tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/renamo-29137/articlesRenamo – The Conversation2023-05-14T06:11:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2008612023-05-14T06:11:57Z2023-05-14T06:11:57ZMost east African refugees are hosted close to borders – it’s a deliberate war strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523812/original/file-20230502-20-ymiyh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Burundian flag flies at the head of a convoy of buses moving refugees back home from Tanzania in 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tchandrou Nitanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are close to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/">4 million</a> people living in refugee camps across Africa. Of the more than 300 camps, nearly 70% are situated within 30km-50km of an international border. They include some of the largest camps in the continent, such as Kakuma in northern Kenya, Nyarugusu in western Tanzania and Bidibidi in north-western Uganda. </p>
<p>The closer the camp is to an international border, the easier it is for people on both sides of the border to interact. </p>
<p>What this means is that healthy refugees in Kakuma, for example, can walk across the Kenyan border and get to Uganda or South Sudan within a day or two. It also means that rebel groups operating in any of these countries can access the refugee camp. This easy access to refugees benefits rebel groups across the border. And asylum countries like Tanzania and Kenya may choose refugee policies that help rebel groups in this fashion. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/99.397.601">Exploitation by armed groups</a> is one of the many threats refugees in border camps face. Often refugees are not allowed to <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/472896f50.pdf">leave camps to seek work</a>, making them dependent on aid. Young refugees, particularly men, are vulnerable to armed rebel groups that recruit people to their causes. These groups also informally tax refugees by taking a share of the aid they receive or demanding contributions. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z6bx">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state">aid groups</a> have suggested that rebel groups take advantage of refugees because host countries <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501700392/dangerous-sanctuaries">cannot or will not stop them</a>. This logic focuses on the lack of will or capacity of such host countries as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-sudan-displaced/chad-failing-to-protect-civilians-refugee-group-idUSL1269730520070712">Chad</a> or the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state">Central African Republic</a>. But this ignores their strategy. </p>
<p>Even governments of <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/205014/why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson/">poor countries choose where to allocate resources</a>. For example, rather than being inept or incapable of protection, <a href="https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2008/02/12/chad-demands-removal-sudanese-refugees/23619034007/">Chad’s approach to refugees has been consistent</a> with a broader approach to its <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2008/02/making-sense-of-chad/">relations with Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>I set out on my <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kara_ross_camarena/files/krc_camplocation.pdf">research</a> project in east Africa to develop an <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691001296/analytic-narratives">analytic narrative</a> of refugee policy selection in the region. Using in-depth case studies and formal theory, I expected to find that foreign policy informed refugee policy in some ways, including interactions with humanitarian aid and donor countries. I sought to investigate the extent to which these tempered the domestic drivers of refugee policy. </p>
<p>What I found is that countries’ policies for hosting refugees are more strategic than expected. Host countries choose their refugee policy to influence the war from which the refugees fled. When <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC111780">Tanzania</a> and Kenya chose the <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/fmr-3/crisp-jacobsen">location</a> of camps and the restrictions on work and movement, influencing war informed their policies. Camp location and restrictions, along with maintaining dense refugee settlements, give rebel groups valuable access to refugee camps for exploitation.</p>
<p>My study demonstrates that east African host countries can follow a foreign policy logic for setting refugees up to be exploited. Domestic considerations can matter as well. </p>
<p>My research can help aid organisations identify whether domestic or foreign policy interests drive border camps in east Africa and elsewhere. When domestic rather than foreign policy considerations drive border camp location, humanitarian agencies can negotiate alternatives that make camps less crowded, move refugees further from the border or provide options for integrating elsewhere. </p>
<p>Each of these make refugee camps safer for refugees but less valuable to a rebel group. However, aid agencies will be less successful in negotiating alternatives when foreign policy drives the border camps because the alternatives undermine the goal of helping the rebel group.</p>
<h2>Proxy intervention aims</h2>
<p>Tanzania’s refugee policy in the 1990s is a good example of how geopolitics can inform refugee policy. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/united-republic-tanzania/tanzania-refugee-situation-report">Tanzania hosted hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees</a>. They began arriving in 1993 because of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/30/tribal-massacres-ravage-burundi/2ce12135-2139-4b78-a89b-f9bcf19b0992/">political violence</a> and then a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/burundian-refugees-tanzania-key-factor-burundi-peace-process">civil war</a>. Densely populated camps were set up for arriving Burundian refugees as close as 15km to the common border. </p>
<p>The location, dense population and movement restrictions ensured that aid groups could serve the refugees. But the refugees were also ideal targets for recruitment and taxation, unable to work and with aid that could be taken away as efficiently as it was distributed. </p>
<p>Tanzania need not have established crowded camps on the border but this favoured its goals. Tanzania’s aim was to create pressure to return Burundi to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x15000324">a government consistent with the 1993 constitution</a>. Tanzania hoped that by Burundi holding multiparty elections and selecting a government backed by the majority of its citizens, Burundi would gain some stability. </p>
<p>At the same time, Tanzania sought to avoid a domestic backlash from the host population in the north-west who were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/21.1_and_2.12">growing weary</a> of hosting refugees. </p>
<p>For Burundian rebel groups, the policy created a constant flow of resources and people from the camps to the front lines, which put the rebel groups in a better position to fight. Tanzania, which also hosted the peace accords, used a variety of tools of statecraft to end the war, and refugee policy was one of them. The better position to fight gave the rebel group more bargaining power. Since the rebel group also supported the 1993 constitution, a negotiated settlement where the rebel group had a pathway to elections would achieve this goal. </p>
<p>East Africa offers another example of the foreign policy logic. Following the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b414.html">fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime</a> in Ethiopia in 1990, refugees from southern Sudan left Ethiopia for Kenya. Kenya established camps for the Sudanese at Kakuma near the border with Sudan. This was in line with Kenya’s support for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army’s fight for autonomy. Like Tanzania, Kenya used multiple tools to sway the civil war outcome in their northern neighbour. Its combined efforts were instrumental in securing a pathway to independence for South Sudan. </p>
<h2>Non-intervention as a policy goal</h2>
<p>Tanzania and Kenya also offer a lesson in advancing foreign policy aims by not intervening. </p>
<p>At roughly the same time as Burundian refugees were being placed into crowded camps, Tanzania was also <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3ae6bcf90/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique.html">hosting</a> between 70,000 and 300,000 Mozambicans. Many of them fled or could not return home because of civil war in Mozambique.</p>
<p>The Tanzanian and Mozambican governments have a long <a href="https://www.mz.tzembassy.go.tz/resources/view/mozambique-tanzania-relations">history of cooperation</a>. Tanzania was also strongly opposed to the apartheid-backed rebel group, Mozambican National Resistance, or Renamo, which was battling the government. </p>
<p>Unlike refugees from Burundi, Mozambican arrivals were not housed in camps. Most Mozambicans <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3ae6bcf90/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique.html">were allowed to settle across the southern regions of Tanzania</a>, where they integrated with their co-ethnics in rural villages. Their shared way of life made the experience more like the regular cross-border migration that has occurred for generations.</p>
<p>By dispersing refugees throughout the countryside, refusing aid and allowing Mozambicans to integrate, Tanzania’s strategy followed a logic of non-intervention. This ensured that the migrant population was not easily targeted by Renamo in keeping with its political backing of the Mozambique administration.</p>
<p>In Kenya’s case with Somalia, the tide turned from indifference to non-intervention within a span of six years. </p>
<p>After the United Nations pulled out of Somalia in <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">1995</a>, Kenya shifted the policy for Somalis away from intervention while building a relationship with what would became the transitional government in Somalia. Kenya <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.54">consolidated existing refugee camps</a> and eliminated camps that were close to the border with Somalia and along the coast. Somali refugees were subsequently moved <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.54">across the country</a> to Kakuma in the north. Settlements in Nairobi were allowed to expand, which reinforced an informal pathway to make Dadaab – the remaining camp near the Somali border – less attractive for recruiting.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Most wars end in negotiated settlements. Rebel groups need to extract sufficient assurances to negotiate. If not, <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/24/1/127/11637/Designing-Transitions-from-Civil-War">they are unwilling to take the risk of giving up the fight</a>. Providing a rebel group with a stronger bargaining position could help along negotiations and bring about a peace agreement. </p>
<p>Giving a rebel group bargaining power by helping it fight a war can inform refugee policy. Alternatively, host countries might avoid camps specifically to prevent helping a rebel group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kara Ross Camarena received funding from the Harvard University Committee on African Studies and
the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs for this project. She is also a faculty affiliate of the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts. </span></em></p>Tanzania’s refugee policy in the 1990s is a good example of how geopolitics affects ordinary refugees.Kara Ross Camarena, Assistant Professor, Loyola University ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2024712023-04-11T15:05:06Z2023-04-11T15:05:06ZWhy some terror campaigns escalate to civil war and others don’t – study reveals surprising new answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520257/original/file-20230411-602-1a1qsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guerillas from the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) pictured in 1990. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Hoffmann/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most terrorist campaigns are short-lived. But some aren’t. In some cases, terror campaigns (low-intensity violence) turn into civil wars (high-intensity violence) where militants fight the government for control of the state. </p>
<p>Mozambique and Angola provide examples of countries in which low-level attacks eventually escalated into protracted armed rebellions. But in Spain, the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group remained just that – a resistance group. Similarly, Front De Liberation Du Quebec was unable to turn its campaign into a civil war in Canada. </p>
<p>These contrasting examples inspired our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17467586.2023.2182446?j=4586542">recent study</a>. We examined what makes terrorist attacks more likely to turn into a civil war. </p>
<p>We explored the impacts of three factors:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>how the state responds to a terror campaign</p></li>
<li><p>how the terrorist group responds to the state’s counterterrorism strategies</p></li>
<li><p>the state’s relations with other states. </p></li>
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<p>We found that a terror campaign is more likely to escalate when the state <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/17284/1/PG_full.pdf">uses repression</a> to stop the terror group and when the group diversifies its <a href="https://personal.utdallas.edu/%7Etsandler/website/Demise%20of%20Terrorist%20Organizations.pdf">attack tactics</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, we found that a civil war is less likely if the state responds with higher spending on health, education and social welfare. Policies that reduce poverty, inequality and socioeconomic insecurity reduce the incentive to engage in or tolerate terrorism.</p>
<p>We also found, surprisingly, that states that engage in some form of rivalry with other countries are more likely to prevent the escalation of a terror campaign into a long-running insurgency.</p>
<h2>How we did it</h2>
<p>We reviewed past research on the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sambuddha-Ghatak/publication/341143687_Terrorists_as_Rebels_Territorial_Goals_Oil_Resources_and_Civil_War_Onset_in_Terrorist_Campaigns/links/5eb4a60c92851cd50da12705/Terrorists-as-Rebels-Territorial-Goals-Oil-Resources-and-Civil-War-Onset-in-Terrorist-Campaigns.pdf">escalation of violent</a> and <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/225561475.pdf">non-violent conflicts</a> into civil wars. We found that research focused more on non-violent movements that turned into civil wars, but didn’t pay due attention to terrorist campaigns doing the same. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, we developed our theory on the three influencing factors listed above. We tested several hypotheses with data, including statistics on <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002719857145">terrorist groups from across the world between 1970 and 2007</a>. </p>
<p>We focused on these three factors because the ability of a terrorist group to sustain a long insurgency depends on surviving the initial stage of conflict with the government. About <a href="https://ccjs.umd.edu/sites/ccjs.umd.edu/files/pubs/COMPLIANT-Survival%20of%20the%20Fittest%20%20Why%20Terrorist%20Groups%20Endure%2C%20Joseph%20K.%20Young%20and%20Laura%20Dugan.pdf">70% of terrorist groups end their campaigns within a year</a> of their first attack. </p>
<p>To survive this initial vulnerability, a terrorist group needs to be able to mobilise its forces for a more systematic form of warfare. Terrorism doesn’t require mobilisation, but insurgency does. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Our research led to four major findings. </p>
<p>First, we found that there’s a higher likelihood of an insurgency when a state violently represses a terrorist group. Violent repression helps terrorist groups convince moderate members to wage a rebellion. It also makes recruitment easier by increasing grievances against the state. </p>
<p>This was seen with the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Renamo">Mozambican National Resistance</a> (Renamo) rebel group. It escalated its violent campaign into a protracted armed rebellion against the country’s ruling party between <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_18">1975 and 1992</a>. The group initially emerged in response to the marginalisation of Mozambique’s rural population in the 1970s. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNITA">National Union for Total Independence of Angola</a> (UNITA) similarly turned its violent campaign for Angola’s independence from the Portuguese into a long and brutal civil war against the ruling party between 1975 and 2002. </p>
<p>In contrast, Spain and Canada put policies in place that addressed grievances and gave people less incentive to support rebellions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/first-october-anti-fascist-resistance-group-grapo">First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group</a> in Spain started its terrorist campaign in 1975 with anti-capitalist motivations. Its last attack was in 2006. The government pursued a policy of negotiation to persuade the group to lay down its arms, and enhanced security measures and anti-terrorism laws. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/flq-front-de-liberation-du-quebec-seven-years-terrorism">Front De Liberation Du Quebec</a> in Canada launched a violent campaign with the goal of establishing an independent Quebec. It conducted terror attacks between 1963 and 1970. Similar to the reaction in Spain, Canada used negotiation to quell the rebellion. The government also adopted reforms, including establishing bilingualism and multiculturalism policies. </p>
<p>Second, we found that when a state prioritises the provision of public goods over repressive counterterrorism policies, a terrorist group is less likely to turn its campaign into an insurgency. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/islamist-terrorism-is-rising-in-the-sahel-but-not-in-chad-whats-different-199628">Islamist terrorism is rising in the Sahel, but not in Chad – what's different?</a>
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<p>We found that the chances of a group conducting a terror campaign decrease by 57% when a state increases government spending per person by 2%. This indicates that better redistributive policies are more likely to prevent organised rebellions. </p>
<p>Fewer terrorist attacks occur in nations with more generous welfare policies. Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, managed to avoid conflict between several ethnic groups for two decades after its independence in 1960 by <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01047691">redistributing a substantial portion of the government’s budget between regions</a>. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424895">Tuaregs of Mali</a> in the early 1990s led an insurrection after realising that they had been poorly educated and economically marginalised. This developed into a civil war, with the last attack happening in 2012. There have been sporadic clashes since. </p>
<p>Third, we found that groups with diversified attack strategies are more likely to escalate their campaigns into organised insurgencies against the state. This has important implications for policymakers looking at counterterrorism efforts. </p>
<p>A terrorist group that uses a wide range of tactical strategies – such as assassinations, armed assaults, bombings and hostage taking – could sound an early warning that it’s capable of waging an organised insurgency. </p>
<p>Both UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique used a <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intorgz72&div=9&g_sent=1&casa_token=zvve5kXRRlUAAAAA:z6zH2eSzo1LsvUCClZkg-tqW_Lez9VVYsrBlLFX3PC_o_dNVi_ZJyqwAdENCXsQ9tubM0E9ZVQ&collection=journals">wide range of attack strategies</a>. On average, 53% of UNITA’s tactical portfolio included three or more attacks, as did 63% of Renamo’s portfolio. </p>
<p>Our fourth major finding highlights the role of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002716645656?journalCode=jcrb">interstate relations</a> on escalation dynamics. It suggests that a country’s involvement in a rivalry with another state reduces the chances of a terror group escalating its campaign into an armed rebellion. Turkey and Greece have had <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/despite-rhetoric-greek-turkish-armed-conflict-seen-remote-/6899227.html">strained relations</a> and last came <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/01/world/charges-fly-as-the-greeks-and-turks-avert-a-war.html">close to war in 1996</a>. This interstate dynamic helped Turkey <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343314531003">unite its citizens</a> against early efforts by the Islamic State to turn its terror attacks into a civil war. </p>
<p>A government facing an interstate rival and a terrorist threat at the same time can use the external conflict to consolidate public support. This can shift public opinion against the terrorist group. </p>
<p>Understanding the effect of interstate rivalry on escalation dynamics is important in Africa. It would help explain why some terrorist campaigns in the continent turn into long and brutal rebellions as <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Civil-Wars-Africa-Guide/dp/0810868857/">external states historically affect</a> the tide of African civil conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isa Haskologlu is affiliated with Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies Group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ibrahim Kocaman and Mustafa Kirisci do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Policies that reduce poverty, inequality and socioeconomic insecurity lower the incentive to engage in or tolerate terrorism.Ibrahim Kocaman, Assistant Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityIsa Haskologlu, Lecturer, American UniversityMustafa Kirisci, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security, DeSales UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1714342021-11-29T14:08:31Z2021-11-29T14:08:31ZWhat lies behind Mozambique’s failure to find lasting peace and true democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433906/original/file-20211125-17-1unpcbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced women and children shelter in temporary camps in Metuge, after fleeing from armed militants in Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Luisa Nhantumbo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mozambique gained independence from Portugal <a href="https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/the-struggle-for-freedom-in-mozambique-jstor/QRl-vPcs?hl=en">in 1975</a> following a bloody liberation war that lasted about 11 years. But independence did not mean the end of conflict. The dominant liberation movement, Liberation Front of Mozambique (<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303956980_FRELIMO_de_um_movimento_revolucionario_a_partido_politico">Frelimo</a>), got embroiled in civil conflicts with the smaller Mozambican National Resistance (<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Renamo">Renamo</a>) immediately <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41105739">after the political independence of the state</a>.</p>
<p>This is not unique to Mozambique. Independence wars in Africa were in many instances followed by civil conflict. This was the case in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">Angola</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/22/timeline-south-sudan-since-independence">South Sudan</a>, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Democratic Republic of Conglo</a> and <a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/zimbabwe-conflict-history/?location=zimbabwe&theme=">Zimbabwe</a>. In others, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Peace%20agreements%20in%20Africa_Fina%20Version.pdf">quality of the peace</a> implemented has been low. </p>
<p>Mozambique is not an exception, but presents some interesting peculiarities. Its process of pacification – after 16 years of civil war between the governing Frelimo and the Renamo rebel movement – has long been considered a good example of how to mediate in African conflicts. But, as the facts show, this is not the case. </p>
<p>Following international mediation, the Frelimo government and Renamo signed the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mozambique-general-peace-agreement92">Mozambican General Peace Agreement</a> in 1992 in Rome, hosted by the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-for-mozambique">Italian government</a> and other international mediators.</p>
<p>Once the peace deal was signed, it was left to the two warring parties to bring about peace. In practice, the peace agreement was not able to bring about a climate for “<a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/introducing-the-concept-of-peace/">positive peace</a>”. The term, first used by Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, emphasises that peace is a multidimensional concept and practice, in addition to a simple absence of war. Social equity, sustainable development and trust among the people are all fundamental aspects which define a climate of positive peace. In Mozambique, the General Peace Agreement did not establish the conditions for avoiding new conflicts and wars.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-must-happen-for-mozambique-to-have-lasting-peace-after-accord-122954">What must happen for Mozambique to have lasting peace after accord</a>
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<p>My <a href="https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/1._peace_and_democracy_in_mozambique_proof.pdf">research</a> aimed to analyse these dynamics in Mozambique, whereby Frelimo and Renamo continued to regard each other as enemies, in a climate of mutual distrust, even after the peace deal. </p>
<p>My conclusion was that the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557579508400113?journalCode=ccam20">General Peace Agreement</a> failed to bring peace to Mozambique. Instead, it created a climate of negative peace in which the conditions that gave rise to old conflicts continued to fester. That’s because international mediators were simply interested in getting the warring parties to quickly agree to end hostilities, instead of supporting deep peace-building processes that take longer but <a href="https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/21/israel">lead to a climate of positive peace</a>. </p>
<p>The result was a mere formal adhesion to democracy by Frelimo that the international community hailed as an example of how to resolve conflicts in Africa. They ignored the problem of ethnic divisions which excluded a great part of Mozambican’s population from economic and social development. </p>
<h2>Conflict in Mozambique</h2>
<p>In 2013 the tensions between Frelimo and Renamo reached a critical level and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tensions-rise-between-mozambiques-former-civil-war-foes/a-17177466">war broke out again in the centre of the country</a>. Hundreds of lives were lost and both sides committed human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Mozambique was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/pt/report/2018/01/12/313287">effectively divided</a> into two: as the war was concentrated in Sofala, the centre of the country, it was impossible to go from the south to the north of the country by land. The <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/guerra-amea%C3%A7a-economia-de-mo%C3%A7ambique/a-17178696">economic impact was dire</a>. Since then, various declarations of cessation of hostilities, and two new peace agreements have been signed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-politics-idUSKBN0GP0DG20140825">in 2014</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/world/africa/mozambique-peace-accord-signed-paves-way-for-elections.html">2019</a>, but the <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/mocambique-assina-acordo-de-paz-pela-terceira-vez-23848078">war continues</a>. </p>
<p>I used a qualitative approach for my <a href="https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/1._peace_and_democracy_in_mozambique_proof.pdf">study</a>, based on a historical and political analysis of Mozambican public life, starting from 1992. I complemented my data with information from privileged witnesses from political parties and civil society organisations.</p>
<p>I explored whether the climate of negative peace originated by the General Peace Agreement in 1992 had a bearing on the new conflicts in Mozambique, starting with the first conflicts which erupted in 2013.</p>
<p>This conflict, like the first just after independence in 1975, have different features and origins, but a common element: exclusion. </p>
<p>I concluded that the electoral processes in Mozambique were not transparent nor fair. The control which Frelimo exerts on all the institutions, including the <a href="https://www.ecfsadc.org/members/mozambique-national-election-commission/">National Electoral Committee</a> and the judiciary, together with the complacent silence of the international community, have allowed the flawed electoral processes to go on for too long. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/old-soldiers-old-divisions-are-central-in-new-mozambique-conflict-62130">Old soldiers, old divisions are central in new Mozambique conflict</a>
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<p>The lack of transparency in electoral processes is a decisive factor in the failure of Mozambique’s democracy. Renamo has no option but to armed conflict.</p>
<p>Besides the conflict with Renamo, another insurgency has been raging in the Cabo Delgado Province since 2017. The Islamist insurgency was not part of this study. But, <a href="https://www.scientiasocialis.lt/pmc/?q=node/178">research</a> shows that it, too, has its in economic, social and ethnic exclusion. </p>
<h2>Mozambique’s negative peace</h2>
<p>My study shows that the Mozambique peace process has never been the success international actors have claimed. Its democracy remains weak and based on an ambiguity: Frelimo has to find a way to manage the country, regardless of what the elections results said. </p>
<p>Thus, elections simply became a mechanism to confirm the hegemony of Frelimo as an incumbent party. It cannot lose power in favour of Renamo, which international donors consider <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2637452">unreliable</a>, given its history of being used by South Africa’s apartheid regime to destabilise Mozambique. Such a situation contributed to fostering a climate of marginalisation and exclusion of large sections of Mozambican society, resulting in Renamo returning to war.</p>
<p>In other words, the 1992 peace agreement stopped the war, but it also contributed to creating a climate of “negative peace” in Mozambique. </p>
<p>This atmosphere unfolded in two ways: Frelimo continued to manage the country following non-transparent elections. Renamo was implicitly allowed to maintain its army, which has been used - especially from 2013 onward - as a weapon of political blackmail. This is against the peace agreement, in terms of which Renamo could keep only a small number of bodyguards to protect its leader, Alfonso Dhlakama.</p>
<p>Some examples illustrate this problem: In 1999, in the second general Mozambican elections, Frelimo faced the real risk of losing power. “<a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20060500_cru_working_paper_37_en.pdf">Administrative” measures</a> were implemented to avoid this. Votes in some Renamo strongholds, such as Zambezia, were not counted. In the end, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, the Frelimo candidate, <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wep/moz1999election1.htm">won 52% of the valid votes</a>.</p>
<p>Renamo did not accept the results. But its attempt to get justice failed. The National Electoral Committee ignored its appeal. Thus, protests, especially in the north of the country, were organised by local leaders of this party. </p>
<p>In 2014 a similar situation occurred: not only Renamo did not recognise the results, but it claimed the right to <a href="https://eisa.org/pdf/JAE16.2Nuvunga.pdf">manage the six provinces in which it had won</a>. Nevertheless, the new president, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, named only provincial governors belonging to Frelimo. It opened a new crisis which <a href="https://youtu.be/Sf_62OiOlrM">culminated with a new war</a>.</p>
<p>A last finding of my research concerns the role of the international, especially western, community: it aimed to establish a “steady” country. Stability was identified with the government of Frelimo, not with the maturity of Mozambican institutions.</p>
<h2>Conclusions</h2>
<p>This research established a close relation between absence of peace, flawed electoral processes and mistrust between the two main political actors, Frelimo and Renamo. This has resulted in a negative peace which has excluded many parts of Mozambican society from public life and economic benefits. </p>
<p>My research has also shown that this negative peace did not permit the building of a strong civil society. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-difficult-decade-three-lessons-to-inform-next-steps-161107">Mozambique's difficult decade: three lessons to inform next steps</a>
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<p>Peace processes in Mozambique have failed to create conditions that prevent the resumption of war. Hence the country remains in a state of war – in the centre of the country because of military activity by Renamo, and in the North, by <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">radical Islamist insurgents</a>, starting in 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luca Bussotti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Study shows that Mozambique 1992 peace agreement was never the success it was claimed to be. The country’s democracy remains weak.Luca Bussotti, Associate professor, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1615492021-05-27T16:42:38Z2021-05-27T16:42:38ZRegional military intervention in Mozambique is a bad idea. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403140/original/file-20210527-21-mrjc1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced people arrive in Pemba, Mozambique, after fleeing Palma following a brutal attack by Islamist insurgents in March.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Wessels/AFF via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The heads of state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have endorsed plans to deploy troops to Mozambique to help it fight <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-extraordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government/">extremists in the Cabo Delgado province in the north of the country</a>. Regional leaders also urged members states to continue working with humanitarian agencies to continue providing humanitarian support.</p>
<p>The insurgency, led by an Islamist group known as the Sunnar (popularly known locally as Al-Shabaab), has destabilised the region <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">since October 2017</a>. Its strength has grown tremendously since last year. In October <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">it made a daring raid</a> on one of the major towns in the north, Mocimbao da Praia. And then in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">March this year</a> it targeted foreign contract workers, including South Africans.</p>
<p>This rang alarm bells in the region.</p>
<p>But is an intervention by the regional body a good idea? And will it help?</p>
<p>Past experiences suggest it’s not. And that it won’t help. </p>
<p>I suggest that the SADC does not have a remarkable record of military interventions in civil conflicts in the region. It would therefore be misguided to attempt an intervention without adequate understanding of the political dynamics at play in northern Mozambique. </p>
<p>Interventions that are hastily prepared by military leaders without deep contextual knowledge of the drivers of conflict are not likely to end well.</p>
<h2>Mixed legacy of intervention</h2>
<p>SADC interventions in internal conflicts in its neighbourhood haven’t worked out well. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://wis.orasecom.org/content/study/UNDP-GEF/NAP-SAP/Documents/References/tda.nap.sap/SA-%20Lesotho%201998.pdf">1998</a> Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe took the lead on behalf of the regional body to restore order and constitutional legality in Lesotho. The haste in which the SADC conceived the operation guaranteed that it would not produce clear outcomes. South African troops <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-19-mandela-and-military-force-its-use-is-determined-by-the-situation/">lost their lives</a> and SADC troops had to withdraw in ignominy. </p>
<p>The SADC has since had to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-efforts-to-stabilise-lesotho-have-failed-less-intervention-may-be-more-effective-137499">continually intervene</a> as a peacemaker in the fractious terrain of Lesotho politics.</p>
<p>The other major experience in intervention was through the <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_un_intervention_brigade_rev.pdf">Force Intervention Brigade</a> composed of Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa. This was put together to defeat the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/11/5/qa-who-are-dr-congos-m23-rebels">M23 Movement</a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013. It was deployed under a United Nations Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm">resolution</a> to assist the United Nations <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en">Mission</a> for the Stabilisation of the DRC. </p>
<p>Initially, the Force Intervention Brigade made a difference. It <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20131105-drc-congo-m23-rebels-announce-end-of-rebellion-insurgency">routed the M23</a> and contributed to a return to some form of stability. But the militia menace in the region has continued unabated, raising questions about the long term <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">efficacy of the brigade’s work.</a>. </p>
<p>The brigade remains in place, though countries contributing troops have lost enthusiasm for managing the multiple problems in the region.</p>
<h2>Lessons learnt from past forays</h2>
<p>What can we learn from these military experiences to inform the envisaged Mozambique intervention? </p>
<p>First, military interventions in complex internal conflicts are fraught with profound obstacles. The biggest are inadequate knowledge about the parties to the conflict and what drives the conflict, and uncertainties about the outcomes. </p>
<p>In Mozambique, the insurgents have grown because of preexisting grievances. This includes the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">political marginalisation</a> of the largely poor and rural Muslim-dominated region. This has coincided with the discovery of one of the world’s largest natural gas deposits, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/offshore-gas-finds-offered-major-promise-for-mozambique-what-went-wrong-158079">attracted French, Italian and American companies</a>.</p>
<p>The rich gas finds have turned Mozambique into a typical resource-cursed nation, where natural resource abundance in marginalised communities predictably <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125773/ARI172-2010_DiJohn_Resource_Course_Theory_Evidence_Africa_LatinAmerica.pdf">fuels dissent and rebellion</a>. </p>
<p>Second, it is dangerous for regional actors to pick a fight with a group they believe they can easily subdue. The insurgents started low level guerrilla attacks targeted at government installations and gradually <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271?journalCode=rjea20;%20https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/growing-insurgency-mozambique-poses-danger-southern-africa;https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56411157">escalated</a> to widespread massacre of civilians and the acquisition of territory. </p>
<p>This escalation, in part, follows the government’s response to the crisis. Rather than engaging with the communities on stemming the crisis, the immediate response was to <a href="https://sofrep.com/news/wagner-group-russian-mercenaries-still-foundering-in-africa/">hire Russian mercenaries</a> to fight the rebellion. </p>
<p>But the rebels launched a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/scorched-earth-policy">scorched-earth</a> counteroffensive that led to the <a href="https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/">defeat and withdrawal</a> of the mercenaries. The consequences were obvious: militarising the conflict inflamed local passions and expanded the recruitment of people into the rebellion. </p>
<p>The deployment of the mercenaries also showed the government wasn’t confident in the capabilities of its own security forces. </p>
<h2>Intervention in a quagmire</h2>
<p>The SADC is now being asked to intervene in a conflict that it has neither resources nor the political will to manage. When the body bags begin to come home, there will be tremendous pressure on SADC forces to withdraw.</p>
<p>Rather than the folly of an intervention, the region should be encouraging the Mozambican state to address the grievances of the communities in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>Throughout Africa, military approaches to grievances over resources have often ended in disaster. For many years, the discovery of oil in South Sudan encouraged the government in Khartoum to militarise a conflict that was, at heart, <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/features/nexus-between-oil-and-conflict-south-sudan/">about self-determination and dignity for Southerners</a>. South Sudan did attain independence in 2011, but after tremendous loss of lives. </p>
<p>Similarly, a low-level insurgency in Angola’s Cabinda oil-rich region has persisted because of Luanda’s <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/213484">indifference to the plight of the local population</a>.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Nigerian governments have learnt to use political approaches in meeting the demands of the Niger Delta oil-producing communities. In a conflict that has festered for decades, the minorities in the region have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/towards-ending-conflict-and-insecurity-niger-delta-region">contested the exploitation of oil resources</a> by multinational companies, in collaboration with the federal government, to the detriment of their livelihoods and welfare.</p>
<p>Mozambique can learn from these and many other experiences. </p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>It took years for the Mozambican government to address the need to decentralise power and resources to the provinces. This had been a long-standing demand by the former rebel movement, Renamo.</p>
<p>But Frelimo, the dominant ruling party, continued to depend on a heavily centralised form of governance where provinces were mere outposts of the central government. Alternative actors and voices were prevented from participation in major decisions. </p>
<p>In the negotiations to resolve the resumption of the Renamo insurgency in 2013, Renamo prioritised decentralisation. Frelimo reluctantly gave in to this demand. But <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/conflict-and-decentralization-mozambique-challenges-implementation">implementation has remained sluggish</a>.</p>
<p>The resource curse is not inevitable. Many countries have avoided it through prudent natural resource governance and improving the access of local communities to the resources generated in their communities. </p>
<p>Botswana is an example. It has used creative institutions and political will to <a href="https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/could_oil_shine_like_diamonds_-_how_botswana_avoided_the_resource_curse_and_its_implications_for_a_new_libya.pdf">manage its mineral wealth</a>. Ghana has also put in place robust mechanisms to ensure that its oil resources are used <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-tried-to-be-responsible-with-its-oil-wealth-this-is-how-136887">for the common good and not to enrich elites</a>.</p>
<p>It should not take decades for the government to build credible and transparent natural resource governance institutions that meet the yearnings of impoverished communities in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>The SADC’s military intervention will only embolden die-hards in Frelimo who are reluctant to find peaceful and political solutions to the crisis. And the intervention will postpone a problem that is not going to go way any time soon. </p>
<p><em>Updated opening paragraph to reflect latest developments.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Southern African Development Community does not have a remarkable record of military interventions in civil conflicts in the region.Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1252702019-10-16T07:36:24Z2019-10-16T07:36:24ZCampaign shows that political tectonic plates are shifting in Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297286/original/file-20191016-98640-z0lk5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of presidential candidate Filipe Nyusi's Frelimo party on the last day of election campaigns in Maputo on October 12, 2019.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Having ruled Mozambique since 1975, the country’s governing party, Frelimo, feels backed into a corner. It behaves as though it must fight any challenge to its hegemony by whatever means necessary. This includes aggression and violence.</p>
<p>Hence the sombre state of human rights that has formed in the past five years. Mozambique has witnessed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr41/1019/2019/en/">intimidation of civil society, arbitrary arrests and detentions</a>. Security forces have used excessive force and there have been incidents of torture and extrajudicial killing. Freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association has been suppressed.</p>
<p>In 44 days of the election campaign, 44 people were killed – one person’s death for every day of campaigning. In addition 271 were injured, about 59 were arrested and <a href="https://zitamar.com/mozambique-political-process-bulletin-73-peaceful-end-no-observer-credentials-party-funding/">property was destroyed</a>. </p>
<p>Since the end of the civil war in 1992, Mozambique has held five general elections. Frelimo has won them all, with Renamo in second place and since 2009 the Mozambique Democratic Movement also in the fray. </p>
<p>The background of rights abuse has cast its shadow into the current electoral cycle. To mention some salient cases:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>On 7 October, members of the special operation of the riot police <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/prm-confirma-que-suspeitos-do-assassinato-de-matavel-sao-agentes-da-lei-e-ordem">publicly executed</a> Anastacio Matavele, an election observer in Xai-Xai, 200km north of the capital, Maputo.</p></li>
<li><p>On 11 October, Augusto Pelembe, the Mozambique Democratic Movement candidate for governor in Maputo province, <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/candidato-do-mdm-escapa-ileso-a-disparos-em-maputo/a-50789735">escaped an assassination attempt</a> in broad daylight in Malwana, 50km north of Maputo.</p></li>
<li><p>On 16 September, unidentified men <a href="https://cipeleicoes.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Casa-da-m%C3%A3e-de-cabe%C3%A7a-de-lista-da-Renamo-incendiada-por-desconhecidos-em-Quelimane.pdf">petrol-bombed </a> Manuel de Araujo’s mother’s house. Araujo is Renamo’s candidate for governor in Zambezia province.</p></li>
<li><p>On 6 September, three unidentified Frelimo militants <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-teacher-and-wife-savagely-beaten-at-their-home-in-derre-zambezia-report-141339/">assaulted</a> a primary school teacher and Renamo member, Aristides da Conceição, and his wife Raina Leão in Zambezia.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, voters, civil society and opposition parties in various provinces <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-frelimo-accused-of-collecting-voter-cards-across-the-country-cip-142779/">accused</a> Frelimo members of collecting voter registration cards. This created confusion among uninformed voters. According to the law, they were allowed to vote if they carried other identification documents. Many voters didn’t know this.</p>
<p>During the campaign, partisans of all political stripes were responsible for the violence. But Frelimo supporters were far more aggressive and violent. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret their war-like posture as a sign of strength. On the contrary, their deadly violence signals their weakness and betrays their vulnerability and desperation. </p>
<p>Underground, the political tectonic plates are shifting, while above ground the political fortunes are changing. The centre cannot hold.</p>
<h2>A change in power dynamics</h2>
<p>Frelimo’s tendency to direct violence towards its political opponents is a symptom of underlying structural transformations which the political sociologist Norbert Elias has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40864499?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">described </a> as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Elias argues that when unequal political groups become less unequal, the formerly powerful groups tend to become more aggressive and violent toward the formerly weaker groups. </p>
<p>The most recognisable feature of this in Mozambique is the pressure towards decentralisation of political power which began with the election of city mayors. From now on, provincial governors will be elected by the people rather than being appointed by the winning party. </p>
<p>On top of this, the incumbent is facing more politically conscious voters. They are better educated, informed, mobilised, organised, and demanding. </p>
<h2>Electoral rigging</h2>
<p>A popular slogan within the ranks of Frelimo is: <em>“A vitória prepara-se”</em>, – “In order to win, one must prepare the victory.” </p>
<p>Frelimo began to “prepare the victory” right at the beginning of the electoral process, the voter registration stage. </p>
<p>In Gaza province 286,000 extra voters were registered, giving Frelimo and president Filipe Nyusi a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambiques-electoral-commission-should-do-the-right-thing">6% bonus in the expected total vote</a>. While the 2017 population census showed that Gaza had 830,000 people of voting age, the electoral secretariat claimed there were 1.116 million registered voters in this province. This <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambiques-electoral-commission-should-do-the-right-thing">implied</a> that the 2017 national census had missed 286,000 people aged 18 and above in the province. </p>
<p>This was so out of bounds that the National Statistics Agency was forced to defend the census. It rejected and denounced the electoral administration’s numbers. It pointed out that according to “scientific methods”, Gaza’s voting-age population is projected to reach the electoral administration’s numbers in 20 years. The statistics agency’s director was immediately sacked, <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-titular-do-ine-demite-se-ap%C3%B3s-recenseamento-pol%C3%A9mico-em-gaza/a-50153003">though an official statement</a> said that he had “resigned due to political pressure”. </p>
<p>The electoral administration also dispatched extra voter registration brigades in Gaza and Maputo. In these provinces the numbers appeared inflated. They are also the regions in which Frelimo has won all past general elections with wide margins. Curiously, the electoral administration failed to provide additional voter registration brigades in Nampula and Zambezia. These provinces have the largest and second-largest voting-age populations. They are also where Renamo and the Mozambique Democratic Movement enjoy more popular support than Frelimo.</p>
<p>The opposition and civil society reorganisations have pointed with disapproval to these “victory preparation” activities. They have also questioned the possibility of a free and fair election. So far, polling is peaceful, but vote counting may not be. Mozambicans are bracing themselves.</p>
<p><em>Sipho Mantula also contributed to this article. He is a researcher at the Institute for Dispute Resolution in Africa, University of South Africa. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the institutions to which they are affiliated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Matsinhe is Researcher at Amnesty International.</span></em></p>During the campaign, partisans of all political stripes were responsible for the violence. But Frelimo supporters were far more aggressive and violent.David Matsinhe, Losophone Research Specialist/Adjunct Professor in African Studies, Carleton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229542019-09-09T13:14:03Z2019-09-09T13:14:03ZWhat must happen for Mozambique to have lasting peace after accord<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291284/original/file-20190906-175700-130zm6h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambique's President Filipe Nyusi (L) and Renamo leader Ossufo Momade (R) after both signed an agreement to cease hostilities.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ANDRE CATUEIRA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Mozambican government recently signed a peace deal with the Renamo opposition party, in time for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/mozambique-president-renamo-leader-sign-peace-deal-190801115411693.html">elections in October</a>. This is the most decisive step so far towards ending a low-intensity yet persistent conflict that began in 2013. </p>
<p>But the peace deal is haunted by at least three important potential issues. These are a splinter group within Renamo, the willingness of the ruling Frelimo to devolve power to the provinces, and how clean the upcoming elections are.</p>
<p>This time, Renamo’s leader <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-who-is-ossufo-momade-renamos-newly-appointed-interim-leader/">Ossufo Momade</a> is on board. But not all of Renamo’s soldiers are behind him. Major-general Mariano Nhongo, claiming to be the leader of a faction called the Renamo Military Junta, has said the men under his command will not disarm until Renamo <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201908290006.html">elects a new leader</a>.</p>
<p>This splintering in Renamo has its origins in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/mozambique-veteran-rebel-leader-dhlakama-dead-party-sources-20180503-2">unexpected death last May</a> of Afonso Dhlakama, its leader of 39 years. He had led Renamo since the late 1970s, through more than a decade of civil war and tortuous negotiations in the early 1990s followed by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-04-mozambique-instability-feared-in-the-wake-of-veteran-renamo-leaders-demise/">20 years of peace</a>. </p>
<p>At the end of July this year some buses were attacked, reminiscent of what happened in 2013, although Nhongo has denied involvement. Four vehicles were shot at in early September on the borders of the Gorongoza district where Nhongo is operating.</p>
<h2>Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo</h2>
<p>So closely identified was Renamo with Dhlakama that even after he left Maputo, claiming not to be safe in the capital, and retreated to his wartime redoubt at Gorongosa in 2012, he was able simultaneously to command the loyalty of a small army of ageing guerrillas and the opposition bench in Parliament. </p>
<p>Groups of veterans from the 1976-92 war began to gather at sites across central and northern Mozambique. A confrontation with riot police in the central Mozambican market town of Muxúnguè in April 2013 triggered a wave of violence that began with Renamo ambushes on government vehicles. It escalated as government forces attacked communities suspected of <a href="https://theconversation.com/old-soldiers-old-divisions-are-central-in-new-mozambique-conflict-62130">harbouring Renamo fighters</a>.</p>
<p>In successive rounds of peace talks, interspersed with periods of violence, Dhlakama made political demands including the devolution of power to provincial level. Party-to-party talks, first with local and then international mediators, proved too unwieldy to make any progress. </p>
<p>Then, when the situation appeared intractable, Dhlakama <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-unexpected-truce-still-hangs-in-the-balance-71365">started talking to Mozambican President Felipe Nyusi</a>, who is also the leader of Frelimo, by phone from his hideout in Gorongosa. Unrestrained by fractious party colleagues, in a matter of weeks, they made more progress than was made in months at the negotiating table. </p>
<p>Dhlakama’s death did not halt the peace process. Now his successor, Momade, has won the trust of the Renamo politicians, but not all of the old soldiers. Will they raise their weapons once more? </p>
<p>To understand the new peace settlement we have to consider its different components, and what they mean for the Renamo leadership, for the soldiers, and for civilians.</p>
<h2>Renamo soldiers and leaders</h2>
<p>First, there’s a process of granting posts in the police and army to a small number of Renamo soldiers. This only became an issue because two parties interpreted the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-mozambique">1992 peace accord</a> differently, but in recent months have reached a consensus. As long as the officers who benefit in this way are chosen from among those who played an important role in the 2013-16 violence, then it makes a continuation of that violence less likely.</p>
<p>The next component of the peace agreement is disarming and demobilising the Renamo men who fought in the recent conflict. This is more complicated, because nobody knows how many of these men there are, or how many weapons they have. </p>
<p>The fighting forces were small and lightly armed – ambush tactics gave them a strategic advantage. Equally, there may be some ambiguities over who was a soldier and who wasn’t: some would travel back and forth between their home villages and the Renamo bases. </p>
<p>Nhongo and his self-styled junta make things still more unpredictable, because it’s unknown how many soldiers will do his bidding – <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/hope-peace-and-reconciliation-pope-francis-mozambique">though this is likely not more than 80</a>, and they’re confined to one area. Even when the conflict was at its worst in 2013-14 and 2015-16, it was never certain to what extent the initiative was coming from the soldiers and to what extent it was from the leadership. </p>
<p>This brings us to the question of civilian support.</p>
<h2>Civilian support</h2>
<p>During the 2013 and 2016 violence there was a widespread feeling in central and northern Mozambique that Renamo was fighting for a just cause, namely a better distribution of power and wealth across the country.</p>
<p>Renamo kept this constituency onside by avoiding civilian casualties. Until there is any concrete progress in addressing <a href="http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/moz1009a.php">regional inequality</a> within Mozambique, there will still be some popular support for continued military mobilisation.</p>
<p>Given this combination of errant soldiers and sympathetic civilians, there should be no surprises if there are further sporadic attacks on government vehicles and installations. The government needs to accept the good faith of Momade’s leadership that Renamo as a party does not bear responsibility for such attacks.</p>
<h2>Elections</h2>
<p>The third element of the agreement is political: provincial governors will now be elected in each province, in contrast to the current system in which the central government appoints provincial governors. </p>
<p>Under the new arrangements, Renamo should be able to win some elections at provincial level. Most obviously, this is good for Momade: candidacies for provincial governorship’s will be his to dispense as favours, and provincial budgets will, in theory, be at Renamo’s disposal.</p>
<p>Devolved elections will help address a widespread complaint that central and northern Mozambique are neglected by a distant government in Maputo. The removal of the immediate political motivation for the conflict would make it harder for the soldiers to retain the trust that they have enjoyed in recent years.</p>
<p>However, Mozambican elections have always been <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/03/09/mozambique-returns-to-war-as-opposition-claims-electoral-fraud/">tainted by fraud</a>, and it is possible that this could be used to keep Renamo away from provincial government. Also, the lesson of municipal-level government, where there has been local devolution for many years, is that Frelimo can use its control of the centre to constrain the power of opposition parties that get elected locally. </p>
<h2>Prospects for peace</h2>
<p>In short, the political agreement may well keep Renamo’s leaders content for now, provided that Frelimo is wise enough to concede some substantive power to Renamo at provincial level.</p>
<p>Ultimately, age may be the decisive factor in preventing a repetition of the events of 2013-16. The recent conflict was waged by veterans aged 40 and older, some as old as 70. They’re not getting younger, and it’s unlikely that Nhongo can come anywhere near Dhlakama’s ability to mobilise such an unlikely army across much of the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122954/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Pearce has received funding from The Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p>The splintering in Renamo has its origins in the unexpected death last May of Afonso Dhlakama, its leader of 39 years.Justin Pearce, Teaching Associate in Politics and International Studies, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1115632019-02-18T14:26:08Z2019-02-18T14:26:08ZTracing the history of Mozambique’s mysterious and deadly insurgency<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259002/original/file-20190214-1748-193gr4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique, provides fertile ground for extremism. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flcker</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province has been held hostage by insurgents for nearly 17 months. Armed attacks, decapitations and the destruction of property have <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">become common</a>. Many are worried that the violence may escalate and destabilise the country’s economy further. </p>
<p>One of the biggest problems is that nobody really knows who the insurgents are. They don’t make public statements, so their motives are unclear.</p>
<p>Speculation and conspiracy theories abound. Many, including state officials and the new president of the <a href="https://macua.blogs.com/files/perdiz-n%C2%BA-245.pdf">Renamo opposition party</a>, believe the insurgency is part of a struggle within the national elite for the control of Cabo Delgado’s oil, gas and mineral riches. </p>
<p>The government offers few – and contradictory – explanations. It has said both that the violence is committed by local unemployed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/no-attacks-in-cabo-delgado-just-crimes-say-police-mozambique">“criminals”</a>, and that the attacks are the result of <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/president-nyusi-warns-that-cabo-delgado-terrorists-can-spread-to-other-neighbouring-countries/">global jihadism trying to move into Mozambique</a>.</p>
<p>Lack of information and clashing explanations have led to confusion as to what’s happening in Northern Mozambique and what should be done to reverse the situation. </p>
<h2>Roots of insurgency</h2>
<p>The local population calls the group behind the attacks “al-Shabaab”. This means “youth” in Arabic and refers, of course, to the global terror group in Somalia (though the Mozambican insurgents have no formal links to them). In Mozambique, the group’s origins go back to the 2000s, when some young men within the Islamic Council of Mozambique began to develop a <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1074#ftn89">new reading and practice of Islam</a>. </p>
<p>In Cabo Delgado, they created a sub-organisation within the Islamic Council called <a href="https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/academico-recomenda-cuidado-ao-governo-para-nao-alienar-apoio-popular-no-norte-de-mocambique-10470432.html">“Ansaru-Sunna”</a> which registered legally with the state. It built new mosques and preached a stricter form of Islam across the province. Soon, a more radical and activist group formed within this sub-organisation and split off as a sect – what has become known locally as “al-Shabaab”.</p>
<p>This group initially concerned itself with religious debates, practice and opposition to the secular state. In 2010 the villagers of Nhacole in the Balama district decided to get rid of the group and destroyed its mosque. Sect members fled to the town of Mucojo, in the district of Macomia. There tensions flared with the local population and authorities. </p>
<p>The police had to intervene twice in Mucojo. In 2015 they were called in because the sect tried to forcefully impose a ban of alcohol in the town. Death and injuries ensued when a sect member fatally <a href="http://www.jornaldomingo.co.mz/index.php/reportagem/7791-tumultos-em-pangane-provocam-morte-e-feridos">stabbed a policeman</a>. </p>
<h2>Resort to arms</h2>
<p>Mainstream Muslim organisations and individuals, among them the Islamic Council from which the “al-Shabaab” sect split off, were disquieted by the group’s actions. They repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ataque-em-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-ter%C3%A1-sido-caso-isolado/a-40977442">asked the government to intervene</a>.</p>
<p>In late 2016, the government finally acceded to their request and began to arrest and bring some group leaders to court across the province. The men were accused of engaging in disinformation, rejecting state authority, refusing to send their children to school, and <a href="http://www.magazineindependente.com/www2/detidos-tres-membros-grupo-muculmano-promove-desinformacao-cabo-delgado">using knives to protect themselves</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not clear when the “al-Shabaab” members began to train militarily, but the state’s actions against their leaders seem to have been the tipping point towards their passing to armed action. Their <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia-">first attack</a> was in October 2017 in the town of Mocímboa da Praia and surrounding communities.</p>
<p>Since then, sect members have taken to the bush from where they attack isolated villages. The number of attacks and their brutality increased steadily in 2018. The insurgency seems to have become more organised. Its attacks and activities have focused on a coastal band about 150kms wide, from the provincial capital of Pemba to the Tanzanian border. </p>
<h2>Seeds of discontent</h2>
<p>It is clear, then, that the insurgency has built on some local social, religious and political tensions. Cabo Delgado is Mozambique’s poorest province; unemployment is high, particularly among the youth. It’s also largely rural. <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/northern_mozambique_violence/">Government services are not reliable</a>.</p>
<p>Major recent oil and gas <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">discoveries in the area</a> have generated many expectations, but communities have seen <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/poverty-and-unemployment-fuels-cabo-delgado-insurgency-admits-nyusi-by-joseph-hanlon/">very few, if any, benefits, particularly in rural areas</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the fact that Muslims feel particularly marginalised in Cabo Delgado, where their ethnic neighbours have had <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1410">privileged access to national political power since independence</a>, helps explain how an anti-state Islamist discourse may have gained traction.</p>
<p>Another aspect is the group’s international connections. Much has been said about <a href="http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/67947-atanasio-mtumuke-reinsiste-que-os-ataques-armados-em-cabo-delgado-tem-mao-externa">links to Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda</a>. But most connections are with Tanzania.</p>
<p>Mozambican Islamic clerics have trained in Tanzania for more than a century and exchanges have taken place for longer, among religious communities on both sides of the border. So it’s unsurprising that the Mozambican “al-Shabaab” connected with like-minded Muslims in Tanzania in the 2010s.</p>
<p>After Tanzanian radicals became violent and the state <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/tanzania">responded forcefully against them after 2015</a>, and <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282841.htm">particularly strongly in early 2017</a>, some of them took refuge with the Mozambican “al-Shabaab”. This has reinforced and partially internationalised the insurgency.</p>
<h2>Seeking solutions</h2>
<p>Since the “al-Shabaab” in Mozambique is not the result of an internal or external conspiracy, the state needs to focus on the social, religious and political dynamics at play to control and combat the insurgency.</p>
<p>While the Mozambican army has managed successfully to contain the geographical spread of the armed sect, the government needs to focus with equal force on redressing the local grievances which the insurgents are tapping into.</p>
<p>Mozambican scholar <a href="https://pt.euronews.com/2018/10/05/yussuf-adam-nega-jihadismo-nos-ataques-de-cabo-delgado">Yussuf Adam</a> has put forward an interesting idea to start addressing these grievances. He argues that the state should hold district “general estate assemblies” to identify issues, and to design solutions from the bottom up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Speculation and conspiracy theories abound about the Mozambican insurgents leaving a trail of violence in resource rich Cabo Delgado.Eric Morier-Genoud, Senior Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/962842018-05-10T16:11:48Z2018-05-10T16:11:48ZWhy Renamo leader’s death could have a major impact on Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218423/original/file-20180510-34018-189ijxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The funeral of Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Ricardo Franco</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The unexpected <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-09-renamo-leaders-death-a-game-changer-for-mozambique-peace-process/">death of Afonso Dhlakama</a>, the former guerrilla leader and president of Renamo, the main opposition party in Mozambique, might lead to the political cards in Mozambique being reshuffled significantly. </p>
<p>The Renamo leader’s death could affect the progress that’s been made in negotiations to <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/dhlakama-says-will-sign-peace-agreement-with-president-nyusi-in-october-or-november/">end hostilities</a> between Renamo and the Frelimo government. It could also affect the outcome of <a href="http://apanews.net/index.php/en/news/mozambique-sets-date-for-municipal-elections">municipal elections</a> due to be held in October and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-04-11-mozambique-sets-october-2019-for-general-elections/">national elections in 2019</a>. </p>
<p>A great deal will depend on who succeeds Dhlakama. There is no clear successor as he centralised power and went to great lengths to prevent the emergence of one. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-09-renamo-leaders-death-a-game-changer-for-mozambique-peace-process/">argued</a> that this would pose a problem for transition in the party. But the smooth and frictionless nomination of Ossufo Momade as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/mozambique-opposition-names-interim-leader-20180505">transitional leader</a> four days after Dhlakama’s death, suggests that the final succession might be smooth. </p>
<p>The peace negotiations to end the simmering war between Renamo and the Frelimo government were still ongoing when Dhlakama died. They had become very personalised, with Dhlakama and Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi mostly <a href="http://www.folhademaputo.co.mz/pt/noticias/nacional/nyusi-e-dhlakama-alcancam-consensos-por-telefone-vidio/">talking on the phone</a>. </p>
<p>Dhlakama’s death should not put an end to negotiations, but it might delay them and lead to changes to the form they’ve taken. The secret one-on-one negotiations have been <a href="https://zitamar.com/analysis-death-mozambiques-father-democracy-could-usher-new-democratic-era">criticised</a>. And since his death there have been calls for the negotiations to be re-institutionalised and opened up to civil society to enable a broad based sustainable peace agreement to be reached.</p>
<h2>Renamo succession</h2>
<p>Momade’s appointment as interim head of Renamo is only temporary and two groups will be competing for the top job – the civilian and the military. The civil branch of Renamo is dominated by its parliamentarians, with Ivonne Soares, Dhlamaka’s niece, at the helm. She is the head of the party in parliament. Should this group win the upper hand it might strengthen the civilian structure of Renamo and possibly help its electoral chances. </p>
<p>The military branch comprises of soldiers and generals from the time of the civil war (1976-1992). It also includes former combatants who resumed fighting in what’s become known as the small war – or <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2017-1-page-153.htm">“proto-war”</a> – of 2013-16. </p>
<p>There are risks either way. There is concern that a civilian might not be able to control the military wing of the organisation. But a military leader as president of Renamo risks keeping it weak as an electoral machine, with consequences for peaceful electoral politics.</p>
<p>As a general cum parliamentarian cum negotiator Renamo’s interim president, <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-who-is-ossufo-momade-renamos-newly-appointed-interim-leader/">Momade</a>could be an ideal compromise. One could also imagine a double ticket with a military as president and a civilian, such as Ivone Soares or Manuel Bissopo, the acting secretary-general, as number two.<br>
Alternatively, some have advanced that Renamo dissidents such as Raul Domingos and Daviz Simango could have a <a href="https://www.voaportugues.com/a/os-desafios-do-p%C3%B3s--dhlakama-para-a-renamo/4384864.html">chance as outsiders</a>. Domingos, at one point seen as Dhlakama’s successor, was expelled from the party in 2000 in the middle of difficult negotiations with the government. Simango was elected for Renamo as mayor of Beira in 2003, but not put forward for reelection in 2008 as he was becoming too independent and influential. He seceded and created his own party, the <a href="http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/proelit/Sergio_Chichava.pdf">Democratic Movement of Mozambique</a>, which now controls several important cities. </p>
<p>More realistically, Renamo might reintegrate these dissidents and their party, or at least align with them, making Renamo a broader church. This could help the party get the electoral victory it has been seeking since 1994. Renamo has come second in all elections since the end of the war in 1992. It almost won in the 1999 elections, possibly only losing then because of fraud.</p>
<h2>What next for peace negotiations</h2>
<p>Dhlakama’s death could tempt both sides to change or withdraw from the negotiations. On May 5, two days after he died, Frelimo’s all powerful political commission, the party’s supreme organ, issued a statement saying that all that remained to be done now was <a href="http://www.frelimo.org.mz/frelimo/index.php/actualidade/noticias/item/1701-mensagem-do-partido-frelimo-pelo-desaparecimento-fisico-do-presidente-da-renamo-afonso-dhlakama">“the disarmament and demilitarisation” of Renamo</a>. It failed to mention the decentralisation agreement which would introduce a system of elections for provincial governors and create district assemblies. The agreement is facing <a href="http://www.dw.com/pt-002/descentraliza%C3%A7%C3%A3o-negocia%C3%A7%C3%B5es-entre-renamo-e-frelimo-num-impasse/a-43692199">difficulties in parliament</a> where Frelimo is arguing that it needs to be amended and put to a national referendum. </p>
<p>Responding in kind, Momade declared that his party would be doing nothing else than finalising the <a href="http://www.verdade.co.mz/destaques/democracia/65673">agreement on decentralisation</a>, as if the reintegration of Renamo soldiers into the Mozambican military was not an issue anymore.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218424/original/file-20180510-184630-z8pc8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A crowd displays the portrait of Afonso Dhlakama at his funeral service.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Ricardo Franco</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If not kept in check these kinds of dynamics could undermine, and even lead to the collapse, of the negotiations. </p>
<p>Political analyst Alex Vines has argued that Dhlakama’s death could, however, also be an <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/afonso-dhlakama-s-death-changes-calculation-peace-prospects-mozambique">opportunity for peace</a>, recalling that the two sides were close to an agreement before he passed away. He has appealed to the goodwill of Renamo and Frelimo and called for greater engagement from the international community and investors. </p>
<h2>Implications for Frelimo</h2>
<p>Dhlakama’s departure could potentially weaken Nyusi, and as a result cause problems for Frelimo. The party fractured under Nyusi’s predecessor President Armando Guebuza. And Nyusi took over at a time of both economic and political crises in the country.</p>
<p>The country’s economic crisis is related to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2018-03-28-no-escape-for-mozambique-as-debt-troubles-mount/">massive secret debts</a> supposedly contracted to fight Renamo. The IMF and the Western international community have <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36158118">suspended cooperation</a> and some investors have <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2016-12-04-once-a-beacon-in-sub-saharan-africa-mozambique-has-been-hit-hard-by-scandal-and-price-cycles/">withdrawn</a>.</p>
<p>On the political front, Nyusi staked his presidency on the resolution of the conflict with Renamo. At the time this was much against the will of his own party. Negotiations are therefore very important to him.</p>
<p>In a strong presidential system, a weakening of the president could lead to more internal divisions. In turn this would weaken him, the party and the government’s hand in negotiations with the IMF, the international community and Renamo.</p>
<p>The elections in October 2018 and in 2019 are looming large in people’s minds. Nobody is sure how they will play out. Renamo might align with other opposition parties while Frelimo might try to use the Renamo leadership transition to undermine its rival, with unknown consequences. There are also fears Frelimo might resort to harsh tactics to win and remain in power. </p>
<p>On the other hand, Dhlakama’s successor could ally more strongly with Nyusi and help him assert his peace agenda. They could work together to ensure a peaceful and constructive environment for the elections as well as widen the negotiations to reach a wide based agreement for a sustainable peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96284/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The death of Mozambican opposition leader Alfonso Dhlakama could affect the progress made to end hostilities in the country.Eric Morier-Genoud, Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/713652017-01-17T17:09:41Z2017-01-17T17:09:41ZMozambique’s unexpected truce still hangs in the balance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152905/original/image-20170116-9055-c3oqt5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi has agreed a truce with opposition Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Antonio Silva</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Christmas tidings of peace and goodwill in Mozambique seemed almost too good to be true after four years of sporadic but escalating civil conflict.</p>
<p>On December 26, Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the Renamo opposition movement, told the media that he and President Felipe Nyusi had spoken by phone and agreed to a <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-new-year-cease-fire-joseph-hanlon/">provisional ceasefire</a>.</p>
<p>A week later they agreed to extend the truce by <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-violence-idUSKBN14N0T2">a further 60 days</a>. The good news was unexpected given that international mediators had recently <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mediators-elaving-mozambique-aim-report/">packed up and left Mozambique</a> after six months of stop-start talks that made almost no progress. </p>
<p>A further oddity of the conflict is that the Renamo guerrillas as well as its parliamentarians are under one man’s leadership – Dhlakama. This means he leads a guerrilla force as well as parliamentarians who debate against the Frelimo government in the National Assembly.</p>
<p>Dhlakama was brought into electoral politics as a result of the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/mozambique/general-peace-agreement-mozambique/p24232">1992 peace accord</a>. But by 2009 he was disillusioned with his party’s declining performance at the polls and relocated to the northern city of Nampula, a place where Renamo has long had <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=TL2FX87v8k4C&pg=PA193&lpg=PA193&dq=%22Nampula,+a+place+where+Renamo+has+long+had+solid+support,&source=bl&ots=oyHTNFXOrb&sig=WMyU4QhxCv3Lgmc2Tx_D8xizR-o&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjK24rQ9cbRAhWCCMAKHWs9B0AQ6AEIGDAA#v=onepage&q=%22Nampula%2C%20a%20place%20where%20Renamo%20has%20long%20had%20solid%20support%2C&f=false">solid support</a>.</p>
<p>It was there that his bodyguards – a force he was allowed to retain in the terms of the peace accord – exchanged fire with the police. Following the shootout, Dhlakama moved again, this time to Satungira, his old wartime redoubt in the Gorongosa National Park in Sofala Province of central Mozambique.</p>
<p>Renamo soldiers, mostly ageing civil war veterans who had not received the demobilisation benefits they expected in 1992, began to gather and <a href="https://theconversation.com/old-soldiers-old-divisions-are-central-in-new-mozambique-conflict-62130">form encampments</a> at locations across central and northern Mozambique.</p>
<h2>Talking peace</h2>
<p>Renamo ambushes on the main roads and exchanges of fire with government forces became more frequent through 2013 and 2014. </p>
<p>Elections in October 2014 brought a truce. But from late 2015 government forces started attacking Renamo positions and targeting civilians <a href="https://theconversation.com/old-soldiers-old-divisions-are-central-in-new-mozambique-conflict-62130">suspected of supporting Renamo</a>. During 2016 at least eight Renamo officials <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_345-4Nov2016_assassinations_tobacco_prices.pdf">were assassinated</a>. Renamo in turn became less restrained in attacking civilian targets, including local government officials. </p>
<p>Dialogue mediated by Mozambican civil society groups secured the truce <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_270_25Aug2014_ceasefire_signed(1).pdf">before the 2014 elections</a>, but failed to find a more enduring settlement. Renamo had been pushing for international mediators and foreign teams <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201607210896.html">arrived in Mozambique in July 2016</a>.</p>
<p>The government and Renamo each got to pick members of <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_332-21July2016_Mediation-begins.pdf">the mediation team</a>. The government called on the Southern African Development Community and on Jonathan Powell, a former chief-of-staff to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. </p>
<p>Renamo got the Catholic Church and the European Union on board. When the mediators left in December after half-a-year of stop-start talks, they made it clear that there was little point in them being there when little progress had been <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mediators-elaving-mozambique-aim-report/">made towards common ground</a>. </p>
<p>The main sticking point involved a political demand put on the table by Renamo: that it be granted the power to appoint provincial governors in the provinces where it claims to have won <a href="https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_282-19March2015_Renamo_autonomous_provinces_proposal.pdf">an electoral majority</a>. Which provinces Renamo won is a further matter of dispute.</p>
<p>This solution would involve a shift away from today’s centralised politics, whereby Frelimo, as the winner of the elections at national level, gets to appoint all the provincial governors. </p>
<p>But it’s also not exactly a gain for democracy: the proposal is not for the provinces to choose their own leaders, but for Renamo, rather than Frelimo, to appoint governors in certain provinces on the basis of previous election results. </p>
<p>At one point during the negotiations, it looked as though the government might be about to make concessions on the <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_336-21August2016_Mediators-cause-confusion_Hunguana_Land-occupation.pdf">crucial issue of decentralisation</a>, only to backtrack. This apparent dithering reflects differing opinions within the party.</p>
<p>On the one hand, a centralised state is an article of faith for party hawks, who also fear that Renamo appointments to provincial governorships would create centres of patronage for Renamo and represent cracks in Frelimo’s dominance of state power. </p>
<p>But another tendency within the party, likely including Nyusi himself, believes Frelimo has little to fear from decentralisation. This more flexible position on Nyusi’s side could explain why a couple of ad-hoc phone chats between him and Dhlakama have managed to keep alive the idea of a peace just weeks after the mediation process fizzled out. </p>
<h2>A question of sovereignty</h2>
<p>Yet the terms of the ceasefire remain unresolved, and this poses an immediate threat to the truce. Renamo has promised to continue operating patrols within a 3km radius of its bases. The government refuses to keep its distance from Renamo bases, which Renamo sees as provocation.</p>
<p>This is not a trivial issue, but goes to the heart of a question about sovereignty and political legitimacy. The same disagreement over where government forces can and cannot go derailed the peace talks in August 2016 when the mediators tried to negotiate a security corridor for them to <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_337-updated-25Aug2016_Talk-stalement-so-mediators-take-break_Mediator-text.pdf">visit Dhlakama at Satungira</a>. </p>
<p>The government has maintained the position that its sovereign prerogatives allow it to deploy its forces wherever it will, and that there is no such thing as Renamo territory. </p>
<p>Renamo, on the other hand, portrays the war as a conflict between equals and insists that it has the right to defend its positions against what it speaks of as government aggression. As things stand now, a skirmish between soldiers of the two sides could easily be seized upon by Dhlakama or by a Frelimo hawk as a reason to declare the truce null and void. </p>
<p>Whether or not the ceasefire holds, Mozambique’s leaders are only starting to face up to the consequence of the country’s financial crisis. In October, Mozambique acknowledged it <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-25/mozambique-says-in-debt-distress-yields-rise-to-record">could not pay its debts</a>. </p>
<p>This is the outcome of a mounting scandal that broke earlier in 2016, when Mozambique revealed that it had <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6c755214-057f-11e6-9b51-0fb5e65703ce">US$1 billion in undeclared debt</a>: the result of government bailouts for two part state-owned companies.</p>
<p>Major lenders promptly halted loans. The government also continues to be haunted by the disappearance of $600 million in <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-debt-idUSKCN0XX160">bonds issued by the state fishing company</a> supposedly to buy new boats. There are suspicions that the missing money was channelled into the war effort. </p>
<p>This squandering of state resources has had consequences for Mozambique’s development indicators: half of rural people live below the poverty line, a figure <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201610310600.html">barely reduced since 2003</a>. Although Renamo is in no position to give farmers a better deal, it has won some sympathy for its cause by exploiting a sense of resentment in the largely rural provinces of the centre and north.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Pearce receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust and the Newton Trust. </span></em></p>The main sticking point in the failed efforts at peace is the demand by Renamo that it be allowed to appoint provincial governors in the provinces where it claims to have won an electoral majority.Justin Pearce, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in Politics and International Studies & Research Associate of St John's College Cambridge, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/679962016-11-08T19:05:41Z2016-11-08T19:05:41ZSome good news from Mozambique: poverty levels have been reduced<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144919/original/image-20161107-4711-1v2fya6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambique has recorded significant poverty reduction in recent years. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Grant Lee Neuenburg</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There has been a serious deficit of good news in Mozambique for quite some time. The recent release of <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/event/conference-poverty-and-well-being-mozambique">Mozambique’s Fourth Poverty Assessment</a>, based on a large nationally representative household survey conducted in 2014-15, provides a welcome shift. The report finds that, relative to the prior survey undertaken in 2008-09, significant gains have been made in Mozambique’s fight to reduce poverty and improve living conditions across an array of measures and approaches.</p>
<p>Over the last 25 years, Mozambique has nearly halved the share of its population consuming below a basic needs poverty line. Comparisons with other countries in Africa and elsewhere are also generally very favourable in terms of trends. Mozambique remains poor. But it is now approaching the living standard levels of other low income African countries, like Tanzania. </p>
<p>The report was released at the end of October in the midst of an unfolding macroeconomic <a href="http://www.mpd.gov.mz/images/Presentation_by_the_Ministry_of_Economy_and_Finance_-_25_October_2016.pdf">crisis</a> which was provoked by a number of factors.
These include the reemergence of <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/negotiations-between-frelimo-renamo-suspended-mozambique-war-escalates-1573691">open hostilities</a> between the ruling Frelimo party and its old foe, the opposition party Renamo. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international partners stopped disbursing funds to Mozambique after revelations that the previous government of President Armando Guebuza <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/09/16/mozambique-president-to-cooperate-on-debt-audit-imf/">failed to disclose official backing of a series of large loans</a> to state owned companies. And, the much lower world prices for coal and natural gas has reduced private investor <a href="https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/february-2016/mozambique-commodity-prices-deal-another-blow">enthusiasm</a>.</p>
<p>Mozambique’s <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">GDP growth</a> in 2016 is expected to be about 3.6%. This will be its lowest by far since 2000. The currency has <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/mozambique/currency">depreciated massively against the dollar</a>. More expensive imports have stoked inflation, which is currently running at about <a href="http://www.ine.gov.mz/">25%</a>. </p>
<p>The current crisis reflects a collapse in confidence across a series of key relationships including between Frelimo and Renamo. Relations between the Mozambican government and its international donor partners and investors have been unsettled. </p>
<p>Most importantly, it is difficult to imagine that all this has not eroded people’s faith in the state’s ability to deliver on broadly shared development objectives.</p>
<p>Yet the poverty assessment reveals that, prior to the crisis, the country had achieved significant improvements in living conditions across multiple indicators. These include monetary measures such as household consumption plus an array of non-monetary measures related to education, water, sanitation, roofing, electricity and possession of durable goods.</p>
<h2>Significant gains</h2>
<p>The assessment considers poverty and well-being using two principal approaches. The first approach focuses on household consumption by determining a basket of goods corresponding to a basic living standard. The cost of acquiring this basket of goods is the poverty line. Households whose real consumption per person falls below the line are considered absolutely poor in monetary terms. </p>
<p>The second approach assesses whether broad based improvements are being realised across a series of non-monetary measures using the now broadly employed <a href="http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/OPHIWP084_Ch3.pdf">Alkire-Foster multidimensional poverty index</a> as well as a complementary <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.3200/full">first order dominance approach (FOD)</a>. The FOD approach dispenses with the need for a weighting scheme across welfare measures by focusing on movement of the population towards unambiguously better living standards. </p>
<p>Across all approaches, a coherent story emerges. At the national level, welfare levels have improved compared with the prior survey undertaken in 2008/09. The share of the population living in monetary poverty (below the absolute poverty line) fell by about five percentage points. Even more rapid gains were realised for the non-monetary measures. Looking back to 1996/97, the gains in well-being, both monetary and non-monetary, have been substantial. These gains have been registered in rural and urban zones and in every province. </p>
<p>Data weaknesses, particularly undercounting of food consumption, militate against precise statements. Nevertheless, the monetary poverty rate in Mozambique likely falls in the range of 41% to 45% of the population. This is down from an estimated 80% in 1990. As such, Mozambique has come very close to achieving <a href="http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml">Millennium Development Goal 1</a>. This called for a halving of the share of the population living in absolute poverty between 1990 and 2015.</p>
<p>The conclusion that poor households are progressing is strongly reinforced by the multidimensional analysis. For example, taking six basic dimensions of non-monetary welfare, nearly half of the population was considered deprived in all six dimensions in 1996-97. This means that nearly half the population lived in households where no member possessed at least a fourth grade education. In these households water access was unsafe, sanitation was inadequate, the roof was made of grass, there was no electricity and there were very few durable goods.</p>
<p>Further, only 2% of the population was considered not deprived in all six dimensions. By 2014-15, the share of the population considered deprived in all six dimensions had fallen to about 14% while the share not deprived in any indicator had risen to about 16%.</p>
<p>The Alkire-Foster multidimensional poverty index, shown in the figure below, comprehensively tracks the population considered deprived across multiple dimensions. Broad based improvements are evident.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=340&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/144391/original/image-20161103-25346-r3vc0h.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Alkire-Foster multidimensional poverty index. 1996/97-2014/15.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fourth National Assessment</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Much remains to be accomplished</h2>
<p>The findings of the most recent poverty assessment are not all positive. In particular, the gains realised have not contributed to a convergence in welfare levels. The gap between rural and urban zones is large and at best persistent, if not aggravating. Living conditions in the south are much better than those in the north and the centre across almost all welfare dimensions considered and all methods. </p>
<p>In addition, the fruits of the rapid economic growth experienced since 1996 have been tilted towards wealthier households. Inequality of consumption has been <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10888-015-9303-5">increasing since 1996/97</a> with a particular spike since 2008/09. One of the best known measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient on consumption, rose to 0.47 in 2014/15 compared with 0.40 in 1996/97. This is a large increase from an initially relatively high level. </p>
<p>In sum, governance weaknesses in the Mozambican state and its failure to deliver a more equitable growth pattern must be balanced against a real record of achievement in the fight against poverty. </p>
<p>The hope is that this record emboldens all parties to begin taking concrete steps towards rebuilding a workable level of mutual confidence. Reestablishing key working relationships is necessary to achieving inclusive growth – the core policy challenge facing Mozambique in its economic and social development over the next decades.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67996/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mozambique has made significant progress in its fight against poverty despite recent economic and political challengesChanning Arndt, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations UniversityFinn Tarp, UNU-WIDER Director, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/621302016-07-12T17:08:31Z2016-07-12T17:08:31ZOld soldiers, old divisions are central in new Mozambique conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129607/original/image-20160706-12743-1azkzmu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 10,000 people have fled the conflict in Mozambique to take refuge in Malawi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Pearce</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peace in <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/af/profiles/Mozambique/SecInfo.html">Mozambique</a> lasted 20 years, between 1992 and 2012.</p>
<p>Following three years of skirmishes, conflict has escalated since 2015. The Mozambican Defence Force has been trying to <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_302-12Nov15-disarming_Renamo-IMF_loan.pdf">destroy</a> the military bases belonging to the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), the principal opposition to the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) in parliament. </p>
<p>At least 10,000 people have fled Mozambique and sought <a href="https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/mozambiques-success-story-under-threat">refuge in Malawi</a>, testifying to attacks perpetrated mostly by government soldiers. The conflict has served to consolidate local support for Renamo, which had previously fought the government from 1976 to 1992.</p>
<h2>Pragmatic peace</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cfr.org/mozambique/general-peace-agreement-mozambique/p24232">1992 Rome Accord</a>, which ended the 16-year war, was greeted at the time as a model of pragmatism. To overcome the misgivings of Renamo’s leader, <a href="https://global.britannica.com/place/Mozambique/Peace-in-Mozambique#ref932106">Afonso Dhlakama</a>, the accord allowed him to retain armed bodyguards.</p>
<p>Other Renamo soldiers were to have been integrated into the police. When this didn’t happen, they <a href="http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/04/09/ijtj.ijv004.full.pdf+html">stayed loyal to Dhlakama</a>. Renamo’s electoral support <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/moz1999background2.htm">peaked in 1999</a> and then declined: the challenge of the opposition party trapped in a system where loyalty requires redistributing state largesse. Then-President <a href="http://live.worldbank.org/experts/he-joaquim-chissano">Joaquim Chissano</a> appeased Dhlakama only through diplomacy and patronage.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=813&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=813&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=813&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1022&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1022&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129856/original/image-20160708-24060-78g4us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1022&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Things changed with the election of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Armando-Guebuza">Armando Guebuza</a> as president in 2004. Not only did Guebuza reject Chissano’s <a href="http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/04/09/ijtj.ijv004.full.pdf+html">conciliatory attitude</a> towards Dhlakama; his presidency also saw state capture by a section of the Frelimo elite at a time when Mozambique’s economy was being transformed by the <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_Bulletin_53_coal-gas.pdf">coal and gas industries</a>.</p>
<p>The emergence of a visibly wealthy elite while most people remained poor was a grievance that Renamo was later to exploit. In 2009, Dhlakama relocated to the northern city of Nampula where, in 2012, Renamo soldiers <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2013.840087">clashed with police</a> at Renamo’s provincial headquarters. Dhlakama retreated to his wartime redoubt at Satungira in the Gorongosa National Park in Sofala province. Meanwhile, Renamo soldiers were quietly establishing bases in rural areas across the central provinces.</p>
<h2>An army of ageing combatants</h2>
<p>The next phase of the crisis began with a gathering of Renamo men in Muxúnguè, a town on the north-south arterial road through Sofala province. Residents of the town recalled that by the end of March 2013 several hundred were camped out at the local Renamo office and conducting marching drills. </p>
<p>The men were all at least 40 years old. A peculiar feature of this conflict has been Renamo’s reliance on ageing combatants from the civil war, rather than recruiting fresh blood. On April 3, police fired teargas to disperse the men. The next day, Renamo attacked the police station before retreating to an unknown location in the bush <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_214_Renamo_attacks_8Apr2013.pdf">outside the town</a>.</p>
<p>Later that year, Renamo began systematically to ambush vehicles on the national road <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_218_2_dead_in_Renamo_attacks_21June2013.pdf">south of Muxúnguè</a>. Civilian casualties were few, but the threat to the economy alarmed the government. The defence force began counterinsurgency operations against farming communities that it suspected of supporting Renamo.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129838/original/image-20160708-24071-10g4q9z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Negotiations got under way, mediated by Mozambican civil society, but with little apparent enthusiasm from either side. Renamo’s demands centred on three main points. First, it should have the right to <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_251-15Apr2014_IMF%26education_talks-deadlock.pdf">appoint officers</a> to the defence force equivalent to those appointed by the government. This was a provision of the Rome Accord, ignored in recent years as retired ex-Renamo officers were replaced by government (in effect, Frelimo) nominees. </p>
<p>Second, Renamo demanded measures to deal with <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_241-election_accord-12Feb2014.pdf">electoral malpractice</a>. Finally, Renamo wanted power to be <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_282-19March2015_Renamo_autonomous_provinces_proposal.pdf">devolved to the provinces</a>; this would create a patronage base for Renamo – and for that reason would be hard for Frelimo to accept. </p>
<p>The negotiations resulted only in a truce to allow elections to go ahead as scheduled in October 2014. The results revealed a <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/renamos-gambit-forcing-the-issue-after-the-mozambique-2014-elections">resurgence in support</a> for Renamo and for Dhlakama.</p>
<h2>Conflicting historical narratives</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanperspectives/2016/06/30/mozambiques-flare-up-of-conflict-is-an-unresolved-elite-power-struggle">Interviews</a> I did in Sofala during the lull that followed the 2014 election, as part of an ongoing research project, gave some clues as to why so many central Mozambicans regard an armed Renamo as a preferable alternative to the status quo.</p>
<p>When people talked about local history, they evoked divisions going back to the independence struggle in the 1960s. In contrast to Frelimo’s official history of undivided nationalism, people in Sofala recall a fractious alliance between leaders from different parts of Mozambique.</p>
<p>They remember a pastor from Sofala called <a href="http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2010/01/suponho-nunca-ter-sido-tornado-publico-na-sua-totalidade-o-documento-apresentado-por-uria-simango-em-novembro-de-1969-e.html">Uria Simango</a>, who as Frelimo vice-president was expected to succeed <a href="http://www.oberlin.edu/alummag/oampast/oam_spring98/Alum_n_n/eduardo.html">Eduardo Mondlane</a>, who was killed in 1969. The fact that Simango was outmanoeuvred by <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/samora-machel">Samora Machel</a>, a southerner who led Mozambique to independence in 1975, is understood as part of a pattern of southern domination over the rest of Mozambique.</p>
<p>After independence, Frelimo’s attempts to relocate peasants to communal villages engendered support in Sofala for a Renamo that promised to reverse the collectivisation policy. When people speak of their own poverty today, they contrast it with wealth being amassed by the southern elite. </p>
<h2>Frelimo’s crisis of legitimacy</h2>
<p>When police demand bribes from farmers taking produce to market, people interpret this as symptomatic of a state that predates on central Mozambicans and has no legitimacy to rule. This suggests a reason why, when Renamo guerrillas reappeared in villages in recent years, they were welcomed by people who harboured long-held resentments.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129857/original/image-20160708-24101-zx5rbw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Armando Guebuza, president from 2004 to 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Segar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Refugees from Mozambique’s <a href="http://www.internationalresourcejournal.com/mining/mining_july_11/mozambique_s_new_mining_epicentre.html">Tete province</a> whom I interviewed in Malawi this year also saw the state as a predatory force. But unlike people in Sofala, they had no historic allegiance to Renamo. When Renamo established bases in Tete in 2012 many were apprehensive, but warmed to Renamo’s men, who explained they had come to bring “democracy”.</p>
<p>Trouble began only after the <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/renamos-gambit-forcing-the-issue-after-the-mozambique-2014-elections">2014 elections</a>. People initially believed Renamo had won, then were confused when they heard Frelimo’s candidate, Filipe Nyusi, had become president. </p>
<p>Refugees said they had expected Renamo to take power for two reasons, each based on a misunderstanding of democracy that Renamo had apparently encouraged. First, because Renamo had a majority in more than half of Mozambique’s provinces, it ought to run the country. Second, they insisted that “democracy means alternation of power”: the fact that Frelimo has been in power since 1975 was reason enough for a change.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129858/original/image-20160708-24074-1ekwmxj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Mozambican refugee outside a makeshift shelter at Kapise camp in Malawi’s Mwanza district.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Eldson Chagara</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Village ‘chiefs’ and ‘secretaries’</h2>
<p>Renamo began during 2015 to assert its presence by appointing “chiefs” and “secretaries” in villages, in parallel with the Frelimo appointees who represent the state as well as the party. Not surprisingly, this alarmed the government, which in late 2015 began a new push to defeat Renamo.</p>
<p>Accounts from throughout central Mozambique reveal a consistent strategy. Government troops would try to expel Renamo, and then attack nearby civilians, accusing them of supporting Renamo. They burnt houses, sometimes with the occupants inside. They burnt grain stores, assuming these to be supplies for Renamo.</p>
<p>Some people were shot, others captured and interrogated. Women and men were raped. Renamo soldiers have been more restrained, targeting Frelimo officials. The Mozambican army is currently trying to take Renamo’s Satungira headquarters, but mountainous terrain gives the guerrillas an advantage.</p>
<p>What is happening in Mozambique is not exactly a popular uprising. It was ignited by Dhlakama’s desire for a share of political power, and its associated wealth, in a situation where the state is synonymous with Frelimo. The Rome Accord deserves some blame for centralising politics while allowing an opposition movement to retain access to the means of violence: 20 years later, Dhlakama realised his soldiers were the only asset he had left.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the recent uprising could not have happened without popular support – support that Renamo mobilised by presenting ideas about history and democracy in a way that resonated with real grievances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Pearce receives funding from The Leverhulme Trust and The Newton Trust.</span></em></p>Mozambican civilians are again bearing the consequences of war between the government and opposition party Renamo. How has Renamo mobilised popular support for a new uprising?Justin Pearce, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in Politics and International Studies & Research Associate of St John's College Cambridge, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.