tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/sino-us-relations-37289/articlesSino-US relations – The Conversation2017-10-03T14:52:39Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/850042017-10-03T14:52:39Z2017-10-03T14:52:39ZTrump’s Africa policy is still incoherent, but key signals are emerging<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/188374/original/file-20171002-12107-1ndl6t5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US President Trump addresses the 72nd UN General Assembly in New York.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Brendan McDermid</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s leaders, along with everyone else interested in US-Africa relations, have waited eight months for US President Donald Trump’s administration to explain its Africa policy. We aren’t there yet. </p>
<p>But in recent weeks Trump has indicated the level and extent of his interest. And, senior African affairs officials at the State and Defence Departments are at last attempting publicly to outline US goals and objectives toward Africa. This, apparently without much guidance from their president.</p>
<p>Trump’s inaugural address to the UN General Assembly said little about Africa – barely one paragraph <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/19/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly">towards the end</a>. One sentence praised African Union and UN-led peacekeeping missions for “invaluable contributions in stabilising conflicts in Africa.” A second praised America, which</p>
<blockquote>
<p>continues to lead the world in humanitarian assistance, including famine prevention and relief in South Sudan, Somalia and northern Nigeria and Yemen.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The next day Trump hosted a luncheon for leaders of nine African countries –Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and South Africa. Only his welcoming remarks have been published but they are nearly devoid of <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/20/remarks-president-trump-working-lunch-african-leaders">policy content or guidance</a>. His opening gambit reminded me of a 19th century colonialist hoping to become rich, as he proclaimed: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Africa has tremendous business potential, I have so many friends going to your countries trying to get rich. I congratulate you, they’re spending a lot of money….It’s really become a place they have to go, that they want to go.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Trump called on African companies to invest in the US. Then, shifting to security cooperation, he urged Africans to help defeat Islamist extremists and the threat from North Korea.</p>
<p>The American president proposed no new presidential initiatives for Africa. But, at least, he did not say those launched by predecessors were a waste of money and would be ended. Nor did he mention opposition to foreign assistance generally. He also did not mention his renunciation of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/live/2017/jun/01/donald-trump-paris-climate-agreement-live-news">Paris Climate Accord</a> and refusal to fund <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/why-trump-seeing-red-about-green-climate-fund-n767351">Green Climate Fund</a>. Both are crucial for Africa’s adaptation to global warming.</p>
<h2>Hints of a policy taking shape</h2>
<p>A “US-Africa Partnerships” conference at the <a href="https://www.sfcg.org/events-schedule/2016-09-13/">US Institute for Peace</a> in Washington in mid-September provided additional clues to how this administration will conduct Africa policy. </p>
<p>Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Tom Shannon, offered the first high level <a href="https://www.state.gov/plus/rem/2017/274073.htm">official statement on Africa</a>. Shannon, a highly accomplished Foreign Service officer, emphasised policy continuity. But, he implicitly affirmed Trump’s apparent desire for minimal engagement in Africa. </p>
<p>Shannon and Acting Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto at a later session, stressed the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201709180753.html">four main pillars</a> that have framed Africa policy for many years, would remain. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>peace and security; </p></li>
<li><p>counterterrorism; </p></li>
<li><p>economic trade, investment and development; and, </p></li>
<li><p>democracy and good governance. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>They endorsed previous presidential initiatives, including specific references to former US President Barack Obama’s <a href="https://www.feedthefuture.gov/">Feed the Future</a>, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/aboutus">Power Africa</a> and the Young African <a href="https://yali.state.gov/">Leaders Initiative</a>. Their continuation, and at what levels, will depend on budget decisions. Trump’s initial recommendations, endorsed by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, call for crippling cuts.</p>
<p>So far, the only new social development programme that Trump has endorsed is the World Bank’s global Women Entrepreneurs <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/women-entrepreneurs">Finance Initiative</a>, championed by his daughter Ivanka. The US has donated USD$50 million toward its global start-up budget of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/07/08/ivanka-trump-and-40-million-for-women-entrepreneurs-nice-idea-but-trivially-unimportant/#757bef521af2">USD$315 million</a>. As Yamamoto noted at the September meeting, Africa could benefit from this initiative.</p>
<h2>Surprise praise for China</h2>
<p>Trump will be less likely to challenge US military’s commitments in Africa. With this in mind I paid close attention to the <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201709140684.html">address</a> by General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander of the US Africa Command (Africom) at the September 13 meeting. He set out Africom’s current engagements in Libya and Somalia, where he said the mission was to support locally engineered political solutions. </p>
<p>Critics of America’s many previous failed interventions in these two countries and elsewhere, will rightly remain sceptical.</p>
<p>The second part of his address dealt more broadly with Africom’s capacity building assistance, nationally and regionally. He said Africom only operates where</p>
<blockquote>
<p>US and partner nation strategic objectives are compatible and aligned and, second, the operations are conducted primarily by partner nation forces with the US in a supporting role.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Africom, he said, conducts “some 3,500 exercises, programs and engagements” annually, with “5-to-6,000 US service members working on the continent every day.” </p>
<p>Waldenhauser ended his address with a surprisingly specific and positive view on China’s role in Africa. He praised China’s assistance to building much needed infrastructure throughout Africa and for the rapid growth in China-Africa trade which exceeded USD$300 billion in 2016.</p>
<p>On security issues, he commended Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pledge of <a href="http://uhuruspirit.org/news/?x=8706#.WdIYnVuCw9c">USD$100 million</a> to the AU and for supporting UN peacekeeping missions with 8,000 police officers. He then referred to the construction of China’s first overseas military base, which is near the US base in Djibouti, as creating “opportunities found nowhere else in the world,” relating that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>China assigned the first soldiers to this base and expressed interest in conducting amphibious training between Chinese and US Marines. Across the continent, we have shared interests in African stability. We see many areas where we can cooperate with the Chinese military. For example, we both support UN peacekeeping missions and training with African defence forces. The fact that we have mutual interests in Africa means that we can and should cooperate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To emphasise the importance of this comment he quoted Secretary of Defence James Mattis when he pointed out earlier this year: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our two countries can and do cooperate for mutual benefit. And we will pledge to work closely with China where we share common cause.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Charting the future</h2>
<p>But China-US security cooperation in Africa can’t succeed without the inclusion of African governments as equal partners in this “common cause”. </p>
<p>Such “win-win-win” experiments in mutual confidence building would not only benefit Africans, but could also serve as positive examples for other regions and could improve US-China relations globally. In the absence of a coherent and compelling US – Africa policy, this at least is one positive development that merits our attention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85004/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau receives funding from South African Institute of International Affairs as its 2017 Bradlow fellow.</span></em></p>US President Donald Trump hasn’t proposed new initiatives for Africa but didn’t end those launched by his predecessors either.John J Stremlau, 2017 Bradlow Fellow at SA Institute of International Affairs,Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/756152017-04-06T06:06:44Z2017-04-06T06:06:44ZTrump-Xi summit is just the start of dealing with thorny issues in US-Sino relations<p>Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet US President Donald Trump for the first time on April 6 and 7 at the latter’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach. On the agenda are a number of contentious issues that the two leaders are unlikely to resolve.</p>
<p>Trump has already noted that the meeting is going to be “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/donald-trump-xi-jinping-to-meet/">very difficult</a>”. The first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders will likely not be ideal for reaching consensus on issues such as trade, the North Korean nuclear crisis and the one-China policy.</p>
<h2>Human rights and “one China”</h2>
<p>Traditionally, the United States has paid much attention to human rights in China, such as its treatment of political dissidents and the arrest of civil rights lawyers. But Trump does not appear to put an emphasis on democracy and human rights in American foreign policy. </p>
<p>During the recent visit to the US by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Trump said their two countries didn’t agree on “a few things”, but he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/middleeast/in-major-shift-trump-taking-egypts-human-rights-issues-private.html">did not raise human rights</a>. As US president, Barack Obama had not invited Sisi to the White House <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-04/trump-tells-sisi-us-egypt-will-fight-islamic-militants-together/8412754">based on human rights concerns and even froze foreign aid</a> to Egypt for two years after the previous president was overthrown in mid-2013. </p>
<p>The same may apply to China if Trump has a consistent policy.</p>
<p>China, on the other hand, is likely to seek continuing American recognition of the one-China policy, given <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-04/trump-tells-sisi-us-egypt-will-fight-islamic-militants-together/8412754">Trump accepted a call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen</a> soon after his inauguration and before he had spoken to Xi. </p>
<p>In February, the two sides put out <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/world/asia/donald-trump-china-xi-jinping-letter.html">statements about their agreement</a> on the policy but the US announcement noted that it had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/world/asia/xi-jinping-trump-china-mar-a-lago.html?emc=edit_ae_20170405&nl=todaysheadlines-asia&nlid=64524812">agreed to this at China’s request</a>. Even though the US <a href="http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2017/03/14/493516/US-reaffirms.htm">reaffirmed its commitment to the policy</a> ahead of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to China in March, China can be expected to make sure that Trump understands the importance of the policy and that it’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/asia/trump-one-china-taiwan.html">not up for negotiation</a>.</p>
<h2>Trade issues</h2>
<p>Another point of contention from Trump’s viewpoint is the American trade deficit with China and whether China has manipulated the exchange rate of its currency.</p>
<p>During his election campaign, Trump highlighted the US trade deficit with China as problematic, going so far as to say <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/opinion/how-trump-can-solve-his-chinese-puzzle.html?em_pos=small&emc=edit_ty_20170405&nl=opinion-today&nl_art=9&nlid=64524812&ref=headline&te=1">China was “raping” the American economy</a>. And the US Trade Representative’s Office recently <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/31/us-trade-barriers-report-slams-china-on-overcapacity-tech-transfer.html">published a report criticising</a> China’s over-production of aluminium and steel. </p>
<p>It’s important to note that Trump had expressed similar discontent with Japan. And that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo <a href="https://theconversation.com/has-abe-got-trumps-measure-golf-diplomacy-puts-japan-back-on-the-green-72739">Abe brought an economic package to Mar-a-Lago in February</a> that promised <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/abe-to-tout-japans-benefits-to-u-s-in-trump-meeting-1486373098">more Japanese investment in the United States</a>, which seemed to smooth over the issue.</p>
<p>China is unlikely to follow the same tactics to please Trump. Right before Xi’s departure, China’s Global Times, which is regarded as a mouthpiece of Beijing, commented that Sino-American trade <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1040609.shtml">should only be guided according to market incentives</a>. And it said that the United States should make its cutting-edge technologies available to China so that it could solve the American trade deficit.</p>
<h2>North Korea</h2>
<p>The North Korean nuclear crisis is also likely be high on the agenda. Ahead of the meeting, Trump told the Financial Times that the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/02/politics/donald-trump-north-korea/">United States would work on its own</a> if China was not willing to further pressure North Korea to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>He did not explain whether he meant a military pre-emptive strike against Pyongyang. And when North Korea <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/world/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missile-test-xi-trump.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170405">launched a test missile just a day ahead</a> of the summit, the US said <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/us/politics/rex-tillersons-reticence-on-north-korea-leaves-allies-confused.html?emc=edit_ae_20170405&nl=todaysheadlines-asia&nlid=64524812">it had no further comment about the reclusive dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>China has repeatedly explained <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/08/north-korea-doesnt-trust-china-an-inch/">its leverage over North Korea has been exaggerated</a>. And Beijing wants to see the denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula so that the United States, South Korea and Japan have no excuse to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. It fears that the missile defence shield, which is already being deployed, could <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/us-south-korea-try-to-reassure-china-on-thaad/">detect the launch of Chinese missiles</a> and allow Washington to intercept these.</p>
<p>Unlike his father, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has never visited China. Without this relationship – and the <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2071191/uncertainty-stalks-china-n-korea-ties-assassination-kim">recent deaths of North Korean allies</a> – it’s difficult to assess what kind of influence China has over the North Korean leadership. </p>
<p>China has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-northkorea-border-idUSKBN1752OY">tightened sanctions on North Korea and put some investments</a> there on hold. But the questions that remain are whether China can afford a failed state on its border and whether that will happen if China pushes too hard on Pyongyang. </p>
<p>A flood of North Korean refugees or a potential American presence in North Korea are both nightmare scenarios for Beijing.</p>
<h2>Sorting through</h2>
<p>Some of the above issues have been discussed before between Beijing and Washington. But Trump clearly has his own preferences, which Xi and Chinese diplomats are likely to know little about.</p>
<p>As this is the first face-to-face meeting between Trump and Xi, and the former is still likely working on his foreign policies, concrete agreements between them are unlikely. </p>
<p>On March 19, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi commented that <a href="http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0319/c90000-9192177.html">the US-China summit was a platform to communicate</a> and build trust as well as to put Sino-American relations back on the right track. It seems that Beijing regards the meeting as a warm-up exercise between the two leaders.</p>
<p>Bilateral trade and the North Korean nuclear crisis are likely to be the focus of the summit, while human rights and climate change may not be discussed extensively. </p>
<p>In regard to the latter issue, the two powers appear to be moving in diametrically opposed directions. The Trump administration has indicated that it <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/donald-trump-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement-change-course-on-climate-change-says-adviser-20170130-gu1t58.html">will likely withdraw from the Paris climate agreement</a>, while China’s pollution problems are making it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/20/china-eyes-an-opportunity-to-take-ownership-of-climate-change-fight">take the issue seriously</a>.</p>
<p>Trump’s lack of interest in human rights, multilateral trade and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/28/politics/donald-trump-climate-change-executive-order/">global environmental issues</a> has significant implications for great power relations in future. It may mean that the United States may no longer be regarded as a world leader, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/china-can-thrive-in-the-trump-era.html">leaving room for China to fill the power vacuum</a>. </p>
<p>The US-China summit is not just a bilateral matter. Countries around the word are closely watching the interaction between a retreating great power and an emerging one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hak-yin Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US-China summit is not just a bilateral matter. Countries around the word are closely watching the interaction between a retreating great power and an emerging one.Hak-yin Li, Lecturer in International Relations, Chinese University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/748342017-03-29T06:24:58Z2017-03-29T06:24:58ZHow Arctic governance could become a testing ground for Sino-US relations<p>The Arctic is becoming an important testing ground for US-China relations. As the world tries to work out ways to deal with how climate change is altering the region, the Arctic has the potential to provide an example of how the two global powers can cultivate peaceful co-existence. </p>
<p>Both countries have an interest in the Arctic – but for very different reasons. The United States, through Alaska, is one of five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean and plays a stewardship role in the region. China is <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf">the world’s largest producer for marine capture fisheries</a> and <a href="http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2016_en.pdf">the world’s third-largest shipowner</a> – two strong economic interests in the resources-rich Arctic region.</p>
<p>The Arctic Five – the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark through Greenland – believe that since an extensive international legal framework already applies to the Arctic Ocean, <a href="http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf">there’s no need for another</a>. </p>
<p>But <a href="http://www.marinelink.com/news/arctic-record-winter423442">Arctic ice is melting at an alarming rate</a>, enabling increased human access to formerly ice-covered areas. And this has increased the potential for intensifying fishing, shipping, tourism, bioprospecting and mining in the region.</p>
<p>Clearly, these changes present significant challenges that the Arctic governance regime needs to evolve to meet. </p>
<h2>Simmering tension</h2>
<p>In recent years, China’s economic success has bolstered Beijing’s confidence in asserting its position in regional and global affairs. Chinese diplomacy has become more active.</p>
<p>The country has, for instance, been advancing the “<a href="http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm">One Belt, One Road</a>” initiative, which intends to construct a Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road to connect Asia, Europe and Africa. And it has been making remarkable progress. </p>
<p>Achievements in 2016 alone include the <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/163792-Gwadar-Port-opening-on-Sunday">opening of Gwadar Port in Pakistan</a>, run by China Oversea Port Management Corporation, as well as the <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-11/26/content_27490326.htm">Djibouti Navy Base</a> – China’s first navy support base on foreign soil. </p>
<p>Under the Obama administration, the United States advanced the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific">Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy</a> in an attempt to contain <a href="http://focusweb.org/node/1218">China’s growing influence in the region</a>. And Donald Trump’s presidency could pose a new challenge to the Sino-American relationship, not least due to Trump accusing China during his campaign of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012">“raping” the US because of “unfair trade policies”</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, China has been condemning the US for being the root of <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-25/china-tells-trump-to-stay-out-of-south-china-sea-dispute/8212246">tensions in the South China Sea</a>. The planned deployment of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/asia/north-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us-china.html?_r=0">THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea</a> has also deeply angered China. </p>
<p>It is not surprising, then, that there are concerns relations between the two nuclear-armed countries could <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/07/donald-trump-and-china-military-confrontation-dangerous-collision-course-experts">deteriorate into an economic or military confrontation</a> in the Trump era.</p>
<h2>Chinese interests</h2>
<p>Since changes in global governance result from <a href="http://media.library.ku.edu.tr/reserve/resspring14/intl532_ZOnis/Theme10.pdf">bargaining between rising powers and incumbents</a>, the Arctic could come to act as a barometer for US-China relations. Evolving Arctic governance could provide the ideal testing ground for how the two countries can work together. </p>
<p>China is expected to publish its <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/chinas-emerging-arctic-policy/">first official Arctic policy</a> soon. According to Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1306858.shtml">Zhang Ming’s speech at the third Arctic Circle Assembly</a> in 2015, China now clearly identifies itself as a “near-Arctic state” and a major stakeholder in the region. </p>
<p>Ming said the Chinese government believed that the changing environment and resources of the Arctic have a direct impact on China’s climate, environment, agriculture, shipping and trade as well as social and economic development. At the same time, China has the political will to contribute to shaping Arctic governance. </p>
<p>While China has thus far emphasised a cooperative attitude in Arctic affairs, it might become more assertive in the governance of the region in response to confrontation with US in other parts of the world. It could, for instance, use the Arctic as a trade-off for a US compromise in South China Sea disputes.</p>
<h2>US leadership</h2>
<p>For the US, the Arctic could present a litmus test of the strength of its leadership in global affairs. To date, the US has been a leader on many global issues and the Arctic is no exception. </p>
<p>Negotiations on the regulation of high sea fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean, for instance, is a US-led process. These were initiated in 2007 by a <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/17/text">joint resolution of the US Senate</a>, which called for a moratorium on Arctic fisheries until an adequate instrument was adopted. </p>
<p>In 2015, the Arctic Five adopted the <a href="https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-july-2015.pdf">Oslo Declaration</a> and invited China, the European Union, Iceland, Japan and South Korea to join the process for developing a regional fisheries organisation or arrangement for the central Arctic Ocean. </p>
<p>Under US leadership, the so-called Arctic 5+5 negotiations have made important progress. Held from March 15-18 2017, the grouping’s latest meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, issued a statement <a href="http://naalakkersuisut.gl/%7E/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Fiskeri_Fangst_Landbrug/Eng/Chairmans%20Statement%20from%20Reykjavik%20Meeting%202017.pdf">emphasising that consensus had been reached</a> on most issues and that there was a general commitment to conclude the negotiations soon. </p>
<p>China, though a major global player in distant water fishing, did not challenge US leadership in these negotiations. </p>
<h2>A potential template</h2>
<p>Sino-US relations in the Arctic will also provide insights into the effectiveness of American diplomacy in the Trump era. The Obama administration achieved considerable success on this front. </p>
<p>It incorporated central Arctic fisheries into the <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1370522.shtml">eighth US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Special Joint Conference on Climate Change</a>, for instance. And the US initiative on fisheries regulation in the central Arctic Ocean was reaffirmed in a <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/03/us-fact-sheet-president-obamas-bilateral-meeting-president-xi-jinping">bilateral meeting between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping</a> during the G20 Summit in Hangzhou in September 2016. </p>
<p>Indeed, the success of the Obama administration in Sino-Arctic diplomacy could explain why the Chinese government supports the ongoing Arctic 5+5 negotiations. Whether the Trump administration can continue to effectively engage the Chinese on Arctic governance issues remains to be seen.</p>
<p>Future Arctic governance could not only be impacted by broader US-China relations, it could also provide a template for how the two global powers can work together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Changes in governance in the Arctic region could supply an example of how the two global powers can cultivate a peaceful co-existence.Nengye Liu, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of AdelaideMichelle Lim, Lecturer in environmental and sustainability law, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.