tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/saudi-arabia-1591/articlesSaudi Arabia – The Conversation2024-03-11T12:24:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2251522024-03-11T12:24:50Z2024-03-11T12:24:50ZRamadan will be difficult for those in Gaza or other war zones – what does fasting mean for those who might be already starving?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580797/original/file-20240309-20-1w4qtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C11%2C3730%2C2144&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinians gather at the area where aid was distributed in Gaza City on Feb. 19, 2024.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinians-struggling-with-hunger-gather-at-the-area-news-photo/2015671793">Karam Hassan/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ramadan in the Gaza Strip this year will be anything but “normal.” </p>
<p>Malnutrition and disease are claiming dozens of lives. The Gaza Health Ministry said on March 6, 2024, that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/famine-gaza-hunger-israel-hamas-war-rcna141891">at least 20 people had died</a> of malnutrition. Many others, it said, were “dying silently,” unable to reach medical facilities.</p>
<p>According to humanitarian organizations, the proportion of people in Gaza deprived of food <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/06/colleagues-starvation-gaza-no-precedent-famine">exceeds any other place in the world</a>. </p>
<p>What meaning can the holy month’s fast have for those who have nothing to eat? </p>
<h2>Ramadan and the Quran</h2>
<p>Fasting in Islam requires believers to abstain from certain acts that are necessary for sustaining life – mainly eating, drinking and sexual – from dawn to dusk. But it is not just about food. It also requires that people abstain from lying or criticizing others behind their backs. </p>
<p>Muslims access “the sacred” primarily through the Quran, which is recited collectively from cover to cover in <a href="https://gulfnews.com/uae/ramadan/ramadan-2023-all-you-need-to-know-about-taraweeh-prayers---when-why-and-how-to-perform-it-1.1618320387277">communal night nighttime vigils during Ramadan</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://keough.nd.edu/people/mahan-mirza/">As a scholar of Islam</a> and as a practicing Muslim, I often think of how Islamic scripture describes the purpose of this sacred month. “Fasting is prescribed to you,” <a href="https://quran.com/2/183">says the Quran</a>, “that ye may learn self-restraint.”
The revelation of the Quran to Muhammad commenced in Ramadan, and Muslims take this time of the year to renew their connection to God’s words. </p>
<p>Fasting in Ramadan was prescribed in 624 C.E., the second year of Islam. This was shortly after the Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in today’s Saudi Arabia to escape persecution. This episode, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Hijrah-Islam">known as the Hijra</a>, came to mark the first year of the Islamic calendar. </p>
<p>While Muslims may fast voluntarily throughout the year, it is mandatory in the month of Ramadan. Sick or pregnant people, as well as travelers, must make up missed days. The chronically ill or elderly must make amends by feeding others. </p>
<p>Fasting in Ramadan is believed to rejuvenate spiritual strength. The <a href="https://sunnah.com/ibnmajah:1690">Prophet Muhammad said</a> the mere ritual of fasting without inner transformation results in nothing but hunger.</p>
<p>“Goodness does not consist in your turning your face towards East or West,” <a href="https://quran.com/2/177">the Quran cautions</a>, in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/qiblah">reference to the orientation</a> that is required in ritual prayer. Rather, goodness consists in caring for the neighbor and stranger. These are principles that <a href="https://www.acommonword.com/the-acw-document/">all religions have in common</a>. </p>
<h2>Ramadan and charity</h2>
<p>In Muslim culture, Ramadan is experienced primarily as a month of prayer, ascetic practice, family life and generosity. A select few engage in a practice known as “<a href="https://www.zakat.org/on-ritual-retreat-itikaf">i’tikaf</a>,” a voluntary retreat in partial seclusion at the mosque, typically during the last few days and nights. </p>
<p>A highlight of Ramadan is increased acts of charity and the feeding of others. Many mosques offer meals, which is believed to be an act of particular virtue at sunset to facilitate breaking of the fast, at this time of the year. Muslims often pay their <a href="https://www.muslimaid.org/what-we-do/religious-dues/ramadan/zakat-facts/">annual mandatory alms known as zakat</a> during Ramadan in order to reap the special rewards of this month. </p>
<p>Islamic educational and humanitarian organizations increase their appeals for donations every year in Ramadan, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2022/apr/11/ramadan-2022-around-the-world-in-pictures">rhythm of life in Muslim communities transforms</a> with pre-dawn family meals, lazy mornings, working afternoons and communal feasts.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several children and adults share a meal while being seated in a circle on the floor where a number of dishes are placed in the center." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580575/original/file-20240307-28-ap9at8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A family living in a tent breaks their fast during Ramadan 2021 in Deir Al Balah, a city in Gaza, on April 19, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tawfik-al-akraa-and-his-family-are-seen-during-the-iftar-news-photo/1232406941?adppopup=true">Ali Jadallah/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Ramadan in Gaza</h2>
<p>The meaning of Ramadan in a war zone is poignant for Muslims who are suffering directly. War is neither prescribed nor prohibited during Ramadan. <a href="https://sunnah.com/abudawud:2406">Muhammad urged</a> his troops to break the fast when entering into battle in order to preserve their strength. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Badr">Battle of Badr</a>, the first of many military confrontations under Muhammad’s command, which became a turning point in early Islamic history, took place in Ramadan. </p>
<p>For those who witness that suffering on screens from the comfort of their homes, the question of moral responsibility still remains. Muslims who seek to fulfill <a href="https://quran.com/2/3">God’s command</a> are “to spend out of what God has provided for them” in worthy charitable causes in Ramadan. Many of them will ask what more could be done to feed the hungriest of hungry in the world, who are <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/80-of-world-s-hungriest-people-live-in-gaza-palestine/3156190">now in Gaza</a>.</p>
<p>Religions help us come to terms with our mortality. They help us make sense of life beyond this life. In a time of war and famine, when death is near, <a href="https://quran.com/50/16">Ramadan can remind us that God is nearer</a>: “closer than the jugular vein.”</p>
<p>For countless innocent victims of all ages and every gender who are breathing their last – in the direst of circumstances and the deepest of anguish – this thought can be a source of solace, if not joy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225152/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahan Mirza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ramadan encourages acts of charity. This also poses a question for many Muslims as they consider what more could be done to feed the hungriest in the world, many of whom are in Gaza.Mahan Mirza, Executive Director, Ansari Institute for Global Engagement with Religion, and Teaching Professor of Teaching Professor of Islam and Global Affairs, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2233632024-02-13T06:12:38Z2024-02-13T06:12:38ZUAE and India are now the best places to start a business, but western countries still beat them in one key respect<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575016/original/file-20240212-22-gtf8t7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abu Dhabi is turning itself into one of the world's leading tech hubs. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/traffic-lights-on-street-abu-dhabi-264424121">Patryk Kosmider/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the best place in the world to start a new business, according to the latest annual <a href="https://www.gemconsortium.org/reports/latest-global-report">Global Entrepreneurship Monitor</a> (GEM) survey. The Arab nation is number one for the third year in a row thanks to a big push by the government into cutting-edge technology in its efforts to diversify away from oil. </p>
<p>Four out of the top five countries in the GEM rankings are in the Middle East or Asia, with India second, Saudi Arabia third and Qatar fifth – the only exception being Lithuania in fourth place. This is characteristic of a clear eastward shift in the quality of entrepreneurship ecosystems in the past five years, closely mirroring a similar shift in the world’s economic <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN20S26W/">centre of gravity</a>.</p>
<p>The UAE has made particularly steady progress, progressing from fifth on the list in 2019 to the lead ranking. Saudi Arabia has risen from 17th to third, while India is up from sixth to second, having shaken off a pandemic dip in between. </p>
<p>Western economies have slipped during the same period. So why has this been happening and what will matter most in future?</p>
<h2>How the survey works</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is a major driver of global economic growth. It is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0148296318304454">greatly affected by</a> a country’s regulations, education system, financial institutions and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1075425321000132">overall culture</a>. By evaluating these variables, you can get a good understanding of the entrepreneurial climate. </p>
<p>GEM captures this each year through a national expert survey that goes out to a range of entrepreneurship ecosystem stakeholders, including business leaders, government officials and academics. This year, 49 countries participated in the survey including most countries in the G20 (with exceptions like Australia that didn’t participate in the most recent survey). From this, GEM produces a rating of 13 different entrepreneurial conditions to create the annual index. </p>
<p><strong>GEM rankings 2019-2023</strong></p>
<h2>The shift to the east</h2>
<p>The explanations for the rise of eastern countries include greater government promotion of business creation, more emphasis on entrepreneurship education and changes in how business activity is viewed culturally. </p>
<p>In the UAE, for instance, there have been initiatives such as <a href="https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/uae-in-the-future/initiatives-of-the-next-50/projects-of-the-50/first-set-of-projects-of-the-50">Projects of the 50</a>, which includes priority visas for entrepreneurs and top students, particularly in areas like artificial intelligence, digital currencies and coding. It also includes pushing national adoption of leading technologies. </p>
<p>The government used Expo 2020 as a campaign to promote the Emirates as an attractive destination for business, as well as changing certain rules to make it easier for foreign investors. Notably, this included allowing for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-allow-100-foreign-ownership-companies-june-wam-2021-05-19/">100% foreign ownership</a> of companies in 2021. The <a href="https://www.abudhabi.gov.ae/en/programmes/ghadan-21">Ghadan 21</a> business accelerator programme has also been spending AED50 billion (£11 billion) in Abu Dhabi since 2019. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Abu Dhabi pavillion in GITEX Global 23" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575020/original/file-20240212-22-vdok8w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Abu Dhabi selling itself in Dubai at GITEX Global 23, the biggest tech startup event in the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/govt-abu-dhabi-pavilion-43rd-gitex-2380335063">Adnan Ahmad Ali</a></span>
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<p>The Saudis are also focused on diversifying away from oil, and entrepreneurship is one of the top priorities in <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/">Saudi Arabia Vision 2030</a>. This has seen the national enterprise development agency, <a href="https://www.monshaat.gov.sa/en">Monsha’at</a>, doing things like promoting university startups and fast-growing ventures. </p>
<p>The country has been trying to make it easier for entrepreneurs to access finance through initiatives such as the Saudi Public Investment Fund and Saudi Venture Capital Company, while there has been targeted support for <a href="https://sponsored.bloomberg.com/article/Monshaat/female-entrepreneurship-transforming-the-saudi-economy">female entrepreneurs</a>. </p>
<p>To attract foreign talent, the Saudi government also approved a <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2439341/business-economy">new residency scheme in 2019</a> and an <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/saudi-arabia-introduces-three-month-temporary-work-visa-1.95099718">instant labour visa</a> in 2023.</p>
<p>In India, there has been a lot of emphasis on innovation in the country’s <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjUsPfI856EAxVAV0EAHXhVCAMQFnoECDgQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.education.gov.in%2Fsites%2Fupload_files%2Fmhrd%2Ffiles%2FNEP_Final_English_0.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2VOhw52WTOK6owxeeFXyay&opi=89978449">New Education Policy</a>, which was introduced in 2020 to raise educational standards across the board. Many school students have also been inspired by a nationwide initiative called the <a href="https://aim.gov.in/atl.php">Atal Tinkering Lab</a>, which inculcates curiosity and design mindset through science projects, while the popular TV show Shark Tank (called Dragons’ Den in some countries) has fired up dinner-table discussions about things like “equity” and “product-market fit”. </p>
<h2>East v west</h2>
<p>The weaker performance of western economies has been very noticeable over the past five years. In 2019, four out of the top ten countries were Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway and the US. All had lost ground by 2023, with Norway and the US no longer even in the top 15, while Switzerland and Netherlands dropped from being the top two countries to ninth and seventh place respectively. </p>
<p>The weakening of business conditions in these economies is potentially explained by the surge in inflation and higher interest rates that they have endured since the pandemic. Incidentally, the UK was ranked 21st overall five years ago and is currently 22nd. </p>
<p>Western economies are still ahead in one important respect, however. When you look at countries like Switzerland, France, Norway and Germany, over 30% of their entrepreneurs are in business services. </p>
<p>The situation is quite different among the leading eastern nations in the GEM rankings, where most entrepreneurial activity focuses on consumer services like retail, hotels, restaurants and personal services. These represent 80% of businesses in Saudi and over 70% in India, while in the UAE the most recent figure is over 60% in 2022. </p>
<p>In Saudi and India, business services such as IT and professional services are less than 10% of entrepreneurial activity overall, while in UAE the 2022 figure was less than 20%. </p>
<p>These low numbers matter because companies providing business services tend to have higher margins, greater potential for scaling and greater barriers to entry. So both in the global east and also in low-income countries, there needs to be more impetus and support for encouraging business services. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Arab walking past fountains at a big hotel in Riyadh" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575036/original/file-20240212-20-krtozg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=575&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Consumer services like hotels make up most of business activity in Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
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<p>It’s also worth pointing out that entrepreneurship education needs more attention in most countries. In 31 out of 49 economies, it was rated as the weakest of the conditions assessed in the survey. Without addressing this, many potential new businesses may never come to fruition simply because a generation of schoolchildren grew up unaware that starting a business was an important option for their futures. </p>
<p>Skills imparted through entrepreneurship education such as creativity, innovation, experimentation, a growth mindset, and overcoming the fear of failure will be fundamental requirements in a world where disruptive technologies are evolving at a breakneck pace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223363/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aileen is executive director of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. The 2023/24 report is sponsored by Cartier Women's Initiative; The School of Management Fribourg in Switzerland; the Ministry of Economic Inclusion, Small Business, Employment and Skills in Morocco; the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation in Morocco; and Hassan II University of Casablanca, Morocco. All views expressed in this article are Aileen’s own. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sreevas Sahasranamam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The eastward shift in the Global Entrepreurship Monitor rankings over the past five years has been striking.Sreevas Sahasranamam, Professor, Adam Smith Business School, University of GlasgowAileen Ionescu-Somers, Lecturer in Entrepreneurship, Université de LausanneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213922024-01-22T16:59:46Z2024-01-22T16:59:46ZWestern strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The United States and the United Kingdom <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">are launching ongoing missile and drone strikes</a> against the Yemeni armed group Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. A faction in the ongoing Yemen civil war, the Houthis had been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/world/middleeast/houthi-hijack-ship-galaxy-leader.html">attacking ships</a> in the Red Sea in the months preceding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">U.S.-British strikes.</a></p>
<p>These kinds of strikes, however, don’t dissuade the Houthis, a predominately Shia minority group in Yemen. They’re continuing <a href="https://time.com/6563864/us-strikes-houthis-yemen-red-sea/">to attack ships in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Continuing to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, furthermore, will undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Middle East. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">The Houthis have said</a> they’re attacking ships affiliated with Israel in response to Israel’s ground invasion and blockade of the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>With the U.S. reputation in the region already in tatters amid mass opposition to Israel’s attack on Gaza, these strikes are creating unintended consequences.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s civil war</h2>
<p>The Yemen civil war is one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It officially started in 2014 when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668">Houthis seized the capital of Sana'a</a>, but multiple entities have become involved since then.</p>
<p>Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict and subsequent blockade <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-fuel-intl/index.html">helped create ongoing famine and food insecurity</a> in Yemen.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Yemen’s civil war, the Houthis have received Iranian support. For both ideological and geopolitical reasons, Iran has helped the Houthis in their efforts to seize the country. While Iran has continually denied claims that it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/21/iran-giving-houthis-significant-and-lethal-support-us-envoy">provides military aid</a> to the Houthis, most <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/12/22/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#iran-has-helped-the-houthi-militia-target-ships-us-intelligence-says">outside observers</a> agree that it has done so in the past and continues to now.</p>
<p>The Houthis are invaluable partners to Iran because of their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This narrow channel is responsible for a significant portion of the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/bab-al-mandan-red-sea-suez-shipping-crisis-houthis-gaza">world’s cargo</a> <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073">and oil</a> shipping. While most vessels can avoid the region by sailing around Africa, this detour <a href="https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/">increases costs</a> for shipowners and, by extension, consumers.</p>
<p>The Houthis, either acting in their own interests or for Iran, escalated their attacks against ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Outside of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09">one cargo ship</a> the Houthi seized in November, however, their attacks have been <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/first-images-released-houthi-damage-153119479.html">largely unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<h2>More time needed for anti-piracy efforts</h2>
<p>Piracy in maritime shipping is not a new phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv21r3j8m">and has been a persistent scourge throughout human history</a>. In contemporary history, however, multilateral efforts to combat piracy have been largely successful in limiting its impact. </p>
<p>Multinational efforts off the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">coast of Somalia</a> and in the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/">Malacca Strait</a> in southeast Asia significantly reduced the piracy threat in those regions.</p>
<p>Given the past success of such measures, American Defense Secretary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220216698/pentagon-announces-new-international-maritime-protection-force-for-the-red-sea">Lloyd Austin’s announcement in late December</a> of an international maritime task force was both practical and had the potential to solve the issue. The problem, however, is that such efforts take time to succeed. The U.S. didn’t give the initiative the time it needed.</p>
<p>U.S.-led strikes against the Houthis in Yemen only stood a chance of success if neighbouring states, most notably Saudi Arabia, combined the American air presence with a ground threat. Saudi Arabia, however, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/">won’t get involved</a> as it seeks to extricate itself from Yemen.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-13/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-on-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say">anger towards</a> Israelis in the region, as well as the Houthi’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/how-houthi-anger-with-israel-is-reshaping-the-middle-east-conflict?ref=mc.news">avowed goal</a> to strike Israel, countering the Houthi would be politically dangerous for Riyadh’s government.</p>
<p>The Houthis know the Americans lack regional allies and therefore they’ve not been deterred, but emboldened. In the aftermath of the U.S.-U.K. strikes, Houthis have vowed to continue <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-red-sea-houthis-1.7083030">to target ships</a> in the Red Sea and are making good on the threat.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has even been forced to admit that the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/us-again-targets-yemen-s-huthis-in-new-strikes-9cac37d1">ongoing airstrikes</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/18/politics/biden-houthi-strikes/index.html">are not having the desired effect</a> of deterring the Houthis, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/us-launches-fresh-strikes-on-yemens-houthi-as-conflict-escalates">but says they’re necessary to protect merchant and military vessels</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback in the broader region</h2>
<p>International norms and laws are effective so long as everyone adheres to them. Norms and laws, furthermore, are most vulnerable immediately after a state has breached them, which the U.S. did when it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-says-us-british-attacks-on-yemen-a-clear-violation-of-the-countrys-sovereignty/ar-AA1mQIsa">violated Yemen’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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<p>Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the strikes against the Houthis.</p>
<p>Because the Houthis are a key partner of Iran, Tehran’s government apparently believed it had to take action in case their credibility became compromised. Iran <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-strikes-targets-in-northern-iraq-and-syria-as-regional-tensions-escalate/ar-AA1n1xOP">conducted strikes</a> against targets in Iraq and Syria. Iran claims the strikes in Iraq were against an Israeli spy installation. </p>
<p>While these events <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/iran-claims-it-has-attacked-an-israeli-spy-base-in-kurdistan">would have been troubling in their own right in terms of the impact on regional stability</a>, Iran followed up these strikes with ones in Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-iran-strike.html">Pakistan retaliated</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465">both Iran</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pakistan-conducts-strikes-in-iran-retaliating-for-earlier-hit-by-tehran/ar-AA1n9O2J">and Pakistan</a> are emphasizing that they’re not targeting the other country, but rather <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/paistan-cnucstrike-in-iran-in-retaliation-to-drone-and-missile-strikes-hits-baloch-separatist-groups/ar-AA1n9AwW">non-state militants</a>.</p>
<p>That said, Iran’s strike against Pakistan occurs as the country is <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/01/imran-khan-loses-his-battle-with-pakistans-army">politically vulnerable</a> in the aftermath of the army’s takedown of Prime Minister Imran Khan. With the Pakistani military unable to appear weak as the country faces crucial elections next month, the potential for events to escalate are very real.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the goal of nearly everyone involved, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/us-israel.html">particularly the U.S.</a>, has been to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. Recent events are compromising this goal, including <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-blames-israel-for-strike-that-killed-four-senior-military-officials-in-syria-as-mid-east-conflict-spirals/ar-BB1gZPbm">strikes by Israel in Syria</a> and an Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/01/21/us-troops-iraq-getting-evaluated-traumatic-brain-injuries-after-iran-backed-militia-attack.html">missile-and-rocket</a> attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.</p>
<p>By abandoning the focus on building a maritime coalition force and instead resorting to air strikes, the U.S. and its allies may have inadvertently created the situation they sought to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the West has aimed to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. But strikes on the Houthis in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. may ensure it will.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210062024-01-12T18:57:11Z2024-01-12T18:57:11ZUS-UK airstrikes risk strengthening Houthi rebels’ position in Yemen and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569063/original/file-20240112-29-67u6k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C15%2C5276%2C3382&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Houthi supporters rally in Yemen following U.S.-U.K. airstrikes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S.- and U.K.-led <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/us/politics/us-houthi-missile-strikes.html">strikes on the rebel Houthi group</a> in Yemen represent a dramatic new turn in the Middle East conflict – one that could have implications throughout the region.</p>
<p>The attacks of Jan. 11, 2024, hit around 60 targets at 16 sites, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-biden-retaliation-attacks-0804b93372cd5e874a0dd03513fe36a2">according to the U.S. Air Force’s Mideast command</a>, including in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, the main port of Hodeida and Saada, the birthplace of the Houthis in the country’s northwest.</p>
<p>The military action follows weeks of warning by the U.S. to the Houthis, ordering them to stop attacking commercial ships in the strategic strait of Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. The Houthis – an armed militia backed by Iran that controls most of northern Yemen following a bitter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">near-decadelong civil war</a> – have also <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-houthi-attacks-affect-both-the-israel-hamas-conflict-and-yemens-own-civil-war-and-could-put-pressure-on-us-saudi-arabia-216852">launched missiles and drones toward Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">expert on Yemeni politics</a>, I believe the U.S. attacks on the Houthis will have wide implications – not only for the Houthis and Yemen’s civil war, but also for the broader region where America maintains key allies. In short, the Houthis stand to gain politically from these U.S.-U.K. attacks as they support a narrative that the group has been cultivating: that they are freedom fighters fighting Western imperialism in the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>For Houthis, a new purpose</h2>
<p>The Israel-Gaza conflict has reinvigorated the Houthis – giving them a raison d'etre at a time when their status at home was diminishing.</p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants</a> in Israel, the Houthis’ long conflict with Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover">government ousted by the Houthis</a> at the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2014, had quieted after an April 2022 cease-fire drastically reduced fighting.</p>
<p>Houthi missile strikes on Saudi cities ceased, and there were hopes that a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">truce could bring about a permanent end</a> to Yemen’s brutal conflict.</p>
<p>With fewer external threats, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/yemens-civilians-besieged-on-all-sides/">domestic troubles</a> that <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1925121/extreme-poverty-threatens-yemenis-living-under-houthi-rule">surfaced in Houthi-controlled areas</a> – poverty, unpaid government salaries, crumbling infrastructure – led to growing disquiet over Houthi governance. Public support for the Houthis slowly eroded without an outside aggressor to blame; Houthi leaders could no longer justify the hardships in Yemen as a required sacrifice to resist foreign powers, namely Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israels-military-campaign-in-gaza-is-among-the-most-destructive-in-history-experts-say">Israel’s attacks in Gaza</a> have provided renewed purpose for Houthis. <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/houthis-involvement-in-gaza-war-a-tactical-move/">Aligning with the Palestinian cause</a> has allowed Houthis to reassert their relevance and has reenergized their fighters and leadership.</p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/yemens-houthis-say-they-fired-ballistic-missiles-towards-israel">firing missiles toward Israel</a>, the Houthis have portrayed themselves as the lone force in the Arab Peninsula standing up to Israel, unlike regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The militia is presenting to Yemenis and others in the region a different face than Arab governments that have, to date, been unwilling to take strong action against Israel.</p>
<p>In particular, Houthis are contrasting their worldview with that of Saudi Arabia, which prior to the October Hamas attack had been <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-israel-normalization-still-table">looking to normalize ties</a> with Israel.</p>
<p><iframe id="P6Wxe" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/P6Wxe/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Houthi’s PR machine</h2>
<p>The U.S. and U.K. strikes were, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/">the governments of both countries say</a>, in retaliation for persistent attacks by Houthis on international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and followed attempts at a diplomatic solution. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3643830/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-coalition-strikes-in-ho/">aim is to</a> “disrupt and degrade the Houthis’ capabilities,” according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.</p>
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<img alt="A blurry picture shows an aircraft at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A U.K. military aircraft takes off en route to Yemen on Jan. 11, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">UK Ministry of Defence via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But regardless of the intent or the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/how-the-us-uk-bombing-of-yemen-might-help-the-houthis">damage caused to the Houthis militarily</a>, the Western strikes may play into the group’s narrative, reinforcing the claim that they are fighting oppressive foreign enemies attacking Yemen. And this will only bolster the Houthis’ image among supporters.</p>
<p>Already, the Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control behind their actions since October 2023. </p>
<p>Dramatic <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-houthi-rebel-attacks-in-the-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping">seaborne raids</a> and the taking hostage of ships’ crews have generated viral footage that taps into Northern Yemeni nationalism. Turning a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940">captured vessel into a public attraction</a> attracted more attention domestically. </p>
<p>Following the U.S.-U.K. strikes on Houthi targets, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree has said the group would <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/yemen-houthi-general-says-attacks-will-not-pass-without-punishment-13046755">expand its attacks in the Red Sea</a>, saying any coalition attack on Yemen will prompt strikes on all shipping through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects to the Arabian Sea at the southern end of the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Weaponizing Palestinian sympathies</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have successfully managed to align the Palestinian cause with that of their own. Appeals through mosques in Yemen and cellphone text campaigns have raised donations for the Houthis by invoking Gaza’s plight. </p>
<p>The U.S.-U.K strikes may backfire for another reason, too: They evoke memories of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/30-years-after-our-endless-wars-in-the-middle-east-began-still-no-end-in-sight/">Western military interventions</a> in the Muslim and Arab world. </p>
<p>The Houthis will no doubt exploit this. </p>
<p>When U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin initially <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/19/us-announces-10-nation-force-to-counter-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea">announced the formation of a 10-country coalition</a> to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on Dec. 18, 2023, there were concerns over the lack of regional representation. Among countries in the Middle East and Muslim world, only Bahrain – home to the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet</a> – joined.</p>
<p>The absence of key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti – where the U.S. has its only military base in Africa – raised <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-12-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/under-irans-auspices-houthis-turn-red-sea-to-an-independent-strategic-threat-zone/0000018c-7452-d48b-a5ec-745308440000">further doubts among observers</a> about the coalition’s ability to effectively counter the Houthis.</p>
<p>Muslim-majority countries were no doubt hesitant to support the coalition because of the sensitivity of the Palestinian cause, which by then the Houthis had successfully aligned themselves with.</p>
<p>But the lack of regional support leaves the U.S. and its coalition allies in a challenging position. Rather than being seen as protectors of maritime security, the U.S. – rather than the Houthis – are vulnerable to being framed in the region as the aggressor and escalating party. </p>
<p>This perception could damage U.S. credibility in the area and potentially serve as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap">al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</a> and similar groups.</p>
<p>The U.S.’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/history-us-support-israel-runs-deep-growing-chorus/story?id=104957109">military and diplomatic support for Israel</a> throughout the current conflict also plays into skepticism in the region over the true objectives of the anti-Houthi missile strikes.</p>
<h2>Reigniting civil war?</h2>
<p>The Houthis’ renewed vigor and Western strikes on the group also have implications for Yemen’s civil war itself.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/moment-truth-yemens-truce">the truce between</a> the two main protagonists in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the Houthis – fighting between the Houthis and other groups in Yemen, such as the Southern Transitional Council, the Yemen Transitional Government and the National Resistance, has reached a deadlock. </p>
<p>Each group controls different parts of Yemen, and all seem to have accepted this deadlock. </p>
<p>But the U.S.-U.K. strikes put Houthi opponents in a difficult position. They will be hesitant to openly support Western intervention in Yemen or blame the Houthis for supporting Palestinans. There remains widespread sympathy for Gazans in Yemen – something that could give Houthis an opportunity to gain support in areas not under their control.</p>
<p>The Yemeni Transitional Government <a href="https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/25465/">issued a statement</a> following the U.S.-U.K. strikes that shows the predicament facing Houthi rivals. While blaming the Houthis’ “terrorist attacks” for “dragging the country into a military confrontation,” they also clearly reaffirmed support for Palestinians against “brutal Israeli aggression.”</p>
<p>While Houthi rivals will likely continue this balancing act, the Houthis face no such constraints – they can freely exploit the attacks to rally more support and gain a strategic advantage over their local rivals.</p>
<p>An emboldened Houthi group might also be less likely to accept the current status quo in Yemen and seize the moment to push for more control – potentially reigniting a civil war that had looked to be on the wane.</p>
<p>The Houthis thrive on foreign aggression to consolidate their power. Without this external conflict as a justification, the shortcomings of the Houthis’ political management become apparent, undermining their governance. During the civil war, Houthis were able to portray themselves as the defender of Yemen against Saudi influence. Now they can add U.S. and U.K. interference to the mix.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The raid follows warnings from Washington to cease attacks in the Red Sea − but it could serve to strengthen rebels and reignite civil war.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2203132024-01-02T16:50:14Z2024-01-02T16:50:14ZAfrica Cup of Nations showcases the continent’s finest footballers – and China’s economic clout<p>When the Africa Cup of Nations begins on January 13, the opening match between Guinea Bissau and the hosts, Ivory Coast, will be played at the Alassane Ouattara Stadium in Abidjan. The state-of-the-art venue is <a href="https://footballgroundguide.com/news/afcon-stadiums-ivory-coast-afcon-2023">one of six stadiums</a> being used during the football tournament. </p>
<p>At a ceremony to mark the beginning of its construction in 2016, the former prime minister of Ivory Coast, Daniel Kablan Duncan, was accompanied by several Chinese embassy officials based in the country. </p>
<p>Their presence was no surprise. After all, the stadium was <a href="https://footballgroundguide.com/news/afcon-2023-guide-to-alassane-ouattara-stadium-abidjan.html">designed by</a> the Beijing Institute of Architectural Design and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/10/04/ivory-coast-inaugurates-60-000-seater-stadium-ahead-of-afcon-2023//">built by</a> the Beijing Construction Engineering Group. Both of these are Chinese <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-chinese-military-companies-listed-under-e-o-13959-have-more-than-1100-subsidiaries/">state entities</a>.</p>
<p>China was <a href="http://www.chinafrica.cn/Homepage/202311/t20231106_800348030.html">heavily involved</a> in building other tournament venues too. In San Pedro, the Laurent Pokou Stadium was <a href="https://footballgroundguide.com/competitions/afcon-2023-laurent-pokou-stadium-san-pedro.html">built by</a> the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (again, state owned). And the China National Building Material group served as <a href="https://footballgroundguide.com/news/afcon-stadiums-ivory-coast-afcon-2023">general contractor</a> on the Amadou Gon Coulibaly Stadium in Korhogo.</p>
<p>All of this is part of a long-term policy of “<a href="https://www.policyforum.net/china-fuelling-african-cup-nations/">stadium diplomacy</a>” which China has been deploying across the continent. Linked to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">belt and road initiative</a>, which is intended to promote trade and foster interdependence between China and other nations, stadiums have frequently been gifted to African nations (or else paid for using relatively <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-debt-banking-loans-financial-developing-countries-collapse-8df6f9fac3e1e758d0e6d8d5dfbd3ed6">cheap loans</a>).</p>
<p>For instance, when Gabon co-hosted (with Equatorial Guinea) the Cup of Nations in 2012, <a href="http://stadiumdb.com/news/2015/07/gabon_one_more_chinese_afcon_coming_up">China was involved</a> in building both of its stadiums. Five years later, when Gabon hosted the tournament again, China <a href="https://venturesafrica.com/how-china-will-play-a-key-role-as-gabon-hosts-2017-afcon/">built another two</a>. </p>
<p>Gabon now sends around <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/gab/partner/chn#:%7E:text=Gabon%2DChina%20In%202021%2C%20Gabon,and%20Sawn%20Wood%20(%24205M)">15% of its exports</a> – mostly crude petroleum and manganese – to China. </p>
<p>And just as construction of the Alassane Ouattara Stadium got underway, Ivory Coast’s president – who happens to be named Alassane Ouattara – visited Beijing to finalise a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/04/28/china-is-gabon-s-most-profitable-trading-partner-from-2009-to-2020/">strategic cooperative partnership</a>. </p>
<p>By 2020, China had invested <a href="https://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS1(2)-Tsao-Lu-Yeh.pdf">US$1.5 billion</a> (£1.2 billion) in Ivory Coast. Now the African nation <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/ivory-coast/total-exports-to-china">exports US$700 million worth</a> of natural resources and goods to China, up from US$100 million in 2016.</p>
<p>Chinese stadium diplomacy, which also exists in countries including <a href="https://medium.com/@qaraqra/building-stadiums-and-alliances-chinas-diplomatic-approach-to-dominance-6a6ce8842643">Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Mali</a> and <a href="https://africachinareporting.com/chinese-stadia-in-cameroon-revive-football-and-smes/">Cameroon</a>, is officially framed as being mutually beneficial. But some critics <a href="http://jpinyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Submission2.pdf">disagree</a>. </p>
<p>For while recipient nations get gleaming new sports infrastructure, inward investment and export deals, <a href="https://indepthsolomons.com.sb/the-negative-impacts-of-chinas-global-stadium-diplomacy/">questions remain</a> about the <a href="https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-investments-in-africa-whats-the-real-story/">economic and political consequences</a> in terms of control and exploitation. </p>
<p>For China though, the benefits are clear. Stadium diplomacy enables the country to extend its sphere of influence in Africa, often creating a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-benefits-from-china-africa-relations/a-59979169">political imbalance</a> which leaves African nations at the behest of Beijing. At the same time, Africa has become a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-engagement-with-africa-from-natural-resources-to-human-resources/">source of raw materials</a> that help sustain China’s economic growth and global dominance in sectors such as battery manufacturing and telecommunications.</p>
<h2>A new player</h2>
<p>But China has a strategic rival. Saudi Arabia also wants a piece of the football diplomacy action.</p>
<p>The Gulf powerhouse is charging ahead with its own economic transformation and development, part of which involves investing <a href="https://nepf.org.au/index.php/playing-for-power-a-deep-dive-into-saudi-arabias-global-sports-ambitions/">hundreds of millions of dollars in sport</a>. And at the heart of Saudi plans is the intention to position itself as an “Afro-Eurasian” hub of international football. </p>
<p>At one stage in 2023, it appeared as though the kingdom would bid to host the 2030 Fifa World Cup <a href="https://nepf.org.au/index.php/saudi-arabia-china-red-sea-geopolitics-the-2030-world-cup/">in conjunction with Egypt and Greece</a>. As part of the proposed arrangement, Saudi Arabia was <a href="https://nepf.org.au/index.php/saudi-arabia-china-red-sea-geopolitics-the-2030-world-cup/">reportedly offering</a> to build new stadiums in each of its partner countries.</p>
<p>In the end, Morocco, Spain and Portugal will be hosting that event, and Saudi Arabia is now the sole bidder for the 2034 competition instead. But that too will probably involve some <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/08/saudi-arabias-neom-project-bring-huge-investments-egypt">collaboration with Egypt</a>, as Neom, the US$500 billion mega-city Saudi Arabia is building, would probably form part of its hosting plans. </p>
<p>In other developments, Saudi Arabia has become the <a href="https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/african-football-league-visit-saudi-sponsorship-caf-visa-afc/">main sponsor</a> of the African Football League. And the Saudi Arabian Football Federation has agreed a deal with the <a href="https://www.insideworldfootball.com/2023/06/14/saudi-fa-keeps-building-influence-africa-mauritania-latest-sign/">Mauritanian Football Association</a> to develop infrastructure and train referees, as part of efforts to <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2341281/saudi-arabia">boost relations</a> between the two nations. </p>
<p>These moves have provoked a mixed response. Some commentators accuse Saudi Arabia of trying to get Africa <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/27/revealed-saudi-arabia-plan-poor-countries-oil">hooked on oil</a> as part of a plan to offset decreasing demand elsewhere. Others <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/saudi-arabia-has-strategic-advantage-sourcing-critical-minerals-africa">have observed</a> that Saudi Arabia needs access to Africa’s natural resources (such as lithium, cobalt and copper) to drive its economic reforms.</p>
<p>We have already seen another Gulf nation, Qatar, setting out a template for engagement with Africa. Having hosted the 2022 Fifa World Cup, it decided to <a href="https://www.qatar-tribune.com/article/93860/sports/generation-amazing-launches-sports-for-development-programme-in-rwanda">fund football projects</a> in Rwanda, while state-owned Qatar Airways made a bid to acquire significant stakes in both Air Rwanda and <a href="https://www.mininfra.gov.rw/updates/news-details/qatar-to-take-60-stake-in-rwandas-new-international-airport">Kigali’s new international airport</a>.</p>
<p>Africa has clearly become a source of great interest to some wealthy countries looking for places to spread influence and investment. The Africa Cup of Nations is a prime example of this – with the diplomatic prizes at stake being as valuable as any of the fixtures being played in China’s new stadiums around Ivory Coast.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Geopolitical tactics are already on display.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy, SKEMA Business SchoolChris Toronyi, PhD Candidate and Lecturer, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2199122023-12-18T19:10:06Z2023-12-18T19:10:06ZFrom laggard to leader? Why Australia must phase out fossil fuel exports, starting now<p>For years <a href="https://priceofoil.org/2021/11/12/fossil-fuelled-five-report/">large fossil fuel producers</a> — <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-know-if-a-country-is-serious-about-net-zero-look-at-its-plans-for-extracting-fossil-fuels-170508">including Australia</a> — have <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/production-gap-report-2023">expanded</a> fossil fuel production while maintaining rhetorically that the world needs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But global emissions are overwhelmingly caused by the extraction, transport and burning of fossil fuels. Unless fossil fuels are phased out, emissions will grow and the climate crisis will worsen.</p>
<p>At COP28 climate negotiations in Dubai, which wrapped up last week, this fact finally became the centre of attention. And fossil fuel producers were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/opec-chief-urges-members-reject-any-cop28-deal-that-targets-fossil-fuels-2023-12-08/">feeling the pressure</a> — forced to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/opec-members-push-against-including-fossil-fuels-phase-out-cop28-deal-2023-12-09/">defend their expansion of fossil fuels</a> or change their tune.</p>
<p>Interestingly, Australia seems to be doing the latter, at least rhetorically. While successive governments have <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/extract/2021/07/double-game">worked assiduously</a> to keep fossil fuel production out of the spotlight at the UN talks, Climate Change Minister Chris Bowen <a href="https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/transcripts/press-conference-cop28-dubai-0">said</a> Australia supports the global phasing out of fossil fuels in energy systems by 2050. Clearly eager to avoid being seen as the villain at the talks, Bowen named Saudi Arabia as the main blocker to an agreement on phasing out fossil fuels.</p>
<p>But the text of COP decisions matters much less than the actions states and companies take. Australia — one of the <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/P667-High-Carbon-from-a-Land-Down-Under-WEB_0_0.pdf">world’s largest producers and exporters</a> of fossil fuel-based carbon dioxide — is fuelling the problem, not solving it. Currently, Australian companies are moving to expand fossil fuel production: <a href="https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/resources-and-energy-major-projects-2022">more than 100 major coal, oil and gas projects</a> are in planning, at a cost of around A$200 billion. Some of these are “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2022/may/11/fossil-fuel-carbon-bombs-climate-breakdown-oil-gas">carbon bombs</a>,” likely to add huge quantities of emissions.</p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-973" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/973/534c98def812dd41ac56cc750916e2922539729b/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Why Australia faces charges of hypocrisy</h2>
<p>The Albanese government has already <a href="https://michaelwest.com.au/ten-and-rising-albanese-government-new-fossil-fuel-approvals-unveiled/">approved</a> a number of new fossil fuel projects, <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/post/how-labor-out-loved-the-coalition-in-its-embrace-of-big-oil-and-gas/">embracing</a> the fossil fuel expansionism of its conservative predecessors. But now that Australia has declared support for a global phase-out of fossil fuels, it must curtail its own exports or face continued <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/sep/19/missing-half-the-equation-scientists-criticise-australia-over-approach-to-fossil-fuels">charges of hypocrisy</a>.</p>
<p>How could Australia do that while managing the fallout? Interestingly, Bowen’s <a href="https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/transcripts/press-conference-cop28-dubai-0">rhetoric at COP</a> contained the seeds of an answer: a “phase out of fossil fuels is Australia’s economic opportunity as [a] renewable energy superpower”. In line with this sentiment, Australia should adopt the mission of leading the Asia-Pacific region to a prosperous future by simultaneously phasing out its fossil fuel exports while phasing up its clean energy exports; by becoming a <a href="https://www.bze.org.au/research/report/renewable-energy-superpower">clean energy superpower</a> instead of a dirty energy one.</p>
<p>Doing so would require a dramatic shift in Australia’s international climate posture: from a defensive, parochial, technocratic stance aimed at protecting fossil fuel expansion to proactive, outward-looking and pragmatic leadership; from merely focusing on its own territorial emissions to using all powers at its disposal in its <a href="https://insidestory.org.au/climate-policy-and-our-sphere-of-influence/">sphere of influence</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-fought-cop28-agreement-suggests-the-days-of-fossil-fuels-are-numbered-but-climate-catastrophe-is-not-yet-averted-219597">Hard-fought COP28 agreement suggests the days of fossil fuels are numbered – but climate catastrophe is not yet averted</a>
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<h2>First a new project ban, then a net zero plan</h2>
<p>Our coal and gas exports are entirely within our sovereign control, and give us enormous leverage over our regional trading partners. No one is suggesting stopping fossil fuel exports overnight. But we could start by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/mar/21/the-latest-ipcc-report-makes-it-clear-no-new-fossil-fuel-projects-can-be-opened-that-includes-us-australia">banning new projects</a>, and then convening our regional partners to work out a plan to phase out existing production and consumption. Australian leadership would involve supporting our neighbours —through investment, trade and aid —to ensure their populations can access energy from zero-carbon sources, just as we’re aspiring to do at home.</p>
<p>Phasing out fossil fuel exports is thus best conceptualised as part of a shift in our foreign and trade policy aimed at securing our and our region’s prosperity against the existential threat of climate change — and amid a global pivot to clean energy. Call it “<a href="https://www.bze.org.au/research/report/laggard-to-leader#:%7E:text=Laggard%20to%20Leader%20is%20a,and%20accelerated%20through%20international%20cooperation.">cooperative decarbonisation</a>”. Viewed in this light, the typical objections to a fossil fuel phase-out in Australia look pathetic.</p>
<h2>The weak objections to a phase-out</h2>
<p>The first objection claims we are not responsible for the overseas emissions produced from burning our exported coal and gas. This falsely conflates Australia’s national interest in reducing emissions globally with its international legal responsibility for <a href="https://legalresponse.org/legaladvice/reporting-requirements-under-article-13-paris-agreement/">reporting emissions</a> locally.</p>
<p>Nothing in the Paris Agreement prevents a country from taking actions that would reduce or avoid emissions in another country. It is reckless and self-defeating to concern ourselves only with emissions produced on our territory when our power to influence global emissions is so much greater. Let’s hope that Bowen’s rhetorical shift at COP28 signals acceptance of this fact.</p>
<p>The second objection is that leaving our fossil fuels in the ground will not affect global emissions, because if we don’t sell our coal and gas, someone else will. Aside from its immorality (the “drug dealer’s defence”), the objection defies Economics 101: if you reduce supply of a product, its price goes up, causing demand to contract. Other countries might supply <em>some</em> of the shortfall, but Australia is such a big producer that it is implausible to think we could exit the coal and gas markets without dramatically reducing global emissions.</p>
<p>Moreover, it’s shortsighted to think of fossil fuel export policy in isolation from the wider foreign policy choices we face. Australia’s current foreign policy is to <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/extract/2021/07/double-game">promote our coal and gas exports</a>: we literally pay public servants to help multinational companies sell more coal and gas. But if we gave our diplomats the nobler mission of leading our region’s decarbonisation, our leadership would help to make trade in fossil fuels redundant.</p>
<p>The last oft-heard objection is that phasing out fossil fuel production would cost too much. The foreign-owned corporations that produce most of our coal and gas <a href="https://michaelwest.com.au/australia-wins-plaudits-for-move-on-multinational-tax-dodgers-but-much-more-is-needed-on-fossil-front/">pay little tax</a> and <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/employment-aspects-of-the-transition-from-fossil-fuels-in-australia/">employ relatively few people</a>, while capturing <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/P1378-Fossil-fuel-subsidies-2023-Web.pdf">billions of dollars in state and federal government subsidies</a>. Scaling up as a clean energy superpower could bring more economic growth, jobs and tax revenue than would be lost from fossil fuels — especially if we <a href="https://michaelwest.com.au/a-real-plan-to-tackle-energy-prices-climate-and-the-budget/">taxed the fossil fuel industry properly</a> on its way out.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/hyped-and-expensive-hydrogen-has-a-place-in-australias-energy-transition-but-only-with-urgent-government-support-219004">Hyped and expensive, hydrogen has a place in Australia’s energy transition, but only with urgent government support</a>
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<h2>Phase-outs can be done: lessons from overseas</h2>
<p>Denmark, France, Ireland and Costa Rica are <a href="https://beyondoilandgasalliance.org/">among a number</a> of countries that have foregone new fossil fuel exploration and production opportunities; others are <a href="https://www.iisd.org/articles/just-transition-examples">working to phase out existing</a> operations. Doing so is undoubtedly challenging: firms, workers and the communities in which fossil fuel operations are located understandably tend to resist policies that would close their industry.</p>
<p>But government support can smooth the transition. The Spanish government, for instance, negotiated a “just transition agreement” with unions and businesses to phase out coal mining, support affected workers and invest in their communities. My coauthors and I <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/how-to-get-coal-country-to-vote-for-climate-policy-the-effect-of-a-just-transition-agreement-on-spanish-election-results/25FE7B96445E74387D598087649FDCC3">found</a> this strategy actually increased the government’s vote share at a subsequent election in the coal regions.</p>
<p>A phase-out of fossil fuel production is <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/employment-aspects-of-the-transition-from-fossil-fuels-in-australia/">entirely feasible</a> for a country with our resources, skills and diverse economy. The standard objections provide fossil fuel companies, and the politicians they’ve captured, with convenient excuses for cashing in while the planet — and Australia — burns. It’s time, instead, for bold actions that lead us and our region to a prosperous, fossil-free future.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-deal-confirms-what-australia-already-knows-coal-is-out-of-vogue-and-out-of-time-219906">COP28 deal confirms what Australia already knows: coal is out of vogue and out of time</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fergus Green is affiliated with the Powering Past Coal Alliance - is a coalition of national and subnational governments, businesses and organisations working to advance the transition from unabated coal power generation to clean energy. He is a member of the Alliance's Just Transition Expert Group.</span></em></p>Australia supported a phase-out of fossil fuels at the recent UN climate summit but is still expanding coal and gas production. It’s a contradiction that threatens the planet. There is a better way.Fergus Green, Lecturer in Political Theory and Public Policy, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2170072023-11-08T17:02:40Z2023-11-08T17:02:40ZHow Saudi Arabia’s unchallenged 2034 World Cup bid could weaken Fifa’s human rights demands<p>In 2010, Qatar was awarded the rights to host the 2022 Fifa men’s World Cup. It marked the culmination of the small, oil-rich gulf nation’s long-term strategy to diversify its economy and strengthen its international standing through investment in sport, culture and tourism.</p>
<p>However, from the moment the hosting rights were awarded until the event’s conclusion in December 2022, the Qatar World Cup was marred by controversies. These controversies included <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/sports/soccer/qatar-and-russia-bribery-world-cup-fifa.html">allegations of bid bribery</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/14/qatar-rights-abuses-stain-fifa-world-cup">violations of human rights</a>, and what has come to be known as “<a href="https://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/23125473.time-blow-whistle-sportswashing-qatar/">sportswashing</a>” – the strategic use of the positive image associated with sport to divert attention away from the less palatable aspects of a nation’s social and political culture. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-repressive-states-and-governments-use-sportswashing-to-remove-stains-on-their-reputation-100395">How repressive states and governments use 'sportswashing' to remove stains on their reputation</a>
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<p>Qatari officials have consistently denied all allegations of bid bribery levelled at them. However, in 2020, the New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/sports/soccer/qatar-and-russia-bribery-world-cup-fifa.html">released information</a> from a US Department of Justice indictment that revealed details about payments made to five members of Fifa before the 2010 vote of Russia and Qatar as World Cup hosts. </p>
<p>The New York Times also reported that over half the people involved in the voting process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, including former Fifa president Sepp Blatter, have been accused of wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Qatar’s gulf neighbour, Saudi Arabia, has now been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/oct/31/saudi-arabia-2034-mens-world-cup-human-rights">all but confirmed</a> as the host of the 2034 edition of football’s greatest spectacle. This comes after it was left as the sole bidder once the deadline for potential hosts to declare their interest passed on Tuesday October 31. Fifa had restricted the process so only countries from Asia and Oceania could put themselves forward.</p>
<p>Upon learning that the bid process was non-competitive, the <a href="https://sportandrightsalliance.org/">Sport & Rights Alliance</a> – a coalition of human rights and anti-corruption organisations, trade unions, fan representatives, athlete survivors groups and players unions – expressed its concern. </p>
<p>In a post on Twitter (now called X), <a href="https://twitter.com/Sport_Rights/status/1718963237834588636?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1718963237834588636%7Ctwgr%5E58e92ead694ae78cae12d33ed891b6da23addbb9%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fdrafts%2F217007%2Fedit">the Alliance said</a>: “Amid the triviality of extravagant sports events and gestures, activists highlight the stark reality of oppressive conditions in Saudi Arabia.” </p>
<p>It is a country where homosexuality is currently illegal, and women’s rights are restricted by a model of male guardianship. Expressing criticism of the ruling regime can also result in <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabia-is-imprisoning-women-while-the-rest-of-the-world-is-not-paying-attention-189928">immediate imprisonment</a> or, in some cases, execution.</p>
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<h2>Losing leverage over human rights</h2>
<p>According to <a href="https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/51aef03d916e5ad/original/FIFA-World-Cup-2030-and-FIFA-World-Cup-2034-Bidding-Regulations.pdf">Fifa’s own guidelines</a>, countries bidding for the men’s World Cup are required to commit to “respecting internationally recognised human rights”. This means that they must ensure human rights and labour standards are implemented by the bidding member associations, governments and all other entities involved in organising the competitions. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/qatars-death-row-and-the-invisible-migrant-workforce-deemed-unworthy-of-due-process-191017">Qatar's death row and the invisible migrant workforce deemed unworthy of due process</a>
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<p>Independent human rights risk assessments are also supposed to be carried out by bidding nations. This was done for the first time in the bidding process for the <a href="https://www.sporthumanrights.org/library/candidate-city-human-rights-proposals-for-the-2026-world-cup-summary/">2026 World Cup</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/global-fifa-should-secure-human-rights-protections-for-2030-and-2034-world-cups-as-bidding-deadline-passes/">Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/27/fifa-broke-own-human-rights-rules-world-cup-hosts">Human Rights Watch</a> have urged Fifa to ensure that they secure binding human rights agreements from Saudi Arabia in line with Fifa’s own stated policy. However, as Saudi Arabia are the sole bidder left in the race, there are genuine doubts as to how adherence to international standards can be guaranteed. </p>
<p>In effect, the non-competitive bidding process means that Saudi Arabia is likely to have less pressure to set challenging targets around improving its human rights because Fifa has no rival bids. </p>
<p>There were two competing bids in 2026: Morocco and the joint bid from the US, Canada and Mexico. As a result, each had to take their human rights risk assessments seriously.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has until July 2024 to submit its full bid. And <a href="https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/fifa-council/media-releases/fifa-council-takes-key-decisions-on-fifa-world-cup-tm-editions-in-2030-and-2034">Fifa</a> has announced that the bid will need to adhere to all bid requirements, including those related to human rights. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-fifa-2034-world-cup-a5788a734c83be35e5ce7119456ab30a">estimated US$10 billion</a> (£8.1 billion) on offer to Fifa from a tournament hosted in Saudi Arabia appears too lucrative to risk jeopardising it.</p>
<h2>How did we get here?</h2>
<p>The fact that Saudi Arabia is on course to host football’s flagship event is no great surprise. Since 2016, the Saudi ruling family has been building towards realising their <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/">Saudi Vision 2030</a>. </p>
<p>As part of this vision, they have committed to bid for, and deliver, a series of spectacular sporting and cultural events – several of which have already happened. These events include football’s <a href="https://www.fifa.com/fifaplus/en/tournaments/mens/fifa-club-world-cup/saudi-arabia-2023">2023 Club World Cup</a>, <a href="https://www.formula1.com/en/racing/2023/Saudi_Arabia.html">Formula One</a>, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/liv-golf-saudi-arabia-pga.html">LIV Golf Series</a>, tennis and boxing.</p>
<p>The Saudi Public Investment Fund also acquired English top-flight football club Newcastle United in 2021. And developments within the Saudi Professional League (the highest division of football in the Saudi league system) have attracted global superstars like Cristiano Ronaldo and Neymar, who both moved for substantial sums of money.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Cristiano Ronaldo at a training session in Saudi Arabia." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557855/original/file-20231106-29-u8p1rf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cristiano Ronaldo joined Saudi Pro League side, Al Nassr, in December 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/riyadh-saudi-arabia-3-january-2023-2251351777">oday jamil moari/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Saudi Arabia has disrupted the sports event market by making significant financial investments to showcase their ability to host international events while also wooing influential sporting figures like Tyson Fury to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/boxing/2023/10/30/tyson-fury-saudi-arabia-francis-ngannou-oleksandr-usyk/">openly support</a> the nation’s political and cultural traditions. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2023/sep/23/bin-salmans-sportswashing-quip-reflected-growing-power-but-was-perhaps-a-mistake">recent interview</a> with Fox News, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman even said: “If sport washing is going to increase my GDP by way of 1%, then I will continue doing sport washing. I don’t care … I’m aiming for another 1.5%. Call it whatever you want, we’re going to get that 1.5%.”</p>
<p>Fifa appears willing to award its premiere football tournament to a nation with a dubious human rights record, despite being outwardly committed to anti-discrimination in all other aspects of its work. Yet again it is left to advocacy organisations to lobby for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14413523.2021.1955531#:%7E:text=Specific%20to%20the%20potential%20of,planning%20and%20delivery%20of%20MSEs">ethical mega events</a> while governments and sporting federations observe from the sidelines. </p>
<p><em>In response to this article, a Fifa spokesperson said that the hosts of the upcoming 2034 World Cup will have to be confirmed by the Fifa Congress in 2024 following “due process”. And that bidding regulations and hosting requirements were approved by the Fifa Council – made of 37 elected members from all around the world. Fifa said it engaged on “all matters” regarding human rights with “a wide range of stakeholders in the bidding countries”, and all relevant reports will be made available on FIFA.com.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217007/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David McGillivray does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Saudi Arabia is on track to host the football World Cup in 2034, raising concern among human rights campaigners.David McGillivray, Professor in Event and Digital Cultures, University of the West of ScotlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168522023-11-01T23:51:23Z2023-11-01T23:51:23ZHow Houthi attacks affect both the Israel-Hamas conflict and Yemen’s own civil war – and could put pressure on US, Saudi Arabia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557170/original/file-20231101-23-25znxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C78%2C3494%2C2243&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A poster of rebel leader Abdul-Malek al-Houthi is held aloft during anti-Israel protests in Yemen.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yemens-houthi-supporters-hold-banners-and-flags-as-they-news-photo/1745360875?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Yemen’s Houthi movement <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-houthis-iran-34eab8bc1d3cf3606d874166fef2f018">launched missiles and drones at Israel</a> on Oct. 31, 2023 – provoking fears of a dangerous escalation of the Middle East conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>With the militia – which <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">controls part of the Arabian Peninsula state</a> – vowing further attacks, Israel countered by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-deploys-missile-boats-red-sea-regional-tensions-surge-2023-11-01/">sending missile boats</a> to the Red Sea. They join <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/10/30/uss-bataan-uss-carter-hall-will-linger-in-red-sea">U.S. warships already deployed</a> in the area.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">Mahad Darar</a>, a Yemeni politics expert at Colorado State University, to explain what is behind the Houthis’ involvement in the war – and how it could risk not only widening the conflict but reigniting hostilities in Yemen itself.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Houthis?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Houthi group</a>, also known as Ansar Allah, is an armed militia of the Zaydi Shia sect in Yemen. They ousted Yemen’s transitional government led by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in a 2014 coup and have since been engaged in a bloody civil war with the ousted administration, which is backed by Saudi Arabia. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-envoy-visits-gulf-help-expand-yemen-truce-launch-peace-process-state-dept-2023-08-14/">truce has stemmed fighting</a> in the country, with the Houthis currently in control of most of northern Yemen.</p>
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<h2>Why did the Houthis attack Israel?</h2>
<p>In the first analysis, one can argue that the Houthis are part of a broader regional alliance with Iran. As such, the attack on Israel can be seen as showcasing both the Houthis’ – and Iran’s – military capabilities to both local and regional audiences. Indeed, some analysts argue that the reason <a href="https://www.state.gov/illegal-iranian-flow-of-weapons-to-yemen/">Tehran supplied the Houthis with long-range missiles</a> was so it could <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-771066">pose a threat to both Israel</a> and also Tehran’s rival in the region: Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>However, although it may seem that the Houthis are acting as an Iranian proxy, the main reason the militia launched the attack could be to gain domestic support. Houthi leadership may be trying to present the group as the dominant force in Yemen willing to challenge Israel – a country that is <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-726753">generally unpopular in the Arab world</a>.</p>
<p>This approach helps the Houthis outmaneuver local rivals and unite the Yemeni public behind the cause of Palestinian liberation. It also allows the militia to carve out a unique stance in the region, setting them apart from Arab governments that have so far been unwilling to take strong action against Israel – such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-after-israel-gaza-conflict-says-it-does-not-mix-trade-with-politics-2023-10-10/">severing ties</a> in the case of more Israel-friendly states, such as United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and others. </p>
<p>In particular, the Houthis will want to present a different face to the Arab world than Saudi Arabia, which had been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-israel-saudi-arabia-normalization-hamas-246213034afa75e4dff27e71362a1979">looking to normalize ties with Israel</a>. Saudi Arabia, it should be added, is the main backer of the internationally recognized Yemeni government – one of the Houthis’ main opponents in the civil war.</p>
<p>It is also important to note that there appears to be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/25/uae-egypt-lebanon-leaders-israel-hamas-war/">growing popular discontent in Arab countries</a> over the perceived weak stance of their governments toward Israel. But due to the authoritarian nature of many of these regimes, public opinion has little influence on policy.</p>
<p>This does not, of course, change the fact that the Houthis themselves <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/02/06/the-houthi-model-of-government">run a theocratic regime</a> with no democratic values.</p>
<p>Plus, launching a missile or a couple of drones is relatively cheap for the Houthis, especially considering the benefits they might gain from the action.</p>
<h2>How could the Houthi attack affect the Israel-Hamas conflict?</h2>
<p>Some analysts have suggested that an attack by the Houthis heightens the chances of overwhelming Israel’s defense systems, if it forms part of a
<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-warns-israel-of-axis-response-as-fears-grow-of-regional-war-/7309548.html">coordinated effort</a> involving
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>But this idea falls short for two reasons:</p>
<p>First, the Houthis likely have fewer <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/">ballistic missiles than Hezbollah</a> and Hamas and realistically stand little chance of inflicting much damage on Israel. Moreover, they will be mindful of keeping these missiles for their own use in the ongoing civil war in Yemen – which poses a more immediate threat to the group than Israel does.</p>
<p>The threat from the Houthis toward Israel is far smaller than both Hezbollah and Hamas, whose fighters can cross a land border to enter Israel.</p>
<p>Second, the imprecision of the Houthi missiles means that any attack also poses a risk to countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, as these projectiles could land in their territories and cause damage. In fact, drones reportedly launched by the Houthis have already caused explosions after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosion-heard-egyptian-red-sea-town-near-israeli-border-witness-2023-10-27/">erroneously crashing in Egypt</a>.</p>
<h2>Could the Houthi attack affect US thinking on the conflict?</h2>
<p>There is a scenario in which the Houthi attacks may benefit Israel. The strike plays into a narrative that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-warns-multi-front-war-far-more-likely-for-israel-than-limited-conflicts/">Israel is facing a multi-front war</a> sponsored by Iran, potentially escalating tensions between Iran and both Israel and the United States.</p>
<p>And this could bolster the arguments of <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/us-iran-war-bad-idea-why">hawks within the U.S. foreign policy establishment</a> who are pushing the U.S. toward a more confrontational stance against Iran. </p>
<p>On the flip side, any perceived threat from the Houthis gives Iran more of a negotiation card in the wider context of regional disputes such as over Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran will be keen to position itself as a country with an array of proxies, capable of wreaking havoc in the region should it wish. </p>
<h2>Could the attack be Iran’s bidding?</h2>
<p>Houthi actions <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/">primarily serve their own interests</a> rather than those of Iran. </p>
<p>And unlike Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Syria – which have <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/attacks-us-forces-iraq-syria-american-airstrikes/#:%7E:text=U.S.%20troops%20have%20been%20attacked,proxies%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria.">recently attacked U.S. troops</a> – the Houthis have not targeted U.S. forces in the region. If the Houthis were truly in the same basket as other Iranian proxies, I believe they would have targeted the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/">nearest U.S. stationed base</a>, which is Djibouti. </p>
<p>But Houthi leadership will be mindful that such an attack would not only be unpopular among the Yemeni population but also would potentially come at a high cost to themselves.</p>
<p>Unlike Hezbollah and Hamas, which are focused on resisting Israeli occupation, the Houthis are <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">primarily concerned with local issues</a> within Yemen. Historically, members of the Zaydi Shia sect have managed Yemen’s issues without foreign support, going back hundreds of years <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">before they were overthrown in 1962</a>.</p>
<p>That said, the Houthis haven’t shied away from appearing aligned with Iran of late, mainly because they rely heavily on Iranian supplies of weapons.</p>
<h2>What could this mean for the Yemen civil war?</h2>
<p>Negotiations between Houthis, Saudis and the Saudi-led coalition backing the Yemeni government forces <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-23/yemen-s-fragile-truce-needs-more-than-talks-to-survive">are at a delicate point</a>.</p>
<p>Recently, it was reported that the Houthis <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-30/saudi-arabia-clashes-with-yemen-s-houthis-rebels-putting-kingdom-on-high-alert?embedded-checkout=true">killed four Saudi soldiers</a> just days after Saudi Arabia <a href="https://allarab.news/saudi-arabia-shoots-down-houthi-missile-from-yemen-heading-towards-israel/#:%7E:text=The%20Wall%20Street%20Journal%20reported,intercepted%205%20missiles%20towards%20Israel.">shot down a missile</a> from the Houthis that was headed for Israel. </p>
<p>In the latest Houthi attack, the missiles passed through Saudi territory uninterrupted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-houthis-iran-34eab8bc1d3cf3606d874166fef2f018">before being shot down by Israel</a>. It is unclear whether this is an indication that the Saudis heeded the Houthis’ warning, which is potentially why they didn’t shoot down the latest missiles. To know more about the true state of Saudi-Houthi negotiations, there needs to be greater evidence, such as increased clashes between the Saudis and Houthis, or even a direct attack by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>But if Houthi missile attacks escalate in the coming days, it could put Saudi Arabia in a difficult spot. At that point, the Saudis would face a difficult choice. They could allow the Houthis’ missiles to continue passing through their land or they could try to shoot them down. But that would risk jeopardizing diplomatic efforts with both the Houthis and Iran. And that, I feel, seems very unlikely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Missiles from rebel Yemeni groups risk widening the Middle East conflict. But the motivation behind the attacks could be more about self-interest.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156572023-10-18T20:01:17Z2023-10-18T20:01:17ZSaudi plans to ‘de-risk’ region have taken a hit with Gaza violence − but hitting pause on normalization with Israel will buy kingdom time<p>Saudi Arabia and Israel had <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/22/middleeast/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-cnn-interview-intl/index.html">seemingly been</a> <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/21/middleeast/saudi-arabia-mbs-interview-fox-intl/index.html#:%7E:text=Saudi%20Arabia's%20Crown%20Prince%20Mohammed,has%20publicly%20acknowledged%20the%20process.">edging closer</a> to a landmark deal to normalize their diplomatic relations – and then the Hamas attack on <a href="https://time.com/6321849/israel-attack/">Oct. 7, 2023</a>, happened. </p>
<p>Since then, thousands have died in Gaza and in Israel. And <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israels-invasion-of-gaza-could-escalate-into-regional-conflict-experts-2023-10">fears of the conflict spreading</a> across the region form the backdrop to frenzied diplomacy across the region, including a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/18/politics/joe-biden-israel-trip/index.html">visit to Israel by U.S. President Joe Biden</a> on Oct. 18.</p>
<p>It also threatens to undermine a key pillar of Saudi Arabia’s foreign and domestic agenda: the “<a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/saudi-israeli-normalization-and-the-hamas-attack/">de-risking” of the region</a>. With Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman set on implementing “<a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/">Vision 2030</a>” – an ambitious economic, social and cultural program – and developing the kingdom as a <a href="https://sponsored.bloomberg.com/article/business-reporter/why-saudi-arabias-tourism-sector-is-emerging-as-the-destination-of-choice-for-global-investors">destination for tourism and investment</a>, a renewal of regional instability is the last thing the crown prince needs.</p>
<h2>De-escalating tensions</h2>
<p>Certainly, the escalating violence in the Middle East presents a challenge to the shift toward de-escalation of tensions across much of the broader region in recent years.</p>
<p>This has included the signing of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/subjects/abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in 2020, which established diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco. But it goes further, including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/whats-behind-growing-ties-between-turkey-and-the-gulf-states/">multiple-state treaties</a> that have <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/gcc-rift-over-qatar-comes-end">healed rifts across the Gulf</a>, culminating in the signing of a deal in March 2023 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/11/changing-global-order-china-restores-ties-with-iran-and-saudi">to restore Saudi-Iranian</a> relations.</p>
<p>These diplomatic breakthroughs opened up a space for greater regional cooperation through initiatives such as the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-world-leaders-launch-a-landmark-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/">India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor</a> unveiled at the G20 meeting in India in September 2023.</p>
<p>The hope of officials across the region was that economic development could integrate the region and move discussion away from the failure to make progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue.</p>
<h2>The Palestinian question</h2>
<p>Violence in Israel and Gaza threatens to knock Gulf states off a delicate balancing act of supporting the Palestinian cause in front of their largely Muslim populations while also making overtures to Israel and the U.S.</p>
<p>Qatar, for example, has long <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231014-qatar-iran-turkey-and-beyond-the-galaxy-of-hamas-supporters">hosted</a> the political leaders of Hamas while remaining on <a href="https://qa.usembassy.gov/us-qatar-relations-a-model-for-global-partnership/#:%7E:text=Our%20security%20partnership%20has%20been,Qatar's%20security%20is%20our%20security">friendly terms with the U.S.</a>. It will now likely face significant Israeli and U.S. <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/10/13/2023/qatar-is-us-partner-potential-adversary-in-hamas-war">pressure to expel</a> Hamas leadership.</p>
<p>The UAE and Bahrain both normalized relations with Israel in 2020, along with Morocco. But public support for the Abraham Accords across the region <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/gulf-states-lukewarm-on-palestine-amid-mass-public-disapproval">was always lukewarm</a> at best and may now <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-arab-allies-navigate-israel-ties-pro-palestinian-public-opinion-as-war-erupts/">dwindle</a> away.</p>
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<p>Meanwhile, Dubai, the UAE’s largest city, is <a href="https://unfccc.int/cop28">gearing up to host COP28</a>, the international climate change conference, starting Nov. 30. The UAE will not want the event overshadowed or put at risk by a new regional war.</p>
<h2>Reaching out to Israel</h2>
<p>But nowhere is the tightrope more delicate than in Saudi Arabia. This is by virtue of the kingdom’s religious standing in the Islamic world – it is custodian of the faith’s two most holy sites, Mecca and Medina – and the ambitious raft of economic reforms the kingdom has rolled out <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/">as part of Vision 2030</a>.</p>
<p>The campaign for Palestinian statehood has long been a cause célèbre in the Muslim world, and the current king of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, has been a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/where-is-king-salman/">staunch supporter of Palestine</a> all his life.</p>
<p>But his son and heir, the crown prince, has increasingly shown an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/21/saudi-crown-prince-says-israel-diplomatic-normalization-closer-every-day.html">interest in dialogue</a> with Israel. This has culminated in the talks to “normalize” relations between the two countries – something that would represent a historic breakthrough in Israel’s acceptance within the Arab and Islamic world. As recently as Sept. 20, <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/bret-baier-interviews-saudi-prince-israel-peace-ties-iran-nuke-fears-cannot-see-another-hiroshima">Crown Prince Mohammed told</a> Fox News that “every day, we get closer” to a deal.</p>
<p>Indeed, a series of leaks to U.S. media in the days and weeks prior to the Hamas attack <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/saudi-israeli-normalization-and-the-hamas-attack/">suggested that the outlines</a> of an agreement were taking shape, <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/04/saudi-mega-deal-biden-israel-normalization-palestinian-talks">driven</a> by the Biden administration.</p>
<h2>Public shows, private diplomacy</h2>
<p>But the Hamas attack and Israel’s response have punctured this momentum. Saudi sources briefed the media on Oct. 13 that talks on normalization had been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-13/saudis-put-israel-normalization-on-hold-in-blow-to-us-goals">paused</a> – but not abandoned.</p>
<p>Such messaging is in line with Saudi attempts to balance domestic and external interests. An <a href="https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1710629609757086172?s=20">initial Saudi Foreign Ministry statement</a> on Oct. 7 appealed to both the “Palestinian factions” and “Israeli occupation forces” to de-escalate. But at the first Friday prayer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca after the attacks, Saudi authorities were more forthcoming in taking sides, with the state-appointed cleric <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-hamas-israel-conflict-may-upend-saudi-and-u-s-calculations/">urging support</a> for “our brothers in Palestine.”</p>
<p>Behind the public shows of support for Palestinians, there is evidence that Saudis are trying to spearhead diplomatic efforts to prevent the war between Israel ad Hamas from developing into a wider conflagration that might bring in Lebanon, Iran and others.</p>
<p>On Oct. 12, Crown Prince Mohammed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/12/irans-raisi-saudi-arabias-mbs-discuss-israel-hamas-war">discussed the unfolding developments</a> in Israel and Gaza with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi – their first conversation since ties between the two countries were restored in March. </p>
<p>Three days later, the crown prince received U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh amid <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/15/blinken-saudi-egypt-israel-gaza/">media reports of differences</a> between the Saudi and U.S. positions on the conflict and the need for de-escalation.</p>
<h2>Oil and foreign investment</h2>
<p>Such diplomatic moves fall in line with the crown prince’s desire to “de-risk” the region. He is eager to see that nothing jeopardizes a series of “<a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2167321/saudi-arabia">giga-projects</a>” – such as Neom, the futuristic new city on the Red Sea coastline – that have become synonymous with Vision 2030.</p>
<p>The Saudi fear is that a prolonged or regional conflict will deter foreign investment in Vision 2030.</p>
<p>Foreign investment was seen as key to the project’s success. But levels of foreign investment plunged after the detention by the Saudi authorities of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/06/07/saudi-arabia-shock-collapse-investment/?sh=6bbf7adc6e60">dozens of senior Saudi business figures</a> at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in 2017 over allegations of corruption. Investors took fright at the prospect that their business partners might suddenly disappear or be shaken down. </p>
<p>As a result, the Saudis are having to shoulder a greater proportion of the costs of Vision 2030 themselves. This explains why Saudi officials have <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/05/what-s-driving-russia-s-opportunistic-inroads-with-saudi-arabia-and-gulf-arabs-pub-88099">cooperated</a> with their Russian counterparts in OPEC+ meetings to keep the price of oil at a level high enough to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/05/business/saudi-higher-oil-prices-grand-plans-mime-intl/index.html">generate</a> enough revenues to fund the projects.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A hand holds a newspaper with Arabic writing and a picture of three men, one wearing traditional Saudi dress." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554608/original/file-20231018-21-eocg0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia was big news.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-in-tehran-holds-a-local-newspaper-reporting-on-its-news-photo/1248021168?adppopup=true">Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Vision 2030 has become so bound up with Crown Prince Mohammed’s pledge to transform Saudi Arabia that he cannot afford for it to fail – hence his determination to reduce sources of regional tension, including with Iran.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1671831?IRAccessToken=Malath">Saudi officials also recently revised</a> their plans to attract 100 million visitors a year by 2030 <a href="https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/2034-fifa-world-cup-saudi-arabia-hosting-bid/?zephr_sso_ott=MIxnYt">upward to 150 million and launched</a> a bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup.</p>
<p>Underlying these initiatives is the Saudis’ desire to diversify the kingdom’s economy away from an overdependence on oil, turning the kingdom into a <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2023/09/21/crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-aims-to-change-us-perceptions-of-saudi-arabia/">destination for capital and people</a> alike. These ambitions would be endangered by another regional war in the Middle East – especially if it drew in Iran.</p>
<h2>Playing the ‘normalization’ card</h2>
<p>So where does the “normalization” of Saudi-Israeli relations go from here?</p>
<p>Putting the process on ice – for now – fits Crown Prince Mohammed’s careful balancing act. Proceeding at full speed would have risked blowback from other Arab and Middle Eastern states, undermining the process of “de-risking” of the region.</p>
<p>It also may provide Saudi Arabia with greater leverage – Israel and the U.S. will be keen that the current violence does not derail the process entirely. </p>
<p>So pausing the process, I argue, now makes tactical sense for Saudi Arabia, given the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/protests-erupt-middle-east-africa-gaza-hospital-explosion/story?id=104064903">outpouring of anger in the Islamic world</a> at developments in Gaza – and it provides the Saudi leadership with an opportunity to control the next phase of what remains an extremely delicate endeavor.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215657/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A decade of de-escalation among Gulf states could be at risk if Israel-Hamas violence spills across region. And that could threaten Saudi plans to transform the kingdom.Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2153842023-10-18T12:43:28Z2023-10-18T12:43:28ZBiden in Israel: How U.S. foreign policy has played a big role in the Israel-Hamas war<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/biden-in-israel-how-us-foreign-policy-has-played-a-big-role-in-the-israel-hamas-war" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/18/1206702426/biden-arrives-in-israel-as-gaza-reels-from-deadly-hospital-explosion">U.S. President Joe Biden is in Israel</a> to lend support to the country in the midst of an already bloody war between the Israelis and Hamas, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/they-believed-it-was-safe-death-toll-rising-blast-gaza-hospital">including the bombing of a Gaza City hospital that has left hundreds dead</a>.</p>
<p>Following Biden’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv, it’s worth looking back at American foreign policy and profound U.S. mismanagement of ongoing crises in the Middle East over a period of decades. It illustrates how badly American domination has served international peace and stability. </p>
<p>Some have argued that Hamas’s attack on Israel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/briefing/hamas-israel-war.html">is an indication of the chaos and disorder that will follow in an emerging “multipolar world,” meaning one in which the U.S. is no longer firmly in control of international affairs</a>. </p>
<p>But let’s look at how that U.S. control has worked out for the Middle East in the past. The current war in Gaza is a direct product of the failure of American foreign policy. It’s an argument in favour of a multipolar world, one in which the U.S. has less influence and other powers can act as countervailing forces. </p>
<h2>Destabilizing influence</h2>
<p>The U.S. has a long history of destabilizing the Middle East, a critically important region of the world. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days">In 1953, the U.S. and the U.K. engineered a coup against democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh</a> and strengthened the shah of Iran.</p>
<p>The shah’s hated regime fell to the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/four-decades-later-did-the-iranian-revolution-fulfill-its-promises/">Iranian revolution in 1979</a>. The result was the Islamic Republic of Iran, a state that has bedevilled the U.S. and its allies ever since. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-the-iraq-war">In 2003, the U.S. illegally invaded Iraq</a>, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/iraqi">killing more than 300,000 people</a>, and spreading chaos across the region. The so-called War on Terror has raged on, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2023/IndirectDeaths">killing millions more, directly and indirectly</a>, for years.</p>
<p>The American mishandling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another substantial failure. Given its enormous leverage over both parties, the U.S. could have taken more neutral steps to bring about a just end to the conflict long ago. Instead, it catered to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/opinion/biden-middle-east-deal.html">increasingly radical Israeli governments</a>, facilitating the brutal subjugation of the Palestinians and creating the pressure cooker that has now exploded.</p>
<h2>Pressure cooker erupts</h2>
<p>The United Nations has called Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129722#:%7E:text=Israel's%20occupation%20of%20Palestinian%20territory,first%20report%2C%20published%20on%20Thursday.">unlawful under international law</a>.” For many decades, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/06/israel-occupation-50-years-of-dispossession/">Israel has built settlements in the West Bank</a> that amount to the de facto annexation of Palestine. Israel has also <a href="https://www.btselem.org/topic/jerusalem">annexed East Jerusalem</a>. <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-hears-that-700000-israeli-settlers-are-living-illegally-in-the-occupied-west-bank-meeting-summary-excerpts/#:%7E:text=From%202012%20to%202022%2C%20the,from%20520%2C000%20to%20over%20700%2C000.">Today, the Israeli settler population in occupied Palestine stands at 700,000</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/07/israeli-settlements-amount-war-crime-special-rapporteur-tells-human-rights#:%7E:text=Israeli%20courts%20had%20been%20enforcing,laws%20to%20the%20occupied%20territory.">The settlements</a> violate <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49">Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention</a>. They are the single greatest obstacle to the “two-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-us-policy-israeli-palestinian-conflict">formally opposes Israeli settlements</a>, but has done nothing to actually stop them. Instead, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/57170576">it’s provided Israel with weapons and financial support</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/19/a-history-of-the-us-blocking-un-resolutions-against-israel">protected Israel from facing the consequences of its violations of international law in the United Nations</a> and other international institutions.</p>
<p>This protection has apparently instilled in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/5/israel-impunity-comes-home-to-roost">Israel an attitude of impunity</a>. Israel builds settlements and oppresses Palestinians; the U.S. either helps it do so or defends Israeli actions.</p>
<p>In 2021, the international NGO <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">Human Rights Watch issued a report</a> that said Palestinian “deprivations are so severe that they amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution.” Other groups like Amnesty International say Palestinians <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/">are subject to regular violence and humiliation from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Jewish settlers</a>.</p>
<p>The current Israeli government <a href="https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20230711_the_pogroms_deliver_another_palestinian_community_was_forcibly_transferred_yesterday">encourages and protects settler violence</a> and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-12-28/ty-article/.premium/natural-right-to-the-land-of-israel-netanyahu-lays-out-west-bank-annexation-plans/00000185-5955-dbd5-abe7-59f5c5d60000">has expressed an intent to annex what remains of Palestine</a>. Indeed, <a href="https://jewishcurrents.org/could-israel-carry-out-another-nakba">its push for controversial judicial reform is connected to its designs on Palestinian land.</a></p>
<h2>‘Open-air prison’</h2>
<p>Gaza has been described as an open-air prison. For 17 years, it’s been under an illegal blockade that violates <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-33#:%7E:text=12%20August%201949.-,Article%2033%20%2D%20Individual%20responsibility%2C%20collective%20penalties%2C%20pillage%2C%20reprisals,or%20of%20terrorism%20are%20prohibited.">Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention</a> that bans what’s known as collective punishment. </p>
<p><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/hell-earth-israel-unrest-spotlights-dire-conditions-gaza/story?id=103829699">Youth unemployment is 60 per cent</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/water-crisis-may-make-gaza-strip-uninhabitable-by-2020#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Gaza%20Strip%2C%2097,and%20supplies%20into%20the%20region.">97 per cent of the water is undrinkable</a>; <a href="https://www.foodnavigator-asia.com/Article/2022/05/31/acute-undernutrition-stunting-rife-among-kids-under-five-in-gaza-strip-palestine-study#">child malnutrition is rife</a>.</p>
<p>Had the U.S. used its global leverage to push Israel to adhere to international law, the situation might have been avoided. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/09/israel-hamas-gaza-war-battle/">Instead, it enabled Israel’s expansionist ambitions while undermining international law</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/trump-pro-israel-truth-social-netanyahu-abraham-accords/?tpcc=recirc_trending062921">The former Donald Trump administration abandoned any American pretense of even-handedness</a> in the Israel-Palestine conflict, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/23/abraham-accords-israel-palestine-two-years/">implementing the Abraham Accords, which were designed to sidestep the Palestinian issue altogether by creating economic ties between Israel and neighbouring Arab states</a>. </p>
<p>Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/israel-saudi-arabia-normalisation-deal-in-reach-netanyahu-tells-biden">has doubled down on Trump’s efforts by pushing the normalization</a> of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, again sidestepping the Palestinians. </p>
<h2>Region on edge</h2>
<p>There is no excusing Hamas’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/opinion/israel-hamas-.html">incredibly violent actions</a> on Oct. 7. But the attack <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/08/normalization-peace-biden-hamas-attack">has been linked to Israeli efforts to build ties with Arab nations like Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>As Biden spends time in Israel, it’s a stark reminder that the U.S. is no longer qualified to mediate the conflict. </p>
<p>As the war claims thousands of Palestinian civilians, the region is in danger of exploding. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-spirit-of-resistance-arab-support-for-palestinians-swells">Arabs are enraged</a>; <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/09/hezbollah-lebanon-hamas-war-israel-iran/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921">Hezbollah may intervene</a>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/business/economy/global-economy-israel-gaza-war.html">The cost of oil may spike, further damaging the fragile world economy</a>. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/china-brokered-saudi-iran-deal-driving-wave-of-reconciliation-says-wang#:%7E:text=China's%20top%20diplomat%20has%20said,%E2%80%9Cissues%20concerning%20core%20interests%E2%80%9D.">helped re-establish diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia</a> because it gets more than <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-China-Overly-Reliant-On-Middle-Eastern-Oil.html">50 per cent of its oil</a> from the Middle East and has a powerful interest in regional peace. </p>
<p>Even so, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east-crisis-test-limits-chinas-diplomatic-push-2023-10-10/">it apparently has no desire to insert itself into a quagmire the U.S. helped create.</a>. Other powers that rely on Middle Eastern oil have to endure the consequences of unbalanced and inept American policy. </p>
<p>The United States causes and exacerbates many of the problems and conflicts that it later seeks to manage. American strength has meant the rest of the world has had to accept this reality. But the sooner a true multi-polar world emerges, the better it will likely be for global stability — and maybe even for the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, J Street and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>The current war in Gaza is an argument in favour of a multipolar world, one in which the U.S. has less influence and other powers can act as countervailing forces.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138832023-10-13T14:59:56Z2023-10-13T14:59:56ZWestern sanctions haven’t curbed Russian oil profits, but the green energy transition could<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552791/original/file-20231009-23-kjud9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5464%2C3034&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oil tankers at sea.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/aerial-view-oil-gas-petrochemical-tanker-1396953689">Avigator Fortuner/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Western sanctions that put <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_7468">a price cap</a> on Russian oil exports from December 2022 aimed to cause the country significant economic pain after its invasion of Ukraine last year. The idea was to curtail the amount Russia makes from its oil while ensuring it continues to flow into the global market to reduce price pressures on consumers around the world. </p>
<p>Back then, oil prices were trading around US$80 (£66) per barrel (/bbl). More than 10 months later, the opposite has happened: Russian exports have declined but its revenues have increased, providing it with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-crude-oil-price-sanction-ukraine-war/">significant funds</a> to continue the war. </p>
<p>This is because since July 2023, oil prices have been above US$80/bbl, exceeding US$95/bbl at times – levels last seen in November 2022. Even though it was subject to a price cap, Russian oil has been in even greater demand due to a squeeze on supply in global oil markets.</p>
<p>Russia’s global oil market position doesn’t seem to be threatened by sanctions and caps. But domestic problems and market changes that have been brewing long before the war in Ukraine could affect Russia’s oil industry for a long time to come.</p>
<p><strong>Oil prices rising again:</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Line chart showing oil price (Brent) falling from around $98/bbl in November 2022 but rising again from the end of August 2023." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553658/original/file-20231013-26-5idwgg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brent is a global benchmark for oil prices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.tradingview.com/chart/?symbol=BRENT">Trading View</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How does the price cap work?</h2>
<p>The price cap restricts the sale of Russian oil to third parties such as China and India. Countries can still buy that oil but they must use services such as shipping and insurance provided by G7, EU and Australian entities, and can also only do so if the oil is sold below a certain price. This price was set at US$60/bbl (after December 5 2022) for oil and around US$100/bbl (after February 5 2023) for refined products such as diesel. </p>
<p>Western providers of insurance and maritime services make up <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/the-price-cap-on-russian-oil-a-progress-report#:%7E:text=In%20December%202022%2C%20the%20Coalition,oil%20at%20%2460%20per%20barrel">around 90%</a> of the market, leaving those that want to buy Russian oil with few alternatives but to respect the cap constraints.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/the-price-cap-on-russian-oil-a-progress-report#:%7E:text=In%20December%202022%2C%20the%20Coalition,oil%20at%20%2460%20per%20barrel">US Treasury report</a> published in May 2023 claimed that the price cap achieved its goals. It reported a decline in Russian oil revenues, even though the country exported around 5-10% more crude oil in April 2023 compared to March 2022.</p>
<p>Russian oil was also trading at a significant discount compared to global oil prices, as Western countries had hoped when they created the price cap. By June 2023, Russia’s oil export revenues plunged to US$11.8 billion, nearly <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-july-2023">half the levels</a> of a year before. </p>
<p>But by the end of August 2023, a switch had occurred. Russian oil export revenues recovered to US$17 billion even as exports hit an 11-month low, averaging 5.27 million barrels a day (Mb/d) in September 2023 – the lowest <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-september-2023">since September 2022</a>, and 0.65 Mb/d <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/090423-russian-oil-exports-hit-11-month-low-as-refinery-downtime-output-cuts-bite">below pre-Ukraine war levels</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the country’s oil production in August 2023 dropped to 10.43 Mb/d in August 2023 compared to 11 Mb/d <a href="https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/sep23.pdf">in December 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Several factors have helped the Kremlin replenish its oil coffers even though it’s selling less oil. First, oil prices increased significantly over the summer of 2023. This was largely a result of <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=60462#">production cuts announced by OPEC members</a>, primarily Saudi Arabia and its allies, led by Russia in what is known as OPEC+. </p>
<p>With less oil around, cheaper Russian oil appeals to many buyers around the world, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/asia-crude-imports-hit-high-china-india-gorge-russian-oil-russell-2023-08-03/">particularly in Asia</a>. Russia has been able to use this to replace eroding European demand.</p>
<p>Breaches of the cap have also been reported, particularly <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/090423-russian-oil-exports-hit-11-month-low-as-refinery-downtime-output-cuts-bite">since July 2023</a>. Russia has significantly decreased its reliance on western maritime and insurance services, reducing the portion of its oil trade subject to the cap. </p>
<p>Almost <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/russian-crude-oil-tracker">three-quarters of all seaborne Russian crude</a> flows travelled without western insurance in August, reported to be up from <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/72ae377d-8435-4d34-92b6-f55c47a662c4?desktop=true&segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-9208a9e233c8#myft:notification:daily-email:content">about 50% in spring</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Line chart showing growth in tankers transporting Russian crude with non-G7/EU/Norway insurance." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=283&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552784/original/file-20231009-19-df97eo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Almost three-quarters of all seaborne Russian crude flows travelled without western insurance in August 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/russian-crude-oil-tracker">Bruegel analysis of CREA Russian Oil API</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trouble brewing</h2>
<p>Long before the war in Ukraine started, several studies – including research published by the Russian government – highlighted the challenges facing the country’s oil industry. </p>
<p>Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035 (published in 2019) presented two main scenarios for the country’s oil production. The optimistic scenario sees oil production for 2024-2035 at only 0.77% above 2018 production levels. In its <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/russias-energy-strategy-2035-struggling-remain">pessimistic scenario</a>, Russia’s oil output slips into a 12% decline by 2035 compared to 2018 levels. </p>
<p>An even <a href="https://ogst.ifpenergiesnouvelles.fr/articles/ogst/full_html/2019/01/ogst190118/ogst190118.html">more pessimistic scenario</a> was suggested by a French research institute called Institut Francais du Petrole (IFP) in 2019, which said Russian oil would shrink by 41% in 2040 compared to 2018 levels. </p>
<p>The flight of western capital, investment and technologies from Russia following its invasion of Ukraine will only worsen all of these scenarios. But the main driver behind such outlooks is the reduction in output from brownfields (projects that have been operating for some time) in Western Siberia – the Soviet-era heartland of Russian oil production.</p>
<p>Alternative supplies are in remote areas (such as the Arctic circle), making them more complex and costly to develop. </p>
<p>Furthermore, as the transition to lower-carbon energy sources accelerates, oil demand is bound to hit a peak. The <a href="https://www.iea.org/news/growth-in-global-oil-demand-is-set-to-slow-significantly-by-2028">International Energy Agency expects</a> this to happen before the end of this decade. Notable uncertainty surrounds such an outlook, but in a shrinking market the axe will fall on high-cost producers first. </p>
<p>New Russian oil fields developed in 2019 break even (including taxes) at an average of US$40-50/bbl. This is on the higher end, particularly <a href="https://www.aramco.com/-/media/images/investors/saudi-aramco-prospectus-cma-en.pdf?la=en&hash=8887077F5ACCE26916E6DA8A953B44771D0C46F1">compared to</a> producers in the Middle East, where costs can even be less than US$10/bbl for some fields in Saudi Arabia, for example.</p>
<p>Of course, the carbon intensity of a country’s oil production will also have a significant impact on producers. As the world attempts to transition to lower carbon forms of energy, buyers will want to reduce the carbon footprint of their energy imports. Russia’s carbon intensity is <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aar6859">double that of Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<p>While the price cap has done little to erode Russia’s power in the global oil markets, it’s only a matter of time before its oil sector’s legacy problems and high carbon intensity start to squeeze its oil riches. This is likely to have a much more sustained negative impact on Russia’s oil wealth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carole Nakhle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An initial squeeze on demand for Russian oil due to western sanctions was temporary but the country’s oil industry might have bigger problems.Carole Nakhle, Energy Economist, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146702023-10-11T13:55:47Z2023-10-11T13:55:47ZRising oil prices, surging inflation: The Arab embargo 50 years ago weaponized oil to inflict economic trauma<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552594/original/file-20231006-29-4blfs7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=321%2C1017%2C3548%2C2355&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cars lined up for gasoline in New Jersey in 1973 as supplies ran low and prices shot upward.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drivers-queue-for-fuel-at-a-petrol-station-near-trenton-new-news-photo/155367107">Frederic Lewis/Archive Photos/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fifty years ago, a secret deal among Arab governments triggered one of the most traumatic economic crises to afflict the United States and other big oil importers. </p>
<p>Saudi King Faisal and other Arab leaders <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo">launched an oil embargo</a> on Oct. 17, 1973, as payback for Washington siding with Israel in <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/arab-israeli-war-1973">its war with neighboring Egypt and Syria</a>.</p>
<p>The oil market hostilities arose from a pact between Faisal and the leaders of Egypt and Syria, whose armies planned surprise drives to retake their territory under Israeli occupation. If the United States intervened to assist Israel, Faisal and other Arab producers agreed to retaliate with the “oil weapon.”</p>
<p>When Washington <a href="https://amcmuseum.org/history/operation-nickel-grass/">airlifted in U.S. weapons</a> that helped Israel thwart Arab gains, Faisal and OPEC’s Arab members retaliated. They increased oil prices, banned oil shipments to the United States and cut production by 5% per month. </p>
<p>The ensuing economic and political carnage is legendary. The embargo catalyzed a long period of upheaval in global oil markets and pain at the gasoline pump for Americans and consumers globally. Oil prices <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/oil-shock-of-1973-74">quadrupled nearly overnight</a> and remained high for over a decade. Producing countries leveraged the opportunity to reclaim sovereignty over their oil reserves. By 1980, many had completed the process of kicking Western oil companies out of their territories.</p>
<p><iframe id="EbIGW" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/EbIGW/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Oil’s global regime change</h2>
<p>The embargo’s disruptive power was due to two key factors: OPEC’s dominance of world oil supply, and oil’s supremacy in the global energy mix.</p>
<p>Prior to the embargo, oil fueled almost half of total energy consumption in the United States (47.5%) and worldwide (49%). While OPEC countries produced more than half (53%) of <a href="https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review">global oil</a>, the concessions were operated by Western oil majors.</p>
<p>After the embargo, producer states took over. Control of global oil production passed from Western oil giants like Shell and Exxon to newly formed national oil companies.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men in suits sit at two rows of tables across from one another. Ahmed Zaki Yamani is looking into the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552582/original/file-20231006-21-fz8jzx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani, second from left at the table, negotiated a deal that shifted control of Arabian American Oil Company from Exxon, Chevron, Mobil and Texaco to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Aramco is now the world’s largest oil producing company.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-taken-08-october-1973-in-vienna-showing-the-news-photo/97661766?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a result, a torrent of cash from oil sales poured into Middle Eastern countries where rudimentary services like electricity were still being built out. Oil revenues in Saudi Arabia jumped fortyfold between 1965 and 1975, from US$655 million to $26.7 billion. These countries also amassed <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/energy-kingdoms/9780231179300">new geopolitical power</a>. </p>
<h2>How the oil price spike played out in the West</h2>
<p>In the West, price increases wreaked havoc on economies and transport systems that were far less efficient than today. Inflation soon boiled over into “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/10/investing/premarket-stocks-trading-stagflation/index.html">stagflation</a>,” a combination of economic stagnation and high inflation. Misguided policies, including gasoline <a href="https://www.eenews.net/articles/what-the-1970s-teaches-about-todays-energy-crisis/">price controls</a> and rationing, exacerbated shortages, creating long lines at service stations and emboldening gasoline thieves.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ra9Ep6jEcLA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A look back at the 1970s oil crisis.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>America saw a pell-mell downsizing of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8VrjlpAdTrU">gas-guzzling vehicles</a> and a simultaneous ramping up of imports of fuel-efficient Japanese cars. Drivers obsessed over miles per gallon, and the U.S. government imposed corporate average fuel economy, or <a href="https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10562">CAFE, standards</a>, aimed at saving fuel by requiring automakers to sell more fuel-efficient cars.</p>
<p>Western oil companies, kicked out of the Middle East and other oil regions, pivoted to more difficult terrain: the offshore Gulf of Mexico and North Sea, and the Arctic regions of northern Alaska.</p>
<p>As scholars of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wXoaLZMAAAAJ&hl=en">energy</a> <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/expert/mark-finley">policy</a>, we have long studied the embargo’s spillover effects on the global economy and political systems. These outcomes are a central theme in Jim Krane’s 2019 book “<a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/energy-kingdoms/9780231179300">Energy Kingdoms</a>.” On the embargo’s 50th anniversary, Oct. 17, 2023, King Faisal’s son, the former Saudi Ambassador to Washington Prince Turki Al Faisal, is joining us for a <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/event/chaos-energy-markets-then-and-now-50-years-after-1973-arab-oil-embargo">conference at Rice University’s Baker Institute</a> to discuss the still-valid lessons of the Arab oil embargo.</p>
<h2>50 years later, new pressures</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/event/chaos-energy-markets-then-and-now-50-years-after-1973-arab-oil-embargo">Fifty years on</a>, markets have changed. But oil continues to be the world’s dominant energy source.</p>
<p>On one hand, crude oil use has grown dramatically. <a href="https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review">Global supply has risen</a> from less than 60 million barrels per day in 1973 to nearly 94 million barrels per day in 2022. Motor fuel prices are still a critical input to inflation; we calculate that the <a href="https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/">increase in gasoline prices</a> in 2022 cost the <a href="https://usafacts.org/data/topics/people-society/population-and-demographics/population-data/households/">average American household</a> roughly $1,000.</p>
<p>On the other hand, OPEC’s importance – and oil’s share of the global energy mix – has declined. <a href="https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm">OPEC’s 13 members</a> account for just 36% of global oil production today. The high oil prices caused by the 1973 embargo created incentives for oil drillers to diversify toward new sources of oil and develop substitute fuels to replace oil.</p>
<p><iframe id="lBwcG" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lBwcG/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Within 15 years of the embargo, production outside OPEC increased by a massive 14 million barrels per day. Oil from Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico helped stabilize U.S. production. Later, the <a href="https://www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security-project/the-u-s-shale-revolution/">shale revolution</a> turned the United States into the world’s largest producer and a <a href="https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php">net exporter of oil</a>, capping a 50-year quest.</p>
<p>The world has also become much more efficient, reducing the amount of oil needed to maintain the same activity. Global per-capita oil use per dollar of gross domestic product has fallen by a massive 60% since 1973, our calculations show.</p>
<p><iframe id="Jh9iZ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Jh9iZ/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But, as in 1973, energy security concerns are back at the top of national agendas. </p>
<p>Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine reprised the risks of energy “weaponization.” Europe, in particular, has been hurt by <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/putin-bulldozing-russias-energy-exports-and-pushing-energy-transition">overdependence on Russian natural gas</a> and has raced to <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-reaches-90-gas-storage-target-ahead-winter-2023-08-18_en">shift its energy sources</a>. The Israel-Hamas war that began on Oct. 8, 2023, has not yet ignited retaliatory responses from Arab governments, and the initial <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/israel-hamas-war-energy-gas-boom-oil-mediterranean-3ac6b224?st=rhcg1eq7ytb7xgi">impact on oil</a> has been minimal, but geopolitical effects from such a large event could still roil markets.</p>
<p>Energy security itself is also being altered. The transition to renewable energy sources like wind and solar <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/more-transitions-less-risk-how-renewable-energy-reduces-risks-mining-trade-and-political-dependence">insulates consumers from most supply chain risks</a>. Electric vehicles likewise protect owners from swinging oil prices. So, while crucial materials can still be manipulated by governments, shortages and price spikes mainly affect component manufacturers and their investors. If supplies are bottlenecked long enough, the energy transition could be delayed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Aerial view in 2014 of the Houston Ship Channel and surrounding energy facilities in Houston." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/552553/original/file-20231006-25-733dzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. still imports more than 8 million barrels of petroleum per day, but since 2020, it has exported more than it has imported. More than one-third of U.S. crude oil exports go through the Houston Ship Channel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iip-photo-archive/16549974959">Carol M. Highsmith/U.S. State Department Bureau of Global Public Affairs</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Like the embargo 50 years ago, today’s crises have rendered the future of energy massively uncertain. Changes in the global energy mix, especially the rapid growth of electric vehicles, could <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/should-abu-dhabi-quit-opec-reconsidering-uaes-membership">weaken the importance of oil and the cartel</a> that oversees it.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2003/10/23/the-end-of-the-oil-age">former Saudi oil minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani</a> was reported to have said a quarter-century ago: “The Stone Age did not end for lack of stone, and the oil age will end long before the world runs out of oil.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jim Krane has received research funding from the government of Qatar and is affiliated with the Energy Policy Research Group at the University of Cambridge. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Finley owns shares in bp. He has consulted for the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center. He is also a member of the US Association for Energy Economics and the National Association for Business Economics.</span></em></p>Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine reprised the risks of energy weaponization, but the oil landscape today and energy security itself are changing.Jim Krane, Fellow in Energy Studies, Baker Institute for Public Policy; Lecturer, Rice UniversityMark Finley, Fellow in Energy and Global Oil, Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154732023-10-11T13:25:40Z2023-10-11T13:25:40ZIsrael-Gaza conflict: how could it change the Middle East’s political landscape? Expert Q&A<p><em>The surprise attack by Hamas launched on Israel on October 7 has already led to thousands of deaths in both Israel and Gaza, and sparked concerns that the conflict could escalate across the Middle East. An expert in the politics and relations of this region, Simon Mabon, explains how all the key players are likely to view this dramatic escalation in violence.</em></p>
<p><strong>Just before the attack by Hamas, Benjamin Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman had talked of progress on a “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141302">historic peace deal</a>” between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Is such an agreement dead in the water now?</strong></p>
<p>Not necessarily. The US-led “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/15/uae-bahrain-and-israel-sign-historic-accords-at-white-house-event-formal-relations-trump-netanyahu">Abraham accords</a>”, signed in September 2020, changed the dynamic of what was possible in the Middle East. While Egypt and Jordan had previously established diplomatic relations with Israel (in 1979 and 1994 respectively), the accords signalled that a wider “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/map-which-mena-countries-have-diplomatic-ties-with-israel">normalisation</a>” of relations between Israel and the Arab states was in process – and by virtue of this, that Saudi Arabia, which has never recognised Israel as a state, would also normalise relations at some point.</p>
<p>Speaking to Saudi friends, they had envisaged a revival of the 2002 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Peace_Initiative">Arab Peace Initiative</a>, which was driven by Saudi Arabia. Getting Israel to buy into that would have been the win that Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Saudi’s crown prince and prime minister, needed to make normalisation happen. Of course, following the shocking attack by Hamas on Israeli civilians, there won’t be any kind of peace initiative for now.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-updates-on-the-conversations-coverage-of-the-conflict-215285">Israel-Hamas war: updates on The Conversation's coverage of the conflict</a>
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<p>Saudi Arabia has not publicly condemned the attacks, but has been <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2386901/middle-east">vocal in its calls for de-escalation</a>, joining a growing chorus of international voices expressing concern at what comes next. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/how-did-arab-states-react-hamas-attack-israel">criticised Hamas</a> for the murder of Israeli civilians. But Israel knows it’s a diplomatic game. In the longer term, the shifting political and economic landscape in the Middle East still points to a desire to establish relations with Israel, and to realign regional politics in such a way that Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are broadly on the same side of history.</p>
<p><strong>Was the attack on Israel an attempt to disrupt this process?</strong></p>
<p>The main driver of the attack on Israel by <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-group-that-attacked-israel-215288">Hamas</a>, the elected governing authority in Gaza since 2007, is the 16-year land, sea and air blockade of this Palestinian territory. In Gaza, more than 2 million people live in an area a quarter of the size of London with limited access to electricity and water.</p>
<p>But the timing of the attack certainly carries wider significance. It came during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/hamas-assault-echoes-1973-arab-israeli-war-a-shock-attack-and-questions-of-political-intelligence-culpability-215228">50th anniversary of the 1973 war</a>, when Egyptian and Syrian armies invaded Israel, which I think is symbolically important. And the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s move to normalise relations with Israel is also significant, because Hamas – and potentially others in the region – will see it as a bonus if the conflict serves to disrupt that dynamic.</p>
<p><strong>When MBS said that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/saudi-arabia-getting-closer-to-normalising-relations-with-israel-crown-prince-says">solving the Palestinian issue</a>” was key to the normalisation process, what did he mean?</strong></p>
<p>There’s a cynical answer to this, which is that Saudi’s leader was looking to use rhetoric to cultivate some support, and to reassure those people (in Saudi and elsewhere) who are concerned about the process of normalisation. To be clear, that’s the bigger prize for MBS – not the articulation or realisation of a Palestinian state.</p>
<p>In the context of Israel-Palestine and the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-palestine-the-legacy-of-oslo-and-the-future-of-a-two-state-solution-podcast-214107">two-state solution</a>”, peace is a mirage – an illusion held up by people seeking to solidify their positions of influence in Israel, Palestine and beyond. If you look at the facts on the ground, there is no two-state solution in process; Palestine is not even recognised as a state by a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine#:%7E:text=Among%20the%20G20%2C%20nine%20countries,the%20United%20States">large number of countries</a>. It has been described as a political football kicked around by political elites seeking to use it for their own advantage, with the Palestinian people being the ones suffering for decades.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-the-oslo-accords-a-new-podcast-series-marks-30-years-since-israel-palestine-secret-peace-negotiations-212985">Inside the Oslo accords: a new podcast series marks 30 years since Israel-Palestine secret peace negotiations</a>
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<p>If we look at the Abraham accords, the positive spin for Palestinians was that there might be scope for states engaging Israel to put pressure on them, to try and force some kind of resolution. But we’re over three years into these accords and nothing has happened.</p>
<p><strong>What’s been Saudi Arabia’s gameplan?</strong></p>
<p>MBS wants to position Saudi as the driving force of regional affairs – and to ensure that he has the economic power to bring about his “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-saudi-arabias-vision-2030-mean-for-its-citizens-58466">Vision 2030</a>” transformation of the kingdom away from a reliance on oil. But to do that, he needs to address regional security concerns. He’s started doing that with Iran, and has already been doing it tacitly with Israel for a number of years.</p>
<p>There is back-channel dialogue, a lot of collaboration under the table, but recently this has become more open. And it’s not hugely popular among some Saudis and other Arab publics, who continue to see the Palestinian cause as important. So, you have a disjunct between elite leaders in the region, who regard Israel as “just another member” of this club of states, and their people, who view the occupation of Palestinian territories as a key element of the Arab portfolio.</p>
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<p><strong>What does Israel want from the normalisation process?</strong></p>
<p>Recognition. Saudi Arabia is the last major Arab player not to recognise Israel other than Qatar, which will not recognise Israel because of its politics and long history of supporting members of Hamas and political Islamist organisations who stand against Israel. And Saudi is hugely symbolic – it’s the leader of the Sunni Muslim world and the location of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Medina.</p>
<p>For Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel would bring an end, formally, to the Arab-Israeli wars that dominated the 20th century in the Middle East. It would hammer home that the new dividing line (a geopolitical line that, in reality, has been playing out over the past 20 years) is between the Arab states plus Israel, and Iran – although there has been an effort to try to reintegrate Iran into the region as well, culminating in a <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85870/saudi-arabia-and-iran-the-politics-of-detente/">China-led normalisation agreement</a> with Saudi earlier this year.</p>
<p><strong>How does Iran feel about current events?</strong></p>
<p>The attack carried out on Israel was a hugely sophisticated, multi-pronged military operation, beyond anything that we’ve seen from Hamas before. That suggests some type of strategic involvement from “others” – but there’s been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/09/no-evidence-yet-of-iran-link-to-hamas-attack-says-israeli-military">no evidence presented</a> that Iran was involved.</p>
<p>Iran is often viewed as an irrational actor, trying to destabilise things – but that misreads the nature of the Islamic Republic and its foreign policy objectives. Firstly, its leaders are pragmatic – they want the republic to survive. Since its inception in 1979, it has faced a huge number of threats to its survival – and right now, it’s got a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-hijab-protests-challenge-legitimacy-of-islamic-republic-191958">very serious one internally</a>. So, while there may be an argument to say that a “rally round the flag” type of event might shift focus away from this domestic unrest, I think the stakes are so high that it wouldn’t want to risk openly engaging in conflict with Israel right now.</p>
<p>Iran just doesn’t have the financial resources. It needs the normalisation of relations with states such as Saudi Arabia and, by extension, the US, to have a cash injection to revive its oil and gas industry, which is in a state of disrepair. It needs a huge cash stimulus to get back on its feet. </p>
<p>However, there is an ideological dimension to the Islamic Republic which we shouldn’t ignore. It has positioned itself against the state of Israel for decades, and this is tied into its very essence. In this, Iran is at the vanguard of what it calls the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_of_Resistance#:%7E:text=The%20term%20Axis%20of%20Resistance,military%20alliance%20between%20Iran%2C%20militant">axis of resistance</a>” – a loose alliance of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and, previously, Syria.</p>
<p><strong>Do the other Gulf states have much influence on how this will play out?</strong></p>
<p>The UAE is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-after-israel-gaza-conflict-says-it-does-not-mix-trade-with-politics-2023-10-10/">invested economically in the West Bank</a>, as is Qatar. The UAE has taken a similar line to Saudi Arabia on the attack, calling it “a serious and grave escalation”. There’s a bit of competition between them in terms of exerting influence in the West Bank, but broadly they’re on the same path, given that UAE was involved in the Abraham accords and Saudi has been talking about normalisation.</p>
<p>History has shown us that there has sometimes been a willingness to disregard controversial issues in the region. For example, when the US embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/14/world-leaders-react-to-us-embassy-relocation-to-jerusalem">most states remained quiet</a> despite it being a hugely symbolic switch. But, of course, the attack on Israel is at an altogether different level of political sensitivity.</p>
<p>Qatar is trying to play a mediatory role in terms of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-leads-talks-swap-hamas-held-hostages-palestinians-israeli-jails-2023-10-09/">potential prisoner swaps</a>. It has a growing history of trying to engage in diplomatic initiatives, having been involved in <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/160109/da1df25567ebd34af26d634892934b03.pdf">Lebanon in the mid-2000s</a> and has been involved in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/qatar-expects-us-taliban-talks-to-have-successful-outcome-very-soon-/4812426.html">dialogue between the US and the Taliban</a>. But despite this diplomatic dimension to Qatari foreign policy, it hasn’t demonstrated that it’s able to exert much influence over Israel.</p>
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<p><strong>Where does this leave the Palestinian people?</strong></p>
<p>The Palestinian people are increasingly isolated – caught up in the contours of geopolitical machinations, abandoned by those who should be supporting them. While countries have some dialogue with Palestinian groups such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah">Fatah</a> in the West Bank, these groups are so weak and have so little legitimacy that it doesn’t really matter what they say. With such huge power disparities, there is limited inclination for the Israelis to engage in peace – even less so since the Hamas attack – and limited capacity for the Palestinians to engage in peace. </p>
<p>In the wake of the attack, Gazans have been <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-instructs-gazans-on-evacuation-routes-while-many-find-shelter-in-unrwa-schools/">instructed by Israel to flee their city</a> – but given there is a blockade and you have to have permission from the Israelis to leave through Israeli-controlled checkpoints, there is <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/hamas-israel-war-we-are-being-completely-strangled-aid-workers-report-from-inside-gazas-worst-ever-humanitarian-crisis-12981768">nowhere for them to go</a>. Gaza is effectively the largest open-air prison in the world, with infrastructure that has been devastated by the 16 years of blockade. The ongoing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-threatens-kill-captives-if-israel-strikes-civilians-2023-10-09/">Israeli air strikes</a> are further destroying its hospitals, schools, shops and homes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-gaza-strip-why-the-history-of-the-densely-populated-enclave-is-key-to-understanding-the-current-conflict-215306">The Gaza Strip − why the history of the densely populated enclave is key to understanding the current conflict</a>
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<p>Hamas as a political entity is not particularly popular, because it hasn’t been able to achieve its goals. But as a militant group, it has cultivated legitimacy in certain constituencies. However, the morally repugnant act of killing civilians will, I think, prove to be a major strategic mistake for the organisation. Israel’s response to the Hamas attack is being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/10/hamas-attack-israel-us-opinion-divided">widely positioned</a> as part of the “global war on terror”, positioning Hamas alongside groups such as al-Qaeda and Daesh as Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, seeks to cultivate global support for his actions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Palestinian-Authority">Palestinian Authority</a> (PA), which is the broad umbrella organisation that regulates life in the West Bank and Gaza, is impotent, unable to exert any influence on Israel or the world stage. There’s a real frustration among Palestinian people with the PA, who will not come out and condemn Hamas because that would mean condemning resistance against an occupation that has caused such devastation in the years after the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39960461">1967 war</a>.</p>
<p>The attack has emboldened extremist voices on all sides, from Hamas militants in Gaza to the right-wing settler communities in Israel. The consequences of extremist voices gaining prominence, and the violence that follows, will be devastating.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and The Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>Is the much-heralded Israel-Saudi peace deal now dead? And how is Iran likely to respond? An expert in Middle Eastern politics explainsSimon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2153172023-10-10T11:52:26Z2023-10-10T11:52:26ZIsrael-Hamas war: A political scientist explains why the very subject of peace is now unthinkable<p><em>Hamas’ surprise attack on Southern Israel on 7 October marks the bloodiest assault the state has sustained since its creation in 1948. At the time of writing, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67050350">death toll</a> on the Israeli side has reached 900. In Gaza, retaliatory Israeli strikes have left more than 700 people dead, according to Palestinian authorities, a day after the government laid total siege on the Hamas-held Gaza Strip. The Israeli army has announced it has retrieved the bodies of 1,500 Hamas fighters.</em></p>
<p><em>Are we heading for all-out war? Can Israel defeat Hamas militarily, and vice versa? Will <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-netanyahu-facing-off-against-the-supreme-court-and-proposing-to-limit-judicial-independence-and-3-other-threats-to-israeli-democracy-197096">the far-right government of Benyamin Netanyahu</a> open up to the left to form a cabinet of national unity, and if so, with what consequences?</em></p>
<p><em>Samy Cohen, an emeritus researcher at Sciences Po, President of the French Association for Israel Studies (AFEIL) and author of many books on the Middle East, including “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32273/chapter-abstract/268473458?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Doves Among Hawks: Struggles of the Israeli Peace Movements</a>” in English and most recently <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/en/content/israel-fragile-democracy-interview-samy-cohen">“Israël, une démocratie fragile”</a> (“Israel, a fragile democracy”) sat down with The Conversation France’s International affairs’ editor, Grégory Rayko, to provide some answers.</em></p>
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<h2>Grégory Rayko: Why did the Hamas attack take Israel by surprise?</h2>
<p>Samy Cohen: On the Israeli side, there were flaws at two levels. Firstly, there was an intelligence failure. Until now, Israel’s internal security services, the <a href="https://www.shabak.gov.il/en">Shabak</a>, was very well informed about the situation in the Gaza Strip. Obviously, recently, it no longer had any sources within Hamas. Its blindness is no less astonishing. For example, journalists had reported in recent months that many Hamas militants regularly went out to train on motorbikes, and even learned to fly light aircraft; and yet the Israeli services saw nothing of it. This is a major flaw for which they will have to answer one day.</p>
<p>But it did not occur in a vacuum. Very often, intelligence failures are due to failures in the country’s political-military conception. Take the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago. The Israeli intelligence services had a lot of information indicating that Egypt was about to attack.</p>
<p>But the political leaders did not want to believe it because they were caught up in a completely defective strategic narrative, according to which Egypt was far too weak to dare to attack. In the same way, for several years now, the politico-strategic narrative has somehow trickled down to the world of intelligence: This narrative, defended for years by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, asserted that Hamas did not present a major danger to Israel and that it was necessary to preserve its presence in the Gaza Strip in order to convince Israeli society and the international community that there was no partner for peace since Palestinian society was fractured between Hamas on the one hand and Fatah on the other.</p>
<p>For Netanyahu and the entire Israeli right, the scarecrow of Hamas was a kind of insurance against any international pressure. Netanyahu even said one day that it was in Israel’s interest for Hamas to continue. To this end, he allowed money to be paid to Hamas, he authorised some 20,000 Gazans to go and work in Israel, and thus to bring money into the Gaza Strip so that life under Hamas would be at least liveable there.</p>
<p>The intelligence services were imbued with this vision, according to which Hamas was not a real threat. Moreover, a short while ago, Tzachi Hanegbi, head of the National Security Council, a body that advises the prime minister, and who is close to Netanyahu, declared that Hamas was not keen to resume hostilities. In short, the intelligence services fell asleep, but to a large extent this can be explained by the government’s stance – and it should be added that for months now the prime minister has been concentrating almost exclusively on his fight to take control of the Supreme Court, which was an absolute priority for him – at least until 7 October.</p>
<h2>Once the Hamas attack was launched, its fighters were able to advance fairly easily into Israeli territory, killing hundreds of people and taking <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/world/middleeast/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">at least 150 hostages</a></h2>
<p>Because the army units around Gaza were woefully inadequate. Why? Because they were in the West Bank. For two years, the Israeli government has been steadily tightening security in the settlements. It’s true that there has been an upsurge in attacks on the West Bank; but the explanation lies mainly in the fact that there are now representatives of the West Bank settlers in the government, starting with the Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, who are demanding that the army provide security for these settlers, who are their loyal electorate – to the detriment of the populations living near the Gaza Strip, who vote in a much more heterogeneous way and are therefore not considered to be a priority electorate.</p>
<p>In short, the combination of blind intelligence, due to the vision of the country’s leaders, and the absence of troops around the Strip allowed this assault to take place with the human toll that we know.</p>
<h2>Netanyahu has said that he wants to form a government of national unity</h2>
<p>It will be complicated. The former prime minister and leader of the opposition, Yair Lapid, has requested that ultra-religious elements leave in exchange for his entry into government. But can Netanyahu manage without them? It is far from certain. As we speak, he has donned the costume of a warlord and is flexing his muscles, claiming that he is going to destroy Hamas.</p>
<h2>Is that possible?</h2>
<p>No. This is pure political rhetoric, not reality. Hamas is not an army that can be defeated on the battlefield and surrendered to. It is a highly decentralised paramilitary organisation whose fighters, who hide in tunnels, are very difficult to flush out. The Israeli air force will not be enough.</p>
<p>To achieve this, it would be necessary to enter Gaza with tanks and thousands of men, and there would be many victims on both sides, among Gazan civilians and Israeli soldiers alike. To which we must add another factor: the hostages…</p>
<h2>What are Hamas going to do with all the hostages it has taken in Gaza? Does it intend to exchange them for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel?</h2>
<p>At the moment, Hamas has no interest in negotiating the release of the hostages. Just imagine, hypothetically, that the movement were to obtain the release of all its prisoners currently in Israeli jails, and release the Israeli hostages it is holding. It would then lose a formidable human shield. Israel could then launch a massive attack on the Gaza Strip, without fear of causing the death of its own citizens in the process.</p>
<p>There might be negotiations, but not for a very long time. In the meantime, these hostages will no doubt be scattered all over Gaza, forcing the army to be extremely careful every time it decides to bomb an area.</p>
<h2>The Israeli-Palestinian peace process was already moribund; are we now looking at the final nail in the coffin?</h2>
<p>But the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been dead for a long time, at least since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/world/middleeast/17olmert.html">Ehud Olmert’s two-state peace plan in 2007</a>. Now we’re no longer hammering the last nail in the coffin; we’re throwing the coffin into the sea. In other words, the very subject of peace has disappeared. What we are seeing today is that even the most moderate Israeli population no longer believes in the possibility of peace. They have seen the images of the massacres of civilians committed by Hamas on 7 October, and they have seen Palestinians on the West Bank loudly celebrating the carnage.</p>
<p>A friend of mine, who lives in the south of Israel, near the Gaza Strip, has been a tireless campaigner for the peace camp for decades; this morning she gave an interview to a website in which she said: “I can’t talk about peace any more.” If even such committed people give up, you can imagine the state of the rest of society. We’re in for some very dark years. There will be no turning back.</p>
<h2>What future do you see for Benyamin Netanyahu?</h2>
<p>He bears huge responsibility for this. He thought that by establishing diplomatic relations with several countries in the Arab world – even though, for decades, all observers had been saying that there would be no Arab-Israeli normalisation without a solution to the Palestinian question – he had shown that Palestine was finally no longer an issue. But Palestine has come back to centrestage in an outburst of appalling violence, making it impossible for Saudi Arabia to continue moving toward a rapprochement with Israel.</p>
<p>However, given the trauma experienced by Israel on 7-8 October, one can’t be sure that Netanyahu will lose power any time soon. He had lost popularity in recent months because of his stance on the Supreme Court case. This loss of popularity also impacted upon the support of his ultra-religious allies, and benefited above all Benny Gantz’s National Unity Party, which has been leading the polls for months and could join the government in the near future.</p>
<p>Note that neither Gantz nor former Prime Minister Yair Lapid has called for Netanyahu’s immediate departure. They know that such a demand would be unpopular because it would be perceived as going in the direction of Hamas, since it would be a weakening of Israeli power following the attacks of 7 October. In short, Netanyahu is here to stay, and so is Hamas, and it is very difficult to find reasons for optimism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samy Cohen ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Rarely has been the prospect of peace between Israelis and Palestinians seem so remote.Samy Cohen, Directeur de recherche émérite (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131062023-09-13T12:49:58Z2023-09-13T12:49:58ZSaudi Arabia’s football spending spree is just the start of a long game plan<p>Football in Saudi Arabia has had a busy and expensive summer. When the transfer window of its top tier closed in early September, it had spent a record <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/saudi-spending-transfer-window-second-only-premier-league-2023-09-08/">£767 million</a> recruiting squad members from the world’s top football clubs.</p>
<p>This was <a href="https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/2d3b5b32c3b965b9/original/International-Transfer-Snapshot-September-2023.pdf">more than</a> each of the top leagues in France (£687m), Germany (£609m), Italy (£568m) and Spain (£324m). And it has <a href="https://www.economist.com/culture/2023/07/14/how-saudi-clubs-are-disrupting-european-football">sparked fears</a> that the huge funds available to Saudi clubs could harm the quality and status of European football, for some big names have accepted lucrative offers to head to the Middle East. </p>
<p>Since the statement <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2023/1/19/what-does-ronaldos-signing-for-al-nassr-mean-for-saudi-arabia">signing of Cristiano Ronaldo</a> in January 2023, players including Sadio Mané (who left Bayern Munich), Riyad Mahrez (Manchester City) and Neymar (Paris Saint-Germain) <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2023-06-22/what-premier-league-stars-going-to-saudi-arabia-means-for-the-domestic-game">have followed</a>.</p>
<p>For its part, Saudi Arabia is clear about its intentions – <a href="https://worldsoccertalk.com/news/saudi-arabia-soccer-revolution-20230716-WST-443009.html">it wants</a> the Saudi Pro League to become one of the best leagues in the world. And for that to happen it needs to attract the best players, who bring fans as well as skills. </p>
<p>So does all this spending really pose a threat to the European football business model? </p>
<p>The Premier League CEO, Richard Masters, certainly <a href="https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/premier-league-chief-insists-saudi-arabia-not-threat-1718390">appears relaxed</a> about the situation. And research has shown that football clubs tend to be more <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14660970.2022.2059858">resilient to economic changes</a> than other industries. </p>
<p>The summer transfer window of 2023 was a case in point. While other economic sectors continue to suffer the effects of high inflation and rising interest rates, the top end of English football appeared immune to economic worries. </p>
<p>Spending in the Premier League reached a new high of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/sports/soccer/premier-league-clubs-spend-record-236-billion-pounds-transfer-window-2023-09-02/">£2.36 billion</a>, up from <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/records-smashed-in-transfer-window-deloitte-reports-highest-ever-premier-league-spend.html?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email">£1.9 billion last year</a>. And out of the 20 most expensive global transfers, 12 <a href="https://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/transfers/saisontransfers/statistik/top/plus/0/galerie/0?saison_id=2023&transferfenster=sommertransfers&land_id=&ausrichtung=&spielerposition_id=&altersklasse=&leihe=">were in England</a>. (The Saudi Pro League had three.)</p>
<p>In fact, Saudi Arabia’s spending spree has actually provided the elite European clubs with a welcome business opportunity. Financial regulation rules (both <a href="https://resources.premierleague.com/premierleague/document/2023/08/31/132475d9-6ce7-48f3-b168-0d9f234c995a/PL_Handbook_2023-24_DIGITAL_29.08.23.pdf">national</a> and <a href="https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/news/0274-14da0ce4535d-fa5b130ae9b6-1000--explainer-uefa-s-new-financial-sustainability-regulations/">European</a>) mean the top sides need to sell players that are deemed surplus to requirements before they can buy any new players to strengthen the team. </p>
<p>The problem with this arrangement was that high <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1178214/Research_report_-_Assessing_the_financial_sustainability_of_football__2023_.pdf">transfer fees and wages</a> could <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1071503/Assessing_the_financial_sustainability_of_football__web_accessible_.pdf">only be paid</a> by a small group of other top clubs. The market for expensive unwanted players was extremely limited. </p>
<p>Now the Saudi Pro League has come charging in, and European clubs have some new and very wealthy customers. And because these Saudi clubs are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/aug/12/its-not-a-fad-the-truth-behind-saudi-arabias-dizzying-investment-in-sport">part of a political project</a>, there is an extra willingness to buy.</p>
<p>In the short term then, European clubs have been presented with a new market which can afford to buy up their unwanted players – and not compete with them in domestic or European competitions. </p>
<p>So perhaps it’s not surprising that many in football don’t consider the influx of Saudi cash to be a problem. As Uefa’s president, Aleksander Ceferin, <a href="https://www.lequipe.fr/Football/Article/Aleksander-ceferin-president-de-l-uefa-mbappe-et-haaland-ne-revent-pas-d-arabie-saoudite/1416813">has commented</a>: “It’s not a threat, we saw a similar approach in China.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/uefa-ceferin-saudi-pro-league-threat-champions-league-rubiales/">He added</a>: “They bought players at the end of their careers by offering them a lot of money. Chinese football didn’t develop and didn’t qualify for the World Cup afterwards.”</p>
<p>But there are differences to what happened with the <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Improving-communication-effects-and-value-in-an-of-Huang-Brewer/cc6f181ccd174580c0ba083715c166b3f1c234b0">Chinese Super League</a> (and in Major League Soccer <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1059601110383405">in the US</a>) in the past. </p>
<p>In Saudi Arabia, there is a lot more money being invested. And there is considerable political backing amid an urgent need for Saudi Arabia to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabias-sports-binge-seeks-economic-dividend/a-65566508">diversify its economy</a> away from oil and gas. </p>
<p>Nor are the Saudi clubs just targeting players at the end of their careers. Some of those who moved this summer will expect to have many years of football ahead of them. And a project where not just players, but <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2023-06-22/what-premier-league-stars-going-to-saudi-arabia-means-for-the-domestic-game">also managers</a> in their prime, are recruited successfully cannot be ignored.</p>
<h2>Screen time</h2>
<p>A key measure of Saudi Arabia’s tactics will be whether the world’s major broadcasters take an interest in the league’s matches. Broadcasting income is
<a href="https://www.logos-verlag.de/cgi-bin/engpapermid?doi=10.30819/iss.44-1.05&lng=eng&id=">a vital element</a> of the game for elite clubs, but broadcasters can only pay to cover a certain number of events.</p>
<p>At the moment, the sporting calendar is already pretty full, so there are limited funds and airtime to offer new leagues. For now, this suits the well-established, leagues which have contracts and airtime nailed down. </p>
<p>But interests change, and so does broadcasting, with streamers like Amazon, Apple and Disney+ all <a href="https://www.digitaltveurope.com/2022/11/09/netflix-explores-live-sports-rights-according-to-reports/#:%7E:text=The%20news%20that%20Netflix%20is%20looking%20at%20sport,that%20Amazon%20established%20its%20foothold%20in%20the%20genre.">providing live sport</a> to subscribers. </p>
<p>And if the first stage of the Saudi Pro League’s game plan was to sign up some of Europe’s top players and managers, the next step may well be to secure valuable broadcasting deals and air time. </p>
<p>If that works, competing for sponsorship income could follow. At the moment, there are a limited number of companies worldwide which are willing and able to sponsor the most popular clubs and leagues. The elite clubs, with their <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844023026816">global market recognition</a>, can attract sponsors easily. </p>
<p>But the larger the pool of elite clubs becomes, the more competitive the market. If the Saudi Pro League clubs develop a global fan base, European clubs could face stiffer competition for sponsorship funds. </p>
<p>For now though, the Saudi league has plenty of funds of its own – and is more than willing to spend them. If that continues for many more transfer windows, European football clubs may understandably start to feel a bit more defensive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christina Philippou is affiliated with the RAF FA and is an education consultant for the Premier League.</span></em></p>The new market has helped some Premier League clubs to balance their books.Christina Philippou, Principal Lecturer, Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105372023-09-05T12:31:07Z2023-09-05T12:31:07ZSaudi reforms are softening Islam’s role, but critics warn the kingdom will still take a hard line against dissent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545381/original/file-20230829-17-2c62j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C8%2C1762%2C1183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHistoryofSuccession/9eb082a3e58543aea3bc012814e60aad/photo?Query=saudi%20arabia%20mbs&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=25&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin, pool, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, or “MBS,” is bringing a new vision of a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476">moderate, balanced”</a> Saudi Islam by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/world/middleeast/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia.html">minimizing the role of Saudi religious institutions</a> once seen as critical to the monarchy. </p>
<p>For decades, Saudi kings provided support to religious scholars and institutions that advocated an austere form of Sunni Islam known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabism</a>. The kingdom enforced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047586.005">strict codes of morality</a>, placing restrictions on the rights of women and religious minorities, among others. </p>
<p>Under MBS, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html">women have been allowed to drive</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-police.html">co-educational classrooms</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/12/12/Saudis-welcome-decision-to-allow-public-cinemas">movie theaters</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/middleeast/saudi-arabia-biggest-rave-mime-intl/index.html">all-night concerts</a> in the desert – in which men and women dance together – are a new normal. </p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1663">Yasmine Farouk</a> and <a href="https://politicalscience.columbian.gwu.edu/nathan-j-brown">Nathan J. Brown</a> call the diminishing role of Wahhabi religious scholars within Saudi domestic and international policy nothing short of a “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/07/saudi-arabia-s-religious-reforms-are-touching-nothing-but-changing-everything-pub-84650">revolution</a>” in Saudi affairs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">MBS acknowledges</a> that these reforms risk infuriating certain constituents or could even provoke retaliation. As a scholar who studies <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/and-god-knows-the-martyrs-9780190092153?cc=us&lang=en&">interpretations of Islamic law</a> to justify or contest militancy, I’ve followed these reforms closely.</p>
<p>In the past, Saudis who challenged the authority of Wahhabis have provoked unrest. When King Fahd, who ruled between 1982-2005, rejected the advice of his Wahhabi scholars and allowed the U.S. military to station weapons and female service members on Saudi soil, several of them <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439">supported a violent insurrection</a> against him.</p>
<p>MBS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/">seems unconcerned</a> with such challenges. In an interview broadcast widely throughout the kingdom, MBS <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">chastised Wahhabi scholars</a>, accusing some of falsifying Islamic doctrines. He then detained a major Wahhabi scholar <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/middleeast/saudi-cleric-sheikh-salman-al-awda-intl/index.html">from whom he once sought counsel</a>, charging him with crimes against the monarchy. MBS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476#:%7E:text=Prince%20Mohammed%20defended%20the%20reforms,to%20live%20a%20normal%20life.">defended these actions</a>, claiming, “We are returning to what we were before. A country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe.”</p>
<h2>Negotiating Wahhabism</h2>
<p>This proclaimed return of “moderate Islam” echoes the reforms of MBS’s grandfather, King Abdulaziz, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511993510.008">founder of the modern Saudi kingdom</a>. This vision rejects policies toward Wahhabi Islam favored by his uncles, King Faisal and King Khalid.</p>
<p>Between 1925 and 1932, Abdulaziz suppressed Wahhabi scholars and militants who had demanded that he uphold <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9780691241609/wahhabism">their version of “pure Islam”</a> and not open the kingdom to trade and development. He did the opposite and asserted the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<p>The booming Saudi oil economy developed by Abdulaziz required his son, King Faisal, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, to <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">reconsider the monarchy’s relationship</a> with Wahhabism. Unlike Abdulaziz, Faisal believed Wahhabis would help him save the kingdom.</p>
<p>Saudis who felt left behind in the emerging Saudi oil economy had found an inspirational symbol of liberation in Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who helped overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and implemented plans to redistribute Egyptian wealth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">Faisal encouraged</a> Wahhabi scholars to work with politically driven Islamists to reject the revolutionary politics of Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and craft a new vision of Islam for Saudi youth.</p>
<p>Faisal permitted Wahhabi scholars to reform Saudi educational institutions with their conservative Islamic curriculum. Abroad, Faisal’s scholars presented Wahhabism as <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25998">an authentic Islamic alternative</a> to the Cold War ideologies of the U.S. and USSR. Wealthy Saudis, these Wahhabi scholars argued, had a religious duty to promote Wahhabism across the globe.</p>
<h2>Resisting Wahhabism</h2>
<p>Faisal’s reforms met with success. King Khalid, who followed Faisal, continued to favor Wahhabi scholars, particularly while responding to two major challenges in 1979. </p>
<p>A group of Saudi students, who believed Faisal’s and Khalid’s reforms to be illegitimate, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred site, for two weeks in 1979. An attack on the Grand Mosque was viewed as an attack on the monarchy itself, which claims the mantle of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph showing smoke rising above the minarets of a mosque with other buildings in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-dated-november-1979-of-burning-meccas-great-mosque-news-photo/51398174?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The seizure came to a violent end with combined action by French and Saudi military forces. Afterward, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/25/inside-the-kingdom-robert-lacey-book-review">Khalid agreed</a> to elevate religious officials who affirmed the Islamic credentials of the monarchy.</p>
<p>Also in 1979, other Saudi youth traveled to join the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One such Saudi who answered the call that year was Osama bin Laden, who would establish al-Qaida in 1988. </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s and al-Qaida’s grievances against the monarchy emerged following King Fahd’s acceptance of an increased deployment of U.S. soldiers to Saudi soil following Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/1952-messages-to-the-world">Bin Ladin proclaimed</a> the presence of American infidels in Saudi Arabia to be a defilement of Islamic holy lands, an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439.003">affront</a>” to Islamic sensibilities, and demanded the destruction of the monarchy. Al-Qaida launched anti-Saudi insurgent campaigns lasting through 2010.</p>
<p>Not all conservative Islamist leaders called for violence. As historian <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/people/madawi-al-rasheed">Madawi Al-Rasheed</a> notes, many Saudi scholars <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/muted-modernists/">framed themselves as reformers</a> who sought to correct Fahd’s departures from “authentic” Islam and restore Faisal’s vision.</p>
<p>When MBS speaks of a “moderate Islam” he is not just condemning the violence of al-Qaida. He’s abandoning the monarchy’s accommodations of the Wahhabi establishment. He <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">blames some Wahhabi scholars</a> for the violence that the monarchy faced in 1979 and again in the the 1990s and 2000s. </p>
<p>He has worked quickly to erase those accommodations and, like his grandfather, affirm the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<h2>A ‘moderate Wahhabism’ for Saudi society?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man, wearing a headdress, walking past a display sign of 'Vision 2030.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Saudi Vision 2030’ aims to bring a complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these revolutionary changes occurred amid the 2016 unveiling of “Saudi Vision 2030,” a plan for complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation. MBS believes that this will meet the demands of Saudis under the age of 30 – who <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/fuller20030601.pdf">number more than 60%</a> of the kingdom’s population.</p>
<p>The religious curriculum shaped by King Faisal is gone, replaced with a “Saudi first” education, which <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-saudi-founding-day-and-the-death-of-wahhabism/">removes Ibn abd al-Wahhab</a>, the founder of Wahhabism, from textbooks and emphasizes Saudi patriotism over a Wahhabi Islamic religious identity. Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200125-saudi-arabia-to-stop-funding-mosques-in-foreign-countries/">has announced it will no longer fund</a> mosques and Wahhabi educational institutions in other countries.</p>
<p>Saudi religious police, once tasked with upholding public morality, saw their <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64501">powers curtailed</a>. They no longer have powers of investigation or arrest. They cannot punish behaviors deemed morally inappropriate.</p>
<p>Critics remain unimpressed, noting that demoting religious officials does not diminish the violence of the Saudi state. Religious police continue their online surveillance of social media. In 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/06/read-jamal-khashoggis-columns-for-the-washington-post/">following his calls</a> for a continued voice for Islamist reformers in Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/women-saudi-arabia-make-gains-overall-rights-remain-issue-n838296">Al-Rasheed argues</a> that the images of a new Saudi society conceal suppression of Saudi reformers. Some observers note that a growing Saudi “<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/01/08/many-saudis-are-seething-at-muhammad-bin-salmans-reforms">surveillance state</a>,” with capacities to peek into the private lives of Saudis, underwrites these reforms. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://schar.gmu.edu/profiles/pmandavi">Peter Mandaville</a>, a scholar of international affairs, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/BbxJAWvM1tc">observes, the “moderate Islam” offered by MBS is complicated</a>. On the one hand, it characterizes a new tolerant Saudi Arabian Islam. Yet, inside the kingdom, Mandaville argues that the “moderate Islam” of MBS demands that Saudi youth – as good Muslims – will submit to the authority of the monarchy over the kingdom’s affairs.</p>
<p>Some observers believe this might not be enough. <a href="https://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty-staff/full-time-faculty/mohammad-fadel">Mohammad Fadel</a>, a professor of Islamic legal history, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-arabia-mbs-religious-reform-incoherent-modernism">argues that the current configuration of the Saudi monarchy is incompatible</a> with “the kind of independent thought the crown prince is calling for in matters of religion.” Saudi society will flourish, he adds, “when Prince Mohammed recognizes the right of Muslims to rule themselves politically.”</p>
<p>With these reforms to Wahhabism, MBS hopes to secure the loyalty of a generation of young Saudis. As Saudi history would indicate, however, such a bargain requires constant renegotiation and renewal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nathan French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who has closely followed reforms that MBS has made to Wahhabism, an austere form of Islam, explains the changes taking place in the Saudi kingdom and their impact.Nathan French, Associate Professor of Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112592023-08-24T21:45:32Z2023-08-24T21:45:32ZSaudi Arabia’s Pro League is taking advantage of football’s greed and inequality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543801/original/file-20230821-30852-p3z0qm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C45%2C3348%2C2203&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jordan Henderson is one of several big-name footballers who have moved to the Saudi Pro League.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Rui Vieira)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/saudi-arabias-pro-league-is-taking-advantage-of-footballs-greed-and-inequality" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>For Liverpool supporters like me, Jordan Henderson was one of football’s good guys. He was the club captain who <a href="https://www.liverpoolfc.com/news/first-team/423102-jordan-henderson-becomes-nhs-charities-together-champion">fundraised for the UK’s National Health Service</a> during the COVID-19 pandemic and <a href="https://www.liverpoolfc.com/news/jordan-henderson-voices-support-rainbow-laces-campaign">vocally supported Liverpool’s LGBTQ+ community</a>.</p>
<p>However, in July 2023, after 12 years at Liverpool, Henderson left for Al-Ettifaq, a club from the Pro League in Saudi Arabia, where same-sex relationships are criminalized. Henderson’s weekly wage at Al-Ettifaq is <a href="https://www.sportsnet.ca/premier-league/article/liverpool-great-jordan-henderson-heads-to-saudi-arabia-to-join-al-ettifaq/">reportedly US$900,000</a> — triple what he earned at Liverpool, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/lists/soccer-valuations/?sh=4575f88e198b">the world’s fourth richest club</a>.</p>
<p>Some have labelled Saudi Arabia’s investment in football as <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/what-is-sportswashing-pga-golf_l_647f717de4b0a7554f473efc">sportswashing</a>. This describes a government’s attempt to launder its domestic and international reputation through sport. It’s often associated with Gulf states like Qatar, which hosted the 2022 World Cup, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.</p>
<p>Henderson isn’t the only footballer following the money. Some of football’s biggest names now call the Saudi Pro League home. Cristiano Ronaldo got the ball rolling, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/30/cristiano-ronaldo-signs-with-saudi-arabian-club-al-nassr-for-reported-record-breaking-salary.html">signing for Al-Nassr in December</a>. He’s been joined by <a href="https://www.espn.com/soccer/story/_/id/37633039/karim-benzema-ballon-dor-win-fulfills-lifelong-dream">the current Ballon d’Or holder, Karim Benzema</a>, who left Real Madrid for Al-Ittihad. Liverpool star Mohamed Salah has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2023/8/24/liverpools-mohamed-salah-agrees-deal-with-saudi-club-al-ittihad">reportedly agreed to move to Al-Ittihad</a>, however Liverpool have thus far not accepted a deal. </p>
<p>Brazil’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2023/8/15/brazils-neymar-signs-for-saudi-football-club-al-hilal">Neymar signed for Al Hilal</a> from Paris Saint-Germain (PSG). <a href="https://www.cbssports.com/soccer/news/kylian-mbappe-transfer-saudi-side-al-hilal-offer-huge-332-million-fee-776-million-wage-for-psg-superstar/">Al Hilal also offered PSG US$332 million for French superstar Kylian Mbappé</a>.</p>
<p>Al Hilal’s bid for Mbappé would have smashed the world transfer record; however <a href="https://www.sportingnews.com/ca/soccer/news/kylian-mbappe-reject-saudi-arabia-contract-al-hilal-psg/beqcltvpr8kgi02rlddzhvym">Mbappé rejected the move</a>. So did one of the world’s best-known footballers, Lionel Messi. He chose to move to Inter Miami in the United States rather than accept a US$1.6 billion deal to join Al Hilal. But Messi will still earn US$25 million over the next three years as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/aug/15/lionel-messi-saudi-arabia-tourism-deal-mls-inter-miami">tourism ambassador for Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<h2>Money outpacing morality</h2>
<p>Via its Public Investment Fund (PIF), <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/revealed-saudi-arabia-6bn-spend-on-sportswashing">the Saudi monarchy has spent US$6.3 billion on sport since 2021</a>. This includes buying English football club <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/07/saudi-wealth-fund-buys-englands-newcastle-united-soccer-team.html">Newcastle United</a> and creating <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/liv-golf-saudi-arabia-pga.html">LIV Golf</a>.</p>
<p>But there’s another aspect to the Pro League story. A super-rich newcomer is buying influence in a game whose profit-driven stakeholders, like FIFA, have faced repeated <a href="https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/f0245071165bcbc/original/wnr43dgn3yysafypuq8r-pdf.pdf">corruption scandals</a>. The wealth and ambition of the Saudi project challenges Europe’s stranglehold on world football. But it’s the logical next step for a sport where money has outpaced morality.</p>
<p>Sport is key to <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/">Vision 2030</a>, Saudi Arabia’s US$7 trillion project to diversify the country’s global image and oil-dependent economy. The Saudi monarchy wants to host the 2030 or 2034 World Cup. It’s pouring money into boxing, Formula 1 racing, golf and football.</p>
<p>In 2023, PIF took majority ownership of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/samindrakunti/2023/06/06/saudi-soccer-bonanza-public-investment-fund-backs-four-domestic-clubs-to-grow-game-and-influence/?sh=16dbbbef34f4">four Saudi clubs</a>, Al-Ahli, Al-Ittihad, Al Hilal and Al-Nassr. Ronaldo’s annual salary at Al-Nassr (US$200 million) makes him <a href="https://www.marca.com/en/football/2023/03/03/64023c3122601dde0e8b45b9.html">the world’s highest-paid footballer</a>.</p>
<p>Money talks, and sportswashing often works. Human Rights Watch recently reported that Saudi border guards <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-66545787">killed hundreds of migrants</a> along the Kingdom’s border with Yemen. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/yemen">A Saudi-led military coalition has been accused of war crimes in the same neighbouring country</a>. The Saudi government <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/06/khashoggi-killing-un-human-rights-expert-says-saudi-arabia-responsible">was responsible</a> for the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia/report-saudi-arabia/">Amnesty International has documented the Kingdom’s many human rights abuses</a>, from its use of the death penalty to its treatment of migrant workers and protesters. </p>
<p>All that is unlikely to matter to many Newcastle supporters. Success on the pitch matters more than the politics of the club’s owners.</p>
<h2>A league that’s here to stay?</h2>
<p>As with Qatar’s World Cup, the Saudi Pro League has provoked genuine ethical concerns. However, many in the Gulf states also point to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/25/world/middleeast/qatar-world-cup-criticism.html">hypocrisy of Western criticisms</a> that highlight human rights abuses elsewhere, while ignoring problems closer to home.</p>
<p>There is a neo-colonial element to the dismissal of Saudi ambitions that reflects Europe’s long dominance of world football. Football is highly popular in Saudi Arabia and much of the Middle East, so why can’t a league there rival the English Premier League or Spain’s La Liga?</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia wouldn’t be the first place where an authoritarian government has enriched domestic competition with overseas talent. <a href="https://www.threemonkeysonline.com/football-and-fascism-the-creation-of-italys-serie-a/">Mussolini did it with Italy’s Serie A in the 1920s</a>. China’s government did it with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4c597b6e-c983-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44">the Super League after 2004</a>.</p>
<p>Henderson might have disappointed Liverpool fans, but focusing on a single footballer misses the point. Vast networks support Saudi sportswashing. Chelsea Football Club, once owned by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, is now 60 per cent owned by <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/chelsea-saudi-pif-transfer-controversy-30269528">Clearlake Capital</a>, a PIF-backed investment firm.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/may/24/government-did-encourage-premier-league-to-approve-saudi-newcastle-takeover">Boris Johnson’s Conservative government approved of PIF’s ownership of Newcastle United</a>. Meanwhile U.K. weapons are sold to Saudi Arabia for use in the civil war in Yemen, which <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">the UN estimates has killed 377,000 people</a>.</p>
<p>The problem with the Saudi league isn’t the league alone, or the unpleasant regime that bankrolls it. The problem is football and the economic structures that underpin it.</p>
<p>Football’s vulnerability to sportswashing tells us a lot about how and for whom the world’s most popular sport is run. It’s not for the supporters, smaller leagues or most players. It’s for unaccountable states, corporations and individuals.</p>
<p>There’s a history of upstart competitions briefly challenging football’s status quo, from <a href="https://www.footballparadise.com/el-dorado/">Colombia’s El Dorado league</a> in the late 1940s to the Chinese Super League. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2023/aug/12/saudi-pro-league-insists-it-will-soon-be-for-exceptional-players-only">The Saudi Pro League looks likely to have more staying power</a>.</p>
<p>Many might be unnerved by Saudi Arabia’s involvement in sport. However, the Saudi authorities are following the example set by football’s governing organizations. They just have more money to exploit the greed and inequality that has seeped into football’s DNA.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211259/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Money talks, and sportswashing often works. Some of football’s biggest names now call the Saudi Pro League home.Alan McDougall, Professor of History, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119482023-08-24T13:10:35Z2023-08-24T13:10:35ZSudan’s future is being shaped by guns and money – like its past<p>Like most contemporary wars, Sudan’s war cannot be reduced to a contest between <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">two sides</a>. It is many other things, among them a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep19226.5.pdf">gun class</a> of constantly shifting coalitions of specialists in violence and political trading that prey on civilians. Sudan’s peripheries have long been a lawless arena of <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137338242_10">brutal exploitation of people and natural resources</a> by a military-commercial complex. Now the whole country is their canvas.</p>
<p>Four months after the fighting began, neither the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has won a decisive victory on the battlefield. That should surprise no-one. Never has a Sudanese war ended that way.</p>
<p>Sudan’s current war began on 15 April when the country’s most energetic and capable politician, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, tried to seize power. Despite scrupulous planning and tactical skill, the coup failed to eliminate the command of the SAF, including its chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. </p>
<p>Even if the RSF does ultimately succeed in controlling the capital, it has failed politically: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/7/sudan-residents-describe-looting-evictions-by-rsf">RSF atrocities</a> —- looting, killings, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2023/8/14/dont-let-the-other-soldiers-watch-rape-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-sudan">rape</a> —- turned its battlefield advances into public relations disasters. </p>
<p>The fight began as a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-descent-chaos">mobster shootout</a> over which soldier-business cartel would run Sudan. But the two bosses are losing their grip. Hemedti appears to be physically incapacitated and has shown none of the populist energy that allowed him to set a political agenda. Trying to dispel rumours that he was dead or in intensive care, the RSF <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eLKYBYTw0-U">released a video of patched together clips</a>, in which Hemedti stood, stiff and pallid, speaking for just 11 seconds.</p>
<p>Al-Burhan has emerged from his bunker and been more visible, but hardly more coherent. He is nominal head of a fractious cabal of generals and financiers, many of them old-guard Islamists from the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir.</p>
<p>I have been a scholar of Sudan for four decades. During 2005-06, I was seconded to the African Union mediation team for Darfur and from 2009-13 served as senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, during negotiations over the independence of South Sudan and its aftermath. My most recent <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/event/sudans-unfinished-democracy-w-justin-lynch-and-alex-de-waal/">book</a>, co-authored with Willow Berridge, Justin Lynch and Raga Makawi, tells the story of the civic revolution of 2019 and why it failed.</p>
<p>Looking at Sudan’s war in the context of the history of the Sudanese state and its wars, it’s reverting to type. It’s not an exact replica of earlier wars but if history doesn’t repeat itself, it rhymes. A cabal of generals and Islamist powerbrokers, who prospered under the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir, are managing to secure recognition as the government. But their state has even more limited territorial control and weaker institutions than before, while peripheral mode of paramilitary governance – exemplified by the RSF – is expanding in territory and capability.</p>
<p>The Sudanese state today betrays its history as a plunder state on the margins of the global order. The men contending for power are brokers in this extractive system, not statebuilders. For this reason, current efforts at finding a compromise between al-Burhan and Hemedti are no more than a square peg for a multi-sided hole. </p>
<h2>Sudan’s political marketplace</h2>
<p>The alliance of civilian forces along with some army generals in the SAF, and the majority of African and western nations, aspired for a transition to an institutionalised and democratic state following the overthrow of Al-Bashir. But on the eve of the August 2019 constitutional declaration, I wrote a paper <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf">whose pessimistic summary</a> was at odds with the optimism of that moment. </p>
<p>It was my view that the issues under negotiation at the time <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf#page=24">did not include</a> the real structures of power in the country. I saw the major question not as instituting democracy but whether Hemedti —- the dominant political entrepreneur —- could take power himself and secure an accommodation with the other political-military businesses or whether there would be an establishment counter-coup. </p>
<p>I also <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2019/07/Sudan-A-political-market-place-analysis-final-20190731.pdf#page=2">argued</a> that because Hemedti’s model was not sustainable, the most likely scenario was an acceleration of the trend towards an unregulated and violent ‘political marketplace’ and ‘paramilitary governance.</p>
<p>In the event, Hemedti compromised with the SAF. First, he agreed to al-Burhan taking the chair of the collective presidency, known as the Sovereignty Council, and later with the coup in October 2021. Such collusion was workable as long as security sector hierarchies were left unresolved. But the politics of delay ran out of road with the provision in the <a href="https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Framework-Agreement-Final-ENG-05122022.pdf">December 2022 Framework Agreement</a> that required the absorption of the RSF under SAF command. So Hemedti made his move.</p>
<p>Instead of capturing the state, Hemedti destroyed it. In the continuing war, battlefield losses and gains are less important than material capacity. Most important are the political funds of the bosses of each belligerent coalition. Now as earlier, the SAF has had more material overall but the RSF has more disposable political income, which matters more.</p>
<h2>The square peg</h2>
<p>In the early weeks of the war, American and Saudi mediators pushed a straightforward cessation of hostilities between the Sudanese forces. It was a justifiable immediate response. Four months on, it is unhelpful.</p>
<p><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/08/03/sudans-next-stop-regional-proxy-war/">The mediation arena is now crowded</a>. The African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development led by Kenya as well as Egypt are all heading initiatives. Each says it is coordinating with the others. Regardless of whether this is sincere or not, the outcome of formal commonality is that all will agree on the simplest possible analysis, a two-sided war. </p>
<p>For Egypt, <a href="https://www.presidency.eg/en/%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/news1372023-2/">the underlying issue is a collapsing or fragmenting state</a>. Just as it correctly feared that the Kenyan-led peace talks twenty years ago would lead to the secession of southern Sudan, today it worries about a failed state with two rival governments that generates millions of refugees.</p>
<p>For Kenya, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-interview/20230623-kenya-president-william-ruto-there-are-already-signs-of-genocide-in-sudan">it’s a blocked transition to democracy</a>. The Americans and Saudis are reviving their joint ceasefire plans, shying away from the question of how a Sudanese state can be made viable. Others, for example the United Arab Emirates, may yet propose new forums or insist on having a role. </p>
<p>The United Nations is missing in action.</p>
<p>In contrast to earlier conflicts in Sudan, national civil society and public intellectuals haven’t shaped a vision for how the country can escape from its death spiral. Nor indeed have African scholars and analysts. Sudanese political scientists have provided rich accounts of their country’s historical dysfunction. It’s time for those analyses to be revived and debated. In the vacuum, Sudan’s future is shaped by guns and money.</p>
<h2>A barebones state</h2>
<p>Thirty years ago, the Islamist minister of finance, Abdel Rahim Hamdi, argued that the central parts of Sudan constituted an economically viable miniature country. The towns and commercial farming schemes within a day’s drive of Khartoum became known as the “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/05/07/3-visualizing-sudan-geographical-inequality/">Hamdi Triangle</a>”. This was a middle-income enclave and the locus of most infrastructure and investment. Hamdi argued that this area could prosper without having to administer the troublesome peripheries of southern Sudan, Darfur and other far-flung areas that served chiefly as labour reserves.</p>
<p>The fruit of this war may be a truncated semi-triangle in eastern Sudan. This would be run like the military-Islamist duopoly of the al-Bashir years, except more brutal and more venal. And, probably, more fractious. Different generals and Islamists have united around al-Burhan as their titular leader but are likely to stick together only as long as the RSF in Khartoum poses an existential threat.</p>
<p>The contest between Hemedti and al-Burhan remains an impasse. Early <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-sudan/">statements from American and Saudi Arabian mediators</a> spoke of the SAF merely as a belligerent, putting it on an equal standing with the RSF. Lately, al-Burhan and his group are now widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-govt-representatives-arrive-jeddah-resume-talks-with-rsf-2023-07-15/">recognised</a> as the Government of Sudan. This is despite the fact that they don’t control the capital city. They administer only their de facto headquarters in Port Sudan and a handful of other cities.</p>
<p>The RSF is the revenge of the cannon fodder against Sudan’s political establishment that was ready to <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap">exploit</a> them when it needed a dirty job done. Its leader, Hemedti, had a populist touch and made opportunistic alliances. His political fortunes rose because he had political energy and money. And because he promised an alternative to the old guard. </p>
<p>But Hemedti’s chameleon-like political stratagems couldn’t conceal the DNA of his political-military business. He is the son of the Janjaweed militias, infamous for their atrocities in the Darfur war of 2003-05. RSF is also a family affair, but none of Hemedti’s deputies – brothers, uncles, cousins – have the charisma and status to replace him.</p>
<p>If the RSF were to prevail, we should expect that the Sudanese government, or remnants thereof, would become a wholly owned subsidiary of the commercial-military-ethnic agenda of the Dagalo family and its most powerful backers. </p>
<p>The contradiction of paramilitary governance is its destructiveness. The RSF modus operandi is to attack and loot everything —- markets, farms, schools, hospitals —- leaving a wasteland. The militiamen drive out the locals but they can sustain themselves only by moving on to new victims. In due course they will run out of cities to pillage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex de Waal is the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.</span></em></p>The Sudanese state today betrays its history as a plunder state on the margins of the global order.Alex De Waal, Research Professor and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110492023-08-07T12:46:48Z2023-08-07T12:46:48ZUkraine war: talks in Jeddah give Kyiv an opportunity to push its ten-point plan to Brics and the global south<p>As the war in Ukraine escalated on and beyond the existing battlefields with intensified <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66419331">air</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66402046">drone</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66383377">ground operations</a>, more than 40 countries met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, over the weekend of August 5-6 2023, to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-calls-jeddah-talks-productive-russia-calls-them-doomed-2023-08-06/">discuss peace</a>. </p>
<p>The talks in Jeddah were the latest effort to rally support behind Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s ten-point peace plan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/we-will-have-fight-longer-liberate-ukrainian-land-says-zelenskiy-2022-11-15/">first presented</a> at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, on November 15 2022. Aimed at mobilising a global and diverse coalition of support, these efforts are not only about bringing this or that particular vision of peace to a war in the heart of Europe. Their deeper significance lies in the continuing shifts in the international order that they reflect.</p>
<p>No breakthrough joint declaration was reached in Jeddah. This is hardly surprising given that some <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/6/7414426/">40 countries participated</a> with very diverse views on the war, its causes and possible solutions. But the fact the meeting was attended, not only by the “usual suspects” among Ukraine’s western partners, but also by four of the five <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brics.asp">Brics members</a> was highly significant. Brazil, India, China and South Africa all sent senior envoys. The fifth member of the bloc, Russia, was not invited.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1688449336546373632"}"></div></p>
<p>The meeting in Jeddah followed an earlier one in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-peace-summit-talks-make-progress-long-way-go-officials-2023-06-26/">Copenhagen</a> at the end of June. Taking place at the same time as Yevgeny Prigozhin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-seriously-weakened-by-wagner-group-mutiny-but-it-was-a-missed-opportunity-for-ukraine-too-208426">ultimately failed mutiny unfolded</a> in Russia, the Copenhagen gathering was a more low-key affair without Chinese participation.</p>
<p>In Jeddah, China not only participated but also <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-ukraine-peace-talks-russia-war-in-saudi-arabia/">sent</a> its Ukraine point man – the special representative of the Chinese government on Eurasian affairs, Li Hui. Li attended <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/doval-in-jeddah-for-2-day-nsa-conference-on-ukraine/article67162395.ece">alongside</a> US national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, and his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval. This is indicative of the importance that China and India – two key Russian allies among Brics – assign to these western-backed Ukrainian efforts to galvanise support for Zelensky’s ten-point plan.</p>
<h2>Russia under pressure</h2>
<p>That China remains engaged in, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/06/china-backs-further-ukraine-peace-talks-saudi-arabia-summit">supports</a>, the continuation of discussions around Ukraine’s plan will be deeply worrying for Russia. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/">plan calls for the</a> restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied Ukrainian lands, and a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes.</p>
<p>In fact, commenting on the Jeddah meeting, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, was only able to <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1657191">express an expectation</a> that “a relevant exchange of views between us and the Brics participants who were there at different levels will be held”. This does not bode well for Russia, which will not be represented by Vladimir Putin, at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-role-as-host-of-the-brics-summit-is-fraught-with-dangers-a-guide-to-who-is-in-the-group-and-why-it-exists-206898">upcoming</a> Brics summit in South Africa. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66247067">Putin</a> is subject to an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134732">arrest warrant</a> issued by the International Criminal Court, which South Africa is bound as a signatory to execute. </p>
<p>Adding further to a sense of continuing marginalisation of Russia, even in formats such as the Brics, Moscow has also been subject to pressure from some of its traditional African allies over the war in Ukraine. An <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-failed-african-peace-mission-underscores-need-for-more-powerful-political-and-military-pressure-on-putin-208162">African peace mission</a> to St Petersburg in June 2023, just before the Copenhagen meeting, yielded no success. </p>
<p>What’s worse for Moscow, a second Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg on July 27 and 28 2023 was an almost unmitigated <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-putin-offers-unconvincing-giveaways-in-a-desperate-bid-to-make-up-for-killing-the-ukraine-grain-deal-210330">disaster</a> for Putin. The Russian president’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse">justifications for abandoning</a> the Black Sea <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/black_sea_grain_initiative_full_text.pdf">grain deal</a> fell on deaf ears among the significantly lower number of African leaders who even bothered to attend the gathering.</p>
<h2>Different drivers, one outcome: a changing world order</h2>
<p>But at the same time, it is important not to overestimate the momentum that appears to be slowly building behind Zelensky’s western-backed peace plan. Proposals for a ceasefire to be followed by negotiations, like that <a href="https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2023/provisional-transcripts/p-3/general-retd-prabowo-subianto-minister-of-defense-indonesia---as-delivered.pdf">suggested</a> by Indonesia’s defence minister, Prabowo Subianto, at the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2023">2023 Shangri-La dialogue</a> in early June, remain on the table. </p>
<p>They may not get traction in Kyiv or western capitals, but they are mirrored in similar efforts, including by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pope-asks-italian-cardinal-carry-out-peace-mission-ukraine-war-vatican-says-2023-05-20/">Vatican</a> and the group of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-ukraine-agree-african-mission-potential-peace-plan-ramaphosa-says-2023-05-16/">African leaders</a> who travelled to Kyiv and St Petersburg in June on a peace mission of their own.</p>
<p>Above all, China has not given up on its peace plan either. Beijing’s “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis</a>”, like the Indonesian, African and Vatican proposals, also prioritises a ceasefire over the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. And Beijing is unlikely to change its stance in this regard until something more compelling emerges that would serve China’s own interests better in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-china-gains-from-acting-as-peacemaker-204629">becoming</a> a major player in a new Eurasian, and global, security order.</p>
<p>This highlights a deeper meaning to the summit. It’s not merely the various different peace plans on the table. But the emergence of a variety of coalitions pushing for different visions of a peace settlement is also of huge significance. This ultimately reflects – and will determine – the nature of the new international order that is emerging. </p>
<p>The meeting in Jeddah, inconclusive as it may have been, signals a continuing shift in Ukraine’s favour, albeit at glacial speed. This is driven by the self-interests of those involved, be it <a href="https://theconversation.com/food-crisis-in-africa-the-high-cost-of-imported-fertilisers-is-adding-to-the-problem-209664">African</a> food security, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-china-gains-from-acting-as-peacemaker-204629">Chinese</a> great-power ambitions, or <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5d69508a-e8c3-46b7-82cf-8c033499b445">Saudi</a> middle-power aspirations. </p>
<p>All of these and other players may <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3230083/saudi-arabia-hosts-ukraine-peace-talks-bid-become-global-mediator">agree</a> with Ukraine and its western partners “that respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty should be at the heart of any peace settlement”. But this should not be mistaken for a reaffirmation of a US-led international order. If anything, it is another indication of its replacement which will be decided both on the battlefield in Ukraine and at a future negotiation table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Ukraine was able to advance its plan for peace with an audience including China and other Brics nations.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102382023-07-31T12:22:46Z2023-07-31T12:22:46ZTourists search for Mount Sinai in Saudi Arabia – but does a geographical location for pivotal Bible event even exist?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539841/original/file-20230727-25-cdzqrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C4955%2C3398&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mount Sinai is mentioned in the second book of the Bible, Exodus, as the site where Moses received his first instruction from God.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-burning-bush-is-an-object-described-by-the-book-of-news-photo/1354443003?adppopup=true">Pictures From History/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Saudi Arabia relaxed rules and expanded visas for tourists in 2019, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/24/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-christian-tourists.html">Christians have been increasingly visiting the country</a>, drawn by word of mouth and promotional YouTube videos, in search of Mount Sinai, where the Bible recounts God revealing the Ten Commandments to Moses. </p>
<p>For many centuries people have believed the location to be in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, near the site of a monastery built around 550 C.E. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saint-Catherines-Monastery">and named after St. Catherine</a>.</p>
<p>But this was entirely based on the word of local tribes living some 2,000 years after the event. Most scholars believe that <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/Encyclopaedia-Judaica/oclc/123527471">the location of Mount Sinai is unknowable</a> from the available textual evidence. As a <a href="https://history.utk.edu/jacob-f-love/">scholar of the Hebrew Bible and language</a>, I agree with them. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C5%2C1955%2C1263&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A cross resting on top of a monastery located amid mountains." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C5%2C1955%2C1263&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539803/original/file-20230727-23-1d00em.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Greek Orthodox Monastery of St. Catherine on the Sinai Peninsula, some 240 miles from Cairo, Egypt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MideastEgypt/87b5a64207a44d2387e138560a49a504/photo?Query=mount%20sinai&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=563&currentItemNo=11&vs=true">AP Photo/Enric Marti, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The existence of Mount Sinai is likely a legendary myth that is part of the stories of many cultures. There is no corroborating evidence, archaeological or otherwise, to support any particular location. </p>
<h2>What’s in a name?</h2>
<p>The first biblical mention of the holy mountain occurs in Exodus, the second book of the Bible and the primary source for the story of Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt. </p>
<p>In Exodus 3:1, a mountain is referred to as Horeb and called the “mountain of God.” Horeb is mentioned twice more in Exodus but then disappears without mention in the third and fourth books – Leviticus and Numbers – until it reappears in the last book of the first section of the Bible, or the Pentateuch – Deuteronomy. </p>
<p>Deuteronomy retells the history of Israel as the Israelites were poised to enter the Holy Land. Throughout Deuteronomy, there are over a dozen references to Horeb as the place where Moses received the commandments.</p>
<p>Horeb is also found in biblical books after the Pentateuch. For example, the <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Malachi+4%3A4&version=RSV">prophet Malachi says in the book that bears his name</a>, “Remember the statutes of Moses … whom I commanded at Horeb.” </p>
<p>Horeb is a common name for the mountain in the Bible and yet is far less known than Sinai. The name Sinai is used throughout Exodus and occurs in Leviticus and Numbers, although Horeb is absent from those works. </p>
<p>But in Deuteronomy, Sinai all but disappears – it is <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%2033&version=RSV">used just once in a poem quoted by the author of Deuteronomy</a> (33:2). The poem is cast as Moses’ final benediction of the people and begins, “This is the blessing with which Moses the man of God blessed the children of Israel before his death. He said, ‘The Lord came from Sinai, and dawned from Se′ir upon us; he shone forth from Mount Paran,
he came from the ten thousands of holy ones, with flaming fire at his right hand.’”</p>
<h2>Horeb or Sinai?</h2>
<p>It is not simply a matter of two different names for the same place. That could be explained as easily as noting that Jerusalem is also called the City of David. And it would be logical if the various books scattered these names as if they were interchangeable. But I would argue that the distribution is anything but random. </p>
<p>The references to Sinai are concentrated in Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers, while Deuteronomy refers almost exclusively to Horeb. In other words, the author or authors of Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers strongly preferred the word Sinai while the author of Deuteronomy used only Horeb.</p>
<p>For over 200 years biblical scholars have been analyzing the Pentateuch to discern its editorial history. The result of this search for the authors of the Pentateuch <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Who-Wrote-the-Bible/Richard-Friedman/9781501192401">has led to the conclusions</a> that the first four books were written by at least three authors and redacted by editors to combine their stories. </p>
<p>There is evidence to show that the last book, Deuteronomy, was written by a single author. However, scholars argue, an editor <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Who-Wrote-the-Bible/Richard-Friedman/9781501192401">probably changed and added material</a>. It is likely that the one poem that mentions Sinai in Deuteronomy, when every other mention of that mountain is in Horeb, is a result of the editorial changes.</p>
<p>A second possibility is that they are two different locations, each of which had sacred status to a particular group of Israelites. The third possibility, favored by most biblical scholars, is that the ancient stories cataloged among the Israelites <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Who-Wrote-the-Bible/Richard-Friedman/9781501192401">came from different sources and were ultimately reconciled by editors</a>. </p>
<p>The second and third possibilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive – in other words, even if the stories were written by different authors, those different authors could have the same place in mind. </p>
<p>Perhaps the key fact to keep in mind is that scholars know very little about the location of Mount Sinai and whether or not it is the same place as Horeb.</p>
<h2>A strange absence</h2>
<p>Many of the books recounting the early history of biblical times, especially the prophets, however, have practically no reference to Sinai or Horeb. Among the 150 Psalms there is <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Psalm+68&version=RSV">but one reference to Sinai</a>. </p>
<p>How can it be that such a critical source of the religion of Israel was of little interest to these prophets? The commandments that Moses is believed to have received from God framed the lives of all Israelites and established the priestly offerings, the courts, and the rules for marriage, divorce and inheritance. Yet, none of the prophets felt a need to call upon Israel to follow the laws of Moses given at Sinai or Horeb. Is it not more reasonable to imagine that they simply knew little of those events or did not attach much importance to them? </p>
<p>Some people might conclude that the belief about Moses at Sinai is just invention. After all, there is so much historical and archaeological evidence for the history of places such as Jerusalem and Lachish. But in the case of Horeb or Sinai, the geographical hints found in the Bible are insufficient to make any sort of determination. </p>
<p>In other words, there isn’t sufficient data to decide whether the biblical account of Sinai or Horeb happened somewhere, or whether it is perhaps a foundation legend created for some purpose such as uniting the disparate Hebrew-speaking tribes of Israel.</p>
<p>When some Christians, such as the ones now looking for Sinai in Saudi Arabia, examine these sources, they often try to stitch together texts written over centuries after the events supposedly happened. It is not surprising that various people have assigned the location of Sinai <a href="https://www.openbible.info/geo/ancient/abfba2a/mount-sinai">to locations hundreds of miles apart</a>.</p>
<p>Based on all the evidence – or lack thereof – I argue that Sinai is located not in any specific place but rather in the hearts and minds of those who treasure the meaning of the Hebrew Bible.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article has been updated in order to correct information about St. Catherine’s Monastery.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacob F. Love does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of the Hebrew Bible argues that very little is known about the location of Mount Sinai, and it is likely that it was once part of a foundational legend.Jacob F. Love, Lecturer in Religious Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094722023-07-25T12:23:14Z2023-07-25T12:23:14ZWomen can now undertake Islamic pilgrimages without a male guardian in Saudi Arabia, but that doesn’t mean they’re traveling alone – communities are an important part of the religious experience<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538621/original/file-20230720-33531-ec3kdl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C6%2C1013%2C760&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">American Muslim women on pilgrimage at the Prophet's Mosque in Medina in 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iqbal Akhtar</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Saudi Arabia has changed its decadeslong rule that <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-hajj-umrah-women-no-male-guardian-required">mandated single women be accompanied by a male relative</a> when performing an Islamic pilgrimage, facilitating the participation of thousands of single Muslim women in the Hajj in 2023.</p>
<p>The new rules don’t apply just during the Hajj. Women can also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2021.1930878">perform the Umrah</a>, known as the “lesser pilgrimage,” or other <a href="https://spaceandculture.in/index.php/spaceandculture/article/download/1102/448">routine pilgrimages such as ziyarat</a> that can be undertaken any time of the year to Islamic holy sites, without a “mahram,” or male guardian. </p>
<p>The fact that women can now travel unaccompanied is part of a campaign by the political leadership of Saudi Arabia to improve the rights of women in the kingdom, which <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10646170701490849">Western societies view</a> <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/apjur5&div=6&id=&page=">as oppressive</a>. </p>
<p>My research looks at issues of identity and “<a href="https://templetonreligiontrust.org/covenantal-pluralism/#:%7E:text=The%20philosophy%20of%20covenantal%20pluralism,as%20equally%20true%20or%20right">covenantal pluralism</a>,” which refers to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2020.1835029">mutual obligations that different faith communities have toward one another</a> to support the pursuit of each one’s spiritual truth. I focus on the geographical area that encompasses the Indian Ocean, and I argue that these changes need to be viewed within a larger historical context and as they relate to Muslim women’s engagement with the sacred sites of Islam. </p>
<h2>Saudi Arabia and the West</h2>
<p>There is no Quranic injunction against women’s traveling alone. Nevertheless, in some patriarchal societies <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2017.1293920">where sexual harassment is common</a>, restrictions are put on women irrespective of religious affiliation.
Currently, Islamic medieval-era injunctions are applied in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. </p>
<p>However, Saudi Arabia is an exception. Conservative Sunni Muslim countries often see the kingdom, the birthplace of Islam, <a href="https://www.sciencegate.app/document/10.4018/978-1-4666-4749-7.ch014">as the bulwark against</a> Western secularization. <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191835278.001.0001/acref-9780191835278-e-91">Medieval Islamic laws</a>, such as capital punishment for apostasy, are used to give an appearance of authoritative piety in present times.</p>
<p>Indeed, the cities of Mecca and Medina are visible manifestations of piety. To enter the holy cities is to be transported into a ritual space of sacred time based on the Muslim call to prayer, in which pilgrims from around the world unite in the idealized Prophetic vision of a nation of faith. It is not a world of punctual appointments set by a work schedule. Rather, worshippers serve God through devotion in prayer in accordance with the ancient Islamic prayer timings set by the rhythm of the Sun and Moon. </p>
<p>Colonization created a dichotomy within the world where Islam was often seen to be the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/islam-and-the-west-9780195090611?cc=us&lang=en&">opposite of the values of the West</a>. Keeping women segregated from male worshippers, and viewing that separation as an expression of piety, is part of the rejection of Western norms while legitimizing the Islamic credentials of the Saudis both domestically and internationally. </p>
<h2>Insider perspectives</h2>
<p>Generally in mosques around the world, women and men worship separately. To some it may appear to violate the norms of Western egalitarianism, but it’s an ancient practice meant to encourage a spiritual intimacy and fellowship. </p>
<p>Until now, single women who did not have a male relative to escort them to the Two Holy Mosques – Al Masjid Al Haram in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina – would join an organized tour group of women. Their accommodations, meals, sermons and prayers would be organized together. </p>
<p>Interestingly, the holiest site in Islam – the mosque in Mecca – is circular, and historically men and women have worshipped openly together with few, if any, barriers.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People walk around a black cubic structure along circular rows." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538576/original/file-20230720-25-k8khvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pilgrims walk around the Kaaba at the Grand Mosque in the Muslim holy city of Mecca.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiHajj/9af9be3fcf7140e4bbda5c893e1d44c5/photo?Query=hajj%20circular&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1167&currentItemNo=7&vs=true">Saudi Ministry of Media via AP, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These barriers, erected for women in Saudi Arabia in the 20th century, are being removed in accordance with the older <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Feminism_and_Islam/PygUCgAAQBAJ?hl">prophetic tradition of women’s independence</a>. For example, the first wife of the Prophet, Khatija, was an independent businesswoman who initially hired the Prophet as an employee for her trading caravans.</p>
<p>What is also important to consider is that whereas the Hajj is the preeminent Muslim pilgrimage, additional sacred sites exist for Shiite pilgrimage in countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. In these countries there is no mahram rule, though the threat of violence in Iraq and Syria means that both male and female pilgrims who visit from abroad come in groups.</p>
<h2>Community and camaraderie</h2>
<p>Islamic pilgrimages are global gatherings of Muslims organized into groups, communities and families in which the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14766825.2021.1953046">individual’s identity</a> is a dynamic one. The ultimate truth in Islam is the unity of God, and a Muslim pilgrimage is a manifestation of that unity through integration and service to the community. In this integration, the individual ego is subsumed through a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Mystical_Dimensions_of_Islam/EMLYeqhKEokC?hl">communal religious experience</a>, which can be ecstatic. </p>
<p>Additionally, Islam is a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Heart_of_Islam/oAbB52U0icgC?hl">religion of right action</a> in which individuals find realization by integrating into the community. The communal model of pilgrimage helps them go through a physically demanding schedule of ritual observance and creates camaraderie, that continues beyond the pilgrimage. </p>
<p>The changes to the mahram rule allowed single Muslim women to join the Hajj pilgrimage in 2023. Over <a href="http://www.hajjreporters.com/hajj-2023-over-4000-indian-women-to-perform-hajj-without-male-guardian/">4,000 women from India</a> performed the Hajj without a male guardian. Nonetheless, community participation remains important, and most women do not actually travel alone. A majority of women join groups that share the same language, rituals and cuisine to facilitate navigation of the foreign world of Muslim religious tourism. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44364151">reshaping, reinterpretation and reconstruction</a> of Islamic pilgrimages has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/technology-remains-at-the-heart-of-the-hajj-206267">going on for centuries</a>; this time, women are leading it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iqbal Akhtar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A religion scholar argues that the communal nature of Islamic pilgrimage helps worshippers go through a physically demanding schedule and creates camaraderie that continues beyond the pilgrimage.Iqbal Akhtar, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2084682023-07-06T20:21:04Z2023-07-06T20:21:04ZIs Saudi Arabia using ‘sportswashing’ to simply hide its human rights abuses – or is there a bigger strategy at play?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535724/original/file-20230705-22-nitql4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=278%2C13%2C4080%2C2932&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Christiano Ronaldo signed a 2.5-year contract with the Saudi team with Al Nassr, estimated to be worth more than 200 million euros. He made his debut in January.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hussein Malla/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Saudi Arabia continues to open up internationally, it is yet again <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2023/jun/07/saudi-arabia-deal-pga-major-step-sportswashing-golf">in hot water over its human rights record</a>. <a href="https://au.sports.yahoo.com/tennis-john-mcenroe-saudi-arabia-swipe-american-legend-shuts-down-nick-kyrgios-call-052520020.html">The current controversy</a> revolves around the kingdom’s increasing presence in the sporting world and accusations of “sportswashing”. </p>
<p>In recent years, the Saudis have thrown the heavy weight of their <a href="https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/Pages/Homepage.aspx">Public Investment Fund</a> into partnerships with Western institutions like the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2023/06/06/liv-golf-pga-tour-merger/">PGA</a>, <a href="https://www.formula1.com/en/racing/2023/Saudi_Arabia.html">Formula One racing</a> and <a href="https://www.thesportster.com/things-you-should-know-wwe-deal-saudi-arabia/">World Wrestling Entertainment</a>. </p>
<p>Riyadh is also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/02/sports/soccer/saudi-soccer-messi-benzema-ronaldo.html">luring top soccer players</a> like Cristiano Ronaldo to its national league and using <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/18/sports/soccer/lionel-messi-saudi-arabia.html">Lionel Messi</a> as an influencer to promote the kingdom.</p>
<p>Recently, Saudi Arabia has signalled its interest in holding <a href="https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-womens-tennis-sportswashing-8e1dbf680b6307cb6c2603c9f58a4379">women’s tennis tournaments</a> and even potentially hosting the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-forging-network-to-bid-for-2030-world-cup/a-64866806">2030 FIFA World Cup</a>, as well.</p>
<p>While the precise dollar figure of all of these efforts is difficult to determine, it has easily reached into the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/28/saudi-arabia-has-spent-at-least-15bn-on-sportswashing-report-reveals">billions</a>.</p>
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<h2>‘Sportswashing’ atrocities?</h2>
<p>But the Saudi sport blitz has been received with less enthusiasm by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/13/saudi-arabia-golf-human-rights-sportswashing">many</a> <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-arabia-sportswashing-human-rights-accusations-60-minutes-2023-04-09/">outside onlookers</a>. </p>
<p>Human Rights Watch and many <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-24/liv-golf-saudi-arabia-and-sportswashing-adelaide/102255808">Western</a> <a href="https://www.sportingnews.com/au/golf/news/sportswashing-pga-tour-liv-golf-merger-saudi-arabia/ztq8cmgar21l3e3yt9ueer4d">commentators</a> describe it as simple “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/16/saudi-arabias-newest-sportswashing-strategy-sponsorship-womens-world-cup">sportswashing</a>” – an effort to distract the world’s attention from its continual disregard for international human rights.</p>
<p>For instance, the kingdom has racked up a well-documented <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/torture-slow-motion-economic-blockade-yemen-and-its-grave-humanitarian-consequences#:%7E:text=The%20naval%20blockade%20imposed%20on,in%20a%20report%20published%20today.">record</a> of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">human rights violations</a> during its eight-year proxy war in Yemen. </p>
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<p>Despite Riyadh’s murky <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/saudi-arabia-makes-peace-proposal-for-yemen-after-houthi-talks">peace deal</a> with the Houthi fighters in Yemen in April, the war <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/18/hrw-saudi-violating-international-law-in-war-on-yemen">will remain a stain</a> on its humanitarian record for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>The lack of any meaningful reparations following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-may-finally-be-returning-to-yemen-but-can-a-fractured-nation-be-put-back-together-203668">peace deal</a> also raises the question whether the deal was simply a way for the Saudis to disengage from the war at a time when a serious rebranding campaign was needed.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-may-finally-be-returning-to-yemen-but-can-a-fractured-nation-be-put-back-together-203668">Peace may finally be returning to Yemen, but can a fractured nation be put back together?</a>
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<p>At home, political freedoms and rights remain tightly constrained by the regime. Despite moves to relax some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/world/middleeast/saudi-driving-ban-anniversary.html">restrictions on women</a> and religious minorities, these reforms have paradoxically come with increasingly harsh measures towards peaceful dissidents. </p>
<p>Only last year, female activists <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/17/saudi-salma-shehab-activist/">Salma al-Shehab</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62736118">Nourah bint Saeed al-Qahtani</a> received prison terms of 34 years and 45 years, respectively, for their engagement with social media posts criticising the regime. </p>
<p>More recently, several Howeitat tribesmen were <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/saudi-arabia-un-experts-alarmed-imminent-executions-linked-neom-project">sentenced to death on terrorism charges</a> for peacefully protesting a megacity project that threatened their ancestral village.</p>
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<h2>Building a new Saudi brand</h2>
<p>But while obfuscating human rights issues is certainly part of the equation when it comes to the kingdom’s sports mania, its motivations <a href="https://www.playthegame.org/news/the-saudis-in-sport-ambitions-much-larger-than-sportswashing/">are far more strategic</a> than simple bait-and-switch tactics. </p>
<p>At their core, these actions fit within a broader effort outlined in the <a href="https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/">Saudi Vision 2030</a> campaign to rebrand the country and normalise it within the wider liberal international order.</p>
<p>For many outside observers, the kingdom has long been an outlier on the international stage. It’s been characterised as a primitive backwater cut off from the outside world and ruled over by a despotic monarchy that has relied on a combination of oil wealth and Islamic extremism to maintain its hold on power. </p>
<p>Such reductive depictions ignored a far more <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/iss-24-securitising-identity-paperback-softback">complex, rich and colourful history</a>. However, few in the West were keen to explore this more nuanced viewpoint (at least if my <a href="https://www.amazon.com.au/Iss-24-Securitising-Identity-Saudi/dp/052287231X">book sales</a> are anything to go by). </p>
<p>Saudi royals have historically been content with such stereotypes, too, provided they maintained their sovereignty and security at home. The kingdom made little effort with <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/minisite/static/4ca0813c-585e-4fe1-86eb-de665e65001a/fpwhitepaper/foreign-policy-white-paper/chapter-eight-partnerships-and-soft-power/soft-power.html#:%7E:text=Having%20the%20ability%20to%20influence,is%20known%20as%20soft%20power.">soft power</a> initiatives outside the Islamic world. </p>
<p>The international art, culture and sporting worlds were seen as being in stark contrast to the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/29606243/The_Saudi_State_as_an_Identity_Racketeer">psychological and cultural norms</a> of the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html">Wahhabi orthodoxy</a> that has long governed Saudi public life. </p>
<p>This all changed in 2015, however, with the ascension of King Salman and his chosen heir, Prince Mohammad bin Salman. The younger bin Salman quickly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/22/saudi-crown-princes-ascendancy-gives-hope-of-reform-but-it-may-be-premature">assumed</a> de facto control over many of the country’s key portfolios. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/535945/original/file-20230706-15-s5muy6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prince Mohammed bin Salman welcomes US President Joe Biden to his palace in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in July 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace/AP</span></span>
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<p>In contrast to his conservative predecessors, the prince was seen as a “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/12/middleeast/saudi-sport-mbs-global-ambitions-mime-intl/index.html">disruptor</a>” with little regard for tradition. Like with many of the Silicon Valley tech-bros he emulates, bin Salman likes to move fast and break things. This includes everything from traditional <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/saudi-arabia/changing-times-for-saudi-arabias-once-feared-morality-police/articleshow/88987601.cms?from=mdr">religious institutions</a> to <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/26/8931389/saudi-arabia-mega-city-neom-plans-futuristic-dystopian-ai-robot-fake-moon">architectural rules</a>.</p>
<p>Bin Salman’s vision is to remake the Saudi brand as a modern authoritarian technocracy in the mould of the United Arab Emirates or Qatar. He wants to emulate these successful case studies through economic reform, military modernisation, technological innovation, cultural modernisation and the opening of the kingdom to cosmopolitan cultural engagement and exchanges.</p>
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<h2>A new platform to engage with the world</h2>
<p>These efforts took a hit, however, after the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Bin Salman <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/06/us-judge-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-khashoggi">denied</a> being personally involved in the murder, counter to what US intelligence reports <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/us/politics/jamal-khashoggi-killing-cia-report.html">concluded</a>. But some believed the global anger of Khashoggi’s killing could have
<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/17/cia-khashoggi-findings-highly-damaging-to-saudi-prince-mohammed-bin-salman">damaged the prince’s reputation badly enough</a> to hamper his future as a statesman.</p>
<p>Memories can be remarkably short-lived, though. And five years on from the killing, bin Salman’s rebranding agenda is charging ahead with increased urgency. This is where the Saudi sporting onslaught comes in, and why it needs to be understood. </p>
<p>Control and influence over these sports provide the kingdom with enormous cachet. Saudi Arabia can use this new stature to engage in cultural outreach with the world, influence global opinion and portray itself as modern and dynamic.</p>
<p>To characterise all of this as mere sportswashing may be catchy, but reduces a much broader and strategic effort.</p>
<p>Indeed, implicit in the notion of sportswashing is that the Saudis are suddenly concerned about the country’s association with human rights violations. </p>
<p>But looking at the examples of Qatar and the UAE, authoritarian regimes are able to flout international norms and laws on human rights and still fit quite comfortably within the wider liberal international order. The reason: the countries serve a valuable function in sustaining that same system.</p>
<p>While human rights abuses will undoubtedly continue to plague the Saudis’ efforts, bin Salman is betting big they won’t stand in the way of other states and companies engaging with an increasingly open and cosmopolitan kingdom. If history is anything to go by, he may just be right.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/big-money-bought-the-pga-tour-but-can-it-make-golf-a-popular-sport-in-saudi-arabia-207803">Big money bought the PGA Tour, but can it make golf a popular sport in Saudi Arabia?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Rich receives funding from The US State Department. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leena Adel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prince Mohammad bin Salman is trying to rebrand the kingdom in the model of Qatar and the UAE – two states with human rights issues that have become part of the global order.Ben Rich, Senior lecturer in History and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLeena Adel, PhD Candidate, Political Science and International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2085712023-06-28T00:18:39Z2023-06-28T00:18:39ZAn unbroken covenant with God: what the Hajj means for Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534208/original/file-20230627-15-rjhwty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ashraf Amra/ AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Millions of men, women and children have converged on Mecca this week for the Hajj pilgrimage. The Saudi government says it will be the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/25/largest-hajj-pilgrimage-in-history-begins-in-saudi-arabia">largest crowd ever</a> for the pilgrimage.</p>
<p>The Hajj pilgrimage is, at its core, a pilgrimage towards God. This presents a paradox of sorts. If God is beyond time and space, then what is the purpose of travelling to a particular place? Is God not present now, everywhere? </p>
<p>The celebrated author Gai Eaton <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1398960">offers an elegant response</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our sense of the divine Presence is blunted. We need to find it focused on a particular place and, for the Muslim, that place is the Ka'ba at Mecca, which he has faced every time he prayed and to which he now journeys in pilgrimage.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A transformative experience</h2>
<p>Within the Islamic worldview then, the Ka’ba functions as the locus of hearts. I use the plural “hearts” here, for the pilgrimage is not only an individual religious obligation. It is a communal act that strengthens ties of kinship between Muslims in a way that resembles nothing else. </p>
<p>When the pilgrims prepare to don the Hajj attire, they discard more than their clothes. Nationality, race and socio-economic status are tossed to the wayside — prince and pauper unite as pilgrims. All distinctions are left behind. </p>
<p>The experience can be transformative, particularly for those embarking on the pilgrimage for the first time. </p>
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<img alt="Female police officer welcoming Hajj pilgrims with rose petals in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534215/original/file-20230627-26-evdjnn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Saudi policewoman throws flowers at Bangladeshi pilgrims as they arrive at the airport in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for the hajj this week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amr Nabi/ AP</span></span>
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<p>The renowned activist and minister Malcolm X was compelled to re-evaluate his views on race in the wake of his Hajj experience. In his <a href="https://islam.uga.edu/malcomx.html">Letter From Mecca</a>, he wrote: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were tens of thousands of pilgrims, from all over the world. They were of all colours, from blue-eyed blondes to black-skinned Africans. But we were all participating in the same ritual, displaying a spirit of unity and brotherhood that my experiences in America had led me to believe never could exist between the white and non-white.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Coupled with his societal reflections was an internal revolution, one that stirred his heart. In <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/malcom-x-in-mecca-2353496">his autobiography</a>, he writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In my thirty-nine years on this earth, the Holy City of Mecca had been the first time I had ever stood before the Creator of All and felt like a complete human being.</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/millions-of-muslims-prepare-to-perform-the-hajj-amid-calls-for-a-boycott-121618">Millions of Muslims prepare to perform the hajj amid calls for a boycott</a>
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<h2>Road to Mecca fraught with challenges</h2>
<p>For Muslims then, the return of Hajj pilgrims to pre-pandemic numbers this year (or even surpassing them) represents another opportunity for this reorientation towards God. </p>
<p>Granted, globalisation has drawn the world closer, denting the impact of encountering people from completely different walks of life. Despite this, the Hajj pilgrimage remains unparalleled in its capacity to turn hearts, both individually and collectively.</p>
<p>All this is not to say that the experience is one of ease and comfort. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1673407059747028992"}"></div></p>
<p>If the history of the Hajj pilgrimage has demonstrated anything, it is the road to Mecca is often fraught with challenges. The most recent challenges confronting potential pilgrims have been unforeseen, drastically altering the Hajj experience. </p>
<p>The COVID pandemic saw pilgrimage to the holy sites halted for two years, with only <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/7/18/in-pictures-hajj-in-mecca-during-covid-pandemic">a limited number of Saudi residents</a> permitted to perform the pilgrimage. </p>
<p>As the pandemic slowly subsided, many Muslims in other countries who had waited with eager anticipation booked their travel plans. But they were met with a new complication. </p>
<h2>The struggle for getting a spot</h2>
<p>In 2022, the Saudi government announced that all those intending to perform the pilgrimage from several Western countries, including the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union, must <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/07/01/motawif-hajj/">register through the Motawif website</a>. Those who had already made bookings were advised to immediately cancel them and register through Motawif. </p>
<p>This would place the registrant into a lottery-type system, replacing the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/7/7/a-new-hajj-booking-system-leaves-tour-operators-out-in-the-cold?traffic_source=KeepReading">Hajj travel tours</a> that had operated locally in these countries for many years.</p>
<p>The Saudi administration claimed it was trying to remove the middle man and make the Hajj travel package process smoother and more affordable. Many testimonies, however, appear to confirm the contrary. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/technology-remains-at-the-heart-of-the-hajj-206267">Technology remains at the heart of the hajj</a>
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<p>Registrants criticised the persistent technical failures of Motawif, and those who were lucky enough to make it to Mecca bemoaned the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/29/hajj-booking-system-changes-leave-many-muslims-disappointed">disorganised mess</a> that greeted them upon their arrival.</p>
<p>The Saudi claim of increased affordability was also contested. Prices for a Hajj package vary, depending on the level of luxury that the pilgrim desires during their stay in the holy cities. When factoring in all costs, however, the total <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-22/hajj-lottery-saudi-arabia-upsets-muslim-australians-pilgrimage/101169798">price for the package hovered</a> in the range of US$7,000 to $13,500 (A$10,000 to $20,000) per person. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Picture of a security officer looking at CCTV monitors in Mecca during Hajj" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/534210/original/file-20230627-29-7mwt03.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Saudi authorities have put in place a large-scale security plan to ensure the safety of the pilgrims and smooth proceedings of the Hajj.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Amr Nabil/ AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For many Muslims in the West, a more affordable Hajj package was viewed as desirable. In reality, though, prices remained high — the only difference being the Saudi government collected the profits.</p>
<p>This year, the Saudi authorities have ditched the short-lived Motawif system. Rather than operating on a lottery basis, it has now been replaced with a new <a href="https://hajj.nusuk.sa/">first-come, first-serve</a> system. Only time will tell whether this new system is feasible, or whether it will go the way of Motawif.</p>
<p>Despite these challenges, Muslims from around the world continue to flock to the Hajj. Through this ritual, they direct their hearts individually and collectively towards the Ka’ba. In doing so, they step out beyond time, linking the past and present in an unbroken covenant with God.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208571/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Hammoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Millions of men, women and children are converging on Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage, a return to pre-pandemic numbers.Ali Hammoud, PhD candidate, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077172023-06-23T12:27:51Z2023-06-23T12:27:51ZThere is no legal reason the US can’t supply cluster bombs to Ukraine – but that doesn’t justify Biden’s decision to do so<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533480/original/file-20230622-5172-r9f59p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C25%2C4214%2C2799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The remains of a rocket that carried cluster munitions found in a Ukrainian field.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-remains-of-a-rocket-that-carried-cluster-munitions-news-photo/1258233929?adppopup=true">Alice Martins/For The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Biden administration announced on July 7, 2023, that it would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cluster-munitions-ukraine-expected-fridays-800m-aid-package-2023-07-07/">send cluster bombs to Ukraine</a> – a deeply controversial move given the munition is prohibited by more than 120 countries because of risks to civilian populations.</p>
<p>The U.S. has been here before. It <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/29/politics/saudi-arabia-us-cluster-bombs-on-civilians/index.html">provided Saudi Arabia with cluster munitions</a> – which <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/what-is-a-cluster-bomb.aspx">contain bomblets that can scatter</a> across a wide area, often not exploding until later – during the kingdom’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44466574">military intervention in Yemen</a>.</p>
<p>Washington <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/exclusive-white-house-blocks-transfer-of-cluster-bombs-to-saudi-arabia/">suspended sales of cluster bombs to the Saudis</a> in 2016 following mounting concern over the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/yemen-children-among-civilians-killed-and-maimed-in-cluster-bomb-minefields/">toll they were taking on civilian lives</a>. But the U.S. is still <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/03/09/coalition-calls-us-swiftly-ratify-global-treaty-banning-cluster-bombs">holding out from joining</a> an <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/home.aspx">international ban on cluster bombs</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">scholar of the law of war</a>, I know that cluster bombs highlight a reality about the use and regulation of weapons, even those that can cause widespread civilian suffering: These munitions are not in themselves illegal, but their usage can be. Furthermore, the decision by the U.S. to provide Ukraine with cluster bombs could weaken the argument against others’ doing likewise. And that, in turn, could increase the chances of cluster bombs’ being deployed illegally.</p>
<h2>Effective or indiscriminate?</h2>
<p>Cluster munitions have been <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/cluster-munitions-factsheet-230710.htm#:%7E:text=Cluster%20munitions%20were%20first%20used,to%20kill%20or%20injure%20combatants.">part of nations’ arsenals since World War II</a>. Delivered by air or ground artillery, they have been used by the <a href="https://asiasociety.org/northern-california/legacies-war-laos">United States in Laos and Vietnam</a> during the Vietnam War, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/8/13/life-among-israeli-cluster-bombs-in-lebanon#:%7E:text=Four%20million%20cluster%20munitions%20were,spread%20across%2015.23%20square%20kilometres.">Israel in southern Lebanon</a>, <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/use-of-cluster-bombs/a-timeline-of-cluster-bomb-use.aspx">the U.S. and U.K. in Iraq</a>, Russia and Syria <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/28/russia/syria-widespread-new-cluster-munition-use">in the ongoing Syrian civil war</a>, and the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/06/yemen-saudis-using-us-cluster-munitions">Saudis in Yemen</a>. And now they are being <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">deployed in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="v689T" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/v689T/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>If deployed responsibly, they can be an effective military tool. Because they can spread hundreds of bomblets across a wide area, they can prove a potent weapon against concentrations of enemy troops and their weapons on a battlefield. In 2017, a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-POLICY-ON-CLUSTER-MUNITIONS-OSD071415-17.pdf">U.S. Department of Defense memo</a> said cluster munitions provided a “necessary capability” when confronted with “massed formation of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise location are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets.” And on June 22, 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1671935568664559632">it was reported</a> that the Department of Defense has concluded that cluster bombs would be useful if deployed against “dug-in” Russian positions in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-POLICY-ON-CLUSTER-MUNITIONS-OSD071415-17.pdf">the Department of Defense argued</a> that in some limited circumstances cluster bombs can be less destructive to civilians. In Vietnam, the U.S. sanctioned the use of cluster bombs – over more powerful bombs – to disrupt transport links and enemy positions while <a href="https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/nat-sec/Vietnam/Linebacker-and-the-Law-of-War.html">minimizing the risk of destroying nearby dikes</a>, which would have flooded rice fields and caused widespread suffering to villagers.</p>
<p>Still, their use has always been controversial. The problem is that not all the bomblets explode on impact. Many remain on the ground, unexploded until they are later disturbed – and that increases the chances of civilians’ being maimed or killed. Their use in urban settings is particularly problematic, as they cannot be directed at a specific military target and are just as likely to strike civilians and their homes.</p>
<h2>Cluster bombs under international law</h2>
<p>Concern over the risk to civilian harm led in 2008 to a <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/2008-convention-cluster-munitions#:%7E:text=The%20Convention%20on%20Cluster%20Munitions,international%20treaty%20prohibiting%20these%20weapons.">Convention on Cluster Munitions</a>, which bans their use, production or sale by member states.</p>
<p>But as of 2023, the convention is legally binding for only the 123 states that are signatories – and Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. are not among them. Nor can they – or any of the other countries yet to sign up to the convention – be compelled to join the ban.</p>
<p>As such, there is no legal reason that Ukraine or Russia cannot deploy cluster bombs in the current conflict – as <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">both have done</a> since the invasion of February 2022. Nor is there any legal reason the Biden administration can’t sell the munitions to Ukraine.</p>
<p>But there are laws that set out how cluster bombs can be used, and how they must not.</p>
<p>The relevant part of international humanitarian law here is 1977’s <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977">Additional Protocol I</a> to the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a>, which both Ukraine and Russia have ratified. The additional protocol sets out rules the warring parties must observe to limit harm to civilians. Acknowledging that civilian deaths are an inevitable part of war, <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-51">Article 51 of Additional Protocol I</a> prohibits “indiscrimate” attacks. Such attacks include those employing a weapon that cannot be directed at a specific military target or of such a nature to strike military targets and civilians and civilian objects without distinction.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-57">Article 57 of the additional protocol</a> stresses that attacking armies have a duty of care to spare civilian populations. This includes taking “all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack.”</p>
<p>Neither article specifies any weapons deemed off-limits. Rather, it is how the weapons are used that determines whether the attack constitutes an indiscriminate one and hence a crime under international law.</p>
<h2>More than an ‘optical’ risk?</h2>
<p>Even if cluster bombs are not inherently indiscriminate – a claim that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/06/anyone-can-die-at-any-time-kharkiv/">advocates of an international ban</a> put forward – their use in urban settings greatly increases the chance of civilian harm. In 2021, <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348668/CMM2022_PPT.pdf">97% of cluster bomb casualties were civilians</a>, two-thirds of whom were children. And the experience of cluster bomb use in Syria and Yemen shows that it can be difficult to hold governments to account.</p>
<p>Which is why Ukraine’s request for U.S. cluster munitions has led to concerns. The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">Cluster Munitions Monitor</a>, which logs international use of the bombs, found that as of August 2022, Ukraine was the only active conflict zone where cluster bombs were being deployed – with Russia using the weapon “extensively” since its invasion, and Ukraine also deploying cluster bombs on a handful of occasions.</p>
<p>Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-seeks-us-cluster-bombs-adapt-drone-use-lawmakers-2023-03-06/">reportedly sought some of the United States’ stockpile</a> of Cold War-era MK-20 cluster bombs to drop on Russian positions via drones. The White House had previously <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/biden-administration-ukraine-cluster-munitions-00073316">aired “concern</a>” over the transfer.</p>
<p>In announcing the decision to send U.S.-made cluster bombs to Ukraine, Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cluster-munitions-ukraine-expected-fridays-800m-aid-package-2023-07-07/">noted that</a> “cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance,” adding: “This is why we’ve deferred the decision for as long as we could.”</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s earlier hesitancy was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/biden-administration-ukraine-cluster-munitions-00073316">reportedly over the “optics</a>” of selling cluster bombs and that it may introducing a wedge between the U.S. and other NATO countries over the weapon’s use. </p>
<p>Certainly, there would be very little legal risk under international law of providing cluster bombs to Ukraine – or any other nation – even if that country were to use the weapon illegally.</p>
<p>There is no case I know of in which a state has been found legally responsible for providing weapons to another that flagrantly misuses them – there is no equivalent to efforts in the U.S. seeking to hold gun manufacturers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/can-us-gunmakers-be-liable-mass-shooting-2022-05-25/">legally responsible for mass shootings</a>, or state “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dram_shop_rule">dram shop laws</a>” that hold the suppliers of alcohol culpable for the actions of an inebriated driver.</p>
<p>Yet one of the things that worried people in Congress regarding the sale of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia was that the Saudis’ <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/07/yemen-coalition-drops-cluster-bombs-capital">consistently indiscriminate use of those weapons</a> in Yemen could be seen at home and abroad as making the U.S. complicit in those violations.</p>
<p>I would argue that it became difficult for Washington to continue to supply the Saudis on moral ground. But still, there was and is presently no clear-cut legal obligation for the U.S. to stop supplying other nations with cluster bombs.</p>
<p>In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will deliberately use U.S.-supplied cluster munitions to target civilians and their environs. </p>
<p>And Ukraine provided “written assurances that it is going to use these in a very careful way,” Sullivan said in announcing the transfer.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, providing Ukraine with cluster weapons could serve to destigmatize them and runs counter to international efforts to end their use. And that, in turn, could encourage – or excuse – their use by other states that may be less responsible.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story was updated on July 7, 2023, in light of the Biden administration’s decision to supply Ukraine with cluster bombs.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US administration said that it had received ‘written assurances’ from Ukraine that it would use cluster bombs carefully. Nonetheless, the munition will provide an additional risk to civilians.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062672023-06-22T16:59:33Z2023-06-22T16:59:33ZTechnology remains at the heart of the hajj<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532431/original/file-20230616-23-novafc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C0%2C8068%2C4913&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranian pilgrims pose for a selfie during the hajj pilgrimage in 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHajj/00c994b4debf44c18cd331df8cac397a/photo">AP Photo/Amr Nabil</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The hajj – <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-hajj-101641">the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca</a>, Saudi Arabia, which Muslims are expected to make once in their lives if they are able – is expected to begin June 26 and last for five days. In 2023, <a href="https://www.arabianbusiness.com/abnews/hajj-2023-saudi-arabia-to-receive-2-million-pilgrims">approximately 2 million pilgrims will participate</a>, close to the annual <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/617696/saudi-arabia-total-hajj-pilgrims/">numbers of pilgrims</a> in years before the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Their visits, like those in generations past, will be enhanced, and even made possible, by modern technology. </p>
<p>In recent years, the Saudi government has developed smartphone apps aimed at organizations of pilgrim groups. Pilgrims use apps themselves, with guides to help them find and pray at specific holy locations. And they document their journey, both physical and spiritual, on social media platforms like <a href="https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/hajj2023/">Instagram</a> and <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/tag/hajj2023">TikTok</a>. </p>
<p>The country is rolling out <a href="https://twitter.com/MoHU_En/status/1416070942166499329">smart cards</a> for pilgrims to access hajj services and information, as well as make cashless payments.</p>
<p>And in 2022, the Saudi government established an online system by which prospective pilgrims from the U.S., Australia and Western Europe must enter a digital lottery for visas allowing them to <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-caravans-to-markets-the-hajj-pilgrimage-has-always-included-a-commercial-component-184418">make the hajj</a>. As for Muslim-majority countries, <a href="https://www.natvisa.com/saudi-arabia-blog/pilgrimage-visa-saudi-arabia">one visa is allocated</a> per 1,000 Muslims in each country. Those who are granted visas must <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-hajj-western-pilgrims-not-able-book-travel-agencies">book their travel through the Saudi government</a>, rather than through travel agencies in their home countries.</p>
<p>As those changes have occurred, news coverage about the hajj has often mentioned the technology involved, describing it as <a href="https://me.mashable.com/culture/23967/hajj-2023-expo-from-smartcards-to-ai-saudi-arabia-is-changing-the-face-of-pilgrimage-with-tech">a new phenomenon</a> that is “<a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/2023/01/11/hajj-expo-2023-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-pilgrimage/">transforming” the pilgrimage</a>. </p>
<p>Yet as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=s3BLaAgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">historian of the Middle East</a> and an expert on contemporary Islam, I know that technology has been at the heart of the hajj since the mid-1800s. Transportation and communications technologies have long been fundamental to governments’ management of the pilgrimage and to pilgrims’ spiritual experiences.</p>
<h2>Travel technology</h2>
<p>As far back as the 1850s, steamship technology made it possible for many more Muslims to make the pilgrimage even if they lived long distances from Mecca. </p>
<p>According to scholar <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/daily-author/eric-schewe/">Eric Schewe</a>, “<a href="https://daily.jstor.org/how-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajjhow-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajj/">European shipping lines sought Hajj pilgrims as passengers to supplement</a>” the money they made from shipping commercial cargo through the Suez Canal. By dropping off pilgrims at Arabian ports along a route their ships were already traveling, merchants were able to make a little extra income around the time of the hajj.</p>
<p>And the pilgrims appreciated the safety, speed, reliability and lower cost of steamship travel. As a result, they could reach the hajj more quickly and more cheaply than at any earlier period in history. From the 1880s to the 1930s, the <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/how-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajjhow-european-empires-helped-shape-the-hajj">number of pilgrims going on hajj each year quadrupled</a>.</p>
<p>While steamships helped those traveling by water, rail helped those coming by land – especially those from Russia, whose multi-leg journeys often included travel by train to Odessa, in today’s Ukraine, or another Black Sea port, where they <a href="https://russia-islworld.ru/main/how-russian-muslims-went-to-the-hajj-in-the-past/">crossed to Istanbul by steamship</a> and then to Mecca via caravan. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photographic panorama of a holy space." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=224&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532299/original/file-20230615-21-df5gh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=282&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘The honoured Ka‘bah and the Meccan sanctuary,’ 1880 photography by Sadiq Bey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Khalili_Collection_Hajj_and_Arts_of_Pilgrimage_Arc.pp-0254.2.jpg">Khalili Collections via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Communications technology</h2>
<p>The telegraph also played an important role in the hajj. The Ottoman government used its extensive telegraph network to govern and as <a href="https://trafo.hypotheses.org/30676">a sign of independence</a> from European powers; one key link was from the capital in <a href="https://www.archnet.org/sites/20029">Istanbul through Damascus, Syria, to Mecca</a>. European consular officials, rail and steamship companies and even individual pilgrims used the telegraph system for hajj-related communications.</p>
<p>Other communications technologies also affected the pilgrimage. <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/imperial-mecca/9780231190770">Colonial powers with Muslim populations worried</a> that the mass gathering of Muslims would lead to political unrest. They also worried about public health. </p>
<p>The speed of rail and steam travel meant that pilgrims could bring infectious diseases home with them, as happened with the <a href="https://www.lectures.iastate.edu/lectures/pilgrims-passport-pandemics-past-mecca-and-hajj-under-quarantine-cholera-covid-19">cholera epidemics that broke out regularly</a> during the hajj in the 1800s. </p>
<p>Many governments introduced tracking regulations that relied on print technologies: The Dutch in 1825 began requiring pilgrims to get passports, while the French in 1892 began requiring Algerian pilgrims to have travel permits. The British government in 1886 gave travel agency Thomas Cook an <a href="https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/package-tour-to-mecca-how-the-hajj-became-an-essential-part-of-the-british-calendar">exclusive contract for hajj travel from India</a>, requiring pilgrims to pre-purchase tickets for each leg of the journey. </p>
<p>Together, these regulations helped pilgrims get through the hajj safely. But they also worked to minimize its potential political and public health risks for the colonial powers that governed most of the world’s Muslim population.</p>
<h2>Into the modern era</h2>
<p>The spread of commercial air travel starting in the 1940s changed hajj dynamics further: Flying was even faster, cheaper and safer than steamship travel. It offered to further open hajj participation to more Muslims, but created massive logistical, political and economic challenges as the number of pilgrims increased six or seven times <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/0195171071.001.0001">between 1950 and 1980</a>.</p>
<p>New communications technologies further popularized the hajj. For example, radio stations covered the hajj, starting in the 1940s in Mandate Palestine, with pilgrim letters broadcast to listeners at home. Like earlier <a href="https://www.britishpathe.com/asset/251774/">cinema newsreels</a>, television from the 1960s showed viewers footage of pilgrims circumambulating or walking around the Kaaba, one of the key hajj rituals. This footage helped inspire them to want to go on hajj as well. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, growing literacy rates allowed Muslims to read the increasing number of <a href="https://www.meccabooks.com/266-handbook-for-hajj-and-umrah-9780860373407.html">printed hajj guides</a> helping them navigate lodging, eating and worship. <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo20313514.html">Contemporary hajj travelogues</a> recording pilgrims’ experiences are part of a classical genre of Middle Eastern travel literature, known in Arabic as the <a href="https://funci.org/the-emergence-of-the-rihla-or-travel-literature/?lang=en">rihla</a> or seyahetname; both terms describe books of travels that typically included pilgrimage.</p>
<p>As pilgrims <a href="https://twitter.com/shen_shiwei/status/1289250173961396224/photo/1">celebrated their ability to travel to the hajj</a> via airplane, glitches happened. In 1952, the Saudi government’s last-minute cutting a hajj entry tax encouraged thousands of additional pilgrims to fly to Beirut, where Lebanese airline companies had no seats available. Instead, the <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2014/when-uncle-sam-rolled-out-the-magic-carpet-for-hajj/">United States Air Force organized an airlift</a> that transported nearly 4,000 stranded pilgrims from Beirut to Mecca in time to make the hajj.</p>
<p>Again, communications technologies played an important role in pilgrim management. In the 1950s, <a href="https://www.papertotravel.com/MP-323/photo/5723">British-governed Malaysia</a> issued so-called “pilgrim passports,” which collected all information relevant to a pilgrim’s travel, from vaccination dates to next of kin contact information. Saudi-issued hajj visas evolved from handwritten and handstamped in the <a href="https://www.ebay.com/itm/314050359157">1970s</a> to digitally stamped, bar-coded visas by the <a href="https://www.papertotravel.com/MP-576/photo/10717">late 2000s</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people moves through a tunnel." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532432/original/file-20230616-25-p8kviv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Massive numbers of people make the hajj every year, requiring significant effort for crowd control and safety.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prospective-pilgrims-continue-their-worship-to-fulfill-the-news-photo/1241839087">Ashraf Amra/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Large numbers of travelers</h2>
<p>Historically, a tiny minority of Muslims envisioned making the pilgrimage at any point in their lives. Even today, most Muslims will never be able to go on hajj, and most who do will go only once. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/04/354870/global-muslim-population-exceeds-2-billion">global Muslim population</a> numbers just over 2 billion, so even a small fraction of their total means a lot of people. The 2 million expected on this year’s hajj are still just 0.1% of the world’s Muslims.</p>
<p>With travel and communications eased, Mecca’s ability to handle all those visitors at once has become <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2023/04/03/Umrah-crowd-control-How-Saudi-authorities-are-ensuring-safety-of-pilgrims-">the major challenge</a>. The stakes are high for the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-fears-put-a-halt-to-the-muslim-pilgrimage-of-umrah-but-not-yet-the-hajj-132943">Umrah</a>: It is expected to provide a safe, healthy and spiritually meaningful experience for all pilgrims, while avoiding any bad press for the host country. Umrah, known as the “lesser pilgrimage”, is recommended but not required for Muslims. It includes many of the hajj rituals but can be completed at any time of the year.</p>
<p>Now, with its own digital tools and devices in the hands of many pilgrims, the 21st century hajj fits within the longer history of technology and the hajj, a story nearly 200 years old. Even as the specific technologies have changed, their importance to the management of the hajj and to pilgrims’ spiritual experiences remains constant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Stanton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Saudi government is using digital technology to help the hajj run smoothly and safely – the latest updates in a 200-year history of technology and the hajj.Andrea Stanton, Associate Professor of Islamic Studies & Faculty Affiliate, Center for Middle East Studies, University of DenverLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.