tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/southern-african-development-community-sadc-40231/articles
Southern African Development Community (SADC) – The Conversation
2024-02-29T14:42:22Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/224345
2024-02-29T14:42:22Z
2024-02-29T14:42:22Z
DRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war
<p>In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo#:%7E:text=The%20Southern%20African%20Development%20Community,by%20the%20resurgence%20of%20armed">South African, Burundian and Tanzanian troops</a> are fighting against the <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Rwandan army</a>, which has deployed in support of the rebellion by the March 23 Movement, or M23. </p>
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<p>Soldiers from <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/south-african-soldiers-killed-in-dr-congo-return-home-e082c87d">South Africa</a> and <a href="https://apanews.net/m23-rebels-claim-burundian-soldiers-killed-and-captured/">Burundi</a>, as well as from the United Nations peacekeeping <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pr-monusco-denounces-attack-helicopter-which-wounds-two-un-peacekeepers-north-kivu">mission</a>, have recently suffered casualties. In the crossfire, civilians have fled: <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-least-78000-children-displaced-and-families-ripped-apart-fighting-escalates#:%7E:text=The%20DRC%20has%20long%20suffered,and%20over%20seven%20million%20displaced.">seven million</a> Congolese are now displaced due to this and multiple other crises in the DRC.</p>
<p>Diplomats are concerned: the conflict in the eastern DRC was the subject of a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15596.doc.htm">special meeting</a> at the United Nations Security Council on 20 February 2024 and a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/mini-summit-discusses-peace-efforts-for-east-democratic-republic-of-congo-/7491551.html">mini-summit</a> on the sidelines of the African Union annual meeting of heads of state on 16 February. </p>
<p>Rwanda, which has denied backing M23, <a href="https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/rwanda-clarifies-security-posture">says</a> the Rwandan rebel group – Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) – which includes combatants who participated in the 1994 genocide, has been fully integrated into the Congolese army. It also claims that the Congolese government is engaged in “massive combat operations” aimed at expelling Congolese Tutsi civilians.</p>
<p>The Congolese government has mounted a campaign against Rwanda. In December, while he campaigned for re-election, President Félix Tshisekedi <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67669187">compared</a> his Rwandan counterpart to Adolf Hitler and accused him of expansionist aims. </p>
<p>In January, the Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye closed his border with Rwanda and <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1531125/politique/entre-paul-kagame-et-evariste-ndayishimiye-chronique-dune-reconciliation-avortee/">accused</a> the country of backing rebels against him. He stopped just short of calling for Kagame’s ouster.</p>
<p>We have been <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/about-us/">working</a> on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for around 20 years. This wave of violence resembles previous ones, but is also different. <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691194080/the-war-that-doesnt-say-its-name">At the root</a> of the M23 conflict are countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, intent on projecting power and influence into the eastern DRC, while the Congolese government seems incapable and often unwilling to stabilise its own territory. Donors and United Nations peacekeepers provide humanitarian aid, but do little to transform these dynamics. </p>
<p>Resolving this crisis will require less hypocrisy from foreign donors, the end of Rwandan aggression, and a more accountable Congolese government. But the hopes of a grand bargain are far off, for now. The current peace processes – a <a href="https://www.eac.int/nairobiprocess">“Nairobi process”</a> for domestic negotiations and a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark">“Luanda process”</a> for regional talks – are dead or on life support. </p>
<p>The upcoming elections in Rwanda (July 2024) and the US (November 2024) will likely not help cool heads or focus minds. But it is clear that ending the violence will require a new approach, one that places the lives of innocent Congolese civilians at its centre.</p>
<h2>Beginning of regional escalation</h2>
<p>During the early days of his presidency, Tshisekedi’s army <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/l-arm%C3%A9e-rwandaise-op%C3%A8re-bien-en-rdc-selon-des-experts-de-lonu/2102125">collaborated</a> intensely with the Rwandan army, allowing troops to conduct operations against the FDLR on Congolese territory in 2019 and 2020. In late 2019, his government even <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/b150-averting-proxy-wars-eastern-dr-congo-and-great-lakes">recommended</a> dropping charges against the M23 commanders, then in exile. </p>
<p>Less than three years after winning power, however, Tshisekedi changed his approach, breaking his coalition with his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, and moving to cement his position in power. He declared a state of siege in two eastern provinces, shuffled generals around in the army, and sidelined key securocrats. He also shifted gears in his regional relations. </p>
<p>By mid-2021, Tshisekedi had begun to <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/70232-museveni-tshisekedi-commission-construction-of-drc-roads">privilege</a> relations with Uganda, then a bitter rival of Rwanda. Notably, Tshisekedi gave <a href="https://s42831.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests-1.pdf">permission</a> to the Ugandan army to deploy somewhere between 2,000 and 4,000 troops to hunt down Allied Democratic Forces rebels, an Islamist Ugandan rebellion based in the eastern DRC. Shortly after that, he did the same for the Burundian army, which had its sights on RED-Tabara, rebels based in the DRC seeking to overthrow the government of Ndayishimiye.</p>
<p>Rwanda suddenly felt isolated, even vulnerable, surrounded by hostile neighbours. <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2022/967&Lang=E">According to United Nations investigators</a>, it probably resumed throwing its weight behind the M23 in November 2021. It is above all these regional tensions, coupled with its goal of maintaining influence in the Congo, that pushed it to move. </p>
<p>Since then, the regional fault lines have shifted. Rwanda has patched up relations with Uganda, and the East African Community intervention force – Kenyan, South Sudanese, Burundian and Ugandan troops – that deployed in 2022 to help quell the violence was asked to leave just a year later. This is because their hosts saw them as dragging their feet, if not complicit with the M23. Tshisekedi, who came into office seeing east African countries as allies, has now turned southwards. </p>
<h2>Military changes in eastern DRC</h2>
<p>Beginning in late 2023, a new force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) began <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/deployment-sadc-mission-democratic-republic-congo">deploying</a> troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi to take the fight to the M23, alongside the Burundian army.</p>
<p>Already, these forces have begun to take casualties. Two South African soldiers were <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/south-african-soldiers-killed-in-dr-congo-return-home-e082c87d">killed</a> on 14 February by a mortar strike; two others were <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/south-africa-commits-2-900-sandf-personnel-to-samidrc/">injured</a> when their helicopter took fire. Some sources indicate that Burundian soldiers have taken <a href="https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/2023/11/16/bujumbura-larmee-burundaise-reste-muette-sur-la-mort-de-ses-militaires-en-rdc-mais-les-enterre/">heavy losses</a>. </p>
<p>The rising degree of military sophistication also raises eyebrows. The US government has <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">accused</a> Rwanda of deploying surface-to-air missiles, UN officials have reported armed drones striking their bases, while Tanzania has <a href="https://chimpreports.com/tanzania-army-employs-saba-saba-guns-against-m23-rebels/">sent</a> Soviet-era BM-21 Grad rocket launchers. The DRC has <a href="https://www.military.africa/2023/06/drc-receives-ch-4-drones-from-china/">bought</a> nine Chinese CH-4 combat drones (three of which have reportedly been shot down already). </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Congolese army has partnered with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/dr-congo-conflict-pulls-in-more-players-to-tackle-rebels/a-68304390">private security contractors</a> as well as with an array of local militia, collectively dubbed Wazalendo (patriots), who are poorly trained and disciplined. There are credible <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2023/990&Lang=E">reports</a> from late 2023 that, as in the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=s/2022/967&Lang=E">previous year</a>, they are also partnering with the Rwandan FDLR rebels.</p>
<p>And yet, the Congolese government has been unable to make much headway. In early February, M23 forces surrounded the lakeside town of Sake, just 30km west of the provincial capital Goma. This most recent push has displaced another 135,000 people toward Goma; there are around <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-north-kivu-flash-update-1-new-surge-violence-masisi-forced-displacement-goma-08-february-2024">half a million</a> displaced people around the town now.</p>
<h2>Mixed signals</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/85966/a-decade-ago-the-obama-administration-acted-when-the-m23-terrorized-eastern-drc-will-biden-do-the-same/">Unlike</a> the previous M23 crisis, influential foreign actors have sent mixed signals. At the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15596.doc.htm">UN Security Council on 20 February</a>, the <a href="https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-situation-concerning-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-3/">US</a> and <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/france-condemns-the-m23-offensive-launched-on-february-7-against-the-town-of">France</a> called on Rwanda to withdraw their troops from the DRC. The US has gone the furthest of all of Rwanda’s donors, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1703">sanctioning</a> a Rwandan general, suspending all military aid, and attempting to broker a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/01/biden-congo-war-00129620">ceasefire</a> in December 2023. </p>
<p>And yet, the US remains, by far, the <a href="https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no">largest donor</a> to Rwanda, which receives the equivalent of around a third of its budget in aid. Other countries have pushed much less or not at all. While the M23 rebellion was going on, the British Commonwealth held its big biannual meeting in Kigali in 2022 and the UK struck a controversial <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/10/uk-abandon-rwanda-asylum-transfer-plan?gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIy-Gol_PBhAMVwCWtBh2uhg8nEAAYAiAAEgKsSPD_BwE">asylum deal</a> with Rwanda.</p>
<p>The EU <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/#:%7E:text=and%20medical%20equipment.-,Support%20to%20the%20deployment%20of%20the%20Rwanda%20Defence%20Force%20in,Force%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province.">gave</a> US$22 million to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique. On 19 February, the EU announced a <a href="https://www.innovationnewsnetwork.com/eu-and-rwanda-strike-deal-for-sustainable-raw-materials-value-chains/44015/">deal</a> to boost mineral exports from Rwanda.</p>
<p>This last piece of news caused an uproar in the DRC, touching on the popular belief that minerals are the root of the crisis. While the causes of the violence are far more complex than that, they have a point: the <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/uga">largest export</a> from Uganda (56% in 2021), Rwanda (23%), and Burundi (29%) in recent years has been gold, almost all of which is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-12-28/where-does-gold-come-from-in-africa-suspected-smuggling-to-dubai-rings-alarms?embedded-checkout=true">smuggled</a> to their countries from the DRC.</p>
<p>In the long term, the DRC government will need to undertake a host of reforms to quell these cycles of conflict. They include reforming the Congolese army, a new demobilisation programme for armed groups, an economic development programme that would allow Congolese to benefit from their resources, a plan for communal reconciliation, and an end to discrimination against Kinyarwanda speakers. But none of that can happen as long as Congo’s neighbours continue to destabilise it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224345/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Stearns has received funding, through his work for the Congo Research Group, from the Swedish government, the European Union, the Schmidt Family Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, and Bridgeway Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Z. Walker has received funding, in his role at the Congo Research Group, from the Swedish government, Dutch government, the European Union, the Schmidt Family Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Bridgeway Foundation.</span></em></p>
Regional countries are embroiled in a geopolitical struggle over influence and survival.
Jason Stearns, Assistant Professor, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University
Joshua Z. Walker, Director of Programs, Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/223827
2024-02-19T11:00:44Z
2024-02-19T11:00:44Z
DRC protests: expert explains why Congolese anger against the west is justified – and useful to the government
<p>Since early February, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, has been rocked by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68273900">protests directed against western embassies</a>. Protests took place in front of the British and French embassies, and in front of United Nations buildings. Throughout the city, American and Belgian flags were burned. </p>
<p>The protesters are denouncing what they believed to be western complicity in the war in the east of the DRC. These protests were triggered by <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/m23-rebels-continue-battle-in-drc/7487566.html">the renewed advance of the rebel movement M23</a>. </p>
<p>M23 is led by Congolese Tutsi, and is the latest in a history of Congolese rebel groups supported by Rwanda. It emerged in April 2012, took control of the eastern city of Goma in November 2012, and was defeated in 2013. In late 2021, the group reemerged, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/why-congos-m23-crisis-lingers">fuelled</a> by longstanding geopolitical tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It has since gained control over large parts of territory.</p>
<p>The movement <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/02/13/dans-l-est-de-la-rdc-l-etau-du-m23-se-resserre-autour-de-goma-faisant-craindre-une-deflagration-regionale_6216376_3212.html">now controls access to Goma</a>. The city of an estimated 2 million people is symbolically and strategically important as the biggest city of the northern Kivu province, bordering Rwanda. </p>
<p>The rebel group has now effectively surrounded the city, allowing it to cut off supplies or conquer the city. The possibility of this happening – as it did in 2012 – has led to widespread panic and more displacement.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://kristoftiteca.be/research">studied</a> the DRC and its geopolitics for close to two decades. In this article, I’ll explain the reasons for, as well as the ambiguity of, the protests. </p>
<p>First, it is striking how <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">silent the international community remains towards Rwanda</a>. Multiple recent United Nations reports have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/12/23/un-report-shows-rwandan-army-intervened-in-drcs-troubled-east/">extensively documented direct Rwandan military support for the M23 rebellion</a> – support that Kigali itself denies. </p>
<p>A number of countries, such as Belgium and France, have called on Rwanda to end its involvement. Most recently, on 17 February, the United States released a strong statement <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">condemning Rwanda’s support</a> for M23. Yet, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/12/16/drc-we-know-the-m23-is-backed-by-rwanda-but-france-has-looked-the-other-way_6007956_23.html">not much concrete action</a> has been taken: Rwanda remains a w<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">estern donor darling</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the current protests are an indictment of the lack of global attention to the Congolese crisis. The comparison with both Ukraine and Israel/Palestine is frequently made in the country: where is the attention to the Congolese crisis? </p>
<p>For Felix Tshisekedi, who recently began a second term as president of the DRC, the protests are convenient. They’re allowing the government to shift the blame to western countries. This is after five years of at best limited progress in resolving the crisis in the eastern part of the country.</p>
<h2>Failed policies</h2>
<p>The Congolese government has failed to solve the armed crisis in the east. The region continues to be plagued by a range of armed groups, including the M23 rebellion. </p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">Second Congo War (1998-2003)</a>, conflict has kept brewing in eastern Congo, driven by interests and grievances at local, national and regional levels. This has spawned a multitude of armed groups, estimated to be over 100 at the moment. Access to natural resources – which are plentiful in eastern Congo – is one, <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/conflict-minerals-inc/">but not necessarily the most important</a>, driver of conflict. At the regional level, neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have continued to protect their economic, political and security interests in eastern Congo. </p>
<p>When Tshisekedi first became president in 2019 he took measures to restore stability in the east.</p>
<p>But these had limited results. </p>
<p>First, he allowed some neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Burundi, to once again operate militarily in the east. This was controversial for many Congolese, given the involvement of Uganda in the looting of Congolese natural resources during the Second Congo War. </p>
<p>This policy, and particularly the presence of Ugandan military on Congolese soil, has been <a href="https://www.ebuteli.org/publications/rapports/https-lh6-googleusercontent-com-b-wr-fq4j-bw-o-yap-fc-pyp4p1uv9-uc-6-rusd27hl6v-f-oo-p-wdls75l-z-umwgv-la-wn-cju-gd-ji-l-mj-bswu-9-y5-mzm-1-llz-azq7fvjtv-hxm-bg7y-rrs-43-j-dd-wa-e-aqr-xt5-q-i-i-ee3-v1c-f-poim-tuj4-mu-ua-n-qi">blamed</a> by the Congolese research group Ebuteli for rekindling the M23 rebellion in 2022. The presence of these foreign troops in the DRC was seen to threaten Rwandan interests.</p>
<p>Second, Tshisekedi declared “martial law” in the conflict-ridden provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, in which the military took over civilian authority. But this too was ineffective. Violence escalated. And, as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-stop-using-prolonged-state-siege-excuse-crush-protests">as shown by Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/dr-congo-martial-law-brings-crackdown-east">Human Rights Watch</a>, the military misused the martial law powers to deepen repression by targeting the opposition in these provinces. </p>
<p>Third was a series of other military interventions. But these too have had limited success. </p>
<p>They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the deployment of <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/01/06/foreign-private-military-contractors-flood-into-north-kivu,109879278-eve">1,000 Romanian mercenaries</a>, led by a <a href="https://osintteam.blog/meet-the-romanian-ex-legionnaire-turned-businessman-part-1-3a5fd1f28726">Romanian ex-legionnaire</a> running his own private military company. They were specifically contracted to fight M23. </p></li>
<li><p>a collaboration with local vigilante groups and existing armed groups, many of which had been fought by the Congolese army. These fighters are referred to as <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/19/the-wazalendo-patriots-at-war-in-eastern-drc_6356363_4.html">Wazalendo</a> (patriots in Kiswahili). This too was specifically aimed at defeating M23.</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of a force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In mid-February 2024 it was announced that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-deploy-2900-troops-fight-armed-groups-eastern-congo-2024-02-12/">South Africa would send another 2,900 soldiers to the country</a>. This is the latest of a range of regional organisations which have became involved in trying to resolve the conflict since Tshisekedi came to power. Others include the East African Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>On the whole, these initiatives and agreements have yielded limited results, and done little to change the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. </p>
<p>Since October last year, the number of internally displaced people in the country has risen to <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/record-high-displacement-drc-nearly-7-million">6.9 million</a> – the highest number recorded yet.</p>
<h2>The role of the west</h2>
<p>The recent protests are to some extent convenient for the Tshisekedi government, allowing it to shift the blame to the west.</p>
<p>It has not escaped notice that the government remained relatively tolerant towards the protests. Anti-west protests were allowed to continue for several days, with public mobilisation on social media. This is markedly different from the response to other recent public protests. Opposition demonstrations against the <a href="https://www.egmontinstitute.be/a-quoi-servent-les-elections-en-rdc/">disputed election results</a> in December <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231226-dr-congo-s-government-bans-protests-against-election-irregularities">were banned</a> or rapidly stopped.</p>
<p>At the same time, there is merit in people’s anger over the west’s role in the region – both its protective attitude towards Rwanda and its apparent indifference to what’s happening in the DRC. </p>
<p>First, the protests build on longstanding frustrations with the United Nations peacekeeping force in the country, better known by its acronym Monusco. Monusco has historically had a major <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">credibility problem</a> in the DRC due to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepers-problem">its appalling record</a> in protecting the civilian population. This frustration has on a number of occasions <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">led to violent protests</a> against the UN in the country.</p>
<p>Second, a number of western diplomatic initiatives helped to entrench the idea that western policy in the region did not have the interests of the Congolese at heart. In December 2022, the European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">announced its decision to give €20 million</a> (about US$21.6 million) to the Rwandan army for its military operations in Mozambique. By this time, there had been much evidence documenting Rwandan support to M23. The initiative was therefore understood by Congolese public opinion as direct European endorsement of M23. </p>
<p>Subsequent diplomatic initiatives to repair the damage, such as the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">same amount in European aid to the Congolese army</a>, did little to change this perception.</p>
<p>It is also true that there has been a lack of global – including western – attention to the Congolese crisis. A direct reason for the protests was that during the recent Africa Cup of Nations semi-final (which the DRC played against Côte d'Ivoire), anti-war <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/sports/football/dr-congo-protest-censorship-during-afcon-semi-final-4520850">protests by Congolese supporters in the stadium were not broadcast</a>. Although it’s up to the Confederation of African Football to sanction such broadcasts, in the DRC the decision was understood to have been made by the French TV broadcasting channel Canal+. It was seen as another illustration of the western attitude to the Congo conflict. </p>
<p>This led to attacks on Canal+ distribution points and protests against the French embassy. </p>
<p>Similar to other crises in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those in Sudan or Ethiopia, the crisis in the DRC is particularly low in the hierarchy of global attention politics, particularly in the west. The protests against western symbols in Kinshasa can therefore also be seen as distress signals: “we’re here too”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Protests in Kinshasa are an indictment of the lack of attention to the Congolese crisis.
Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/218282
2023-11-24T11:26:29Z
2023-11-24T11:26:29Z
Southern African troops versus M23 rebels in the DRC: 4 risks this poses
<p>The security situation in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate. The region comprises North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces. It’s about seven times the size of neighbouring Rwanda. </p>
<p>The violence in North Kivu has drawn most of the attention of the DRC’s neighbours and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/21/readout-of-director-of-national-intelligence-avril-hainess-travel-to-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-rwanda/">international community</a>. This close attention is aimed at preventing <a href="https://medafricatimes.com/32898-un-fears-direct-confrontation-between-drc-and-rwanda.html">possible confrontation between Rwanda and the DRC</a>. </p>
<p>Since late 2021, North Kivu has been confronted by <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have executed people and forcibly displaced thousands within the province and outside the DRC. The <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/un-again-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-m23-rebels-4281916">DRC and UN officials have accused</a> Rwanda of supporting M23 rebels. Kigali denies this.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">mid 2022</a>, the East African Community sent <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-regional-force">a regional force</a> into the DRC to halt the military advancement of M23 in an effort to address rising tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The DRC shares a <a href="https://www.trademarkafrica.com/democratic-republic-of-congo/">2,500km border</a> with five east African countries: Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. </p>
<p>Since this deployment, however, DRC president Felix Tshisekedi and residents of North Kivu have <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tshisekedi-gives-ultimatum-to-eacrf-4229574">criticised the east African force</a>, accusing it of deferring to the M23. The East African Community heads of states <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/it-s-official-the-eac-troops-are-leaving-eastern-dr-congo-4445094">recently agreed</a> to withdraw the force starting in December 2023.</p>
<p>The DRC’s leadership is now seeking <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-signs-an-agreement-for-the-deployment-of-sadc-troops--4437868#:%7E:text=Saturday%20November%2018%202023&text=The%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo,ceremony%20in%20Kinshasa%20on%20Friday.">support</a> from another regional bloc, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC <a href="https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/communique-extra-ordinary-summit-sadc-heads-state-and-government">has pledged</a> to deploy a military unit to North Kivu <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/drc-announces-deployment-of-sadc-troops/7362075.html">in the coming days</a>. The DRC is a member of SADC, as are its neighbours Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.</p>
<p>The SADC mission will <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/11/19/actualite/securite/la-rdc-signe-laccord-de-deploiement-des-militaires-de-la-sadc-dans">support the Congolese army</a> in its quest to root out M23 and other armed groups operating in eastern Congo. It’s still unclear if these troops will replace the east African force, or cooperate with it. Either way, this deployment comes on the heels of the gradual planned <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/pr-the_government_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_and_monusco_sign_a_disengagement_plan_for_the_withdrawal_of_the_mission.pdf">exit of UN peacekeepers from DRC starting in December 2023</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Rwanda and DRC's turbulent past continues to fuel their torrid relationship</a>
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<p>As a researcher on micro-level violence, I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=4SlemykAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017. In my view, there are four risks to the proposed SADC mission. These are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>it would primarily target M23 rebels, leaving out the other armed groups in eastern DRC</p></li>
<li><p>it could give Rwanda more room to exploit the M23 rebel force</p></li>
<li><p>it could antagonise the East African Community, which the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">DRC joined in 2022</a></p></li>
<li><p>the SADC force could end up being outnumbered in a vast region. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The focus on M23 rebels</h2>
<p>The primary mission for the SADC force would be to stabilise and contribute towards peacebuilding in eastern DRC. The danger is that this mission, especially if deployed under the banner of the Congolese national army, could end up condoning the army’s perspective. </p>
<p>This perspective tends to concentrate on the danger posed by M23 and disregards the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20120%20militias%20and,against%20humanity%20and%20war%20crimes.">armed groups (more than 120)</a> operating in eastern Congo. Further, it tends to accommodate other armed groups that commit atrocities against civilians. In countering M23 attacks, <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/weekly-briefing/m23-crisis-flares-again-in-north-kivu-context-dynamics-and-risks/">the army has co-opted foreign and local militias</a>, providing them with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/conflict-in-eastern-dr-congo-flares-again/a-67203737">guns and ammunition</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC mission in the DRC may end up trapped in the Congolese army’s approach. This would be dangerous for the stability of the region. Some of these local and foreign <a href="https://www.genocidewatchblog.com/post/addressing-the-banyamulenge-s-plight-in-dr-congo-part-1">militias have vowed to wipe out</a> ethnic communities whom they believe are not “real Congolese”. </p>
<p>Any regional force aiming to stabilise eastern Congo should remain neutral in its actions and be alive to the ways the <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">Congolese army has fanned violence and committed atrocities against civilians</a>.</p>
<h2>Rwanda and the M23</h2>
<p>Efforts to stabilise eastern DRC should dissociate Rwanda’s grievances from those of the M23. </p>
<p>The rebel group claims to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">fighting for the rights of Congolese Tutsis and other ethnic communities</a> in the Kivus. Rwanda, on its part, <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">accuses the DRC</a> of working with a rebel force, the FDLR, that seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government and operates out of Congo. In a 2022 report, a group of UN experts on the DRC <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">claimed that Rwanda armed M23 rebels</a> to enable them to go after FDLR combatants. Rwanda has dismissed such allegations.</p>
<p>The M23 cause shouldn’t be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/dr-congo-atrocities-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">exploited</a>. Instead, preference should be given to enabling peaceful negotiations between the rebels and the Congolese government to address grievances. </p>
<p>However, the Congolese army and Tshisekedi’s stance <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/m23-rebels-fight-on-in-eastern-drc-despite-truce-/6850531.html">against the M23</a> – particularly ahead of the DRC’s general elections in December 2023 – could push SADC forces to opt for a military solution to the rebel group’s offensive. SADC should be careful not to back a stance that would end up forcing M23 to remain a rebel force that regional countries could manipulate for their own agenda. </p>
<p><strong>DRC and its neighbours</strong></p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-8iMZR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8iMZR/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="600" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<h2>Antagonising the East African Community</h2>
<p>The East African Community’s force is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67239214">largely criticised</a> by Kinshasa and residents of North Kivu for failing to attack M23 rebels. The public – under the influence of Congolese political figures – tends to see the threat posed by M23 and disregards other forms of violence in the region. </p>
<p>Kinshasa has demonised the rebel force and its links to Rwanda for political mileage. Calling the east African troops’ efforts to root out M23 a failure after less than two years is premature. Particularly since the UN peacekeeping mission, <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Monusco</a>, has been in the DRC for more than two decades. </p>
<p>The upside to the East African Community’s intervention is that it <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2660-communique-of-the-consultative-meeting-between-the-chairperson-of-the-summit-and-the-facilitator-of-the-eac-led-eastern-drc-peace-process-on-the-security-situation-in-eastern-drc">combines</a> political consultations and dialogue among different belligerents. It is unclear what will happen to the peace talks initiated by <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyatta-says-drc-peace-restoration-talks-to-resume-4185714">former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta</a> should the SADC mission replace the east African one. </p>
<h2>Limited force strength in a vast area</h2>
<p>Eastern DRC contains at least 120 armed groups, and borders Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. The SADC mission in the DRC will, therefore, be taking on multiple rebel forces in a vast area with complex politics. It runs the risk of having its efforts criticised just like those of the East African Community because of its limited capacity to tackle the [underlying causes of violence <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">in eastern Congo</a>. </p>
<p>The SADC force could choose to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-democratic-fighting-idUSBRE97M0WA20130823/">focus on attacking</a> M23 rebels – which is how the group was first rooted out in <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">2012-2013</a>. Or it will get lost in the vast jungles of eastern Congo. Either scenario won’t bring lasting peace. </p>
<p>Many of the drivers of violence in eastern DRC are linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">the state’s absence</a> in the daily life of ordinary Congolese. This is largely driven by the political elites’ focus on their own survival. A purely military approach to addressing the violence would, therefore, be ill-advised.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated to reflect the East African Community’s decision to withdraw its regional force in the DRC.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delphin R. Ntanyoma does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The international effort to address three decades of violence in eastern DRC has drawn in the UN, east African troops and now a southern African force.
Delphin R. Ntanyoma, Visiting Researcher, University of Leeds
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/205586
2023-06-26T13:56:58Z
2023-06-26T13:56:58Z
Military interventions have failed to end DRC’s conflict – what’s gone wrong
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533552/original/file-20230622-29-mfl86e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soldiers on patrol in Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in November 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 30 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from communal violence, armed conflict and insecurity. Diverse actors have tried to stop it but conflict has intensified, particularly in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. Regular armed forces and non-state armed groups have been involved in the violence. </p>
<p>In mid-April 2023, it was reported that there were <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2023/04/18/actualite/securite/est-de-la-rdc-266-groupes-armes-locaux-et-etrangers-recenses-par-le-p">252 local and 14 foreign armed groups</a> in the eastern Congolese provinces. </p>
<p>The Congolese state’s inability to guarantee security has created fertile ground for armed groups to emerge. Aside from violence, they engage in various illicit activities, like exploiting mineral riches. </p>
<p>Weakened by decades of kleptocratic rule and armed uprisings, the Congolese state relies on support from regional and global actors. The United Nations peacekeeping and stabilisation mission has been in the DRC for more than 20 years. In February 2023, the UN force (MONUSCO) had <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">16,316</a> men and women from 62 countries operating as intervention troops, staff officers and mission experts.</p>
<p>The East African Community completed <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">its deployment of troops</a> in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">April 2023</a>. No sooner had they settled down than the DRC asked the Southern African Development Community to “<a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2023-05/EN%20-%20Communique%20of%20the%20SADC%20Organ%20Troika%20Summit%20Plus%20SADC%20Troika%20and%20TCC%2008%20May%202023%20Final_0.pdf#page=5">restore peace and security in eastern DRC</a>”.</p>
<p>More than a decade of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Felix-Ndahinda">research</a> on identity politics, indigeneity, human rights, transitional justice and peacebuilding in the region informs my view on its prospects for peace. This revolving door of military interventions raises questions about whether domestic and international actors involved genuinely examine past failures and draw useful lessons from them. Contemporary crises often reemerge from unresolved prior crises. This is the case here. </p>
<p>I argue that the DRC is being shortsighted, driven by populist pressures and political calculations. It’s making the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebel movement</a> the single convenient target of its actions, instead of resolving its deeper and broader problems. </p>
<h2>Disrupting the peacekeepers</h2>
<p>Many of the issues that the DRC government and other regional actors have undertaken to address are well known and documented. The UN <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo&field_paregion_tid%5B%5D=15">Peacemaker</a> database lists 19 agreements concluded since the Sirte Agreement of 1999. This preceded negotiations to end the second Congo war in 2003. </p>
<p>The DRC has committed to guarantee security for different communities, to resolve identity, citizenship and land issues, to oversee the return of refugees, and to a demobilisation process that addresses the concerns of belligerents. </p>
<p>The East African Community force’s <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">mandate</a> was formulated with this in mind. The force would, in collaboration with Congolese military and administrative authorities, stabilise and secure the peace in DRC. The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2720-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-20th-extra-ordinary-summit-of-the-east-african-community-heads-of-state">initial deployment</a> of Kenyan, Burundian, Ugandan and South Sudanese troops was projected to grow to between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>The idea was to reduce tensions by enforcing a ceasefire and a withdrawal of armed groups to initial positions. Local armed groups would be demobilised in an orderly way through a political process involving talks with Congolese authorities. Finally, foreign armed groups would be repatriated.</p>
<p>What came to be known as the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">Nairobi process</a> framed the resolution of the M23 crisis within a broader goal of peacemaking. All domestic and regional armed groups active in eastern DRC would be disarmed and the emphasis was on dialogue. </p>
<p>Before long, it went wrong. DR Congo president Felix Tshisekedi bluntly <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1656066871488020480">criticised</a> the East African Community force and suggested that it might be asked to leave. </p>
<p>It seems that a comprehensive peace strategy is not an immediate priority for Congolese authorities. They have an eye on elections. These are planned for December 2023, and the current president is seeking a second term. Tshisekedi’s administration has turned the fight against the M23 and its alleged backers into a tool of <a href="https://twitter.com/PatrickMuyaya/status/1600082788895449090">popular mobilisation</a> in support of its policies. Therefore, military and diplomatic success on this front remains its priority.</p>
<h2>Towards sustainable peace</h2>
<p>Authorities in the DRC have also <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/un-peacekeepers-expected-to-leave-dr-congo-in-six-months-authorities/">announced</a> that UN peacekeepers in the country would be withdrawn by December 2023. </p>
<p>Congolese authorities have criticised the East African force and the UN mission for their unwillingness to fight the M23. The M23 is seen as representing nothing more than a masked <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1572365176770535424">Rwandan</a> (and at times <a href="https://twitter.com/StanysBujakera/status/1545118793801900039">Ugandan</a>) intervention in the DRC, and as such the biggest threat to Congolese territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The DRC’s counter strategy is to recognise some local armed groups as resistant patriots (Wazalendo) to be officially supported in fighting an external aggression. Several public officials are on <a href="https://afrique.lalibre.be/76281/rdc-le-blanchissement-des-groupes-armes-par-les-autorites-congolaise-frustre-le-processus-de-nairobi-et-luand/">record</a> expressing their support for these Mai Mai-Wazalendo fighters. </p>
<p>None of the triggers of the DRC’s recurrent crises can be addressed in this atmosphere. It’s impossible to imagine scenarios where sustainable peace can be achieved without first addressing land rights, equal citizenship claims and inclusive governance institutions catering to the needs of the entire Congolese population. </p>
<p>Enforcement of a comprehensive strategy that addresses belligerence and the disarmament of all armed groups through a combined military and political dialogue strategy, as imagined under the Nairobi process, should be the main priority of any peace initiative. Peace between peoples and countries in the region requires a genuine commitment to addressing all local, regional and international dimensions of the crises in eastern DRC.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A comprehensive strategy does not seem to be an immediate priority for Congolese authorities with an eye on elections.
Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Honorary Associate Professor, College of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Rwanda
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/179320
2022-03-23T12:13:45Z
2022-03-23T12:13:45Z
DRC is set to become 7th member of the east Africa trading bloc: what’s in it for everyone
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452234/original/file-20220315-17-1w168gs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">DRC President Felix Tshisekedi waves an official copy of the nation's Constitution during his swearing in on January 24, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/democratic-republic-of-the-congos-newly-inaugurated-news-photo/1087921674">TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Shortly after his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46819303">controversial</a> electoral victory in early 2019, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Felix Tshisekedi sought to get his country admitted into the East African Community. <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/151-international-relations/2373-democratic-republic-of-congo-inches-closer-to-joining-eac">Recently</a>, the East African Community ministers recommended the DRC’s admission, a decision set to be <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/news/east-africa/drc-finally-joins-eac-next-week-three-years-after-application-3755792">formalised</a> by the bloc’s presidents when they meet on 29 March. Regional integration expert Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi discusses key points of the decision.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the state of East African Community integration?</h2>
<p>East African Community is one of the most vibrant and best performing blocs in Africa. This is according to the <a href="https://www.integrate-africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/ARII2019_technical_report_EN.pdf">African Regional Integration Index</a> which ranks blocs on five aspects of integration - trade, productive, macroeconomic, infrastructural and movement of people.</p>
<p>Currently, it has six members: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. </p>
<p>East Africa’s integration is envisioned under <a href="https://www.eac.int/integration-pillars">four pillars</a>. These are the customs union, the common market, the monetary union, and the political federation. So far, the bloc has been implementing protocols on a customs union and a common market. These have <a href="https://mocu.ac.tz/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/OMUCHESI-JONATHAN-ANGANI_The-Interaction-Between-Intra-regional-Investment.pdf">helped improve</a> trade and investments in the region since 2006 and boosted country relations. </p>
<p>Under the customs union protocol taxes on goods produced within the region have been eliminated. East Africa is also applying a <a href="https://www.eac.int/documents/category/eac-common-external-tariff">common external tariff</a> on imports from outside the region. </p>
<p>In the long run, an operational customs union should open up the regional economy so that small economies are able to gain access to industries that would otherwise be out of their reach. </p>
<p>For its part, the purpose of a common market is to ease cross-border movement of goods, persons and workers. It’s implementation has <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Promise_and_Efficacy_of_E_African_Community1.pdf">seen</a> the east African governments harmonise immigration procedures and order border posts to operate for 24 hours. Some of the governments in the region, <a href="https://www.eac.int/working-in-east-africa">notably</a> Rwanda and Kenya, have also waived the work permit fee for citizens from the region. </p>
<p>The bloc is now preparing the ground for its third pillar, the <a href="https://www.eac.int/monetary-union">monetary union</a>. This began with the adoption and signing of the East African Monetary Union Protocol on 30 November 2013. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/afr1506.pdf">protocol</a> set a timeline of 10 years within which the partner states need to have a common currency. That’s in 2023, a deadline that’s unlikely to be met. There has been mixed progress in the implementation of agreed action on this front. </p>
<h2>How do countries get admitted?</h2>
<p>The criteria for admission into the bloc is provided under Article 3 of the East African Community <a href="https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2487/download">treaty</a> signed in 1999. The regional law provides the following grounds for admission of a new member:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>acceptance of the Community as set out in the East African Community Treaty;</p></li>
<li><p>adherence to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice;</p></li>
<li><p>potential contribution to the strengthening of integration within the East African region;</p></li>
<li><p>geographical proximity to and interdependence between it and the partner states;</p></li>
<li><p>establishment and maintenance of a market driven economy; and</p></li>
<li><p>social and economic policies being compatible with those of the Community.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>So far, the body has had <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-history">three</a> admissions: Rwanda and Burundi in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. The DRC shares borders with Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and South Sudan. There has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/lawyer-sues-to-block-congo-s-admission-to-eac-bloc-3445788">opposition</a> to its plan to join the East African Community due to its past human rights record. </p>
<h2>What does the East African Community gain?</h2>
<p>The DRC’s admission would give the bloc its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tshisekedi-launches-construction-congos-first-deep-water-port-2022-01-31/">first port</a> on the Atlantic coast. At the moment, the region relies on Indian Ocean-based seaports of Kenya and Tanzania for trade with the rest of the world. The challenge of <a href="https://www.ics-shipping.org/press-release/change-in-piracy-threats-in-indian-ocean-prompts-re-think-of-high-risk-area/">intermittent</a> piracy off the Somalia coast has exposed the need for an alternative trade route. </p>
<p>The DRC is also set to significantly expand the regional trading bloc’s size. The DRC’s geographical area is far much larger than all the six East African states put together. The DRC has a geographical area of 2.4 million sq km while the bloc is about 1.8 million sq km. The additional geographical area - known uniquely for its copper, coltan, cobalt, tin and other minerals - is set to boost East Africa’s profile as an investment destination. </p>
<p>On a world stage, the East African Community gains a bigger clout with the DRC’s huge population (consumer base) of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CD">about</a> 90 million people and an economy of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=ZG">nearly US$50 billion </a>. It is <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-quick-facts">estimated</a> that the bloc has a population of 177 million people and an economy of US$193.7 billion. </p>
<h2>What’s in it for the DRC?</h2>
<p>The DRC is already doing substantial trade with the East African Community bloc which could <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eac-scorecard-drc-admission-win-trade-rows-slow-business-3669232">benefit</a> from lower or eliminated tariffs. Goods produced in the DRC will no longer be subjected to customs taxes at any of the region’s border points.</p>
<p>It already has established trade relations with <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/world-bank-drc-rwandas-most-promising-trade-partner#:%7E:text=By%202019%2C%20Rwanda%20had%20exported,the%20report%20noted%20in%20part.">Rwanda</a>, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/drc-and-burundi-agreements-3472358">Burundi</a> and <a href="https://gltfp.comesa.int/uganda-and-democratic-republic-of-congo-develop-a-simplified-trade-regime-tool-kit/">Uganda</a>. For imports, parts of the DRC rely on the trade corridor that runs from Mombasa port via Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. These connections are set to firm up as national agencies of the East African governments ease tariffs and administrative barriers on the new bloc member.</p>
<h2>Does it matter that this is the third bloc the DRC is joining?</h2>
<p>Generally, membership in more than one customs union is technically impossible. Firstly, one country cannot apply different common external tariffs. Secondly, integration agenda differs from one bloc to the next meaning overlapping membership may lead a country to conflicting obligations. According to the World Trade Organisation, the practice <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm">hurts global trade liberalisation</a>, especially when affected traders have to meet multiple sets of rules.</p>
<p>But <a href="http://repository.eac.int/bitstream/handle/11671/24273/en-epa-overlapping-memberships-2005.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">analysis</a> of the treaties of the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa shows they do not preclude members from maintaining prior trade arrangements or entering into new ones.</p>
<p>The DRC is already a member of the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. But it won’t be the only East African Community country with overlapping membership of regional blocs. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa while Tanzania is a member of Southern African Development Community. </p>
<p>The East African Community, for instance, has not been able to establish a full customs union since it had to allow Tanzania to grant preferences to its southern Africa partners. </p>
<p>The three blocs are currently <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-integration/tripartite-cooperation/">harmonising their agenda and laws</a> with the aim of integrating their economies and markets.
This fits into the broader objective of the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a>, of accelerating economic integration of the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179320/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The admission of DRC will extend the East African Community bloc’s reach to the Atlantic Ocean.
Jonathan Ang'ani Omuchesi, Lecturer In Governance and Regional Integration, Catholic University of Eastern Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/168013
2021-09-16T14:20:26Z
2021-09-16T14:20:26Z
Why the push led by South Africa to revoke Israel’s AU observer status is misguided
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421535/original/file-20210916-21-popyo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, speaks during a briefing in Addis Ababa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The announcement in July that Israel had been formally granted observer status at the African Union drew a sharp reaction from some countries on the continent. These included Algeria and Djibouti as well as South Africa, which said it was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/28/shocking-south-africa-slams-israels-au-observer-status">“appalled”</a>. </p>
<p>Pretoria moved quickly to lobby other Southern African Development Community states <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/sa-appalled-by-israels-african-union-observer-status-20210728">against the decision</a>. </p>
<p>At a meeting of Heads of State and Government in Lilongwe, Malawi, the regional body <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108200204.html">issued a statement</a> objecting to the decision. It said it had been taken unilaterally by the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat. It also expressed its solidarity with the Palestinian people.</p>
<p>Let us consider the regional body’s main objection – unilateralism on the part of Moussa Faki Mahamat. Did Commissioner Faki act outside his mandate in granting Israel observer status? The AU Commission <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-08-07-moussa-faki-defends-move-to-admit-israel-as-au-observer-state/">argues</a> that it acted within its “full sphere of competence”
reading of the <a href="https://portal.africa-union.org/DVD/Documents/DOC-AU-DEC/EX%20CL%20DEC%20230%20(VII)%20_E.pdf">AU document</a> setting out the criteria for granting observer status and the system of accreditation. It certainly grants the AU Commission discretion in making such decisions. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that Moussa Faki Mahamat’s decision <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">was supported</a> by the current chairperson of the African Union, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Félix Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/africa/2021-08-07-moussa-faki-defends-move-to-admit-israel-as-au-observer-state/">Faki noted in August 2021</a>, out of the AU’s 55 member states, 46 already enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel. Logically, then, Israel’s entry into the pan-African organisation, is merely an extension of what is happening at bilateral level between member states and Israel.</p>
<p>I have been involved in the subject of Israel’s relationship with the continent from an academic perspective for three decades. Based on this experience I believe that South Africa, and the regional body, are wrong in their approach. A more mature and sophisticated foreign policy that embraces engagement and dialogue is needed. </p>
<p>This is because Israel is becoming more integrated in the international community. The unprecedented close political, economic, trade and security ties between Israel and its Arab neighbours as well as African countries like Morocco, Chad, Guinea and Sudan <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/uae-targets-1-trillion-in-economic-relations-with-israel/2365173">speaks to this</a>. This is also the case in <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">East Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, South Africa is out of sync with the views of most African heads of state</p>
<p>In addition, isolating Israel will not work in promoting the well-being of Palestinians. This was tried for decades by Arab countries and has failed.</p>
<p>What is needed is a critical engagement with Israel and concerted efforts to strengthen the pro-peace constitutuency in Israel itself. </p>
<h2>The human rights question</h2>
<p>South Africa, as well as the Southern African Development Community, raised the issue of human rights in relation to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. </p>
<p>I believe the organisation is using this selectively. </p>
<p>The leadership of the regional body did not raise the issue of human rights during the bad behaviour on the part of a number of country leaders. These included the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/life/mugabe-zimbabwe-s-liberator-turned-authoritarian-leader/1575001">worst excesses</a> of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe and the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/subverting-democracy-in-tanzania-and-zambia/">authoritarianism</a> of Edgar Lungu Zambia. It has also been silent about the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17762749">corrupt despotism</a> of Africa’s last feudal monarch King Mswati III. </p>
<p>Neither did human rights considerations feature when Pretoria <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africa/icc-south-africa-sudan-bashir.html">attempted to shield </a> Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir from the International Criminal Court to answer for atrocities in Darfur. </p>
<p>A second objection to the position taken by the Southern African Development Community is that, in my view, granting Israel observer status does not undermine previous AU resolutions expressing solidarity with the Palestinian cause.</p>
<p>Commissioner Faki said as much when he stated that Israel’s formal accreditation did not weaken the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>unflinching commitment of the Pan-African Organisation to the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent National State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, within the framework of a global, fair and definitive peace between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">In search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>South Africa, Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have formally requested that the decision to accredit Israel should be rescinded at the October 2021 meeting of the AU Executive Council. </p>
<p>Most other countries on the continent, however, have sought closer ties with Isreal. Many, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda have secured Israeli investments and expertise in a wide variety of areas from agriculture to tech start ups. </p>
<p>Such a pragmatic approach follows a more pragmatic Arab approach. This was set in train by the signing of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/trump-israel-united-arab-emirates-uae.html">Abraham Accords</a> between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 2020. </p>
<p>Just as Algeria and South Africa could not stop Morocco’s entry into the AU, neither can they stop Israeli accreditation. </p>
<p>In addition, 46 AU Member States already have relations with Israel. And Egypt, which also opposed Israel’s observer status, has since agreed to strengthen bilateral relations following a meeting between President Al-Sisi and Prime Minister Bennett. </p>
<p>In my view South Africa, and those of the same view on the continent, won’t be able to get the accreditation decision reversed. This echoes the failed attempts by Algeria and South Africa to stop Morocco’s entry into the AU.</p>
<p>Malawi, the country where the 41st SADC Summit took place, is seeking to open an embassy in Jerusalem. Harare is also seeking to improve its bilateral ties with Israel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Solomon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Just as Algeria and South Africa could not stop Morocco’s entry into the AU, neither can they stop Israeli accreditation.
Hussein Solomon, Senior Professor and Academic Head of Department: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/152029
2021-01-19T14:28:36Z
2021-01-19T14:28:36Z
COVID-19 policy briefs must be realistic: a review by young southern African scientists
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379221/original/file-20210118-21-movumy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hand hygiene is important to fight COVID-19 but how can you do that without water</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just over a year after the coronavirus was first reported in China countries are still reeling from its effects. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19 disease, has infected over <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">90 million</a> people globally and resulted in more than <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">1.9 million</a> deaths. In January 2021, South Africa has the highest number of cases on the <a href="https://africacdc.org/covid-19/">African continent</a> and has seen a <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/455928/mkhize-declares-second-wave-of-covid-19-in-south-africa-as-new-cases-pass-6000-in-a-day/">surge</a> in daily infections since December.</p>
<p>The race to find and provide effective vaccines and therapeutics continues. <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31142-9/fulltext">Non-pharmaceutical interventions</a> are still needed to limit the transmission of COVID-19. They include isolating cases, quarantining contacts as well as relevant, accurate and timely risk communication. Hand and respiratory hygiene, infection control and prevention are also vital.</p>
<p>Evidence-based research and interventions are important in the fight against COVID-19. But it is equally important to pay attention to <a href="https://preventepidemics.org/covid19/science/insights/3-ws-to-reduce-the-risk-of-covid-19/">social measures and people’s everyday experiences</a>. These contribute to adherence to government regulations relating to COVID-19. Adherence isn’t always easy or possible in certain circumstances. For example, living conditions may make it difficult to keep a safe distance, and access to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2020-04-12-covid-19-and-the-call-for-solidarity-challenges-for-informal-settlements/">water</a> may be limited.</p>
<p>In view of these potential difficulties, <a href="https://www.sayas.org.za/">a group of young scientists</a> who are part of <a href="https://www.zimbabweyas.org/">South Africa Young Academy of sciences</a> came together to discuss how policy briefs that focus on non-pharmaceutical interventions could be made more accessible for the general public and policy makers alike. The group comprised experts in the behavioural, social, natural, health and human sciences.</p>
<p>In particular, we drew from policy briefs compiled by a public health initiative called <a href="https://resolvetosavelives.org/">Resolve to Save Lives</a>. This initiative puts together data on COVID-19 trends in Africa from multiple sources. These briefs target decision makers involved in the COVID-19 response in Africa, including national task forces and emergency operation centres. </p>
<h2>Issues and possible solutions</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://preventepidemics.org/covid19/perc/">briefs</a> are intended to inform public health and social measures in Africa. They are based on social, economic, epidemiological, population movement, and security data from 20 African Union member states. The briefs highlight the various strategies African governments have taken in responding to COVID-19 and whether these are effective or not. </p>
<p>We discussed the briefs in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrB6za1jr1w&feature=youtu.be">closed webinar</a>. It aimed to assess whether the briefs take into account the real experiences of people in our communities. The people invited to the webinar included academics, students and representatives of non-governmental organisations.</p>
<p>The webinar highlighted some big issues. These are listed below.</p>
<p>Environmental factors are important in the southern African region’s responses to COVID-19. Most countries in the region did not have a disaster management plan in place, and this contributed to environmental challenges. An example is the disposal of used masks in the streets, with many ending up in rivers and other <a href="https://twentytwo13.my/issues/used-face-masks-sanitiser-bottles-end-up-in-rivers/">water bodies</a>. There is, therefore, a need for a disaster management plan which would guide the safe disposal of these waste materials. </p>
<p>There is an overuse of hand sanitisers (for example in shopping malls when people move from one store to the next), which may lead to <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-heavy-use-of-hand-sanitisers-could-boost-antimicrobial-resistance-136541">antimicrobial resistance</a>. Some ways to limit the negative impact of overuse of hand sanitisers on the skin should entail thorough washing of hands with water and soap when available. There should also be extreme caution and avoidance of diluting and combining different sanitisers. A point also highlighted by <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-heavy-use-of-hand-sanitisers-could-boost-antimicrobial-resistance-136541">Winston Morgan</a>, a reader in toxicology and clinical biochemistry at the University of East London, in his assertion that we should “avoid combining pre-prepared products with other ones”.</p>
<p>While government task teams have some diversity and interdisciplinary experts, there is a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2020/06/05/government-misreads-people-covid-19-friedman">bias towards the health and “core science”</a> professionals. Psycho-social and political sciences should also be represented in policy decision making processes. The role of traditional leaders, faith groups and businesses must also be taken into consideration. It is important to have this <a href="https://preventepidemics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PERC_RespondingtoCovidData.pdf">multi-sectoral response</a> as COVID-19 is more than just a health problem. </p>
<p>Governments should strengthen evidence-based risk communication and engage community leaders and trusted people to encourage adherence to public health measures and dispel misinformation. In addition, there needs to be an open and honest conversation between traditional leaders and governments on cultural practices and people’s need to perform rituals. </p>
<p>For example, in many communities, initiation schools are an integral part of community life. Such rituals are an integral part of many communities and people want to practise and observe <a href="https://health-e.org.za/2020/11/20/initiation-schools-covid-19/">traditional rites</a>. But these events may be high risk as the initiates might find it difficult to observe COVID-19 safety protocols. Working closely with traditional leaders who have in-depth understanding of such rituals can assist in ensuring adherence.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>It is important to acknowledge that COVID-19 has affected all aspects of people’s lives. The young scientists’ webinar was an opportunity to understand the similarities and differences in challenges associated with COVID-19 in communities across southern Africa. </p>
<p>It highlighted the need for policies that are appropriate for people’s real lives. These need to be “living documents”. This can only happen if communities are consulted in making decisions affecting their lives. Pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions have to be adopted alongside one another.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Puleng Segalo receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences.. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adeyemi Oladapo Aremu receives funding from the National Research Foundation, Pretoria, South Africa. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pradeep Kumar receives funding from the National Research Foundation, the South African Medical Research Council, and the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. </span></em></p>
African leaders can make strategies to fight COVID-19 more accessible to the people.
Puleng Segalo, Professor of Psychology, University of South Africa
Adeyemi Oladapo Aremu, Associate professor, North-West University
Pradeep Kumar, Associate Professor of Pharmaceutics at Department of Pharmacy and Pharmacology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/135386
2020-04-19T08:10:38Z
2020-04-19T08:10:38Z
Southern Africa’s porous borders pose a problem for containing the coronavirus
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/328360/original/file-20200416-192762-zc0cke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An illegal Zimbawean immigrant crosses into South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many countries around the world have declared lockdowns in an attempt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/what-a-coronavirus-lockdown-might-mean-for-london">to curb</a> the sharp rise in deaths from the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>In South Africa, which has the highest number of cases in Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa imposed <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-escalation-measures-combat-covid-19-epidemic%2C-union">a three week lockdown</a> from 27 March. This has since been <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-extension-coronavirus-covid-19-lockdown-end-april-9-apr-2020-0000">extended by two weeks</a>. Other African countries in general, and within the 16-member <a href="https://www.sadc.int/member-states/">Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> region, have followed suit.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe is also <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-03-30-zimbabwe-begins-21-day-covid-19-lockdown/">in lockdown</a>. Botswana has imposed a <a href="https://inkjournalism.org/2093/botswana-declares-state-of-emergency-goes-on-lockdown/">state of emergency and lockdown</a>. So has <a href="https://www.worldaware.com/covid-19-alert-mozambique-declares-state-emergency-through-least-april-30">Mozambique</a>, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/africa/lesotho-declares-national-emergency-over-covid-19-outbreak/ar-BB11ozHJ">Lesotho</a>, <a href="https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/africa/2020-04-07-angola-deploys-emergency-police-armoured-vans-to-enforce-lockdown/">Angola</a>, Democratic Republic of Congo <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200325-dr-congo-president-imposes-state-of-emergency-to-contain-coronavirus-outbreak">(DRC)</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cdl8n2edxept/mauritius">Mauritius</a>, <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/324541/comoros-authorities-implement-measures-amid-covid-19-as-of-march-18">Comoros</a>, <a href="https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/329996/madagascar-nationwide-state-of-emergency-extended-lockdown-measures-in-fianarantsoa-april-5-update-5">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://newsaf.cgtn.com/news/2020-04-09/COVID-19-Seychelles-declares-a-21-day-lockdown-PxbcqdAx4k/index.html">Seychelles</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-47639452">Malawi</a>. <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00072524.html">Namibia</a> and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2020/04/02/coronavirus-eswatini-partial-lockdown-update-covid-19//">eSwatini</a> have declared partial lockdowns.</p>
<p>In Zambia, only <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kafue">Kafue</a>, a town in south-central Zambia and its surrounds, and about 40 km from the capital Lusaka, is in <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/04/14/president-lungu-orders-the-complete-lockdown-of-kafue/">a total lockdown</a>, leaving most of the country uncovered. Similarly, Tanzania has implemented very mild measures, <a href="https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/tanzanias-mild-response-to-covid-19-and-its-implications-for-the-2020-elections/">short of a lockdown</a>.</p>
<p>This shows that there’s no uniform lockdown of all the region’s 16 countries in response to the pandemic. </p>
<p>A lockdown means that a nation-state shuts its borders and restricts all forms of movement and business. In the case of South Africa, this has actually meant that people are restricted to their homes, and only workers in the essential services are allowed to travel. </p>
<p>Likewise, all businesses except those involved in essential services, <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/disaster-management-act-regulations-address-prevent-and-combat-spread-coronavirus-covid-19">ceased operations</a>. </p>
<p>In my view closing borders in Africa in general, and in the Southern African Development Community region specifically, will not stop the spread of the coronavirus. This is because, by and large, borders in the region are porous. </p>
<p>This means countries in the region need to rethink their approach. The solution, in my view, lies in a coordinated approach, as envisaged in the Southern African Development Community <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf">treaty</a> and protocols.</p>
<h2>Borders have little power</h2>
<p>Borders on the continent were arbitrarily imposed by former colonial powers, and aren’t respected. This includes cross border regions between South Africa and Zimbabwe and Botswana and Zimbabwe in which people have continued to cross the border at unofficial points <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319553986">despite the existence of fences</a>. </p>
<p>In some parts of the region, particularly the contiguous border regions of Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique, people have long established a strong cross border socio-cultural and economic clout which has diminished the impact of the border.</p>
<p>In the minds and lives of people, the borders do not actually exist. That is why in the contiguous borderlands of Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique people move in between countries to access various services, such as health services across borders. This is <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319553986">considered acceptable and “normal”</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/unravelling-why-some-democracies-but-not-all-are-better-at-fighting-pandemics-136267">Unravelling why some democracies -- but not all -- are better at fighting pandemics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Some borders are not even fenced. In some places the physical “border” is marked by an isolated concrete pillar or beacon a few centimetres above the ground. </p>
<p>People have always disregarded them, moving easily in between countries, in the conduct of their everyday lives in line with their social, economic, cultural and other needs. For instance, at Mwami (Malawi-Zambia border), people <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08865655.2017.1390689?journalCode=rjbs20">simply walk or cycle freely between the two countries</a>.</p>
<p>In such a situation, declaring a lockdown of a country and closing its borders is not an effective way of stopping the spread of the coronavirus. </p>
<h2>Coordinated approach</h2>
<p>The Southern African Development Community needs to look to its regional integration project for how best to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Briefly, the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf">1992 declaration and treaty</a> outlines the programmes, projects and activities towards the establishment of a regional community. </p>
<p>Several protocols have been signed to make this a reality. For example, the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/7413/5292/8365/Protocol_on_Health1999.pdf">SADC Protocol on Health </a> was approved by the regional body’s heads of state in 1999, and came into force in 2004. </p>
<p>It encourages cooperation among the member countries on health issues, such as curbing communicable and non-communicable diseases. It also calls for cooperation in managing disasters. Hence, member states need to adopt a regional and coordinated response to such pandemics as COVID-19. An example of this would be to establish a regional fund to deal with pandemics. </p>
<p>Similarly, there needs to be a proactive plan of action, such as concrete procedures in terms of the uniform application of COVID-19 lockdown rules across all states in the region.</p>
<h2>Disaster preparedness</h2>
<p>There is an urgent need to move beyond political declarations to the actual setting up of systems and mechanisms to enable the region to jointly tackle communicable diseases and other disasters.</p>
<p>Such a proactive approach would entail uniform action by all states in the region, instead of the current disparate responses, which leaves each country to look after its own. </p>
<p>Failure by member states to establish a fully operational regional architecture will mean that it will be impossible to bring the epidemic under control in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135386/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inocent Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Borders in southern Africa – as on the entire continent – were arbitrarily imposed by former colonial powers, and aren’t respected.
Inocent Moyo, Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/130498
2020-01-27T07:36:58Z
2020-01-27T07:36:58Z
Events in Lesotho point to poor prospects for political stability
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311836/original/file-20200124-81362-8smmxs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tom Thabane has resigned as the Prime Minister of Lesotho amid a scandal over his wife's murder.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images/Angela Weiss</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2017 the estranged wife of Lesotho’s prime minister Tom Thabane was <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-06-15-estranged-wife-of-lesothos-incoming-pm-shot-dead/">shot dead</a> in suspicious circumstances two days ahead of his inauguration. Now there’s a new twist in the saga: on 11 January authorities issued an <a href="http://diepos.co.za/afp/901725/lesotho-court-issues-arrest-warrant-for-pms-wife/">arrest warrant</a> for his current wife, Maesaiah Thabane, in connection with the murder. </p>
<p>The scandal has erupted amid a bitter dispute within Thabane’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/All-Basotho-Convention-Offical-Page-392608360913655/">All Basotho Convention</a> and has culminated in his <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/lesotho-politics-rocked-by-leaders-fugitive-wife-20200119">resignation</a>. This is likely to destabilise the governing coalition, leading to an early general election and continued political instability in the small landlocked country of just <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/lesotho-population/">over 2 million</a> that is encircled by South Africa. </p>
<p>Thabane served a stint as Prime Minister between 2012 and February 2015 when divisions with the then coalition government led to an early general election. The successor government led by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pakalitha-Mosisili">Pakalitha Mosisili</a> of the Democratic Congress was in turn rocked by divisions. </p>
<p>After Mosisili <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/lesotho-pakalitha-mosisili-loses-parliament-vote-170301165711605.html">lost a vote of no confidence</a>, Lesotho was forced into another election in February 2017. In this latest contest, <a href="http://lestimes.com/thabane-returns-to-power-2/">Thabane was returned to power</a> at the head of a coalition led by his All Basotho Convention, backed by three other smaller political parties.</p>
<p>Two days before Thabane’s inauguration in 2017 his estranged wife, Lipolelo, who had refused to divorce him, <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/01/23/one-first-lady-is-dead-in-lesotho-another-has-fled">was murdered</a>. Her place was immediately filled by Thabane’s customary law wife, Maesaiah. For the moment, Lipolelo’s murder remained unsolved, one of those mysterious killings of prominent figures in Lesotho which occur all too frequently. Maesaiah went on the run after the police issued the arrest warrant and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2020-01-22-lesotho-police-call-in-ministers-for-questioning-about-thomas-thabanes-first-wifes-murder/">had not still not been found</a> nearly two weeks later. </p>
<p>Maesaiah rapidly acquired notoriety for reputedly dictating who should be <a href="http://lestimes.com/mahao-blasts-maesaiah-thabanes-takeover-of-govt/">appointed to ministerial roles and who should be dismissed</a>. She was accused of interfering directly with the allocation of government tenders. A trust fund she started, ostensibly to assist the poor and needy, was widely suspected to have been a money laundering scheme.</p>
<p>Thabane was already on the losing end of a bruising struggle to retain control of his party when police announced they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51105278">wanted to question Maesaiah</a> in relation to Lipolelo’s murder. He was left with little option but <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/01/16/tom-thabane-s-resignation-set-to-create-more-challenges-for-lesotho">to resign</a>.</p>
<h2>Seeds of discontent</h2>
<p>Lesotho is <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview">a poor country</a>. Opportunities for employment in the private sector are few and far between. As a result there is a desperate scramble for jobs in government, the public services, the military and the police. </p>
<p>Worse, because the demand for resources far outmatches the patronage available, Lesotho’s political arena has become brutally competitive. It is characterised by battles between factions which stretch across the various political parties into the military and police. As a result, political life has been regularly punctuated by interventions by elements within the army.</p>
<p>Lesotho’s current malaise goes back to the assassination of the Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force, Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5770d2074.html">in June 2015</a>. Mahao had been promoted to the post by Thabane in place of Lieutenant-General Tlali Kamoli. </p>
<p>The assassination resulted in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-sadc-at-last-flexing-its-muscles-in-lesotho">intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a>, which launched <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-officially-launches-sadc-preventive-mission-kingdom-lesotho-december-2-2017/">an initiative</a> to bring peace, stability and good governance to Lesotho. The aim was to try and keep the peace and bring about stability.</p>
<p>Against this troubled background South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, acting as the facilitator of the reform process, managed to chivvy Lesotho’s political parties into signing an agreement to establish a statutory <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/ramaphosa-succeeds-in-brokering-lesotho-reform-agreement-28765012">National Legislative Reform Authority</a> in mid-2019. The agreement was hailed as an achievement but even at the time, its prospects of success seemed to be belied by political realities.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311845/original/file-20200124-81411-1gzs7sv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Lesotho Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simphiwe Nkwali. © Sunday Times</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The question of who was responsible for Mahao’s assassination has never been resolved. Two senior officers, both fervent supporters of General Kamoli, were under criminal investigation for his murder. But, they themselves were gunned down after they had just shot dead the latest commander of the army, General Khoantle Motsomotso, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41165298">in early September 2017</a>. </p>
<p>All this frustrated the Mahao family immensely. Its bid to get at the truth was led by his brother Nqosa Mahao, vice-chancellor of the National University of Lesotho. It was also to lead to his direct <a href="http://lestimes.com/m1-million-golden-handshake-for-mahao/">involvement in politics</a>.</p>
<h2>Changing of the guard</h2>
<p>Mahao had hitherto remained on the periphery of politics. But he emerged as the lead candidate for election to the deputy leadership of Thabane’s All Basotho Convention at its elective conference in February 2019. Thabane immediately regarded him as a threat and resorted to court action to block his candidature. </p>
<p>Conveniently, the case was heard by Acting Chief Justice Maseforo Mahase, who was appointed to the post by Thabane after he had suspended Chief Justice Nthomeng Majara from office some months earlier. Mahase ruled in favour of Thabane, but Mahao turned to the Court of Appeal. It overturned Mahase’s judgment, recording <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201906050423.html">scathing criticism of her decision</a>.</p>
<p>Mahao and his supporters proceeded to win the election and form a new National Executive Committee of the All Basotho Convention. But the result was immediately challenged by Thabane. Again the case went to court; again it was heard by Mahase; again Mahase ruled against Mahao and found reason to restore Thabane’s National Executive Committee in office pending new party elections. </p>
<p>Mahao inevitably went back to the High Court. It dealt with the case sporadically, until it finally declared in his favour in December 2019. Mahao’s National Executive Committee immediately proceeded to suspend Thabane’s membership of the party. But it made it plain he would remain Prime Minister until either he resigned or he lost a vote of confidence in parliament.</p>
<p>It was a comprehensive defeat for Thabane. </p>
<h2>Uncertain times ahead</h2>
<p>The outcome of the present political turbulence is unclear. Mahao appears to be the most likely immediate successor to Thabane as Prime Minister. Yet, if he takes office, it will be at the head of an extraordinarily fragile coalition. </p>
<p>Thabane’s followers continue to dispute the legitimacy of Mahao’s national executive committee. And Mahao will find securing a majority in parliament tough.</p>
<p>In short, Lesotho seems destined for yet another election – the fourth in eight years. And, yet again, it seems unlikely that any party will win outright. The result will be another shaky coalition, with the related risk of further involvement by the military in the political arena.</p>
<p>The SADC reform process was originally intended to be completed by the end of May this year. Currently there is no chance of that. If an election is called, there’s no knowing what the outcome will bring, and SADC may have to go back to the drawing board.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Since the demand for resources far outmatches the patronage available, Lesotho’s political arena has become brutally competitive.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/124718
2019-11-05T14:23:11Z
2019-11-05T14:23:11Z
Malawi’s dream of a waterway to the Indian Ocean may yet come true
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299688/original/file-20191031-187898-1ytiywh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A small boat carries passengers across the Zambezi river. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Malawi’s landlocked status places a huge <a href="https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/Projects/AWF-Project-appraisal-report-MULTIN-SHIREZAMBEZI.pdf">burden on its economy</a>. This makes imports and exports expensive. Because of time-consuming and poor-quality rail and road transport, the country’s transport costs are <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/pdfpreview/bitstream/handle/10855/23017/b11560861.pdf?sequence=1">among the highest in Africa</a>. </p>
<p>The search for a solution has dominated Malawi’s foreign policy since independence in 1964. Malawi relies on four main trade corridors: the ports of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania; Beira and Nacala in Mozambique and Durban in South Africa. </p>
<p>An alternative route is a waterway to the Indian Ocean through Mozambique. It was first proposed in 1891. The now <a href="http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/livros/des2015/IESE-Desafios2015_16_ConSob.pdf">controversial idea</a> was revived in 2005 by Malawi’s third president, Bingu wa Mutharika (2004-2012) as a signature foreign policy project. It was known as the Shire-Zambezi Waterway. </p>
<p>Believing it would be an important legacy of his presidency, he <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/malawi-zambia-seek-trade-waterway-mozambique">consistently</a> claimed that using the route from Nsanje in Malawi to Chinde in Mozambique would drastically reduce Malawi’s transport costs and boost economic growth.</p>
<p>Malawi’s <a href="http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=110">main exports</a> are tobacco, tea, sugar. It imports oils, consumer goods and fertilisers.</p>
<p>But Malawi has so far failed to get access to the Indian Ocean. Our <a href="https://www.sum.uio.no/english/research/publications/2019/happy-kayuni-dan-banik-joseph-chunga-the-perils-of-megaphone-diplomacy-malawian-mozambican-relations-following-the-shire-zambezi-waterway-project.html">research</a> suggests this is because of two important factors: Malawi’s diplomatic strategy and the absence of Mozambique’s buy-in. </p>
<p>We found that for the project to happen, Malawi must change its diplomatic approach and the two countries must ensure that their national interests in the project are closely aligned.</p>
<p>Yet there may be renewed hope for the project. This is because there are recent signs that the two countries do in fact have interests in common and can collaborate on a project. </p>
<h2>The Shire-Zambezi waterway</h2>
<p>Malawi’s diplomatic relations with Mozambique have not been harmonious since independence. Historically, Malawi was aligned to apartheid South Africa, which provided support to the Renamo rebel movement during Mozambique’s 16-year <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/mozambique-civil-war/">civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Mozambique’s leaders therefore showed little interest in Mutharika’s vision of a waterway running through its territory. The other factor was Mozambique would likely lose out on the toll or freight charges for foreign vehicles that use its transport network. Instead, in 2009 they announced plans to <a href="http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/publication/Dibben,Pauline_tranport.pdf">rehabilitate the port of Beira</a>, rather than Chinde’s, and improve the country’s road network.</p>
<p>Still, Mutharika pursued the waterway project. First, beginning in 2005, he sought <a href="http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0610/S01566/cablegate-the-shire-zambezi-waterway-gods-highway-or-bingus.htm">support from other African leaders</a> at meetings of the African Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD). </p>
<p>Second, he bolstered the credibility of the project by formally and informally <a href="https://www.timalawi.nl/LaatsteNieuws/NsanjeInlandPort.htm">including</a> Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a former Secretary General of the Preferential Trade Area of East and Central Africa (PTA), he believed that a regional integration component would win his project favour. </p>
<p>Third, Mutharika insisted that the project be <a href="http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0610/S01566/cablegate-the-shire-zambezi-waterway-gods-highway-or-bingus.htm">completed quickly</a>, even in the absence of Mozambican approval. He may have reasoned that if he demonstrated his commitment, Mozambique would be forced to comply for the sake of neighbourly relations.</p>
<h2>Megaphone diplomacy</h2>
<p>Mutharika’s strategy demonstrated the shortcomings of <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/16-Dlamini.pdf">“megaphone diplomacy”</a> in international relations. Megaphone diplomacy is generally understood as the use of mass media to advance contentious diplomatic aims. This is the opposite of “quiet diplomacy” through traditional diplomatic channels. </p>
<p>Without consulting the Mozambican government and after almost a year in power, Mutharika organised a highly publicised groundbreaking ceremony in Nsanje port in southern Malawi in October 2005. Subsequently, his administration engaged a private Portuguese company to begin phase one of the construction of the port. </p>
<p>This phase was quickly completed and Mutharika’s government went ahead to publicise the official opening of the waterway. Billboards went up across the country emblazoned with the words </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The dream becomes reality: Nsanje Port opens October 2010”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The presidents of Zambia and Zimbabwe were invited to the public ceremony to celebrate the planned arrival of a barge carrying 60 tonnes of imported fertiliser. Mozambican authorities, however, <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/daily-news-south-africa/20101026/282531539771813">impounded the barge and detained </a> four Malawians for navigating the river without authorisation. </p>
<p>Mozambique objected to the project on grounds that no economic feasibility study or environmental impact assessment had been carried out. It also claimed that Malawi had not even requested official clearance of the barge. </p>
<p>The final blow for Malawi’s diplomatic debacle was the publication of the feasibility report commissioned by the SADC. The 2013 report <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/PRINT-VERSION/SHIRE-ZAMBEZI-2016-02-19">concluded</a> that the project is </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“technically feasible but not financially viable.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Although the waterway is Malawi’s shortest route to the sea, the report <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/shire-zambezi-waterway-not-viable-insists-transport-ministry-of-mozambique/">concluded</a> that only 273,200 tonnes per year could be transported through the waterway. Annual dredging and removal of aquatic plants would cost 80 million US dollars per year, the report further said. </p>
<h2>Mozambican response</h2>
<p>The report provided a legitimate reason for Mozambique’s withdrawal from the project, but failed diplomacy undoubtedly led to the collapse of the waterway project. Mozambique was operating from a position of power as it controls access to the sea. And it was unlikely to benefit much from the Shire-Zambezi Waterway. If Malawi changes its diplomatic approach, the project may ultimately see the light of day. </p>
<p>Indeed, Malawi’s tactics appeared to reinforce Mozambique’s opposition to the project, which it felt undermined its national interests. </p>
<p>In recent months, Malawi’s current president Peter Mutharika (Bingu Mutharika’s brother) has been drumming up support for the project again. Mozambique continues to ignore such signals. </p>
<p>But the two countries recently <a href="https://southerntimesafrica.com/site/news/world-bank-funding-malawi-mozambique-interconnection">signed an agreement</a> that will allow the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi to purchase 200 megawatts of power from Mozambique starting in 2022. This is a clear case of a successful partnership with both countries sharing a common national interest on power generation and supply. </p>
<p>Despite the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/flagship-projects">talk of globalisation, regional integration and partnerships</a>, national interest continues to rule in international diplomacy. For the Shire-Zambezi project to go ahead, Malawi and Mozambique must have a frank discussion about how they could both benefit from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Happy Kayuni receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Banik receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Chunga receives funding from the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). </span></em></p>
Malawi must change its diplomatic approach and align its national interests with Mozambique’s
Happy Kayuni, Professor, University of Malawi
Dan Banik, Professor of political science, Director of the Oslo SDG Initiative, Host of "In Pursuit of Development" podcast, University of Oslo
Joseph Chunga, Lecturer & Research fellow, University of Cape Town
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/122139
2019-08-21T09:42:34Z
2019-08-21T09:42:34Z
Repression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren’t working
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288885/original/file-20190821-170927-slrpli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's crisis is deepening on all fronts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">globalnewsart.com/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 general elections and <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1800/Zimbabwe-the-2018-elections-and-their-aftermath/">the violence that marked its aftermath</a>, the Mnangagwa regime once again resorted to coercion in the face of the protests in January 2019. The protests were in response to the deepening <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-06-zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-by-26-percent/">economic crisis in the country</a>, and part of the opposition strategy to contest the legitimacy of the government. </p>
<p>The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/police-soldiers-deploy-in-zimbabwe's-bulawayo-as-opposition-challenges-protest-ban/">rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.</p>
<p>At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.</p>
<p>In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme. </p>
<p>The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/31/Zimbabwe-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46952">hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies</a>. </p>
<p>The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.</p>
<p>But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.</p>
<h2>Dialogues</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF. </p></li>
<li><p>The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies. </p></li>
<li><p>The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/06/04/gukurahundi-zimbabwe-mnangagwa/">Gukurahundi massacres</a>. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence. </p></li>
<li><p>The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/building-from-the-rubble">first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The functions of this body set out in an <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/documents/national-gazette-42554-of-28-june-2019-vol-648_20190628-GGN-42554">Act of Parliament</a>, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/tnf-launched-20-years-later-amid-visible-tensions">insists that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The strategy</h2>
<p>In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.</p>
<p>The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.</p>
<p>When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.</p>
<p>The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime. </p>
<p>As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/sikhala-mnangagwa-faces-overthrow-through-citizen-mass-protests/">threatened protests since 2018</a>.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.</p>
<p>The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/trump-administration-condemns-latest-govt-abductions-and-torture-of-opposition-in-zimbabwe/">strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government</a>, there has been a closing of ranks <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">around a fellow liberation movement</a> in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">recent appointment</a> as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.</p>
<p>There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is affiliated with a Zimbabwean NGO Ukuthula Trust. </span></em></p>
The Mnangagwa regime’s coercive acts are a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era, while he seeks global re-engagement and selective national dialogue.
Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/118135
2019-06-05T12:39:01Z
2019-06-05T12:39:01Z
More work lies ahead to make Africa’s new free trade area succeed
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277925/original/file-20190604-69059-1afywat.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The port of Mombasa in Kenya, which was the first country, with Ghana, to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a time when the global trade regime is under attack, the African Union (AU) is celebrating the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190429/afcfta-agreement-secures-minimum-threshold-22-ratification-sierra-leone-and">on 30 May</a>. </p>
<p>After being ratified by the required minimum 22 nations, all the member states of the AU are now legally bound to allow African goods to be traded without restraint throughout the continent. </p>
<p>This is an impressive achievement. AfCFTA not only covers the entire continent, but has proceeded at a record pace. It was <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/34055-ext_assembly_dec_1x_e26_march.pdf">signed on 21 March 2018</a>. Its entry into force underlines African leaders’ commitment to pan-African economic integration – a <a href="https://archive.org/details/africamustunite00nkru/">goal as old as African independence</a> in the 1960s. </p>
<p>Intra-regional trade has long been minimal in Africa, standing at <a href="https://www.tralac.org/news/article/13489-african-trade-statistics-yearbook-2017.html">13% for intra-imports and 17% for intra-exports</a> over the last seven years. Earlier continental trade initiatives, such as the <a href="http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/14129">1980 Lagos Plan of Action</a> and the <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm">1991 African Economic Community</a>, have lagged far behind their ambitions. </p>
<p>However, the practical implications of the continental free trade area are <a href="https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/will-free-trade-be-africas-economic-game-changer">not immediate</a>. Significant work is required to deliver tangible results. Negotiations on tariffs, time lines and the seat of the AfCFTA Secretariat are still ongoing. And without effective public policies, liberalising trade risks having negative implications for many people on the continent.</p>
<h2>African trade to date</h2>
<p>Establishing regional economic communities across the continent has produced a complex pattern of overlapping but inconsequential <a href="https://ecdpm.org/publications/political-economy-africas-regional-spaghetti-bowl-synthesis-report/?utm_source=ECDPM+Newsletters+List&utm_campaign=bb4d47f899-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_27_01_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f93a3dae14-bb4d47f899-388797801">trade regimes</a>. The only functioning <a href="https://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/customs-union/">customs union</a> on the continent remains the 109 year-old <a href="https://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394">Southern African Customs Union</a>, an imperial relic that is dominated by South Africa.</p>
<p>The last large-scale attempt to liberalise trade in Africa - the <a href="https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html">Tripartite agreement</a> covering most of eastern and southern Africa - was launched in 2015. Only four out of 27 countries ratified it, and the agreement was yet another hyped but ultimately stillborn initiative.</p>
<p>After a disappointing track record of African trade agreements, the AU is convinced that AfCFTA is finally the silver bullet. Indeed, there are some encouraging signs that the stars are aligning favourably.</p>
<p>At a time when the World Trade Organisation has proclaimed the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46395379">worst crisis in global trade since 1947</a>, and in a context of China and the US waging <a href="https://www.ft.com/us-china-trade-dispute">trade disputes</a>, African governments are collectively swimming against the stream.</p>
<p>The AU leadership has been eager to push a <a href="https://au.int/agenda2063/overview">long-term integration agenda</a> and an <a href="http://ipss-addis.org/research/policy_periodicals/the_au_reform_agenda-_what_areas_of_reform_are_mos.php">institutional reform agenda</a>. But it has struggled with what Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in his role as AU chairperson in 2018, <a href="http://www.rci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/78/News/FInal%20AU%20Reform%20Combined%20report_28012017.pdf">called</a> a “crisis of implementation”.</p>
<p>The reform process aims to focus the AU on fewer priorities and to make the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">AU Commission</a> more efficient in steering integration. It also seeks to make the AU central budget financially independent from international partners. This plan has struck a chord with many member states and the AU Commission. Creating a continental free trade area fits well into the strategy.</p>
<h2>Why AfCFTA is different</h2>
<p>Adherence to AfCFTA has become a competition for the title of “who is the best pan-Africanist”. This peer pressure to jump on the train <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Nigeria-now-close-to-signing-African-trade-pact/2560-5133532-a9cs0m/index.html">before it leaves the station</a> is behind the agreement’s rapid ratification.</p>
<p>The free trade area aspires to a membership of 55 highly diverse countries. This seems arbitrary from an economic point of view. However, it corresponds to and will likely benefit from an increasingly recognised and institutionalised “continentalist” interpretation of Africa. </p>
<p>AfCFTA is also vague enough to appeal to advocates of both trade liberalisation and economic protectionism. At this stage it is still possible for it to become either a stepping stone towards global integration, or a barrier against businesses from outside the continent.</p>
<h2>Obstacles to overcome</h2>
<p>In practice, trade in Africa did not change overnight on 30 May. Three key obstacles must still be overcome. If they’re not, the deal may follow the same path as the ill-fated agreements that have gone before it.</p>
<p>Firstly, AfCFTA has put the cart before the horse. Although it is now in force, many of the actual rules <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Keys_to_success_for_AfCFTA.pdf">still need to be agreed upon</a>. The process of negotiating rules of origin, tariff schedules, and service sector concessions will be long and cumbersome.</p>
<p>African states often lack the expertise or capacity to conduct such negotiations. International partners like the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/africa-europe-alliance-eu-supports-african-continental-free-trade-area-eu50-million_en">European Union</a> and <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/AfCFTA%20Factsheet%20%20EN%2002112019.pdf">Germany</a> have flocked to the AU Commission in large numbers to support AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Their support will likely be fragmented through the deployment of consultants and technical assistance. This does not bode well for the ownership of AfCFTA by AU member states and the AU Commission.</p>
<p>Secondly, AfCFTA is facing challenges regarding its governance. The details of its secretariat are yet to be thrashed out. What we do know is that the secretariat will be a <a href="https://www.tralac.org/documents/events/tralac/2800-tralac-annual-conference-presentation-the-afcfta-secretariat-beatrice-chaytor-auc-march-2019/file.html">semi-autonomous organ of the AU</a>, and that six countries are <a href="https://www.viportal.co/kenya-leads-quest-to-host-acfta-secretariat/">competing to host it</a>.</p>
<p>The likely geographical distance from AU headquarters in Ethiopia will complicate coordination with the continental body’s policy agenda. Budget cuts to the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry further hamper the transitory facilitation of AfCFTA.</p>
<p>Finally, the free trade area will invariably pose economic challenges in AU member states. The promise of free trade agreements is to create wealth through increased competition, the equalisation of wages and the substitution of domestic labour with imported goods. </p>
<p>International experience shows that the gains tend to be <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/firms-trade/integrated-and-unequal-effects-trade-inequality-developing-countries">unequally distributed</a>, especially if a free trade area involves a large amount of diverse economies. Entire economic sectors and communities can be heavily affected by the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448862/REA_FreeTradeAgreements.pdf">downsides</a>: wage cuts, unemployment and environmental degradation.</p>
<p>Questions abound. How will governments manage AfCFTA’s winners and losers when existing social protections are weak, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-voice-of-africas-informal-economy-should-be-heard-52766">informal markets dominate</a> many sectors? Will governments still respect the agreement even if it hurts some of their businesses and state companies? And how will they deal with the loss of customs revenue? Nigeria’s <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2019/05/27/settle-problem-home-dont-bring-african-union-obasanjo-tells-nigeria/">internal disputes</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/30/muhammadu-buhari-has-big-ambitions-for-nigerian-manufacturing">protectionism</a> are a case in point</p>
<p>The road ahead to an effective free trade agreement that delivers results to Africans is still long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118135/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Africa’s new continental free trade area, the AfCFTA, is a remarkable achievement. However, decisive diplomatic, technical and social action is needed for it to succeed.
Frank Mattheis, Senior research fellow, University of Pretoria
Ueli Staeger, PhD researcher, International Relations/Political Science, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/88705
2017-12-07T12:36:32Z
2017-12-07T12:36:32Z
Why the focus on China’s role in Mugabe’s fall missed the bigger picture
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197972/original/file-20171206-915-1jj24bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews the guard of honour on a state visit to Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fall of Robert Mugabe has dominated global coverage of Africa over the past few weeks. In Western coverage of the first week after the coup in Zimbabwe there was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/zimbabwe-coup-china-benefits-from-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-post-mugabe.html">speculation</a> about what China knew beforehand and whether Beijing played an active role in pushing for it.</p>
<p>China’s mention drowned out other notable external stakeholders such as the UK, the US, South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU). And it almost threatened to overshadow the domestic dynamics that led to the changeover. </p>
<p>There are reasons to draw a direct parallel between China and the recent events in Zimbabwe. The most obvious is the fact that army chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/16/zimbabwe-army-chief-trip-china-last-week-questions-coup">visited Beijing</a> shortly before the tanks rolled into Harare. The timing of the visit was certainly eye-catching. It led to speculation that Beijing was informed beforehand of the coming coup. </p>
<p>There were also rumours that other external stakeholders, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-17-00-just-what-did-sa-know-about-zimbabwes-coup">notably South Africa</a>, had been informed. </p>
<p>But some coverage underplayed the distinction between knowing the coup was afoot and actively pushing for it. In some reporting, China was all but accused of <a href="http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11945674">fomenting regime change</a>. The reason put forward was that relations between the two countries had soured in recent years because of Beijing’s concerns about loan repayments. There was also the issue of Chinese investments in the face of a ramped up indigenisation campaign by Harare. </p>
<p>A decline in the “special friendship” between Mugabe and China is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/04/26/chinas-pains-over-zimbabwes-indigenization-plan/">well documented</a>. It’s a relationship that goes back to the Mao era and also involves Emmerson Mnangagwa, now president, who received military training in China. But simply jumping from these facts to the implication that China actively pushed for, or orchestrated Mugabe’s fall, skips over a few important facts. </p>
<h2>Three reasons to dismiss the conspiracy theorists</h2>
<p>In the first place, China has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-27-china-hails-new-zimbabwe-leader-denies-role-in-transition">strenuously denied</a> any involvement in the change of government. This is worth noting, though it’s unlikely to convince those looking for a conspiracy. </p>
<p>More fundamentally, there is little evidence of China in the post-Mao era pushing for regime change in Africa. This includes countries where it has larger economic interests than in Zimbabwe, and where those are in considerably more danger than in Zimbabwe. South Sudan is one example. </p>
<p>For all Mugabe’s many crimes, Zimbabwe during his reign was relatively stable and predictable. No matter how frosty the relationship between Harare and Beijing had become, Zimbabwe seems like an unlikely candidate for such a big departure in tactics. This is especially true after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, an event that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bbfb1cb8-ceb1-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc">pushed China even further away</a> from support for interventionism. </p>
<p>Second, <a href="http://www.mangalmedia.net/english//decentering-colonial-narratives-about-zimbabwe">as the young, Hong Kong-based Zimbabwean academic Innocent Mutanga has argued</a>, the Western fixation on a possible Chinese regime change plot has the effect of discounting African agency. This is doubly problematic because it also discounts the ability of African governing bodies like SADC to enforce the rules in their own back yard.</p>
<p>In fact, the careful choreography that accompanied the ousting of Mugabe was clearly aimed at appeasing the AU. The aim was to avoid any invocation of the AU’s mandatory suspension of unconstitutional changes in government. This was a concern every bit as important for Mnangagwa’s faction as assuaging external powers’ interests. </p>
<p>The regime change argument misses a wider point: that Chiwenga’s visit can be read as a sign of China’s new prominence on the global stage. The fact that China was probably informed about the coup beforehand actually makes clear of its shifting geopolitical position. Being given prior warning shows that China is getting recognition alongside the US and UK as a fully fledged great power. </p>
<p>This perspective should lead us to focus in detail on Chinese investments in Zimbabwe – not because they might point towards direct Chinese involvement in Mugabe’s fall, but because they raise questions about how various Chinese actors interact with illiberal governments across the global south. </p>
<p>Since 2006 the relationship between China and Zimbabwe has been rooted in collusion <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/diamonds-and-the-crocodile-chinas-role-in-the-zimbabwe-coup/">between military and party elites</a> on both sides. This led prominent Chinese companies into lucrative mining contracts in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-10/diamonds-fund-zimbabwe-political-oppression-global-witness-says">collaboration</a> with companies owned by the Zimbabwean military. One such Chinese company is the arms manufacturer <a href="http://source.co.zw/2017/02/mugabe-lifts-lid-arms-minerals-deal-china/">Norinco</a>. President Mnangagwa, and possible vice-president Chiwenga have been enriched via such <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/diamonds-and-the-crocodile-chinas-role-in-the-zimbabwe-coup/">joint deals</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, large loan packages and prospective infrastructure investments have followed, broadening ties across sectors and society.</p>
<h2>Wider lens needed</h2>
<p>A narrow focus on whether China actively pushed for Mugabe’s fall tends to assume that the China-Africa relationship is a unique and isolated phenomenon. We would argue that the Zimbabwe situation calls for a broader look at how various Chinese role players act globally. </p>
<p>Under President Xi Jinping, China has begun to push more explicitly for great power status, and for a leadership position in world politics. Events in Zimbabwe strongly suggest that it’s time that the world – and particularly Africa – started to reflect on this new role and focused on what kind of global power China will be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cobus van Staden is affiliated with the South African Institute of International Affairs. He is also a co-founder and co-chair of the China-Africa Project, a US-listed non-profit focused on widening the conversation about China-Africa relations. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Alden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A narrow interest in whether Beijing actively pushed for Mugabe’s fall is based on the assumption that the China-Africa relationship is an isolated phenomenon.
Cobus van Staden, Senior Researcher: China Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs
Chris Alden, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/87646
2017-11-16T16:25:34Z
2017-11-16T16:25:34Z
Mnangagwa and the military may mean more bad news for Zimbabwe
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195045/original/file-20171116-15428-u8p65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The military has taken control of the national broadcaster, troops are in the streets and the president is being held in a secure environment. All military leave is cancelled and a senior general has addressed the nation. Yet the Zimbabwean military continues with the pretence that this is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-15-zimbabwe-army-in-control-of-state-institutions-but-insists-not-a-coup/#.Wg2PqE27LL8">not a coup d’etat</a>. </p>
<p>The obvious response to this is: if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then the chances are it’s a duck. And the sole reason the Zimbabwean military is not acknowledging this as a coup d’etat is to avoid triggering the country’s automatic suspension from the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> and the Southern African Development Community <a href="http://www.sadc.int/">(SADC)</a>. Both bodies frown on coups.</p>
<p>A perfect storm formed ahead of these events and made military action predictable. The country had once again entered a steep economic decline (not that its “recovery” had been anything of note). A clear and reckless bid for power was being made by the so-called <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation 40 (G40) faction</a> around Grace Mugabe in direct opposition to the Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the standard bearer for the so-called <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a>. </p>
<p>This culminated in <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12164/Mugabe_drops_the_crocodile">Mnangagwa’s dismissal</a> by President Mugabe: a clear indication that Grace Mugabe was now calling the shots. It also served as a follow up to the 2015 Grace-engineered dismissal of another Vice President and rival, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30400178">Joice Mujuru</a>. </p>
<p>The coup means that Mugabe’s long and disastrous presidency is finally over. The only questions that remain are the precise details and mechanics of the deal which secures his departure.</p>
<h2>Why the coup</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa is a long time Zanu-PF stalwart and is clearly closely integrated with the military high command and the intelligence services. Both institutions are concerned that the succession is being arranged for a faction led by people with no liberation credentials but who have been skilled in manipulating Mugabe himself and in making him do their bidding. The G40 now appear to have overreached, perhaps believing that their proximity to the “old man” made them invincible.</p>
<p>This coup’s explicit purpose is twofold. First, it’s trying to definitively kill off Grace Mugabe’s ambitions to become president and to set in place a ruling dynasty akin to the Kims in North Korea. Second, it’s a bid to clear Mnangagwa’s path to power, first in Zanu-PF and then within the state itself (over the last three decades these have been virtually one and the same thing). </p>
<p>What we do not yet know is what counter force, if any, the G40 can bring to bear against the military. The calculation of the military hierarchy appears to be that Grace and company are paper tigers who will have few cards to play against such force majeure and who lack the popular appeal to bring angry and disillusioned masses out onto the streets.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195047/original/file-20171116-15428-9jvnwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Could this be the end of President Robert Mugabe’s 37 year reign?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The coup has formally stripped away the façade that Zimbabwe is a constitutional state. This is clearly a militarised party-state where the military is a pivotal actor in the ruling party’s internal politics. It is not simply a neutral state agency subordinate to the civilian leadership. And the idea that this military intervention is an aberration – a departure from the constitutional norm – is misplaced. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is a de facto military dictatorship. It serves as a guarantor of Zanu-PF rule rather than as a custodian of the constitution. It has helped Zanu-PF rig elections. And it was central to the state terror which was unleashed against the population to reverse Mugabe and Zanu-PF’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2170138/Zimbabwe-Death-toll-rises-in-Robert-Mugabes-reign-of-terror-before-election.html">electoral defeat in 2008</a>. The military has always been a key political actor. The only difference this time is that its intervention is designed to control events within Zanu-PF rather than to crush opposition to it.</p>
<p>But, a highly politicised military is a major impediment to the re-establishment of a democratic order in Zimbabwe. It has nothing to gain, politically or financially, from democratic rule given the lucrative networks of embezzlement and plunder it’s put in place over decades. Most recently it seized and siphoned off of the country’s diamond wealth for military officers and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/12/zimbabwe-diamonds-mugabe-marange-fields">party hierarchy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195048/original/file-20171116-15400-1d2c5r8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This intervention is designed to secure the presidency for Mnangagwa. So it is hard to avert our eyes from the elephant –- or in this case the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Crocodile</a> –- in the room. Mnangagwa is the Mugabe henchman who helped enable the misrule and tyranny of the last 37 years. He was one of the principal architects of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> -– the genocidal attack on the Ndebele – in the early to mid-1980s which left at least 20 000 people dead.</p>
<p>He has also been instrumental in rigging elections and crushing all opposition to Zanu-PF rule, including the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-15-after-mugabe-what-next?utm_source=Mail+%26+Guardian&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily+newsletter&utm_term=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2017-11-15-after-mugabe-what-next">atrocities of 2008</a>. </p>
<p>Expecting such a person to now make a deathbed conversion to the democracy, constitutional government and good governance he has spent an entire career liquidating is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/15/mugabe-gone-zimbabweans-decide-future-mnangagwa">dangerous nonsense</a>.</p>
<h2>Dilemmas to come</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa will soon have to confront a series of dilemmas. How can he put in place an administration which has the appearance of a national unity government, can secure international approval and the financial assistance required to help rebuild a shattered economy – but avoid ceding any meaningful power or control? Can this circle be squared? </p>
<p>The best hope for Zimbabweans is that the international community uses its leverage wisely and sets stringent conditions for such assistance: free elections closely monitored by an array of international organisations, the establishment of a new electoral commission, free access to the state media and the right of parties to campaign freely. </p>
<p>There should also be a role here for South Africa to restore its badly tarnished image as a champion of democracy in Africa. It has followed a malign path over the last two decades, facilitating Zanu-PF authoritarianism in the name of a threadbare and increasingly degenerate “liberation solidarity”.</p>
<p>Such a combination of pressures will severely restrict Mnangagwa’s room for manoeuvre. Anything short of that will deliver an outcome which is essentially Mugabeism without Mugabe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The coup in Zimbabwe means Mugabe’s long and disastrous presidency is finally over. The questions that remain are the precise details and mechanics of the deal which secures his departure.
James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/79948
2017-07-03T14:53:47Z
2017-07-03T14:53:47Z
Why Malawi and Tanzania should stick to mediation to settle lake boundary dispute
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176051/original/file-20170628-7299-69ewqf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A fisherman prepares his boat on Lake Malawi about 100 kilometres east of the capital Lilongwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tensions about rights to the lake that lies between Tanzania and Malawi have been brought to boiling point yet again. Known to Tanzanians as Lake Nyasa but as Lake Malawi to those across the border, the lake is at the centre of a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201209150192.html">boundary dispute</a> that has simmered for decades. In the latest exchanges, the foreign minister of Malawi has threatened to <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-africa-byo-110592.html">escalate</a> the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. </p>
<p>The Malawi–Tanzania dispute is a quintessential African boundary dispute with its origins mired in colonial history.</p>
<p>Malawi’s position is that the boundary simply follows the shoreline of the lake as established in clear terms by the 1890 <a href="http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=782">Anglo-German Treaty</a>. Malawi says its position is also backed by the 1964 <a href="https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf">Cairo Resolution</a> to freeze African territories along the borders inherited at independence from colonial powers to cement African unity. The international court itself upheld this view in the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oZKzCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA89&lpg=PA89&dq=1964+OAU+%5BCairo+Resolution%5D+significance+for+boundaries&source=bl&ots=hxyUqnkY0v&sig=9UddfsbKj44qURv6eixQYsVOl5M&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjs9Lbl8uLUAhWqI8AKHQ9aBmIQ6AEIRjAF#v=onepage&q=1964%20OAU%20%5BCairo%20Resolution%5D%20significance%20for%20boundaries&f=false">Frontier Dispute case</a> between Burkina Faso and Mali. </p>
<p>Tanzania disagrees and relies on the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EG4IPBW-23EC&pg=PA145&dq=median+line+as+boundary+in+international+waters&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj72LLoiuPUAhXCBcAKHbYFCXgQ6AEIWTAJ#v=onepage&q=lake&f=false">tradition</a> within international law that a median position on the lake is the boundary giving both states large parts of the lake. Examples of these include Lake Geneva’s median line between France and Switzerland, the Great Lakes shared between Canada and the US and Lake Chad on the borders of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria.</p>
<p>The Malawi-Tanzania case therefore presents two apparently irreconcilable positions on the delimitation of Africa’s third largest lake. Unique to this dispute is the way it turns on the question of treaty law versus customary international <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PQxpC4hd2CEC&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=shoreline+boundary+and+international+law&source=bl&ots=cZhXLlkCX_&sig=UUr4bKN9HNylYxlP03Kx2Yo6jtA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi56Kzdz-HUAhVQa1AKHSUTCjAQ6AEIUTAI#v=onepage&q=shoreline%20boundary%20and%20international%20law&f=false">law governing</a> the delimitation of fluvial bodies. </p>
<p>The dispute is no small matter for Malawi as the lake’s geographical space represents about a third of its entire territory. Malawi argues that its economic life, culture, folklore, and sentiment as a nation are inextricably linked to the lake. </p>
<p>Tanzania derives considerable value from the lake too. It supports a large number of artisanal fishermen and there are shoreline communities that have ancestral burial places that now lie under the lake. </p>
<p>The dream outcome would be an amicable solution allowing joint use of the lake for irrigation, transportation and extraction of mineral resources. Collaboration would mitigate costs and risks and increase the well-being of the people living on the shores of the lake.</p>
<p>But the positions could hardly be more starkly different. Longstanding negotiations have failed. The real question is can there be a mutually agreed way forward in such cases outside of the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1ySxkfcma-EC&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=use+of+war+in+resolving+territorial+disputes&source=bl&ots=-GQLdEpPf8&sig=vB_i0AbGGLkRssyBbCPa741PJjw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiKqq_A9uHUAhVkBsAKHfJLB6o4ChDoAQgqMAE#v=onepage&q=use%20of%20war%20in%20resolving%20territorial%20disputes&f=false">drumbeats of war</a> or the bitterness of a court case?</p>
<h2>A clash of equities</h2>
<p>Malawi crucially points to a series of public statements by senior Tanzanian political leaders between 1959 and <a href="http://www.worldlakes.org/shownews.asp?newsid=1345">1962</a> to support its case. This includes a statement by the country’s founding president Julius Nyerere in 1960, in which he <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/d/Books/International-Law-Boundary-Disputes-Africa-Routledge-Research/0415838924">emphasized</a> that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is now no doubt at all about the boundary. We know that not a drop of water of the Lake Nyasa belongs to Tanganyika…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Malawi insists that the delimitation of a shoreline boundary was not a mistake. It asserts that this favourable position in relation to the lake was accorded to the country in recognition of Tanzania’s considerable geographical advantages. Malawi presents itself as a small landlocked and densely populated country.</p>
<p>The preferred argument in Dar es Salaam is that the lake is a natural gift which logically cannot be claimed by one party. It argues that the 1890 treaty is inconclusive because of a provision in it that says parties should hold meetings and correct the treaty in the future. </p>
<p>The truth is that most African states and boundaries were carelessly carved out as compromises between European colonial powers rather than reflections of the realities of African ethnography or politics. This is so despite <a href="https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article-abstract/16/1/77/3848884/Legal-and-Evidential-Implications-of-Emerging?redirectedFrom=fulltext">overwhelming evidence</a> of precise boundary features and markers separating precolonial African cities, states and political groups. </p>
<p>The effects of colonialism linger and produce consequences which include this particular border dispute.</p>
<h2>Why mediation is the best option</h2>
<p>Malawi and Tanzania have a common interest in the form of a massive reservoir of the most valuable natural resource – freshwater. There is talk of hydrocarbon deposits but at the very least it is filled with fish. The peaceful resolution of the dispute is therefore, imperative. </p>
<p>The two countries decided to seek the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after previous bilateral efforts to find a solution failed. This paved the way for mediation by a team of former heads of state and government led by Mozambique’s Joaquim Chissano in 2012. Since its inception the mediators have interacted with both parties with the aim of deepening their knowledge and understanding the dispute. Progress has been modest. </p>
<p>To disentangle the legal arguments, the mediation panel relies on a multi-disciplinary team of experts. They include Abdul Koroma, a former judge at the International Court of Justice. </p>
<p>Among the issues they face is the relevance of the 1890 treaty and illustrative maps which are now contested by both countries in true legal tradition. Experts have <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PQxpC4hd2CEC&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=shoreline+boundary+and+international+law&source=bl&ots=cZhXLlkCX_&sig=UUr4bKN9HNylYxlP03Kx2Yo6jtA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi56Kzdz-HUAhVQa1AKHSUTCjAQ6AEIUTAI#v=onepage&q=shoreline%20boundary%20and%20international%20law&f=false">pointed out</a> that maps are not titles to territory. At best they only represent what is contained in the title. </p>
<p>So could the title only come from what is found in the Treaty of 1890 as argued by Malawi? </p>
<p>There are hidden dangers in pursuing strict legal rights. While many experts <a href="http://www.academia.edu/7554074/Lake_Malawi_Nyasa_International_Delimitation_Analysis_of_Claims_-_Malawi_vs_Tanzania">argue</a> that Malawi’s opinion aligns with recent International Court of Justice judgments, there’s always the possibility it could lose all its claims if a court rules against it. </p>
<p>At this stage mediation is therefore the more attractive option. </p>
<p>But the mediation panel has betrayed some of its limitation. The body is not a court. It will therefore be less legalistic and formalistic. The parties have resorted to mediation to draw on the experience, expertise and wisdom of its members. Whatever the limitations of mediation – even a painfully slow one – Malawi stands to gain more from a consensual resolution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79948/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gbenga Oduntan was engaged as one of the five member Legal and Other Experts (LOE) team to assist the High Level Mediation Team (HLMT) led by H. E. Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique and comprised also H.E Festus Mogae, former President of Botswana and H.E. Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa.</span></em></p>
Whatever the limitations of mediation – even a painfully slow one – Malawi stands to gain more from a consensual resolution in the boundary dispute with Tanzania.
Gbenga Oduntan, Reader (Associate Professor) in International Commercial Law, University of Kent
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.