tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/persian-gulf-states-19913/articlesPersian Gulf States – The Conversation2017-06-16T00:42:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794802017-06-16T00:42:10Z2017-06-16T00:42:10ZCan tiny Qatar keep defying its powerful neighbors? It may be up to Washington<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174096/original/file-20170615-24943-1sjg23z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nearly all of Qatar's residents live in its capital, Doha.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Doha skyline via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent decision by half the nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a few other countries to isolate fellow member Qatar came <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-05/saudi-led-alliance-cuts-qatar-ties-as-gulf-crisis-escalates">as a surprise to many</a> – though perhaps it shouldn’t have.</p>
<p>Essentially, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-other-gulf-states-cut-ties-with-qatar-78906">severed all ties</a> over <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">Qatar’s positive opinion</a> about Iran and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ap-explains-qatars-ties-with-iran-and-islamist-groups/2017/06/11/d8294df0-4ec9-11e7-b74e-0d2785d3083d_story.html?utm_term=.3678e572241f">support</a> for Islamist groups like Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Besides cutting those ties, <a href="http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-issues-qatar-list-10-demands-must-meet/">one of their demands</a> also included putting curbs on the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, which is based in Qatar’s capital of Doha and is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by its ruling family.</p>
<p>The diplomatic and security ramifications have so far taken center stage, with most Western nations, including the U.S., and countries in the region calling for a negotiated resolution to avoid further escalation. Yet the dispute that led to the recent outburst has been lingering for years – and erupted in a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">similar if smaller kerfuffle in 2014</a> – which begs the following questions: </p>
<p>What exactly has allowed Qatar to defy its more powerful GCC neighbors for so long? And what (or who) could possibly change that? </p>
<h2>Flouting its neighbors’ demands</h2>
<p>Qatar is the second-smallest country in the GCC with a national population of just 243,000. That swells to almost 2.4 million when you include expatriates, yet it’s still <a href="http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-total-population-percentage-nationals-foreign-nationals-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2010-2016-numbers/">just a fraction</a> of Saudi Arabia’s 31 million total population or the UAE’s 8 million. </p>
<p>It also has the smallest military, at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_Armed_Forces">just 12,000 soldiers</a>, <a href="http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/mideast-africa/2015/03/26/saudi-arabia-gulfs-best-equipped-military/70494532/">compared with</a> Saudi Arabia’s 227,000. </p>
<p>Despite this large gap in population and military power, Qatar <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/timeline-qatar-gcc-disputes-170605110356982.html">has long ignored</a> the complaints of its stronger neighbors over its foreign policy positions that on some issues are diametrically opposed to theirs. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174066/original/file-20170615-24951-13ionr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Al-Jazeera, which is based in Doha and partially supported by the government, is one of the sticking points between Qatar and its neighbors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/ Hamid Jalaudin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There’s essentially one reason Qatar can afford to do this: the American security umbrella, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">which includes basing</a> some 11,000 U.S. military personnel in Doha – the largest deployment in the region – as well as hosting the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center, which oversees air power in 20 countries. </p>
<p>Like the other GCC countries, Qatar has a <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/qatar-forrel-us.htm">bilateral security arrangement</a> with the U.S., and it hosts the United States’ largest military base in the region. The U.S. military protection not only shields Qatar against military threats from outside the region but empowers it to stand up to its larger GCC allies when it chooses to do so. </p>
<p>Qatar is not the only GCC member that takes advantage of U.S. military protection in this manner. Bahrain has also defied other GCC members on occasions. In 2005, this tiny island of one million and home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet upset Saudi Arabia when it signed a <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/archives/2004/may/us-and-bahrain-conclude-free-trade-agreement">bilateral free trade agreement</a> with the U.S., which violated the GCC common tariff <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200841012520998396.html">regulations</a>. In a sign of America’s pull in such disputes, it was Saudi Arabia that <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/economic-integration-can-ease-regional-tensions">ultimately backed down</a>. </p>
<p>Consequently, as long as Qatar remains under U.S. military protection, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can not resort to military options and have to limit their campaign to diplomatic and economic pressure. In other words, bilateral security relations with the U.S. serves as an equalizer in interactions among GCC countries regardless of their size. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174063/original/file-20170615-24971-1y1zger.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defense Secretary James Mattis, second from right, greets an airman during a recent visit to the U.S. military base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pool Photo via AP/Jonathan Ernst</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How long can Qatar hold out?</h2>
<p>A secure and protected Qatar can afford to remain defiant in the face of economic isolation from its neighbors as long as it can tolerate the economic and financial costs. While these costs are hardly trivial, Qatar, as the <a href="https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/richest-countries-in-the-world?page=12">richest country in the world</a> on a per capita basis, can probably afford to ride them out for some time. </p>
<p>In terms of imports, Qatar’s reliance on other GCC countries and Egypt is relatively modest and easily substitutable. The main immediate impact of the severing of ties was a disruption of food imports <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/qatar-residents-rush-to-stock-up-food-supplies-as-border-closes">from Saudi Arabia</a>, but Qatar managed to quickly switch to air shipments from Iran and Turkey – notably more expensive than ground shipments via Saudi border. </p>
<p>Qatar’s dependence on these neighbors for exports is even less. In 2015, only 4.6 percent of Qatar’s US$80 billion worth of exports <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/qat/are/show/2015/">went to the UAE</a>, while just 1 percent <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/qat/sau/show/2015/">flowed to Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>A key reason for so little <a href="http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=F&Country=QA">trade</a> between countries in the GCC is that their primary exports (oil and gas products) and imports (food and industrial products) are very similar. </p>
<p>So all in all, economic disengagement from the UAE and Saudi Arabia will disrupt about 13 percent of Qatar’s commodity imports and 5.6 percent of its exports (trade with Bahrain and Egypt is insigificant). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174067/original/file-20170615-24933-xkplvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kuwait’s Emir Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, left, meets with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Doha in hopes of helping mediate an end to the crisis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KUNA via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Qatar also has financial and commercial investment links with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. By one account, 300 Saudi businesses are active in Qatar with <a href="https://english.mubasher.info/news/3120439/Qatar-could-lose-SAR50bn-of-Saudi-investments">investments worth $13.3 billion</a>, as well as <a href="http://qatarchamber.com/6030">1,075 UAE companies</a>. The same report estimated 4,200 Qatari businesses were engaged in the UAE in 2016. </p>
<p>While disruption of these business activities will also be costly for Qatar, the value of these investments is only a small share of its financial and commercial capital. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-11/qatar-sovereign-wealth-fund-s-335-global-empire">Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund</a>, for example, is estimated at $335 billion. </p>
<p>Beyond U.S. protection, the relatively small size of trade and investment links with Saudi Arabia and the UAE is what gives Qatar little immediate incentive to concede to <a href="http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-issues-qatar-list-10-demands-must-meet/">their demands</a>, even as it hopes <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/06/12/qatar-says-gulf-citizens-can-stay-despite-crisis">to avoid escalation</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174065/original/file-20170615-24991-sq0wee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Qatar recently agreed to buy up to 36 F-15 fighters from the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Amir Cohen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US still holds the key</h2>
<p>So while Qatar’s economy is under some stress, its substantial financial resources as well as diplomatic and economic <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/66128/irans-4th-food-shipment-sent-to-qatar">support from</a> several countries including Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Oman give it quite a bit of breathing room.</p>
<p>But in the end, it all comes down to its security patron, the U.S., and President Donald Trump, who <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872062159789985792">in a tweet praised and even seemed to claim credit for</a> the move by Saudi Arabia and the other countries. </p>
<p></p><blockquote><p>During my recent trip to the Middle East, I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar - look!</p>— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872062159789985792">June 6, 2017</a></blockquote> <p></p>
<p>Afterwards, officials at the <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/06/09/532294710/in-an-afternoon-trump-and-tillerson-appear-to-contradict-each-other-on-qatar">State</a> and Defense departments <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/donald-trump-qatar-tweets-us-diplomatic-damage">expressed a more neutral position toward this dispute</a> and called for a negotiated resolution, as some diplomats acknowledged Qatar’s efforts to prevent financial support for terror groups. </p>
<p>So if Qatar ends up making any major concessions, it will most likely be a response to demands from the United States, on whom Qatar depends for its security. A few years ago, Qatar’s former ruler Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/qatar-crisis-economy-diplomatic-links-torn-middle-east-russia-hacking-real-story-robert-fisk-a7778616.html">put that dependence this way</a>: Without the Americans, “my Arab brothers would invade me.”</p>
<p>And in a sign that the U.S. commitment to Qatar remains solid, the Pentagon <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-14/qatar-said-to-sign-deal-for-u-s-f-15s-as-gulf-crisis-continues">just announced a $12 billion deal</a> to sell as many as 36 F-15 jets to its ally. </p>
<p>In other words, apart from President Trump’s tweet burst, the U.S. government has given diplomatic breathing room to Qatar. But if the United States calls for significant concessions, it is unlikely that Qatar will risk its military protection by saying no.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saudi Arabia and the UAE led a group of countries that have severed all ties to fellow American ally Qatar over its foreign policy. The US will play a key role in whether it accedes to their demands.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793852017-06-15T09:39:47Z2017-06-15T09:39:47ZQatar and the art of ‘brotherly’ diplomacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173806/original/file-20170614-31550-vca7h8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IvanKurmyshov/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most political upheavals in history are known to have thrown up a specific word or expression that defines the core values of that event. “Guillotine” characterised the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/french-revolution">French Revolution</a>, while the American War of Independence had “<a href="http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h640.html">representation</a>” at its core, as Americans demanded to be represented in the British parliament that was taxing them. The 20th century rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, meanwhile, was the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War">Cold War</a>”. </p>
<p>During the <a href="https://theconversation.com/qatar-must-choose-whether-to-bow-to-saudi-pressure-or-defy-it-78856">ongoing diplomatic crises</a> in the Middle East, however, the word that has been bandied about most is “brotherly”. But is all this brotherly love genuine – or is it a case of keeping your enemies closer than your friends?</p>
<p>The ruling houses in the region describe their bilateral and multilateral relationships in the context of fraternity. So when Saudi Arabia cut all land, air and sea contacts with Qatar, it <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-saudiarabia-idUSKBN18W09H?il=0">called upon</a> “all brotherly countries and companies to do the same.” </p>
<p>A week into the diplomatic and economic isolation of Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s top diplomat – foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir – said Qatar is a “<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4580824/Saudi-FM-says-brother-state-Qatar-act-end-crisis.html">brother state</a>” and a “a partner” and that punitive steps against the emirate were “well-intentioned”. Interestingly, when Qatar defended its position and condemned its diplomatic isolation by fellow neighbouring nations, it also did so in the context of brotherhood. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/gulf-diplomatic-crisis-qatar-reaction-full-170605071246160.html">said</a> the blockade was “fabricated in order to take action against a brotherly GCC nation”.</p>
<p>So what was Qatar’s supreme error? It is alleged to have been providing financial and tactical support to the transnational Sunni Islamic political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. And this move was at the cost of “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism">other brotherly states</a>” in the Middle East. </p>
<p>While the crisis was boiling, Qatari foreign minister Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Thani, told the news channel Al Jazeera in an interview: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not launch measures to escalate toward our brotherly nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At the same time, however, Doha was frantically in touch with Turkey to prepare a bulwark against this “brotherly assault”. Turkey used the occasion to its advantage while reaching out to a “brother” in need. It promptly convened a special session of parliament and committed a strong contingent of troops to its military base in Qatar. </p>
<p>In the meantime, to deescalate the growing tension between Qatar and its neighbours, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, made a “<a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1110916/middle-east">brotherly visit</a>” to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<h2>Hot air and hypocrisy</h2>
<p>So what does all this “brotherly” love mean in the context of contemporary political Islam? What exactly do they mean by “brotherly” when these states try to do business with each other? And why call a blatant encircling of a state’s sovereignty a “brotherly” act? </p>
<p>The use of the terms “brother” and “brotherly” is deeply problematic in Islamic realpolitik. While commonly used, it is a deeply ambiguous term. At one extreme, it can mean a genuine fraternal concern – but at the other it may be nothing more than a lot of hot air and outright hypocrisy. In the region’s contemporary diplomatic doublespeak, “brotherly” can mean shoving the dagger into your “brother” when you are at an advantage. Lest we forget, Middle Eastern statecraft has often dabbled in such Machiavellianism. </p>
<p>In the medieval Islamic world, “brotherly” implied fratricide. The Ottoman Turkish rulers were supreme in the art of bumping off their “blood brothers”. Interestingly, in the 15th century, Mehmed the Conqueror passed a Law of Fratricide that <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/feature/2015/08/07/the-history-of-fratricide-in-the-ottoman-empire--part-1">stipulated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Whichever of my sons inherits the sultanate, it behooves him to kill his brothers in the interest of world order (nizam-i alem).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Following that principle, upon ascending the throne, one of Mehmed the Conqueror’s great grandsons, Mehmet III, killed 19 of his brothers and half-brothers and buried them next to his father. </p>
<p>In the semantics of current Middle Eastern diplomacy, one word that has not found any voice is unbrotherly. If being unbrotherly means conducting oneself in a way which is “not characteristic of or befitting a brother” then Qatar fits the bill (at least in the current climate of accusations). But it’s unlikely you will hear that from the lips of the sovereign states boycotting Qatar. To paraphrase Saudi foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir: You have to be able to tell your friend or your brother when they are doing the right thing and when they are doing the wrong thing.</p>
<p>So in the dog-eat-dog world of contemporary Middle Eastern politics, the term “brotherly” has very little real meaning. It is a convenient cloak to mask hypocrisy. “Brotherly” in this landscape is all about carrying a big dagger. But most important of all, it is about being able to wield that dagger at the opportune moment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amalendu Misra receives funding from British Academy. </span></em></p>What’s so ‘brotherly’ about a major diplomatic spat?Amalendu Misra, Senior Lecturer, Department: Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/789062017-06-07T01:33:08Z2017-06-07T01:33:08ZWhy have other Gulf states cut ties with Qatar?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172568/original/file-20170606-3677-1533bvt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The skyline of Doha, Qatar.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AWest_Bay_Skyline%2C_Doha%2C_State_of_Qatar.jpg">Gregory Hawken Kramer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gulf Arab countries summon images of oil-fueled wealth, luxurious malls and strong Muslim identity. Nasty regional rivalry, diplomatic ruptures and panicked citizens <a href="https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/Qatar_residents_stockpile_food_as_Saudi_plans_to_close_land_border-ZAWYA20170605103702/">stockpiling groceries</a> don’t usually figure.</p>
<p>So why have Gulf states Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, as well as non-Gulf Egypt, dramatically ruptured relations with tiny Qatar? What will this international crisis mean for the Middle East and the broader world?</p>
<h2>What is the dispute about?</h2>
<p>The Arab Gulf spans diverse countries. On one end of the scale is <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview">fractured, war-torn Yemen</a>. Then come the tourist destination and politically unassertive Oman, the small oil kingdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>As the largest country in the Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia has long championed common regional policies under its leadership. However, in the past few decades, the rapid growth of massive oil wealth in smaller countries like Qatar and the UAE has allowed them excess capital to establish their own global influence.</p>
<p>The UAE has largely aligned its foreign policy with its larger neighbor. But Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies different from, and sometimes rivaling, Saudi Arabia’s. Qatari positions have been propelled through the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/">Al-Jazeera</a> media network, based in Qatar’s capital, Doha, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/al-jazeera-block-article-slamming-saudi-arabian-human-rights-record-a6779596.html">partially funded</a> by Qatar’s ruling family, and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/al-jazeera-the-most-feared-news-network/">popular throughout the Middle East.</a></p>
<p>The Saudis have not appreciated Qatar’s foreign policy assertions, particularly its warmer relations with their archrival Iran. In Syria’s civil war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both oppose ruler Bashar al Assad, but have supported competing Sunni militias. Qatar also had <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/qatar/inside-doha-at-the-heart-of-a-gcc-dispute">good relations with the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt</a> and other anti-establishment Islamist organizations, again in contrast to Saudi positions.</p>
<p>The 2013 removal by the military of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government under President Mohamed Morsi spearheaded a broader move among Arab governments to crack down on Sunni Islamist organizations that could threaten their authority. Some of these organizations <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">had received Qatari support</a>. </p>
<p>In 2014, to pressure Qatar to fall in line with Saudi-led policies, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE suspended diplomatic ties with their neighbor. In response Qatar pulled back somewhat from open support for militant Sunni political groups and cooperation with Iran. It continued nonetheless to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/will-gcc-survive-qatar-saudi-rivalry-201431864034267256.html">assert a right to its own foreign policy.</a> </p>
<h2>What prompted the current crisis?</h2>
<p>Relations improved modestly since 2014. But Saudi and other commentators still complained that Qatar was <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/qatar-cannot-be-allowed-to-sabotage-the-region">“sabotaging the region</a>.”</p>
<p>And then came President Donald Trump’s May 21 visit to Riyadh, bolstering U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and promoting a common front against Iran and <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1103136/saudi-arabia">Islamist “extremism,”</a> a vague term which for the Saudis can include political opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172567/original/file-20170606-3674-1qo61fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On his recent trip to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump, right, met with Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Middle-East/5912b74b0fe3474d845b0ccb60dd1200/2/0">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Soon after, on May 24, Qatari news sites were blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE after alleged remarks by Qatar’s ruler <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/saudi-arabia-and-uae-block-qatari-media-over-incendiary-statements-iran-israel">that openly acknowledged Iran’s regional political role and Qatari ties to Israel.</a> Arab Gulf leaders would not normally take such positions publicly. Qatari sources insisted that the remarks were inaccurate, and that <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-23/qatar-says-its-official-state-news-agency-was-hacked">Doha’s media had been hacked</a>.</p>
<p>But Saudi Arabian and Emirati sources played up the alleged comments. They portrayed them as a renewed sign that Qatari policies remain deviant, despite the 2014 efforts to make Doha fall in line. The Trump administration’s <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/20/us-saudi-arabia-seal-weapons-deal-worth-nearly-110-billion-as-trump-begins-visit.html">announcement of a large military sale to Saudi Arabia</a> suggests new assurance in Riyadh that Washington will back confrontation against Iran. This likely bolstered Saudi confidence that it could move to rein in Qatar.</p>
<h2>What is Qatar’s perspective?</h2>
<p>Qatar’s ambitious growth has included opening its society to global <a href="http://qatarphilharmonicorchestra.org/">cultural</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-qatars-education-city-us-colleges-are-building-an-academic-oasis/2015/12/06/6b538702-8e01-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html?utm_term=.0b78554f2a2a">educational</a> and business influences, as the country completes its plans to host <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/jun/05/2022-world-cup-qatar-under-threat-saudi-arabia-blockade-fifa-football">soccer’s 2022 World Cup</a>. As part of this ambition, Qatar has asserted its intention to <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf">work with a range of global partners</a>. </p>
<p>This foreign policy has included <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf">mediating between Islamist groups and Arab governments</a>, as well as <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/iran-qatar-rapprochement-middle-east.html">between Iran and other countries</a>. Although <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/qatar-needs-to-do-its-part/">some have critiqued</a> such an approach as two-faced, Qatari officials could argue that it is a rational strategy to resolve conflict in places where repressing Islamic political opposition <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/10/14/islamism-the-arab-spring-and-the-failure-of-americas-do-nothing-policy-in-the-middle-east/">has not worked</a>. </p>
<p>Whatever actually happened to trigger the crisis, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4535914/Qatars-state-news-agency-hacked-unknown-entity.html">Qatar’s concerns about hacking</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/2017/06/06/Qatar-s-ambition.html">recent Saudi and other critiques of the country</a>, and <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/leakers-share-new-email-dump-targeting-top-arab-diplomat-and-us-foreign-policy-elites_us_5934450be4b0c242ca252468">leaked emails from other Gulf governments</a> make Qataris feel victimized by what <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/01/whats-going-on-with-qatar/?utm_term=.4baf6d58fffe">could be a well-orchestrated campaign against them</a>. </p>
<h2>Why does this matter?</h2>
<p>Stability in the Arab Gulf region is <a href="https://gccstat.org/en/">critical to world trade</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_busiest_airports_by_international_passenger_traffic">global transportation</a> and regional military security. Dubai, for example, has been the world’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/united-arab-emirates/dubai/articles/The-incredible-rise-of-Dubai-as-the-worlds-air-travel-hub/">busiest airport by international passenger traffic for several years</a>, with Qatar’s Hamad Airport not far behind. And, with 11,000 U.S. troops on site, Qatar hosts the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/qatar-us-largest-base-in-mideast/index.html">Middle East’s major American military base</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/172570/original/file-20170606-3681-11p0s9b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Al_Udeid_Air_Base.jpg">U.S. Government</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The bottom line is that the dramatic escalation of tensions in the Arab Gulf threatens regional stability, and makes it much harder to resolve graver conflicts in Syria, Libya, Islamic State-controlled Iraq and Yemen. Indeed, Qatar’s isolation from other Arab states could lead it closer to Turkey or even Iran. </p>
<p>More generally, the move against Qatar is part of a broad regional shift since the Arab uprisings of 2011. Many Arab governments now feel justified in <a href="https://www.ifex.org/middle_east_north_africa/2017/06/04/repression-crush-dissent/">acting strong to quash dissent</a>. They are now more likely to condone <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170526-world-leaders-find-freedom-repress-era-trump">using force internally to maintain stability</a> and in <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/20/if-trump-doubles-down-on-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-millions-could-starve/">external conflicts like Yemen</a>. The Trump administration appears <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/middleeast/-egypt-sisi-trump-white-house.html?_r=0">comfortable with this</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"872077638042628096"}"></div></p>
<p>Indeed, the President has inserted himself directly into the growing conflict in several tweets, pointing a finger at Qatar as a funder of “radical ideology.” The U.S. may end up mediating the dispute out of its own interest in regional stability and its military base. At the same time, Trump has revealed his support for the Saudi position, and the trend to curb dissenting Arab voices around regional policy.</p>
<p>This trend goes against Qatar’s past autonomy and policies, leaving it little wiggle room. Qatar may have no choice but to conform its policies to Saudi ones, and to limit Al-Jazeera’s independence. Whether or not the crisis resolves soon, Riyadh’s new move against Doha has underscored its clear <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-may-have-pay-heavy-price-restore-links-its-gulf-neighbors-620948">determination to limit Qatari policy influence as much as possible</a>.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was updated to include President Trump’s statements – via Twitter – on Qatar.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff received a Fulbright US-government fellowship to be a visiting professor in Qatar in 2006-7, a fellowship at Harvard University funded in part through the Dubai School of Government in the UAE, and a research grant from 2013-16 from the Qatar National Research Fund. He currently receives no external funding from any government or government-funded entity.</span></em></p>Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies sometimes rivaling Saudi Arabia’s. Think, for example, of the popular Al-Jazeera. Now the Saudis seem determined to limit Qatari influence as much as possible.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/466582015-08-31T10:13:56Z2015-08-31T10:13:56ZArab Gulf states can outlast low oil prices, but expect foreign policy to shift<p>What might <a href="http://marketrealist.com/2015/08/crude-oil-prices-rally-despite-chinese-slowdown-drama/">decreasing oil revenues</a> mean for the Persian Gulf oil states? With low crude prices, high supply and global economic challenges, it is natural to wonder whether the level of dependence on petrodollars by Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries bodes ill for their future. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most predictable outcome of the current oil glut is that it spells doom for the Arab oil monarchs, who will no longer be able to provide their citizens with massive payouts and social welfare benefits. However, a look at the realities of the GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – shows this outcome is far from certain.</p>
<p>Instead, as petrodollars become less of a global force amid <a href="http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2015/08/how-resilient-is-saudi-arabia-to-a-prolonged-oil-price-slump/">specific domestic policy dilemmas</a>, changes are likely to be more noticeable on the regional and global levels. </p>
<h2>Arab Gulf states already looking beyond oil</h2>
<p>As <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100161970&fa=author&person_id=5098">one expert notes</a>, the oil monarchs’ endurance is grounded in a tight royal family elite who have options for political reform that can keep kings in power even if oil revenues fall. <a href="http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199660063.do">Another recent study observes</a> the importance of stable, coercive state institutions that remain linked to Arab leaderships when a successful dynastic transfer of power occurred, as has been the case in most Gulf Arab states. </p>
<p>A third relevant point here is that Arab Gulf oil states have already been planning for decades to shift to less petro-driven societies. The United Arab Emirates has, for example, become a global center of air traffic, trade and tourism. </p>
<p>These strategies may accrue the added benefit of branding particular Gulf states’ putative post-oil identities, such as <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100190900">Qatar’s reputation</a> as a foreign policy and international mediating actor. </p>
<p>Finally, the current disappointments, instability, and regional threats after the 2011 Arab uprisings, while not eliminating anti-regime protests, make many Arab citizens value stability over foment, as appears true for Egyptians under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.</p>
<p>Thus, even if major challenges persist – such as youth malaise in Saudi Arabia or hostility between Sunni and Shi’a citizens of Bahrain – decreasing fiscal benefits from oil would likely not mean the end of Gulf Arab monarchies.</p>
<h2>No loss in regional role for Arab Gulf states seen</h2>
<p>Externally, GCC states have been characterized in recent years by a combination of efforts to assert influence abroad and internal rivalry. Arab Gulf countries have used their global economic prominence to influence Middle Eastern events. For example, Qatar has fostered media, like al-Jazeera, and supported universities that have influenced regional and global political debates; the country also took direct roles in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. </p>
<p>At the same time, individual Gulf states have used their ample coffers to pursue different approaches to key issues, such as Saudi and Qatari disagreement on whether to fund strong Islamist political groups in Egypt and Syria.</p>
<p>Amid a generally more unstable regional climate, declining petrodollars may affect the level of engagement and intraregional squabbles of Gulf Arab countries. This is perhaps most evident in the recent policies of Qatar’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21580197-remarkable-emir-bows-out-hard-act-follow">young new emir.</a> Qatar has pared back some of its transnational involvement and decreased funding to the Qatar Foundation, its major entity coordinating educational and research production. </p>
<p>Moreover, Qatar has brought its foreign policy priorities more in line with those of other GCC members, particularly Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have taken on a new costly regional policy initiative in their war in Yemen, and a campaign to limit Iranian global influence if the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal">nuclear deal</a> goes forward. Yet this level of engagement is likely to be pared back gradually, as we are seeing with Qatar.</p>
<p>Since state fragmentation, socioeconomic discontent, and challenges such as the threat of the Islamic State or ISIS and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-refugees-time-to-get-serious-about-preventing-a-lost-generation-of-arab-youth-43568">refugee crisis</a> are only intensifying in the Middle East, Gulf states are unlikely to rest easy in their region any time soon. </p>
<h2>Changes ahead for Gulf states’ foreign policies</h2>
<p>However, dwindling means to fund foreign policy will likely mean at least three noticeable major shifts. </p>
<p>First, the sheer number of foreign migrant workers in GCC countries, mostly from South and Southeast Asia, will decrease, albeit gradually. This is not an easy shift, given how much Gulf citizens depend on noncitizen labor in the construction and service industries. As the intense infrastructural growth and urban expansion in the GCC starts to wane, the challenge of facility support and maintenance will remain great, still necessitating a large external labor force.</p>
<p>Yet, reductions will occur, and these reductions should make Gulf states’ relations with Asian governments more grounded in actual policy issues of mutual concern, rather than mainly on concerns arising from worker mistreatment.</p>
<p>Second, the Gulf states will have little alternative but to continue depending on external security support, presumably the US. In the past few years, dissension over Iran and other issues has led Saudi leaders to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/10/saudi-reassess-relations-with-us-20131022213218439646.html">signal decreased policy alignment with Washington</a>. If petrodollar coffers dwindle, Gulf states will have less ability to pursue regional initiatives at odds with more dominant military powers. In the medium run, this suggests that the GCC, whether it likes it or not, is stuck with the US.</p>
<p>But what if energy diversification and the oil glut make the US feel that it is no longer stuck with the GCC? Although this scenario is <a href="http://www.agsiw.org/stakes-have-rarely-been-higher-for-us-gulf-relations/">unlikely</a>, GCC worry that the US may turn away from Gulf Arab allies, along with Iran’s possible growing influence in the region, may encourage it to find ways to intensify, and avoid duplication in, its foreign policy involvements. </p>
<p>This third likely consequence of decreasing petrodollars might even take the form of <a href="http://www.grc.net/index.php?frm_module=contents&frm_action=detail_book&frm_type_id=&op_lang=en&override=Research+Papers+%3E+A+Gulf+Conference+for+Security+and+Cooperation+Could+Bring+Peace+and+Greater+Security+to+the+Middle+East&sec=Contents&fr">new transnational entities that could heighten</a> the potential for Iran to be a regional partner, rather than an antagonist. </p>
<p>In short, Arab Gulf states may have a lot more staying power even in relatively lean times than a simple link between oil revenue and stability would predict. </p>
<p>Still, the Middle East is not getting any calmer politically, and GCC economic vulnerability will make for some real adjustments in global dynamics. Thus, whatever happens with Iran or elsewhere in the region, this is not a time for Washington or the Gulf states to pivot away from one another, which I suspect leaders on both sides believe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46658/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>American consumers may welcome lower gas prices, but the drop in oil revenues could impact Arab Gulf states and Middle East security. A scholar examines the realities of decreased oil revenues.David Mednicoff, Assistant Professor of Public Policy; Director of Accelerated Degree Programs, Center for Public Policy and Adminstration; and Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.