tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/spd-43593/articlesSPD – The Conversation2023-10-18T15:54:56Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156472023-10-18T15:54:56Z2023-10-18T15:54:56ZFar-right AfD makes unprecedented election gains in west Germany, worrying national government<p>Germany’s governing three-party coalition under Olaf Scholz has <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-far-right-afd-makes-key-political-gains-as-olaf-scholzs-governing-coalition-wobbles-209544">already had a difficult time this year</a>. But things just got significantly worse with recent state elections in Hesse and Bavaria, two of the country’s most prosperous states. </p>
<p>These elections really do matter. State governments control significant areas of policy and are represented in the upper house of Germany’s parliament (the Bundesrat), which has a <a href="https://www.bundesrat.de/DE/dokumente/statistik/statistik-node.html">veto on nearly 40% of legislation</a>. </p>
<p>They are also a test of the political mood. It’s not uncommon for mid-term elections to go badly for incumbent governments, but these ones were especially noteworthy because of the sheer scale of the losses for Germany’s ruling parties. </p>
<p>The gains made by the far right are also a marker of troubling instability in a country to which many would look for clear leadership, at a time of such substantial challenges in Europe and globally, including conflict and a cost of living crisis.</p>
<p>The defeat for the coalition parties was comprehensive. Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD) achieved the worst results in post-war German history in both states. </p>
<p>In Hesse, a state which historically had been one of its strongest, the SPD took just <a href="https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/weidel-after-election-afd-is-an-all-german-peoples-party/">15.1% of the vote</a>. In Bavaria, it won just 8.4%. Scholz’ Green coalition partners lost ground in both states, and the third party, the liberal FDP, lost support in both. </p>
<p>This unpopularity is also reflected in dire national poll ratings. The most recent national <a href="https://www.infratest-dimap.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DT2310_Report.pdf">Deutschlandtrend</a> survey showed 79% of Germans were dissatisfied with their government.</p>
<p>The AfD took 14.67% of the vote in Bavaria and 18.4% in Hesse. This is significant because support for the AfD has historically been <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/gps/40/2/gps400206.xml">far weaker on average</a> in these and other western states. It is more commonly known as an east German phenomenon so these latest gains are a blow to anyone who hoped the AfD was being contained there. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, elections will be held in the <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/landtage/">eastern states</a> of Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia in September 2024, with polls suggesting impressive vote shares for the AfD. </p>
<p>It is unlikely to win a majority of seats, but “anyone but the AfD” coalitions encompassing all parties from far left to Christian Democrat would be hard to form, hard to keep together and risk <a href="https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/rechtspopulismus/284482/dialog-oder-ausgrenzung-ist-die-afd-eine-rechtsextreme-partei/">reinforcing the view the AfD puts about</a> that mainstream parties will stop at nothing to keep it out of government.</p>
<h2>No longer just a protest vote</h2>
<p>As in previous state elections, the AfD made gains in Bavaria and Hesse by mobilising people who don’t usually vote. It also gained new supporters mostly from the centre right, taking votes from the Christian democratic incumbents CDU in <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/waehlerwanderung-hessen-106.html">Hesse</a> and CSU in <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/waehlerwanderung-bayern-104.html">Bavaria</a>, as well as from the liberal FDP.</p>
<p>Dissatisfaction with other parties does not entirely explain the successes of the AfD, which now draws an increasing number of voters who back the party out of “conviction”. Its supporters perceive the party as competent in the area of asylum and refugee policy in particular. In Hesse, <a href="https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Aktuelles/Wahlanalyse_Hessen/Newsl_Hess_231009.pdf">17%</a> of all voters took this view. </p>
<p>The success of the AfD is also evidence of a further “normalisation” of the German far right. In Bavaria, <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/germansplaining-germanys-lurch-to-the-right/">85%</a> of AfD supporters state they do not mind that the party is considered “extreme” in parts as long as it focuses on issues that matter to them. The post-war West German taboo against voting for the far right is an increasingly distant memory.</p>
<p>With its electoral successes, the AfD leadership does not appear to have felt the need to give the party a more “moderate” image, in contrast to manoeuvres (however tactical or insincere) by far-right parties in Italy and France.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/italys-election-is-a-case-study-in-a-new-phase-for-the-radical-right-92198">Italy's election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In fact, since being founded in 2013, it has steadily moved from its origins as a liberal-conservative “anti-Euro” party to the radical right. Some AfD candidates for next year’s European elections have <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europawahl-2025-afd-spitzenkandidaten-krah-verfassungsschutz-1.6083761">publicly defended</a> the extreme-right “identitarian movement” and some members spread tropes associated with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afd-far-right-conspiracy-theories/a-66396943">conspiracy theories</a> such as the “great replacement”. Certain party representatives are even monitored by the German internal intelligence services.</p>
<h2>Scholz shaken</h2>
<p>The relative strength of eastern state parties in the AfD’s national organisation (notably the Thuringian branch, led by the outlandish Björn Höcke) makes any course of moderation even less likely. This may keep the AfD from national or state government, but the strong showing in Hesse and Bavaria is evidence of a further entrenchment of the far right in German politics.</p>
<p>The immediate consequences of these recent state elections are already in evidence. Scholz and his government are looking to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/scholz-calls-for-cross-party-cooperation-on-german-migration-policy/ar-AA1i3GlZ">tighten</a> immigration policy, currently <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-moma-102.html">considered</a> by 44% of German voters to be the country’s “biggest political problem”, way ahead of environmental and climate issues (18%) and the cost of living (13%). This has the <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/partei-vor-der-zerreissprobe-wie-die-asyldebatte-die-grunen-spaltet-10633984.html">potential to be a political headache</a> for Green party government ministers, going against the instincts of many party members.</p>
<p>And with European elections coming next June, the prospect of another mauling will only heighten the sense of chaos and bickering amongst the national government’s coalition parties. Members of each will demand leaderships differentiate themselves from their coalition allies even more clearly in the hope of fending off the challengers. </p>
<p>This vicious circle could lead the AfD to even stronger results in the European election (they took 11% of the vote last time) – and future elections beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julian Hoerner receives funding from the British Academy (BA) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)</span></em></p>Gains in Bavaria and Hesse mark new territory for a radical-right party that once only really enjoyed support in one region.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityJulian Hoerner, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687902021-09-27T15:23:14Z2021-09-27T15:23:14ZGermany election: Olaf Scholz’s social democrats come out on top but smaller parties hold the key to government<p>Election night in Germany proved inconclusive. There were some clear winners and losers, but not such that we can be sure of the shape of the next German government.</p>
<p>The social democratic SPD <a href="https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse.html">came out on top</a>, crowning a remarkable turnaround in its fortunes. In 2017, it bagged the worst result in its history, in 2019 the European elections were even worse, it was riven with internal division. Now the party looks united and hungry for power, with Olaf Scholz laying claim to the chancellorship (and clearly favoured for the role in opinion polls).</p>
<p>The Greens were also winners, gaining ground, but will also be thinking about what might have been. Prior to COVID, they looked to be in a battle with the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) for first place but now find themselves a distant third. Party figures on election night were honest that results had not met their expectations.</p>
<p>Perhaps the broadest smile of the night was that of liberal (FDP) leader Christian Lindner. His party was up, and appeared to have been forgiven for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-preliminary-coalition-talks-collapse-after-fdp-walks-out/a-41445987">walking out of coalition talks in 2017</a> – a move most Germans considered rather irresponsible at the time. Lindner’s satisfaction came not just out of gains of votes and seats, but rather the return to the FDP’s traditional role of kingmaker. He and his team will play a key role in choosing which of the larger parties would govern Germany.</p>
<p>The biggest loser was the CDU/CSU under Armin Laschet. Perhaps there was slight relief that the party seemed to pick up some support in the final days of the campaign, and the gap with the SPD was lower than polls had predicted. But the result was widely acknowledged to be a disaster, and Laschet’s suggestions on election night that the party had a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-cdus-laschet-vows-try-build-conservative-led-government-2021-09-26/">mandate to lead the government</a> were slapped down by other party figures.</p>
<p>Two other losers were the Left Party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The Left Party came perilously close to losing its Bundestag representation. It failed to meet the 5% threshold for representation, but did get its quota of 4.9% of MPs as it won three seats directly. The party is set for a period of soul-searching and possible division.</p>
<p>The performance of the AfD was more nuanced: the party lost ground nationally, but performed strongly in eastern Germany (winning 19.2% compared to 8.1% in the west), and even coming first in two eastern states. The AfD will not get anywhere near government, but seems to have established itself as <a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-continuing-popularity-of-far-right-afd-has-roots-in-east-west-divide-167844">part of the political landscape</a>.</p>
<h2>Who will form a government?</h2>
<p>By far the two most likely options for a coalition are a “traffic light” arrangement between the SPD, Greens and FDP, and a “Jamaica” coalition of CDU/CSU, Greens and FDP. The Greens have made it clear they lean towards the former. </p>
<p>Messages from the FDP have been mixed. In terms of policy, an alliance with the CDU/CSU is more easily formed, but they know that rehabilitating the CDU/CSU, with or without Laschet, after such a bruising defeat, would be difficult. </p>
<p>An SPD/Green/Left Party coalition would not have a majority, so that is no longer a serious option for Scholz. That leaves Lindner with significantly more leverage than he might have expected as a potential coalition partner. </p>
<p>Unusually, Lindner declared he would seek exploratory talks with the Greens, to understand common ground and, by implication, to form a view on whether a traffic light or Jamaica alliance should be favoured, and under what terms. Lindner’s price will probably be control of the federal finance ministry, and he appeared to offer the Greens the opportunity to lead on climate and the environment. </p>
<p>While the numbers stack up for an SPD-CDU/CSU alliance, there is little appetite in either party for such an arrangement. Becoming junior partner would be hard for the CDU/CSU to stomach, and SPD members are heartily fed up with “grand coalitions”.</p>
<p>In the coming weeks, exploratory talks will be held. In this period, the Greens and FDP will be keen to drive a very hard bargain with, most likely, the SPD.</p>
<p>Once this phase has concluded, formal coalition negotiations begin. The morning after the election, Scholz <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nkFQ683sSM">emphasised his desire</a> to see a new government in place by Christmas.</p>
<p>The manoeuvres will make for an exciting spectacle. It will be challenging to decode whether party statements are sincere, or part of elaborate games of brinksmanship. Finding the truth in Lindner’s cheerful expressions will be the hardest task of all. </p>
<p>Only when coalition talks start will we have a clear sense of the way forward, and even then agreement is not assured. The final paradox of Angela Merkel’s term of office, successful for the CDU and stable for Germany, is that as she leaves the stage the CDU is in disarray and the future government so uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. </span></em></p>After beating the formerly biggest party to top the poll, the social democrats will enter complex coalition talks with potential partners, including the Greens and the liberal FDP.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687442021-09-27T05:05:31Z2021-09-27T05:05:31ZGermans have voted for Angela Merkel’s replacement – here are 7 ways to understand the results so far<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423270/original/file-20210927-124938-17wakg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C0%2C5620%2C3622&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martin Meissner/AP/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Sunday, Germans went to the polls to decide who will succeed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/26/what-is-the-legacy-of-the-angela-merkel-era">retiring Angela Merkel</a> as chancellor. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-madchen-to-mutti-as-angela-merkel-departs-she-leaves-a-great-legacy-of-leadership-168187">From 'Mädchen' to 'Mutti': as Angela Merkel departs, she leaves a great legacy of leadership</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>With a very close result as counting continues, it could be weeks or even months before a government is formed. This is what we know so far: </p>
<h2><strong>1. Progressive parties were the big winners</strong></h2>
<p>Both the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens added more than 5% to their <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2021-09-26-BT-DE/index.shtml">vote</a>. </p>
<p>It looks like the CDU has ended up with their <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/26/germany-election-worst-ever-result-momentarily-silences-cdu">worst performance</a> of the post-war period, scoring just 24.1% of the popular vote. This means that the SPD, currently on 25.8%, will have the right to try and form a government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="SPD candidate for chancellor Olaf Scholz addressing supporters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423273/original/file-20210927-125162-jqeviu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">SPD candidate for chancellor, Olaf Scholz had a good election but now faces tough negotiations to get a result in his favour.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Michael Sohn/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Few would have suggested 12 months ago the SPD under Olaf Scholz would be in a position to build a government. Having endured a long, grinding period as the junior party in a “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/impatient-dissatisfied-divided-germans-at-the-end-of-merkels-grand-coalition/av-59185068">grand coalition</a>” with Merkel’s centre-Right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), pundits (including <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-she-prepares-to-leave-politics-germanys-angela-merkel-has-left-her-mark-at-home-and-abroad-105957">myself</a>) had wondered whether the SPD could survive the serious challenge to their base from the German Greens and a more centrist CDU. </p>
<p>This weekend’s election has shown the party’s resilience in a fragmenting electoral landscape. </p>
<h2>2. The CDU paid dearly for fumbling their post-Merkel succession plan</h2>
<p>Merkel announced her retirement <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46020745">in 2018</a>, so the CDU had plenty of time to think about succession. </p>
<p>In the last few years, the party had experimented with two Merkel-style centrists. The first, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, quit the leadership in 2020 after a state election in Thuringia saw her party court far-right votes. </p>
<p>After another destabilising party ballot, Armin Laschet — the pick of party apparatchiks — was chosen as leader. Many CDU voters would have preferred the Bavarian state premier <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-markus-s%C3%B6der-bavarias-premier/a-53525147">Markus Söder</a>, who pulled out of the leadership race in April. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Armin Laschet and other CDU leaders on Sunday." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423272/original/file-20210927-125935-1wvt5x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The election result has left the CDU reeling.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carsten Koal/EPA/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Laschet’s avuncular style of politics <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-laschet-disaster-the-slow-motion-collapse-of-merkel-s-cdu-a-ba70b3c4-ba87-4ee0-8d11-e5ae0d851df2">failed to gain traction</a> during the campaign, while the deadpan gravitas of the SPD’s Scholz and the urgent politics of the Greens seemed to have struck a chord in sombre times. </p>
<h2>3. Even the winners didn’t get what they wanted.</h2>
<p>Talk of SPD “triumph” and CDU “failure” is all relative. In reality, the two parties are less than 2% apart and between them only hold about 50% of the national vote — scarcely enough for another grand coalition. </p>
<p>In the last televised debate before the election, Scholz made it clear if he had the chance to build a coalition government, he would prefer to do that <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/triell-bundestagswahl-2021-olaf-scholz-und-annalena-baerbock-gegen-arminlaschet-a-252f8898-76f9-4bd7-bc93-96bbe61d422e">with the Greens</a>. </p>
<p>But the SPD won’t be able to form government with the Greens alone. They will need a third party.</p>
<h2>4. Coalition-forming talks will be tricky</h2>
<p>While coalition governments are the norm in Germany, forming a government won’t be straightforward. There are a number of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-a-guide-to-possible-coalitions-for-the-new-government/a-38756817">coalition possibilities</a> with names that often stem from the colours associated with the parties. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-explained-why-is-it-always-so-hard-to-form-a-government-168040">German election explained: why is it always so hard to form a government?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These include another “grand coalition” of the two biggest parties, the SPD and the CDU, “Kenya” (SPD, CDU, and Green) or, perhaps less likely, “Jamaica” (CDU, Green and the free marketeer Free Democratic Party (FDP)). A “traffic light” coalition (SPD, Green, and FDP) is also possible. </p>
<p>Some had tipped that the socialist Left Party (Die Linke) might have been brought into a ruling coalition of left-wing parties for the first time at the federal level, a so-called “Red-Red-Green” coalition. Even with them, however, Scholz still wouldn’t have enough seats to govern.</p>
<p>Coalition talks have already begun behind the scenes. The main parties also began declaring their conditions for joining a ruling coalition during the election coverage on Sunday night. </p>
<h2>5. The minor players remain minor</h2>
<p>In the last coalition discussions of 2017, the free marketeer FDP infamously chose to preserve their doctrinal purity rather than take up a role as a junior partner in government. </p>
<p>It would be unsurprising to see them do the same again, with their leader already seeming to have <a href="https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/mit-der-fdp-wird-es-keinen-linksruck-geben-lindner-zweifelt-an-einer-ampelkoalition-mit-der-spd/27619274.html">ruled out</a> a so-called “traffic light” coalition with the SPD and the Greens because it wouldn’t deliver the tax cuts the FDP want. </p>
<p>Meanwhile the Left Party had a horror night, losing almost half of their votes, and relying on complicated electoral rules to be able to sit in the German parliament with fewer than the normal 5% of votes required. </p>
<h2>6. The far-right vote slipped overall</h2>
<p>But at 10.5% nationally, it is worryingly high in some areas, particularly the eastern states of Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. The far-right Alternative for Germany party are the greatest threat to German democracy, and their voters are not, as some imagine, pensioners who remember the certainties of the old Communist regime fondly. Rather, they are young and middle-aged East Germans who have voted against migration, anti-COVID measures and “the system”. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/german-election-continuing-popularity-of-far-right-afd-has-roots-in-east-west-divide-167844">German election: continuing popularity of far-right AfD has roots in east-west divide</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>All other parties have completely ruled out political cooperation with this pariah party, an encouraging sign after the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-everyone-in-germany-talking-about-thuringia-and-afd/a-52277013">debacle in Thuringia</a> in 2020, which saw the CDU and FDP flirt with making use of Alternative for Germany votes to support them in state government. </p>
<h2>7. Green politics is mainstream</h2>
<p>At one stage, the Greens had entertained hopes of winning the election. Even thought they fell well short of this with 14.6% of the vote, the election was fought on their territory, with all of the parties forced to explain their plan for taking Germany to net zero emissions and a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-annalena-baerbock-calls-for-a-climate-protection-government/a-59232468">green economy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Greens supporters dancing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423275/original/file-20210927-124881-1vvl847.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Greens supporters danced in response to the election result on Sunday.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jens Schlueter/EPA/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Their success on the weekend means Germany seems set to continue its support of these goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Fitzpatrick receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC). </span></em></p>With a very close result as counting continues, it could be weeks or even months before a government is formed. But Sunday’s election has already delivered some significant results.Matt Fitzpatrick, Professor in International History, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1676582021-09-13T10:14:35Z2021-09-13T10:14:35ZGerman election: what to expect in the race to replace Angela Merkel<p>Germany is shortly to hold its first ever federal election in which the sitting chancellor is not running. The departure of Angela Merkel means that, for the first time since 1949, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-to-step-aside-heres-what-it-means-for-germany-and-what-to-expect-next-105875">change is inevitable</a>. </p>
<p>For most of the past four years, the most likely outcome of this vote appeared to be a government led by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), probably in coalition with the Green Party. For a time, the Greens were almost level-pegging with the CDU/CSU, but fell behind during the pandemic when governing parties across Europe <a href="https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12401">gained ground</a>.</p>
<p>Few rated the chances of the social democratic SPD – currently Merkel’s reluctant junior coalition partner. The party had its <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1037985/cdu-and-spd-vote-share-by-election/">worst result ever in 2017</a>, plumbed new depths in the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-spd-reels-from-double-defeat-in-eu-and-regional-vote/">2019 European election</a>, and gave an impression of severe internal division. </p>
<p>Its leader, Andrea Nahles, was forced from office after the European election debacle, and Vice-Chancellor and Federal Finance Minister Olaf Scholz lost a ballot among party members for the leadership to two largely unknown, left-wing contenders. He was selected as the SPD’s candidate for chancellor but, at the time, this seemed largely a face-saving move.</p>
<p>Roll the clock forward to September 2021, and the social democrats can barely believe their luck. They are <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm">polling</a> well ahead of the CDU at around 25% – quite an achievement in a highly fragmented, six-party system. Meanwhile, the CDU/CSU is in crisis, in some <a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/forsa.htm">polls</a> even falling below 20%.</p>
<h2>CDU on the rocks</h2>
<p>The current situation owes as much to the other parties’ faltering campaigns as it does the SPD’s strength. The CDU/CSU selected Armin Laschet to be chancellor candidate ahead of Bavarian Minister President Markus Söder, despite polling evidence that this was a big risk.</p>
<p>Laschet has had a torrid time in the campaign. Most damaging was his reaction to the terrible floods in western Germany, including his home state of North Rhine Westphalia. His crisis management was questionable, but worse was the clip of him laughing and joking with party colleagues while the federal president made a solemn speech <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-successor-criticized-for-laughing-during-flood-visit/a-58305436">commemorating victims</a>.</p>
<p>Laschet apologised, but the damage was done. His performance in the pandemic had been the subject of criticism, and the whole episode confirmed German voters’ doubts. Add in allegations of plagiarism, a TV interview where he struggled to name three things a CDU-led government would do, and barbed comments from Söder (who demonstratively <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-csu-markus-soeder-schaut-aufs-handy-armin-laschet-patzt-in-deutscher-geschichte-a-350717ba-b97b-42c0-a725-0522f8b188a2">played with his phone</a> during Laschet’s speech at the campaign launch), and the CDU seems determined to test how low its support can fall.</p>
<p>The Greens have also found the extra scrutiny associated with the final stages of the campaign a challenge. Candidate <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-greens-leader-baerbock-self-critical-in-plagiarism-debate/">Annalena Baerbock</a> has been variously criticised for apparent plagiarism (such a common pattern – can a university offer some courses in footnotes?), failing to declare income and embellishing her CV.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Scholz has edged up in the polls, as the German public considers more deeply what qualities it would like in a chancellor ahead of casting votes. His dry, sober manner of presentation, coupled with centrist politics, is (quite deliberately) reminiscent of Merkel, and has a <a href="https://politik.watson.de/deutschland/exklusiv/925962569-umfrage-olaf-scholz-ist-bei-juengsten-waehlern-der-beliebteste-kanzlerkandidat">strong appeal</a>, especially to older voters. </p>
<h2>Who could end up in government?</h2>
<p>On election night, we will know who has topped the poll. There is no guarantee that the candidate of the largest party will lead the government, but there is a fair degree of expectation on the part of the German public this will happen. However, the next puzzle will be how to build a coalition.</p>
<p>Scholz would love to lead an SPD-Green coalition, but although things are shifting in that direction, the odds are against them having a majority.</p>
<p>The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is out of the picture but one option could be SPD-Green-Left Party – and this has not been ruled out by the SPD or Greens. On domestic policy, such a coalition would be doable, but on foreign policy, there is a gaping chasm in views (with the Left Party pressing to disband NATO and replace it with an alliance involving Russia).</p>
<p>Partnering with the Greens and the Left Party would also leave Scholz rather less room to resist policy demands from the SPD’s left, running counter to his more centrist instincts. The most likely scenario is a “traffic light” coalition of SPD, Greens and the liberal FDP, but the latter will play hard to get, and there are major policy differences between the FDP and its potential partners, especially in the key areas of climate and fiscal policy.</p>
<p>Given all this uncertainty, multiple coalition formulations may well be possible. On election night, we may get some hints. There will then be exploratory talks among potential partners over a few weeks, which will resolve key issues. Will the FDP be open to compromise with the SPD and Greens? Will the Left Party spring a surprise and jettison its foreign policy platform? </p>
<p>Only after these initial talks will we know which combination will embark on formal coalition negotiations. And as we saw in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nejo.12310">2017</a>, there is no guarantee of success: talks might fail, or the outcome might be voted down by party members or delegates. </p>
<p>Germany will be in a period of hiatus, with just an acting government, for a period of several weeks if not months. Readers across Europe, and beyond should stay tuned: we are set for an exciting ride.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167658/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) which has supported his work on various party projects. He has undertaken occasional consultancy for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.</span></em></p>After a rocky start, the social democrats are on the up as polling day approaches.Ed Turner, Reader in Politics, Co-Director, Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1058752018-10-29T15:44:37Z2018-10-29T15:44:37ZAngela Merkel to step aside: here’s what it means for Germany and what to expect next<p>German politics has been dominated by two parties since the end of the war – the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Yet, recent election results in the southern state of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/14/bavaria-poll-humiliation-for-angela-merkel-conservative-allies">Bavaria</a> and in the central region of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/28/merkel-suffers-another-election-setback-key-german-state-of-hesse">Hesse</a> are evidence that they are in big trouble. </p>
<p>This became even more apparent when, the day after the Hesse election, Angela Merkel, Germany’s long-time leader, announced that she would not stand again as Chancellor in the 2021 election and wouldn’t put herself forward for re-election as leader of the Christian Democrats (CDU) in December.</p>
<p>The logic behind this decision is simple: Merkel recognises that her brand is not the electoral asset that it once was and that the need to groom a successor is getting ever more urgent. All eyes will now be keeping a close on on the likes of Jens Spahn, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Armin Laschet – the three front-runners to take over as CDU leader. </p>
<h2>Tough at the top</h2>
<p>It’s certainly not implausible that German party politics is undergoing a seismic shift. The Christian democrat parties – CDU and their regional partner the CSU – and the Social Democrats (SPD) continue to govern nationally as part of a longstanding grand coalition but are seeing their vote shares and opinion poll ratings slump to historic lows. Meanwhile, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is, since the Hesse election, now present in all 16 regional parliaments plus the European Parliament and the Bundestag. Both the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the socialist Left Party have solid bases of support that see them maintaining a firm presence in national politics. The Greens, meanwhile, are flying high in the national opinion polls and have performed admirably in recent regional elections. </p>
<p>The two main parties do nonetheless now have some time to try to shape the national narrative in a way that suits them. The CDU will try to do that under a new party leader, the SPD almost certainly with the leaders they currently have. That both parties are managing a way out of the unloved grand coalition is clear, but that way out cannot begin any time soon. Both parties are desperate to find alternatives to governing with each other, but, for now, these alternatives are not clear enough and reliable enough to be viable. The only option is to keep calm and carry on.</p>
<p>The CDU/CSU and SPD are helped by the fact that Germany is moving into a period of relative electoral tranquillity. There are no major electoral contests between now and May 2019, the date of both elections to the European parliament and also to the smallest of Germany’s 16 states, Bremen. The next major regional elections take place in the eastern states of Brandenburg and Saxony on September 1 2019. They are quickly followed by another contest in Thuringia (again in the east) on October 27 2019.</p>
<p>This gives the German government some breathing space. Politicians in both the CDU and the SPD are well aware that internal bickering has badly hamstrung the government. Stories of <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-faces-investigation-over-claims-her-defence-department-mishandled-millions-of-euros-qxxz9xfnx">scandal</a> and intrigue far outweigh discussions of any substantive achievements. Both Merkel and Andrea Nahles (the leader of the SPD) know that simply has to change. </p>
<p>Neither Merkel nor Nahles has the slightest interest in collapsing the coalition and calling new elections. That way electoral disaster lies for both parties. They, and majorities in their parties, know that they somehow have to make the national government work. Nahles announced that this will involve a (newly declared) mid-term assessment of whether there’s enough evidence of SPD achievements to merit carrying on. In reality, this will be for internal consumption as the SPD will – in all likelihood – still be a long way from strong enough to risk pulling out of the coalition and prompting new elections. The two parties are subsequently doomed to govern together for at least the medium term.</p>
<h2>2019: a bellwether year?</h2>
<p>The fact that 2019 will be the year of eastern regional elections will be significant. German national elections are often won and lost in the east. The Greens’ two <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/the-surprising-success-of-germanys-green-party/a-45864675">impressive successes</a> in 2018 have both come in western regions where their post-materialist supporter base is much stronger. This shouldn’t deflect from the considerable achievements of the Greens in Bavaria and Hesse, but eastern Germany will be a totally different challenge.</p>
<p>It’s worth remembering that in the last regional election in Brandenburg in 2014 the Greens polled 6.2%. In both Saxony and Thuringia (also in 2014) they managed identical scores of 5.7%. At the 2017 national election the Greens managed 5%, 4.6% and 4.1% respectively in those three states. Compare this to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46012098">19.5% in Hesse</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/bavaria-merkel-afd-greens-election-result/">17.5% in Bavaria</a> and it’s clear that the Greens have a long way to go before they are flying as high in the East as they currently are in the West.</p>
<p>An interesting indicator of where Germany may ultimately end up by autumn 2021 (the date of the next scheduled federal election) could come in where disgruntled CDU voters go in each of the 2019 eastern elections. In Hesse, <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article182880406/Landtagswahl-Hessen-2018-An-diese-Parteien-verloren-CDU-und-SPD-die-meisten-Waehler.html">Infratest Dimap</a>, one of Germany’s leading opinion poll agencies, estimated that around 99,000 former CDU voters opted to support the Greens. Around 96,000 went to the AfD. Only 35,000 went to the CDU’s long-time ally in federal politics, the Free Democrats.</p>
<p>In Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia the CDU doesn’t have as much to lose as it did in Bavaria and Hesse, having polled 26.7%, 26.9% and 28.8% last time out. But, since 1990 the eastern electorate has been – at times markedly – more volatile than that in western Germany. Voters can and do change their preferences, and sometimes quite drastically. If the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-green-party-how-it-evolved/a-40586834">Greens</a> are again able to pick up around the same number of voters from the CDU as the AfD does, then we can take that as a fair indication that their supporter base really is growing nationally. Given that the AfD is no newcomer in those three states (it took 12.5%, 9.7% and 10.6% of the vote respectively in each of the last regional elections in those states), it won’t be the <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-afd-how-to-understand-the-rise-of-the-right-wing-populists-84541">fresh upstart</a> that it has been until now.</p>
<p>Predicting national trends from regional polls <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/15/bavarias-christian-social-union-partys-campaign-strategy-flopped-heres-what-this-means-for-germany-and-europe/?utm_term=.458b9107e885">can be a dangerous game</a>. But given that the German government now has the best part of a year to look and act like a government that knows what it’s doing, the three eastern regional elections will be an excellent time to take stock of what all the trends that have appeared in 2018 actually mean. Until then, expect to see muddling along aplenty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105875/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Hough does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>German politics is experiencing a major shift. Merkel knows her time is up.Daniel Hough, Professor of Politics, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/931532018-03-12T12:23:00Z2018-03-12T12:23:00ZGermany’s Social Democrats: where did it all go wrong?<p>In March 2017, Martin Schulz was announced, with great fanfare, as the new leader of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD). As the party’s candidate for chancellor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/24/martin-schulz-boost-to-germanys-spd-raises-stakes-for-angela-merkel">“Saint Martin”</a> was set to storm the 2017 elections, oust Angela Merkel and bring the SPD back to power.</p>
<p>Twelve short months later, the SPD’s dreams lie in tatters. Its 20% vote share in the September vote was its <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-wins-a-fourth-term-in-office-but-it-wont-be-an-easy-one-84578">lowest ever</a> in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. After the election, Schulz committed the party to an opposition role as a point of principle, rather than entering another coalition with Merkel’s CDU. </p>
<p>However, when the CDU failed to form an alternative coalition with two smaller parties, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier persuaded Schulz to backtrack on that commitment in the interests of political stability and to work with Merkel on a new “GroKo” (grand coalition). The SPD’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-grand-coalition-gets-the-green-light-but-pressure-mounts-on-spd-leader-martin-schulz-90473">U-turn on the GroKo</a> was felt by many in the party as a <a href="https://newsocialist.org.uk/anti-coalition-campaigning-spd/">betrayal</a>. Since then the SPD’s leadership has imploded, its Young Socialists (<a href="https://www.jusos.de/">Jusos</a>) group has mutinied and the party has been widely ridiculed in the press. Where did it all go so horribly wrong?</p>
<h2>Social Democrats in the doldrums</h2>
<p>In many ways, the downturn in the German SPD’s fortunes mirrors the fate of similar parties elsewhere in Europe. Structural changes in European economies and societies have played out badly for social democrats in general.</p>
<p>A decline in manufacturing in favour of an expanding services sector has undermined social democratic parties’ traditional voting “clienteles”. Globalisation and the progressive liberalisation of employment markets have weakened the collective power of labour, traditionally the bedrock of parties of the left in European countries. </p>
<p>The emergence of the gig economy and the trend towards casual labour are resulting in a workforce with fragmented, often conflicting interests. European social democrats have generally failed to keep up with the changing concerns of low-income workers –- and the German SPD has been no exception.</p>
<h2>The rise and fall of Martin Schulz</h2>
<p>Schulz’s dynamic approach and self-styled image as an establishment “outsider” was hoped to spark a fresh connection with the German electorate. But this persona ultimately worked against him. Most of Germany’s party leaders have built a public profile as government ministers at federal level. In contrast, Schulz had forged his political career largely at the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/former-eu-parliament-president-martin-schulz-rival-angela-merkel-germany-elections-sdp-a7544151.html">European level</a>. His only notable political post in Germany had been as a small-town mayor. As such, he was virtually unknown to the German public. Compared with Merkel – a high-profile national and international leader – Schulz was the invisible man. The <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/kaffeeklatsch/2017/05/schulz-effect-rip">“Schulz effect”</a> failed to deliver in key regional elections in Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia, leaving the SPD <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/martin-schulz-effect-fades-further-poll/">struggling to reignite its federal campaign</a>.</p>
<p>Worse, Schulz seemed to lack political sense. He boxed himself in with points of principle in the fluid political situation after the election, only to have to retract them later. Having claimed he would never serve in a Merkel government, he later angled for the top job of foreign minister in the new cabinet. His credibility was fatally undermined. His vacillations ultimately contributed to his resignation as party leader.</p>
<h2>You emotional bread roll!</h2>
<p>The deep divisions in the SPD over leadership and policy added to the party’s woes. These came to the fore during the GroKo negotiations. Tensions between Schulz and the current foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, exploded in a playground spat when Gabriel, quoting his little daughter Marie, called Schulz “the man with the hairy face”. Schulz retaliated by calling Gabriel an <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/martin-schulz-to-sigmar-gabriel-you-are-just-as-much-a-bread-roll-of-emotion-as-i-am/">“Emotionsbrötchen”</a>. Literally an “emotional bread roll”, the unflattering term carried shades of “big girl’s blouse” and “drama queen”.</p>
<p>The row has done nothing for the party’s public image. A recent opinion poll showed that 58% of respondents believed the SPD was <a href="http://www.dw.com/de/ard-deutschlandtrend-zweifel-an-der-regierungsf%25C3%25A4higkeit-der-spd/a-42787544">no longer fit for government</a>. In spite of its record allocation of ministerial posts, the SPD will enter the new coalition as a weakened force. The designated minister for the Home ministry, the Christian Social Union politician Horst Seehofer, has already <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/csus-horst-seehofer-confirms-he-will-join-angela-merkels-cabinet/a-42793190">exploited the situation</a> by engineering the transfer of construction policy from the SPD’s environment portfolio to his own.</p>
<p>Schulz’s failure has highlighted the need for a generational change in the SPD’s leading elites. The top-down designation of Schulz’s deputy <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/andrea-nahles-would-take-the-reins-of-a-troubled-spd/a-40706641">Andrea Nahles</a> (47) as the new leader ignores the <a href="https://newsocialist.org.uk/anti-coalition-campaigning-spd/">Jusos</a>’ demands for greater transparency and democracy within the party.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the coalition agreement between Merkel and the SPD focuses on those issues on which there is the greatest agreement between the coalition partners. These included minor reforms to the health service to smooth out the worst inequalities and gaps in provision, a focus on digital modernisation and some minor measures to assuage Germany’s emerging housing crisis. These policy guidelines <a href="https://theconversation.com/germany-finally-has-a-government-but-the-spd-grassroots-could-still-derail-it-91435">fall far short</a> of the root-and-branch reform that SPD members had hoped for in health and housing.</p>
<p>The new GroKo only cements the SPD’s long-standing problem in forging a policy identity both independent of the CDU and meaningful to a new, stable cohort of voters. To achieve this, it needs to address some of the leading <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/07/26/germany-s-working-poor">concerns of the working poor</a> in Germany: low pay rates, a long overdue pensions reform; equal access to health services; reform of the education sector; and the entry and integration of immigrants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Hogwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The SPD is in government with Angela Merkel again after signing a coalition deal. But life has been harder for the social democrats.Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/914352018-02-07T17:45:13Z2018-02-07T17:45:13ZGermany finally has a government – but the SPD grassroots could still derail it<p>More than four months after Germany’s federal election, the countries’ two leading parties have finally agreed to form another “grand coalition” (GroKo). So why is nobody cheering?</p>
<p>Few see the continuation of Angela Merkel’s previous government as an exciting prospect. Although the GroKo option was one of only two coalition formations with a potential majority in parliament, it was soon branded a “<a href="http://www.handelsblatt.com/my/meinung/kommentare/kommentar-zu-groko-verhandlungen-koalition-der-grossen-verlierer/20872802.html?ticket=ST-544904-DaoJEbfUD29wedpqOwDv-ap3">coalition of losers</a>”. The GroKo parties – the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union and the Social Democratic Party – all lost votes in last September’s election. The latest polls on voting intentions and the party leaders’ personal ratings show that they are <a href="http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Aktuelles/Politbarometer/">still falling</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, the GroKo will only take office if the policy programme agreed by the party leaders is formally adopted by the SPD party membership. Between a coalition agreement that favours the Union parties in many key areas and a militant and determined anti-GroKo movement within the SPD, it is by no means certain that the membership’s agreement will be forthcoming.</p>
<h2>Waiting for GroKo</h2>
<p>The SPD has laboured under a tangle of conflicting pressures over its role in the GroKo. SPD leader Martin Schulz <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-grand-coalition-gets-the-green-light-but-pressure-mounts-on-spd-leader-martin-schulz-90473">prevaricated for weeks</a>, severely testing his <a href="https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/richtungsstreit-in-spd-wenn-die-grosse-koalition-kommt-waeren-diese-politiker-unhaltbar_id_7895086.html">credibility</a> and arguably compromising his ability to lead his party.</p>
<p>Schulz’s failures opened up a can of worms within the party. They also mobilised a grassroots anti-GroKo movement under the leadership of the radical “Young Socialists” (Jusos). In December 2017, the party conference’s crucial endorsement of the GroKo talks <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-grand-coalition-gets-the-green-light-but-pressure-mounts-on-spd-leader-martin-schulz-90473">squeaked through</a> with a narrow majority. Inspired by UK Labour’s <a href="http://www.peoplesmomentum.com/">Momentum</a> movement, <a href="http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/groko-463723-spd-mitglieder-duerfen-ueber-grosse-koalition-abstimmen-aid-1.7374417">more than 24,000</a> new members – mainly anti-GroKo – joined the SPD before the deadline of February 6 2018 in the hope of influencing the party membership’s deciding vote in the coming weeks.</p>
<h2>Persuading the SPD grassroots</h2>
<p>Some SPD members oppose the GroKo on principle. Others dread the prospect of another parliamentary term without significant policy alternatives. There is little hope that Merkel’s “same old, same old” approach will change and this threatens to dilute the SPD’s main election promises. While polls show that a majority of SPD voters (<a href="http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Aktuelles/Politbarometer/">60%</a>) supports the GroKo, significant compromises have been made to reach a deal. Many party members will not view the concessions kindly.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205341/original/file-20180207-74512-n613si.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The SPD’s youth wing votes against a coalition at an earlier stage in the talks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The two policy areas that tested the negotiators in the final days – health and labour policy – encapsulate the different visions for German society embraced by the union parties (the CDU and CSU) and the SPD respectively. The union parties wanted to preserve a neoliberal capitalist model that allows the wealthy to pay their way to better provision, while the SPD wanted root-and-branch reforms.</p>
<p>Within the health service, the SPD wanted to introduce a national health insurance scheme to end a two-tier health service that favoured those with private health insurance. It also wanted to ban medical professionals for charging more for private services. Measures included in the coalition agreement include additional funding to upgrade healthcare provision for poorer communities and to shift the balance of insurance costs from the individual to the employer. However, they stop short of the more fundamental reform foreseen by the SPD.</p>
<p>The SPD also wanted to ban employers from issuing fixed contracts without specific justification and to protect family life by requiring larger employers to offer a one-off, time-limited period of part-time work to employees. The <a href="http://www.handelsblatt.com/downloads/20936422/2/koalitionsvertrag_7-2-2018.pdf">negotiators agreed</a> to limit the use of unjustified fixed contracts and to ban the repeated use of such time-limited contracts. The SPD also secured minor concessions on the <a href="http://www.handelsblatt.com/downloads/20936422/2/koalitionsvertrag_7-2-2018.pdf">right of return</a> to full-time employment after a period of part-time work. As part of the coalition deal, the SPD gains control of the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. This has been greeted as a triumph for the SPD, but could also mean it will carry the can for the GroKo’s half-hearted reforms.</p>
<p>The SPD membership may also baulk at voting for the GroKo’s immigration and taxation deals. They will be dismayed, if not entirely surprised, to see the Ministry of the Interior go to the right-wing CSU. This ministry includes the controversial domain of immigration. For some SPD members, the coalition agreement on refugee quotas and on family reunion will amount to an attack on foreign incomers’ human and civil rights.</p>
<p>The interior ministry will also gain a new brief on “Heimat” – a concept of homeland policy that focuses on Germanness and German identity. Many SPD members will read this as a licence to pursue policies that discriminate against foreigners. The SPD’s longstanding aim to bring in a wealth tax was knocked back at an earlier stage of the negotiations. They had wanted to increase the <a href="http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/groko-gespraeche-tag-drei-steuerstreit-bei-den-sondierungen/20826514.html">highest tax band</a> from 42% to 45% while simultaneously raising the annual income threshold for this band from earnings of just under €55,000 to €60,000.</p>
<p>During the election campaign, Schulz swore <a href="http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/koalitionsverhandlungen-rolle-von-schulz-in-moeglicher-groko-noch-unklar/20926340.html">he would not serve in a Merkel government</a>. Now he has <a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eil-schulz-will-parteivorsitz-aufgeben-1.3857149">announced</a> that he will accept the post of foreign minister – ousting the popular Sigmar Gabriel – and give up the party leadership to his deputy, <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-politics-spd-schulz/germanys-schulz-to-step-down-as-spd-leader-nahles-to-take-over-sueddeutsche-zeitung-idUKKBN1FR1KX">Andrea Nahles</a>. While his departure from the top party post will reassure many party members, a new leader may not be enough to convince the party grassroots over the prospect of another spell in office with the CDU and CSU.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91435/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Hogwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Martin Schulz could face a major backlash from his own party after breaking his promise not to enter government with Angela Merkel’s CDU again.Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879902018-01-03T11:18:47Z2018-01-03T11:18:47ZGerman ‘grand coalition’ could strengthen right-wing extremism<p>In today’s highly polarized political atmosphere, Americans may find themselves longing for increased bipartisanship. Wouldn’t greater cooperation from politicians improve our political situation or at least civilize political debate? What’s happening in Germany, however, should make them aware of some of the pitfalls of cooperating across the political aisle. </p>
<p>Germany will have taken a record 100 days to start preliminary talks Jan.
3 about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics/german-parties-at-odds-ahead-of-coalition-talks-idUSKBN1ER04K">exploratory talks Jan. 7</a> on whether to renew their “grand coalition” between the major parties on the center-left (the Social Democrats or SPD) and the center-right (Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats or CDU/CSU). </p>
<p>While in Germany to observe the national election in September, I saw little enthusiasm for this governing arrangement. The subsequent long hesitation of the main political parties reveals their trepidation. </p>
<p>With 399 of the 709 seats in the Bundestag, a grand coalition may be able to pass any legislation it can agree on, but this is unlikely to help Germany address one of its major problems: the rise of a new right-wing, anti-immigrant party, the Alternative for Germany, or AfD. </p>
<h2>A positive experience in the 1960s</h2>
<p>In the first 50 years of the Federal Republic, West Germany experienced only one grand coalition, which lasted only three years. </p>
<p>Major parties choose to govern together for a variety of reasons. In some cases, there are significant political challenges that can only be addressed when actors across the political spectrum work together. </p>
<p>Germany’s earlier grand coalition – in power from 1966 to 1969 – came into being as a result of the first economic crisis of the postwar years and fears of an <a href="https://50years.intereconomics.eu/an-economic-crisis.html">“economic collapse.”</a></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200263/original/file-20171220-4957-13ds2ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The architects of the 1960s grand coalition: Willy Brandt, Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Helmut Schmidt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_B_145_Bild-F057026-0011,_Bonn,_Pflanzung_von_Kanzler-Ged%C3%A4chtnisb%C3%A4umen.jpg">Engelbert Reineke/German Federal Archives</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ruling Christian Democrats wanted to respond to this situation by raising taxes. Their coalition partners, the market-oriented Freedom Democratic Party or FDP, refused to agree to this move and resigned. The Christian Democrats then joined with the left-wing SPD <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/grand-coalition-a-controversial-alliance/a-17108175">in a grand coalition and worked together</a> to pass policies that brought Germany out of recession. They also found common ground on other policies such as pension reform and greater support for higher education. </p>
<h2>21st-century difficulties</h2>
<p>Germany’s grand coalitions of the 21st century – and this year’s would be the third after the first between 2005 and 2009 and the second from 2013 to 2017 – have been another matter entirely. </p>
<p>Following the Sept. 24 elections, seven parties sit in the German Bundestag, more than any other year since 1949. </p>
<p>In addition to the CDU/CSU (<a href="http://www.aicgs.org/2017/09/the-csu/">the sister Christian Democratic parties </a>count separately and must both agree to any potential governing coalition), the German parliament now includes the Social Democrats, the Freedom Democrats, the Greens, the Left Party (the party that emerged from the remains of the East German Communist Party) and the nationalist AfD. </p>
<p>The Left Party and the AfD are relatively young, both having been created in the 21st century, and are considered to be beyond the pale for coalition formation at the national level because of their extremism. </p>
<p>The problem is that the fragmentation of the party system means that neither of the “standard” coalition arrangements of right-leaning CDU/CSU-FDP or left-leaning SPD-Green has enough seats to form a government. The two major parties, therefore, have been forced into partnership not because of a shared bipartisan vision, but because of a lack of other alternatives.</p>
<p>Initially, however, after the September elections, the SPD declined to join a potential government. This was because many Social Democratic leaders believe that <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379411000709">the main reason</a> for their party having their worst election result since 1949 is that they were the junior partner in a grand coalition for the past four years. How can they claim, the argument goes, that they represent an alternative to the CDU/CSU when they have always voted to support the government? The party, in other words, needs time to re-establish itself as having a vision distinct from that of the Christian Democrats.</p>
<p>What then ensued was a rather unusual proposal for what was dubbed the <a href="https://qz.com/1104508/everything-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-three-way-jamaica-coalition-talks">“Jamaica coalition,”</a> because of its color scheme of black (for the CDU/CSU), yellow (for the FDP) and green (for the Greens). But these negotiations broke down when the parties failed to reach a compromise on the <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/refugee-family-reunification-in-germany-what-you-need-to-know/a-40449409">very controversial issue of family reunification of refugees</a>. At that point, Germany’s federal president <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics/german-social-democrats-face-pressure-over-coalition-talks-idUSKBN1DM10H">publicly pressured</a> the SPD to reconsider. </p>
<h2>What to do about the extremist AfD?</h2>
<p>The Christian Democrats and Social Democrats are far apart on many issues. </p>
<p>The SPD would like to do away with private health insurance; the CDU adamantly disagrees. The SPD wants to allow federal investment in schools, but that policy is opposed by the CDU since it would require lifting a ban on national interference in education, <a href="http://www.perfar.eu/policy/education/germany">a policy area</a> reserved for the states. </p>
<p>The parties <a href="http://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/politik/parteien-was-die-buerger-von-einer-grossen-koalition-erwarten-koennen-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-171220-99-359970">do have common ground on some issues</a> such as tax cuts for the lower- and middle-income brackets. Both also want to do away with the “Solidarzuschlag” – a special tax to support former East Germany – though they have different ideas about how to do so. And they might even find <a href="http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-12/regierungsbildung-union-familiennachzug-kompromiss">a compromise</a> on the tricky issue of family reunification for refugees by agreeing initially to admit only those family members in most danger. </p>
<p>What Christian Democrats and Social Democrats definitely share, however, is the goal of limiting the power of the nationalist AfD. </p>
<p>Indeed, the SPD’s initial reluctance to join the governing coalition was also driven by their desire to make sure that the AfD – now the third largest party in parliament – not be able to claim the mantle of parliamentary opposition. </p>
<p>The German Bundestag does not have an official leader of the opposition, but <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/what-is-the-role-of-germanys-parliamentary-opposition/a-40615464">the largest opposition party does have the right</a> to chair the budget committee and to respond first to any government statements, thus ensuring it greater publicity and prestige. This role may help establish the AfD as a legitimate parliamentary actor. </p>
<h2>No other options</h2>
<p>The lack of other governing options shows how desperate the situation is. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/">Opinion polls</a> show that calling new elections would either return the same results as on Sept. 24 or might even put the AfD in a stronger position. </p>
<p>On the other hand, a minority right-leaning government with just the CDU-CSU in power would be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/25/germany-return-weimar-angela-merkel-bundestag-coalition">worryingly reminiscent</a> of the unstable Weimar Republic of the 1930s that led to Hitler and the Nazis taking power. It would also probably have to rely on the AfD for support in passing legislation, thereby further legitimizing the party. </p>
<p>The bottom line is that the German parties are stuck in a bind because there is no guarantee that a grand coalition will constrain the power of the AfD. </p>
<p>With both major parties in the government, both will be targets of voter frustration. In particular, almost any policies the government passes to integrate <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1c069e0-872f-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787">hundreds of thousands of refugees</a> are likely to lead to some voter pushback. </p>
<p>Voters worried about the refugee issue were already likely to turn to the AfD. With the major parties governing together, however, the AfD will have even more impact as the leading force of the opposition. As the major parties begin exploratory talks on Jan. 7, they face the continuing dilemma of how to constrain the power of the AfD.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Elise Wiliarty receives funding from Wesleyan University, International Association for the Study of German Politics, German Academic Exchange Service. </span></em></p>Over three months since Germans voted in national elections, preliminary talks are due to start Jan. 7 on forming a coalition government. What has taken so long?Sarah Elise Wiliarty, Assistant Professor of Government, Wesleyan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/886062017-12-06T10:14:24Z2017-12-06T10:14:24ZWhy Germany’s Social Democrats should enter government with Angela Merkel again<p>Bonn Is Not Weimar was the title of a 1956 book by the Swiss journalist Fritz René Allemann. He argued that the (West) German Federal Republic, founded in 1949 and with Bonn as its capital, had devised a stable form of parliamentary government which had successfully avoided the political chaos and weak, short-lasting coalitions of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Weimar-Republic">Weimar Republic</a>.</p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/german-election-2017-40386">federal elections</a>, held in September 2017, appear to have marked an abrupt end to that stability. A total of six parties (seven if we include Angela Merkel’s Bavarian ally, the CSU) are now represented in the Bundestag or federal parliament. That’s the largest number since it was decided in 1952 that every party needed to win a minimum of five per cent of the overall vote to secure a place in parliament. </p>
<p>The two major parties, Merkel’s conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) and the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), both lost support, while in another post-war first, an extreme right-wing party, the anti-immigrant <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-afd-how-to-understand-the-rise-of-the-right-wing-populists-84541">Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)</a>, entered the Bundestag with 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats.</p>
<p>The SPD initially refused to continue as Merkel’s junior partner in a grand coalition, instead expressing a desire to go into opposition. The CDU/CSU was therefore obliged to look elsewhere – to the Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) – to form a coalition. But that plan failed when the FDP walked out of talks on November 19.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197625/original/file-20171204-22982-1w1aeoz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The election results in full.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2017/kw39-wahlergebnis/527056">bundestag.de</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Just three alternatives now present themselves. The first is to stage fresh elections. However, this could easily end in another indecisive result and even further gains for the AfD. The second is to form a new grand coalition. SPD leader Martin Schulz showed some signs of moving in this direction by engaging in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/27/german-grand-coalition-talks-unlikely-to-begin-until-new-year">preliminary talks</a> with the CDU and CSU but no deal has yet been struck.</p>
<p>Finally, the SPD could decide to “tolerate” a <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-why-angela-merkel-would-be-better-off-in-a-minority-government-87884">minority CDU/CSU administration</a>. It would not formally join the federal government and would reserve the right to oppose its overall programme and present alternative policies, but would be open to approving (or rather not blocking) parliamentary legislation on a case-by-case basis in order to prevent complete political paralysis.</p>
<h2>The risks they face</h2>
<p>All of these options present significant risks for the SPD. As the oldest party in Germany (it was founded in 1875), and one that experienced several dramatic splits and changes of direction in the 20th century, it arguably has most to lose from the recent fragmentation of party politics. This is because it risks haemorrhaging votes both to its main socialist rival, the Left, and to the populist, anti-system right. </p>
<p>It has been widely accepted that the SPD’s historically poor election result was punishment from voters for its coalition years. In large parts of eastern Germany it is now in fourth position, behind the CDU, the AfD and the Left. All this makes it even harder for the party to forge ahead nationally to beat the CDU/CSU at the next federal election while maintaining a position inside the governing coalition.</p>
<p>It’s also worth noting that if the SPD did agree to another grand coalition, the far-right AfD would become the largest opposition party in parliament.</p>
<p>But accepting a minority CDU/CSU administration comes with all the same risks as a grand coalition without any of the advantages of government. The last time the SPD tolerated a right wing government was between 1930 and 1932. Back then, the minority administration led by the conservative Catholic politician <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Heinrich-Bruning">Heinrich Brüning</a> instituted a series of highly unpopular welfare and public spending cuts in response to the economic crisis, aided at crucial moments by the SPD’s decision to “tolerate” such measures without being able to negotiate any significant concessions in return. In the two Reichstag elections of 1932, the SPD’s share of the vote crashed to 21.6% in July and 20.4% in November.</p>
<p>Even if we accept that the SPD had no alternative but to “tolerate” Brüning in the early 1930s, the situation today is very different. Germany is not facing an economic downturn, let alone a crisis on the scale of the Great Depression. A grand coalition would rest on a clear majority in the Bundestag, offering – in contrast to the late Weimar period – a realistic chance of the government lasting for a full four years. </p>
<p>Unlike Brüning, Merkel favours consensus. The SPD has a significant opportunity to obtain concessions on key issues affecting its members and supporters, including the environment, welfare and immigration. In the coming weeks, the SPD should grasp the nettle and aim for a formal coalition agreement, rather than “tolerating” a minority CDU-led government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Stibbe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Martin Schulz has said he’d rather go back into opposition than agree to another grand coalition. But is that sensible?Matthew Stibbe, Professor of Modern European History, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/878842017-11-21T12:10:56Z2017-11-21T12:10:56ZHere’s why Angela Merkel would be better off in a minority government<p>The collapse of talks to form a <a href="https://theconversation.com/germany-enters-political-no-mans-land-as-angela-merkel-wrestles-with-election-fallout-87778">coalition government in Germany</a> has left an unsettling sense of uncertainty in Europe’s biggest democracy. In a country where stability is valued above all else, no-one is sure what comes next.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/german-election-2017-40386">election</a> in September produced a fragmented result. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-afd-how-to-understand-the-rise-of-the-right-wing-populists-84541">radical-right AfD</a> made big gains and the two major parties, Angela Merkel’s Christian-democratic CDU/CSU and the social-democratic SPD suffered significant losses. With the SPD insisting it would not return to government alongside the CDU, the latter sought an untried coalition with the liberal FDP and the Greens. This so-called “Jamaica coalition” (from the colours of the parties) proved too much of a stretch for the FDP.</p>
<p>Unless the parties reconsider their positions, the only other options are an early election or a minority government. Merkel says she prefers a new election because a minority administration might not be stable. Yet such governments are common in Europe, especially in proportional democracies like Denmark and Sweden, but even currently in Britain. The fact that minority governments can often survive for entire electoral cycles suggests there must be structural factors at work that increase their stability.</p>
<h2>The median legislator</h2>
<p>The most important is the support of the so-called median legislator. Imagine that all members of a parliament were arranged in order from the most left wing to the most right wing. In a parliament of 101 MPs, the median legislator – the “middle” MP – would be number 51: they would have 50 MPs to their left and 50 to their right. The median legislator’s support would be needed to pass any bills, because they are the MP who would give left or right a majority. That puts the median MP in a strong position.</p>
<p>If we assume for simplicity that all MPs in a given party adopt the same position, we can arrange the parties left to right and see which contains the median legislator. That party will have the greatest bargaining power – which explains the stability of so many minority and coalition governments.</p>
<p>To apply this idea to Germany, we need information on the parties’ general ideological positions. The <a href="https://www.chesdata.eu/">Chapel Hill Expert Survey</a> of 2014 gives the average estimates for each party by a group of academic specialists on German politics. On a 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) scale, the Left Party’s average position was 1.2, the Greens were at 3.6, the SPD at 3.8, the CDU at 5.9, the FDP at 6.5, the CDU’s Bavarian allies, the CSU at 7.2 and the AfD at 8.9. As there are 709 MPs in the German parliament, the median is number 355. Counting in from the right, AfD has 94 seats, the CSU 46, the FDP 80 and then the CDU, which has 200 and controls the median legislator.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=174&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=219&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=219&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195583/original/file-20171121-6013-nyzniw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=219&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Number of seats won in 2017 election with 0-10 ideological scale.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys/">chesdata.eu</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The CDU, then, is in a pivotal position. That would make a minority or coalition government containing the CDU more stable than any other offering. Majorities would have to be constructed for each parliamentary vote, but if parties vote on a left-right basis, the CDU’s proposals could not be defeated by those put forward by more right-wing or left-wing parties. For example, a rival alliance among the three left-leaning parties would still need the CDU’s support to pass any legislation.</p>
<p>The German constitution also contains a specific rule that makes minority governments more stable than they would be elsewhere.</p>
<p>The rules of the federal republic stipulate that for a chancellor to be defeated on a motion of no confidence, there must also be a nominated alternative chancellor. This would require parties to the left and right of the CDU agreeing on a single alternative in order to beat Merkel.</p>
<h2>Germany’s problem</h2>
<p>The fragmented parliament leaves German politics at a crossroads. Voters enjoy an abundance of party choice but they do not have choice over governmental formation and that is a fundamental weakness.</p>
<p>Until the 1980s, German governments were largely decided by the small FDP, which was the kingmaker in the old three-party system. For a brief period in the 1990s and 2000s, when the Greens allied with the SPD and the FDP was closer to the CDU/CSU, Germany had a two-bloc system in which voters could select centre-left or centre-right coalitions. It is the type of party system seen across Scandinavia and southern Europe, where voters know before elections what the likely coalition choices are and can therefore choose the government directly. But with the rise of Germany’s Left Party, which was excluded by the others, a two-bloc system failed to produce majority coalitions.</p>
<p>In its place, grand coalitions became more frequent from 2005. What were previously two alternative governing options – the CDU and the SPD – joined together to become one. They were chosen by party elites, not voters. Germany’s party system makes it very difficult for voters to choose and remove governments. It’s no wonder the SPD was so badly damaged by its time in government: why would left-wing voters support the SPD if they thought it would lead to a CDU-led government? A similar problem applies to the cross-bloc “Jamaica coalition”: left-wing supporters of the Greens could find themselves facilitating a right-dominated government.</p>
<p>This is where a minority government could be an improvement. The CDU/CSU and the FDP could form a coherent centre-right administration that looked for – or in some cases, simply received without soliciting it – legislative support from other parties on individual issues. The median position of the CDU would lend stability. The SPD would be free to vote for issues it supported, while remaining the alternative government-in-waiting, along with the Greens. A CDU/CSU-Green coalition should be avoided because it cuts across the left-right divide. AfD and the Left Party would be excluded; with clear governmental alternatives now on offer to voters, they would need to seek greater credibility or their appeal could wither.</p>
<p>There is no guarantee that new elections would produce a substantially different result and if they didn’t, German politicians would be back where they started. Rather than hankering for overly large and ideologically incoherent coalitions, those politicians should look to Europe on how to run minority governments. In doing so, they would move towards the type of two-bloc system of competition that puts governmental choice in the hands of voters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Quinn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The parliamentary arithmetic suggests Merkel would actually be in quite a stable position if she goes it alone, without calling fresh elections.Tom Quinn, Senior Lecturer, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/877782017-11-20T13:45:19Z2017-11-20T13:45:19ZGermany enters political no-man’s land as Angela Merkel wrestles with election fallout<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195435/original/file-20171120-18533-imjg66.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/german-bundestag-constitutional-legislative-building-berlin-661559881?src=cK6drqDK8yNLJzAQWmwLpg-4-35">immodium/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Angela Merkel is in trouble. Serious trouble. Negotiations to form the next German government have collapsed dramatically. Quite where the chancellor, and indeed Germany, go from here is anything but certain.</p>
<p>It wasn’t meant to be like this. Although the Christian Democrats (CDU) performed poorly in the federal <a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-afd-how-to-understand-the-rise-of-the-right-wing-populists-84541">election of September 24</a> (gaining just 32.9% of the vote), the post-election expectations were nonetheless clear. Merkel would get representatives from the CDU’s sister party in Bavaria (CSU) and two smaller parties (the liberal FDP and the Greens) around a table and, over time and at their own pace, they would knuckle down and form Germany’s first “Jamaica Coalition” – so-named as the parties’ colours are the same as those on the Caribbean island’s flag.</p>
<p>Those expectations have now gone up in smoke. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42047532">The FDP walked out</a>. Christian Lindner, the FDP’s leader, claimed that there simply wasn’t enough common ground for the parties to draw up a coalition agreement that everyone could sign up to. “Better not to govern at all than to govern badly,” as he dramatically put it. </p>
<h2>Tough choices</h2>
<p>Where to now? Essentially, German politicians have three options. </p>
<p>First, there is another plausible majority in the German parliament. Merkel’s Christian Democrats could look to govern with the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD). The parties have a majority in parliament and they have experience of working together. Indeed, they did that in the four year period from 2013-2017. </p>
<p>However, the SPD has made it (crystal) <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-coalition-martin-schulz-let-germany-vote-again-if-merkel-talks-fail/">clear</a> that it’s not up for that. The Social Democrats were humbled at the last election, polling 20.5%; a historic low. Governing alongside Merkel has done the party little political good and a period of internal rejuvenation is badly needed. As recently as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/19/german-coalition-talks-close-to-collapse-angela-merkel">this weekend</a> Martin Schulz, the SPD leader, reemphasised that. </p>
<p>Given that, Merkel could try to govern without a majority in the Bundestag. Minority governments are not uncommon across mainland Europe, and the Nordic countries have often shown that these administrations can be successful. The government simply seeks majority support for each bill it presents to parliament; sometimes Merkel would look to persuade the Social Democrats to support her, on other occasions she’d look to one (or more) of the smaller parties. </p>
<p>Such an idea remains, however, anathema to many in Germany. The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weimar_Republic">Weimar Republic</a> existed over 70 years ago, but the weakness of successive minority administrations led ultimately to its collapse and to the ushering in of the far right and ultimately to World War II. Germany has not had a minority government since. The idea of a government existing on the basis of ever-shifting majorities in parliament therefore leaves many feeling deeply uneasy.</p>
<h2>Merkel’s future in doubt?</h2>
<p>The third option is for new elections. But this is not nearly as straightforward as outside observers might think. The chancellor can indeed engineer a lost confidence vote in parliament that would trigger new polls, but the federal parliament hasn’t formally elected Merkel chancellor yet. Until it does, that’s not an option for her. </p>
<p>The federal president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, could decide that new elections are the cleanest way to solve the impasse. Even then, there are constitutional problems; German politicians would have to come together in parliament and a majority would (twice) have to fail to support Merkel. There would then have to be a third round of voting where (one assumes) Merkel’s CDU/CSU colleagues would support her whereas parliamentarians from other parties would not. </p>
<p>It’s at this point that the president would step in; he would either formally nominate Merkel as the head of a minority government or he’d decide that that government would be neither strong nor stable and call for a new election within 60 days. Either way, Steinmeier’s role in sorting this mess out is an important one.</p>
<p>The option of holding another election would appear to be the most logical (if constitutionally cumbersome) way of proceeding, but there is a further problem. It is not at all clear that any new election would deliver a result that was much different to that of September 24. Germany could effectively end up either in the same place again or, and this is something that many fear, the far-right Alternative For Germany (AfD) could be the main beneficiary. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Steinmeier has already sent subtle messages to the parties saying that they need to be statesmanlike, knuckle down and simply find a way to agree. It’s not implausible that he’ll simply tell them to turn around and get back to the negotiating table. </p>
<p>Germans are not getting the government they thought they were going to get, and it is not at all clear what should or will happen next. All three scenarios outlined above are unpalatable, but Germany clearly cannot stay in limbo indefinitely. The chances of new elections have undoubtedly increased, but they are not a forgone conclusion. </p>
<p>Could a CDU/CSU/Green minority government, supported implicitly by the SPD from the backbenches, be the way forward? Some 48 hours ago no one would have said yes. Now, it’s at least plausible if not probable. If a new election happens, will Merkel be leading the CDU in to it? Probably, yes, but by no means certainly. Germany has suddenly gone from a country of boring politics to one where politics has turned in to high drama.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Hough has received funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)</span></em></p>German chancellor is running out of options to form a viable government.Daniel Hough, Professor of Politics, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/845782017-09-24T18:58:45Z2017-09-24T18:58:45ZAngela Merkel wins a fourth term in office – but it won’t be an easy one<p>Angela Merkel will continue as chancellor of Germany. But following an <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/politics">election</a> that saw the rise of <a href="http://www.focus.de/politik/praxistipps/erste-hochrechnungen-die-aktuelle-prognose-zum-ergebnis-der-bundestagswahl-2017_id_7631195.html">smaller parties</a> – most notably the far right – her fourth term will probably be an eventful one in ways she would not wish for.</p>
<p>The Union parties (Merkel’s CDU and sister party CSU) finished in top place with just under 33%. They did nevertheless lose almost 9% over their previous election result of 2013. </p>
<p>The Social Democratic Party (SPD), coalition partner to the Union parties, finished a distant second, with just over 20% of the vote. For the SPD, this is a historic low: almost 6% down on the last election. Party leader Martin Schulz failed to come up to scratch in a lacklustre campaign.</p>
<p>Four smaller parties have managed to meet the 5% threshold to qualify for seats in parliament.</p>
<p>The right-wing populist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), achieved a dubious milestone in post-war German history. With a vote share of 12.5%, it will be the first overtly far-right nationalist party to enter the federal parliament.</p>
<hr>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/germanys-afd-how-to-understand-the-rise-of-the-right-wing-populists-84541">Germany’s AfD: how to understand the rise of the right-wing populists</a></em></p>
<hr>
<p>The Left Party (die Linke) and the Green Party (Bündnis ‘90/die Grünen) made marginal gains to score 9% and just over 9% respectively. Big gains went to one party that had been more or less written off after the last election and to another that many commentators hoped never to see in parliament at federal level. The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) rose from the ashes to return to parliament under their charismatic new leader Christian Lindner. With 10.7% of the vote, the party more than doubled its tally of the last election.</p>
<h2>Forming a government</h2>
<p>The new government will need to control 316 seats in the parliament to achieve the majority needed to take office. While probably technically possible, a continuation of the current Grand Coalition (GroKo) between CDU/CSU and SPD now seems unlikely.</p>
<p>Having sent mixed messages before the election, the SPD declared after the close of polls that it aims to work as an <a href="http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagswahl_2017/bundestagswahl-2017-im-live-ticker-wahlbeteiligung-bislang-schwaecher-als-2013_id_7631710.html">opposition</a> party in the new parliament.</p>
<p>With the AfD and die Linke ruled out of a CDU/CSU-based coalition on ideological grounds, this leaves the possibility of a so-called Jamaica coalition of CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens (the parties’ traditional colours of black, green and yellow tally with the Jamaican flag). However, this option is no foregone conclusion and could prove very unpopular with voters.</p>
<h2>All roads lead to Merkel</h2>
<p>Despite the consistency of the polls over the past few weeks, an unprecedented number of German voters – <a href="http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundestagswahl/bundestagswahl-2017-entscheidet-die-taktik-der-waehler-15212740.html">around 40%</a> – remained undecided as late as a week before the election. </p>
<p>The uncertainty was palpable in an unusually nervy, volatile mood among the electorate. <a href="https://www.pocketstory.com/der-spiegel/sicherheit-und-wut">Psychologist Stephan Grünewald</a> noted odd swings in public perceptions of the Merkel government’s achievements. One minute Germany was a “desolate land”, the next an “island of prosperity”.</p>
<p>Germans are well aware of their relative prosperity in Europe but seem to have been traumatised by the impact of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41147362">migrant crisis</a> within their borders. Anxiety runs high over international tensions and there is a fear that Germany’s economic security is under threat. At one level, people could hardly be bothered about the election. Even so, social media posts exploded with rage and Merkel’s car was <a href="http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundestagswahl/merkels-wagen-mit-tomaten-beworfen-15190057.html">pelted with tomatoes</a> at appearances in the east – her home territory.</p>
<p>The voters sensed that a change was overdue, but calculated that in practice all votes – other than for the radical outliers of the Left Party and AfD – would trickle back to Merkel. Ironically, the opposition parties fed the perception that there was no alternative to Merkel.</p>
<p>Before election day, all of the remaining mainstream parties – SPD, Greens and FDP – had seemed open to the idea of joining a coalition. With the Union parties bossing the polls at around 36% and the SPD well behind at around 22%, it was clear that any continuation of the GroKo would be led by Merkel, not Schulz.</p>
<p>Even after three terms in office and after testing the forbearance of the German public with her open doors asylum policy, 56% claimed in polling that they would rather see her <a href="http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Aktuelles/Politbarometer/">remain chancellor</a> while only 32% favoured Schulz. With neither the mainstream parties nor the voters daring to rock the boat, Merkel barely needed to campaign.</p>
<p>But now she faces another set of challenges before she can forge a new government. Before the election it was thought that the higher the vote for the AfD, the greater the likelihood that the vote of the other smaller parties would be squeezed, making a continuation of the crumbling CDU/CSU-SPD partnership unavoidable. Instead, it was the vote of the two main parties that was squeezed, apparently convincing the SPD that there was no future for it in a Merkel-led GroKo. Now Merkel must try to make a pact with two parties that will stretch the comfort zone of an already broad Union church.</p>
<p>Also, the higher the vote for the AfD, the greater the pressure that the CSU, the CDU’s more conservative and reactionary Bavarian sister party, can exert on the content of the government’s coalition agreement and on future policy direction. Horst Seehofer, leader of the CSU, had already announced his intention of driving the Union parties further to the right in the post-election coalition negotiations. The strident entry of the AfD into parliament will help him to justify his demands, including a more <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkels-election-manifesto-attempts-to-rebrand-refugees-80447">rigorous immigration control policy</a>. With the CSU suffering a historic low of 38.5% – a drop of almost <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/csu-stuerzt-in-bayern-auf-niedrigstes-ergebnis-seit-1949-a-1169590.html">11% of the vote</a> – in its Bavarian constituency, it will be sure to press even harder for conservative reforms.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia Hogwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The chancellor wins again, but the rise of the populists will probably force the next administration to the right.Patricia Hogwood, Reader in European Politics, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841672017-09-21T00:39:13Z2017-09-21T00:39:13ZGerman elections could bring a new wave of extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186872/original/file-20170920-16430-147p9li.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C183%2C4494%2C1958&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Election posters in Frankfurt tout German Chancellor Angela Merkel and request votes for her CDU party. German elections will be held on Sunday but, as usual, the action begins after the race is over. The slogan reads "Successful for Germany"</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Probst)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Not with a bang, but a whimper. <a href="https://msu.edu/%7Ejungahre/transmedia/the-hollow-men.html">T.S. Eliot’s famous line</a> could apply to the end of most German election campaigns. There are campaign posters and some rallies and one or two rhetorical flourishes which reflect a disquieting undercurrent of xenophobia, but on the whole these elections are rather tame.</p>
<p>The action heats up once campaigning stops. Since German elections rarely produce a majority government, the end of the campaign marks the start of negotiations between the largest faction in the Bundestag (federal parliament) and other parties willing to join a coalition government. Newcomer party, Alternative for Germany, (AfD), running on an anti-immigration platform, could become the major opposition party - and an obstacle to Angela Merkel’s CDU.</p>
<p>The jockeying will begin the same evening the election results are announced. In a peculiar German tradition, leaders of all major parties will appear together on TV to discuss the outcome. </p>
<p>This <em>Elefantenrunde</em> (elephants’ roundtable) is something to behold, and impossible to imagine in North America. The leaders usually just rehash the campaign, but sometimes it’s a little more exciting.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186861/original/file-20170920-16437-boozy8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A xenophobic election campaign poster for the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The tagline reads: Burkas? We’re more into bikinis. The party has seen success by embracing German fears about immigration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To grasp the significance of the right-wing AfD party’s potential influence, one must first understand the context.</p>
<h2>Negotiations begin after the elections</h2>
<p>In 2005, then-chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democrats (SPD) was bested by Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Angela Merkel. Her margin of victory was minute, but still a victory. Even so the <em>Elefantenrunde</em> was treated to the sight of Schröder futilely claiming that he had, in fact, won the election.</p>
<p>This year’s elephants’ roundtable won’t be that sensational, but the negotiations afterwards will be more important for Germany’s future than the election campaign that preceded them. </p>
<p>All polls predict Chancellor Merkel’s parties (the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union - CSU) will win the most seats, though not enough for a majority. Merkel will have to find a coalition partner, or partners. </p>
<p>From 2006 to 2009, and again since 2013, Merkel has governed in a “Grand Coalition” with the SPD, the country’s second-largest party. Ironically, while the CDU/CSU have based their entire campaign on the steadiness of Merkel and her government, the SPD have had to criticize a government they’ve helped run. That tends to take the wind out of one’s rhetorical sails. The SDP party was buoyed by the early positive response to the naming of former European Parliament president <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/martin-schulz-angela-merkel-germany-populism/539088/">Martin Schulz as their candidate for chancellor, but the joy was short-lived</a>. </p>
<p>The impact of globalization and the labour market reforms of Schröder’s government have weakened the SPD’s grip on the worker vote. To halt the decline, members of Germany’s oldest political party argue that the SPD must return to the opposition, otherwise it will continue to be boxed in by Merkel’s unerring political tactics.</p>
<p>If a coalition with the SPD proves impossible, Merkel can look to two other parties: the Free Democrats (FDP), a right-of-centre party; and the Greens, the environment party that governed with the SPD under Schröder. </p>
<h2>Green party’s platform now a universal one</h2>
<p>In one way, the Greens have been very successful. Climate change is accepted as fact in Germany. After the <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">Fukushima catastrophe</a> of 2011, Merkel reversed course and began phasing out nuclear power. The “green consciousness” is now widely shared by Germans, making it difficult for the party to develop a platform that is uniquely theirs. </p>
<p>Merkel could partner with the FDP. In the last election they failed to obtain the 5 per cent of the vote required to enter parliament. For years the party was criticized as having no other platform than to be the junior coalition partner for either the CDU/CSU or the SPD. That and poor leadership cost them dearly. </p>
<p>This time round they will return to the Bundestag. Their improved standing is almost entirely thanks to leader Christian Lindner’s charisma. An untraditional marketing campaign featured Lindner in a photo that would be at home in a fashion magazine. The tagline “impatience is also a virtue” was tantalizing. But what did it mean in political terms? </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186885/original/file-20170920-28770-ag7iwg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A non-traditional campaign poster for the FDP, features the right-of-centre party’s leader, Christian Linder. The tagline reads: Impatience is also a virtue.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unfortunately for Merkel, neither the Greens nor the FDP is polling spectacularly well, so their parliamentary factions might be too small to help her form a government. She could try to work with both of them, but Lindner has said that he can’t imagine participating in a government with the Greens and their more relaxed policy on immigration.</p>
<h2>Extreme politics pose challenges to Germany</h2>
<p>Two other parties will also be entering Parliament, though Merkel has ruled out a coalition with either of them. By occupying extremes on the political spectrum, these parties pose the greatest challenge to Germany’s political order. </p>
<p>The offspring of a leftist splinter group of the SPD and the Party of Democratic Socialism (the successor to the East German ruling party), the Left Party has been shunned by the older parties for its connections to Soviet-era politics. It has a solid core of support in the former East Germany, where it channels eastern disgruntlement with the loss of socialism. </p>
<p>But the Left Party’s attacks on capitalism have become a lot more respectable, or a lot less noticed, since a new kid arrived on the block: the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Originally focused on euroskepticism, the party has seen success by embracing German fears about immigration. </p>
<p>The AfD has no chance of winning, but has gained outsized media attention with little provocations. It currently trails only Merkel’s CDU/CSU and Schulz’s SPD in voter surveys. Its leaders have made racist and anti-Semitic statements. Like other populist movements, it has challenged the usual campaign norms, making other campaigns look stale by comparison.</p>
<p>One AfD campaign poster shows a pregnant woman with the caption “’New Germans?’ We’ll make them ourselves.” Another, picturing women from behind wearing skimpy bathing suits, reads: “ ‘Burqas?’ We’re more into bikinis.” For the anti-Islamist AfD, women are merely baby machines and sex objects.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186866/original/file-20170920-16032-1rz2ctx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A xenophobic election campaign poster for the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The tagline says: New Germans? We’ll make them ourselves. The party has seen success by embracing German fears about immigration.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The AfD’s xenophobic nationalism has struck a chord, and this hasn’t gone unnoticed by Merkel. She has tried to block further gains by the AfD by hardening her party’s stance on immigration. She called for a burqa ban, and has continued to resist calls that asylum seekers be permitted to have their immediate family members join them in Germany.</p>
<p>Whatever its make-up, the new government will face multiple challenges. Germany’s automobile industry is in the doghouse over its reluctance to part with eco-unfriendly diesel motors. The country’s relationship with Turkey is on the brink of collapse. The impact of Brexit on the European Union is still uncertain.</p>
<p>But two issues will predominate. The first is German identity. The presence of the AfD in the Bundestag will challenge Germany’s sense of itself. If Schulz’s SPD rejoins the government, the AfD could well be the largest opposition party. It will not forego any chance to hammer home its displeasure at the changing make-up of German society. </p>
<p>The other issue is Merkel herself. No other politician in Germany today has her knack for straddling the political centre and neutralizing the opposition. Only Merkel could have convinced Germans to welcome upwards of one million asylum seekers, and then still be praised for that openness while supporting a burqa ban. </p>
<p>But many think this will be her last election. Her eventual exit from the political scene will create a vacuum in her party and the country as a whole. Will extremism fill the void if the strength of Merkel’s centrism can’t be duplicated?</p>
<p>Yes, the 2017 campaign was bland. Nothing new there. But the resulting political atmosphere will be highly charged. The potential for drama is high.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James M. Skidmore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>German elections are typically tame. Jockeying for power takes place later, in negotiations for a coalition government. Could the xenophobic Alternative for Germany form the opposition?James M. Skidmore, Director, Waterloo Centre for German Studies, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.