tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/secession-5705/articlesSecession – The Conversation2024-01-24T13:28:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215022024-01-24T13:28:13Z2024-01-24T13:28:13ZSomaliland has been pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia<p><em>Somaliland declared itself an independent state in 1991. It used colonial boundary lines to separate itself from Somalia. More than three decades later, however, it has yet to gain international recognition. It has had a difficult relationship with Somalia. A recent memorandum of understanding to grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea threatens the relationship further. But it could support Somaliland’s quest for recognition as an independent state. We asked <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2397-7303">Aleksi Ylönen</a>, who has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for independence, some questions about this situation.</em></p>
<h2>1. What has Somaliland achieved in its quest for statehood?</h2>
<p>Somaliland unilaterally <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1877&context=auilr">declared its independence in 1991</a>, based heavily on its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Somaliland">separate colonial experience</a> from Somalia. Britain declared a Somaliland protectorate in 1884. Italy established another protectorate, which became a colony, in 1889. </p>
<p>British Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960. It voluntarily joined the former Italian Somaliland upon its independence on 1 July 1960 to form Somalia. </p>
<p>This union <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/republic-somalilands-position-somaliland-somalia-talks">was never formally ratified</a> and eventually fell apart. </p>
<p>In the decades since 1991, Somaliland’s people and their representatives have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4392784">emphasised</a> their distinct colonial status and associated borders. Regional organisations and foreign powers have adhered to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2705705">colonial boundaries</a> when recognising independent states in post-colonial Africa. </p>
<p>Somaliland’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2013.776279">political system</a> is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">democratic</a> in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans. </p>
<p>Somaliland has organised <a href="https://www.hadiamedical.ch/DE/pdf/Somaliland%20Elections.pdf">successful elections</a> and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently, however, there has been some <a href="https://www.eisa.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2022-journal-of-african-elections-v21n2-elections-electoral-processes-somaliland-fading-democracy-eisa.pdf">backsliding</a>.</p>
<p>Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured <a href="https://www.communitypolicing.eu/ehandbook/country-specific-information/africa/somaliland/">a measure of internal stability and security</a> in an otherwise troubled region. </p>
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<p>No United Nations member state or global organisation recognises Somaliland’s independence officially. Still, Somaliland <a href="https://www.republicofsomaliland.com/">has unofficial diplomatic relations</a> with various UN member states. It also maintains relations with other <a href="https://unpo.org/nations-peoples">marginalised nations and territories</a> and partially recognised <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-somaliland-ties-growing-despite-diplomatic-isolation/">Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>Several foreign nations have representative offices in its capital, Hargeisa. It maintains <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/visa-consular-services-1">liaison offices</a> in 20 countries on five continents. </p>
<h2>2. How would you describe the relationship with Somalia?</h2>
<p>It’s turbulent. </p>
<p>The Federal Republic of Somalia rejects Somaliland’s independence and agreements with foreign parties. Meanwhile, Somaliland has <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/somaliland-accuses-somalia-of-attacks-despite-truce-f80371da">accused Mogadishu</a> of involvement in the <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB235834/full/html">conflict</a> in its eastern territories.</p>
<p>Negotiations over their relationship have taken place from time to time <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335684954_The_Somaliland-Somalia_Talks_in_2012-2015_A_Critical_Appraisal_Somali_Studies_Vol_4_2019">since 2012</a>, with little progress. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s recent announcement of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">memorandum of understanding</a> with Somaliland has set back relations between Somaliland and Somalia even further.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi in January <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566">announced a plan</a> to give Ethiopia access to 20km of the Somaliland shoreline. </p>
<p>In exchange, Ethiopia said it would <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">seriously consider</a> Somaliland’s aim of international recognition. The exchange also included Somaliland getting a stake in Ethiopian Airlines or EthioTelecom. </p>
<p>The government of Somalia reacted swiftly to this announcement. </p>
<p>It held an emergency parliamentary session and withdrew its ambassador from Ethiopia for consultations. It also declared the proposed deal “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240102-somalia-recalls-envoy-to-ethiopia-over-null-and-void-somaliland-port-deal">null and void</a>” and a sign of Ethiopian “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390">aggression</a>” towards Somalia. </p>
<h2>3. What other bilateral arrangements has Somaliland signed?</h2>
<p>Many of the deals Somaliland has made with foreign agencies haven’t been made public. It does have unofficial diplomatic ties with various countries. It has also made agreements with <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/09/19/waiting-for-ethiopia-hopes-and-aspirations-of-port-infrastructure-development-in-the-horn-of-africa/">foreign countries and organisations linked to their political elites</a>. </p>
<p>These include deals around <a href="https://africanreview.com/manufacturing/water-a-environment/british-government-signs-us-38mn-deal-to-support-development-in-somaliland">infrastructure development and management</a>, as well as <a href="https://african.business/2023/07/trade-investment/first-ever-funded-startup-sparks-somaliland-investment-hopes">investment</a> and <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/exploration/genel-boosts-somaliland-block-stake/2-1-704070">natural resource extraction</a>.</p>
<p>Ethiopia-Somaliland ties have been strong for decades. </p>
<p>In the early 1980s, Addis Ababa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/723037.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac99d580633354dfaf07401242dbf6900&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1">provided sanctuary</a> for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Somali-National-Movement">Somali National Movement</a>, which sought to topple the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohamed-Siad-Barre">repressive Siad Barre</a> administration in Somalia. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, Ethiopia eyed Somaliland as a possible import-export route to the sea to lower its reliance on Djibouti. </p>
<p>As a result, Dubai Ports World, a state-linked United Arab Emirates ports and logistics company, <a href="https://www.horndiplomat.com/2016/08/22/dp-world-dubai-opens-door-for-ethiopia-in-somaliland/">agreed</a> with the Somaliland administration to develop and manage the Berbera port in 2016. Two years later, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/somaliland-defends-stake-sale-of-dp-world-berbera-port-to-ethiopia-1.710037">agreed to take a 19% stake</a> in a Berbera port consortium. </p>
<p>Although Ethiopia <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366">didn’t follow through</a>, it still had plans for a logistics corridor through Somaliland. </p>
<h2>4. What can Ethiopia offer Somaliland on the independence issue?</h2>
<p>The understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa includes a provision for an <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-in-depth-assessment-of-somalilands-recognition-bid-by-ethiopia-part-of-mou/">in-depth assessment</a> of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This would make Ethiopia the first UN member state to recognise it.</p>
<p>It would give Somaliland what it wants most. Recognition would help open doors for international public financing and raise Somaliland’s status in the region.</p>
<p>Ethiopia seems committed to the proposed deal. Some of the reasons for this include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>its wish for sea access </p></li>
<li><p>its strong ties with Somaliland</p></li>
<li><p>national security advisor <a href="https://twitter.com/addisstandard/status/1742164114351247808?t=hctuznfeOoXdYeDY7PzDXQ&s=09">Redwan Hussien’s comments</a> that discussions would include other sectors of collaboration. Ethiopia is already talking to Somaliland <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ethiopia-holds-military-cooperation-talks-with-somaliland-4486080">about military cooperation</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Somaliland is holding a long-delayed presidential election towards the end of 2024. Gaining international recognition would likely give President Muse Bihi Abdi a second term in office, even though he has been <a href="https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/ucid-chairman-muse-bihi-mishandled-the-defense-of-somaliland/">criticised for mishandling</a> the <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/inside-the-newest-conflict-in-somalias-long-civil-war/">conflict in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands</a>. People in this area have tried to set up their own state as part of federal Somalia.</p>
<h2>5. Why has Somaliland made so little progress and what needs to change?</h2>
<p>Achieving recognition has been a <a href="https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/article/about-mfa">foreign policy priority</a> for Somaliland. All administrations have <a href="https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/24272-a-shadow-on-tomorrows-dreams--somalilands-struggle">made efforts</a> to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/butty-somaliland-20th-anniversary-nur-18may11-122134824/158138.html">raise awareness</a> about its situation internationally. </p>
<p>But international politics have not favoured Somaliland. Most states, including great and middle powers, <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">fear that recognising Somaliland could be destabilising</a>. They have opted to support unity, and peace and state building of federal Somalia. </p>
<p>One of their reasons for non-recognition is that Somaliland’s 1991 self-declaration of independence may appear illegal under international law.</p>
<p>In my view, it’s wrong to think that dividing up states inevitably causes instability and conflict. Each case is unique and deserves consideration based on historical and legal arguments, as well as current conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aleksi Ylönen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia has maintained strong ties with Somaliland since the 1980s when it supported a rebel movement in the breakaway region.Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172172023-11-26T08:40:58Z2023-11-26T08:40:58ZWhat is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect<p><a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0CQBBAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Elazar,+federalism&ots=7_EoePhxVm&sig=vtSyxjKaMi8qqzhyHsk9Oj_OIrU#v=onepage&q=Elazar%2C%20federalism&f=false">Federalism</a> is a system of government where power is shared between a central authority and smaller regional governments. </p>
<p>Many countries adopt federalism to manage ethnic diversity within their borders and help promote unity. There are <a href="https://forumfed.org/countries/">25 federal countries globally</a>, representing 40% of the world’s population. </p>
<p>Federalism allows regions to govern some of their affairs – such as decisions regarding education or working languages – while being part of the larger country. </p>
<p>Ethiopia adopted federalism in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four major parties – came to power. This followed 17 years of insurgencies to depose the Derg, a communist military junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1991.</p>
<p>The primary aim of Ethiopian federalism is to accommodate the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-modern-ethiopia-18551991/C0852BA84C34071333C899ACC8F1C863">diverse ethnic groups</a>. Before 1991, Ethiopia had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">centralised unitary government</a> that suppressed diversity. It restricted ethnic groups from using their languages in official settings and schools. </p>
<p>Ethiopian federalism grants ethnic groups the <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">right to self-determination</a>. An ethnic group can form its own region or become an independent country. This approach has drawn both praise and criticism. </p>
<p>Some academics view it as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/524968">novel approach</a> to resolving conflicts and preventing state disintegration. It’s impossible to forge unity without the voluntary alliance and assurance of the right to self-determination. Others <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/abs/ethiopias-leap-in-the-dark-federalism-and-selfdetermination-in-the-new-constitution/A05454ABA30C4C79F78DD7397FF91BED">argue that it worsens tensions</a> and could eventually lead to disintegration. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">studied</a> Ethiopian politics for more than a decade, with a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac039">focus</a> on <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/92367/">the implementation of federalism</a>. After more than 30 years, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated. </p>
<p>In my view, federalism remains the best approach for Ethiopia. It allows for cultural and language freedoms. It enables self-rule at regional levels, and has contributed to economic growth. The system, however, is not without its drawbacks. An increase in democratic space would allow more voices to be heard.</p>
<h2>How Ethiopian federalism works</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s approach to federalism is bold <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">compared to other highly diverse African</a> federal states. Nigeria, for instance, has avoided constitutional recognition of ethnic diversity. <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">Article 39 of Ethiopia’s federal constitution</a>, adopted in 1995, explicitly acknowledges the country’s ethnic diversity.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is a federation comprising nations and nationalities, each possessing sovereignty as defined in <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=4">Article 8 of the constitution</a>. Nations and nationalities with defined territorial homelands have the right to establish their own regions or even seek independence. </p>
<p>There are 12 regions in the country, each with <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=20">extensive authority</a>. This includes policymaking, constitution making, choosing a working language, and maintaining regional police and civil services.</p>
<p>However, the exercise of these powers has been constrained by <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/28/5/article-p972_972.xml">the dominance of the party system</a>. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2019, the EPRDF tightly controlled regional governments. It <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">suppressed any demands for self-rule</a>. The coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 helped open up the political space. The prime minister established the Prosperity Party by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50515636">merging three of the parties that made up the EPRDF</a>, as well as its smaller affiliates. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front refused to amalgamate. </p>
<p>Abiy addressed some of the demands from various ethnic groups for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">regional status</a>. He created three <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/ethiopia-creates-a-12th-regional-state-/7168313.html">additional regions</a> between 2019 and 2023.</p>
<p>The working of Ethiopian federalism, however, depends on the party system. Party norms often supersede constitutional principles. Internal party crises tend to lead to government instability and potential conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">Tigray war</a> between 2020 and 2022 is a stark example. It originated from tensions between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the federal government. Disagreement was triggered by <a href="https://doi.org/10.14321/nortafristud.21.2.011v">the dissolution of the EPRDF</a>.</p>
<h2>Major benefits</h2>
<p>Ethiopian federalism has had three major benefits. </p>
<p>First, it allows for language and cultural freedom. The country’s 80 ethnic groups fought long and hard to secure their rights to culture, language and identity. More than <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096221097663#tab-contributors">57 of Ethiopia’s 80 languages</a> are used as mediums of instruction in schools. </p>
<p>Second, the system has allowed many <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">ethnic groups to exercise self-rule</a> in areas where they constitute the majority. Ethnic minorities are also entitled to form local governments, such as district administrations. </p>
<p>Third, the federal system has contributed to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%20aims%20to%20reach%20lower-middle-income%20status%20by%202025.,one%20of%20the%20highest%20rates%20in%20the%20world.">country’s economic growth</a> and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">relative stability</a>. It achieved this by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2020">decentralising power and resources</a> to regions and local governments.</p>
<h2>Key challenges</h2>
<p>One of the primary challenges of Ethiopian federalism lies in its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2015.1124580">inability to entirely resolve conflicts</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts – for instance in the western region of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/ethiopia-ethnic-killings.html">Benishangul-Gumuz</a> and in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce">western Tigray</a> – are instigated partly by the system’s attempt to empower a particular ethnic group in an area. This has created divisions between empowered groups and others. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://ethiopia.iom.int/news/more-438-million-people-displaced-ethiopia-more-half-due-conflict-new-iom-report">recent report</a> by the International Organization for Migration found that more than half of the 4.4 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia left their homes due to conflict. </p>
<p>A second challenge is the gap between the constitution and the practice of political rights. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">Certain ethnic groups have not exercised their rights</a> due to political repression. </p>
<p>Since Abiy assumed power in 2018, ethnic groups’ demands for regions has increased. The government addressed some of these demands, but repression of certain requests has led to grievances and conflicts. Some ethnic groups are too small to have their own region. </p>
<p>A third challenge is the dominance of the ruling party and the lack of democracy. The tendency of party norms to undermine constitutional principles casts a shadow on the federal system. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While federalism may exist in form, it struggles to operate effectively without democracy and a multiparty system.</p>
<p>In a democratic system, the rule of law and protection of individual rights complement federalism by ensuring respect for citizen rights. A multiparty system would include diverse voices in decision-making and help protect minorities. Following these principles would help build peace and unity in a country as ethnically diverse as Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After more than 30 years of federalism, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069902023-06-08T14:08:37Z2023-06-08T14:08:37ZKenya’s opposition wants to split up the country – but secession calls seldom succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530907/original/file-20230608-22-hj7i1j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s opposition politicians recently called for <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">secession</a> – which is the withdrawal of territory and sovereignty from part of an existing state to create a new state. Led by Raila Odinga, who received <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62554210">48.8%</a> of the presidential vote in Kenya’s 2022 election, the politicians want the country split into two republics to create a new state for Kenyans unhappy with President William Ruto’s leadership.</p>
<p>Calls for secession are not a new political phenomenon in Kenya. </p>
<p>Even before the territory gained independence from Britain in 1963, some Kenyan Somalis had <a href="https://medium.com/@muturi/kenya-that-was-never-kenyan-the-shifta-war-the-north-eastern-kenya-e7fc3dd31865">sought to secede</a> and join neighbouring Somalia. And the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-mombasa-republican-council-liberators-or-nascent-radical-fanatics">Mombasa Republican Council</a>, established in the 1990s, has called for an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/kenya-ocean-coast-secessionist-party">independent state</a> for the coastal people, citing their marginalisation.</p>
<p>Opposition groups also made <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/112/446/48/10197">secession calls</a> after Kenya’s 2007-08 <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These calls were repeated in the run-up to the elections in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-coast-mrc-idUKBRE86M0H820120723">2013</a>. Then in 2017, a bill tabled in parliament proposed creating a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mp-peter-kaluma-drafts-bill-for-secession-of-40-counties-476322?view=htmlamp">People’s Republic of Kenya</a> from 40 of the country’s current 47 counties. Geographically, this new republic would retain nearly 87% of Kenya’s population and 97% of the land mass, leaving behind a nation that would not be economically viable. </p>
<p>Secessionist movements around the world usually result from the belief by some groups within a region or state that they aren’t able to exercise their right to <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm">self-determination</a>. This is their right to determine “<a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm">their own future, political status and independence</a>”, according to the UN. </p>
<p>Self-determination can be <a href="https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/511#:%7E:text=External%20self%2Ddetermination%20is%20the,an%20exercise%20of%20self%2Ddetermination.">external or internal</a>: full independence from other states, or access to political and social rights within a state. The two kinds are related. When governments fail to guarantee internal self-determination, affected groups may seek secession, or external self-determination. </p>
<p>The politicians calling for secession in Kenya argue that some Kenyans have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">systematically deprived</a> of the right to participate in the country’s government and economy. </p>
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<p>Aggrieved groups may seek to form their own independent sovereign state, like the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">Biafrans of Nigeria</a> did between 1967 and 1970. Or they may seek to join another independent state, as the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/oped/comment/what-can-kenya-s-budding-secessionist-movement-learn-from-elsewhere--1378732">Somalis of Kenya</a> did in the 1960s. </p>
<p>In my view as a legal scholar and economist who has studied the political economy in Africa for close to two decades, any group in Kenya that unilaterally declares independence is unlikely to find support on the continent. Additionally, Kenyan politicians have yet to prove that aggrieved groups have been systematically denied the right to participate in the government and the economy in meaningful ways. </p>
<h2>Colonial borders</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-totally-rejects-the-so-called-declaration-of-independence-by-a-rebel-group-in-northern-mali">African Union</a> has been against secession since it was first established as the Organisation of African Unity in <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">1963</a>. </p>
<p>The organisation refused to intervene in the Nigerian civil war sparked by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">Biafran secession of 1967</a>, calling it an internal affair. And in Mali, in response to the declaration of the independent state of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406">Azawad</a> by northern Tuaregs in 2012, the union rejected this, terming it “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406">null and of no value whatsoever</a>”. </p>
<p>The union’s chairperson at the time, <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-comm-mali-2-06-04-2012.docx-eng.pdf">Jean Ping</a>, emphasised the </p>
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<p>fundamental principle of the intangibility of borders inherited by African countries at their accession to independence.</p>
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<p>This echoes <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=8">Article 4(b)</a> of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. It states that the continental organisation shall respect the borders that existed at independence. The act also calls on the union to defend the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=7">territorial integrity</a> of its member states. This presents it with a dilemma when it comes to addressing secessionist movements. </p>
<p>The answer to this dilemma is for the African Union to establish a legal mechanism for recognising legitimate struggles for secession. These include struggles that offer a <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=114130#:%7E:text=Van%20Der%20Driest%20defines%20remedial,or%20domestic%20constitutional%20authorization%2C%20yet">remedy</a> for grave and systematic injustices.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-breakdown-of-biafra-separatism-and-where-kanu-fits-into-the-picture-166235">A breakdown of Biafra separatism, and where Kanu fits into the picture</a>
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</em>
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<p>This was seen in South Sudan in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">2011</a>. The South Sudanese people based their push to secede on the argument that since independence in <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0721/South-Sudan-5-key-questions-answered/Why-did-the-Republic-of-South-Sudan-secede-from-the-North#:%7E:text=The%20decision%20to%20secede%20can,Sudan%20became%20independent%20in%201956.">1956</a>, Khartoum had systematically marginalised them and denied them the right to pursue their political, economic and social development within a united Sudan. </p>
<p>At the end of a brutal civil war (<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/">1985 to 2005</a>), the warring parties signed a peace agreement. It granted southerners the option to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">pursue self-determination</a>. Sudan <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20100628-sudan-agrees-commission-southern-referendum">approved</a> of South Sudan’s independence push.</p>
<p>National governments can also establish constitutional processes that allow aggrieved groups to peacefully and constitutionally petition for separation. This has been done in the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9104/">UK</a> and <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-31.8/page-1.html">Canada</a>. Such constitutional mechanisms <a href="https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/secession">can encourage</a> aggrieved groups to seek internal instead of external self-determination.</p>
<p>While secession can involve the use of force – as it did in Biafra and South Sudan – it can also be achieved through peaceful means. Scotland’s ongoing bid to become independent of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-16/nicola-sturgeon-resigned-what-s-next-for-scottish-independence#xj4y7vzkg">Britain</a> is a case in point. </p>
<h2>Kenya’s obstacles</h2>
<p>Secession by Kenya’s aggrieved groups or peoples is unlikely to succeed as it faces four major obstacles.</p>
<p>First, as is clear from the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a>, any move to interfere with Kenya’s territorial integrity is unlikely to be supported by the organisation. </p>
<p>Second, it’s not likely that the post-secession state will gain the approval of the UN Security Council and then that of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly to be admitted to the UN. This is largely because the secessionists have not yet made a credible case for splitting Kenya into two states. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-secessionist-conflict-has-its-genesis-in-colonialism-its-time-to-reflect-158953">Ghana's secessionist conflict has its genesis in colonialism: it's time to reflect</a>
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</em>
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<p>Third, secession as <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">envisioned</a> by Kenya’s opposition will create two states, one of which is not likely to be economically viable. This could lead to a civil war. </p>
<p>Fourth, the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=3979#:%7E:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya%2C%202010,specified%20in%20the%20First%20Schedule.">2010 constitution</a> <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/brief/kenyas-devolution">devolved power</a> from the central government in Nairobi in favour of local communities in 47 regions. This significantly improved the ability of various groups to govern themselves and participate in their own economic, social and cultural development. </p>
<p>Politicians and aggrieved groups need to exercise the right to self-determination through this decentralised governance process. Through it, they can help create a participatory, inclusive and development-oriented government and economy in a united Kenya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls to secede have been heard from time to time in Kenya – most often around elections.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052812023-05-29T12:29:09Z2023-05-29T12:29:09ZWhat really started the American Civil War?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527606/original/file-20230522-23-ijaoe1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C5770%2C4022&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 600,000 soldiers died during the American Civil War.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/battle-of-kennesaw-mountain-royalty-free-illustration/1152759368?adppopup=true">Keith Lance/Digital Vision Vectors via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=293&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/281719/original/file-20190628-76743-26slbc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/curious-kids-us-74795">Curious Kids</a> is a series for children of all ages. If you have a question you’d like an expert to answer, send it to <a href="mailto:curiouskidsus@theconversation.com">curiouskidsus@theconversation.com</a>.</em></p>
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<p><strong>What really started the Civil War? – Abbey, age 7, Stone Ridge, New York</strong></p>
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<p><a href="https://www.boundless.com/immigration-resources/citizenship-test-questions-and-answers/#american-history-">The U.S. citizenship test</a> – which immigrants must pass before becoming citizens of the United States – has this question: “Name one problem that led to the Civil War.” It lists three possible correct answers: “slavery,” “economic reasons” and “states’ rights.” </p>
<p>But as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=SsoLG_0AAAAJ&hl=en">a historian and professor</a> who studies slavery, Southern history and the American Civil War, I know there’s really only one correct answer: slavery. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="1862 photo of enslaved people and soldiers on a plantation, standing for the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527601/original/file-20230522-4578-n3onvk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Enslaved people and soldiers on a South Carolina plantation in 1862.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-enslaved-people-and-soldiers-on-the-plantation-of-news-photo/1402910706">Henry P. Moore/LOC/Archive Photos via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>White Southerners left the Union to establish a slave-holding republic; they were <a href="https://www.nps.gov/liho/learn/historyculture/slavery-cause-civil-war.htm">dedicated to the preservation of slavery</a>. </p>
<p>What’s more, unlike slavery in the ancient world, slavery in the United States <a href="https://chssp.sf.ucdavis.edu/resources/curriculum/lessons/was-slavery-always-racial">was based on race</a>. By the time of the Civil War, Black people were the ones enslaved; white people were not. </p>
<p>Every American citizen, whether born in this country or naturalized, should understand that the conflict over slavery is what caused the Civil War. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Slavery in the U.S. began at least as early as 1619, when a Portuguese ship brought about <a href="https://www.nps.gov/fomr/planyourvisit/first-african-landing.htm">20 enslaved African people to present-day Virginia</a>. It grew so quickly that by the time Colonists fought for their independence from England in 1775, slavery was <a href="https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/12/before-there-were-red-and-blue-states-there-were-free-states-and-slave-states/#:%7E">legal in all 13 Colonies</a>.</p>
<p>As the 19th century progressed, Northern states <a href="https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/slavery/experience/freedom/history.html#:%7E">slowly abolished slavery</a>; but Southern states made it central to their economy. By 1860, nearly 4 million enslaved people lived in the South. </p>
<p>Increasingly, the North and South were at odds over the future of slavery. White Southerners believed slavery had to expand into new territories or it would die. In 1845, they pressured the federal government <a href="https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/annexation">to annex Texas, where slavery was legal</a>. They also supported an effort to <a href="https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1854OstendManifesto.pdf">purchase Cuba and add it as a slave state</a>. </p>
<p>In the North, people generally opposed the expansion of slavery into new territories, and many favored the gradual emancipation of enslaved people. A smaller group, known as abolitionists, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/abolitionist-movement">wanted slavery to end immediately</a>. </p>
<p>But even though many Northerners opposed the expansion of slavery, they <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2957.html">did not favor equal rights for Black people</a>. In most Northern states, segregation was rampant, Blacks were barred from voting and violence against them was common.</p>
<p>By the 1850s, it became more difficult for the federal government to satisfy either side. <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/compromise-of-1850#:%7E">The Compromise of 1850</a>, a series of bills that tried to solve the problem, pleased almost no one.</p>
<p>The publication of the 1852 novel “<a href="https://www.harrietbeecherstowecenter.org/harriet-beecher-stowe/uncle-toms-cabin/">Uncle Tom’s Cabin</a>” – about the pain and injustice inflicted on an enslaved man – turned Northerners against slavery even more. In the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/dred-scott-v-sandford">1857 Dred Scott decision</a>, the Supreme Court ruled that enslaved people were not U.S. citizens, nor could Congress ban slavery in a federal territory. Two years later, the abolitionist John Brown <a href="https://www.battlefields.org/learn/topics/john-browns-harpers-ferry-raid">attacked a federal arsenal in Harpers Ferry, Virginia</a>, in an unsuccessful attempt to supply weapons to enslaved people.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Dressed in a three-piece suit, Abraham Lincoln sits for a photograph." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528041/original/file-20230524-21-b3wwpj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A digitally restored photograph of President Abraham Lincoln, taken during the American Civil War.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/portrait-of-president-abraham-lincoln-royalty-free-image/640971707">National Archives/Stocktrek Images via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Lincoln becomes president, secession follows</h2>
<p>Amid this swirl of troubles, the presidential election of 1860 took place. A new political party, the Republican Party, was opposed to the spread of slavery throughout the western territories. With four major candidates running for president, <a href="https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/abraham-lincoln">Abraham Lincoln</a> won the electoral vote – but only 40% of the popular vote. </p>
<p>The election of a president from a party that opposed slavery jolted white Southerners to action. Less than two months after Lincoln won, South Carolina delegates, meeting in Charleston, decided to secede from the Union – that is, to <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp">formally withdraw membership in the United States</a>. </p>
<p>Other Southern states followed and said slavery was the primary reason for secession. Texas delegates wrote the abolition of slavery “would bring <a href="https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/secession/2feb1861.html">inevitable calamities upon both races and desolation</a>” in the slave states. The <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_missec.asp">Mississippi secession document</a> said “our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery – the greatest material interest in the world.” </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZKWrxZN5jmM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The hundreds of brutal, bloody battles of the Civil War took a terrible toll on the country.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Confederate supporters made their position clear</h2>
<p>The vice president of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens, also said slavery was the reason for secession, and that Thomas Jefferson’s words in the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript">Declaration of Independence</a> – that all men are created equal – were wrong. </p>
<p>“Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea,” <a href="https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/cornerstone-speech">Stephens told a crowd</a>. “Its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition.” </p>
<p>Although the evidence shows slavery caused the Civil War, some Southerners created a myth – <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lost-Cause">the “Lost Cause</a>” – that transformed Confederate generals into heroes who were defending freedom. To some degree, that myth has, unfortunately, taken hold. Some schools are still <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/17/us/confederate-schools-trnd/index.html">named after Confederate generals</a>; <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-military-bases-honoring-confederate-figures-slated-to-get-new-names-/6641654.html">so are some military bases</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/symbols-of-the-confederacy-are-slowly-coming-down-from-us-military-bases-3-essential-reads-205729">although that is changing</a>. </p>
<p>It’s important to know the real reason for the Civil War so the country no longer celebrates historical figures who fought to establish a slave-holding republic.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to clarify that the colonies became states in the United States of America.</em></p>
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<p><em>Hello, curious kids! Do you have a question you’d like an expert to answer? Ask an adult to send your question to <a href="mailto:curiouskidsus@theconversation.com">CuriousKidsUS@theconversation.com</a>. Please tell us your name, age and the city where you live.</em></p>
<p><em>And since curiosity has no age limit – adults, let us know what you’re wondering, too. We won’t be able to answer every question, but we will do our best.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Gudmestad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There was one central reason the Civil War happened.Robert Gudmestad, Professor and Chair of History Department, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2034932023-04-20T12:41:21Z2023-04-20T12:41:21ZWhite Tennessee lawmakers speak out for insurrection in honoring Confederate history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521362/original/file-20230417-1000-2uvs3y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C15%2C5084%2C3794&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Tennessee State Capitol. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-view-of-tennessee-state-capitol-news-photo/1449200189?adppopup=true">Joe Sohm/Visions of America/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ghost of the Confederacy hangs heavily over the Tennessee Legislature. </p>
<p>Justin Jones, one of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/14/us/justin-pearson-justin-jones-tennessee.html">two Black members expelled</a> from the state’s House of Representatives in April 2023, had run afoul of House leadership before. In 2019, as a private citizen, he was arrested following his actions in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/aed77e8d3dcc4ae7ac7386a7df96b068">protesting a bust</a> in the state capitol <a href="https://www.newschannel5.com/news/the-history-of-the-nathan-bedford-forrest-busts-move-from-the-capitol-to-the-state-museum">honoring Nathan Bedford Forrest</a>, a Confederate general and later Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.</p>
<p>While the expulsion of Jones and his colleague, Justin J. Pearson, riveted the nation’s attention, a curious and related event in the Legislature’s other branch, the Tennessee Senate, passed nearly unnoticed.</p>
<p>On Feb. 3, 2023, two state senators issued a formal proclamation commemorating April 2023 as <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/2643/Proclamation.pdf?1681739436">Confederate History Month</a> and encouraging “all Tennesseans to increase their knowledge of this momentous era in the history of this State.” </p>
<p>One of the signers is <a href="https://www.capitol.tn.gov/senate/speaker.html">Senate Speaker Randy McNally</a>, who is also the state’s lieutenant governor; the other is <a href="https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/legislatorinfo/member.aspx?district=S17">Sen. Mark Pody from Lebanon</a>. Though not considered in legislative session and not listed on the Legislature’s website, the proclamation holds an official stature: It was issued on Senate stationery and stamped with the Tennessee state seal.</p>
<p>The proclamation’s wording closely follows that of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/07/virginia.confederate.history/index.html">a proclamation issued</a> by Virginia’s Gov. Robert McDonnell in April 2010, with one striking exception. McDonnell’s <a href="https://wamu.org/story/10/04/07/mcdonnell_apologizes_changes_language_of_confederate_history_month_proclamation/">proclamation in final form</a> included a paragraph, inserted after protests to an earlier version, stating “that it is important for all Virginians to understand that the institution of slavery led to this war.” </p>
<p>The Tennessee proclamation, which includes eight introductory clauses celebrating “the cause of Southern liberty,” says nothing of slavery at all. Rather, it declares that Confederates conducted “a four-year heroic struggle for states’ rights, individual freedom, local government control, and a determined struggle for deeply held beliefs.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521603/original/file-20230418-22-930gfs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1007&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A proclamation of the Tennessee Senate declares April 2023 Confederate History Month.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tennessee State Senate</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Safeguarding slavery</h2>
<p>As we <a href="https://history.utk.edu/people/daniel-feller/">historians of the Civil War</a> have tirelessly pointed out, the documentary record speaks clearly of the motive behind that “heroic struggle.” </p>
<p>Both official proceedings and private utterances prove abundantly that there was <a href="https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/reasons-secession">only one reason</a> to secede from the United States and create a new Confederacy. <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2011/04/12/135353655/slavery-not-states-rights-was-civil-wars-cause">That was to safeguard racial slavery</a> from the threat posed by the election of an antislavery Northerner, Abraham Lincoln, as president of the United States.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Confederate-States-of-America">Tennessee seceded later</a> than other states, after the Confederate firing on Fort Sumter. Lincoln’s responding call for troops made plain that there would be a war and that Tennessee, like other fence-sitting Upper South states, would have to choose sides. </p>
<p>The record of the state’s reasons is easy to find, and would have been available to the authors of the recent proclamation. In 2021, the University of Tennessee Press published “<a href="https://utpress.org/title/tennessee-secedes/">Tennessee Secedes: A Documentary History</a>.” It shows that in Tennessee, as elsewhere, the protection of slavery was the sole motive for secession.</p>
<p>In 1861, Gov. Isham Harris convened the state’s Legislature with <a href="https://civilwarcauses.org/harris.htm">a message denouncing the North’s</a> “systematic, wanton, and long continued agitation of the slavery question,” crowned by the insulting election of a president who “asserted the equality of the black with the white race.” </p>
<p>Harris went on:</p>
<p>“To evade the issue thus forced upon us at this time, without the fullest security for our rights, is, in my opinion, fatal to the institution of slavery forever. The time has arrived when the people of the South must prepare either to abandon or to fortify and maintain it. Abandon it, we cannot, interwoven as it is with our wealth, prosperity and domestic happiness.”</p>
<p>In all the deliberations that followed, no cause or grievance but slavery was mentioned.</p>
<p>Yet these basic facts go unacknowledged in a proclamation that boldly declares that knowledge of Confederate history is “vital to understanding who we are and what we are.”</p>
<p>Other omissions in the proclamation are equally curious. </p>
<p>Tennessee’s role in the Confederacy was uniquely conflicted. Thousands of citizens, especially in mountainous East Tennessee, <a href="https://tennesseeencyclopedia.net/entries/civil-war/">opposed secession</a>. Ignoring “local government control,” the state suppressed their dissent by force. </p>
<p>Some 50,000 Tennesseans, white and Black, spurned the Confederacy and <a href="https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/2017/08/26/east-tennessee-civil-war-pro-union-divided/599123001/">fought for the United States</a> – more than from any other Confederate state. The proclamation silently erases not only their struggle and sacrifice but their very existence.</p>
<h2>‘Be not deceived by names’</h2>
<p>Whether the Confederacy should be celebrated or condemned depends inescapably on point of view. </p>
<p>The proclamation casts the Confederacy in the mode of the American Revolution. The picture it paints is of a noble, if unsuccessful, attempt to erect a new self-governing independent nation – ignoring the fact that the institution of human slavery was at its center, as the <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csa.asp">Confederate constitution</a> made clear. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A poster announcing the sale of an enslaved man named Dick and an enslaved girl named Lydia in Cross Plains, Tenn., dated June 18, 1857." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=960&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=960&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521371/original/file-20230417-16-gi4qzo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=960&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Broadside announcing the sale of an enslaved man named Dick and an enslaved girl named Lydia in Cross Plains, Tenn., dated June 18, 1857.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/broadside-announcing-the-sale-of-an-enslaved-man-named-dick-news-photo/1326279488?adppopup=true">Heritage Art/Heritage Images via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet from another perspective, the Confederacy was nothing more than an armed mass rebellion against a legitimately elected government. </p>
<p>It was, ironically, a famous Tennessean, President Andrew Jackson, who had <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jack01.asp">warned would-be seceders</a> in an official proclamation in 1832: “Be not deceived by names. Disunion by armed force is treason. Are you really ready to incur its guilt?” </p>
<p><a href="https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-4-1861-july-4th-message-congress">Lincoln labeled the Confederacy an “insurrection”</a> within the United States itself, which the government and loyal citizens had not only a right but a duty to put down. </p>
<p>In words that echo today, Lincoln also observed that if the United States won its battle against forcible dismemberment, “it will then have been proved that, among free men, there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet; and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case, <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-james-c-conkling">and pay the cost</a>.”</p>
<h2>Celebrating insurrection</h2>
<p>The old adage that the victors write history is true at least to this extent. Generally the American Revolutionaries are deemed patriot heroes rather than rebels and traitors because they won their war, and because the course of subsequent history appears to have vindicated their cause. </p>
<p>Yet many Confederate acolytes, the proclamation’s sponsors among them, seem to have difficulty confronting what the Confederacy actually stood for. Hence, citizens serving in government – who upon entering their offices take a solemn oath to <a href="https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/Apps/GeneralAssembly/About.aspx">uphold and defend the United States Constitution</a> and begin their daily sessions by pledging allegiance to “<a href="https://www.legion.org/flag/pledge">one Nation indivisible</a>” – chose to officially exalt a failed attempt to overthrow that Constitution and dismember the nation that it bound together. </p>
<p>Under a statute enacted in 2021, Tennessee public school teachers are <a href="https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/education/legal/Prohibited%20Concepts%20in%20Instruction%20Rule%207.29.21%20FINAL.pdf">barred from using</a> instructional materials “promoting or advocating the violent overthrow of the United States government.” </p>
<p>No such prohibition applies to state legislators.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203493/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Feller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An official proclamation issued by two Tennessee lawmakers commemorates Confederate History Month, fails to mention slavery and instead honors what it calls a “heroic struggle for states’ rights.”Daniel Feller, Emeritus Professor of History, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2008132023-03-20T12:42:57Z2023-03-20T12:42:57ZSecession is here: States, cities and the wealthy are already withdrawing from America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515905/original/file-20230316-20-kjjhgl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C2117%2C1406&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Acts of secession are happening across the U.S.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/illustration/poster-map-united-states-of-america-with-royalty-free-illustration/610663444?phrase=U.S.%20map&adppopup=true">Vector Illustration/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Republican from Georgia, wants a “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/marjorie-taylor-greene-refuses-back-national-divorce-proposal/story?id=97390020">national divorce</a>.” In her view, another Civil War is inevitable unless red and blue states form separate countries. </p>
<p>She has <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/texas-republican-bill-secession-referendum-1234691622/">plenty of company</a> on the <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/21/secession-donald-trump-449348">right</a>, where a host of others – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/12/13/how-seriously-should-we-take-talk-of-us-state-secession/">52% of Trump voters</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-wants-parts-of-the-country-to-secede--at-least-in-their-minds/2020/10/22/7f4bc048-148f-11eb-ad6f-36c93e6e94fb_story.html">Donald Trump himself</a> and <a href="https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/are-texas-republicans-serious-about-secession/">prominent Texas Republicans</a> – have endorsed various forms of secession in recent years. Roughly <a href="https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/new-initiative-explores-deep-persistent-divides-between-biden-and-trump-voters/">40% of Biden voters</a> have fantasized about a national divorce as well. Some on the <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/140948/bluexit-blue-states-exit-trump-red-america">left</a>
urge a domestic breakup so that a new <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/secession-constitution-elections-senate/">egalitarian nation</a> might be, as Lincoln said at Gettysburg, “brought forth on this continent.” </p>
<p>The American Civil War was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWpe3lsWZpQ">national trauma</a> precipitated by the secession of 11 Southern states over slavery. It is, therefore, understandable that many <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/02/states-disunion-secession-movements-richard-kreitner/673191/">pundits and commentators</a> would <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/02/sean-hannity-marjorie-taylor-greene-secessionist">weigh in</a> about the <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3869319-us-secession-is-a-great-idea-for-russia/">legality, feasibility and wisdom</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/05/opinion/national-divorce-civil-war.html">of secession</a> when others clamor for divorce. </p>
<p>But all this secession talk misses a key point that every troubled couple knows. Just as there are ways to withdraw from a marriage before any formal divorce, there are also ways to exit a nation before officially seceding.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://communication.cofc.edu/about/faculty-staff-listing/lee-michael.php">studied secession</a> for 20 years, and I think that it is not just a “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/3884444-what-if-marjorie-taylor-greenes-secessionist-fantasy-came-true/">what if?</a>” scenario anymore. In “<a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/we-are-not-one-people-9780190876517?lang=en&cc=us">We Are Not One People: Secession and Separatism in American Politics Since 1776</a>,” my co-author and I go beyond narrow discussions of secession and the Civil War to frame secession as an extreme end point on a scale that includes various acts of <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674276604">exit</a> that have already taken place across the U.S. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A blond woman in a pink jacket stands in front of many lights and a marquee that says 'Marjorie Taylor Greene'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515909/original/file-20230316-26-oqmrry.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GOP Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene wants red and blue states to separate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rep-marjorie-taylor-greene-speaks-during-the-annual-news-photo/1470988997?phrase=Marjorie%20Taylor%20Greene&adppopup=true">Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Scaled secession</h2>
<p>This scale begins with smaller, targeted exits, like a person getting out of jury duty, and progresses to include the larger ways that communities refuse to comply with state and federal authorities. </p>
<p>Such refusals could involve legal maneuvers like <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/nullification-definition-and-examples-5203930">interposition</a>, in which a community delays or constrains the enforcement of a law it opposes, or <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315081595-5/overturned-america-nullification-brown-board-education-albert-samuels">nullification</a>, in which a community explicitly declares a law to be null and void within its borders. At the end of the scale, there’s secession.</p>
<p>From this wider perspective, it is clear that many acts of departure – call them secession lite, de facto secession or soft separatism – are occurring right now. Americans have responded to increasing polarization by exploring the gradations between soft separatism and hard secession. </p>
<p>These escalating exits make sense in a <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Why-Were-Polarized/Ezra-Klein/9781476700366">polarized nation</a> whose citizens are sorting themselves into <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo27527354.html">like-minded neighbhorhoods</a>. When compromise is elusive and coexistence is unpleasant, citizens have three options to get their way: Defeat the other side, eliminate the other side or get away from the other side.</p>
<p>Imagine a national law; it could be a mandate that citizens brush their teeth twice a day or a statute criminalizing texting while driving. Then imagine that a special group of people did not have to obey that law. </p>
<p>This quasi-secession can be achieved in several ways. Maybe this special group moves “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILcUScfebJ4">off the grid</a>” into the boondocks where they could text and drive without fear of oversight. Maybe this special group wields political power and can buy, bribe or lawyer their way out of any legal jam. Maybe this special group has persuaded a powerful authority, say Congress or the Supreme Court, to grant them unique <a href="https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/12/6/16741840/religious-liberty-history-law-masterpiece-cakeshop">legal exemptions</a>.</p>
<p>These are hypothetical scenarios, but not imaginary ones. When groups exit public life and its civic duties and burdens, when they live under their own sets of rules, when they do not have to live with fellow citizens they have not chosen or listen to authorities they do not like, they have already seceded.</p>
<h2>Schools to taxes</h2>
<p>Present-day America offers numerous hard examples of soft separatism. </p>
<p>Over the past two decades, <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/27/16004084/school-segregation-evolution">scores</a> of wealthy white communities have separated from more diverse school districts. Advocates cite local control to justify these acts of school secession. But the result is the creation of <a href="https://harvardcrcl.org/opting-out-school-district-secession-and-local-control/">parallel</a> school districts, both relatively homogeneous but vastly different in racial makeup and economic background.</p>
<p>Several prominent district exits have occurred in the South – places like <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2019/05/resegregation-baton-rouge-public-schools/589381/">St. George, Louisiana</a> – but instances from <a href="https://edbuild.org/content/fractured#intro">northern Maine to Southern California</a> show that school splintering <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/14/1111060299/school-segregation-report">is happening nationwide</a>. </p>
<p>As one reporter <a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/9/6/20853091/school-secession-racial-segregation-louisiana-alabama">wrote</a>, “If you didn’t want to attend school with certain people in your district, you just needed to find a way to put a district line between you and them.”</p>
<p>Many other examples of legalized separatism revolve around taxes. Disney World, for example, was classified as a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/business/desantis-disney-world-district.html">special tax district</a>” in Florida in 1967. These special districts are functionally separate local governments and can provide public services and build and maintain their own infrastructure. </p>
<p>The company has saved millions by avoiding typical zoning, permitting and inspection processes for decades, although Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-03-01/what-did-disney-actually-lose-from-its-florida-battle-with-desantis">has recently challenged</a> Disney’s special designation. Disney was only one of 1,800 special tax districts in Florida; there are <a href="https://gfrc.uic.edu/special-districts-americas-shadow-governments/">over 35,000</a> in the nation.</p>
<p>Jeff Bezos paid no federal income taxes in 2011. Elon Musk paid <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seen-records-reveal-how-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax">almost none</a> in 2018. Tales of wealthy individuals <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/08/25/1119412217/how-the-ultrawealthy-devise-ways-to-not-pay-their-share-of-taxes">avoiding taxes</a> are as common as stories of rich Americans buying <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-affluenza-texas-case-20131213-story.html">their way out</a> of jail. “Wealthier Americans,” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/magazine/secession-of-the-successful.html">Robert Reich lamented</a> as far back as the early 1990s, “have been withdrawing into their own neighborhoods and clubs for generations.” Reich worried that a “new secession” allowed the rich to “inhabit a different economy from other Americans.” </p>
<p>Some of the nation’s wealthiest citizens pay an <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-irs-files-trove-of-never-before-seen-records-reveal-how-the-wealthiest-avoid-income-tax">effective tax rate</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57383869">close to zero</a>. As one investigative reporter put it, the ultrawealthy “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57383869">sidestep the system in an entirely legal way</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A lot of people applauding as they sit at a meeting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515921/original/file-20230316-20-londr7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spectators applaud after the Buckingham County Board of Supervisors unanimously votes to pass a Second Amendment sanctuary resolution at a meeting in Buckingham, Va., Dec. 9, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/GunSanctuariesVirginia/dfa46843d6df44f799a5a408248a4f0a/photo?Query=Second%20Amendment%20Sanctuary&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=14&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Steve Helber</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>One nation, divisible</h2>
<p>Schools and taxes are just a start. </p>
<p>Eleven states dub themselves “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/us/politics/missouri-gun-law.html">Second Amendment sanctuaries</a>” and refuse to enforce federal gun restrictions. Movements aiming to carve off rural, more politically conservative portions of blue states <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2023/01/10/county-secession-local-efforts-to-redraw-political-borders/">are growing</a>; 11 counties in Eastern Oregon <a href="https://oregoncapitalchronicle.com/2023/02/15/idaho-house-passes-nonbinding-measure-calling-for-formal-greater-idaho-talks/">support seceding</a> and <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/campaign-to-join-idaho-gains-support-of-two-more-oregon-counties/">reclassifying themselves</a> as “Greater Idaho,” a move that Idaho’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/greater-idaho-movement-lawmakers-house-rural-oregon-counties-join-state-2023-2">state government supports</a>. </p>
<p>Hoping to become a separate state independent of Chicago’s political influence, over two dozen rural Illinois counties have passed <a href="https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-politics/27-counties-in-illinois-have-passed-referendums-to-explore-seceding-from-state-heres-where/2993937/%22">pro-secession referendums</a>. Some <a href="https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/are-texas-republicans-serious-about-secession/">Texas</a> Republicans back “Texit,” where the state becomes an independent nation. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.vermontpublic.org/programs/2017-11-03/what-would-it-look-like-if-vermont-seceded">Separatist ideas</a> come from the Left, too. </p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/calexit-explainer-california-plans-to-secede-2016-11">Cal-exit</a>,” a plan for California to leave the union after 2016, was the most acute recent attempt at secession. </p>
<p>And separatist acts have reshaped life and law in many states. Since 2012, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/07/us/20230306-oklahoma-marijuana-vote-five-charts-dg/index.html">21 states</a> have legalized marijuana, which is <a href="https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/20/17938372/marijuana-legalization-federal-prohibition-drug-scheduling-system">federally illegal</a>. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/made-by-history/2022/09/15/red-states-send-migrants-blue-states-sanctuary-cities-are-crucial/">Sanctuary cities and states</a> have emerged since 2016 to combat aggressive federal immigration laws and policies. Some <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/dozens-elected-prosecutors-say-will-refuse-prosecute-abortion-care-rcna35305">prosecutors and judges refuse</a> to prosecute women and medical providers for newly illegal abortions in some states. </p>
<p>Estimates vary, but some Americans are increasingly opting out of hypermodern, hyperpolarized life entirely. “Intentional communities,” rural, sustainable, cooperative communes like <a href="https://www.ic.org/directory/east-wind-community/">East Wind in the Ozarks</a>, are, as The New York Times reported in 2020, proliferating “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/t-magazine/intentional-communities.html">across the country</a>.”</p>
<p>In many ways, America is already broken apart. When secession is portrayed in its strictest sense, as a group of people declaring independence and taking a portion of a nation as they depart, the discussion is myopic, and current acts of exit hide in plain sight. When it comes to secession, the question is not just “What if?” but “What now?”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200813/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Secession talk evokes fears of a second Civil War. But one scholar says secession is already happening in the US under a variety of guises.Michael J. Lee, Professor of Communication, College of CharlestonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997612023-02-16T14:37:22Z2023-02-16T14:37:22ZHow to poll 93 million voters – the challenge of pulling off Nigeria’s presidential elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510325/original/file-20230215-29-2l84q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters display their permanent voters card during the 2019 Presidential and National Assembly elections in Lagos. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adekunle Ajayi/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria’s registered voters, which the <a href="https://www.inecnigeria.org/">Independent National Electoral Commission</a> has put at <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/preliminary-number-of-registered-voters-in-nigeria-now-93-5m-says-inec">93.5 million</a>, are expected to come out in their numbers in what will be Africa’s biggest election this year.</p>
<p>They will be electing the president and members of the National Assembly on 25 February and governors and members of the State Houses of Assembly on 11 March.</p>
<p>To vote in the elections, Nigerian citizens must be at least 18 years old and must have collected their permanent voter’s card by 5 February. The electoral commission has not yet released the number of people who have collected their cards. The number of collected cards will determine how many people that can be expected to vote.</p>
<p>The logistical challenges for the 2023 elections are huge, given the fact that 18 political parties are contesting, the security environment and the number of contestants at various levels. There are 18 presidential candidates, 1,101 candidates for the Senate and 3,122 candidates vying for federal constituencies in the House of Representatives. The elections will be conducted across 176,606 polling stations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511942/original/file-20230223-330-uixwc4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nigeria election infographic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Infographic: The Conversation Africa / Data: INEC Nigeria – Independent National Electoral Commission</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the presidential election, a three-horse race, could end in a runoff. Candidates of the ruling <a href="https://apc.com.ng/">All Progressives Congress</a>, <a href="https://peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng/">People’s Democratic Party</a> and the <a href="https://labourparty.com.ng/">Labour Party</a> command a large national following, as shown by several <a href="https://www.stears.co/premium/article/stears-poll-predicts-nigerias-next-president/">pre-election polls</a>. </p>
<p>And the cost is huge. Nigeria spends about <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE11.1Aregbeyen.pdf">2% of its GDP</a> on elections. </p>
<p>Logistics, security challenges and malpractice in past elections have led to a focus on the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350467727_Aiyede_Matters_Arising_from_the_2019_Elections_and_Electoral_Reform_Processes">reform of election administration</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.yiaga.org/sites/default/files/portfolio/Signed-Version-of-the-Electoral-Act-2022-compressed.pdf">Electoral Act 2022</a> has given legal backing for any voter accreditation technology that the electoral commission uses. If any technical device used in the election fails to function and isn’t replaced, the election will be cancelled for that voting station and another scheduled within 24 hours. The law also allows the commission to transmit election results electronically. These steps greatly reduce the ability to rig results, compared with manual methods.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerian-elections-eight-issues-young-people-want-the-new-government-to-address-199034">Nigerian elections: Eight issues young people want the new government to address</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>The logistics</h2>
<p>A total of 1,265,227 officials have been trained and will be deployed for the elections. They include presiding, collation and returning officers, as well as 530,538 polling unit security officials.</p>
<p>The Independent National Electoral Commission will issue 1,642,386 identification tags for the polling and collation officers, and provide 176,846 <a href="https://dubawa.org/what-you-need-to-know-about-bimodal-voter-accreditation-system/">Bimodal Voter Accreditation System</a> (BVAS) devices and 17,618 BVAS machines for back-up. These devices verify the identity of voters by checking fingerprints and facial features electronically.</p>
<p>In December 2022, the electoral commission signed a memorandum of understanding with transport unions that will help deploy over one million personnel and large quantities of election materials to 774 local government areas, 8,809 electoral wards and 176,846 polling units across the country.</p>
<p>Over 100,000 vehicles and about 4,200 boats, accompanied by naval gunboats, will be used.</p>
<p>These have to be deployed under the current state of <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-next-president-faces-a-collapsing-security-situation-five-things-he-can-do-188179">insecurity</a> as well as a scarcity of fuel. </p>
<iframe title="Nigeria Election 2023" aria-label="Map" id="datawrapper-chart-fzk8t" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/fzk8t/5/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="800" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<h2>Challenges of 2023 polls</h2>
<p>The success of the 2023 general election will largely depend on the degree to which citizens can vote without impediments. But there are challenges. </p>
<p><strong>Voter apathy:</strong> Nigeria has a history of voter apathy, where a significant number of registered voters fail to show up on election day. For the 2019 general elections, the country had <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/01/07/84-million-nigerians-registered-to-vote-in-2019-polls-inec//">84 million registered voters</a>. Voter turnout in the presidential election was only <a href="https://punchng.com/2019-presidential-polls-only-35-of-voters-voted-inec/">35.66%</a>. In 2015 it was <a href="https://inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Conference-Paper-by-Sakah-Saidu-Mahmud.pdf">43.65%</a>. These figures put Nigeria among the 10 countries with the <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/2019-election-nigeria-has-the-lowest-voter-turnout-in-africa/">lowest voter turnout</a> in the world. Rwanda recorded <a href="https://www.state.gov/report/custom/4572fd52ca/">98.15%</a> voter turnout in 2017, the highest in the world. </p>
<p><strong>Naira redesign and scarcity of fuel:</strong> The electoral environment has been bedevilled by <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/576987-why-fuel-scarcity-persists-across-nigeria-marketers.html">scarcity of fuel</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-currency-redesign-and-withdrawal-limits-questionable-policy-and-bad-timing-197813">naira notes</a>. The shortages have led to public <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/02/14/cash-crunch-protesters-shut-down-lagos-abeokuta-expressway/">demonstrations</a> and heightened tension which might deter some voters from coming out on election day.</p>
<p><strong>Insecurity:</strong> Fifty-two electoral commission offices were <a href="https://leadership.ng/arson-inec-records-50-attacks-in-4-years/">destroyed or burnt</a> between 2019 and 2022. Secessionist movements and militants from the southern regions and religious extremists and bandits in the north have <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-violence-in-nigerias-south-east-is-threatening-to-derail-voting-in-the-region-198610">besieged</a> electoral facilities. This may discourage prospective voters.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-largest-democracy-goes-to-the-polls-amid-rising-insecurity-193960">Africa’s largest democracy goes to the polls amid rising insecurity</a>
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</em>
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<hr>
<h2>The voting process</h2>
<p>There are four steps in the voting procedure to be followed on election day: accreditation, voting, sorting and counting, recording and announcement of results. </p>
<p><strong>Accreditation:</strong> Voters, armed with their permanent voter’s card, must be present at the polling unit where they are registered between 8.30 am and 2.30 pm. They need to queue up in an orderly manner for accreditation. Voters will present their card to the assistant polling officer, who will use the BVAS device to check that voters match their cards. Where the fingerprint fails to confirm the match, the BVAS will be used to verify the facial identity of the voter.</p>
<p><strong>Voting:</strong> After accreditation, voters will be given the ballot paper. They will go to the voting booth to make their choice on the ballot paper in secret by thumb printing. Then they put the ballot paper in the ballot box in full view of everyone present, without disclosing how they voted. Voting will be declared closed when the last voter in the queue has voted. Voters may remain at the polling unit to watch the vote.</p>
<p><strong>Sorting and counting:</strong> The ballots will be sorted and counted in full view of everyone at the polling unit. </p>
<p><strong>Recording and annoucement:</strong> The results will be filled into the result sheet and announced by the electoral commission officer at the polling unit. The results from the polling units will be taken to the various levels of collation. The sum of the results will be recorded and at the final level, the candidate who meets the criteria will be announced the winner. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-2023-presidential-election-10-factors-that-could-affect-the-outcome-195247">Nigeria's 2023 presidential election: 10 factors that could affect the outcome</a>
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<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>To vote validly, the voter must be aware of the process of voting beyond being registered to vote and collecting the permanent voter’s card. </p>
<p>Invalid ballots during the vote count will widely be attributed to inadequate civic and voter education. Thus, voter education is central to increasing voter turnout and reducing incidents of invalid votes. </p>
<p>For these reasons, the Independent National Electoral Commission made a <a href="https://www.inecnigeria.org/downloads-all/inec-strategic-plan-2017-2021/">plan</a> for voter education. It has a voter education manual and <a href="https://inecnigeria.org/voter-education/faqs/">frequently asked questions</a>. Observer <a href="https://www.wfd.org/where-we-work/nigeria">organisations</a> have also tried to help <a href="https://yiaga.org/election101">prepare</a> voters.</p>
<p>For a peaceful, free, fair and credible election, citizens must stay up to date, including knowing the location of their polling place before election day, and contribute to keeping the peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmanuel Remi Aiyede does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Logistical challenges facing the 2023 elections remain huge given the number of political parties, the security environment and the number of contestants at various levels.Emmanuel Remi Aiyede, Professor of Political Institutions, Governance and Public Policy, University of IbadanLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1844362022-08-07T08:03:59Z2022-08-07T08:03:59ZKenya’s Muslims: a divided community with little political clout<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469210/original/file-20220616-15-lr7hna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Graffiti in Muslim-dominated Mombasa rallies against the 2017 election with the Kiswahili slogan "Kura ni Haramu" ("voting is haram/prohibitted").
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Janer Murikira/picture alliance via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenyan <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt22727nc">Muslims</a> played a part in the push to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/12/03/kenyan-leader-opts-for-multi-party-rule/4e0fb998-a0d7-434c-bc75-efa43c626c0c/">repeal</a> repressive political laws in the country in the early 1990s. But Muslims, who account for <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kenya/">11% of the population</a>, have yet to enjoy the fruits of their activist labour. </p>
<p>This is because they remain divided. Their division – due both to internal and external factors – means they aren’t a political power bloc big enough for the elites who run the country to seek their support as a community. In Kenya, political and economic power <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2077-49072016000100010">rests with the large ethnic groups</a>. </p>
<p>There have been attempts before to organise Kenya’s Muslims, but these have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/90017586">failed</a>. One reason is opposition by the country’s political leadership to using religion as the basis for political mobilisation. Leaders fear that mobilisation along religious lines risks being abused by extremists who seek to impose an Islamic state governed by sharia. </p>
<p>Yet, Islam in Kenya has become increasingly politicised. As I have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42636190?seq=1">argued</a> before, this process, beginning in the early 1990s, can be traced to the policies of post-independence regimes that have left the Muslim minority behind. </p>
<p>Muslims have felt increasingly <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/iafr/12/2/article-p240_004.xml">marginalised</a> economically and politically in Kenya. The majority of Muslims are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/095624780001200111">jobless, low-income earners, and generally poor</a>. This is not to suggest that Muslims are economically worse off than other minority groups in Kenya. But regions dominated by Muslims record a high percentage of the population in poverty and illiteracy.</p>
<p>Furthermore, in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304721380_Kenyan_Muslims_the_Aftermath_of_911_and_the_War_On_Terror">global war on terror</a>, Kenya’s pursuit of violent extremists has led to increasing human rights violations while <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.57.4.3">intensifying</a> historical frictions between the state and the Muslim community.</p>
<p>Unlike previous terrorist threats, such as the embassy bombing in 1998, attacks by the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab and its Kenyan supporters such as <a href="https://igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/4-igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat/file#page=22">Jeshi Ayman</a> have targeted the country’s institutions. The upshot is a backlash by the state <a href="https://www.kerenweitzberg.com/post/id-troubles-in-nairobi-vetting-double-registration-and-the-marketing-of-reputational-identities">against its Muslim population</a>. There have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38239138">targeted</a> kidnappings and extrajudicial killings. The backlash bolsters the narrative of government mistreatment of the community. </p>
<p>In an election year, this could be used as a rallying call to mobilise Muslims to vote in a certain way. However, there is no common Muslim position on which of the two main coalitions to support. This can be traced to age-old ethnic and racial rivalries within the Muslim community. </p>
<p>These disputes extend beyond internal religious rivalries. They have implications for how the state relates to the community.</p>
<h2>Internal rivalry and elusive unity</h2>
<p>Divisions among Muslims are numerous. There is a small but relatively wealthy minority of Arab and Asian descended Muslims. Then there are coastal and up-country Muslims. Coastal Muslims are mainly descendants of the <a href="https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/bitstream/handle/11071/3619/the%20growth%20of%20Islam%20among%20the%20Mijikenda%20of%20the%20Kenya%20coast.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1">local communities</a> that first adopted Islam no later than 500 years ago. By the 16th century there were several Muslim communities dotted along the Kenya coast.</p>
<p>The so-called upcountry Muslims are considered more recent converts – from around the mid-20th century. Coastal Muslims tend to question the “Muslimness” of upcountry Muslims. </p>
<p>The government capitalises on these divisions. When the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1581839">Islamic Party of Kenya</a> began to gain influence in the early 1990s, government <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt22727nc.9.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A77cd68a8a6ad49ba15d6a41628eab95a&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1">sponsored</a> the United Muslim of Africa party as a counter. The new party, founded and supported by African Muslims, became critical of the so-called Arab Muslims, stressing its African identity before Islamic solidarity.</p>
<p>During the colonial period, the British administration had varied policies towards different groups of Muslims in Kenya. Arab Muslims were higher up in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/islamicafrica.4.2.135">pecking order</a>. Indigenous Muslims were classed together with other Africans at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. The colonial legacy of this divide between Muslims lives on today in ethnic and racial rivalries and divergent aspirations.</p>
<p>In the years leading up to Kenya’s independence in 1963, some Muslims at the coast and the northern region of Kenya wanted secession. The secession agenda was driven by the fear of Muslim marginalisation in a postcolonial state presided over by Christian politicians. At the coast, they sought to form a separate state or reunite with Zanzibar under the leadership of the sultan. In northern Kenya they sought to be part of the larger <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt22727nc.7.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5c41c70b596cbbd48e5c107f8edb533f&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1">Pan Somalia state</a>. </p>
<p>The Mwambao movement that championed the secession agenda at the coast attracted minimal support. It was seen as an effort by Arabs to retain their political and economic dominance. Pwani (the coast) became part of Kenya. </p>
<p>In the northern region, though the secession movement was popular among the Somalis, the minority communities were reluctant to support this agenda, fearing Somali political ascendancy. </p>
<p>Consequently, in postcolonial Kenya, Muslims have been viewed as “foreigners” because of their history of seeking separation.</p>
<p>The political aspirations of a separate state for the coastal community re-emerged in the 1990s. Under the rallying call “Pwani si Kenya” (the coast is not part of Kenya), the outlawed Mombasa Republican Council <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/112/446/48/10197">argued</a> that the former Coast Province had never been part of Kenya and had a legal right to a separate status. </p>
<p>Unlike the Mwambao, the new movement was secular and attracted supporters across different religions. After about 10 years it fizzled out. Government cracked down against its leadership and most coastal residents were put off by the movement’s support for violence.</p>
<p>Due to this history of fissures, there have been <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/iafr/12/2/article-p240_004.xml">disputes</a> about who has the right to speak for Muslims in Kenya. These find <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ramadhan-special/article/2001409563/why-muslims-are-divided-on-when-to-start-ramadhan">expression</a> over pronouncements about the sighting of the new moon to mark the beginning and ending of fasting during the month of Ramadan. </p>
<h2>The war on terror and extrajudicial killings</h2>
<p>A growing population of unemployed Muslim youth is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26489068">easily attracted</a> to radical preachers who allege systematic discrimination of Muslims by the state. Many have been recruited to join Somalia-based Al-Shabaab, which was responsible for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19392206.2019.1587142?casa_token=Fee_S0v4j1IAAAAA:mqfocyj6qee3zR1ccULpBuJ4kRceX4dvp64fJxn8AWHbM_EnobekCpnYzTT63C5vYM4jHrfKoCIIiudmUQ">at least 409 attacks on Kenya</a> between 2005 and 2017.</p>
<p>The government response to the terrorist attacks and increased radicalisation has heightened feelings of marginalisation and discrimination. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 10 radical Muslim clerics were <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2014/07/28/gunned-down-mombasa-clerics-have-died">assassinated</a> by security agents. </p>
<p>At the core of recent Muslim political activism against the state are those influenced by the Saudi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Its leadership <a href="https://www.academia.edu/35022483/The_Rise_of_Jihad_Killing_of_Apostate_Imams_and_Non_Combatant_Christian_Civilians_in_Kenya_Al_Shabaab_s_Re_definition_of_the_Enemy_on_Religious_Lines">condemns</a> collaboration with the state.</p>
<p>The appearance of numerous factions within the community is an indication that narrower interests have always succeeded over larger abstract goals, such as that of Muslim unity in the country. Arguably, the country’s Muslims have made their marginalisation a reality because of their failure to achieve unity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hassan Juma Ndzovu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The increase in terror attacks has complicated the Kenyan government’s relationship with the country’s Muslim community.Hassan Juma Ndzovu, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Moi University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1670482021-12-20T22:09:20Z2021-12-20T22:09:20ZRepublic of Western Australia: how the west has always charted its own course, from secession to COVID<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435518/original/file-20211203-23-mt9cbl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C2%2C459%2C352&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Four secessionist delegates holding the proposed flag for Western Australia in 1934.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Library of WA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly two years, Western Australia Premier Mark McGowan has sealed his state off from the rest of the world to pursue a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MarkMcGowanMP/posts/388455319309986">hugely popular</a> zero-COVID strategy. </p>
<p>Now the state is inching closer to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-13/wa-border-open-date-announced-by-mark-mcgowan/100683620">reopening its borders</a> to the world in early February, when 90% of the adult population is hopefully double-vaccinated. </p>
<p>The pandemic has tested the strength of the federation in many ways, but no state or territory has sealed itself off from the rest of the country as WA has. </p>
<p>McGowan’s <a href="https://expressdigest.com/wa-premier-mark-mcgowan-launches-a-blistering-attack-on-basket-case-nsw-over-covid-catastrophe/">strong stance on borders</a> has reminded many of the long streak of separateness that has defined WA throughout history and placed it at odds with its eastern neighbours. </p>
<p>The distance from its sister states (and, before federation, sister colonies) helped make WA a late and somewhat reluctant member of the Commonwealth of Australia. This feeling of separateness remains today, although formal secession, once a dream of WA residents, is still a fantasy.</p>
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<h2>Reluctance, then acceptance, of federation</h2>
<p>By the 1890s, the campaign to unite the Australian colonies was gaining momentum. A depression in the eastern colonies bolstered the argument that all Australians would benefit from a common market.</p>
<p>Western Australians were far from convinced. The discovery of gold had led to a rapid growth of WA’s population and wealth. Western Australians worried their prosperity would be undermined by greater competition with the eastern states.</p>
<p>WA did not hold a referendum on federation in 1898 and 1899 when the other colonies did. But public sentiment soon shifted. The Gold Rush had sparked an influx of colonists from eastern Australia to the goldfields around Kalgoorlie, and pressure from these “tothersiders” saw the WA parliament reluctantly agree to a referendum. </p>
<p>More than half of the “yes” vote in the 1900 referendum came from easterners working in the goldfields. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/breaking-up-is-hard-to-do-why-western-australia-would-find-it-difficult-to-divorce-canberra-14663">Breaking up is hard to do: why Western Australia would find it difficult to divorce Canberra </a>
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<h2>Immediate attempts to break away</h2>
<p>It took only five years, however, for the WA legislative assembly to tire of federation. In 1906, it passed a resolution in favour of WA’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth that did not lead anywhere.</p>
<p>The real impetus for an actual secession movement came during the Great Depression. Western Australians became increasingly resentful of protectionist tariffs imposed by the Commonwealth government on foreign imports. This protectionism seemed to benefit manufacturers in New South Wales and Victoria at the expense of primary producers like them. </p>
<p>In 1930, a Dominion League took wing in WA. The league was a pressure group whose aim was to make their state autonomous from Canberra. WA would instead be a “dominion” of the British Empire in the same way Australia and Canada were. </p>
<p>The Dominion League persuaded the Nationalist government led by James Mitchell to submit a referendum for secession to WA voters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435517/original/file-20211203-25-42h665.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A meeting of the Dominion League for the secession movement, 1934.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Library of WA</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The referendum took place on April 8 1933, at the same time as a state election. By a majority of two to one, Western Australians voted in favour of secession. </p>
<p>Voters also elected a Labor state government, and the premier, Philip Collier, was confronted by popular sentiment that was overwhelmingly in favour of separation from Canberra. He could not stop a loyal WA delegation petitioning the British parliament for secession in 1935. </p>
<p>The route the secessionist delegation favoured was an <a href="https://www.legislation.wa.gov.au/legislation/prod/filestore.nsf/FileURL/mrdoc_12573.pdf/$FILE/Secession%20Act%201934%20-%20%5B00-00-00%5D.pdf?OpenElement">imperial act of parliament</a>. This would amend the Australian Constitution, which had been enshrined in an act of the UK parliament. </p>
<p>The British parliament, however, rejected the state’s petition. It maintained that its own <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/history-of-the-commonwealth/statute-westminster#:%7E:text=Statute%20of%20Westminster%20gives%20legal,facto%20independence%20of%20the%20dominions.">1931 Statute of Westminster</a> had given Australia dominion autonomy. So the only way WA could achieve independence would be with Canberra’s consent.</p>
<p>The Dominion League was bitterly disappointed, and got a modicum of revenge in 1937 by voting out the most prominent local advocate of federation, Senator George Pearce. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the federal parliament helped turn around the mood for separation in WA. It did this, in part, by promoting financial aid to WA and other smaller states through the Commonwealth Grants Commission. </p>
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<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A souvenir envelope marking the celebration of the secession referendum in 1933.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<h2>WA battles with Canberra over resources</h2>
<p>From the 1930s onward, WA often clashed with Canberra and the eastern states. </p>
<p>One fight was over a 1938 decision of the Lyons government to stop the Japanese-led development of iron ore deposits at Yampi Sound, off Australia’s northwest. To do so, the Lyons government completely prohibited the sale of any Australian iron ore to foreign countries.</p>
<p>Throughout the 1950s, WA governments campaigned to modify the federal iron ore embargo. Finally, in 1959, the WA government led by Premier David Brand and Charles Court, the minister for industrial development, took unilateral action. It decided to advertise a public tender for the development of deposits at Mount Goldsworthy, a mining area that used Port Hedland as its outlet. </p>
<p>This started a chain of events that eventually persuaded the Menzies government to relax the embargo in 1960. The end of the embargo allowed the development of what would become Australia’s greatest export industry. </p>
<p>Then, in the 1960s and ‘70s, Canberra’s stipulation of minimum prices for WA mineral exports enraged the state government. </p>
<p>Court, WA premier from 1974-82, also campaigned against the Whitlam government’s plan to bypass WA by developing the oil and gas resources of the North West Shelf through a sovereign oil company. </p>
<p>In this context, a <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/159324082">“Westralian” secession movement</a> was revived with the financial backing of mining magnate Lang Hancock. It harked back to the rhetoric of the secessionist movement of the 1930s, but failed to translate an anti-Canberra sentiment into a concrete outcome like the 1933 secession plebiscite.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wa-border-challenge-why-states-not-courts-need-to-make-the-hard-calls-during-health-emergencies-143541">WA border challenge: why states, not courts, need to make the hard calls during health emergencies</a>
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<h2>Echoes of the past</h2>
<p>As recently as 2017, a group of WA Liberals revived a proposal to make the state an independent nation. </p>
<p>Since then, WA and the Commonwealth have frequently been at loggerheads, most recently over Clive Palmer’s challenge to WA’s closed borders during COVID (which the Morrison government backed for months until realising McGowan’s stance had overwhelming public support). </p>
<p>Today, distance and hard borders are being hailed as potential saviours of the west from the pandemic and the interminable lockdowns in the eastern states. After closing itself off for nearly two years, WA seems finally ready to reopen, although those long-harbored secessionist dreams will likely never die.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lee receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for a history of the Department of Trade. </span></em></p>WA Premier Mark McGowan’s strong stance on borders has reminded many of the long streak of separateness that has defined Western Australia throughout history.David Lee, Associate Professor of History, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721582021-11-21T09:04:03Z2021-11-21T09:04:03ZEthiopia’s civil war: Five reasons why history won’t repeat itself<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432810/original/file-20211119-25-1gq54g5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A cheering crowd surrounds the toppled statue of Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in Addis Ababa following the overthrow of the Ethiopian military regime in 1991. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jerome Delay/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One year after the outbreak of civil war in Ethiopia the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/could-ethiopias-capital-fall-tigrayan-allied-forces-2021-11-05/">spectre of regime change looms</a> over Africa’s second most populous nation. The tides of the military conflict pitting Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his allies against the rebel Tigray Defence Forces and Oromo Liberation Army changed after a government offensive failed to push back their enemies in October. Instead the insurgents made <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1051940127/rebels-are-closing-in-on-ethiopias-capital-its-collapse-could-bring-regional-cha">important territorial gains</a> over the past weeks, vowing to take the capital Addis Ababa.</p>
<p>In response, the government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58163641">called on civilians to join the war effort against the ‘terrorists’</a>. It also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/2/ethiopia-declares-nationwide-state-of-emergency">declared</a> a nation-wide state of emergency. </p>
<p>The military outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Nevertheless, the threat to Abiy’s elected government is reminiscent of the <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ethiopian-capital-falls-to-rebels">downfall</a> of the Derg dictatorship in May 1991. Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, the <a href="https://yale.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.12987/yale/9780300141634.001.0001/upso-9780300141634">socialist military regime</a> ruled Ethiopia for 17 years after the 1974 revolution that deposed emperor Haile Selassie. It gained a reputation as one of Africa’s most repressive Cold War governments.</p>
<p>Supporters of Abiy, including many residents in Addis Ababa, fear a victory by Tigrayan and Oromo fighters. This could lead to a resurrection of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, which ruled the country for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54932333">27 years</a>. This coalition of ethno-national parties, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, ruled with an iron fist until Abiy’s unexpected rise to power in April 2018. </p>
<p>Those in favour of the rebels argue that Abiy’s nationalist politics seek to undo the autonomy and political rights of the country’s various ethno-linguistic groups. </p>
<p>At a superficial level the conflict is between, on the one hand, a pan-Ethiopianist political centre advocating for a more unitarian state and, on the other, ethno-nationalist forces fighting for a federal order. This follows a familiar fault line in modern Ethiopian politics.</p>
<p>But, based on my long-term research on local and national politics in Ethiopia, this is where historical parallels between the current and past conflicts in Ethiopia end. A 1991 type of regime change at national level is unlikely, even if the Tigray Defence Forces and Oromo Liberation Army – which recently established the nine-member <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nine-ethiopian-groups-form-anti-government-alliance-2021-11-05/">United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces</a> – were to prevail militarily.</p>
<p>Prevailing political attitudes, security actors, alliances and geopolitics differ starkly from the final days of the hated Derg military regime. Five reasons in particular explain why 2021 is not 1991.</p>
<h2>1. Abiy’s leadership is not deeply unpopular</h2>
<p>When Tigray People’s Liberation Front forces entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 after 16 years of guerrilla warfare against one of Africa’s strongest armies, the Derg government was deeply unpopular. The same cannot be said about Abiy’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-ruling-prosperity-party-declared-landslide-winner-of-june-vote/a-58227894">Prosperity Party</a>. The party enjoys considerable support in Addis Ababa and parts of Amhara and Oromia regions. It is popular in major cities across the country and among parts of the Ethiopian diaspora.</p>
<p>The Tigrayan-led forces were welcomed as liberators three decades ago. But that’s unlikely to happen today. Many Ethiopians remember the pre-Abiy regime for its uncompromising authoritarian rule and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2011.642516">broken promises</a> to democratise Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Few believe that a reincarnated Tigray-led transitional government will solve the country’s deep seated political problems, in particular inter-ethnic animosities. </p>
<h2>2. Proliferation of inter-communal conflicts</h2>
<p>Today’s security environment is very different. The federal army has been considerably weakened after a year of war. The removal of senior Tigrayan commanders from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces after Abiy came to power is another factor. These commanders are now on the Tigray Defence Forces’ side. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian army’s ability to lead and coordinate operations has diminished while security forces operating under the command of regional states have strengthened. These ‘<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/three-more-regions-reinforce-ethiopia-army-amhara-against-tigray-forces-2021-07-16/">special forces</a>’ of Amhara, Oromia, Afar and other regions – not the army – have shouldered much of the recent fighting against the Tigrayan and Oromo rebels.</p>
<p>In Amhara region in particular, thousands of <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/06/07/amhara-nationalism-at-the-polls-in-ethiopia/">local nationalists</a> have joined the war against Tigrayan forces to reverse their gains. A proliferation of <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/east-africa-report/what-is-driving-ethiopias-ethnic-conflicts">inter-communal conflicts</a> across the country and a militarisation of Ethiopian society mean that, militarily speaking, neither the rebels nor the government are the only game in town.</p>
<h2>3. Fragile alliances</h2>
<p>The political alliances underpinning both Abiy’s government and the rebel coalition are fragile at best. The Amhara and Oromo wings of the ruling Prosperity Party are held together by their joint animosity towards Tigray. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eighteen-killed-clashes-between-ethiopias-oromo-amhara-groups-2021-04-19/">Inter-ethnic conflicts between Amhara and Oromo communities</a> in both regional states has been a source of tension within the ruling party. Amhara nationalists feel increasingly let down by Abiy’s government and are likely to continue fighting against Tigrayans even in the unlikely event of a peace deal.</p>
<p>On the rebel side cooperation between Tigray and Oromo forces is based on an opportunistic calculus as well. Oromo nationalists were <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8101c.html">sidelined</a> from political power during the early years of the previous regime, when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front was in power.</p>
<h2>4. The Eritrean factor</h2>
<p>When Tigray People’s Liberation Front forces entered the capital three decades ago, they were backed by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. This paved the way for the <a href="https://www.csis.org/independence-movements/eritrea">secession</a> of Eritrea. Between 1998-2000 however, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war driving a wedge between the Tigrayan and Eritrean leadership. </p>
<p>Abiy’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-eritrea-saudi-idUSKCN1LW0KV">peace agreement</a> with Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki, signed in 2018, turned out to be a military pact against their common enemy – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Eritrean defence forces invaded Tigray in the early days of the war, playing a crucial role in the government’s early battle wins.</p>
<p>What’s more, future relations between Tigray and Eritrea have the potential for long-term destabilisation in the northern parts of Ethiopia.</p>
<h2>5. The Tigray question</h2>
<p>Finally, Tigrayan elites are themselves divided over strategy. The options are between further decentralisation of the country or secession of Tigray in line with <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/et00000_.html">article 39</a> of the Ethiopian constitution. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front has long argued that self-determination within Ethiopia was in the best interest of Tigrayans. But the war and humanitarian crisis in Tigray have pushed many Tigrayans to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f377353-b69a-41af-8e65-ddca918f599d">rally behind calls for secession</a>. </p>
<p>For the time being the main objective is to defeat Abiy’s government. The other is to liberate what they consider as Amhara-occupied territories in western Tigray, and to establish a national <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-eight-groups.html">transitional government</a>. But Tigray’s political future remains very much <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-ethiopia-and-tigray-face-tough-options-the-west-needs-to-be-even-handed-164714">in the balance</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tobias Hagmann received funding from various national research councils in the past.</span></em></p>Prevailing political attitudes, security actors, alliances and geopolitics differ starkly from the final days of the hated Ethiopian military regime.Tobias Hagmann, Associate professor, International Development, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1662352021-08-18T15:01:09Z2021-08-18T15:01:09ZA breakdown of Biafra separatism, and where Kanu fits into the picture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416757/original/file-20210818-17-1yy9g3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nnamdi Kanu favours a more radical approach to achieving the Biafran dream.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nnamdi Nwannekaenyi Okwu Kanu is currently one of the most <a href="https://dailytrust.com/nnamdi-kanu-unmasking-ipob-controversial-leader">controversial figures</a> in Nigeria. He is the leader of the <a href="https://www.ipobgovernment.org/">Indigenous People of Biafra</a>, one of the Biafra separatist organisations, as well as the director of Radio Biafra. </p>
<p>He was born in 1967 in present-day Abia state, South-East Nigeria, to parents from a family of royalty. </p>
<p>Kanu was an alumnus of the prestigious Government College Umuahia. He later enrolled to study geography at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Two years later he moved to the UK where he studied politics and economics at the London Metropolitan University. </p>
<p>Kanu was a relatively unknown figure in politics before 2009. That year he was enlisted by Ralph Uwazuruike, leader of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df4be7b20.html">Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra</a>, as a Radio Biafra anchor and broadcaster. </p>
<p>The radio station, which currently broadcasts out of London, served as the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/119/477/526/5948046">propaganda arm</a> of the short-lived Republic of Biafra during <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970/">the Nigerian Civil War</a> (1967-1970). </p>
<p>The Nigerian government has previously <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/07/weve-jammed-radio-biafra-transmission-signals-fg/">claimed</a> to be jamming Radio Biafra transmission signals. But the station continues to broadcast unhindered, mainly via the internet and shortwave.</p>
<p>The station is very popular among many Nigerians of southern origin. This is mainly because of its no-holds-barred and bellicose dissection of the major ills bedevilling the Nigerian state. In October 2018 over <a href="https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/radio-biafra-biafra-tv-nnamdi-kanu-has-created-two-apps-to-push-his-agenda/tr4pvze">200,000 people</a> were reported to have downloaded the station’s app to listen to Kanu make a broadcast from Israel. This was after a year of silence following his disappearance from Nigeria the year before.</p>
<p>Kanu’s views are echoed by other Biafran separatist groups. Their grievances are rooted in the failure of the Nigerian state to implement the <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt0nw283jj/qt0nw283jj.pdf?t=qkv60z">3-Rs</a> (reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction) post-war peacebuilding initiatives in the country. </p>
<h2>Unresolved issues</h2>
<p>The war was ended on the principle of ‘no victor, no vanquished’. But several <a href="https://www.arabianjbmr.com/pdfs/NG_VOL_4_1/4.pdf">policies</a> have been introduced in the intervening years that have stoked Igbo resentment against the Nigerian state.</p>
<p>These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>removing jurisdiction of state and regional governments from strategic resources like crude oil,</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/biafra-group-sues-fg-over-abandoned-property-others/">confiscating</a> so-called ‘abandoned property’ of the Igbo after the war,</p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349703522_Indigenisation_of_Nigeria%27s_Economy_Appraising_the_Second_and_Third_National_Development_Plans_1970-1980">indigenisation policy</a> of the 1970s,</p></li>
<li><p>the transfer of mineral-rich areas of Igboland to neighbouring Rivers and Cross River (now Akwa Ibom) states. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Other grievances <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/what-biafra-and-why-are-some-nigerians-calling-independence-401164">include</a> poor investment, inequitable resource allocation, ethnic exclusion and military repression in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/119/477/526/5948046">the South-East region of Nigeria</a>. </p>
<p>There are indeed major problems in the region. The area has become highly militarised over the past 20 years. The result has been an unusually high number of cases of <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/302621-nigeria-security-forces-extort-n100-billion-in-southeast-in-three-years-report.html">extortion</a> and other human rights abuses. For example, in 2016 Amnesty International accused the Nigerian military of embarking on a campaign of extrajudicial executions and violence. It said the actions had resulted in the death of at least <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/peaceful-pro-biafra-activists-killed-in-chilling-crackdown/">150 peaceful</a> pro-Biafra protesters over the course of a year.</p>
<h2>Kanu’s ideology</h2>
<p>Kanu’s idea of Igbo nationalism is mainly underpinned by radical separatism. He represents the radical faction of the Igbo nationalists, which is largely confrontational. </p>
<p>For their part, conservative Igbo nationalists prefer a gradual diplomatic negotiation over their desired outcomes. These include the equitable inclusion of the Igbo in Nigeria’s economic and political landscape. </p>
<p>Populist organisations that support the Biafran cause have, for the most part, been founded on the doctrine of non-violence. Although inspired by the Biafra secessionist movement led by Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu between 1967 and 1970, separatist agitators are more inclined to civil disobedience than armed struggle.</p>
<p>The Indigenous People of Biafra is the most recent manifestation of Biafran separatism. It represents the militant wing of post-war Igbo nationalism. The organisation espouses the exit of the Igbo and other ethnic minorities from the defunct Eastern Region into an alternative political arrangement. </p>
<p>The Indigenous People of Biafra and other pro-Biafra organisations are considered militant relative to conservative Igbo nationalists.</p>
<p>Separatist agitators from the various organisations all agree on secession. But they differ on the operational strategies. </p>
<p>Kanu’s Indigenous People of Biafra has set out three possible routes to sovereignty. The first is the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/119/477/526/5948046">threat of armed secession</a>. The second is civil disobedience and the third a referendum. (The last two are not mutually exclusive.)</p>
<p>The option of armed struggle was first mooted in 2014. During the 2014 National Conference in Nigeria, Kanu <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2014/03/25/if-they-fail-give-us-biafra-somalia-will-look-paradise-nnamdi-kanu">threatened</a> that war-torn Somalia would look like paradise should Igbo delegates to the conference fail to secure a secession. </p>
<p>A year later at a Convention of the World Igbo Congress in Los Angeles, California, Kanu stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fPQOPEH-0Y">We need guns and we need bullets</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kanu’s confrontational rhetoric and call for armed struggle were the reasons for his arrest in 2015 in Lagos. He was charged with sedition, ethnic incitement, terrorism and treasonable felony. His arrest was met with <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-s-biafran-separatist-upsurge">protests</a> by the Indigenous People of Biafra members in different parts of Nigeria. Areas particularly affected were Abia, Anambra, Cross River, Delta, Enugu, Imo and Rivers States. The protests heightened tension in Igboland, especially the southeast region of Nigeria. They also put pressure on the Nigerian government to act.</p>
<p>In September 2017 President Muhammadu Buhari launched <a href="https://guardian.ng/tag/operation-python-dance-ii/">Operation Python Dance II</a> in the South-East. The operation was putatively deployed to combat crimes. But it later turned into a <a href="https://independent.ng/biafra-180-lives-lost-to-operation-python-dance-ii-rights-group/">repressive tool</a> against unarmed members of the Indigenous People of Biafra. </p>
<p>That same month the Nigerian government <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/09/ipob-stands-proscribed-terrorist-group-fg/">declared</a> the Indigenous People of Biafra a proscribed organisation. But its activities have not abated. </p>
<p>In December 2020, the organisation founded its paramilitary wing, known as the Eastern Security Network. According to the media and publicity secretary of the Indigenous People of Biafra, Comrade Emma Powerful, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgdXtaKX4KY">the network was</a> mandated to defend what he described as Biafraland by counteracting the activities of suspected armed Fulani herdsmen against peasant farmers and local communities.</p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The agitation for Biafra separatism has grown in frequency, intensity and geographical spread during Buhari’s presidency.</p>
<p>Two factors might be responsible for this.</p>
<p>The first is the <a href="https://www.icirnigeria.org/buharis-lopsided-appointments-in-six-years-continue-to-generate-controversy/">alleged lopsidedness</a> of Buhari’s key appointments, which leaves southern Nigeria, particularly the Igbo, with the shorter end of the stick. </p>
<p>A second factor has been the siting of physical infrastructure across the country. One example is the construction of a rail line in which the Port Harcourt-Maiduguri rail project was completely neglected. Another was the National Assembly approving a massive infrastructural development <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/10/30/examining-buharis-request-for-30bn-foreign-borrowing/">plan</a> without allocating a single project to the South-East zone.</p>
<p>In my view only inclusive governance that reflects Nigeria’s federal character and multinational composition will stem Biafra separatism in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166235/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chikodiri Nwangwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The grievances of Nnamdi Kanu and other Biafran separatist groups are deeply rooted in the failure of the Nigerian state to implement post civil war peacebuilding initiatives.Chikodiri Nwangwu, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647142021-07-20T14:42:30Z2021-07-20T14:42:30ZAs Ethiopia and Tigray face tough options, the West needs to be even-handed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412109/original/file-20210720-17-1jukg29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrives to cast his vote during the country's parliamentary elections in Beshasha, Oromia, in June.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>War broke out in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/19/ethiopia-says-its-forces-closing-in-on-tigray-capital">Tigray in November 2020</a>, pitting the Ethiopian National Defence Force alongside Eritrea against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>The conflict has caused <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">colossal damage </a> to human life, economy and the nation’s social fabric. Following the government’s recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/28/ethiopian-government-agrees-immediate-ceasefire-in-tigray">declaration of a unilateral ceasefire</a> the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front has declared a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/29/world/tigray-ethiopia">victory</a>. </p>
<p>After two weeks of relative calm, another round of war <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-14/ethiopia-s-tigray-conflict-deepens-as-abiy-s-cease-fire-fails">is on the horizon</a>. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front is claiming that it’s determined to “liberate” Tigray from the “occupation” of the Amhara and federal forces. For its part, the government has also declared that it will <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-s-abiy-vows-to-crush-tigray-fighters-3478012">vanquish</a> Tigrayan forces once and for all. </p>
<p>TPLF is emboldened by the support of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-official-warns-washington-will-not-stand-by-face-horrors-tigray-2021-06-29/">international community</a>. But it is already clear from how both sides are regrouping themselves that the second wave of war will open another – and perhaps more devastating – chapter in this tragic saga. The question is: what is the end game?</p>
<p>Several factors could be in play in charting out the next phase. This includes a constitutional arrangement which gives Tigray the right to self-determination including cessation – becoming an independent country. But they might have not achieved unanimity in the Tigrayan camp on this yet.</p>
<p>Another element that could influence the outcome is the continued palpable animosity between individual politicians in both isles. This could get in the way of any dialogue.</p>
<p>And lastly, many Tigrayans see themselves as an integral part – indeed a founding part – of Ethiopia. </p>
<p>So how could the future unfold?</p>
<h2>Secession</h2>
<p>The first possible scenario is secession. In his interview with The New York Times Debretsion Gebremichael, the Vice President of Tigrayan Regional State, cast doubt on Tigray’s future as a part of Ethiopia. He claimed that “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/world/africa/tigray-leader-interview-ethiopia.html">the trust has been broken completely</a>”. </p>
<p>If the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front opts for this, it will have to get over several hurdles. The first is internal. It’s not clear all the members of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front leadership would endorse secession because there are some moderates among them. Influential figures – including the commander of rebel forces Tsadkan Gebretensae, and perhaps, Debretsion himself – might see this war as a means of finding a more favourable settlement for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front within Ethiopia rather than secession. </p>
<p>Secondly, Tigrayans pride themselves on being the birthplace of Ethiopia’s statehood, religion and civilisation. This would make walking away from the federation hard.</p>
<p>The third hurdle is political and economic. </p>
<p>Politically, if Tigray seceded it would be landlocked. It would also be surrounded by hostile nations in the north (Eritrea) and south (Ethiopia). It could, conceivably, open a corridor through Sudan to connect with more friendly countries. But, in the long run, Sudan would benefit more from a strong relationship with Ethiopia given the country’s resources. </p>
<p>The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front has made it clear that it is determined to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-amhara-region-vows-go-offensive-new-phase-civil-war-looms-2021-07-14/">reclaim disputed territory</a> in the west - which is fertile farmland - from Amhara regional forces. This might have to do with ensuring food security as a stepping stone for secession. However, the reclaiming process would be contentious, and possibly even bloody, if it happens at all, because the regional government of Amhara is as determined to retain it. </p>
<p>The West seems to be on their side for now. But, for one, it is not clear for how long the support from the West will last. For another, the disintegration of the federation that makes up Ethiopia might not be the best outcome for the West because it could have a catastrophic impact on the region. Full-blown political chaos in <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/81417/ethiopia-eritrea-somalia-djibouti-the-constant-instability-in-the-horn-of-africa/">an already volatile Horn of Africa</a> means that the region would become fertile ground for extremist groups. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, cessation is an extreme scenario, but it is not far-fetched. </p>
<h2>Controlling the centre</h2>
<p>Controlling the centre of power in Ethiopia might be another bridge that’s too far for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which, they might think, can be realised through Western <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/27/us-official-condemns-violence-in-tigray-warns-of-new-sanctions">support</a>. This is rooted in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19332646">West’s historical alliance</a> with former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The intellectual legacy and the diplomatic network he left behind has proven to be very beneficial to the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front in garnering support from the West. </p>
<p>It is becoming <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/152370">increasingly clear</a> that Western powers want the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front as part of Ethiopia’s future. It is not clear, however, if they envisage this within Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy’s administration or without it. </p>
<p>But at what cost? </p>
<p>If the West is determined to resurrect its trusted client to control the centre of Ethiopian politics it could unleash other ethno-federalist forces – especially in Oromia – who might be willing to forge an alliance with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. In addition, former satellite groups embedded in each ethnic group could be reactivated, increasing tension and possibility of conflict.</p>
<p>Another related risk is if the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front comes back riding on foreign support. This could create a sense of resentment. Abiy Ahmed, is still popular in some regions, including in parts of Oromia, Amhara region and the capital Addis Ababa. The recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/10/prosperity-party-declared-winners-of-ethiopian-election">elections </a>, however imperfect, are a testament to the fact he has the popular mandate. </p>
<p>However, the government in Addis Ababa remains vulnerable despite winning the elections. This war has been riddled with miscalculations and blunders on both sides. The government promised to end the military campaign in weeks. It hasn’t done so.</p>
<h2>A constructive option – dialogue</h2>
<p>Violence has brought tremendous loss. People need peace, security and a return to normal life. </p>
<p>It would, therefore, be wise for both sides to pursue a more fruitful direction.</p>
<p>Both parties need to commit to a ceasefire. This should start with putting an end to branding each other as “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/28/ethiopia-tigray-war-amhara-abiy-ahmed-expansionism/">expansionist</a>” or “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnLD9QB01kA">terrorist</a>. Such narratives create excuses for violence”. </p>
<p>A settlement only happens when politicians put their egos aside and heed the plight of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/194a494a-e596-4dbe-a21e-f7e9d8daed92">suffering people</a> – the big losers in this tragic war. </p>
<p>This should lead to dialogue as to how to reconfigure the union of the nation. More importantly, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front would be wise to reinvent itself as an opposition party that leads a peaceful struggle. The only choice should not be between either taking the control of the government or leading the whole nation to an endless abyss. The voice of Tigrayans need to be represented - Ethiopia without Tigrayans is not complete. Leaders of the central government should do away with dehumanising rhetoric.</p>
<p>For its part, instead of fanning the flames, the West needs to be even-handed in bringing the warring sides to the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Girma is affiliated with International Bible Advocacy Centre (IBAC).</span></em></p>Instead of fanning the flames, the West needs to be even-handed in bringing the warring sides to the table.Mohammed Girma, Visiting Lecturer, University of RoehamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1589532021-04-26T15:28:01Z2021-04-26T15:28:01ZGhana’s secessionist conflict has its genesis in colonialism: it’s time to reflect<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396397/original/file-20210421-15-lr2gdm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Modern secession claims find their roots in the Trusteeship System of the UN</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_Nations_Trusteeship_Council_chamber_in_New_York_City_2.JPG">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana’s secessionist conflict is rooted in a system that was meant to promote peace.</p>
<p>Since the advent of decolonisation after <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">World War II</a>, secessionist conflicts have been the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590960">main cause of civil wars</a> worldwide. An historical example is the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-40507324">Biafra War (1967-1970)</a>. A current one is Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis around the calls for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-cameroons-self-named-ambazonia-secessionists/a-50639426">the secession of “Ambazonia”</a>.</p>
<p>Over the past couple of years, Ghana has also been kept on tenterhooks by calls for secession. In November 2019, the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/22103">Homeland Study Group Foundation</a> <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2019/11/separatist-movement-declares-independence-for-western-togoland/">declared the independence of “Western Togoland”</a>. Its call was for the secession of Ghana’s Volta region and parts of the Northern and Upper East regions. At first peaceful, this demand led to <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Detailed-account-of-how-Western-Togoland-group-staged-successful-attacks-in-Volta-Region-1076896">violence in September 2020</a> with the emergence of the Western Togoland Restoration Front. </p>
<p>The antecedents of this claim go back over 60 years, and the role played by the United Nations (UN). Prior to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13433790">Ghana’s independence</a> in 1957, the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> oversaw <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501019?seq=1">British (Western) Togoland</a> through the <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories">International Trusteeship System</a>. This system was created to administer and supervise certain territories. Its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-12">aim</a> was to promote development towards independence and to maintain international peace and security. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2021.1890935?journalCode=risb20">study</a> we conducted, we argue that the UN trusteeship system after <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">World War II</a> had the unintended effect of perpetuating secessionist conflicts. Colonial powers framed secessionism as a threat to state-building – not as an expression of self-determination. We looked specifically at the Ewe/Togoland unification conflict in the bordering regions of the British Gold Coast and the trusteeship territories of Togoland. </p>
<p>Our analysis leads us to caution against a rhetoric that polarises the issue in terms of “threats”.</p>
<h2>A history of distrust</h2>
<p>International intervention by the UN is generally supposed to provide a peaceful solution – not the perpetuation of conflicts. But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704242?seq=1">historical research</a> using colonial archives and UN documents points to precisely such a pattern. A significant number of the former <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/tc/territories">11 UN trust territories</a> in various parts of the world experienced some form of secessionist conflict. </p>
<p>The UN trusteeship system was by no means a venue of tranquil diplomacy. Rather, it involved a politically heated negotiation process between the UN, its trustees and national elites.</p>
<p>The Western Togoland secessionism fits this pattern too. Many of the actors involved in the system attempted to escalate, de-escalate or ignore conflicts around the separation of Western Togoland from the erstwhile Gold Coast. They used a mode of conflict communication called <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/">“securitisation”</a>. This involves reframing an issue as a security problem to gain room for manoeuvre and push through more far-reaching, controversial measures politically.</p>
<p>When France and Britain divided up <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/history-in-africa/article/abs/historiography-of-german-togoland-or-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-model-colony/E9C35F0CA7CC012CB656E163F4DF9F25">German Togoland</a> after World War I, the new colonial demarcation separated the<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321785130_The_Ewe_in_West_Africa_One_Cultural_People_in_Two_Different_Countries_TogoGhana_1884-1960"> Ewe-speaking population</a> into three territories. These were the British Gold Coast Colony, British Togoland and French Togoland. A <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ewe-unification-movement-a-political-history/oclc/24013896">movement</a> then formed to campaign at the UN for the political unification of the Ewes.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of the division of Ewe-speaking peoples by colonial borders" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=656&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=656&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=656&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colonial division of the Ewe-speaking peoples (1920-1956)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unwilling to cede territory, France and Britain pointed out the dangers of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkanization">balkanisation</a>“ to the UN. Allowing the Ewes to decide on unification would implicitly give them the right to secession. It would create an incalculable domino effect by setting a precedent for numerous other dependent territories whose borders had been drawn arbitrarily. </p>
<p>The UN itself <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/794632">reported</a> in 1949 that in the interest of peace and stability a solution should be sought with urgency. In view of France’s and Britain’s reluctance to consider the Ewes’ demands, representatives of the anti-colonial UN member states cautioned that their nationalistic clamour was a danger to peace in West Africa. </p>
<p>Faced with the apparent futility of Ewe unification, the movement shifted in the early 1950s to the more promising <a href="https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/T/1218">reunification of French and British Togoland</a>. Its supporters pursued a strategy of pointing to human rights violations, which discredited the French in particular. While anti‑imperial UN member states acknowledged the problem, the permanent members of the Trusteeship Council did not seriously consider Ewe or Togoland reunification.</p>
<p>In 1956 the UN-supervised referendum <a href="https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/1044%20(XI)">sealed</a> the incorporation of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Those in support of unification then asked the UN as the "world peace organisation” to revise the result, or at least consider the electoral districts separately on the grounds that there could be “serious unrest” or an “ultimate war”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2021.1890935?journalCode=risb20">Overruling the request</a>, the UN followed the wishes of the colonial authorities. It framed secessionism as a “threat” to state-building rather than an expression of self-determination. </p>
<p>By curbing secessionism during the period of decolonisation, the UN laid the foundation for it to escalate again later. The issue of Western Togoland fortunately never turned into a full civil war. Nevertheless low-level violence and political conflicts remained. The <a href="http://elibrary.jsg.gov.gh/fg/laws%20of%20ghana/2%20REP/AVOIDANCE%20OF%20DISCRIMINATION%20ACT,%201957%20NO.%2038.htm">1957 Avoidance of Discrimination Act</a> and <a href="http://www.justiceghana.com/index.php/en/law-a-justice/7443-human-rights-individual-freedoms-and-democracy-in-ghana-the-preventive-detention-act-and-after?start=1">1958 Preventive Detention Act</a> practically outlawed Togoland secessionism overnight. It <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/160799">revived only briefly in the mid-1970s</a>, and seemed to have disappeared until recently. </p>
<h2>Changing legacies</h2>
<p>The long history of the conflict around “Western Togoland” illustrates two points.<br>
First, the vocabulary of international law and <a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/637(VII)">the UN implies a clear meaning of terms such as self-determination or decolonisation</a>. In reality, the specific meanings in the decolonisation period were shaped by the perception of whose self-determination was seen as a threat to the international order. Secessionist movements and territorial changes could easily be portrayed as an overriding threat to the state and regional order and therefore considered illegitimate. </p>
<p>Secondly, the introduction of the <a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/637(VII)">right to self-determination</a> by the UN in 1952 led to new conflicts over secession, a very real legacy of colonialism and the UN trusteeship system. The UN, with no genuine answer as to <em>who</em> could claim independence and <em>how</em>, adhered to colonial borders. </p>
<p>Both points led to the fact that in Ghana, almost 60 years after independence, the conflict over “Western Togoland” does not seem to have been resolved. </p>
<p>Politicians and security analysts have joined the securitisation of the secessionists and called for heavy-handed solutions. But the past shows that this kind of rhetoric might solve the issue in the short term but not in the longer term.</p>
<p>A public dialogue that avoids portraying the other side as a threat would be more likely to succeed in settling the conflict once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors receive funding from by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under grant number TRR 138/2–2018.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Werner Distler receives funding from German Research Foundation (DFG)</span></em></p>Colonial powers framed secessionism as a threat to state-building and not as an expression of self-determinationJulius Heise, Research Fellow, Center for Conflict Studies, University of MarburgWerner Distler, Research Fellow, Center for Conflict Studies, University of MarburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1519752021-01-03T14:20:52Z2021-01-03T14:20:52ZScotland could vote to separate in 2021, testing Canada’s independence formula<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376913/original/file-20210103-49872-13sqj5j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C47%2C3969%2C2584&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Scottish Saltire flag hangs in the window of an apartment in Edinburgh, Scotland, next to the EU flag in August 2020. Scotland could vote to separate from the U.K. in 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/David Cheskin)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If the <a href="https://www.snp.org/">Scottish National Party</a> wins Scotland’s parliamentary election in five months, it will be with a mandate to hold a <a href="https://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=12053&i=109040">second independence referendum</a>. </p>
<p>Scotland <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/what-scotland-independence-crusader-alex-salmond-learned-from-quebec-1.2766564">took the idea that a lawful path to independence exists from the Québec experience</a>, more specifically from a <a href="https://canliiconnects.org/en/summaries/31075">Canadian ruling on Québec secession</a>. If it comes to a constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom, however, the British balance of powers may make a Canadian-style compromise impossible.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/31/post-brexit-trade-deal-boris-johnson-thanks-mps-and-peers-for-passing-bill">With Brexit negotiations finally complete</a>, a process of national reckoning will soon begin that may decide whether the British union survives with its political and constitutional traditions intact. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1344780841445154817"}"></div></p>
<p>Canada faced a similar reckoning in the 1990s after a punishing series of <a href="https://www.clo-ocol.gc.ca/en/timeline-event/canadians-vote-no-charlottetown-accord">failed constitutional negotiations</a> combined with a close <a href="http://collections.musee-mccord.qc.ca/scripts/explore.php?Lang=1&tableid=11&elementid=105__true&contentlong">referendum in Québec</a> to make the independence question unavoidable. </p>
<h2>Canada’s Supreme Court played a role</h2>
<p>Faced with the prospect of a successful vote in Québec, the Canadian government turned to the Supreme Court for advice. The <a href="https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do">1998 Québec Secession Reference case</a> established referendums as a lawful means to legitimate independence, acknowledged Québec’s right to secede and obliged all parties to negotiate an exit in good faith.</p>
<p>Canada was brought to this point because Québec held the power to poll its own electorate. Whether Scotland has the same right is disputed, so Scottish plans to hold an independence vote as <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/scotland-nicola-sturgeon-aims-for-2021-independence-vote/a-55779762">early as 2021</a> sets up a messy confrontation.</p>
<p>The Canadian judgment held that so long as a referendum returned a “<a href="https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/supreme-court-answers-quebec-secession-questions">clear majority on a clear question</a>,” the democratic implications of an independence vote could not be ignored. The decision was hailed at the time as even-handed; in reality it was a mixed blessing. </p>
<p>It promised to regulate the process of political divorce and offered the international community a yardstick for recognizing new states, but the question of what constitutes clarity was never resolved, merely <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-31.8/page-1.html">assigned to the Canadian government to decide</a>. Yet if a referendum delivers credibility and a duty to negotiate, the incentive for national governments to obstruct consultation among minorities soars. </p>
<p>Consider, for instance, the spectacle of riot police seizing ballot boxes in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/02/europe/catalonia-independence-referendum-explainer/index.html">2017 Catalan referendum</a> after the Spanish Supreme Court declared it illegal to poll voters on independence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man holds up a ballot box during a protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376162/original/file-20201221-21-bx6n3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man holds a ballot box during a protest in support of Catalonian politicians jailed on charges of sedition and condemning the arrest of Catalonia’s former president, Carles Puigdemont in Germany, during a protest in Barcelona in March 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Santi Palacios)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Close Scottish vote in 2014</h2>
<p>An unexpectedly close Scottish independence vote in 2014, followed by an unequivocal Scottish “no” to Brexit in the 2016 referendum, made divergent views within the U.K. more pressing.</p>
<p>The 2014 “indyref,” as it became known, was conducted under a <a href="https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130102230945/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Agreement-final-for-signing.pdf">joint Edinburgh-London agreement</a> and used a co-negotiated question intended to settle the matter <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/09/19/world/politics-diplomacy-world/cameron-says-scottish-independence-issue-settled-for-a-generation/">for a generation</a>. </p>
<p>Scotland never conceded it needed the agreement, but it was in everyone’s interest to avoid testing the question constitutionally. Still, Scotland made Canadian-style clarity a watchword of its referendum exercise, and when the results turned out <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">closer than expected</a>, stakes were raised. </p>
<p>Fifty-five per cent voted against independence but only after an 11th-hour <a href="https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-ed-miliband-nick-4265992">pledge to extend new powers to Scotland</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Students look at their laptops." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376172/original/file-20201221-23-d6ohog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Students at the University of Montréal watch on their laptops as polls close in the Scottish referendum in September 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Graham Hughes</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That was when EU membership was still a perk of union. Now, independence offers the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-51357050">best chance for Scotland to rejoin the EU</a>. The Scottish government maintains Brexit <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-49105538">makes a new vote necessary</a>. The British government insists <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-54827100">the matter is closed</a>.</p>
<p>If support for independence continues to climb, Scotland’s demand will be hard to refuse without transparently muzzling popular voice. If the Scottish government presses ahead with plans for what London considers an unlawful vote, it could plunge the country into constitutional crisis.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Canada?</h2>
<p>How did Canada avoid the impasse looming in the U.K.? </p>
<p>In many ways it didn’t; the tensions of the 1990s nearly tore the country apart. The Canadian Constitution is no more enlightened than the British when it comes to secession. As the saying goes “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/constitution-is-not-a-sui_b_4073379">the constitution is not a suicide pact</a>,” and specifying terms for its expiry seems perverse. </p>
<p>But while some constitutions, like Spain’s, declare national union “<a href="https://www.boe.es/legislacion/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf">indissoluble</a>,” Canada’s is silent on the question. Canada largely inherited its constitutional structure from the British, although not entirely, and it crafted an extraordinary formula for reconstitution out of that legacy.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A fire burns under a Oui sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/376317/original/file-20201222-15-pt4yko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Montréal riot police watch a fire burn underneath a Oui sign after the No side won the Québec referendum in October 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Tom Hansen</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Supreme Court judgment worked like oil on troubled waters, establishing rights for Québec and Canada alike. But it was the balance of power in the Canadian federation that ultimately proved the real saviour of Canada.</p>
<p>Because there was no stopping a Québec referendum, there was no silencing the independence question. The ruling defused the standoff by insisting an unwilling Québec could not be held hostage to union, and that a democratic federation meant heeding democratic voice. </p>
<p>Québec has declined to use its new right of democratically chosen exit. Simply having it acknowledged has so far proven sufficient. For democratic voice to be heeded though, it must first be heard.</p>
<p>By raising the stakes on independence votes, the judgment that saved the Canadian union may have made it more difficult to reach a solution in regions where national co-operation is needed to poll an electorate. In that case, it’s not the clarity of a referendum that matters — it’s the capacity to hold one at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151975/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Frost receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada</span></em></p>Scotland’s renewed push for independence is not only similar to Québec’s — there are also lessons for Scottish politicians in Canadian law on the concept of separation.Catherine Frost, Professor of Political Science, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1493502020-11-13T13:43:01Z2020-11-13T13:43:01ZGenocide claims in Nagorno-Karabakh make peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan unlikely, despite cease-fire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369190/original/file-20201112-13-15vuilx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C29%2C3235%2C2079&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers patrol the mountainous, disputed border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, on Nov. 8.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/servicemen-walk-towards-the-armenian-border-the-fighting-news-photo/1229530009?adppopup=true">Stanislav Krasilnikov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan/russian-peacekeepers-deploy-to-nagorno-karabakh-after-ceasefire-deal-idUSKBN27Q11R">Russian-brokered cease-fire</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan this week halted fighting over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, where long-standing hostilities <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54314341">reerupted on Sept. 27</a>. </p>
<p>The deal leaves Azerbaijan, which was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh">given Nagorno-Karabakh by the Soviets in 1923</a>, largely in control of the majority-Armenian territory. Leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh, located in Western Azerbaijan close to Armenia, continue to demand independence. </p>
<p><iframe id="HD7bv" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/HD7bv/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-pm-signs-deal-to-end-war-with-azerbaijan-and-russia">Thousands have died</a> and an estimated 100,000 have been displaced in Nagorno-Karabakh since September. As the cease-fire took effect on Nov. 10, Azerbaijanis danced in the streets. But <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54882564">angry Armenians</a> stormed the Armenian parliament and office of the prime minister. </p>
<p>Both sides in the conflict have <a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/Azerbaijans_Foreign_Ministry_releases_statement_on_Armenia_missile_attack_on_Barda-1627027">claimed that fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh</a> isn’t just about territorial control – it <a href="https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/31/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Al-Arabiya/">is a fight to prevent genocide</a>, a fight for their lives. These grave accusations, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/11/11/shortly-before-ceasefire-experts-issue-a-genocide-warning-for-the-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh/?sh=53240f94d005">while yet unproven</a>, may make a lasting resolution to the conflict much harder.</p>
<h2>Freedom fighting and genocide claims</h2>
<p>Violence first broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1980s, when the region’s ethnic Armenian leaders sought to gain independence from Azerbaijan. There has been intermittent fighting since then, including a bloody war in the 1990s that ended in another <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-05-17-mn-58811-story.html">Russia-brokered cease-fire</a> giving Azerbaijan legal control of the region. </p>
<p>But Armenian leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh declared themselves an independent republic, and have repeatedly tried to secede. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">research on self-determination</a>, I find that genocide is often invoked by secessionist regions as a last-ditch effort to secure outside intervention in their conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">United Nations</a> defines genocide as the destruction or partial destruction of a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” It is a war crime under international law, and countries are supposed to “prevent and punish” it under a 1948 U.N. agreement.</p>
<p>Secessionist leaders often try to rally <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/secessionist-minorities-and-external-involvement/58E0E7DB76EB90039C0581F608304078">foreign powers around their cause</a> with arguments based on geopolitical strategy, economic self-interest, religious bonds or shared ideology. Those reasons broadly explain why <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/kurdish-factor-iran-iraq-relations">Iran supports</a> the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/14519">Iraqi Kurds</a> in their quest for greater autonomy, and why the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/sympathy-for-the-palestinians/">Arab states back</a> the Palestinians’ efforts at statehood. </p>
<p>But when all else fails, freedom fighters will highlight their own repression in the starkest of terms to gain international assistance. In war a global campaign for victimhood is the weapon of the weaker side – and genocide claims are the most powerful weapon in this arsenal. </p>
<p>According to my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2012.649893">more than two-thirds of members</a> in the <a href="https://unpo.org/">Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization</a>, a nongovernmental organization composed of autonomy-minded minority groups like the Kurds, have alleged genocide.</p>
<h2>Genocide makes peace hard</h2>
<p>Genocide may be, as one scholar puts it, the “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2307/1389562?journalCode=spxb">embodiment of radical evil</a>,” but as a war crime it is incredibly difficult to prove. </p>
<p>Under international law, accusers must show perpetrators acted with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” specified groups. <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2003/22.html#The%20requirement%20of%20proving%20the%20specific%20intent%20to%20commit%20genocide_T">Demonstrating intent</a> is a tall order. </p>
<p>Armenia knows this as well as any nation. The 1915 Armenian genocide by Turkey is recognized by fewer than <a href="https://www.armenian-genocide.org/recognition_countries.html">three dozen countries</a>. In terms of both law and politics, declaring a deadly military campaign to be genocide – <a href="https://theconversation.com/preventing-genocide-in-myanmar-court-order-tries-to-protect-rohingya-muslims-where-politics-has-failed-130530">versus just the atrocities of a bloody conflict</a> – is tricky indeed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Rubble of a cement home and photo of a boy with flowers around it" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369182/original/file-20201112-15-1uof1fn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A house destroyed in an Oct. 17 rocket attack on Gyandzha, outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, that killed a young boy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/photograph-of-the-deceased-russian-boy-artur-mayakov-is-news-photo/1229548313?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Genocide allegations, on the other hand, are more easily come by. But according to my research they don’t bode well for peace. </p>
<p>Genocide claims turn “the other side” into an enemy bent on the destruction of an entire people. Once the public sees a conflict in these terms, history shows, leaders understandably balk at the prospect of <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49KT-6910-00KJ-D1GC-00000-00&context=1516831">sitting down at the negotiating table</a> with that enemy. </p>
<p>Genocide claims also reduce the likelihood of effective outside mediation by winnowing away the pool of “honest brokers” – that is, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27798500?seq=1">objective intermediaries</a>. Opposing parties can and do reject would-be peacekeepers based on their acknowledgment of – or refusal to acknowledge – genocide accusations, my research finds. </p>
<p>In archived coverage of the <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:605K-2V91-DYRH-01PW-00000-00&context=1516831">South Ossetian</a> region of Georgia, for example, local leaders in the 2000s insisted various European and American troops could not serve as peacekeepers since they had not defended Ossetians from an alleged 1992 genocide. </p>
<h2>Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide</h2>
<p>Genocide claims in the Georgia cases did eventually lead to international intervention and separation from Georgia, but not through peaceful negotiations. Instead, South Ossetia, like another <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030">breakaway Georgian state called Abkhazia</a>, gained de facto independence after a brutal Russian military assault on Georgia in 2008. </p>
<p>This mirrored what occurred in Kosovo nearly a decade earlier when Serbian <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/04/kosovos-push-for-serbian-genocide-tribunal-likely-to-fail/">atrocities</a> prompted Western intervention. Western powers recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18328859">Serbia</a> continues to contest Kosovo’s separation.</p>
<p>In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, genocide claims on both sides are nothing new. In archival research I found media reports showing that Armenian leaders have repeatedly <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-NCK0-0013-F32T-00000-00&context=1516831">reminded foreign powers of the 1915 Armenian genocide</a> when pressing for <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJ4-DBK0-0007-W0Y8-00000-00&context=1516831">outside intervention</a> in their conflict with Azerbaijan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Parade of cars with men waving Azerbaijani flags out the windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C14%2C4929%2C3261&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369181/original/file-20201112-13-1dtw2f0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Azerbaijanis celebrate the end of the military conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh on Tuesday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/local-people-celebrate-the-end-of-the-military-conflict-news-photo/1229566072?adppopup=true">Gavriil Grigorov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Azerbaijanis, for their part, retort it is their citizens who should fear genocide. During a 1992 Armenian military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenians committed what is now called the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17179904">Khojaly massacre</a>, when at least 613 civilians were reportedly killed. As <a href="https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-bc.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49NB-0J80-01S8-D0TP-00000-00&context=1516831">newspapers from the era</a> reveal, Azerbaijani leaders declared then that without international intervention, Armenians would finish the job.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>It is impossible to determine whether genocide has in fact occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh without in-depth investigations. But the accusations alone may overpower any truce. And as Armenians’ angry reaction to the recent cease-fire demonstrates, peace between the two nations is fragile at best.</p>
<p><em>A photo caption in this story has been changed to reflect that a rocket attack killed a young boy outside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149350/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Grodsky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Each side in the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accuses the other of war crimes. Such allegations attract foreign attention and possibly intervention, but rarely lead to a peaceful solution.Brian Grodsky, Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1462082020-09-25T02:18:29Z2020-09-25T02:18:29ZIs Malaysia heading for ‘BorneoExit’? Why some in East Malaysia are advocating for secession<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359930/original/file-20200925-16-ib2xrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">FAZRY ISMAIL/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Unity is a common theme every year on Malaysia Day, the holiday celebrated last week that marks the day Malaysia became a federation in 1963. </p>
<p>That year, Britain agreed to relinquish control of most of its remaining colonies in Southeast Asia — Singapore, North Borneo (now called Sabah) and Sarawak. They then joined with Malaya, which had gained independence from Britain in 1957, to form a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Malaysia/Political-transformation">new nation called Federation of Malaysia</a>.</p>
<p>The legal instrument to form the federation is called the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338422104_The_1963_Malaysia_Agreement_MA63_Sabah_And_Sarawak_and_the_Politics_of_Historical_Grievances">Malaysia Agreement (MA63)</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, for the people of Sabah and Sarawak, located on the island of Borneo, the agreement left many with mixed emotions. Some people in these states have long desired secession and, in recent years, the drumbeat of separation has only grown louder. </p>
<p>This issue is now a key political issue in the <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/state-election-sabah-identity-malaysia-agreement-1963-13132640">Sabah state election</a> this weekend and upcoming the Sarawak elections, which must be held before the end of 2021. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=245&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=245&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=245&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359933/original/file-20200925-18-8tg62z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The two parts of Malaysia are separated by the South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Source of historical grievances</h2>
<p>In a nutshell, most people in Sabah and Sarawak (also known as East Malaysia) are unhappy with federation because they think it has not delivered on two main promises made in 1962 — <a href="https://www.academia.edu/11581228/James_Chin_2014_Federal_East_Malaysia_Relations_Primus_Inter_Pares_">high levels of autonomy and economic development</a>.</p>
<p>In the first area, the federal government has stripped away a lot of local powers in Sabah and Sarawak in the last 57 years. On top of that, the federal authorities have tried to impose the same toxic racial and religious politics found in Malaya (also known as West Malaysia) to the eastern states. </p>
<p>East Malaysia is much more ethnically and religiously diverse compared to the west. For example, the Malay population is a minority in both Sabah and Sarawak; in fact, no ethnic group constitutes more than 40% in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Sarawak">either</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Sabah">state</a>. As a result, political Islam has not taken root here. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/now-that-malaysia-has-a-new-government-the-real-work-begins-reforming-the-country-96914">Now that Malaysia has a new government, the real work begins reforming the country</a>
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<p>In fact, one of the defining features of East Malaysia is intermarriage among the different ethnic and religious groups. The divide between Muslims and non-Muslims is reasonably insignificant — a marked difference from the often suspicious attitude Islamic leaders have toward non-Muslims in Kuala Lumpur.</p>
<p>In terms of economic development, Sabah remains one of the poorest states in Malaysia. And the infrastructure in both <a href="https://thenewsarawak.com/sarawak-third-highest-in-absolute-poverty-level">Sabah and Sarawak</a> is vastly underdeveloped compared to the west of Malaysia. </p>
<p>To add insult to injury, more than half of Malaysia’s oil and gas production comes from Sabah and Sarawak. The common joke is that all the iconic infrastructure in peninsular Malaysia, such as the Petronas Towers, Penang Bridge and Kuala Lumpur international airport, was built with money from East Malaysia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359928/original/file-20200925-14-qlvns2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The infrastructure in Kuala Lumpur far exceeds that in Malaysia’s eastern states.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">FAZRY ISMAIL/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Britain’s hand in the federation</h2>
<p>In recent times, one of the biggest grievances in East Malaysia comes from the process of decolonisation administered by the British after the second world war. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/The_Making_of_Malaysia.html?id=-F5EkgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">clear, documented evidence</a> that back in 1962, the colonial office in London used its powers and influence to get the local leaders in Sabah and Sarawak to agree to the formation of Malaysia. </p>
<p>The British wanted a clean exit from Southeast Asia and to ensure its former colonies did not turn to communism. So the British conceived the idea of a “Federation of Malaysia”, where its former territories would come under a single political entity.</p>
<p>Activists in East Malaysia say if the British had not supported the formation of the federation, it was highly <a href="https://www.academia.edu/41542761/The_1963_Malaysia_Agreement_MA63_Sabah_And_Sarawak_and_the_Politics_of_Historical_Grievances">unlikely local leaders</a> would have agreed to it. Many would have instead preferred independence or a federation consisting of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei (which gained independence from Britain much later, in 1984).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359935/original/file-20200925-18-kpgp7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A campaign event in Sabah ahead of this weekend’s elections.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>What Sabah and Sarawak want</h2>
<p>All these historical grievances have led to a <a href="https://www.nationalia.info/new/10755/sarawak-pro-sovereignty-movement-gains-momentum">growing movement</a> in Sabah and Sarawak advocating for secession from the federation. </p>
<p>With elections upcoming in both states, all local politicians — including those serving in the federal government — are now claiming to be <a href="https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/malaysia-sabah-sarawak-exit-nightmare">MA63 nationalists</a> trying to keep “Malaya out” of Sabah and Sarawak.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.facebook.com/Sabah-Sarawak-Keluar-Malaysia-SSKM-334349033386833/">Social media</a> is one key reason the secessionist movement has taken off in East Malaysia. It is now much easier for advocates to organise and magnify their grievances. </p>
<p>What the Sabah and Sarawak people want, at the very least, is a constitutional amendment to recognise the special autonomy of both states. But a significant minority argues the whole federation has failed, and thus <a href="https://twitter.com/DayakDaily/status/1306451111373606912?s=20">secession is the only way</a> forward.</p>
<p>Currently, the secessionist groups pose no real threat to the federation. But if enough people buy the secession argument in the future, public sentiment may be too strong for the national leaders to ignore. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1306451111373606912"}"></div></p>
<h2>How should the federal government respond?</h2>
<p>There are basically two options available to the federal government. </p>
<p>The first is the ostensibly easy option — the political route. This would require the federal government to recognise the historical grievances and try to resolve them. </p>
<p>However, this is not as simple as it seems. The government is reluctant to grant real autonomy to the two states, worried this will end up weakening federal powers in the other 11 states of the federation. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/will-the-najib-razak-verdict-be-a-watershed-moment-for-malaysia-not-in-a-system-built-on-racial-superiority-143617">Will the Najib Razak verdict be a watershed moment for Malaysia? Not in a system built on racial superiority</a>
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<p>There was an attempt to reword the Constitution last year to symbolically recognise the <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/sarawak-sabah-malaysia-bill-secession-ma63-sarexit-11428822">special status of both states</a>, but it failed. </p>
<p>This is the only way to keep the federation together, however. The federal leaders need to agree to recognise the special status of Sabah and Sarawak and grant them wide autonomy in the Constitution, as envisaged in the 1963 Malaysia Agreement. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1059217850307534848"}"></div></p>
<p>The second option for the government is to play a wait-and-see game. Politically, this is dangerous, as the final outcome could very well be secession.</p>
<p>By way of comparison, the push for <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Rise-of-Catalan-Independence-Spains-Territorial-Crisis/Dowling/p/book/9781138587700">independence in Catalonia</a> was similarly based on historical grievances that mushroomed into a mainstream political movement and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29478415">eventually an independence referendum</a> — declared illegal by Spain’s constitutional court.</p>
<p>At the very least, what is happening on the ground in East Malaysia suggests the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia is not yet complete. This colonial legacy is not merely history, but is clearly reflected in the present reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Chin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is a growing movement in Sabah and Sarawak for increased sovereignty or outright secession. Many feel the promises of federation haven’t been delivered.James Chin, Professor of Asian Studies, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1409172020-06-26T12:32:27Z2020-06-26T12:32:27ZAuthorities are yanking the legacy of slaveholder John C. Calhoun from public sphere, but his bigotry remains embedded in American society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343843/original/file-20200624-132982-1jd1ctm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Construction workers extracted a Calhoun statue in Charleston, South Carolina on June 24, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/workers-use-a-cherry-picker-to-access-the-statue-of-john-c-news-photo/1222328146?adppopup=true">Sean Rayford/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When I toured the <a href="https://www.scgovernorsmansion.org/">South Carolina Governor’s Mansion</a> in 2019, I noticed the multi-volume <a href="https://www.archives.gov/nhprc/projects/catalog/john-calhoun">papers of John C. Calhoun</a> on display. It struck me as remarkable that Calhoun’s ideas would be featured so prominently given his vigorous defense of slavery and his role in laying the groundwork for the Civil War.</p>
<p>But the reality is <a href="https://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/calhoun-john-caldwell/">Calhoun’s legacy</a> until now has been quite prominent in American society – and not just in the South.</p>
<p>His statue stands between the two chambers of the House and Senate in the South Carolina Statehouse. However, a separate statue in Charleston has been <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/24/882681085/crews-begin-removal-of-john-c-calhoun-statue-in-south-carolina">removed</a> from the town square following nationwide protests sparked by the killing of George Floyd during an encounter with police. The statue had stood for 124 years just a block from <a href="https://motheremanuel.com/">Mother Emanuel Church</a>, site of the <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/16/charleston-church-shooting-mother-emanuel-five-years/3193054001/">horrific shooting massacre in 2015</a> of nine Black worshipers by an avowed white supremacist. The church is also located on Calhoun Street. </p>
<p>Despite his historic prominence, Calhoun’s days as a revered icon in the public sphere are gradually coming to an end.</p>
<h2>Calhoun is all around us</h2>
<p>Numerous cities and counties, streets and roads, schools and other public places are named for Calhoun, a <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/about/history/properties/fort-hill/african-americans.html">slaveholder</a> who served as <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/calhoun-john-caldwell">secretary of state</a>, <a href="https://history.army.mil/books/Sw-SA/Calhoun.htm">secretary of war</a>, <a href="https://www.senate.gov/senators/FeaturedBios/Featured_Bio_Calhoun.htm">a U.S. senator</a>, and two terms as <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/officers-staff/vice-president/VP_John_Calhoun.htm">vice president</a>.</p>
<p>For instance, the <a href="https://www.historiccolumbia.org/tour-locations/john-c-calhoun-state-office-building">Calhoun State Office Building</a> sits in the capitol complex in Columbia, South Carolina’s state capital city.</p>
<p>There are counties named for him in his <a href="https://calhouncounty.sc.gov">home state</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.calhouncounty.org">Alabama</a>, <a href="https://calhouncounty.arkansas.gov">Arkansas</a>, <a href="http://calhouncountyga.com">Georgia</a> and elsewhere in the South. There is even a <a href="https://www.battlecreekenquirer.com/story/news/2020/06/12/calhoun-county-named-white-supremacist-slavery-michigan-john-c-calhoun/5334260002/">Calhoun County in Michigan</a> named for him. </p>
<p>Major streets in Columbia and Charleston, still bear his name.</p>
<h2>Colleges and universities</h2>
<p>Despite his prominence elsewhere, Calhoun is about to become less prominent on the landscape of American higher education.</p>
<p>The board of trustees at Clemson University, a public university, <a href="https://newsstand.clemson.edu/mediarelations/clemson-trustees-approve-honors-college-name-change-request-authority-to-restore-original-name-of-tillman-hall/">announced</a> on June 12 that its Honors College would no longer be named after Calhoun.</p>
<p>South Carolina’s “<a href="https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess113_1999-2000/bills/4895.htm">Heritage Act</a>” prevents renaming of buildings without legislative approval, but the honors college is an organizational unit, not a building.</p>
<p>This is a particularly significant development given that Clemson University sits on what was once <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/about/history/properties/fort-hill/">Calhoun’s plantation</a>, which his daughter and her husband, Thomas Clemson, inherited.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343845/original/file-20200624-132982-q7mtzy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Football players at Clemson University lead the March for Change on their campus on June 13, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/clemson-university-football-players-lead-a-march-for-change-news-photo/1249471210?adppopup=true">Maddie Meyer/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While public memorials of Calhoun appear to be on the decline, what I find more significant – and more troublesome – is the way that Calhoun’s ideology has been ingrained in the American culture and psyche – thanks in large part to the way his ideas were embraced in U.S. institutions of higher learning long after his death.</p>
<p>I make this observation as a historian and author of a chapter for the book “<a href="https://www.upress.state.ms.us/Books/P/Persistence-through-Peril">Persistence Through Peril: Episodes of College Life and Academic Endurance in the Civil War South</a>.”</p>
<h2>Who was he?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.clemson.edu/about/history/bios/john-c-calhoun.html">Calhoun</a>, who was born in 1782 and died a decade before the Civil War began, in 1850, was not only a <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/about/history/properties/fort-hill/african-americans.html">slaveholder</a> and an ardent defender of slavery, but a chief architect of the political system that allowed slavery to persist.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=746&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=746&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=746&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=937&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=937&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/343848/original/file-20200624-133002-8soap2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=937&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Engraved portrait of John C. Calhoun.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/engraved-portrait-of-american-politician-former-us-vice-news-photo/164287442?adppopup=true">Stock Montage/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More enduring than the effects of his political career – which included the <a href="https://www.tsl.texas.gov/exhibits/annexation/part4/page2.html">annexation of Texas</a> to expand the number of slaveholding states – are the repercussions of his political ideology. </p>
<p>As a political theorist, Calhoun is best known for two ideas: “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2210719.pdf">concurrent majority</a>” and “nullification.” A concurrent majority is the notion that a minority of the electorate – namely, one with money and property – can veto a political majority.</p>
<p>This idea is related to his belief in <a href="https://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/nullification/">nullification</a> theory, which is the idea that a state can void federal laws. Nullification made the idea of South Carolina seceding from the nation – and the creation of the Confederacy – a political possibility and then a reality. </p>
<p>Calhoun laid out his arguments for these ideas in his treatise “<a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/disquisition-on-government-and-a-discourse-on-the-constitution-and-government-of-the-united-states/oclc/1308732">A Disquisition on Government</a>.”</p>
<p>While some Americans defended slavery as a “<a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/necessary-evil-slavery-and-the-debate-over-the-constitution/oclc/32092358">necessary evil</a>” Calhoun viewed slavery as “<a href="https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/slavery-a-positive-good/">a positive good</a>.”</p>
<p>He held <a href="https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/conquest-of-mexico/">paternalistic views of Blacks as well as other non-whites</a>, declaring: “We make a great mistake when we suppose that all people are capable of self-government.”</p>
<h2>The Calhoun curriculum</h2>
<p>Calhoun’s political doctrines were taught explicitly in college classrooms for decades after his death. There are still <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2020/06/09/defeat-systemic-racism-institutions-must-fully-integrate-truly-diverse-subject">remnants</a> in the curriculum.</p>
<p>His own views on nullification theory, states’ rights and secession were formed when he studied at Yale University where the college’s president, <a href="https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/resources/3810">Timothy Dwight</a>, introduced to him the espoused the idea that New England could leave the young nation and become a separate country. Yale named a residential college in his honor in 1931. It <a href="https://news.yale.edu/2017/02/11/yale-change-calhoun-college-s-name-honor-grace-murray-hopper-0">renamed it in 2017</a> after the intense pressure from students and alumni that followed the Charleston massacre at the Mother Emanuel Church.</p>
<p>In the chapter that I am writing for “Persistence through Peril,” I am explaining how Calhoun’s ideologies permeated Southern institutions of higher education. His views were taught at the Military Academy of South Carolina, before, during and after the Civil War. When those cadets studied the U.S. Constitution, their professors and texts emphasized Calhoun’s interpretation of it.</p>
<p><a href="https://digital.tcl.sc.edu/digital/collection/thomasmull/id/33/">John Peyre Thomas</a>, a Citadel graduate and Confederate Army colonel who served as professor, superintendent and later trustee at The Citadel, heaped praise upon Calhoun, having served as editor for <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/07015660/">The Carolina Tribute to Calhoun</a> in 1857.</p>
<p>In a speech given at Clemson University on June 22, 1897, Thomas declared, “It is conceded that Calhoun’s standard in the science of government is so lofty as in some respects to be unattainable in our day and generation.”</p>
<h2>The road ahead</h2>
<p>Decades of teaching a particular doctrine do not fade easily or quickly. The United States is now witnessing another <a href="https://theconversation.com/minneapolis-long-hot-summer-of-67-and-the-parallels-to-todays-protests-over-police-brutality-139814">racial awakening</a> with protests for social justice. Symbols of racism and white supremacy are being removed from higher education. </p>
<p>On June 17, the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees <a href="https://www.unc.edu/posts/2020/06/17/unc-trustees-lift-moratorium/">reversed</a> its <a href="https://www.greensboro.com/z-no-digital/unc-cant-rename-buildings-with-racist-history-professors-are-trying-to-change-that/article_946e5b6d-c2db-54f3-b21e-496f9c9412ad.html">16-year moratorium</a> on renaming buildings, put in place after the statue known as “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/12/805250903/judge-voids-uncs-controversial-settlement-over-confederate-statue-silent-sam">Silent Sam</a>” was torn down in 2018.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.onlineathens.com/news/20200618/university-system-of-georgia-to-review-names-of-buildings-uga-ready-to-rsquoassist-and-supportrsquo-says-morehead">University System of Georgia</a>, which includes the University of Georgia, also moved in June 2020 to review the names of its buildings. This would include the University of Georgia’s Grady School of Journalism, which is named after Henry Grady, an <a href="https://www.ajc.com/blog/get-schooled/opinion-has-moment-come-strip-grady-name-from-atlanta-high-school-and-uga-college/A8ks9IdMLwdHvE14SGdb1N/">avowed white supremacist</a>.</p>
<p>After Calhoun’s death in 1850, his colleague in the Senate, <a href="https://www.historynet.com/john-c-calhoun-the-man-who-started-the-civil-war.htm">Thomas Hart Benton</a> of Missouri, remarked about him: “He is not dead. There may be no vitality in his body, but there is in his doctrines.” He was prophetic in his words. </p>
<p>Calhoun’s ideologies <a href="https://www.historynet.com/john-c-calhoun-the-man-who-started-the-civil-war.htm">fueled the Civil War</a>, gave comfort to those who believed in the “<a href="https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/lost_cause_the">Lost Cause</a>” (that is, to show the Civil War in the best light possible from the Confederate point of view) and perpetuated the teaching of racist and white supremacist attitudes.</p>
<p>Because the ideas he espoused have flourished, I believe that dismantling his legacy will take much more than just removing statues of his likeness or renaming buildings, streets and other public places named in his honor.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian K. Anderson receives funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities to conduct a summer seminar for school teachers on Black lawmakers during Reconstruction. </span></em></p>Despite his defense of slavery, the former vice president and US senator from South Carolina has been honored with statues and streets, schools and counties. That’s finally changing.Christian K. Anderson, Associate Professor of Higher Education, University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1324492020-03-02T14:18:34Z2020-03-02T14:18:34ZAfrican Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/317115/original/file-20200225-24694-p154fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Cameroonian President Paul Biya outside the French embassy in Yaounde.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images/AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The violent conflict that erupted in the North West and South West regions of Cameroon <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-it-would-take-to-break-the-impasse-in-cameroons-deadly-crisis-122134">in 2016</a> continues unabated. It was triggered by the government’s repression of protests over the increasing influence of French in the English-speaking legal and educational institutions, and by the perceived marginalisation of the country’s Anglophone regions.</p>
<p>Some Anglophones are demanding increased decentralisation, while others are violently struggling for an independent state called <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/130-cameroon-worsening-anglophone-crisis-calls-strong-measures">“Ambazonia”</a>. </p>
<p>The conflict has had devastating consequences for the Anglophone regions. <a href="https://bit.ly/2uLy6Re">According to Crisis Group</a> around 3,000 people have died and half a million have been displaced. One in three people in the Anglophone regions are estimated to be in need of humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>Attempts have been made, including the involvement of other countries, to resolve the crisis. For example, Switzerland led a <a href="https://bit.ly/2Rzsd2K">mediation initiative in 2019</a>. But, for its part, the African Union, has been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/au-silent-over-cameroon-separatist-crisis/a-40820693">largely silent on the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>It supported the Swiss-led initiative. It was also party to a joint statement <a href="https://bit.ly/3aUCMow">on a tripartite commitment to supporting</a> Cameroon’s ongoing peace and reconciliation process. And the African Union head, Moussa Faki Mahamat, visited Cameroonian President Paul Biya in <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180716/readout-visit-chairperson-african-union-commission-cameroon">July 2018</a> and discussed the need for a national dialogue to resolve the conflict. He visited again in <a href="https://au.int/ar/node/37799">November 2019</a>. </p>
<p>But the conflict is conspicuously absent from the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, its decision-making body on the “prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”. This, despite the council being mandated to “facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. </p>
<p>The reason for this, we believe, is that a major part of the struggle in Cameroon is separatist in character. Cameroon’s territorial integrity is therefore at stake. In 1963, the Organisation of African Unity, predecessor to the African Union, adopted the principle of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20007111?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">inviolability of borders</a> inherited from colonisation. </p>
<p>Since then there has been little support for secessionist movements in Africa. Eritrea and South Sudan were able to become independent states and many African countries support Western Sahara’s quest for self-determination. But a host of others – including Biafra, Katanga, Bioko, Zanzibar, Darfur, Casamance, Somaliland – have not seen much support. </p>
<p>Many of Cameroon’s neighbours, and a few on the Peace and Security Council, face similar challenges and are, therefore, not sympathetic to this cause. Indeed the African Union chairperson, during his visit to President Biya in 2018 <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180716/readout-visit-chairperson-african-union-commission-cameroon">had reconfirmed</a> the African Union’s “unwavering commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Cameroon”.</p>
<p>But the African Union is vital to finding a sustainable solution to the conflict in Cameroon. It needs to overcome this difficulty, and step up its lacklustre conflict management response. </p>
<h2>Who should be doing what</h2>
<p>The United Nations (UN) is tasked with the responsibility of preventing and managing conflict globally. In 2017, it and African Union signed a joint <a href="https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/signed_joint_framework.pdf">“framework for enhanced partnership in peace and security”</a>. It emphasised collaboration and predictability in dealing with conflict in Africa. </p>
<p>Regional organisations are tasked, where appropriate, to respond to conflicts in their respective regions. There are many positives about this division of labour. But, there can also be challenges when there is a lack of capacity or unwillingness to respond to conflicts. </p>
<p>The UN Security Council attempted to discuss Cameroon in May 2019, but had to be content with an informal discussion after African members <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-au-peace-and-security-council-do-better-in-2020">blocked a formal tabling of the matter</a>.</p>
<p>For its part, the African Union has established a robust peace and security architecture. Besides the Peace and Security Council, it also has the</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-the-african-standby-force-any-closer-to-being-deployed">African Standby Force</a>, for peace enforcement and peacekeeping;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-panel-wise-conflict-prevention/">Panel of the Wise</a>, for preventative diplomacy;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533312.2013.838393">Continental Early Warning System</a>, which monitors, analyses and provides warnings of impending conflict situations in Africa; and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://au.int/en/aureforms/peacefund">Africa Peace Fund</a>, established in 1993 to be the main funder of peace and security activities.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The African Union also has a mediation unit and, more recently, established a post conflict reconstruction centre. </p>
<p>The African Union has used these various avenues to resolve conflicts in a number of countries. These have included the Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Somalia, Gambia and Sudan. </p>
<p>Its track record in conflicts mixed. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aus-role-in-brokering-sudan-deal-offers-lessons-for-the-future-121822">It did well in managing the conflict in Sudan</a>, but not so well in Libya or South Sudan. The reasons often cited for the failures include <a href="https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-1371834a43?crawler=redirect&mimetype=application/pdf">the near absence of</a> regional leadership, reliance on external funding, problems of harmonisation with the regional economic communities and a <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/237284/rigos_and_peacebuilding_the_role_of_civil_society.pdf">lack of capacity</a>.</p>
<p>There is also a lack of political will on the part of the African Union’s peace and security council to get involved in a conflict deemed largely as an internal matter. </p>
<p>The fact that an African Union head has visited the country could point to some “quiet diplomacy” taking place in the background. But, that is not enough.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>If the African Union does not become more proactive in resolving the conflict in Cameroon, it risks seeing it escalate, and possibly fuelling instability in the region. </p>
<p>For many years Cameroon was considered a haven of peace in Central Africa, one of the more unstable regions on the continent with conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi and Chad. The region does <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-global-state-of-democracy-2019.pdf">not have a single democratic state</a>.</p>
<p>There are a number of different issues that need to be simultaneously addressed in the management of the conflict in Cameroon. </p>
<p>Firstly, the African Union and UN need to coordinate their efforts in addressing the humanitarian needs of the refugees and displaced persons. And the African Union <a href="https://www.achpr.org/">Commission on Human and Peoples Rights</a> must investigate the many complaints of human rights abuses in Cameroon, and to take appropriate action. </p>
<p>Secondly, the continental body needs to deploy its “Panel of the Wise” to determine how best to manage the conflict. Thirdly, it must also send a special envoy to the Anglophone region to implement a conflict management strategy that will lead to a sustainable peace agreement.</p>
<p>Fourthly, it must settle the disputes over the right to self determination through the appropriate UN structures. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-cameroon-must-move-beyond-dialogue-to-solve-its-anglophone-crisis-125241">Why Cameroon must move beyond dialogue to solve its Anglophone crisis</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks is the Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa at the Human Science Research Council which receives funding from multiple sources.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabriel Ngah Kiven does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union’s intervention track record in conflict situations is mixed.Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilGabriel Ngah Kiven, PhD candidate in Political Studies at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1313132020-02-11T11:58:28Z2020-02-11T11:58:28ZProbe into the death of UN boss 60 years ago needs South Africa’s help<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314234/original/file-20200207-27564-dm1ezm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dag Hammarskjöld died along with 15 others when his plane crashed in Zambia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Democratic South Africa has skeletons in the closet that it needs to address. One of these is the death of <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1961/hammarskjold/biographical/">Dag Hammarskjöld</a>, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in a plane crash shortly after midnight on 17 to 18 September 1961. The plane went down as it approached Ndola, a mining town in Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) bordering the Congo.</p>
<p>On board were 15 other people. Hammarskjöld planned to meet Moïse Tshombe, leader of the secessionist Katanga province, to find a solution to the conflict in the Congo. All but one, Hammarskjöld’s bodyguard Harold Julien, died. He succumbed to his injuries six days later in a local hospital. He could have been saved if treated properly. His eyewitness report was also neglected.</p>
<p>Foul play has never been eliminated. Hammarskjöld had engaged in crucial negotiations bringing the secession of the Katanga province to an end. This was followed with concerns by Western interests. His engagement in the <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/dag-hammarskjold-the-united-nations-and-the-decolonisation-of-africa/">decolonisation of Africa</a> provoked dismay among the white minority settler regimes. The crash, therefore, immediately provoked suspicions that it was not an accident. As recently as <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/pdf/ham_245_Final_UN_report_071019.pdf">September 2019</a>, António Guterres, the current UN Secretary-General stated in a letter to the General Assembly:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It remains our shared responsibility to pursue the full truth of what happened on that fateful night in 1961. We owe this to Dag Hammarskjöld and to the members of the party accompanying him. However, we also owe this to the United Nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>New evidence substantiates the early suspicions of possible foul play. This means a UN Secretary-General and those in his company were possibly the victims of an attack in air. This ought to be verified.</p>
<p>Apartheid South Africa had interests in the region and followed closely the events unfolding in the Congo. It must be taken for granted that there are records, which offer additional information to verify assumptions. But access to classified documents needs a state’s active support.</p>
<h2>New investigations</h2>
<p>Fifty years after Hammarskjöld’s death, the Zambian-born scholar Susan Williams published a <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/who-killed-hammarskjold-2/">book</a> which pointed to omissions, flaws and failures of the earlier investigations. It triggered a new inquiry conducted by an independent commission of jurists. It submitted <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldcommission.org/index.html9">a report in 2013</a>, which concluded:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola. … the possibility that the plane was in fact forced into its descent by some form of hostile action is supported by sufficient evidence to merit further inquiry.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a result, <a href="https://theconversation.com/speaking-truth-to-power-the-killing-of-dag-hammarskjold-and-the-cover-up-65534">official investigations</a> by the UN resumed. The United Nations Association Westminster Branch <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/">in London</a> has provided regular updates on developments since then.</p>
<p>In 2017 the former Chief Justice of Tanzania, Mohamed Chande Othman, was appointed as Eminent Person, tasked with further investigations. He concluded in his <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/pdf/ham_150_Othman_report_251017.pdf">first report</a> that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(an aerial attack) would have been possible using resources existing in the area at the time (and) that there is likely to be much relevant material that remains undisclosed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Justice Othman identified “the continued non-disclosure of potentially relevant new information in the intelligence, security and defence archives of member states” as “the biggest barrier to understanding the full truth” about what happened.</p>
<p>He stressed that it depends on the UN member states to become active in the search for further evidence in their national archives. The burden of proof had, therefore, shifted to them. They should show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information.</p>
<p>In support of Othman’s report, Guterres in 2017 <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/pdf/ham_150_Othman_report_251017.pdf">recommended</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>that relevant member states appoint an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated and internal review of their archives, in particular their intelligence, security and defence archives, to determine whether they hold relevant information.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/252">UN General Assembly</a> extended Othman’s mandate in early 2018. He presented his <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/pdf/ham_245_Final_UN_report_071019.pdf">second report</a> in September 2019.</p>
<p>New information, Othman concluded</p>
<blockquote>
<p>highlights the fact that there were many more foreign mercenaries in and around Katanga, including pilots, than had been considered by earlier inquiries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These had the logistics and necessary conditions (suitable planes and airfields) to intercept with the plane approaching. For Othman </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it remains plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>New information also confirmed that the crash site was discovered much earlier than officially reported – and testifies to the deliberate neglect of the only survivor. As Othman notes, this</p>
<blockquote>
<p>calls into question the acts of various governments directly after the crash and leaves open the issue of why the earlier crash discovery time was not reported.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Othman based his conclusions partly on reports of the independent, high-ranking official appointed by several UN member states. But, states such as South Africa, the US and the UK, where most discoveries could be expected, did not comply. </p>
<h2>A challenge to South Africa</h2>
<p>South Africa subsequently assigned a high-ranking official at its foreign relations department in <a href="http://www.hammarskjoldinquiry.info/pdf/ham_245_Final_UN_report_071019.pdf">May 2019</a> with the task to look into potential sources, which could offer new information. But no report has so far been submitted.</p>
<p>On delivering his most recent report, Othman recommended: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>that an independent person is appointed to continue the work;</p></li>
<li><p>that key member states again be urged to (re)appoint independent high-ranking officials to determine whether relevant information exists within their security, intelligence and defence archives;</p></li>
<li><p>that a conclusion be reached over whether member states have complied with this process;</p></li>
<li><p>that key documents be made public.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In December 2019 another <a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/248">Swedish draft resolution</a> was adopted to extend Othman’s mandate, with a record number of 128 co-sponsoring countries, including South Africa, out of the UN’s 193 member states. Once again, the resolution was not supported by the US and the UK.</p>
<p>It is one thing for the US and the UK to be unwilling to assess and disclose classified material. It’s quite possible that they want to avoid any embarrassment. </p>
<p>But South Africa has no reason to want to hide anything. There were plausible reasons for the apartheid regime’s refusal to cooperate with the probe into Hammarskjöld’s death. But these no longer stand under a democratic government.</p>
<p>It is inconceivable that the country’s archives contain no information on what happened at Ndola. Concerned about apartheid, Hammarskjöld had visited South Africa in early 1961. South African agencies and individuals played an active role in the region. This needs to be more closely investigated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is Director emeritus of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. He was a member of the Hammarskjöld Inquiry Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barney Pityana is affiliated with The 70s Group, an independent gathering of South African political activists from the 1970s. It aims to contribute to informed political and economic thinking in society. </span></em></p>Does South Africa have skeletons in the closet over the death of the UN Secretary-General?Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaBarney Pityana, Professor Emeritus of Law, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217012019-08-12T13:27:52Z2019-08-12T13:27:52ZWhy Sidama statehood demand threatens to unravel Ethiopia’s federal system<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287513/original/file-20190809-144873-rmi5qp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The thread that holds Ethiopia together could be unravelling.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephen Morrison/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ethiopia’s ethnic federal arrangement was designed to empower ethnic groups with the right to self administration rights. But it’s facing a major test. The current challenge comes from the Sidama ethnic group from a region commonly known the Southern Ethiopia Regional State. </p>
<p>Ethnic Sidamas have been granted self administrative rights by controlling political powers in the Sidama Zone administration. Zone administrations are the second tier of Ethiopia’s local government structure, just after regional states. But those pushing for statehood contend that the size of the Sidama population, which is about <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population/">4%</a> of Ethiopia’s total population, should empower it to have its own regional state. </p>
<p>This demand is two decades old. It has gained new momentum over the past year following political changes that swept through the country and led to the rise of Abiy Ahmed as <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-brings-new-hope-but-faces-some-familiar-old-problems-109668">prime minister</a>, a reformist who remains highly popular thanks to his pro-unity stance.</p>
<p>Ethnic federalism, as an institutional design, has its backers and its detractors. Those who defend the system argue that its failures are due to the fact that it hasn’t been implemented in the way in which it was designed. They contend that local governments are stripped of their constitutional powers, thanks to a dominant central government that interferes in regional affairs. </p>
<p>But those who oppose the system argue that it pits one group against the other. They point to the fact that Ethiopia has a very large number of internally displaced people due to numerous ethnic conflicts. Although its framers believed that the federal arrangement could promote unity in diversity, those who oppose it believe that internal displacements have occurred mainly because some groups want to homogenise the regions they administer. They also argue that the rise of ethno-nationalist movements are evidence that the federal arrangement is unravelling. </p>
<p>The Sidama demand for statehood presents one of the greatest challenges Ethiopia’s federal system has faced since its inception in 1995. It has already led to violence after the federal government announced it was delaying a referendum to settle the secession demand. But it poses a much bigger threat: if Abiy gives into the Sidama’s demands, he could signal the unravelling of Ethiopia’s federal system of government. </p>
<p>Here is why. Sidama’s secession from the Southern regional state would end the region’s status as a symbol of Ethiopian unity and would come at the most trying and divisive times in the country’s history. Such a decision will also pave the way for more Southern groups to push with similar <a href="https://borkena.com/2019/05/20/wolayta-demonstration-for-statehood/">quests for statehood</a>. </p>
<p>The Sidama secession debacle is another example of the fact that a constitution that has prioritised the promotion of group rights over individual rights is under strain. In my view the solution remains that of political compromise followed by constitutional reform that guarantees all Ethiopian ethnic groups and citizens equal rights to live, work and prosper across the country. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-why-the-sidama-secession-demand-needs-to-be-negotiated-120734">Ethiopia: why the Sidama secession demand needs to be negotiated</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Background</h2>
<p>After the fall of the military regime in 1991, the provisional government charter created 14 regions that established Ethiopia’s new federal order. But a year later when the country’s new constitution was ratified, the governing Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front made some major changes. The biggest was that it consolidated five of the transitional era regions from the Southern part of the country into just one regional state. This was named Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region, although commonly referred to as Southern Ethiopia regional state. </p>
<p>The effects of this decision continue to be felt. The one consequence was that it sowed the seeds of disaffection among the Sidama. Another is that the Sidama secession from the Southern region would massively affect the ruling party. This is because the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement is one of the four members that form part of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. Sidama’s secession would weaken the voting capacity of Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement at the federal level. This could worsen if other groups in the south follow the Sidama example. This, in turn, would weaken the ruling democratic front.</p>
<p>This goes to explain Abiy’s responses. His administration seems to have controlled a situation that had the potential to trigger a nationwide disaster. </p>
<p>Abiy and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, which was mandated to organise and hold the referendum for Sidama’s statehood demand, tactfully delayed the decision. This appears to reinforce Abiy’s conviction that the country’s federal order and national unity need to be maintained, at least until the constitution is reformed.</p>
<p>Abiy’s actions are not without a recent precedent. A few months after he assumed office, the Somali region, which was led by Abdi Ile, with the help of his trusted <em>Liyu</em> (special in Amharic) Police, had attempted to force the regional parliament to discuss secession. Abiy ordered the Ethiopian army, then led by the late Chief of Staff General Seare Mekonnen to step in. The army foiled the regional President Abdi Mohammed Iley’s plans and subsequently put him in jail. Immediately, a new Somali regional administration was established with Mustafe Oumer, a popular former Somali activist at its helm. Since then, the Somali region has been relatively stable.</p>
<p>The fact that the situation seems calmer does not mean the political tension is over. Such political challenges indicate that Ethiopia’s federal arrangement remains extremely vulnerable. </p>
<p>There’s still a great deal of work to be done. Abiy’s government must make sure some of the most serious issues of disagreement are sorted once and for all. And the issue of constitutional reform needs to be addressed. The only outcome that will ensure Ethiopia steers away from imploding is if self administration rights – whether in the form of statehood demands or merger with other regions – are respected. But with the country’s constitution as a guideline.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yohannes Gedamu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls for secession in Ethiopia could destabilise the entire nation.Yohannes Gedamu, Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1207342019-07-30T09:41:26Z2019-07-30T09:41:26ZEthiopia: why the Sidama secession demand needs to be negotiated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285949/original/file-20190728-43145-12i3i21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young men in the traditional attire of southern Ethiopia's Sidama people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">commons.wikimedia.org</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mounting tensions in southern Ethiopia are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49070762">creating</a> high levels of nervousness in the country. At the centre of the conflict is the clamour for internal secession by the Sidama, the country’s fifth largest ethic group. Most recently, the federal government declared that it, rather than the local authorities, was now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics-idUSKCN1UI29Z?utm_source=34553&utm_medium=partner">in charge</a> of maintaining peace and security. This followed violence which had led to deaths and injuries.</p>
<p>Ethiopia has 80 ethnic groups. More than two decades ago, the country adopted a constitution that uses ethnicity as a basis to organise the federation. But only five of the nine states are home to a dominant ethnic community. The remaining four states are markedly multi-ethnic. </p>
<p>Here the complications set in. While some numerically stronger ethnic communities have been denied the status of a state, some smaller ones have a state to call their own. For example, the State of Harari is home to the eponymous community of fewer than 200 000 people. </p>
<p>On the other hand there are ethnic groups, like the Sidama – with more than three million people – that don’t have a state of their own. </p>
<p>It has not always been like this. The Sidama have a history of distinct administrative existence dating back to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b146-time-ethiopia-bargain-sidama-over-statehood">imperial days</a>. More recently, the ethnically defined State of Sidama, in which the Sidama were the majority, was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23644459?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">established in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>But this was abolished when Ethiopia adopted a new Constitution in 1995 and the Southern Nations and Nationalities and People’s Regional State (the Southern State) was established where the Sidama became just one of the 56 or so ethnic groups that inhabit the state. </p>
<p>Since then, members of the Sidama community have been demanding their own state, pointing to states like Harari.</p>
<p>The matter came to a head on July 18 when members of the Sidama community tried to carry out their threat of unilaterally <a href="https://borkena.com/2019/04/09/sidama-women-marched-awassa-demanding-ethnic-sidama-statehood/">declaring</a> the creation of a separate state. This followed months of agitation. </p>
<p>What Ethiopia now faces is a hugely complex legal and political issue. The clauses in the Constitution dealing with secession are open to wide interpretation, as has been made clear by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-security/ethiopia-faces-more-conflict-with-ethnic-groups-push-for-region-idUSKCN1TZ1H0">recent comments</a> by the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. </p>
<p>On the other hand, it’s important that all parties concerned work their way towards a negotiated settlement particularly given the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/250-arrested-ethiopia-foiled-coup-state-tv-190628005517448.html">fragile state</a> the country’s in.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/285839/original/file-20190726-43153-u4sq1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Ethiopia’s semi-autonomous states.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Constitutional amendment</h2>
<p>The good thing for the Sidama and others is that the Constitution has kept the door of statehood ajar for ethnic groups wanting to establish a state of their own. <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf">Article 47(2)</a> provides ethnic groups the right to establish a state of their own. </p>
<p>All a community needs to do is to show that it has support for its demand. A simple majority vote of the community is enough – or so it would seem. In reality, the process is proving to be much more complicated.</p>
<p>In his recent address to law makers Abiy alluded to the complexity of the problem when he pointed out that a majority vote in favour of statehood might not be sufficient because the constitution only lists nine states that constitute the federation. Getting the prospective state of Sidama onto that list would require a constitutional amendment. </p>
<p>Many, including myself, were quick to dismiss this as an <a href="https://en-gb.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2124590420997449&id=1046081962181639&__xts__%5B0%5D=68.ARCfqZGMNJHZ09WoGoSlEIbAo_xtxIQpUSSwO4wLC_EDhINnsb3fV3mzojb5Uj64o4JZXdi4dEmfqhEG90ThmRgBU3lJpWDNBvy9imYA983BhalRJRhVrPCWz2wSxT0yLnkAAFZcZUa864kVAAB-YY7IVLOJRrPgv7EFinkDhaSnMOw9pRZg2BoqSS_uAVD6xIfMHCLrM7OngauHwrvTpcVB2egqor0AouuQ2lTFTPYojYiZUDiod6F4gdrEDoBKmghtnwq5dZq28W22Z9eKtS9Ak3sP-uznlaKH9JG0tbH036LX1aQ6DVMj9PYPn9gtgCntSYpjzKTmvDMlfWCk5mkl&__tn__=K-R">act of legal gymnastics</a> by a Prime Minister who has found himself between a rock and hard place. The Constitution, after all, states that a new state directly becomes a member of the federation without any need for application to join it. </p>
<p>But the prime minister is also correct that the constitutional clause listing the states must be amended if the Sidama’s quest for statehood is to be completed. And this is an amendment that requires the support of the two houses of the federal parliament and the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the states.</p>
<p>One may argue that a suitable referendum result should place an obligation on the member states and the federal government to effect the necessary constitutional amendment. To borrow the famous lines of the Supreme Court of Canada, <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-31.8/page-1.html">‘a clear expression of a will by a clear majority’</a> of the population of the Sidama to secede from the Southern State should create an obligation on the rest of the country to do what is constitutionally necessary. </p>
<p>But this also poses a potential stumbling block: is it possible to coerce a state from which a territory is seceding – in this case the Southern State – to vote for a constitutional amendment that effectively presents a threat to its territorial integrity? After all, there is no language of obligation in Article 47. In as much as it gives ethnic communities the right to demand internal secession, it does not impose a corresponding duty on the others to accept it.</p>
<p>Even if an obligation exists, I would argue that it is an obligation to negotiate. This means that the concerned parties, including the federal government, the government of the Southern State and the Sidama local governments, must come to the table to negotiate the possibilities and ramifications of a new Sidama state. </p>
<p>That is why, in my view, it was also unconstitutional for members of the Sidama community to unilaterally declare the formation of a new state. Ethiopia’s Constitution is silent on what should be done in the event a state or federal government refusing to entertain a request to secede. But it does subject internal secession to a procedure. This suggests that it does not allow for a unilateral declaration of succession. Further, a federal law requires appeals to be directed to the House of Federation, the body tasked to deal with constitutional disputes.</p>
<h2>Negotiating table</h2>
<p>All roads, it seems, lead the parties to a negotiating table. It must be admitted that the Sidama’s struggle to have their own state is at a point of no return. The state and federal authorities have now agreed to hold a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-security/ethiopia-faces-more-conflict-with-ethnic-groups-push-for-region-idUSKCN1TZ1H0">referendum</a> within the next five months. </p>
<p>Perhaps in the meantime they can engage in a negotiation and deal with many of the questions that remain unanswered. This includes who should be allowed to vote in the referendum, the division of assets and the concerns of individuals that do not belong to the Sidama ethnic group. </p>
<p>Ethiopia is in an extremely fragile political state. It can’t afford the instability and chaos that might follow from the disorderly partitioning of an existing state and a similar push by others. Both state and non-state actors must work towards a cooperative internal secession.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article was first published on the <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2019-posts/2019/7/15/internal-secession-and-federalism-in-ethiopia">IACL-IADC Blog</a> under the title “Internal secession and Federalism in Ethiopia”.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yonatan Fessha receives funding from Horizon 2020. </span></em></p>The already extremely fragile political condition cannot handle any further instability and chaos.Yonatan T. Fessha, Marie-Curie Fellow, EURAC Research and Associate Professor, Public Law and Jurisprudence, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/982482018-06-24T07:21:37Z2018-06-24T07:21:37ZCameroon’s Anglophone crisis threatens national unity. The time for change is now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224195/original/file-20180621-137717-1xr78ht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cameroon's President Paul Biya has been in charge for nearly 40 years. His people want change.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/LINTAO ZHANG</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cameroon’s governance and security problems have historically attracted little outside attention. But this seems likely to change, for two reasons. The first is the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">growing political crisis</a> in the Central African nation’s English-speaking region. The second is a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/cameroon-opposition-party-picks-presidential-candidate-20180224">presidential election</a> scheduled for October 2018.</p>
<p>Roughly <a href="https://qz.com/1097892/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-danger-of-becoming-a-full-blown-conflict/">20% of the country’s population</a> of 24.6 million people are Anglophone. The majority are Francophone. The unfair domination of French-speaking politicians in government has long been the source of conflict.</p>
<p>Activists in the country’s Anglophone western regions are protesting their forced assimilation into the dominant Francophone society. They argue that this process violates their minority rights, which are <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-cameroon-is-at-war-with-itself-over-language-and-culture-85401">protected under agreements that date back to the 1960s</a>. Anglophone political representation and involvement at many levels of society has dwindled since the Federal Republic of Cameroon became the United Republic of Cameroon in 1972. There are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/12/world/africa/ap-af-cameroon-deadly-violence.html">growing calls</a> for the Anglophone region to secede from Cameroon. </p>
<p>This festering conflict represents <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">a major test</a> as Cameroonians prepare for the October elections.</p>
<p>Three things are urgently needed now in Cameroon. The first is to understand the origins of the crisis. The second is to support an inclusive national dialogue. And the third is to ensure that the 2018 elections are free and fair for all.</p>
<h2>Growing crisis</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">Before 1961</a>, the Southern Cameroons were a British administered territory from Nigeria. They elected to join the Republic of Cameroon by UN plebiscite in 1961 around the time of decolonisation. </p>
<p>A power-sharing agreement was reached: the executive branch of government was meant to be shared by Francophones and Anglophones. But that agreement has not been upheld and, over the years, Anglophone political representation has been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">steadily eroded</a>.</p>
<p>The crisis came to a head in late 2016 when lawyers, joined by teachers and others with similar grievances, led protests in major western cities demanding that the integrity of their professional institutions be protected and their minority rights respected. </p>
<p>President Paul Biya responded by deploying troops to the region and blocking internet access. When peaceful demonstrations were met with violent repression it exacerbated tensions and escalated the conflict to a national political crisis. </p>
<p>On 12 June 12 2018, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/12/world/africa/ap-af-cameroon-deadly-violence.html">Amnesty International issued a report</a> documenting human rights violations in Cameroon. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">The International Crisis Group says</a> that at least 120 civilians and 43 members of security forces <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-says-160-000-anglophone-cameroonians-fled-violence-145916871.html">have been killed</a> in the most recent waves of violence. </p>
<p>More than 20,000 people have fled to neighbouring Nigeria, and an estimated 160,000 are displaced within Cameroon. </p>
<p>Some human rights activists <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/30/africas-next-civil-war-could-be-in-cameroon/?utm_term=.0880fcf57106">worry</a> that Cameroon could be the site of Africa’s next civil war.</p>
<p>Agbor Nkongho, an Anglophone human rights lawyer and director of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, told the <em>Washington Post</em>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are gradually, gradually getting there (civil war). I’m not seeing the willingness of the government to try to find and address the issue in a way that we will not get there.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another issue is that there are diverse views even within the Anglophone and Francophone communities about what would be best for Cameroon going forward.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to national unity</h2>
<p>In October 2017 the separatist leader Julius Ayuk Tabe declared the independence of the <a href="https://www.ambazonia.org/">Republic of Ambazonia</a>. His interim government laid claim to a territory whose borders are the same as the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British rule (1922-1961). </p>
<p>The interim government’s spokesman, Nso Foncha Nkem, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KL7HM47aqA8">invited</a> Francophones to leave the region and called on Anglophones in Biya’s “rubber-stamp” government to return to Ambazonia and support the movement. He also pleaded for unity, asking that Anglophones speak in one voice. </p>
<p>However, that call has not overcome the challenges posed by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">diverse viewpoints</a> within the Anglophone population itself. Some favour secession. Others want to return to the 1961 federation and the power-sharing agreement. There are those who prefer decentralisation that would devolve power to regional leaders, and some who simply want an administrative solution that would leave the Republic of Cameroon as it stands. </p>
<p>And among the Francophone population, there is some support for the radical separatists, while some see the Anglophone situation as a general crisis of governance and others deny any problem exists. </p>
<p>Mongo Beti, a Francophone novelist and activist who spent 30 years in exile, observed after <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3820363?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">returning home</a> in the 1990s that a general absence of identification with a viable, unified nation due to various divisions had frayed Cameroon’s social fabric and was a significant impediment to progress. </p>
<p>It is unclear whether Biya, who is 85 and in power since 1982, will run for re-election. His 38 years in office as a corrupt, absent leader have left <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-electoral-uncertainty-amid-multiple-security-threats">the nation in tatters</a>. The vast majority of Cameroonians, whether Anglophone or Francophone, are hungry for change. </p>
<h2>The way forward?</h2>
<p>There is an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAgBBzrjMUI">urgent need for an inclusive national dialogue</a> to harness this desire for change. </p>
<p>The government must recognise that it faces a substantive national crisis and take extraordinary steps. A general conversation about governance in all its regions is also necessary. Given the depth and severity of people’s grievances, a holistic approach is needed that would address issues of governance, security, and civic engagement to mend the bonds that have been broken. </p>
<p>This is necessary if the current crisis it to become an opportunity to develop a new road map for the future that could empower citizens.</p>
<p><em>Phyllis Taoua is the author of African Freedom: How Africa Responded to Independence (Cambridge University Press, 2018) and was a Tucson Public Voices Fellow with the Op-Ed Project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phyllis Taoua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some human rights activists worry that Cameroon could be the site of Africa’s next civil war.Phyllis Taoua, Professor of Francophone Studies (Africa, Caribbean), Faculty Affiliate with Africana Studies, World Literature Program and Human Rights Pracice, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/939792018-03-27T11:03:13Z2018-03-27T11:03:13ZArrest of Carles Puigdemont closes another chapter in Catalonia’s bid for independence<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43519438">detention</a> of five leading Catalan pro-independence politicians, followed 48 hours later by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/26/catalan-leader-carles-puigdemont-remanded-in-custody-in-germany">arrest and detention</a> of deposed Catalan President Carles Puigdemont in Germany, brings the extraordinary and tumultuous events of Spain and Catalonia since September 2017 closer to an end point. </p>
<p>Puigdemont had been living in self-imposed exile in Belgium, and was arrested in Germany on his return from a trip to Finland after a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43532217">European Arrest Warrant</a> was reissued for him. German authorities have 60 days to respond to Madrid’s request to extradite him back to Spain, where he and his colleagues are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-court-charges-13-catalan-independence-leaders-rebellion/">charged with</a> rebellion and misuse of public funds. </p>
<p>The attempted unilateral secession of Catalonia from Spain dramatically failed, as Puigdemont was the last remaining figure of significance who still stood by the notion of an independent Catalan Republic <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">declared on October 27, 2017</a>. </p>
<p>The Catalan process for secession, or independence, began in a political sense in 2012, though its root causes are much deeper. The turn in support for independence, reaching polling support as high as <a href="https://www.ara.cat/politica/Centre_d-Estudis_d-Opinio-CEO-independencia-si-no_0_941306030.html">55% in 2013</a>, occurred at the height of Spain’s greatest economic crisis since the death of Francisco Franco in 1975. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-cultural-struggle-against-madrid-goes-back-centuries-89403">Catalonia's cultural struggle against Madrid goes back centuries</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Opinion polls aside, there has never been a majority support for independence in any regional election held since 2012, leading to a questionable legitimacy. This was compounded by Catalonia’s decision to try to break from Spain unilaterally from September 2017, based on the support of <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-separatist-parties-win-the-catalan-election-international-law-doesnt-provide-a-right-to-independence-86900">the 48%</a> of voters for Catalan separatist parties obtained in the election of September 2015.</p>
<p>The Spanish authorities, the main political parties and the government have repeatedly declared that the separation of a part of Spain from the national territory is illegal. Here lie the origins of legal mechanisms being used again now against Puigdemont and his colleagues to confront the independence movement: the state declares independence is “illegal” hence it is simply a matter for the courts. </p>
<p>From 2012 and with more intensity from 2014, Catalan institutions embarked on an intense international lobbying campaign to obtain international support and achieve the aim of becoming a new member state of the European Union. But five months after the proclamation of the independent Catalan Republic in October 2017, not one country in the world has recognised Catalonia’s independence.</p>
<p>These three elements, ambivalent social and political support, a state explicitly hostile to any attempt at separation and a complete absence of international support, have led to the almost complete defeat for Catalan independence. The capture and imprisonment of Puigdemont symbolically closes this phase.</p>
<h2>Independence never an inevitability</h2>
<p>Between 2012 and 2017, the Catalan movement for independence displayed extraordinary capacity for mobilisation, managing to bring a million people onto the streets of Barcelona almost every year. The movement was peaceful, optimistic and celebratory, confident that separation from Spain was eminently achievable and imminent. However, this relentlessly upbeat outlook seemed to prevent recognition of hard political reality. </p>
<p>In spite of the repeated warnings from the Spanish political and legal authorities regarding the impossibility of secession, the movement’s leaders seemed oblivious to it. In spite of public statements from a range of international leaders, including the European Union, supporting the continued unity of Spain, the movement told itself that when the time came, recognition for Catalonia was inevitable.</p>
<p>While arguably it had little choice, the EU has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-the-world-reacted-to-catalan-independence-declaration/">backed Spain</a> in the Catalan dispute. One consequence has been a eurosceptic turn within the Catalan independence movement over perceived betrayal by Brussels.</p>
<p>The Catalan movement for independence, as well as a number of internal and strategic errors, seriously misjudged the interest and willingness of the EU to countenance the break up of Spain. Yet, the EU is an alliance of states. Its <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html">2009 Lisbon Treaty</a> explicitly stated that member states must respect others’ territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The EU has been through repeated crises since 2008 and it seems astonishing that the leaders of Catalan independence thought the bloc might be supportive of further disruption. While accommodation might have been made for Scotland, this was because the British state was prepared to accept the separation of 5m Scots from a Britain of almost 65m should they vote for it in a referendum. Catalonia comprises a much higher proportion of the overall Spanish population (16%), while the Catalan economy is <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-spain-and-the-economic-consequences-of-a-split-85557">almost 20% of Spain’s overall</a> GDP. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-independence-movements-in-scotland-and-elsewhere-are-tongue-tied-over-catalonia-86669">Why independence movements in Scotland and elsewhere are tongue-tied over Catalonia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With Spain hostile, any separation of Catalonia could only be highly destabilising, with potential knock on effects in a Europe gradually recovering from the financial crisis. </p>
<p>Since the autumn of 2017, there has been a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2018-02-05/why-spanish-nationalism-rise">dramatic resurgence</a> of Spanish nationalist sentiment in both Catalonia and Spain and a receding possibility of reforms of the 1978 Spanish constitution to adopt real federalism. </p>
<p>The Catalan independence movement is deeply divided between pragmatists and idealists and the optimism inherent in the movement since 2012 has been shattered. However, the grievances that produced the turn to secession in Catalonia have not even begun to be addressed and no meaningful resolution of the Catalan question will occur until the Madrid government recognises that it is a political problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dowling does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former president of Catalonia is in a German prison, awaiting possible extradition to Spain where he faces charges of rebellion.Andrew Dowling, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907112018-01-26T16:47:50Z2018-01-26T16:47:50ZWith an exiled president Skyping from Brussels, where now for Catalan independence?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203539/original/file-20180126-100929-38uo5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/barcelona-spain-october-21-2017-500000-739211284">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Can a self-exiled leader remotely control the politics of a region, effectively ruling by Skype? That is what the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-leader-carles-puigdemont-left-spain-brussels-rebellion-charges-eu-independence-latest-a8027366.html">ousted</a> Catalan president, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/world/europe/in-catalonia-independence-referendum.html">Carles Puigdemont</a>, is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKlcEgTaJ1U">trying to do</a> from Brussels, where he escaped in October 2017 after an <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/09/economist-explains-17">illegal referendum</a> and a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41780116">unilateral declaration of independence</a>. </p>
<p>Following the ambivalent declaration of October 27, the Spanish prime minister <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-12-19/profile-mariano-rajoy-brey-video">Mariano Rajoy</a> proceeded to <a href="https://www.independent.ie/world-news/spanish-pm-sacks-catalan-government-after-independence-vote-36266140.html">sack</a> the Catalan premier, disband parliament and call for snap elections on December 21 2017. Spain’s supreme court decided to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">imprison</a> several Catalan politicians and civic leaders, who face charges of misuse of public funds, rebellion and sedition – a crime punishable by up to 30 years in prison.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203541/original/file-20180126-100915-i999bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Exiled Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/656175574?src=0cNZnCw82eNgW1XRa5SLXg-1-5&size=huge_jpg">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>With 47.5% of the vote, the diverse secessionist coalition of Puigdemont did not win the popular vote on December 21, but they regained an absolute majority of seats, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/08/will-catalonias-separatists-win-in-december-the-voting-system-is-stacked-in-their-favor/?utm_term=.049e394fd741">assisted</a> by a rural bias in the election law. They could go ahead and form a government again, but the problem is that Puigdemont cannot be invested as head of the regional executive on January 31, when the Catalan parliament is expected to hold a first vote on his candidacy – Spanish authorities insist he will be arrested the moment he sets foot on Spanish soil.</p>
<p>The reason for his escape to Brussels was to allow the wannabe “Skype president” to maintain a voice (which the imprisoned Catalan politicians have lost) and internationalise the Catalan conflict for global audiences.</p>
<p>The strategy of internationalisation characterised the so-called “Catalan process” – a movement of civil society and government mobilisations aimed at holding a vote on Catalonia’s relationship with Spain. However, the strategy that began in 2012 has been unsuccessful – because domestic politics and international politics work very differently.</p>
<p>As we argue in a recent <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/secession_and_counter_secession_an_international_relations_perspective">report</a>, secessionist movements tend to focus on domestic politics and neglect the power play that distinguishes international affairs. This is surprising, as these movements want to be recognised as independent states, a status that can only be conferred by recognition from the international community.</p>
<h2>Big power play</h2>
<p>When it comes to constituting sovereign statehood, aspiring states need to pay significant attention to the calculations of interest-driven big powers. And a <a href="https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/monografias/secession_and_counter_secession/what_s_law_got_to_do_with_it_democracy_realism_and_the_tina_turner_theory_of_referendums">study</a> of 34 successful referendums on independence since the 1990s by referenda expert Matt Qvortrup has suggested that the countries that matter most for supporting or opposing the birth of a new state are three of the permanent members of the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/">UN Security Council</a>: the USA, France and the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>China would never take the lead because of its own secessionist troubles in Tibet. Russia on the other hand might be supportive to legitimise its separatist machinations in Crimea and to weaken the European Union, but has been on the receiving end of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12274023">secessionist aspirations</a> in the Caucasus. In any case Russian support would not be sufficient, barring the consent of Western powers.</p>
<p>In the absence of a universal legal right to secession under international or domestic law, there is no clear guidance for sorting out which nations merit statehood and which do not. Realpolitik, not ideals, ends up deciding who becomes a sovereign state.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203543/original/file-20180126-100915-og4r4m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/259374893?src=PlpSg4ZV5QmxLVPkXhTKZw-1-78&size=huge_jpg">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Catalan secessionists did not get the international recognition they were craving. And it was not for a lack of trying. Catalonia <a href="http://thediplomatinspain.com/en/government-closes-catalan-embassies-except-brussels/">opened</a> several “embassies” in European capitals and in New York, whose main purpose was to gather support for Catalan independence aspirations. To no avail. International politicians increasingly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/02/catalan-government-emergency-meeting-spain-independence">shunned</a> Catalan leaders and did not grant them photo opportunities. </p>
<p>Secessionist movements within Europe face a different environment than those outside the EU when it comes to international recognition. The 2004 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-eu/spooked-by-catalonia-eu-rallies-behind-madrid-but-warily-idUSKCN1BW1OC">Prodi doctrine</a> (named after former EU Commission president Romano Prodi) holds that any territory that breaks away from an EU member state would be outside the union and would need to re-apply for membership – a process that normally takes many years, even in the absence of vetoes from member countries.</p>
<p>The theoretical <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2016.1149993">threat of EU exclusion</a> – brushed aside by secessionists during their campaign – has been enough to prompt more than <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/firms-quit-catalonia-amid-its-political-upheaval-2017-12?IR=T">3,000 companies to move</a> their headquarters out of Catalonia since the illegal referendum of October 1. The economic rationale for remaining in the EU as part of Spain has proved to be a powerful argument for unionist forces in Catalonia. On the other hand, the fiscal gains that separatists promised if the relatively rich Catalonia broke away look increasingly dubious.</p>
<p>When it comes to EU membership, bilateral agreements are more successful than unilateral steps. In the case of a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), a Catalan application to the EU would be vetoed by the Spanish executive. Other member states that may also want to discourage claims to self-determination in their own territories, such as France (Corsica), Italy (Lega Nord) and Belgium (Flanders), could also oppose it.</p>
<p>The exception to this rule would be provided by the Scottish case, which held a binding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/10/scottish-independence-guide-referendum-uk-yes-no">referendum</a> agreed with the UK. The Westminster government pledged not to veto Scotland’s accession to the EU, if there was a pro-independence majority in the 2014 plebiscite.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203545/original/file-20180126-100912-16ca1ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Catalonia faces fierce opposition over independence from Spain’s unionists.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/725539885?size=huge_jpg&src=lb-59856941&sort=newestFirst&offset=10">Shutterstock</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>The realpolitik</h2>
<p>Puigdemont’s nomination as regional president will not attract international support. His unilateral power-play has seemingly run its course, and it is only a matter of time before he returns to Catalonia to face legal proceedings. </p>
<p>Besides, the European Union has repeatedly stressed the need for strict adherence to the rule of law. It is apprehensive about a possible <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/is-selfdetermination-contagious-a-spatial-analysis-of-the-spread-of-selfdetermination-claims/84F1FDF9EB18EB98F902C85C0E05C2B4">contagion effect</a> if Catalonia succeeds in declaring independence without first seeking an agreement with Spain.</p>
<p>However, merely rallying the consent of fellow nation states and engaging in a purely legalistic discourse at home as the Spanish government has done might not be sustainable in the long run, either. The grievances of a large part of the Catalan population are real and will remain a problem if they are allowed to fester.</p>
<p>Rather than insisting on recentralisation or offering Catalonia more autonomy, Spain will need to find a more positive political and national narrative. The way out might be more <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/federalism">federalism</a> that gives regions a real say in Madrid.</p>
<p>When it comes to international recognition of new states, secessionist movements need to expand the domestic support base and convince international powers that secession will not affect them negatively. It is unclear how a Skype president with scant regard for legal norms can help Catalonia become a full member of the international community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the most recent elections, Catalonia’s secessionist coalition is free to form a government. But their president is still exiled in Belgium.Diego Muro, Lecturer in International Relations, University of St AndrewsEckart Woertz, Senior research fellow, Barcelona Centre of International Affairs (CIDOB)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864252017-11-02T09:57:30Z2017-11-02T09:57:30ZCatalonia: civil disobedience and where the secession movement goes now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192866/original/file-20171101-19853-1x6y1x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/68637044@N05/23628067908/in/photolist-BZW2pb-Cey3S1-Z2UxJS-Y2rRPj-YnNj9G-oTFVc9-pKDLzd-Z4qrX1-Z2R5yf-fPhFVk-Z6Zfqz-a4yMJw-C17BNm-YDuLJe-fbkZ3F-Z6Ym14-Z77EZa-BZV3oC-YDuMfK-C16yQE-nz5SVJ-YHjcyS-Y2pumJ-Z2QuXC-ZUwD7t-Z4qWj1-d9VTfw-Z2SqoJ-YLAn2U-fG5ui4-Z2W3Cw-YCh2bs-Z4psVW-feLPot-Y2oUPy-Z4gjpU-YHcXMW-Y1ybXT-YDPzV3-Z2LtGu-Z2YrHf-9axmrJ-Z2TcpL-Y5ZktB-Z2KQym-Y2qiB5-Z7azhT-Y5QLaP-BZUN6E-Z7JPBi">Sasha Popovic/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As tension increases in Catalonia, there have been <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-spanish-direct-rule-civil-disobedience-police-teacher-firefighters-public-sector-catalan-a8016766.html">calls for widespread civil disobedience</a> against the Spanish government. Even the recent referendum itself, along with its <a href="http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/11/18/catalan-democratic-rebellion/">2014 precursor</a>, have been described as acts of civil disobedience. </p>
<p>This popularity of gathering en masse in disobedience to the central government has been inspired in large part by the anti-austerity efforts of one group: the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca or <a href="http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/">Platform for the Mortgage-Affected</a> (PAH). The outgoing disobedient Catalan government is a peculiar mix of anti-austerity parties, which have supported the PAH’s fight for people’s housing rights, and the Catalan establishment party that has generally opposed it.</p>
<p>The PAH was founded in Barcelona in 2009 in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which burst the Spanish housing bubble. It now has around 200 groups across Spain. Barcelona’s mayor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/ada-colau-barcelona-most-radical-mayor-in-the-world">Ada Colau</a> was the movement’s spokesperson before moving into institutional politics. The PAH is famous for its innovative protests, which it calls acts of civil disobedience. This includes physically stopping evictions, organising sit-ins in banks and squats in empty buildings that belong to banks. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">PAH has mobilised a large portion of the Catalan population.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/imagenenaccion/8481858349/in/photolist-dVvJZ4-dVvK3z-ebRB6Z-bWk5iJ-aqukVK-dVBkoJ-dVrGMG-bWk421-dVm7uX-ebRAvR-bWk52y-bWk4UG-bWk4wY-dVrGFy-dUwryA-bWk4P7-dVvJAP-ngnYFA-dYA28b-aqx1Ls-arDqVw-e19ryF-dVm7Ex-dYuj96-aqx1GU-ebRzJa-ebXfvG-aqx1Mq-dKvbbs-bWk4FQ-e6xEpY-eiKquC-ebXfiS-V55zSE-dVnunJ-dMoW3o-oQvnbD-e6s2Ek-arAMyz-nxSyot-aqx1J9-ebRzxB-dNNpcJ-dWmMC4-auAbkK-eiJWAE-dVKcob-ebRAnv-auCHp9-e19tcV">Imagen en Acción/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>The movement arose as a response to hundreds of thousands of Spanish households facing mortgage defaults, <a href="http://time.com/4007349/spain-evictions-housing-crisis/">evictions</a>, homelessness and lifelong debt. Unlike many other countries, Spain lacks personal bankruptcy legislation. This leaves people in negative equity with large debts even after having their homes repossessed and becoming homeless. In contrast to all the evictions and homelessness, Spain has more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/feb/23/europe-11m-empty-properties-enough-house-homeless-continent-twice">3m empty homes</a>, mainly in the hands of banks, vulture funds and other financial institutions.</p>
<p>Through the PAH, people <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=caD17RKJfbc">collectively put pressure</a> on both the banks and the state to cancel people’s debts and provide social housing. The movement campaigns for legal changes to eradicate mortgage debt for repossessed families and increase social housing by using the empty housing stock. Alongside this, the PAH practices civil disobedience, both to support the campaign and to solve the homelessness and indebtedness of individual households. </p>
<h2>In action</h2>
<p>The PAH stops evictions everyday across Spain by gathering dozens of people at short notice to block the doorway of families due to be evicted. In most cases, bailiffs and police refrain from forcing their way in and the eviction is suspended or postponed. Through sit-ins, the PAH puts pressure on the bank to negotiate and to pardon mortgage debt and provide social housing. In many cases, usually after years of struggle, families achieve these aims in full or in part. </p>
<p>The PAH also runs a social housing project called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkrM-zBGjBQ">Obra Social</a> by taking control of empty properties that are owned by banks. Here, the PAH occupies entire empty apartment blocks and carries out a needs-based assessment of which families should be allowed to move in. </p>
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<p>The aim is to turn the buildings into official social housing where the households pay an affordable rent based on their income. Most households in Obra Social buildings remain, some have been granted permission to stay, and only in very few cases have people been evicted from them. </p>
<p>These seemingly radical methods of political activism have gained widespread legitimacy. <a href="http://metroscopia.org/sentencia-escraches-y-burbuja/">Most Spanish people</a> now think that housing and mortgage legislation illegitimately favours the banks and that adequate housing should be a right, as <a href="http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=47&tipo=2">article 47</a> of the Spanish constitution states.</p>
<h2>Legitimacy vs the law</h2>
<p>Civil disobedience is a liberal concept, which (unlike anarchism) does not mean a general disregard for the law. For example, Martin Luther King Jr. claimed to have <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/martin-luther-kings-letter-from-birmingham-jail/274668/">“the very highest respect for the law”</a>, while disobeying illegitimate discriminatory segregation laws. For the practitioners of civil disobedience, legitimacy comes from a higher sense of morality or justice than the law that they protest.</p>
<p>This separation between the legal and the legitimate lies at the heart of civil disobedience. And over the last eight years, the PAH has made civil disobedience acceptable to a large part of the Catalan population.</p>
<p>Nobody disputes that the Spanish law and <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">constitution</a> leave no room for secession. For the Spanish government, the buck stops with the constitution (though not when it comes to housing apparently). </p>
<p>For the <a href="http://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/politica/sondeo-GAPS-preve-participacion-referendum_0_691531939.html">majority of Catalans</a>, who want a proper referendum, this position lacks legitimacy because they see their right to decide their future as a higher form of morality and justice than the constitution. For many observers outside of Spain, a legal and orderly referendum also seems like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/spains-hard-line-on-catalonia-is-no-way-to-handle-a-serious-secession-crisis-86243">reasonable solution</a>.</p>
<p>So the situation is ripe for widespread civil disobedience against the Spanish government in Catalonia. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/27/spanish-government-demands-special-powers-could-remove-catalan/">Unilateral declarations of independence</a>, without a proper referendum, are unlikely to gain legitimacy for the Catalan government internationally. But, equally, more repression from the central government will likely reduce its legitimacy. </p>
<p>Catalan institutions may now become laboratories for how to disobey state policies. For many Catalans, it will mean a form of resisting occupation. And if this disobedience remains civil and non-violent, it could well win the battle for international legitimacy, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Berglund received funding from ESRC. </span></em></p>The situation in Catalonia is ripe for widespread civil disobedience against the Spanish government.Oscar Berglund, Senior Teaching Associate in Public Policy, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.