tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/recep-tayyip-erdogan-5905/articlesRecep Tayyip Erdogan – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:21:08Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266712024-03-28T12:21:08Z2024-03-28T12:21:08ZErdoğan’s party seeks advantage as Turkey’s local elections coincide with Ramadan<p>Millions of voters in Turkey will <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-erdogan-local-elections-things-to-know-1cad0f209f0aed8c78f41307b52d4c2d">head to the polls</a> on March 31 to elect mayors in local elections. These elections are seen as crucial both for the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which has been in power since 2002, and the opposition.</p>
<p>The last time Turkey held local elections, in March 2019, Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost key cities such as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48739256">Istanbul</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-loses-control-ankara-turkish-elections/">Ankara</a>. It will be looking to win them back. At the same time, retaining key cities would help revive Turkey’s opposition after it <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-held-onto-power-in-turkey-and-what-this-means-for-the-countrys-future-206293">failed to defeat</a> Erdoğan in the 2023 national and presidential elections.</p>
<p>How will the elections pan out on March 31? Many things have happened since the last local elections, not least the COVID pandemic and the devastating <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-earthquakes-one-year-on-the-devastation-has-exposed-deep-societal-scars-and-women-are-bearing-the-brunt-221819">earthquakes</a> that rocked the country in 2023. But one thing is clearly different this time. While the elections in 2019 happened before the holy month of Ramadan, the 2024 elections will happen at the height of Ramadan.</p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00031224221101204">Research</a> from 2022 that I co-authored with my colleague, Diego Gambetta, suggests that Ramadan can drive up the intensity of religious beliefs, bolster the success of religious organisations, and even influence the results of elections. </p>
<p>Erdoğan’s AKP has a strong base of support among people from the conservative tradition of Turkey. This could give the party an extra edge. However, the role Ramadan might play in the elections is intricate. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-held-onto-power-in-turkey-and-what-this-means-for-the-countrys-future-206293">How Erdogan held onto power in Turkey, and what this means for the country's future</a>
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<h2>The Muslim holy month</h2>
<p>Ramadan is the holiest month of the Islamic year. It is a month where religious activities as well as charity and community services increase. Muslims abstain from drinking, eating, smoking and sexual intimacy from sunrise to sunset for a whole month.</p>
<p>Ramadan fasting is a physically and mentally demanding religious practice. Nevertheless, a very large majority of Muslims <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/dataset/the-worlds-muslims/">report</a> to be adhering to the full month of fasting.</p>
<p>A particular feature of Ramadan is that its start date is based on the lunar calendar. The lunar year is shorter than the solar year. Therefore, the whole month of Ramadan shifts back in the solar year by about 11 days each year. Because fasting happens between sunrise and sunset, this means that how long people must fast in a Ramadan day varies over the years. </p>
<p>How much day length changes over the years also varies by latitude. Take, for instance, London. When Ramadan falls in December (which happened during the late 1990s), a Muslim Londoner fasts for slightly less than eight hours. However, when Ramadan falls in June (which happened in 2015), the fasting duration is nearly 17 hours, a difference of nine hours. </p>
<p>In Antakya, the southernmost city in Turkey, the same difference between a winter and summer Ramadan day length is only about five hours (just below ten hours in winter and just above 14 hours in summer).</p>
<h2>Do religions defy the law of demand?</h2>
<p>The changing start date of Ramadan gives <a href="https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/130/2/615/2330341">researchers</a> a source of variation in the costliness of religious practice. This variation, in turn, helps researchers tackle the following longstanding social scientific puzzle.</p>
<p>As the cost of an activity increases (in this case, the physical and mental demands of fasting), people should, in theory, not be willing to spend as many resources on it, assuming all else remains equal. Economists call this the law of demand. In the religious domain, however, something different seems to happen. </p>
<p>Research, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00031224221101204">including my own</a>, shows that the more effort someone exerts in religious practice, the more religious they get, and subsequently the more successful religious organisations that require those practices become. </p>
<p>The mechanisms that give rise to this effect seem to involve adaptive preferences. This is where gradually increasing effort in a certain task raises a person’s commitment to the task. Indeed, the change in fasting duration over the years happens only gradually rather than abruptly.</p>
<p>If religiosity increases and religious organisations become more successful during and after Ramadans with long fasting days, we can, in principle, detect the effects of Ramadan on the electoral cycle. The longer people are fasting during Ramadan, the more votes Islamic political parties should get.</p>
<p>We tested this prediction in our research using data from Turkey, focusing on the parliamentary elections from 1973 to 2018. We found that a half-hour rise in the duration of Ramadan fasting increases the vote share of Islamist political parties by 11%. The sooner the election is after Ramadan, the stronger the effect of fasting duration on Islamic votes. </p>
<p>It seems that gradually exerting higher religious effort further intensifies religious beliefs and participation, which in turn drives up votes for political parties with religious connotations.</p>
<h2>What will happen on March 31?</h2>
<p>All else equal, which admittedly is never the case, the fact that Turkey’s local elections are taking place during Ramadan should help Islamist political parties gain ground, including Erdoğan’s AKP.</p>
<p>However, Ramadan day length in the northern hemisphere peaked in 2019 and has been decreasing since. This could mean that Islamic parties will face a steeper uphill struggle to keep their votes in the longer term. This is particularly true at northern latitudes (both within Turkey and beyond) where the decline in Ramadan day length is stronger. </p>
<p>It is difficult to tell which of these two opposing effects of Ramadan will dominate on March 31. But <a href="https://tr.euronews.com/2024/03/06/31-mart-yerel-secimleri-son-anketlere-gore-istanbulda-kim-onde-imamoglu-ve-kurumun-oyu-kac">polls</a> show that the race between AKP and the opposition is very close in many places. </p>
<p>In such close elections small factors could tip the balance. Time will soon tell who Ramadan will be most generous towards.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ozan Aksoy receives funding from the British Academy (Grant no: SRG20\200045). </span></em></p>Research finds that Ramadan can bolster the success of religious organisations and even influence the results of elections.Ozan Aksoy, Associate Professor in Social Science, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254422024-03-12T21:53:32Z2024-03-12T21:53:32ZAs Erdoğan hints at retirement, how has his rule shaped Turkey?<p>Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently gave the clearest indication yet about his political future, stating, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-erdogan-says-march-election-his-last/a-68480102">“With the authority that the law confers on me, this election is my last election.”</a> Erdoğan has been in power since 2003, first serving as prime minister before being elected president in 2014.</p>
<p>The statement, made at a meeting for the Turkish Youth Foundation, was not an official announcement by any means. Rather, it was what appeared to be a frank statement communicated to a young party audience. Mincing words is not usually Erdoğan’s style; he can be quite direct and candid, which has been one of the key appeals of his charismatic personality.</p>
<p>Understandably, response to the speech, both within and outside of Turkey, has so far been somewhat muted. Erdoğan still has four years left to serve as the country’s president.</p>
<p><a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/imamoglu,1155253">The Republican People’s Party, the main opposition party,</a> has argued Erdoğan’s statement was nothing more than a strategy to garner support in the upcoming local elections for his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) candidates. That certainly may have played a role; as a seasoned politician Erdoğan is known for his timing.</p>
<p>A lot can change between now and 2028 when Erdoğan’s term ends. The Turkish constitution states that <a href="https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/presidency/power/#">a person can only be president for two terms at the most</a>. However, with enough pressure from his followers and <a href="https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/10032024">political support from the Turkish Parliament to introduce the necessary constitutional changes</a>, Erdoğan may seek another term. At the same time, it appears he is growing tired of political life and is waiting for the right moment to step aside. And Friday’s statement is an indication of that.</p>
<h2>Erdoğan’s legacy</h2>
<p>It is perhaps too early to judge Erdoğan’s political legacy comprehensively. But his impact on the nation’s trajectory, its regional standing, social structures and government institutions has been undeniable.</p>
<p>Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has experienced its most politically stable era since it transitioned to the multi-party system in 1946. The country went through fundamental readjustments and transformations. The dominant secular class and the elite of all upper social strata were largely displaced and replaced by religious conservatives, and to a limited extent, at least in the first decade of AKP rule, by the progressive camp.</p>
<p>One of the most significant structural changes has been the subjection of the military to civilian rule and oversight, an institution that had been for many years the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/16/timeline-a-history-of-turkish-coups">key decision-maker in Turkish politics</a>. </p>
<p>There was a brief power struggle with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1453244">the Gülen movement who had initially played an important role in helping the AKP wrest power from the military establishment</a>. The two sides had a falling out and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-coup-latest-news-blames-us-west-terrorism-gulen-a7168271.html">Erdoğan accused the movement of being behind the failed coup in 2016</a>.</p>
<p>In the economic sphere, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/69a30398-4fd6-4e94-a111-435cc01c3386">Erdoğan’s success has not been consistent</a>. From 2002 until the early 2010s, Turkey’s economy experienced unprecedented growth, fueled by increased foreign investment and large scale projects. The economic success of these years lifted millions into the middle class and led to higher living standards overall. <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkish-economy-under-presidential-system">Since the mid 2010s</a>, however, inflation has skyrocketed, the currency’s value plunged, foreign capital inflow slowed and economic conditions deteriorated.</p>
<p>The country’s foreign policy over the last two decades mirrors its economic ups and downs. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/sor.2021.0014">Erdoğan and his party expected the nation to be more involved in regional politics and to further improve relations with the West</a>. It was successful in doing so in the first decade as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna33253825">relations with neighboring countries</a> improved. But as Turkey’s foreign policy grew more assertive, the strategy faltered and the country found itself surrounded by more enemies and fewer friends.</p>
<p>In the first decade in power, the AKP introduced highly encouraging democratic initiatives supported by liberals and progressives. The country’s Kurdish population was one of the key beneficiaries. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18410596">Albeit limited, the use of the Kurdish language in schools was decriminalized</a>, and many restrictions that were placed on the Kurdish language, politics, and culture were, <a href="https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/redakteure/publications/JEMIE_Datens%C3%A4tze/Jemie-datens%C3%A4tze_2016/Kolcak.pdf">to some degree, loosened</a>.</p>
<p>But these democratic policies came to a standstill and were partially reversed soon after AKP’s poor showing in the 2015 elections. To regain lost votes, Erdoğan adopted a more nationalistic strategy, which resulted in the AKP winning a majority government later that year. This unexpected shift led to the growing rapprochement and eventual coalition alliance with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.a907689">Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies are no secret</a>. The 2017 constitutional referendum <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38883556">gave him sweeping powers over the judiciary and parliament</a>. He commands considerable influence over the media, the business world, the judiciary, the legislative branch, the economy, on foreign policy and so on. </p>
<p>One of the glaring consequences of these tendencies under Erdoğan’s leadership has been the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-using-courts-laws-target-dissent-ahead-votes-human-rights-watch-2023-01-12/#">suppression of political dissent</a>, particularly the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jailed-kurdish-leader-quits-active-politics-after-party-slips-turkey-election-2023-06-01/">imprisonment of members of the Kurdish political party</a>. </p>
<p>While this kind of top-down projection of power has unfortunately become somewhat <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/issues/democracies-decline">of a norm for democracies around the world</a> today, it was more of an anomaly 10 years ago. </p>
<h2>A Post-Erdoğan era?</h2>
<p>So far, there appears to be no heir to Erdoğan on the horizon. His son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, once touted as a clear frontrunner in the race to succeed him, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/11/10/berat-albayrak-erdogan-turkey-economy/">has since left active politics</a>. Erdoğan’s influential <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys-erdogan-appoints-new-cabinet-signaling-economic-shift-e84e3829">former interior minister Suleyman Soylu has also been sidelined</a>. Aside from these once presidential hopefuls there is no emerging leader from AKP’s ranks.</p>
<p>Outside the AKP, the current Istanbul mayor <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbu%20ls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">Ekrem İmamoğlu</a> is often portrayed as someone who could potentially be the next president, but his success will depend on the alliances his party is able to form before 2028.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s recent comments seem to indicate his intentions about his political future. But they are just that, intentions. They can change under certain conditions. What is clear though, he is a far more divisive figure today than he was 20 years ago.</p>
<p>Is Turkey ready for a post-Erdoğan era? Much depends on who and what comes after. </p>
<p>If a new president continues much of the similar policies and has a non-disruptive approach, then a peaceful transition is plausible. But Erdoğan’s party failing to concede a loss, or his voter base failing to recognize the results, may lead to a turbulent transition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasar Bukan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Under Erdoğan, Turkey has seen periods of growth and stagnation.Yasar Bukan, Lecturer in Global Politics & Political Philosophy, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212982024-02-15T13:33:03Z2024-02-15T13:33:03ZTurkey will stop sending imams to German mosques – here’s why this matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575397/original/file-20240213-24-p2rrrc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=80%2C17%2C5867%2C3932&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The imam of the Khadija Mosque, in the Pankow district of Berlin, talks to visitors.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/october-2022-berlin-said-arif-imam-of-the-khadija-mosque-news-photo/1243697775?adppopup=true">Fabian Sommer/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the Turkish government has sent imams to work in mosques across Germany. But the German Ministry of the Interior <a href="https://www.br.de/nachrichten/kultur/tuerkische-imame-sollen-bald-nicht-mehr-in-deutschland-predigen,TyQ3ynX">recently announced</a> that it had reached an agreement with the Turkish government to put an end to the practice. </p>
<p>These imams, approximately 1,000 at present, are Turkish civil servants. Imams are sent to Germany on four- to six-year rotations, based on a long-standing agreement between the two governments. They work with Germany’s <a href="https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/Publikationen/Downloads-Migration/migrationshintergrund-2010220217004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">more than 2.8 million</a> residents with Turkish citizenship or heritage.</p>
<p>The practice had come under intense criticism in Germany in recent years. German politicians have accused Turkish imams of <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-turkey-use-spying-imams-to-assert-its-powers-abroad-75643">spying on their flocks</a> or <a href="https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/oezdemir-warnt-vor-instrumentalisierung-junger-menschen-in-deutschland-durch-tuerkische-imame-100.html">abusing their positions</a> to promote support for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party.</p>
<p>The German government described plans to replace “imported imams” with imams trained in Germany as an “<a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2023/12/imam-ausbildung.html#:%7E:text=Das%20Bundesinnenministerium%2C%20die%20t%C3%BCrkische%20Religionsbeh%C3%B6rde,der%20T%C3%BCrkei%20nach%20Deutschland%20geeinigt">important milestone for integration</a>.” On the other hand, <a href="https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/imame-tuerkei-ditib-100.html">some observers</a> have questioned whether it will change anything for Germany’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/the-growth-of-germanys-muslim-population-2/">5 million Muslims</a>.</p>
<p>As part of my ongoing research into the <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/brian-van-wyck/">history of migration</a> between <a href="https://migrantknowledge.org/2020/08/14/turkish-teachers/">Turkey</a> and <a href="https://zeithistorische-forschungen.de/sites/default/files/medien/material/2005-3/Wyck_2017.pdf">Germany</a>, I have investigated the origins of this exchange and the goals both governments pursued by bringing Turkish imams to Germany. </p>
<p>Efforts by both states to intervene in the religious lives of Muslims by selecting which imams can preach in German mosques have a long history – although such efforts might not always achieve the goals of governments.</p>
<h2>The ‘strategy’ of sending imams</h2>
<p>A 1961 agreement led to Turkish “guest workers” being sent to Germany to meet the labor demands of its booming postwar economy. Many recruited workers and their families chose to settle permanently in Germany. By 1974, a year after labor recruitment ended, at least <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/443877/pdf">1 million</a> Turkish citizens were residing in Germany.</p>
<p>It was only in the 1980s that the Turkish government began sending cohorts of imams abroad, after it had become evident that a large Turkish population was in Germany to stay. </p>
<p>This step was motivated by several goals. One was to use state imams to create <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2014.926233">an alternative to Islamic groups</a> active in Germany who opposed the secular Turkish state. Another was to use imams to <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315143842-16/governing-turkey-diaspora-limits-diaspora-diplomacy-1">foster continued ties to Turkey</a> among the Turkish diaspora in Germany, encouraging them to continue to invest in Turkey.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, conservative governments made increasing use of Islam to encourage national unity in Turkey by, for example, mandating religious education in schools and revising curricula to emphasize Turkey’s Islamic heritage. Sending imams abroad was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12184">an example of this strategy being exported to Turkey’s overseas diaspora</a>.</p>
<h2>Only Turkish imams for Germany</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An ivory-colored building with two tall minarets with a dome in their center, set against the backdrop of a clear, blue sky." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575398/original/file-20240213-20-2zhafm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Sehitlik Mosque in the Berlin district of Neukoelln.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-sehitlik-mosque-photographed-on-july-16-2009-in-the-news-photo/1513208364?adppopup=true">Kaveh Rostamkhani/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In the early 1980s, German authorities, like their Turkish counterparts, had become concerned about Islamic institutions in the country. Historian <a href="https://dl.acm.org/profile/99659642849">Alexander Konrad</a> has demonstrated that <a href="https://www.wallstein-verlag.de/9783835352681-umdeutungen-des-islams.html">unsubstantiated reports about corporal punishment and political extremism</a> in courses devoted to learning the Quran achieved wide currency in Germany in the 1970s.</p>
<p>When German diplomats and Turkish officials began to discuss their shared concerns in meetings in Ankara in 1980, they quickly found common ground. As diplomatic cables in the archives of the German Federal Foreign Office reporting on these discussions reveal, Turkish and German officials agreed that having the right imams in German mosques would solve the social and political problems they believed were caused by extremist imams. And they believed that imams employed by the Turkish state were guaranteed to be well-trained and moderate.</p>
<p>Accordingly, as I learned from directives preserved in the State Archive of North Rhine-Westphalia, German policymakers had begun by 1982 to issue entry visas directly to the Turkish government to distribute to those imams it selected to serve in Germany. Already by the end of the 1980s, <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/muslim-identity-and-the-balkan-state/oclc/037261064">more than 500</a> Turkish state imams were active in Germany.</p>
<p>At the same time, entry visas for all other imams were more tightly controlled. This meant that imams from Turkey or anywhere else in the world who wanted to work in Germany but were not employed by the Turkish government faced new hurdles. I learned from legal judgments in the German Federal Archives that some imams who were already working in Germany were forced to leave the country as a result of the new policy.</p>
<h2>Limits to the influence of Turkish state imams</h2>
<p>Both governments assumed that Turkish state imams would be able to reshape German mosques, eliminate perceived extremism and ensure secular Islamic practice in Germany. However, this agreement did not achieve the results the Turkish or German government desired. </p>
<p>There were a few reasons for this. For one, imams often arrived with limited knowledge of German and Germany. Because of that, they relied on members of the local Turkish community, as the sociologist <a href="https://www.irp-cms.uni-osnabrueck.de/personal/professoren/prof_dr_dr_rauf_ceylan.html">Rauf Ceylan</a> has <a href="https://www.herder.de/geschichte-politik/shop/p4/58318-imame-in-deutschland-kartonierte-ausgabe/">argued</a>.</p>
<p>Contrary to what German and Turkish officials might have assumed, these imams could not simply assume control over the often long-established mosques to which they were assigned. And that meant that whatever control the Turkish government exercised over German mosques through them was partial and depended on local buy-in.</p>
<p>Furthermore, not all mosques in Germany received Turkish state imams. Turkish-origin migrants and their descendants created Islamic institutions and organized religious life for themselves for decades <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9783657782130/BP000007.xml">without Turkish state intervention</a>. Those institutions did not disappear when competition in the form of Turkish state imams arrived. Both now and then, many Muslims with Turkish roots choose to attend mosques with Turkish state imams, but many do not. </p>
<h2>Imams trained in Germany?</h2>
<p>Over the course of the more than 40 years in which Turkish state imams have been sent to Germany, the German and Turkish governments invested their work with high expectations. And now, as the end of these imam exchanges comes into sight, German officials continue to assume that changing who preaches in mosques will dramatically alter religious life for German Muslims.</p>
<p>In the coming years, imams trained in academies in Germany will replace more and more Turkish state imams as they end their rotations in Germany and return home. According to this plan, the eventual result will be that only domestically trained, German-speaking imams will work in German mosques at some point in the near future. German officials <a href="https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2023/12/imam-ausbildung.html#:%7E:text=Das%20Bundesinnenministerium%2C%20die%20t%C3%BCrkische%20Religionsbeh%C3%B6rde,der%20T%C3%BCrkei%20nach%20Deutschland%20geeinigt">described the new model</a> as “an important milestone for the integration and participation of Muslim communities in Germany.”</p>
<p>Ultimately, as history demonstrates, it is German Muslims themselves, and not the imams who lead them in prayer, who will determine if this is the case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221298/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Van Wyck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Turkish government started sending imams to Germany in the 1980s, but under a new agreement, imams will be trained in Germany instead.Brian Van Wyck, Assistant Professor of History, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222372024-02-06T15:58:26Z2024-02-06T15:58:26ZHow political issues hindered Turkey’s 2023 earthquake response<p>Two major earthquakes shook southern Turkey on February 6 2023. Over 50,000 people <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/devastating-earthquakes-southern-turkiye-and-northern-syria-december-15th-2023-situation-report-30-entr">lost their lives</a> and nearly 2 million people – many of whom were Syrian refugees – were evacuated from the country’s affected provinces.</p>
<p>Disasters are not simply natural phenomena. They are also <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-59975-1_20">influenced</a> by what was not done before, during or after the event. The Turkish government’s <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/09653561011037977/full/htm">response</a> to the crisis has been reactionary rather than pre-planned, exacerbating the death toll and the suffering that has followed.</p>
<p>Because the government was not ready, basic needs in some areas were not met even days and weeks later. Victims <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374490062_Experiences_of_Earthquake_Victim_Families_in_the_Disaster_of_the_Century_A_Qualitative_Study">reported</a> finding it challenging or impossible to fulfil basic hygiene, water, heating, clothing, sleep and privacy needs. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.who.int/europe/publications/i/item/WHO-EURO-2023-7145-46911-68823">report</a> released by the World Health Organization in March 2023, a month after the initial quakes, also indicated that people with underlying medical conditions might face limited access to medical care due to overburdened and damaged health infrastructure.</p>
<p>Over the past year, I have carried out research with colleagues based in Turkey (Arzu İcagasioglu Coban and Gonca Polat). Our study, which has not yet been published, involved exploring social workers’ experiences in disaster management in the earthquake-affected regions of Turkey. </p>
<p>The social workers we have spoken to repeatedly underline that a lack of coordination among institutions has acted to reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the support services they provide. Following the quakes, these workers distributed aid, carried out need assessments, and offered psycho-social support to survivors.</p>
<p>In the badly damaged Turkish province of Malatya, we interviewed one social worker who said: “There was so much aid coming, but it could not be distributed. We couldn’t organise. In the first week, it was very difficult to even find water and food for the rescue teams.” </p>
<h2>Rooted in politics</h2>
<p>The deficiencies in disaster management that have been seen in Turkey are deeply rooted in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10999922.2023.2273454">underlying political issues</a>. Turkey’s democratic institutions have been deliberately weakened by the country’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has consolidated his rule over the past two decades.</p>
<p>In 2009, three government units were <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2212420922007270?via%3Dihub">merged</a> to form a new independent department that would prioritise risk management. This new department was called the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Afad). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, speaking at a conference." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573550/original/file-20240205-28-8ywvch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has deliberately weakened Turkey’s democratic institutions over the past two decades.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-press-2240909569">Andie.NV/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, using newly acquired presidential decree powers following the 2017 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10999922.2023.2273454">transferred</a> control of the Afad to the Ministry of the Interior. This move effectively eliminated the Afad’s ability to operate autonomously.</p>
<p>The decline of Turkey’s public institutions undoubtedly contributed to the <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/271547">slow and uncoordinated</a> response to the earthquakes. There was very little rescue activity at all in the 24 hours that followed the initial quakes, and only marginally more the day after. </p>
<p>Residents in the affected areas also expressed frustration that they could not get in contact with the Afad to arrange help for themselves and others who were trapped under rubble. </p>
<h2>Uncoordinated response</h2>
<p>Many of the social workers we have spoken to argue that this uncoordinated response led to earthquake victims having only limited access to essential services such as medical help, food and accommodation in the immediate aftermath of the initial earthquakes. </p>
<p>Some participants shared the opinion that most of the newly employed social workers and other professionals lacked sufficient training and experience to provide psychological support in such crisis environments. One social worker, who worked in the damaged city of Gaziantep, said that many of those hired to give <a href="https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/majorhazards/ressources/virtuallibrary/materials/turkey/Turkey.pdf">psycho-social support</a> were “inexperienced, newly graduated personnel”.</p>
<p>Interviewees have also told us that some of the country’s most vulnerable groups, including ethnic and religious minorities, were not afforded fair and equal access to humanitarian aid. Several <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/380/bmj.p559.full">reports</a> indicate that Syrian refugees were forcibly removed from emergency shelters and have been subjected to verbal abuse. </p>
<p>Discrimination and animosity towards Syrian refugees appear to have intensified in the earthquake-affected areas of Turkey since the start of the crisis.</p>
<p>There is still considerable need for a more coordinated <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gizem-Tiglioglu-2/publication/371756030_Do_You_Hear_My_Voice_LGBTIQA_Solidarity_and_Resistance_in_Kahramanmaras_Earthquake_in_Turkiye_through_Lubunya_Earthquake_Solidarity_Network/links/649372fe8de7ed28ba42bc55/Do-You-Hear-My-Voice-LGBTIQA-Solidarity-and-Resistance-in-Kahramanmaras-Earthquake-in-Tuerkiye-through-Lubunya-Earthquake-Solidarity-Network.pdf">approach</a> to disaster risk management in Turkey. If nothing changes, the quality of the social services provided will continue to suffer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222237/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hakan Acar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Social workers encountered challenges in providing their services in the aftermath of the Turkey earthquakes, facing obstacles outside of their control.Hakan Acar, Senior Lecturer in Social Work, Liverpool Hope UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2218192024-02-06T15:56:29Z2024-02-06T15:56:29ZTurkey earthquakes one year on: the devastation has exposed deep societal scars and women are bearing the brunt<p>In the early hours of February 6 2023, the south-eastern region of Turkey was rocked by a series of powerful earthquakes. One year on, large parts of Hatay, the worst-affected province, remain in ruins. In a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6jxgqvi4xY">vlog</a> from Hatay on January 24, journalist Cüneyt Özdemir remarked: “The city is like a construction site mostly under rubble.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us6000jllz/executive">first earthquake</a>, measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale, struck near the border with Syria, killing at least 1,500 people as they slept. This was followed by a <a href="https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us6000jlqa/executive">7.5-magnitude quake</a> nine hours later, located around 59 miles (95km) to the south-west. Hatay, already in ruins, was shaken again by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/20/turkey-new-6-point-4-magnitude-earthquake-hatay">6.4-magnitude tremor</a> two weeks later.</p>
<p>The disaster resulted in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/devastating-earthquakes-southern-turkiye-and-northern-syria-december-15th-2023-situation-report-30-entr">deaths</a> of more than 50,000 people while injuring a further 107,000. A total of 9 million people have been affected, including 1.7 million refugees who had fled the civil war in Syria. </p>
<p>One year on, the region’s economy and society remain shaken. The devastation has exposed deep societal scars, and the task of rebuilding is still immense.</p>
<h2>Economic ramifications</h2>
<p>The affected areas represented <a href="https://www.tobb.org.tr/Sayfalar/Eng/Detay.php?rid=29752&lst=MansetListesi">13.3%</a> of Turkey’s total employment before the earthquakes. The quakes rendered around 220,000 workplaces <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_873893.pdf">unusable</a>, leading to a 16% reduction in working hours. Particularly hard-hit provinces such as Hatay, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya lost <a href="https://www.tobb.org.tr/BilgiErisimMudurlugu/Sayfalar/sanayi-kapasite-raporu-istatistikleri.php">more than 10%</a> of their combined industrial capacity.</p>
<p>A year on, unemployment remains a dire problem in these areas. Over 230,000 people in the region applied for <a href="https://media.iskur.gov.tr/79379/12-aralik-2023-aylik-istatistik-tablolari.xlsx">unemployment benefits</a> throughout 2023, but less than 40% of these applications met the necessary criteria. </p>
<p>The Turkish government has recently launched a <a href="https://www.ekonomim.com/ekonomi/gunluk-850-lira-odenecek-deprem-bolgesinde-istihdama-donus-programi-baslatildi-haberi-725793">programme</a> to help people return to employment in the region. But <a href="https://www.evrensel.net/haber/508685/deprem-bolgesinde-istihdama-donus-programi-patronlara-bedava-depremzede-isci">labour unions</a> view this as a way of providing cheap labour to employers, and have asked the government to focus more on satisfying the urgent needs of workers, such as housing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of people standing in front of crumbled buildings with a cloud of smoke overhead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573731/original/file-20240206-24-ex9dv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hatay was devastated by last February’s earthquakes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hatay-iskenderun-turkey-february-7th-2023-2260847503">Doga Ayberk Demir/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fractured society</h2>
<p>The earthquakes shattered not only the region’s economy but the very fabric of society. More than 850,000 buildings collapsed in the initial quakes and the thousands of aftershocks that followed. This exposed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/64568826">inadequacies</a> in construction practices and a widespread lack of compliance with building regulations. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-issues-earthquake-rebuilding-rules-after-millions-left-homeless-2023-02-24/">pledged</a> to rebuild 650,000 homes within a year – but progress has been slow. A mere <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/fear-uncertainty-and-grief-year-after-turkey-s-quake-3bd85540">15%</a> of these new homes have been built, and hundreds of thousands of people remain displaced. Today, more than <a href="https://sheltercluster.org/turkiye-earthquake-2023/documents/20240118-shelter-sector-turkiye-earthquake">670,000 people</a> are still living in small, temporary, metal container homes.</p>
<p>The earthquakes also had a profound impact on education in the region. Damage to schools and other educational facilities disrupted the in-class teaching of around <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/3091756">7 million</a> students. </p>
<p>On January 2 2024, Turkey’s minister of education, Yusuf Tekin, <a href="https://basinmus.meb.gov.tr/www/bakan-tekin-haberturk-canli-yayininda-egitim-gundemini-degerlendirdi/icerik/105">admitted</a> that only a quarter of the educational facilities that were destroyed by the quakes have been rebuilt. During the most recent school term (mid-September to mid-January), students were taught mostly in <a href="https://www.egitimis.org.tr/guncel/sendika-haberleri/2023-2024-egitim-ogretim-yili-1-yariyil-degerlendirmesi-4360/">sites under construction</a>.</p>
<h2>Roadmap for recovery</h2>
<p>Turkey’s government claims to be focusing on <a href="https://time.com/6255896/turkey-rebuild-earthquake-climate-resilience/">“building back better”</a>. Its stated aim is to construct cities and communities that are more resilient to any such shocks in the future. This is commendable (provided it does in fact happen), but it’s crucial that efforts to recover go beyond mere reconstruction. </p>
<p>The government’s response to the disaster has, for example, largely <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/building-back-better-gender-mind-centering-turkeys-women-and-girls-earthquake-recovery#:%7E:text=Recommendations%20for%20building%20back%20better&text=More%20must%20be%20done%20to,rights%2Dbased%20disaster%20management%20framework.">failed</a> women and girls. Following the quakes, women and girls have <a href="https://eca.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/UN%20Women%20Brief%20on%20Earthquake%20in%20Turkiye%20Gendered%20impacts%20and%20response.pdf">faced</a> heightened care and domestic work responsibilities, health challenges (particularly related to <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10084526/">pregnancy</a>), and an increased susceptibility to violence.</p>
<p>On top of this, they grapple with enduring poverty. A <a href="https://ekmekvegul.net/gundem/deprem-bolgesinde-kadinlarin-ucreti-asgarinin-altinda">recent report</a> which surveyed 60 women in the affected region revealed that most are earning what is called a “women’s daily wage”. This wage has emerged in the region in the aftermath of the quakes and falls below the national minimum wage, further worsening <a href="https://turkiye.unfpa.org/en/gender-equality#:%7E:text=Labor%20force%20participation%20rate%20of,the%20rest%20of%20the%20world">existing gender inequality</a> in the country.</p>
<p>According to the same report, wages below the minimum wage have become the norm for women in the region – including those women in white-collar jobs.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-turkey-women-are-feeling-the-worst-aftershocks-of-the-earthquake-disaster-this-disparity-may-lead-to-dwindling-trust-in-government-200801">In Turkey, women are feeling the worst aftershocks of the earthquake disaster – this disparity may lead to dwindling trust in government</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While the Turkish government’s response to last February’s earthquakes has been widely criticised, it still enjoyed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/26/turkey-quake-zone-voters-backing-erdogan-in-runoff">strong support</a> in the national election in the summer of 2023. Turkey’s current government, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and its alliance came out on top in ten of the 11 earthquake-affected provinces.</p>
<p>Turkey is now gearing up for local elections this spring. The <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/elections/turkiyes-ak-party-eyes-another-victory-in-municipal-elections">current political rhetoric</a> is dominated by a focus on replacing old buildings not resistant to major disasters with new ones. But it is clear the affected regions need solutions that include all members of society – which will only be possible with the help of the national government.</p>
<p>Yet, in a <a href="https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fandan-hataya-yerel-se%C3%A7im-mesaj%C4%B1/a-68167503">speech</a> on February 3 2024, Erdoğan hinted there would be a sustained absence of assistance in the disaster-stricken areas if central government and local administration “do not join hands and are not in solidarity”. However, the nature of this alignment – whether the president meant cooperation or political ideology – remains unclear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221819/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ufuk Gunes Bebek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has been one year since Turkey’s deadly earthquakes – the road ahead remains daunting.Ufuk Gunes Bebek, Assistant Professor in Economics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197882023-12-14T13:19:24Z2023-12-14T13:19:24ZHumza Yousaf: how to understand the first minister’s spat with David Cameron over his COP28 meeting with the Turkish president<p>No one likes being given a public telling-off. But that is exactly what happened when foreign secretary David Cameron decided to flex his <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00323217231176474?casa_token=i7YqsjwnwQ4AAAAA%3Ai4r1O12KHtjU9iWg4UtHxEIoR3hO2dbbGotHT0nPlIoSMxHWFeRACaRmtGJORfr-pJpLcIqVnmmg">“muscular unionism”</a> by directly and openly rebuking the Scottish first minister Humza Yousaf for holding his own bilateral meetings with national leaders at the COP28 summit. </p>
<p>The main point of tension relates to a meeting with the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at which no UK diplomats were present. Only a month into his new job, Cameron has made a clear statement of intent by reminding the first minister openly of Scotland’s “proper” place in international relations. Such direct engagement with another national leader can only be carried out at the largesse of the British state. </p>
<p>Under the hierarchical nature of the devolution settlement, responsibility for international affairs remains the preserve of the UK’s central state authorities. Other areas of policy are then “devolved” to the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The problem is that there is a very blurred line between what is domestic and what is international politics in the contemporary world. The first minister emphasised that his meeting with the Turkish leader had focused on the climate crisis. </p>
<p>As environmental policy is a devolved matter, he therefore argued that private talks are a legitimate international dimension to the Scottish government’s work on climate issues. Yousaf’s attendance at COP28 in the first place is potentially evidence in support of such an argument.</p>
<p>The UK devolution framework stresses, in legal terms, a protectionist vision of the scope for sub-state governments such as Yousaf’s to conduct foreign relations. It says that while “reserved” to the UK government, sub-state international interactions are permissible, as long as these do not commit the UK state as a whole to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/notes">obligations in the international arena</a>. </p>
<p>The UK government’s concern is the potential damage arising from a multiplicity of “UK” voices contradicting one another, causing confusion amongst international partners, with the risk of undermining the UK position on the global stage.</p>
<p>Yousaf’s meeting with Erdoğan was not the first time he had been criticised by the UK government for contravening protocol. In September, he met with the Icelandic prime minister Katrin Jakobsdóttir <a href="https://www.scottishdailyexpress.co.uk/news/politics/humza-yousaf-warned-uk-government-31210076">without a UK diplomat in the room</a> and was issued a warning by the then foreign secretary James Cleverly. </p>
<p>Scotland secretary Alister Jack has told the <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13971/html/">Scottish affairs committee</a> in Westminster that there were four other unescorted meetings with foreign dignitaries at COP28. That suggests a more strategic approach than Yousaf admits.</p>
<h2>‘Protodiplomacy’</h2>
<p>Despite the threats from Westminster, the opportunity to grab a few pics at such a significant global forum (all of which can be posted on <a href="https://twitter.com/HumzaYousaf/status/1730669529473118313">social media</a>) is hard to pass up. </p>
<p>Such public interactions <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21622671.2023.2203176">project an image</a> of a Scottish leader who is on a level playing field with global figureheads. They combine to present a subtle communication to the wider world about the SNP government’s ambitions for statehood. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1730669529473118313"}"></div></p>
<p>Yousaf’s tactics are therefore an example of “protodiplomacy” – a prototype for Scottish international diplomacy. He is signalling what a Scottish foreign policy would look like after independence. </p>
<p>These visuals plant the seed of an idea – of Scotland being competent in its own international affairs – into the mindset of the watching world, priming the audience for its acceptability.</p>
<p>Such strategies of protodiplomacy <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0211">rarely produce the results expected by its proponents</a>. Rather than producing the results these governments want, namely to secure significant international support for secessionist claims, they are much more likely to lead to international isolation, with consequent economic, social and political costs. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Im4yptJJPHA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Yousaf calls Cameron’s reaction to his meeting ‘petty’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cameron’s threat to withhold UK diplomatic support for the Scottish government overseas if there are further breaches of protocol comes at a time when relations between the UK government and the SNP-led administration in Edinburgh are at a new low. There are major disagreements over the legality of Downing Street’s unprecedented veto of Holyrood’s contentious <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/dec/08/scottish-court-rules-uk-government-veto-of-gender-recognition-bill-lawful">gender recognition bill</a> and Scottish moves to repeal the <a href="https://www.holyrood.com/news/view,msps-vote-to-scrap-uk-internal-market-act">UK Internal Market Act</a>. </p>
<p>Like many others, Yousaf has vocally criticised the UK government’s controversial Rwanda bill, which he <a href="https://twitter.com/HumzaYousaf/status/1734659666146164763">described</a> as “the most disgraceful piece of legislation in modern UK political history”.</p>
<p>These tensions form the mood music to much of the daily business of intergovernmental cooperation that is a requirement of the proper functioning of a devolved state. If there is real fear at the UK government level that sub-state interactions with leaders like Erdoğan risk undermining national positions in the global arena, then solutions which are more meaningful than threats to withhold diplomatic support ought to be developed. </p>
<p>Embedding sub-state voices fully and more effectively in an internal conversation on what the UK’s international priorities should be is much more likely to contain that risk than public rebukes of the kind delivered by Cameron.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Rowe receives funding from the Coppieters Foundation </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elin Royles received funding from the Coppieters Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Minto receives funding from the Coppieters Foundation. </span></em></p>Westminster has rebuked Scotland’s first minister for holding his own bilateral meetings without a UK diplomat being present.Carolyn Rowe, Reader in Politics and Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University, Aston UniversityElin Royles, Reader at the Department of International Politics and Centre for Welsh Politics and Society, Aberystwyth UniversityRachel Minto, Research Associate - Brexit and UK devolved politics, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169552023-11-10T13:24:51Z2023-11-10T13:24:51ZErdogan’s stance on Israel reflects desire to mix politics with realpolitik – and still remain a relevant regional player<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558693/original/file-20231109-29-sl40tf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C14%2C3277%2C2179&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a pro-Palestinian crowd in Istanbul.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-tayyip-erdogan-speaks-during-a-rally-news-photo/1749720071?adppopup=true">Yasin Akgul/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/11/04/turkey-recalls-ambassador-from-israel-00125397">pulled his ambassador from Israel</a> on Nov. 4, 2023. Less than a month earlier, he was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-turkey-will-ramp-up-diplomacy-calm-israeli-palestinian-conflict-2023-10-08/">offering diplomatic assistance</a> to calm the situation in the Middle East.</p>
<p>That diplomatic shift is indicative of how in just a few short weeks, Turkey has <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/turkeys-response-to-the-war-in-gaza/">recalibrated its stance</a> on the escalating violence in Israel and the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>Erdogan’s initial reaction following the Oct. 7 Hamas-led massacre in Israel was a carefully balanced one, calling for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/7/we-are-at-war-reactions-to-palestinian-hamas-surprise-attack-in-israel">restraint and an end to “aggressive acts</a>.” But amid an escalating death toll in Gaza, he quickly tilted toward a pro-Hamas and seemingly anti-Israel position. By Oct. 25, the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/what-driving-turkeys-erdogan-pro-hamas-fiery-israel-criticism#ixzz8IINF0ent">Turkish leader was accusing Israel</a> of “one of the bloodiest and most savage attacks in history,” while defending Hamas as a “liberation group.”</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/visiting-scholars/current-visiting-scholars/">expert on Turkish politics and international affairs</a>, I believe Erdogan’s evolving rhetoric cannot be understood without considering the domestic and international constraints surrounding Turkey’s leader. In responding to the crisis in the Middle East, Erdogan faces a significant dilemma: He needs to appease his political base at home – which <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">has Islamist</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-address-pro-palestinian-rally-eve-turkeys-centenary-2023-10-28/">strong pro-Palestinian sympathies</a> – while not totally alienating Israel, with whom Turkey has <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4228775-what-turkey-israel-reconciliation-means-for-the-region-and-the-world/">significant geopolitical and economic ties</a> and, until now, <a href="https://jstribune.com/turkey-israel-relations-on-the-upswing/">warming relations</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, Erdogan is eyeing an opportunity to project himself as a key regional player in Middle East politics – and a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-11-09/turkey-is-key-to-ending-the-israel-hamas-war">potential mediator in the current crisis</a>. And to understand how he intends to do all this, you need to look beyond rhetoric and diplomatic gestures alone.</p>
<h2>Politics vs. realpolitik</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s reaction to the conflict reflects an attempt to strike a balance between two forces: domestic politics and realpolitik on the international stage.</p>
<p>Since the renewal of conflict in Gaza, Erdogan has <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/turkeys-erdogan-strikes-moderate-stance-israel-hamas-war-rages">faced pressure</a> from various quarters in Turkey. His initial response drew <a href="https://www.gazetepencere.com/babacandan-erdogana-israil-tepkisi-turkiye-iliskileri-duzeltmek-icin-israilin-pesinden-kostu-erdogan-gitti-new-yorkta-netenyahunun-elini-sikti/">extensive ire</a> among the country’s Islamist circles, who have long shared deep sympathy for Hamas – leading members of whom <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/president-erdogans-meeting-with-hamas-leadership/">Turkey has been offering a safe harbor</a>. Ahmet Davutoglu, formerly a prime minister and a minister of foreign affairs under Erdogan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c2vdn5q7vn4o">condemned the Turkish president</a> for hesitance and called on him to align with his Islamist base. Leaders of other <a href="https://yenidenrefahpartisi.org.tr/page/genel-baskanimiz-fatih-erbakan-39-dan-iktidara-israil-cagrisi-incirlik-ve-kurecik-kapatilmali-/2661">Islamist parties</a> and Erdogan coalition partner <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkiye-must-step-into-gaza-conflict88-says-bahceli-187244">Devlet Bahceli</a>, the leader of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party, likewise called on the government for a stronger anti-Israeli positioning.</p>
<p>Growing <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-reaction-to-gaza-siege-has-exposed-the-growing-rift-between-the-west-and-the-global-south-216938">anti-Israeli sentiment in the international arena</a> also encouraged Erdogan to take an openly pro-Hamas stance. On Oct. 26, 120 countries in the United Nations General Assembly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847#:%7E:text=The%20resolution%20calls%20for%20an,services%20into%20the%20Gaza%20Strip.">voted in favor of a resolution</a> calling for an “immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce.” Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/thousands-march-in-capitals-around-the-world-demanding-cease-fire-in-israel-hamas-war">protests on the streets of Western capitals</a> have put further pressure on governments there to soften support for Israel. They have also facilitated Erdogan’s repositioning. </p>
<p>Erdogan is aware that his criticism can’t go too far and risk a complete severing of ties with Tel Aviv. Israel is an important partner for Turkey. The two countries have seen growing trade relations, with <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports/israel#:%7E:text=Turkey%20Exports%20to%20Israel%20was,COMTRADE%20database%20on%20international%20trade.">Turkish exports to Israel</a> doubling from 2017 to 2022. This includes extensive arms trade, with Israeli and Turkish arms producers seeing the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-israel-defence-firms-see-highest-growth-arms-sales">highest growth</a> in weapons sales worldwide in 2021.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits and red ties sit at a table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558695/original/file-20231109-23-118inq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meet in New York on Sept. 19, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-who-is-in-new-york-news-photo/1676990796?adppopup=true">Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, regional geopolitical dynamics have shifted to put Israel and Turkey in greater alignments. Recently, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/death-of-the-armenian-dream-in-nagorno-karabakh-was-predictable-but-not-inevitable-214699">Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh conflict</a> has drawn Ankara and Tel-Aviv closer – with both backing the Azerbaijani government <a href="https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2021/arms-transfers-conflict-zones-case-nagorno-karabakh">with weapons</a>. </p>
<p>And in its own fight against Kurdish separatists, Turkey deployed Israeli surveillance <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkeys-pkk-conflict-regional-battleground-flux">drones</a> in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-drones-israel/turkey-reaches-deal-with-israel-on-drone-purchase-idUSLDE5BL0N420091222">late 1990s and 2000s</a> before developing its own drones.</p>
<h2>Erdogan as peacemaker?</h2>
<p>There is another critical factor at play as Erdogan’s stance has developed. From the beginning of the crisis, Erdogan has sought to assert himself as a mediator. To that end, he has held talks with regional leaders in which he signaled an intention to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-discusses-israeli-palestinian-conflict-with-uns-guterres-turkish-2023-10-10/">act as a peacebroker</a>. Senior Turkish officials have also revealed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-turkey-prisoners-idAFL8N3BH6T1">negotiation attempts</a> over hostages being held in Gaza by Hamas.</p>
<p>This approach echoes Erdogan’s strategy in Ukraine, where he likewise <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/how-erdogan-is-playing-peacemaker-s-role-in-ukraine-conflict-59926">put himself forward as a potential mediator</a>.</p>
<p>In some ways, the challenges of balancing these domestic and regional concerns is what makes Erdogan <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/22/is-turkey-uniquely-positioned-to-mediate-between-palestinians-and-israel">uniquely suited</a> as a potential mediator: He has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/20/erdogan-turkey-hamas-ties-israel-war-normalization/">maintained ties with Hamas</a> while also recently deepening a relationship with Israel.</p>
<p>But for Erdogan to pull off the role of mediator, he will need to manage those links well. Initial proposals for Turkish mediation over the crisis were reportedly <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/eying-gaza-mediator-role-turkey-cools-hamas-ties-erdogan-restrains-rhetoric#ixzz8H1tbdh4B">turned down</a> by Hamas.</p>
<p>If Erdogan’s harsher rhetoric on Israel was aimed at alluring Hamas to a negotiation table, then there is a case to be made that he went too far. Calling <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/world/turkeys-erdogan-calls-hamas-freedom-fighters-terms-israel-occupier-2746457">Hamas a freedom-fighting group</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-pulls-diplomats-from-turkey-to-reassess-ties-as-erdogan-blasts-its-war-crimes/">accusing Israel of war crimes</a> in Gaza has harmed relations with Israel. It may be the case that Erdogan may have already <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/11/07/turkey-s-erdogan-is-mediator-no-more-in-israel-hamas-war_6233351_23.html">squandered the opportunity</a> for an arbitrator role.</p>
<p>But go beyond the words and you see something else at play. While talking tough on Israel, Erdogan has taken concrete steps to prevent a complete souring of strained relations with the West and Israel. On Oct. 23, he signed <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/explainer-why-turkeys-erdogan-finally-initiated-swedens-nato-ratification">Sweden’s NATO accession</a> protocol, increasing the hopes for an end to an at-times tense standoff between Turkey and its NATO allies. On the same day, Turkish law enforcement <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-police-arrest-33-daesh-isis-terror-suspects/3029850#:%7E:text=Police%20nabbed%2033%20suspects%2C%20including,in%2039%20addresses%20in%20Ankara.">arrested 33 ISIS members</a> in Ankara, potentially to preempt Western criticism for Erdogan’s support of radical Islamist networks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Turkish media circulated reports of <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/24/ankara-denies-asking-hamas-leaders-to-leave-turkey/#:%7E:text=Ankara%20has%20denied%20this%2C%20stating,by%20pro%2DHamas%20domestic%20constituents.">Hamas leadership leaving Turkey</a> around the same time. </p>
<p>Notable too is what Turkey hasn’t done. It hasn’t tried to stop <a href="https://aze.media/a-million-barrels-of-azerbaijani-oil-are-headed-to-israel/">shipments of Azeri oil</a> through Turkey to Israel, and continues to allows the U.S. to use its Incirlik Air Base in Turkey despite increasing public pressure. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/video/pro-palestinian-crowds-try-to-storm-air-base-housing-u-s-troops-in-turkey-197161541899">Police had to disperse pro-Palestine crowds</a> intending to storm the base on Nov. 5.</p>
<h2>Becoming unbalanced?</h2>
<p>This may explain the relatively muted reaction by Washington and Tel Aviv thus far to Erdogan’s statements. The U.S. Department of Treasury was <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1816">content with sanctioning</a> a few Turkish entities for trade links to Hamas. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://x.com/SecBlinken/status/1721539780226236891?s=20">visited Ankara</a> as part of his recent Middle East trip, and U.S. administration officials have been at pains to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/us-affirms-turkiyes-vital-role-as-valuable-nato-ally-/3038233">stress Turkey’s value</a> as an ally despite disagreements over Erdogan’s comments on Hamas.</p>
<p>Israel did responded to those remarks by pulling its <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-pulls-diplomats-from-turkey-to-reassess-ties-as-erdogan-blasts-its-war-crimes/">diplomatic mission back</a> to Tel Aviv, prompting <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/11/04/turkey-recalls-ambassador-from-israel-00125397">reciprocal moves</a> from Turkey.</p>
<p>But there are reports that the tit-for-tat was more for appearances and that Israeli diplomats <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/turkey-says-israel-pulls-out-its-diplomats-due-to-security-concerns-amid-war/">had already been recalled</a> out of concern for their safety.</p>
<p>In fact, there are reasons to suggest that Erdogan’s strategy is working – despite the shift in tone, Ankara has kept its communication channels open with both Israel and Hamas throughout the crisis.</p>
<p>But balancing domestic support for Hamas and geopolitical reliance on Israel means walking a very fine line for Erdogan – and some of his most recent statements suggest he is beginning to teeter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ozgur Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey and Israel exchanged tit-for-tat diplomatic withdrawals over President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pro-Hamas stance in the regional conflict. But behind that, the picture is more nuanced.Ozgur Ozkan, Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher School's Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151342023-10-26T12:31:38Z2023-10-26T12:31:38ZTurkey faces competing pressures from Russia and the West to end its ‘middleman strategy’ and pick a side on the war in Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555704/original/file-20231025-15-e5fh9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5494%2C4119&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, walks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-shakes-hands-with-turkish-news-photo/1645160088?adppopup=true">Photo by Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has performed a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/turkey-elections-russia-erdogan-putin-nato/">delicate balancing act</a>, portraying itself as an ally to the warring sides while reaping economic and political benefits from its relationship with both. </p>
<p>Turkey has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-rejects-russias-annexation-ukrainian-territory-2022-10-01/">condemned Russia’s invasion</a> and extended diplomatic and material assistance to Ukraine’s war efforts. At the same time, the country’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1427365">pointedly opted not to join</a> the Western-led sanctions against Russia or cut ties with Moscow.</p>
<p>But Turkey’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/28/turkish-neutrality-how-erdogan-manages-ties-with-russia-ukraine-amid-war">neutrality in the Ukraine conflict</a> is seemingly meeting with growing impatience in Washington and Moscow, and may be difficult to sustain amid a shifting geopolitical landscape.</p>
<p>In September 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-sanction-five-turkey-based-firms-broad-russia-action-2023-09-14/">sanctions on Turkish companies</a> and a businessman accused of helping Russia to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Meanwhile, Erdoğan has <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/09/04/russias-putin-meets-for-talks-with-turkish-leader-erdogan-to-revive-ukraine-grain-deal">failed to revive a deal</a> with Russian President Vladimir Putin that allowed the export of Ukrainian grain shipments via Turkey’s Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits and eased global food prices.</p>
<p>The developments suggest that both Washington and Moscow are seeking to pressure Turkey into taking a decisive stand. Already there are signs of Erdoğan bending. On Oct. 25, 2023, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/turkey-submits-bill-to-ratify-sweden-nato-membership">signed Sweden’s NATO accession protocol</a> and sent it to the Parliament for ratification, having earlier refused to endorse the move – much to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html">annoyance of Turkey’s NATO allies</a>.</p>
<p>The move may be interpreted as a sign that Turkey’s balancing strategy is reaching its limits. But it may also be another tactical move in Erdoğan’s geopolitical chess game, which has expanded as he seeks to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-turkey-will-ramp-up-diplomacy-calm-israeli-palestinian-conflict-2023-10-08/">position Turkey as a diplomatic force</a> amid escalating violence in the Middle East. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/person/ozgur-ozkan#:%7E:text=Biography,D.">expert on Turkish politics and international affairs</a>, I have watched as Erdoğan walks a fine line between the country’s commitments as a longtime NATO member and its <a href="https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/709-turkey-will-not-give-up-on-its-lucrative-trade-with-russia.html">reliance on Russia for trade</a>, economic resources and energy imports. But this balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult the longer the war goes on.</p>
<h2>The middleman strategy</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s approach aligns with Turkey’s historical foreign policy trajectory. Turkey has maintained a balance between Western European powers and Russia since the latter <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=OmKJDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=russian+ottoman+relations&ots=f8tmkyssUN&sig=gJ7mZVVUaCBMU8sFS49vTx1Mk1I#v=onepage&q=russian%20ottoman%20relations&f=false">emerged</a> as an ambitious regional player along Turkey’s northern border in the early 18th century.</p>
<p>The balancing act <a href="https://besacenter.org/turkey-foreign-policy-balancing/">allowed the Ottoman Empire</a>, Turkey’s predecessor, to survive the 19th century largely intact despite mounting pressures from the Russian Empire and European powers. Failure to utilize a balancing strategy in the First World War facilitated the empire’s demise. <a href="https://nes.princeton.edu/publications/ottoman-road-war-1914-ottoman-empire-and-first-world-war">Joining forces with</a> the losing Central Powers, Turkey had to share a catastrophic fate. In contrast, in World War II, a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/history/twentieth-century-regional-history/turkish-foreign-policy-during-second-world-war-active-neutrality?format=PB&isbn=9780521523295">strategy of neutrality</a> helped Turkey to weather the war unscathed. </p>
<p>Against a mounting Soviet threat during the Cold War, Turkey took refuge under Western security guarantees, <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-nato-together-for-peace-and-security-since60-years.en.mfa#:%7E:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the,Turkey's%20defense%20and%20security%20policy.">joining NATO in 1952</a>.</p>
<p>Relieved of the Soviet threat in the 1990s, Ankara sought greater foreign policy autonomy. However, it lacked the necessary economic and military resources and domestic political will to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357694">fully realize this ambition</a>, leading to alignment with U.S. policies in the Middle East and Balkans until the early 2010s.</p>
<h2>Splintered support</h2>
<p>But U.S. support to Kurds in northern Syria, aligned to the militant separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/15/turkeys-failed-coup-attempt-explainer">2016 coup attempt</a> against Erdoğan marked the beginning of a more confrontational relationship between Washington and Ankara.</p>
<p>Blaming the U.S. and its Persian Gulf allies for complicity in the coup, Erdogan began to court Putin, who <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2019-07-17/ty-article/.premium/putin-s-400-how-failed-coup-erdogan-turkey-nato-biggest-headache-trump-no-f-35/0000017f-db3c-d856-a37f-fffc38200000">openly stood behind him</a> during and after the attempted coup. Ankara’s acquisition of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missiles led to its <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1908351/us-begins-process-of-unwinding-turkey-from-f-35-program-dod-officials-say/">removal from the U.S.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program</a> and a set of <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/#:%7E:text=Today%2C%20the%20United%20States%20is,main%20arms%20export%20entity%2C%20by">U.S. sanctions</a> on Turkey’s defense industry. Coupled with its repeated military interventions in Syria, Turkey’s closeness with Russia has, critics say, reduced it to a status of “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/turkey-unreliable-partner-fight-against-isis">unreliable partner</a>” in the North Atlantic alliance. </p>
<p>But it didn’t take long for Ankara’s flirtation with Moscow to reach a deadlock. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-toll/at-least-34-turkish-soldiers-killed-in-air-strikes-in-syrias-idlib-syrian-observatory-idUSKCN20L32S">death of 34 Turkish soldiers</a> in a Russian bombardment in northern Syria in February 2020 prompted a renewed effort to seek reconciliation with the U.S. However, the Biden administration <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-us/ignored-biden-erdogan-desperate-get-his-attention-business-insider">hesitated to reset relations</a> due to concerns over Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.</p>
<h2>The balancing act and Ukraine</h2>
<p>War in Ukraine offered a new boost to Erdoğan’s balancing act. Turkey’s <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/turkey-closes-the-dardanelles-and-bosphorus-to-warships/">control of two major straits</a> and established ties with Ukraine and other states along the Black Sea provided significant leverage for a multifaceted and neutral approach. Erdoğan seemingly hoped that maintaining trade relations with Russia and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/amirhusain/2022/12/20/ukraine-war-thrusts-iran-and-turkey-into-the-role-of-arms-suppliers/?sh=6c32a16e4b1f">arms sales to Ukraine</a> would bolster the struggling Turkish economy and rehabilitate his image in the West. </p>
<p>But Erdoğan’s early blocking of Sweden’s and Finland’s entry into NATO <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html">stirred resentment in Washington and Brussels</a>. </p>
<p>As the Ukraine conflict continued and Erdoğan’s domestic popularity <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-lags-election-rival-closely-watched-poll-2023-05-11/#:%7E:text=The%20survey%20by%20pollster%20Konda,%2D7%2C%20before%20Ince's%20announcement.">dipped in the lead-up</a> to the May 2023 elections, the sustainability of Turkey’s balancing act seemed uncertain again. </p>
<p>In need of financial and political support, Erdoğan has turned to the West and Persian Gulf countries. He approved Finland’s NATO accession and forged economic deals with West-friendly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/03/08/saudi-crown-prince-sees-a-new-axis-of-evil-in-the-middle-east/">Saudi Arabia</a> and the <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/12/27/dubais-deputy-security-chief-claims-turkey-is-evil-wants-to-harm-uae-with-qatar">United Arab Emirates</a> – Turkey’s two bitter rivals in the Middle East.</p>
<p>In summer 2023, Erdoğan announced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/03/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-announces-new-cabinet">new cabinet</a> that projected a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/turkey/recep-erdogan-post-western-turkey">pro-Western outlook</a>. He mended <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-turkey-normalization-cairos-perspective/">ties with Egypt</a>, another traditional regional rival, aligning with the new balance of power that the U.S. and its regional allies were shaping in the Middle East. And then, at the July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, Erdoğan announced the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-press-turkey-finland-sweden-hope-nato-breakthrough-2022-06-28/">withdrawal of his veto</a> against Sweden’s accession to NATO.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s pro-Western moves have prompted a cautiously optimistic approach by Western leaders, using both incentives and punitive measures: extending a US$35 billion <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-bank-increase-exposure-turkey-35-bln-within-three-years-anadolu-2023-09-07/">World Bank credit</a> to aid Turkey’s economy, while penalizing Turkish entities for violating <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/us-turkey-sanctions-russia-ukraine-shipping-nato/">U.S. sanctions</a>. The latter has been taken as a not-so-veiled message to Ankara to take a definitive stance in its foreign affairs.</p>
<p>Erdoğan has received a similar message from Putin. Disappointed in part by Turkey’s reconciliation with the West, Putin chose <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/17/1188048725/ukraine-russia-grain-deal-putin">not to renew</a> the Ukrainian grain deal despite Erdoğan’s earlier successful brokerage. It was a considerable blow for Erdoğan, who sought to position himself as a crucial power broker in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.</p>
<p>Although Erdoğan faces pushback from the U.S. and Russia, this does not necessarily signal the demise of his middleman strategy. Turkey’s location on the Europe-Asia boundary and historical ties to neighboring regions provide Erdoğan opportunities to sustain and even expand a strategy of neutrality among regional and global actors. </p>
<p>Developments in the South Caucasus and the escalating conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip are two recent examples. They add a new layer of complexity for Erdogan’s balancing act, but also more room for him to maneuver. Turkey has been a <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/turkeys-erdogan-backs-azerbaijans-offensive-nagorno-karabakh-us-russia-urge">key backer</a> of Azerbaijan’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh – something that has exposed Russia’s waning influence in the region and created a major geopolitical setback for Iran. Meanwhile, Erdoğan’s ties with both <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/20/erdogan-turkey-hamas-ties-israel-war-normalization/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors%20Picks%20-%2010232023&utm_term=editors_picks">Hamas</a> and <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4228775-what-turkey-israel-reconciliation-means-for-the-region-and-the-world/">the Israeli government</a> provide an opportunity for him to play a <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/eying-gaza-mediator-role-turkey-cools-hamas-ties-erdogan-restrains-rhetoric">mediator role</a> there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ozgur Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey walks a fine line between NATO commitments and Western alliances and its dependence on Russia for financial resources and trade.Ozgur Ozkan, Visiting Professor at the Fletcher School's Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146612023-10-09T15:26:06Z2023-10-09T15:26:06ZNagorno-Karabakh: What’s next for the South Caucasus region following Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenians?<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/nagorno-karabakh-whats-next-for-the-south-caucasus-region-following-azerbaijans-aggression-against-armenians" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/19/1200311438/azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabkh-russia">Azerbaijani forces attacked the breakaway and long-disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh</a> in September 2023. Less than a month later, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66995976">the region is now all but deserted.</a></p>
<p>The declared aim of the attack was to eliminate the last forces of the Armenian-majority self-styled republic. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijan-launch-anti-terror-operation-nagorno-karabakh-armenia/">The lightning “anti-terror operation,” as Azerbaijan called it</a>, precipitated the collapse of the breakaway republic. Most importantly — given that it came after a debilitating blockade that lasted for almost nine months — it instilled fear among the Karabakh Armenian population.</p>
<p>Many fled their ancestral homeland. </p>
<p>As an endless convoy of cars transporting desperate refugees filled the winding road to an uncertain future away from their homes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-in-the-caucasus-could-destabilise-the-whole-of-eurasia-214400">regional entities were lining up</a> to influence the future shape of the South Caucasus region on the border of eastern Europe and west Asia. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been unfolding there for decades. </p>
<h2>Aliyev’s regime</h2>
<p>In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev has been investing heavily in cultivating nationalism and militarism over the past few years to shore up his authority and his regime.</p>
<p>Starting from the <a href="https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/analysing-second-karabakh-war">second Karabakh war in 2020</a> until the present, Azerbaijan’s Border Service and Armed Forces used inspirational <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bSh5tm2Hmn0">pop music videos</a> to glorify the government’s military posturing and patriotic films to incite nationalism.</p>
<p>After Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory effectively cut off Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia — leaving only one precarious point of access to the outside world, the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-humanitarian-aid-nagorno-karabakh-/32589510.html">Russian-policed Lachin corridor</a> — the international community urged a negotiated peace settlement that would ensure Nagorno-Karabakh’s reintegration to Azerbaijan in exchange for local self-government. </p>
<p>But Aliyev’s preference for military action was no surprise, since a self-governed Nagorno-Karabakh would have required conflict resolution that was at odds with his preferred authoritarian and centralized governance approach over the rest of Azerbaijan.</p>
<p>Aliyev’s boldness was enabled by Russia’s and Turkey’s interests. Both are intent on regional peacemaking. This allows them to maintain their dominance in the South Caucasus region and keeps both the European Union and the United States at arm’s length.</p>
<h2>Russia, Turkey influence</h2>
<p>Russia and Turkey have developed a model I call “<a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/114559/3/Peacebuilding_in_Turbulent_Times_1_.pdf">managed competition</a>” in the South Caucasus to ensure their often competing objectives don’t undermine their common goal to exclude states with opposing interests.</p>
<p>They worked together during the 2020 conflict to ensure they were the only powers to have a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/18/the-nagorno-karabakh-settlement-and-turkish-russian-relations">presence by stationing peacekeeping and monitoring forces</a> in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor, albeit Turkey assumed a lesser and mostly symbolic role. The Turks are intent on <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/while-russia-and-us-trade-barbs-over-karabakh-turkey-lays-ground-for-corridor-via-armenia/">doing so now</a> as well. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-to-continue-supporting-baku-with-all-means/1992169">“two states, one nation” slogan used by Turkey and Azerbaijan</a> to emphasize the ethnic kinship of their people underlies their strategic partnership, including co-ordination on foreign policy, energy and defence.</p>
<p>Turkey supported Azerbaijan with arms and by training the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in both the 2020 and 2023 conflicts. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan, in turn, has helped Turkey <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/azerbaijan-boost-gas-exports-turkey-by-19-10-bcm-2023-2023-02-03/">reduce its energy dependence on Russia and Iran</a> by boosting its own gas exports. </p>
<p>Both Russia and Turkey regard military action in Nagorno-Karabakh as an opportunity to open the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-armenia-negotiations-zangezur-corridor/32613002.html">Zangezur corridor</a> — a land bridge between the Nakhcivan (the only part of Azerbaijan sharing a border with Turkey and largely dependent on it) and the rest of Azerbaijan that will effectively provide a link between the two countries. </p>
<p>An increasingly isolated Russia sees in a friendly Azerbaijan a crucial link <a href="https://eurasianet.org/russia-and-iran-agree-on-new-rail-corridor-via-azerbaijan">to Iran</a> and its Persian Gulf ports and a valuable ally that gives it strategic depth in the South Caucasus.</p>
<p>By sacrificing its traditional alliance with Armenia and acquiescing to Azerbaijani aggression, Russia wants to convince Aliyev not to undermine Russia’s strategy of disrupting western natural gas supplies. </p>
<p>Furthermore, <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/09/azerbaijan-planning-long-term-presence-armenia">the destabilizing effect</a> of a tense relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan strengthens Russia’s role as an arbiter in the region. </p>
<h2>Stoking nationalism</h2>
<p>Aliyev knows how to stir nationalist fervour, and he’s likely to continue creating tensions if Russia allows him to. </p>
<p>He’s already been designating territories in Armenia as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/30/azerbaijan-is-hungry-for-land-armenians-fear-country-will-seek-to-grab-more-territory">“western Azerbaijani lands</a>” and vowed to work for “<a href="https://president.az/en/articles/view/58330">the return</a>” of western Azerbaijanis to Armenia. </p>
<p>Another reason Russia is turning a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s military posturing — including its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/armenias-pm-azerbaijan-established-control-over-some-territories/a-63118664">occupation of 50 square kilometres</a> of Armenian territory — is the effect it has in destabilizing the current Armenian government. </p>
<p>Russia considers Armenia a reluctant ally that’s increasingly looking westwards. Already, Armenia’s pro-Russian opposition <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/armenia-grapples-multiple-challenges-after-fall-nagorno-karabakh-103633854">anticipates the demise of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan</a> and its return to power, despite its history of corruption and cronyism.</p>
<p>If the current developments provide any indication of what a post-conflict scenario underwritten by Russia and Turkey will look like in the region, the picture is bleak. </p>
<p>Russia and Turkey opt for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab221">containment, not peace and reconciliation</a>, and so tensions will likely intensify in the South Caucasus until the next opportunity to forge a genuine peace presents itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Spyros A. Sofos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What are the broader implications of Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh in terms of peace and security in the South Caucasus?Spyros A. Sofos, Assistant Professor in Global Humanities, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2048842023-07-24T12:59:14Z2023-07-24T12:59:14ZDeSantis’ ‘war on woke’ looks a lot like attempts by other countries to deny and rewrite history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536350/original/file-20230707-15-306n0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">SB 266 aims to stop college professors from teaching about systemic racism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/florida-governor-ron-desantis-speaks-to-police-officers-in-news-photo/1467938775">Spencer Platt/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266">Florida law</a> that took effect on July 1, 2023, restricts how educators in the state’s public colleges and universities can teach about the racial oppression that African Americans have faced in the United States. </p>
<p>Specifically, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266/BillText/er/PDF">SB 266</a> forbids professors to teach that systemic racism is “inherent in the institutions of the United States.” Similarly, they cannot teach that it was designed “to maintain social, political and economic inequities.” </p>
<p>We are professors who teach the modern history of the <a href="https://gufaculty360.georgetown.edu/s/contact/00336000014RpbOAAS/rochelle-a-davis">Middle East</a> and <a href="https://www.conncoll.edu/directories/faculty-profiles/eileen-kane/">Eastern Europe</a>, and we know that even democratically elected governments suppress histories of their own nations that don’t fit their ideology. The goal is often to smother a shameful past by casting those who speak of it as unpatriotic. Another goal is to stoke so much fear and anger that citizens welcome state censorship. </p>
<p>We see this playing out in Florida, with SB 266 being the most extreme example in a series of recent <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/here-are-the-states-where-lawmakers-are-seeking-to-ban-colleges-dei-efforts">U.S. state bills</a> that critics call “<a href="https://pen.org/more-than-meets-the-dei/">educational gag orders</a>.” The tactics that Gov. Ron DeSantis is using to censor the teaching of American history in Florida look a lot like those seen in the illiberal democracies of Israel, Turkey, Russia and Poland. </p>
<p>Here are four ways SB 266 relates to attempts used by modern governments to censor history. </p>
<h2>1. Invent a threat</h2>
<p>One strategy that DeSantis shares with other world leaders is to invent a threat that taps into anxieties and then declare war against it.</p>
<p>In Russia, President Vladimir Putin has been waging a brutal war against Ukraine in the name of “<a href="https://www.rapsinews.com/legislation/20140505/271257417.html">denazifying” the country</a>. This claim that Ukraine is a Nazi bastion <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-claim-to-rid-ukraine-of-nazis-is-especially-absurd-given-its-history-177959">is a fabrication</a>. Nevertheless, it stokes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/world/europe/russia-victory-day-may-9.html">real fear and hatred of Nazis</a>, whose 1941 invasion of the USSR led to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/06/21/stalin-no-longer-liable-wwII-deaths-a61939">27 million Soviet deaths</a>.</p>
<p>In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/">labels critics of state violence “terrorists</a>.” More than 146 Turkish academics who signed a 2016 peace petition condemning Turkey’s violence against its Kurdish citizens faced trials for “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/05/turkey-academics-trial-signing-petition">spreading terrorist propaganda</a>.” Ten were convicted and served jail terms before Turkey’s Constitutional Court, in a 9-8 decision in 2019, <a href="https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/actions/academics-for-peace-turkey/">overturned their convictions</a> because of the violation of their freedom of expression. </p>
<p>In Florida, the phantom threat is “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-wokeness-has-become-the-latest-battlefront-for-white-conservatives-in-america-207122">wokeness</a>,” a reference to a term that the <a href="https://www.vox.com/culture/21437879/stay-woke-wokeness-history-origin-evolution-controversy">Black Lives Matter movement made mainstream</a>. To “stay woke” means to be self-aware and committed to racial justice. Republicans have co-opted the term and use it sarcastically to denigrate progressive ideas and drown out discussions about the reasons for America’s <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/racial-inequality-in-the-united-states">stark racial inequities</a>. </p>
<h2>2. Criminalize historical discussions</h2>
<p>Once a fake threat has been ginned up, world leaders can use it to create new laws to criminalize speech and critical discussions of history. </p>
<p>In Russia, Putin uses so-called “<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/02/03/russias-ministry-of-higher-education-approves-new-history-curriculum-includes-notion-of-instability-belt-around-russia-en-news">memory laws</a>” to, among other things, prevent knowledge about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/28/world/europe/russia-memorial-human-rights.html">scale of crimes</a> committed by former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin against the Soviet people from the 1930s to the 1950s. And in 2018, Poland’s right-wing leadership added an amendment to one of its own memory laws to defend the “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/21/poland-distorts-holocaust-history-gross-jedwabne/">good name</a>” of Poland and the Polish people against accusations of complicity in the Holocaust. Historians who defy this gag order have <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-historians-under-attack-for-exploring-polands-role-in-the-holocaust">faced harassment</a> and death threats.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Turkish government has a law against “denigrating the Turkish nation” <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/10/turkey-nationalism-killer-penal-code-article-has-come-back.html">that makes it a crime</a> to acknowledge the early-20th-century <a href="https://theconversation.com/armenian-genocide-us-recognition-of-turkeys-killing-of-1-5-million-was-tangled-up-in-decades-of-geopolitics-129159">Armenian genocide</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/magazine/the-era-of-people-like-you-is-over-how-turkey-purged-its-intellectuals.html">Turkey’s purge of its intellectuals</a> resulted in the firing of more than 6,000 university instructors in an effort to silence critical teaching about the nation’s past and present.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266/BillText/er/PDF">SB 266</a>, meanwhile, requires general education courses to “provide instruction on the historical background and philosophical foundation of Western civilization and this nation’s historical documents.” It also prohibits general education core courses from “teaching certain topics or presenting information in specified ways.”</p>
<p>The vagueness is deliberate. Teaching virtually anything related to <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/2270-racecraft">America’s history of racism</a>, particularly as it relates to racial inequalities in the present, could be seen as violating SB 266. Florida professors may refrain, for example, from teaching that <a href="https://newjimcrow.com/">Jim Crow laws</a> were designed to deny African Americans equal rights. These are the same laws that <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691172422/hitlers-american-model">Hitler used as a model</a> for the Nuremberg Laws that stripped Jewish citizens of Germany of civil rights.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Demonstrators hold signs that read 'Protect Black history' and 'Black history is US history'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536352/original/file-20230707-23-8v0ego.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest Gov. Ron DeSantis’ plan to eliminate AP courses on African American studies in Florida high schools.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-protest-florida-governor-ron-desantis-plan-to-news-photo/1247974907">Joshua Lott/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Punish transgressors</h2>
<p>With laws in place that criminalize dissenting interpretations of history, governments can then punish those who violate them. Punishment can involve threatening arrest and imprisoning individuals, and stripping funding from institutions. </p>
<p>For example, in 2011 Israel enacted the <a href="https://www.adalah.org/en/law/view/496#:%7E:text=The%20%E2%80%9CNakba%20Law%E2%80%9D%20authorizes%20the,as%20a%20day%20of%20mourning.%E2%80%9D">Nakba Law</a>, which authorizes the minister of finance to cut funding to institutions that commemorate or acknowledge what Palestinians refer to as the Nakba – or “catastrophe” in Arabic. The <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/about-the-nakba/">Nakba</a> is the displacement of more than half of the Indigenous Palestinian population and destruction of their communities that resulted from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.</p>
<p>Likewise, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2023/266/BillText/er/PDF">SB 266</a> defunds diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in public colleges and universities and empowers school administrators and boards to take action against those who defy the rules. It comes in the wake of Florida’s 2022 <a href="https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Stop-Woke-Handout.pdf">“Stop WOKE” law</a> – which restricted discussions about race in K-12 schools and led teachers to <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/book-bans-florida-public-schools/">purge their classrooms</a> of books they worried could get them a five-year jail sentence.</p>
<h2>4. Write new history</h2>
<p>With actual historical events denied or suppressed, governments can then rewrite history to further monopolize truth and impose ideology. Russia offers the most egregious example of this. </p>
<p>In 2021, Putin published a 20-page article, “<a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181">On the Historical Unity of the Russians and Ukrainians</a>,” in which he argued that the Ukrainian and Russian people are one and the same. <a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/news/putin-historical-unity">Alarmed critics</a> rightly saw this as a preemptive justification for escalating his war against Ukraine, which he did with a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-putin">full-scale invasion of the country</a> in February 2022. </p>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/4/28/23037788/ron-desantis-florida-viktor-orban-hungary-right-authoritarian">right-wing ideologues in other parts of the world</a>, DeSantis claims to be defending U.S. history from falsehoods <a href="https://floridaphoenix.com/2021/03/17/gov-desantis-has-found-a-new-culture-war-enemy-critical-race-theory/">pushed by ideologues</a>. In his attempts to rewrite history, calls for a reckoning with America’s history of anti-Blackness are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/04/conservatives-ron-desantis-florida-education">ridiculed as indoctrination</a>, and <a href="https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/revamped-florida-civics-education-aims-for-patriotism-will-it-catch-on-elsewhere/2022/07">bigotry gets repackaged as patriotism</a>. </p>
<p>If the way governments are rewriting history in other parts of the world is a guide, DeSantis’ and other states’ legislation could be the prelude to an even greater assault on accurate history and freedom of thought.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eileen Kane receives funding from the MacArthur Foundation</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rochelle Anne Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tactics used to censor the teaching of American history in Florida schools bear much in common with those seen in the illiberal democracies of Israel, Turkey, Russia and Poland.Rochelle Anne Davis, Professor of Cultural Anthropology, Georgetown UniversityEileen Kane, Professor of History, Connecticut CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096652023-07-13T13:09:08Z2023-07-13T13:09:08Z3 takeaways from the NATO summit – and where it leaves the military alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537176/original/file-20230712-20641-prm6on.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C47%2C3185%2C2079&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Biden and Zelenskyy take to the stage.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/NATOSummitBiden/cb891a9717f64b1ab201bde86fefcec8/photo?Query=nato&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=35514&currentItemNo=73">AP Photo/Susan Walsh</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The leaders of the 31 nations that comprise NATO made their way home on July 12, 2023, after concluding <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nato-summit-vilnius-lithuania-ukraine-6eff9f614dd01746280e43f0473b1a26">two days of highest-level diplomatic meetings</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The summit in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius wasn’t just all talk – it provided an opportunity for the Western military alliance to reassess its purpose, size and structure in light of more than a year of war in Ukraine.</em></p>
<p><em>John R. Deni, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=SKtbkskAAAAJ&hl=en">research professor</a> at the U.S. Army War College and author of “<a href="https://librarycatalog.ecu.edu/catalog/4809141">NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense</a>,” was in Vilnius to attend a public forum on the side of the summit. The Conversation asked him for his main takeaways form the leaders’ meeting and what it suggests about the future of NATO.</em></p>
<h2>Ukraine gets some of what it wants</h2>
<p>The headlines from the summit were largely about what Ukraine really wanted – a clearly defined timeline to membership – and how <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66183066">NATO members fell short</a> on promising that.</p>
<p>But I think that downplays what <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-offer-ukraine-security-framework-zelenskiy-asks-nato-allies-more-arms-2023-07-12/">Ukraine did achieve</a>. Germany, France and Norway pledged a significant increase in aid to Kyiv in the shape of tanks, long-range missiles and other military assistance that should be useful in Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive against Russia. Ukraine also secured further commitments to nonlethal assistance and training from NATO members.</p>
<p>And even on the issue of membership, there was progress that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can take back to Kyiv. NATO members confirmed their commitment that Ukraine would become a member at some point and agreed to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/nato-agrees-to-remove-membership-action-plan-requirement-for-kyiv-s-membership-ukraine/2941486">dispense with the the requirement of a memberhsip action plan</a>. The alliance similarly waived the membership action plan during Finland’s and Sweden’s bids, putting Ukraine in a select group of favored nations.</p>
<p>The summit also saw the first meeting of the <a href="https://time.com/6293378/nato-ukraine-council/">newly formed NATO-Ukraine Council</a> – a body formed to further signal NATO’s commitment to Ukraine membership.</p>
<p>Of course, this still fell short of Zelenskyy’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/11/nato-stops-short-of-ukraine-invitation-angering-zelenskyy">hopes of an “invite</a>” to NATO, or assurances that Ukraine would be accepted as a member as soon as the war is over.</p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ukraine/2023/07/11/ukraine-russia-live-war-updates/70401625007/">frustration on display</a> by Zelenskyy ahead of the meeting – and which I witnessed among some delegates at the public forum – appeared to dissipate during the summit itself. </p>
<p>In my view, Zelenskyy achieved all he could during the summit. Ukraine was embraced by NATO publicly and given clear shows of support and bilateral assistance from key members of the alliance. And that shouldn’t be overshadowed by some of the noises of disappointment or talk of Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/urging-gratitude-weapons-uk-defence-minister-tells-ukraine-were-not-amazon-2023-07-12/">not showing enough “gratitude</a>” toward NATO members.</p>
<h2>Stronger with Sweden after Turkey relents</h2>
<p>Perhaps one of the biggest achievements of the summit occurred on the eve of the event itself, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/erdogan-proposes-letting-sweden-join-nato-in-exchange-for-a-path-for-turkey-to-join-the-eu">gave the green light</a> for Sweden to become NATO’s 32nd member.</p>
<p>Much like what happened with <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-nato-and-the-evolving-new-world-order-what-small-nations-know-203278">Finland’s earlier successful bid</a>, Erdoğan had been holding out over what he perceived to be concerns over <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sweden-supreme-court-approves-extradition-of-pkk-supporter-to-turkey/a-65854132">Sweden’s “harboring</a>” of members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK – an organization that Turkey, among others, has labeled a terrorist group.</p>
<p>Before announcing that Ankara would no longer stand in Sweden’s way, Erdoğan had suggested that his compliance on Sweden might be conditional on the European Union’s looking favorably on <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/10/europe/erdogan-turkey-nato-eu-sweden-intl/index.html">Ankara’s own bid to join the economic union</a>. But it appears that was just spitballing on behalf of the Turkish president, wanting to see what additional concessions he might gain for approving Sweden’s bid. It doesn’t appear that it was a serious suggestion – and would in any case be a nonstarter, as the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/07/10/erdogan-s-nato-sweden-blackmail-dooms-turkey-s-eu-membership/77728246-1f5c-11ee-8994-4b2d0b694a34_story.html">European Commission itself acknowledged</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man in a dark suit waves in front of a blue screen." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537177/original/file-20230712-21-ho72pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arrives at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LithuaniaNATOSummit/4aad3925341443d584bd65a03c0419e4/photo?Query=nato%20erdogan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1006&currentItemNo=25">AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Erdoğan’s about-face on Sweden allowed him to look magnanimous on the international stage, but it was likely rooted in domestic politics. His opposition to the Nordic states’ ascension to NATO should, I believe, be viewed in the context of a reelection bid for the long-serving Turkish leader. Polls had him lagging behind the main Turkish opposition candidate ahead of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-held-onto-power-in-turkey-and-what-this-means-for-the-countrys-future-206293">May presidential vote</a>. He knew that taking a nationalist line on Sweden’s and Finland’s perceived lax attitude toward enemies of the Turkish state would play well to his base. Since he won the election, there is no real need for him to oppose NATO membership for either country.</p>
<p>The episode does raise concern that NATO could be beholden to nationalist self-interest in the future – but this is always a risk in a consensus-based organization of sovereign countries. But the counterbalance is that the alliance’s allies rarely want to be seen as being out in the cold on key issues. It was notable that a day after Erdoğan’s announcement, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/11/hungary-signals-it-is-ready-to-join-turkey-in-approving-swedens-bid-for-nato-membership">signlaled that he too</a> would now greenlight Sweden’s bid.</p>
<h2>Back to adversary-based military planning</h2>
<p>The alliance also <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm">approved a pivot</a> in how it will conduct defense planning and how it views its strategic goals and objectives.</p>
<p>For the past 30 years, NATO planning has been geared around general threats rather than targeted at clear adversaries. That has now changed. The NATO <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm">allies approved a new set of defense plans</a> that embody this new approach to how the alliance will protect and defend its members’ security. </p>
<p>In short, it has gone back to framing its capabilities (what it needs) and operations (where and how it deploys resources) around the idea of alliance members’ having clear adversaries.</p>
<p>This change of direction has been underway for a while. But the meeting in Vilnius provided the first opportunity for heads of states to give the new pivot their formal approval.</p>
<p>It changes the way NATO goes about its business. I wouldn’t say NATO has entirely gone back to a Cold War mentality – but it’s certainly conducting its business more like the way it did during the Cold War. </p>
<p>When it comes to who the adversaries are, the NATO summit <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm">communiqué made it clear</a>: Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” Added to this was the ongoing threat of terrorism.</p>
<p>And despite concern over the growing military threat from China, the Asian giant is not identified in the summit communiqué as a primary military threat to NATO nations. When NATO looks at the challenges facing Europe, it doesn’t see Chinese militarism as an existential threat to members. It is in the realms of cyberspace and space-based operations where it views China’s threat. At the same time, the communiqué made clear that NATO is open to engagement with China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John R. Deni is a research professor at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and an associate fellow at the NATO Defence College. He’s the author of NATO and Article 5. The views expressed are his own.</span></em></p>As Western leaders depart a crucial summit, a NATO scholar parses what went down.John Deni, Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies, US Army War CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069192023-07-13T12:39:30Z2023-07-13T12:39:30ZMany once-democratic countries continue to backslide, becoming less free – but their leaders continue to enjoy popular support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537135/original/file-20230712-29-v1zm1l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power since 2003 and has tried to strengthen the executive branch during that time. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/d5b62e740a5e46e1a7c134fc8959c0c0/preview/AP17111331555373.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democracy <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigtalPDF.pdf">is decreasing</a> globally – and has been doing so for the last 17 years, according to 2023 findings published by the nonprofit group Freedom House, which advocates for democracy.</p>
<p>These leaders’ generous public spending on key constituencies and effective promotion of nationalism are two reasons why they remain popular. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Xz968xcAAAAJ&hl=en">political scientist</a> who studies political and economic dynamics in low- and middle-income countries. <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">This phenomenon</a> of societies becoming less democratic after having made progress toward full democracy is known as <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/">democratic backsliding</a>. </p>
<p>In my 2022 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2021.2017891">co-authored research</a>, my colleague, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=h0o27GgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Byunghwan Son</a>, and I identified two key ways that democratic backsliding happens.</p>
<p>First, political leaders weaken democracies when they adopt legal and policy measures that make the executive branch stronger and the other branches of government – such as the judiciary and legislative branches – weaker. This then reduces checks and balances on the executive branch.</p>
<p>Democracy also is weakened when leaders make it difficult for opposition parties to compete in elections. This curtails the citizens’ choice to support candidates who are not the de facto leader, whether it becomes harder to learn about these candidates in the media or because it is dangerous to publicly support their causes. </p>
<p>Political leaders in a range of countries, including China and Nicaragua, are increasingly taking steps to consolidate their power by undermining other branches of government and the opposition. When leaders do so, they are displaying <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism">authoritarian tendencies</a>, meaning they try to create a <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/authoritarianism/">government with a very strong executive branch</a> and little tolerance for dissent. </p>
<p>But despite these trends, some leaders who have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/04/hungarys-authoritarian-leader-no-gift-us-conservatives">gained authoritarian</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/no-erdogan-was-not-authoritarian-all-along">reputations among critics</a> – like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary – <a href="https://pro.morningconsult.com/analysis/tayyip-erdogan-election-turkey">enjoy high</a> <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1191282/hungary-satisfaction-with-viktor-orban/">approval ratings</a> within their countries.</p>
<p>Why do leaders who diminish democracy have such strong public support? </p>
<p>These leaders’ generous public spending on key constituencies and effective promotion of nationalism are two reasons. </p>
<h2>Erdoğan’s endurance</h2>
<p>Erdoğan has been in power for almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">20 years</a>. He first served as prime minister of Turkey in 2003 and then became president in 2014. He was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/28/europe/turkey-president-runoff-polls-erdogan-intl/index.html">reelected president</a> for another five-year term in May 2023. </p>
<p>Opposition parties are able to compete in Turkish elections, but Erdoğan has taken other legal measures over the years to <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/erdogans-winning-authoritarian-populist-formula-and-turkeys-future/">diminish contenders’ chances</a> among voters. </p>
<p>Since Erdoğan’s AKP political party <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/Rise-of-the-AKP-in-the-21st-century">came to power</a> in 2002, he has appointed sympathetic judges. This has also enabled him to remove or jail prosecutors and judges and replace them <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-judges/">with loyalists</a>. </p>
<p>Ekrem İmamoğlu, the former mayor of Istanbul and a member of the CHP opposition party, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">considered a formidable challenger</a> to Erdoğan before the 2023 election. But in December 2022, a Turkish court sentenced İmamoğlu to nearly three years in jail for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">calling Turkey’s supreme election council “fools,”</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/istanbuls-opposition-mayor-barred-from-politics-over-insult-to-regime-officials/">barred him from politics</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s control of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48599281">judiciary system</a> helped remove the threat of İmamoğlu’s popularity. Around 2021, Erdoğan himself was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-17/turkey-2023-presidential-election-anger-over-prices-threatens-erdogan">experiencing a dip </a>in popularity. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has taken other steps to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">consolidate his power</a>. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-gulen/turkey-orders-detention-of-82-military-personnel-over-suspected-gulen-links-anadolu-idUSKBN28B3UL">detaining military officials</a> who question his authority, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/23/turkish-journalist-arrested-on-charge-of-insulting-erdogan">arresting journalists</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-bogazici/turkish-police-clash-with-students-protesting-erdogan-appointed-university-head-idUSKBN2991TT">activists and academics</a> who criticize him. </p>
<p>Despite these actions, people reelected Erdoğan – and his <a href="https://pro.morningconsult.com/analysis/tayyip-erdogan-election-turkey">approval rating</a> continues to be relatively high, even in the face of a weak <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-erdogans-reelection-means-for-turkey">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-inflation-higher-than-expected-nearly-58-2023-02-03/">high inflation</a>.</p>
<p>Public spending is one key way Erdoğan has maintained people’s support. </p>
<p>Leading up to the May 2023 elections, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cdd95bad-8f38-402d-a636-4d27aa20b3cc">went on a spending spree</a> to help consolidate his support. He repeatedly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/23/world/middleeast/turkey-election-economy-president.html">increased the minimum wage</a>, most <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-20/turkey-raises-minimum-wage-by-34-in-second-hike-in-a-year">recently by 34%</a>. He dropped the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-eliminates-age-requirement-retirement-2022-12-28/">retirement age requirement</a>, giving 2 million people the opportunity to stop working and receive pensions. </p>
<p>Erdoğan, who has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679">long championed Islamic</a> causes and groups in a secular country, has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/27/erdogan-kilicdaroglu-rally-supporters-before-turkish-election">rallied conservative constituents</a> by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-13/turkey-s-erdogan-looks-to-islamic-fringe-refah-huda-to-boost-electoral-alliance#xj4y7vzkg">positioning himself</a> as a leader who will fight for religious rights. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Viktor Orban salutes to a crowd of people while he stands on a podium, with red, white and green flags around him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537141/original/file-20230712-23-vgnm47.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, greets supporters during an election rally in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/3e62f6ca15ad49d7a5cbf9aa39a92425/preview/AP22091491809418.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Petr David Josek</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Orbán’s hold on Hungary</h2>
<p>Similar trends are underway in Hungary. Orbán has served consecutive terms as prime minister since 2010. He won his <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">fourth election</a> in 2022.</p>
<p>Since 2010, Orbán has taken measures to strengthen his power. In <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-constitution-idUSBRE92B0OM20130312">2013, he used his party’s majority</a> in parliament to make constitutional amendments that limit courts’ power. One change involved eliminating all decisions courts made before 2012, discarding a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-constitution/hungary-defying-eu-limits-powers-of-top-court-idUSBRE92B0OM20130312">body of law</a> from before Orbán’s time. </p>
<p>More recently in 2018, Orbán tried creating a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-courts/hungary-to-set-up-courts-overseen-directly-by-government-idUSKBN1OB193">parallel court system</a> that would have let a justice minister oversee election-related cases in a separate court system. </p>
<p>However, pressure from the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/31/hungary-scraps-parallel-justice-system-plans-after-eu-failure">European Union</a> – of which Hungary is a member – stopped these planned reforms in 2019. </p>
<p>Orbán has also <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">tried to consolidate his power</a> by weakening independent media. This effort includes <a href="https://www.eurozine.com/viktor-orbans-war-on-the-media/">not renewing news organizations’ broadcast rights</a> and government purchase of media outlets. This, in turn, makes <a href="https://hungarianfreepress.com/2018/07/09/fidesz-holds-budapests-jozsefvaros-in-mayoral-election-amidst-23-percent-turn-out/">it difficult for opposition candidates</a> to get their message out to voters. In some cases, print news outlets have not allowed opposition candidates to place political advertisements, for example. </p>
<p>Despite these developments, Orbán’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/08/03/hungarians-differ-in-their-evaluations-of-democracy-under-orbans-leadership/">approval ratings remain high</a>, hovering around 57% following the 2022 parliamentary election. </p>
<p>Here again, a political leader used high levels of public spending, as well as a nationalist message, to his advantage. </p>
<p>Orbán provided <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d9d736f5-96c6-4b74-a29e-7078390360b9">generous benefits</a> to families, children and armed forces before the 2022 elections. Some of these measures he announced included tax rebates to families with children, additional pay to members of armed forces and canceling personal income tax for workers under the age of 25. </p>
<p>Orbán used <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/viktor-orbans-hungary-populism-election-nationalism/">nationalism</a> – expressed through anti-immigrant rhetoric – as a strategy to garner support during elections, as well. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/24/viktor-orban-against-race-mixing-europe-hungary">He has discussed</a> the drawbacks of “race mixing” and migration in order to drum up support among Hungarians who are concerned about the influx of newcomers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people, some of whom are wearing headscarves, wave Turkish flags and appear to celebrate." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537143/original/file-20230712-17-r0b8xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate his reelection in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://mapi.associatedpress.com/v1/items/ec312af9c2e14ade9d5dd4e2db4680c0/preview/AP23134852367603.jpg?wm=api&tag=app_id=1,user_id=904438,org_id=101781">AP Photo/Ali Una</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Authoritarianism a broader trend</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s and Orbán’s attempts to consolidate power are only two examples of a broader, rising trend of authoritarianism across the world. </p>
<p>A total of 60 countries – <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/11/10/under-daniel-ortega-nicaragua-has-become-a-one-party-state">including Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reorienting-us-policy-toward-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/myanmars-coup-emblematic-regional-democracy-failures">and Myanmar</a> – experienced declines in freedom in 2022, while only 25 improved, according to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule">Freedom House</a>. The U.S. received a score of 83, or “free,” according to this list, which considers political rights and civil liberties and scores countries based on these factors. </p>
<p>Using money to give incentives to voters and invoking nationalism are two ways leaders like Erdoğan and Orbán maintain support. But other factors, like <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism">rising inequality</a>, may also play a role in why people turn to strongmen leaders for answers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206919/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nisha Bellinger receives funding from Social Science Research Council (SSRC). </span></em></p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary, are two leaders who have consolidated power using a similar playbook.Nisha Bellinger, Associate Professor of Political Science and Global Studies, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082722023-07-10T12:29:10Z2023-07-10T12:29:10Z‘Idiots,’ ‘criminals’ and ‘scum’ – nasty politics highest in US since the Civil War<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536078/original/file-20230706-15-1575vv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C26%2C5991%2C3961&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former U.S. President Donald Trump at the Moms for Liberty Joyful Warriors summit in June 2023 in Philadelphia. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidate-former-u-s-president-news-photo/1506161556?adppopup=true">Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Joe Biden, “together with a band of his closest thugs, misfits and Marxists, tried to destroy American democracy.” </p>
<p><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/trump-republicans-conjure-familiar-enemy-attacking-democrats-marxists-100187077">This is what Donald Trump said</a> to his supporters hours after pleading not guilty in federal court in June 2023 to his mishandling of classified documents. </p>
<p>The indictment of a former president was shocking, but Trump’s words were not. Twenty years ago, his rhetoric would have been unusual coming from any member of Congress, let alone a party leader. Yet language like this from the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/24/politics/cnn-poll-republican-primary-field/index.html">leading Republican presidential candidate</a> is becoming remarkably common in American politics. </p>
<p>It’s not just Republicans. In 2019, New Jersey Democratic Sen. Cory Booker appeared on a talk show bemoaning Trump’s rhetoric and the lack of civility in politics. But he then went on to <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/454311-cory-booker-my-testosterone-sometimes-makes-me-want-to-punch-trump/">call Trump</a> a “physically weak specimen” and said that his own “testosterone makes me want to” punch Trump.</p>
<p>How bad have things gotten? In <a href="https://www.zeitzoff.com/book-project.html">my new book</a>, I show that the level of nastiness in U.S. politics has increased dramatically. As an indication of that, I collected historical data from The New York Times on the relative frequency of stories involving Congress that contained keywords associated with nasty politics such as “smear,” “brawl” and “slander.” I found that nasty politics is more prevalent than at any time since the U.S. Civil War. </p>
<p>Particularly following the Jan. 6. insurrection by Trump’s supporters, journalists and scholars have focused on the rise of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/12/us/politics/republican-violent-rhetoric.html">politics of menace</a>. In May 2023, U.S. Capitol Police Chief Tom Manger testified before Congress and <a href="https://wtop.com/congress/2023/05/u-s-capitol-police-facing-more-threats-while-understaffed/">said that</a> one of the biggest challenges the U.S. Capitol Police face today “is dealing with the sheer increase in the number of threats against the members of Congress. It’s gone up over 400% over the last six years.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A balding man in a dark blazer and blue shirt standing against a yellow wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536074/original/file-20230706-29-jtwzj7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Aug. 25, 2017, booking photo of U.S. Rep. Greg Gianforte, a Montana Republican who was later convicted of assaulting Guardian reporter Ben Jacobs. Gianforte is now Montana’s governor.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/AssaultChargeGianforte/c65894c8f1414bd0ae3cd66a45399418/photo?Query=(renditions.phototype:horizontal)%20AND%20%20(Gianforte%20reporter)%20&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=32&currentItemNo=6">Gallatin County Detention Center via AP, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From insults to actual violence</h2>
<p>“Nasty politics” is an umbrella term for the <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/30/yes-political-rhetoric-can-incite-violence-222019/">aggressive rhetoric</a> and occasional actual violence that politicians use against domestic political opponents and other domestic groups. </p>
<p>Insults are the least threatening and most common form of nasty politics. These include politicians’ references to opponents as “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/06/27/liz-cheney-electing-idiots/">idiots</a>,” “<a href="https://www.axios.com/2019/09/25/adam-schiff-ukraine-trump-transcript-impeachment">criminals</a>” or “<a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/467131-trump-blasts-never-trump-republicans-as-human-scum/">scum</a>.” Leveling accusations or using conspiracy theories to claim an opponent is engaging in <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/28/democrats-trump-russia-investigation-congress-1025919">something nefarious</a> is also common in nasty politics. </p>
<p>Less common – and more ominous – are threats to <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sheerafrenkel/12-people-who-actually-jailed-their-political-opponents">jail political opponents</a> or encouraging one’s supporters to commit violence against those opponents. </p>
<p>In 2021, Republican U.S. Rep. Paul Gosar of Arizona <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/18/1056761894/rep-paul-gosar-is-censured-over-an-anime-video-depicting-him-of-killing-aoc">tweeted</a> out an anime cartoon video of his likeness killing Democratic U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York. </p>
<p>The rarest and most extreme examples of nasty politics entail politicians actively engaging in violence themselves. For instance, in 2017, Republican U.S. Rep. Greg Gianforte of Montana <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/happened-republican-greg-gianforte-body-slammed-reporter/story?id=58610691">body-slammed</a> a reporter from The Guardian. Gianforte would later win his 2018 election and is the current governor of Montana.</p>
<p>But nasty politics is not just a U.S. phenomenon. </p>
<h2>Deadly words</h2>
<p>In 2016, then-candidate Rodrigo Duterte famously promised Philippine voters that when he was president he would kill 100,000 drug dealers and that “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines.html">fish will grow fat</a>” from all the bodies in Manila Bay. </p>
<p>In 2017, in a speech on the one-year anniversary of the failed coup attempt against him, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170715-erdogan-turkey-threatens-chop-off-traitors-heads-coup-anniversary-speech">threatened</a> to “chop off the heads of those traitors.” </p>
<p>Before Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-721498">murdered by a far-right Jewish extremist</a> in 1995, then-opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu railed against Rabin’s support for territorial compromise with Palestinians. In an op-ed in The New York Times, Netanyahu compared Rabin’s potential peace deal with Palestinians to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/05/opinion/peace-in-our-time.html">Neville Chamberlain’s</a> appeasement of the Nazis before World War II. In the lead-up to the assassination, Netanyahu spoke at several right-wing rallies at which his supporters held up posters of Rabin in a Nazi uniform, and Netanyahu himself even marched next to a coffin that said “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/opinion/incitement-movie.html">Rabin kills Zionism</a>.” </p>
<p>In Ukraine before the 2022 Russian invasion, the Ukrainian parliament, known as the Rada, many times resembled a meeting of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-parliament-fight/24934282.html">rival soccer hooligans</a> rather than a functioning legislature. Fights among rivals regularly broke out, including the occasional egging and smoke bomb. In 2012, a full-blown legislative riot occurred in the Rada over the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/world/europe/ukraine-parliament-debate-over-language-escalates-into-a-brawl.html">rival lawmakers punching and choking one another</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a blue striped shirt, standing among a number of people, raises his clenched fist." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536076/original/file-20230706-17-zoq2h1.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=574&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Philippines presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte clenches his fist during a campaign visit to Silang township, Philippines, on April 22, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PhilippinesElectionsDuterte/756a5ca3edf046aa91b239aacdb16e0f/photo?Query=(renditions.phototype:horizontal)%20AND%20(persons.person_featured:%22Rodrigo%20Duterte%22)%20AND%20Duterte&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:asc&dateRange=&totalCount=502&currentItemNo=14">AP Photo/Bullit Marquez</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Voters don’t like it</h2>
<p>The conventional wisdom for the reason politicians go nasty is that while voters find mudslinging or political brawling distasteful, it’s actually <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/304141-the-dirty-secret-about-negative-campaign-ads-they/">effective</a>. Or that although they won’t admit it, voters secretly like nasty politics. </p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/11/01/662730647/poll-nearly-4-in-5-voters-concerned-incivility-will-lead-to-violence">polling</a> consistently shows the opposite. </p>
<p>Voters don’t like it when politicians go nasty, are worried it could lead to violence, and reduce their support for those who do use it. That’s what I found in countless surveys in the U.S., Ukraine and Israel, where I did research for my book. Other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000140">research in the U.S.</a> finds that even ardent Trump supporters reduced their approval for him when he used uncivil language.</p>
<p>So why do politicians use nasty politics? </p>
<p>First, nasty politics grabs attention. </p>
<p>Nasty rhetoric is more likely to get covered in the media, or to get likes, clicks or shares on social media than its civil counterpart. For Trump, some of his most-shared tweets were one <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/politics/trump-antifa-terrorist-group.html">labeling antifa</a> a “terrorist” organization and a clip of him <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/02/trump-body-slam-cnn-tweet-violence-reporters-wrestlemania">body-slamming</a> a pro wrestler with CNN’s logo superimposed. </p>
<p>Second, given their attention-grabbing nature, nasty politics can be a particularly important tool for opposition or outsider politicians. These politicians who don’t have the name recognition, or access to the same resources as party leaders, can use nasty politics to get noticed and build a following. </p>
<p>Third, and perhaps most important, nasty politics can be used to signal toughness. This toughness is something that voters seek out when they <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/authoritarian-dynamic/7620B99124ED2DBFC6394444838F455A">feel threatened</a>. This sentiment was best captured in a <a href="https://twitter.com/JerryFalwellJr/status/1045853333007798272?s=20">September 2018 tweet</a> from the Rev. Jerry Falwell Jr., a Trump ally: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Conservatives & Christians need to stop electing “nice guys”. They might make great Christian leaders but the US needs street fighters like @realDonaldTrump at every level of government b/c the liberal fascists Dems are playing for keeps & many Repub leaders are a bunch of wimps!</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>From nasty words to worse</h2>
<p>Nasty politics has important implications for democracy. </p>
<p>It can be a legitimate tool for opposition and outsider politicians to call attention to bad behavior. But it can also be used as a cynical, dangerous tool by incumbents to cling to power that can lead to violence. </p>
<p>For example, in the lead-up to the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, Trump and his supporters concocted a baseless conspiracy that the 2020 election would be stolen. He <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/07/trump-incitement-inflammatory-rhetoric-capitol-riot">implored his supporters</a> to come to Washington on Jan. 6 as part of a rally to support the baseless conspiracy and “Stop the Steal,” and urged followers to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/capitol-mob-trump-supporters.html">Be There. Will Be Wild!</a>” foreshadowing the violence that was to come. </p>
<p>Perhaps most ominously for the near future of U.S. democracy, the growing Trump legal troubles have escalated to violent rhetoric. </p>
<p>After Trump’s indictment in June, Republican U.S. <a href="https://twitter.com/RepAndyBiggsAZ/status/1667241900938502146">Rep. Andy Biggs of Arizona tweeted: “We have now reached a war phase. Eye for an eye</a>.”</p>
<p>The uptick in nasty politics in the U.S. is both a symptom of the country’s deeply divided politics and a harbinger of future threats to democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208272/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Zeitzoff has received funding from the National Science Foundation and the Charles Koch Foundation</span></em></p>Studies show, though, that voters don’t like all that nastiness.Thomas Zeitzoff, Associate Professor, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067322023-05-31T14:56:08Z2023-05-31T14:56:08ZTurkey: what to expect from Erdoğan, his ultranationalist alliance and their ‘family values’ pledges<p>After a bitter and hard-fought campaign that went to a second run-off vote, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has retained <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/28/europe/turkey-president-runoff-polls-erdogan-intl/index.html">the Turkish presidency</a> in an election that some deemed as “<a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/30/turkish-election-free-but-not-fair-say-international-observers#:%7E:text=%22Media%20bias%20and%20ongoing%20restrictions,the%20OSCE%20said%20on%20Monday.">free but not fair</a>”. Having first won power in 2003, Erdoğan has been able to extend his rule for a further five years by creating an alliance with ultranationalist parties. </p>
<p>A key aspect of the next term is likely to be a hardline <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/20/1177309928/how-far-right-nationalism-campaigns-in-turkey-have-impacted-its-presidential-ele">conservative agenda</a>. An agreement between the Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and his hardline Islamist New Welfare party (YRP) allies has pledged to <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/turkeys-ruling-alliance-welcomes-islamist-parties-misogynist-agendas">reevaluate existing laws</a> to “protect the integrity of the family”.</p>
<p>Turkey’s LGBTQ+ community is likely to be a target. Erdoğan and his allies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/may/12/lgbt-recep-tayyip-erdogan-targets-gay-trans-rights-critical-turkish-election">ramped up</a> anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric during the election campaign. This is by no means a new part of Erdoğan’s programme, but it has intensified in the last few months. For instance, the AKP and coalition partner the YRP <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/akp-and-new-islamist-coalition-partner-sign-protocol-discriminating-against-women-and-lgbti-news-62090">signed</a> a declaration which suggested potential discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community could follow. The YRP has previously called for the closure of LGBTQ+ organisations.</p>
<p>Immediately after his victory was announced, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-elections-victory-lgbt-rant-b2347705.html">accused</a> the opposition of promoting LGBTQ+ rights while <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/turkish-president-erdo-attacks-lgbtq-124424560.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAJR7jQDShb-COYOF6x0tSKxfgGCuoYY0G8_O-FW5eQrhFb2fdXfoeqM4NrwxL4BiVZWvH1hAj3bGZj-Oo_HF8-BwGXEZLzRT89ET00zDfXzQQfQAVm_WNBCojQdRQBkj_hzj5nyzPQf0Xm6vbvsNFXaqeshy4mW2wLARBKk8wwD2">stressing</a> that “LGBT forces” had not been able to infiltrate the AKP. </p>
<p>Women’s rights are also at risk. The <a href="http://www.lawsturkey.com/law/law-to-protect-family-and-prevent-violence-against-woman-6284">6284 law</a>, which aims to protect women, particularly from domestic violence, was introduced by the AKP government in 2012. Both radical Islamist parties within Erdoğan’s coalition – YRP and Huda Par – have <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/turkeys-ruling-alliance-welcomes-islamist-parties-misogynist-agendas">called for</a> it to be repealed and <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/turkeys-ruling-alliance-welcomes-islamist-parties-misogynist-agendas">made</a> their support for Erdoğan conditional on a pledge to amend this law. </p>
<p>This comes against a backdrop of high levels of violence against women <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/25/femicide-remains-major-problem-in-turkey-report-warns/">in Turkey</a>. In 2022 at least 116 women were murdered <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/25/femicide-remains-major-problem-in-turkey-report-warns/">by their partners</a>. </p>
<p>Huda Par has also proposed <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/ruling-akps-ally-huda-par-calls-for-criminalization-of-extra-marital-relationships-defends-single-sex-education-news-62196">criminalising</a> extra-marital sex and adultery, getting rid of alimony rights for women and <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/former-akp-minister-admits-warning-against-hatay-airports-construction-news-62110">argued for</a> single-sex education.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish police halt Pride march in Istanbul in 2022.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Erdoğan-led majority in parliament was <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2023/05/19/fifty-shades-of-nationalism-post-elections-turkey/?sh=2077d5fdf4aa">propped up</a> by another of AKP’s coalition partners, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement party (MHP). And they also received backing from the extreme nationalist presidential candidate, Sinan Oğan of the ATA (Ancestral) Alliance party, who won around <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sinan-ogan-turkey-election-anti-refugee-ultranationalist">5%</a> of the vote in the first round, before <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-sinan-ogan-wins-support-from-turkey-election-kingmaker/">declaring</a> his support for Erdoğan. </p>
<p>When it became clear that anti-immigrant views had been popular in the first round, opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/28/turkey-election-candidates-eye-surge-of-nationalism-before-runoff-vote">pivoted</a> to a hardline anti-immigration stance in the second round. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/anger-fear-among-syrians-amid-turkish-oppositions-anti-immigrant-campaign-2023-05-26/">Billboards</a> promised Syrian refugees would have to leave the country, if he was elected.</p>
<h2>Rising anti-Syrian rhetoric</h2>
<p>The whole <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-presidential-parliamentary-election-syrian-refugees-d8ddc022f5285cb2440df58a206b4bfc">campaign</a> was marked by rising hostility against the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey">3.6 million</a> Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Syrians have already been targeted by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58185612">violent protests</a> that damaged Syrian-owned properties, as well as physical attacks and <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/syrian-refugees-recount-harassment-abuse-turkey">murders</a>. Just before the second round, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/26/turkey-syrians-refugees-erdogan-election/">killing</a> of a 28-year old Syrian man living in Turkey raised fears about what might happen next. </p>
<p>It seems unlikely that such incidents – and the near constant hate speech that Syrians are subjected to – will decrease after this election result, especially now that Erdogan is so dependent on the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2023/05/19/fifty-shades-of-nationalism-post-elections-turkey/?sh=74be3e2adf4a">ultranationalists</a> in parliament. The pressure from these parties may cause the regime to target Syrians even more directly. Even before the election Erdoğan vowed “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/26/turkey-stateless-syrians-earthquake-elections-erdogan-assad/">to repatriate refugees</a>” and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/turkey-election-runoff-results-intl/index.html">talked about “resettling”</a> one million Syrian refugees. </p>
<h2>Ultranationalists grasp power</h2>
<p>The increased power of the ultranationalist right and their rhetoric and ideas is also a threat to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Kurds have already <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/24/turkey-erdogans-onslaught-rights-and-democracy">experienced an increase in repression</a> since Erdoğan <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/can-erdogan-survive-without-kurdish-question">adopted</a> a more nationalistic and anti-minority policy direction in 2015. The 2023 election campaign saw him ramp up the nationalist rhetoric further. </p>
<p>He <a href="https://turkishminute.com/2023/04/24/erdogan-slam-kilicdaroglu-for-vowing-release-demirtas-refers-to-jailed-leader-as-terrorist/">portrayed</a> jailed Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas as “a terrorist” and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic party (HDP) as a <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-to-speak-with-putin-on-grain-deal-in-coming-days-181808">front</a> for the outlawed PKK paramilitary group. Erdoğan returned to his attack on Demirtas in his election victory speech while the crowd <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/erdogan-supporters-chant-death-penalty-for-demirtas-during-victory-speech-news-62493#:%7E:text=During%20his%20victory%20speech%20held,for%20Selo%E2%80%9D%20referring%20to%20Demirta%C5%9F.">chanted</a> for the death penalty. </p>
<p>We should expect to see an increase in anti-Kurdish policies. This could include further crackdowns on Kurdish organisations, in particular the <a href="https://www.turkishminute.com/2023/04/11/amnesty-international-warned-turkey-of-human-rights-violations-in-hdp-closure-case/">possible closure</a> of the HDP. </p>
<p>With an ongoing economic crisis threatening the livelihoods of many Turks and prices rising dramatically, Erdoğan may hope a wave of nationalism could distract his citizens from their financial troubles. With inflation <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/246951b4-1bcd-4144-a9c9-33f9f6c3e107">running at around 40%</a> and the lira having lost a fifth of its value over the past 12 months, there’s definitely a lot of distraction going to be needed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206732/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balki Begumhan Bayhan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey’s president has solidified his political power by allying with ultranationalist groups.Balki Begumhan Bayhan, PhD Candidate in Politics, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063562023-05-29T17:46:23Z2023-05-29T17:46:23ZWhat Erdoğan’s reelection means for Turkey’s political system, economy and foreign policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528911/original/file-20230529-8428-5q7g5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C109%2C5573%2C3623&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate in Istanbul on May 28, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TurkeyElection/7ccdfea232cc4bebb7071e84ed681682/photo?Query=erdogan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=23036&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65743031">reelected as president</a>, ensuring that his term as leader of Turkey will extend to a quarter century.</p>
<p>The electorate returned Erdoğan to power in a runoff vote on May 28, 2023, with 52% of votes. But with 48% of voters siding with opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan will have to govern a divided nation <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">in its centennial year</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ABctik8AAAAJ&hl=en">professor of political science</a>, I have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/democracy-islam-and-secularism-in-turkey/9780231159326">analyzed Turkish politics for many years</a>. The election provided a stark choice for Turkey’s voters: To end or extend Erdogan’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">two-decade-long creep toward authoritarian-style governance</a>. The decision to opt for the latter will dictate the country’s future in key ways, both domestically and in terms of its relationships with Western countries.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Turkey’s political system?</h2>
<p>Turkey had its first <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/made-by-history/2023/05/12/turkey-election-erdoan/">democratic election in May 1950</a>. Since then it has had a multiparty competitive system, albeit one that has been sporadically interrupted by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/16/timeline-a-history-of-turkish-coups">several military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In the last 10 years, Erdoğan has taken Turkey down a more <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">autocratic, one-man-rule style</a> of governance. This has included restrictions on <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/18/turkeys-new-media-law-is-bad-news-but-dont-report-it/">freedom of speech</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-media">freedom of the press</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/turkey-end-abuse-criminal-proceedings-against-selahattin-demirtas">free assembly</a>.</p>
<p>There is a little reason to believe that Erdoğan, enboldened by a fresh mandate, will reverse this trajectory.</p>
<p>Erdoğan won the election without making any promises about restoring or expanding rights and freedoms. Rather, his campaign signaled an intention to continue Turkey’s path toward being a conservative, religious state – a far cry from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">vision of a modern, secular nation</a> of founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the election, Erdoğan presented himself as the leader of religious conservatives – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnyuFMVZ2N8">reciting the Quran in Hagia Sophia</a> and <a href="https://t24.com.tr/video/erdogan-camlica-camii-icinde-cemaate-fetih-cagrisi-yapti,54253">addressing the people in another mosque following the Friday prayer</a>. He also presented himself as a militarist leader, using <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqsshbA3WEA">battleships, drones and other weapons</a> as campaign instruments and uploading a new Twitter profile photo with an <a href="https://twitter.com/RTErdogan">air force pilot jacket</a>. This posturing combined with his accusations that the opposition <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-erdogan-accuses-opposition-of-acting-together-with-pkk-amid-dwindling-support-for-govt-news-59442">was collaborating with the PKK</a> – a Kurdish separatist organization designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey – suggests that Erdoğan continues to promote Turkish nationalism and militarism.</p>
<p>The runoff victory for Erdoğan comes just two weeks after his Justice and Development Party and coalition partners <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/15/erdogans-ak-party-wins-parliamentary-majority-state-media">won a parliamentary majority</a>. It means that the opposition will have no executive or legislative power to restrict Erdoğan’s agenda.</p>
<h2>Future relations with the U.S. and the West</h2>
<p>Another important and consistent characteristic of Erdoğan’s presidential campaign was his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkeys-erdogan-says-wests-provocative-policies-towards-russia-not-correct-2022-09-07/">criticism of the West</a> in general and <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-738657">the United States</a> in particular. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has accused the U.S. of a variety of perceived slights and Washington’s stance on issues affecting Turkey. In the past year, the Turkish leader has criticized over Washington’s <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/us-ignores-turkiyes-concerns-over-ypg-support-in-syria-erdogan">support of the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdish PKK</a> and protested the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/26/turkey-files-protest-with-greece-and-us-as-aegean-tensions-rise">deployment of U.S. armored vehicles</a> on two Greek Islands. Meanwhile, he has pointedly distanced himself from NATO allies on the issue of Russian sanctions, and instead <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/middleeast/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-interview-mime-intl/index.html">talked up Turkey’s “special relationship”</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>In mid-April, Erdoğan framed the election <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-bu-secimle-birlikte-batiya-bir-mesaj-verecek">as a chance for voters to “send a message to the West”</a> which, he claimed, was supporting the opposition candidate. “This country does not look at what the West says, neither when fighting terrorism nor in determining its economic policies,” <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-to-give-message-to-west-on-may-14-president-erdogan-/2870668">he said</a>.</p>
<p>Some of this was campaign rhetoric. And Erdoğan may make some attempts to heal rifts with Western countries, such as approving <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation/">Sweden’s NATO membership bid</a> – something he has to date refused to do over what <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-says-turkey-start-ratifying-finlands-nato-bid-2023-03-17/">Turkey sees as the Nordic country’s harboring</a> of Kurdish terrorists.</p>
<p>But even such a concession would not amount to a transformation of Erdoğan’s deeply critical attitude to Western countries overall.</p>
<p>Indeed, the only factor that may force Erdoğan to <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040128-3.html">return Turkey to a pro-Western position</a> is Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis – which might necessitate the support of wealthy Western states and institutions.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Turkey’s shaky economy?</h2>
<p>Since 2018, the Turkish economy has <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/how-erdogans-pseudoscience-ruining-turkish-economy-1">shown symptoms of a crisis</a>. Turkey’s currency, the lira, has fallen in value precipitously. In March, it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/turkish-lira-falls-record-low-near-19-dollar-2023-03-09/">fell to a new low</a> of 19 to the dollar. Moreover, in 2022, the annual <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">inflation rate surpassed 80%</a>.</p>
<p>In order to win the elections, Erdoğan pursued several policies that appealed to voters but may further stress the economy and bleed national reserves. They include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-eliminates-age-requirement-retirement-2022-12-28/">dropping the retirement age</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-gives-civil-servants-45-percent-pay-rise-in-turkeys-tight-election-race/">giving a 45% pay raise to public workers</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, economic crisis and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/07/world/asia/turkey-inflation-doctors.html">authoritarian policies</a> have resulted in a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42433668">brain drain</a>” with many educated young people moving to Western European countries.</p>
<p>If the election result leads to a further exodus of skilled, educated workers, then it will only weaken Turkey’s capability of confronting its economic crisis. Such thinking could nudge Erdoğan towards a rethink over policies that alienate younger, secular Turks.</p>
<p>It could also force Erdoğan to reevaluate his foreign policy. At present, the Turkish leader has looked to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7I54Dj6Clw">Qatar, Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d1b33e56-2835-4d04-8387-ba1d8dc55646">Russia</a> for financial support. If this appears to be insufficient, Erdoğan may be forced to seek stronger relations with the United States to facilitate financial aid from the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations.</p>
<p>Erdoğan won the election without making any promises of change regarding domestic or foreign policy. But if the economic crisis he faces fails to abate, change may be forced upon him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Long-term Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was reelected with 52% of the vote. Will he push the country further down an autocratic, anti-West path?Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062932023-05-29T01:10:37Z2023-05-29T01:10:37ZHow Erdogan held onto power in Turkey, and what this means for the country’s future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528727/original/file-20230529-210960-m9kgkc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=112%2C25%2C4010%2C2761&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ali Unal/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recep Tayyib Erdogan will remain president of Turkey for another five years after winning Sunday’s run-off election over his long-time rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. If he serves the full five-year term, he will have held power for 26 years – almost the entire history of Turkey in the 21st century.</p>
<p>What is astonishing is how the majority of Turkish people elected Erdogan despite a worsening economy and now chronic hyperinflation that would likely bring down any government in a democratic country. </p>
<p>So, how did Erdogan win the election and, more significantly, what is likely to happen in the country in the foreseeable future?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-framed-his-science-and-tech-great-achievements-as-part-of-election-campaign-206029">How Erdoğan framed his science and tech 'great achievements' as part of election campaign</a>
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<h2>Free but far from fair</h2>
<p>The election was free in that political parties could put forth nominees on their own and carry out campaigns. Parties also had the right to have representatives in every polling station to ensure the votes were counted correctly. And voters were free to vote. </p>
<p>However, the election was far from fair.</p>
<p>First, a potential leading rival in the race, Ekrem Imamoglu, was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/14/turkey-erdogan-ekrem-imamoglu/">sentenced</a> in December to more than two years in prison on a charge of “insulting public figures”.</p>
<p>Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, dealt Erdogan’s party a rare <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/23/erdogan-faces-scrutiny-once-more-as-istanbul-goes-back-to-the-polls">defeat in the 2019 Istanbul elections</a>. Polls had shown he could win against Erdogan in the presidential election by a comfortable margin. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">argue</a> the court ruling was politically motivated. With Imamoglu out of the picture, the opposition had to coalesce behind Kilicdaroglu, the weakest of all possible high-profile candidates.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1660345098981318658"}"></div></p>
<p>Erdogan also has an almost ubiquitous <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/turkey-erdogans-grip-media-threatens-fair-elections">grip over the Turkish media</a>, engineered through Fahrettin Altun, the head of media and communication at the presidential palace.</p>
<p>Turkish media are either directly owned by Erdogan’s relatives, such as the popular Sabah newspaper managed by Sedat Albayrak, or controlled through managing editors appointed and monitored by Altun. Some independent internet news sites such as <a href="https://t24.com.tr/">T24</a> practice self-censorship in order to remain operational. </p>
<p>With this massive media control, Erdogan and his men ensured he had the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-opposition-43f8d2c0aba17958c8e7123cf39eeabf">most television airtime</a>. Erdogan was depicted in the media as a world leader advancing Turkey by building airports, roads and bridges. He was put in front of dozens of journalists on TV, but all the questions were prepared in advance and Erdogan read his answers through a prompter.</p>
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<p>Altun also orchestrated a massive smear campaign against Kilicdaroglu. The opposition leader <a href="https://www.turkishminute.com/2023/05/14/state-run-trt-provide-91-time-more-airtime-to-erdogan-than-to-rival-kilicdaroglu/">received minimal airtime</a>, and when he was in the media, he was depicted as an inept leader unfit to rule the country.</p>
<p>Altun not only controlled the conventional TV channels and print media, but also <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-elon-musk-twitter-turkey-elections-social-media-power/">social media</a>. On Twitter, a very influential platform in Turkey, Altun used bots and an army of paid trolls and influencers to seek to control the dialogue.</p>
<p>And it worked. Sufficient number of voters were swayed through confusion and fear that the country would be far worse if Kilicdaroglu was elected.</p>
<p>Lastly, there was the potential for fraud due to the non-transparent way the election results are processed. Once each ballot box is counted, the ballot and result sheet are transported by police in cities and the military in regional areas to the electoral commission. Both the police and military are under Erdogan’s tight control. </p>
<p>The results are then <a href="https://www.turkishminute.com/2023/05/17/allegation-of-election-fraud-cast-shadow-over-turkey-elections/">reported</a> only through the state-owned Anadolu Agency, while in the past they were reported by multiple independent agencies.</p>
<p>Even if no evidence of fraud emerges in this election, the spectre could put in doubt the integrity of the entire electoral process.</p>
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<h2>Staunch support from religious voters</h2>
<p>There are two other factors that were decisive in the elections.</p>
<p>The first is the support Erdogan received from Sinan Ogan, who was third in the first round of the presidential election two weeks ago, with 5.2% of the votes. Erdogan persuaded <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-22/turkey-s-presidential-loser-could-emerge-as-key-player-in-runoff#xj4y7vzkg">Ogan to throw his support</a> to him. </p>
<p>The second and most important factor was the way Erdogan was viewed in an almost mythical fashion by conservative and religious voters. For them, Erdogan is a religious hero and saviour.</p>
<p>The religious population in Turkey has long suffered persecution in the name of secularism. For them, Kilicdaroglu and his Republican People’s Party symbolised that persecution. Although Kilicdaroglu abandoned the party’s previous strict secular policies, these voters never forgave it for preventing Muslim women from wearing the head scarf in educational and state institutions and keeping religion out of public life and politics for decades. </p>
<p>The conservative and religious right in Turkey sees Erdogan as a world leader and a hero who struggled against ill-intentioned forces, both internally and externally, to make Turkey great again. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528739/original/file-20230529-25-9tnjz5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Erdogan supporters celebrate his victory in Istanbul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Emrah Gurel/AP</span></span>
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<h2>What is likely to happen in Turkey post-election?</h2>
<p>Turkey desperately needed a change of government and a breath of fresh air. Now the social, political and economic suffocation is likely to get worse. </p>
<p>Erdogan had promised a Turkish revival by 2023, which is the <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2023/01/04/opinion/turkey-turns-100-its-democratic-future-still-has-not-arrived/">100th anniversary</a> of the republic’s founding. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world by then. However, Turkey barely sits in the top 20, at 19th.</p>
<p>The economy has experienced a significant downturn in the past three years. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-crisis-is-a-textbook-example-of-what-not-to-do-with-interest-rates-172709?gclid=CjwKCAjw1MajBhAcEiwAagW9MQQdaZXJvhUkboFsSTzbP8M60NuLd2mFpDd3fX6xphAxMfXsqikRnRoC6mcQAvD_BwE">Turkish lira has plummeted</a> in value, leading to a dollar-based economy. </p>
<p>But dollars are hard to come by. The Turkish Central Bank kept the economy afloat by emptying its reserves in the last few months for the elections. The Central Bank has been <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkiyes-current-account-deficit-at-8-8-billion-182256">running a current account deficit</a> of US$8-10 billion dollars every month, and its reserves last week <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-cenbanks-net-forex-reserves-negative-first-time-since-2002-2023-05-25/#:%7E:text=The%20central%20bank's%20forex%20reserves,since%20the%20end%20of%202022.">fell into the negative</a> for the first time since 2002.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1661096189540835333"}"></div></p>
<p>Now Erdogan has to find money. He will resort to high interest foreign loans and embark on a diplomatic spree of the oil-rich Muslim countries to draw some of their funds to Turkey. The uncertainty around how successful these endeavours will be and their likely short-term gain may throw the Turkish economy into recession.</p>
<p>For the people of Turkey, this could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living. The <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/11/03/annual-inflation-in-turkey-reaches-record-25-year-high-of-855">inflation rate had reached a 24-year high of 85.5%</a> last year, and may go even higher, as the cash-strapped government continues to print digital money to pay for its large bureaucratic workforce.</p>
<p>On foreign policy, Erdogan will continue to try to become a regional power independent of NATO, the European Union and the US. He will likely continue to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-special-relationship-russia-grow-recep-tayyip-erdogan-valdimir-putin/">strengthen Turkey’s ties</a> with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has been a worry for Turkey’s Western allies.</p>
<h2>What does the future hold?</h2>
<p>This will be Erdogan’s absolute last term in office, according to the Turkish constitution, and it could possibly be cut short. </p>
<p>The 69-year-old president has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-29/turkey-s-erdogan-returns-to-campaign-trail-after-stomach-illness#xj4y7vzkg">many health problems</a>. He is becoming increasingly physically frail, finding it hard to walk, and his speech often slurs. In coming years, his health may get worse and he may have to hand over his presidency to a trusted deputy.</p>
<p>The other possibility is that potential leaders in his party could decide to carry out a party coup to topple Erdogan before his term is up, so they can garner public support ahead of the 2028 presidential election.</p>
<p>While there may be some political stability in post-election Turkey for now, the country will be in economic, social and political turmoil for the foreseeable future.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-erdogan-took-a-page-from-us-presidents-and-boosted-reelection-campaign-by-claiming-to-have-killed-a-terrorist-205369">Turkey's Erdoğan took a page from US presidents and boosted reelection campaign by claiming to have killed a terrorist</a>
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<p><em>Correction: This piece has been amended to say that if the Turkish economy slips into recession, it could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living, instead of reduced cost of living.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy Limited. </span></em></p>Turkey desperately needed a change in government and a breath of fresh air. Now the social, political and economic suffocation is likely to get worse.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2064732023-05-26T16:55:19Z2023-05-26T16:55:19ZTurkey’s presidential runoff: 4 essential reads on what’s at stake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528620/original/file-20230526-23155-b6trtr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C53%2C5858%2C3870&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Erdoğan or Kılıçdaroğlu -- which one will be flying high after the runoff? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flags-fly-over-taksim-square-showing-turkeys-president-news-photo/1489812545?adppopup=true">Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkish voters will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-election-2023-whats-stake-runoff-2023-05-26/">head to the polls on May 28, 2023</a>, for the second time in the month – this time facing a choice between a winnowed field of two candidates, each of whom is vowing to take the country in a very different direction.</p>
<p>The fact that the presidential vote has gone to a runoff is no great surprise – polls <a href="https://globeelectionshistorysociety.wordpress.com/2023/05/15/tr-pe2023-final-projection-r1/">had predicted</a> that none of the initial candidates would get above the 50% mark needed to be declared the outright winner. Nor is the binary choice in front of voters a shock. Turkish people have long known that the likely option would be between sticking with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogans-milestones-before-turkeys-election-2023-05-07/">incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, who has ruled the country for two decades, or throw their lot in with main <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/03/1172704065/turkey-election-candidate-kemal-kilicsdaroglu-erdogan-challenger">opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu</a>.</p>
<p>But the fact that Erdoğan enters the runoff as the favorite, having secured more votes in the first round, is something that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-lags-election-rival-closely-watched-poll-2023-05-11/">earlier polls had not predicted</a>.</p>
<p>Here are four stories from The Conversation’s Turkish election coverage that help contextualize the choice in front of voters, and how it could impact the future direction of the nation.</p>
<h2>1. Erdoğan defies the polls</h2>
<p>How did Erdoğan enter the runoff weekend in such a strong position? </p>
<p>The assumption was that he might have sunk under the combined weight of a faltering economy, concerns about his authoritarian style and a widely held perception that he mishandled a devastating earthquake just months before the vote.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/graduate-students/yasun-salih.html">Salih Yasun</a>, an expert on Turkish politics at Indiana University, noted, Erdoğan <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-presidential-election-how-erdogan-defied-the-polls-to-head-into-runoff-as-favorite-205719">had some things going for him</a> as the campaign took shape. First off, he was able to use state resources, and utilized control over a large section of the media to bolster his bid for reelection.</p>
<p>He has also mitigated falling support for his AKP party by adding smaller Islamist and nationalist parties to his coalition. </p>
<p>“By doing that, he has allowed his base to vote for coalition parties other than the AKP while maintaining their support for his own candidacy within the presidential race,” wrote Yasun. </p>
<p>Meanwhile his main opponent made several missteps, such as not agreeing to public debates and bypassing primary elections to secure his candidacy as opposition leader. In addition, under Kılıçdaroğlu, the opposition party has become more of a catchall organization at the cost of presenting a clear social democratic message, Yasun argued.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-presidential-election-how-erdogan-defied-the-polls-to-head-into-runoff-as-favorite-205719">Turkey's presidential election – how Erdoğan defied the polls to head into runoff as favorite</a>
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<h2>2. Claiming counterterrorism success</h2>
<p>There is another potential factor in Erdoğan’s outperforming of the polls in the first round: his political use of counterterrorism.</p>
<p>Just as it looked like the long-standing Turkish leader was struggling to achieve any momentum, events played into his hands. On April 30, 2023,
the suspected leader of the Islamic State group, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi, was said to have been killed in an apparent Turkish strike in Syria.</p>
<p>Terrorism and political science scholars <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/staffmembers/graig-klein#tab-1">Graig Klein</a> and <a href="https://www.gettysburg.edu/academic-programs/political-science/faculty/employee_detail.dot?empId=011229447120013384&pageTitle=Scott+Simon+Boddery">Scott Boddery</a> noted how <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-erdogan-took-a-page-from-us-presidents-and-boosted-reelection-campaign-by-claiming-to-have-killed-a-terrorist-205369">Erdoğan claimed credit for the operation</a>, echoing a tried and tested tactic by leaders around the world.</p>
<p>“The targeted killing of al-Qurashi was announced three days after Erdoğan fell sick on national TV and the same day he returned to the campaign trail. The counterterrorism strike created an opportunity for Erdoğan to focus domestic attention on his national security credentials, his role in the anti-Islamic State coalition, and his abilities to be an authoritative and strong leader,” Klein and Boddery wrote.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-erdogan-took-a-page-from-us-presidents-and-boosted-reelection-campaign-by-claiming-to-have-killed-a-terrorist-205369">Turkey's Erdoğan took a page from US presidents and boosted reelection campaign by claiming to have killed a terrorist</a>
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<h2>3. Pushing science and tech credentials</h2>
<p>But it wasn’t only his self-proclaimed counterterrorism credentials that Erdoğan was pushing to the electorate. As <a href="https://www.lborolondon.ac.uk/about/staff/dr-merve-sancak/">Merve Sancak</a>, a lecturer in political economy at the U.K.’s Loughborough University, noted, the incumbent centered much of his campaign around what <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-framed-his-science-and-tech-great-achievements-as-part-of-election-campaign-206029">he framed as his “great achievements</a>” in putting Turkey firmly on the science and tech map.</p>
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<img alt="A man in suit and tie exits a red car." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528632/original/file-20230526-25028-1dir73.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Erdoğan stands next to his Togg T10X, Turkey’s first domestically produced electric car.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-stands-next-to-his-news-photo/1250748150?adppopup=true">Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>As others pointed to soaring inflation and a sluggish economy, Erdoğan trumpeted a series of initiatives in the lead-in to the first-round vote. These included plans to send a Turkish astronaut to the International Space Station, the launching of an aerospace and technology festival, and state-of-the-art military projects. He even took to driving around in the first “Togg” car – the result of a project to produce a domestically made Turkish national car.</p>
<p>“Erdoğan clearly hoped that these announcements would boost his popularity by creating an image of Turkey becoming a world leader in science and technology,” wrote Sancak.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-erdogan-framed-his-science-and-tech-great-achievements-as-part-of-election-campaign-206029">How Erdoğan framed his science and tech 'great achievements' as part of election campaign</a>
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<h2>4. After 100 years, what’s next for Turkey?</h2>
<p>Later in 2023, Turkey is set to celebrate its centenary as a modern republic. <a href="https://politicalscience.sdsu.edu/people/kuru">Ahmet Kuru</a>, a political scientist at San Diego State University, argued that <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">what is presented to the electorate</a> is two distinct visions ahead of that landmark occasion: a future in line with that of the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, or one that takes Turkey further down an autocratic, religious path.</p>
<p>“Erdoğan seeks to win the election to present himself as the founder of ‘a new Turkey,’ where populist Islamism prevails. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, wants to revive Atatürk’s secular vision, with certain democratic revisions,” Kuru wrote.</p>
<p>Which way Turkish voters turn will have ripple affects across the world, Kuru added.</p>
<p>“An Erdoğan win will signal that the global rise of right-wing populists is still robust enough to dominate a leading Muslim-majority country. A victory for Kılıçdaroğlu, meanwhile, may be celebrated by democrats worldwide as a defeat of a populist Islamist leader, despite his control over the media and state institutions.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">In centennial year, Turkish voters will choose between Erdoğan’s conservative path and the founder’s modernist vision</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan faces opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a second-round vote that will decide the future trajectory of Turkey’s politics.Matt Williams, Senior International EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060292023-05-26T13:52:59Z2023-05-26T13:52:59ZHow Erdoğan framed his science and tech ‘great achievements’ as part of election campaign<p>President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has ruled Turkey for the last 21 years. In the first few terms of his rule, Turkey experienced significant <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/8ca5e1cc-5c01-53f4-b404-e735aca40aa0">economic growth</a> and a <a href="https://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-9789264235120-en.htm">reduction</a> in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1024529419888430">inequality</a>. This was widely believed to be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379412000261">a reason</a> for Erdoğan’s long-term popularity.</p>
<p>However, inflation hit a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/turkeys-inflation-hits-24-year-high-855-after-rate-cuts-2022-11-03/https:/www.reuters.com/markets/asia/turkeys-inflation-hits-24-year-high-855-after-rate-cuts-2022-11-03/">24-year high of 85.5%</a> in November 2022, creating speculation that economic instability would count against Erdoğan in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/23/turkey-election-2023-runoff-vote-erdogan-endorsed-by-sinan-ogan">2023 general election</a>.</p>
<p>Despite this, in the first round of the election <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/5/15/turkey-election-results-live-run-off-likely-with-erdogan-leading">Erdoğan</a> attracted 49.5% of the vote. Some <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/05/04/if-turkey-sacks-its-strongman-democrats-everywhere-should-take-heart">argued</a> that what Erdoğan calls his “<a href="https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-yuzyili-destanini-85-milyon-olarak-hep-beraber-yazacagiz-42261516">great achievements</a>” in science and technology were a significant reason for his continued popularity.</p>
<p>In the weeks before the first round, Erdoğan made a flurry of announcements about his “great achievements” and upcoming projects. He unveiled plans for Turkey to send its first astronaut to the International Space Station by the end of the year. The <a href="https://www.teknofest.org/en/">Teknofest Aerospace and Technology Festival</a> was held to showcase many of these projects to the public. Erdoğan also showed off Turkey’s new multipurpose <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Erdogan-s-defense-heavy-campaign-shows-off-new-drone-carrier">amphibious assault ship</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/major-tech-event-teknofest-to-exhibit-new-turkish-armed-drone-tb3/2856942">a new Turkish armed drone</a>, capable of taking off from <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/major-tech-event-teknofest-to-exhibit-new-turkish-armed-drone-tb3/2856942">aircraft carriers</a>.</p>
<p>Erdoğan clearly hoped that these announcements would boost his popularity, by creating an image of <a href="https://www.setav.org/soylesi-cumhurbaskani-recep-tayyip-erdogan-secimler-icin-kampanya-stratejimizi-21-yil-once-hazirlamaya-basladik/">Turkey becoming a world leader</a> in science and technology. Erdoğan’s government also oversaw the country’s <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/turkiye/2017/09/15/turk-akimi-projesi-icin-57-bin-709-agac-kesilecek">Black Sea natural gas pipeline project</a>, an attempt to make Turkey <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-61793078">energy independent</a>. <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkiyes-defense-spending-expected-to-constitute-2-of-gdp-by-2025">And more than £55 billion</a> had been invested in the national defence industry as part of a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Erdogan-s-defense-heavy-campaign-shows-off-new-drone-carrier">plan to make Turkey a world leader in defence products</a>.</p>
<h2>Creating Turkey’s own car</h2>
<p>Although the car industry has had <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-production-national-institutions-and-skill-formation-9780198860655?cc=gb&lang=en&">an important role in Turkey’s economy</a>, it has been dominated by <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-production-national-institutions-and-skill-formation-9780198860655?cc=gb&lang=en&">foreign car companies</a>. But the idea of having a national car brand has had a long history. In 1961 the <a href="https://wizard3417.wordpress.com/2016/12/31/devrim-cars-rejuvenation-of-the-hope-of-creating-cars-in-turkey/">military government attempted</a> to develop the first Turkish car, <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/museum-dedicated-to-1st-domestic-car-devrim-reopens-in-eskisehir/news">Devrim</a>, as a symbol of modern Turkey, but it was not very successful. This desire for a Turkish national car was even made into <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1282139/">a popular film</a>.</p>
<p>In 2017, Erdoğan invited <a href="https://www.bcct.org.tr/news/the-new-turkish-electric-car-togg-to-be-launched-before-2022/70964">six business groups</a> to produce a <a href="https://www.cnnturk.com/ekonomi/11-yil-once-bu-sozlerle-baslamisti-iste-ilk-yerli-elektrikli-otomobil-toggun-hikayesi?page=1">100% domestic and national car by 2023</a>, a year that marked the 100th anniversary of Turkey’s republic as well as being an election year.</p>
<p>The six business groups and the <a href="https://www.sanayi.gov.tr/anasayfa">ministry of science, technology and industry</a> formed <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-29/erdogan-set-to-roll-out-first-turkish-ev-ahead-of-elections?leadSource=uverify%20wall">Türkiye’s Automobile Joint Venture Group</a> (Togg) in 2019, aiming to build the first fully Turkish-made car, which was also going to be an electric vehicle. Togg received the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12713">highest support package</a> believed to have been given to any automotive firm in Europe and North America (about £2.8 billion).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A big car in the middle of a ring surrounded by people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528367/original/file-20230525-25-y3f8rb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Production of Turkey’s first domestically produced electric car has been framed as a big success for President Erdogan’s government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">muhennak/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the extensive financial support and hype, the Togg car could not be “100% domestic and national” because <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dech.12713">domestic suppliers didn’t have the capacity</a> to make the key parts. Crucial complex and expensive components, such as the battery, had to be imported.</p>
<p>In the end, only 51% of the Togg car was domestically sourced. This led to a change in the way it was described, rather than a “100% domestic and national” car Erdoğan began calling it “the car of Türkiye” and claimed the product as a Turkish industrial win.</p>
<h2>Social costs</h2>
<p>With political economists <a href="https://www.gaborscheiring.com/">Gabor Scheiring</a> and <a href="https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?auteur1784">Tamas Gerocs</a> I have been investigating the implications of the policies related to Turkey’s car industry on social and economic development. Policy interventions that led to the development of Togg and Erdoğan’s other “achievements” came <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745343112/the-condition-of-the-working-class-in-turkey/">at the expense of workers</a>. Changes during the Erdoğan years made <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44157664">subcontracting</a> legal for big firms, resulting in more <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/global-production-national-institutions-and-skill-formation-9780198860655?cc=gb&amp;amp;lang=en&amp;amp">insecure and low-paid employment</a>.</p>
<p>Membership of unions <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00263206.2014.987665?casa_token=u-qzks03KAsAAAAA%3AaWdyvaqPRGiEAq22z9G6djQ9h2qIXzpr4b_R4M15Ls_U9FuWrlAwAM5DD4tYxdfz1t6EyTjcN0eTtw">decreased by 46% from 2001-2011</a>, making Turkey the country with the lowest level of unionisation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/toggun-bursadaki-fabrika-insaatinda-bir-isci-oldu-haber-1535463">Labour rights abuses</a> were reported in Togg’s plant.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/J3LRQl69XIA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">President Erdogan and the new “national” car.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most people in Turkey are <a href="https://finans.mynet.com/haber/detay/otomotiv/bir-otomobil-kac-asgari-maas-ile-alinabiliyor-yillara-gore-asgari-maas-ve-otomobil-fiyatlari-karsilastirilmasi/429933/">unable to afford to buy a new average car</a>, let alone the Togg car, which will be sold for Turkish lira 953,000 (£38,500). This is about 112 times the minimum wage. <a href="https://disk.org.tr/2021/12/disk-ar-asgari-ucret-gercegi-raporu-2022-yayimlandi/#:%7E:text=%C3%96zel%20sekt%C3%B6r%20i%C5%9F%C3%A7ilerinin%20y%C3%BCzde%2021,si%20ve%20alt%C4%B1nda%20%C3%BCcretlerle%20%C3%A7al%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1yor.">More than 70% of workers</a> in Turkey earn the minimum wage or less.</p>
<p>Togg received <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2174607">extensive public support</a> despite its inability to keep the promise of a 100% Turkish car and deteriorating working conditions. In a survey, <a href="http://busbed.bingol.edu.tr/tr/pub/issue/57327/731882">94%</a> of the population supported the initiative and this support was primarily based on nationalist and patriotic grounds, such as “<a href="http://busbed.bingol.edu.tr/tr/pub/issue/57327/731882">helping one’s own country</a>”.</p>
<p>The car was portrayed as a major success that would add “<a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/automotive/2017/11/02/5-turkish-companies-take-part-in-consortium-for-domestically-made-car-production">success to Turkey’s list of ongoing achievements</a>”. Erdoğan described Togg as the “<a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/togg-first-turkish-vehicle-sharing-pride-of-85-million-turks-erdogan-178088">shared pride of Türkiye and 85 million people</a>”. The businesses involved in Togg were declared “<a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/automotive/2017/11/02/5-turkish-companies-take-part-in-consortium-for-domestically-made-car-production">brave fellows</a>”.</p>
<p>Even supporters of the <a href="https://www.mynet.com/babala-tv-de-oguzhan-ugur-un-konugu-olan-kemal-kilicdaroglu-ndan-togg-aciklamasi-cikip-televizyonlarda-anlatmadim-110107128025">opposition</a> were in favour of Togg and criticised opposition leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/kemal-k-l-cdaroglu-turkeys-opposition-leader-is-leading-in-the-polls-heres-what-you-need-to-know-205162">Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu</a> for not showing enough support for such an important initiative.</p>
<h2>Rallying nationalist support</h2>
<p>It is no surprise that Erdoğan’s “great achievements” were at <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Turkey-elections/Turkey-s-Erdogan-touts-accomplishments-ahead-of-tight-election">the centre of his election campaign</a>. Just days before the first round, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3LRQl69XIA">drove around in the first Togg car</a> to get media coverage. He said the car “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-29/erdogan-set-to-roll-out-first-turkish-ev-ahead-of-elections?leadSource=uverify%20wall">will hit the roads of Europe with all of its models</a>” soon and the Europeans “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-29/erdogan-set-to-roll-out-first-turkish-ev-ahead-of-elections?leadSource=uverify%20wall">will say ‘crazy Turks’ are coming</a>”.</p>
<p>The government has created an understanding that every Turk must work “hard to elevate the country to the level of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718519303513">developed civilizations</a>”. Low pay and insecure employment are the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718519303513">sacrifices</a> workers must make for their country to reach this goal. Those who die in work accidents such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32709431">mining disaster in Soma</a> are called <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/somadaki-maden-sehitleri-aniliyor/2586924">martyrs</a>.</p>
<p>However, without being able to turn around the economy, Erdoğan’s projection of Turkish success and place in the world would seem to have been a winner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Merve Sancak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Erdoğan has been hoping his government’s science wins would spark a wave of patriotic support.Merve Sancak, Lecturer in Political Economy, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2053692023-05-24T12:18:30Z2023-05-24T12:18:30ZTurkey’s Erdoğan took a page from US presidents and boosted reelection campaign by claiming to have killed a terrorist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527549/original/file-20230522-4578-qb5exw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C12%2C8013%2C5314&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Man on track: Turkish President Erdoğan, center, did better in his reelection campaign than predicted.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-attends-the-debut-of-news-photo/1252478070?adppopup=true">Emin Sansar/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed credit on April 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/erdogan-says-turkey-has-killed-suspected-isil-leader">for killing</a> Islamic State group leader Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi in Syria, it may not have been simply a straightforward announcement of victory over the leader of a terrorist group. </p>
<p>History suggests the operation against al-Qurashi could have been an effort to boost Erdoğan’s reelection campaign.</p>
<p>When the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/5/15/turkey-election-results-live-run-off-likely-with-erdogan-leading">results from Turkey’s presidential election</a> on May 14, 2023, came in, they showed no clear winner. Neither long-serving President Erdoğan nor the main challenger, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, won 50% of the votes. But Erdoğan came close and did better than predicted. Polls leading up to the election <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/14/turkey-opinion-poll-tracker-erdogan-vs-kilicdaroglu">had shown Kılıçdaroğlu consistently leading by 5 to 10 percentage points</a>. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-election-runoff-2023-what-you-need-know-2023-05-18/">A runoff is scheduled</a> for May 28.</p>
<p>So what changed and how did Erdoğan make up so much ground so quickly?</p>
<p>One answer is Erdoğan’s <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380151">political use of counterterrorism</a>. </p>
<h2>Tough conditions for reelection</h2>
<p>Leading up to the election, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview">Turkey’s domestic economy was in decline</a>. Erdoğan’s tenure appeared uncertain because of a series of political missteps. It was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/14/erdogans-grip-on-power-tested-as-turkey-goes-to-the-polls">a difficult path to reelection</a>. </p>
<p>Adding to these hurdles, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/28/1172836561/turkeys-erdogan-cancels-election-appearances-after-falling-ill">had to demonstrate he was healthy enough</a> to continue in office. He had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65409951">fallen ill when he was on TV</a> on April 27 and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/29/erdogan-returns-from-three-day-campaign-absence-due-to-illness">suspended his campaign for three days</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mX4CH8cAAAAJ&hl=en">political scientists</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=g0xQ--gAAAAJ&hl=en">who study</a> foreign policy decision-making, we know that, faced with such scenarios, elected leaders are often motivated to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111408">gamble for resurrection</a> by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693556">demonstrating strength</a>, resolve and capability. They do this through a kind of aggressive foreign policy known in our field as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1958273">political use of force</a>, or <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111653">diversionary use of force</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large white building with rubble near it and farm fields behind it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The building in Syria where Turkey claims it killed the so-called leader of the Daesh/ISIS terrorist organization, al-Qurashi, in an operation carried out by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-aerial-view-of-the-building-where-the-so-called-leader-news-photo/1252469437?adppopup=true">Bekir Kasim/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ultimate diversion</h2>
<p>Leaders who undertake this kind of action hope a successful military endeavor will divert the public’s attention from the administration’s domestic shortcomings. </p>
<p>Such shortcomings come in a variety of forms – high unemployment, high inflation, a stalled legislative agenda or even political scandal. These leaders have little power to rectify the problems alone, and the incentive to use military force is heightened further by the uncertainty of an approaching election. </p>
<p>This is not only a theoretical argument. In the U.S., presidents are more likely to break covert mission protocol and claim credit from <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380151">successful drone strikes</a> when they have political incentives to distract the public from a weak economy or negative domestic debates.</p>
<p>Historically – and routinely – national leaders have attempted to garner political support through the use of military force that predictably boosts domestic sentiments of nationalism and patriotism. For example, President George H.W. Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama aimed to “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48608710">cure his political image problems at home</a>,” as political scientist Jane Kellett Cramer wrote. </p>
<p>At the height of his impeachment scandal in 1998, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346926">President Bill Clinton ordered counterterrorism airstrikes</a> against al-Qaida. The 2011 U.S. <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/19/barack-obama-libya-airstrikes-1224550">airstrikes on Libya were ordered</a> by President Barack Obama in the depths of economic turmoil – high unemployment and a negative economic growth rate.</p>
<p>This phenomenon extends beyond the U.S. In May 1978, Belgium faced an economic crisis. Uniformed soldiers were protesting on the streets. Government was gridlocked. Prime Minister Leo Tindermans <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621715">tried to overcome those problems by deploying soldiers</a> to evacuate Europeans threatened by fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, then called Zaire. </p>
<p>In 1982, Argentina’s military junta was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028354">facing escalating public disorder and declining support</a>. President Leopoldo Galtieri announced the country’s invasion of the Falkland Islands and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804784931-006">crowds cheered on the streets</a>. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1693618">junta overlooked</a> British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s own domestic political turmoil. The British military quickly responded and retook the islands. Thatcher flaunted the successful operation, rallying the British public behind her government.</p>
<h2>A new frontier</h2>
<p>Studying political use of force is notoriously difficult for a variety of reasons. Not all presidents have the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299604900306">opportunity</a> to use force abroad. And when political leaders are under pressure and most likely to seek a diversion with an attack, potential targets often de-escalate to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00123">avoid confrontation</a>.</p>
<p>But counterterrorism efforts have created a unique scenario in which there is always opportunity to strike. Successful operations against terrorist targets produce a comparatively pronounced increase in public support.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211019904">Our research</a> investigates modern-day counterterrorism tactics, which we find can generate a larger bump in approval than traditional military operations. </p>
<p>In an experiment, we asked a sample of Americans to evaluate their support for a president in office during a declining economy and increasing unemployment. The approval ratings were predictably quite low. </p>
<p>Approval ratings increased under those same domestic conditions when respondents were also informed that a successful counterterrorism operation had just occurred. And when the counterterrorism operation involved a drone strike, and thus little risk to service members, support was at its highest and changed from disapproval to approval of the president’s performance.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A huge crowd, with many carrying red flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters wave flags and chant slogans while waiting for CHP Party presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to arrive at a campaign rally on April 30, 2023, in Izmir, Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-wave-flags-and-chant-slogans-while-waiting-for-news-photo/1486600794?adppopup=true">Burak Kara/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>For Erdoğan, favorable timing and conditions</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s claim of the targeted killing of the Islamic State’s al-Qurashi fits the profile of political use of counterterrorism in two important ways: Turkey’s domestic economic and political conditions and the strike’s timing. </p>
<p>In the lead-up to the 2023 presidential election, with the domestic economy in decline, his physical health questioned and a credible challenger, Erdoğan was faced with an extraordinarily tough reelection environment. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan">Erdoğan was first elected in 2014</a>. Since then, Turkey has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-election-runoff-2023-what-you-need-know-2023-05-18/">seesawed between economic expansion and decline</a>. Erdoğan championed Turkish nationalism and religious identity and escalated ethnic <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups">tensions with the Kurdish minority</a> – including conflict with and counterterrorism against the Kurdish groups known as PKK. Erdoğan has sometimes played an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/13/turkey-erdogan-nato-crucial-corrosive-ally/">oversize role in international politics</a> and at others times has been a political pariah, particularly after <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/15/turkeys-failed-coup-attempt-all-you-need-to-know">his response to the 2016 coup</a> attempt.</p>
<p>Since May 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/we-cant-afford-anything-turkeys-cost-of-living-crisis-threatens-erdogans-re-2023-05-08/">currency devaluation</a> has created a significant cost-of-living problem in Turkey. The Turkish lira has declined by nearly 27% against the euro and slightly over 22% against the U.S. dollar. The weak economy and socioeconomic struggles were <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/10/turkey-erdogan-economy-election-earthquake-recovery/">exacerbated by earthquakes in February 2023</a> that caused extraordinary human and physical destruction. </p>
<p>Erdoğan is the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/turkey-syria-earthquake-erdogan-elections-negligence/">face of government corruption</a> and inadequate oversight and regulation of construction contracts blamed for the devastation. </p>
<p>And the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-president-erdogans-grip-on-power-threatened-by-devastating-earthquake-200033">government is criticized</a> for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/01/turkey-erdogan-earthquake-apk-strongman-authoritarianism-democracy-military-disaster-relief/">slow and insufficient disaster response</a> and relief operations. </p>
<p>While Erdoğan is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-20-year-rule-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-transformed-turkey-188211">criticized and lauded</a> for many <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-issues-erdogan-947c641990cb6a88d9c332fca184e062">domestic</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/turkeys-growing-foreign-policy-ambitions">international policies</a>, the domestic issues are potentially insurmountable and are difficult to solve through standard policymaking.</p>
<p>The targeted killing of al-Qurashi was announced three days after Erdoğan fell sick on national TV and the same day he returned to the campaign trail. The counterterrorism strike created an opportunity for Erdoğan to focus domestic attention on his national security credentials, his role in the anti-Islamic State coalition, and his abilities to be an authoritative and strong leader. </p>
<p>Counterterrorism has long played a pivotal role in Turkish politics. An <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1940457">analysis of Turkey-PKK conflict data</a> from 2004 to 2018 shows that when the Turkish government was challenged by domestic economic decline and needed to generate political support, the number of Turkish Armed Forces operations against the PKK increased. </p>
<p><a href="https://dronewars.net/tag/turkey/">Turkey’s</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2020.1743488">rapid proliferation</a> and <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/the-future-of-drone-warfare-striking-at-home/">use of weaponized drone technology</a> could usher in more political uses of counterterrorism. Indeed, al-Qurashi’s targeted killing in the midst of a looming, uncertain election fits this model perfectly. Erdoğan’s gambit could very well secure his reelection. And the May 14 election suggests it almost worked.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Invading, attacking and killing adversaries abroad can boost the political prospects of leaders doing poorly at home.Graig Klein, Assistant Professor of Terrorism & Political Violence, Leiden UniversityScott Boddery, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Law, Gettysburg CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2057192023-05-15T20:33:15Z2023-05-15T20:33:15ZTurkey’s presidential election – how Erdoğan defied the polls to head into runoff as favorite<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526290/original/file-20230515-25944-pv1hhi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C51%2C5728%2C3767&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-of-turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-news-photo/1490199979?adppopup=true">Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Turkey is heading toward a presidential runoff election on May 28, 2023, after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65600585">no candidate won more than half the votes</a> in the first round – the barrier needed to be declared an outright winner.</em></p>
<p><em>Incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has ruled the country for two decades, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-lags-election-rival-closely-watched-poll-2023-05-11/">defied polls</a> by coming closest. He will now face off against opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a second-round vote.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://syasun.com/">Salih Yasun</a>, an <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/graduate-students/yasun-salih.html">expert on Turkish politics</a> at Indiana University, to talk us through the first-round results, and what will come next.</em></p>
<h2>1) What happened in the first round of voting?</h2>
<p>Turkish voters participated in two elections on May 14, 2023: one for the presidency and one for the nation’s parliament. As of writing, 99.9% of ballot boxes have reported.</p>
<p>With 49.6% of the vote, President Erdoğan’s governing coalition – which consists of his own conservative Justice and Development Party, or AKP, the nationalist MHP and smaller Islamist parties – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/may/15/turkey-elections-2023-latest-presidential-and-parliamentary-results">earned a majority of seats</a> within the parliament: <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-erdogan-runoff-be8c7b0bcbb32eae7795a2cd84974ee4">322 of the available 600</a>. Although the de jure authority of parliament was curtailed substantively as the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/13/the-turkish-constitutional-referendum-explained/">result of a 2017 referendum</a>, controlling it would enable Erdoğan to govern without worrying about any serious challenge from parliament. If he wins the presidency, he will have a solid legislative support for his agenda.</p>
<p>In the presidential race, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/turkey-presidential-election-heads-to-runoff-as-incumbent-erdogan-surges">Erdoğan earned 49.5% of the vote</a>, which means that he will have a runoff election on May 28, 2023, with Kılıçdaroğlu, who earned 44.9% of the vote. Kılıçdaroğlu is the joint candidate of “the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-turkey-government-recep-tayyip-erdogan-49b2a7d7afa1e476d2eab40f4dbca8e4">table of six” coalition</a> – an opposition bloc that consists of parties that are secular and nationalist as well as conservative – two of which have split from the AKP.</p>
<p>In the second round, whoever reaches 50% will become the president. But Erdoğan is heading into the vote with a clear advantage and momentum, especially given that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/10/recep-tayyip-erdogan-facies-real-chance-of-losing-as-turkey-gets-ready-to-vote">polls before the vote</a> suggested he would come second in the first round. </p>
<h2>2) Why did Erdoğan do better than predicted?</h2>
<p>Multiple reasons can account for Erdoğan’s strong performance. Although Turkish citizens have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-year-end-inflation-seen-46-despite-likely-post-election-rate-hikes-2023-04-24/">suffered from severe inflation</a>, it appears that Erdoğan’s message of <a href="https://eurasiantimes.com/new-end-erdogans-reign-of-20-years-who-done/">putting national security interests</a> above economic challenges convinced a substantial portion of his conservative and nationalist base. </p>
<p>This is despite the fact that Erdoğan’s party, AKP, keeps losing popularity, particularly in metropolitan districts. The percentage of nationwide support for AKP declined from <a href="https://www.sozcu.com.tr/secim2018/">42.5% in 2018</a> to <a href="https://secim.aa.com.tr/">35.6% in 2023</a>. </p>
<p>However, Erdoğan manages to remain afloat by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-13/turkey-s-erdogan-looks-to-islamic-fringe-refah-huda-to-boost-electoral-alliance">adding small Islamist</a> and nationalist parties to his coalition. By doing that, he has allowed his base to vote for coalition parties other than the AKP while maintaining their support for his own candidacy within the presidential race. It is not uncommon to hear people in Turkey complain about corruption and dissatisfaction in the country’s economic performance who keep voting for Erdoğan as national leader. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, regions hit by an earthquake earlier this year did not punish Erdoğan for the poor initial response as severely as many had expected. </p>
<p>I should also add that Turkey’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/12/turkey-election-free-fair-vote-erdogan/">commitment to free and fair elections</a> <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023">has been questioned</a>. Erdoğan uses state resources and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">control over the judiciary</a> and a <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/turkey-erdogans-grip-media-threatens-fair-elections">significant portion of the media</a> for his own advantage. In a few instances, the opposition candidates were <a href="https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/ekrem-imamogluna-erzurum-mitinginde-tasli-saldiri,OR6TkZPX9kSE_cl8T1uGnA">intimidated by vigilantes</a>.</p>
<p>There were also missteps by his main rival that undermined his turnout. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/03/1172704065/turkey-election-candidate-kemal-kilicsdaroglu-erdogan-challenger">Kılıçdaroğlu</a> has been the head of the Republican People’s Party or CHP, since 2010. Under his chairmanship, his party has lost every single election and referendum except for a 2019 local ballot. Kılıçdaroğlu did not allow any public debates on his candidacy <a href="https://www.dw.com/tr/belediye-ba%C5%9Fkanlar%C4%B1-aday-olmayacak-m%C4%B1/a-58812128">and blocked</a> the nomination of two popular mayors, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, early on. </p>
<p>He tasked the “table of six” leaders with the nomination process, which was a means for him to bypass the need for primary elections and earn some mandate for his candidacy. He promised the four small parties various positions, including ministers, vice presidents and the nomination of <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/secimin-kaderini-sagduyu-belirleyecek-kilicdaroglu-ilk-turda-kazanabilir-haber-1614269">77 parliamentarians</a> on CHP’s list, in order for them to nominate him. Meanwhile he used the support of these parties to pressure Meral Akşener, the leader of IYI Party, to accept his candidacy. Although Akşener reluctantly accepted, a substantive base of IYI voted in the presidential ballot for the third candidate, Sinan Oğan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-runoff-potential-kingmaker-draws-red-line-kurdish-consessions-2023-05-15/">who earned 5.2% of the vote</a>.</p>
<p>Over the years, Kılıçdaroğlu has been accused of establishing a patrimonial and hierarchical governance structure, <a href="https://www.tamgaturk.com/chp-nin-secim-guvenligi-yine-onursal-adiguzel-e-emanet-edildi/60907/">rewarding his loyalists</a> and isolating people who <a href="https://www.odatv4.com/yazarlar/orsan-k-oymen/chp-kurultayindan-bosuna-umutlanmayin-2901181200-132216">dared to challenge him</a>. Media outlets that are financially supported by his party have <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yilmaz-ozdil-sozcu-tvden-chpyi-suclayarak-ayrildi-haber-1607029">fired journalists critical of him</a>. As a result, his own media did not critically evaluate his candidacy, and news of his popularity may have been inflated.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the ideological orientation of CHP – social democracy – has, I believe, gradually eroded, with the party becoming more of a catchall organization without a clear direction.</p>
<p>Added to this, a substantial number of voters may have been wary of a coalition government. Turkish citizens suffered substantively during the coalition governments from <a href="https://birartibir.org/uzun-on-yil-1990larin-ekonomi-politigi/">1990s through 2002</a> because of political instability and economic recession. </p>
<p>Finally, turnout in Kurdish-majority cities <a href="https://secim.aa.com.tr/">remained rather low</a>, and nationalist voters wary of any ties to HDP, the Kurdish nationalist party, shied away from voting for Kılıçdaroğluu. </p>
<h2>3) What happens next?</h2>
<p>The better-than-expected performance from Erdoğan <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/turkey-presidential-election-heads-to-runoff-as-incumbent-erdogan-surges">puts him in the driver’s seat</a> heading into the second-round vote.</p>
<p>An Erdoğan win would consolidate his <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">authoritarian style of governance</a>. It could also further weaken the opposition, with indicators that the two main opposition parties may experience a leadership struggle. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Turkish citizens will go to the ballot once again on March 31, 2024, for local elections. The two main opposition parties previously nominated joint candidates, who succeeded in winning mayoral positions in key metropolitan areas. A potential division within the opposition could enable Erdoğan’s governing AKP to expand its control over these major municipalities, such as Istanbul and Ankara. </p>
<p>Moving forward, this would be very bad news for the opposition. Erdoğan has been in power since 2002. He has ruled the country longer than any other Turkish president and even many Ottoman sultans. An additional five years would allow him to consolidate his authority within the state institutions even further.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salih Yasun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkish voters will be heading back to the polls on May 28 after no candidates managed to gain more than half the votes. But incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was boosted by a stronger-than-expected showing.Salih Yasun, PhD Candidate, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2054062023-05-15T09:48:46Z2023-05-15T09:48:46ZAfter a brutal presidential election campaign, Turkey is headed to a run-off contest. Here’s why<p>Last weekend, Turkey held a historic election that will be crucial in deciding in the way the country is heading. Although almost all pre-election polls were predicting a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/10/recep-tayyip-erdogan-facies-real-chance-of-losing-as-turkey-gets-ready-to-vote">narrow win</a> for the main opposition candidate, the results are inconclusive, and the country will go to a runoff election in two weeks’ time.</p>
<p>The new constitution <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Turkish_constitutional_referendum#:%7E:text=The%20referendum%20was%20held%20under,coup%20attempt%20in%20July%202016.&text=Early%20results%20indicated%20a%2051,to%20be%20accepted%20as%20valid.">voted in 2017</a> stipulates the parliament and presidential elections must be held at the same time. To win the presidential component of the election, a candidate must garner more than 50% of the votes. If none of the candidates receives greater than 50% of the votes, the election goes to a runoff election between the two candidates with the highest votes.</p>
<p>This is precisely the situation Turkey faces now. Incumbent President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and his closest rival, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/5/13/kilicdaroglu-the-challenger-that-could-unseat-erdogan">Kemal Kilicdaroglu</a>, will face each other in a runoff election on May 28.</p>
<h2>Who is Erdogan’s opposition and what were their arguments?</h2>
<p>There are two main blocks that fought to win in a bitter and ruthless campaign. </p>
<p>The broad opposition National Alliance is made up of six political parties, spearheaded by the Kilicdaroglu-led Republican People’s Party (CHP) party. CHP is known for its pro-secularist policies, and for this reason have been fiercely opposed by the religious segment of Turkish voters.</p>
<p>To turn this image around, Kilicdaroglu promised a broad <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chp-leader-vows-reconciliation-for-unity-in-society-173050">reconciliation policy</a> to unite the country and heal the wounds of the past. He also followed an appeasement strategy by drawing under the National Alliance the national and conservative leaning Good Party (IP) and three minor religious parties, the conservative Happiness Party (SP), Future Party (GP) and Solution Party (DEVA).</p>
<p>The last two parties’ inclusion in the alliance are significant, as they are respectively led by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Davuto%C4%9Flu">Ahmet Davudoglu</a>, a former prime minister and Erdogan’s former foreign minister, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Babacan">Ali Babacan</a>, who served as the minister of economy until 2019 under successive Erdogan governments.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526162/original/file-20230515-29-ys53kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Kemal Kilicdaroglu will face off against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a run-off election at the end of May.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sedat Suna/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Holding the alliance together was important, as a key criticism against the opposition was its fragmented nature, which some argued would make it impossible to form a concerted front against Erdogan. The National Alliance successfully overcame this hurdle.</p>
<p>The next problem was who would be the collective candidate of the National Alliance. The polls consistently showed mayors of Ankara and Istanbul ahead of Kilicdaroglu as candidates. Turkish voters tend to prefer politicians with proven public office track record – two of the mayors had this but Kilicdaroglu did not.</p>
<p>In a decision <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/14/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-imamoglu-sentenced-to-jail-over-fools-insult">some argue</a> was politically motivated, Imamoglu was charged and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/12/21/as-a-turkish-court-bans-istanbuls-mayor-from-politics-has-erdogan-miscalculated/">sentenced to three years</a> for insulting the Electoral Council (YSK). This took him out of contention.</p>
<p>Another spanner in the works for the National Alliance was the self-nomination of Muharrem Ince for the presidential election. Ince was CHP’s nominee in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44596072">2018 election</a> where he lost to Erdogan. </p>
<p>The National Alliance was fearful Ince’s candidacy would split opposition votes, which would in turn take the election to a second round that would advantage Erdogan. Ince announced his <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-ince-withdraws-ab71e315144e0d8454945611895d6d1e">withdrawal</a> from the race two days before the election, after several images were circulated on internet alleging him having an affair.</p>
<p>Battered and bruised, Kilicdaroglu remained as the main opposition candidate in the last stretch. He had three main arguments in his campaign. </p>
<p>The first was the failure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s 2023 goals and objectives. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world. Turkey barely stays within the top 20, at 19th.</p>
<p>What is worse, the economy has been on a downturn for the past three years. The Turkish lira has plummeted in value and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/11/03/annual-inflation-in-turkey-reaches-record-25-year-high-of-855">inflation has reached as high as 85.5%</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-turkish-earthquakes-affect-how-the-country-is-governed-199946">Will the Turkish earthquakes affect how the country is governed?</a>
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<p>Kilicdaroglu has pointed to the high price of onion and potatoes as a symbol of economic crisis and worsening cost of living for many Turks.</p>
<p>The second is the increasing reputation of nepotism, corruption and wasteful government spending, which has been long criticised by many segments of Turkish society. Mismanagement of the government were widely criticised immediately after the February 2023 earthquake, delivering further a blow to Erdogan and his government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/526168/original/file-20230515-21-kb5wcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Erdogan government’s slow response to devastating earthquakes in southern Turkey in February was widely criticised.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khalil Hamra/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Finally, Kilictaroglu tried to present a new vision for the electorate. He announced a four-step reform program that would make Turkey </p>
<ul>
<li>more democratic</li>
<li>more productive, with investment in agriculture and industry</li>
<li>a social state with services </li>
<li>able to sustain these reforms. </li>
</ul>
<h2>What was Erdogan’s election strategy?</h2>
<p>Unfortunately for Kilicdaroglu, his message could not be heard by all voters, especially those in small towns and rural areas who primarily rely on conventional media of TV and newspapers.</p>
<p>As a result, he won the majority vote in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, but Erdogan was in front in inland areas and smaller cities.</p>
<p>A key strategy for Erdogan is controlling the Turkish media. Turkey has one of the highest rates of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/12/12/the-countries-imprisoning-the-most-journalists-in-2019-infographic/?sh=5625e4fc13d6">detained and jailed journalists</a> in the world – in fact, it is second only to China. During April, Erdogan received more than <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-opposition-43f8d2c0aba17958c8e7123cf39eeabf">33 hours of airtime</a> on the state-run TRT channel. Kilicdaroglu had just 32 minutes.</p>
<p>The incumbent government’s job was relatively easier. Erdogan was the natural candidate for the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led People’s Alliance. Ultra nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) has been supporting the AKP government since 2015. The alliance also included several minor religious and nationalist parties.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/secondary-crises-after-the-turkey-syria-earthquakes-are-now-the-greatest-threat-to-life-199682">Secondary crises after the Turkey-Syria earthquakes are now the greatest threat to life</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The ruling block had three main arguments against the opposition.
First was the secular history of CHP, established by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and now led by Kilicdaroglu. In the 1990’s, CHP was the leading defender of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/03/turkey-iran-women-headscarf-uncovered-erdogan/">headscarf (hijab) ban</a> for women. </p>
<p>Erdogan argued if Kilicdaroglu became president, religious Muslims in Turkey would lose their freedoms gained in the past two decades under his rule.</p>
<p>Second was Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi religious identity. Alevism is a branch of Shi’a Islam followed by about <a href="https://yetkinreport.com/2019/11/18/how-many-kurds-sunnis-and-alevis-live-in-turkey/">5-10% of Turks</a> within a largely Sunni nation. The Erdogan camp was hoping the Sunni majority would not relate to Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi orientation.</p>
<p>Third was the accusation that Kilicdaroglu would collude with the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/pkk_fto.html">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a> or PKK, the Kurdish separatist organisation that was responsible for many terrorist activities in Turkey. The extreme implication was that Kilicdaroglu would divide the country along Turkish and Kurdish lines, a charge vehemently denied by Kilicdaroglu. </p>
<p>It seems the fear mongering strategy against Kilicdaroglu worked, and Erdogan will go to the runoff election ahead of his rival.</p>
<h2>What is likely to happen next?</h2>
<p>Erdogan, nevertheless, has been wounded. If 50+% gives political legitimacy, and Erdogan is the incumbent president, he lost some legitimacy by receiving less than 50% of the votes last weekend. </p>
<p>The Turkish media will play a key role in the next two weeks. They are in a conundrum. They cannot be too critical of Erdogan and support Kilicdaroglu for fear of a post-election crackdown if Erdogan wins. But they would also not want to be seen as too supportive of the Erdogan government in case Kilicdaroglu wins the election.</p>
<p>Erdogan will have no qualms about putting excessive pressure on the media, and that may be sufficient to tip the election in his favour.</p>
<p>Kilicdaroglu will have a chance to face Erdogan, with no other opposition candidate, in an electoral duel. If he is able to appeal to people who did not vote for Erdogan, he may pull off a narrow win. His strategy will be to call for all voters to turn up and vote if they do not want another five year’s of Erdogan rule and economic hardship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205406/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and research Academy.</span></em></p>With no clear winner in last weekend’s election, Turks will again go to the polls in a run-off elections between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and challenger Kamal Kilicdaroglu.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2051622023-05-10T13:44:52Z2023-05-10T13:44:52ZKemal Kılıçdaroğlu: Turkey’s opposition leader is leading in the polls, here’s what you need to know<p>Turkey’s general election on Sunday, May 14 will see voters cast their ballots for 600 members of its parliament and the country’s powerful presidency. This election has become intensely competitive in a country which has undergone <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732">severe democratic erosion</a> over the past decade, but may now be looking for change. </p>
<p>Turkish president, and previously prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to extend his 21-year rule, but the unified opposition candidacy is now consistently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/#turkey-2023">ahead</a> the in the polls. Many opposition parties agreed to nominate the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as their candidate, overcoming previous <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/24/1171570753/opposition-parties-in-turkey-band-together-to-try-to-defeat-president-erdogan">divisions</a>. </p>
<p>Kılıçdaroğlu has led the CHP since <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/Turkeys_Ghandi_Takes_The_Reins_Promising_March_To_Power/2052602.html">2010</a>, and has helped spearhead some of the opposition’s recent local election victories. He hails from Turkey’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20230420-erdogan-s-rival-breaks-taboo-by-talking-about-alevi-heritage-ahead-of-elections">Alevi minority</a>, an Islamic tradition which has been persecuted over the years, and would be the first Alevi leader if elected. His appointment as a presidential candidate was <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/09/turkeys-opposition-has-picked-its-man?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=Cj0KCQjwu-KiBhCsARIsAPztUF05heaL3atTsmpWVtsuNtXIuN-Sb_4UuRSCNXfTsdEBc14spaHsf2oaAoEsEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds">not easy</a>, with leaders of allied parties initially preferring the charismatic mayor of Istanbul <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekrem_%C4%B0mamo%C4%9Flu">Ekrem İmamoğlu</a>. </p>
<p>But Kılıçdaroğlu has managed to secure the support of a wide range of parties that now form the Millet (nation) Alliance. These include: the nationalist İyi, the small religious Felicity party, the conservative Democrat party and two splinter groups from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) – the Democracy and Progress party and the Future party. Since his candidacy was confirmed, Kılıçdaroğlu has maintained a steady but <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/#turkey-2023">narrow lead </a> over Erdoğan in the polls. Many people are now asking what changes Kılıçdaroğlu and his coalition would make. </p>
<h2>Erdoğan’s past and present</h2>
<p>In 20 years of AKP government Erdoğan has massively <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/698203">centralised</a> power, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429264030-13/competitive-authoritarianism-turkey-akp-rule-berk-esen">undermining</a> the rule of law and constitutional checks and balances. Undoing this process is a core policy for the alliance and was highlighted in the draft <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/28/turkish-opposition-unveils-post-erdogan-constitutional-package/">constitutional reform package</a> they published last November. This document proposes measures to prevent future leaders from accumulating power in the way Erdoğan did, as well as strengthening the independence of the judiciary. The alliance’s <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-opposition-bloc-announces-election-manifesto-news-61743">election manifesto</a>, published in January 2023, also heavily emphasised these themes.</p>
<p>Over the years, the AKP government has <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11616-020-00600-9">taken control</a> of most media outlets in the country. In addition, a vaguely worded <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/turkeys-new-disinformation-law-an-alarming-trend-towards-cyber-authoritarianism">disinformation law</a> was passed in 2022, which has made it easier for the regime to crack down on its critics and further tighten its control over online platforms. The opposition leader and the coalition have put an emphasis on freedom of speech and expression. Kılıçdaroğlu recently <a href="https://twitter.com/kilicdarogluk/status/1646221727238586377">released</a> a video on his Twitter account, stating that: “If I become president, you will be free to criticise me.” He also vowed to repeal the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/17/turkey-end-prosecutions-insulting-president">law</a> on insulting the president, which is punishable by imprisonment of one to four years.</p>
<p>The opposition campaign has been focused on plans to reverse some of the changes that Erdoğan has made to the Turkish constitution since 2002. This is widely supported by the coalition parties, who are fiercely opposed to the <a href="https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-hyper-presidential-system-violates-separation-of-powers-undermines-parliament-report/">hyper-presidential system</a> introduced in 2017 and which concentrated power in Erdoğan’s hands. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/six-opposition-parties-propose-new-constitution-draft-for-strengthened-parliamentary-system-news-61578">proposals</a> discuss restructuring into a parliamentary system and reducing executive dominance. The president would be reduced to a single seven-year term, the post of prime minister re-established and the presidential veto abolished, increasing the power of parliament. This is partly a response to the extreme personalisation of the executive that has taken place under Erdoğan and the single-party dominance that has existed since 2002. They also plan to change the threshold for parliamentary representation from 7% to 3% of the vote, to give smaller parties a chance.</p>
<h2>Foreign policy shift</h2>
<p>Turkey’s foreign policy could also undergo a significant change if Millet wins. The country’s relationship with the west has suffered under Erdoğan, with the EU accession process stalling, tensions with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-mevlut-cavusoglu-threat-war-greece-territorial-sea-dispute/">Greece</a> and <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/turkey-and-israel-a-relationship-unlikely-to-be-fully-rekindled/">Israel</a> increasing and conflict with <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-threatens-to-hit-us-backed-syrian-kurds-/6845288.html">US-backed Kurdish forces</a> in Syria. Turkey’s now <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-19/us-ratchets-up-pressure-on-turkey-over-russia-ties">warm relationship with Russia</a> has also been a source of concern in western capitals. The opposition parties have largely coalesced around a pro-west agenda. They have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-anti-recep-tayyip-erdogan-opposition-reset-eu-nato/">pledged</a> to restart the EU accession process, comply with ECHR rulings, and to abandon strategic positions at odds with their Nato alliance partners. </p>
<p>It is unclear whether human rights would improve for Kurdish people, Turkey’s largest minority group. Erdoğan has cracked down on Kurdish organisations and activists in the last few years – <a href="https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-detains-110-over-terror-links-in-diyarbakir-based-operation/">making</a> over 120 arrests of Kurdish activists, journalists, and artists only a few weeks before the election. While elements in the Millet coalition have expressed conciliatory views towards the Kurds, CHP governments have been equally repressive in the past and İyi leader Meral Akşener is a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-turkish-marine-le-pen-meral-aksener-president-erdogan-politics/">former hardline interior minister</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1646221727238586377"}"></div></p>
<p>The alliance has also pledged to <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kilicdaroglu-vows-houses-free-of-charge-to-quake-victims-if-elected-182363">build free houses</a> for those people who lost their homes in the catastrophic earthquakes on the Turkish/Syrian border, where 50,000 people died and where irregularities in <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/earthquake-might-upend-more-turkeys-elections">planning regulations</a> are believed to have led to many sub-standard buildings being destroyed. </p>
<p>Kılıçdaroğlu and the opposition would start off with a difficult hand. Turkey has been going through an <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/11/09/everything-is-overheating-why-is-turkeys-economy-in-such-a-mess">economic crisis</a> for years. With consistently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-inflation-higher-than-expected-nearly-58-2023-02-03/">high inflation </a> rates and a significantly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/turkish-lira-falls-record-low-near-19-dollar-2023-03-09/">devalued currency</a>, economic constraints are felt through all parts of Turkish society. It will prove to be an extremely difficult task for the opposition to fix this. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/01/16/the-turkish-economy-is-in-pressing-need-of-reform-and-repair">dire state</a> of the country’s economy has been one reason why Erdoğan has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/19/business/turkey-earthquake-economy-erdogan.html">lost support</a> and voters will be expecting a rapid improvement. It also faces massive reconstruction work in the earthquake zone, where millions are now homeless.</p>
<p>The AKP has carefully placed loyalists into all parts of the state who are not likely to cooperate with a new regime. Regardless of this, Millet is a diverse coalition of the left and right united only by their opposition to Erdoğan, and keeping this unwieldy band united for an entire term will be an enormous challenge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205162/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balki Begumhan Bayhan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is looking like he might end the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the upcoming election.Balki Begumhan Bayhan, PhD Candidate in Politics, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2035632023-05-08T01:42:27Z2023-05-08T01:42:27ZTurkey’s Erdogan is facing re-election to hold onto power – can a divided opposition oust the strongman?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524803/original/file-20230508-195023-5mctet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sedat Suna/ AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Turkish voters head to polls for the presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14, the biggest question is whether President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-erdogan-key-dates-elections-82af9b0c0c5d09a9a9bdb1e2bf1b5b08">two-decade-long grip on power</a> can be challenged. </p>
<p>Turkey’s main opposition parties have made a range of promises that include boosting the economy, democratising the political system, separating religion from state affairs and improving the country’s ties with the West. </p>
<p>However, it is increasingly clear there are significant differences in the positions of each party in the opposition coalition. Serious questions remain as to how much change one can expect to see, even if Erdogan is defeated.</p>
<p>Many Turkish citizens would like to see new policies to lift Turkey out of one of the most severe economic crises it has experienced in the last two decades. But the political issues are even more complex. Any issues related to the political system, secularism and foreign relations have become more polarised as Erdogan has consolidated his power in recent years.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521501/original/file-20230418-19-k177vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kemal Kilicdaroglu is the presidential candidate representing the Nation Alliance, an election coalition made up of six opposition parties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erdem Sahin/ EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A divided opposition</h2>
<p>Turkey’s largest opposition party is the Republican People’s Party (the Turkish acronym for which is CHP). Formed by the founder of Turkey’s secular republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, this party remains loyal to the ideology of Turkish nationalism and is considered to be in the centre-left of politics.</p>
<p>CHP has aligned itself with <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/turkish-elections-alliances-and-challenges-for-akp.aspx">other nationalist and conservative forces</a> in a coalition called the Nation Alliance, whose combined shares of the vote might be enough to defeat Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (also known as the AK Party).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-turkish-earthquakes-affect-how-the-country-is-governed-199946">Will the Turkish earthquakes affect how the country is governed?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While there is widespread scepticism about polling in Turkey, the most recent surveys have showed that <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/14/turkey-opinion-poll-tracker-erdogan-vs-kilicdaroglu">CHP’s position is relatively strong</a> in the presidential race. In the parliamentary elections, however, Erdogan’s conservative policies seem to be serving the AK Party well.</p>
<p>This is a problem for the opposition, which has not done enough to counter the conservative politics of the ruling alliance. </p>
<p>The leader of the opposition is Kemal Kilicdaroglu, whom the Nation Alliance has nominated as its presidential candidate. This is despite Kilicdaroglu’s relatively low credibility with the public, as compared to other CHP figures.</p>
<p>Kilicdaroglu has pledged to deport the large number of refugees who have sought shelter in Turkey since 2011 when the war began in Syria. The opposition has argued this is a primary reason why Turkey is suffering economically, despite the widely acknowledged role of <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/01/27/is-recep-tayyip-erdogans-monetary-policy-as-mad-as-it-seems">Erdogan’s disastrous monetary policy</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-currency-crisis-is-a-textbook-example-of-what-not-to-do-with-interest-rates-172709">Turkey's currency crisis is a textbook example of what not to do with interest rates</a>
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<p>However, other nationalist and left-leaning forces with significant public support have decided to stay outside the Nation Alliance. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1647597966465572866"}"></div></p>
<p>On the nationalist side, the opposition candidate for the 2018 presidential elections (Muharrem Ince) is running on behalf of his new Homeland Party. Ultra-nationalists are also being represented by the Ancestral Alliance coalition, led by Sinan Ogan.</p>
<p>Parties on the left, on the other hand, have <a href="https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/goodbye-erdogan">only been able to run in the parliamentary elections</a>. Potential candidates from Turkey’s large Kurdish minority have faced particular difficulty in nominating themselves for the presidential race. Many of them have been <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/19/turkey-could-be-on-the-brink-of-dictatorship">imprisoned</a> on charges of being linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Their only option is to back Kilicdaroglu, which some have done.</p>
<p>Erdogan is, of course, the AK Party’s candidate for president. The party has been in power since 2002 when it won a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections for the first time. Erdogan became prime minister in 2003, and then won the presidential election in 2014 before being reelected in 2018. If he is elected, this would be his final term.</p>
<p>The AK Party is a conservative party with Islamist origins, currently in a coalition with the far-right Nationalist Movement that has become fragmented and unpopular. Despite this unpopular coalition, Erdogan himself has managed to maintain somewhat favourable ratings with the public.</p>
<h2>No checks on the president</h2>
<p>One of the biggest pledges the Nation Alliance has made is to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/turkish-opposition-join-powers-to-return-to-parliamentary-system">return Turkey’s presidential political system back to a parliamentary system</a>. Since Erdogan pushed through a referendum in 2017 to abolish the prime minister’s office, the president has been able to exercise an unprecedented level of power. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/524797/original/file-20230508-8275-a0nicj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is believed to have forged strong ties with his Russian counterpart, President Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexander Zemlianichenko/ AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many observers blame the referendum for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/dec/18/the-observer-view-on-the-fall-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-cant-come-soon-enough?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1671345535">removing crucial checks on presidential power</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the opposition has also assured voters it will <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-anti-recep-tayyip-erdogan-opposition-reset-eu-nato/">mend fences with Europe</a> after ties deteriorated sharply under Erdogan’s rule. It would try to unfreeze Turkey’s European Union accession talks, which have been stalled since 2018 due to the country’s democratic backsliding. Turkey’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/turkey-elections-russia-erdogan-putin-nato/">economic and political partnerships with Russia</a> have also been an issue for the EU.</p>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, in terms of foreign policy, the opposition is promising to foster better relations with countries in the Middle East. These ties have frayed because of Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy and incidents like the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/07/turkish-court-sends-case-of-26-accused-over-khashoggi-killing-to-saudi-arabia">murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi</a> at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, which caused a rift between Turkey and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The opposition is also pledging to expedite the country’s rapprochement with Israel, the Gulf states, Egypt and Syria. </p>
<p>Erdogan has yet to fully normalise relations with these states, as they are still wary of Turkey’s regional influence under the AK Party’s rule. Erdogan has positioned Turkey as a middle power with strategic influence in the Middle East and the wider region, particularly after the Arab Spring. This influence is unlikely to fade soon, regardless of the elections. </p>
<p>So, will a change in Turkish leadership transform Turkey and the region? </p>
<p>The answer is not simple. But it’s likely much will stay the same. Many key institutions in Turkey like the parliament, judicial system and press have lost their independence during the Erdogan era. </p>
<p>Erodgan’s party has become very influential in both domestic and foreign policy, which means his footprint will not disappear immediately, even if he is not re-elected. Rather, Erdogan will have a lasting social, economic and political legacy for both Turkey and its neighbours.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Khalid Al Bostanji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even if Erdogan loses the upcoming presidential election, serious questions remain about how much the country would change.Khalid Al Bostanji, PhD candidate, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2041832023-04-27T20:17:48Z2023-04-27T20:17:48ZFriday essay: Stan Grant on how tyrants use the language of germ warfare – and COVID has enabled them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522488/original/file-20230424-22-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C9%2C3020%2C2269&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Uighur woman protests before a group of paramilitary police in western China's Xinjiang region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ng Han Guan/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is 2019. There is a virus lurking in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is warning that if it is not contained, it could infect the entire country. It could turn the country upside down. Tear at the social fabric. The CCP’s dream of harmony cannot withstand this. So they tell their people: this must be wiped out. Memories are too fresh in China of what happens when things spiral out of control.</p>
<p>China is a nation that barely hangs together. Throughout time, empires have risen and fallen. Bloodshed beyond imagining – on a scale almost unseen in human history – marks each turn in China’s fate. </p>
<p>The hundred years between the mid-19th century and the Communist Revolution in 1949 were brutal. The Opium Wars with Britain, the fall of the Qing, the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, the civil war between nationalists and communists, the Japanese occupation – tens of millions were slaughtered.</p>
<p>The CCP knows it should fear its own. It knows what happens when people rise up. The party seeks stability, but stability can only come with force and threats. Nothing can be tolerated that strays too far from the reach of the party.</p>
<p>Now, a virus is loose. In 2019, the world is not watching. Not really. Some warn of what is happening, what is to come. But who listens? It is too far away. We are trading with China and we grow rich as China grows rich.</p>
<p>So, the Communist Party goes to work in secret. It is rounding up people infected with the virus. It is locking them away in secret facilities. Prisons. Isolating them. Choking off the virus at its source. Nothing short of elimination will do.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-uyghurs-and-why-is-the-chinese-government-detaining-them-111843">Explainer: who are the Uyghurs and why is the Chinese government detaining them?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>An ideological virus</h2>
<p>This virus has a name. Uighur. Many, if not most, in the West cannot spell it. Nor can they pronounce it. Uighurs. Muslims. A people in the outer western regions of this vast country. People who have been yearning to be free. Who speak their own language. Practise their culture. Pray to their god.</p>
<p>They are a virus. At least, that’s what the CCP calls them.</p>
<p>The Communist Party transmits “health warnings”. As reported by Sigal Samuel <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/%2008/china-pathologizing-uighur-muslims-mental-illness/568525/">in The Atlantic</a>, and <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/infected-08082018173807.html">translated</a> by Radio Free Asia, it aims them at Uighurs via WeChat, a popular social media platform in China:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Members of the public who have been chosen for re-education have been infected by an ideological illness. They have been infected with religious extremism and violent terrorist ideology, and therefore they must seek treatment from a hospital as an inpatient […] The religious extremist ideology is a type of poisonous medicine, which confuses the mind of the people […] If we do not eradicate religious extremism at its roots, the violent terrorist incidents will grow and spread all over like an incurable malignant tumour. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2018, Human Rights Watch released a report, titled <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/10/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs">Eradicating Ideological Viruses</a>. The warnings are there. Even if the world is slow to wake to them. The report says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Perhaps the most innovative – and disturbing – of the repressive measures in Xinjiang is the government’s use of high-tech mass surveillance systems. Xinjiang authorities conduct compulsory mass collection of biometric data, such as voice samples and DNA, and use artificial intelligence and big data to identify, profile and track everyone in Xinjiang. <br></p>
<p>The authorities have envisioned these systems as a series of “filters”, picking out people with certain behaviour or characteristics that they believe indicate a threat to the Communist Party’s rule in Xinjiang. These systems have also enabled authorities to implement fine-grained control, subjecting people to differentiated restrictions depending on their perceived levels of “trustworthiness”. </p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522492/original/file-20230424-14-d7xzj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Uighur Abudwaris Ablimit points to a photo of his brother during a gathering to raise awareness about loved ones who have disappeared in China’s far west.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Christina Larson/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Note the language. Biometric data. Voice sampling. DNA. This is ideological and it is biological. People are treated as viruses that transmit illness. If not stopped, they will threaten us all, is the message.</p>
<p>Human Rights Watch says in the name of stability and security, authorities will “strike at” those deemed terrorists and extremists, to rid the country of the “problematic ideas” of Turkic Muslims. Not just Muslims, but anyone not expressing the majority ethnic Han identity. As Human Rights Watch says: “Authorities insist that such beliefs and affinities must be ‘corrected’ or ‘eradicated’.”</p>
<p>This is not new. What the CCP is doing is what other tyrannical regimes have done. They seek to create what’s been called a “harmony of souls”. They want nothing less than to produce the perfect, subdued, sublimated human. Compliant. Passive. </p>
<p>In the words of Joseph Stalin: “The production of souls is more important than the production of tanks.” Historian Timothy Snyder says the Nazi and Soviet regimes turned people into numbers. And tyrants everywhere have used the language of germ warfare. They define their enemies as diseases or infections and they seek to inoculate their own societies.</p>
<p>Authoritarian regimes seek to sterilise and “purify” society. Listen to them.</p>
<p>Stalin’s henchman <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vyacheslav-Molotov">Vyacheslav Molotov</a> spoke of purging or assassinating people who “had to be isolated” or, he said, they “would spread all kinds of complaints, and society would have been infected”.</p>
<p>The architect of Hitler’s Holocaust, Heinrich Himmler, in sending millions to the gas chambers, <a href="https://www.museumoftolerance.com/education/teacher-resources/holocaust-resources/what-is-holocaust-denial.html">said</a> he was exterminating “a bacterium because we do not want in the end to be infected by a bacterium and die of it”. He said: “I will not see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterise it.”</p>
<p>And then there is Adolf Hitler, who compared himself to the famed German microbiologist <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1905/koch/biographical/">Robert Koch</a> who found the bacillus of tuberculosis. Hitler said, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I discovered the Jews as the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/27387/chapter-abstract/197176732">bacillus and ferment</a> of all social decomposition. And I have proved one thing: that a state can live without Jews.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To Hitler, Jewish people were “no longer human beings”. He described the Holocaust as a “surgical task”, “otherwise Europe will perish through the Jewish disease”.</p>
<p>It is no mistake these regimes use the language of virus, disease and contamination. Just as a virus is to be eradicated, so too people are to be removed, eliminated or exterminated. These attitudes do not belong to a time past. There are leaders today who exploit the same fears, who focus on difference and create division using the same language of disease.</p>
<p>Remember what Donald Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease">said</a> of Mexican immigrants? That they are responsible for “tremendous infectious diseases pouring across the border”.</p>
<p>And in China, the Communist Party <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-documents-on-uighur-detention-camps-in-china-an-expert-explains-the-key-revelations-127221">has locked up</a> a million Uighur Muslims in “re-education camps”, where human rights groups say they are brainwashed with Communist Party ideology. A virus to be eradicated.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-report-on-chinas-abuse-of-uyghurs-is-stronger-than-expected-but-missing-a-vital-word-genocide-189917">UN report on China's abuse of Uyghurs is stronger than expected but missing a vital word: genocide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Virus of tyranny</h2>
<p>The virus of tyranny has haunted our world. Albert Camus warned us of this in his novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-albert-camus-the-plague-134244">The Plague</a>: the story of a rat-borne disease that overruns an entire city. His was a bleak vision of death and fear, of a city sealed off and a people locked down, then shot when they tried to escape. </p>
<p>Written in 1947, just two years after World War II, when the West was still celebrating the victory of freedom, Camus’s plague is an allegory of authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Camus wanted to tell us of the courage that swells within us, that when the plague was at its worst, brave people fought against it. But he cautioned us, too, that the plague can return. It is “a bacillus that never dies or disappears for good”, but bides its time “slumbering in furniture and linen”. It waits patiently “in bedrooms, cellars; trunks, handkerchiefs, old papers”, until one day it will rouse again. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522493/original/file-20230424-16-u9uicp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1056&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Engraving of a plague doctor in 17th-century Rome.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Furst/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In coronavirus, tyranny may have found the perfect host: a fearful population and all-powerful government. French philosopher Michel Foucault long ago made the link between the plagues of the 17th century and authoritarian control. </p>
<p>Behind state-imposed discipline, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/discipline-and-punish-9780241386019">he wrote</a>, “can be read the haunting memory of contagions”: not just the memory of a virus but of rebellion, crime, all forms of social disorder, where people “appear and disappear, live and die”. It is the state that brings order to the fear: “everyone locked up in his cage, everyone at his window, answering to his name and showing himself when asked”. </p>
<p>In the response to the plague, Foucault saw the forerunner of the modern prison: the panopticon; the all-seeing eye.</p>
<p>The plague-stricken village, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/discipline-and-punish-9780241386019">wrote Foucault</a>, is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilised by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies – this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The coronavirus shutdowns remind us freedom is the province of the state. The crisis has centralised government control. Around the world, governments have used physical and biological surveillance to control the pandemic. To eradicate the virus.</p>
<p>We have all become, to varying degrees, a little bit like China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-albert-camus-the-plague-134244">Guide to the Classics: Albert Camus' The Plague</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>A strange illness in Wuhan</h2>
<p>Coronavirus emerges out of China in the dying months of 2019. I remember reporting on it. A strange illness is being detected in the city of Wuhan. Dozens of people are being treated for pneumonia-like symptoms. In January 2020, there is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19">first reported death</a>. Then quickly, deaths in Europe, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Thailand.</p>
<p>We are still so blasé. It feels so far away. We have seen this before, haven’t we? SARS, swine flu, Ebola. They come and they go. Life goes on. We go to the beach. We get on planes. We have parties. And if we have a cough or feel a bit under the weather, we most likely still go to work.</p>
<p>We don’t realise what is happening. I am <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/qanda/2020-24-02/11983216">on ABC’s Q+A program</a> in February 2020. Footage is shown of lockdown in Wuhan. People are barricaded in their apartments while police forcibly remove and restrain. The audience is appalled.</p>
<p>It couldn’t happen here, could it? An epidemiologist on the panel says, actually, yes. We have laws to allow for just these extreme emergency measures. Surely though, we agree, it isn’t likely.</p>
<p>On the same program is China’s deputy ambassador to Australia, Wang Xining. Minister Wang, as he is known, is an old acquaintance. A sparring partner. When I was based in China for CNN, he was my minder. He was appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to watch everything that I did.</p>
<p>In China I was arrested and detained, taken to Chinese police cells for doing stories the authorities did not approve of. I was, on several occasions, physically attacked and beaten. My family was under constant surveillance. Now the man responsible was sitting next to me in an ABC studio.</p>
<p>In the audience, a Uighur man asks a question. He was separated from his wife and child. He had come to Australia ahead of them, hoping to settle and secure visas so they could follow. He didn’t know where they were. He had family in the Chinese “re-education” camps. He was clearly worried.</p>
<p>Minster Wang defends the China COVID lockdown. And he defends the lockdown – soon to be called the genocide – of the Uighurs.</p>
<p>In this moment were twinned the two crises – the two “viruses” – threatening our world. COVID-19 threatened our health. Soon, we would indeed follow China’s lead and introduce lockdowns. And the virus of tyranny was spreading.</p>
<p>In 2020, as COVID crossed borders, so, too, did tyranny. Liberal democracy was in retreat. Freedom House, which measures the health of democracy, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege">now counted</a> 15 straight years of democratic decline. From the post–Cold War boom, freedom was now being crushed.</p>
<p>Within democracies, too, people were falling under the sway of autocrats and demagogues. This had been a slow burn. Growing inequality, war-fuelled refugee crises and a blowback against globalisation had eroded trust. The poor and left-behind felt abandoned.</p>
<p>The devil dances in empty pockets. From the early 2000s, anti-immigration attitudes grew. Racial division became even more stark. Far-right parties made a comeback in Europe as barbed wire went back up on borders. People wanted their countries back and they were primed for populists. Türkiye’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-20-year-rule-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-transformed-turkey-188211">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</a>, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, India’s
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-pressure-builds-on-indias-narendra-modi-is-his-government-trying-to-silence-its-critics-159799">Narendra Modi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-philippines-is-set-for-a-fiery-election-even-without-any-dutertes-at-least-for-now-169535">Rodrigo Duterte</a> in the Philippines, Brazil’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-now-for-brazil-president-lula-strengthened-but-bolsonaro-supporters-wont-go-quietly-197530">Jair Bolsonaro</a> – all would come to power. Each spouted easy solutions to complex problems. Each divided to conquer.</p>
<p>Into the picture came a political circus act. A Manhattan real estate billionaire and reality television star. Donald Trump styled himself as the anti-politician. He promised to “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-drain-the-swamp/2020/10/24/52c7682c-0a5a-11eb-9be6-cf25fb429f1a_story.html">drain the swamp</a>” and “make America great again”. Eight years of the first Black president of the United States, Barack Obama, ended in 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-trumps-victory-will-mean-the-end-of-us-soft-power-68654">with the election</a> of a man who exploited racism.</p>
<p>To populists, COVID-19 initially was a boon. They seized on it to strengthen their grip on their countries. This was the state of the world in 2020, when the virus took hold. This was a perfect storm. A virus that robbed us of our freedom just as democracy was imploding and freedom was in retreat. And China was proudly boasting that its authoritarianism was ascendant.</p>
<p>If the 20th century was a triumph of democracy, the 21st century, to China’s Xi Jinping, would crown the China dream.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kafkaesque-true-stories-of-ordinary-people-inside-the-first-days-of-covid-19-in-wuhan-china-180039">'Kafkaesque' true stories of ordinary people: inside the first days of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Plagues, political repression and violence</h2>
<p>Plagues have historically been a harbinger of political repression and violence. The Spanish flu after World War I <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/1918-flu-pandemic-boosted-support-for-the-nazis-fed-study-claims.html">contributed to</a> the rise of the extreme right in Germany. The Black Death in the 14th century <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-black-death">unleashed violence</a> against Jews.</p>
<p>Sydney University Professor of Jurisprudence Wojciech Sadurski, in his book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/pandemic-of-populists/E75407A3309F868636BBA65F9F1ED783">A Pandemic of Populists</a>, says COVID has been a “powerful accelerator of many of the pre-existing trends, both negative and positive, in business, culture and politics”. </p>
<p>Populist leaders declared states of emergency and, as Sadurski writes, pushed them “well beyond the limits of the necessary”. Viktor Orbán <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-europe/how-viktor-orban-used-the-coronavirus-to-seize-more-power">set aside parliament</a>. He was a one-man government. People critical of him could be arrested. In <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_misinformation_in_the_Philippines">the Philippines</a>, as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/fake-news-real-arrests/">in India</a>, police were given powers to detain anyone “spreading misinformation” or inciting mistrust.</p>
<p>Sadurski points out that, in most cases, these authoritarian leaders used militaristic language. Fighting COVID was a war. The people were conscripted.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522499/original/file-20230424-20-u9uicp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán set aside parliament and became a one-man government during COVID. He’s pictured here with medical supplies flown from China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomas Kovacs/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Xi Jinping is not a populist leader. He doesn’t seek legitimacy at the ballot box. He is an authoritarian. And he believes his system is better. To Xi, the battle against coronavirus is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13/805760466/china-declares-peoples-war-on-covid-19-including-reporting-family-and-friends">also a war</a>: a “people’s war”.</p>
<p>It has been a war without end. Xi cannot allow the virus to win. Long after lockdowns passed elsewhere, Xi continued to keep a stranglehold on COVID flares. It has weakened the economy. It is straining nerves. People are angry. There have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-strict-covid-zero-policy-are-sweeping-china-its-anyones-guess-what-happens-now-195442">protests</a>. Some are even calling for Xi to go.</p>
<p>But Xi has strengthened his grip. By <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/26/asia/china-xi-jinping-president-intl/index.html">altering the constitution</a> and scrapping two-term presidential limits, he is now leader for life. Under cover of fighting COVID, he has used <a href="https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/covid-19-and-the-rise-of-the-surveillance-state-in-china/">enhanced surveillance</a> and tracking technology to peer into every part of people’s lives. The COVID crackdown <a href="https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00829/">coincided</a> with crushing democracy in Hong Kong. He has arrested dissidents. Silenced rivals. He is <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/china-ready-fight-after-3-days-large-scale/story?id=98494152#:%7E:text=TAIPEI%2C%20Taiwan%20%2D%2D%20China's,McCarthy%20in%20the%20United%20States.">threatening</a> war on Taiwan.</p>
<p>And Uighurs remain a target. Still a “virus” to be eliminated.</p>
<h2>A hinge point of history</h2>
<p>We are at a hinge point of history. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, there is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/03/06/sliding-toward-a-new-cold-war">talk</a> of Cold War 2.0. The United States is staring down a new rival: China. We are witnessing a return of great power rivalry. It is a supercharged great power rivalry. </p>
<p>China is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-soviet-union-containment-polarization-foreign-policy-11639526097">more powerful</a> today than the Soviet Union was then, and the United States is unquestionably diminished. America is politically fractured, it is deeply divided along racial and class lines; it has <a href="https://theconversation.com/american-exceptionalism-the-poison-that-cannot-protect-its-children-from-violent-death-184045">an epidemic</a> of gun violence and it has been devastated by coronavirus.</p>
<p>Donald Trump thought he was bigger than COVID. He was slow to act, he was dismissive and his populism was eventually revealed as reckless. Yes, he fast-tracked vaccine research and production. But he was a master of mixed messaging and so much damage was done. At the time of writing, in the United States there have been more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/28/us-records-100-million-covid-cases-but-more-than-200-million-americans-have-probably-had-it.html#:%7E:text=The%20U.S.%20has%20officially%20recorded,even%20more%20difficult%20to%20control.">100 million cases</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/15/1-million-us-covid-deaths-effects">one million deaths</a>. The only country to reach that number. Trump lost office.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522501/original/file-20230424-22-paq5g6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump thought he was bigger than COVID – and lost office.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">zz/Dennis Van Tine/STAR MAX/IPx/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, Xi Jinping is entrenched in power. The country where COVID first emerged is the world’s biggest engine of economic growth. It is on track <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/12/06/china-and-india-will-overtake-us-economically-by-2075-goldman-sachs-economists-say/?sh=3f8d5a358ea9">to usurp the United States</a> as the single biggest economy in the world. It is extending its influence and economic reach via the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, the biggest investment and infrastructure program the world has ever seen.</p>
<p>Xi is building an army to match his economic might. And he is leading the way on artificial intelligence research. The numbers tell the story. In the 20 years between 1997 and 2017, China’s global share of research papers <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/china-rises-first-place-most-cited-papers">increased</a> from just over 4 per cent to nearly 28 per cent. And what is it focusing on? Speech and image recognition. The Chinese Communist Party can track anyone, anywhere, anytime.</p>
<p>Technology was meant to liberate us. Some saw the death knell for authoritarian regimes. How can you control the internet? But China has. Cyberspace has become a tool of tyranny. China has taken the digital age and put it in service of genocide.</p>
<p>There are lessons here for journalists. Our job is not to simply report events, it is to connect them. To join the dots. To reveal the big forces at play in our world. We missed this opportunity.</p>
<p>We cannot understand the COVID pandemic and its impact without understanding the currents shaping our world. COVID emerged out of China at a time when Xi Jinping had his eyes on global supremacy. He had shown how far he would be prepared to go to “harmonise” the nation. He had trialled his lockdown measures on what he callously called the “virus” of the Uighurs. </p>
<p>Around the world, democracy was in retreat and authoritarianism on the march. And now a virus was spreading that would attack the liberal democratic West where it believed it was strongest: its freedom.</p>
<p>Media can so easily be overwhelmed by events. One of the most common failings – particularly of television – is to report what we see, not what it means. Images can drive coverage. And images of people in white suits locking down entire cities obscured what was even more important. COVID was a 21st-century virus; a virus of a globalised world, of high-speed travel and borderless trade. It was also a virus of an increasingly authoritarian world.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522533/original/file-20230424-20-ydq9i6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1153&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic was a stress test. It revealed and accelerated fault lines already there. Populists were stripped bare. Their slogans, easy answers and arrogance meant they were slow to act. Millions died who might otherwise have lived. In strong democracies where there is trust in science and authority, countries emerged stronger. Yet they, too, walked a fine line between surrendering liberty and saving lives.</p>
<p>In China, Xi Jinping believes the People’s War is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/china-declares-victory-over-both-the-coronavirus-and-critics-of-the-communist-party-at-the-biggest-political-event-of-the-year">a victory</a> for the Communist Party. The Party – the all-seeing eye – can control everything. It sits at the heart of everything. Xi believes he is the fulfilment of prophecy. The man who follows the great leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The one who delivers on China’s greatness.</p>
<p>Xi walks a tightrope, too. He has strained the nation to breaking point. The relentless, cruel lockdowns have slowed the economy and crushed the spirit of Chinese people. And they are angry and rising. China, like the rest of the world, is also reaching a tipping point.</p>
<p>In December 2022, Xi felt the pressure from the Chinese people, following mass demonstrations and unrest, and lifted the lockdowns abruptly. COVID quickly ran rampant. However, though the COVID lockdowns have ended, the Uighurs continue to suffer.</p>
<p>The virus of tyranny sleeps within democracy, too. It has always been in our bloodstream. China has edged us, the democracies, closer to what political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520282209/the-devil-in-history">has called</a> “the age of total administration and inescapable alienation”.</p>
<p>The COVID pandemic has passed, at least as a political crisis. Our minds are turned now to <a href="https://theconversation.com/essentialising-russia-wont-end-the-war-against-ukraine-might-real-and-credible-force-be-the-answer-195938">war in Ukraine</a> and economic strife. But journalists must remember that, as in contagions past, COVID will shape us. It leaves behind the trace of tyranny. And that is the true virus. The virus that will not die.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from <a href="https://publishing.monash.edu/product/pandemedia/">Panemedia: How Covid Changed Journalism</a> (Monash University Press).</em></p>
<p><em>This essay was originally written in November 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204183/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Grant does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s Xi Xinping had trialled his COVID lockdown measures on what he callously called the ‘virus’ of the Uighurs, writes Stan Grant. COVID lockdowns are now over, but the trace of tyranny remains.Stan Grant, Vice Chancellors Chair Australian/Indigenous Belonging, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2025542023-04-25T12:27:32Z2023-04-25T12:27:32ZIn centennial year, Turkish voters will choose between Erdoğan’s conservative path and the founder’s modernist vision<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521721/original/file-20230418-28-yjmrs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C59%2C3946%2C2592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Erdoğan has led Turkey for 20 years. Will he be elected for five more?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-wave-turkish-national-flags-as-they-attend-a-news-photo/1251714967">Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey has two historic events on the horizon. On May 14, 2023, voters will go to the polls for presidential and parliamentary <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-elections-to-watch-in-2023-whats-at-stake-as-millions-head-to-the-ballot-box-around-the-globe-196840">elections</a>, and in October, the country will celebrate the centennial of the Republic. </p>
<p>In 1923, military leader <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691175829/ataturk">Mustafa Kemal Atatürk</a> led the foundation of the Republic of Turkey as a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/sociology-religion/secularism-and-state-policies-toward-religion-united-states-france-and-turkey?format=PB">secular and Turkish nationalist state</a>, unlike its forerunner, the Ottoman Empire, which had <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-politicization-of-islam-9780195136180">Islamic laws</a> and was <a href="https://press.syr.edu/supressbooks/1295/genesis-of-young-ottoman-thought-the/">ethnically diverse</a>.</p>
<p>Since taking power in 2003, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-takes-on-ataturk/a-38391293">challenged Atatürk’s legacy</a>. Erdoğan was prime minister from 2003 to 2014, after which he became president – a position that was largely symbolic in Turkey until a series of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/17/europe/turkey-referendum-explainer/index.html">constitutional amendments</a> in 2017 made the president the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/13/the-turkish-constitutional-referendum-explained/">head of government</a>. </p>
<p>During his 20 years leading the country, Erdoğan has tried to revive the Ottoman era in various ways, from <a href="https://theconversation.com/hagia-sophia-has-been-converted-back-into-a-mosque-but-the-veiling-of-its-figural-icons-is-not-a-muslim-tradition-144042">the conversion of Hagia Sophia</a> from <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/hagia-sophia-islamism-and-secularism-in-turkey">a museum into a mosque again</a> to a wildly popular <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/opinion/erdogan-tv-show-turkey.html">historical TV series glorifying Ottomans</a> broadcast on a <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/life/barbaros-another-turkish-series-to-take-the-world-by-storm-49997">state-run TV network</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ABctik8AAAAJ&hl=en">professor of political science</a>, I have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/democracy-islam-and-secularism-in-turkey/9780231159326">analyzed Turkish politics for many years</a>. The upcoming elections are truly historic because voters will choose which vision they prefer in the second centennial of Turkey – Erdoğan’s or Atatürk’s. </p>
<h2>The presidential race</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/four-candidates-officially-running-in-turkeys-2023-presidential-elections-news-62103">Four candidates</a> are running in the forthcoming presidential race. But <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/14/turkey-opinion-poll-tracker-erdogan-vs-kilicdaroglu">public surveys suggest</a> that it is a two-man race between President Erdoğan and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, founded by Atatürk.</p>
<p>Erdoğan seeks to win the election to present himself as the founder of “<a href="https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/142559/-2023-yeni-vizyonumuz-turkiye-yuzyili-nin-baslangicidir-">a new Turkey</a>,” where populist Islamism prevails. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, wants to <a href="https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/siyaset/kemal-kilicdaroglu-partisinin-vizyon-belgesini-acikladi-mesele-ataturkun-buyuk-hayaline-sahip-cikmaktir-2008690">revive Atatürk’s secular vision</a>, with certain democratic revisions.</p>
<h2>Erdoğan and populist Islamism</h2>
<p>In his first decade in power, Erdoğan received the support of the Atatürkist establishment’s discontents. This included many Kurds, members of an ethnic minority in Turkey, who want cultural recognition and therefore <a href="https://merip.org/2018/12/the-failed-resolution-process-and-the-transformation-of-kurdish-politics/">resisted Turkish nationalism</a>. </p>
<p>He also garnered the support of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-two-islamic-groups-fell-from-power-to-persecution-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-and-turkeys-gulenists-120800">Gülenists</a>, followers of the U.S.-based cleric <a href="https://theconversation.com/fethullah-gulen-public-intellectual-or-public-enemy-62887">Fethullah Gülen</a>, who supported an Islamization of Turkey, as well as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/europe/turkish-liberals-turn-their-backs-on-erdogan.html">liberal intellectuals</a> who wanted to make Turkey a member of the European Union.</p>
<p>By 2013, these groups succeeded in weakening Atatürkists’ grip on politics and the bureaucracy. Then, old rivalries between them resurfaced and the alliance fractured. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivers a speech" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=619&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=619&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522236/original/file-20230420-21-25ak5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=619&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Erdoğan has drawn more nationalist supporters over the last decade.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-and-leader-of-the-justice-and-development-news-photo/1249861028">Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Erdoğan established a new partnership with certain Turkish nationalist groups. He went back to the Turkish state’s old policies of discriminating against Kurds. For instance, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/turkey-end-abuse-criminal-proceedings-against-selahattin-demirtas">Selahattin Demirtaş</a>, the former leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, or HDP, has been held in prison for more than six years.</p>
<p>Erdoğan also declared Gülenists, <a href="https://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Islam-And-Democracy-In-Turkey.php">his former main allies</a>, to be terrorists, and had <a href="https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2022/gundem/fetoden-gozaltina-332-bin-kisi-alindi-19-bini-tutuklu-7233107/">over 100,000 of them jailed</a>. This crackdown escalated after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/one-year-after-the-failed-coup-in-turkey-the-crackdown-continues">a failed coup attempt in 2016</a>, for which he held Gülenists exclusively responsible. </p>
<p>Erdoğan’s oppressive rule also led to the <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-writer-ahmet-altan-i-went-to-prison-i-came-out-and-i-can-go-back-again-news-58764">imprisonment of many liberal intellectuals</a>, which pleased his new nationalist partners.</p>
<p>This recent alliance with nationalists, however, does not suggest that Erdoğan has converted to Atatürkism. On the contrary, he has wooed nationalists to his populist Islamist regime.</p>
<p>For the upcoming elections, Erdoğan’s alliance includes his Justice and Development Party, the Nationalist Action Party, and two smaller nationalist and Islamist parties. All four of these parties <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-vote-who-are-erdogans-allies/a-65281080">agreed to withdraw Turkey</a> from an international treaty on preventing violence against women, commonly called the <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/gender-matters/council-of-europe-convention-on-preventing-and-combating-violence-against-women-and-domestic-violence">Istanbul Convention</a>. They argued that it threatened “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/turkeys-withdrawal-from-the-istanbul-convention-rallies-the-fight-for-womens-rights-across-the-world-2/">family values</a>.” </p>
<p>They also all support <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/how-erdogans-pseudoscience-ruining-turkish-economy-1">statism</a> by way of Erdoğan’s one-man rule over the economy. And they share <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation/">anti-Western attitudes</a>, from promoting <a href="https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/bakan-soylu-deas-pkkpyd-ve-fetonun-sahibi-amerikadir-704330.html">anti-Western conspiracy theories</a> to proposing <a href="https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/bahcelinatodan-ayrilmak-bile-tercih-olarak-gundeme-alinmali,v--iN0aLAUeOap8HMA24dw">Turkey’s exit from NATO</a>.</p>
<h2>The Atatürkist alternative</h2>
<p>As the leader of the CHP, Kılıçdaroğlu represents the Atatürkist alternative to Erdoğan’s populist Islamism. </p>
<p>Yet Kılıçdaroğlu has been an exception among the Atatürkist elite. He was born in the <a href="https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglundan-dersim-acilimi-51647">provincial town of Tunceli</a>, which is mostly <a href="https://twitter.com/kilicdarogluk/status/1648755862905708551?s=20">populated by Alevis</a>, members of a Muslim minority that has historically been discriminated against by Turkey’s Sunni Muslim majority.</p>
<p>Unlike Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu has defended women’s rights. For example, he has promised to <a href="https://m.bianet.org/english/politics/258802-main-opposition-leader-kilicdaroglu-promises-to-bring-back-istanbul-convention">return Turkey to the Istanbul Convention</a> if he is elected. Turkey’s only female political party leader, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/10/25/ex-turkish-minister-meral-aksener-launches-new-party">Meral Akşener of the nationalist Good Party</a>, is Kılıçdaroğlu’s main ally. </p>
<p>To oversee the economy, Kılıçdaroğlu is reportedly eyeing two candidates – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-opposition-alliance-plans-put-babacan-charge-economy-sources-2023-03-10/">a former economy minister</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-22/a-wharton-professor-pledges-revolution-in-turkish-economy-after-elections">a University of Pennsylvania finance professor</a>. Both support liberal market policies, which signals a turn away from the centralized state programs of Erdoğan’s tenure.</p>
<p>The most unknown aspect of a possible Kılıçdaroğlu presidency is foreign policy and whether he would <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-2023-election-erdogan-kilicdaroglu/">strengthen ties with the West</a>, given the widespread popularity of <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/why-turkey-torn-between-united-states-and-russia/">anti-Westernism in Turkish society</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Turkish presidential candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu makes a heart shape with his hands during a rally" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522237/original/file-20230420-2128-7etqgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It’s not yet clear whether Kılıçdaroğlu would continue Erdoğan’s anti-Western policies or strengthen ties with the West.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkeys-republican-peoples-party-chairman-and-presidential-news-photo/1251715008">Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Candidates’ advantages and hurdles</h2>
<p>Both candidates have strengths and weaknesses heading into the presidential race. </p>
<p>Erdoğan will rely on aspects of the authoritarian administration he has built over the last two decades. His system includes a <a href="https://us.boell.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/2022_10_26_turkey_crony_snapshot.pdf">widespread patronage network</a>, near-absolute <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-media/">control over the media</a>, a <a href="https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/en-US/">religious affairs agency</a> that runs 80,000 mosques and <a href="https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Detay/35388/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-diyarbakirda-selahattin-eyyubi-camiinin-acilisini-gerceklestirdi">serves his political agenda</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/10/turkey-earthquake-erdogan-government-response-corruption-construction/">imposed loyalty in various state institutions</a>. </p>
<p>But Erdoğan faces hurdles related to his authoritarian style, too, particularly the many discontented citizens his 20-year rule has produced. <a href="https://www.indyturk.com/node/440846/haber/bir-milyon-576-bin-ki%C5%9Fi-ter%C3%B6r-%C3%B6rg%C3%BCt%C3%BC-%C3%BCyeli%C4%9Finden-soru%C5%9Fturma-ge%C3%A7irdi%E2%80%A6-muhaliflere">Over 1.5 million</a> Turkish people have faced terror charges in the past seven years. </p>
<p>The ongoing economic crisis – with <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">an inflation rate over 80%</a> – is another hindrance to his reelection. And his vote could take a hit from the fallout of the recent earthquake that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/teenager-rescued-rubble-turkey-10-days-after-quake-2023-02-16/">killed over 45,000 people</a> in Turkey. The tragedy highlighted Erdoğan’s disastrous <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-president-erdogans-grip-on-power-threatened-by-devastating-earthquake-200033">deregulation of the construction industry</a> and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-president-erdogans-grip-on-power-threatened-by-devastating-earthquake-200033">ineffective emergency response</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Kılıçdaroğlu is likely to benefit from a large percentage of the Turkish nationalist vote, along with the support of Akşener, and a bulk of Kurdish votes. While the pro-Kurdish <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/681bbff7-f923-46de-99ed-15f1d462c92d">HDP’s support for him is only implicit</a> – the party chose not to field its own candidate, which would divide opposition votes – the former HDP leader Demirtaş <a href="https://twitter.com/hdpdemirtas/status/1647964725534236673?s=20">explicitly supports</a> his candidacy, from prison.</p>
<p>Kılıçdaroğlu’s main weakness is that he has lost many elections to Erdoğan since he became the CHP’s leader in 2010. The majority of Turkish voters are conservative Muslims who tend to <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/democracy-islam-and-secularism-in-turkey/9780231159326">oppose the CHP’s assertive secularist policies</a>.</p>
<p>To lessen opposition from conservatives, Kılıçdaroğlu has revised the authoritarian secularism of Atatürkists. He declared that the CHP <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-elections-why-chp-has-changed-its-stance-headscarves">will not reimpose a headscarf ban</a> in universities and public institutions, and also asked <a href="https://t24.com.tr/video/kilicdaroglu-en-cok-basortulu-kizlarla-helallesmek-isteriz,44119">forgiveness from female students</a> for that previous policy.</p>
<p>Kılıçdaroğlu has also established a broad-based alliance. Under his leadership, the CHP has established a coalition with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-turkey-government-recep-tayyip-erdogan-49b2a7d7afa1e476d2eab4K%C4%B1l%C4%B1%C3%A7daro%C4%9Flu0f4dbca8e4">five right-wing parties</a>, three of which are run by conservatives and Islamists. </p>
<p>Additionally, Kılıçdaroğlu has promised to appoint two popular CHP politicians who can appeal to conservative voters – Istanbul’s mayor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-istanbuls-mayor-was-sentenced-to-jail-and-what-it-means-for-turkeys-2023-presidential-race-196632">Ekrem İmamoğlu</a>, and Ankara’s mayor, <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/aksener-back-in-opposition-alliance-after-meeting-with-chp-mayors-imamoglu-and-yavas-news-61968">Mansur Yavaş</a> – as vice presidents if he is elected.</p>
<h2>A global impact?</h2>
<p>The outcome of the upcoming presidential election will determine whether Turkey will continue to be ruled by a populist Islamist regime, or return to a path of secular modernization and democratization.</p>
<p>This has international implications. </p>
<p>An Erdoğan win will signal that the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/cultural-backlash-trump-brexit-and-authoritarian-populism?format=PB">global rise of right-wing populists</a> is still robust enough to dominate a leading Muslim-majority country. </p>
<p>A victory for Kılıçdaroğlu, meanwhile, may be celebrated by democrats worldwide as a defeat of a populist Islamist leader, despite his control over the media and state institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s a lot at stake in the May 14 presidential election. Will Turkey continue to be ruled by a populist Islamist government or return to a path of secular democratization?Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.