processed via tangled messes and violence, whether in the media or via the democratic process. </p>
<p>The No vote and the Nobel, though they fall on opposite sides of the peace spectrum, actually share one thing, which is that they empower the empowered - not the people.</p>
<p>Many pundits are doing political analysis right now: what happened? Why did we vote no to peace? What’s next? Does our president winning a Nobel prize actually change anything?</p>
<h2>Short-term thinking</h2>
<p>I’m a political scientist, but I’m also a Colombian citizen, and the ambiguity that has followed the No vote makes me think not just about politics but about the very nature of my country. What <a href="http://www.dinero.com/agenda-publica/edicion-impresa/articulo/para-donde-va-colombia/14301">short-term thinking</a> we demonstrated on October 2. How socially and culturally retrograde we’ve shown ourselves to be, unable to imagine a better world, a new reality. How vulnerable we’ve made ourselves – economically, emotionally, and physically. </p>
<p>The recent No vote has echoes in broader Latin American history. Obfuscation of the truth has a long trajectory in the region, one in which <a href="http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/resilience-latin-american-right">slogans and catchy turns of phrase</a> are used to mask hatred and resentments: opaque language in the service of political ambitions.</p>
<p>From the <a href="http://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/resena-historica-la-guerra-mil-dias-1899-1902/55045-3">1,000 Day War</a> (1899-1902) between the Liberal and Conservative parties to Sunday, October 2, 2016, Colombia has specialised in violence, opportunism and insider dealing, not compromise. </p>
<p>In the end, policy – like everyday life in this country – is schizophrenic: the absurd overlaps with the sagacious, the logical with the unheard of, reticence with bombast such that, in the end, we create only the illusion of a political and social system when in reality there’s just a one-dimensional reality without alternative or mediation. </p>
<p>It’s tough living in a knotty, tangled-up country, where making things harder is the easiest thing to do. Political dialogue since the No vote has rung hollow. Words can’t alter a social reality that includes classism, exclusion, marginalisation, disdain, and even apathy (<a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-10-05-the-country-that-voted-against-peace-the-reasons-behind-colombias-failed-negotiation/#.V_fnx2WMCi4">note the widespread absenteeism on referendum day</a>). These are all part of our political knot. The Nobel prize won’t change that.</p>
<h2>Self-destructive potential</h2>
<p>In the end, the October 2 plebiscite, rather than embodying democracy – which is the theory of popular consultation – <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/world/americas/colombia-brexit-referendum-farc-cameron-santos.html">actually subjugated it</a>. The government used the vote to mask an insoluble, incredibly complex problem. The No result just shows the extremes that a people can embrace in political culture that promotes revenge, retaliation, and pugnacity, which says that such emotions are “<a href="http://elestimulo.com/climax/colombia-se-debate-entre-el-perdon-y-la-venganza/">the only alternatives</a>” and that peace accords will just <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/proceso-de-paz-alvaro-uribe-rechaza-el-acuerdo-final-entre-gobierno-y-farc/491269">turn the FARC into another paramilitary force</a> in a country that desperately needs less, not more, violence.</p>
<p>The result of the vote was to deligitimise the government of President Santos. This has been somewhat mitigated by the Nobel Prize, but what cannot be rolled back is that the plebiscite opened the door to for former president <a href="http://justiciaypazcolombia.com/Embrujo-autoritario-Derechos">Àlvaro Uribe and his ilk</a>, to gain new power. That’s awfully convenient for him, given <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/plebiscito-por-la-paz-alvaro-uribe-revela-su-estrategia-si-gana-el-si/492107">the fact that the next election is less than two years away</a>. Holding a referendum on peace was basically the beginning of the 2018 election season. </p>
<p>With its national “No!”, Colombia showed all its self-destructive potential. It showed a society whose principles are based on a longstanding relationship with extremism, polarisation, and the mentality that “if you’re not with me, you’re against me”. A citizenry that, despite the opportunities and possibilities that peace could have meant in leaving history behind, prefers to turn back the hands of time because, in Colombia, rancour is a political platform. </p>
<p>The October 2 No vote was not a triumph of democracy, a renewal of the electorate, or <a href="http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/uribe-y-centro-democratico-impulsan-el-no-al-plebiscito-por-la-paz-FF4698474">a mandate to start a new political order</a>. </p>
<p>It was, simply, the latest chapter in a history of political agony in Colombia, a country of uncertainty, a land now locked in suspense of the unknown.</p>
<p>No Nobel prize can change that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66666/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rafael Rubiano Muñoz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nobel Prize aside, Colombia continues to choose war over peace and uncertainty over resolution. Is it something ingrained in the national psyche, or the product of a tangled-up political process?Rafael Rubiano Muñoz, Professor, University of AntioquiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/664672016-10-05T18:16:21Z2016-10-05T18:16:21ZWhat displaced Colombians living abroad think about the peace efforts<p>The peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group was rejected by less than a <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21708156-no-one-wants-return-war-voters-have-blocked-path-peace-saving-colombias-peace?cid1=cust/ddnew/n/n/n/2016103n/owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/NA/email&etear=dailydispatch">0.5 percent margin</a> in a referendum on Oct. 2.</p>
<p>This outcome shocked the world and defied the expectations of most external observers. The signed agreement to end the violence seemed all but complete, so its rejection by referendum makes the future of peace efforts uncertain. </p>
<p>The Colombian conflict has cost more than <a href="http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basta-ya-colombia-memorias-de-guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf">220,000 lives</a> over half a century, and has forced seven million people to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html">flee their homes</a>. Colombia is the leading <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html">source of refugees</a> in Latin America and has the <a href="http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/colombia-pais-con-mayor-numero-desplazados-internos-onu">most internally displaced people</a> in the world, surpassing Syria in 2015.</p>
<p>As a conflict resolution professor in the U.S. and director of a <a href="http://www.cemproc.org">peacebuilding NGO</a> in Ecuador, I have conducted dozens of interviews and hundreds of surveys with Colombian refugees in six provinces of Ecuador over more than a decade. This research provides a useful context for analyzing the effects of the Colombian peace process and the rejection of the current deal on neighboring countries and the region. </p>
<p>Elevating the voices of those in Colombia and abroad who have been most affected by the conflict could help the rest of the population in Colombia to relate to their suffering, and internalize the cost of continued war. </p>
<h2>Rejection of the peace deal</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-colombia-voted-no-to-peace-with-farc-66416">Several factors</a> led to the <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/plebiscito-por-la-paz-diez-argumentos-con-los-que-gano-el-no/496484">failure of the peace deal</a>. <a href="http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/10/03/qa-colombians-narrowly-reject-peace-deal#.V_RoBxFcJTM.facebook">Key reasons</a> included government overconfidence, low turnout and, especially, anger at the perception that FARC was gaining impunity and costly benefits after years of violence. <a href="http://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2016/06/26/juan-manuel-santos-entre-el-historico-acuerdo-de-paz-y-su-imagen-por-el-suelo/">President Juan Manuel Santos</a> was the main proponent of the peace process, but many ordinary Colombians felt he was ignoring or silencing their concerns. His <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/encuesta-gallup-mayo-2016/16582461">popularity sagged</a>.</p>
<p>The popular ex-president, Alvaro Uribe, was a vocal <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-biggest-obstacle-to-peace-in-colombia-may-not-be-farc-but-an-ex-president/2016/07/06/09834850-3d79-11e6-9e16-4cf01a41decb_story.html">opponent</a> whose conservative followers demanded greater punishment for the FARC. Both presidents represent major ideological blocs in a polarized country – “yes” and “no” became politicized camps.</p>
<p>The right wing was not the only source of skepticism. Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/27/colombia-peace-deals-promise-and-flaws">criticized</a> the deal’s amnesty for government forces who committed human rights abuses. Many victims, civil society groups and displaced Colombians complained about being left out of the negotiations, although “yes” won in nearly <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPL88330ZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">all countries</a> where Colombian migrants voted from abroad.</p>
<p>Some were skeptical that the signed agreement would lead to a reduction in the violence in the short and medium term. They argued that elements of the FARC might splinter upon demobilization and <a href="http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/el-riesgo-de-farc-se-vuelvan-bacrim-articulo-423122">join criminal bands or cross borders</a> to neighboring countries, rather than accept the terms of the peace deal.</p>
<h2>Voices of Colombians abroad</h2>
<p>Only <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPLZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">37 percent</a> of eligible voters in Colombia – and 12 percent of eligible Colombians living in <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPL88330ZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">other countries</a> – cast a vote in Sunday’s referendum. This suggests that many felt disenchanted with a process that was far removed from their own needs and interests.</p>
<p>Jorge, a Colombian refugee living in Venezuela, told me last month, “Those of us who are refugees and asylum seekers displaced across borders were absolutely invisible in the peace process by both the Colombian government and the insurgency.” </p>
<p>Earlier this year, I spoke with a woman named María, a member of the <a href="http://www.forointernacionalvictimas.com/">International Forum of Colombian Victims</a>. This group is composed of Colombian refugees and other victims who have fled to other countries, and it advocates for a just peace in Colombia. María fled the violence and has been living in Ecuador for several years.</p>
<p>She said illegal paramilitary groups had already started <a href="http://congresodelospueblos.org/comunicados-congreso-de-los-pueblos/item/958-accion-urgente-asesinado-lider-del-congreso-de-los-pueblos-en-el-centro-del-cesar.html">targeting</a> civil society leaders in Colombia for assassination, especially indigenous leaders. They have done so in the past in <a href="http://www.un.org/spanish/News/story.asp?NewsID=16740#.V_PzS_krKUk">Ecuador</a>, which means that even in crossing the border, activists’ lives can be in danger. </p>
<p>This raises concerns that civil society activists might be targeted while the peace process is ongoing, and even if an agreement is signed. Some victims and displaced people fear that <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/amenazas-a-lideres-indigenas-en-cauca-y-valle/16603321">advocating</a> for alternatives to militarization and for a more just economic model can have deadly consequences. Maria said, “We are not willing to accept with silence and indifference those who think that we can build peace with the same strategies with which we waged war.” </p>
<p>She pointed out that advocacy and <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh13f">coordination</a> of allied <a href="http://www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/balyk-pugh.html">networks across borders</a>, including the International Forum of Colombian Victims, is key. Together, they can pressure negotiators to work toward genuine peace and justice that includes protections for victims and other excluded Colombians, including those living abroad. Otherwise, excluded groups will not feel they have a stake in the deal, or may even join spoilers in rejecting it.</p>
<h2>Engaging displaced Colombians</h2>
<p>In a striking pattern, the regions that were <a href="http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/plebiscito-por-la-paz-victimas-del-conflicto-votaron-por-el-si/496571">hardest hit</a> by the war registered the highest percentages in favor of the peace deal. These included rural areas in the coast and jungle, as well as Colombians <a href="http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/resultados-plebiscito-en-el-exterior/16716619">voting from abroad</a> because they had to flee their homes. </p>
<p>The “no” vote was <a href="http://plebiscito.registraduria.gov.co/99PL/DPLZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ_L1.htm">highest</a> in the urban and central regions that had been relatively more insulated from the violence. </p>
<p>I believe these groups need to hear more from each other.</p>
<p>Greater <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/4/570cf4706/unhcr-include-refugees-displaced-colombia-peace-talks.html">inclusion of victims and excluded groups</a> in the negotiations and public discourse would not only widen the base of the population with a stake in the conflict, but would also help to humanize the costs of continued war. </p>
<p>Cecilia, a Colombian researcher in Quito who is now an Ecuadorian citizen, told me last month after the peace deal was announced: “We don’t build peace only by signing agreements. It is something that we have to work for every day, in our closest relationships.” </p>
<p>Including victims of all of the armed groups might help break the ideological polarization and define a new narrative that <a href="http://caracol.com.co/emisora/2016/10/03/cartagena/1475517266_047376.html">everyone has suffered loss</a> and some level of forgiveness is a necessary price for ending the suffering.</p>
<p>My <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/crq.21184/full">own research</a> focuses on Colombia’s forced migrants <a href="http://www.fmreview.org/fragilestates/balyk-pugh.html">living in Ecuador</a>, of whom more than <a href="http://www.acnur.org/donde-trabaja/america/ecuador/">170,000</a> have requested asylum since 2000. My surveys of more than 600 Colombians living in six Ecuadorian provinces show that only <a href="https://www.academia.edu/22767750/Redes_de_Migrantes_y_Refugiados_en_Ecuador_Un_Estudio_De_Quito_Lago_Agrio_y_Esmeraldas">9 percent</a> see themselves returning to Colombia within the next five years. This number has not changed much since 2013 as the political negotiations progressed. </p>
<p>Major economic and security investments are needed to create conditions that reassure Colombians abroad that it is safe to come home. A voluntary right to return is also important. Many Colombians have made a new life for themselves abroad, and are worried about being forced to return to a country they no longer consider <a href="http://www.flacsoandes.org/sima/images/FLACSO_InternetN2.pdf">home</a>. </p>
<p>As Jorge, the refugee in Venezuela, said, “My heart has been in Colombia and my feet are in Venezuela. The hard part is wanting to return and knowing that is not possible for now. But if I went back [to Colombia] tomorrow, I would feel like a stranger in my own land.” </p>
<h2>A regional perspective going forward</h2>
<p>Colombia’s neighbors are weary of the burden of refugees and cross-border security incursions caused by the conflict. Playing a constructive role in supporting renewed peace efforts could be in their interest. </p>
<p>Ecuador, which is the <a href="http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/RefugiadosAmericas/Ecuador/EN/UNHCR_in_Ecuador_-_April_2011.pdf?view=1">largest recipient</a> of refugees in Latin America, offered earlier this year to <a href="http://www.eltelegrafo.com.ec/noticias/mundo/9/ecuador-sera-la-sede-de-las-negociaciones-entre-gobierno-de-colombia-y-el-eln">host negotiations</a> between the Colombian government and the National Liberation Army, the other major leftist guerrilla group. Virginia Bouvier, a Colombia expert at the United States Institute of Peace, <a href="https://www.usip.org/olivebranch/2016/09/09/colombian-rebels-government-start-push-moves-ahead-of-vote">cautions</a> that any agreement would remain an “incomplete peace” as long as the ELN remains mobilized for fighting. A peace process that includes them at the same table would better reflect the range of interests in play.</p>
<p>The United States can also play an active role to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on all sides in Colombia to continue the peace process. Since 2009, the U.S. has given over US$9 billion <a href="https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10454.pdf">to Colombia</a>, much of which funded military equipment and training. Now, President Obama proposed $450 million for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/who-pays-for-peace-in-colombia/">“Peace Colombia,”</a> the post-accord implementation of peace initiatives. The failure of the peace deal makes the future of this proposal uncertain.</p>
<p>Ex-President Uribe in particular benefited enormously from the <a href="http://www.flacsoandes.org/internacional/publi_acade/colombia/05tickner_arlene_b_y_rodrigo_pardo.pdf">U.S. military assistance</a>, and the United States could apply international pressure to hold him to his promise to continue working toward peace after the rejection of the current deal.</p>
<p>The referendum rejecting the deal was a setback for peace, but it creates an opportunity to address the problems of the first deal, especially if FARC and the government remain committed to keep working together and include more voices. If Colombia hopes to revive the peace process, it needs to engage a more representative range of political interests so they have a stake in the success of the outcome. </p>
<p>I believe this should include those who are affected by the conflict but have not had their voices heard. It should also invite external actors, including Ecuador and the United States, to apply leverage, provide resources and help coordinate a regional strategy to find solutions to the transnational aspects of the conflict that cross borders. </p>
<p><em>The names of interviewees have been changed for their safety.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey D. Pugh has received funding from the Fulbright Commission.
He is the director of the Center for Mediation, Peace, and Resolution of Conflict (CEMPROC), based in Quito-Ecuador</span></em></p>Few Colombians who have been displaced by violence voted on the peace deal from abroad. An expert in conflict resolution explains why their voices must be part of the peace process.Jeffrey D. Pugh, Assistant Professor of Conflict Resolution, UMass BostonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/654292016-09-28T05:54:52Z2016-09-28T05:54:52ZShimon Peres and the legacy of the Oslo Accords<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138946/original/image-20160923-2587-zy3hyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shimon Peres during his visit to Terezin in the Czech Republic in 2011.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-405308788/stock-photo-terezin-czech-republic-march-30-2011-israeli-statesman-and-politician-shimon-peres-during-his-visit-on-march-30-2011-in-terezin-czech-republic.html?src=snTpd8_enDZmbh9vqSuggA-1-1">Michal Kalasek/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Shimon Peres, the former prime minister of Israel, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37492153">has died</a> at the age of 93 after suffering a stroke. A titan of Israeli political life, Peres remained an active player in his country and the region until his death, working hard to promote closer ties between Israelis and Palestinians. </p>
<p>He will be remembered above all else for his role in negotiating the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords and for winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 along with then-Israeli Prime Minster Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, who was at the time chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). A peace treaty with Jordan also followed, which established mutual recognition between that country and Israel.</p>
<p>Peres always believed that the Israelis needed to be a proactive partner in the peace process. As he <a href="http://www.upi.com/Israeli-President-Shimon-Peres-Give-peace-a-chance/26161366056092/">put it</a> in 2013: “We can and should bring an end to the conflict – and we have to be the initiators. Playing hard-to-get may be a romantic proposition, but it’s not a good political plan.” </p>
<p>His dedication to the peace process was established even before Oslo. In the late 1980s, Peres was involved in a secret agreement with Jordan’s King Hussein. Signed in April 1987, the so-called London Agreement outlined a framework for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would focus on education and the development of the two countries’ respective economies. Unfortunately the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzak Shamir, disagreed, and <a href="http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Peres-I-do-not-regret-the-Oslo-Accords-309850">refused to approve the agreement</a>.</p>
<p>Peres was involved in the peace process again by the early 1990s, while serving as foreign minister under Rabin. But before Oslo even took place there were internal battles about who to negotiate with – the PLO in Israel-Palestine, which was supposedly composed of moderates, or the PLO based in Tunis and led by Arafat. Ultimately, it was Arafat who came to the negotiating table. </p>
<p>To make this happen, both Peres and Rabin had to change their mind about dealing with the PLO abroad. Peres felt that it was <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.701386">futile to keep Arafat in exile in Tunisia</a> since it made co-operation between the two sides more difficult.</p>
<p>Though the secret accords have been highly controversial ever since they were struck, they nevertheless included several noteworthy steps. The first was <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/13/oslo-accords-explained.html">mutual recognition</a>: for the first time, the PLO would recognise the state of Israel, and vice versa. </p>
<p>The accords also created an interim government for the Palestinians, the Palestinian National Authority, which would take over responsibilities in education, social welfare, health care, direct taxation and tourism. Within nine months, elections were to be held. </p>
<p>The accords allowed for Arafat to return to Gaza after years in exile; Israel was also supposed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho within four months. In return, the PLO would also remove chapters in its charter referring to the destruction of Israel, which would be given guarantees that its people had the right to live in peace and security. </p>
<h2>The stalled process</h2>
<p>Proponents of Oslo at the time claimed that the accords helped <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr158.pdf">encourage a peaceful approach</a> to the conflict, and constituted the first step to getting the peace process started in earnest. But as is all too evident today, and despite Peres’s lifelong optimism, the peace the accords planned for was never achieved.</p>
<p>Oslo failed to address the key issues of the conflict: the status of Jerusalem, right of return for the 1948 Palestinian refugees, the status of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the borders of the Palestinian territory. There was also no promise of an independent Palestinian state. It was assumed that these issues would be negotiated at the end of the five-year transition period the accords provided for. For many critics, the Oslo was just a litany of empty promises.</p>
<p>Part of the problem was that the accords were not actually a peace treaty, but only a <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/13/oslo-accords-explained.html">first step to peace</a> and a framework for facilitating negotiations for a final treaty intended to be negotiated in 1998.</p>
<p>When the accords were signed in September 1993, the criticism was sharp and immediate. Palestinian scholar Edward Said decried them as a “<a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v15/n20/edward-said/the-morning-after">Palestinian surrender</a>”, and claimed that the plan would throw the Palestinian leadership into complete disarray. </p>
<p>There was also anger on the Israeli side. Peres’s fellow negotiator Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli extremist in November 1995, an event which in turn led to the election of the right-wing Likud Party in 1996. Led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who today serves as Israel’s prime minister again, the new government was openly antagonistic towards Oslo. </p>
<h2>Dashed hopes</h2>
<p>So why did Oslo fail? As ever, it depends which voices on which side you listen to.</p>
<p>Many Israelis blame Palestinian violence for wrecking the peace process. After the Camp David Accords collapsed in July 2000, the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7381378.stm">Second Intifada</a> broke out and ran until 2005. The militant Islamist group Hamas <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4650788.stm">won legislative elections</a> in 2006, further <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr158.pdf">deepening a rift</a> among Palestinians and making the Palestinian Authority more irrelevant than ever. </p>
<p>In contrast, many Palestinians claim that it was the Israelis who have reneged on their side of the deal. Highly contentious is the issue of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories: in 1993, there were 115,700 Israeli settlers living there, whereas <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/12/oslo-israel-reneged-colonial-palestine">today</a> there are more than 350,000 in the West Bank and another 300,000 living within East Jerusalem’s pre-1967 borders. No settlement freezes have taken place, and this constant encroachment has made the two-state solution more difficult.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/aai/pages/9783/attachments/original/1431961130/20YearsAfterOslo.pdf?1431961130">2013 poll</a> examining the effects of Oslo on public opinion 20 years later found both sides have been dissatisfied. Palestinians maintained that the Israelis were the big winners, with 49% claiming that the accords damaged their interests. On the Israeli side, 68% of Israelis felt that the main beneficiaries were the Palestinians, and 64% felt that they themselves had been harmed by the accords. </p>
<p>And yet a <a href="http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/623">2015 poll</a> revealed that while 90% of Palestinians don’t think Israel has abided by the Oslo Agreement, 68% still want to support the agreement. So for all that the Oslo framework is resented criticised, any new peace process for peace in the region will almost certainly have to stick to it in some form. </p>
<p>Although the two sides are far apart, Peres died an optimist, still hopeful that the day would come when the Israeli Defence Forces’s soldiers would serve purely for peace. As he famously put it: “<a href="http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Peres-I-do-not-regret-the-Oslo-Accords-309850">Impossibility is only a product of our prejudice</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65429/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>One of Israel’s greatest political figures, Shimon Peres left an indelible mark on the Middle East.Natasha Lindstaedt, Senior Lecturer, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/644522016-08-26T20:19:48Z2016-08-26T20:19:48ZA momentous peace deal with the FARC – so what next for Colombia?<p>The groundbreaking news reached me when I was in Bogotá in a meeting with the head of the Colombian Army: after more than 50 years of armed conflict, and four years of negotiations, the Colombian government and the leftist guerrilla group, the FARC, have reached a final <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-37180752">peace agreement</a>. The historic deal looks set to bring to an end the longest running war of recent history. The agreement is cause for huge celebration, but an official end to war with the FARC is only the start of the road to peace. </p>
<p>Securing sustainable peace needs a balance of addressing the immediate security risks during <a href="http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/publications/securing-peace-in-the-borderlands-a-post-agreement-strategy-for-colombia.html">the period of transition</a>, as well as anticipating the long-term challenges that may emerge. </p>
<h2>‘Yes’ or ‘no’ to peace</h2>
<p>The deal states that the FARC will lay down their arms and make the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/colombia-government-farc-rebels-peace-deal-52-year-war">transition</a> towards being a legally recognised political party. On Monday, 29 August, the definite bilateral ceasefire will start. This will be no easy task for the guerrillas, who began their fight against the state back in the mid-1960s as a leftist group championing the needs of the rural dispossessed. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/colombia-conflict-death-toll-commission">More than 220,000</a> have been killed in the ensuing conflict which became every time more intertwined with the illicit drug trade, involving not only the FARC, but also other insurgent, paramilitary and criminal groups. </p>
<p>The deal is proof that the government and the FARC are making a huge step forward towards peace in the violence-ridden country. But despite such a momentous agreement, the peace deal, including the proposed 180-day long demobilisation process, is still subject to the approval of the Colombian population. A “yes” or “no” referendum is due to be held on October 2. It is not yet clear cut which side will win.</p>
<p>It might be hard for the casual observer to see why the Colombian people wouldn’t want peace. But both in the large cities and in rural regions some people’s enthusiasm for peace has clashed with the scepticism of others. As a taxi driver in the capital city, Bogotá, put it to me on the morning after the peace deal – how can Colombians be sure that ex-FARC combatants, after a life in the jungle, will be able to reintegrate into civilian life? Will they not use the demobilisation as a pretext to continue life as entrepreneurs of violence, fuelling insecurity in urban areas? </p>
<p>On the other hand, we have to consider that people in marginalised rural regions, who have been hit hardest by the ongoing fighting face huge uncertainty. For generations, their lives have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/apr/23/colombia-farc-killed-mothers-justice">caught up</a> with the fighting. Without knowing what peace will bring, and whether the situation may deteriorate, they might prefer to maintain the status quo. </p>
<p>Local elites could also jeopardise the process if they stand to lose some of their considerable power as a result of the peace agreements. Any threat to their political or economic position, may give them an incentive to violently deter state interventions.</p>
<p>The government will need to reassure people that voting for peace will produce positive change. Engaging in a dialogue with rural populations on the ground is key. This should go beyond sending messages from Bogotá, and should include the different indigenous languages spoken in Colombia, to show a real commitment to those people.</p>
<h2>Protecting civilians</h2>
<p>If “yes” wins the vote and the deal goes ahead prioritising the protection of civilians is critical. In the immediate post-FARC period more violence is possible, as a number of other armed groups –- old and new, leftist and rightist –- fight to take the FARC’s place. </p>
<p>In many parts of the country, third parties are often better placed than the state to fill <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-deal-with-the-farc-could-bring-peace-or-create-a-power-vacuum-48130">power vacuums</a>. The <a href="http://www.cfr.org/colombia/colombias-civil-conflict/p9272">leftist ELN group</a>, for example, has assumed governance functions such as the provision of basic services or conflict resolution in regions such as Arauca, in north-east Colombia, for decades, ensuring local support where the state has been absent. Life will be extremely unstable for local people until it becomes clear who the new “ruler” is. </p>
<p>Civilians living in areas where the FARC were previously operating could also be stigmatised as FARC collaborators. Without the FARC’s protection, civilians’ lives are at risk if they are exposed to violence from any of the other armed groups still active in Colombia. Equally, civilians risk punishment by groups other than the FARC for participating in processes perceived to be against their interests, such as the peace deal.</p>
<p>The management of risks to civilian security in the initial transition period is therefore critical to long term stability. To this end, the country’s security apparatus and the <a href="http://colombia.unmissions.org/en/mandate">United Nations Mission in Colombia</a> are busy preparing the complex process of the FARC’s demobilisation.</p>
<h2>The ins and outs</h2>
<p>The UN is mandated to collect weapons and monitor the disarmament process, to take place in 23 “normalisation zones” and eight <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/28/tk-tk-colombias-margin-states-and-the-peace-process/">camps</a> that the government and the FARC had identified together. In these territories, which are distributed across the country, former FARC combatants will gather to lay down their arms and prepare themselves for reintegration into civilian life. </p>
<p>The normalisation zones will be surrounded and secured by three safety rings. The UN and international observers are in charge of the inner one, the police are charge of the middle one, and the armed forces of the outer ring. </p>
<p>Preventing violence within the zones is of the highest priority. Yet the armed forces will have to be prepared against threats from the outside. These could come from armed groups such as the ELN, or one of the many right-wing and criminal groups involved in the illicit drug trade and other forms of transnational organised crime that plague the country. </p>
<p>Just one unintended shot could have destabilising effects for the entire demobilisation process. Protocols have been put in place to avoid or address even a single soldier’s mistake on the tactical level. </p>
<p>High levels of international attention and the presence of UN observers in the field are likely to deter violent actions in or near to the normalisation zones. However, once the UN leaves and the normalisation zones cease to exist, violence may return. </p>
<p>Unresolved grievances may also fuel acts of retaliation by other armed groups against former combatants. These ex-FARC members will also be vulnerable to recruitment (by force or willingly) by other violent non-state groups. As a result, groups such as the ELN may be strengthened.</p>
<h2>The long term</h2>
<p>After the immediate demobilisation process is over, a reshuffling of participants in illicit activities will produce power struggles over roles in the drug trade, gasoline smuggling, human trafficking, sexual exploitation and other forms of organised crime. </p>
<p>Both ex-guerrillas, and military personnel who may have to leave the armed forces due to budget cuts will now face the difficulties of a transition into civilian life. Reintegration programmes are crucial not only for former combatants but also for those who have served their country for years.</p>
<p>Securing peace therefore requires the coordination of all security-related government institutions across ministries, in partnership with the UN, and in line with the protection needs of civilians. This joint effort can boost confidence in tackling both immediate and long-term security challenges, paving the way for the Colombian people to vote “yes” to peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annette Idler received funding from UK Higher Education Innovation Funding. </span></em></p>History was made with the agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. Making the gesture a reality will require a concerted effort from all involved.Annette Idler, Director of Studies, Changing Character of War Programme, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/606062016-07-19T08:41:19Z2016-07-19T08:41:19ZPhilippines hopes new president can fashion peace from a war of many sides<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130869/original/image-20160718-2153-fvsj2r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Rodrigo Duterte talks with former president Benigno Aquino III, shown here in 2013.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ryan Lim/Malacañang Photo Bureau</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Newly elected president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/132335-foreign-media-philippine-elections-duterte-trump">drawn comparisons</a> worldwide to the US Republican Party presidential nominee Donald Trump: bold, outspoken, controversial, and strangely popular. Duterte has vowed to end the violent conflicts that have blighted the Philippines, stating he will open dialogues with the various insurgent groups involved within three to six months. He has also pledged to tackle corruption, illegal drugs, and criminality throughout the archipelago.</p>
<p>The Philippines has for years faced an insurgency in the southwest of the main southern island of Mindanao led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who seek independence for the Muslim Moro people from the predominantly Catholic Philippines. Filipino governments have also faced communist uprisings from the Communist Party of the Philippines and their armed wing, the New People’s Army, and the National Democratic Front. In recent years, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36138554">jihadist groups declaring allegiance to the Islamic State</a> have further complicated matters. </p>
<p>“Fixing Mindanao” and solving “the Moro problem”, tasks Duterte has set himself, will not be easy. But Duterte is the first president from Mindanao, and is not part of one of the political dynasties of his predecessors, based in the northern island of Luzon, where the capital is. This makes Duterte an unusual figure in Manila, but it also brings hope to many Filipinos. </p>
<p>The senate president and house speaker are also Mindanaoan, and while many key cabinet positions may go to Mindanaoan colleagues, Duterte has hinted that he will <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/789762/ndfp-sees-peace-deal-within-6-9-months-of-duterte-administration">reserve four cabinet positions for leftist politicians</a>, including those from the Communist Party now that they are willing to restart peace talks. </p>
<p>Regarding the Moro problem, Duterte has supported the <a href="http://opapp.gov.ph/ct/bangsamoro-basic-law">Bangsamoro Basic Law</a> (BBL), part of the peace agreement hammered out with MILF which the previous administration failed to ratify, <a href="http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/03/1549312/philippines-fears-new-fighting-stalled-autonomy">setting back the peace process</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130871/original/image-20160718-2144-7lvqk5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The peace process is on rocky ground.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Moro_soldier_outside_USAID_GEM_700x500.jpg">Mark Navales</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Potential, but a patchy record in power</h2>
<p>So what could Duterte’s ascent to power mean for peace in the Philippines? Arguably his Mindanaoan heritage gives him an understanding of the conflict there, as well as close relationships with many Muslims. But his statements have appeared contradictory: running on an anti-corruption and anti-elitism platform, he has also <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/787173/duterte-arroyo-declined-my-offer-for-pardon">offered to pardon former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo</a> who is currently under house arrest pending charges for electoral fraud.</p>
<p>While opening peace talks with the many different conflicting groups, he has also asserted that the “terrorist” Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) <a href="http://www.manilatimes.net/duterte-wants-next-afp-chief-to-crush-abu-sayyaf-drug-rings/262335/">will be eliminated</a> – a daring statement, as many have tried and failed before.</p>
<p>As mayor of Davao city, Duterte’s human rights record was poor, too, especially in view of his “cleansing” of criminals. This involved frequent extrajudicial killings, a policy Duterte famously <a href="http://www.gulf-times.com/story/493535/Philippine-president-elect-Duterte-vows-to-kill-criminals">promised to implement</a> nationally. </p>
<p>And while Duterte vowed to pass the BBL during his presidential campaign, his views now seem to have moved instead towards implementing a federal state, which would inevitably see the MILF having to compete for power with others in the region, rather than becoming de facto rulers of their areas as under the BBL.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130867/original/image-20160718-2122-jwxi9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s insurgency has been a long-running problem for the government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kitoy/2704303280">kitoy</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Maintaining an uneasy balance</h2>
<p>Corruption in the Philippines is widespread and one of the main reasons that the protracted conflicts continue. Duterte has sworn to fight corruption, but while blaming political elites in Manila he is turning towards his own political cronies to <a href="http://atimes.com/2016/05/manila-imperialism-to-end-as-duterte-hires-mindanaoans-to-run-the-country/">take control of the peace process</a>. Any change to the teams negotiating a peace may risk a loss of personal understanding and a return to square one. Having said that, if Mindanaoans play a greater role in negotiations this may avoid the mistakes of previous administrations which lacked an understanding of the region’s complex dynamics.</p>
<p>MILF welcomed Duterte as a presidential candidate, but his shift towards a federal state since has left them confused and frustrated. Including rival faction, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), in talks has <a href="http://www.luwaran.com/home/index.php/editorial/26-january-24-31/740-a-non-starter-statement">irritated them further</a>. Duterte is friendly with Nur Misuari, founding chair of the MNLF, but while this group signed a peace accord in 1996, factions have since taken up arms in an attempt to spoil the MILF peace agreement. Duterte is allegedly also close to the Maoist New People’s Army, which is also due to be brought to the negotiating table – but more parties to the peace process means less lucrative deals for the MILF than those they’d already negotiated. </p>
<p>So this is all highly ambitious, and will probably prove too great a challenge for Duterte. There are many sides to keep sweet, and waging war against “terrorists” and “criminals” – with all the risks to civilians that inevitably entails – while inviting the MNLF and the NPA to the negotiating table might well upset not only the peace agreement with the MILF, but also the established political elites in Manila and Mindanao. </p>
<p>To reach a peace agreement with all groups within a year seems unattainable. Despite positive rhetoric and steps in the right direction, Duterte faces many obstacles and has yet to address some of the root causes of the insurgencies: poverty, injustice, marginalisation, environmental degradation, and Moro identity. </p>
<p>One thing remains certain – without a clearer roadmap, lasting peace in the Philippines will remain elusive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rikard Jalkebro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Philippines suffers from many internal conflicts. Can the new president bring about a much-needed peace?Rikard Jalkebro, Teaching Fellow, School of International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/262662014-05-02T16:59:45Z2014-05-02T16:59:45ZGerry Adams arrest: peace process in Northern Ireland can’t take much more pressure<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/47664/original/8999w48m-1399043191.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gerry Adams has been arrested over the 1972 murder of Jean McConville</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://images.pressassociation.com/meta/2.16604385.html">Niall Carson</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>By any standards, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-24801620">the murder of Jean McConville</a> stands out during the troubles. She was a mother of 10 with no connection to the violence. She was killed by the IRA, who did not admit to the killing but instead hid her body until it was discovered in 2003. That the body was discovered at all was down to the ongoing pursuit for truth of her children and family, and the deals of the peace process itself. </p>
<p>In 1999 the IRA <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-10814888">agreed to respond</a> to the claims of the families of the “disappeared”. This was a group of 16 victims of the troubles whose situation was similar to that of McConville in that, unlike many other IRA killings, there had never been an institutional admission of responsibility and no bodies have ever been found. </p>
<p>Westminster had <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/7/contents">passed legislation</a> that provided that no forensic evidence from the bodies or exhumations could be used subsequently in criminal proceedings. This limited trade-off between truth and accountability, which received remarkably little attention at the time, enabled the IRA’s cooperation (not successful in all cases –- seven bodies were never found and admissions of responsibility were not made in all cases).</p>
<h2>The Boston tapes</h2>
<p>With the arrest (and freeing without charge) of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27249495">Gerry Adams</a>, the question of accountability for Jean McConville’s murder is more firmly on the table. It came about following an <a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/united-kingdom/140501/northern-ireland-uk-gerry-adams-jean-mcconville-boston-college-tapes">academic project at Boston College</a> that recorded interviews with former combatants about their role in the conflict under guarantee of confidentiality until their death. Allegedly some confessed to involvement in killings or implicated others. </p>
<p>The Northern Ireland Police Service last year succeeded in obtaining the transcripts after fighting a lengthy legal battle in the US courts. The police service has since apparently been re-opening and investigating all the killings cases that the transcripts touch on. There <a href="http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/jean-mcconville-murder-arrest-based-on-boston-tape-30116713.html">have already been arrests</a> and charges in relation to Jean McConville’s murder. </p>
<p>Adams denies any involvement. The arrest is likely to widen cracks in the peace process. It is difficult for the Northern Irish assembly to withstand the pressures of the past without having a wider process that deals with all its elements. </p>
<p>For unionists, knowing that key politicians are alleged by some people to have been complicit in violence is quite different from contemplating the possibility of prosecutions for specific particularly horrible killings. For republicans, selective investigation of the past makes it more difficult for them to sustain support and confidence in the now reformed legal institutions.</p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>As a string of European Court of Human Rights cases illustrate, there are many cases of UK state killings and alleged collusion between the state and loyalist paramilitaries which have not received adequate investigation, and where the government resists inquiries. Most notable is the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20683378">murder of Pat Finucane</a> where the attenuated and inadequate de Silva inquiry documented multiple layers of collusion. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/gerry-adams-arrest-the-day-the-rift-at-heart-of-stormont-grew-deeper-30237154.html">Republicans are already questioning</a> the timing of the arrest during election campaigns north and south of the border, in which Adams is prominent, and <a href="http://www.sinnfein.ie/">Sinn Féin</a> seemed poised to do well. The contrary argument runs that sometimes investigations just take the time they take and that it is in fact the lack of political interference that has resulted in unfortunately election timing (see Northern Irish secretary <a href="http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/video-theresa-villiers-defends-police-over-gerry-adams-arrest-1-6035920">Theresa Villiers’ response</a>, for example). </p>
<p>This is the second time in almost as many months that the past has threatened to destabilise political institutions in Northern Ireland. In late February first minister Peter Robinson <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-26352967">said he would resign</a> unless an inquiry was held into letters of comfort given to “on the runs” –- IRA suspects who had left the jurisdiction because they understood they were being sought in relation to offences, and had returned after they had been assured by the authorities that this was no longer the case.</p>
<h2>The Haass failure</h2>
<p>These latest difficulties take place against the backdrop of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/31/northern-ireland-draft-proposals-published">Haass proposals</a> to deal with outstanding issues in the peace process. These came on the back of new negotiations in late December between the Northern Irish political parties that were chaired by US diplomat Richard Haas and saw the past firmly on the agenda. </p>
<p>The parties agreed a broad mechanism, but not a formal agreement. The detail was not fully worked out, and it is difficult to say with certainty how it would have affected current events. But certainly it would have meant that the Disappeared investigations would have taken place in the context of a holistic mechanism for the past, and the families would have been given a choice as to whether to pursue public prosecutions or open the way towards getting more information voluntarily about their lost relatives. </p>
<p>So, implementation of yet another set of fairly sensible proposals did not take place. Instead Northern Ireland has been left to continue with the eclectic and incoherent approach to dealing with the past that has evolved. </p>
<p>In fact, we are being propelled into an ever more piecemeal and unsatisfactory process. For example in place of the Haass process we now have these latest arrests and an inquiry into letters of comfort that were themselves a sort of fix for a failure to solve the “on-the-runs” problem more transparently. This in turn was a fix to the partial provision on prisoner release in the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/northern_ireland/understanding/events/good_friday.stm">1998 Good Friday agreement</a>. </p>
<p>In response we have politicians in Sinn Féin and the unionist <a href="http://www.mydup.com/">DUP</a> who are being forced into expressing lack of confidence in political and legal institutions they have taken huge political and personal risks to support. This is not like the early days post-agreement, where threats to withdraw support reflected reluctance to enter them in the first place. </p>
<p>This is now an established peace process where the rubicon has already been crossed, involving political sacrifice on all sides. Both sides know that both they and the peace process lose if the new institutions collapse or are undermined. </p>
<p>It is all a terrible mess. To sort it out, the politicians should ideally now commit to Haass and implement it –- the details can be refined in implementation. If they do not, the UK government (with the support of the Irish government) should move to implement it without formal local sign-off. </p>
<p>The proposals may not be perfect, but experience from other countries shows that no perfect mechanism for dealing with the past exists. The key question now is not how to get to something better. It is a choice between Northern Ireland having a dedicated thought-through forum in which to contend with the past, or being forced to make do with political and legal institutions that were not designed to deal with it. </p>
<p>The peace process has come too far and everyone -– not least the victims and their families -– has made sacrifices to get this far. Its achievements should not be treated so carelessly. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/26266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christine Bell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By any standards, the murder of Jean McConville stands out during the troubles. She was a mother of 10 with no connection to the violence. She was killed by the IRA, who did not admit to the killing but…Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.