tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/pierre-nkurunziza-18503/articlesPierre Nkurunziza – The Conversation2024-01-30T10:09:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177022024-01-30T10:09:59Z2024-01-30T10:09:59ZBurundi’s quota for women in politics has had mixed results, but that’s no reason to scrap it<p>Since 2005, Burundi has <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">set quotas</a> to ensure that the country’s three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa), as well as women, are represented in its parliament, central government and municipal administrations. Its constitution states that women should make up at least <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">30% of these institutions</a>. </p>
<p>The senate, Burundi’s highest chamber of parliament, recently started a <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/review-constitutionalized-ethnic-quotas-burundi-turning-point">process of evaluating</a> ethnic quotas in political institutions. This <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/burundi--ethnic-quota-system-under-senate-evaluation/7210281.html">process</a> is expected to lead to recommendations on whether quotas should continue to be used. Regrettably, the evaluation lacks methodological rigour and transparency.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=hAOjiu8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researchers</a> with a focus on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=9Gwdmm8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">gender representation</a> in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/search?q=Stef%20Vandeginste">politics</a>, we believe this is a missed opportunity. Gender and ethnic quotas have been adopted in Burundi as a forward-looking solution to sustainable peace. A decision about removing them should be based on whether they have met (or can meet) their goals. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/00020397231203021">recent paper</a>, we examined whether gender quotas foster Burundian women’s political representation. </p>
<p>We drew on data covering the period between October 2001 and June 2020 to determine three things:</p>
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<li><p>whether Burundian political actors abide by the gender quotas</p></li>
<li><p>the relative importance of ministerial portfolios allocated to women </p></li>
<li><p>whether these gender quotas have had an effect on government positions where they aren’t mandated. </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-representation-ethnicity-trumps-gender-in-burundi-and-rwanda-104146">Political representation: ethnicity trumps gender in Burundi and Rwanda</a>
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<p>We found that gender quotas have gradually resulted in women being assigned to prominent ministerial portfolios. The impact of this, however, has been mixed. </p>
<p>Women have remained confined to typically “feminine”, care-giving ministerial portfolios, such as health and education, over nearly two decades. They have been excluded from portfolios such as defence, security and foreign affairs. Their representation as senior advisers to the president or as CEOs of parastatals has remained marginal. </p>
<p>Our research illustrates that embedding gender quotas in the constitution can fast-track representation. But it doesn’t necessarily spiral beyond the targeted positions and institutions. This implies that any policy targeting an increase in women’s representation needs to take into account the broader political setting. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13537113.2022.2047248">formal mechanisms</a> to enforce gender quotas in government and parliament in Burundi are in place, they are absent in other important and sought-after positions, such as parastatal CEO or provincial governor.</p>
<h2>Meeting the gender quota</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have been consistently respected in Burundi since 2005. </p>
<p>The country has one of the highest shares of women in parliament. It ranks <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf#page=18">41st</a> out of 145 countries in the 2023 global political empowerment metric. </p>
<p>This is mostly because gender quotas are compatible with clientelistic politics. Most women positions are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=4">allocated</a> to people related to key regime figures. This has led to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021">increasing assignment</a> of women to key portfolios like justice, health and education. </p>
<p>In theory, one might <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CBA8C55CF243B6364C5DCE5D0D0AAAC6/S1743923X15000434a.pdf/div-class-title-rules-of-ministerial-recruitment-div.pdf">expect</a> that gender quotas would affect both the supply and demand side of women political elites, triggering an upsurge in women’s representation. </p>
<p>Burundi’s cabinet ministers, of whom 30% are women, nominate individuals to head departments under their jurisdiction. The pool of qualified candidates for such positions has increased as more women take on political responsibilities. Ideally, this should facilitate the nomination of women, even when there are no quotas.</p>
<p>But the gender quotas in Burundi have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundian-women-want-greater-say-running-country">fallen short</a> of spilling over into quota-free positions. Women are still under-represented as senior advisers to the president, permanent secretaries in ministries or CEOs of parastatals.</p>
<p>Our interviews with political elites and women civil society activists revealed two ways women are sidelined.</p>
<p>First, women are not fully embedded in the formal and informal structures that decide who to appoint where and when. </p>
<p>For instance, women are not in the ruling party’s main decision-making body, <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004355910/B9789004355910_031.xml">Conseil des Sage</a> (council of the wise). They are also not part of the ruling party’s Cercle des Généraux (circle of generals). This is a group of former army and police generals who enjoy a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2017.1381819">de facto veto right</a> to any important decisions. Equally important, women aren’t appointed as provincial and municipal party executive secretaries. These are the career brokers and connectors between grassroots ruling party structures, the party’s leadership and the president.</p>
<p>Second, the ruling party has increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">relied on coercion</a> to maintain its dominance in politics since 2005. It relies heavily on hardliners, most of whom are former combatants in Imbonerakure, the party’s youth league, or Abahumure, party veterans. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">paramilitary power configuration</a> that has prevailed in Burundi since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Nkurunziza">ruling party’s accession to power</a>, the ability to wage violence has become a valued “skill set”. This is a comparative disadvantage for women, leading to their under-representation in appointed positions where gender quotas don’t apply.</p>
<h2>Opportunistic use of quotas</h2>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=11">Our research found</a> that women made important gains in high-value ministerial positions, in cabinet positions and in provincial governor positions in the 2015-2020 legislature. Their representation in high-visibility ministries increased, growing their political role. </p>
<p>On the surface of it, it may appear to be due to the gender quota policy. However, this would have taken a longer time to produce the desired effects. In our view, the 2015-2020 legislature resulted from a <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=hrbregionalcoverage-spring2016#page=2">chaotic and contested electoral process</a> in 2015 that was marred by massive human rights violations. </p>
<p>This election prompted key donors, such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government">European Union</a>, to withdraw support to the government. We see what resulted as an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2CB1F142F6235323B08B506601376DE9/S0017257X2200032Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-appointment-of-women-to-authoritarian-cabinets-in-africa-div.pdf">opportunistic use</a> of gender quotas as a window dressing strategy. It was an effort to sanitise a regime that had become an international pariah. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have the potential to increase women’s representation in decision-making positions. However, to lead to sustainable change, governments need to take into account informal political practices. These include the role played by multiple layers of clientelistic networks in accessing key political positions. Women’s integration in political parties’ formal and informal structures would better level the playing field.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any state policy looking to increase women’s representation must take into account formal and informal political practices.Reginas Ndayiragije, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpPetra Meier, Professor of Politics, University of AntwerpStef Vandeginste, Associate Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909942022-10-10T13:34:44Z2022-10-10T13:34:44ZBurundi after exit of Nkurunziza’s men - what Evariste Ndayishimiye should do next<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488238/original/file-20221005-11-3peami.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi President Evariste Ndayishimiye addresses the UN General Assembly.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Mary Altaffer-Pool/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi’s president, General Évariste Ndayishimiye, recently sacked the country’s prime minister Guillaume Bunyoni <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/rumours-of-a-coup-bedevil-burundi-3938998">after alleging</a> that Bunyoni was plotting a coup against the government. </p>
<p>The dismissal was a public display of divisions within the ruling party (CNDD-FDD) about what direction the country should go in, and what the government’s priorities should be. </p>
<p>In the preceding months, it had become clear that the CNDD-FDD’s authority was waning as a result of these internal divisions. There were signs that the party was slowly losing its popularity ahead of the next legislative and municipal elections in 2025 and presidential elections in 2027. The rumoured coup plot was part of this trajectory.</p>
<p>The president’s decision to fire Bunyoni followed a standoff between the political actors over several days. There were mounting fears that the country could descend into violence again. </p>
<p>Based on our <a href="https://www.academia.edu/33026982/Mapping_Conflict_and_Peace_in_Burundi_An_Analysis_of_the_Burundi_Conflict_Terrain">research</a> on the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/Negotiations%20and%20Power%20Sharing%20Arrangements%20in%20Burundi%27s%20Peace%20Process.pdf">peace process in Burundi</a> over the past 12 years, it is apparent that the president and former prime minister represent two divergent political groups of influence within Burundi’s political arena. The two groups are dominated by high-ranking officers – the generals – with different ideologies regarding the management of the country and social welfare. </p>
<p>The first group is made up of influential officers from the former rebel movement, CNDD-FDD. This group is striving to bring some deep reforms following decades of poor governance marked by endemic poverty and rampant corruption. </p>
<p>The second group is composed of powerful people, among them many high-ranking police officers. For the past 15 years, members of this group have been enriching themselves at the expense of the country’s development. In the eyes of many Burundians, the sacked prime minister was the face of this group.</p>
<p>Bunyoni’s removal is an attempt by President Ndayishimiye to get rid of corrupt officials whose presence within the highest echelons of state administration was derailing government’s efforts to repair the country’s economy in the aftermath of <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-of-sanctions-burundi-can-start-to-recover-and-rebuild-177087">sanctions that were imposed in 2015</a> after former President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term in office. Ndayishimiye’s initiatives included increasing access to fertilisers for farmers, supplying basic necessities such as sugar and cement, and improving the energy supply. </p>
<p>In removing Bunyoni, Ndayishimiye has communicated his commitment to his electoral promises. And his action seems to have been well received by Burundians. The hope is that, with a new and young team in cabinet, the president will be able to meet his electoral slogan:</p>
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<p><a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2022-03-30/Burundi-president-outlines-food-security-plan-to-FAO-chief-18O2Ew3dTVe/index.html">Every mouth has food, every pocket has money</a>.</p>
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<h2>The backdrop</h2>
<p>Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has been fraught with violent conflict. The root of this conflict has been a complex interplay between ethnic and political factors. This has resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of people. Many others <a href="https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/ubushingantahe_as_a_base_for_political_transformation_in_burundi_2.pdf">have fled</a> to other countries. In 1998, <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1207">peace negotiations</a> began in Arusha, Tanzania yielding a deal in August 2000. </p>
<p>At this stage an agreement had been reached by the main conflicting parties – Uprona, Frodebu and Palipehutu. But violence continued between the government army, the CNDD-FDD, and the military wing of Palipehutu, the Forces nationales pour la libération (FNL). </p>
<p>After further negotiations, the CNDD-FDD signed the ceasefire, but FNL continued fighting. So when the 2005 general elections were held, not all conflicting parties were part of the process.</p>
<p>The 2005 elections were seen by many as a significant <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/112/446/72/10397">turning point</a> in the decades-long violence in Burundi despite being held in the midst of ongoing conflict. The peace negotiations ended in 2009, when the FNL finally gave up their arms and became an official political party. This was in the hope that they might stand a chance to win in the 2010 elections. </p>
<p>The CNDD-FDD won the presidential elections after most of the opposition parties boycotted the polls. </p>
<p>Conflict erupted again in 2015 in response to President Nkurunziza’s running for a third term in office. But generally, it’s been a smooth ride for CNDD-FDD in the last 17 years as a divided and weak opposition has been unable to present a united front. Nkurunziza remained in power until his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52984119">sudden death</a>, on 8 June 2020.</p>
<p>When Ndayishimiye took over the country’s leadership, he initially did not remove members of the administration left behind by the Nkurunziza regime. Those retained included the finance minister and the governor of the central bank. Also spared was Nkurunziza’s chief of cabinet, General Gabriel Nizigama, one of the most influential and powerful officers. Nizigima was removed at the same time as Bunyoni.</p>
<p>The cabinet headed by Bunyoni was seen as a soft and slow transition from a system established a decade earlier by Nkurunziza. Nkurunziza, a rebel leader, came to power in 2005 in the framework of the Arusha peace process. The Arusha pact allowed his movement – the CNDD-FDD – to convert to a political party that won the first post-conflict elections. </p>
<p>Bunyoni’s appointment was criticised by many, including the donor community and other foreign partners. Bunyoni has been on the US and EU sanction list over allegations of being involved in the violence that targeted opposition leaders. Recently, he was accused of derailing many of the government projects despite being the prime minister and chief of the executive. His firing was one of the tough decisions Ndayishimiye needed to make.</p>
<p>The departure of Bunyoni from the government signals the arrival of a new political order after two years of a difficult transition. For many Burundians it is a start of a new era which brings some hope despite the many challenges the country still faces.</p>
<h2>Tough times</h2>
<p>Burundi has experienced a fraught economic situation over the past seven years as a result of the 2015 political crisis, and economic sanctions imposed by western donors. The economic downturn has led to fiscal and balance of payment difficulties. To compensate for the loss of external resources, the government mobilised internal resources, but this has not been sufficient for ever-increasing social demands driven by sustained population growth.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic was yet another terrible blow to the fragile economic recovery. According to the <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/155701641854790325/burundi-covid-19-emergency-preparedness-and-response-project-additional-financing">recent World Bank report</a> the consequences of the pandemic intensified macroeconomic imbalances in Burundi’s economy. Economic growth was estimated at 1.8% in 2021 compared to 0.3% in 2020, supported by an easing of restrictions related to COVID-19. However, inflation is projected to remain high at around 9% in 2022, particularly following the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on food and oil prices worldwide.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>So, the question is whether this political shakeup will bring the much expected reforms that many Burundians want to see. Will this political shift create better conditions to tackle economic challenges and put Burundi back on the path of economic and social recovery? </p>
<p>It is still early to make any reliable prognosis. But the decisions Ndayishimiye made show that he is willing to start a new chapter for Burundi. It will be very difficult to address all the challenges the country is facing. These include a weak economy hampered by the current geopolitical conjunctures, a political elite that lacks a sense of responsibility, and one of the youngest and fastest growing populations on the continent. </p>
<p>To address these pressing issues, the president will need to mobilise both internal forces and international support. He should also be able to manage existing resources well to attract the right investors. </p>
<p>So far, there seems to be no sign of a return to ethnic or political conflict. The threat to Burundi’s future lies in the economic realm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190994/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Hajayandi works as a Senior Project Leader for the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa. He receives funding from the Embassy of Norway in South Africa and from the Robert Bosch Stiftung. He is affiliated with the Centre for Mediation in Africa at the University of Pretoria. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cori Wielenga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The president has used coup rumour to get rid of anti-reform elements in government, and consolidate his power ahead of 2025 electionsPatrick Hajayandi, Research Affiliate, University of PretoriaCori Wielenga, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Sciences and Director of the Centre for Mediation in Africa, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1868442022-08-01T13:55:11Z2022-08-01T13:55:11ZBurundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474611/original/file-20220718-72671-x6b330.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sorting newly picked coffee beans.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thierry BrŽsillon-GODONG/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi, which marked 60 years of independence on 1 July 2022, ranks as the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/256547/the-20-countries-with-the-lowest-gdp-per-capita/">poorest country on the planet</a> in terms of GDP per capita. This must be understood in the light of a <a href="https://recherche-afriquedesgrandslacs.pantheonsorbonne.fr/activites-et-programmes/burundi-recherche-son-histoire">history punctuated by political upheavals</a>. Until 1996, the country lived to the rhythm of <a href="https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/burundi-1962-present/">coups</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972.html">massacres</a> and political <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-military-behind-1993-assassination-president">assassinations</a> – before plunging into a long civil war. </p>
<p>Peace was eventually restored in 2005. However, the country returned to authoritarian governance in 2015. Since then, the UN has noted progress but continues to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100092">denounce</a> the political violence that plagues the country. </p>
<p>How did Burundi come to this? Why is change so slow to arrive?</p>
<p>I have studied the politics and economies around the Great Lakes region for more than 40 years – including the links between governance and poverty. The countries that form the region are Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. , Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. It’s my view that the end of the Belgian and British colonial empires <a href="https://www.persee.fr/issue/tiers_0040-7356_1986_num_27_106">upset</a> the political, economic and social frameworks of the two nations formed out of the former <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ruanda-Urundi">Ruanda-Urundi</a> colonial entity. </p>
<p>Present-day Rwanda and Burundi served as reservoirs of labour for the exploitation of the wealth of the vast agricultural and mining areas of the Belgian Congo to the west and the British colonies in the east. Refocused within their borders following independence in the 1962, they were reduced to small, overcrowded and landlocked micro-states.</p>
<p>Burundi is a country familiar with <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/tiers_0040-7356_1991_num_32_127_4651">various military regimes since independence</a>. These regimes have succeeded in appropriating state resources while ordinary citizens – mostly rural farmers – have borne the brunt of the civil war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-gone-wrong-in-burundis-search-for-stability-54014">Explainer: what’s gone wrong in Burundi’s search for stability</a>
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<p>The divide that has emerged between military elites and “people of the hills” – as rural farmers are commonly referred to – runs deeper than ethnic and regional differences. The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state. But most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation, including at the grassroots levels where party delegates, often peasants, do as directed. </p>
<p>The state has imposed itself as the exclusive economic operator. Civil servants and party cadres programme and direct investments. Ordinary people are for the most part powerless.</p>
<h2>Nkurunziza’s missed opportunity</h2>
<p>Following the gradual return of peace nearly 20 years ago, Pierre Nkurunziza was elected president in 2005. Drawn from the majority Hutu ethnic group, Nkurunziza ended 25 years of pro-Tutsi military regimes. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422339#metadata_info_tab_contents">minority Tutsi make up 14% of the population and the Hutu 85%</a>. In the next five years, the president and his party – the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) – <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/post-nkurunziza-total-supremacy-cndd-fdd">went about consolidating power</a>.</p>
<p>Hopes for stability were stronger at the next election in 2010. For the first time in the country’s history, voters were called upon to vote at the normal end of an electoral cycle. CNDD-FDD secured another mandate thanks to a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/burundi-ruling-party-wins-parliamentary-elections-99322559/155447.html">divided opposition</a> and the charismatic personality of the incumbent president, who enjoyed massive support from rural populations. </p>
<p>A party that had managed to reconcile ethnic divisions and to <a href="https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Burundi-CNDD-FDD-1994-2004.pdf">integrate</a> the armed forces with former rebels now had a resounding national mandate.</p>
<p>Unchallenged, Nkurunziza concentrated power in his hands under a de facto one-party state. A youth militia loyal to his party kept an eye on dissent among local populations and neutralised any organised opposition. But the mood soured quickly when Nkurunziza <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">sought a “third term”</a> in the 2015 elections, contrary to the constitution.</p>
<p>A popular protest was immediate and strengthened despite the mobilisation of the police. Within weeks a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/14/burundi-violence-coup-protests-bujumbura-president-pierre-nkurunziza">failed military coup</a> laid bare the fractures within the armed forces. A <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/26/april-2015-june-2020-chronology-repression-media-and-civil-society-burundi">violent repression</a> followed in which freedom of expression and independent media were crushed. </p>
<p>In July 2015, after elections “<a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2015/07/315472-burundi-lonu-estime-que-lenvironnement-general-netait-pas-propice-des-elections">neither free nor credible</a>” according to the UN, the CNDD-FDD exceeded the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza’s victory was Burundi’s loss. Amid the repression of opponents, the country’s economy slowed down, foreign capital took flight and infrastructure crumbled. There was looting of public resources and a sharp reduction in social benefits. </p>
<p>At the end of his third term, the leaders of the CNDD-FDD party were happy to see the back of the <a href="https://gl-news.com/news/burundi-to-pay-530-thousand-dollars-to-the-president-who-leaves-office/">“eternal supreme leader”</a> who had become a liability. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nkurunziza-left-a-troubling-legacy-burundis-new-leader-has-much-to-mend-140972">Nkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi's new leader has much to mend</a>
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<h2>The electoral rescue of 2020</h2>
<p>Burundi’s GDP had been <a href="https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Burundi-report-v2.pdf">battered badly</a> during the civil war, which ended in 2005. It was on the rise for ten years from 2005 to 2014. Following the Nkurunziza-instigated political crisis in 2015 the economy dipped sharply again. Ranked second poorest country in the world in 2013 and 2014, it fell to the poorest in 2015 and has remained there ever since. The UN <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI">Human Development Index</a>, which measures longevity, education and inequality, also attests to this deterioration. Burundi was ranked 180th in 2015, falling to 185th in 2019 and 2020.</p>
<p>Thus, in almost all socio-economic measures, Burundi’s performance is among the lowest on the planet thanks mainly to conflict and <a href="https://iwacu.global.ssl.fastly.net/une-annee-du-president-ndayishimiye-un-bilan-economique-indolent/">elite corruption</a>. </p>
<p>The failed coup of May 2015 upset a delicate balance in which the army – including former rebels – and the police were jointly managed. Pro-Nkurunziza <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/coup-d-etat-au-burundi-32942">elements</a> in the army who crushed the coup sensed an opportunity for <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">self-enrichment</a> to match the fortunes of their senior Tutsi colleagues and graduates of military schools. </p>
<p>Hitherto contained or concealed, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/burundi/au-coeur-de-la-crise-burundaise-iv-la-rente-du-maintien-de-la-paix-en-question">this “financial catch-up”</a> was transformed into an open competition for personal enrichment commensurate with each person’s powers.</p>
<p>In May 2020, General Evariste Ndayishimiye, <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">a wise and withdrawn man</a>, became the new president. Nkurunziza died shortly afterwards officially from COVID-19, a disease whose danger he had always underestimated. Burundi, on the other hand, continues to suffer the effects of Nkurunziza’s political legacy. </p>
<h2>Struggle between elites</h2>
<p>Having experienced since independence all forms of divisions that can be exploited by authoritarian regimes, the “people of the hills” now know that their lot is the result of struggles between elites for the capture of national resources.</p>
<p>Only the re-appropriation of the state, to make it legitimate once more in the eyes of the population, could free resources for their purposes. This implies that peasants emancipate themselves from <a href="https://iwacu42.global.ssl.fastly.net/quand-le-ministre-ndirakobuca-prend-la-grosse-seringue/">co-opted administrative and economic bureaucracies</a> which have appropriated power and wealth by force, first for the benefit of a Tutsi and then of a Hutu elite. Burundians need to impose themselves through free and credible elections as self-organised citizens responsible for the future of a democratic country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peasantry still provides almost all the resources of the party-state, yet most of the agrarian policy decisions are taken without consultation.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1528742021-01-08T15:58:53Z2021-01-08T15:58:53ZTrump-inspired mob at U.S. Capitol follows a familiar path of election violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377705/original/file-20210108-21-1qf437j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5007%2C3320&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trump supporters try to break through a police barrier at the U.S. Capitol. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/John Minchillo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The siege of the U.S. Capitol by Donald Trump’s supporters follows identifiable paths and patterns of election <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/702127">violence seen around the world</a>.</p>
<p>Election violence is rarely spontaneous. It is intentionally organized in order to influence the process and outcome of elections. It is not a coup, but it is a close cousin. Coups are about change in power, often with a military backing.</p>
<p>Election violence begins in three clear stages, all of which have unfolded during the recent events in Washington.</p>
<p>First, the perpetrators convince their followers that their political grievances cannot be resolved through <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319889657">institutional channels of democracy</a>. This explains why Trump has relentlessly insisted the presidential <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-removes-trump-video-capitol-siege-2021-1">election was a fraud</a>. Individuals may lash out spontaneously, but <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43821581?casa_token=O27Y4X6VGyQAAAAA%3AkGxk-8Q_eQ9LLYh-RFqzOX1Jn0ixWH4C7RzZPfwwXEzotmRuuoAMf6Fs-r1LvKaktCPA44lM8iv7FnWefsd91QUD4Fhe2bNczOqJ8NRIS4Y9PqIOrA&seq=1">legitimizing violent acts</a> is a strategy usually groomed over time until it’s whipped into a frenzy.</p>
<h2>A traceable timing</h2>
<p>The second stage happens when violent currents are pushed past the breaking point during expected political events, which gives election violence a traceable timing.</p>
<p>The attack on the Capitol was a textbook example of such timing. It happened as Congress was certifying the electoral college votes — a normally dull and largely ceremonial chore. As well, the mayhem immediately followed elections in Georgia which cost Republicans control of the Senate.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1346818855298072576"}"></div></p>
<p>Flash points in electoral processes become triggers for election violence.</p>
<p>The Washington violence takes a page from <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">Kenya in 2017</a>, when opposition leader Railia Odinga alleged election results had been tampered with. Odinga refused to accept the loss. Deadly riots broke out around the timing of vote counting and the swearing-in of President Uhuru Kenyatta.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/muted-response-to-thai-coup-hints-at-other-nations-limited-options-27100">The 2014 coup in Thailand</a> followed a series of protests that mirrored the counting of votes and the dissolution of parliament.</p>
<h2>Symbolic targets</h2>
<p>The third stage of election violence involves a symbolic target. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02255189.2013.809334?casa_token=fPQtHYN5Vn0AAAAA:QHuabYNn0--j6PmM8PieURnDcfuyWA_1Al4syerDUpwMbs38CsGZh6qgXEkxu1EadBUMW4Nv4qo">Most peaceful protests take to the streets against a policy, event or an individual</a>. Creative banners, powerful speakers and disruption of traffic tend to be part of the package. Rioters, not protesters, attack the symbolic landscapes of power. </p>
<p>Although countless protests are held in the U.S. capital every year, the events of Jan. 6 were different. It was not a protest. It was a rejection of the institution of Congress itself.</p>
<p>This is a disturbing break in American politics. The last attempted occupation of the Capitol was in the summer of 1932, <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=axLCDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=hoover+bonus+army&ots=OrtjN9_cAn&sig=HsTifcEXYEIFK1NKg52pXT5HiQ4&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=hoover%20bonus%20army&f=false">when President Herbert Hoover refused to pay pensions to First World War veterans</a>. Two veterans lost their lives when Hoover ordered the protesters cleared out. </p>
<p>The veterans sought pay from government, but they did not attempt to destroy government. Trump’s supporters were the first armed, domestic anti-democratic forces to ever occupy the building.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>What’s even more disturbing about the electoral violence script is what <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032321719881812">may yet happen</a> should Trump supporters shift their anger from buildings towards human beings. Looking at the history of global election violence, this threat can remain well beyond election day.</p>
<p>Election violence is the most extreme expression of discontent within the outer bounds of democratic processes.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/once-you-engage-in-political-violence-it-becomes-easier-to-do-it-again-an-expert-on-political-violence-reflects-on-events-at-the-capitol-152801">'Once you engage in political violence, it becomes easier to do it again' – an expert on political violence reflects on events at the Capitol</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>When the target of the attack turns from the objects of partisan politics to the symbol of democracy itself, it is an overture to civil war. The mobs at the Capitol waved Trump flags — an attack on behalf of the executive branch of government against the legislative branch.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The U.S. Capitol dome is in the background as a large Trump flags flaps in the foreground near protesters." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377706/original/file-20210108-13-1pk3aac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many of those who stormed the U.S. Capitol were carrying Trump flags.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/John Minchillo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Justice and the rule of law</h2>
<p>How does election violence get resolved? The best-case scenario is through human rights and the rule of law.</p>
<p>Perpetrators should be brought to justice and tried for their crimes (especially the instigators). Failing that, police repression and dispersion of violent mobs can put a stop to immediate destruction. (There are ongoing investigations into why <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/police-response-to-trump-rioters-and-blm-night-and-day-experts-1.5256386">the violent pro-Trump supporters were treated more favourably by police</a> than the peaceful Black Lives Matter protesters who gathered in Washington last year.)</p>
<p>Finding resolution will mean dealing with Trump’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/10/28/928336749/trump-has-weaponized-masculinity-as-president-heres-why-it-matters">toxic hyper-masculine ego</a>. Like Trump, sore election losers worldwide often publicly flex their muscles and stroke their bruised egos by fuelling chaos and violence in the streets.</p>
<p>How have other instigators of election violence been demobilized? </p>
<p>Often, self-centred rulers like Trump are wooed out of power by appeals to their egos. FIFA, the world soccer body, was asked by Swiss authorities in 2015 to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36104168">offer a position to Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza</a> (a soccer aficionado) to help ease <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/out-of-options-in-burundi/">Burundi’s political crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Sometimes glamorous parachutes are offered up, such as when Yahya Jammeh, the president of The Gambia, went into exile in <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2017/03/22/exiled-yahya-jammeh-works-on-equatorial-guinea-farm-for-the-cameras//">Equatorial Guinea</a> after an election crisis in 2016. </p>
<p>Backdoor, <a href="https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1192338&dswid=-9776">“big man” diplomacy</a> is a bloodless way to get rid of fragile male egotists like Trump. But it comes at a terrible cost.</p>
<h2>Root causes of violence can remain</h2>
<p>Granting legitimacy or exile to dangerous narcissists allows for the underlying cause of the violence to remain. It is how violence replicates itself and amplifies over time. Democracy is weakened over the long term. It’s not the right solution, nor the morally desirable one. </p>
<p>The attack on the U.S. Capitol follows historic patterns of election violence that need to be stopped in their tracks. Any solution that shields Trump’s limitless ego and retains the legitimacy of his actions is reprehensible. Trump’s <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1347334804052844550">after-the-fact commitment to a “smooth” transition</a> must not absolve him of his seditious actions.</p>
<p>If the United States is, as it claims, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-07/-american-exceptionalism-on-the-line-after-capitol-hill-stormed">the global cradle of democracy</a>, then Trump must face the rule of law within that democracy and be prosecuted for sedition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152874/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The attack on the U.S. Capitol follows some familiar patterns of violence inspired by politicians around the world who won’t accept electoral defeats.Gabrielle Bardall, Research Fellow, CIPS, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaRobert Huish, Associate Professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1409722020-06-18T08:50:52Z2020-06-18T08:50:52ZNkurunziza left a troubling legacy: Burundi’s new leader has much to mend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342633/original/file-20200618-41234-152e7l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi's president-elect Evariste Ndayishimiye signs a condolence book for Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Photo by Evrard Ngendakumana/Xinhua via Getty) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pierre Nkurunziza, who presided over Burundi’s destiny for 15 years, died in June at the age of 55. He died three weeks after the election of his successor, after which he’d been bestowed with the title of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics/outgoing-burundi-president-nkurunziza-famed-for-soccer-and-violence-dies-idUSKBN23G24H">“supreme guide of patriotism”</a>. </p>
<p>The cost of Nkurunziza’s re-election in 2015 for an unlawful third – and final – term is well-known. It brought oppressive laws, brutal repression, arbitrary arrests and huge groups of refugees fleeing overseas. The GDP per person fell to the world’s lowest, overseas investment collapsed, the country was marginalised both regionally and internationally. Ethnic rhetoric underpinned political mobilisation that feeds on the pervasive confrontation with the Rwandan model. </p>
<p>His death means that his successor, Évariste Ndayishimiye, faces a great challenge. It’s a challenge that he is not prepared for, given the pressing demands that result from the country’s deteriorated political, economic and social situation. </p>
<p>Initial decisions by a president usually define the rest of their term. A good place for Ndayishimiye to start would be the immediate release of journalists and various observers condemned for simply doing their job. That is, providing information and monitoring the electoral process. </p>
<p>He would thus show that he is willing to entertain questions on the functioning of institutions, even the abuses of his peers. Hopefully, he might even be willing to deal with the corruption of some of his colleagues. </p>
<p>But above all, at the end of an election that was not dominated by ethnic contestation, he could be the first president likely to put an end to all forms of partisanship that could encourage or revive this cleavage. </p>
<p>It’s a deep and troubling legacy that he’s been bequeathed.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza’s rise to power was hardly auspicious. </p>
<p>In 1993, after 30 years of military rule led by ethnic minority Tutsi officers, Burundi held its first democratic elections. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was elected president in July, but was assassinated three months later during an attempted military coup. The country convulsed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/heurs-et-malheurs-du-modele-burundais-53279">decade of violence and wars</a>.</p>
<p>Painstaking negotiations facilitated by former South African president Nelson Mandela culminated in the Arusha Accords in August 2000. But the conflict dragged on for five more years, before a ceasefire eventually took effect and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundin%C3%A9gociations-la-pr%C3%A9sidence-de-la-transition-pose-probl%C3%A8me-%C3%A0-la-veille-du">the means of political transition</a> and the future constitutional framework were defined.</p>
<p>In 2003, the National Defence Force, which had been leading the country since 1966 after overturning the monarchy and proclaiming a republic, merged with the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the main arm of the pro-Hutu armed rebellion led by Nkurunziza. CNDD-FDD became a political party.</p>
<p>In 2005, a new constitution was adopted by referendum. The general elections followed in which CNDD-FDD candidates won nearly all seats by a landslide. These elected representatives carried Nkurunziza to the head of state. Nkurunziza quickly ingratiated himself with the population through <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/bilan-des-r%C3%A9formes-sociales-de-l%C3%A8re-nkurunziza-au-burundi/a-53431355">reforms</a> that aimed to meet urgent social demands such as healthcare and education. </p>
<p>However, the true power was still in the hands of a small council of the main officers who had organised the guerrilla movement and led the civil war. </p>
<p>At the same time, the party strengthened its position in all municipalities. Bit by bit, CNDD-FDD members took charge of all the social and economic activities for rural populations. <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/459791/politique/burundi-milliers-de-jeunes-imbonerakure-defilent-bujumbura/">Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the party</a>, became operational during the 2010 electoral campaign.</p>
<p>Five years later, the CNDD-FDD <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/155301/politique/large-victoire-du-cndd-fdd-aux-l-gislatives/">overwhelmingly won the 2010 municipal, presidential and legislative elections</a>. As the only candidate in the presidential election, due to boycotts from the opposition parties, Nkurunziza won <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20100630-reelection-surprise-president-nkurunziza-tete-burundi">with a substantial majority</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/report/2010/11/23/des-portes-qui-se-ferment/reduction-de-lespace-democratique-au-burundi">Thus began the slide into an authoritarian regime</a>. The main reason for this comes from the fact that during the 2010 elections, Nkurunziza’s party found itself in a position of strength that even they did not expect. The turmoil and division among the disordered opposition powers gave them free rein.</p>
<p>From then on, “civil society” organisations became the main areas of debate and mobilisation for political, economic and societal issues. </p>
<p>CNDD-FDD leaders were openly intent on taking control of civil society organisations. But this proved impossible in the run-up to the commemorations of the <a href="https://bdiagnews.com/economie/burundi-preparatifs-des-50-ans-dindependance-2/">50th anniversary of independence, in July 2012</a>, which thrust Burundi into the international spotlight. This required that authorities display an atmosphere of apparent political openness and relative national consensus.</p>
<p>The media and civil society organisations thrived like never before and were credited with the success of the public events organised for the occasion. Freedom of expression went far beyond the political issues at hand, and shows explicitly discussed the daily experience and aspirations of citizens. Debates on poverty, healthcare and unemployment were fair game.</p>
<p>All these endeavours found a large audience <a href="http://umr-developpement-societes.univ-paris1.fr/menu-haut/recherche/projets-de-recherche/afrique-des-grands-lacs/">in the country and beyond</a>. But this Burundian exceptionalism didn’t survive the president’s decision to aggressively end it for his own convenience.</p>
<h2>A third term at any cost</h2>
<p>There were mass demonstrations when Nkurunziza announced his candidature for a third term in <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/251198/politique/presidentielle-burundi-scrutin-calme-libre-credible-inclusif-selon-lonu/">2015</a>. This was a direct challenge to the constitution, which allows for a maximum of two terms. An attempted military rebellion was quickly snuffed out and the country found itself facing an insurmountable political impasse. </p>
<p>The president and generals <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/archive/burundi-des-poids-lourds-du-r%C3%A9gime-limog%C3%A9s/97191">Adolphe Nshyirimana and Guillaume Bunyoni</a> opted for <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2015-1-page-169.htm">heavy-handed tactics</a>. These included neutralising opposition parties, arresting and exiling CNDD-FDD dissidents and destroying independent radio stations. </p>
<p>The grim outcome forced CNDD-FDD leaders to push out a president who was also increasingly facing regional and international isolation. A new constitution, adopted in 2018, eliminated the main gains from the Arusha Accords in terms of democratic representation of all parties. The institutions in charge of truth-telling and laying down justice (the press, the courts, the electoral monitoring body) were brought into line. </p>
<p>After guaranteeing the outgoing president a sumptuous pension, the “most neutral” candidate, General <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burundi-qui-est-evariste-ndayishimiye-candidat-du-systeme-cndd-fdd-343510">Évariste Ndayishimiye</a>, became the new president in a contested election. His victory in the presidential election in May was <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/20200525-burundi-%C3%A9variste-ndayishimiye-d%C3%A9clar%C3%A9-vainqueur-de-l-%C3%A9lection-pr%C3%A9sidentielle">made official</a> only a few days before Nkurunziza’s death.</p>
<p>The maturity of the opposition, the firm <a href="https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/elections-2020-le-bilan-alarmant-des-eveques-catholiques/">position of the Catholic Church</a> on these results and, above all, a common fear, prevented a new crisis.</p>
<p>Whether Burundi can chart a different course under Ndayishimiye is unclear. Burundians must be hoping that it does.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Rosie Marsland for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en">Fast ForWord</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140972/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sudden death of Burundi’s former president, Pierre Nkurunziza, marks the end of a long reign, characterised by violent political crises.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1404922020-06-11T09:57:47Z2020-06-11T09:57:47ZWhy history will judge Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza harshly<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/341142/original/file-20200611-80778-1smmz5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Pierre Nkurunziza arrives to inaugurate Burundi's Chinese-built state house on September 27, 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Photo by ONESPHORE NibigIra/AFP via Getty Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pierre Nkurunziza, Burundi’s football-loving president and self-proclaimed pastor, has <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/buru0610.htm">died at the age of 55</a>. By all accounts this was death most cruel. He was soon to hand over power to his handpicked successor, Major General Evariste Ndayishimiye.</p>
<p>Ndayishimiye, the former army major, recently won a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200525-ruling-party-s-presidential-candidate-secures-resounding-win-in-burundi">controversial election</a> which was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/06/05/world/africa/05reuters-burundi-election.html">reaffirmed by the constitutional court</a> only a few days ago. This would have been the first time in Burundi’s history that power was transferred peacefully from one leader to another, albeit from the same party. </p>
<p>So what does Nkurunziza’s passing mean for the transition process in Burundi? And to Burundi’s regional relationships?</p>
<p>When Burundians look back, some will remember their president as a man who laid the foundation for a belated political transition. Others will see his departure as good riddance. History will judge Nkurunziza as someone who brought unnecessary pain to a nation that had long suffered from political misrule, but who in death bequeathed it a golden opportunity for renewal.</p>
<h2>Iron fist</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza had been president of Burundi for the past 15 years. He came to power first as a parliamentary nominee in 2005, later winning two controversial popular <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-25/burundi-president-wins-controversial-third-term/6648132">elections</a>. </p>
<p>He ruled with an iron fist, making few compromises. For example, his insistence in 2015 on changing the constitution to enable him to have a controversial third term in power plunged Burundi into civil unrest of near civil war proportions. <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/burundi-s-flawed-constitutional-referendum/">Thousands died</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/unhcr-burundi-crisis-propels-refugee-exodus-150626180155576.html">many fled</a> the country.</p>
<p>To many, Nkurunziza was a hardliner within his National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy party. He presided over wide-scale <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1013292">purges</a> of opponents and the muffling of the press. He also oversaw the rise of the much dreaded <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2015/04/28/who-are-imbonerakure-and-burundi-unravelling"></a><a href="https://africatimes.com/2019/12/17/report-burundis-imbonerakure-create-fear-ahead-of-2020-election/">Imbonerakure</a> – militias that terrorised any real and perceived opponents.</p>
<p>His untimely passing, therefore, presents the nation of 11 million with an opportunity to chart a new path. </p>
<h2>The transition</h2>
<p>We could anchor Burundi’s political transition to Nkurunziza’s decision not to seek a fourth term of office, which he <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32621442">first signalled</a> in 2015 and reiterated in 2018. Having muscled his way to a third term through the intimidation of judges of the constitutional court, and subsequently winning controversial elections, Nkurunziza must have understood the ramifications of his continued hold on power.</p>
<p>His decision to “step aside” was instrumental in tempering political opposition and potential violent challenge to the status quo. Handpicking a successor, like many African strongmen, ensured both change and continuity – actions borrowed from the playbook of neighbours such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola.</p>
<p>It is highly unlikely, therefore, that transition in Burundi will dramatically deviate from the existing status quo, given the existence of entrenched interests, particularly the military and ruling party elites. </p>
<p>The fact that there’s an institutionalised dominant party will ensure ideological continuity, regime endurance and the strategic sequencing of transition or succession. </p>
<p>It is also crucial to appreciate that when authoritarian leaders die in office, more often than not regime elites coalesce rather than fragment. Regime elites are best served by ensuring the maintenance of the status quo. </p>
<p>In Burundi’s case this means rallying around Nkurunziza’s chosen successor, Ndayishimiye.</p>
<p>The sudden death of Nkurunziza is therefore unlikely to result in a fundamental change of direction.</p>
<h2>Protecting the legacy</h2>
<p>In handpicking the trusted party secretary, Nkurunziza ensured that his legacy wouldn’t be challenged or derailed by either the opposition or an outsider. </p>
<p>Nkurunziza had taken other steps to ensure that his influence on matters of the state continued uninterrupted. He had designated for himself the role of “<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/05/19/burundis-president-is-now-supreme-eternal-guide-retirement-is-out">supreme guide of patriotism</a>”. This was no doubt designed to ensure a “subservient” successor president whose fortunes would have been at the behest of the ex-president. </p>
<p>The incoming president is considered to be more open-minded and less prone to violence than other generals. But the death of his predecessor doesn’t necessarily provide him with an open hand to do as he pleases, given the need to balance various competing elite interests within the party and the military.</p>
<p>The country’s new leader will also have to consider mending fences with its neighbours.</p>
<p>Burundi’s regional and international relations have ranged from frosty to toxic. Burundi blamed the failed coup attempt against Nkurunziza in 2015 on its northern neighbour, Rwanda. Bilateral relations and trust plunged to an all time low. </p>
<p>Rwanda saw Burundi <a href="https://www.chronicles.rw/2020/04/27/kagame-burundi-troops-operating-in-drcs-south-kivu-province/">as sympathetic</a> to the FDLR rebels in the DRC fighting against the Rwanda government. In turn, Burundi accused its neighbour of actively supporting opponents of Burundi’s own regime. Many of those opponents found shelter in Rwanda. So did thousands of refugees.</p>
<p>Burundi took exception to this. Nkurunziza’s personal relationship with Rwandan leader Paul Kagame was, at best, <a href="https://www.softpower.ug/burundi-president-nkurunziza-decries-rwandas-evil-policy-of-destabilising-neighbours/">frosty</a>. His death presents the ideal opportunity to reset relations between Burundi and Rwanda.</p>
<h2>Global pariah</h2>
<p>Burundi under Nkurunziza was cast as a global pariah. International financial and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government">economic support</a> was all but frozen. Long accused of gross human rights violations, Burundi became hostile towards the international community. It purged national and international NGOs, and expelled the personnel of international institutions. The World Health Organisation’s country representative was the <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-burundi/burundi-expels-national-who-head-during-election-campaign-idUKKBN22Q0Y1">most recent casualty</a>.</p>
<p>President Ndayishimiye now has the opportunity to be his own man, and chart a different course for Burundi. The hope is that it will be one of prosperity, and peace and good neighbourliness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History will judge Nkurunziza as a man who brought unnecessary pain to a nation that had long suffered from political misrule.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1133782019-03-13T08:53:10Z2019-03-13T08:53:10ZWhy the closure of Burundi’s UN human rights office is a major setback<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263348/original/file-20190312-86703-xp7c1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Doudou Diene, President of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/SALVATORE DI NOLFI</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>After 23 years, the UN Human Rights Office in Burundi has closed – at the insistence of the country’s government. The Conversation Africa’s Moina Spooner spoke to Professor Christof Heyns, who was Chair of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi, about the closure, why it happened and what this means for the country.</em></p>
<p><strong>The human rights situation in Burundi seems to be deteriorating. What’s happening?</strong></p>
<p>Burundi has a long history of violence between its two dominant ethnic and cultural groups – the usually politically dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority. A <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175189">civil war</a> that lasted 12 years ended in 2000 as a result of the <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB469/">Arusha peace accords</a>. In 2005 Pierre Nkurunziza, a former Hutu rebel leader, became the first president to be chosen in democratic elections since the start of the civil war in 1994.</p>
<p>But the situation deteriorated in 2015 when Nkurunziza announced, based on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-crisis-looms-as-2020-elections-open-up-old-divisions-110049">dubious interpretation</a> of the peace accords, that he was entitled to run for a third term. Large protests in the streets of Bujumbura, the country’s capital, were brutally suppressed. Security forces, supported by the youth group <a href="https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/imbonerakure">Imbonerakure</a>, often took the law into their own hands.</p>
<p>Matters escalated. Opposition parties retaliated and were suppressed. Hundreds were killed and hundreds of thousands fled the country, not least because of concerns that Burundi’s violent history was about to repeat itself. People with moderate views were pushed out of the government and very rough elements took control. Civil society was gutted. Institutions like the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/burundi-s-flawed-constitutional-referendum">Constitutional Court</a> were marginalised and most of <a href="https://rsf.org/en/burundi">the press</a> has been silenced.</p>
<p>The UN Human Rights Council <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20010&LangID=E">established</a> the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi in 2015 to investigate violations and abuses of human rights in Burundi. When <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/UNIIB/Pages/UNIIB.aspx">our report</a> came out, those holding onto power ceased to collaborate with the UN human rights team. The government isolated itself further during the last two years. They pulled out of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court">International Criminal Court</a>, harassed UN officials and independent investigators and even threatened to prosecute them. </p>
<p><strong>What’s brought this about?</strong></p>
<p>I see it essentially as a problem of a lack of leadership. It’s not impossible to bring peace and development to Burundi. But those in power have retreated so far into defending their own narrow self interests that they simply have no interest in working for the common good. </p>
<p><strong>What are the worst developments? Has it ever been this bad?</strong></p>
<p>In sheer numbers it has been much worse before. In 1972 for example, there was a <a href="http://combatgenocide.org/?page_id=893">mass killing</a> mostly of Hutus by Tutsis, and in 1993 a mass killing mostly of Tutsis by Hutus. <a href="http://atrocitieswatch.org/the-1972-and-1993-burundi-genocides/">Hundreds of thousands</a> were killed in both genocides. </p>
<p>The current figures have not approached this is any way. Since the crisis started in 2015, the killings are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/burundi/report-burundi/">probably</a> now in the low thousands. But looking at it in terms of sheer numbers doesn’t really capture what’s wrong here. </p>
<p>Every life is of infinite value. While a lower number of killings are obviously better it’s not a matter of adding up all the dead bodies to establish how serious the situation is. Even if fewer people are killed, the violence still paralyses the entire society.</p>
<p>The killings take the form of individual targeted assassinations and enforced disappearances of people who are moderate, creative, or simply have different views. The government is depriving the nation of the very “middle ground” people who could contribute to the building a peaceful nation. </p>
<p>Whereas one could somehow conceive of a rationale about who was targeted before -– normally the high profile dissidents, the activists, the opposition and participants in demonstrations and movements - now it could be anyone. Even if you are low profile you could be next. Ordinary citizens are being targeted for not sufficiently supporting the party that’s in power. This takes the life out of the society very much in the same way as large scale killings do.</p>
<p><strong>Are there any glimmers of hope?</strong></p>
<p>Having said the above, the fact that the country has not (yet) descended into the full-scale madness of earlier times is a positive. In my view the presence of the international community, in spite of all the setbacks, has helped to prevent such a slide and served as a damper on the more violent forces at work. So the closing down of the UN office is a serious setback. </p>
<p>The government is also <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/ingos-suspended-in-burundi-amid-crackdown-on-civil-society-93329">tightening its control</a> over foreign NGOs; it’s put in place demands about the ethnic composition of staff and budget reporting requirements – as conditions for being permitted to continue to operate in Burundi. Several have decided to close down rather than comply. Very few remain.</p>
<p>Burundi is preparing to hold presidential and legislative elections next year. This is sadly not necessarily good news. Elections have often been sensitive periods in the country. Violence, especially ethnic violence, is unleashed and don’t necessarily yield fair results. But what’s the alternative? The stakes are very high. It will be important to assure that Burundi remains high on the international agenda. But the UN doesn’t have a magic formula. In the end nothing can work without responsible leadership within the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113378/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christof Heyns does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UN doesn’t have the magic formula to end tensions in Burundi. It’s up to the country’s leadership.Christof Heyns, Professor of human rights law, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/965442018-05-16T10:40:48Z2018-05-16T10:40:48ZDemocracy in peril: Burundi’s referendum will cement Nkurunziza’s grip on power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218760/original/file-20180514-178734-1rmb8ib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A sign at a candlelit vigil tells the story of a country sliding further into authoritarianism.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">DAI KUROKAWA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The citizens of Burundi, the small country in Central Africa that borders Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are about to vote in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/14/burundi-to-vote-in-referendum-to-extend-presidents-term">a controversial referendum</a>. </p>
<p>The vote is likely to result in a set of amendments to Burundi’s constitution that will effectively consolidate the dominance of the ruling party, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy - Forces for the Defence of Democracy, or <a href="http://cndd-fdd.org/">CNDD-FDD</a>. This is a decisive moment in the country’s history. It may prove to be the final nail in the coffin of the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Arusha_Peace_Accord____.pdf">Arusha Accords</a> of 2000, which led to the constitution being ratified in 2005. And it may lead the country further down the path of electoral authoritarianism.</p>
<p>The upcoming poll will, among other things, ask Burundians to vote on whether the president’s term should be extended from five years to seven. This could allow sitting <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32490645">President Pierre Nkurunziza</a>, who has been in power since 2005, to rule for another 14 years when his term expires in 2020. </p>
<p>If the referendum goes Nkurunziza’s way, it will also be a further blow to ordinary Burundians, who live in a state of hardship and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GLR_humanitarian_snapshot_23%20April%202018.pdf">adversity</a>. Nearly <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/great-lakes-region-humanitarian-snapshot-march-april-2018">half a million people</a> have fled the country since 2015 and are now living as refugees in neighbouring countries. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GLR_humanitarian_snapshot_23%20April%202018.pdf">Food insecurity</a> is rampant. </p>
<h2>Dismantling peace accords</h2>
<p>The ruling party tried to <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-burundi-politics/burundis-ruling-party-fails-in-first-bid-to-change-constitution-idUKBREA2K1MO20140321">amend the constitution</a> in a similar fashion in 2014. That was a bid to constitutionally allow Nkurunziza to run for a third term. The attempt failed to gain the necessary political support in parliament. </p>
<p>The party’s decision to select Nkurunziza as their candidate in the 2015 elections anyway was followed by <a href="https://matsutas.wordpress.com/2015/05/06/brinkmanship-in-bujumbura-a-struggle-for-power-at-all-costs-by-mimmi-soderberg-kovacs/">mass protests and demonstrations</a>. Such resistance is unlikely this time around, partly because of the crisis that followed: <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20534&LangID=E">a trail</a> of assassinations, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence against those who raised their voices in opposition.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza has been remarkably successful in neutralising internal opposition during his years in power. He’s also <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/african-union-tried-and-failed-burundi-now-its-time-try-again">withstood pressure</a> from the region and the international community. Meanwhile, he has gradually undermined the very foundation for the peace that allowed him to lay down his gun and get elected in the first place: the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha-peace-and-reconciliation-agreement-burundi">Arusha peace agreement</a> under which the 2005 constitution was ratified.</p>
<p>Burundi’s 2005 constitution was crafted to enable power-sharing between the country’s main ethnic groups, the majority Hutu, and the Tutsi and Twa minorities. This followed a history of ethnicised political conflict and civil war. </p>
<p>The referendum represents a dismantling of the core principles agreed in the peace accords. </p>
<h2>Towards electoral authoritarianism</h2>
<p>The build-up to the referendum has offered ample proof of Burundi’s continually degrading democracy. The campaigns for the constitutional referendum have included <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/castrate-the-enemy-violence-grips-burundi-ahead-of-vote/2018/05/08/edd103a8-529e-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_term=.a6f946dadc79">divisive language and what amounts to hate speech</a> – this in a country that has experienced cycles of ethnically framed civil war and mass atrocity.</p>
<p>The ruling party and its youth wing, the <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/101418/who-are-imbonerakure-and-burundi-unravelling">Imbonerakure</a>, have used <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/17/burundi-repression-linked-presidential-term-vote">violence</a> to threaten and intimidate opponents of the referendum.</p>
<p>The government recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/burundi-bans-bbc-voice-america-referendum-180505092310602.html">banned the international and national free press</a>, including the BBC and the Voice of America. </p>
<p>And if constitutional amendments go ahead as proposed, there will be a further reversal of Burundi’s democratic gains. As author and scholar <a href="http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/burundis-constitutional-referendum-consolidating-fait-accompli-run-2020-elections">Stef Vandeginste</a> has noted, the constitutional reforms do not create a complete upturning of the previous balance of power between Burundi’s ethnic Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. However, they do cement the power of Nkurunziza’s ruling party through a virtual “one-party system”.</p>
<h2>Echoing global and regional trends</h2>
<p>Burundi isn’t the only African state to <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/08/economist-explains-3">push through constitutional amendments</a>. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni passed amendments removing term limits in 2006 and age limits in 2017. Rwanda’s Paul Kagame also scrapped presidential limits in 2015.</p>
<p>The relative calm on the surface of these countries may lend itself to an international agenda of weighing short-term stability over political participation and human and civil rights. It may tempt the idea that perhaps strongmen who serve as presidents for life are simply part of a patrimonialist tradition that’s specific to African democracy. </p>
<p>For Museveni and Kagame, however, the costs of imposing their rule have been relatively low. They have not had a sizeable minority against them. They have remained strong military rulers under a light coating of civilian governance. Their authoritarianism can hold without too much exercise of widespread abuses and atrocities, which gives the impression of stability - at least to observers who are intent on not looking too closely.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza is in a different position. His ruling party has had to share power with others. It is historically riven with internal divisions, as the recent armed conflict and <a href="https://matsutas.wordpress.com/2015/05/15/to-have-a-coup-or-not-to-have-a-coup-by-gudrun-sif-fridriksdottir/">failed coup d’état in 2015</a> reveal. </p>
<p>He is not a classical founding father, but an everyman who must contend with other leaders in the party and the opposition, with their own sectarian politics, constituents, and charismatic personas. </p>
<p>The Burundian referendum can also be understood as yet another sign of the current global wave of counter-democratisation. There are worrying trends of ascendant <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.631624f7b928">authoritarian populist leaders</a> around the world. These are big men like Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines. </p>
<p>One of Burundi’s own international allies, China, has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/china-xi-jinping-expected-secure-lifetime-presidency-180311062057325.html">recently scrapped</a> its presidential term limits. This comes at a time when the partnership between Africa and China has begun to eclipse relations with Western governments. </p>
<p>The European Union and the US criticised Nkurunziza’s third term. China did not. It has focused on Burundi’s <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/t1461479.htm">food and development issues</a> but has largely ignored its political crisis, a strategy that the Burundi government welcomes and interprets as China’s acceptance of its state sovereignty.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza’s advance toward a presidency that could become a lifelong rule is worrying. If the referendum goes his way – and it almost certainly will – more of Burundi’s hard-won democratic freedoms will most likely be sacrificed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96544/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs has previously held a research grant from the Swedish Research Council for a project on electoral violence in Africa hosted at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) in Sweden, in which both Angela Muvumba Sellström and Jesper Bjarnesen participated.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela Muvumba Sellström receives funding from the Swedish Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jesper Bjarnesen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the referendum goes President Pierre Nkrunziza’s way, it will also be a further blow to ordinary Burundians, who live in a state of hardship and adversity.Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, Associated senior researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI); and Head of Research, Senior Researcher Peace and Conflict Research (Folke Bernadotte Academy), Uppsala UniversityAngela Muvumba Sellström, Researcher, Departement of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (FMSH)Jesper Bjarnesen, Senior researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/856172017-10-16T13:12:55Z2017-10-16T13:12:55ZElections in Africa: democratic rituals matter even though the outlook is bleak<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189998/original/file-20171012-31381-thdt34.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An elderly woman displays her inked finger after casting her vote during the 2016 presidential elections in Uganda. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/James Akena</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multi-party systems established in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in the early 1990s have endured despite electoral violence. But democratic hopes have been dashed or perverted throughout the rest of the region. The governments built on the ruins of the civil wars in Angola, Burundi, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda and Rwanda have all relied on armed political groups to stay in power. </p>
<p>From June 2015 to August 2017 an uninterrupted series of general elections took place in Central and East Africa. Those in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/burundi-president-nkurunziza-wins-disputed-election-150724140417364.html">Burundi (2015)</a> and the DRC (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-election/congo-presidential-election-set-for-november-27-2016-commission-idUSKBN0LG28M20150212">initially set for 2016</a>) were expected to be the most problematic. In both the incumbent presidents were seeking to extend their mandates beyond a second term. In the <a href="http://time.com/4080835/africa-republic-of-congo-protest-sassou-nguesso-violence/">Congo</a>, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/uganda-opposition-leader-arrested-days-elections-160215132155444.html">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">Kenya</a>, the risk of violent clashes was palpable.</p>
<p>The ruling regimes were not only dated, but worse for wear. At the time of the elections, the presidents of Angola (José Eduardo Dos Santos), the Congo (Denis Sassou N'Guesso) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), all members of the revolutionary or progressive <a href="http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/02/bill-clintons-new-generation-of-african"><em>New Generation</em></a> of African leaders, were all in their seventies and had been in power for 30 or more years. The Presidents of Rwanda (Paul Kagamé), the DRC (Joseph Kabila) and Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza), having served terms of 21, 14 and 10 years respectively, took steps to change their countries’ constitution to seek a third term.</p>
<p>Despite the bleak regional outlook and contagious scepticism among voters, these pious “democratic” rituals have become critical events over the past 20 years. This is true even in the most authoritarian countries where so much is predetermined. From the parties in the running to the authorised candidates and even the results.</p>
<p>As artificial as they may be, these rites still represent a risk for those in power. Rulers need expert skill to ensure both maximum control over their institutions and demonstrations of love from their people. Consequently, the outcome of the race – between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression – is never entirely certain.</p>
<p>From Kinshasa to Kampala, from Brazzaville to Luanda and Bujumbura, courageous dissenters have organised numerous protests, usually with the approval – and sometimes active support – of the general population. These protests express the frustrations and expectations of a generation fed up with regimes clinging to power and responding to growing disillusion with increasing authoritarianism.</p>
<p>The ruling parties have, on the whole, proved themselves highly resourceful and resilient against the desire for change. Their victory has been comprehensive. Only Kenya is the exception: a second vote is set for October 26 following the Supreme Court’s surprise <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election-court/kenya-supreme-court-criticizes-election-board-in-verdict-on-polls-idUSKCN1BV0QB">decision</a> to invalidate the election results. In the DRC, Joseph Kabila’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-election/no-congo-election-until-mid-2019-vote-commission-says-angering-opposition-idUSKBN1CG1KW">delaying tactics</a> have so far allowed him to remain in power. And while Dos Santos eventually withdrew his candidature due to illness, the election of his chosen successor has ensured power in Angola <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">remains in his faction’s hands</a>.</p>
<h2>In power until 2034</h2>
<p>The string of Central and East African elections got off to a bad start. In April 2015, the president of Burundi <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32588658">controversially</a> sought a third term in office. Although devastated by 10 years of internal strife, Burundi had become a <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2003/sc7748.doc.htm">symbol of peaceful transition</a> in the region. Three months of tactical manoeuvring and brutal repression were required to bring victory to the incumbent president. This pushed the country back to the brink of civil war and further plunged it down the ranks of the world’s poorest countries. </p>
<p>The resulting crisis and the violent response by this relatively inexperienced president threw discredit on other outgoing presidents in the region, all flagrant repeat offenders. They were forced to up their game.</p>
<p>In February 2016, Museveni took office for the fifth time in Uganda amid relative calm. In March, in a tenser national atmosphere, Congolese president Denis Sassou-Nguesso started on the first of the three extra terms allowed by the recent constitutional reform. He could still be in power in 2031, at nearly 90 years of age.</p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Rwandan President Paul Kagame presided over a constitutional referendum in 2015 enabling him to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/rwanda-vote-gives-president-paul-kagame-extended-powers">remain in power until 2034</a>. The reform was approved by 98% of voters, with a voter turnout of more than 98%.</p>
<p>Overall, pending the outcomes in Kenya and DRC, each of the self-proclaimed candidates who won the recent bout of electoral contests can boast enviable popular mandates, and even landslide victories.</p>
<h2>Every leader for themselves</h2>
<p>In the eyes of these leaders their longevity, and that of their counterparts in the region, constitutes in and of itself a justification for remaining power.</p>
<p>Their relations, alliances and conflicts were carved out in a shared past, marked by civil wars and fiercely violent regional clashes. Widespread structural insecurity <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-and-rwanda-a-rivalry-that-lies-at-the-heart-of-great-lakes-crises-63795">plagues the entire region</a> as a result. The insecurity is fuelled by governments’ failure to lay down formal, mutually beneficial, political frameworks for cooperation and regional integration. Yet such frameworks would allow them to develop the human resources and agricultural and mining potential of the region in an equitable manner.</p>
<p>In 2013, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game-congo">African Intervention Brigades</a> were authorised to take offensive measures to neutralise the main militia groups in the country’s Eastern region. The Brigades’ main target was the M23, a movement supported by Rwanda and Uganda, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/drc_5.pdf">intelligence</a> later submitted to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The return to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo">low-scale warfare</a> is a sign of a regulated joint governance of the instability.</p>
<p>Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces, numerous political and criminal armed groups still control vast, lawless zones. In their own ways, these groups secure the exploitation of natural resources. They supply a lucrative cross-border trade run at the highest levels of government. These activities bring in significant profits for the ruling classes. They also allow countries in the sub-region to export goods they do not produce themselves. And they ensure the continued viability of the various regional and international trade routes towards the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>At every stage of wealth creation, profits are essentially redistributed according to private interests. It is therefore easy to understand why each head of state believes themselves best placed to serve both national and personal interests, and the interests of the political-ethnic groups they represent.</p>
<h2>The price of longevity</h2>
<p>When they came to power, the <em>new generation</em> of leaders from the Great Horn of Africa embodied the new ideal of “good governance”. They were “strong men” at the head of “strong and sustainable democracies”, ensuring the order and security necessary for development.</p>
<p>During the course of these elections, none of these so-called democrats, so regularly and resoundingly “elected” by their citizens, had any thoughts of retirement. Setting aside Kabila, whose fate is still undecided, at least two of them, in Burundi and Uganda, had no qualms about changing their country’s constitution to ensure their own reelection.</p>
<p>But in a region of considerable wealth, it’s by no means certain that government can indefinitely be determined by the life expectancy of leaders who are still incapable of developing the regional cooperative frameworks that would ensure peace, security and prosperity for their citizens.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The outcome of the race between increasingly artful electoral manipulation and limitless possible manifestations of democratic expression is never entirely certain.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812772017-07-23T11:43:25Z2017-07-23T11:43:25ZZambians firmly defend democracy. But will they stand up against Lungu?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179046/original/file-20170720-8687-1la65jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia has become increasingly ruled by fear under President Edgar Lungu.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Philippe Wojazer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a year of authoritarian backsliding under <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">President Edgar Lungu</a> in their once-proud democracy, Zambians face a choice of futures. Ordinary citizens are clearly disposed to stand by their democratic ideals and reject dictatorship.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad157-democracy-in-zambia-at-a-crossroads">survey</a> by Afrobarometer an independent research network that conducts public attitude surveys across the continent, leaves little doubt that most Zambians are dissatisfied as they see their country going in the “wrong direction” and their democracy beginning to erode.</p>
<p>To defend democracy, citizens require an open political environment, and Zambians see that political space closing. Between 2012 and 2017, the proportion of citizens who say they feel “completely” or “somewhat” free to say what they think has declined sharply, from 81% to 62%. On top of this, 72% of Zambians now say that they must “always” or “often” be “careful of what they say about politics,” a proportion that has risen by 10 percentage points over the past five years.</p>
<p>Since 1999, the proportion of citizens who say they enjoy “somewhat” or “much” more freedom of speech “compared to a few years ago” has dropped from 77% to 41%. </p>
<p>Zambia has gone from a country where most people felt free to engage in open political debate to one where most people have begun to look over their shoulders to see who is listening.</p>
<p>But are citizens prepared to stand up to defend democratic rights at this critical juncture? In Zambia, the answer is mixed. </p>
<h2>Mixed feelings</h2>
<p>On one hand, Zambians are fierce defenders of the right to personal privacy: Two-thirds (67%) reject government monitoring of private communications (on mobile phones, for example), even under the pretext of security. </p>
<p>Almost as many (58%) assert that they “should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves of it”. On the other hand, Zambians fall short in resisting other real or potential excesses of presidential power. A slim majority (54%) says </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(the government) should be able to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fully 70% say they are willing to accept that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>when faced with threats to public security, the government should be able to impose curfews and set up special roadblocks.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It must be stressed that the April 2017 survey was conducted before Lungu <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">seized extraordinary powers</a>. At that time, few Zambians may have believed that security conditions actually existed that warranted infringements of rights. So these results should not be read as a direct endorsement of the president’s actions.</p>
<p>As in Burundi, where Afrobarometer traced a rise in support for <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/press-release/burundi/bdi_r6_pr_Burundians_support_democracy_08012015.pdf">term limits </a> as President Pierre Nkurunziza moved to undermine them, it may well be that there has been movement in public opinion since Lungu cracked down. </p>
<p>Figure 5: Popular resistance to emergency measures | Zambia | April 2017*</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 5.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>The questions the respondents were asked include:
1. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Government should be able to monitor private communications, for example on mobile phones, to make sure that people are not plotting violence.
Statement 2: People should have the right to communicate in private without a government agency reading or listening to what they are saying.
2. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: The government should be able to ban any organisation that goes against its policies.
Statement 2: We should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves of it.</em></p>
<h2>Political attitudes</h2>
<p>As Zambia’s own history demonstrates, a mobilised public can be a powerful force for democratisation. But who will lead public opinion in defence of Zambia’s democracy in 2017?</p>
<p>The data show few important differences between urban and rural residents, or between Internet and social-media users and non-users, when it comes to these political attitudes. Instead, educational achievement is the best marker of difference among Zambians in terms of their willingness to support and defend democracy.</p>
<p>Table 1: Political attitudes by level of education | Zambia | 2017
No formal education</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table 1.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For some political attitudes, a little education goes a long way. For example, primary schooling seems to sharply step up the likelihood that Zambians will support democracy, reject military and one-man rule, see a need to be careful about what one says about politics, and feel constrained about criticising President Lungu.</p>
<p>In other instances, political attitudes change by increments as respondents gradually attain higher levels of education, with respect to the likelihood that Zambians will, for example, reject one party rule, see the last election as less than free and fair and prefer to limit the president to two terms in office.</p>
<p>Finally, a post-secondary education seems to be required before individuals are able to take on the most demanding understandings of, and commitments to, democracy. For example, majorities of this group tend to recognise recent declines in freedom for the media, NGOs, and opposition parties; oppose efforts by the government to control the mass media and oppose moves by the government to ban independent organisations.</p>
<p>While Zambians strongly endorse democratic principles, less educated citizens may be prone to underestimate the threats inherent in government takeover of the legislature, courts and the mass media, or to acquiesce to specious arguments that law and order requires the sacrifice of individual liberties.<br>
In that case, the defence of democracy in Zambia depends critically on active political engagement by educated citizens. They have essential roles to play in helping other Zambians to understand that the greatest risk to democracy in the country today comes not from the imminent threat of a military coup but from the gradual erosion of hard-won political gains at the hands of an elected civilian leader bent on expanding his own power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afrobarometer receives funding from Swedish International Development, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the US State Department, the National Endowment for Democracy, among others.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span> Afrobarometer receives funding from SIDA, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the Hewlett Foundation , among others.</span></em></p>Zambia has gone from a country where people engaged freely in open political debate to one where most people now look over their shoulders to see who’s listening.Boniface Dulani, Senior lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Malawi and Research Associate, Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape TownMichael Bratton, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and African Studies, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/691222016-12-12T18:05:19Z2016-12-12T18:05:19ZBurundi edges closer to the abyss in 2016<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149385/original/image-20161209-31370-j197sj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protestor uses grass to obscure his identity during a protest against President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term in Bujumbura, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza was hardly a household name. That was before he turned his country into a hellhole following his unconstitutional <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33590991">decision</a> in 2015 to run for a third term. </p>
<p>Burundi <a href="http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconne1/documents/Nkurunziza.pdf">is</a> an overpopulated and immensely corrupt state. It shares much the same ethnic map as Rwanda. But it hardly attracted a fraction of the attention claimed by its neighbour to the north during and after the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml">1994 genocide</a>. If anything, its principal claim to fame was that it successfully managed its <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/burundi">transition</a> to multi-party democracy after a vicious 10-year civil war.</p>
<p>The key to this remarkable achievement was a power-sharing arrangement. The arrangement gave a share of executive and legislative power to the two principal, and once bitterly antagonistic, ethnic communities, the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tutsi account for approximately 30% – this is a guesstimate as no reliable recent census figures are available – of a population of some ten million.</p>
<p>At first, the experiment seemed highly promising. It was formalised in the <a href="http://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-why-the-arusha-accords-are-central/">Arusha accords</a> of 2000, and later enshrined in the <a href="http://aoma.ukzn.ac.za/Libraries/Newsletters_2011/Constitution_of_Burundi_English.sflb.ashx">2005</a> constitution. It offered a striking counter-example to Rwanda’s tragic destinies. It all went well until the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32724083">failed coup</a> of May 13 2015. The coup was a desperate attempt by a group of dissident officers to seize power by force. The light was shone on the regime’s savagery. The precipitating factor was Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term, in violation of the constitution.</p>
<h2>The Burundi enigma</h2>
<p>Burundi today seems dangerously close to a Rwanda-like scenario. The Tutsi minority was targeted once again as a potential victim of genocidal violence. On closer inspection, the events of 2016 reveal a more ambivalent state of affairs. A <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-hears-echoes-anti-tutsi-hate-speech-that-sparked-rwanda-genocide-1527836">significant number</a> of Tutsi elites, civil servants, army men, journalists and human rights activists have been killed by pro-regime elements. Scores of Tutsi <a href="http://time.com/4179101/rape-burundi/">women have been raped</a>.</p>
<p>But the same could be said of the hundreds of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/world/africa/burundi-crackdown-puts-hutus-and-tutsis-and-the-west-on-edge.html?_r=0">Hutu victims</a>. One can’t ignore the large number of extra-judicial killings <a href="http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/burundi_report_english-2.pdf">committed</a> by anti-Nkurunziza rebels. These are opponents of Nkurunziza and both Hutu or Tutsi are targets. </p>
<p>Since 2015, <a href="http://eng.imirasire.com/news/all-around/out-of-rwanda/article/burundians-living-in-terror-after">at least</a> 1,000 people have been killed. Thousands of others have been arbitrarily arrested and tortured. An estimated 330,000 have fled their homeland to <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi">neighbouring states</a>. </p>
<p>But we have to be cautious in speaking of a straight Hutu-Tutsi confrontation. The conflict is not strictly speaking ethnic. It’s political. It revolves around the pro- and anti-Nkurunziza’s third term option.</p>
<p>At the heart of the Burundi enigma lies a paradox. This is the power-sharing formula devised in the Arusha accords – the critical element behind the transition to democracy – and it still holds. Nonetheless, everything points to a diffuse yet distinctly anti-Tutsi political climate.</p>
<h2>Hutu takeover</h2>
<p>Today 60% of government positions and parliamentary seats are <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi1105/2.htm">controlled</a> by Hutu and 40% by Tutsi. The army, as prescribed by the constitution, is evenly split between Hutu and Tutsi, each accounting for 50% of the officer corps and troops. Left out of the accounting, however, is:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The growing number of Hutu hard-liners in positions of authority</p></li>
<li><p>The presence of parallel security organisations under tight Hutu control</p></li>
<li><p>The systematic clamping down on civil society organisations, and</p></li>
<li><p>The climate of pervasive fear created by the omnipresent Hutu-dominated youth militia known as <em>imbonerakure</em>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Burundi is seen by many as alarmingly close to the edge of the abyss. Given the salience of such informal control mechanisms this is hardly surprising. Such is the consensus of most Burundi experts. Their views are corroborated by the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/burundi/repression-and-genocidal-dynamics-in-burundi">report</a>, the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/UNIIB/Pages/UNIIB.aspx">2016 report</a> of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, many Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/burundi">reports</a> and the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-will-soon-be-one-africas-biggest-refugee-crises-says-msf-1591871">international media</a>.</p>
<h2>A bleak future</h2>
<p>But what adds to the sense of pessimism is such actions as the appointment of notorious hard-liners to key positions. </p>
<p>For example, General Evariste Ndayishimiye’s <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundian-opposition-concerned-by-appointment-army-general-ndayishimiye-head-cndd-fdd-1577368">appointment</a> as the secretary general of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie – the current ruling party in Burundi. This leaves few doubts about the intransigence of the regime. He is known to be a tough-minded general and viscerally anti-Tutsi. </p>
<p>Ethnicity is becoming more noticeable as a policy issue. A growing number of Tutsi elements have been excluded from key government positions. In February of 2016 some 700 Tutsi troops <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21697289-political-ethnic-and-economic-crises-stalk-rwandas-neighbour-sliding-towards">were forced</a> into early retirement. The police force and the ruling party’s youth wing, now <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/07/briefing-%E2%80%93-who%E2%80%99s-who-burundi%E2%80%99s-armed-opposition">undergoing</a> regular military training, have become virtually mono-ethnic, and so too the security units operating alongside the normal channels. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more ominous is the <a href="https://africanvoicess.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/discours-du-president-du-senat-du-burundi-reverien-ndikuriyo-on-va-travailler-invitation-au-genocide/">outrageous language</a> used by the president of the Senate, Reverien Ndikuriyo. Some of his utterances have been reminiscent of the coded euphemisms employed during the Rwanda genocide as synonyms for killing Tutsi. He even made <a href="https://africanvoicess.wordpress.com/2015/11/07/discours-du-president-du-senat-du-burundi-reverien-ndikuriyo-on-va-travailler-invitation-au-genocide/">reference</a> to “going to work”, a metaphor for killing.</p>
<p>It is easy to see why the thinly veiled anti-Tutsi posturings of the Nkurunziza regime should be seen by many as payback for the <a href="http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/The-Burundi-Killings-of-1972Lemarchand.pdf">1972 tragedy</a>. Some 200,000 Hutu were killed at the hands of a predominantly Tutsi army. Hundreds if not thousands of Tutsi civilians were killed by Hutu insurgents. </p>
<p>The prospects for reconciliation are bleak. Formal gestures by the government to nudge the legitimate opposition parties to join an intra-Burundi dialogue have consistently <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Burundi-peace-talks-fail-to-take-off-in-Tanzania-/2558-3027236-fa0un7/index.html">failed</a>. As for the weak and fragmented rebel forces in exile, nothing short of a miracle would enable them to capture power in the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>There have been repeated attempts by organisations like the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/african-union-and-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality">African Union</a> to impose sanctions aimed at stopping atrocities and prepare the ground for the presence of an international protection force. These efforts have not been successful. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-13/u-s-russian-tensions-threaten-to-paralyze-un-security-council">Internal rifts</a> in the UN Security Council between supporters of Nkurunziza, like China and Russia, and their opponents ensured the failure of a concerted diplomatic initiative. </p>
<p>Burundi’s <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN12622V">planned withdrawal</a> from the international criminal court in response to pressure to investigate the country’s human rights situation stands as another ill omen for the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rene Lemarchand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prospects for reconciliation are bleak. Formal gestures by the government to nudge the opposition parties to join an intra-Burundi dialogue have consistently failed.Rene Lemarchand, Emeritus professor of Political Science, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/637952016-08-15T15:10:19Z2016-08-15T15:10:19ZBurundi and Rwanda: a rivalry that lies at the heart of Great Lakes crises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133913/original/image-20160812-16364-1or4lu2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A policewoman carries a Burundi flag during a protest against President Nkurunziza's decision to run for a third term. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The end of two particularly bloody and dramatic civil wars saw a <a href="http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml">reversal</a> of the political and ethnic dominance in Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi in 2004. This dominance had come into being at independence. </p>
<p>In Rwanda, the 1959 revolution overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and brought Hutu elites to power. Fifty-five years later, Tutsi refugees who had settled in Uganda led a rebellion and <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html">seized power</a> in Kigali. In Burundi, 40 years of “Tutsi military regimes” ended when free multiparty elections resulted in the victory of the most important pro-Hutu movement in the armed rebellion. </p>
<p>Two radically different personalities emerged. Paul Kagame, former chief of intelligence services of the Ugandan rebel National Resistance Army, has become Rwanda’s only master. He managed this by pushing aside or eliminating all his fellow fighters of the 1990s. </p>
<p>Pierre Nkurunziza, on the other hand, never featured among the small circle of “generals” who waged Burundi’s war of liberation. But in the background of the political system of the party he led, the CNDD-FDD, he played a decisive role in keeping military chiefs’ rivalries and ambitions during the civil war under control. He then deftly developed his position of weakness within the CNDD-FDD into an asset. He cultivated the various contenders for leadership. </p>
<p>The rise to power of these two men is having a profound effect on the region, including efforts to end conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda and Burundi are tiny countries, but have managed to establish themselves as bulwarks to the region’s progress. That they are both run by “strong men” is highly relevant to these developments.</p>
<h2>Rwanda’s helping hand</h2>
<p>In 2005 Nkurunziza was presented as the presidential candidate by default. He was regarded by the population as approachable and simple. Leaders of neighbouring countries and foreign powers were reassured by his “civilian” profile.</p>
<p>At the same time the authorities in Rwanda were not in favour of former Burundian leader Pierre Buyoya and, by extension, the Burundian Armed Forces. This is primarily because they had refused to support the Rwanda Patriotic Front during the guerrilla war. Rwanda, with the RPF now in power, therefore financed Nkurunziza’s party’s electoral campaign. There were also regular consultations between the two countries’ “generals” on regional security issues such as the <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3decf4b24.html">Interahamwe</a> and respective opponents.</p>
<p>Rwandan investments in Burundi, already substantive, steadily increased.
For Rwanda, coexistence with a CNDD-FDD majority and a “democratic” Burundi made sense because:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the other pro-Hutu guerrilla components were marginalised</p></li>
<li><p>the new “integrated” army maintained a strict balance between the ex-Burundian armed forces, that had been predominantly Tutsi, and the combatants of the ex-Hutu rebellions, and</p></li>
<li><p>the economic dependency of a badly managed country impoverished by ten years of war tilted regional trade in Rwanda’s favour and left a clear field for foreign capital and businessmen.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>But this marriage of convenience was rocked in October 2013. Relations between the two countries changed profoundly. The fallout was triggered by the defeat of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20438531">M23</a> rebellion, a pro-Rwandan armed group active in eastern Congo. The defeat came at the hands of the South African and Tanzanian contingents of the United Nations <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/">stabilisation force</a>. But Rwanda lashed out at Burundi. It accused its neighbour of being a safe haven for combatants whose presence in the Congo had justified Rwanda’s intervention until then.</p>
<p>This accusation weighed heavily on Burundi. It gave rise to sharp <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/05/04/rwanda-stirring-rebellion-burundi">tensions</a> that are at the origin of the current political hardening and repression against the opposition. </p>
<p>As friends quickly became foes, a very busy schedule of presidential elections was approaching in the region. Burundi was first followed by Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and DRC. Like several of its neighbours, Burundi was confronted with the constitutional question of renewing an outgoing president’s mandate.</p>
<p>The regional crisis generated by Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term soon began to play out. The immediate crisis appeared at first to justify Rwanda’s decision to keep its distance from a regime that was discrediting itself. Various Burundian opponents were openly received in Rwanda.</p>
<p>But the situation changed dramatically when an attempt by some of the Burundian military high command to oust the president failed. It soon became clear that Nkurunziza would pursue his objective to the very end, whatever the cost. </p>
<p>Rwanda then committed a double mistake – as did a number of western embassies – by assuming that the Burundian crisis could be put down to purely personal ambitions and overestimating opponents’ operational capacities.</p>
<p>The assassination of a <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/3/burundi-general-adolphe-nshimirimana-killed.html">general</a> close to Nkurunziza and a <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-armed-forces-chief-general-prime-niyongabo-survives-assassination-attempt-1519344">failed attempt</a> to kill the army’s chief of staff marked the end of commando operations targeted at the regime’s senior dignitaries. This was followed by a massive and brutal mobilisation of the security forces and the ruling party’s youth organisations.</p>
<h2>Competition between two authoritarian regimes</h2>
<p>Burundi’s policy of strengthening its repressive apparatus has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/13/interview-killings-abductions-and-torture-spread-fear-burundi">increasingly evident</a>. For the chiefs of intelligence and police this has been undertaken with the explicit objective of catching up in the shortest possible time with “Rwandan standards”. The ultimate aim is to ensure the symbiosis of intelligence services, police forces and local militia forces. </p>
<p>But the catching up does not stop there. It also extends to the denial of public freedoms and closure of almost all independent media. It also involves the dissolution of major civil society organisations, proscription of opposition parties and pervasive surveillance of the population. </p>
<p>Kagame now looks certain to remain in power <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-paul-kagame-is-in-line-to-stay-in-office-until-2034-53257">until at least 2034</a>. It also seems inconceivable that the regime in Burundi will be prepared <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/africa/burundi-president-pierre-nkurunziza-push-for-power-is-marked-by-bloodshed.html?_r=0">to loosen its hold</a>. It is certainly unlikely to tolerate full expression for its internal opposition, which it denounces as being supported by Rwanda. </p>
<p>The competition between the two authoritarian regimes has become a fact that, given the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/africa/after-unrest-a-fragile-burundi-views-rwanda-with-suspicion.html">regional context</a>, is here to last. It justifies the security policies and postpones the expression of democratic forces.</p>
<h2>Crisis of authoritarianism</h2>
<p>Burundian authorities used force to reinstate the Nkurunziza regime beyond its term, to change the constitution and secure a firm grip on the de facto single party CNDD-FDD. Regressive as it was, this only really aligned Burundi with the common political standards of most countries in the region. </p>
<p>Burundi’s obstinate refusal of any political openness reflects its view that the international community should accord it the same “understanding” extended to other countries in the region. In its view any other approach would amount to interference, intimidation or aggression. </p>
<p>The Great Lakes region has become the theatre of a number of large-scale crises. These range from politico-ethnic conflicts to secessionist movements, civil wars and genocide. There has also been external aggression and interference, foreign occupation and pillaging of mineral resources. </p>
<p>Funding the intervention and peacekeeping forces in the region constitutes one of the UN system’s <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/report/99741/briefing-ddr-eastern-drc-try-try-again">most costly</a> budget items.</p>
<p>The current turmoil is directly correlated to the system of governance specific to the region’s authoritarian regimes. It includes personalised power, de facto monopoly of representation and refusal of democratic change. Repressive apparatuses are on the rise. These include violent party militia groups and assassination squads, as well as restrictions on personal and political freedoms. </p>
<h2>Stalemate</h2>
<p>The strategy of increasing tension that both countries pursue today is based on radically uneven strengths. Rwanda has an obvious superiority in the military, diplomatic, political, economic and ideological domains.</p>
<p>The only thing the two heads of state are equal in is their determination to defeat their opponents. </p>
<p>President Kagame looks forward to Burundi’s economic and political collapse. This would enable him to consolidate his ambition of regional hegemony. It would also justify his hold on power as the archetype of a modernising political leader in a military-authoritarian state.</p>
<p>Across the way President Nkurunziza is stalling for time to tighten his control. </p>
<p>In a sense both protagonists have won a double victory. The first is that each has, apparently, succeeded in crushing political resistance and opposition. </p>
<p>The second is that they have imposed their own rivalry as a regional stake by obliging all neighbouring countries (and South Africa) to support – openly or implicitly – the cause of the one or the other. By doing this they have demonstrated that, although they are small countries, they are able to <a href="http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/03/02/burundi-power-struggle-outlasts-diplomatic-flurry">block</a> resolutions to major conflicts in the Great Lakes region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Guichaoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The competition between the two authoritarian regimes has become a fact that, given the regional context, is here to last. It justifies repression and indefinitely postpones democratic expression.André Guichaoua, Professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/530802016-01-14T12:22:57Z2016-01-14T12:22:57ZPresident Nkurunziza of Burundi still has a choice: war criminal or peace bringer?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108026/original/image-20160113-10390-6inxky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burundi's president (centre) on a visit in 2014. He would do well to meet now for peace talks.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/13966069951/in/photolist-nh8L2v-njbmKK-nh8vYb-njbcgV-nhsanW-nh8Fcw-njbiGa-njbrQV-njbgR6-nh8Pym-nh8t4n-nfnnsw-nh8vr9-4TApEa-4TApKP-4TECaS-4TECd9-mC8nyM-mC9YuL-mC8mkK-mC9W8b-mC9WLL-mC9X8C-mC9XWw-4TApzZ-rVoknu-rVokXh-rVzv52-sSoWSP-s84geV-dXagA1-sSbDbs-rVzsDa-sSoXtt-sSbDAA-wuBBAe-dX1b7f">Ilyas A. Abukar/AMISOM Public Information</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/burundi/12096506/UN-says-it-is-ill-prepared-for-genocide-in-Burundi.html">leaked UN memo</a> to the Security Council has warned that a peacekeeping force in the African nation of Burundi would be unable to stop large-scale violence should it erupt in an ongoing crisis caused by president Nkurunziza’s election for a third term.</p>
<p>However it is not too late for Nkurunziza to choose his legacy: either be remembered as a war criminal facing prison or death, or renowned for solving a dangerous political situation. A new round of peace talks is due to take place this month but Burundi’s government <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN0UJ10Q20160105">recently announced</a> there had been “no consensus” on a date.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza has the opportunity to engage fully in peace talks with the help of the African Union and the United Nations. By doing so, he will be able to show the Burundian people that he can lead his state to peace, and concentrate on what he can do best: providing further <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2013/11/10/burundi-president-builds-schools-but-education-remains-weak">education</a> for all, and in the long term, economic development, too.</p>
<h2>A questionable third mandate</h2>
<p>Since April 2015, when Nkurunziza decided to run for another term, over 400 people have been killed and <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/unhcr-we-cant-cope-with-mass-burundian-refugee-influx-in-tanzania/a-18869964">hundreds of thousands</a> have been internally displaced or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>The president’s third mandate was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/29/burundi-election-goes-ahead-despite-claims-presidents-bid-is-illegal">considered illegal</a> by <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/28/burundi-elections-pie-ntavyohanyuma-flees-violence-president-pierre-nkurunziza">some Burundians</a>, the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-africanunion-idUSKCN0P80YD20150628">international community</a>, and <a href="http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2015/12/30/filip-reyntjens-et-la-crise-burundaise/">some experts</a> because under the country’s constitution and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000, only two terms are allowed. </p>
<p>However, the Burundian Constitutional Court countered that the renewal of the presidential term for another five years <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32588658">was not against the constitution</a> of Burundi, because Nkurunziza was appointed by the parliament, and not elected by the people, for his first term – a decision that <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/burundi-court-validates-president-term-bid-150505095216200.html">a leading opposition member claimed</a> had been made under pressure by the Nkurunziza regime. </p>
<h2>Lengthening terms</h2>
<p>But the stance of the international community seems hypocritical: presidents <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35209186">Paul Kagame in Rwanda</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34646310">Sassou Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville</a> have also sought changes to the constitutions of their states to run for a third mandate, but there is more criticism of Nkurunziza for effectively doing the same. Even though the overall environment was <a href="http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51507#.VpOhQVmB6nM">“not conducive”</a> to an inclusive, free and credible electoral process on election day, the UN said, “Burundians in most places went peacefully to the polls to cast their ballots”. The head of the electoral commission, Pierre Claver Ndayicariye, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/burundi-president-nkurunziza-wins-disputed-election-150724140417364.html">told reporters</a> that Nkurunziza won 70% of the votes cast. This needs to be acknowledged by the international community.</p>
<p>Violence was fomented by both the government and the demonstrators. The government has led a campaign of political repression that has included beatings, arrests and house-to-house searches, <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-burundi-unrest-un-idUKKBN0U014Q20151217">with nearly 3,500 detained</a>. Demonstrators have also been violent, and have attacked military sites [in the capital Bujumbura](http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12117.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12117.doc.htm). Today, the president can either encourage violence further, and face being handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague or he can lead Burundi out of violence, and engage with mediating the conflict.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza is certain to face the ICC if he does not stop Burundi from descending into further violence, because Burundi has ratified the ICC statute. The prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201511070100.html">has already warned</a> that she would act if wide-scale abuses are committed. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108025/original/image-20160113-10409-15na1qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Didn’t end well for DRC’s Laurent Kabila.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurent-D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9_Kabila#/media/File:Laurent-D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9_Kabila_cropped.jpg">JJ Georges</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nkurunziza will be in the same situation as other heads of states <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2013.800737">who have been wanted</a> by the ICC: <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/Pages/icc02050109.aspx">Omar al Bashir</a> in Sudan in 2009 (though investigations into alleged war crimes in Darfur were halted in 2014); Laurent Gbagbo in Ivory Coast (whose trial at the ICC <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0211/related%20cases/ICC-02_11-01_15/Pages/default.aspx">begins this month</a>); and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011. A violent end is another possibility, and was the fate of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2001, and Gaddafi in 2011.</p>
<h1>At a crossroads</h1>
<p>That said, president Nkurunziza could nonetheless become the leader who prevents another civil war. From 1993 to 2006, an estimated <a href="http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Burundi%20Policy%20Brief.pdf">300,000 people were killed</a> in Burundi due to <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/112/446/72.short">political conflict with ethnic manifestations</a>, and there are fears that this may happen again if the matter is not resolved in talks. </p>
<p>For the moment, <a href="http://www.lesechos.fr/monde/afrique-moyen-orient/021576079337-devon-curtis-ce-nest-pas-une-guerre-ethnique-mais-un-conflit-politique-1187008.php">as academic Devon Curtis says</a>, the crisis in Burundi is political and not ethnic. To avoid further bloodshed, it must remain so, and president Nkurunziza could lead the way out of the current crisis by engaging with the African Union which is [prepared to help stop violence](http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/12/burundi-african-union-maprobu-arusha-accords/](http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/12/burundi-african-union-maprobu-arusha-accords/), and with the United Nations which is currently at loss as to how to deal with further violence, but <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12174.doc.htm">which can help with mediation</a>.</p>
<p>To alleviate the tense situation, Nkurunziza needs to make the most of the window of opportunity of negotiation he still has with the international community. Likewise regional actors who show bias need to stay clear from the mediation process. Rwanda in particular <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/burundis-dangerous-neighbor/2015/11/18/298b1e88-8bbe-11e5-934c-a369c80822c2_story.html">has been backing demonstrators in Burundi</a>.</p>
<p>Nkurunziza is at a crossroads. The path he takes will be a crucial one for the country – and himself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53080/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Gegout has received funding from the British Academy and the European Union. </span></em></p>Fears over violence in the African nation bring its leader to a crossroads.Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/515972015-12-08T04:20:09Z2015-12-08T04:20:09ZWhy the world can’t stand by as Burundi becomes a failed state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/104682/original/image-20151207-3108-1u66cqr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Maintaining law and order in Burundi is proving increasingly difficult as the number of militias organised along ethnic lines increases.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The unfolding <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/burundi/11995805/Belgium-tells-citizens-to-leave-Burundi-as-crisis-escalates.html">human tragedy</a> in Burundi needs urgent intervention from the international community before it is too late. The seemingly hands-off attitude by the <a href="http://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a>, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN0SB0JM20151017">African Union</a> and even the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-unrest-idUSKCN0T20ZJ20151113#ukm4Pgbderu3TEvL.97">United Nations</a> raises many questions. </p>
<p>The crisis has been characterised by sporadic violence, assassinations, intimidation, and the grouping of <a href="https://www.scholars-press.com/catalog/details/store/cn/book/978-3-639-70955-1/peace-building-strategies-and-sustainable-peace-in-rwanda-and-burundi?search=Computational%20Analysis%20of%20Nonnegative%20Polynomial%20Systems">militias along ethnic lines</a>. The situation is eerily reminiscent of the start of the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/burundi.htm">1993-2006</a> civil war in which an estimated 300,000 people died. The underlying issues of ethnic balance of power, corruption and poor governance linked to that conflict appear to be re-emerging.</p>
<p>The current crisis began in April with multi-ethnic protests by the opposition and civil society against President <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Nkurunziza">Pierre Nkurunziza’s</a> decision to vie for a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-wins-third-term-disputed-election">third term</a>.</p>
<h2>Ethnic balance of power</h2>
<p>In Burundi, ethnic balance of power seems to be the major threat to stability. The two dominant ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, have had <a href="http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/burundi/conflict-profile/">altercations</a> since the precolonial era. </p>
<p>Their squabbling became more serious in the aftermath of Burundi’s independence in <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/burundi-gains-independence-belgium">1962</a>. The ethnic conflict culminated in the genocidal violence of 1993-2006 that killed more than <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13087604">300,000 people</a>. </p>
<p>The 1998 <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/No%201%20arusha.pdf">Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement</a>, specifically Article 7, made efforts to diminish the ethnic cleavage. But the tragedy of the peace effort was that it was anchored on power sharing among ethnic elites. </p>
<p>This was done without consideration for genuine justice and reconciliation across Burundi’s ethnic society. Nor with an eye on the establishment of strong governance institutions. </p>
<p>The “quick fix” nature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement seems to have come back to haunt Burundi. Ethnic protests threaten to tear the country apart, leading it to the path of a failed state.</p>
<p>There has been a mass exodus of Burundians to neighbouring countries since the new violence. This has been driven by <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=JVP9gdreY6gC&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=negative+ethnicity+in+burundi&source=bl&ots=st0ZcDRfmg&sig=qXsbWj_pOSqQRI5znLX5FTljl3Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjujM2D7snJAhXGbhQKHfzKB7QQ6AEIHzAA#v=onepage&q=negative%20ethnicity%20in%20burundi&f=false">negative ethnicity</a> – described as people fighting for their rights by destroying the rights of others – especially among the elites. </p>
<p>The UN refugee agency estimates that by November more than 200,000 people had <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php">fled Burundi</a> in anticipation of ethnic conflict. </p>
<p>An outbreak of a full scale civil war seems inevitable. </p>
<p>Bad governance and corruption by the Nkurunziza regime also threaten the survival of Burundi as a state. The ripple effects of these have seen a rise of <a href="http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/12/impact-2015-elections-burundis-economy/">poverty</a> and unemployment, <a href="http://www.equaltimes.org/poverty-and-unemployment-fuel?lang=en#.VmWQq7h97IU">especially among the youth</a> who constitute the majority of Burundi’s population of <a href="http://countrymeters.info/en/Burundi">11.2 million</a>. </p>
<p>The large population of disenfranchised young people makes them vulnerable targets for recruitment into militias. This is evident in the high number who have aligned themselves with key actors across the political divide. The buildup of youth militia, leading to a highly militarised society, has created a tinderbox. All it requires is a spark to set off civil war that will consume Burundi’s state and national fabric.</p>
<h2>Militarisation and ethnic militias</h2>
<p>Rising militarisation, especially among youths allied to rival Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, is a clear indication of Burundi’s possible descent into the club of failed states. </p>
<p>The central government is weak and has little control over the country. It faces clear challenges in providing public services and is riddled with widespread corruption and criminality. Refugee numbers are climbing as more people flee their homes and the economy is in sharp decline.</p>
<p>Intimidation is on the rise and ethnic militia groups are retreating to their ethnic strongholds. Targeted assassinations across the political spectrum are increasing in the capital Bujumbura, akin to the initial stages of the 1993 civil war.</p>
<p>The most notorious case of militia hemmed along ethnic lines is the Hutu dominated and pro-government militia, the <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-who-are-feared-imbonerakure-youth-1504301">Imbonerakaure</a>. It has continuously waged a campaign of intimation against Tutsis. </p>
<p>The militarisation of ethnic groups indicates a clear pattern of a failing state incapable of using state institutions, such as the police and other security forces, to maintain law and order. The division of military along ethnic lines, which led to the aborted coup, is another symptom of gradual decline in the state’s capabilities.</p>
<h2>Why neighbours aren’t helping</h2>
<p>There is no easy solution to the dangerous crisis in Burundi. The East African Community, which should be the obvious arbiter, doesn’t seem to be suited to resolve the crisis. </p>
<p>Kenya is busy with its own International Criminal Court <a href="http://www.ijmonitor.org/category/kenya-cases/">cases</a> and seems not to have time for the crisis. In Tanzania, President <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/world/africa/tanzania-presidential-election-john-magufuli.html?_r=0">John Magufuli</a> is new and needs time to establish his government.</p>
<p>For his part, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34760943">overtly declared</a> that Nkurunziza’s regime is targeting minority Tutsi groups in Burundi. He has threatened to <a href="http:%20//www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/16624/burundi-rwanda-spat-stokes-fear-of-revived-ethnic-tensions.">intervene</a> if the crisis turns genocidal to protect Tutsis. </p>
<p>Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni – who is the current mediator – is facing a stiff competition from the opposition <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/03/can-anyone-defeat-president-yoweri-museveni-in-uganda/">in elections</a> slated for January 2016 and may have no time for Burundi. </p>
<p>Museveni, just like Nkurunziza, has been accused by the Ugandan opposition of manipulating the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12421747">constitution</a> to extend his stay in power. Hence, in the eyes of Burundi opposition, he lacks credibility to resolve a crisis sparked by his counterpart’s machinations to cling to power. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Any attempt to resolve the crisis and find a long term solution must tackle political, constitutional, economic and social problems in Burundi. For instance, the trigger issue in the recent conflict was the ambiguities in the interpretation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the country’s 2005 constitution.</p>
<p>Hence the Burundian peace process, while addressing the current political and constitutional crises, should also take into account the economic, ethnic and social issues behind the conflict.</p>
<p>In the meantime the UN should send a <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml">Chapter 7</a> peacekeeping mission to Burundi. Such missions apply to volatile:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This would enable it to be given a mandate to use force to stop the killings by both the opposition and the government. After this, the African Union must lead in creating an inclusive political dispensation acceptable to all parties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Muthengi Maluki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The “quick fix” nature of the Arusha Peace Agreement seems to have come back to haunt Burundi. Ethnic protests threaten to tear the country apart, leading it to the path of a failed state.Patrick Muthengi Maluki, Lecturer, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/477142015-09-18T04:35:15Z2015-09-18T04:35:15ZBeyond political violence in Burundi: an economy in crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95209/original/image-20150917-7530-1xkg6vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vendors sell bananas in an open market in a village near Bujumbura. Burundians are being driven deeper into poverty.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burundi may have slipped off the world’s attention, but the crisis that <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundi-teeters-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-following-coup-attempt-41869">erupted</a> in May when President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term is far from being resolved. </p>
<p>Most commentators have, rightfully so, discussed the political aspects of the crisis. This includes whether Nkurunziza’s third mandate is <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/08/17/afraf.adv045.full">constitutional</a> and the lack of coherence of the political <a href="https://storify.com/Emayi2011/le-burundi-dans-le-piege-des-obstinations-politiqu">opposition</a>. They also discussed the alarming <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/burundi-opposition-spokesman-patrice-gahungu-shot-dead-as-violence-escalates">political violence</a> and <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/16624/burundi-rwanda-spat-stokes-fear-of-revived-ethnic-tensions">mounting tension</a> with Rwanda.</p>
<p>Often overlooked is the economy, which is central to understanding the backdrop to the most severe crisis Burundi has had since the end of the <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/%7Eenm2105/docs/onub/Taylor_Samii_Mvukiyehe_Burundi_apsa06_061003.pdf">1993-2005 civil war</a>. While acknowledging the crucial political dimension of the crisis, this article focuses on the economic situation and its consequences.</p>
<h2>Hungriest nation on earth</h2>
<p>With a GDP per capita of US$267, the country’s 10.16 million people are among the poorest in the world. Burundi ranked 180 out of 186 in the last <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/BDI.pdf">Human Development Index</a>.</p>
<p>89% of the active population depends on farming a territory as densely populated as Belgium. Coffee, once the proud main export of Burundi, was controversially <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13246&LangID=E">privatised</a> in 2008 and has been declining for 20 years. Tea and cotton, the other traditional exports, are also in poor shape.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95200/original/image-20150917-7504-ta9ntd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">source: http://www.indexmundi.com.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The country has few mineral resources. It has been expecting a lot, so far in vain, from a potentially important <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/significant-pgm-prospects-at-burundi-project-2014-08-22">nickel</a> <a href="http://www.miningweekly.com/article/significant-pgm-prospects-at-burundi-project-2014-08-22">deposit</a>. The hopes in gold, which is artisanally mined and had become Burundi’s <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/bdi/">first export</a> by 2012, collapsed with the recent crash of international prices. Part of Burundian gold has also reportedly been <a href="http://enoughproject.org/reports/congo%E2%80%99s-conflict-gold-rush">smuggled</a> from the DR Congo.</p>
<p>The apparently decent 4% to 4.5% <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi">growth</a> of Burundi’s GDP in the past years is dwarfed by a population growth above <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW/countries/BI?display=graph">3%</a>. The number of mouths to feed keeps growing very fast and the GDP per capita has not grown by more than <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG">1.5%</a> in the best of the past years. </p>
<p>Even before the crisis, <a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/183047/burundi-faces-challenges-beyond-elections.aspx">reports</a> indicated that the living conditions were deteriorating for most people. Burundi was, and still is, the <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/topic/global-hunger-index">hungriest nation</a> on earth. With the political crisis, things have deteriorated even further.</p>
<p>When violent unrests exploded in Bujumbura, the city was paralysed for months. It concentrates 70% of the <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/07/20/the-political-crisis-leaves-burundi-on-the-brink-of-economic-collapse-by-lorraine-nkengurutse/">economic activity</a> of the country. </p>
<p>Trade with regional and local markets was heavily disrupted and is still not back to normal as security forces control displacements of people in and out the capital city. The government recently estimated that the insurrection cost at least US$ 32.7 million in <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150910-soulevement-burundi-rapport-autorites-accable-opposition">material damage</a>.</p>
<p>At least <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/burundi/regional.php">190,000 people</a> have left the country since April, and among them investors, business people, and part of the middle class. Most of them still have not returned. </p>
<p>The Burundian diaspora, mostly from Canada, the US, France, and Belgium, are a habitual and most-welcomed source of cash in the summer. But they did not spent their holidays on the beaches of Bujumbura this year.</p>
<p>Perhaps more important for the economy, Western donors are in the process of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201509071997.html">cutting</a> their support to Burundi, whose budget relies <a href="http://finances.gov.bi/index.php/budgets">49% on aid</a>. </p>
<p>The government already had to use its own money to organise the elections, reportedly diverting <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/burundi-to-fund-election-by-cutting-education-malaria-budgets">funds</a> earmarked for malaria and education. And it seems clear that the 2015 budget is now totally offtrack. Hypothetical fresh support from <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/28/how-the-west-lost-burundi/">Russia or China</a> is unlikely to be enough to balance the budget. Inflation only rose by a bit less than a percentage point <a href="http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Burundi-inflation-hits-8-in-July-as-political-unrest-persists-20150828">since May</a>. But official tax revenues for May-August are about 30% lower than expected, and 23% less than <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKCN0RB1MX20150911">last year</a>.</p>
<h2>Pressure points</h2>
<p>Nkurunziza, who was controversially re-elected in August, is now facing an economic crisis that could destabilise him in at least three different ways:</p>
<ul>
<li>First, the first long-serving Hutu president has built his popularity on generous social policies including the abolition of healthcare user fees for children below five and pregnant women, free primary education, and a national fertiliser subsidy program. These social services depend on foreign and are now in grave danger.</li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=290&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/95201/original/image-20150917-7512-t0p9of.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: Ministry of Finance of Burundi.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<ul>
<li><p>Second, if the reported current disruption of wage payment continues, Nkurunziza may alienate a small but influential middle-class of civil servants as well as the police and military still mostly loyal to him.</p></li>
<li><p>Third, benefits from politically appointed positions are becoming potentially less interesting as the economy contracts. This makes it harder to buy off loyalty and opponents, and potentially exacerbates corruption, which is already a key reason for discontent with the regime.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Nkurunziza’s current strategy, in a fashion not dissimilar to his predecessor president <a href="http://global.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Buyoya">Pierre Buyoya</a>, is to <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/burundi-president-announces-early-inauguration/2925131.html">blame</a> the insurgents and Western countries for the economic difficulties. This may reinforce him, but probably only for a short while.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Burundians are being pushed towards even more intolerable levels of poverty. The locking of the political space and the volatility of the situation is likely continue to scare off economic actors and international partners and fuel the mismanagement of public services. </p>
<p>In the current context, few have any interest or incentive to look beyond the very short term. The economic and social costs of protracted fragility are <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working_Paper_197_-_Estimating_the_Economic_Cost_of_Fragility_in_Africa.pdf">huge</a>, even in an already impoverished nation.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/article/democracy-and-growth-new-evidence">safest route</a> to restoring stability and developing the Burundian economy is to rebuild strong and inclusive institutions that citizens and international partners – including the diaspora that has an important potential for economic development – can trust. </p>
<p>In the past years, the boundaries between the state and party apparatus have <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx">blurred</a> at the expense of ordinary citizens. Abuses used to be vocally denounced by the local independent media, but most of them were shut down after the failed May coup attempt.</p>
<p>Calls for a national unity government, which the president says he has responded to by including a few not-too-virulent opposition parties to his government, are missing the point if they only lead to <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/185-burundi-la-crise-de-corruption.aspx">redistributing rents</a> between a slightly larger or different elite group. </p>
<p>Burundi needs a social and economic vision that rests on economic and political institutions that are genuinely accountable and directed to the people, and that everybody, including the poorest and non-party members, can rely on.</p>
<p><em>This article is based on a blog that appears on the <a href="http://blog.qeh.ox.ac.uk">Oxford Department of International Development</a> site.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Benoit Falisse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whenever the crisis in Burundi is discussed, the economy is often overlooked, even though it is central to understanding the backdrop to the most severe crisis since the end of the civil war.Jean-Benoit Falisse, DPhil candidate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/441972015-07-08T04:21:51Z2015-07-08T04:21:51ZBurundi and Rwanda at 53: what sets the conjoined twins apart<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87673/original/image-20150707-1315-1uaz4e8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 100,000 people have fled Burundi since violence erupted in April.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rwanda and Burundi have historically been considered conjoined twins given their identical ethnic and social make-up. They have also cut almost similar political paths, characterised by some of the most brutal human catastrophes of modern times. </p>
<p>In 1994, both were rocked by the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/07/world/2-africa-leaders-die-un-says-rocket-may-have-downed-plane.html">death</a> of their respective presidents. This was followed by a genocide in Rwanda that claimed more than 800,000 lives. But both emerged from the abyss by embarking on transitional processes that were expected to lead to a democratic dispensation, development and political stability.</p>
<p>Both countries have just marked the 53rd anniversary of their independence from Belgium. Independence was characterised by ethnic tension and fissures that coloured their post-independence histories. But both countries still harbour a grievance that their status as independent nations is not respected and continue to yearn for meaningful independence.</p>
<p>Rwanda perceives that it is patronised by the West. Burundi resents the sharp criticism of most Western countries over President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term. In 2015, does the “conjoined twins” label still hold?</p>
<h2>Regionalism</h2>
<p>Rwanda and Burundi are members of the East African Community, a grouping of formerly British colonies. Rwanda was also admitted into the Commonwealth. It is one of the very few countries in the groupings without a British colonial legacy. </p>
<p>Their membership in the East African Community was not only set to integrate these two small neighbours – they are both roughly the size of <a href="http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Americas/Haiti.html">Haiti</a> – into this mutually beneficial regional grouping, but it was equally crucial to their <a href="http://sidint.net/docs/RF26_burundiEAC.pdf">sociopolitical socialisation</a> and economic development. </p>
<p>Since then, they have benefited from peer support and oversight. Rwanda’s economic fortunes have risen exponentially – it was voted one of the best and least corrupt countries to <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/20/positive-discrimination-rwanda">do business</a> in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=821&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/87674/original/image-20150707-1288-1avuyyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1032&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Paul Kagame had led Rwanda to stability and economic growth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, Burundi’s fortunes haven’t fared as well. At least 6.3 million people – or almost 70% of its citizens – still live <a href="http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Burundi_EN.pdf">below the poverty line</a>. The country is also the most corrupt in the East African Community.</p>
<h2>Bad habits persist</h2>
<p>Until not long ago, <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi/overview">Burundi</a> and <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview">Rwanda</a> were judged to be on a firm path of deepening democracy. Burundi was holding <a href="http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Burundi_EN.pdf">fairly steady</a> with its <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2015/06/25/burundi-opposition-fights-for-survival-in-key-polls?service=print">“quota democracy”</a> plan. It stipulated that 60% of elected parliamentary seats should go to Hutus, who make up 85% of the population, and the remaining 40% to Tutsis. At least 30 of the seats were reserved for women.</p>
<p>Rwanda banished ethnic identity-based politics, and holds periodic and relatively credible elections. </p>
<p>However, critics have increasingly argued that both countries have since veered off the path of democratic good practice and strengthened authoritarian tendencies. Rwandan President Paul Kagame is being seen as increasingly <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/10/paul-kagame-rwanda-success-authoritarian">authoritarian</a> and often ruthless with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/27/rwanda-freedom-of-speech">opposition</a> and <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Kagame+tells+off+critics+as+he+begins+final+term/-/979180/1005034/-/wy9eky/-/index.html">critics</a> alike. This has led to alleged <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-01-02-kagame-accused-in-killing-of-rwandas-former-spy-chief/">assassinations</a> and disappearances, and the <a href="http://niemanreports.org/articles/no-easy-life-for-journalists-in-africa/">muzzling</a> of independent press. </p>
<p>For Burundi, the carefully negotiated transition and nascent democracy has simply come unstuck at the seams. Nkurunziza has cracked down on critics, the opposition and the independent press, with ever-more dwindling space for political compromise and moderation.</p>
<p>Burundi held a <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/news/world/article/100-students-seeking-refuge-leave-US-embassy-in-6351520.php#photo-8220148">controversial</a> local and parliamentary elections last week. The results have yet to be announced. They were boycotted by a majority of the opposition. The elections were also sharply criticised by the United Nations, the African Union, Western donors and regional powers. The presidential election is set for next week, to be followed by the senatorial election on July 24. </p>
<p>During this electoral cycle, Burundi has been hit by sharp political violence, refugee flows, assassinations and the flight of the country’s <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/World/Burundi-vice-president-flees--calls-on-president-to-quit/-/688340/2764906/-/p9w6ig/-/index.html">vice president</a>, president of the national assembly and a host of national electoral commissioners, among others. All this was sparked by Nkurunziza’s insistence on running for a third term. This move is strenuously opposed by a broad section of civil society, including the influential <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/world/africa/burundis-catholic-church-pulls-support-for-elections.html?_r=0">Catholic Church</a> and the opposition.</p>
<p>Despite its socioeconomic success, Rwanda too finds itself on the defensive against its perceived detractors following two crucial developments largely symptomatic of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/10/paul-kagame-rwanda-success-authoritarian">ongoing unease</a>. It is still plagued by alleged excesses by the governing Rwanda Patriotic Front during the 1994 genocide. Its intelligence chief, General Karenzi Karake, was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/11698554/President-Kagame-of-Rwanda-attacks-contemptible-decision-to-arrest-spy-chief-in-London.html">recently arrested</a> by the UK government on a visit to London. This was followed by a quick <a href="http://www.africareview.com/News/Kagame-slams-UK-and-Spain-for-spy-chief-arrest/-/979180/2765192/-/49y0klz/-/index.html">remonstration</a> from Kagame, who cast the arrest as political, flawed, and a vestige of colonial mentality, slavery and bigotry. </p>
<p>Equally, with Kagame’s tenure coming to an end in 2017, there have been increased political campaigns to engineer a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/paul-kagame-third-term-rwandan-president">rollback</a> of constitutional term limits to allow him to stand again in 2017. Following criticism of this perceived unwillingness to step aside, he has said that Rwandans would:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… decide on what we want to become – not Spain, UK or France.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A tale of two presidents</h2>
<p>The chorus of criticism against Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term from the opposition, civil society and senior political and judicial personalities internally and globally warn of a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/burundi-protests-police-crackdown-deaths-nkurunziza-bujumbura-150628092724226.html">toxic environment</a> which many believe is dragging Burundi closer to the precipice. The failed coup and the subsequent violence – which is threatening to escalate – point to a vulnerable presidency.</p>
<p>Kagame – who had strenuously dismissed the possibility of changing the constitution to stay on beyond 2017 – has changed his tune. He argued that it is the people’s interests that dictate what is to be done with the set rules of the political game. As such, a carefully choreographed process that has seen more than two million – or 17% of the population – <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/rwanda-parliament-debate-allowing-kagame-seek-third-term-152041173.html;_ylt=A9mSs25c6JNVowkACRlLBQx.;_ylu=X3oDMTByMnE1MzMwBGNvbG8DaXIyBHBvcwMzBHZ0aWQDBHNlYwNzcg--">petition</a> to call for a referendum to repel the constitutional term limits has gained significant traction.</p>
<p>Clearly, Rwanda cannot go the same way as Burundi. Kagame still enjoys a degree of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/10/paul-kagame-rwanda-success-authoritarian">political support</a> internationally due to his role in pulling Rwanda out of its ashes. But, significantly, there is no formidable domestic opposition and civil society that can harness any meaningful opposition to him – unlike in Burundi.</p>
<p>Reflecting on the 53 years of independence, one wonders if the Rwandan and Burundi citizens of 1962 would today be happy with the journey thus far travelled.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwanda and Burundi, once the conjoined twins of East Africa, marked over five decades of going separate ways since independence. Today, the difference in their fortunes couldn’t be more stark.David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, Princeton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.