tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/political-theory-1919/articlesPolitical theory – The Conversation2023-12-01T13:41:00Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2148202023-12-01T13:41:00Z2023-12-01T13:41:00ZA First Amendment battle looms in Georgia, where the state is framing opposition to a police training complex as a criminal conspiracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560536/original/file-20231120-23-322rcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C5216%2C3469&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bulldozed land at the planned site of a controversial police training facility, with Atlanta in the distance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/section-of-bulldozed-land-is-seen-at-the-planned-site-of-a-news-photo/1246850758">Cheney Orr/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When does lawful protest become criminal activity? That question is at issue in Atlanta, where 57 people have been <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/dozens-indicted-on-georgia-racketeering-charges-related-to-stop-cop-city-movement-appear-in-court">indicted and arraigned on racketeering charges</a> for actions related to their protest against a planned police and firefighter training center that critics call “Cop City.” </p>
<p>Racketeering charges typically are reserved for people accused of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/21/1200898062/rico-case-against-cop-city-protesters-in-atlanta-stirs-concerns-about-free-speec">conspiring toward a criminal goal</a>, such as members of organized crime networks or financiers engaged in insider trading. Georgia Attorney General Christopher Carr is attempting to build an argument that seeking to stop construction of the police training facility – through <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/sep/05/cop-city-protesters-racketeering-charges-georgia">actions that include</a> organizing protests, occupying the construction site and vandalizing police cars and construction equipment – constitutes a “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/21/1200898062/rico-case-against-cop-city-protesters-in-atlanta-stirs-concerns-about-free-speec">corrupt agreement” or shared criminal goal</a>. </p>
<p>The indictment’s justification is rooted in <a href="https://immigrationhistory.org/item/1903-anti-anarchist-legislation/">long-standing anti-anarchist sentiments within the U.S. government</a>. However, some civil rights organizations <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/rico-and-domestic-terrorism-charges-against-cop-city-activists-send-a-chilling-message">call this combination of charges unprecedented</a>. </p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pWgCJMMAAAAJ&hl=en">environmental change</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Pellow-2">social justice</a>, we believe the charges seek to suppress typical acts of civil disobedience. They also target grassroots community organizing models and ideas rooted in the practice of mutual aid – people <a href="https://www.kqed.org/news/11909218/in-2020-mutual-aid-was-in-the-spotlight-how-are-organizers-holding-up-in-2022">organizing collective networks</a> in order to meet each other’s basic needs.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The RICO indictment against ‘Cop City’ protesters describes the accused protesters as ‘militant anarchists.’</span></figcaption>
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<h2>The ‘Stop Cop City’ movement</h2>
<p>“Cop City,” officially known as the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, was <a href="https://atlanta.capitalbnews.org/cop-city-timeline/">first proposed in 2017</a>. The facility is expected to <a href="https://www.atlantaga.gov/Home/Components/News/News/14700/672">cost US$90 million</a> and is located on 85 acres of public land in the Weelaunee Forest, once home to the Indigenous Muscogee Creek peoples. The site is owned by the city of Atlanta but sits on <a href="https://decaturish.com/2022/09/cop-city-explained-a-look-at-the-ongoing-controversy-surrounding-police-training-center/">unincorporated land in DeKalb County</a>, just outside the city.</p>
<p>The opposition campaign has garnered support from activists and environmentalists who are concerned about <a href="https://theconversation.com/militarization-has-fostered-a-policing-culture-that-sets-up-protesters-as-the-enemy-139727">militarization of police forces</a> and potential threats to <a href="https://stopcop.city">the Black community</a>, as well as to <a href="https://defendtheatlantaforest.org">climate resilience</a> in Atlanta. </p>
<p>Members of <a href="https://defendtheatlantaforest.org/">Defend the Atlanta Forest</a>, a decentralized movement of grassroots groups and individuals, argue that the threatened forest provides essential ecological services – filtering rainwater, preventing flooding, providing habitat for wildlife and cooling the city in a time of climate change. </p>
<p>Activists have led protest marches, written letters to elected officials and <a href="https://www.copcityvote.com/updates">organized a referendum</a> for the public to decide the future of the property. Some have camped out in the Welaunee Forest – a method that radical environmental defense groups like <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Earth-First">Earth First!</a> have used to <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/total-liberation">delay or prevent logging</a>. In one instance, activists reportedly <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/atlanta-protests-cop-city-georgia-state-of-emergency-forest-defenders/">set construction equipment on fire</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/CyeS2xhvy_r/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link\u0026igshid=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<p>Authorities have responded with force. </p>
<p>In January 2023, police <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/13/1163272958/cop-city-protester-autopsy-manuel-paez-teran">fatally shot activist Manuel “Tortuguita” Terán</a>, who had been camping on the Cop City site for months. Authorities assert that Terán had shot and wounded a state trooper, while Terán’s family contends that they were <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-charges-troopers-killing-cop-city-activist-manuel-paez-teran-georgia/">protesting peacefully</a>. </p>
<p>An independent autopsy concluded that Teran <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/04/20/atlanta-cop-city-protester-autopsy/">was shot 57 times</a> while <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/11/1162843992/cop-city-atlanta-activist-autopsy">sitting with hands raised</a>. A prosecutor opted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/cop-city-atlanta-activist-shot-no-charges-421f6fe392a9202523ea154b2ddabb7d">not to file charges</a> against state troopers involved in the shootout, calling their use of deadly force “objectively reasonable.” </p>
<p>Attorney General Carr <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/us/cop-city-atlanta-indictment.html">indicted 61 activists</a> on Sept. 5, 2023, under <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2021/title-16/chapter-14/">Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act</a>, which is a <a href="https://www.ajc.com/politics/what-to-know-about-georgias-rico-law/3Y2PBKLHWFDMLKYFEURTHLBVZY/">broader version</a> of the <a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/rico-racketeer-influenced-and-corrupt-organizations-act-statute">1970 federal RICO law</a>. Three defendants have been charged with money laundering for <a href="https://www.ajc.com/news/crime/breaking-more-than-60-training-center-activists-named-in-rico-indictment/DQ6B6GHTAJAJRH4SLGIIBAMXR4/">transferring money to protesters</a> occupying the forest around the construction site, and five are charged with <a href="https://www.ajc.com/news/crime/breaking-more-than-60-training-center-activists-named-in-rico-indictment/DQ6B6GHTAJAJRH4SLGIIBAMXR4/">domestic terrorism and arson</a>. Some of the accused face up to 20 years in prison.</p>
<p>Clashes between protesters and police have continued. Protesters organized a march for Nov. 13 and were met by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/16/atlanta-police-cop-city-protest-grenades-snipers-terrorism">heavily armed police officers in riot gear</a>. When activists attempted to push past the officers, the police used <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/police-protesters-atlanta-clash-cop-city-rcna124956">tear gas and flash-bang grenades</a>. </p>
<h2>How does RICO apply?</h2>
<p>Georgia’s <a href="https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/GAOAG/2023/09/05/file_attachments/2604508/23SC189192%20-%20CRIMINAL%20INDICTMENT.pdf">109-page indictment</a> of “Cop City” protesters paints a broad – and, in our view, troubling – picture of the actions and beliefs that allegedly contributed to what it describes as a corrupt agreement.</p>
<p>The indictment cites the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html">2020 killing of George Floyd</a> by Minneapolis Police as the event that sparked the “conspiracy.” It refers to the Atlanta-based movement as the Defend the Atlanta Forest “Enterprise” and <a href="https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/GAOAG/2023/09/05/file_attachments/2604508/23SC189192%20-%20CRIMINAL%20INDICTMENT.pdf">describes participants</a> as engaging with “anarchist” ideas and practices such as “collectivism, mutualism/mutual aid, and social solidarity.”</p>
<p>Protesters use these practices, the indictment asserts, to advance their goal of stopping construction of the training center. As evidence, it <a href="https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/GAOAG/2023/09/05/file_attachments/2604508/23SC189192%20-%20CRIMINAL%20INDICTMENT.pdf">cites examples</a>, including posting calls to action on online blogs, reimbursement for printed documents and transferring money to activists for materials such as camping gear, food, communications equipment and, in two instances, ammunition. </p>
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<span class="caption">Georgia Attorney General Christopher Carr has filed a sweeping RICO indictment against dozens of activists protesting the planned police training site.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Election2022Georgia-AttorneyGeneral/09a8169fb9aa43f8b2c5bbd6d424a13e/photo">AP Photo/John Amis, File</a></span>
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<h2>Threatening First Amendment rights</h2>
<p>As we see it, these activists are being criminalized for their political beliefs and for engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, such as exercising free speech. Throughout the indictment, the Georgia attorney general uses the term “anarchist,” we believe, as a synonym for “criminal.” </p>
<p>Such language echoes the Immigration Act of 1903, also known as the <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/total-liberation">Anarchist Exclusion Act</a>. This law targeted anarchists for exclusion from the U.S. solely based on their political beliefs. Section 2 of the law states that “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the United States or of all governments or all forms of law, shall be <a href="https://immigrationhistory.org/item/1903-anti-anarchist-legislation/">excluded from admission into the United States</a>.” </p>
<p>This wording reflects a widespread view of anarchy as a state of violent disorder. In fact, however, many anarchist thinkers actually proposed to organize society on the basis of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/anarchism">voluntary cooperation</a>, without political institutions or hierarchical government. </p>
<p>Another, broader view of anarchy is that it is an ideology and practice of <a href="https://www.akpress.org/featured-products/black-dawn.html">organizing communities and society</a> in ways that confront any and all forms of oppression, including <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/total-liberation">oppression by government</a>. </p>
<p>Why would such a philosophy be deemed threatening? Consider recent U.S. history.</p>
<h2>The Black Panthers</h2>
<p>In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the federal government sought to repress and criminalize the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-shootout-between-black-panthers-and-law-enforcement-50-years-ago-matters-today-153632">Black Panther Party for Self Defense</a> as part of a covert and illegal <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/COINTELPRO">counterintelligence program, known as COINTELPRO</a>. </p>
<p>The Black Panther Party created extensive <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/body-and-soul">community survival and mutual aid programs</a> for Black communities at a time of ongoing government neglect. Offerings included free access to medical and dental clinics, ambulance service and buses to visit friends and relatives in prison. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Black Panther Party organized dozens of social programs to directly meet local needs in underserved areas like New York’s South Bronx.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The Black Panthers’ <a href="https://www.history.com/news/free-school-breakfast-black-panther-party">free breakfast for children program</a> fed thousands of children across the country. In Chicago, local police destroyed food the night before the program was set to begin operations. A memo by an FBI special agent called the program an attempt to “create an image of civility” and “assume community control,” thus <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600802683767">threatening the centralized authority</a> of the U.S. government. </p>
<p>Federal agencies relied mainly on covert tactics to surveil, infiltrate and discredit the Black Panther Party. Like the Cop City protesters, the Black Panthers also engaged in <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-shootout-between-black-panthers-and-law-enforcement-50-years-ago-matters-today-153632">direct confrontations with police</a>.</p>
<p>However, we see the current use of RICO charges to address political activism and protest activities as a new tactic. </p>
<h2>Future implications</h2>
<p>In our research, we have explored how mutual aid groups establish networks of care and survival in the face of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1089/env.2022.0104">climate change</a>. We expect mutual aid to become even more important for Black and Indigenous people of color as environmental disasters <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12986">become more frequent</a>.</p>
<p>From our perspective, efforts to stop Cop City demonstrate the interconnection between two critical issues: overpolicing of communities of color and climate change. We see Georgia’s RICO indictment as an attempt to repress social movement activity, using the state’s tools of legal interpretation and enforcement. </p>
<p>Criminalizing collectivism, mutual aid and social solidarity is particularly concerning for historically marginalized populations, who often rely on these tactics for survival. </p>
<p>Seeking to use the state’s political processes, organizers recently collected over 116,000 signatures supporting a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-10-04/-cop-city-referendum-aims-to-repeal-planned-atlanta-police-training-center">ballot referendum</a> that, if approved, would cancel the lease of the city-owned site for the training center.</p>
<p>However, Atlanta officials have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/atlanta-cop-city-referendum-signatures-4b617a220807b6701c9f46745e4762c4">refused to verify those signatures</a> as they await a federal court ruling on whether the organizers missed a key deadline. Meanwhile, Atlanta is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-10-04/-cop-city-referendum-aims-to-repeal-planned-atlanta-police-training-center?sref=Hjm5biAW">already clearing land</a> for construction at the training site.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214820/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This isn’t the first time that US authorities have criminalized civil disobedience or framed grassroots organizing as a conspiracy.Rachel McKane, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Brandeis UniversityDavid Pellow, Department Chair and Professor of Environmental Studies and Director, Global Environmental Justice Project, University of California, Santa BarbaraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1932252022-11-16T19:02:37Z2022-11-16T19:02:37ZThe End of History: Francis Fukuyama’s controversial idea explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494044/original/file-20221108-23-a4taad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5883%2C3961&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin has eschewed liberal democracy and remains vulnerable because of this, according to Fukuyama.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sergei Bobylev/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 1989, a policy wonk in the US State Department wrote a paper for the right-leaning international relations magazine The National Interest entitled “The End of History?”. His name was Francis Fukuyama, and the paper stirred such interest – and caused such controversy – that he was soon contracted to expand his 18-page article into a book. He did so in 1992: <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/57981.The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man">The End of History and the Last Man</a>. The rest, they say, is (the end of) history.</p>
<p>Fukuyama became one of those academics whose work was cribbed to a shorthand: The End of History. It is, no doubt, a memorable and dramatic phrase – but it is as unclear as it is striking.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494039/original/file-20221108-22-n1oqpx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Put very simply, by “the end of history,” Fukuyama did not mean that we had reached a stage where nothing else would occur of historical significance – that all problems had been solved and politics would now be smooth-sailing. </p>
<p>His argument was that the unfolding of history had revealed – albeit in fits and starts – the ideal form of political organisation: liberal democratic states tied to market economies. (Or to put it in Churchillian language, the least-worst form.) </p>
<p>Fukuyama’s use of the word “history” here is best approximated by synonyms in sociology such as “modernisation” or “development”. </p>
<p>He wasn’t saying those states that claimed to be liberal democracies lived up to this ideal, nor that such a political organisation resolved all possible problems – merely that liberal democracy, with all its flaws, was the unsurpassable <em>ideal</em>.</p>
<p>For him, a liberal democratic state requires three things. First, it is democratic, not only in the sense of allowing elections, but in the outcomes of these elections resulting in the implementation of the will of the citizenry. Secondly, the state possesses sufficient strength and authority to enforce its laws and administer services. Thirdly, the state – and its highest representatives – is itself constrained by law. Its leaders are not above the law. </p>
<p>In a recent article in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/10/francis-fukuyama-still-end-history/671761/">The Atlantic</a>, Fukuyama, now a senior <a href="https://fukuyama.stanford.edu/">fellow and professor</a> at Stanford University, appeared to stand firm on his central idea. He argued that those states which have eschewed liberal democracy and proclaimed it dead or dying – particularly Russia and China – remain vulnerable in two specific ways. </p>
<p>Firstly, he argues, their reliance on a single leader or small leadership group at the top virtually guarantees bad decision-making over the long-term. Secondly, the absence of public participation in any political processes means the support for such leaders is inherently volatile, liable to evaporate at any moment. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-putins-retreat-from-kherson-could-be-his-most-humiliating-defeat-yet-194254">Why Putin’s retreat from Kherson could be his most humiliating defeat yet</a>
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<h2>A debt to Hegel and others</h2>
<p>The phrase “the end of history” was not, in fact, coined by Fukuyama. It bears a history, and philosophical currency tracing back to the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) (who coined the term) and his modern interpreters Karl Marx (1818-1883) and the Russian-born French philosopher and statesman Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968). Understanding it requires an understanding of these thinkers. </p>
<p>Hegel had argued that history has a <em>telos</em> or goal – an end point – equivalent to the emergence of a perfectly rational and just state. That state would guarantee the liberty necessary for the full development of all human capacities. At the same time, it would exist in a state of perpetual peace with other – similarly configured – states. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=781&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494041/original/file-20221108-17-pk0bac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=982&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jakob Schlesinger: The Philosopher Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, 1831.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Hegel – according to Kojève – had witnessed this end of history (or at least the beginning of such an end) with the French Revolution and its universalisation of the ideas of equality and liberty.</p>
<p>Fukuyama judged Kojève correct: the French republic had not been bettered, despite many fascistic and communist attempts to make it so. It is not necessarily that the ideals of the revolution were all realised perfectly (as if the Reign of Terror served as vindication of liberalism) but that – as ideals – they had manifested themselves decisively, shown their force, and since proved unsurpassable.</p>
<p>For Fukuyama, Hegel’s misfortune was to be thought of by many 20th-century intellectuals as a mere precursor to Marx, for whom the fate of a society – and an “end of history” – was not determined by its ideas, but by its material organisation. </p>
<p>For Marx, the resolution of historical development would take the form of global communism. This would mean the end of the exploitation of man by man, the dissolution of private property, the resolution of all antitheses between mental and physical labour, the emergence of a system in which each individual would contribute “according to his ability,” and consume “according to his needs”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/karl-marx-his-philosophy-explained-164068">Karl Marx: his philosophy explained</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But by the end of the 1980s, Fukuyama – along with a host of others – began to suspect we weren’t going to see a Marxist “end of history” after all.
The Russian Communist Party, under Mikhail Gorbachev, was moving towards a series of reforms: a “reconstruction” (Perestroika) pushing for greater openness and transparency (Glasnost) and even the expansion of profit-seeking and commercialisation within the confines of a planned economy.</p>
<p>These democratising and liberalising reforms – a response to the totalitarian impulses and long-term economic stagnation of the Eastern Bloc – both delayed and precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. </p>
<h2>Limitations</h2>
<p>Many have accused Fukuyama of a Whiggish tendency towards reifying and valorising a particular model of government – the United States specifically – as somehow embodying the perfect form of the modern state.</p>
<p>But this critique, commonly held, is largely misplaced. Fukuyama has pointed out repeatedly the failures of the US, the misguided collapsing of liberalism with neoliberalism, and – more recently – the populist nationalism of the Republican Party, which he sees as catastrophic and of a piece with parallel developments in, for instance, Tayyip Erdōgan’s Turkey and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494042/original/file-20221108-24-kav88a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Viktor Orban pictured last month.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hungarian Prime Minister's Press Office/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>His thesis, therefore, concerning “the end of history” is not so much that this form of political organisation has been realised, but that, as an idea, it is one upon which we cannot improve. And maybe he is right about this. But the devil, as always, is in the details – and Fukuyama seems to sometimes pass over those in silence.</p>
<p>He acknowledges, for instance, but has provided scant recommendation on how to resolve, the inherent tension between the strength of liberal democratic states and the freedoms of their citizens.</p>
<p>A strong state will be one which is able to enforce its mandate – but how is this enforcement to be squared with the liberties of the individuals that comprise its citizenry?</p>
<p>Here Fukuyama counsels “balance”. We may be given to wonder not only what to weigh, but what metric might be used. Furthermore, issues about “details” may run deeper than merely the question of policy resolutions to address such fundamental tensions; much of Fukuyama’s best-known work work favours the general over specifics.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/494040/original/file-20221108-24-cj0iav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Francis Fukuyama speaking at a world leaders forum in Seoul in 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yonhap/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This may be no coincidence, given the German idealist framework out of which his thesis was originally couched. Both Hegel and Marx have been accused of a “totalising” vision in which the dirty historical details – of stateless people, show trials and pogroms, the human casualties of both liberal and illiberal “state building” – are swept to the side in the name of universal tales of progress.</p>
<p>It is important to point out that the liberal democratic state Fukuyama praises is one which is very rarely established liberally or democratically. Recent attempts at forcefully <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War">“exporting” liberal democracy into countries</a> have very often resulted in destabilisations and tyrannies far worse than those they hoped to replace. </p>
<p>And what of the recent phenomenon concerning the global resurgence of a number of authoritarian regimes, from Nicaragua and Sudan to Burma and Iran, whose successes (if not stability) don’t immediately give rise to the kind of optimism about democratisation that was at large in the 1980s? </p>
<h2>A more sober stance</h2>
<p>Even if his commitment to his position hasn’t wavered, Fukuyama has sobered somewhat in the years following his original article. Although as convinced as ever in liberal democratic states as the ultimate form of political organisation, he is certainly more sanguine about their imminent victory in the world we actually live in. </p>
<p>In <a>an interview in 2021</a>, the Norwegian political historian Mathilde C. Fasting pressed Fukuyama on the global rise rise and damaging impact of populism, and on what Stanford University’s Larry Diamond calls “democratic recession” – <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">a decline in the number of democracies around the world</a>, as well as the degradation of democratic structures within established democracies, including the US and Britain:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Fasting</strong>: Is what we are witnessing “temporary counterwaves,” to quote <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Samuel-P-Huntington">Samuel Huntington</a>, or are they fundamental reversals that belie the optimism before the millennium?</p>
<p><strong>Fukuyama</strong>: I don’t think you can answer that at this point.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nobody can, of course. As a science, political futurology has proved itself even more dismal than economics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Fleming does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s a phrase often bandied around – but what does it mean? And how relevant is the notion of ‘the end of history’ today?Chris Fleming, Associate Professor in the School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1082172018-12-07T13:33:03Z2018-12-07T13:33:03ZBrexit deadlock: this three-way referendum design could break it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249279/original/file-20181206-128190-1qhhrri.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=45%2C4%2C1285%2C631&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2016 EU referendum resulted in a marginal victory for Brexit and a divided nation. After two years of negotiations, politicians and voters seem further divided. The final decision may now be put back in the hands of voters in another referendum. So how could such a referendum produce an outcome to settle the debate? Or at least, could we design a referendum that will not be perceived as an effort to overturn the 2016 decision? The answer is not easy, and different designs lead to different outcomes. As we however argue, while certain designs favour consensus, others may lead to further divisions.</p>
<p>Consider the three available options on a scale running from anti to pro-EU. The two options of remaining in the EU or exiting without a deal lie at the two extremes of the scale. Leaving the EU with the negotiated deal lies somewhere between. This would make a two-option referendum controversial so a three-option vote might be preferable. However, that raises the question of how you get a meaningful mandate.</p>
<p>We argue that a “<a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/borda-count/">Borda count</a>” (named after the 18th-century mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda) should be used in this three-way referendum. On polling day, voters rank the three options, marking their favourite with a “1”, their second favourite with a “2”, and their worst option with a “3”. For each ballot, the rule assigns 2 points to each voter’s first option, 1 to their second, and 0 to their third. The option with most points wins.</p>
<p>With a Borda count, if an option is supported by a majority, the rule delivers it (as any other reasonable rule would do). If no single option is supported by a majority, the Borda count in the particular setting works well. As we will argue, it would most likely deliver the option that would have also won in a two-way referendum against either alternative. This would guarantee a certain degree of consensus.</p>
<h2>The setting</h2>
<p>In the case of Brexit, we think you can divide voters into four groups:</p>
<p><strong>1) “No-deal supporters”</strong> want to leave the EU without a deal. If not possible, they would rather leave the EU with a deal rather than remain. </p>
<p><strong>2) “Remain supporters”</strong> want to remain. If not possible, they would rather leave the EU with a deal than crash out of it.</p>
<p><strong>3) “Deal/no-deal supporters”</strong> want to leave the EU with a deal. Their second preference is to leave the EU without a deal and their worst option is to remain.</p>
<p><strong>4) “Deal/remain supporters”</strong> also want to leave with a deal, but they would rather remain in the EU than crash out of it. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249295/original/file-20181206-128190-1cg1bpm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">If voters’ rankings of options in the Brexit context are accurately represented in the graph, research has valuable input on building consensus in a three-way referendum.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Consider that none of the options is ranked first by at least 50% of voters. A Borda count in a three-way Brexit vote would most likely deliver the “deal” option. While this might sound like a terrible result to some, in the absence of a clear majority it’s actually the least divisive option.</p>
<p>That’s because in the absence of at least 50% of “no-deal” or “remain” supporters, accepting the deal would also win against both other options in two-option referenda. Consider a “deal” versus “no deal” referendum: “deal” and “remain supporters” vote for the deal, “no-deal supporters” oppose it. Since “no-deal” supporters are not a majority, “remainers” and “deal supporters” give the victory to the “deal”.</p>
<p>Similarly, in a “remain” versus “deal” referendum, “no deal” and “deal” supporters give the victory to the “deal”.</p>
<p>The desirable feature of the Borda count is precisely this: it delivers the consensual “deal” option in a divisive scenario where no option is supported by a clear majority. Of course, it would also deliver a victory for any of the three options if one were supported by a clear majority. Hence, while it gives both “extreme” options (“remain” and “no deal”) fair chances, it delivers a “moderate” soft Brexit in the absence of a clear majority. </p>
<p>The above features make the Borda count a credible design that treats all options equally. It’s a design that parliamentarians could get behind as momentum builds towards holding a referendum. And, should such a referendum happen, this neutral design could help deliver a result voters can trust.</p>
<h2>Consider the alternatives</h2>
<p>We think that any other system would fail to produce a result that can truly resolve this question. A <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/first-past-the-post/">first-past-the-post</a> three-option referendum would obviously fail to promote consensual options. It could give the victory to one of the extreme outcomes with 34% of the total vote – with the other two options tying at 33%. </p>
<p>Others <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/23/peoples-vote-brexit-mps-second-referendum">propose</a> a two-question referendum in which question one repeats the original EU referendum question and question two asks voters to choose a preferred type of Brexit. This has similar properties to the Borda count. However, if you repeat the original referendum question on the new ballot, you invite criticism that you are simply rerunning the 2016 vote, which risks perpetuating Brexit divisions. The Borda count is more neutral: it treats all options equally.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/249282/original/file-20181206-128202-2q8pgp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A second referendum must be carefully designed, otherwise it could cause even further division.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this context, there are also problems with using a <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/alternative-vote/">transferable vote</a> system, as supported by Conservative MP <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/20/parliament-people-brexit-theresa-may-second-referendum">Justine Greening</a>. As with the Borda count, voters return a simple ranking. If there is no alternative ranked first by a majority, the option that got the least first preferences is eliminated. These votes are then allocated to the two other options following the second ranked option. </p>
<p>In the polarised scenario at hand, if there is no majority for one of the “remain” or “no-deal” options to guarantee those options a straight win, the “deal” option would most probably have the least first preferences. Hence the transferable vote would eliminate the moderate option first and one of the extreme options would win. This is, in our view, an undesirable feature of this system since as we previously established the moderate option would most likely win against both other options in a two-way referendum.</p>
<p>That’s why we think the three-way, Borda count vote is the best option for finding a way out of this Brexit mess.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s the fairest way to settle this debate – though in the absence of a clear majority supporting either “remain” or a “no deal” it would probably mean accepting Theresa May’s deal.Orestis Troumpounis, Senior Lecturer, Lancaster UniversityDimitrios Xefteris, Assistant Professor of Political Economy, University of CyprusLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1074572018-11-22T16:31:08Z2018-11-22T16:31:08ZWhat is populism – and why is it so hard to define?<p>We live in a moment in which the word <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/series/the-new-populism">“populism”</a> is never far from the lips of politicians (although oh so rarely of the populist politicians themselves). We hear the word repeated over and over, but once we try to get a handle on what it actually means, confusion abounds. There are a few good reasons for this difficulty of understanding but, at the same time, the burgeoning academic community writing on populism has increasingly forged a consensus around at least the core features of the concept.</p>
<p>The first reason for the conceptual confusion is that words don’t neatly map onto their referents. There is a struggle over the meaning of key political terms and the predominant use of populism in politics and the media is derogatory. Established politicians and journalists dismiss populism as an aberrant infant intruding into and disrupting political normality.</p>
<p>Because populists don’t understand politics, according to this establishment view, the populist intrusion will be temporary. Voters will inevitably return to their senses and see through the seductive but hollow musings of this infantile intruder. This is why the signifier “populism” tends to be used by establishment figures – such as former British prime minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/tony-blair-6417">Tony Blair</a> and former deputy prime minister Nick Clegg. And what they intend to signify by that word is that the public should reject populism. They are the anti-populists but, again, you don’t tend to hear those accused of being populist – <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nigel-farage-5524">Nigel Farage</a> or Donald Trump, for instance – labelling themselves as such.</p>
<p>Invoking Blair and Clegg brings us to the second reason for populism’s conceptual confusion. Historically, populism has not been a permanent political phenomenon. It comes in waves. It disappears and reappears, usually coinciding with crisis (whether real or declared). What matters is the people have to feel that crisis, have to recognise that the crisis designated by the interloping populist performer is upon us. And this time the crisis is also a crisis of the worldview that the likes of Blair and Clegg brought into being. When in power, Blair regularly likened the version of globalisation New Labour fostered as a force of nature. As sure as night follows day, globalisation was upon us, and the only valid response was to find a way to work within this unstoppable force.</p>
<p>Nationalism began to rise in Europe several decades back. It came in response to the establishment, consolidation and growth of the EU, and the decline of the continent encapsulated by decolonisation and the end of empires. Initially it was a trickle, but it grew inexorably throughout this century. Populists began to rail against postnational institutions such as the EU and UN and against international treaties that attempt to bind all nations (relating to climate change and other environmental factors). Globalisation no longer seems quite as inevitable as Blair claimed.</p>
<h2>Rejecting the ‘elites’</h2>
<p>In this shift from Blair’s globalisation to the reassertion of nationalism, something happened to the people. This is one of the most heavily contested concepts in politics, but under the calm of Blair’s rule, the people were viewed as one – both rulers and ruled got along with one another. Blair was declared the “man of the people” and he thought his popularity resulted from his being “a normal guy”. This is not how populists treat the people. For populists, the seamless harmony between the people and their rulers no longer holds. The people have been betrayed. A gulf has opened up between the people and the elites. Instead of unity, they have entered a conflictual relationship.</p>
<p>And it is this understanding of populism – the people pitched against elites – that has now become widespread among the academic community. But this is a somewhat limited or minimal presentation of what populism is, and once academics start expanding on it, they quickly start to disagree.</p>
<p>The most contentious issue is over whether populism is an ideology as Cas Mudde, the most quoted commentator on contemporary populism <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/populism-a-very-short-introduction-9780190234874?cc=gb&lang=en&">claims</a>. This would align populism with other political ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism and conservatism.</p>
<p>Yet liberalism has core identifiable features – the centrality of the individual (and not the people), human rights, the separation (and limitation) of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/liberalism-a-very-short-introduction-9780199670437?q=liberalism%20a%20very%20short%20introduction&lang=en&cc=gb">powers</a>. Populism does not have these.</p>
<p>Moffitt <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25175">suggests</a> populism is better understood as a style. It’s a manner or practice of doing politics. You identify (or declare) a crisis, invoke the people against elites, and so on. And because it is more of a style of politics than an ideology with content, there are several variants of it, most notably of the left and right. Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain are perhaps the most obvious left variants emerging in the aftermath of 2008 – although both Corbynism (far more than Jeremy Corbyn himself) and Bernie Saunders share certain affinities.</p>
<p>It is the right, however, especially in Europe and now the US under Trump, that is very much in the ascendancy. The right has proved highly effective at mobilising the national people against not only “the swamp” in Washington or Brussels, but also against those these elites are deemed to represent and protect: migrants primarily, but also other minority interests.</p>
<p>This is the final complicating factor about populism: alongside the people and the elites, there is a third group against which populists will direct their ire – migrants usually for the right; financial elites for the left. The success of right populists mobilising against the dual combination of Brussels elites and migrants (or minorities) explains why Viktor Orban is in power in Hungary, Matteo Salvini in Italy, and European politics continues to be profoundly influenced by Farage, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders – and plenty more besides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andy Knott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s a slippery concept but academics have reached agreement on some of its fundamental elements.Andy Knott, Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities, University of Brighton, University of BrightonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/999882018-07-16T14:00:24Z2018-07-16T14:00:24ZCan democracy vote itself out of existence?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227692/original/file-20180715-27036-1enkwcy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Look at the state of the world’s democratic nations, and it is easy to see why so many are <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/american-democracy-on-the-brink-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-2018-06?barrier=accesspaylog">concerned for the future of democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Leaders such as <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/24/europe/turkish-election-results-intl/index.html">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-result-factbox/russian-presidential-election-results-idUSKBN1GU0WZ">Vladimir Putin</a> and Hungary’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/apr/08/hungary-election-victor-orban-expected-to-win-third-term-live-updates">Viktor Orbán</a> have centralised political power by changing their countries’ constitutions, silencing dissent and controlling the media. Since 2016’s coup attempt in Turkey, Erdoğan’s government has used the subsequent state of emergency to incarcerate thousands without trial. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/07/turkey-opposition-party-leaders-mps-jailed">Opposition politicians</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/05/turkey-judges-prosecutors-unfairly-jailed">judges</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/27/turkey-journalists-convicted-doing-their-jobs">journalists</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/11/erdogan-turkey-academics-terrorism-violence-kurdish-people">academics</a> have been thrown in jail – all following a successful referendum that saw the office of president <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/04/15/turkey-is-sliding-into-dictatorship">shed many of the restraints of parliament</a>. The recent presidential elections then <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-snap-election-yields-surprises-on-all-sides-what-next-98865">returned Erdoğan to office</a>, albeit with the slimmest of majorities.</p>
<p>Given this climate of fear and censorship, the people cannot be said to have voted freely. But the fact that they did vote raises a fundamental question: can an electorate vote democracy away?</p>
<h2>The people have spoken … sort of</h2>
<p>First of all, there are important distinctions between general elections and constitutional referendums, and each comes with its own set of democratic dangers.</p>
<p>In Turkey and the UK, narrow referendum results have endorsed fundamental constitutional change. But these referendums are not, like general elections, exercising the democratic right to select leaders. Instead, they are making complex governmental decisions that often require understanding of specialist information, way beyond what could reasonably be expected of an ordinary person. Voting on such questions – usually concerning fundamental long-term change – ought to, and often does require a <a href="https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/supermajority">super majority</a>. Otherwise, as we can see from the 52/48 split in the UK’s Brexit vote, the results can be highly contentious.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227688/original/file-20180715-27015-hr84yv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some Turks have heralded the threat to their democracy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/president-turkeys-ruling-justice-development-party-1122337505?src=-2Tjymfa7ydayyweDp1t8g-1-27">shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>General elections do not require super majorities, and the government is formed from whichever party captures enough seats to command the legislative assembly, or, in a proportional system, the opportunity to lead a coalition. Frequently, the popular vote is not reflected in the number of seats a party wins. In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz party won <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-election-2018-viktor-orban-fidesz-jobbik/">49% of the vote</a>, but 133 of the 199 available seats. In the US Hillary Clinton <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2016/nov/11/clinton-won-more-votes-trump-won-the-election-and-its-not-the-first-time">gained more votes overall</a>, but lost the presidency under the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/what-is-the-electoral-college_n_2078970.html">electoral college system</a>. </p>
<p>These divergences are well-established, and when elections are contested between two moderate parties trying to appeal to the middle ground (as has been the case across Europe for many years), such anomalies have not caused too much instability. But in today’s more extreme, divergent political climate, a greater number of governments could emerge that are divisive and extremely unstable. When there is enough support for the extremes, they can be elected against the wishes of the majority of the population, leaving the ordinary voter faced with “democratically elected” leaders whose policies they vehemently oppose.</p>
<h2>Tale as old as time</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227693/original/file-20180715-27045-1shqhgz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Napoleon III was elected in 1848, but declared himself emperor four years later.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/napoleon-iii-aka-louis-bonaparte-18081873-86443465?src=e_KbsZqE8nmwDnY4sMwNOw-1-0">shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The concept of electorate-mandated autocracy goes back as far as the modern democratic state. In his <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/18th-Brumaire.pdf">Eighteenth Brumaire</a>, Karl Marx lamented the election of Napoleon III in 1848 that led to him declaring himself “emperor” in 1852. Marx observed how easy it was for an already centralised power to centralise further, and remove the institutions that might stop it from doing so. He lamented too, how easy it was to adopt a “heroic” personality, and to strategically appeal to the interests of specific groups of people in order to win an election. The appeals are of course hollow, but they can harness the support of those seduced by charisma and strength.</p>
<p>To suggest that electorates deliberately, or consciously vote for autocracy is another matter. The standard explanation is that people know not what they do – that they are swept up in a desire to be part of something greater than themselves. This is partly true, but there are certainly those that support autocracy and hold extreme views. When these elements represent a significant enough minority they can sometimes sweep enough people into their narratives to elect an extreme leader whose views do not represent the body politic.</p>
<h2>More than a vote</h2>
<p>But even in a vote with high turnout, an electorate free of disproportionately powerful minorities, and a legislative assembly aligned entirely with the popular vote, the results of an election could be wholly undemocratic. An election, to hold validity, must be “free and fair”.</p>
<p>Many recent votes have been blighted by constraints on the press, manipulation of social media and data (note the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election">Cambridge Analytica</a> story), and defamatory campaigns that have strangled the free flow of information. Targeted attacks on those representing “the establishment” (such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jul/06/the-george-soros-philosophy-and-its-fatal-flaw">George Soros</a> during the Hungarian elections), destabilise the moderate views and institutions associated with them, and foster a divisive “us and them” mentality.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227696/original/file-20180715-27030-1epeqyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A float in Prague’s Labour Day procession protests the degradation of Eastern European democracy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/prague-czech-republic-maj-1-2017celebration-634592537?src=Ld9MwCd5ZKc3zCov9LlbwA-1-48">shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The institutions that structure political power and authority can also easily be centralised, particularly in moments of recognised stress, such as war or a state of emergency. These provide a reason or excuse for consolidation of executive power, allowing the governing class to make decisions without having to go through regular legislative channels. And once in place, these can be difficult to reverse. Turkey’s <a href="http://www.intellinews.com/turkey-s-state-of-emergency-to-end-144250/">state of emergency</a>, the US <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm">Patriot Act</a> and Britain’s <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n10/karma-nabulsi/dont-go-to-the-doctor">Prevent legislation</a> are all examples of the power states have acquired to act without regard for due process.</p>
<p>Turkey’s presidential elections, and its presidential referendum, were not democratic because the state had already become autocratic. Rather, they were exercises in projecting an image of democracy, since states that run elections are popularly assumed to be democratic. In reality the vote was not free, so the people did not “vote against” democracy.</p>
<p>Democracy is about more than just voting. It is about freedom of speech, the separation of executive from legislative power, judicial independence, and political equality. Democratic institutions exist to keep power from becoming centralised in a single, despotic location. Once these institutions begin to weaken, and the only remaining element of democracy is the pretence of elections, then democracy in its meaningful form is already gone.</p>
<p>Powerless votes perpetuating pre-existing autocracies are barely votes at all. And a democratic vote that votes against democracy, probably wasn’t very democratic in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Manjeet Ramgotra is a member of the Labour Party, and a representative for the SOAS UCU.</span></em></p>Recent elections in Turkey, Hungary and Russia raise a fundamental question about democracy. Can it give autocracy a mandate?Manjeet Ramgotra, Senior Teaching Fellow in Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841442018-06-26T11:11:33Z2018-06-26T11:11:33ZHere’s a better way to think about identity politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224893/original/file-20180626-112641-1570vq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3484%2C2321&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Victoria Jones</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Identity politics has become a phrase of common currency in recent years, yet it is often painfully, and badly, used. Generally, it is wheeled out in a negative context. Take UK environment minister <a href="https://twitter.com/SebastianEPayne/status/998478337541537792">Michael Gove</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/OxfordUnion/status/998647034126241792">Tim Farron</a>, former leader of the Liberal Democrats, for example. Both sought to distance themselves from such thinking in two separate speeches given on the same day earlier this year. Gove said “identitarians” undermine liberal politics, while Farron condemned identity politics as a “poison”.</p>
<p>In fact, it seems the term is used almost entirely negatively, by people who wish to argue against the concept. However, they rarely stop long enough to adequately, or meaningfully, define the term to a point of usefulness. We should recall George Orwell’s remark on the word “fascism” in his essay <a href="http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit">Politics and the English Language</a>; that it has come to mean little more than “something not desirable”. In this sense, “identity politics” has become the new fascism – or indeed the new centrism, neo-liberalism, Blairism or populism. It is simply shorthand for a concept or idea that you dislike.</p>
<p>But underlying each of these terms is something worth clearly identifying and discussing. After all, there is such a thing as fascism – there are clearly fascists. The same is true of identity politics. There is clearly something called identity out there, and it clearly plays a role in politics. But what is it, and should it be taken seriously? </p>
<p>As I’ve <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/16/british-identity-key-brexit-crisis-negotiations">argued</a>, identity is the image someone has of themselves. This image is made of different components – football teams we support, cities we live in, music we listen to, and more. This is not an effort to give a final definition, but it is an effort to give a useful one.</p>
<p>Identity politics, at face value, is a politics that speaks to our image of ourselves. Immediately, we face a trap – it’s easy to declare all politics identity politics, because everything relates to our identity. But this is to erase the other things that politics is about – such as healthcare, taxes, and other issues that concern who gets what. It risks conceding the argument to those who think that “identity politics” is a major, if not the greatest, problem with politics today, because those voices so often proclaim that “identity politics” is taking over, and destroying the space for “normal” or “good” politics. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"998647034126241792"}"></div></p>
<p>A more satisfactory position is to argue that all politics involves an element of identity. Instead of disregarding it, we should seek to understand it – but we should acknowledge that this isn’t a sufficient condition for understanding any one issue. This creates space for meaningful and interesting discussions around identity, but also an awareness that either seeking to remove or exclusively focus on identity as the aspect of politics worth discussing is ultimately going to produce incomplete answers. </p>
<p>How can we apply this practically? Take, for example, the discussion over Brexit. If we discuss Brexit purely as a matter of economics – of the allocation of resources, the openness of countries to trade, the free movement of capital, and so on – we might produce an “answer” to Brexit that seemingly reconciles all the different economic issues and produces an optimal outcome. For the sake of argument, let us imagine that is that the UK becomes rather like <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-brexit-options-a-refresh-79364">Norway</a>, and stays in the single market. Yet, that solution proves wildly unpopular – and likely would. Why? </p>
<p>Because it would exist in tension with the identities of many people, who feel that it would be an unacceptable infringement on aspects of the country that they identify with – or the values that form a part of their identity – through the lack of control on immigration or, say, over new rules that the UK would have to follow, or so on. Those who back a Norway-style deal might, rightly in this scenario, argue that the deal they had was the most efficient in economic terms. But if it has no resonance with identities – or worse, actively is seen as being hostile to them – then it will struggle to gain ground.</p>
<p>Ultimately, identities are the images that we have of ourselves. Having that self-image challenged is incredibly disruptive and it can be very difficult for us to adapt that image in light of the challenge. Most identity changes occur over longer periods of time, and with less tension and conflict.</p>
<p>If anything, therefore, identity politics should call on us to reflect on what it is about what we do that angers others so much, and how we can reconcile the different aspects of our identities in a way that produces mutually beneficial settlements. It should be a means to see a vital aspect of all politics, and how it plays a key role in shaping how people respond to us. On that ground alone, identity politics is worth understanding.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Oliver does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Given that so many people have a strong opinion about identity politics, it is surprising how few of us have a clear idea on what it actually is.Timothy Oliver, Teaching fellow in British and Comparative Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/974792018-06-05T13:37:37Z2018-06-05T13:37:37ZWhat Karl Marx has to say about today’s environmental problems<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221802/original/file-20180605-119867-19sxm3m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Green Marx.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/libertinus/9940279183/">Montecruz Foto/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>…all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility.</p>
<p>– Karl Marx, Capital vol 1</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and an economic shift in China it seemed that capitalism had become the only game in town. Karl Marx’s ideas could safely be relegated to the dustbin of history. However the global financial crash of 2008 and its aftermath sent many rushing back to the bin. </p>
<p>For good or ill, the German philosopher’s ideas have affected our world more profoundly than any other modern social or political thinker. Yet on Marx’s recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/karl-marx-wouldnt-agree-that-worker-power-has-been-killed-by-the-21st-century-95982">200th birthday</a>, discussion of his continuing relevance was still dominated by “traditional” understandings of Marxism. Commentators, whether hostile or sympathetic, focused on his critique of the exploitation and inequality of capitalism and imperialism, and the struggle to transform society in a socialist direction. </p>
<p>Sadly, there was little – far too little – on Marx’s thinking on the relations between humans and nature. </p>
<p>After all, the steady but accelerating destruction by modern capitalism of the very conditions which sustain all life, including human life, is arguably the most fundamental challenge facing humanity today. This is most widely recognised in the shape of one of its most devastating symptoms: climate change. But there is much more to it, including toxic pollution of the oceans, deforestation, soil degradation and, most dramatically, a loss of biodiversity on a geological scale.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221771/original/file-20180605-119870-sbl60r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘The history of nature and the history of men are dependent on each other so long as men exist’ – Karl Marx.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephen Bonk / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some will say that these are new problems, so why should we expect Marx, writing more than a century ago, to have had anything worthwhile to offer to us today? In fact, <a href="http://environment-ecology.com/journals/411-capitalism-nature-socialism-a-journal-of-socialist-ecology.html">recent</a> <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/product/marxs_ecology/">scholarship</a> has demonstrated that the problematic, often contradictory relationship between humans and the rest of nature was a central theme in Marx’s thinking throughout his life. His ideas on this remain of great value – even indispensable – but his legacy is also quite problematic and new thinking is needed. </p>
<h2>Alienation – from nature</h2>
<p>Marx’s early <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf">philosophical manuscripts of 1844</a> are best known for developing his concept of “alienated labour” under capitalism, yet commentators hardly ever noticed that for Marx the fundamental source of alienation was our estrangement from nature.</p>
<p>This began with <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch27.htm">enclosure of common land</a>, which left many rural people with no means of meeting their needs other than to sell their labour power to the new industrial class. But Marx also talked of spiritual needs, and the loss of a whole way of life in which people found meaning from their relationship to nature.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221785/original/file-20180605-119860-6banma.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Enclosure turned common land into private property and, Marx argued, helped England move from feudalism to capitalism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cristian Teichner / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The theme running through his early manuscripts is a view of history in which exploitation of workers and of nature go hand-in-hand. For Marx, the future communist society will resolve the conflicts among humans and between humans and nature so that people can meet their needs in harmony with one another and <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm">with the rest of nature</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Man <em>lives</em> on nature – means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In these writings Marx makes vital contributions to our understanding of the human-nature relationship: he overcomes a long philosophical tradition of viewing humans as separate from and above the rest of nature, and he asserts the necessity for both survival and spiritual well-being of a proper, active relationship with the rest of nature. At the same time he recognises this relationship has gone wrong in the capitalist epoch.</p>
<h2>The problem is capitalism – not humanity</h2>
<p>In his later writings Marx develops this analysis with his key concept of “mode of production”. For Marx, each of the different forms of human society that have existed historically and across the globe has its own specific way of organising human labour to meet subsistence needs through work on and with nature, and its own specific way of distributing the results of that labour. For example, hunter-gatherer societies have usually been egalitarian and sustainable. However feudal or slave-owning societies involved deeply unequal and exploitative social relations, but lacked the limitlessly expansive and destructive dynamic of industrial capitalism. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/221777/original/file-20180605-119860-1h7772.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Marx talked of ‘primitive communism’ in ancient societies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anton_Ivanov /Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This concept of “modes of production” immediately undermines any attempt to explain our ecological predicament in such abstract terms as “population”, “greed” or “human nature”. Each form of society has its own ecology. The ecological problems we face are those of capitalism – not human behaviour as such – and we need to understand how capitalism interacts with nature if we are to address them. </p>
<p>Marx himself made an important start on this. In the 1860s he wrote about <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/2013/12/01/marx-rift-universal-metabolism-nature/">soil degradation</a>, a big concern at the time. His work showed how the division of town and country led to loss of soil fertility while at the same time imposing a great burden of pollution and disease in the urban centres. </p>
<p>Modern writers have developed these ideas further, including the late <a href="http://libcom.org/library/capitalism-nature-socialism-theoretical-introduction-james-oconnor">James O’Connor</a>, the sociologist John Bellamy Foster, who identified an endemic tendency of capitalism to generate an “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Ecological_Rift.html?id=VGzJQgAACAAJ">ecological rift</a>” with nature, and those in the UK associated with the <a href="http://redgreenstudygroup.org.uk/rgsg-position-paper-2016/">Red Green Study Group</a>.</p>
<p>I suggested above that Marx’s ideas were indispensable but also problematic. There are places where he appears to celebrate the huge advances in productivity and control over the forces of nature achieved by capitalism, seeing socialism as necessary just to share the benefits of this to everyone. Recent scholarship has challenged this interpretation of Marx, but historically it has been very influential. It is arguable that the disastrous consequences of the Stalinist drive for rapid industrialisation in Russia came from that interpretation. </p>
<p>But there is another point. The newer ecological marxists argue, rightly, that capitalism is ecologically unsustainable, and that socialism is necessary to establish a rational relationship to the rest of nature. However, to build a movement capable of transforming society in this way, we need to recall Marx’s early emphasis on both the material <em>and spiritual</em> needs that can be met only by a fully rewarding and respectful relationship to the rest of nature: in short, we need a Marxism that is green, as well as ecological.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97479/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ted Benton received funding from ESRC. He is affiliated with Red-green Study Group and Green Party</span></em></p>Marx believed that exploitation of workers and of nature went hand-in-hand.Ted Benton, Emeritus Professor of Sociology, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/900112018-04-26T03:22:27Z2018-04-26T03:22:27ZKidnapped democracy: how can citizens escape?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214688/original/file-20180413-560-1d698i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Contemporary politics is no longer able to resist the pressure of economic power.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Day_40_Occupy_Wall_Street_October_25_2011_Shankbone_13.JPG">David Shankbone/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/revolutions-and-counter-revolutions-49124">Revolutions and Counter Revolutions</a> series, curated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> as a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a> and The Conversation. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2006/apr/15/featuresreviews.guardianreview16">José Saramago’s parable Seeing</a> (2004) explores how irrationality and stupidity become manifest when political decision-making is taken “hostage” by financial powers. The Nobel Prize-winning author warns that contemporary politics is no longer able to resist the pressure of economic power. This is because we live in amputated and kidnapped democracies that no longer protect citizens’ interests.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, this concern has become much more generalised among citizens in recent years. Journalists, activists, politicians and economists have also intuitively employed the concept of “kidnapped democracy” to describe our political predicament. The term kidnap is clearly a useful metaphor for understanding the times and power relations in which we live, especially if we can spell out its meaning, its consequences, and the stakeholders (the kidnappers and the hostages) who intervene in the process. </p>
<p>Kidnapping implies that someone is being held against their will. At the mercy of the kidnapper, the hostage loses any capacity for action and free movement. So when democracy is kidnapped, its main institutions and basic structures – parliaments, political parties, trade unions, mass media and NGOs – are held hostage. </p>
<p>Of course, there are some differences between the kidnapping of people and the kidnapping of institutions, but both situations are complex and potentially violent. And both can produce repressed, complicit victims.</p>
<h2>Meet the hostages</h2>
<p>Separating the victims from the kidnappers is no easy task. There are plenty of kidnapped stakeholders and different types of kidnappers.</p>
<p>Parliaments, governments, political parties, trade unions, mass media and NGOs all play a basic role in the political system. Despite performing specific tasks, each is expected to serve citizens and respect the maximum plurality of possible interests, or at least try to do so. Unfortunately, all these institutions are becoming less legitimate, to varying degrees, in almost all democracies. </p>
<p>More and more people believe these democratic institutions exist only to serve a select minority, having lost their capacity to act and their freedom to mediate or represent plural interests meaningfully. </p>
<p>So have they been kidnapped? How did it happen? And what hidden causes and dynamics lie behind the capture? </p>
<p>Take, for example, the Greek government: can it really act freely? Can it represent its citizens or is it hostage to international powers and organisations that dictate its policies and destiny, to the great frustration of its citizens? </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214689/original/file-20180413-543-1nsqcug.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Greek citizens have been frustrated by the austerity policies of their government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/0742/4386566455">underclassrising.net/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/greeks-are-overworked-and-exhausted-from-the-debt-crisis-71589">Greeks are overworked and exhausted from the debt crisis</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While a seemingly extreme example, Greece is certainly not the only country that must confront such questions. Other European Union nations are similarly troubled. </p>
<p>When the Spanish Socialist government (PSOE), supported by what was then the Partido Popular opposition party, reformed the nation’s constitution in 2011, a budget stability principle was passed. This gave priority to repaying public debt within the state’s general budget. This measure was considered most controversial, and was unpopular among citizens precisely because it explicitly and exclusively addressed the need to satisfy financial markets. </p>
<p>Things are not so different when we look northwards. Even in the “powerful” and economically strong Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel suffered such captivity. </p>
<p>At the beginning of 2010 and in the face of economic crisis, Merkel considered the need to redistribute certain costs, insisting that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/22/germany-ireland-eurozone-bailout-crisis">creditors should also pay part of the costs</a>. However, this proposal swiftly changed when “the markets” reacted by slightly increasing interest rates on German public debt. The idea of redistributing, albeit minimally, the costs of the country’s economic hardships was rapidly ruled out. </p>
<p>Evidently, governments have tremendous difficulty acting freely. The financing of markets, globalisation and the formation of multi-party governments all come into play. Political parties have even contributed to their own captivity and loss of freedom by taking on large debts with banks in order to win elections. </p>
<p>Other basic pillars of the democratic system are losing the capacity to represent plural interests. Trade unions and their close links with media powers, along with their concentration and progressive takeover by international corporations, come to mind. </p>
<p>So do NGOs that depend on external financing from political and economic centres. Are they not increasingly becoming hostage to propertied powers and dynamics that prevent them from meeting their original purpose?</p>
<h2>Who are the kidnappers?</h2>
<p>The kidnappers themselves are many and diverse; they vary by country and the range of strategies they employ. It is remarkable that former International Monetary Fund chief economist Simon Johnson has <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/307364/">expressed his concern</a> about the power of well-established financial oligarchies, particularly in the US, to impose systematic policies that are self-serving. Such financial elites include multinationals, rating agencies and powerful pharmaceutical and weapons industries. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214690/original/file-20180413-584-19itc0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Something’s obviously wrong when even a former IMF chief economist voices concern about the power of financial oligarchies over policy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/guigui-lille/28270947186/">Guillaume Delebarre/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, these stakeholders whose power goes well beyond the economic sphere to kidnap the space of politics are also prevalent in Europe, Latin America, Australia and many other “stable democracies”. The kidnappers resort to various strategies and tools, which range from providing finances and maintaining close connections with politicians to taking advantage of revolving doors and making implicit or explicit threats. </p>
<p>But their common objective is seen everywhere: to determine the destination of politics and to limit, or even strangle, the power of basic democratic structures that should otherwise grant citizens a voice. When the pillars of democracy are kidnapped, citizens become victims of the whole process.</p>
<h2>Stockholm syndrome</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/Stockholm-syndrome">Stockholm syndrome</a> is a peculiar but well-known psychological reaction that sets in when hostages develop an affective link and positive feelings towards their kidnappers. It’s not a stretch to see this syndrome at work in our contemporary democracies. </p>
<p>How many voters, even those aware of their captivity, justify their kidnappers’ decisions? How many brush off austerity policies with a simple “it’s just what has to be done”? And how many economic and political leaders are paradoxically received as liberators of a population? </p>
<p>A significant part of the population, while certainly not the entire population, seems to be complacent about today’s kidnapped democracy. It is as if they have surrendered themselves emotionally and given themselves up to their captors. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-pathologies-of-populism-82593">The pathologies of populism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>These kidnappers stay silent</h2>
<p>It’s worth noting the difference in the levels of silence (or noise) when people, as opposed to whole democracies, are kidnapped. In “classic” forms of kidnapping, the criminals themselves often contact the relatives and loved ones of their hostage to make demands. In doing so, they raise the alarm, which can also be raised by anyone who may have witnessed the kidnapping. </p>
<p>Something different takes place when a democracy is kidnapped. In this instance, the kidnappers intentionally keep quiet about what is happening. They do not want to draw attention to what they are doing. They make no calls and showcase no distressed victims, nor do they seek to attract media coverage to voice explicit demands. </p>
<p>The kidnappers’ power lies in their capacity to keep their control over institutions silent. To do so, the kidnappers must develop their influence as subtly as possible. They need citizens to perceive that all is normal and suppose that democracy works. Appearances must be reassuring enough that no-one fears the power that the kidnappers acquire, so that their control is not threatened, or at least not openly questioned.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214687/original/file-20180413-543-pt0rdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The populist leaders of our times do not appear to offer much hope for an urgent renewal of democracy for the people.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/number7cloud/32388615916/">Lorie Shaull/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How can citizens free themselves?</h2>
<p>Is there any way to free democracy and citizens from their stealthy, wealthy, elite captors? To date, the populists who promise us salvation do not appear to offer much hope for an urgent renewal of democracy for the people. </p>
<p>Yet some monitoring and accountability initiatives launched by civil society are finding ways to resist the silence, raise the alarm and break up the Stockholm syndrome. </p>
<p>Unveiling and demonstrating with evidence the extent to which our democracies have been kidnapped is necessary, not least to promote public reflection on the problem. But the key to renewal surely lies in new democratic mechanisms and forms of citizen participation that are capable of ending the concentrations of power that are kidnapping our democracies and victimising their citizens. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-spanish-political-laboratory-is-reconfiguring-democracy-74874">How the Spanish political laboratory is reconfiguring democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read other articles in the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/revolutions-and-counter-revolutions-49124">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ramón A. Feenstra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The financial oligarchies differ from other kidnappers by being silent about their power over institutions and policies – they don’t want to alert anyone to what they have done.Ramón A. Feenstra, Lecturer of Moral Philosophy, Universitat Jaume ILicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/937672018-04-04T13:20:22Z2018-04-04T13:20:22ZGerman politicians invest in opera when seeking re-election – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211700/original/file-20180323-54863-ztqef1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yossi Zwecker/Wikipedia</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In virtually all rich democracies, governments subsidise expensive highbrow culture, such as theatre and opera. And they hire artists to work for these theatres and operas as public employees. At first sight, this might seem to pose a puzzle. After all, highbrow culture is elitist. And it seems electorally irrelevant. </p>
<p>Parties don’t really compete on culture in elections. It’s unlikely that hiring artists to turn them into grateful voters (patronage) makes electoral sense. Even if it did, the number of actors, singers, dancers and musicians working in these roles is simply too small to make any meaningful electoral impact. In fact, even the number of voters who actually go to the opera and theatre seems too small to make a difference in elections.</p>
<p>In our <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2296877">research</a>, Markus Tepe, from the University of Oldenburg, and I try to make sense of this puzzle. We offer a theory of political and sociological multiplier effects to do so.</p>
<p>We believe that politicians will strategically manipulate subsidies for highbrow culture and hire more artists when they are aiming to be reelected. They do this because they want to use artists as conduits of indirect competence signals aimed, through them, at their audiences. In other words, politicians want to please highbrow culture consumers by hiring more artists for them to watch or hear – during election times.</p>
<p>These audiences – highbrow culture-consuming voters – are obviously more numerous than the artists themselves. But they are politically even more important than their numbers.</p>
<p>Sociologically speaking, highbrow culture consumers are what we call “high-multiplier” voters. Theatre and opera visitors are more likely to be consummate “political animals” themselves. Compared to other demographics, they are particularly likely to turn out to vote and to otherwise actively participate in politics.</p>
<p>These people may even be unusually influential in shaping other voters’ political behaviour. They are more interested in politics and they have more social network ties with other voters. So, impressing opera and theatre goers should be especially attractive to politicians in times of elections – at least, that is our theory.</p>
<p>We took our theory to the opera in Germany by using data on artist hiring between 1993 and 2010.</p>
<h2>Is there a multiplier in the audience?</h2>
<p>In German federalism, together with education and domestic security, culture is one of only three policy domains that are still decided largely at the state rather than federal level. German state-level and local-level politicians have joint legal and funding authority for theatres and operas.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/211704/original/file-20180323-54898-15tv3rj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Berlin Konzerthaus, a rich source of electoral support.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABerlin_Konzerthaus_.JPG">JosefLehmkuh/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the period 1993-2010, there were on average only around 12,000 people working as dancers, singers, actors or musicians in public theatres and orchestras in all of Germany. </p>
<p>Using <a href="https://www.gesis.org/en/allbus/allbus-home/">German General Social Survey</a> data, we found that even after controlling for a whole array of socio-economic variables, Germans who consume more highbrow culture in their leisure time tend to go voting more frequently. They also more frequently tend to actively participate in politics in their leisure time. For instance, increasing the frequency of highbrow cultural leisure time from its minimum to its maximum corresponds with an average increase in personal political activism by 23 percentage points, and in voting likelihood by 20 points. Compared to the impact of core socio-economic control measures such as age (35 points) and income (38 points), this indicates a considerable direct effect of highbrow culture consumption on active political engagement.</p>
<p>And, as we suspected, German highbrow culture consumers also turn out to be political multipliers. They are much more interested in politics and have more social network ties with whom they might discuss politics. Increasing the frequency of highbrow cultural activities from its minimum to its maximum corresponds with an average increase in interest in politics by 19 percentage points, in spending one’s leisure time with friends, neighbours and acquaintances by 8 points and with family by 5 points.</p>
<p>The number of actors, singers, dancers and musicians employed in German public theatres and orchestras tends to increase during state-level and municipal-level election years. So it does indeed look like local politicians fine-tune their hiring of artists according to the electoral cycle.</p>
<p>Interestingly, in line with our theory, we have also found evidence of similar tactics in the remaining two “localised” policy domains of German federalism: education and domestic security. German local politicians also time the public hiring of teachers and of police officers to coincide with election periods.</p>
<p>Power politics permeates policymaking even when one least expects it. You are on the receiving end of electioneering even as you enjoy a night out at the opera.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pieter Vanhuysse MAE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opera goers are high multiplier voters. Win them over and you might get a few more supporters along the way.Pieter Vanhuysse MAE, Professor of Comparative Welfare State Research, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/873622018-02-15T01:12:26Z2018-02-15T01:12:26ZBe realistic – demand the impossible: the legacy of 1968<p><em>This article is the first of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/revolutions-and-counter-revolutions-49124">Revolutions and Counter-Revolutions</a> series, curated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> as a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a> and The Conversation. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The events of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/egalit-libert-sexualit-paris-may-1968-784703.html">May 1968</a> in Paris and then France more generally still resonate as a graphic illustration of the potential for relatively peaceful and wealthy societies to explode in spontaneous anger.</p>
<p>May 1968 was not an uprising against tyranny or manifest injustice of a kind that animated the civil rights movement. Starting out as a set of demonstrations against university reform, the French uprisings quickly gathered momentum in a manner that almost defies explanation. </p>
<p>Part student revolt, part disillusionment with various aspects of contemporary existence, part trade union opportunism and part extended street party, everyone’s account of why it “kicked off” seems to differ.</p>
<p>Assessing the legacy of ’68 is just as demanding as providing an explanation for why it happened at all. Little remains in the way of lasting institutional impressions. The uprising disappeared almost as quickly as it had erupted once the militarised police imposed order.</p>
<p>On the surface, then, though this brief and spontaneous episode marked the emergence of “<a href="https://ourworldindata.org/materialism-and-post-materialism/">post-materialist</a>” concerns amongst the young, it was of little consequence for contemporary purposes. Yet scratching beneath the surface of this Wikipedia-style narrative, it is possible and perhaps necessary to mount a more serious defence of the legacy of ’68. </p>
<p>Certain themes and tropes are very evident in today’s politics. Let’s start with some obvious pointers.</p>
<h2>The collapse of grand narratives</h2>
<p>1968 can be seen as the moment when the two dominant narratives on the left – social democracy and communism – were both called into question. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/money-capitalism-and-the-slow-death-of-social-democracy-58703">Social democracy</a> had dominated mainstream progressive discourse since the end of the 19th century. Now it was seen as irredeemably complicit in the maintenance of a status quo that seemed to consecrate a materialist, routine form of life offering very little to the young or to the political imagination.</p>
<p>Social democratic politics was held as “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=SyIuDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT15&lpg=PT15&dq=%22capitalism+with+a+human+face">capitalism with a human face</a>”. It accepted the necessity for the market order and so, as far as ’68 critics of capitalism were concerned, for exploitation, alienation and the division of society into pharaohs and slaves. </p>
<p>Social “democracy” reduces politics to an electoral spectacle, and our place within it to passive recipients of whatever it is a rotating set of elites deems to be in our best interests. The insurgents of 1968 searched for something more than a passive quiescent existence built around consumption.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/YCtcD9CfMOI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘The old left thought the new left was out of control – they had impossible dreams.’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Historically, the principal alternative to social democracy on the left had been communism, the militant ideology of Lenin and his followers. </p>
<p>But communism according to influential critics on the fringes of ’68 – such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornelius_Castoriadis">Cornelius Castoriadis</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard">Jean-Francois Lyotard</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claude_Lefort">Claude Lefort</a>, all members of the ultra-left <a href="https://libcom.org/library/socialisme-ou-barbarie-linden">Socialisme ou Barbarie</a> group – had ossified into a debased ideology guarded by a self-interested theocracy. It had gone from a vital credo of insurrection to a doctrine maintained and guarded by bureaucrats.</p>
<p>The communist vision of revolution – an industrial working class led by an intellectual class – was now an anachronism.</p>
<p>By 1968, the working class had given up on the dream of its own emancipation in favour of chatter around holiday pay, generous pensions and the trifles that made existing life more bearable. It had lost its heroic capabilities, settling instead for indolent acceptance of a comfortable “<a href="https://libcom.org/library/redefining-revolution-cornelius-castoriadis-paul-cardan-solidarity">air-conditioned</a>” existence.</p>
<p>So, calls against social democracy and communism exploded on the streets of Paris under joyously enigmatic slogans:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Be realistic: demand the impossible! Under the cobbles, the beach! It is forbidden to forbid!</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194691/original/file-20171114-30020-6zzuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘It is forbidden to forbid!’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Espencat/Wikipedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, quite what it was that the demonstrators wanted was often difficult to discern. Much of the discourse of 1968 rotated around the idea of auto-gestion or self-management. But almost implicit in the idea was the rejection of normative ideals or frameworks of a kind that we associate with classical ideologies. </p>
<p>Also implicit was a rejection of the idea of the leading role of intellectuals in terms of that task of framing.</p>
<p>The net result was a politics of refusal – of social democracy, of communism, of capitalism, of elites, vanguards, intellectuals, and so on and so forth. But where, it could legitimately be asked, was affirmation?</p>
<p>Those engaged in the uprising were clear about what they were against; they were less clear in terms of what they were actually for in concrete, institutional terms. Auto-gestion was a difficult term to operationalise. It still is.</p>
<p>So, 1968 represents the end of grand narratives in politics. It was an uprising against something; less for something else. </p>
<p>The sense of ’68 as a refusal lives on in contemporary politics. We don’t have a redemptive ideology to place our hopes on. We don’t believe the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/everyday-makers-defy-populists-false-promise-to-embody-your-voice-78762">experts</a>”. We don’t think there’s a formula for collective planetary happiness. We have individualised politics to the point where refusal is a first, and quite often last, resort.</p>
<p>Lyotard famously described this “incredulity” towards metanarratives as “<a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-postmodern-condition">the postmodern condition</a>”. The result was a kind of political paganism, a politics of the faithless, of those who move from one campaign against injustice to another, only without any certainty that there is another way of life, model or system that could, in a sense, “cure” the ills of modernity.</p>
<h2>The end of the party</h2>
<p>Related to the collapse of dominant narratives was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-movements-could-mark-the-end-of-representative-politics-42369">collapse in faith in organisational politics</a>, more familiarly the political party, the dominant form of collective mobilisation since the 19th century. </p>
<p>The party could not, as per Marxist teaching, represent the interests of the working class. Nor could it evade the kind of bureaucratic ossification outlined most famously by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_Parties_(book)">Robert Michels</a> and <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/381-critique-of-dialectical-reason-2-volume-set">Jean-Paul Sartre</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps the idea of a permanent or standing organisation of any kind was the problem. 1968 therefore marked the embrace of what later became known as “horizontal” forms of organisation in the search for a kind of being together that celebrated all manner of differences and, at the same time, provided the basis for collective action.</p>
<p>The rejection of inherited organisational politics in 1968 has been felt very clearly in more recent times. Established in 2001, the World Social Forum went as far as banning participation by political parties and their representatives. Parties, it was claimed, contaminated “dialogue” and, hampered by considerations of loyalty or affiliation, prevented the free flow of opinion. </p>
<p>Later, high-profile initiatives such as <a href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/horizontalism-and-the-occupy-movements">Occupy Wall Street</a> and Spain’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/postcard-from-spain-where-now-for-the-quiet-revolution-43779">#15M</a> also made clear their distance from the inheritance of left progressive politics and, in particular, the “vertical” politics of parties and formalised mechanisms of representation.</p>
<h2>Living with(out) capitalism</h2>
<p>1968 unleashed a wave of “post-materialist” energies directed at capitalism. Capitalism became the object of anger less because it was failing in some distinct fashion, but more because it was succeeding, or more accurately it was succeeding in creating subjects, ourselves, who needed capitalism and who wanted capitalism to succeed.</p>
<p>The consumer age was dawning after the austerity of the post-war years. This meant putting the desiring subject, rather than the producer, at the centre of the system of reproduction. Hitherto radical analyses of capitalism had concentrated on the experience of the producer or worker.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194693/original/file-20171114-29997-1ncklrh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graffiti in a classroom at the University of Lyon that appeared during a student occupation of parts of the campus in May 1968.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">George Garrigues/Wikipedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many found their origin in Marx’s pungent critique of capitalism in works such as the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm">1844 Paris manuscripts</a>. These described the alienating properties of capitalist production in almost poetic terms. </p>
<p>But what lurked in these earlier works was an appreciation of the way in which we as consumers were ensnared by the logic of capitalist reproduction through the fetish properties of commodities themselves.</p>
<p>It was this latter aspect that became such a prominent feature of the critiques of capitalism that both inspired and were in turn inspired by 1968. They found their ultimate expression in the work of <a href="https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/jason-mcquinn-raoul-vaneigem-the-other-situationist">The Situationists</a>, notably via Guy Debord and Raoul Vaniegem. They describe contemporary capitalism as engaging with us at the subliminal level through the manipulation of desire via advertising and the saturation of the visual and aesthetic field with “affirmative” messages designed to encourage further consumption.</p>
<p>Many involved in 1968 turn to psychoanalysis to explain how it was that capitalism appeared so adept at creating followers in the midst of its own inhumanity. Work such as Deleuze and Guattari’s <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/305132/anti-oedipus-by-gilles-deleuze-and-felix-guattari/9780143105824/">Anti-Oedipus</a> and Lyotard’s <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=20853">Libidinal Economy</a> looked for the key to unlocking a joyful subject beneath the cramped subject of consumerist desire.</p>
<p>These critiques reflect and in some cases inspired the approach adopted by many of those taking part in the events of 1968. One of the legacies of the uprisings was the rich use of slogans, posters, films and cartoons to engage the senses.</p>
<p>Out of 1968 came a distinct political strategy, <a href="https://theconversation.com/whither-anarchy-the-fantasy-of-natural-law-60778"><em>detournement</em></a>, in today’s lingo “jamming” or “hacking”. The idea here is to take images of an everyday kind, such as those appearing in advertising, and in some way distort them so they produce an opposite effect – while at the same time reminding us of the chilling manipulation of desire that lies beneath.</p>
<p>The idea is to create a meme that reminds us of the fetish quality of everyday existence and the instrumentalisation of our world in the search for profit. By overturning the integrity of the image or the words we remind ourselves of the contingency of social arrangements, of hierarchies and the mode of exploitation.</p>
<p>This strategy has become a powerful source of inspiration for today’s anti-establishment resistances, from the glossy pages of <a href="https://adbusters.org/">Adbusters</a>, through to the humorous “liberation” of billboards, guerrilla gardening, critical mass and other seemingly spontaneous “laboratories of insurrection”. </p>
<p>Today’s activists feed off and are inspired by the legacy of 1968’s suspicion that the only way to overcome capitalism is to challenge the spectacle of elite domination in the visual field, at the level of affect, and in the very constitution of our subjectivity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194696/original/file-20171114-30005-9lebml.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Adbusters today practises the distinctly 1968 strategy of <em>detournement</em> as a form of resistance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">PBS NewsHour/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Activists are aware of the mediated nature of contemporary existence and therefore of the power of images, sounds and experiences passing through the circuits of the capitalist life world. </p>
<p>A politics that does not engage us at the level of our emotions, our desires and our deeper needs cannot hope to produce that sense of connection to a wider purpose that is the starting point for mobilisation.</p>
<h2>What’s left of 1968’s left?</h2>
<p>1968 did not lead to an overturning of French capitalism, of the domination of elites, or the structures of inequality. Far from it.</p>
<p>But the legacy of 1968 runs deep in terms of how a good part of the left “assemblage” sees its task and goes about seeking to accomplish it. </p>
<p>1968 represents the inauguration of a politics of refusal: refusal to be incorporated into dominant narratives; refusal to conform to a logic of political mobilisation that has been practised for over three centuries; refusal to deploy the organisational forms so familiar from previous models of collective action.</p>
<p>1968 represented a freeing up of politics from the congealed, stodgy and unimaginative understandings that had so dogged the emergence of an oppositional politics after the second world war. It unleashed a wave of joyous experimentation, evanescent and spontaneous efforts to challenge the dull routine of the repetitious lives that had been constructed in and through advanced capitalism.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/194699/original/file-20171115-30029-av4192.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1044&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘No to the bureaucracy’: street art from the 1968 revolts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IISG/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rejection of political inheritance and the embrace of a more fluid and experimental style of politics is not without its own pitfalls, challenges and critics. One can almost hear the <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2011/07/the-power-of-nonsense">Zizeks</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-left-wing-populism-55869">Mouffes</a> intoning against forms of politics that dispensed with the militant collectivism associated with the Leninist tradition in particular.</p>
<p>Where is the institutionalisation, or rendering permanent the demands of this assemblage? Where is the attempt to create the necessary counter-hegemonic structure that will provide a genuine force to challenge the state, the ruling class and the repressive apparatus? Where is the desire for seeing through a program designed to ameliorate the conditions of the least well off?</p>
<p>There is a certain obvious way in which this stony-faced realism misses the point. This is that the linearity of politics, the sense of a common collective endeavour undertaken by a mass of like-minded citizens toward a common goal, is precisely what was challenged in 1968. </p>
<p>Those who took to the streets didn’t know what they wanted; they just knew what they were against – routine, elites, boredom, mortgages, certainty. They wanted to construct something new together, but they didn’t have the tools or the vocabularies to do that in the brief window of opportunity that presented itself.</p>
<p>John Holloway gets close to this atmosphere when he notes that politics often starts from “<a href="https://platypus1917.org/wp-content/uploads/readings/Holloway_Change_the_World.pdf">a scream</a>”. 1968 was a scream, an alarm bell going off, a red light flashing. It told us that the certainties that had sustained the post-war order – the promise of more jobs, more stuff to buy, happier and more contended lives – was not enough. It was not exciting, interesting, fulfilling.</p>
<p>But nor was the narrative of emancipation “enough”. It didn’t engage. It too was hostage to a set of expectations that a generation fed on austerity had enough of hearing: the heroism of the working class locked in its cycle of repetitious labour, greasy hands and greasier chips.</p>
<p>1968 was the scream of the “post-materialists”: those in search of colour in a black-and-white world. May 1968 did not change the world, but it made us look differently at the world we have and the world being created. It made us think that maybe – beneath the cobbles – there is another world.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read other articles in this series as they are published <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/revolutions-and-counter-revolutions-49124">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Tormey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The protesters who took to the streets of Paris didn’t know what they wanted: they just knew what they were against. But they did make us think that maybe there is another, better world.Simon Tormey, Professor of Political Theory and Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/884832018-02-07T01:25:15Z2018-02-07T01:25:15ZIf democracy is failing, why do so many lay claim to it?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198452/original/file-20171211-27693-1vrfm3q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The 2014 Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong against 'Chinese-style democracy' laid bare democracy's contested meanings.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/studiokanu/15327905238/">Studio Incendo/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>These comments on the global fate of democracy, the last in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">Is Democracy Dead or Alive?</a> series, are gathered by <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/democratic-theory-overview.xml">Democratic Theory</a> and co-published by The Conversation with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. Several of these comments will feature as full-length articles in a special issue of Democratic Theory.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>A higher ideal, despite failures along the way</h2>
<p><strong>Patricia Roberts-Miller, University of Texas-Austin</strong></p>
<p>Democracy is always being pronounced dead by those who are trying to kill it. Perhaps because it has tended toward ambitious claims of its origins and possibilities, democracy is held to higher and often different standards from other models of governance. </p>
<p>Democracy certainly has its instances of disastrous decisions – from supporting the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian_Expedition">Sicilian Expedition</a> to our current problem of citizens wanting lower taxes and more expensive services. </p>
<p>In this regard, however, it’s no different from any other form of government: oligarchy, monarchy, fascism and rule by the market all have their disastrous wars, unwise economic policies, and even outright genocides.</p>
<p>Many critics argue that democracy is an inherently flawed system because “the citizenry” is not actually very good at making decisions. And, granted, the empirical research does show that voters tend to make decisions largely on the basis of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/the-dynamics-of-voters-leftright-identification-the-role-of-economic-and-cultural-attitudes/E7F5CD30B213A59C1FAEFF75F3C56CCF">identification</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CHuLCwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22voting%22+AND+%22short-term%22+AND+%22election%22+OR+%22elections%22&ots=kuS1LIFkVV&sig=3F3fuqL3Cx0IuL5a4Vd6Z8g9b44">short-term gain</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=61ZeDgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=patricia+roberts-miller&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">politicians’ charisma</a>, and <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=W6MY-TobYjcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=factional+politics&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">factionalism</a>. </p>
<p>Voters are prone to such cognitive biases as <a href="https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/94/False-Dilemma">false binaries</a>, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Availability_heuristic">availability heuristic</a>, <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fulfillment-any-age/201012/in-groups-out-groups-and-the-psychology-crowds">in-group</a> favouritism, <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>, <a href="https://psychcentral.com/encyclopedia/just-world-hypothesis/">just world hypothesis</a>, <a href="http://psychology.iresearchnet.com/social-psychology/decision-making/naive-realism/">naïve realism</a>, and others. In other words, citizens are only human.</p>
<p>And that is ultimately the point. Humans are prone to cognitive biases. There is no governmental system immune to bad decisions, no set of experts with the judgement of angels, because human government is necessarily one run by humans. </p>
<p>Democracies rarely live up to the ideals of democracy, and so democracy remains an aspiration, but it is a normative one, in which our inevitable failure inspires us to try better.</p>
<h2>Basic values survive disappointment</h2>
<p><strong>Xavier Marquez, Victoria University of Wellington</strong></p>
<p>News of democracy’s demise has been greatly exaggerated. Academic measures show at worst small declines in the level of democracy in the world <a href="http://abandonedfootnotes.blogspot.co.nz/2016/03/artisanal-democracy-data-quick-and-easy.html">in the last decade</a>. </p>
<p>The constitutional documents of <a href="http://abandonedfootnotes.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-age-of-democracy.html">almost every country</a> proclaim their democratic character, and few governments wish to be thought undemocratic. Peoples throughout the world <a href="http://abandonedfootnotes.blogspot.com/2015/06/what-do-people-think-of-democracy.html">demand democracy</a>, and pro-democracy feeling is high even in the most unlikely places.</p>
<p>With some very minor exceptions, as historian <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dunn_(political_theorist)">John Dunn</a> has noted, the word “democracy” has come to symbolise the only legitimate political system in most languages. </p>
<p>Yet, despite its apparent triumph, democracy’s meaning remains disputed and disappointments with its reality are keenly felt. </p>
<p>The standard view of liberal democracy, with its emphasis on electoral institutions, checks and balances and individual rights, has been challenged both by illiberal populists, claiming to speak more clearly on behalf of “The People”, and by conceptions of technocratic management reinvigorated by the apparent successes of a Chinese model that still officially wishes to be called “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_China">the people’s democratic dictatorship</a>”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202531/original/file-20180119-80191-13rhocu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Under Xi Jinping, China now has a day to celebrate a constitution that sets down the principle of ‘the people’s democratic dictatorship’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/hleung/2208600327/">HKmPUA/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The contemporary high esteem for the vague idea of democracy and surprisingly low esteem for actually existing democracies suggests the source of the problem. Since the basic values of democracy – equality, freedom and consent, among others – have often been in conflict with existing hierarchies of power, prestige and knowledge, it is no wonder that existing democracies so often produce disappointment. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, democracy’s values are also alluring; it is telling that today few who wish to condemn the failures of democracy do so in the name of anything other than democracy.</p>
<h2>Governing ourselves is hard work</h2>
<p><strong>Sor-hoon Tan, National University of Singapore</strong></p>
<p>Democracy has never been the “only game in town”, just better than others in terms of offering ordinary citizens more chance or hope of having some say in the decisions that affect them. </p>
<p>No country has ever lived up to the ideal of the people truly governing themselves. Attempts to realise this ideal could only be measured by different degrees to which ordinary citizens have influenced political outcomes and achieved self-government in their daily lives.</p>
<p>It is not democracy, but rather the imperfect mechanisms for achieving it that are failing in the face of today’s challenges. Instead of jettisoning one ideology (which is unfortunately what democracy has come to mean for many) for other more dangerous alternatives, it is up to every one of us to realise that, for self-preservation, we must try even harder to find some way to prevent others from dictating how the world and our lives will turn out. </p>
<p>We need <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CIVBDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT8&dq=%22sor+hoon+tan%22+AND+%22democracy%22&ots=JLiwoEImiC&sig=jNffsZCAzVkvaBoStziu3DP8Wl4">more, not less, democracy</a>. But democracy cannot be forced on another, nor can it be handed over as a free gift. Unless people want and are willing to put in the effort to govern themselves, democracy has no hope.</p>
<h2>At risk of losing its meaning</h2>
<p><strong>James Wong, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</strong></p>
<p>Recently, Rana Mitter <a href="http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/society/article/2102330/mystery-chinas-eagerness-own-term-democracy">wrote</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China is now in position to redefine democracy for the region, taking ownership and reshaping the term in its own, more authoritarian image. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>If Mitter is correct, the real issue seems to be not so much about the dying of democracy but whether the world will accept China’s redefinition of democracy with fewer liberal elements.</p>
<p>China is sceptical of liberal democracy as it cannot guarantee political stability and harmony. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Przeworski">Adam Przeworski’s</a> famous definition of democracy as <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Mfjv6snK0-EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=democracy+and+the+market&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">institutionalised uncertainty</a> is what China seeks to avoid. </p>
<p>At the core of so-called “Chinese-style democracy”, such an institutionalised possibility of unforeseen outcomes is not embraced. People, or at least leaders, want to know not only what is possible, but also what will happen. This explains why China is keen on restricting domains for certain assurance of outcomes – from the list of candidates screened for elections to the varieties of opinions censored in everyday life.</p>
<p>Does this redefinition make democracy a sham? To a large extent, yes. How popular is it going to be? It’s hard to say. But if people are so frustrated by the outrageous outcomes of democratic uncertainty, some may be tempted by the seemingly more assured alternatives. </p>
<p>What we need to recognise is that these alternatives come in the name of democracy and not authoritarianism. </p>
<p>In the future, we might not witness the death of democracy but rather the discursive struggles over its different definitions and redefinitions, over its mutation into something different.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199670/original/file-20171218-27595-35ga7e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping both espouse their own versions of democracy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">President of Russia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Where do democrats find common ground?</h2>
<p><strong>Camille Bedock, Université Libre de Bruxelles</strong></p>
<p>Talking about the “crisis of democracy” is consubstantial with democracy itself. Representative democracy in particular, as <a href="https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/bernard-manin.html">Bernard Manin</a> argues, is built on elections that are simultaneously aristocratic and democratic, egalitarian and inegalitarian. </p>
<p>As such, pessimism about representative democracy has always existed. What is new is the renewed intellectual and political controversy about what democracy is and what it should achieve. This is creating a sense of emergency to “reform” democracy.</p>
<p>Around the second world war, the dominant Western definition of democracy, embodied for instance by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter">Josef Schumpeter</a>, was fairly monolithic: democracy revolved around elections, which are organised to choose between political parties alternating in power, with relatively uninformed and deferent citizens. </p>
<p>Today the picture is blurrier: traditionally dominant parties in so-called consolidated democracies are paddling in troubled waters. Some are at risk of disappearing altogether. </p>
<p>Elections are less and less seen as the cornerstone of democracy. Instead we are seeing the multiplication of groups challenging representation and proposing mechanisms that attempt to go beyond elections.</p>
<p>Citizens also no longer share a unified, uncritical and enthusiastic vision of democracy. A <a href="http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora95&div=86&g_sent=1&collection=journals">substantial share of them</a> actually show little commitment to the democratic regimen. </p>
<p>Concurrently, multiple and often contradictory versions of democracy have come to the forefront in public and intellectual debates: participatory democracy, stealth democracy, advocacy democracy, direct democracy, output-oriented democracy, deliberative democracy, and so on. </p>
<p>A huge question remains unanswered: can traditional “representative” democracy be <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=70nADgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22camille+bedock%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">combined with new forms of democracy</a> without creating more ambiguity about what democracy actually is?</p>
<h2>Crisis is also an opportunity to revitalise</h2>
<p><strong>Sabeel Rahman, Brooklyn Law School</strong></p>
<p>Democracy in the US is in the midst of a crisis, but perhaps not in the way that many might think. Our current democratic crisis is both worse and better than it may seem. </p>
<p>The crisis of American democracy is not so much one of a blatant collapse into open authoritarianism; rather, the crisis arises from a deeper, in some ways more systemic, failure.</p>
<p>Democracy as a moral ideal <a href="http://www.ksabeelrahman.com/democracy-against-domination">involves two dimensions</a>: the negative value of anti-domination – resisting the concentration of arbitrary power, in individual private or public actors, or in diffuse systems like the market itself – and the positive value of agency – expanding our collective capacities for self-government. Along both of these dimensions, modern democracy is in crisis.</p>
<p>Our democracies have failed to protect their communities from the problem of domination, whether in the form of concentrated private power from too-big-to-fail finance or new corporate titans, or in the form of the diffused inequities of contemporary capitalism and subordination of different communities.</p>
<p>At the same time, however, crises are moments of reinvention. The economic and political upheavals of the current moment offer a very real opportunity to reinvent and renew democracy’s promise.</p>
<p>It is out of such moments of crisis that radically democratising movements and institutional transformations in US history have taken place: <a href="http://www.ushistory.org/us/35b.asp">Radical Reconstruction</a> following the Civil War; the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/New-Deal">New Deal</a> following the Great Depression; the civil rights movement following <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/freedom-riders-jim-crow-laws/">Jim Crow</a>. </p>
<p>Such revitalisation is not a foregone conclusion. But a wide range of social movements are leading the charge for a more inclusive, equitable, multiracial democratic order. Whether we can achieve this remains to be seen.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>You can read parts 1 and 2 of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-has-a-future-if-we-rethink-and-remake-it-88239">here</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/which-democracy-what-exactly-are-we-supposed-to-nurture-88482">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sabeel Rahman is an Assistant Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, and a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. In addition to his academic work, he has worked as a consultant and advisor for a variety of projects relating to democracy reform, inequality, and economic policy for philanthropic foundations and think tanks, including the Hewlett Foundation, the Democracy Fund, New America, and the Roosevelt Institute. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Camille Bedock, James K. Wong, Patricia Roberts-Miller, Sor-hoon Tan, and Xavier Marquez do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Uncertainty is built into democracy, but we are seeing more talk of crisis and more attempts at redefinition. So where does this leave citizens who want to have a meaningful say in how they live?Camille Bedock, Chargée de recherche, CNRS, Université de BordeauxJames K. Wong, Research Assistant Professor in Social Science and Public Policy, Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyPatricia Roberts-Miller, Professor of Rhetoric, The University of Texas at AustinSabeel Rahman, Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law SchoolSor-hoon Tan, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, National University of SingaporeXavier Marquez, Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/884822018-02-02T02:49:44Z2018-02-02T02:49:44ZIs Democracy Dead or Alive? What democracy exactly are we supposed to nurture?<p><em>These comments on the global fate of democracy, the second part of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">Is Democracy Dead or Alive?</a>, are gathered by <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/democratic-theory-overview.xml">Democratic Theory</a> and co-published with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. Several of these comments will feature as full-length articles in a special issue of Democratic Theory.</em></p>
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<h2>Imagine a new form of popular sovereignty</h2>
<p><strong>Eva Cherniavsky, University of Washington</strong></p>
<p>If we cannot imagine a future for democracy after the break-up of its historic marriage to capitalism, then I suppose we should declare it dead. But I prefer to think that capitalism’s spurning of democracy offers a context for instituting new forms of democratic governance.</p>
<p>The institutions of the modern democratic state have always stood for the interests of proprietors, upholding formal rights (equality of opportunity) over material equity (equality of condition). </p>
<p>The revolutions that threw off monarchical and colonial rule in the late 18th and early 19th centuries were, with very few exceptions, bourgeois revolutions. The state’s obligation to the collective interest of the people thus finds a limit in its competing and contradictory obligation to the protection of private property.</p>
<p>From this vantage point, the corporate takeover and decimation of existing democratic institutions may free us to conceive and cultivate more radically democratic organisations that centre on the welfare of peoples, rather than individuals.</p>
<p>Movements such as Occupy Wall Street clearly tend in this direction, experimenting with radical, participatory democracy in the belly of the beast.</p>
<p>On the model of Occupy, radical democracy entails the creation of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Lamborn_Wilson">myriad autonomous zones</a>, whether temporary or semi-permanent. </p>
<p>As ethnonationalism and authoritarianism flourish in the ruins of capitalist democracy, it remains to be seen if the Left can reimagine itself, no longer as a dissident force, hostile or marginal to the institutions of capitalist democracy, but rather as a force for institutionalisation, elaborating new forms and practices of <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ywfvCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=neocitizenship&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">popular sovereignty</a> at the local, regional and planetary scale.</p>
<h2>Democracy expresses itself in many ways</h2>
<p><strong>Jean-Paul Gagnon, University of Canberra</strong></p>
<p>When someone says “democracy is dead” they aren’t critiquing democracy itself. They’re critiquing a specific expression of it, usually the representative kind. To conflate democracy with but one of its expressions is dangerous because this dismisses <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2234-Expressions-of-Democracy.pdf">more than 2,000</a> of its other expressions. </p>
<p>Some, like deliberative democracy, are normative projects in part destined to improve the representative institutions that most of us are familiar with. </p>
<p>Others, like <a href="http://www.democraticaudit.com/2017/08/23/there-are-at-least-2234-expressions-of-democracy-and-the-less-common-versions-can-teach-us-a-lot/">Waldorf democracy</a>, where “waiters and financiers, telephone girls and captains of industry, coatroom clerks and merchant princes [sit] side by side” at dinner, are historical expressions that can help us find new purchase on some of today’s more enduring problems such as class division.</p>
<p>There are also expressions of democracy in action: <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=cN8YDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22kabuki+democracy%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">kabuki democracy and karaoke democracy</a> are used to explain modern Japanese politics; <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=eKIVVsIqmjQC&q=%22garbage+democracy%22&dq=%22garbage+democracy%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">garbage democracy</a> captures Fidel Castro’s opinion of representation in the US; and <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=9rxdQUCY6Z4C&pg=PA30&dq=%22sleepy+democracy%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">somnolent democracy</a> is used to describe countries with docile citizens. </p>
<p>These expressions help us make sense of the democracies we live in – think in particular of unwieldy democracy, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-greening-of-democracy-7182">green democracy</a> and corrupt democracy.</p>
<p>So, it doesn’t make sense to say “democracy is dead”, because democracy doesn’t mean just one thing. As we come to know each of democracy’s expressions better, and make sense of them collectively, it’s my wager that this will lead to more inclusion, equality, self-rule, autonomy, fairness and non-violence within our states, between our states, and in our lives.</p>
<h2>Enemies within exploit ideology of democracy</h2>
<p><strong>Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University</strong></p>
<p>The ideology of democracy has <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=3HbzAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22nadia+urbinati%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">disfigured democracy</a> and is one of the reasons for its weakness today. </p>
<p>Contemporary democracy is at the centre of this paradox: as a political system, democracy enjoys an undisputed global hegemony so that even constitutional “reforms” that curtail civil liberties and contradict the spirit of political openness are made in the name of democracy as more genuine affirmations of democracy’s values. <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-venezuela-democracy-20170801-story.html">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-is-on-the-brink-in-hungary-so-why-is-no-one-talking-about-it-82163">Hungary</a> offer prime examples of this.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">As well as fighting for the basics, Venezuelans are fighting to hang on to Venezuela’s 60-year-old democracy.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Particularly after the Cold War, the ideology of democracy has found itself in a situation of planetary solitude. The paradox is that no other names today are available to give legitimacy to political enterprises that are not easily rendered as democratic in the constitutional and representative mode in which democracy is valued. </p>
<p>So we witness the coinage of oxymoronic terms, like authoritarian democracy, technocratic democracy and meritocratic democracy, among others.</p>
<p>One of the effects of this paradox is that political orders named as democratic are not only in contrast with democracy but are moreover primed to cast doubt on the value of democracy. How can we value political equality when our democracies promote <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-antiegalitarian-mutation/9780231169844">technocracy or national-populism</a>? </p>
<p>Not to have names to name these transformations of democratic governments is a problem because it contributes to delegitimising democracy. The ideology of democracy obfuscates political reality and leaves us with no argument against adversaries of democracy from within.</p>
<p>This is the cultural and political context in which a new form of representative government is today primed to emerge within the democratic nest, thus changing democracy from within, silently and inadvertently.</p>
<h2>A problem of shallow cultural foundations</h2>
<p><strong>Youngho Cho, Sogang University</strong></p>
<p>Democracy is still a dominant force this century. No government or political leader literally opposes democracy and openly attempts to break it down. Indeed, they instrumentally use democracy to legitimise their own rule and governance. </p>
<p>Democracy has, in this sense, absolute power over its alternatives, as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Fukuyama">Francis Fukuyama</a> declared more than two decades ago.</p>
<p>So why is democracy dysfunctional in spite of its <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912914532721">global and universal appeal</a> among leaders and ordinary people? One reason is that leaders manipulate the meanings of democracy and people misunderstand it. People do not understand democracy as its scholars do.</p>
<p>Moreover, a large proportion of Asians do not conceive democracy as most Westerners do. When thinking about democracy, many Chinese people imagine economic development, the domestic and regional dominance of Han China and social order. </p>
<p>Certainly, the rule of law, limited government, civil liberties, political rights and press freedom do not matter much in mass conceptions of democracy in certain corners of the world.</p>
<p>Even in advanced countries, when strong leaders such as Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen speak about democracy, they emphasise dominance and the rule of the majority and try to take minority rights away. We may be living in an era of democratic dominance for the first time in history, but its practices are not necessarily liberal or democratic. </p>
<p>Lamentably, democracy’s cultural foundation is shallow. We need more education about democracy and popular engagement with its diverse forms.</p>
<h2>Where is the evidence for claims of doom?</h2>
<p><strong>Dawn Brancati, Columbia University</strong></p>
<p>Dramatic claims that democracy is in peril around the world or, worse yet, that it is already dead, make great headlines. They may even be valuable in motivating governments and individuals to be vigilant against threats to democracy around the world. </p>
<p>However, there isn’t sufficient empirical evidence to support these claims.</p>
<p>Statements about democracy’s recession are often based on a few anecdotal, but salient, cases of where democracy has been genuinely curtailed, and do not take into account the number of cases where democracy has remained strong or has advanced in recent years. </p>
<p>These statements are also often about aspects of political systems that are important, but not about democracy per se. Claims that democracy is on the decline have been made based on bureaucratic incompetency, corruption, government criticism of the media, and so forth.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"832708293516632065"}"></div></p>
<p>Many democracy indices exist that can discern trends over time, but there are no indices that identify or measure all aspects of political systems, that define open and competitive elections, and that are needed, therefore, to make conclusions about which aspects of democracy are on the decline and which are on the rise around the world. </p>
<p>Such comprehensive data would make for a much less titillating view about the state of democracy in the world, but it would be a more accurate and responsible one.</p>
<h2>Democracy as equality</h2>
<p><strong>Clare Woodford, University of Brighton</strong></p>
<p>For too long political thought has muddled democracy – the enactment of the equality of all – with representative regimes we call democratic but which are in actual fact always oligarchic. </p>
<p>The equality of the people cannot be institutionalised. This does not mean that some forms of institutionalisation would not be more disposed towards democracy than others.</p>
<p>It seems pertinent to question the relationship between democracy and the regimes that go by its name. But the focus of such questioning must surely be the manner and extent to which any regime creates and supports (or represses and undermines) the ongoing conditions for democracy rather than simply institutionalising and entrenching one form of equality over others such that it becomes stale and oppressive.</p>
<p>A debate over whether democracy is dead or alive may only work to discipline the demos in an ill-fated attempt to defend it. But the very emergence of this debate highlights the urgency with which we must attend to the ways in which emancipation has become entangled with and subverted by domination through institutionalisation. </p>
<p>To misrecognise democracy is to place more barriers in its way. As long as things could be other than they are democracy is always possible. Regardless of how long it is suppressed or lies dormant, and to the perpetual chagrin of its opponents, democracy can never die.</p>
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<p><em>You can read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Democracy takes many forms, some of them democracy in name only. Confusion and misappropriation complicate the public struggle for the democracy to come, but this challenge is always unending.Jean-Paul Gagnon, Assistant Professor in Politics, University of CanberraClare Woodford, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE), University of BrightonDawn Brancati, Visiting Scholar, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia UniversityEva Cherniavsky, Andrew Hilen Professor of American Literature and Culture, University of WashingtonNadia Urbinati, Kyriakos Tsakopoulos Professor of Political Theory, Columbia UniversityYoungho Cho, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Sogang UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882392018-01-17T02:33:55Z2018-01-17T02:33:55ZIs Democracy Dead or Alive? Democracy has a future, if we rethink and remake it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198445/original/file-20171211-27719-ni5dcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">While some are declaring that democracy has had its day, others see this as a time to develop more truly democratic ways of living.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.leopoldmuseum.org/en/leopoldcollection/masterpieces/41">Gustav Klimt, Death and Life, 1910</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>These comments on the global fate of democracy, the first in a three-part series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">Is Democracy Dead or Alive?</a>, are gathered by <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/democratic-theory-overview.xml">Democratic Theory</a> and co-published by The Conversation with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. Several of these comments will feature as full-length articles in a special issue of Democratic Theory.</em></p>
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<p>Consider Brexit, the election of US President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-on-the-verge-of-democide-as-referendum-looms-74621">referendum</a>, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s policy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-cannot-build-a-nation-over-the-bodies-of-100-000-dead-in-dutertes-war-on-drugs-64053">state-sanctioned murder</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungary-cracks-down-on-foreign-funding-dealing-a-harsh-blow-to-ngos-and-to-european-democracy-77185">Hungary’s</a> drift towards a new authoritarianism.</p>
<p>“Democracy is dead,” say the disheartened. “It’s time to bury democracy,” <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1085336/world">pounds</a> one Tunisian pro-Sharia party. “Democracy has fallen, we need a new game in town,” argue Vladimir Putin’s populist and Xi Jinping’s neo-authoritarian allies.</p>
<p>These mantras, circulated widely through social media, have ricocheted around the world and were felt perhaps most viscerally in 2017. It was a year full of political events that, in hindsight, look like a string of assaults against democratic ways of living.</p>
<p>Is democracy dying, or perhaps already dead? Is it really time to eulogise democracy, or are we rather on the cusp of a new phase in its long and varied life? <strong>– Jean-Paul Gagnon, University of Canberra</strong></p>
<h2>Anguish about democracy attests to its value</h2>
<p><strong>Alice el-Wakil, University of Zurich</strong></p>
<p>It has become common that under half of the citizenry votes in most Western democracies, that anti-democratic politicians get elected, and that elected authorities are accused of failing to protect citizens’ interests.</p>
<p>Corruption and nepotism are making comebacks and inequalities of all sorts are on the rise. At this time it is legitimate to ask whether democracy is breaking apart. </p>
<p>However, this worrisome situation should not transform us into sceptics about democracy. The outcry against the problems mentioned above shows that the public notices and criticises political shortcomings to realise democratic ideals – that there is something about democracy worth mobilising for.</p>
<p>Hence, as certain existing democratic regimes risk being perverted, we should use this critical moment to reinvent and expand democracy.</p>
<p>In most parts of the world, democracy has so far only taken the form of a specific kind of institutional arrangement, namely electoral representative democracy. It relies on a valuable but limited set of institutions, which preserves an <a href="http://www.the-college-reporter.com/2017/03/05/yale-theorist-helene-landemore-promotes-open-democracy-democratic-experimentation/">exclusionary bias</a> and a fundamental suspicion of citizens’ capacity to make political decisions. </p>
<p>The current challenges to this specific set of institutions should encourage us to acknowledge alternative, emerging practices of democratic participation and to create and experiment with complementary institutions. </p>
<p>Referendum procedures, new forms of representation, or assemblies of citizens are examples of the innovations we should consider to <a href="http://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/4/1/dt040101.xml">revivify</a> democratic systems. Be it only because democracy enables us to publicly, legitimately and continuously question its value and to peacefully propose new ways of realising it.</p>
<h2>Don’t look to the powerful for answers</h2>
<p><strong>Anna Szolucha, University of Bergen</strong></p>
<p>The democratic impulse rarely originates in the corridors of power. Certain political elites may have a knack for exploiting right-wing populist and nationalist narratives to rewrite history and give a semblance of democratic legitimacy to the “corporate state”, but they are hardly effective when it comes to promoting popular concerns about freedom, justice, equality and social dialogue.</p>
<p>Normally, democracy is fought for and won by <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VgkxDQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22anna+szolucha%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">ceaseless struggles and popular resistances</a>. </p>
<p>During the wave of pro-democratic protests that recently swept through the world, protesters in the West were critical of the liberal representative model of democracy, growing inequalities, and the influence of business on politics.</p>
<p>It’s clear there is a need to rethink democracy. The solution, however, is not to revamp the old model but to defend and simultaneously revisit the idea of democracy. We need to do so in such a way that it fosters equality, freedom and a sense that ordinary citizens have a greater influence on politics – virtues that the liberal representative version has failed to deliver.</p>
<p>The task of rethinking democracy is pressing because we are witnessing arrogant and aggressive attempts by political elites to appropriate democratic language to expand their own powers. </p>
<p>Despite massive protests and opposition to their policies, they call on “<a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures-populism-43503">The People</a>” to offer more undemocratic solutions to real or imagined problems. They curtail freedom, centralise control, divide society, destroy the climate and institutionalise their privilege in the process.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The more than 13.4 million files in the Paradise Papers revealed the workings of the tax haven industry.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The rethinking and remaking of democracy is going to take effort and perseverance, but the continuing resistance shows that now is definitely not the time to announce the death of democracy because it never belonged to those who seem to be killing it in the first place.</p>
<h2>Three keys to democratic values</h2>
<p><strong>Nancy Rosenblum, Harvard University</strong></p>
<p>Authoritarian power grabs – those grim assaults on constitutional democracy – demand political and legal resistance. Illiberal populism – those episodic rejections of the terms of political representation – demand the rehabilitation of hollowed-out parties.</p>
<p>Authoritarianism is the business of predators: the cynical exploitation of the democratic weaknesses of the moment. Populism is expressive anger: a reaction against conditions of the moment felt to be threatening and out of control. Both are caused by democracy’s own political demons.</p>
<p>We don’t need to relitigate democracy, but we do need a full-throated affirmation of its value, which comes in three different keys.</p>
<p>The aspirational key: democracy is a system of political representation rooted in the moral ground of the equal value of all the governed. No constitutional arrangement is democratic without aspirational commitment to civil and political equality in the form of civil and political rights. No bad faith “illiberal democracy” makes that commitment.</p>
<p>The outcome key: over time and in the face of vicissitudes and ineptitude, democracy aims at general wellbeing more consistently and competently than other forms of government. Democracy is the only self-correcting system. Democracies have recessions, depressions and fumbling responses to crises. They do not have famines.</p>
<p>The defence against tyranny key: civil society is the bulwark against arbitrary and total power. Only democracy cultivates freedom of association and its product: the <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=vnjqCgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22nancy+rosenblum%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">groups, associations, networks and political parties</a> that fuel unendingly contested democratic politics and that make trouble.</p>
<h2>Our best check on elite tyranny</h2>
<p><strong>David Teegarden, University at Buffalo – State University of New York</strong></p>
<p>Democratic governance provides the best practical check on elite domination. The citizenry has numerical superiority in every state. Unfortunately, elites (wealth, military, religious) know how to atomise and render them effectively powerless: thus the persistence of narrow oligarchy and autocracy throughout recorded history.</p>
<p>However, democratic institutions such as elections, the law and the free press, along with their ideals of political equality and individual freedom, can facilitate citizens’ efforts to co-ordinate their actions, draw upon their collective strength and force their elite competitors to agree to some sort of co-operative relationship. </p>
<p>In a functioning democracy, everybody – even billionaires, generals and bishops – must obey laws made by and enforced by all citizens.</p>
<p>It is certainly true that democratic governance often breeds contentious public discourse. It can lead to terrible, even disastrous outcomes from time to time. But it is far better to endure those things than to endure the horror of being forced to bow down publicly to <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=GY6GAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=death+to+tyrants&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">an oppressive tyrant</a> with no realistic hope of betterment either for yourself or for your children.</p>
<h2>Solutions start with a constructive critique</h2>
<p><strong>Peter Wilkin, Brunel University</strong></p>
<p>Representative democracy has always been regarded as problematic by <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=RWLNDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22peter+wilkin%22+AND+%22democracy%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">those who have sought to replace it</a> with authoritarian rule. Today many of these authoritarian trends have gained new voice and increasingly anti-democratic forces can be found.</p>
<p>But we can’t conflate all challenges to representative democracy as being the same. We can distinguish between those social forces that draw inspiration from the radical right – such as <a href="https://blogs.crikey.com.au/worldisnotenough/2017/03/03/macedonia-debates-country/">ethnonationalism</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/world/europe/europe-neo-fascist-revival-slovakia.html">neo-fascism</a>, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/henry-giroux-joan-pedro-cara-ana/henry-giroux-public-intellectual-on-menace-of-trump-and-new-authori">militarism</a> – and those that can be seen as a novel continuation of the libertarian socialist tradition – <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_Wall_Street">Occupy</a>, <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/08/economist-explains-15">Black Lives Matter</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/kurds-rojava-syria-isis-iraq-assad/505037/">Rojava</a>.</p>
<p>The radical right is intolerant, aggressive and wants to capture the state for authoritarian ends and to nationalise capitalism. </p>
<p>By contrast, the libertarian socialist tradition is an attempt to extend democracy into areas like the economy (for example the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/new-zealand-plan-to-give-everyone-a-citizens-wage-and-scrap-benefits-a6932136.html">citizen’s wage</a>, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/neweconomics/universal-basic-income-is-a-neoliberal-plot-to-make-you-poorer/">universal income</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_democracy">worker control of industry</a>). Libertarian socialists also attempt to reconfigure centralised state power and restore decision-making to communities.</p>
<p>Both movements are responding to the same conditions: the polarising impact of capitalism on social life (inequality, insecurity, poverty) and the failure of representative democracy to offer solutions to these problems. </p>
<p>Such solutions are simpler for the radical right, which has no commitment to democracy or civil liberties. The radical right wants to impose order upon society by any means, including violence and intimidation.</p>
<p>For movements inspired by the libertarian socialist aspiration to deepen, enrich and extend democracy, finding solutions is much harder. The means to be used are seen as fundamental to the society that will emerge. </p>
<p>As a result, violence, fear, propaganda and other powerful anti-democratic tools are eschewed in favour of education and organising communities through dialogue and negotiation.</p>
<h2>Overcome short-termism for democratic renewal</h2>
<p><strong>Graham Smith, University of Westminster</strong></p>
<p>In privileging the present over long-term sustainability, contemporary democracies have failed to deal effectively with climate change. But this does not mean, <a href="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/whp/ev/2015/00000024/00000003/art00006">as some suggest</a>, that we require a more authoritarian solution. Rather, we need to understand the sources of short-termism and think more creatively about our democratic institutions and practices.</p>
<p>The sources of short-termism are multiple and mutually reinforcing. These include: short electoral cycles that incentivise limited party-political horizons; vested interests that benefit from current political and economic arrangements; our psychological preference for immediate gratification; an economic system that privileges carbon-based consumption; and unborn generations who are unable to defend their interests.</p>
<p>These examples could be seen as a litany of despair. Or they could be recognised as a new set of challenges on which to base democratic renewal. </p>
<p>The potential contours for a reinvigorated long-term democracy are beginning to emerge. <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=8FPFBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT78&dq=%22graham+smith%22+AND+%22future+generations%22&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y">Imaginative and practical democratic innovation</a> already includes: institutional experimentation such as <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YfW4DQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA117&dq=%22future+generations%22+AND+%22democracy%22&ots=snBzcUcH6_&sig=a9thNf8CVzAx0cSjWdxcvDkrjkA">independent offices for future generations</a> that scrutinise the decision-making of other public bodies; new rights and forms of public participation designed to orientate citizens towards consideration of future generations; and co-operatives and other forms of collective corporate governance that prioritise sustainability over immediate economic return.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199668/original/file-20171218-27568-b93qfb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leading policymakers, business leaders and civil society activists gathered in 2017 for the first UN Global Festival of Ideas for Sustainable Development.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Global Festival of Action/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Time to get serious about citizenship education</h2>
<p><strong>Ryusaku Yamada, Soka University</strong></p>
<p>Civil society, voluntary associations, active citizenship, social capital – these were the rosy keywords often used in discussions of radical democracy at the end of the 20th century.</p>
<p>Now, nearly 20 years later, we are seeing that people’s active participation can be negative, driven by emotional populist movements. Social capital is not always strong enough to empower people who are alienated and excluded from decision-making. Civil society is often uncivil.</p>
<p>History tells us that the so-called democratic political system does not guarantee the improvement of democratic society. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Mannheim">Karl Mannheim</a>, for example, who analysed mass society in the <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/humaff.2016.26.issue-2/humaff-2016-0011/humaff-2016-0011.xml">age of fascism</a>, worried about an irrational democracy of emotions. </p>
<p>Mannheim was an advocate of social education (a concept similar to citizenship education today), which is meant to make the attitudes and behaviours of both common people and elites more democratic.</p>
<p>Although some might doubt the efficacy of such an education for the democratisation of society, it hasn’t in any serious way been tried before. As the old saying goes: we won’t know if it’ll work until we try. </p>
<p>For Mannheim and some of his contemporaries like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dewey">John Dewey</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T._S._Eliot">T.S. Eliot</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandie_Lindsay,_1st_Baron_Lindsay_of_Birker">A.D. Lindsay</a>, democracy is not only a political system but also a way of life. Citizenship education is not only a matter of school education but also of people’s social practice in their everyday lives. </p>
<p>Far from saying “democracy is dying”, we need to say that “now is the time for democracy to be lived”.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Read parts 2 and 3 of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryusaku Yamada receives funding from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice el-Wakil, Anna Szolucha, David A. Teegarden, Graham Smith, Nancy L. Rosenblum, and Peter Wilkin do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is it really time to eulogise democracy, or are we rather on the cusp of a new phase in its long and varied life?Alice el-Wakil, PhD Researcher, University of ZurichAnna Szolucha, Research Fellow, Polish Institute of Advanced Studies, Polish Academy of SciencesDavid A. Teegarden, Associate Professor, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Department of Classics, University at BuffaloGraham Smith, Professor of Politics, University of WestminsterNancy L. Rosenblum, Senator Joseph Clark Research Professor on Ethics in Politics and Government, Harvard UniversityPeter Wilkin, Reader In Communications Media & Cultural Studies, Brunel University LondonRyusaku Yamada, Professor of Political Theory, Soka UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/885612017-12-11T19:15:00Z2017-12-11T19:15:00ZThree reasons Australians should be concerned that NGOs’ voices are not being heard<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198479/original/file-20171211-27693-19krp0c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The government has been criticised for its appointment of Gary Johns to head up Australia's independent charities regulator.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A healthy democracy is built on the premise that public debate should allow for many and diverse voices to be heard as part of the contest for ideas that informs policymaking. If Australians want this to be the case, the current state of play offers three reasons for concern.</p>
<h2>NGOs are self-silencing</h2>
<p>The first is the finding in <a href="https://civilvoices.com.au/">our research</a>, released today, that Australian NGOs are self-silencing. Our data show that many not-for-profit organisations, representing some of Australia’s most disadvantaged people, are cautious about advocating dissenting views for fear of losing government funding and other forms of political retribution.</p>
<p>Of the 1,462 senior representatives of Australian NGOs surveyed, more than half think our political culture is not encouraging of political debate. </p>
<p>The survey identified the barriers to being heard included: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>fears of funding cuts</p></li>
<li><p>less access to policymaking processes than in the past</p></li>
<li><p>fewer resources available for advocacy</p></li>
<li><p>lack of media interest</p></li>
<li><p>restrictive clauses in government funding agreements that limit public commentary.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>More than 80% of respondents have deductible gift recipient (DGR) status. This means they can accept donations from the public. 40% directly linked the prospect of speaking out as a threat to their DGR status. </p>
<p>The result is a degree of self-silencing or “quiet advocacy”, where charities and not-for-profits attempt to minimise the risk of retribution by selectively choosing which battles to fight. </p>
<p>As one respondent said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>As a non-profit receiving government funding we are concerned about any negative perceptions that governments may form and possible repercussions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another wrote: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Advocacy could adversely impact relationships and government decision-making on funding and engagement. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>And: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In general, our advocacy is quiet and within the government’s defined consultation frameworks. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Put more simply, another said we “pick our battles carefully”.</p>
<p>While the survey found that advocacy is not the foremost function of most not-for-profit organisations, advocacy matters. This is because, according to liberal-democratic theory, citizens should be able to encounter diverse and multiple viewpoints, including those of dissenting voices and those critical of the state.</p>
<h2>Trust in government fades</h2>
<p>Spanish sociologist <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716207311877">Manuel Castells</a> reminds us that, in a democracy, the relationship between the state and civil society is key, because:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… without an effective civil society capable of structuring and channelling citizen debates over diverse ideas and conflicting interests, the state drifts away from its subjects.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, democratic representation is called into question. </p>
<p>This might go some way to explaining falling levels of public trust in government in many developed democracies – including Australia. In 2016, the ANU’s long-running <a href="http://www.australianelectionstudy.org/trends.html">Trends in Australian Political Opinion</a> survey found that 74% of respondents believed people in government look after themselves. This was up from 66% in 2013.</p>
<p>Our study had a similar finding: 71% of NGOs said people in government are more likely to look after themselves than be trusted to do the right thing. </p>
<p>But our findings were less bleak than the benchmark survey of the NGO sector <a href="http://www.tai.org.au/documents/dp_fulltext/DP65.pdf">undertaken in 2004</a>. It found that NGOs felt the government was undermining their credibility, shutting them out of civic discourse, defunding (or threatening to defund) organisations that were considered uncooperative, and micromanaging NGO activities by dismantling peak bodies.</p>
<p>Those historic findings have not-so-faint echoes of a second cause for concern: the Turnbull government’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/dec/07/charities-criticise-bizarre-appointment-of-anti-charities-campaigner-as-head-of-regulator">recent appointment</a> of Gary Johns to head the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC). </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/charity-regulators-should-not-assume-that-donors-always-know-best-88926">Charity regulators should not assume that donors always know best</a></strong></em></p>
<hr>
<p>The former federal Labor MP and commentator with right-wing think-tank the Institute of Public Affairs has <a href="https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2017/12/who-is-gary-johns/">previously argued</a> that advocacy should not be considered a purpose of charities. In this regard he has singled out environmental not-for-profit groups.</p>
<h2>Uncertainty over the ACNC’s role</h2>
<p>A third issue is the ACNC’s <a href="http://kmo.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/114-2017/">newly-expanded powers</a>.</p>
<p>While little detail has yet been provided of what the reform of “the administration and oversight of organisations with Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) status” will involve, Revenue Minister Kelly O’Dwyer did make clear that the ACNC and the tax office will receive extra funding to “review a greater number of DGRs for ongoing eligibility”.</p>
<p>After his appointment, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/gary-johns/charities-commission-my-job-is-to-keep-them-transparent-efficient/news-story/87062c8b28aef4a35b6e6afe335a610e">Johns said</a> the ACNC’s goal will be to help:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the donor market drive the charity dollar to its most efficient and best uses. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>How he conceives “best uses” is a matter that time will tell. Until then, Australians have reason to be apprehensive that some civil voices are not being heard in our liberal democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88561/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Carson was commissioned to do this research by Probono Australia with the Human Rights Law Centre. Andrea did not personally receive any income or other material benefits from doing this research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Maddison was commissioned to do this research by Probono Australia with the Human Rights Law Centre. She did not personally receive any income or other material benefits from doing this research.</span></em></p>Australians have reason to be apprehensive that some civil voices are not being heard in our liberal democracy.Andrea Carson, Lecturer, Media and Politics, School of Social and Political Sciences; Honorary Research Fellow, Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of MelbourneSarah Maddison, Associate Professor, School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/825932017-09-29T02:53:53Z2017-09-29T02:53:53ZThe pathologies of populism<p><em>During the past year, The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>, a global partnership of researchers, journalists, activists, policymakers and citizens concerned with the future of democracy, have published a lengthy <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures-populism-43503">series</a> of scholarly reflections on the causes and consequences of populism.</em></p>
<p><em>The following remarks aim to summarise the contributions, to tease out their insights, and to draw some conclusions about the vexed relationship between populism and democracy.</em> </p>
<hr>
<p>Many people are today asking questions about the worldwide upsurge of populism. Does burgeoning talk of “the people”, and action by governments in their name, offer fresh hopes for democrats in these darkening times? Can populism rescue us from the corruption and decay of the ideals and institutions of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-origins-of-monitory-democracy-9752">monitory democracy</a>, now under attack from a potent variety of corrosive and contradictory forces? </p>
<p>Are <a href="http://www.ukip.org/the_people_s_army_will_prevail_over_anti_democratic_eu">Nigel Farage</a> and other peddlers of populism basically right when colourfully they call upon a “people’s army” to take back “their country” by sparking a “political tsunami” in support of “democracy” against a corrupted “political class”? </p>
<h2>The spirit of populism</h2>
<p>In a sign of our times, the two dozen contributors to this <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures-populism-43503">series on populism</a>, and democrats everywhere, are divided deeply in their replies to such questions, and about what can and should be done to deal with the upsurge of populism.</p>
<p>Without doubt, most democratically minded scholars, journalists and commentators find the new populism fascinating. For several years, hypnotised by its “simple, headline-grabbing, dramatic message” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/face-the-facts-populism-is-here-to-stay-63771">Benjamin Moffitt</a>), populism has been their favourite topic of discussion. </p>
<p>Some are genuinely unsure about what to think, or what to do. They prevaricate: sit on the fence or, as <a href="http://theconversation.com/is-populism-democracys-deadly-cure-82592">Simon Tormey</a> proposes in his interpretation of populism as the <em>pharmákon</em> of democracy, keep their minds open to the perplexing dialectics and potentially surprising, if unintended, practical effects of populist politics. </p>
<p>These abreactions are understandable, not least because populism is a political phenomenon marked by democratic qualities. What could be more democratic than public attacks on financial and governing oligarchs, “unrepresentative plutocracies” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">Christine Milne</a>), in the name of a sovereign people? Isn’t democracy after all a way of life founded on the authority of “the people”? </p>
<p>And what about the populist account of the pathologies of contemporary parliamentary democracy? When measured in terms of political “theatrics” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">Mark Chou</a>), populism is “a spectre of things to come: of political performance in an age of projection rather than representation” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">Stephen Coleman</a>). </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Jan Zielonka</a> notes that within today’s so-called democracies far too many governments regard themselves as “a kind of enlightened administration on behalf of an ignorant public”. <a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Ulrike Guérot</a> says that in an age when “nobody seems to care” and “opportunity remains a fiction for many people”, we should not be surprised by the global upsurge of populism. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-the-unspeakable-and-democracy-in-america-68943">Wolfgang Merkel</a> agrees. He describes contemporary populism as a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">rebellion of the disenfranchised</a>” and a symptom of the “general failure of the moderate left to address the <a href="https://theconversation.com/failing-union-of-capitalism-and-democracy-fuels-rise-in-inequality-27217">distributive question</a>”. </p>
<p>They and other contributors warn that the diagnoses proffered by <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-cannot-build-a-nation-over-the-bodies-of-100-000-dead-in-dutertes-war-on-drugs-64053">Rodrigo Duterte</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/while-the-military-junta-buries-democracy-the-thai-state-is-failing-36823">Thaksin Shinawatra</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/modis-polarising-populism-makes-a-fiction-of-a-secular-democratic-india-80605">Narendra Modi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-didnt-win-over-women-can-anyone-on-the-far-right-78446">Marine Le Pen</a> and other populists contain more than a few grains of truth. </p>
<p>In effect, all contributors to this series ask: isn’t the populist mobilisation of public hope, its insistence that things can be different and that people should expect better, consonant with the spirit of democracy and its equality principle? </p>
<p><a href="http://thelifeanddeathofdemocracy.org/">The Life and Death of Democracy</a>, my contribution to rethinking the history of democracy’s spirit, language and institutions, replies to these questions by analysing populism as a recurrent autoimmune disease of democracy. </p>
<p>That’s to say populism is not just a symptom of the failure of democratic institutions to respond effectively to anti-democratic challenges such as the “growing influence of unelected bodies” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Cristóbal Kaltwasser</a>), rising inequality and the dark money poisoning of elections; populism is itself a problematic and perverted response that inflames and damages the cells, tissues and organs of democratic institutions. </p>
<p>The point should be obvious, but it’s often ignored: populism is a pseudo-democratic style of politics. In the name of an imagined “people” defined as if it were a demiurge, something akin to a metaphysical gift to earthlings from the gods, populism is a style of politics whose “inner logic” or “spirit” (<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montesquieu/#4.1">Montesquieu</a>) destroys power-sharing democracy committed to the principle of equality. </p>
<p>Yes, populism can have positive unintended consequences, as history shows. By publicly exposing the Trump-style <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/reasons-president-donald-trump-170906091102447.html">crudeness and potential brutality of unbridled state power</a> exercised in the name of “the people”, populism can spark long-lasting democratic reforms. But everywhere, at all times, the inner logic of populist politics and its “folksy slogans” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Takashi Inoguchi</a>) are anything but folksy: their practical effect is to rob life from power-sharing democracy. </p>
<p>Populism “always tends towards extreme forms of plebeianism”, observes our Chinese contributor <a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Yu Keping</a>. He is right. Populism necessitates demagogic leadership. It encourages attacks on independent media, expertise, rule-of-law judiciaries and other power-monitoring institutions. </p>
<p>Populism “denies the pluralism of contemporary societies” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">Jan-Werner Müller</a>). It promotes hostility to “<a href="https://theconversation.com/modis-polarising-populism-makes-a-fiction-of-a-secular-democratic-india-80605">enemies</a>” and flirts with violence. It is generally gripped by a territorial mentality that prioritises borders and nation states against “foreigners” and “foreign” influences, including multilateral institutions and so-called “<a href="https://theconversation.com/everyday-makers-defy-populists-false-promise-to-embody-your-voice-78762">globalisation</a>”. </p>
<p>My line of interpretation may seem harsh, or one-sided, but its feet are planted firmly on the ground. Not only does it pay attention to the inner dynamics (let’s call them) or functional imperatives of populism, it also taps evidence from many recorded cases of populism, past and present.</p>
<p>The interpretation notes that populism is a recurrent feature of the history of democracy, and it pinpoints the efforts by past democrats to cure the democratic disease of populism. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187232/original/file-20170922-11625-1d3zg9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ostraka cast against Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, Athens, 5th century BCE.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Keane</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the age of assembly democracy, for instance, citizens of Athens and other city-based democracies dealt with demagogues by voting to send them into prolonged exile, a practice known as <em><a href="http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2006/2006-07-58.html">ostrakismos</a></em> . </p>
<p>During the early modern age of representative democracy, by contrast, periodic elections, multi-party systems and parliamentary government in constitutional form were designed to check and restrain populist outbursts (“the people”, noted John Stuart Mill in <a href="https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645o/">On Liberty</a>, “may desire to oppress a part of their number” so that “precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power”). </p>
<p>Our post-1945 age of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-origins-of-monitory-democracy-9752">monitory democracy</a> was born of efforts to apply much tougher political restrictions to (fascist and other totalitarian) abuses of power in the name of a fictive people. </p>
<p>Public integrity bodies, human rights commissions, activist courts, participatory budgeting, teach-ins, digital media gate watching, global whistle-blowing, bio-regional assemblies: these and scores of other innovations were designed to check populists bent on self-aggrandisement in the name of “the people”. </p>
<p>Current events show that this old problem of populism is making a comeback, and that populism is indeed an autoimmune disease of monitory democracy. Populism picks fights with key monitory institutions, such as the courts, “experts”, “fake news” platforms and other media “presstitutes” (<a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-salutes-vk-singh-slams-media-for-ignoring-good-work/">Modi</a>). The new populism wants to turn back the clock to simpler times when (it imagines) democracy meant “the people” were in charge of those who ruled over them. </p>
<p>Political dynamics in Hungary, the US, Poland, Thailand and elsewhere show that the aim of the new populism is to amass a fund of power for itself and its influential supporters. That’s why it is bent on destroying as many power-monitoring, power-restraining mechanisms as it can, in quick time, all in the name of a people that is never carefully defined, a phantom people that is simultaneously present and absent, everything and nothing. </p>
<h2>Left populism?</h2>
<p>How serious is the populist threat to monitory democracy?</p>
<p>More than a few democrats, especially those with a strong sense of history, suppose that the current epidemic of populism will abate. They think along the lines sketched by the American historian <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/">Richard Hofstadter</a>, who once likened populism to a stinging bee. After causing annoyance and inflicting pain in the backside of the political establishment, populism, on this view, typically dies a slow death, especially after it reaches elected office. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=620&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=620&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=620&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=779&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=779&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187233/original/file-20170923-11625-13pmbkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=779&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Workingmen’s Party of California 1870s postcard.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Boston Public Library</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Hofstadter was principally concerned with the American case, where during the late 19th-century populist parties such as the Workingmen’s Party of California and the Populist Party were outflanked using democratic means, cleverly and constructively transformed by their elected opponents into catalysts of long-lasting democratic reforms. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-10-06/trump-and-american-populism">Michael Kazin</a> and others have noted, the dialectics of populism produced surprising results. While at first populist bigotry prevailed (“<a href="http://immigrants.harpweek.com/ChineseAmericans/2KeyIssues/DenisKearneyCalifAnti.htm">The Chinese Must Go!</a>” campaign in California, for instance), populist politics, in spite of its exclusionary impulses, helped trigger such inclusive democratic reforms as the full enfranchisement of women (1920), a directly elected Senate (1913), municipal socialism, new laws covering income tax and corporate regulation and the eight-hour working day for all wage earners in the country. </p>
<p>More than a few analysts and defenders of democracy are today tempted to think in this way about the tactical outflanking of populism.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, for instance, American political scientist <a href="http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170330-the-uncertain-future-of-democracy">Larry Diamond told the BBC</a> that “mainstream politicians” will need to concede ground, stepping back from their previous “liberal” commitments to open-door immigration and global trade. The overriding aim must be to defeat populist “authoritarianism” by absorbing its concerns into mainstream “liberal democratic” politics. </p>
<p>Diamond cited the example of <a href="https://theconversation.com/populist-wilders-may-have-come-up-short-but-dutch-intolerance-is-still-real-74668">Geert Wilders</a>, whose populist PVV (Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands did worse than expected in recent elections exactly because Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte grasped what was happening and reacted by making “significant policy adjustments”. </p>
<p>It’s worth noting that among these concessions was Rutte’s <a href="https://thecorrespondent.com/6426/the-dutch-donald-trump-wasnt-stopped-he-was-copied/247047570-65e67de8">public announcement</a> that the Dutch experiment with “multiculturalism” was over. Many Dutch citizens were shocked, not just by the indignity inflicted verbally on various minorities, but by the realisation that Rutte hadn’t prevailed over the populist right, but joined its ranks.</p>
<p>Making political concessions to populists is risky business. It can result in co-optation and end in charges of hypocrisy, outright political humiliation and defeat. That is why, historians remind us, the power ambitions of populism were sometimes blocked by their opponents using more drastic means, <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-of-russian-populism-provides-important-lessons-for-today-67476">as in late 19th-century Russia</a>. There its public appeal was snuffed out anti-democratically, killed by armed force. </p>
<p>Elected populist governments also tasted forcible overthrow by coup d'état. This was the fate of El Conductor, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/94/1/249/150607/robert-d-crassweller-Peron-and-the-Enigmas-of">Juan Domingo Perón</a>. The former Argentine lieutenant-general and twice-elected president was forced from office into exile (in September 1955), hunted by hostile allegations of demagogic corruption and dictatorship. These were charges designed to erase forever memories of his massive support by millions of Argentine citizens, his many <em>descamisados</em> (“shirtless”) followers rapt by his efforts to dignify labour and eradicate poverty. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=873&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187234/original/file-20170923-15786-1x76x3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1097&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Juan Perón perch atop a lamp post at a rally in Buenos Aires in the 1950s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cornell Capa/International Center of Photography</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Inspired by the example of Perón, the Belgian scholar Chantal Mouffe is sure there’s another way of meeting the challenge of Trump- and Wilders-style populism: a new, true politics that can get us out from under the rubble of collapsing “liberal democratic” institutions.</p>
<p>Known globally for her thinking and writing on politics and popular sovereignty, Mouffe calls for a new brand of “left-wing populism”. </p>
<p>During the past year, and in an earlier <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-left-wing-populism-55869">contribution to this series</a>, she has launched spirited attacks on what she calls the “anti-populist hysteria” of our time. </p>
<p>She’s also <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/04/15/chantal-mouffe-melenchon-un-reformiste-radical-contre-l-oligarchisation_5111864_3232.html">sided publicly</a> with populist leaders like <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3171-melenchon-a-radical-reformist-against-mounting-oligarchy">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a>. He’s the politician who in June stood on the steps of the Assemblée Nationale, together with his newly elected <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_France_insoumise">La France Insoumise</a> (France Unbowed) MPs, fists clenched, laced with shouts of “Resistance!” and his talk of their collective “service of the people”. </p>
<p>Mouffe’s political thinking is symptomatic of a rise of aesthetic and political fascination among disaffected left-of-centre intellectuals with populism.</p>
<p>The attraction is understandable. It has a positive side. It embraces the “wisdoms” of contemporary populism: for instance, the ways in which contemporary populists have exposed the “deep tension between democracy and capitalism” (<a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Thamy Pogrebinschi</a>), turned their backs on corrupted middle-of-the-road cartel parties, denounced rising social inequality, poured scorn on the deadening breaking news “churnalism” of mainstream media platforms and raised expectations among millions of people that things can and must be better. </p>
<p>Mouffe echoes these points, but her principal contention, in opposition to “neoliberalism”, is that the political right enjoys no monopoly on populism. A left-wing populism is possible and is needed urgently in these anti-democratic times. She <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-left-wing-populism-55869">concludes</a> that “the only way to counter right-wing populism is through left-wing populism”. </p>
<p>The argument is expressed in simple binary terms. But what exactly does she mean, in theory and practice? </p>
<p>Mouffe’s reply runs thus: the imperative is to defend and extend “democracy”, understood as a political form that draws strength from “the power of the people”. </p>
<p>So understood, democracy is “ultimately irreconcilable” with, and superior to, “political liberalism” and its mantras of the rule of law, the separation of powers, free markets and the defence of the individual. A commitment to democracy implies opposition to “post-politics”, the liberal and neoliberal “blurring of [the] frontier” between the right and the left. </p>
<p>Mouffe explains the recommendation at greater length in <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/MOUOTP">On the Political</a> and deploys it in her latest pleas for more democracy and support for Mélenchon. The “principles of popular sovereignty and equality”, she writes, “are constitutive of democratic politics”. So what is now needed, and what she predicts will have to be born, is left-wing populism, an “agonistic populism” that breaks with exhausted “<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-capitalism-and-the-slow-death-of-social-democracy-58703">social democracy</a>”. </p>
<p>The point is to stop philosophising and to begin drawing lines by means of a new politics (the language is obviously drawn from Marx and Engels and Gramsci) that “divides society into two camps” by engaging in a “war of position”, in support of the “underdog” against “those in power”. </p>
<p>How are we to assess these large claims? Her thesis certainly invites historical objections. </p>
<p>I have <a href="http://www.johnkeane.net/dictatorship-and-the-decline-of-parliament-carl-schmitts-theory-of-political-sovereignty/">noted elsewhere</a> that Mouffe’s reliance on Carl Schmitt’s attack on liberalism misleads her into saying that “the origin of parliamentary democracy”, the watering down of democracy by liberal representative government, resulted from the 19th-century marriage of convenience of “political liberalism” and “democracy”. </p>
<p>In her own defence, Mouffe cites my doctoral supervisor, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._B._Macpherson">C.B. Macpherson</a>, but this was not exactly his argument (his vision of future democracy preserved plenty of liberal themes, for instance). </p>
<p>Besides, as <a href="http://thelifeanddeathofdemocracy.org/">The Life and Death of Democracy</a> shows in some detail, parliamentary representation has pre-liberal medieval roots, while the republican melding of the languages and institutions of representation and democracy happened during the last quarter of the 18th century, not in the century that followed. </p>
<p>These are fripperies over which historians and political thinkers bicker and tussle. They needn’t detain us. The real trouble is with Mouffe’s case for “left-wing populism”. </p>
<p>My discomfort stems not only from its poor sense of the history of democracy, her wilful ignorance about monitory democracy and her unjustified nostalgia for an unadulterated “sovereign people” principle. </p>
<p>Or from the fact that her rhetorical style is Bolshevik, a species of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/books/review/redeemers-by-enrique-krauze-book-review.html?mcubz=1">“redemptive” political thinking</a> that preaches the need for “agonistic” (pain-in-the-backside) populism and the use of “democratic means” to “fight” with “passions” against “an adversary” (which passions? which adversary?, she doesn’t say). </p>
<p>Or discomfort triggered by the suspicion that her commitment to “democratic Hobbesian” axioms is worse than oxymoronic, but actually self-contradictory. </p>
<p>Mouffe reduces democracy to a mere tactical weapon. It is a means for dealing agonistically with enemies. </p>
<p>In her view, democracy courts violent power conflicts, in accordance with the old Hobbes principle of <em>homo homini lupus</em> (man a wolf to men), the precept that warns that politics is about the danger that the world can lurch towards an unruly “state of nature”, in which (so much for the sovereign people principle!) actual human life becomes solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. </p>
<p>It’s true there are fleeting moments when Mouffe’s vision of left-wing populism admits of the dangers of “authoritarian populism”. The “antagonistic populism” of the French Revolution is the example she gives, by means of a half-hearted anachronism (the terms populist and populism were coined only in the mid-19th century). </p>
<p>That doesn’t really rescue her overall argument from association with the politically damaging pathologies typically found within every type of populism. These pathologies blindside her whole argument. </p>
<p>What’s more, they are normally ignored in treatments of populism as a “thin-centred ideology” (<a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron_bonikowski_populismlitreview_2013.pdf">Cas Mudde</a>) bent on separating any given society into two homogeneous but antagonistic groups: “the corrupt elite” and “the pure people”, whose <em>volonté générale</em> (general will) should be the measure of all things political. </p>
<p>“Depending on its electoral power and the context in which it arises, populism can work as either a threat to or a corrective for democracy,” Mudde and his co-author <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/populism-a-very-short-introduction-9780190234874?cc=au&lang=en&">Cristóbal Kaltwasser</a> write. “This means that populism per se is neither good nor bad for the democratic system.”</p>
<p>In this SDN-commissioned series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Thamy Pogrebinschi</a> echoes the point. She says that since “populism is not an ideology”, it “can be so politically empty that it joins forces with ideologies as different as socialism and nationalism. Populist discourses can thus favour exclusion, or inclusion.” </p>
<p>This content-centred approach, a way of understanding populism as a “thin-centred ideology”, addressing only a limited set of issues and open to variations as different as “nationalism” and “socialism”, is evidently mistaken. It fails to spot <em>the pathologies inherent within all forms of populism</em>. </p>
<h2>Pathologies</h2>
<p>The most obvious formal pathology is <em>the inner dependence of populism upon political bosses</em>. “It is not a question of ending representative democracy,” <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-challenge">says Mouffe</a>, “but of strengthening the institutions that give voice to the people.” </p>
<p>Fine words but, to put things bluntly, this precept wilfully ignores the way populism functionally requires big-mouthed demagogy, a devil’s pact with leaders who pretend to be the earthly avatars of “the people”. </p>
<p>Chavez, Wilders, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/03/peru-election-alberto-fujimori-keiko-pedro-pablo-kuczynski">Fujimori</a>, Trump, <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-way-trump-is-different-from-european-nationalists-71259">Kaczynski</a> and other demagogues are neither incidental nor accidental features of populist politics: metaphysical talk of a people necessitates the personalisation of power. </p>
<p>When seen in populist terms, emancipation of a people can never be the work of The People itself; populism and <a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1960/xx/trotsub.htm">substitutionism</a> are twins. </p>
<p>Ecuador’s most famous populist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Mar%C3%ADa_Velasco_Ibarra">Jose Maria Velasco</a>, who was elected president five times but deposed by the army four times, understood this well. “Give me a balcony, and I will become president,” he liked to say. </p>
<p>Sometimes, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/modis-polarising-populism-makes-a-fiction-of-a-secular-democratic-india-80605">Irfan Ahmad</a> points out in his contribution to this series, Big Leader populists claim they have the support of the heavens. <em>Vox princeps, vox populi, vox dei</em>. This is the way <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28968191/The_Rise_of_Hindu_Populism_in_Indias_Public_Sphere">Modi</a> interpreted his 2014 electoral victory: as the victory of “the will of the people” blessed by the Hindu god Lord Krishna (<em>janata jan janārdan</em>). </p>
<p>“Left populism” dispenses with talk of deities, but it similarly demands the materialised embodiment of “the people” in a leader capable of mobilising sections of “the people” to confirm who they are: The People.</p>
<p>Populism is demolatry. Populism is ventriloquism. Through acts of concealed representation, it incites and excites Big Leaders who are above the common herd, The Ones who attract a coterie of lesser, loyal people, citizens who are encouraged to follow because they are offered spoils, calculated gifts designed to produce followership from leadership. </p>
<p>Populism so interpreted is a strangely anti-democratic throwback, a 21st-century and secularised version of the old king’s “<a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10728.html">two bodies</a>” doctrine, which supposed the body of the crowned ruler is the spiritual and visceral manifestation of the body of the people. </p>
<p>In contrast to the “two bodies” doctrine, however, today’s populism has no seamless solution to the succession problem when the Great Leader dies, or is felled, as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/27/cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner-indicted-corruption-argentina">Cristina Fernández de Kirchner</a> and <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/08/23/nicolas-maduro-venezeula-president/573363001/">Nicolás Maduro</a> have both been forced to recognise. </p>
<p>The earthly worship of the mortal political boss helps explain other pathologies lurking within Mouffe’s call for a left-wing populism. In this series and in his book, <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15615.html">What Is Populism?</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">Jan-Werner Müller</a> notes the simple-minded mentality of populism, its hostility to ambivalence, complexity and pluralism. </p>
<p>The point needs toughening: the drive to build followers by big boss leaders fuels their hostility to institutions that stand in their way. Populists have little or no taste for institutional give-and-take politics. Unchecked ambition is their thing; so is tactical manoeuvring to deconstruct and simplify organisations and their rules. Populism loves monism. </p>
<p>Gripped by <em>an inner urge to destroy checks, balances and mechanisms for publicly scrutinising and restraining power</em>, populist leaders and parties reveal their true colours in action. It’s a myth that election to office slakes their thirst for power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alberto_Fujimori">Alberto Fujimori’s Peru</a>, <em>democracia plena</em> (as he called it) meant hostility to the <em>palabrería</em> (excessive, idle talk) of the political class and its established media. Declaring an end to oligarchy, government secrecy and silence, it proceeded to contradict itself by bribing and browbeating legislators, judges, bureaucrats and corporate executives. </p>
<p>Theresa May nowadays dreams of transforming the Westminster parliament into a poodle of executive power, in the name of a fictional “British people”. Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/02/world/africa/kenyans-celebrate-courts-ruling-to-nullify-election.html?mcubz=1">Uhuru Kenyatta</a> rails against courts run by “thugs” paid by “foreigners and other fools” who rule “against the will of the people”. </p>
<p>In Hungary, the government of Viktor Orbán has collared mainstream media, the judiciary and the police, and now breathes fire down the necks of the universities and civil society organisations. “We are committed to using all legal means at our disposal to stop pseudo-civil society spy groups such as the ones funded by George Soros,” says Human Capacities Minister <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/05/george-soros-battles-10b-lawsuit-familiar-charges-wielding-political-influence.html">Zoltán Balog</a>. </p>
<p>Trump meanwhile seems to be locked in a low-level, permanent war with Congress, so-called fake news media, the judiciary and intelligence services, even the Boy Scouts of America. He hankers after trust in family ties, and demands loyalty from his followers, egged on by their talk of the need to “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/steve-bannon-will-lead-trumps-white-house">bring everything crashing down</a>” through deep budget cuts, centralisation of federal decision-making and refusing to fill empty leadership positions. </p>
<p>Trump thinks of himself as a lollapalooza leader who never ever loses. He is thus for government by nepotism: not bureaucracies, but personal channels, self-styled machismo against foes at home and abroad. </p>
<p>None of this <em>clientelismo</em> is accidental, or random: populism yearns for a type of politics that resembles a permanent coup d’état in slow motion. Populism is “not an ideology”, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-challenge">replies Mouffe</a>. “It is a way of doing politics” guided by “the construction of a <em>demos</em> that is constitutive of democracy”. </p>
<p>The reply is tautological, and it begs important questions that lie at the heart of a genuinely democratic politics: in the process of constituting “popular sovereignty”, who decides who gets what, when and how? Who does the politics? Who establishes the “chains of equivalence” to decide who is the <em>demos</em>? Who determines what counts as “democracy”, and how do its champions deal with differences and disagreements about means and ends? Are the champions of “the people” themselves subject to legitimate institutional restraints? </p>
<p>Mouffe provides no clear answers to these political questions. The hush is revealing of her populist understanding of politics as the uncompromising battle to win friends and to monopolise state power over followers persuaded they are the promised People. </p>
<p>The definition of politics is narrowly Hobbesian. Seen as the struggle to win over allies and to crush opponents, populism is a strange and self-harming form of politics. </p>
<p>For tactical reasons, to protect its flanks, populist governments usually forge alliances with friends in high places. For all its talk of empowerment of “the people”, populism embraces the ancient political rule that governments need allies whose loyalty requires that they be treated well.</p>
<p>Populism practises “<em>in-grouping</em>”. <a href="http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8295.pdf">Rudiger Dornbusch</a> and other scholars, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">James Loxton</a> in this series, have shown that although populism can foster economic growth and redistribute wealth and income in favour of formerly marginalised groups – as in the Bolivia of Eva Morales, the great champion of natural gas-funded public works projects and social programs to fight poverty – it typically has the effect of privileging new sets of elites. </p>
<p>It is well known that Trump’s campaign talk of “draining swamps” is actually filling them with millionaires and billionaires, but left-wing populism doesn’t escape the same rule. </p>
<p>In the name of “the people”, it practically does what all populism does: it creates a wealthy stratum of oligarchs, like Venezuela’s <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boliburgues%C3%ADa">boliburguesía</a></em>, whose appetite for chartered flights, real estate and luxury cars has been whetted by kickbacks linked to state contracts showered on pro-government corporate executives and former military officials. </p>
<p>The logic of in-grouping inherent in all forms of populism contradicts Mouffe’s claim that left-wing populism is straightforwardly pitted against oligarchy. It confirms the suspicions of ancient Greek democrats, who used a (now obsolete) verb <em>dēmokrateo</em> to describe how demagogues ruling the people in their own name typically team up with rich and powerful <em>aristoi</em> to snuff out democracy. </p>
<p>There’s another self-contradiction that plagues populism. In practice, populism not only cultivates new oligarchs; its struggles in the name of “the people” force it to pick political fights with those it defines as deviants, dissenters and protagonists of disagreement and difference. </p>
<p>Populism champions the tactic of “<em>out-grouping</em>”. That’s why it comes as no surprise that Mouffe’s call for “left-wing populism” is hand-in-glove with Schmitt’s definition of politics as all about “friend-enemy” alliances. We could speak of Mouffe’s Law: <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-left-wing-populism-55869">“There is no ‘we’ without a ‘they’.”</a>.</p>
<p>At no point does she say who would be excluded from her brand of populism: big business, super-rich bankers, government bureaucrats, confessed neoliberals, surely. But who else, pray tell, would be on her hit list? Knowing perhaps that a detailed list would scare off potential supporters, she doesn’t say. </p>
<p>Still it’s clear that her avowed commitment to “democracy” is contradicted by her dalliance with a politics of exclusion. The contradiction runs deep through populism: in its drive to amass a fund of power, confronted by opponents, populists typically hit hard against those they define as Other. </p>
<p>In the past, the designated enemies were monarchs, aristocrats, railroad magnates, bankers, Chinese immigrants. Today, populists like Wilders <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/17/dutch-greenleft-party-populism-rightwing-jesse-klaver">rail against</a> Muslims and their “palaces of hatred” and Moroccan youth “street terrorists”. They spit at “liberals” and “foreigners”, unpatriotic people from <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-road-to-somewhere/">nowhere</a>, ethnic minorities and environmental activists. </p>
<p>Local politics always defines who exactly is under the gun, but the outcast marginalia of The People are deemed people who are “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/06/07/eric-trump-says-those-who-oppose-his-dad-are-not-even-people_a_22130573/">not even people</a>”. </p>
<p>Writing in this series, Jan-Werner Müller <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">quotes</a> a passing but similarly revealing campaign rally remark by Donald Trump: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The only thing that matters is the unification of the people – because the other people don’t mean anything.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This way of thinking helps us understand why it is no accident that populists are frequently <em>fascinated by violence, or urge violence, or speak of it as a feature of “human nature”</em>. Some present arms. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/fall-rise-india-yogi-adityanath-170622133909959.html">Yogi Adityanath</a>, the priest-politician recently appointed as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest
state, says protection of the “<em>rashtra</em>” (nation) is the “<em>dharma</em>” (religion) of his government. Among his favourite personal possessions are a revolver, a rifle and two luxury SUVs, plus a reputation as a much-feared activist who arrives quickly with his supporters at trouble spots, to cause trouble.</p>
<p>By 2014, the pending criminal cases against Adityanath included promoting enmity, attempted murder, defiling a place of worship, trespassing on a burial site and rioting. </p>
<p>Admittedly, this is populism in its most extreme form. But the important thing to see is that the populist commitment to wilful out-grouping of people judged as worthless trash necessarily results in a dalliance with violence. Trump’s advice to police officers, not to be “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/nyregion/trump-police-too-nice.html?mcubz=3">too nice</a>” when handling suspects, is no exception, no idiosyncrasy. </p>
<p>The dark energy of violence was present at every Trump campaign rally; “knock the crap out of ’em”, “punch ’em in the face” and “carry ’em out on a stretcher” were among his favourite fighting phrases. </p>
<p>Mouffe’s aesthetic fascination with violence fits the same pattern. In a <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-laws-of-hostility">little-known passage</a>, she puts things plainly, in the language of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. “The same movement that brings human beings together in their common desire for the same objects,” she writes, “is also at the origin of their antagonisms. Far from being the exterior of exchange, rivalry and violence are therefore its ever-present possibility … violence is ineradicable.” </p>
<p>That conviction is consistent as well with the propensity of Mouffe and other populists to think in territorial terms. They are <em>attached to bounded territorial states</em>. They like borders, stricter visa and immigration rules and talk of “national sovereignty”.</p>
<p>There are times when Mouffe appears to dissent on this point. She says she favours more “democracy” at the European level, but it turns out that her “progressive left-wing populism” comes wrapped within a territorial mentality. </p>
<p>It echoes Mélenchon’s speeches, interviews and policy program, <a href="https://avenirencommun.fr/avenir-en-commun/"><em>L’Avenir en Commun</em></a> (A Common Future). This speaks of a “democratic reconstruction” of European treaties and France’s withdrawal from the European Union’s Stability Pact, NATO and the World Bank.</p>
<p>The program also calls for closer ties with Russia and respect for Brexit, without “punishing” the UK for its decision to leave the EU, except for withdrawal from the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/09/le-touquet-treaty/">Le Touquet accord</a>, which allows British border controls to operate inside France. </p>
<h2>What’s to be done?</h2>
<p>The contributors to this series, for different reasons, are mostly united in their opposition to populism in its various local forms. </p>
<p>Among the exceptions is <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-frown-on-voters-ambivalence-about-democracy-but-they-might-just-save-it-80083">Adele Webb</a>, whose diagnosis of the public ambivalence produced by dysfunctional democracies sets out mainly to <em>understand</em> the populism of Duterte and Trump, to help us grasp that their popularity stems in no small measure from their “appeal to people’s desire not to be fixed into pre-determined standards of how to think and behave”. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">Cristóbal Kaltwasser</a> similarly calls for engaging populists “in honest dialogue” and proposing “solutions to the problems they seek to politicise”. <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">Laurence Whitehead</a> recommends “respectful engagement and genuine dialogue” about the “darker” but potentially “emancipatory” potential of the new populism. <a href="https://theconversation.com/progressive-politics-is-losing-to-a-fantasy-state-of-mind-79499">Mick Chisnall</a> is interested in interpreting populism as a form of politics based on people’s “identification with a common form of enjoyment-in-transgression”.</p>
<p><a href="http://theconversation.com/is-populism-democracys-deadly-cure-82592">Simon Tormey</a> similarly reserves judgement about its political merits. “We have become populists in the sense of seeing elites as disconnected or uncoupled from the people,” he writes. </p>
<p>Populism is symptomatic of the breakdown of representative democracy; but he’s unsure whether populism “will ‘work’ and make life better”, or if “there is life after representative democracy”, or whether the best cure for the dysfunctions of contemporary democracy is a “non- or post-representative strategy that will reduce, if not eliminate, the distance between the people and political power”, for instance through the nurturing of “liquid democracy” and “deliberative assemblies”. </p>
<p>Other contributors, understandably, for good reasons, are more doubtful about the democratic potential of populism; several express open disdain for its pathological, anti-democratic effects. </p>
<p>The anthropologist <a href="https://theconversation.com/modis-polarising-populism-makes-a-fiction-of-a-secular-democratic-india-80605">Irfan Ahmad</a> reminds readers that the Western literature on contemporary populism suffers a secular bias. The case of India shows why the bias is misleading, and why the BJP government led by Modi is spreading a religious form of populism with murderous consequences for Muslims and other non-Hindu citizens.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/everyday-makers-defy-populists-false-promise-to-embody-your-voice-78762">Henrik Bang</a>, citing Jürgen Habermas, similarly worries about the anti-democratic potential of populism. He reminds us of the political importance of everyday makers, “laypeople who can act spontaneously, emotionally, personally and communicatively as interconnected ‘fire alarms’, ‘experimenters’ and ‘innovators’”. </p>
<p>Bang calls for a new democratic politics that values “mutual acceptance and recognition of difference at all levels, from the personal to the global”, a politics of everyday making that can “push against populism by reminding political authorities that the only exceptional leaders we need today are the ones who help us to govern and take care of ourselves”. </p>
<p>Bang is surely right in questioning the mistaken Mouffe-style presumption that all politics is populist politics. </p>
<p>Along similar lines, using a different language, <a href="https://theconversation.com/deliberative-democracy-must-rise-to-the-threat-of-populist-rhetoric-76576">Nicole Curato and Lucy Parry</a> consider “the democratic virtues of mini-publics” to be a vital antidote to the pathologies of populism. </p>
<p>Populists are said to be the foes of “intellectual rigour”, “evidence” and public-spirited “deliberative reason”. They peddle “base instincts” and “prejudices and misconceptions”. What is needed is more “deliberative democracy”, randomly selected public forums guided by “the virtues of participation governed by reason”. </p>
<p>Their call to rejuvenate the spirit of democracy is laudable. But the proposed vision of “deliberative democracy” suffers a rationalist bias; the means of achieving it are equally questionable.</p>
<p>There is certainly a pressing need in our times for what I have called “<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-democratic-enlightenment-66013">a new democratic enlightenment</a>” in which democracy “dreams of itself again”. But the vision of “deliberative democracy” is no match for populism and its pathologies. </p>
<p>Supposing that the “essence of democracy” is “deliberation, as opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights, or even self-government” (John S. Dryzek’s opening words in <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019925043X.001.0001/acprof-9780199250431">Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations</a>), democracy is reduced to “authentic deliberation”, or “the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion”. </p>
<p>This way of thinking about democracy by deliberative democrats suffers multiple weaknesses. Their self-understanding of their own historicity, and the age of monitory democracy to which they belong, is weak. Their penchant for small-scale, face-to-face deliberative forums begs difficult tactical questions about scalability, including whether micro-level schemes can be replicated at the national, regional and global levels. </p>
<p>Deliberative democrats are prone to understate such strategic challenges as the “artificiality” of pilot scheme experiments (where indefatigable citizen deliberators are expected to behave as if they are rational communicators in a scholarly seminar). </p>
<p>The bullish veto power of power-hungry vested interests is also underestimated. The contested meanings of the word “reason” don’t feature. The propensity of calm “reasonable” talk to dissolve bigoted opinions, of the kind expressed by hardcore populists in “civic dialogues” hosted by Germany’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-berlin-christmas-market-attack-puts-new-pressure-on-angela-merkel-70668">Alternative für Deutschland</a> to tap rising anxiety about immigration, is exaggerated. </p>
<p>In sum, we could say that the whole vision of “deliberative democracy” suffers from nostalgia. Inspired originally by the work of Habermas (as my <a href="http://www.johnkeane.net/portfolio_page/public-life-late-capitalism/">Public Life and Late Capitalism</a> emphasised), deliberative democrats are secretly Greek.</p>
<p>Convinced that democracy is quintessentially assembly democracy, or “participatory democracy”, they downplay the strategic and normative importance of courts, media platforms and other power-monitoring institutions and generally seem blind to the ubiquity and importance of elections and other forms of representation within political life. </p>
<p>So where do these analyses leave us? No doubt, critical consideration of the pathologies of populism, the weaknesses of “deliberative democracy” and the pitfalls of “left-wing populism” should force democrats of all persuasions to ask truly basic political questions, in support of viable democratic alternatives. </p>
<p>The historic task before us is not only to imagine new forms of democratic politics that aren’t infected with the spirit of populism. The goal must be to outflank populism politically by enabling democracy to dream of itself again, in other words, to strengthen <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-origins-of-monitory-democracy-9752">monitory democracy</a> by inventing adventurous new forms of democratic politics that don’t fall prey to big boss Leaders and their blarney and blather about “the people”. </p>
<p>At a minimum, this means not just more citizen involvement in public life but also inventing new forms of monitory democracy.</p>
<p>That calls for mechanisms with teeth capable of politically rolling back unaccountable corporate and state power, building non-carbon energy regimes and fostering greater social equality among participating citizens who value free and fair elections, welcome media diversity and feel utterly comfortable in the company of different others who are not treated as “enemies”, but as partners, strangers, colleagues and friends.</p>
<p>Democratic politics is a politics that democratises the sovereign people principle. It feels no urge to bow down and worship an imaginary fictional body called “The People”.</p>
<p>Democratic politics has regard for flesh-and-blood people in all their lived heterogeneity. It thus refuses the urge to smash up power-monitoring institutions, to label whole groups as out-groups and threaten them with violence and expulsion beyond “sovereign” borders that are deemed sacred. </p>
<p>What’s needed is much more monitory democracy, radically new ways of humbling and equitably redistributing power, wealth and life chances that expose populism for what it is: a form of counterfeit democracy. </p>
<p>Once upon a time, in the early years after 1945, such political redistribution went by the names of “progressivism”, “socialism”, “liberalism” and the “welfare state”. </p>
<p>In the harder times that are coming, what ecumenical name should we give to this new radical politics? Why don’t we simply call it “democracy”?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Keane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Current events show that the old problem of populism is making a comeback, and that populism is indeed an autoimmune disease of our age of monitory democracy.John Keane, Professor of Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/825922017-09-21T02:14:25Z2017-09-21T02:14:25ZIs populism democracy’s deadly cure?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182702/original/file-20170821-17116-1oyq2r6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is populism a poison or a cure for democracy, or both, depending on the circumstances?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Londre_wellcome_institute_boilly_vaccinee.jpg">Louis Boilly/Wikipedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> project, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<p><em>This piece is part of a series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/after-populism-39385">After Populism</a>, about the challenges populism poses for democracy. It comes from a talk at the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Populism-Symposium-6-April-2017.pdf">Populism: What’s Next for Democracy?</a> symposium hosted by the <a href="http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au/">Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis</a> at the University of Canberra in collaboration with <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>It is impossible to follow the news without catching reference to the rise of populism. A once little-used term that denoted a handful of parties in otherwise unconnected political contexts, populism now seems almost definitive of a political moment in time.</p>
<p>It also elicits a wide range of responses from specialists. The most common reaction is a negative recoil against the emergence of forces that seem to <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-the-unspeakable-and-democracy-in-america-68943">threaten</a> democracy. The emergence of far left and far right political forces seems redolent of the 1930s, and look where that left us.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there are influential figures who argue that there is nothing to be afraid of in populism. Far from it: populism represents an appeal to <a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-dr-jekyll-and-mr-hyde-67421">The People</a>, and on this basis is not just consonant with democracy, but with any kind of politics that seeks universal appeal. </p>
<p>Since political parties seek power, broad, if not universal, appeal is what they crave. Populism on this account is nothing more than “the logic of politics”, assuming politics to be what is of public or collective concern. A non-populist politics is doomed to fail, or to be the preserve of groups or identities who set their face against the <em>demos</em>.</p>
<p>So populism can be defined as something menacing and threatening to democracy, but also as something redemptive, celebratory and expressive of democracy. The question is, which of these two senses is the right one? Which gets closer to the “truth” about populism?</p>
<h2>Populism as democracy’s pharmakon</h2>
<p>In a famous essay on Plato’s Phaedus, Jacques Derrida explores the concept of “<a href="http://www.occt.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/derrida_platos_pharmacy.pdf">pharmakon</a>” as an example of a term with apparently self-contradictory meanings. </p>
<p>Pharmakon, from which we derive the terms pharmacology and pharmacy, denotes a toxic substance used to make someone better, but which might also kill them.</p>
<p>Pharmakon is in this sense both poison and cure. It cannot be one or the other; it is both. Whether it is one or the other depends on dosage, context, receptivity of the body to the toxin, and so forth. In short, pharmakon expresses contingency and possibility, both life and death.</p>
<p>Now think back to what we have just been discussing in relation to populism. Do we really want to say that populism is always and everywhere a threat to democracy, something to be opposed or fearful of? Are there not moments or contexts where an appeal to the people versus corrupt or decadent elites might make sense in terms of saving democracy – from itself?</p>
<p>By contrast, are we really convinced that the appeal to the people is a necessary and constructive feature of politics, indeed something that we cannot avoid? Don’t we want to say, rather, that whether this appeal to the people versus the elites is to be celebrated or not depends on the position of the individual observer or participant in a vortex of political choices?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182703/original/file-20170821-17116-10xmwen.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Though Podemos’s populist message resonated with many on the streets, it has led the party into trouble.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paolo Di Tommaso/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The emergence of a populist discourse in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-spanish-political-laboratory-is-reconfiguring-democracy-74874">Spain</a> accompanied a near-complete collapse in faith in the political elites. Millions of people flooded the streets in 2011 to protest against those who were inflicting austerity from the luxury of the presidential palace. </p>
<p>It was a manoeuvre pitched in the midst of well-documented examples of corruption, clientelism and cronyism – not to mention the extraordinary waste of public money on useless megaprojects that seemed to rub the noses of ordinary people in the dirt of their own powerlessness.</p>
<p>So the emergence of the populist <a href="https://theconversation.com/podemos-find-itself-caught-between-the-battle-lines-of-spanish-politics-69771?sa=google&sq=podemos&sr=1">Podemos</a> and its potent message of “yes we [the people] can” chimed. However, it sounded a false note for others: fear of “charisma”, of leader-centred politics, and thus of the snuffing out and rendering irrelevant of the street protesters and micro-initiatives that had fostered the conditions for its creation in the first place. </p>
<p>The celebration of populism “from below” is mixed with an anticipation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/podemos-find-itself-caught-between-the-battle-lines-of-spanish-politics-69771">problems</a> to come – not least the cutting off of “the below” itself in a fanfare of triumphant, mediatised politics.</p>
<p>Consider too the emergence of France’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-emmanuel-macrons-big-gamble-to-save-the-eu-really-pay-off-81980">Emmanuel Macron</a>, centrist saviour of the European project. Through clever semantics he countered the populist charge of Marine Le Pen with a neat populist manoeuvre. </p>
<p>Le Pen was the “parasite” living off the system she criticised, not he. He was the political outsider who had given up on the elites; she was the product of the elites – or least one part of it. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/182704/original/file-20170821-17144-cgfcrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=670&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Emmanuel Macron as ‘Le Kid’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lorde Shaull/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Macron was the figure untainted by association with the failed political order, while Le Pen reeked of stale battles and a lost France. He embodied France’s future, she its dark and gloomy past. Not a battle royale but a bataille Republican of Pharmaka. </p>
<p>But isn’t all this talk of outsiders and elites a little iffy stemming from someone who made millions as a banker with <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/18/emmanuel-macron-is-about-to-face-five-years-of-crazy-conspiracy-theories/">Rothschild</a>? How long before this outsider rhetoric <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/why-does-emmanuel-macrons-presidential-approval-rating-keep-falling/2017/08/19/c48a069a-82a4-11e7-9e7a-20fa8d7a0db6_story.html?utm_term=.51e55e7861b5">collides</a> with the reality of budget cuts and labour market reforms?</p>
<h2>Will it work?</h2>
<p>Accepting the ambivalence of populism and pharmakon, so what? Why does it matter what kind of spin we put on the term?</p>
<p>Contemporary politics has by and large become a politics of reconstituting democracy after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-movements-could-mark-the-end-of-representative-politics-42369?sa=google&sq=simon+tormey&sr=4">collapse</a> of the narrative of representation under which we have been living for at least two centuries. We have become less inclined to believe in the benign intentions of our representatives, of politicians. </p>
<p>We have become populists in the sense of seeing elites as disconnected or uncoupled from the people, and thus ourselves.</p>
<p>We seem inclined to believe those who set themselves up as defenders of the people against the elites, no matter how preposterous a gesture that is, and there are few gestures more preposterous than that of a billionaire property developer setting himself up as defender of the people against the elites.</p>
<p>We’re not quite sure what the “cure” entails: the election of the outsider (<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-both-the-old-crazy-and-the-new-normal-58728?sa=google&sq=coleman+trump&sr=1">Donald Trump</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/progressives-should-accept-corbyns-triumph-its-the-price-of-democracy-66120">Jeremy Corbyn</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/dutch-election-why-geert-wilders-failed-to-destroy-the-mainstream-government-74710?sa=google&sq=wilders&sr=2">Geert Wilders</a>) or the assumption of some non- or post-representative strategy that will reduce, if not eliminate, the distance between the people and political power (<a href="https://theconversation.com/deliberative-democracy-must-rise-to-the-threat-of-populist-rhetoric-76576">deliberative assemblies</a>, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pablo-mancini/wiki-democracy-begins-in-_b_934331.html">wikidemocracy</a>, <a href="https://blog.liquid.vote/2016/09/21/what-is-liquid-democracy/">liquid democracy</a>). </p>
<p>We’re not sure if the cure, the exuberant outsider, will “work” and make life better, make America “great”, or whether it will kill politics stone dead. </p>
<p>We’re not sure if there is life after representative democracy, or whether some alternative model will work better or fail, leaving our world in tatters. But we are inclined to experimentation as the certainties that have sustained our politics for the past two centuries wither. </p>
<p>We watch the toxin descend with an admixture of hope and fear – populism: democracy’s pharmakon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Tormey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We’re not sure if the cure, the populist outsider, will work and make life better. but we are willing to experiment as the old certainties of representative politics wither.Simon Tormey, Professor of Political Theory and Head of the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794992017-09-08T03:35:39Z2017-09-08T03:35:39ZProgressive politics is losing to a fantasy state of mind<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174369/original/file-20170619-5822-1djv8ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Why are communities that need government's help seemingly rejecting it on principle?
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/susanad813/3447466061/">Susan E Adams/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> project, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<p><em>This piece is part of a series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/after-populism-39385">After Populism</a>, about the challenges populism poses for democracy. It comes from a talk at the “<a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Populism-Symposium-6-April-2017.pdf">Populism: what’s next for democracy?</a>” symposium hosted by the <a href="http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au/">Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis</a> at the University of Canberra in collaboration with <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Why are we increasingly seeing voters support policies that, superficially at least, are against their own interests? In California, Central Valley farmers face a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/california-farmers-backed-trump-but-now-fear-losing-field-workers.html?_r=0">crisis</a>. Despite their livelihoods depending on large numbers of unauthorised workers, the group overwhelmingly supported Donald Trump, who campaigned on deporting “<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-policies-will-affect-four-groups-of-undocumented-immigrants-70467">illegals</a>”.</p>
<p>Something similar occurred with many “Leave” voters in the UK <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-and-eu-both-need-major-democratic-reform-to-survive-brexit-fallout-55870">Brexit</a> referendum, who seemingly voted against their own economic interests. </p>
<p>Another example: voters in Sunderland voted to “leave” by a margin of <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information">61% to 39%</a>. Yet this working-class city is <a href="http://www.sunderlandecho.com/news/sunderland-mp-s-open-letter-on-brexit-and-nissan-1-8351176">highly dependent</a> for employment on <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/brexit-latest-news-nissan-uk-business-jobs-7000-employees-car-plant-sunderland-a7603721.html">Nissan</a>, which was located there largely due to the UK’s access to the European Union market.</p>
<p>Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild has explored another example. She spent five years with Tea Party voters in Louisiana. Most of her subjects or their family members had “personally benefited from a major government service”. Yet they voted for Trump’s Republican Party, which had the explicit aim of cutting social welfare support.</p>
<p>Why?</p>
<h2>Waiting in line, outraged by queue jumpers</h2>
<p>One striking aspect of Hochschild’s <a href="http://thenewpress.com/books/strangers-their-own-land">account</a> is the affection and respect she has developed, despite her own liberal leanings, for her right-wing subjects:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Many of the Tea Party people I met seemed to me warm, intelligent, generous … They have community, and church, and goodwill toward those they know. Many care deeply about the environment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They were, however, deeply resentful of taunts of “crazy redneck” and “ignorant southern Bible-thumper”. As Hochschild explained, they felt like “strangers in their own land”, patiently waiting for their lot to improve, while outsiders were pushed ahead by the federal government.</p>
<p>Much of Hochschild’s research took place in Louisiana’s southwest, home to Cajun, Catholic conservatives deeply attached to a culture of church and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayou">bayou</a>.</p>
<p>Hochschild stresses the devastating effects of the oil industry (and more recently the chemical industry) on their community through environmental degradation. Still, the jobs in these industries had given people incomes, pride and meaning in a past “golden age”. </p>
<p>Many of those jobs are long gone. The industries’ legacy, in addition to a degraded environment, includes work-related illness, disability and unemployment.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184106/original/file-20170831-22218-1nikns6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The
oil industry left many in Louisiana sick and unemployed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baton_Rouge_Refinery#/media/File:Exxon_Mobil_oil_refinery_-_Baton_Rouge,_Louisiana.jpg">W. Clarke/Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We meet Lee Sherman, who exemplifies the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/books/review/strangers-in-their-own-land-arlie-russell-hochschild.html">Great Paradox</a> – the need for help and a principled refusal of it”. Sherman worked for a chemical company and become chronically ill through toxic exposure. Later, he became an avowed environmentalist. And yet he still supported the anti-environmental Tea Party. </p>
<p>Hochschild notes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>His source of news was limited to Fox News and videos and blogs exchanged by right-wing friends, which placed him in an echo chamber of doubt about the EPA, the federal government, the president, and taxes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tea Party supporters blame the federal government for challenging their religious faith, imposing wasteful “progressive” taxes and diminishing their pride and honour. For them, the church provides community, culture, meaning and succour. They see government as an ungodly roadblock to infusing religion into every aspect of their community, especially in public education.</p>
<p>The Louisianan group’s experience of losing honour cuts profoundly into the foundational cultural logic of the US, the “American dream”. It tells its adherents that, through unfailing effort, they can, and should, progress in the queue towards material success and the relief and happiness this brings. Indeed, it is an individual’s right and duty to progress along this path.</p>
<p>Sherman and his community’s hatred of taxes, then, masks a strong underlying belief about “others” interfering in their passage along the path. Hochschild writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Lee’s biggest beef was taxes. They went to the wrong people — especially welfare beneficiaries who ‘lazed around days and partied at night’ and government workers in cushy jobs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some 150 years of perceived discrimination, from defeat in the Civil War through to the “northern” promotion of equal rights for African-Americans and women in the 1960s, and more recently LGBTI activism and support for Syrian refugees, have fuelled the group’s growing hatred for the political elites purportedly driving these changes. </p>
<p>Hochschild’s deep story of these very normal, often generous and intelligent people is that, as they try to pursue the American dream, they resent the government humiliating them by pushing “others” ahead in the line.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184111/original/file-20170831-31892-1ak0eed.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tea Party supporters believe that ‘big government’ stands in the way of achieving their American dream.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jacreative/3445836139/">John Ashley/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>How is it that their political party, whose aggressive neoliberal policies are arguably most responsible for destroying their home environment, along with their chronic unemployment, illness and lack of health care, is somehow spared this resentment?</p>
<h2>Self-transgressive behaviour</h2>
<p>To answer this question, Jason Glynos introduces the idea of “<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/pcs.2014.2">self-transgression</a>”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The ‘problem of self-transgression’ … aims to capture an intuition about those kinds of situations where an individual or group appear both to affirm an interest or ideal … and simultaneously subvert it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Retaining good health, a living income and an unpolluted environment are in the affirmed interests of Hochschild’s research subjects. In that sense, their open and enthusiastic support for policies that directly work against those interests is self-transgressive.</p>
<p>Central to the argument is the Lacanian concept of <a href="http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2015/07/what-does-lacan-say-about-jouissance/"><em>jouissance</em></a>; in English partly explained by the word “enjoyment”, but also incorporating the idea of an emotional “pay-off”. </p>
<p>Glynos writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What binds a community together is often not simply identification with a common ideal like ‘justice’ or ‘freedom’, but also an identification with a common form of enjoyment-in-transgression … Various coded political communication tactics – populist ‘dog-whistle’ politics, for example – could be readily understood in this light.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Glynos offers two explanations. The first, his “Orthogonality Thesis”, suggests that the <em>jouissance</em> in hating the government seems quite independent of any real justification. It is as if the outrage occurs at the intersection of two mutually exclusive orthoganal planes, one a “psychic reality” and the other more associated with evidence and logic.</p>
<p>This thesis offers some explanation for the success of Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-both-the-old-crazy-and-the-new-normal-58728">rhetorical style</a>, his lack of concern with evidence for his claims and, the advent of a plane of thinking and feeling that can happily support a world of “alternative facts”. </p>
<p>Trump’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.4fddcfe0a250">locker room</a>” sexual references, his stream-of-consciousness attacks on anyone who stands in his way, and his willingness to say anything to anyone all play court to the collective transgressive impulse of his supporters.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2JLZKz1oDZM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘The Tea Party are incredible people that work hard and love the country – and then you just get beat up all the time.’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>According to Glynos, the “fantasmatic logics” operating in the psychic plane allow the subject to be so invested in the hatred of government, or the evil of Hillary Clinton, or the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/by-framing-secular-society-as-a-christian-creation-hansons-revival-goes-beyond-simple-racism-67707">un-Australianness</a>” of the burqa, that any possibility of alternative social, political and economic identifications and ideals is effectively blocked from their view. </p>
<p>Truth has no bearing on the fantasmatic logics operating in the psychic plane.</p>
<p>Glynos’s second explanation, which he calls the “Overdetermination Thesis”, departs from the simple idea that thinking occurs in either one or other of the orthogonal planes. Political discourse is necessarily made up of both types of thinking. Any number of “fantasmatics” can attach to a set of events. </p>
<p>This might help explain why Pauline Hanson, in her first sojourn in politics could “other” and demonise Asians, only to reappear 20 years later having <a href="https://theconversation.com/pauline-hanson-20-years-on-same-refrain-new-target-65433">seamlessly refocused</a> on Muslims.</p>
<h2>Where to now for progressive politics?</h2>
<p>Fantasmatic logics are by no means the exclusive tool of the right. Glynos suggests the “free market” can easily replace “big government” as a fantasmatic signifier in left-wing rhetoric. </p>
<p>And therein lies the big question for social progressives. Politics without affective fantasmatic elements is sterile, inhuman and possibly totalitarian. </p>
<p>Politics moving more toward the fantasmatic plane, on the other hand, is “wacky”, ineffective and sometimes dangerous (though often entertaining). The pervasive use of the fantasy tools of brand marketing in politics has moved us perilously towards the latter.</p>
<p>It is well to remember that, despite the <a href="https://theconversation.com/face-the-facts-populism-is-here-to-stay-63771">dominance of fantasmatics</a> in US, Australian and European politics, there is also a rising tide of rejection of <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-the-wannabe-king-ruling-by-twiat-72269">shallow political rhetoric</a>, especially among the young. </p>
<p>The existential global issues challenging humanity call for innovative responses that are both passionate and reasoned. Progressive politics and its spokespeople will not jump-start the stalled vehicle of complex problem-solving by staying on a marketing message, or trading fantasmatic slogans. It is a long way back, but more respect, honesty and participation will help clear the path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr MIck Chisnall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why are we increasingly seeing voters support candidates whose policies are, superficially at least, against their own interests?Dr MIck Chisnall, PhD Candidate at the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816122017-08-25T01:49:40Z2017-08-25T01:49:40ZWas embracing the market a necessary evil for Labour and Labor?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179766/original/file-20170726-11301-tchofs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Wayne Swan has drawn a parallel between the the ALP's 'Laborism' and New Labour's 'Third Way' in the UK.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/number10gov/4739085177/">Number 10/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The Australian Labor Party and Britain’s Labour Party are in vastly different places. While the ALP <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2017/jun/14/the-guardian-essential-report-14-june-results">holds a firm lead</a> in opinion polls over the Coalition government, its British counterparts <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-2017-uk-election-polls-underestimated-labour-79513?sa=google&sq=UK+election&sr=1">pulled off a shock</a> election result in June. Its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, proved critics wrong and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-election-result-vote-share-increased-1945-clement-attlee-a7781706.html">increased</a> Labour’s vote share more than any other party leader since 1945.</p>
<p>Although Labour was not able to form government, Corbyn’s “win” signalled the party’s existential crisis had come full circle. His success as leader can be seen as a fundamental rejection of Tony Blair’s centrist policies, or “<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-labour-20-years-on-assessing-the-legacy-of-the-tony-blair-years-76884?sa=google&sq=Third+Way+blair&sr=1">Third Way</a>”, and a return to the party’s democratic socialist foundations.</p>
<p>Ed Miliband’s defeat at the 2015 UK election marked the beginning of a radical turn back to the left for Labour. This shift led to various reports about <a href="https://theconversation.com/progressives-should-accept-corbyns-triumph-its-the-price-of-democracy-66120">internal conflict</a> within the party. </p>
<p>All of this may seem remarkably familiar to Australians, after the now-infamous ALP <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-leadership-war-is-over-where-to-from-here-for-the-alp-15564?sa=google&sq=ALP+leadership&sr=7">leadership spills</a> between 2010 and 2013. Labor MPs ousted two sitting prime ministers.</p>
<p>What appears to be a critical juncture for both parties was their respective embrace of the free market and economic liberalisation. But was this move a necessary evil for both parties to return to government? Or was it a response to broader global economic liberalisation? Or a genuine attempt to achieve equity through trickle-down economics?</p>
<p>The answer lies somewhere in between.</p>
<h2>Neoliberalism or ‘Laborism’?</h2>
<p>Labor prime ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating are perhaps best remembered for the economic reforms that opened Australia’s economy to the world after decades of protectionism and stagflation. </p>
<p>Arguably, Gough Whitlam initiated these reforms. After inheriting one of the most protected and least competitive economies in the world, Whitlam took the first steps toward liberalisation through the flat 25% reduction of tariffs.</p>
<p>Hawke and Keating continued this economic liberalisation by further reducing tariffs, deregulating the financial sector, floating the Australian dollar, and privatising state assets.</p>
<p>Within a wider context, the shift toward more economically liberal policies was part of a move within the English-speaking world toward the Anglo-American model of neoliberalism, as promoted and implemented by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.</p>
<p>However, in retrospect, it would appear the ALP is reluctant to label these reforms as neoliberal. Recently, Australia’s former federal treasurer, Wayne Swan, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/14/the-hawke-keating-agenda-was-laborism-not-neoliberalism-and-is-still-a-guiding-light">argued</a> that Whitlam, Hawke and Keating’s agendas were not strictly neoliberal; they were an example of “Laborism”.</p>
<p>Swan explained that neoliberalism was a poor description of Labor’s economically liberal reforms because, ultimately, their aim was to create greater equity in Australia through trickle-down economics that would lift the standard of living for working-class Australians alongside wealthier citizens.</p>
<p>Swan also pointed to other social reforms that were implemented alongside the tariff cuts and privatisation, such as the reintroduction of Medicare. Such social policies were not, he argued, necessarily in line with what he believed to be the broader neoliberal doctrine.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179768/original/file-20170726-2133-1uwdwc4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bob Hawke and Paul Keating’s reforms opened Australia’s economy to the world after decades of protectionism and stagflation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bentley Smith/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tony Blair and the ‘Third Way’</h2>
<p>Swan drew a parallel between the ALP’s “Laborism” and the “Third Way” of New Labour in the UK. </p>
<p>Blair crafted the “Third Way” with the view that old class divisions between the “left” and “right” were redundant. He saw a greater move toward the centre as not only necessary but practical.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/feb/10/labour.uk1">original argument</a> for a “Third Way” came from Anthony Giddens, who argued that reformist governments could no longer rely on the left-right binary in the face of powerful globalising forces. To adapt, the traditionally left-leaning Labour Party would need to adopt more conservative policies.</p>
<p>In moving toward the Third Way, New Labour cast aside traditional party preferences for Keynesian economic policies that relied heavily on state intervention. Instead, it looked to the ALP for lessons in <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/how-the-british-came-saw-and-helped-rudd/2007/12/16/1197740090746.html?page=2">“marrying economic openness with social justice”</a>.</p>
<p>In doing so, Blair and his chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, introduced reforms that made the Bank of England independent and allowed for freer movement of labour between the UK and the European Union.</p>
<p>It appeared New Labour was continuing some of the economic reforms begun by previous Conservative governments. Yet Blair also declared his party’s commitment to a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/blair-well-build-a-welfare-state-for-the-21st-century-1138878.html">“21st-century welfare system”</a>, which was directly aimed at reducing the perceived inequities and social divisions that Thatcher’s policies created.</p>
<h2>A necessary evil?</h2>
<p>“Neoliberalism” often gets used as a catch-all description for the negative aspects of the modern world. Hence the ALP and Labour’s reluctance to refer to their policies as being “neoliberal”.</p>
<p>One of New Labour’s legacies has been a perceived failure of the “Third Way”. It has been argued that New Labour’s economic policies <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10992792/How-did-Tony-Blair-leave-the-British-economy.html">set the UK up</a> for a spectacular fall during the global financial crisis.</p>
<p>Corbyn, along with the movement that supported his rise, defined his policies as being a return to the party’s democratic socialist roots. His success was an inherent rejection of the Third Way.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/MCRpc_8Tu7c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A song for Jeremy Corbyn.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ALP, on the other hand, appears content to continue on the path of Hawke and Keating. The reason for this could lie in the relative success of the ALP’s decision to embrace the free market. Economist Thomas Piketty <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/14/the-hawke-keating-agenda-was-laborism-not-neoliberalism-and-is-still-a-guiding-light">estimated</a> the share of income going to the top 1% is about 14-15% in Britain – but only 9-10% in Australia. </p>
<p>And unlike other Western economies such as the UK and the US, Australia is yet to undergo a recession. One of the factors that have been credited for this was the economic policies of former Liberal prime minister John Howard; Howard was continuing the neoliberal program first set out by Hawke and Keating. </p>
<p>Howard was succeeded by Kevin Rudd. His government’s stimulus programs of 2008-10 were credited by most economists, both local and international, for helping Australia avoiding a post-global-financial-crisis recession.</p>
<p>So, was embracing the market a necessary evil? While it’s easy to assess this with the gift of hindsight, it’s important to place Britain and Australia’s move toward economic liberalisation within the context of a broader global shift towards neoliberalism. </p>
<p>Both countries had significant recessions during the 1970s. Britain required IMF assistance <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/11484844-b565-11df-9af8-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1">in 1976</a>; Australia experienced sustained “stagflation”.</p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system">The Bretton Woods system</a> had collapsed, and it appeared Keynesian economics had failed both countries. A shift toward freer markets appeared to be the radical change that was needed to remedy the economic malaise.</p>
<p>But it can also be argued that neither party was truly neoliberal. Both created an ideology that attempted to marry economic liberalisation with the democratic socialist values upon which they were founded. </p>
<p>The varying successes of “Laborism” and the “Third Way” not only tell of how two democratic socialist parties sought to modernise through the creation of new ideologies, but also point toward why the ALP has remained firmly in the centre while Labour has taken a sharp turn back to the left.</p>
<p>While both parties may have set out to modernise and renew their ideologies, the attempts by the ALP and Labour to marry the old and new precipitated two separate identity crises, which have carried through to the present day. </p>
<p>Especially in light of Corbyn’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-jeremy-corbyn-an-open-letter-on-moving-on-from-glorious-defeat-79321">election performance</a>, questions about whether Labour’s return to the left is still symptomatic of an identity crisis or a solid acceptance of a return to its roots are louder than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81612/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keshia Jacotine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While both parties may have set out to modernise and renew their ideologies, the ALP’s and Labour’s attempts to marry the old and new instead precipitated two separate identity crises.Keshia Jacotine, MPhil Candidate and Teaching Associate in Politics, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/800832017-08-11T02:09:20Z2017-08-11T02:09:20ZWe frown on voters’ ambivalence about democracy, but they might just save it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177787/original/file-20170712-14452-n1dwgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters might be quite rational in refusing to give the green light to those who wield power and benefit from the status quo.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/edenius/11035402625/">Mats Edenius/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> project, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<p><em>This piece is part of a series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/after-populism-39385">After Populism</a>, about the challenges populism poses for democracy. It comes from a talk at the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Populism-Symposium-6-April-2017.pdf">Populism: What’s Next for Democracy?</a> symposium hosted by the <a href="http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au/">Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis</a> at the University of Canberra in collaboration with <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The flipside of the populism coin is voter ambivalence about “democracy” as we know it.</p>
<p>Though much of the reporting of last year’s US presidential race focused on the “angry” American voter, it has been <a href="https://cer.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/cer.columbian.gwu.edu/files/Sides2016.pdf">observed</a> that perhaps the most striking feature of the campaign that led to the election of Donald Trump was not so much that people were angry, as “ambivalent”.</p>
<p>In another surprising 2016 election, in the Philippines, <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/vote-philippines-elite-democracy-disrupted">observers also reflected</a> that a shared “ambivalence” about democratic government must in large part have led many middle-class voters to support the firebrand Rodrigo Duterte.</p>
<p>And in France, people explained the <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/4-takeaways-from-the-french-parliamentary-election/">record low turnout</a> in June’s parliamentary elections by pointing to the “<a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/05/03/macron-le-pen-runoff-reveals-fault-lines-french-catholic-revival">ambivalent base</a>”. Despite Emmanuel Macron’s election, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/world/europe/france-parliament-elections-emmanuel-macron.html?_r=0">new president had</a> “yet to convince many French voters that his ideas and legislative program will make their lives better”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177831/original/file-20170712-14488-15hq579.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This French voter isn’t easily won over.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">radiowood/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These examples suggest political ambivalence is everywhere <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Foa%26Mounk-27-3.pdf">on the rise</a>, and that these are anxious times politically. </p>
<p>If the appeal of leaders like Trump and Duterte is anything to go on, despite or perhaps because of their peddling of a violent and exclusionary rhetoric, widespread ambivalence among citizens of democracies has potentially dangerous consequences.</p>
<h2>A wilful, rational response</h2>
<p>We often equate ambivalence with indecision or indifference. But it’s a more complex and more spirited idea than that. Ambivalence reflects our capacity to say both “yes” and “no” about a person or an object at the same time.</p>
<p>Eugen Bleuler, the Swiss psychiatrist who <a href="http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=ambivalence">coined the term in 1910</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=RiTyZUYp9asC&pg=PR33&lpg=PR33&dq=Symbiosis+and+Ambiguity&source=bl&ots=pIZi_P3P3G&sig=lir2rqgmv7vz5sYeTAPoyKib_8w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjB77ClpbrVAhXEHJQKHfm8BDIQ6AEIPTAF#v=onepage&q=dreams%20of%20healthy&f=false">wrote</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the dreams of healthy persons, affective as well as intellectual ambivalence is a common phenomenon.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Freud soon picked up the term to describe our capacity to love and hate a person all at once.</p>
<p>We needn’t be Freudians to see that ambivalence reflects our common “<a href="http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/635426">inner experience</a>”. While we cannot physically be in two places at once, in our minds it is not only possible but likely that dualities and conflicting ideas or beliefs co-exist at the same time. Think of Hamlet’s soliloquy:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>To be, or not to be, that is the question:</p>
<p>Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer</p>
<p>The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,</p>
<p>Or to take Arms against a Sea of troubles,</p>
<p>And by opposing end them…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The point is that, rather than reflecting some psychological deficiency or cognitive dissonance, ambivalence is an active and wilful position to take. </p>
<p>Ambivalence is even rational, in that it requires an awareness of mutually exclusive choices and a refusal to choose; just as wanting a bit of both is also rational.</p>
<h2>Is this a dangerous development?</h2>
<p>When it comes to politics, we often hold conflicting, even mutually exclusive visions, of the sort of society we want. </p>
<p>In the Philippines, the middle-class voters I interviewed in 2015 wanted the civil liberties that democracy provides. At the same time, they were concerned that too much freedom was causing social and political chaos. </p>
<p>The two ideas, though contradictory, co-existed in people’s minds. This type of ambivalence at least partly explains why urban middle-class voters <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/nation/05/11/16/more-class-abc-voters-picked-duterte-exit-poll">came out in numbers</a> to elect someone like Duterte. </p>
<p>As ambivalence is often linked to the victories of populists, there is a general sense that our ambivalence is destabilising, dangerous and needs to be purged. Ambivalent citizens, the reasoning goes, place a heavy burden on their country’s democracy, as by questioning the status quo of the modern democratic state they undermine its very legitimacy. </p>
<p>The failure to reach clarity implies a failed agency on the part of the ambivalent citizen; it is they who carry the burden of resolving their own feelings and returning to a place of undivided certainty. </p>
<p>Commentary after the US election spoke of not letting the ambivalent Trump-voting middle class (who should have known better) “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/138754/blame-trumps-victory-college-educated-whites-not-working-class">off the hook</a>”.</p>
<p>Yet, as Zygmunt Bauman <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=iegdiOrGugkC">noted</a>, the more we try to eradicate ambivalence by calling it ignorance and “mere opinion”, the more the opposite is likely to occur. </p>
<p>Furthermore, people who have been reduced to decision-takers will be more likely to see radical, revolutionary, even destructive change as the only way to resolve their ambivalence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177830/original/file-20170712-10371-lol25q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Those in positions of power often view ambivalence on the streets as socially toxic or threatening.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">jprwpics/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ambivalence can be a check on power</h2>
<p>Democracy and ambivalence, rather than being antithetical, may be strange bedfellows. At the heart of the democratic idea is a notion of “the people” as both the source and guardians of power.</p>
<p>Consider the way <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0191453706059848">Ernesto Laclau</a> sees the political as always in conflict, inherent in conflicting identities struggling for dominance. </p>
<p>While the collective identity of “the people” claims to accommodate difference, this is impossible without the constitutive exclusion of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/modis-polarising-populism-makes-a-fiction-of-a-secular-democratic-india-80605">the other</a>”. </p>
<p>If this is the case, democracy should stimulate our scepticism. Who is being excluded in the name of “the people”? And who has gained the power to constitute their particular identity as a unified whole?</p>
<p>Ideally, representative democracy seeks not only to recognise but to institutionalise this scepticism, and to manage our disappointment with democracy. It is our ability to withdraw our support and give it elsewhere that means our contested visions of society don’t lead to its destruction.</p>
<p>The trouble is that the 21st-century democratic state has little tolerance of our scepticism about power. Citizens are pressured to turn their trust over to a bureau-technocratic order led by “experts” in order to deal with complex, contemporary problems. The role of voters is transformed into that of passive bystanders, prone to chaos and irrationality, and not to be trusted.</p>
<p>Matters are made worse by extreme concentration of wealth and income inequality. Thomas Piketty correctly <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674430006">warned</a> that extreme inequality would threaten the democratic order. </p>
<p>Despite observing (and experiencing) the undermining of basic social protections and equity principles, people are expected to stay in their place. It is as if ordinary citizens are not trusted to make their own judgements, unless those judgements endorse the path of little or no change. </p>
<p>Their ambivalence, which may be a purposive response to their evaluation of how democracy is actually working, is deemed toxic and socially useless.</p>
<p>No doubt such widespread ambivalence, as well as this denial of the valid expression of unmet aspirations, has provided fertile ground for populist politicians. </p>
<p>The likes of Trump and Duterte appeal to people’s desire not to be fixed into pre-determined standards of how to think and behave. And in claiming to fill a gap as “true” representatives of “the people”, they enable what often turns out to be a radical expression of voter ambivalence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/177819/original/file-20170712-20377-1xyv26g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rodrigo Duterte poses with the Philippines military and boxer and senator Manny Pacquiao in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rene Lumawag/Republic of the Philippines Presidential Communications Office</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A chance to rethink the status quo</h2>
<p>Political ambivalence is more than a flawed tension of opposites. Neither is it a temporary deviance. It is deeply rooted, and likely here to stay. </p>
<p>The more we dismiss and disparage it, rebuking voters who “should know better”, the more we risk its manifestation in destructive ways.</p>
<p>A more constructive first step for managing ambivalence as a society would be to recognise it – even embrace it – as a chance to reflect critically on the status quo.</p>
<p>Kenneth Weisbrode <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/ambivalence">likened</a> ambivalence to a yellow traffic light, the one that exasperates us at the time, but in fact helps us avoid fatal collisions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… a yellow light that tells us to pause before going forward pell-mell with green, or paralysing ourselves with red.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If we heed his advice, the presence of widespread ambivalence should prompt us to pause and look around.</p>
<p>This is more radical than it may sound. Slowing down, and contemplating how our democracy is working for us as a community, potentially limits the power of those who benefit from the status quo. </p>
<p>It could even be seen as one of democracy’s internal safety mechanisms, since being sceptical about the exercise of power and keeping in check those who benefit from it, is what keeps democracy alive. </p>
<p>Bauman <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?redir_esc=y&id=ftcYAAAAYAAJ&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=by+hook">wrote</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The world is ambivalent, though its colonisers and rulers do not like it to be such and by hook and by crook try to pass it off for one that is not.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ambivalence may be the most rational response to the fact that, in 2017, the notion of democracy as a politics of self-government and collectively made choices has, in many respects, become a lullaby, mere rhetoric that serves the interests of those who benefit from the persistence of a shared yet elusive ideal.</p>
<p>If not the populist figures, who or what else in our democracies today is claiming to represent “the people”? A living democracy hinges upon this type of circumspection. It could even usher in a new era of democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Adele Webb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ambivalence among voters is reason to think about how democracy is working for us as a community. To keep democracy alive we need to be sceptical about the exercise of power and keep it in check.Dr Adele Webb, PhD Researcher, Department of Government and International Relations / Sydney Democracy Network, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/795002017-08-02T00:57:47Z2017-08-02T00:57:47ZMore than ‘slacktivism’: we dismiss the power of politics online at our peril<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174863/original/file-20170621-30161-12pwj92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Political groups of all stripes recognise the enormous power of online mass persuasion, one meme at a time.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/fibonacciblue/32452974604/">Fibonacci Blue/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Log on to Facebook or Twitter and you’re likely to see a deluge of political posts – a humorous <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-donald-trump-won-the-2016-meme-wars-68580">meme</a> or viral video skewering politicians like Donald Trump, the latest hashtag slogan in response to breaking news, maybe even a social movement symbol as an updated profile picture. </p>
<p>The sharing of political opinion on social media is now ubiquitous. But what does it mean for democracy?</p>
<p>For years, debate has raged about the significance of symbolic, expressive political activity at the level of the everyday citizen. </p>
<p>Critics fear it is simply self-satisfying “<a href="https://theconversation.com/slacktivism-that-works-small-changes-matter-69271">slacktivism</a>”. It gives people an easy way to feel they’re contributing to a cause while substituting for more intensive political participation. </p>
<p>Conversely, optimists see a flourishing of civic engagement on the internet that gives people an accessible entry point into politics. If it helps them to develop a sense of political identity and agency, that enables more participation down the line.</p>
<p>These contrasting positions both have merit. Yet are those who take them asking the right questions in the first place?</p>
<p>By evaluating online political expression only in terms of possible impacts on traditional political activity, we risk sidestepping a far more crucial set of issues.</p>
<h2>Forget ‘slacktivism’</h2>
<p>Myriad organisations and institutions see this citizen-level expression on social media as being far from just a private or personal affair. It is increasingly valued for its aggregate promotional power. The marketing professions know this as <a href="http://www.buzztalkmonitor.com/blog/electronic-word-of-mouth-presents-a-window-of-opportunity-for-businesses/">electronic word of mouth</a>.</p>
<p>Political groups of all stripes promote social media participation to amplify the reach and credibility of their persuasive messages. Although each individual act of posting, linking, commenting and liking may look insignificant up close, at a macro level they add up to nothing less than the networked spread of ideas. </p>
<p>There is enormous power here for mass persuasion, one viral share at a time. We dismiss this power at our peril.</p>
<p>During the 2016 US presidential election cycle social media soared to new heights of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-relationship-between-social-media-and-traditional-media-has-shaped-this-election-61585">prominence</a> in the political media landscape. It appears we are finally starting to recognise this power for what it is. </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-the-wannabe-king-ruling-by-twiat-72269">Trump, the wannabe king ruling by twiat</a></strong></em></p>
<hr>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.sc0N0nwlP#.laLN2PYkM">controversy over fake news on sites like Facebook</a> has drawn attention to how peer-to-peer sharing can influence public opinion and even the course of elections (in this case by spreading false and defamatory messages about Hillary Clinton that consolidated her image problems). New <a href="https://datasociety.net/output/media-manipulation-and-disinfo-online/">research</a> has highlighted how:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… far-right groups develop techniques of ‘attention hacking’ to increase the visibility of their ideas through the strategic use of social media, memes and bots.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174873/original/file-20170621-30211-16o258g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fake news stories from websites like End The Fed are designed to go viral on social media.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">End The Fed</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The so-called alt-right celebrates its “<a href="http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/memes-4chan-trump-supporters-trolls-internet-214856">meme magic</a>” in propagating white nationalist ideology online in service of Trump. The pro-Clinton <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/correct-the-record-online-trolls/484847/">“Correct the Record” political action committee</a> admits to paying people to post on social media during her primary battle with Bernie Sanders. We are seeing the persuasive value of citizen-level political media coming into sharp focus.</p>
<p>We need to reflect on how we each use this power. That involves thinking through the consequences of what we share online and how it can both strengthen and harm democratic values.</p>
<h2>The citizen marketer</h2>
<p>Sharing political opinion on social media must be understood in no small part as participation in political <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-citizen-marketer-9780190658069?lang=en&cc=us">marketing</a>. Its practitioners have long circulated persuasive media messages to shape the public mind and influence political outcomes. </p>
<p>This understanding calls for a new kind of media literacy. It requires individuals to acknowledge their own position in circuits of media influence and take seriously their capacity to help shape the flow of political ideas across networks of peers. </p>
<p>We should no longer think of political marketing — or its conceptual forebear, propaganda — as something only powerful elites do. We must recognise that we are all now complicit in this process every time we spread political messages via media platforms that we personally control.</p>
<p>Many citizens are keenly aware of their capacity to persuade their peers through their online posting. They have embraced the role of social media influencer. Most often, they focus on trying to rally the like-minded or undecided, rather than winning over converts from the other side.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-citizen-marketer-9780190658069?lang=en&cc=us">citizen marketer</a> approach to political action can be seen as an outgrowth of the more established concept of the citizen consumer. A citizen consumer deliberately uses their spending power as another way to influence the political sphere. </p>
<p>They may, for instance, buy only environmentally friendly products, or boycott companies whose CEOs donate to campaigns and causes that the consumer opposes. Similarly, we are seeing citizens use their power as micro-level agents of viral media promotion and word-of-mouth endorsement to advance a wide range of political interests and agendas.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ry-hqi9zRuM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">#BlackLivesMatter forced America to confront racism once more using the power of social media.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is an enormous opportunity to democratise the flow of political media messages and publicise causes that lie outside the mainstream. </p>
<p>Consider recent activist movements, often built around viral hashtags like #occupywallsteet and #blacklivesmatter. Here, citizens are co-opting the tools and logics of social media marketing to advocate for political ideas that are typically poorly represented in the corporate mass media.</p>
<p>By recognising the potential value of our own grassroots political marketing power, we can gain a foothold in a political media landscape that elite interests traditionally dominated. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more importantly, cultivating a sense of responsibility for what we share on social media puts us in a better position to navigate the emerging digital ecosystem in which these elite actors are capitalising upon — at times even exploiting – our electronic word of mouth.</p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Further reading: <a href="https://theconversation.com/not-so-grassroots-how-the-snowflake-model-is-transforming-political-campaigns-54166">Snowflake model is transforming political campaigns</a></strong></em></p>
<hr>
<h2>Know what you are posting, and who you are posting for</h2>
<p>Nowadays, major election campaigns and large-scale issue advocacy organisations have professional digital marketing teams. One of their tasks is to spur the promotional labour of everyday citizens to maximise the virality of their messages, whether these people are truly aware of their participation in political marketing or not. </p>
<p>In addition, for-profit political news sites like Breitbart and The Daily Kos have become dependent on social media shares to boost clicks and advertising revenue, as well as to advance their proprietors’ often-partisan agendas.</p>
<p>In this environment, it is crucial that we make informed decisions when we lend our promotional labour and word-of-mouth endorsement to institutional actors and the interests and agendas they represent. </p>
<p>At times we may be eager to act as “<a href="https://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/social-media-strategy/how-to-build-brand-evangelists-with-3-winning-examples/">brand evangelists</a>” for candidates, parties, advocacy groups or news agencies whose political goals align with our own. At other times developing media literacy might cause us to pause and reflect before we amplify the latest trending political message.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/174864/original/file-20170621-30177-1k2nd9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Human Rights Campaign logo that made the rounds on Facebook.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Human Rights Campaign</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Back in 2013, Facebook users <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2013/03/what-is-that-red-equal-sign-on-facebook-all-about/">posted a red equal sign</a> as their profile picture to express their support for same-sex marriage. Some had <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-citizen-marketer-9780190658069?lang=en&cc=us">no idea</a> the symbol was the logo of the <a href="http://www.hrc.org/">Human Rights Campaign</a>. This organisation has had a <a href="http://transgriot.blogspot.com/2013/04/why-trans-community-loathes-hrc.html">controversial</a> status in the LGBT movement because of its past treatment of transgender issues.</p>
<p>Would these citizens still have posted the image if they knew they were participating in a viral marketing campaign for an organisation that was not universally supported by the LGBT community, and whose message of equality has drawn criticism for emphasising assimilation over radical structural change? </p>
<p>Or would they have chosen instead to amplify an image and an organisation with a different shade of meaning?</p>
<p>These kinds of important conversations can only be opened up if we start to develop a critical literacy of the citizen marketer approach and how it is transforming what it means to be an active participant in our media-dominated, postmodern political reality.</p>
<p>If we see our online political expressions as mere “slacktivism”, a simple private matter, or just having fun with friends, then we become more vulnerable to manipulation by forces that seek to exploit our citizen marketing power to serve agendas that we may not share.</p>
<p>If we become more aware of our position in these circuits of power, we will be better equipped to resist this manipulation. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Joel Penney’s new book, <a href="https://www.citizenmarketer.org">The Citizen Marketer</a>, is available from <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-citizen-marketer-9780190658069?lang=en&cc=us">Oxford University Press</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79500/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joel Penney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Each individual act of posting, linking, commenting and liking may look insignificant up close, but they add up. There is enormous power here for mass persuasion, one viral share at a time.Joel Penney, Professor of Communication and Media, Montclair State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/808822017-07-30T20:09:32Z2017-07-30T20:09:32ZDiscontents: identity, politics and institutions in a time of populism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178586/original/file-20170718-22034-1wjivyh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Donald Trump constantly invoked the idea of political correctness gone mad in his presidential campaign.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Scott Morgan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This piece is republished with permission from <a href="https://griffithreview.com/editions/perils-of-populism/">Perils of Populism</a>, the 57th edition of Griffith Review. Articles are a little longer than most published on The Conversation, presenting an in-depth analysis of the rise of populism across the world.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Fifteen years ago, economist Joseph Stiglitz published a book, <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/globalization-and-its-discontents/">Globalisation and its Discontents</a>. For Stiglitz, globalisation meant:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge and (to a lesser extent) people across borders. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>While the global economy has continued to expand, Stiglitz could not foresee the extent to which the movement of people would become a toxic political issue, as refugee flows and draconian measures to prevent them have increased.</p>
<p>Stiglitz was primarily concerned with the impact of globalisation on the world’s poorest countries. But he also acknowledged its impact on democratic institutions. </p>
<p>Contrary to the neoliberal belief that economic globalisation would ensure the triumph of Western-style democracies, it appears that democratic institutions everywhere have been weakened by their inability to satisfy an increasing number of voters. This was remarkably prescient, given Stiglitz was writing before the catalyst of the global financial crisis.</p>
<p>It is not difficult to find evidence for this claim. Despite some small gains in the past decade in a few African countries, liberal democracy has been on the retreat in several countries: Russia, Turkey, Thailand, Hungary. </p>
<p>In established democracies, major political parties have either been taken over by populist forces, as is the case for the US Republicans, or lost ground to them, as in France. </p>
<p>The apparent failure of globalisation seems to have energised the right to a greater degree than it has the left. In several countries, social democratic parties have lost much of their traditional support, with some of it even having swung to nationalistic and socially conservative movements.</p>
<p>The term “populism” is now so widely used that it seems equivalent with any political position not shared by the speaker. One of Australia’s more distinguished political commentators, Paul Kelly, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/paul-kelly/beware-the-dangers-of-shortenled-leftwing-populism/news-story/ba241d652f60b6b78002038eea16e3da">consistently attacks</a> Bill Shorten for “populism” when he is really pointing to a mixture of opportunism and cautious appeals for greater equity by an opposition leader who is strongly committed to the processes of liberal democracy. </p>
<p>In contemporary usage, “populism” is generally understood to mean political movements and individuals who channel widespread alienation and frustration by claiming to speak for “the people” against forces that are said to be destroying cherished ways of life. “The people” in Western societies are, for the most part, implicitly understood to be white and Christian, blurring the line between race and religion. </p>
<p>In particular, attacks on Muslims are a hallmark of contemporary populism. There are versions of left-wing populism – as in Venezuela or Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines, where racism is not an ingredient – but they are less relevant to the Australian experience.</p>
<p>The essential difference between populism and democracy is that democracy entails more than majority rule. <a href="https://edsitement.neh.gov/curriculum-unit/alexis-de-tocqueville-tyranny-majority">Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning</a> of the “tyranny of the majority” remains relevant today. The protection of political freedoms and minority rights is an essential test of democracy. </p>
<p>Majority support for slavery, racial discrimination or denial of equal rights to women does not make any of these things democratic. Populism feeds on a heady dose of philosophical nihilism, which sometimes seems to echo critiques of globalisation made by the left. </p>
<p><a href="http://insidestory.org.au/metaphysics-with-a-vengeance">In an article</a> on the rise of an alt-right movement straddling the Atlantic, Jane Goodall quotes one of its central figures, Reza Jorjani. She said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tensions and disagreements were to be anticipated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But they were clear in what they stood united against:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The alternative right unequivocally rejects liberal democracy.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Populism and identity politics</h2>
<p>Populist leaders not only attack the institutions of global capital, they also disregard the checks and balances of institutional democracy. </p>
<p>Vladimir Putin’s imprisonment of opponents, Donald Trump’s attacks on the media, Viktor Orbán’s attacks on immigrants and NGOs, Nicolás Maduro’s recourse to military courts and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s assaults on journalists and secular opponents are all justified in the name of protecting “the people”, and are legitimised by popular election. </p>
<p>This creates a dichotomy between “the people” and the (largely unspecified) “ruling elites”, despite the reality that populist leaders themselves are clearly part of the latter. </p>
<p>No matter. Their ability to channel anger and frustration at the status quo, and to promise easy solutions, seemingly grants them immunity from being attacked for their own exploitation of the system. Trump, Putin and Erdoğan are all notable for the extent to which they have profited personally from their control of state institutions.</p>
<p>As national economies are increasingly subject to the flows of international capital, the ability of governments to control them declines. This has resulted in increased economic inequality in wealthy countries and led to greater voter dissatisfaction – and a search for political scapegoats. An emphasis on nationalism is one manifestation of this search.</p>
<p>Nationalism is often assumed to emerge spontaneously from “the people” rather than, as is often the case, to have been carefully cultivated by political leaders. Commentators have stressed hostility to immigrants in fuelling the vote for Brexit in England (though not all of Britain) last year. But had several leading Tories, above all Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, not campaigned for withdrawal, it is unlikely that the referendum would have ended as it did. </p>
<p>While Trump won over a considerable number of white working-class Americans, his victory was equally due to the support of traditional Republican elites. And his administration is staffed by wealthy conservatives rather than the working men and women to whom his rhetoric appealed.</p>
<p>Such populists both denigrate the state and turn to it to repress those they see as “enemies of the people” – the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-us-news-media-enemy-of-the-people-coverage-fixation-tv-west-wing-white-house-president-a7622216.html">phrase used by Trump</a> against the media. They distrust the intermediaries of liberal democracy – parties, pressure groups, media – preferring to resort to rallies and direct contact between leaders and mass audiences. They scorn the idea that politics is an elaborate system of building consensus through persuasion and mutual respect. </p>
<p>Hungary, whose leader proclaims he seeks an “illiberal democracy”, has perhaps the best current example of this form of populism in power: an elected government is attacking independent media and NGOs, while whipping up support through systematic scapegoating of refugees and, to a lesser extent, Jews and homosexuals. </p>
<p>Responding to a question about gay rights, Orbán <a href="http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/05/22/viktor-orban-hungary-is-a-serious-country-where-gays-are-patiently-tolerated/">summed up</a> the language of contemporary populism more eloquently than either Trump or Pauline Hanson ever could: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tolerance, however, does not mean that we would apply the same rules for people whose lifestyle is different from our own. We differentiate between them and us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Populist attacks on “political correctness” have become shorthand for resentment against a whole set of social changes that unsettle people who feel what was once taken for granted is now under attack. </p>
<p>Trump constantly invoked the idea of political correctness gone mad in his campaign. And his victory was based on the collapse of old-style blue-collar jobs, and on Hillary Clinton’s failure to win over the educated white Republican women whom she assumed could not abide Trump, but who disliked her more. </p>
<p>In both the Trump and the Brexit vote, there was a deep undercurrent of racial resentment that was expressed through attacks on “political correctness”. But this was deeply entangled with basic economic concerns.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of Trump’s win, some commentators claimed the Democrats had become a party of special interests, unable to speak to the majority. One of Clinton’s supporters, historian Mark Lilla, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html">wrote</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some years ago I was invited to a union convention in Florida to speak on a panel about Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous Four Freedoms speech of 1941. The hall was full of representatives from local chapters – men, women, blacks, whites, Latinos. </p>
<p>As I looked out into the crowd, and saw the array of different faces, I was struck by how focused they were on what they shared. And listening to Roosevelt’s stirring voice as he invoked the freedom of speech, the freedom of worship, the freedom from want and the freedom from fear – freedoms that Roosevelt demanded for ‘everyone in the world’ – I was reminded of what the real foundations of modern American liberalism are.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Lilla is only half-right. When Roosevelt made his demands they effectively excluded more than half the population: African, Latino and Native Americans, homosexuals – even women were in part excluded from the freedoms of the New Deal.</p>
<p>Too often, attacks on political correctness and identity politics assume a world in which rights and freedoms are equally available to all. In reality it is those who experience discrimination and disadvantage who most need to assert their identity. </p>
<p>Lamenting what he sees as a decline in Christian-based values, Kelly <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/paul-kelly/new-progressive-morality-rapidly-taking-over-from-christian-beliefs/news-story/c5f0c19f4f73d088f546fbd6b884befe">wrote recently</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Politics is intruding into private and family life. Value judgements are being made in a way inconceivable two decades ago. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But to argue this is to overlook the ways in which value judgements and state power have always shaped “private and family life” – abortion, adoption, adultery – and to overlook the position of privilege from which so much of the denunciation of identity politics stems. The women’s and gay movements emerged precisely because of the need to struggle against state-supported discrimination.</p>
<p>Identity politics can be both individual and collective. We assert ourselves – as women, as Indigenous, as queer – to emphasise both our particularities and our sense of belonging. </p>
<p>In so doing, identity politics implicitly breaks with the Enlightenment tradition of claiming us all as equal citizens committed to liberté, égalité, fraternité (though, in practice, the universal citizen of Enlightenment thought was a white male with property).</p>
<p>Asserting difference through the creation of social movements based on specific identities of race, language, gender and sexuality was a necessary step toward expanding citizenship to become genuinely universal and not, as social conservatives argue, a retreat from these values. </p>
<p>Yes, there are versions of identity politics that assert difference to justify prejudice and persecution. But that does not deny the need to build a sense of community and self-acceptance among people who are not fully included in dominant power structures.</p>
<p>In the contemporary world, the most obvious examples of the identity politics of hate come from extreme white nationalist groups, who claim an identity that is defined by superiority to all others.</p>
<p>It is ironic that many of the attacks on “identity politics” come from people who wish to privilege another form of identity – namely, the national. To assert “Australian values” is, after all, to declare a particular form of identity that carries with it specific entitlements. </p>
<p>Nationalism has been the model for certain forms of identity politics, and contains the same tensions between liberatory and repressive possibilities. Arguments for “national identity” too quickly become arguments for exclusion, with unpopular views denounced as unpatriotic. Tony Abbott <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/the-wests-high-culture-is-the-best-antidote-to-discrimination-20170503-gvy1ld.html">wrote of</a> attending an Anzac Day dawn service at which:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the padre denounced political correctness as shutting the mouth, twisting the mind and warping the soul. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>But is the demand to adhere to “Australian”, as distinct from universal, values not just another form of political correctness?</p>
<p>It’s worth recalling American critical theorist <a href="https://newleftreview.org/II/3/nancy-fraser-rethinking-recognition">Nancy Fraser’s assertion</a> that both redistribution and recognition are essential for a just polity. Equality of access and opportunity depends upon both redistributive policies and a genuine acceptance of diversity. </p>
<p>Perhaps a third category needs to be added to Fraser’s terms: sustainability. The dismal failure to control carbon emissions over the past decade illustrates just how problematic this dimension has become.</p>
<p>Fraser argues that “struggles for recognition [can] be integrated with struggles for redistribution”, rather than portrayed as single-issue demands which have no bearing on economic structures. </p>
<p>As “identity politics” becomes increasingly understood as the politics of victimhood rather than empowerment, it is essential to remember that no one movement has a single identity, nor can it achieve liberation without larger social and political change.</p>
<p>The enthusiastic support of many corporations for same-sex marriage is a case study of embracing equality through recognition while failing to discuss the inequities of distribution or to think globally.</p>
<p>Qantas might well <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-21/qantas-boss-says-marriage-equality-makes-economic-sense/8373888">parade its support</a> for marriage equality in Australia. But this does not prevent its close alliance with Emirates, the official airline of a state that criminalises homosexuality, nor does it guarantee decent conditions for all its employees. </p>
<p>The current language of “equality” centres almost entirely on civic and political rights, not on social and economic equality. In human rights language, these are first- and second-generation rights. To people struggling to survive in a rapidly changing economy, this emphasis on “rights” can sound dismissive and elitist – one of the standard complaints about identity politics.</p>
<p>We need a politics of shared values rather than one based on separate identities. To speak personally: I am deeply committed to a struggle for queer rights. But that does not mean I feel a political bond with the many right-wing homosexuals who support groups such as Marine Le Pen’s Front National or Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. </p>
<p>The danger, as Fraser points out, is that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… struggles for recognition simultaneously displace struggles for economic justice and promote repressive forms of communitarianism.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178588/original/file-20170718-22028-1g1gdm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is known for his attacks on immigrants and NGOs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Bernadett Szabo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What populism means for political parties</h2>
<p>It has become commonplace to claim that the collapse of “rusted-on” support for the major political parties is due to a new form of cultural politics, pitting inner-city cosmopolitan “elites” against rural and outer suburbanites.</p>
<p>Liberal assistant minister Angus Taylor <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/connect-the-regions-rising-star-angus-taylors-solution-to-stop-the-trumpification-of-australia-20170302-gupkuq.html">reportedly claims</a> that cultural identity and political correctness are can explain Trump, Brexit and Hanson’s resurgence:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Political correctness, above all, is the thing I hear from people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a neat rhetorical device to avoid the role of growing inequality and resentment at rapid social change that the economic policies of his government do little to moderate.</p>
<p>In a similar vein, the columnists of the Murdoch press are obsessed with questions such as Safe Schools, same-sex marriage and hate speech, while insisting that most voters have little interest in these issues.</p>
<p>Reflecting on the 2016 federal election, former Liberal Party leader John Hewson <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/theres-an-obvious-way-for-malcolm-turnbull-to-beat-the-politics-of-fear-leadership-20161026-gsbp73.html">wrote</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The whole political process over the past several decades has been an unsavoury race to the bottom, delivering little real/effective government … The last election … clearly revealed voters’ dissatisfaction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his judicious <a href="https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/03/the-white-queen">Quarterly Essay</a> on Hanson, David Marr quotes political scientist Ian McAllister as saying that respect for the political class has fallen to its lowest level in recent history. </p>
<p>It is not surprising, nor necessarily troubling, that party loyalties are declining. The development of a multi-party system is not itself evidence of populism. The largest minor party in Australia remains the Greens, which, despite the fulminations of the Murdoch press, is committed to parliamentary processes and does not meet most definitions of populism.</p>
<p>When she governed with their support, Julia Gillard faced far more problems from within her own ranks – Kevin Rudd, Craig Thomson – than she did from the Greens.</p>
<p>Our political institutions are products of the 19th century. Our major parties were shaped in the 20th. But Australia today is a very different country, largely because of globalisation. </p>
<p>The opening up of the economy to global pressures, and a subsequent change in its nature, has meant greater affluence but also greater inequality. In the past three decades, the manufacturing industry has declined and whole communities <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/economy-not-society">have been destroyed</a> as factories and assembly plants have given way to apartment blocks and shopping malls. </p>
<p>The mining boom created a sudden surge of wealth in some areas, but much of that growth has slowed. And while some new jobs have been created in the meantime, they are more dependent on educational qualifications. </p>
<p>With these shifts has come a decline in blue-collar trade unions, and a rise in self-employment. In the past two decades union membership <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/trade-union-membership-hits-record-low-20151027-gkjlpu.html">has fallen</a> from about 40% of the workforce to well under 20%. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the rapid development of the virtual economy and our dependence on electronic media continue to erode traditional jobs and change the very ways in which we organise our lives. Traditional divides between “work” and “leisure” are disappearing with the ability to remain hooked into the internet wherever we are.</p>
<p>Australia today has 10 million more people than it did in 1980 – a staggering growth that has made house prices and urban congestion major political issues in the capital cities. </p>
<p>Our population has become much more diverse, with a very high proportion having been born overseas. The subsequent emphasis upon diversity – not only of race and ethnicity, but also of sexuality and gender – is often the basis for bitter political divisions.</p>
<p>The collective impact of these changes has been to undermine the assumptions of mainstream politics, which are based upon structures and institutions that have little changed during the past century. Relatively few people retain deep loyalties to the major parties, which explains the rapid turnover in governments and the attraction of minor parties. </p>
<p>There are currently nine members of the Senate who are from parties named after individuals: Hanson, Nick Xenophon, Jacqui Lambie, Derryn Hinch. When I asked Hinch in a pre-election radio interview about the potential hubris of an eponymous party name he agreed, but said that were he to campaign for the Justice Party he’d poll far fewer votes.</p>
<p>This being said, it is easy to overstate the decline of votes for the major parties. One assumes most voters have some understanding of preferential voting, and are using their first preference to send a signal while still making an effective choice between a Coalition and a Labor government. Minor parties poll better for the Senate than the lower house because voters understand it is the latter that determines which party will form government. </p>
<p>More troubling is the hollowing out of the major parties, as fewer people join and participate, leaving them open to manipulation and branch-stacking. Approximately 100,000 people “belong” to political parties in Australia. In most cases this means no more than paper membership, often to support a particular faction or candidate. </p>
<p>Labor Party membership has increased since the decision in 2013 to give members a role in the choice of the parliamentary leader. Currently, it’s at more than 50,000 paid-up members. The Liberals have roughly 40,000, while the Greens membership is about 10,000. </p>
<p>Exact figures are very hard to find, but none of Australia’s political parties have a membership as large as that of the most popular AFL teams.</p>
<p>Increasingly, politicians are those who have worked their way up through the party machinery, often with little experience or knowledge outside their immediate political base. This in turn creates greater cynicism among voters, who are exposed to stories of corruption, self-interest and endless point-scoring. </p>
<p>The tendency of politicians on both sides to constantly denigrate and belittle their opponents is a major contributor to the corrosion of liberal democracy.</p>
<p>Growing cynicism about politics is also, in part, the product of neoliberal attacks on the state, which depict governments as disconnected from real lives and bent on taking away our money and our freedoms. </p>
<p>The past few decades have seen a systematic delegitimisation of the idea that the state exists to provide collectively what we cannot provide as individuals. This leads to declining commitment from more and more people to maintaining public services, and increases inequality. </p>
<p>For instance, as more parents want private schooling for their kids, the political and financial support available to the state system decreases, which widens the gap between school outcomes and, in turn, employment opportunities.</p>
<p>And the more universities position themselves as corporate enterprises, the more state support for higher education dwindles, despite political rhetoric about the need for greater knowledge and innovation.</p>
<p>The neoliberal economy has broken down many of the thick networks of voluntary associations that were fundamental to a liberal political culture. Not only have unions declined, so too have middle-class business and social associations that often provided the base for the conservative parties. </p>
<p>As church attendance has decreased, the influence of fundamentalist minorities across all faiths has increased, which is closely associated with the rightward shifts within the Liberal Party. </p>
<p>Yes, new forms of social and political networking have flourished this century, but they are often realised by little more than a Facebook like or signing an electronic petition. It’s unwise to over-romanticise the associative life of an earlier period, but there is a real difference between face-to-face interaction and “electronic activism”. </p>
<p>As the disciplines of meeting procedures and building acceptable compromises are sacrificed to instant tweets and ticks, politics becomes indistinguishable from other aspects of consumerism.</p>
<p>In a similar effect, where online media demand instantaneous coverage, commentary has come to replace genuine reporting – and with this comes a decline of civility in public debates. </p>
<p>2GB broadcaster Alan Jones’ <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/gillards-father-died-of-shame-alan-jones-20120929-26soa.html">appalling comments</a> on Gillard (that her father “died of shame”) followed a tendency in the media to address her as “Ju-liar”, rather than prime minister. </p>
<p>However, the left can be equally guilty of shutting out debate – about gay marriage, transgenderism, Islam – by branding anyone who expresses unease as bigots. </p>
<p>Instead of rational discussion, the media feed on crude polarisation. This is the basic presumption of the ABC’s Q&A program, which seeks out guests with dramatically opposing views, regardless of how absurd they will appear.</p>
<p>Too often, there is a lack of generosity from those seeking change who misread unease with the pace of change as bigotry and hostility. Where the left sees sexism, racism and homophobia, the right yells that its freedom of speech has been infringed upon. As writer Christos Tsiolkas <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2016/december/1480510800/christos-tsiolkas/second-coming">noted</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is a symbiosis that links the outraged liberal to the furious conservative, the radical activist to the enraged reactionary. It is the subtext that seems to define the contemporary moment: my rage is grievous and justifiable, and yours is ignorant and selfish.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178590/original/file-20170718-22028-10sbrhn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nine members of the Senate are from parties named after individuals, including Pauline Hanson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What for Australia?</h2>
<p>Liberal democracy in Australia, with its particular federalist inflections – a powerful upper house, a complex set of electoral systems, compulsory voting and tight party discipline – has manifold imperfections, but it also has certain strengths worth defending. </p>
<p>That governments are held accountable through free and fair elections and that freedom of speech and association are protected are important assumptions, even when there are clear failures to meet them.</p>
<p>Equally important are the institutional arrangements that ensure the workings of the system. It’s unprovable, but if the US had an independent electoral commission to set electoral boundaries and/or compulsory and preferential voting, the results of both the 2000 and the 2016 presidential elections might have been very different. </p>
<p>Despite its imperfections, Australia’s electoral systems mean a closer fit between voters’ intent and electoral outcomes than is true in other English-speaking democracies – with the exception of New Zealand, where a system of proportional representation has enabled good government since its adoption in 1996. </p>
<p>Interestingly, the Economist Intelligence Unit <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2017/DemocracyIndex/">ranks Australia</a> in the highest sector for democracy, above both the US and the UK.</p>
<p>It’s important both to defend the institutions of liberal democracy and to question how they might be improved. For some theorists, the possibilities of the electronic age and the decline in traditional party membership open up a path towards forms of more direct democracy. </p>
<p>The political philosopher Simon Tormey <a href="http://au.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0745681964,subjectCd-PO17.html">has written</a> of the increasing tendency to bypass representative institutions in favour of direct action of various sorts: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The perception, increasingly, is that citizens don’t need representatives and politicians to make themselves heard or to act. They can do it for themselves in the expectation that others will want to join in or support their efforts …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are interesting moments of “deliberative democracy” being used to help resolve contentious issues by bringing together groups of interested citizens, such as South Australia’s <a href="http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/citizens-jury-overwhelmingly-rejects-nuclear-waste-storage-facility-for-south-australia/news-story/8340c103234775fffcf9b88b2aea6906">appointment of “citizens’ juries”</a> to consider the question of nuclear waste. </p>
<p>But, at some point, direct action needs to be translated into legislative and bureaucratic responses. And while new forms of consultation and participation might supplement representative government, they are unlikely to replace it. </p>
<p>When the federal government sought to resolve same-sex marriage through a referendum there was strong opposition from many of those most affected, who insisted on the primacy of parliament.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the student and anti-war movements of the 1960s (more accurately the early 1970s), several radicals turned their attention to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_long_march_through_the_institutions">“long slow march through institutions”</a>. Tom Hayden, one of the authors of the Port Huron Statement, became a state legislator. Danny Cohn-Bendit, a leader of the May 1968 Paris movement, became a European parliamentarian. </p>
<p>What Donald Horne <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/cabinet/by-year/1971-events-issues.aspx">termed</a> “the time of hope” in Australia (1966–72) was a period marked both by the emergence of the new left and new social movements and by Gough Whitlam’s reshaping of the Labor Party to offer a real alternative to the legacy of the Menzies decades. </p>
<p>The anti-Vietnam movement included several leading figures within the Labor Party, which came to power with a commitment to ideals that had been inspired by the anti-war, Indigenous, feminist and environmental movements. </p>
<p>In the following decade, Bob Brown went from leading protests against environmental destruction to become the leader of the Greens, and many of his parliamentary colleagues have followed similar trajectories.</p>
<p>We need strong social movements to keep pressure on governments, but we also need good people in government to develop and enact progressive policies. Many of my friends on the left have lost faith in the Labor Party, viewing it as corrupt and unable to either take on big business interests or defend human rights unambiguously. </p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://theconversation.com/national-conference-subdued-about-labor-revival-as-shorten-gets-his-way-44825">when I attended</a> Labor’s national conference in 2015, I was struck by the size and energy of two groups: the environmental activists and the refugee advocates. Their presence in the party reminds us that a Labor government is pressured from the left, a Coalition government from the right.</p>
<p>The rise of populism has created new rifts in the body politic – sometimes, as in France, displacing the major parties; sometimes, as in the case of Trump and Jeremy Corbyn, unseating dominant party elites. </p>
<p>Neither has happened in Australia. My hunch is that the dominance of the existing major parties will persist in the medium term, while the Greens seem unlikely to break through and become much more than a minor party with limited reach. The best prospect for countering a toxic mix of bigotry and rising inequality is a Labor government constantly pressured from “the left” by the Greens and significant social movements.</p>
<p>But nothing is inevitable in politics. Faced with the potential growth of populist right-wing parties – whether led by Hanson, Cory Bernardi, or someone yet to emerge – mainstream politicians need to recognise the cynicism of the electorate, and rebuild trust in the political system. </p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2017-lowy-institute-poll">Lowy Institute poll</a>, nearly one-quarter of Australians said that “in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable”. It’s not clear what respondents understand by either “non-democratic” or “some circumstances”. But I suspect the response suggests ignorance rather than antipathy. </p>
<p>Despite well-meaning attempts to introduce civics into school curricula, there is a disconnect between the minority who follow politics in detail and the bulk of people who dutifully turn up to vote (the latter being an important protection against the triumph of demagoguery).</p>
<p>Populists thrive on a mix of passion and ignorance, and they need to be countered on both levels. The deep distrust between those who seek to effect change through mainstream institutions and those who work outside of them (through movements such as GetUp!) needs to be resolved, as both are important.</p>
<p>If politics is the art of the possible then what is possible is itself determined by political choices, and requires debate and coalition building. The greatest challenge for our political leaders is to demonstrate that politics matters, that while in some respects the state might take away from individuals, when managed properly it can ensure a richer life for us all.</p>
<p>There’s a <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/cartoon/a20660">New Yorker cartoon</a>, published just after Trump’s inauguration, of two corporate dudes in an office, one of whom says: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Part of me is going to miss liberal democracy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Australia is not yet at that point. Our challenge is to simultaneously strengthen the institutions of democracy and re-imagine the role of government in a rapidly changing global environment.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Thanks to Robert Manne and Sean Scalmer for their comments in writing this essay.</em></p>
<p><em>You can read other essays from Griffith Review’s latest edition <a href="https://griffithreview.com/editions/perils-of-populism/">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Altman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Populist leaders not only attack the institutions of global capital, they also disregard the checks and balances of institutional democracy.Dennis Altman, Professorial Fellow in Human Security, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/787622017-07-20T04:09:27Z2017-07-20T04:09:27ZEveryday makers defy populists’ false promise to embody ‘your voice’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173486/original/file-20170613-1873-q6f4oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Populism celebrates laypeople without offering them any real autonomy or integrity.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/geoliv/32549211206/">Geoff Livingston/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> project, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<p><em>This piece is part of a series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/after-populism-39385">After Populism</a>, about the challenges populism poses for democracy. It comes from a talk at the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Populism-Symposium-6-April-2017.pdf">Populism: What’s Next for Democracy?</a>“symposium hosted by the <a href="http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au/">Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis</a> at the University of Canberra in collaboration with <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Populism is not about bureaucracy, technocracy or even democracy. Donald Trump’s presidential campaign slogans – "America First” and “Make America Great Again” – clearly express the essence of populism. It is a moral and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/what-is-nativist-trump/521355/">nativist</a> political response to the increasing globalisation, professionalisation and individualisation of national policy.</p>
<p>We no longer live in a collectively disciplined mass society with clearly defined groups and classes along the left-right axis. The connections between bureaucracy, capitalism and democracy have long been undercut.</p>
<p>These have been reshaped to fit <a href="https://theconversation.com/neoliberalisms-failure-means-we-need-a-new-narrative-to-guide-global-economy-69096">globalist neoliberalism</a> and its celebration of the accumulation of human capital as the foundation of economic, political and social development. </p>
<p>Neoliberalism is not about hierarchy (the state), anarchy (the market) or solidarity (civil society). It’s principally about self-management. Enhancing global competition and growth is about increasing the stock value of the human capital that identifies one as a “whole person”. It is about governing individuals positively and constructively to constantly value or appreciate themselves. </p>
<p>Such chronic monitoring is required to improve their own self-appreciation and thereby their chances of success in the competitive and professionalised neoliberal world. “Co-production”, “citizen-centric government” and “evidence-based policy” are all about steering individuals, from cradle to grave, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-neoliberalisms-moral-order-feeds-fraud-and-corruption-60946">seek success</a> above everything else.</p>
<p>Populism, on the other hand, springs from the idea of the exceptional moral and political leader who rises to prominence and power in order to restore and protect the nation as the home of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-the-people-the-charms-and-contradictions-of-populism-63769">we the people</a>”. Neoliberalism creates a democratic dilemma by identifying self-governance only with those individuals who exercise their human faculties professionally and successfully. </p>
<p>But when Trump exclaims “I am your voice”, he indicates that laypeople have no political voice of their own at all.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BEuboZ98TxE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘They are forgotten, but they are not to be forgotten long … they no longer have a voice. I am your voice.’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since populism is primarily about political authority and leadership (citizenship and the political community are secondary), it doesn’t actually make the life of political “amateurs” easier. By subjecting them to an exceptional leader’s struggle for hegemony, populism doesn’t seek to make the laypeople better at governing and taking care of themselves. </p>
<p>Instead, leaders like Trump are trying to persuade them to blindly follow and support him in his battle against the establishment or the globally interconnected and collaborating “<a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-bregret-offers-timely-lessons-for-australian-voters-this-weekend-61806">professionals</a>” who purportedly trample on their feelings and values.</p>
<p>It’s Trump as political leader, not “the people”, who is re-articulating the boundaries between us and them. His is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-resist-the-political-rise-of-the-global-nativist-70173">nativist</a>/globalist opposition that precedes all other societal cleavages, including the overarching contest between the right and the left.</p>
<p>It is him, not them, who is the moral and political medium for placing Americans first and making the nation great again. Trump wants to reawaken the lonely, silenced and atomised crowd to help <em>himself</em>.</p>
<p>In short, populism considers politics:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a property of communication which takes form in retrospective demands (“Make America Great Again”);</p></li>
<li><p>a metaphysics about the “pure people” and the extraordinary leader as its physical embodiment;</p></li>
<li><p>a conflict-driven discourse, constructing the political order in terms of a binary friend/foe opposition;</p></li>
<li><p>a crisis-focused framing of the political situation in terms of a resistance identity aimed at crushing a so-called rigged and corrupt system;</p></li>
<li><p>a moralist and emotionalist political discourse that condemns everyone who neglects, devalues, or exploits the nation as the home of the pure people;</p></li>
<li><p>an anti-technocratic mode of governance that celebrates the exceptional leader’s power and will to decide and act immediately, intuitively, toughly and smartly in the face of an emerging or escalating crisis; and</p></li>
<li><p>a counter-elitist strategy for replacing the “<a href="https://twitter.com/louisfarrakhan/status/704333938723045376?lang=en">wicked</a>” political establishment of globally networked elites with “<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-both-the-old-crazy-and-the-new-normal-58728">authentic</a>” political leaders who are drawn from, or more effectively represent, the interests and values of the pure people.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Rounding up the forgotten amateurs</h2>
<p>Somewhat shamefully, mainstream political theory and research did not see populism coming, just as they didn’t foresee the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/egalit-libert-sexualit-paris-may-1968-784703.html">1968 Youth Rebellion</a> or the fall of the Berlin Wall. </p>
<p>One reason is that the mainstream has, in this period, paid less and less attention to the “amateurs” that populism calls upon and attempts to mobilise in its quest for hegemony.</p>
<p>This is odd, given the widespread <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-edelman-trust-crisis/513350/">reports</a> of escalating distrust in established politicians, political parties and democratic governments. New but fading social movements like the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-spanish-political-laboratory-is-reconfiguring-democracy-74874">Indignados</a> and Occupy Wall Street also recognise that a crucial dilemma for democracy lies in its neglect of laypeople’s political capacities to interrupt how “professionals” authoritatively articulate, deliver and evaluate policies.</p>
<p>Still, had the theorists and researchers read <a href="https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/11/democratic-polarisation-pull-ground-right-wing-populism/">Jurgen Habermas</a>, they might have been forewarned. Habermas concludes <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inclusion-other">The Inclusion of the Other</a> with:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The private autonomy of equally entitled citizens can be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Amateurs are at the core of democracy in Habermas’ conception of the lifeworld. This consists of laypeople who express themselves by connecting with each other in various networks and project communities. There can be no representative, participatory, discursive or deliberative democracy without laypeople who can and will govern and take care of themselves.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173689/original/file-20170614-30067-1exy01o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In a democracy, political amateurs should be able to organise and govern themselves.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ted Eytan/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Populism’s main challenge to democracy, then, is its claim that laypeople lack the faculties required for governing themselves. It celebrates laypeople without offering them any real autonomy or integrity as political subjects of history. </p>
<p>Instead, the laypeople must depend for their sovereignty on an exceptional leader who can marshal them around a collective resistance identity and lead them in the struggle against the establishment.</p>
<p>And yet populism destroys the possibility of self-governance precisely by imposing a homogenising collective identity upon laypeople. Without difference, there can be no self-governance and no civic autonomy. </p>
<p>The idea of the exceptional leader as the very embodiment of the “pure people” is as metaphysical as it is anti-democratic. It doesn’t only deny laypeople a voice of their own. It also relegates those who don’t identify with the great leader to “non-people” who must be kicked out from the home of “the people”.</p>
<p>Clearly, Trump places national sovereignty before “people power”. For him, “the people” is just a collective construct that will help him <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaslighting">gaslight</a> the establishment, seize power and sustain his own order. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=BSO1CgAAQBAJ&pg=PT129&lpg=PT129&dq=The+assumption+of+a+compulsory,+collective+identity+necessitates+repressive+policies,+whether+it+be+the+forced+assimilation+of+alien+elements+or+the+purification+of+the+people">Habermas</a> would strongly oppose this populist self-image of the leader as “unbound”, a symbol of the (pure) people’s hopes and desires. As he conceives of democracy, despotism will take over whenever and wherever people power becomes synonymous with a national quest for collective self-assertion and self-realisation:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The assumption of a compulsory, collective identity necessitates repressive policies, whether it be the forced assimilation of alien elements or the purification of the people through apartheid and ethnic cleansing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Trump, “<a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/04/30/526199913/trump-stars-on-stage-he-built-himself-far-from-washington">The People’s President</a>”, constantly reaffirms that he will never let his voters down. But by taking responsibility for the people’s collective choices, he moves to dominate their political existence. “The people” effectively become the exceptional leader’s own construct. </p>
<p>Certainly, Trump recognised from the outset how big an asset “<a href="http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/12/30/2016-was-year-deplorables.html">the deplorables</a>” would be to his campaign, if only he could <a href="http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article91203222.html">convince</a> them he was their man.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve joined the political arena so that the powerful can no longer beat up the people who cannot defend themselves … Nobody knows the system better than me. Which is why I alone can fix it.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The thorn in populism’s side</h2>
<p>Without laypeople’s acceptance of what’s got to be done, a political system could not survive, far less develop, at least in the long run. The authority relationship between professionals and amateurs is at the heart of the political.</p>
<p>There must be political authorities if authoritative decisions are to be made and implemented for the population. However, it does not follow that political control must always lie in the hands of the few.</p>
<p>The difference between authorities and non-authorities is functional, not causal. In principle, at least, their relationship could be shaped to involve balanced reciprocities of power, knowledge and trust. </p>
<p>In fact, political authority could always have been shaped otherwise. As such, Habermas speaks about the lifeworld as composed of laypeople who can act spontaneously, emotionally, personally and communicatively as interconnected “fire alarms”, “experimenters” and “innovators”.</p>
<p>This is <a href="https://theconversation.com/whither-anarchy-perspectives-on-anarchism-and-liberty-59979">anarchism</a> with a twist: the laypeople’s sociopolitical integrity and self-governance are not considered the only things that matter in a democracy. Democratic action must also often be spontaneous, fast and emotionally driven. </p>
<p>This does not diminish the value of strong, collective civil action and rigorous and “slow” deliberation. It simply maintains there is often no time for any of this. </p>
<p>This is why laypeople’s chronic disruptions of how things are done are so important. Anarchists consider the laypeople a permanent thorn in the side of existing superpowers that police people power.</p>
<p>I call active laypeople who engage with one another in political networks and action communities to pursue various goals and projects <a href="https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/42117">everyday makers</a>. They:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>want to do things themselves;</p></li>
<li><p>do it for fun or because they find it necessary;</p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/173692/original/file-20170614-8123-1x6jt9m.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=811&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Everyday makers at the 2017 Women’s March in Washington, DC.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lorde Shaull/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<ul>
<li><p>on their own terms and conditions;</p></li>
<li><p>with or without experts;</p></li>
<li><p>for, against, with, or by avoiding the system;</p></li>
<li><p>on and off, when they have time for it and feel like it;</p></li>
<li><p>by connecting with others across all differences;</p></li>
<li><p>online and offline; and</p></li>
<li><p>as expressive persons who want to make a difference, when associating to articulate and pursue a common project or cause.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Recovering laypeople’s political importance for democracy means moving beyond both neoliberalism and populism. Democracy is not about homogenised or atomised individuals. </p>
<p>And democracy can only function properly with mutual acceptance and recognition of difference at all levels, from the personal to the global. To handle the existential risks it faces, contemporary democracy must essentially be “glocal”, rather than global or national in its orientation.</p>
<p>Everyday makers, then, must strive for self-governance and political integrity, not just for freedom from bureaucratic or technocratic domination. They must also push against populism by reminding political authorities that the only exceptional leaders we need today are the ones who help us to govern and take care of ourselves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78762/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henrik Bang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The only exceptional leaders we need today are the ones who help us to govern and take care of ourselves.Henrik Bang, Professor of Governance, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765762017-06-07T02:24:20Z2017-06-07T02:24:20ZDeliberative democracy must rise to the threat of populist rhetoric<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166399/original/file-20170424-22270-1j9vug5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Can we avert a populist apocalypse through good old-fashioned deliberation?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nightfall404/14346785804/">Richard Hopkins/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> project, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<p><em>This piece is part of a series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/after-populism-39385">After Populism</a>, about the challenges populism poses for democracy. It comes from a talk at the “<a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Populism-Symposium-6-April-2017.pdf">Populism: what’s next for democracy?</a>” symposium hosted by the <a href="http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au">Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis</a> at the University of Canberra in collaboration with <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org">Sydney Democracy Network</a>.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>We are “living in the end times”, or so <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/968-living-in-the-end-times">Slavoj Žižek</a> tells us. We have seen the arrival of the “four horsemen of the apocalypse”: the global ecological crisis, sharp inequalities in the economic system, the biogenic revolution, and exploding social divisions. </p>
<p>The global rise of populism, it seems, is only a symptom of these long-standing tragedies in the making.</p>
<p>Populist claims – the grand promises that prey on unrealistic expectations, those that dodge responsibility by conjuring “alternative facts”, and the kind that leaves citizens committed to the project of Enlightenment dazed and breathless — are both outcomes and drivers of Žižek’s apocalyptic vision.</p>
<p>How should we make sense of these realities? Wicked problems and intractable conflict have indeed marked the past few decades. But these have also been times of <a href="https://participedia.net/">widespread democratic experimentation</a>.</p>
<p>Participation in “traditional” politics such as <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21716023-democracies-are-risk-if-young-people-continue-shun-ballot-box-millennials-across">voting</a> and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-11/poll-data-reveals-waning-interest-in-politics/5662568">party membership</a> may be declining, but there has been an explosion of activities that seek to “<a href="http://realdemocracynow.com.au/page/3/">do democracy differently</a>”.</p>
<h2>The promise of deliberative democracy</h2>
<p>Deliberative democracy could once have been dismissed as pie in the sky with no bearing on the world of practical politics.</p>
<p>More recently, practitioners of deliberative innovations have generated compelling evidence to show the democratic virtues of <a href="http://realdemocracynow.com.au/1-1/">mini-publics</a>. These involve small(ish) groups of randomly selected citizens who meet several times to deliberate on an issue.</p>
<p>Random selection, similar to the logic of jury selection, underpins this process such that the forum represents a microcosm of the wider population. </p>
<p>In recent years, the case for mini-publics has been articulated more boldly, by <a href="https://penguin.com.au/books/against-elections-9781847924223">David van Reybrouck</a> and then, just this year, by <a href="https://unbound.com/books/the-end-of-politicians">Brett Hennig</a>. Both make a case for <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-is-due-for-an-overhaul-could-lawmaking-by-jury-be-the-answer-49037">sortition</a>, where a group of citizens drawn by lot are given a mandate to deliberate and propose, if not decide, policies that bind the rest of the polity.</p>
<p>Given the enthusiasm for mini-publics, why has this not been enough to avert “the apocalypse”? There are three ways of looking at this.</p>
<h2>1. We haven’t scaled up enough</h2>
<p>The application of mini-publics has been disparate, inconsistent and small-scale.</p>
<p>Had people, especially the so-called “pissed-off white men”, had more opportunities to participate in deliberation, they would have, potentially, taken a more complex view of issues that they feel threaten their identities, such as immigration or gay rights.</p>
<p>Had “smug cosmopolitan liberal types” engaged in deliberation with “pissed-off white men”, societies could have developed a shared vocabulary to cohabit a world with meta-consensus on the range of legitimate discourses.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166400/original/file-20170424-12468-1dagr55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Forms of deliberative democracy are not only effective, but also much needed in deeply divided societies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joe Flood/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is evidence that mini-publics work in deeply divided societies. Examples include deliberative polls in <a href="http://participedia.net/en/cases/omagh-education-policy-omagh-northern-ireland">Northern Ireland</a> and deliberative forums involving ex-combatants and paramilitaries in <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Deliberation_Across_Deeply_Divided_Socie.html?id=uf4ovgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">Colombia</a>. </p>
<p>We can only wonder how the US elections or the UK’s Brexit referendum might have turned out had they convened a “deliberation day” where citizens deliberated systematically before the vote.</p>
<h2>2. We are scaling up incorrectly</h2>
<p>One could argue that mini-publics, by themselves, are not the answer to mass democracy’s legitimacy deficit. Even where well-resourced, excellently designed and high-quality deliberations unfold, these have little bearing if the epistemic gains and civic virtues developed in these forums do not spill over into the broader public sphere.</p>
<p>To scale up deliberation is not simply to host bigger mini-publics (mega-publics?) but to think of ways in which mini-publics can be <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11077-015-9238-5">linked to the broader public discourses</a>.</p>
<p>What use is it if we replace politicians with a randomly selected group of citizens if the public sphere is mostly still characterised by partisan point-scoring, cheap political tactics, spin-doctoring and market-driven media? </p>
<p>The reforms of deliberative politics must equally focus on reforming the broader structures that shape public discourse.</p>
<h2>3. Mini-publics are not the answer</h2>
<p>The logic of mini-publics primes participants to be respectful, public-spirited, other-regarding and open-minded. Unsurprisingly, citizens who harbour deep scepticism, strongly held views and defensiveness in their private interests may not find these forums to be the most understanding and supportive spaces. </p>
<p>In other words, mini-publics may have inherent limitations in processing populist rhetoric. This is because they, by design, aim to keep loud and insistent voices out of the room to celebrate the voice of the “average reasonable person”.</p>
<p>Discursive enclaves such as those found online, or in assemblies of populist supporters, may provide a more hospitable stage for impassioned, confrontational and sometimes bigoted discourses.</p>
<p>While mini-publics enable citizens to carefully reflect on their prejudices, one must take a step back and consider that some do not want to reconsider their views. </p>
<p>Research on climate change deniers provides evidence for this. Australian <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963662511430459">studies</a> have revealed how deliberation not only <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-novel-idea-on-climate-change-ask-the-people-1962">fails to dispel scepticism</a> but also makes the deniers feel like they are not listened to, so they become more dogmatic and belligerent. </p>
<p>Other research <a href="https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/580046">data</a> demonstrate how people with a “social dominance orientation” tend to see participatory processes as rigged if the forums do not produce their preferred outcomes.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/sG8gLt4GChg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">ABC’s Q&A often illustrates the limitations of some forms of deliberation.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The issue of trust compounds such alienation. Mini-publics typically rely on information presented by expert witnesses and resources persons, and we now know that many people have simply <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-bregret-offers-timely-lessons-for-australian-voters-this-weekend-61806">had enough of experts</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond expertise, public trust in Australian politics and politicians is at a staggering low. Recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-for-the-big-question-who-do-you-trust-to-run-the-country-58723">research</a> suggests the public has little trust in any level of government in Australia. For the most part, mini-publics in Australia are instigated by or at least associated with government.</p>
<p>Even though the best-designed forums are independently organised and facilitated, we have to recognise that people may simply not trust the process, organiser or the expertise presented. “<a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2006.00612.x">Micro</a>” deliberative events don’t exist in a political vacuum. We cannot design out the broader context and power relations.</p>
<h2>How can things go right?</h2>
<p>There are many reasons to consider populist rhetoric as the opposite of deliberative reason. Populism appeals to base instincts. It sacrifices intellectual rigour and evidence to the promise of quick solutions. </p>
<p>The polarising speech style of populism creates information silos, which bond rather than bridge, opposing views. Inherent in the populist logic is the division of the “virtuous people” versus “the dangerous other”. This inflames prejudices and misconceptions, instead of promoting public-spirited ways of determining the common good.</p>
<p>Given the coming populist apocalypse, then, it is worth revisiting how deliberative democrats conceptualise power and its relationship to knowledge. </p>
<p>The populist moment reminds us of the insidious legacies of power, the kind we generally take for granted, but experience every day. Drawing on the “<a href="http://www.sunypress.edu/p-4439-race-and-epistemologies-of-igno.aspx">epistemologies of ignorance</a>”, the solution is not simply to offer facts, but to lay bare the structural phenomenon that disables people from seeing in a certain way. We undeniably find ourselves facing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… an <a href="http://shifter-magazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/mills-white-ignorance.pdf">ignorance that resists</a> … an ignorance that fights back … an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go away.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Deliberative democracy may have been the punching bag of those who remain sceptical of the virtues of participation governed by reason. But it has also been a beacon of hope for visionaries who keep on asking how we can make democracy better. </p>
<p>This field of democratic theory and practice has a lot more to offer, especially when we set our gaze towards spaces for reform beyond the forum.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Curato receives funding from the Australian Research Council. She is currently a Discovery Early Career Research Award Fellow ((DE150101866),</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucy J Parry is affiliated with Participedia, a global project documenting democratic innovations around the world.</span></em></p>Populist politics would appear to have left deliberative democracy by the wayside, but innovations that engage citizens in reasoned decision-making have much to offer.Nicole Curato, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis, University of CanberraLucy J Parry, Research Assistant, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775882017-05-12T12:18:49Z2017-05-12T12:18:49Z‘Horseshoe theory’ is nonsense – the far right and far left have little in common<p>After the first round of the French presidential elections, several <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/24/10-things-learned-french-election-macron-le-pen">liberal commentators</a> condemned the defeated leftist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon for refusing to endorse the centrist Emmanuel Macron. His decision was portrayed as a failure to oppose the far-right Front National, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/europe/france-melenchon-macron-le-pen.html?_r=0">it was argued</a> that many of his supporters were likely to vote for Marine Le Pen in the second round. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/25/le-pen-far-right-holocaust-revisionist-macron-left">Comparisons were drawn</a> with the US presidential elections and the alleged failure of Bernie Sanders supporters to back Hilary Clinton over Donald Trump.</p>
<p><a href="https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/05/could-the-french-far-left-propel-marine-le-pen-to-victory/">Underlying these claims</a> is a broader and increasingly popular notion that the far left and the far right have more in common than either would like to admit. This is known as the “horseshoe theory”, so called because rather than envisaging the political spectrum as a straight line from communism to fascism, it pictures the spectrum as a horseshoe in which the far left and far right have more in common with each other than they do with the political centre. The theory also underlies many of the attacks on the leader of the UK Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, who is accused of cosying up to authoritarian and theocratic regimes and fostering antisemitism within his party.</p>
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<p>Taken one by one, these claims do not withstand scrutiny. Did Mélenchon give succour to Le Pen? No: he explicitly ruled out supporting Le Pen, and most of his supporters <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62d782d6-31a7-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a">voted for Macron</a> in the second round. Are there antisemites in the Labour Party? Yes: but there are antisemites in every British political party; the difference is that <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/27-times-tory-party-racism-7904018">repeated incidents of racism</a> in other parties go unremarked (as does Corbyn’s longstanding record of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/29/jeremy-corbyn-arrest-protesting-apartheid-shows-ready-lead-britain/">anti-racist activism</a>).</p>
<p>Fans of the horseshoe theory like to lend their views weight and credibility by pointing to the alleged history of collusion between fascists and communists: the favoured example is the Nazi-Soviet Pact. But – aside from the fact that the Soviet Union played a vital role in defeating the Nazis – it is patently absurd to compare Stalin to present-day leftists like Mélenchon or Corbyn.</p>
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<p>Can we instead find convergence between far left and far right at the level of policy? It is true that both attack neoliberal globalisation and its elites. But there is no agreement between far left and far right over who counts as the “elite”, why they are a problem, and how to respond to them. When the billionaire real-estate mogul Donald Trump decries global elites, for example, he is either simply giving his audience what he thinks they want to hear or he is indulging in <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/11/06/is_donald_trump_s_closing_campaign_ad_anti_semitic.html">antisemitic dog-whistling</a>.</p>
<p>For the left, the problem with globalisation is that it has given free rein to capital and entrenched economic and political inequality. The solution is therefore to place constraints on capital and/or to allow <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-100-trillion-case-for-open-borders-72595">people to have the same freedom of movement</a> currently given to capital, goods, and services. They want an <em>alternative</em> globalisation. For the right, the problem with globalisation is that it has corroded supposedly traditional and homogeneous cultural and ethnic communities – their solution is therefore to <em>reverse</em> globalisation, protecting national capital and placing <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-marine-le-pens-144-point-presidential-plan-for-france-actually-says-72910">further restrictions on the movement of people</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169125/original/file-20170512-3659-1c9vu46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump and Sanders both attacked globalisation – for different reasons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/80038275@N00/31642423416/in/album-72157674058907543/">Michael Vadon</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Is there a more fundamental, ideological resonance between far left and far right? Again, only in the vaguest sense that both challenge the liberal-democratic status quo. But they do so for very different reasons and with very different aims. When fascists reject liberal individualism, it is in the name of a vision of national unity and ethnic purity rooted in a romanticised past; when communists and socialists do so, it is in the name of international solidarity and the redistribution of wealth.</p>
<p>Given the basic implausibility of the horseshoe theory, why do so many centrist commentators insist on perpetuating it? The likely answer is that it allows those in the centre to discredit the left while disavowing their own complicity with the far right. Historically, it has been “centrist” liberals – in Spain, Chile, Brazil, and in many other countries – who have helped the far right to power, usually because they would rather have had a fascist in power than a socialist.</p>
<p>Today’s fascists have also been facilitated by centrists – and not just, for example, <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/694928/why-not-le-pen?utm_source=links&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=twitter">those</a> on the <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/05/is-marine-le-pen-really-far-right/">centre-right</a> who have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/opinion/sunday/is-there-a-case-for-le-pen.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fross-douthat&action=click&contentCollection=opinion&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=4&pgtype=collection">explicitly defended Le Pen</a>. When centrists ape the Islamophobia and immigrant-bashing of the far right, many people begin to think that fascism is legitimate; when they pursue policies which exacerbate <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/daily-chart-1">economic inequality</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-french-election-shows-the-democratic-limits-of-the-countrys-presidential-system-77114">hollow out democracy</a>, many begin to think that fascism looks desirable.</p>
<p>If liberals genuinely want to understand and confront the rise of the far right, then rather than smearing the left they should perhaps reflect on their own faults.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Choat is a member of the Labour party.</span></em></p>Both attack the status-quo, but for entirely different reasons.Simon Choat, Senior Lecturer in Political Theory, Kingston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760352017-04-11T11:45:35Z2017-04-11T11:45:35ZGreen nationalism? How the far right could learn to love the environment<p>Green politics is associated with the left these days, but that doesn’t rule out an eco-friendly turn at the opposite end of the spectrum. After all, nationalist worries over finite resources and talk of “threats to tradition” have been echoed throughout the history of the green movement.</p>
<p>So, is a far right environmentalism possible? And if so, given climate change is hugely disruptive for any form of traditional nationalist idyll, how long before far right groups join the likes of Greenpeace on the frontlines?</p>
<p>Modern forms of green activism emerged in the 1960s in a context of threats like acid rain or increasing pesticide use which <a href="http://photos.state.gov//libraries/mumbai/498320/fernandesma/June_2012_001.pdf">transcended national boundaries</a>. The EU in the early 1970s also began to grapple with environmental problems that could no longer be effectively managed <a href="http://www.eeb.org/publication/chapter-3.pdf">by individual states</a>.</p>
<p>This form of green activism thus showed that the nation state had failed to protect citizens against environmental problems. As such, it drew upon an older tradition that in the 1800s reacted against the perceived attacks on humanity and nature by capitalist interests by calling for a return to the land. </p>
<p>This could give early environmentalism a left-wing flavour, as in the <a href="http://rossendale-ramblers.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Winter-Hill-Mass-Trespass-1896.pdf">Winter Hill trespass of 1896</a> when thousands of people in Bolton reclaimed an ancient right of way through private land. But the disruption that modernisation brings also produced a range of responses that could be termed “green nationalism”.</p>
<h2>The far right feels threatened</h2>
<p>The far right respond to threats they perceive to custom, culture, identity and locales <a href="https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/">posed by cosmopolitan elites</a>. They usually have <a href="http://www.cultdyn.co.uk/valuesmodes.html">settler value systems</a> that express pessimism and victimhood, emphasise threats rather than opportunities and see conspiracies as explanations for the degradation of their personal and group life-chances and local environment. </p>
<p>This leads to a green nationalism of <a href="http://englishgreen.weebly.com/progressive-nationalism-booklet.html">defensive parochialism</a> in which degradation of local features are opposed because they negatively affect customs – such as tending allotments, or the retention of the village green – threaten the familiar locale, and represent the effects of distrusted outsiders. </p>
<p>How this plays out in practice seems to depend upon which outsiders they distrust. In the US there are <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-04-11/green-tea-party-fights-more-environmentally-friendly-gop">Tea Party environmentalists</a> who have been mobilised, for instance, by the impact of polluting energy companies. However, a tradition of blaming government not business, along with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Money-History-Billionaires-Radical/dp/0307970655">diversionary nationalist propaganda</a> (Drill here! Drill now!) funded by wealthy oil barons, has meant these same activists are often vehement <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/10/american-right-inside-the-sacrifice-zone/">opponents of better environmental regulation</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, far right groups in Britain seem <a href="http://www.britainfirst.org/policies/">simply to ignore</a> the environmental threats posed by extreme energy extraction such as fracking.</p>
<h2>Nationalism needs landscape</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14608944.2014.934561?src=recsys">landscape</a> is a key element in national identity throughout the world. A defence of that landscape against perceived threats can so become an environmentalism focused on preserving the distinctive characteristics of a nation’s land, from the rolling green fields of England to the snow-capped mountains of Switzerland. </p>
<p>This has often been accompanied by other ways of reasserting identity. Myths of a pagan past in harmony with nature have been a feature of green nationalism, from its beginnings through to the Anastasia ecovillages in contemporary Russia where, unlike their equivalent hippy communes found in the West, sustainable living is combined with a “<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cuag.12043/full#footer-citing">reactionary eco-nationalism</a>”. Such myths give identity and meaning to some groups attracted to the far right, such as the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0031322X.2016.1243349?journalCode=rpop20">skinhead movement</a> that emerged in Britain in the 1960s, while also providing imagined alternatives to the drudgery associated with modern capitalism or the compromises of democracy.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164847/original/image-20170411-26726-rl9qdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia’s ecovillagers want to revive the cultural traditions of their ancestors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">De Visu / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘They come here, use our finite resources …’</h2>
<p>The other aspect of the green movement that is appropriated by the far right is the concern about the depletion of key resources by unchecked usage. At its most cynical, this can be a far right equivalent of business “greenwashing”. However, it also reflects a tendency to see economics and society as <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/the-anatomy-of-populist-economics-by-brigitte-granville-2017-02?barrier=accessreg.">a zero-sum game</a> in which every gain for others is a loss for the victimised groups they see themselves as.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=971&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=971&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164837/original/image-20170411-26726-143ao2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=971&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Press Complaints Commission later noted the paper was ‘unable to provide any evidence for the story’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Sun</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Concerns about finite resources therefore align with anxieties about immigration. Far right groups and their media supporters are swift to exploit fears of <a href="http://tabloid-watch.blogspot.co.uk/2010/03/migrants-fish-and-swans-cont.html">threats to the local animals</a> allegedly posed by immigrants. Such baseless hostility is then compounded by the widespread and equally erroneous view that England’s green and pleasant land has already largely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2014/may/21/six-reasons-to-build-on-green-belt">disappeared under concrete</a>.</p>
<p>Green causes are not usually the main motivating factor for those attracted to the far right. This does not mean, however, that their espousal is mere greenwashing. </p>
<p>The far right tends to think of green issues differently from their left-wing counterparts. Their approach focuses on the local, not the global, and reflects the centrality of landscape to national identities. Their defensive parochialism means that these threats are usually seen in cultural terms through the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/david-standen/appropriation-of-victimhood.">appropriation of victimhood</a>, hence the tendency to focus upon immigration as opposed to the emphases of left-wing environmentalists. </p>
<p>Green issues tend to be seen by the far right through the distinct lenses of cultural identity and the land. That does not necessarily prevent, however, the emergence of a green nationalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pippa Catterall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Those on the far right already worry about finite resources and protecting traditional culture, and they see the natural landscape as a big part of national identity.Pippa Catterall, Professor of History and Policy, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.