tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/spying-1616/articlesSpying – The Conversation2024-02-05T14:19:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221652024-02-05T14:19:18Z2024-02-05T14:19:18ZSurveillance and the state: South Africa’s proposed new spying law is open for comment – an expert points out its flaws<p>In early 2021, the South African Constitutional Court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllowed=y">found</a> that the country’s <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a>, through its signals intelligence agency, the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-spy-wars-south-africa-is-not-innocent/">National Communication Centre</a>, was conducting <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/827/how-bulk-interception-works">bulk interception of electronic signals</a> unlawfully. </p>
<p>Bulk interception <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/827/how-bulk-interception-works">involves</a> the surveillance of electronic signals, including communication signals and internet traffic, on a very large scale, and often on an untargeted basis. If intelligence agents misuse this capability, it can have a massive, negative impact on the privacy of innocent people. </p>
<p>The court found that there was no law authorising the practice of bulk surveillance and limiting its potential abuse. It ordered that the agency cease such surveillance until there was. </p>
<p>In November 2023, the South African presidency responded to the ruling by tabling a bill to, among other things, plug the gaps identified by the country’s highest court. The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/B40-2023_General_Intelligence_Laws.pdf">General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill</a> sets out how the surveillance centre, based in Pretoria, the capital city, should be regulated.</p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance for over a decade and also served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>. <a href="https://intelwatch.org.za/2023/11/17/briefing-note-general-intelligence-laws-amendment-bill-gilab/">In my view</a>, the bill lacks basic controls over how this highly invasive form of surveillance should be used. This compromises citizens’ privacy and increases the potential for the state to repeat previous abuses. I discuss some of these abuses below. </p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>Intelligence agencies use bulk interception to put large numbers of people, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/everyone-is-under-surveillance-now-says-whistleblower-edward-snowden">even whole populations</a>, under surveillance. This is regardless of whether they are suspected of serious crimes or threats to national security. Their intention is to obtain strategic intelligence about <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Signals-Intelligence/Overview/">longer term external threats</a> to a country’s security, and that may be difficult to obtain by other means. </p>
<p>Former United States National Security Agency contractor <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance">Edward Snowden’s</a> leaks of classified intelligence documents showed how these capabilities had been used to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN25T3CJ/">spy on US citizens</a>. The leaks also showed that British intelligence <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/08/british-spying-tentacles-reach-across-africa-s-heads-of-states-and-business-leaders_5045668_3212.html">spied on African</a> trade negotiators, politicians and business people to give the UK government and its partners unfair trade advantages.</p>
<p>In the case of South Africa, around 2005, rogue agents in the erstwhile <a href="https://irp.fas.org/world/rsa/index.html">National Intelligence Agency</a> misused bulk interception to <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/igreport0.pdf">spy on</a> senior members of the ruling African National Congress, the opposition, business people and civil servants. This was despite the agency’s mandate being to focus on foreign threats. </p>
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<p>These rogue agents were able to abuse bulk interception because there was no law controlling and limiting how these capabilities were to be used. A 2008 commission of inquiry, appointed by then-minister of intelligence <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ronald-ronnie-kasrils">Ronnie Kasrils</a>, <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers/Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf">called</a> for this law to be enacted. The government refused to do so until it was forced to act by the Constitutional Court ruling. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Answering-Affidavit-DG-State-Security-Agency.pdf">justified</a> its refusal to act by claiming that the National Communication Centre was regulated adequately through the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act39of1994.pdf">National Strategic Intelligence Act</a>. The court rejected this argument because the act failed to address the regulation of bulk interception directly. </p>
<h2>What the Constitutional Court said</h2>
<p>The 2021 Constitutional Court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllowed=y">judgment</a> did not address whether bulk interception should ever be acceptable as a surveillance practice. However, it appeared to accept the <a href="https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Answering-Affidavit-DG-State-Security-Agency.pdf">agency’s argument</a> that it was an internationally accepted method of monitoring transnational signals. But the legitimacy of this practice is <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3115985-APPLICANTS-REPLY-to-GOVT-OBSERVATIONS-PDF.html">highly contested internationally</a>. That’s because this form of surveillance usually extends far beyond what is needed to protect national security.</p>
<p>The court <a href="https://collections.concourt.org.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.12144/36631/%5bJudgment%5d%20CCT%20278%20of%2019%20and%20279%20of%2019%20AmaBhungane%20Centre%20for%20Investigative%20Journalism%20v%20Minister%20of%20Justice%20and%20Others.pdf?sequence=42&isAllow">indicated</a> that it would want to see a law authorising bulk surveillance that sets out “the nuts and bolts of the Centre’s functions”. The law would also need to spell out in</p>
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<p>clear, precise terms the manner, circumstances or duration of the collection, gathering, evaluation and analysis of domestic and foreign intelligence.</p>
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<p>The court would also be looking for detail on</p>
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<p>how these various types of intelligence must be captured, copied, stored, or distributed.</p>
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<h2>What the amendment bill says</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/B40-2023_General_Intelligence_Laws.pdf">amendment bill</a> provides for the proper establishment of the National Communication Centre and its functions. This includes the collection and analysis of intelligence from electronic signals, and information security or cryptography. A parliamentary <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee/335/">ad hoc committee</a> has set a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-ad-hoc-committee-general-intelligence-laws-amendment-bill-extends-deadline-written-submissions#:%7E:text=Unfortunately%2C%20the%20timeline%20to%20process,over%206%20000%20written%20submissions.">deadline</a> of 15 February 2024 for public comment.</p>
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<p>The bill says, in vague terms, that the centre shall gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse relevant intelligence to identify any threat or potential threat to national security. But it doesn’t provide any of the details the court said it would be looking for. This is a major weakness.</p>
<p>The bill has one strength, though. It states that the surveillance centre needs to seek the permission of a retired judge, assisted by two interception experts, before conducting bulk interception. The judge will be appointed by the president, and the experts by the minister in charge of intelligence. The position is <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs">located in the presidency</a>.</p>
<p>However, it does not spell out the bases on which the judge will take decisions. The fact that the judge would be an executive appointment also raises doubts about his or her independence.</p>
<h2>Inadequate benchmarking</h2>
<p>The bill fails to incorporate international benchmarks on the regulation of strategic intelligence and bulk interception in a democracy. These require that a domestic legal framework provide what the European Court of Human Rights <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">has referred to</a> as “end-to-end” safeguards covering all stages of bulk interception.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-watchdog-is-failing-civil-society-how-to-restore-its-credibility-195121">South Africa's intelligence watchdog is failing civil society. How to restore its credibility</a>
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<p>The European Court <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">has stated</a> that a domestic legal framework should define</p>
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<li><p>the grounds on which bulk interception may be authorised</p></li>
<li><p>the circumstances</p></li>
<li><p>the procedures to be followed for granting authorisation </p></li>
<li><p>procedures for selecting, examining and using material obtained from intercepts</p></li>
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<p>The framework <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210077%22%5D%7D">should also set out</a> </p>
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<li><p>the precautions to be taken when communicating the material to other parties</p></li>
<li><p>limits on the duration of interception </p></li>
<li><p>procedures for the storage of intercepted material</p></li>
<li><p>the circumstances in which such material must be erased and destroyed </p></li>
<li><p>supervision procedures by an independent authority</p></li>
<li><p>compliance procedures for review of surveillance once it has been completed.</p></li>
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<p>The bill does not meet these requirements. </p>
<p>Incorporating these details in regulations would not be adequate on its own, as the bill gives the intelligence minister too much power to set the ground rules for bulk interception. These rules are also unlikely to be subjected to the same level of public scrutiny as the bill. </p>
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<p>The fact that the presidency is attempting to get away with the most minimal regulation of bulk interception raises doubt about its <a href="https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/assets/downloads/State%20Capture%20Commission%20Response.pdf">stated commitment</a> to intelligence reform to limit the scope for abuse, and parliament needs correct the bill’s clear deficiencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the British Academy and is a director of the non-governmental organisation Intelwatch. </span></em></p>The fact that the presidency is attempting to get away with minimal regulation of bulk interception raises doubt about its commitment to ending intelligence abuse.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2206272024-01-12T12:45:20Z2024-01-12T12:45:20ZSmersh: why Putin has reinstated Stalin’s notorious and much-feared anti-spy unit<p>A man under arrest by Russian internal security forces was seen confessing to a “crime”, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/smersh-stalin-counter-intelligence-unit-russian-007-wvx5jsgn3">in a video posted on January 2</a>. He had been apprehended after allegedly posting a video on social media that purportedly showed air defences near the Russian city of Belgorod. This city, on the border with Ukraine, was the target of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67880239">Ukrainian missile attacks on the same day</a>. </p>
<p>What was notable, though, about this confessional was that the man was flanked by two internal security officers who had the word <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/smersh-stalin-counter-intelligence-unit-russian-007-wvx5jsgn3">Smersh emblazoned on the backs of their jackets</a>.</p>
<p>Many people in the west remember Smersh from Ian Fleming’s early James Bond novels (and early films). It was the shadowy Soviet spy agency bent on eliminating the fictional British agent. </p>
<p>But there was nothing fictitious about Smersh itself. It was a real counterintelligence agency set up in Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union during the second world war. </p>
<p>Indeed, the name Smersh (a blend of Russian words <em>Smert’ Shpionam</em> which translates into English as “death to spies”), was <a href="https://lenta.ru/articles/2023/04/20/smersh/">supposedly coined by Stalin</a> himself. The fact that Smersh – with its alarming moniker – has reappeared may be seen as a further indication of the increasing <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-justifies-crackdown/32526230.html">clampdown on all forms of internal dissent</a> in Russia.</p>
<h2>Smersh and German spies</h2>
<p>Smersh was originally set up to focus on German spies operating within the Soviet Union during the second world war. Prior to its establishment in <a href="https://lenta.ru/articles/2023/04/20/smersh/">April 1943</a>, counterintelligence operations were within the purview of the NKVD (<em>Osobye Otdely Narodnogo Kommissariata Vnutrennikh Del</em>). </p>
<p>Thereafter, the counterintelligence reins were assumed by the 3rd Main Directorate for Counterintelligence of the <a href="http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/archival_material/Golokoz.htm">People’s Commissariat of Defence</a> (GUKR-NKO). This is the body that Stalin renamed Smersh. In Russian, the term “death to spies” is a declaration, not a description. It probably demands an exclamation mark and is a name that is inevitably <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/uk/post/26487">designed to invoke fear</a>.</p>
<p>Smersh’s main role was not just to root out spies, but also to monitor the patriotism of members of <a href="https://lenta.ru/articles/2023/04/20/smersh/">the Red Army</a> and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/260812">overall civilian population</a>. In this capacity, Smersh did invoke a significant degree of fear across the country. <a href="http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/archival_material/Golokoz.htm">Declassified archives</a> from the Federal Security Service (<em>Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti</em> or FSB – Russia’s current internal intelligence agency) shed light on Smersh’s activities. </p>
<p>Apparently, it was responsible for the identification (and inevitable death) of <a href="https://mir24.tv/articles/16408739/smersh-shpionam-kak-rabotala-luchshaya-kontrrazvedka-mira">approximately 30,000 German “spies”</a> within the Red Army, and arrested at least 594,000 more <a href="https://www.rbth.com/history/328183-death-to-spies-how-most-successful-counterintelligence-was-born">Soviet soldiers</a>. Just how many of these people were actual “spies” is very much open to doubt. </p>
<p>It was also a “vitally important instrument of political repression” among the civilian population near the front. Indeed, it was seen to be more effective as an instrument of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/260812">political repression</a> than as a counterespionage service.</p>
<h2>Smersh phased out?</h2>
<p>Smersh was disbanded <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/smersh-stalin-counter-intelligence-unit-russian-007-wvx5jsgn3">in 1946</a>. It had fulfilled its primary purpose once the war was over. But it now seems that the demands of the current war in Ukraine has led to its return. </p>
<p>In March 2023, Sergey Aksyonov, the Moscow-installed political <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5875823">leader of occupied Crimea</a>, had proposed the creation of a counterintelligence organisation reminiscent of Smersh. This was due to his concern about a purported “fifth column” operating within Crimea. </p>
<p>Aksyonov’s proposal was implemented on December 4 2023, when <a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2023/12/04/v-gosdume-zayavili-o-vozrozhdenii-sluzhby-smersh/">Lt Gen Andrei Gurulev</a>, from the Russian Duma’s committee on defence, announced the revival of Smersh in the “new territories” – that is, in those areas of Ukraine now controlled by Russian forces. </p>
<p>The new Smersh, <a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2023/12/04/v-gosdume-zayavili-o-vozrozhdenii-sluzhby-smersh/">said Gurulev</a>, would be an agency that will “work in approximately the same way in the new territories as did the old Smersh in the Soviet Union”.</p>
<p>While the actual affiliation of the officers seen in the “confessional” video noted above wearing the Smersh jackets remains uncertain, the fact that the name itself has reemerged is itself telling. There must be a significant problem to solve. </p>
<p>And, in the occupied territories and in those Russian regions close to Ukraine, there are increasing reports of behind-the-lines operations by forces, groups or individuals working for Kyiv. For example, in November 2023, <a href="https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/11/13/z-voenkori-soobschili-oprorive-diversantov-vbelgorodskuyu-oblast-a112995">numerous Russian military media outlets</a> reported instances of Ukrainian sabotage activities and operations by reconnaissance groups (known as DRGs - <em>diversionno-razvedyvatel'naya gruppa</em>). </p>
<p>The challenges to the internal security forces in Russia extend well beyond the regions close to Ukraine (such as Belgorod). There was also, in December, a reported attack on a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-conducts-new-attack-russian-railway-deep-siberia-source-2023-12-01/">railway line in Siberia</a> (presumably in an attempt to interdict Russian military supply lines).</p>
<p>The revival of the name Smersh – even if no new agency has actually been created – is patently a form of messaging. It is designed, it must be assumed, to invoke fear in the Russian people. </p>
<p>The targets will not just be potential saboteurs, but also, and perhaps more pertinently, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-justifies-crackdown/32526230.html">the entire Russian people</a>. The overall message is: “Do not do anything that undermines the country’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine; because if you do the consequences could be severe.” It could lead to <em>smert</em> – death. </p>
<p>And, while “crimes” could include posting sensitive videos, they will also include <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/07/russia-20000-activists-subject-to-heavy-reprisals-as-russia-continues-to-crack-down-on-anti-war-movement-at-home/">any criticism of the war</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/russias-putin-imposes-new-curbs-on-election-reporting">of the government </a> that may be interpreted as subversive.</p>
<p>The resurrection of the name Smersh is clearly the reaction of an increasingly oppressive state. Russian authorities, it can only be assumed, want to invoke fear again. This does not bode well for the Russian people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Miron received funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rod Thornton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Smersh was originally set up to trace German spies in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.Marina Miron, Post-doctoral Researcher, War Studies Department, King's College LondonRod Thornton, Associate Professor/Senior Lecturer in International Studies, Defense and Security., King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204732024-01-11T15:54:30Z2024-01-11T15:54:30ZSouth Africa’s new intelligence bill is meant to stem abuses – what’s good and bad about it<p>When South Africa became a constitutional democracy <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>, it replaced its apartheid-era intelligence apparatus with a new one aimed at serving the country’s new democratic dispensation. However, the regime of former president Jacob Zuma, 2009-2018, deviated from this path. It <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">abused</a> the intelligence services to serve his political and allegdly corrupt ends. Now the country is taking steps to remedy the situation.</p>
<p>In November 2023, the presidency published the <a href="https://pmg.org.za/bill/1197/">General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill</a>. It proposes overhauling the civilian intelligence agency, the <a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a>, to address the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">abuses</a>.</p>
<p>The bill is extremely broad in scope. It intends to amend 12 laws – including the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act39of1994.pdf">main</a> <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a65-020.pdf">intelligence</a> <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/120224oversight_0.PDF">laws</a> of the democratic era. </p>
<p>Parliament has set itself a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/38063/">1 March deadline</a> to complete work on the bill before it dissolves for the national election expected between <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/elections/whats-new-in-the-2024-elections-electoral-amendment-act">May and August</a>. </p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance for over a decade and also served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>In my view, some of the proposals in the bill risk replacing the old abuses with new ones. The bill seeks to broaden intelligence powers drastically but fails to address <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/38207/">longstanding weaknesses in their oversight</a>. </p>
<h2>Ending abuse</h2>
<p>The bill is meant to respond to major criticisms of the State Security Agency during Zuma’s presidency. The critics include the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel</a> and the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">Commission of Inquiry into State Capture</a>. </p>
<p>The main criticism of the panel appointed by Zuma’s successor Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018 was that under Zuma, the executive <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">repurposed</a> the agency to keep him in power, along with his supporters and others dependent on his patronage. In 2009, he merged the erstwhile domestic intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Agency, and the foreign agency, the <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs/Branches">South African Secret Service</a>, by <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/ssa-takes-shape-legislation-to-follow/">presidential proclamation</a>, to centralise intelligence. This made it easier for his regime to control intelligence to achieve nefarious ends. The state capture commission made <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">similar findings</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-surveillance-law-is-changing-but-citizens-privacy-is-still-at-risk-214508">South Africa’s surveillance law is changing but citizens’ privacy is still at risk</a>
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<p>The most important proposal in the bill is to abolish the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/42/state-security-agency-ssa">State Security Agency</a>. It is to be replaced by two separate agencies: one for foreign intelligence, and the other for domestic. The proposed new South African Intelligence Service (foreign) and the South African Intelligence Agency (domestic) will have separate mandates.</p>
<p>Abolishing the State Security Agency would be an important step towards accountability, as set out in the 1994 <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/intelligence-white-paper-01-jan-1995#:%7E:text=The%20goal%20of%20this%20White,relevant%2C%20credible%20and%20reliable%20intelligence.">White Paper on Intelligence</a>. </p>
<p>The proposed names of the envisioned new agencies have symbolic importance. They suggest a shift away from a focus on state security, or protection of those in positions of power. Instead, it puts the focus back on human security. This is the protection of broader society, as <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/intelligence-white-paper-01-jan-1995#:%7E:text=The%20goal%20of%20this%20White,relevant%2C%20credible%20and%20reliable%20intelligence.">required</a> by the 1994 White Paper.</p>
<h2>The dangers of over-broad definitions</h2>
<p>However, the new mandates given to the two new agencies, and the definitions they rely on, are so broad that abuse of their powerful spying capabilities is almost a foregone conclusion.</p>
<p>The bill says the new agencies will be responsible for collecting and analysing intelligence relating to threats or potential threats to national security in accordance with <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/chp11.html#:%7E:text=198.,to%20seek%20a%20better%20life.">the constitution</a>.</p>
<p>The bill defines national security as</p>
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<p>the capabilities, measures and activities of the state to pursue or advance any threat, any potential threat, any opportunity, any potential opportunity or the security of the Republic and its people …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This definition is extremely expansive. It allows the intelligence services to undertake any activity that could advance South Africa’s interests. This is regardless of whether there are actual national security threats. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-watchdog-is-failing-civil-society-how-to-restore-its-credibility-195121">South Africa's intelligence watchdog is failing civil society. How to restore its credibility</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This creates the potential for overlap with the mandates of other state entities. However, unlike these, the intelligence agencies will be able to work secretly, using their extremely invasive <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-spy-wars-south-africa-is-not-innocent/">surveillance</a> <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-28-the-awful-state-of-lawful-interception-in-sa-part-two-surveillance-technology-thats-above-the-law/">capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>Such capabilities should only be used in exceptional circumstances when the country is under legitimate threat. To normalise their use in everyday government functions threatens democracy.</p>
<p>Intelligence overreach has happened elsewhere. Governments are increasingly requiring intelligence agencies to ensure that policymakers enjoy <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/national-security-surveillance-in-southern-africa-9780755640225/">decision advantages</a> in a range of areas. These include bolstering trade advantages over other countries.</p>
<p>For example, whistleblower <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance">Edward Snowden’s</a> leaks of classified US and UK intelligence documents showed how the countries misused broad interpretations of national security to engage in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/25907502">industrial espionage</a>.</p>
<p>The UK government used its powerful <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/">signals intelligence capability</a> to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/08/british-spying-tentacles-reach-across-africa-s-heads-of-states-and-business-leaders_5045668_3212.html">spy on</a> African politicians, diplomats and business people during trade negotiations. These abuses mean intelligence mandates should be narrowed and state intelligence power should be reduced.</p>
<h2>Human security definition of national security</h2>
<p>The State Security Agency used its presentation to parliament on the bill to seek broad mandates. Its <a href="https://pmg.org.za/files/231129Presentation_of_GILAB_Final.pptx">presentation</a> says it seeks to give effect to the national security principles in <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/chp11.html#:%7E:text=198.,to%20seek%20a%20better%20life.">section 198</a> of the constitution. The section states that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>national security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This principle is actually based on the human security definition of national security. The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/">United Nations General Assembly</a> calls this freedom from fear and freedom from want. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/surveillance-laws-are-failing-to-protect-privacy-rights-what-we-found-in-six-african-countries-170373">Surveillance laws are failing to protect privacy rights: what we found in six African countries</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In its broadest sense, human security protects individuals from a wide range of threats and addresses their underlying drivers. These include <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231962570_Critical_Human_Security_Studies">poverty, underdevelopment and deprivation</a>. State security, on the other hand, is about protecting the state from threats. </p>
<p>If social issues are <a href="https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Waever-Securitization.pdf">securitised</a> – or treated as national security issues requiring intervention by the state’s security services – it becomes difficult to distinguish the work of these agencies from the social welfare arms of the state.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>International relations scholar Neil MacFarlane and political scientist Yuen Foong Khong <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000147585">suggested</a> in 2006 that it was possible to address this conundrum by maintaining the focus on broader society as the entity that needs protection, rather than the state. </p>
<p>Legislators need to take a <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000147585">similar approach</a> when debating the bill. They should narrow the focus of the envisaged two new agencies to domestic and foreign threats of organised violence against society, such as genocide or terrorism. By doing so, they would still be recognising the best of what human security has to offer as an intelligence doctrine, while providing a much more appropriate focus for civilian intelligence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the British Academy and is a director of Intelwatch, a non-governmental organisation devoted to strengthening democratic oversight of state and private intelligence. </span></em></p>The bill seeks greater intelligence powers but neglects oversight.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193602023-12-15T13:22:30Z2023-12-15T13:22:30ZA US ambassador working for Cuba? Charges against former diplomat Victor Manuel Rocha spotlight Havana’s importance in the world of spying<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564965/original/file-20231211-19-9ppems.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C8%2C2830%2C2074&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. Justice Department image showing Victor Manuel Rocha during a meeting with an FBI undercover employee. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/FormerAmbassadorArrested/b4d90c09c592424a9f30e01c3c7a423c/photo">U.S. Department of Justice via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The U.S. Department of Justice announced on Dec. 4, 2023, that Victor Manuel Rocha, a former U.S. government employee, had been arrested and faced federal charges for secretly acting for decades as <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-ambassador-and-national-security-council-official-charged-secretly-acting-agent">an agent of the Cuban government</a>. Rocha joined the State Department in 1981 and served for over 20 years, rising to the level of ambassador. After leaving the State Department, he served from 2006-2012 as an <a href="https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/manuel-rocha-charged-as-intelligence-mole-for-cuba-served-as-career-us-diplomat-in-latin-america/4919137/">adviser to the U.S. Southern Command</a>, a joint U.S. military command that handles operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.</em></p>
<p><em>Harvard Kennedy School intelligence and national security scholar <a href="https://calderwalton.com/">Calder Walton</a>, author of “<a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Spies/Calder-Walton/9781668000694">Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West</a>,” provides perspective on what <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-ambassador-and-national-security-council-official-charged-secretly-acting-agent">U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland described</a> as “one of the highest-reaching and longest-lasting infiltrations of the United States government by a foreign agent.”</em></p>
<h2>How common is it for spies to embed in foreign governments?</h2>
<p>Every state seeks to place spies in this way. That’s the business of human intelligence: providing insights into a foreign government’s secret intentions and capabilities. </p>
<p>What makes Rocha’s case unusual is the length of his alleged espionage on behalf of Cuba: four decades. It’s important to emphasize the word alleged here – the case is underway, and Rocha has not yet offered a defense, let alone been convicted. </p>
<p>If proved, however, Rocha’s espionage would place him among the longest-serving spies in modern times. Allowing him to operate as a spy in the senior echelons of the U.S. government for so long would represent a staggering U.S. security failure.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Victor Manuel Rocha’s arrest is the culmination of a multiyear security investigation.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What can a spy in this kind of position do?</h2>
<p>Typically, an embedded spy would be tasked by his or her recruiting intelligence service to take actions like stealing briefing papers, secret memorandums and other materials that show what decision-makers are thinking. Such work quickly resembles movie scenes – photographing secret documents, swapping information in public places or depositing it under lampposts and bridges. </p>
<p>Having an agent reach ambassador level would be a prize for any foreign intelligence service. Rocha held senior diplomatic postings in South America, including Bolivia, Argentina, Honduras, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. This would have given him, and thus his Cuban handlers, access to valuable intelligence about U.S. policy toward South America — and anything else that crossed his desk. </p>
<p>An embedded spy can also act as an “agent of influence” who works secretly to shape policies of the target government from within. This will be something to look for as the federal government discloses more information to support its charges against Rocha. </p>
<p>Presumably the U.S. intelligence community either already has carried out a damange assessment, or is urgently now conducting one, reviewing what secrets Rocha had access to during his diplomatic service – and whether, as ambassador to Bolivia, he may have shaped U.S. policy at the behest of Cuban intelligence.</p>
<h2>Has Cuban intelligence partnered with Russia, in the past or now?</h2>
<p>Cuban intelligence worked closely with the Soviets during the Cold War. After Fidel Castro took power in Cuba in 1959, Soviet intelligence maintained close personal liaisons with him. Cuba’s intelligence service, the DGI, later known as the DI, received <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Spies/Calder-Walton/9781668000694">early training and support from the KGB</a>, Russia’s former secret police and intelligence agency.</p>
<p>From the 1960s through the 1980s, Cuban intelligence operatives acted as valuable proxies for the KGB in Latin America and various African countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique. But they didn’t just follow Moscow’s direction. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://cri.fiu.edu/faculty/brian-latell/">Brian Latell</a>, a former U.S. intelligence expert on Latin America, has shown, Castro’s intelligence service was often <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781137000019/castrossecrets">far more aggressive</a> than the Soviet Union in supporting communist revolutionary movements in developing countries. Indeed, at times, the KGB had to try to <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Spies/Calder-Walton/9781668000694">rein in Cuban “adventurism</a>.” </p>
<p>One of Cuba’s greatest known espionage feats was recruiting and running a high-flying officer at the U.S. <a href="https://www.dia.mil/">Defense Intelligence Agency</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/True_Believer.html?id=cpksAAAAYAAJ">Ana Montes</a>, who spied for Cuba for 17 years before she was detected and convicted. To the best of my knowledge, there is no publicly avilable U.S. damage assessment of her espionage, but one senior CIA officer told me it was “breathtaking.”</p>
<p>Cuban intelligence recruited Montes while she was a university student and encouraged her to join the Defense Intelligence Agency. There, using a short-wave radio to pass coded messages and encrypted files to handlers, Montes betrayed a massive haul of U.S. secrets, including identities of U.S. intelligence officers and descriptions of U.S. eavesdropping facilities directed against Cuba. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Ana Montes spied for Cuba at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency for 17 years. She returned to her native Puerto Rico in 2023 after serving 20 years in prison.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Cuban and Russian intelligence agencies maintained their ties after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed. That relationship has only strengthened since Vladimir Putin, an old KGB hand, took power in the Kremlin in 1999. </p>
<p>Putin’s government reopened a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/16/russia-reopening-spy-base-cuba-us-relations-sour">massive old Soviet signals intelligence facility in Cuba</a>, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80t01782r000100710001-8">near Havana</a>. This facility had been the Soviet Union’s largest foreign signals intelligence station in the world, with aerials and antennae pointed at Florida shores just 100 miles away. </p>
<p>Soviet records reveal that Moscow <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">obtained valuable information from U.S. military bases in Florida</a>. Russia may well still be trying to try to eavesdrop on U.S. targets today from Cuba, although the U.S. government is doubtless alert to such efforts and is likely undertaking countermeasures.</p>
<p>Cuban intelligence today is also collaborating with China, which reportedly plans to open <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0">its own eavesdropping station in Cuba</a>. Beijing has significant influence over Cuba as its largest creditor and, following in Soviet footsteps, views the island as a valuable intelligence collection base and a “bridgehead” — the KGB’s old code name for Cuba — for influence in Latin America.</p>
<h2>If Rocha is proved guilty, how would he rank historically among other spies?</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen what damage Rocha may have done while allegedly working as a Cuban spy. His tenure in the U.S. government, however, would place him right up there with the most successful, and thus damaging, spies in modern history. </p>
<p>The longest-running Soviet foreign intelligence agent in Britain, Melita Norwood, <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">spied for the KGB for four decades</a>. When she was exposed in 1999, the unrepentant 87-year-old great-grandmother was quickly dubbed “the great granny spy” in the British tabloid press. </p>
<p>In the United States, the highest Soviet penetration of the executive branch was probably <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">Lauchlin Currie</a>, who was President Franklin Roosevelt’s White House assistant during World War II. Records obtained after the Soviet Union’s collapse reveal that <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/christopher-andrew/the-sword-and-the-shield/9780465010035/?lens=basic-books">Currie acted as a Soviet agent</a>. </p>
<p>The greatest damage to U.S. national security, however, was done in the 1980s and 1990s by <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/circle-treason">Aldrich Ames at the CIA</a> and <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/A-Spy-in-Plain-Sight/Lis-Wiehl/9781639364572">Robert Hanssen at the FBI</a>. Each man betrayed a wealth of secrets, including U.S. intelligence operations. The information that Ames stole for the Soviets led to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/12/naming-those-betrayed-by-ames/5ed7accf-bcdd-4b8a-9de5-75a2b422044a/">arrest and execution</a> of Soviet agents working for U.S. intelligence behind the Iron Curtain. </p>
<p>In due course, we will find out whether Rocha occupies a place of similar ignominy in U.S. history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219360/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Calder Walton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cuba gets less attention as an espionage threat than Russia or China, but is a potent player in the spy world. Its intelligence service has already penetrated the US government at least once.Calder Walton, Assistant Director, Applied History Project and Intelligence Project, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2183722023-11-29T08:52:54Z2023-11-29T08:52:54ZDenmark’s biggest spy scandal raises questions on how to try intelligence officials<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/02/scandinavian-spy-drama-the-intelligence-chief-who-came-under-state-surveillance">biggest spy scandal</a> in Denmark’s history closed not with a bang, but with a whimper. On November 1 the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/04/ex-danish-defence-minister-and-spy-chief-relieved-after-charges-dropped">Danish Supreme Court ruled</a> that a case involving leaked state secrets could go not go ahead in secret. In response, the state prosecutor <a href="https://anklagemyndigheden.dk/da/straffesagerne-mod-lars-findsen-og-claus-hjort-frederiksen-gennemfoeres-ikke">dropped the case</a>. Thus ended a three-year attempt to prosecute <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59951041">Denmark’s highest ranking spy chief</a> and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59992534">veteran defence minister</a>. But many questions remain unanswered. Among them: how can openness be ensured in a democratic society?</p>
<p>In August 2020, Lars Findsen, head of the Danish foreign intelligence service, was suspended. A <a href="https://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE13626986/overblik-tidslinje-i-fesagen/">three-judge commission</a> found him blameless, but he was indicted and arrested in December 2021 and jailed until February 2022, charged with leaking top-secret information. In December 2021, former Danish Defence Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen was also charged with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59992534">leaking state secrets</a>. An unnamed third intelligence agency worker also faced charges. All charges have now been dropped.</p>
<p>What exactly Findsen and Hjort were accused of leaking was classified. However, there was significant press speculation, including claims that the spy chief and former minister disclosed information relating to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/31/us-spied-on-merkel-top-eu-officials-through-danish-cables">classified arrangement involving Danish security services and the US National Security Agency</a>. </p>
<p>This public speculation appears to have informed the Danish Supreme Court’s decision to reject the prosecutor’s demand that the case go forward behind closed doors.</p>
<h2>A state within a state?</h2>
<p>Democratic societies require transparency in government action and procedural safeguards for criminal law defendants. But security services are necessary defence institutions that must be able to act in secret to protect the nation. </p>
<p>The prosecutor asserts it was required to drop its case because Danish courts did not offer necessary secrecy protection. It was ruled that certain case-related documents must be made available to the defence. The state prosecutor had strenuously resisted the provision of top secret documents to a defendant accused of leaking top secret documents. In its <a href="https://anklagemyndigheden.dk/da/straffesagerne-mod-lars-findsen-og-claus-hjort-frederiksen-gennemfoeres-ikke">statement withdrawing the case</a>, the prosecutor said that the lack of secrecy meant that the intelligence service would no longer permit its material to be used in the case.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“<em>The Supreme Court has ruled that Lars Findsen will be able to take classified information home, without requirements on how it should be stored or who has access to it. This will, of course, significantly increase the risk of information being spread uncontrollably. Therefore, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service has informed the prosecution service that the classified information cannot be presented as evidence in a criminal case.”</em> </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is interesting because beyond the competing questions of security, we see issues of power and authority. The prosecutor asserted it was dropping the case because it no longer had the evidence upon which the case was based, as the intelligence service had withdrawn it. This move by the intelligence service – akin to taking its ball and going home when it doesn’t like the decision of the referee – added to a concern held by some that the Danish intelligence services are developing their own self-regulating state within the Danish state.</p>
<h2>Where does Denmark go from here?</h2>
<p>Discussion regarding the case and its conclusion has been vigorous and heated across Denmark’s political divides. From right of centre, allegations have flourished charging that Findsen’s surveillance was politically motivated by centre-left political actors. Findsen himself suggests as much in his bestselling book, <em><a href="https://www.saxo.com/dk/spionchefen_bog_9788740078107">Spymasters</a></em> (in Danish: ‘Spionchefen’) published in 2022.</p>
<p>The present government, a left-right coalition, includes parties that called for the Prime Minister’s removal over this and other politicised cases in the last elections. When the present government came to power late in 2022, it announced a second three-judge commission to investigate the case. Its remit has been expanded following the dropping of the case, though <a href="https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/kristian-hegaard-konklusionerne-fra-fe-kommissionen-30-er-givet-paa-forhaand">some commentators</a> remain remain doubtful about what it can achieve. </p>
<p>There is also concern that a case of such significance has been frustrated by general procedural requirements blind to the specialised needs of security services. Some <a href="https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sO3V3nAk-m8qD36XA-69610">point to Sweden</a>, which recently held a top-secret spy trial without incurring charges that it was operating outside democratic bounds, as a counter example for how things could be done.</p>
<p>This concern is reflected in <a href="https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/pressemeddelelse/udtalelse-fra-justitsminister-peter-hummelgaard/">public remarks</a> made by Justice Minister Peter Hummelgaard, who is from the same centre-left party as the prime minister, addressing the dropped indictment:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Given the legal situation established by the Supreme Court’s rulings, it will be extremely difficult to conduct criminal proceedings for breach of professional secrecy in relation to the country’s most confidential information. Regardless of the specific cases, the government considers this to be an untenable legal situation. I have therefore asked the authorities concerned to consider appropriate legislative changes in this area.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It remains to be seen what legislative changes may be considered. The claim that the outcome indicates a system failure that must be addressed ought to be regarded with caution, however. Denmark’s Supreme Court is <a href="https://forskning.ku.dk/soeg/result/?pure=da/publications/constitutional-identity-in-denmark-extracting-constitutional-identity-in-the-context-of-a-restrained-supreme-court-and-a-strong-legislature(43c40fe2-f3e1-4371-9ced-3b647cead9a8)/export.html">notoriously restrained</a>. Even the history-making 2016 Ajos case, where the Danish Supreme Court <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/legal-disintegration-the-ruling-of-the-danish-supreme-court-in-ajos/">rejected the supremacy of EU law</a>, should be understood as a challenge of external authority. </p>
<p>Many Danish political actors are looking for a scapegoat. Making this scapegoat the Danish Supreme Court could set a dangerous political precedent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218372/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerstin Bree Carlson a reçu des financements de Nordic Research Council for Criminology.</span></em></p>The curious case of the Danish spy chief and former minister may be over, but key questions about secrecy and democracy remain.Kerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120102023-09-27T03:44:15Z2023-09-27T03:44:15ZChina’s new anti-espionage law is sending a chill through foreign corporations and citizens alike<p>Earlier this year, China <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202304/b964e9c05be34eb3a7090f2456a4e139.shtml">updated</a> its anti-espionage law amid an intensifying rivalry with the US and growing distrust of the Western-led international order. </p>
<p>The law broadens the scope beyond what it originally sought to prohibit – leaks of state secrets and intelligence – to include any “documents, data, materials, or items related to national security and interests.” </p>
<p>The law also empowers authorities with new surveillance powers. These include the ability to access people’s emails or social media accounts on electronic devices.</p>
<p>The Chinese government is clearly using the new catch-all provision to cast a wider net to identify “spies”. It is targeting not only Westerners working in China, but also Chinese nationals who work for foreign companies or organisations or interact with foreigners in any way. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1704318496942010654"}"></div></p>
<p>The law is more than just theoretical – it has teeth. Last month, a new national campaign was launched with rewards of up to <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-04/10/c_1120777169.htm">500,000 renminbi</a> (just over A$100,000) for anyone reporting suspicious individuals or suspected espionage activities. </p>
<p>Red banners have started appearing on Chinese streets, proclaiming </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Implement the new anti-espionage law, mobilise collective efforts to safeguard national security. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Posters with a hotline number for reporting suspicious individuals can now be found on public transport, as well.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hotline number for reporting suspicious activities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These visible signs serve as reminders that spies could be anywhere, potentially feeding sensitive information to foreign entities that pose threats to China’s national security and interests.</p>
<h2>Implications of the new law</h2>
<p>The new law has sent a chill through multinational corporations, Chinese companies and other organisations. </p>
<p>State-owned companies or those affiliated with the government are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b869421-10fd-41e7-8280-5d09a224062f">distancing themselves</a> from
multinationals offering legal, investment and consultancy services, fearful of being associated with foreign entities.</p>
<p>Multinationals themselves were once welcomed with open arms to help accelerate China’s economic and technological development. Now, they find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations governing the cross-border transfer of data and other information. Many are considering <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2f52965f-3bdb-4223-891b-e2208ad2e16e">decoupling</a> their data and IT systems from China.</p>
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<p>From an individual standpoint, anyone with foreign affiliations, including those who have returned from overseas, feel as if they are on a kind of community “watch list” upon arrival in China. </p>
<p>Some Chinese firms indicate in <a href="https://www.toutiao.com/article/7272284502448407055/?log_from=d0901d6b2a217_1693371484238">recruitment</a> drives for new employees they will not consider applicants who have returned from certain overseas regions. The perception is they may have been exposed to foreign forces who use money, friendship or even romance to coerce them into becoming an undercover agent or informant. </p>
<p>An invisible net has been cast over every stratum of Chinese society. Many Chinese people will no doubt become more hesitant in their interactions, cautious in their communication and sceptical in their collaborations. This will only further encourage people to retreat into silence or resort to coded language in both face-to-face conversations and social media. </p>
<p>And those perceived as having divergent political or ideological views will especially be under scrutiny. This includes private businesspeople, entrepreneurs and those working in non-government sectors who openly voice political or ideological values that go against the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The expansive nature of the law evokes memories of the Cultural Revolution, an era in which little trust existed in society and even among family members. </p>
<p>An unsettling divide is emerging today between those in governmental circles and everyone else. Having a foreign diploma or other affiliation was once seen as a positive, offering one a different perspective and international experience. Now, however, it could be seen as a liability or even a crime.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-china-may-be-ending-an-agreement-on-science-and-technology-cooperation-a-policy-expert-explains-what-this-means-for-research-212084">The US and China may be ending an agreement on science and technology cooperation − a policy expert explains what this means for research</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<h2>Ambiguity has risks</h2>
<p>The first iteration of the anti-espionage law was enacted in 2015 and was aimed at bolstering national security and generally protecting against espionage activities detrimental to the country’s interests. </p>
<p>The updated law comes in a changed world. The rivalry between the US and China has escalated in recent years in trade, technology, defence and influence over global institutions. Both nations are actively engaging in intelligence operations to understand each other’s capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-indication-of-aliens-spy-balloon-saga-continues-to-surprise-amid-rising-us-china-tension-199769">'No indication of aliens': spy balloon saga continues to surprise amid rising US–China tension</a>
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</em>
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<p>Because the new law is so expansive and ambiguous, however, the implementation and enforcement could be difficult. And it could diverge significantly from the initial objectives of lawmakers. </p>
<p>When laws are ambiguous, it leaves ample room for interpretation and potential exploitation. The lack of clarity with the revised anti-espionage law could give rise to witch hunts, leaving people vulnerable to accusations that lack substantial evidence. The ripple effect could extend beyond China’s borders, affecting academic exchanges, technological cooperation and diplomatic relations. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1704405881591619992"}"></div></p>
<p>If collaboration with the outside world becomes secondary to perceived threats, it could also deter both foreign investment and domestic private enterprises in China, stifling economic growth. </p>
<p>At a time when the Chinese economy is grappling with domestic challenges and an increasingly hostile global environment, this could hasten the “decoupling” from China that many in the West are advocating for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Yue Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The revised law is targeting not only Westerners working in China, but also Chinese nationals who work for foreign companies or organisations or interact with foreigners in any way.Marina Yue Zhang, Associate Professor, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134862023-09-13T17:27:30Z2023-09-13T17:27:30ZHow action over parliamentary spying scandal could affect the UK’s economic relationship with China<p>The arrest of a parliamentary researcher on suspicion of spying for China has fuelled calls in Westminster for tougher action against China by the UK government. This could impact the UK economy since China is an important trading partner and industry investor. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202309/t20230911_11141145.html#:%7E:text=The%20allegation%20that%20China%20spies%20on%20the%20UK%20is%20entirely%20groundless.">Chinese officials</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-66773052">the researcher</a> have both denied the spying claims. But prime minister Rishi Sunak <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/pm-conveys-to-china-significant-concerns-about-interference-in-uk-parliamentary-democracy-no-10-12958311">reportedly ticked off</a> his Chinese counterpart, premier Li Qiang, on the sidelines of the G20 in New Delhi last weekend, accusing China of undermining parliamentary democracy. </p>
<p>Deputy prime minister Oliver Dowden has also said there is a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-66780515#:%7E:text=Mr%20Dowden%20said%20there%20was%20a%20%22strong%20case%20to%20be%20made%22%20for%20this">“strong case” for the government</a> to officially designate China as a threat to the UK, but that it was unrealistic to “completely disengage”.</p>
<p>This is an early Christmas present for <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/not-just-china-spy-scandal-7-flashpoint-britain-uk-tory-hawks/">the hawkish side of the Conservative party</a> which has called for the UK to take a tougher stance on China for several years. A more critical engagement with China is long overdue, but clumsy mitigation policies won’t safeguard the UK’s relationship with China – economic or otherwise.</p>
<p>Leaving aside the political theatrics, little is known yet of the nature of the charges of the two persons arrested in March under the Official Secrets Act over alleged espionage-related offences. One of these people was a parliamentary researcher whose alleged identity was recently published in the media. But China is unlikely to ignore such a slight. </p>
<p>So what could this mean for British firms and the UK economy? A look at trade, investment and broader UK cooperation with China gives a sense of the economic hit the UK might sustain from any action against China.</p>
<h2>What does the UK import from China?</h2>
<p>China is the UK’s <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1178757/china-trade-and-investment-factsheet-2023-08-18.pdf">fourth largest trading partner</a>, accounting for <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/datasets/uktotaltradeallcountriesseasonallyadjusted">6.1% of total UK trade</a> in goods and services, which was £107.6 billion over the 12 months to the end of March 2023. Of this, the UK exported £38 billion of goods and services to China, but <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/trade-and-investment-factsheets-latest-update/latest-trade-and-investment-factsheets-collection">imported £69.5 billion from China</a>. </p>
<p>In other words, the UK imports substantially more from China, meaning it has an overall trade deficit with the Asian country.</p>
<p>This deficit, however, is concentrated in goods rather than services. China is the UK’s second largest source of physical product imports, accounting for 10.4%. But as a destination for exports, it is the UK’s fifth largest export market, taking 6.6% of British goods. </p>
<p>Major UK imports from China include telecoms and sound equipment, office machinery, clothing and cars. The leading UK exports to China include cars, crude oil, pharmaceuticals and scientific instruments. The largest category, unspecified goods (41%), could include products like Scottish salmon, whiskey and luxury clothing from British brands like Burberry.</p>
<h2>How could China squeeze the UK economy?</h2>
<p>Services are a bright spot for UK exports to China. At £9.9 billion, the UK latest annual services exports are three times the value of those China sells to the UK. Especially important are <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/uk-china-trade-and-investment-analysis-2023-updates/#:%7E:text=asset%20management%20powerhouse.-,The%20UK%2DChina%20Strategic%20Plan%20for%20Financial%20Services,-Because%20of%20the">financial services</a> and educational services. More than <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/372922/number-of-chinese-students-in-the-united-kingdom/">150,000 Chinese students are studying in the UK</a> right now. </p>
<p>These students directly and indirectly support local economies. Universities and their host towns, cities or areas are typically heavily reliant on student spending in general, not just those from China and other countries.</p>
<p>The recent spying allegations could encourage Chinese government retaliation against the UK comparable to <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-australia-bilateral-ties-opportunities-challenges-latest-updates/">action it has taken against Australia</a> in recent years. This included restricting imports, which would hurt and widen the merchandise deficit. Australia <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference">toughed it out</a>, and China softly wound back its restrictions over the past year. </p>
<p>But UK industries aren’t as heavily dependent on Chinese demand as some of those in Australia such as <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-to-lift-restrictions-on-australian-coal-imports/#:%7E:text=The%20significance%20of%20Australian%20coal%20to%20China">coal mining</a>, <a href="https://www.trademinister.gov.au/minister/don-farrell/media-release/statement-reinstatement-barley-exporters-china#:%7E:text=Prior%20to%20the%20imposition%20of,barley%20with%20China%20effectively%20ceased.">barley</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/australian-wine-industry-faces-hangover-chinas-high-tariffs-2023-08-18/#:%7E:text=The%20curbs%20battered%20the%20wine,pandemic%20began%20to%20take%20hold.">wine production</a>. Also, exports of UK services could be less affected by government action because Chinese people’s demand for things like education is so strong government action may not dull this demand.</p>
<p>It’s more difficult to predict the impact of potential government action on foreign direct investment (FDI). This is when companies invest in other countries, often encouraged by subsidies or tax breaks. </p>
<p>The total stock of FDI into the UK in 2021 was <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8534/#:%7E:text=FDI%20in%20the%20UK&text=The%20value%20of%20foreign%20direct,up%20very%20slightly%20from%202020.">£2 trillion</a>, of which a third comes from the US, while <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1178757/china-trade-and-investment-factsheet-2023-08-18.pdf">China accounts for just 0.3%</a>. But how much investment comes into the UK from China via tax havens and third countries is a big unknown. Total Chinese money invested in firms, real estate and other ventures in the UK could well exceed official accounting.</p>
<p>Brexit has already been a major disincentive for Chinese state and private investors. The electric vehicle maker BYD, now the world’s largest producer, shied away from the UK <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/mar/12/china-byd-blames-brexit-as-it-rules-out-uk-for-first-european-car-plant">for that very reason</a>. </p>
<p>If the UK is seen as an increasingly hostile environment for China, it won’t help encourage Chinese FDI. For the more hawkish on China that might seem like a good thing. But this is short sighted. Decoupling from China is neither feasible nor desirable. </p>
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<img alt="Two speech bubbles filled with British flag and China flag, dark clouds in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C5946%2C2901&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548069/original/file-20230913-23-e0gdrf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Officials believe the UK and China should keep talking.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/uk-china-brexit-negotiation-talks-3d-1621857976">Ink Drop/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Managing the UK’s relationship with China</h2>
<p>UK foreign secretary James Cleverly subtly captured the problem when <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-visits-beijing-to-further-british-interests">he said before a recent visit to China</a> that the challenge was to “manage our relationship with China across a range of issues”, citing climate change, pandemic prevention, economic instability and nuclear proliferation. “China’s size, history, and global significance means they cannot be ignored,” he said, adding that China had to fulfil its international commitments and obligations.</p>
<p>There are very real risks to UK security from China. But addressing this will require a deft hand by policymakers. Continued engagement is needed with China if the UK is to tap into the technological advances it has made in green technologies and other sectors vital to an advanced economy. </p>
<p>China needs to be kept inside the tent. Left outside, it will become so much more difficult to observe, let alone to share in economic developments that might be beneficial for the west. Sensible risk mitigation and collaboration strategies will be much more fruitful for the UK economy than name calling.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Morgan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As a key UK trading partner, the government should tread carefully when addressing the very real risks posed by China.Stephen Morgan, Professor of Chinese Economic History (Emeritus), University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099202023-07-19T14:17:08Z2023-07-19T14:17:08ZMission Impossible: Dead Reckoning – a modern spy film that knows the value of old tech<p><em>Warning: this article contains spoilers for Mission Impossible: Dead Reckoning Part One.</em></p>
<p>Mission Impossible: Dead Reckoning Part One is a pulsatingly entertaining spy film that combines frenetic action, globetrotting visuals and spectacular set pieces. </p>
<p>The film is the latest in a near 30-year franchise (itself an adaptation of a popular 1960s <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0060009/">TV spy series</a>), Mission Impossible is characterised by state-of-the-art <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQhsns4ejYc">surveillance systems</a>. Dead Reckoning confronts the implications of over-reliance on digital technology.</p>
<p>The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) as a fundamental threat to concepts of truth and reality provides the film with an intriguing (and timely) central antagonist. </p>
<p>The team must go back to basics and rediscover the merits of physical archives, analogue communication systems and personal friendships to thwart the relentless information-gathering algorithm of the all-seeing “Entity”.</p>
<h2>Digital heritage</h2>
<p>Tom Cruise reprises his role as Ethan Hunt, a now-ageing spy tasked with finding the (literal) key to the AI mainframe. His mission briefing is refreshingly low-key, concealed within an Uber Eats-style food delivery.</p>
<p>The package contains an old-school Dictaphone cassette tape and several printed photographs. It is a nod to the original TV series and a throwback to the pre-digital age of cold war spycraft. It’s a far cry from the technological innovations of previous Mission Impossible films and an early indication of the intrinsic value of the traditional objects and methods of espionage.</p>
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<p>With cloud-based information systems developing sentience and playing havoc with global security, governments and intelligence agencies must revert to retro tools to create physical records. The humble typewriter – a mainstay of <a href="http://journal.wrocah.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/WRoCAH-JOURNAL-ISSUE-7-SUMMER.pdf">20th century western spy films</a> – makes a comeback, generating mountains of paperwork as the authorities attempt to preserve sensitive data, which is now compromised by online connectivity.</p>
<p>The ongoing value of seemingly obsolete technology is a key theme in Dead Reckoning, despite the franchise’s reputation for high-tech inventions. At one stage, an analogue satellite previously donated to a local weather station is re-appropriated for an operations control room. This allows surveillance to continue offline, but also indicates how extensively military technologies have been assimilated into public and civilian life.</p>
<p>The cigarette lighter that Hunt uses throughout the film as a mark of his identity is an incongruous piece of kit for a dedicated nonsmoker. It recalls the famous cigarette lighter belonging to George Smiley in John Le Carré’s novel Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, which is a symbol of the character’s all-too-human flaws. Hunt’s own lighter is an emblem of his ingenuity.</p>
<h2>Missed connections</h2>
<p>The human capacity to make mistakes, act illogically and think creatively gives the team a fighting chance to outsmart the machine. Friendship and loyalty are shown to be both a weakness and a strength when trying to stay one step ahead of the calculated manipulations of Entity.</p>
<p>Disconnected from online systems, Hunt and his team must rediscover their offline bonds. They are forced to rely on each other’s emotional decision making – with all the associated flaws, inconsistencies and contradictions – to get them through. Ultimately, it is Hunt’s capacity for mercy that throws a metaphorical spanner into the works and (for now) allows him to retake control of the narrative.</p>
<p>Dead Reckoning Part One has been released against the backdrop of Twitter’s transition from a functioning social platform to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-meta-launches-its-threads-microblogging-site-twitter-is-being-kicked-while-its-down-209070">glitch-ridden shadow</a> of its former self. The film makes the case for finding alternative, offline ways of building and nurturing relationships. It points to the limitations of digital networks and the value of human connections.</p>
<p>By drawing attention to the technological heritage of typewriters, cassette tapes and analogue satellites, the film also acknowledges its own place in the spy genre. Mission Impossible has been going for 30 years and even if newer spy franchises come along, this one isn’t outdated yet. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Edwards does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cutting edge gadgets are unreliable in a world under the threat of artificial intelligence.Catherine Edwards, PhD Candidate, English and Related Literature, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079812023-06-21T12:29:26Z2023-06-21T12:29:26ZChina and the US are locked in struggle – and the visit by Secretary of State Blinken is only a start to improving relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533013/original/file-20230620-19384-h5r2uh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C24%2C5442%2C3556&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Secretary of State Antony Blinken joins government officials from the U.S. and China during a meeting with China's President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 19, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-attends-a-meeting-with-news-photo/1258808670?adppopup=true"> Leah Millis/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the weeks building up to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China on June 18-19, 2023, there was a lot of uncertainty in both the United States and China about the purpose and possible outcomes of the visit. When Blinken left Washington, D.C., it wasn’t even clear if he would be able to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He did.</p>
<p>The meeting took place just two weeks after <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">a Chinese naval vessel crossed</a> within 150 yards of a U.S. destroyer, in what the U.S. military calls an “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/chinese-warship-cuts-off-us-navy-ship-marking/story?id=99817905">an unsafe maritime interaction</a>” in the Taiwan strait. It was not an isolated incident. Three weeks before Blinken and Xi sat down, a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/30/united-states-calls-out-china-unnecessarily-aggressive-maneuver-00099309">Chinese fighter jet came dangerously close</a> to a U.S. surveillance plane over the South China sea.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, these two close interactions heightened tensions at a time when <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/06/us-china-relations-just-got-more-fragile.html">relations between the two countries were already strained</a>. </p>
<p>President Joe <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/20/us/politics/biden-china-spy-balloon.html">Biden’s characterization of Xi as a dictator</a> during a June 20, 2023, campaign fundraiser – just a day after Blinken returned to the U.S. – shows just how rocky the relationship is between the two countries. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/06/20/biden-xi-jinping-dictator-china/">China is already reacting to the remarks</a>, labeling them “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=PwGGCkUAAAAJ">scholar of international relations</a> specializing in Indo-Pacific security issues, I closely follow U.S-China relations, including territorial and maritime disputes.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-military-exercises-60af099f1526c6fce180d217e97788ad">U.S. routinely sails ships and flies planes</a> in the disputed waters and airspace in the South China Sea to indicate the right of free transit mandated by international law. But <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">China claims both areas</a> as its own territorial waters and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/china-defends-its-actions-in-warship-incident-involving-u-s-canada-in-taiwan-strait">denounces U.S. activities</a> in what China sees as its domestic domain. </p>
<h2>The bar was fairly low</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/secretary-of-state-mike-pompeos-visit-to-china-kicks-off-with-a-frosty-exchange.html">last visit by a U.S. secretary of state</a> to China was in 2018, and dialogue has been limited on multiple levels since then. While the relationship between the U.S. and China has grown increasingly tense and uncertain for several years, the past year has seen the worst relations since <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/15/us-recognizes-communist-china-dec-15-1978-1060168">diplomatic relations began in 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the continued <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/us-trade-with-china">economic connections between the two</a> powers, political and security relations have soured dramatically. Both countries have repeatedly condemned each other for a variety of reasons, resulting in the current tensions.</p>
<p>While not likely to become another cold war, the U.S.-China relationship is certainly an intense rivalry. It is in this context that Blinken visited China.</p>
<p>The Blinken visit opened the lines of communication for the more serious talks the two countries must have in order to lower tensions. But in other ways, it was more symbolic and part of the tenuous, uncertain relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries. </p>
<p>The official reason for the trip was mainly <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/">to reestablish regular communication</a>. But restarting regular communication, which Blinken and Xi said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-blinken-xi-biden-ce8bf13e5a02977a5291c001761ae0b3">the countries are willing to do</a>, made the talks a successful first step in the long walk back to diplomacy.</p>
<p>Now, the tedious work begins. Other U.S. officials such as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, climate envoy John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin – whose request to meet with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu at a security conference in Singapore in May 2023 <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-rejects-meeting-defense-chiefs-lloyd-austin-li-shangfu-rcna86732">was rejected by China</a> – will be able to more easily meet with their counterparts. On their agendas will be issues ranging from concerns about imports and exports to avoiding armed conflict. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2728%2C1848&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men, wearing suits and ties stand side-by-side and shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2728%2C1848&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets China’s President Xi Jinping in Beijing on June 19, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-shakes-hands-with-chinas-news-photo/1258808175?adppopup=true">Leah Millis/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Growing list of issues</h2>
<p>It will be a while before we know whether Blinken’s main goal of arranging a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/19/us-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-to-meet-chinas-xi-jinping.html">meeting between Xi and Biden</a> later in 2023 was successful. </p>
<p>I believe the diplomatic visit was a good step toward addressing a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28673.6">growing list of bilateral issues</a> that need attention. But it will take more time and require much more communication before a clearer picture of the status of the U.S.-Chinese relationship appears.</p>
<p>This will require continual dialogue, not the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/05/30/unstable-us-china-relationship">on-again, off-again meetings</a> that have been happening in the past five years. Even then, while the U.S. government <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/">appears to be direct and transparent</a> about its foreign policy – <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">following through with stated policies</a> in its actions – the Chinese approach to diplomacy is opaque and <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_complicated_foreign_policy311562">frequently features a disconnect </a> between what is claimed versus what is done. The Chinese government rarely publicizes foreign policy documents, and speeches by government officials tend to be deliberately ambiguous and nonspecific. Uncertainty is the name of the game for at least one side in this rivalry.</p>
<h2>Issues at stake</h2>
<p>The list of bilateral issues and disputes between the two countries is extensive: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">U.S. support for Taiwan</a>, which <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220802_10732293.html">China contends</a> “seriously infringes upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” </p></li>
<li><p>Chinese <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48601793">territorial and maritime claims</a> in the East China Sea and South China Sea <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html">conflict with the U.S. position</a> that international law guarantees freedom of the sea. </p></li>
<li><p>China is angry over <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/maintaining-military-edge-over-china-pub-8690">national security-based restrictions</a> by the U.S. and several allies on the importation of Chinese-made semiconductor chips and exports of certain technologies to China.</p></li>
<li><p>U.S. condemnation of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-debt-banking-loans-financial-developing-countries-collapse-8df6f9fac3e1e758d0e6d8d5dfbd3ed6">Chinese economic coercion</a> in countries around the world – providing loans at low rates, then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html">taking control of a port</a> or other infrastructure when the country cannot repay the loan in time. </p></li>
<li><p>U.S. criticism of China’s human rights violations <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/31/asia/un-xinjiang-china-bachelet-report-intl/index.html">in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The existing Chinese spy base in Cuba, which, according to The New York Times, might <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/10/us/politics/china-spy-base-cuba.html">allow China to intercept electronic signals</a> from U.S. military and commercial buildings.</p></li>
<li><p>Recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-navy-releases-video-chinese-warships-unsafe-interaction-near-taiwan-2023-06-05/">near misses between U.S. and Chinese vessels in the Taiwan Strait</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/08/asia/south-china-sea/">South China Sea</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The overarching point of contention for the U.S. is China’s implied intention to displace the U.S. and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">become the world’s most powerful</a> country. The current <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">U.S. national security strategy</a> names China as the most significant security challenge to the U.S. in our time.</p>
<h2>China’s superpower ambitions</h2>
<p>It’s a classic power struggle. The U.S. views China as a direct threat to its position as the lone superpower, with China attempting to replace the U.S.-led world order. The key questions are whether China will displace the U.S., when, and whether peacefully or by military force.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59600475">speed of the Chinese military buildup</a> over the past decade, both conventional and nuclear, is remarkable and daunting. While neither country wants a war, a potential military clash over Taiwan, in the East China Sea or the South China Sea could escalate, forcing U.S. officials to make difficult decisions about using force against China, which would have massive consequences felt around the world. </p>
<p>Even if diplomatic relations improve, the official U.S. national security strategy citing China as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the U.S. will remain as the predominant foreign policy issue of our time. This is the <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/us-and-china-hold-top-level-talks-but-their-rivalry-remains-unchecked/">century of a U.S.-China rivalry</a>, with tensions being the only certainty of the relationship. </p>
<p>One visit by the U.S. secretary of state will not solve that problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Krista Wiegand is an Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum, and was a Visiting Scholar at the East-West Center and a Fulbright Senior Fellow in the Philippines. </span></em></p>The US and China are engaged in a classic power struggle. The question is, who will come out on top?Krista Wiegand, Professor of Political Science, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2054052023-05-11T05:16:47Z2023-05-11T05:16:47ZIt’s being called Russia’s most sophisticated cyber espionage tool. What is Snake, and why is it so dangerous?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525550/original/file-20230511-15-nzjt8r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C41%2C1016%2C981&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock AI</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like most people I check my emails in the morning, wading through a combination of work requests, spam and news alerts peppering my inbox.</p>
<p>But yesterday brought something different and deeply disturbing. I noticed an alert from the American Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (<a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories">CISA</a>) about some very devious <a href="https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=what+is+malware&qft=+filterui:duration-short&view=detail&mid=FE061B5C45296C83E456FE061B5C45296C83E456&&FORM=VRDGAR&ru=/videos/search?&q=what+is+malware&qft=+filterui:duration-short&FORM=VRFLTR">malware</a> that had infected <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-129a">a network of computers</a>.</p>
<p>The malware in question is Snake, a cyber espionage tool deployed by Russia’s Federal Security Service that has been around for about 20 years. </p>
<p>According to CISA, the Snake implant is the “most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia’s Federal Security Service for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets”.</p>
<h2>The stealthy Snake</h2>
<p>The Russian Federal Security Service developed the Snake network in 2003 to conduct global <a href="https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/cyber-espionage">cyber espionage</a> operations against NATO, companies, research institutions, media organisations, financial services, government agencies and more. </p>
<p>So far, it has been detected on Windows, Linux and macOS computers in more than 50 countries, including <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/advisories/hunting-russian-intelligence-snake-malware">Australia</a>. </p>
<p>Elite Russian cyber espionage teams put the malware on a target’s computer, copy sensitive information of interest and then send it to Russia. It’s a simple concept, cloaked in masterful technical design.</p>
<p>Since its creation, Russian cyber spies have regularly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network-controlled">upgraded the Snake malware</a> to avoid detection. The current version is cunning in how it <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network-controlled">persistently</a> evades detection and protects itself.</p>
<p>Moreover, the Snake network can disrupt critical <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-110a">industrial control systems</a> that manage our buildings, hospitals, energy systems, water and wastewater systems, among others – so the risks went beyond just intelligence collection. </p>
<p>There are warnings that in a couple of years bad actors may gain the capability to hijack critical Australian infrastructure and cause unprecedented harm by interfering <a href="https://ia.acs.org.au/article/2021/industrial-cyber-attacks-will-kill-someone-by-2025.html">with physical operations</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1656064279148396546"}"></div></p>
<h2>Snake hunting</h2>
<p>On May 9, the US Department of Justice <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network-controlled">announced</a> the Federal Bureau of Investigation had finally disrupted the global Snake <a href="https://www.digitalcitizen.life/what-is-p2p-peer-to-peer/">peer-to-peer network</a> of infected computers.</p>
<p>The covert network allowed infected computers to collect sensitive information. The Snake malware then disguised the sensitive information through sophisticated <a href="https://us.norton.com/blog/privacy/what-is-encryption">encryption</a>, and sent it to the spy masters.</p>
<p>Since the Snake malware used custom <a href="https://www.comptia.org/content/guides/what-is-a-network-protocol">communication protocols</a>, its covert operations remained undetected for decades. You can think of custom protocols as a way to transmit information so it can go undetected.</p>
<p>However, with Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise in cybersecurity activity over the past few years, the FBI has increased its monitoring of Russian cyber threats.</p>
<p>While the Snake malware is an elegantly designed piece of code, it is complex and needs to be precisely deployed to avoid detection. According to the Department of Justice’s press release, Russian cyber spies were careless in more than a few instances and did not deploy it as designed. </p>
<p>As a result, the Americans discovered Snake, and crafted a response.</p>
<h2>Snake bites</h2>
<p>The FBI received a court order to <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network-controlled">dismantle Snake</a> as part of an operation code-named MEDUSA.</p>
<p>They developed a tool called PERSEUS that causes the Snake malware to <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network-controlled">disable</a> itself and stop further infection of other computers. The <a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/advisories/hunting-russian-intelligence-snake-malware">PERSEUS</a> tool and instructions are freely available to guide detection, patching and remediation.</p>
<p>The Department of Justice <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-disruption-snake-malware-network-controlled">advises</a> that PERSEUS only stops this malware on computers that are already infected; it does not <a href="https://blogs.iuvotech.com/what-is-patching-and-why-is-it-important">patch</a> vulnerabilities on other computers, or search for and remove other malware. </p>
<p>Even though the Snake network has been disrupted, the department warned <a href="https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/learn/vulnerability-vs-threat-vs-risk.html">vulnerabilities</a> may still exist for users, and they should follow safe <a href="https://www.digitalguardian.com/blog/what-cyber-hygiene-definition-cyber-hygiene-benefits-best-practices-and-more">cybersecurity hygiene</a> practices. </p>
<h2>Snake bite treatment</h2>
<p>Fortunately, effective cybersecurity hygiene isn’t overly complicated. <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en/security/business/microsoft-digital-defense-report-2022">Microsoft</a> has identified five activities that protect against 98% of cybersecurity attacks, whether you’re at home or work.</p>
<ol>
<li><p><a href="https://www.onelogin.com/learn/what-is-mfa">Enable multi-factor authentication</a> across all your online accounts and apps. This login process requires multiple steps such as entering your password, followed by a code received through a SMS message – or even a biometric fingerprint or secret question (favourite drummer? Ringo!).</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/3695697/what-is-zero-trust-and-why-is-it-so-important.html">Apply “zero trust” principles</a>. It’s best practice to authenticate, authorise and continuously validate all system users (internal and external) to ensure they have the right to use the systems. The zero trust approach should be applied whether you’re using computer systems at work or home.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.cyber.gov.au/protect-yourself/securing-your-devices/how-secure-your-device/anti-virus-software">Use modern anti-malware</a> programs. Anti-malware, also known as antivirus software, protects and removes malware from our systems, big and small.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/5-reasons-software-updates-are-important">Keep up to date</a>. Regular system and software updates not only help keep new applications secure, but also patch vulnerable areas of your system.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://geekflare.com/data-backup-best-practices/">Protect your data</a>. Make a copy of your important data, whether it’s a physical printout or on an external device disconnected from your network, such as an external drive or USB.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>Like most Australians, I have been a victim of a cyberattack. And between the recent <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-21/optus-hack-class-action-customer-privacy-breach-data-leaked/102247638">Optus</a> data breach and the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-15/woolworths-mydeal-cyber-attack-hack-information-leaked/101539686">Woolworths MyDeal</a> and <a href="https://www.afr.com/technology/cyber-experts-worry-as-medibank-puts-hack-behind-it-20230223-p5cn10">Medibank</a> attacks, people are catching on to just how dire the consequences of these events can be. </p>
<p>We can expect malicious cyberattacks to increase in the future, and their impact will only become more severe. The Snake malware is a sophisticated piece of software that raises yet another concern. But in this case, we have the antidote and can protect ourselves by proactively following the above steps. </p>
<p>If you have concerns about the Snake malware you can read more <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/3389044/us-agencies-and-allies-partner-to-identify-russian-snake-malware-infrastructure/">here</a>, or speak to the fine folks at your IT service desk.</p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/holding-the-world-to-ransom-the-top-5-most-dangerous-criminal-organisations-online-right-now-163977">Holding the world to ransom: the top 5 most dangerous criminal organisations online right now</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205405/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Skulmoski works at Bond University and having it's academics comment on the news elevates Bond University's reputation. </span></em></p>The Snake network has been detected in more than 50 countries, including Australia.Greg Skulmoski, Associate Professor, Project Management, Bond UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040832023-04-19T17:34:38Z2023-04-19T17:34:38ZRussia’s legal interpretation of ‘espionage’ has broadened since the Soviet era – as the case of Evan Gershkovich shows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521872/original/file-20230419-26-wxakq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C0%2C5439%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich faces up to 20 years behind bars on espionage charges.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-wall-street-journal-reporter-evan-gershkovich-the-us-news-photo/1251953016?adppopup=true">Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The case of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/wsj-reporter-evan-gershkovich-detained-russia-cd03b0f3">Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich</a>, who on April 18, 2023, saw his appeal against investigative detention on spying charges <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/18/europe/evan-gershkovich-appeals-detention-russia-intl/index.html">turned down by a Russian court</a>, has echoes of an earlier era. Not <a href="https://theconversation.com/reporting-is-not-espionage-but-history-shows-that-journalists-doing-the-former-get-accused-of-the-latter-203020">since the Cold War</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-reporter-gershkovich-appeal-against-arrest-detention-russian-jail-2023-04-17/">the Kremlin noted</a>, has an American journalist been charged with espionage in the former Soviet Union.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/william-e-butler">longtime specialist on Russia’s legal system</a>, I am aware that the charges levied against Gershkovich are a product of modern Russia – and that could have worrying consequences for the journalist.</p>
<h2>Foreign agents and state secrets</h2>
<p>The legislation on espionage in Russia is no longer the same as that of the former Soviet Union. On July 14, 2022, <a href="https://www.lawbookexchange.com/pages/books/73884/william-e-butler/criminal-code-of-the-russian-federation-september-2022">Article 276 of the Russian Criminal Code</a> amended the definition of “espionage.” </p>
<p>Under the revised version of Article 276, espionage now constitutes “the transfer, collecting, stealing, or keeping for the purpose of transfer to a foreign State, international or foreign organization, or of their representatives, of information comprising a state secret.”</p>
<p>If such an act was committed by a foreign citizen or stateless person – that is, a person having no citizenship – then it constitutes espionage, the code provides.</p>
<p>This amended text broadened the definition considerably. The Gershkovich case appears to be the first involving a journalist under the expanded definition.</p>
<p>Precisely what information Gershkovich is believed by the Russian authorities to have acquired or collected is not a matter of public record. The FSB, Russia’s security service, has put the accusations in fairly vague terms, saying the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/30/russia-arrests-wall-street-journal-reporter-on-espionage-charges-evan-gershkovich">journalist was caught</a> “collecting classified information” on Russia’s “military industrial complex” <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/who-is-evan-gershkovich-what-does-russia-accuse-him-2023-04-18/#:%7E:text=The%20FSB%20security%20service%20said,a%20steakhouse%20in%20the%20city.">during a trip to Ekaterinburg</a>, around 1,400 kilometers (880 miles) east of Moscow. The FSB added that Gershkovich was “acting on instructions from the American side.”</p>
<p>The journalist’s employer, The Wall Street Journal, has <a href="https://time.com/6267183/evan-gershkovich-arrested-wsj-russia-espionage/">vigorously denied</a> that its reporter was involved in espionage. The U.S. State Department <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/10/wsj-reporter-wrongfully-detained-russia-00091293">has likewise said</a> that Gershkovich has been “wrongfully detained” and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/18/1170595511/moscow-court-rejects-wsj-reporter-evan-gershkovichs-detention-appeal">called for his release</a>.</p>
<p>Either way, under Russian espionage law the newspaper would be regarded as a foreign organization – that is, an entity created under the law of a foreign country.</p>
<h2>Years of detention – or a deal?</h2>
<p>So what lies ahead in the criminal proceedings over Gershkovich’s case? Under the <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Russian_Law_and_Legal_Institutions.html?id=aWy-ugEACAAJ">Russian Criminal Code</a>, the crime of espionage requires “direct intent” to be proved by the prosecution.</p>
<p>“Direct intent” is defined under Russian law as being aware of the social danger of one’s actions, or foreseeing the possibility – or inevitability – of consequences that are deemed to create a danger to society.</p>
<p>The prosecution will be seeking to prove that Gershkovich handled, sought to acquire, actually acquired, or had in his possession state secrets. Although the definition of what constitutes a state secret is narrower than during the Soviet era, it nonetheless remains quite extensive and would include the information that Gershkovich is accused to have accessed.</p>
<p>Should Gershkovich be convicted of espionage, the punishment prescribed by the criminal code is deprivation of freedom for a term of from 10 to 20 years. Russian criminal law refers to “deprivation of freedom” because while it may be served in a prison if the individual is dangerous to others, for most it takes the form of detention in some kind of camp where the prisoners share accommodation.</p>
<p>It is probable that the Russian authorities will detain Gershkovich in an investigative cell, probably shared with someone else, while the legal proceedings continue.</p>
<p>Gershkovich’s legal counsel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/europe/100000008863670/wsj-journalist-evan-gershkovich-russia.html">invited the court</a> on April 18 to replace investigative detention with either house arrest, potentially at Gershkovich’s Moscow address, or financial security, through a pledge or bail. </p>
<p>Either would have been possible under Russia’s <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Russian_Law_and_Legal_Institutions.html?id=aWy-ugEACAAJ">Code of Criminal Procedure</a>. But both were declined by the court. </p>
<p>The investigation will now continue until trial unless Russia and the United States come to another arrangement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204083/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William E. Butler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Russia’s legal code explains the case against the Wall Street Journal reporter accused of espionage.William E. Butler, Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2030202023-04-06T12:08:11Z2023-04-06T12:08:11ZReporting is not espionage – but history shows that journalists doing the former get accused of the latter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519107/original/file-20230403-1415-caez98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C35%2C2615%2C1706&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich being taken into custody on March 30, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXRussiaReporterArrested/5a81f4828dc5447686799b5b65fc7394/photo?Query=Evan%20Gershkovich&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=13&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/04/europe/russia-wall-street-journal-evan-gershkovich-lawyers-intl/index.html">detention of Wall Street Journal reporter</a> Evan Gershkovich in Russia on espionage charges marks an unusual throwback to the old Soviet tactics for handling foreign correspondents. </p>
<p>Authorities in Vladimir Putin’s Russia have increasingly used criminal <a href="https://ipi.media/alerts/?topic=russia-ukraine-war&alert_type=criminal-investigationcharges&incident_source=0&country=0&search=&">charges against their own journalists</a> as part of a “increasing crackdown on free and independent media,” as Jodie Ginsberg, the president of the Committee to Protect Journalists, <a href="https://autos.yahoo.com/why-russia-arrested-wall-street-164255981.html">has put it</a>. But prosecutions of international journalists in Russia are still rare enough. </p>
<p>Indeed, media historians <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=KB_e52gAAAAJ&hl=en">like myself</a> have to reach back decades to recall similar incidents. History shows that when they do occur, arrests of foreign journalists over espionage charges tend to provoke a diplomatic tempest.</p>
<h2>Tinker, tailor, soldier, journalist?</h2>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/09/17/william-oatis-dies/bfd42eb0-670e-4447-87b8-29f4abb9b1f9/">Prague “show trial</a>” of Associated Press reporter William Oatis at the height of the Cold War in 1951. The prosecution of Oatis on spying charges was choreographed to suit the Soviet authorities, but the only real issue was that Oatis talked with Czechs and didn’t get government permission first. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man wearing glasses and a bow tie squints." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1270&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519593/original/file-20230405-558-tlioj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1270&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Associated Press correspondent William Oatis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APStafferOatis/a9273c0392044c47a2781668c5c90de2/photo?Query=William%20Oatis&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=7&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“Reporting is not espionage,” The New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1953/05/22/archives/reporting-is-not-espionage.html">said in an editorial</a> at the time. “[Oatis] was doing what all good newspaper men do in countries whose governments have not chosen to crawl back into the dark recesses of pre-historic barbarism.” </p>
<p>The case <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/107769901008700203">became a cause celebre</a> from 1951 to 1953, and led to years of travel and trade embargoes between the U.S. and Czechoslovakia, which was then strictly controlled by the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>When Oatis was finally released in 1953, the journalist emerged weak and tubercular, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1953/09/18/archives/czech-jail-a-tomb-that-tests-sanity-oatis-describes-discomforts-and.html">describing his prison experience</a> as akin to being “buried alive.” Still he carried on reporting, returning to the U.S. to cover the United Nations for decades before retiring. </p>
<p>Oatis’ case was perhaps the most famous during the Cold War, but it was far from the only one. Other American journalists who were arrested in Soviet sweeps of countries behind the Iron Curtain included Oatis’ fellow Associated Press reporters Leonard Kirschen – arrested in 1950 in Romania and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/obituaries/leonard-kirschen-dies-at-74-reporter-jailed-by-rumanians.html">held in jail for a decade</a> – and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/02/nyregion/endre-marton-95-dies-reported-on-the-56-uprising-in-hungary.html">Endre Marton</a>, who was arrested in Hungary in 1955 along with his wife, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/world/europe/ilona-marton-92-who-wrote-of-56-revolt-dies.html">Ilona Marton</a>, who worked for United Press. They were released in 1956 and smuggled out of the country and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/02/nyregion/endre-marton-95-dies-reported-on-the-56-uprising-in-hungary.html">into the U.S. the following year</a>. Dozens of reporters from other agencies and other Western countries were also expelled from Eastern Europe around this time.</p>
<h2>The risks of reporting</h2>
<p>Of course, arrest wasn’t the only way to silence a reporter. Then – as now – there’s a risk of violence and death.</p>
<p>Dozens of journalists were killed around the world’s hot conflicts in every year of the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, <a href="https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&motiveUnconfirmed%5B%5D=Unconfirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker&start_year=1992&end_year=2023&group_by=year">attacks on journalists slowed down</a>. Nonetheless, the global death toll since 1992 <a href="https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&motiveUnconfirmed%5B%5D=Unconfirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker&start_year=1992&end_year=2023&group_by=year">stands at over 2,190</a>, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. And in nearly 8 out of 10 cases, the murderers go free. Of those deaths, at least 12 have involved <a href="https://cpj.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/CoE_report_03-07-2023.pdf">journalists covering the war in Ukraine</a>, according to a March 2023 report by the human rights organization Council of Europe.</p>
<p>As part of its crackdown on free and independent media, Russia’s forces have been particularly hostile to journalists on the front lines of Ukraine, the Council of Europe report noted. Meanwhile, data from the Committee to Protect Journalists suggest an uptick in the number of Russian journalists being held behind bars. Of the 19 currently imprisoned, <a href="https://cpj.org/data/imprisoned/2022/?status=Imprisoned&cc_fips%5B%5D=RS&start_year=2022&end_year=2022&group_by=location">half were picked up by authorities</a> after the invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Journalists working in hostile nations or in war zones do so knowing the risk that death or imprisonment may be used as diplomatic leverage or as a warning to other journalists. It is part of the job. </p>
<h2>Cover stories</h2>
<p>Yet not all reporters or editors are innocent observers. It is true that over the years, American journalists have indeed worked with, or even for, the U.S. government or intelligence services. Several hundred, at least, worked closely with the CIA and other intelligence agencies during World War II and through the course of the Cold War, according to <a href="https://www.carlbernstein.com/the-cia-and-the-media-rolling-stone-10-20-1977?rq=the%20cia%20and%20the%20media">evidence that emerged during the Watergate era</a>.</p>
<p>For many, the collaboration had laudable aims. American <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/04/18/711356336/a-woman-of-no-importance-finally-gets-her-due">journalist Virginia Hall</a> used her credentials as a New York Post reporter to help the French resistance in World War II, guiding downed Allied airmen to safety in neutral countries and arranging weapons drops. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A black and white photo shows a woman in a black top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=644&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=644&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=644&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/519598/original/file-20230405-1644-qn2j08.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=809&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">American journalist and spy Virginia Hall.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/virginia-hall-american-journalist-member-of-soe-for-f-news-photo/89864144?adppopup=true">Apic/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Her story was <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/558307/a-woman-of-no-importance-by-sonia-purnell/">told in the book</a> “A Woman of No Importance.” The <a href="https://journalistandspy.substack.com/p/erling-espeland">Norwegian journalist Erling Espeland</a> did similar work in World War II. </p>
<p>In some cases, like that of The <a href="https://journalistandspy.substack.com/p/donald-a-allan">New York Times’ Donald A. Allan</a>, American journalists transitioned from World War II reporting into work for intelligence agencies with relative ease. Allan quit the New York Times in 1952 and supposedly went to work for CBS and United Press. But later, he said that was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/27/archives/a-young-reporters-decision-to-join-cia-led-to-strain-anger-and.html">nothing more than a cover</a> for his work with the CIA.</p>
<p>In 1975, the U.S. and Russia <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki">signed the Helsinki Final Act</a>, starting a process of detente and trade normalization, including guarantees of press freedom. Still, Western journalists were routinely harassed and detained in the Cold War Soviet Union. In a case that resonates with that of Gershkovich’s, in 1986 Nicholas Daniloff, the Moscow correspondent for U.S. News & World Report, was <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2023-03-30/nicholas-daniloffs-1986-arrest-in-russia-on-espionage-charges-from-the-archives">arrested and detained</a> on charges of espionage. He was later allowed to leave the Soviet Union.</p>
<h2>A totalitarian tool</h2>
<p>Most journalists today would reject the practice of being entangled with the work of the intelligence services. In 1996, Society of Professional Journalists President G. Kelly Hawes <a href="https://www.spj.org/news.asp?ref=455">rejected the use of American journalism</a> as a cover for intelligence. </p>
<p>“The public shouldn’t have to fear speaking to the press, and journalists shouldn’t have to fear for their safety,” she said. “Our integrity is compromised and our lives are endangered. That is wrong.” And to be clear, Gershkovich and The Wall Street Journal have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/31/us/politics/russia-evan-gershkovich-arrest-wsj-reporter.html">denied the espionage claims</a>. </p>
<p>But to officials in an authoritarian government like that of Russia, journalists are not much different from spies. It is, after all, a reporter’s job to uncover uncomfortable truths, often hidden from the wider world.</p>
<p>Seen in that light, slapping a charge of espionage on a journalist is one of the more Orwellian tools in the authoritarian playbook.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Kovarik does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich is far from the first American journalist to be accused of spying, a media historian explains.Bill Kovarik, Professor of Communication, Radford UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999182023-02-14T18:24:57Z2023-02-14T18:24:57ZSpy balloons: modern technology has given these old-fashioned eyes in the sky a new lease of life<p>The US military has now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-64632378">shot down four high-altitude objects</a> that had entered American and Canadian airspace, raising questions about their purpose and origin.</p>
<p>The first of these objects, a Chinese balloon, was downed by a fighter jet on 4 February. While China says it was for weather monitoring, US officials say it was being used for surveillance. A knowledge of technology in this area throws up some clues about what may have been going on.</p>
<p>The balloon is believed to have supported a signals intelligence collection payload, although this has yet to be confirmed. Debris has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/feb/13/biden-ufo-shot-down-michigan-flying-objects">now been retrieved</a> from US territorial waters off the coast of South Carolina and will be transported ashore for analysis. </p>
<p>A further three objects were downed between February 10 and 12 over Deadhorse in Alaska, near Yukon in Canada and over Lake Huron close to the US-Canada border.</p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signals_intelligence">Signals intelligence, or “sigint”</a>, refers to electronic data, which could consist of conversations, written messages or data from weapons or radar systems. Sigint is normally collected by satellites, but can also be gathered from aircraft flying in international airspace.</p>
<p>Normally, satellites that collect sigint are positioned in <a href="https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits">low-Earth orbit (LEO)</a> – say at 500 to 1,000km altitude – or at geostationary orbit, at the much higher altitude of 36,000km. Although the collection of this type of intelligence by satellites is efficient and reasonably effective, there are some limitations. </p>
<p>A satellite in LEO will complete an orbit around the Earth in 70 to 100 minutes but it will not pass the same point on the Earth again for 14 to 20 hours depending on its altitude. This is because our planet is also moving. Even then, it will only be visible to a point on Earth for a maximum of 20 minutes; which is called its “dwell time”. Increasing the number of satellites helps, but there will still be large time gaps in coverage. </p>
<p>In theory, a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geostationary_orbit">geostationary satellite</a> could have a permanent dwell time. But, because it is positioned at around 36,000km from the Earth’s surface, it could miss the collection of important but weak signals. </p>
<p>The US military has been developing signals – electronic data transmissions – with a low probability of intercept. This is making sigint collection by both Chinese and Russian spy satellites difficult. There will be large gaps in a 24-hour period when collection is not possible – a silent time. </p>
<p>China has attempted to close the gaps. In 2020, the country launched, to a 600km orbit, <a href="https://spacenews.com/china-launches-latest-trio-of-yaogan-30-remote-sensing-satellites/">three new reconnaissance (spy) satellites</a> from the Yaogan-30 series, as part of a wider network, or “constellation”, called <a href="https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=2020-021C">Chuangxin-5 (CX-5)</a>, bringing the number of satellites in the network to 21.</p>
<h2>Steering ability</h2>
<p>Enter the high-altitude “objects” that have been shot down over the US. Let’s take the balloon that was shot down on February 4. By tracing this object’s path over the US, it can be seen to have passed several highly sensitive defence installations, including silos for nuclear-capable <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intercontinental_ballistic_missile">intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)</a> in Montana, US. </p>
<p>The balloon travelled across the US at an altitude of 20 to 30km and had the ability to steer in the upper atmosphere jet streams. Clearly, the advantage for sigint collection was that its dwell time was likely to be several hours, and its closeness to the surface of the Earth ensured that it could, if it were spying, collect very weak signals. </p>
<p>Thus, a balloon that can remain undetected would be an ideal platform to augment the collection of sigint by both satellites and aircraft. Many countries have been employing balloons for intelligence gathering for <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-spy-balloon-inflatable-eyes-in-the-sky-have-been-used-in-war-for-centuries-199268">at least 200 years</a>, so the idea is not new and the advantages are well known.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-spy-balloon-inflatable-eyes-in-the-sky-have-been-used-in-war-for-centuries-199268">China's spy balloon: inflatable eyes in the sky have been used in war for centuries</a>
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<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The E-3 Sentry" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510115/original/file-20230214-28-5ecehz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system, or AWACS, aircraft. Planes like this form a vital component of US air defences.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104504/e-3-sentry-awacs/">US Air Force</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Today’s technologies have given this method of intelligence collection a new lease of life, as we’ve also seen from the use of small aerial vehicles – or “micro drones”. Remaining undetected for a significant period is a key requirement to success. As to how this was possible in the US is an interesting question, given that the country has one of the best air defence systems anywhere. </p>
<p>One possible answer lies in the design of ground-based and airborne early warning system (AEW) radars. To reduce clutter on the radar, objects that are static such as mountains and towers are removed from the radar returns by making use of a natural effect known as “Doppler shift”. When a train travels past you, the pitch of its whistle seems to change as it moves away from you. This is an everyday demonstration of the Doppler shift in sound waves.</p>
<p>The Doppler capability is common to all defence radars as they are focused on an aircraft and missile threat. A balloon or inflatable object, could be travelling at a velocity slower than the Doppler threshold and thus remain undetected. </p>
<h2>Radar clutter</h2>
<p>This shortfall in detection capability was recognised by <a href="https://www.norad.mil">NORAD (North American Air Defense Command)</a> and radars have been reset to see very low velocity objects. However, the clutter will increase –- perhaps fulfilling one of China’s aims to reduce the effectiveness of air defence radars. </p>
<p>A further difficulty with detection is the material used for balloons or objects. Plastics and synthetic inflation fabrics have <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/materials-science/radar-absorbing-material">no or very low radar reflectivity</a>, thus adding another notch to their covert credentials. The balloon that started the current controversy in the US was first discovered visually and reported, rather than detected by air defence systems.</p>
<p>But the more recent discoveries over Canada and Alaska resulted from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/12/us/politics/us-shoots-down-object-michigan.html">high-intensity surveillance</a>. It has not yet been revealed what they are. Once that has been ascertained, the key question will be whether the objects were designed to penetrate the US defence system to gather better signals intelligence, or whether they were a test of US air defence systems.</p>
<p>It could, alternatively, be just a nuisance ploy. We shall know when the results of the balloon debris analysis are made known.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Stupples does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Balloons can still be useful for gathering intelligence when used alongside satellites and aircraft.David Stupples, Professor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering and Director of Electronic Warfare Research, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1995632023-02-09T18:30:36Z2023-02-09T18:30:36ZChina violated international laws and standards with its surveillance balloon<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509266/original/file-20230209-148-cgdttn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5991%2C3826&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this photo provided by Chad Fish, the remnants of a large balloon drift above the Atlantic Ocean just off the coast of South Carolina, with a fighter jet and its contrail seen below it. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Chad Fish via AP)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/feb/04/chinese-spy-balloon-shot-down-us">The United States recently shot down a Chinese high-altitude balloon</a> after it apparently travelled from China and flew over Alaska and British Columbia.</p>
<p>Its first public sighting was over Montana where it was seen to “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3287177/us-tracking-high-altitude-surveillance-balloon/">hang out for a longer period of time</a>” over military installations where nuclear missiles are located. </p>
<p>Panic bells sounded, and fighter jets were scrambled as tensions between China and the U.S. intensified due to the incursion of a flying object into American airspace. </p>
<p>Another balloon, also of Chinese origin, was spotted <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/second-chinese-surveillance-balloon-spotted-over-latin-america-2023-2">flying over several countries in Latin America</a>.</p>
<h2>Balloon versus airships</h2>
<p>China has stated it “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230205_11019871.html">strongly disapproves of and protests</a>” the downing of what it calls a “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/202302/t20230203_11019484.html">civilian airship” with “limited self-steering capability” used “for research, mainly meteorological, purposes</a>.”</p>
<p>However, the U.S. Pentagon noted the object was a “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3288103/general-says-chinese-surveillance-balloon-now-over-center-of-us/">manoeuvrable Chinese surveillance balloon</a>” with a “broad array of capabilities” that forms <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3288618/senior-defense-official-and-senior-military-official-hold-an-off-camera-on-back/">part of a Chinese fleet of balloons</a> developed to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spy-balloon-technology/index.html">conduct surveillance operations</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1623517264149467142"}"></div></p>
<p>Balloons and airships are both considered aircraft under international law. Airships are more manoeuvrable than balloons, which are <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chinese-spy-balloon-has-unexpected-maneuverability/">wind-propelled</a>. Even Chinese regulators define an airship as an “<a href="http://www.caac.gov.cn/XXGK/XXGK/GFXWJ/201511/P020151103346893330985.pdf">engine-propelled, lighter-than-air, manoeuvrable aircraft</a>.” </p>
<p>The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations agency that regulates global civil aviation, describes a balloon as a “<a href="https://www.icao.int/Meetings/anconf12/Document%20Archive/an02_cons%5B1%5D.pdf">non-power-driven, unmanned, lighter-than-air aircraft in free flight</a>,” and says that an airship must give way to balloons precisely because an airship is more manoeuvrable.</p>
<p>The organization’s 1944 Chicago Convention provides that “<a href="https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/07/7-01/international-civil-aviation.xml">every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory</a>.” Any aircraft, regardless of whether it is a commercial airliner, balloon or airship, cannot fly over the territory of another country without permission. </p>
<h2>Military operations?</h2>
<p>If the Chinese balloon was actually <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/spy-balloon-part-of-a-broader-chinese-military-surveillance-operation-u-s-intel-sources-tell-cnn-1.6264443">a military aircraft or conducting military operations</a>, as many countries and experts believe it is, there is even less of a right to over fly the territory of another country. </p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/international/2023/02/03/china--u-s--tensions-rise-over-suspected-chinese-spy-balloon">both the U.S.</a> <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/02/statement-from-the-minister-of-national-defence.html">and Canada</a> openly complained that China’s balloon violated their respective airspaces as well as international law. </p>
<p>Additionally, there are <a href="https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2018-GREPECAS18/GRP18_WP20%20CANSO.pdf">specific international standards regarding the operation of heavy unmanned balloons</a> that suit the description of what flew over Canada and the U.S. </p>
<p>These standards require a country to properly authorize and operate any balloon originating from its territory. The launch and trajectory of any balloon must also be communicated in advance to relevant air traffic services to “minimize hazards to persons, property or other aircraft.”</p>
<p>Furthermore, before the unauthorized entry into the airspace of another country, the operation of the balloon must be terminated. China does not appear to have fulfilled any of these obligations.</p>
<p>To safeguard the safety and security of international civil aviation, the ICAO should further clarify the rights and obligations of nations on the use of civilian balloons and/or airships, and provide guidelines on how to respond when they enter into foreign sovereign airspace. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man pulls a boat by a rope towards a dock." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509204/original/file-20230209-28-ofkear.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Men use ropes to secure a U.S. navy boat to a dock in North Myrtle Beach, S.C., after the navy carried out an extensive operation to gather debris from the Chinese spy balloon downed off the coast of South Carolina.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Nell Redmond)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Previous balloon incursions and downings</h2>
<p>The U.S. claims “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3288618/senior-defense-official-and-senior-military-official-hold-an-off-camera-on-back/">Chinese balloons have previously been spotted over countries across five continents, including in East Asia, South Asia, and Europe</a>.” </p>
<p>Despite repeating the craft is “of civilian nature,” <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/china-says-will-safeguard-interests-after-shooting-of-alleged-spy-balloon#:%7E:text=China%20claims%20it%20was%20a,and%20entered%20U.S.%20airspace%20accidentally.">China has said it was a civilian balloon used for meteorological research</a> but has refused to say to which government department or company it belongs.</p>
<p>The manufacturer of the balloon is reportedly a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/07/china-spy-balloon-intelligence/">research and design institute affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army</a>, and China reportedly has a <a href="https://canoe.com/news/world/chinas-military-has-shown-growing-interest-in-high-altitude-balloons">growing interest in using balloon technology for military purposes</a>. </p>
<p>Due to their agility and ability to stay stationary above targets for long periods of time, many countries, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/02/pentagon-balloons-surveillance-midwest">U.S.</a>, <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/news/adf-high-altitude-balloons-launch-trials/">Australia</a> <a href="https://www.defenseadvancement.com/news/high-altitude-tethered-aerostat-to-protect-german-forward-operating-base/">and Germany</a> are again <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/05/u-s-militarys-newest-weapon-against-china-and-russia-hot-air-00043860">using balloons to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A giant translucent weather balloon floats over open water and islands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=869&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1092&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1092&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509196/original/file-20230209-16-zpj3xf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1092&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A giant Canadian weather balloon over Finland in September 1998. The 25-storey helium-filled balloon was launched near Saskatoon to measure ozone levels over Canada but drifted away.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/LEHTIKUVA-Ari-Matti Ruuska)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There has been a long history of balloons flying into the sovereign airspace of other nations, all of which were met with protest and/or attempts to bring them down. </p>
<p>In 1956, <a href="https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/cold-war-balloon-surveillance">hundreds of balloons released by the U.S. flew over parts of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union</a>, fuelling diplomatic tensions.</p>
<p>In 1995, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/14/world/2-american-balloonists-die-when-shot-down-in-belarus.html">American balloonists taking part in a race</a> were shot down by Belarus. </p>
<p>In 1998, despite attempts to down it with more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/weather-balloon-canada-china-1.6737831">a Canadian weather balloon drifted into British, Norwegian, Finnish and Russian airspace</a>. </p>
<h2>U.S. was within its rights</h2>
<p>In response to a clear and flagrant violation of its sovereignty, the U.S. had a right to bring down the Chinese balloon. Japan, which <a href="https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2023020700551/possible-to-shoot-down-balloon-violating-japan-airspace-defense-min.html">also experienced balloons flying over Japanese territory in 2020 and 2021</a>, has said it reserves the right to use weapons to “deal with airspace intrusions.”</p>
<p>Even though China has condemned the “<a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-lodges-protest-over-us-shooting-down-civilian-airship/article66478556.ece">abusive use of force towards the civilian airship</a>” by the U.S, in 2019, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-07/china-touted-its-ability-to-shoot-down-errant-balloons-in-2019?utm_source=google&utm_medium=bd&utm_campaign=Pol&cmpId=GP.Pol&leadSource=uverify%20wall">Chinese state media displayed images of China’s own air force shooting down a balloon</a> that could “endanger [the] security of air defence.” </p>
<p>There are clear international prohibitions against using weapons against civilian aircraft out of “<a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/montreal1984.pdf">elementary considerations of humanity for the safety and the lives of persons</a>.” Those regulations do not apply to unmanned stray balloons.</p>
<p>To prevent further balloon incidents, all countries should behave in accordance with international law and avoid actions that may exacerbate tensions and strain international relations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kuan-Wei Chen receives funding from the Australian Government Research Training Program. </span></em></p>Despite China’s complaints about the United States shooting down its balloon, the U.S. was within its rights — and China has done the same thing in the past.Kuan-Wei Chen, Researcher, Air and Space Law, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1994842023-02-08T23:26:07Z2023-02-08T23:26:07ZSpy balloon drama elevates public attention, pressure for the US to confront China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508957/original/file-20230208-25-vwyhez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Chinese spy balloon flies over Myrtle Beach, S.C., on Feb. 4, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1246809673/photo/us-has-shot-down-chinese-spy-balloon.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=4ssDJ2P2wGdpQeIZn1s4Py_QM1Bnb50XyZJXDVm0AEY=">Peter Zay/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seven days after a Chinese spy balloon began drifting across the United States, the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3288543/f-22-safely-shoots-down-chinese-spy-balloon-off-south-carolina-coast/">U.S. military downed it</a> with a single missile. </p>
<p>But the balloon, in a sense, continues its flight <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-briefed-40-nations-china-spy-balloon-incident-diplomats-official-say-2023-02-08/">through diplomatic circles,</a> complicating U.S.-China relations amid rising tensions.</p>
<p>One consequence is that the balloon <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/07/china-spy-balloon-us-national-security/">may help shift</a> how Americans view China. </p>
<p><a href="http://ma-allen.com/">We are</a> <a href="https://www.carlamm.com/">political science scholars</a> and <a href="https://www.m-flynn.com/">U.S. foreign policy</a> experts who recently published <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/beyond-the-wire-9780197633403?lang=en&cc=cl">a book about U.S. overseas military deployments</a>. In it, we discuss how U.S. military bases might change with a more powerful China expanding its influence.</p>
<p>The balloon incident is an example of mounting tensions and espionage between China and the U.S. – but it is different largely because it took place in public, occurred over U.S. territory and the subsequent diplomatic tiff received a lot of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/spy-balloon-chinese-trump-shot-b2278238.html">media coverage</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="About 10 people wearing heavy clothing and camo sit on a small boat and lean over a large white plastic sheet, which has black sticks and white strings throughout." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508959/original/file-20230208-25-lydj6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. sailors recover a high-altitude surveillance balloon on Feb. 5, 2023, off the coast of South Carolina.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1246870327/photo/recovery-of-high-altitude-surveillance-balloon-off-south-carolina-coast.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=_xUjfvH28jZ5pLUXe1RaUyKH_pJPOj_ItX3QD5CtzH4=">Petty Officer 1st Class Tyler Thompson/U.S. Navy via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Spying is routine</h2>
<p>China’s balloon entered U.S. airspace over the Aleutian Islands in Alaska on Jan. 28, 2023, and then made its way to Montana. On Feb. 3, as Montana residents spotted and asked questions about this <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/thats-not-the-moon-montana-residents-spot-suspected-chinese-spy-balloon/vi-AA175h6M">“weird thing”</a> in the sky, U.S. officials <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-antony-blinken-china-314302278a5f05bdc2df146ed5b35ec6">publicly acknowledged</a> the balloon. That same day, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-expresses-regret-that-civilian-airship-strays-over-us-2023-02-03/">canceled an upcoming diplomatic</a> trip to Beijing. </p>
<p>While the U.S. has said <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-balloon-carried-antennas-other-equipment-to-gather-intelligence-u-s-says-11675953033">it has evidence</a> that the balloon carried antennas and other equipment to gather intelligence, China has maintained that the vessel is used to <a href="https://portal.tds.net/news/read/article/newser-china_doubles_down_on_weather_balloon_claim-rnewsersyn/vendor/Newser">track weather</a>. </p>
<p>A United States Air Force F-22 Raptor <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3288543/f-22-safely-shoots-down-chinese-spy-balloon-off-south-carolina-coast/">shot down</a> the balloon with a missile off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4.</p>
<p>Recently, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3288618/senior-defense-official-and-senior-military-official-hold-an-off-camera-on-back/">senior U.S. defense officials acknowledged</a> that China had targeted several countries worldwide in a similar way over recent years.</p>
<p>While public awareness of specific cases might be new, spying between countries is not. The U.S. has been <a href="https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/julius-and-ethel-rosenberg">both the target</a> and the <a href="https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/online-documents/u-2-spy-plane-incident">agent of an increasing amount of espionage</a>.</p>
<p>Countries routinely spy on one another to gather information. In fact, governments often rely on secret agents to collect and report information about both their rivals and allies. In other cases, they may monitor electronic communications. <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/space/2022/08/04/us-spy-agency-sends-another-satellite-to-space-in-show-of-rapid-launch-capability/">Wealthier countries may also</a> use high-altitude surveillance aircraft, like the balloon China floated over the U.S., or orbiting satellites to collect photographic or other intelligence on various targets. </p>
<p>In some cases, governments may want information on enemy troop positions or movements. They may also want information on other aspects of their enemy’s capabilities. For example, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-politics-united-states-government-china-19e1f66a6db19f44548c402d81facc8e">several U.S. officials expressed concern</a> that one suspected target of the Chinese spy balloon was Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, <a href="https://www.ktvq.com/news/local-news/montanas-150-missile-sites-in-line-for-replacement-as-chinese-spy-balloon-questions-remain">which houses nuclear missile</a> silos.</p>
<h2>Espionage can make war less likely</h2>
<p>Countries <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300246742/arms-and-influence/">care about gathering information</a> on each other because it can give them an advantage over their rivals. But rivals having more information is not always a bad thing.</p>
<p>In political science, we often think of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/rationalist-explanations-for-war/E3B716A4034C11ECF8CE8732BC2F80DD">conflict as a bargain</a> over how to divide something – be it territory and resources, or policy and political control. </p>
<p>War often happens when states cannot agree on dividing these types of things. The problem is that war can be an inefficient way of resolving disputes because it destroys resources – both wealth and often human lives. </p>
<p>Why, then, do countries fight wars? </p>
<p>One argument is that countries may have <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/rationalist-explanations-for-war/E3B716A4034C11ECF8CE8732BC2F80DD">different information</a> from their opponents. They may overestimate their capabilities or underestimate those of the opponent. </p>
<p>Because countries generally have an incentive to bluff or act stronger than they really are, they also have the incentive to gather private information from their rivals. </p>
<p>Espionage may then serve the purpose of making the probability of <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v65y2021i9p1551-1575.html">war less likely</a> by preventing miscalculations. It lets governments gain information about each other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691184241">without pressure from hawkish groups</a> to escalate confrontations. </p>
<p>We know also know from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720957713">our research</a> that the U.S. sometimes willingly shares information about its own capabilities with rival militaries as a way to deter them from initiating conflict. </p>
<h2>Under pressure</h2>
<p>Before the balloon incident, much of the increasing tension between the U.S. and China had been relatively abstract or remote in most Americans’ eyes. But a Chinese spy balloon drifting directly over U.S. is a material object people saw with their own eyes.</p>
<p>Suddenly, the United States’ action – or inaction – over what to do with the balloon became a hotly debated topic. President Joe Biden’s Republican opponents <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/3844665-cotton-suggests-biden-administration-delayed-shooting-down-balloon-to-salvage-blinken-trip-to-china/">criticized his timing as late</a> in shooting down the balloon. Former President Donald Trump claimed that <a href="https://www.salon.com/2023/02/06/seethes-on-truth-social-after-pentagon-says-chinese-spy-balloons-flew-over-us-on-his-watch/">no such balloon would fly over</a> the U.S. under his administration – despite <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/chinese-spy-balloons-over-us-during-trump-admin-discovered-after-he-left-office-senior-biden-official">evidence indicating</a> three such balloons flew undetected at the time.</p>
<p>While Americans have become <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/28/some-americans-views-of-china-turned-more-negative-after-2020-but-others-became-more-positive/">increasingly suspicious of China’s role in the world</a>, the country <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/american-public-divided-cooperating-confronting-china">has been divided</a> on how the U.S. should confront the risk.</p>
<p>More than three-quarters of U.S. adults have expressed an unfavorable opinion of China since 2020, according to a Pew Research Center survey in September 2022. This number has <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/28/some-americans-views-of-china-turned-more-negative-after-2020-but-others-became-more-positive/">continued to rise</a> since 2005. </p>
<p>And in 2021, 45% of Americans said that <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/337457/new-high-perceptions-china-greatest-enemy.aspx">China is the greatest enemy</a> of the U.S. – more than double the percentage who said so in 2020, according to a Gallup poll.</p>
<p>The balloon, whatever the intent of those who launched it, left the U.S. little choice but to down it – in order to both end the balloon’s intelligence gathering and mollify domestic critics. </p>
<p>While China has <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-wants-suspected-spy-balloon-us-shot-down-returned-2023-2">asked for the balloon back</a> intact, countries often <a href="https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/u2-incident/5-10-60-state-telegram.pdf">pore over</a> and <a href="https://www.history.com/news/uss-pueblo-north-korea-united-states-spy-ship-capture">examine captured spy</a> and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-hi-tech-warfare-system-seized-ukraine-hold-military-secrets-2022-3">military equipment</a> thoroughly before returning it to the country of origin. Some countries may even <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/580076540/looking-at-the-saga-of-the-uss-pueblo-50-years-later">refuse to return</a> seized equipment. The U.S. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bdf29ea5-bfdf-43f6-a845-38788544fdab">has said</a> it will not return the balloon. </p>
<p>So while espionage can reduce the chances of conflict by providing more information on a rival’s capabilities, getting caught can affect other parts of the bargaining process that make conflict more likely. Public outcry may force leaders to take a harder stand in future interactions with their spying rival. At present, the balloon incident has deflated political <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/situation-china-tense-u-looking-162446922.html">support for further cooperation with China</a> and increases the likelihood of further confrontation.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An older white man stands against a bright blue sky and talks to people, whose hands and voice recorders or phones are only visible." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508960/original/file-20230208-23-j9wvvm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Joe Biden speaks to reporters about the surveillance balloon on Feb. 4, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1246795543/photo/us-politics-biden-security-balloon.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=0wM_CCuclU40hRZWN9zSKg5J94DM-3mH12haQhB0U3w=">Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The latest incident between US and China</h2>
<p>The balloon incident may have surprised the U.S. population, but it fits the recent pattern of interactions between the U.S. and China. </p>
<p>The Trump administration engaged in a <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-trade-war-timeline-date-guide">trade war with China</a>, and though there were some steps toward better relations with a new trade agreement, the emergence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0011">COVID-19 created new conflict between the countries</a>. China was not <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/27/fauci-china-covid-lab-leak-theory-00070867">fully transparent about what happened</a> early during the pandemic. Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/30/donald-trump-coronavirus-chinese-lab-claim">claimed to have evidence</a> that the virus originated in a Chinese lab (though <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01529-3">most scientists</a> believe it to have had natural origins). </p>
<p>A few days before leaving office, Trump administration officials <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/determination-of-the-secretary-of-state-on-atrocities-in-xinjiang/index.html">accused China of committing genocide</a> against <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281">the Uyghurs</a> – a Muslim ethnic minority group of people who predominantly live in China’s northwest. </p>
<p>While the Biden administration has seemed less confrontational toward China than the previous administration, it maintained many of the Trump-era policies on <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/26/politics/china-tariffs-biden-policy/index.html">trade</a> – keeping tariffs against China in place – and the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/biden-boycott-2022-beijing-winter-olympics">Uyghurs</a>. Biden <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/12/23/statement-first-anniversary-president-biden-signing-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention">signed a law in 2021</a> that prevents the import of any Chinese products made with forced labor by the more than <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights">1 million Uyghur people that China</a> has illegally detained.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s Note: This story was updated on Feb. 9, 2023 to include China’s characterization of the balloon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael A. Allen has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. Part of the work mentioned in here was funded by these organizations. The views expressed here are the authors' only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carla Martinez Machain has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. Part of the work mentioned in here was funded by these organizations. The views expressed here are the authors' only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E Flynn has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. Part of the work mentioned in here was funded by these organizations. The views expressed here are the authors' only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p>Espionage routinely plays out between countries like the US and China. But a public spectacle like the Chinese spy balloon can change the game.Michael A. Allen, Professor of Political Science, Boise State UniversityCarla Martinez Machain, Professor of Political Science, University at BuffaloMichael E. Flynn, Associate Professor of Political Science, Kansas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992892023-02-06T06:08:48Z2023-02-06T06:08:48ZBeyond spy balloons: here are 7 kinds of intelligence spies want, and how they get it<p>The news of a so-called “<a href="https://gcp.theconversation.com/chinese-spy-balloon-over-the-us-an-aerospace-expert-explains-how-the-balloons-work-and-what-they-can-see-199245">Chinese spy balloon</a>” being shot down over the US has reignited interest in how nation-states spy on one another.</p>
<p>It’s not confirmed that the balloon, seen floating over US military areas, was indeed a dedicated vessel for spying. China <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-64514120">has claimed</a> it was a “civilian airship” deployed for weather research and blown off-course by the wind. Nonetheless, the very threat of potential spycraft has the US <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/52a791c3-5df8-4957-8685-e88f9b7f9715">up in arms</a>. </p>
<p>And that makes sense. The significance of intelligence can’t be overstated. Nations make important political, economic and military decisions based on it. </p>
<p>While people may chuckle at the idea of using a balloon to passively float above a country to spy on it, the reality is anything goes when it comes to getting the upper hand on your adversaries. So what are some other ways nations collect intelligence today?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/did-chinas-balloon-violate-international-law-199271">Did China's balloon violate international law?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Signals intelligence</h2>
<p>One major <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-the-australian-intelligence-community-works-94422">intelligence collection strategy</a> is signals intelligence. This involves using a variety of ground- and space-based technologies to target the signals and communications coming from a target’s device/s. </p>
<p>The results, called the “product”, often reveal highly sensitive information, which explains why signals intelligence is also the most contested form of espionage. </p>
<p>Countries that turn this capability inward face mounting criticism from those caught in the net, and from citizens concerned with privacy. In 2013, Edward Snowden <a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-the-scenes-at-the-start-of-the-snowden-era-citizenfour-is-crucial-viewing-33345">disclosed</a> the US National Security Agency’s use of signals intelligence for bulk data collection from the public. The US government has since worked to convince citizens the NSA’s efforts are largely focused on external collection. </p>
<p>The White House also recently published an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/07/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-to-implement-the-european-union-u-s-data-privacy-framework/">executive order</a> on this topic.</p>
<h2>Geo-spatial intelligence</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/in-sea-of-satellite-images-experts-eyes-still-needed-53192">Geo-spatial intelligence</a> concerns human activity on and beneath the ground, including waterways. It’s generally focused on military and civilian construction, human movements (such as movement of refugees and migrants) and natural resource use.</p>
<p>Geo-spatial intelligence exploits information obtained through satellites, drones, high-altitude aircraft and, yes, even balloons!</p>
<p>Spy balloons can collect not just images and signals, but also chemical analyses of the air. They aren’t common, since this approach lacks plausible deniability and (as we have seen) balloons are easily observed and shot down. On the other hand, they do offer a low radar signature, are cheap and can seem innocuous.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1622270072365400069"}"></div></p>
<h2>Imagery intelligence</h2>
<p>Closely related to geo-spatial intelligence is imagery intelligence, which is also often conducted using satellites, drones and aircraft.</p>
<p>This is intelligence derived from the overhead collection of images of civilian and military activities. Imagery intelligence often focuses on the strategic movements of troops and weapons systems, and specifically targets military bases, nuclear arsenals and other strategic assets.</p>
<h2>Measurement and signature intelligence</h2>
<p>One highly technical form of intelligence collection – and one that’s rarely mentioned – is measurement and signature intelligence. This is intelligence derived from the electromagnetic signatures of rockets, command and control systems, radar and weapons systems, and other military and civilian equipment. </p>
<p>The data collection is done using high-tech instruments, designed specifically to identify and categorise the electromagnetic emanations. Among other things, this form of intelligence collection allows for the remote identification of weapons deployments and detailed information on space platforms.</p>
<h2>Cyber intelligence</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/morrisons-1-3-billion-for-more-cyber-spies-is-an-incremental-response-to-a-radical-problem-141692">Cyber intelligence</a> is generally lumped together with signals intelligence, but is distinct in that it uses direct human interaction (such as through hackers) to penetrate protected systems and gain access to data.</p>
<p>Cyber intelligence refers to the overt and covert collection of information from friendly and adversarial networks. It can be obtained through signals collection, malware, or through hackers gaining direct unauthorised access into a systems. Nations may even target their own allies’ networks.</p>
<p>One example of cyber intelligence was the 2015 data breach of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Personnel_Management_data_breach">US Office of Personnel Management</a>. This breach was designed to collect all the available information on US government and military personnel who had been screened for a security clearance.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-hack-shows-data-is-the-new-frontier-in-cyber-security-conflict-42904">US hack shows data is the new frontier in cyber security conflict</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Open source intelligence</h2>
<p>The newest of the intelligence <a href="https://theconversation.com/open-source-intelligence-how-digital-sleuths-are-making-their-mark-on-the-ukraine-war-179135">collection disciplines</a> is open source intelligence. Emerging in the late 1980s, open source information comes from a variety of primary sources such as newspapers, blogs, official postings and reports, and secondary sources such as <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/technology/spies-blow-their-cover-through-the-internet-20121225-2bvaf.html">leaks</a> on sites including WikiLeaks, The Intercept and social media. </p>
<p>Although this information is readily available, turning it into actionable intelligence requires specific tools such as web scrapers and data miners, as well as trained analysts who can find connections between large datasets.</p>
<h2>Human intelligence</h2>
<p>Human intelligence is the oldest form of intelligence collection and perhaps the most well-known. Spies are generally divided into three categories: </p>
<ul>
<li>declared intelligence officers (overt)</li>
<li>people working under official cover, such as spies working as diplomats, military personnel and embassy/civilian support personnel </li>
<li>non-official cover spies, often ostensibly working in commercial, academic and trade positions. </li>
</ul>
<p>Human intelligence officers will recruit citizens of a country to spy, wittingly or unwittingly, and run agents (co-operating citizens of a host nation) to support the strategic objectives of their nation. </p>
<p>Thanks to the internet and dark net, we now have cyber-based human intelligence that allows spies to assess, recruit and operate assets and sources from the safety of their home nation. This is even happening on <a href="https://theconversation.com/you-could-break-espionage-laws-on-social-media-without-realising-it-151665">LinkedIn</a>.</p>
<p>While intelligence collection disguised as a stray weather balloon seems rather sloppy, the latest events remind us of the constant war for information that nations are waging. Analysts following the war in Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-are-governments-sharing-intelligence-on-the-ukraine-war-with-the-public-and-what-are-the-risks-191114">are reviewing</a> reams of information to compare Russian, Chinese and Iranian weapon systems with those of Ukraine and its NATO supporters. </p>
<p>As the world continues to face new challenges, including climate change and the rapid development of new technologies, the intelligence focus of nations will likely need to expand to keep up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis B Desmond received funding from the Australian Government under an ARC linkage Grant. Dr Desmond previously worked for the US intelligence community.</span></em></p>While human spies are the best-known way nations collect intelligence, there are several methods countries can use to spy on one another.Dennis B. Desmond, Lecturer, Cyberintelligence and Cybercrime Investigations, University of the Sunshine CoastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992452023-02-04T14:38:10Z2023-02-04T14:38:10ZChinese spy balloon over the US: An aerospace expert explains how the balloons work and what they can see<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508173/original/file-20230205-29-5mwnzv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2651%2C1789&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chinese surveillance balloon in U.S. airspace before it was shot down by the U.S. military.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-spy-balloon-flies-above-in-charlotte-nc-united-news-photo/1246788383">Peter Zay/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The U.S. military <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/04/chinese-balloon-shoot-down/">shot down</a> what U.S. officials called a Chinese surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4, 2023. Officials said that the U.S. Navy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/02/04/us/china-spy-balloon">planned to recover the debris</a>, which is in shallow water.</em></p>
<p><em>The U.S. and Canada tracked the balloon as it crossed the Aleutian Islands, passed over Western Canada and entered U.S. airspace over Idaho. Officials of the U.S. Department of Defense confirmed on Feb. 2, 2023, that the military was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/suspected-chinese-spy-balloon-found-northern-us-rcna68879">tracking the balloon</a> as it flew over the continental U.S. at an altitude of about 60,000 feet, including over Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. The base houses the 341st Missile Wing, which operates nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.</em></p>
<p><em>The next day, Chinese officials <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202302/t20230203_11019484.html">acknowledged that the balloon was theirs</a> but denied it was intended for spying or meant to enter U.S. airspace. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the balloon’s incursion led him to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-antony-blinken-china-314302278a5f05bdc2df146ed5b35ec6">cancel his trip to Beijing</a>. He had been scheduled to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang on Feb. 5 and 6.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Pentagon has reported that a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/03/second-chinese-spy-balloon-pentagon/">second suspected Chinese balloon</a> was seen over Latin America. On Feb. 4, officials told reporters that a third Chinese surveillance balloon was operating somewhere else in the world, and that the balloons are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/04/chinese-balloon-shoot-down/">part of a Chinese military surveillance program</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Monitoring an adversary from a balloon dates back to 1794, when the French <a href="https://www.centennialofflight.net/essay/Lighter_than_air/Napoleon%27s_wars/LTA3.htm">used a hot air balloon</a> to track Austrian and Dutch troops in the Battle of Fleurus. We asked aerospace engineer <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?hl=en&user=0vO6w7MAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Iain Boyd</a> of the University of Colorado Boulder to explain how spy balloons work and why anyone would use one in the 21st century.</em></p>
<h2>What is a spy balloon?</h2>
<p>A spy balloon is literally a gas-filled balloon that is flying quite high in the sky, more or less where we fly commercial airplanes. It has some sophisticated cameras and imaging technology on it, and it’s pointing all of those instruments down at the ground. It’s collecting information through photography and other imaging of whatever is going on down on the ground below it.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/WglPIjZeC58?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A high-altitude Chinese balloon drifted over the U.S., entering over Montana and moving over the central portion of the country, causing the U.S. to send fighter jets into the air and triggering an angry response from the U.S. government.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why would someone want to use a spy balloon instead of just using spy satellites?</h2>
<p>Satellites are the preferred method of spying from overhead. Spy satellites are above us today, typically at one of two <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog">different types of orbit</a>.</p>
<p>The first is called <a href="https://www.space.com/low-earth-orbit">low Earth orbit</a>, and, as the name suggests, those satellites are relatively close to the ground. But they’re still several hundred miles above us. For imaging and taking photographs, the closer you are to something, the more clearly you can see it, and this applies to spying as well. The satellites that are in low Earth orbit have the advantage that they’re closer to the Earth so they’re able to see things more clearly than satellites that are farther away. </p>
<p>The disadvantage these low Earth orbit satellites have is that they are continually moving around the Earth. It takes them about 90 minutes to do one orbit around the Earth. That turns out to be pretty fast in terms of taking clear photographs of what’s going on below. </p>
<p>The second type of satellite orbit is called <a href="https://www.space.com/29222-geosynchronous-orbit.html">geosynchronous orbit</a>, and that’s much farther away. It has the disadvantage that it’s harder to see things clearly when you’re very, very far away. But they have the advantage of what we call persistence, allowing satellites <a href="https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/10/17/persistent-surveillance/">to capture images continuously</a>. In those orbits, you’re essentially overlooking the exact same piece of ground on the Earth’s surface all the time because the satellite moves in exactly the same way the earth rotates – it rotates at the exact same speed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a black-and-white view from high above a seaport showing a submarine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508153/original/file-20230204-12319-pno2r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.S. satellite photo showing a Soviet submarine in port in 1982.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/images/gambhex/Gambit_and_Hexagon_Images/300_dpi/14.jpg">National Reconnaissance Office</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A balloon in some ways gets the best of those. These balloons are much, much closer to the ground than any of the satellites, so they can see even more clearly. And then, of course, balloons are moving, but they’re moving relatively slowly, so they also have a degree of persistence. However, spying is not usually done these days with balloons because they are a relatively easy target and are not completely controllable.</p>
<h2>What types of surveillance are spy balloons capable of?</h2>
<p>I don’t know what’s on this particular spy balloon, but it’s likely to be different kinds of cameras collecting different types of information.</p>
<p>These days, imaging is conducted across different regions of the <a href="https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html">electromagnetic spectrum</a>. Humans see in a certain range of this spectrum, the visible spectrum. And so if you have a camera and you take a photograph of your dog, that’s a visible photograph. That’s one of the things spy aircraft do. They take regular photographs, although they have very good zoom capabilities to be able to magnify what they’re seeing quite a lot. </p>
<p>But you can also gather different kinds of information in other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. Another fairly well-known one is infrared. If it’s nighttime, a camera operating in the visible part of the spectrum is not going to show you anything. It’s all going to be dark. But an infrared camera can pick up things from heat in the dark.</p>
<h2>How do these balloons navigate?</h2>
<p>Most of these balloons literally go where the wind blows. There can be a little bit of navigation, but there are certainly not people aboard them. They are at the mercy of whatever the weather is. They sometimes have guiding apparatus on them that change a balloon’s altitude to catch winds going in particular directions. According to reports, U.S. officials said the Chinese surveillance balloon <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/02/04/chinese-balloon-shoot-down/">had propellers to help steer it</a>. If this is confirmed, it means that its operator would have much more control over the path of the balloon.</p>
<h2>What are the limits to a nation’s airspace? At what altitude does it become space and anybody’s right to be there?</h2>
<p>There is an internationally accepted boundary called the <a href="https://astronomy.com/news/2021/03/the-krmn-line-where-does-space-begin">Kármán Line</a> at 62 miles (100 kilometers) altitude. This balloon is well below that, so it is absolutely, definitely in U.S. airspace.</p>
<h2>Which countries are known to be using spy balloons?</h2>
<p>The Pentagon has had programs over the last few decades studying what can be done with balloons that couldn’t be done in the past. Maybe they’re bigger, maybe they can go higher in the atmosphere so they’re more difficult to shoot down or disable. Maybe they could be more persistent. </p>
<p>The broad interest in this incident illustrates its unusual nature. Few people <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/84ca852e-8653-43ac-ae76-023f8829229c">would expect any country to be actively using spy balloons</a> these days.</p>
<p>The U.S. flew many balloons over the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, and those were eventually replaced by the high-altitude spy airplanes, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/U-2">U-2s</a>, and they were subsequently replaced by satellites. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a black and white photograph of a group of men holding ropes attached to a large balloon being inflated from the back of a truck in a desert" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508152/original/file-20230204-7549-g18sit.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Project Moby Dick was an early Cold War-era effort by the U.S. to monitor the Soviet Union using high-altitude balloons.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Moby_Dick#/media/File:Launch_of_MOBY_DICK_balloon.png">United States Air Force Public Affairs</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I’m sure a number of countries around the world have periodically gone back to reevaluate: Are there other things we could do now with balloons that we couldn’t do before? Do they close some gaps we have from satellites and airplanes? </p>
<h2>What does that say about the nature of this balloon, which China confirmed is theirs?</h2>
<p>China has complained for many years <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3153916/us-ships-and-planes-conducted-2000-spying-missions-aimed-china">about the U.S. spying</a> on China through satellites, through ships. And China is also well known for engaging in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-accuses-china-increased-south-china-sea-provocations-2022-07-26/">somewhat provocative behavior</a>, like in the South China Sea, sailing close to other nations’ boundaries and saber-rattling. I think it falls into that category. </p>
<p>The balloon doesn’t pose any real threat to the U.S. I think sometimes China is just experimenting to see how far they can push things. This isn’t really very advanced technology. It’s not serving any real military purpose. I think it’s much more likely some kind of political message.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to include news that the balloon has been shot down by the U.S. military.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, and Lockheed-Martin. </span></em></p>A Chinese high-altitude balloon violated U.S. airspace, a serious enough breach to nix a high-level diplomatic meeting in Beijing. The balloon itself, however, was not much of a threat.Iain Boyd, Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado BoulderLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973932023-01-18T13:38:56Z2023-01-18T13:38:56ZDozens of US schools, universities move to ban TikTok<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504510/original/file-20230113-14-datjvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C4608%2C3442&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The TikTok social media app has raised concerns about cybersecurity and online safety.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/illustration-tiktok-a-short-video-platform-suqian-jiangsu-news-photo/1245918786">Future Publishing via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A growing number of public schools and colleges in the U.S. are moving to ban TikTok – the popular Chinese-owned social media app that allows users to share short videos.</p>
<p>They are following the lead of the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-ban-biden-government-college-state-federal-security-privacy-rcna63724">federal government</a> and <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/tiktok-bans-government-devices-raise-222316798.html">several states</a>, that are banishing the social media app because <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/students-question-tiktok-bans-public-universities-rcna62801">authorities believe foreign governments – specifically China – could use the app</a> to spy on Americans.</p>
<p>The app is created by ByteDance, which is based in China and has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/07/tiktoks-china-bytedance-data-concerns">ties to the Chinese government</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/students-question-tiktok-bans-public-universities-rcna62801">The University of Oklahoma, Auburn University in Alabama</a> and <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/social-media/tiktok-also-banned-by-some-us-universities/">26 public universities and colleges in Georgia</a> have banned the app from campus Wi-Fi networks. <a href="https://www.bestcolleges.com/news/these-colleges-just-banned-tiktok/">Montana’s governor has asked</a> the state’s university system to ban it. </p>
<p>Some K-12 schools have also blocked the app. Public schools in Virginia’s <a href="https://www.fox5dc.com/news/stafford-county-public-schools-blocking-students-access-to-tiktok">Stafford, Prince William and Loudoun counties</a> have banned TikTok on school-issued devices and schools’ Wi-Fi networks. Louisiana’s state superintendent of education recommended that <a href="https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-superintendent-education-tik-tok-ban/42393440">schools in the state remove the app from public devices</a> and <a href="https://www.edweek.org/technology/should-schools-ban-tiktok-louisiana-ed-chief-urges-districts-to-do-it/2023/01#:%7E:text=He%20implored%20districts%20to%20delete,laptops%2C%20a%20department%20spokesman%20added.">block it</a> on school-issued devices. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=g-jALEoAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">researcher</a> who specializes in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1097198X.2019.1603527">cybersecurity</a>, I don’t believe these schools are overreacting. TikTok captures user data in a way that is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/19/tiktok-has-been-accused-of-aggressive-data-harvesting-is-your-information-at-risk">more aggressive than other apps</a>.</p>
<p>The version of TikTok that is raising all these concerns is not available in China itself. In an effort to protect Chinese students from the harmful effects of social media, the Chinese Communist Party has issued a rule that limits the time students can spend on TikTok to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/fbi-says-it-has-national-security-concerns-about-tiktok/6836340.html">40 minutes a day</a>. And they can view only <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/fbi-says-it-has-national-security-concerns-about-tiktok/6836340.html">videos with a patriotic theme or educational content</a> such as science experiments and museum exhibits.</p>
<h2>Aggressive tactics to capture and harvest user data</h2>
<p>All <a href="https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-superintendent-education-tik-tok-ban/42393440">major social media platforms</a> <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/">raise privacy concerns and include security risks</a> for users.</p>
<p>But TikTok does more than the rest. Its default privacy settings allow the app to collect much more information than the app needs to actually function. </p>
<p>Every hour, the app accesses users’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/19/tiktok-has-been-accused-of-aggressive-data-harvesting-is-your-information-at-risk">contact lists and calendars</a>. It also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/19/tiktok-has-been-accused-of-aggressive-data-harvesting-is-your-information-at-risk">collects the location of devices</a> used to access the service and can scan hard drives attached to any of those devices. </p>
<p>If a user changes privacy settings to avoid that scrutiny, the app <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/19/tiktok-has-been-accused-of-aggressive-data-harvesting-is-your-information-at-risk">persistently asks for that permission to be restored</a>. Other social networking apps, like Facebook, don’t ask users to revise their privacy settings if they lock down their information.</p>
<p>How TikTok handles the data it collects from users also raises concerns. Ireland’s data protection regulator, for instance, is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-fire-warning-shots-at-tiktok-over-privacy/">investigating possible illegal transfers</a> of European citizens’ data to Chinese servers and potential violations of rules protecting children’s privacy.</p>
<h2>Cybersecurity vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://businessplus.ie/tech/social-media-lost-user-data/">with other social media services</a>, researchers have found <a href="https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/tik-or-tok-is-tiktok-secure-enough/">serious vulnerabilities</a> with TikTok.</p>
<p>In 2020, cybersecurity company Check Point found that it could send users messages that looked as if they came from TikTok but actually contained malicious links. When users clicked on those links, <a href="https://futurism.com/major-security-flaws-tiktok">Check Point’s researchers could seize control of their TikTok accounts</a>, get access to private information, delete existing content and even post new material under that user’s account.</p>
<p>Hackers have also taken advantage of <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2022/11/29/tiktok_invisible_challenge_malware/">viral TikTok trends to distribute malicious software</a> that creates additional cybersecurity problems. For instance, a trend called the “Invisible Challenge” encouraged users to use a TikTok filter called “Invisible Body” to film themselves naked – assuring users their followers would only see a blurry image, not anything revealing. </p>
<p>Cybercriminals created TikTok videos that claimed they had made software that would reveal users’ nude bodies by reversing the body-masking filter. But the software they encouraged users to download actually just stole people’s <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/tiktok-invisible-body-challenge-exploited-to-push-malware/">social media, credit card and cryptocurrency credentials</a> from elsewhere on their phones, as well as files from victims’ computers.</p>
<h2>National security concerns</h2>
<p>Many U.S. lawmakers have objected to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1144745813/why-the-proposed-tiktok-ban-is-more-about-politics-than-privacy-according-to-exp">the app’s location tracking services</a>, saying it could allow the Chinese government to monitor <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/tiktok-security-concerns-explained-republican-led-states-look-ban-it-1765790">the movements and locations of U.S. citizens</a> – including members of the military or government officials.</p>
<p>If the Chinese government wants information about the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1100836/number-of-us-tiktok-users/">more than 90 million TikTok users</a>, it does not need to hack anything.</p>
<p>That’s because China’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html">2017 National Intelligence Law</a> <a href="https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/preemptive-safety/is-tiktok-safe">requires Chinese companies</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/19/tiktok-has-been-accused-of-aggressive-data-harvesting-is-your-information-at-risk">share any data they collect if the government asks</a>.</p>
<p>Technology industry observers have also raised concerns that ByteDance, the company that makes TikTok, may be <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/tiktok-owned-controlled-china-communist-party-ccp-influence-1752415">partially owned by the Chinese government</a>.</p>
<p>These problems take on even more importance in the context of the Chinese government’s alleged efforts to build a <a href="https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chinas-mss-linked-to-marriott/">huge “data lake” of information about all Americans</a>. China has been linked to several large-scale cyberattacks targeting federal employees and U.S. consumers. These attacks include the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html">2015 hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management</a>, 2017 attacks on the <a href="https://www.csoonline.com/article/3444488/equifax-data-breach-faq-what-happened-who-was-affected-what-was-the-impact.html">consumer credit reporting agency Equifax</a> and the 2018 attack on hotel group <a href="https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chinas-mss-linked-to-marriott/">Marriott International</a>. </p>
<h2>Negative effects outweighing positive ones?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.edweek.org/technology/tiktok-gas-twitter-how-social-media-is-influencing-education/2022/12">Teachers and school administrators have used TikTok</a> in some interesting, and useful, ways – such as connecting with students, building relationships, teaching about the risks of social media and delivering small, quick lessons.</p>
<p>But it is not clear whether those positive effects counterbalance the potential and actual harm. In addition to general concerns about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439316660340">the possible risks of social media addictions</a>, some school officials say increased TikTok use has <a href="https://www.fox5dc.com/news/stafford-county-public-schools-blocking-students-access-to-tiktok">distracted students from paying attention</a> to teachers.</p>
<p>Also, the app’s algorithm for recommending videos to watch next has increased students’ risk of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/15/tech/tiktok-teens-study-trnd/index.html">suicide and eating disorders</a>. The “One Chip Challenge,” which asks TikTok users to eat a single chip containing <a href="https://shop.paqui.com/products/one-chip-challenge">two of the world’s spiciest chili peppers</a>, sent <a href="https://medicalxpress.com/news/2022-10-tiktok-trend-kids-home-sick.html">some students to the hospital</a> and made others sick.</p>
<p>TikTok videos have also led students to <a href="https://www.krgv.com/news/students-destroy-steal-school-property-for-viral-tiktok-challenge/">engage in vandalism</a>. In response to one viral challenge, some students <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/viral-trend-on-tiktok-encourages-students-to-damage-school-property-steal/">stole bathroom sinks and soap dispensers</a> from schools. </p>
<p>With all that potential for harm and damage, it’s not surprising school officials are considering a ban on TikTok.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nir Kshetri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>School officials are becoming increasingly wary of TikTok amid concerns that the app poses a risk to student safety and privacy and makes the nation vulnerable to spies.Nir Kshetri, Professor of Management, University of North Carolina – GreensboroLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1925372022-11-08T14:02:26Z2022-11-08T14:02:26ZGreece’s ‘Watergate’ explained: why the European Parliament is investigating over a wiretapping scandal<p>After Greece and the European Central Bank <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2016.1154977?casa_token=nA5m981NE14AAAAA%3AvZsgVPwIH54QnboqbHweNklssbC6gIrdXWojSmH-Vlesr94IRns26RjeOgNgZ8lG1bqzYK1LSNE">agreed</a> post-economic-crash bailout terms in 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a 146-page <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10110.pdf">report</a> outlining all the key state problems that were seen as having caused Greece’s fiscal crisis. </p>
<p>One of them was <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230294752">corruption</a>, which has eaten away at accountability in Greek politics since the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30036358#metadata_info_tab_contents">end of military dictatorship</a> in 1974. Sean Hagan, the former general counsel of the IMF described Greece as a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oe_MSTMFLGM">tough case</a>, as corruption appeared to be widespread on all levels of public administration.</p>
<p>On winning the 2019 general election, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis acknowledged those underlying issues. He <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSZO4XVAMb4">promised</a> to be ruthless about the symptoms of corruption and fight off accusations of elitism. Far from achieving these goals, however, Mitsotakis’ government now stands accused of <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733637/EPRS_ATA(2022)733637_EN.pdf">spying on journalists and opposition politicians</a>. </p>
<h2>‘Greek Watergate’</h2>
<p>Mitsotakis had to admit that the Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP) <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733637/EPRS_ATA(2022)733637_EN.pdf">had been wiretapping</a> Nikos Androulakis, leader of centre-left opposition party Pasok and a member of the European parliament. However, he claimed not to have known about it and insisted all operations were legal.</p>
<p>This last point is crucial since several journalists have accused the Greek government of <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2021/12/pegasus-vs-predator-dissidents-doubly-infected-iphone-reveals-cytrox-mercenary-spyware/">putting Predator spyware on their phones</a> – a type of software similar to the notorious <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/18/what-is-pegasus-spyware-and-how-does-it-hack-phones">Pegasus</a> spyware – which is illegal in the European Union. </p>
<p>The EYP has admitted to monitoring journalist Thanasis Koukakis but denied deploying Predator. </p>
<p>The EYP has refused to provide records of the surveillance to prove that Predator was not used, however. And to the surprise of many, EYP director general Panagiotis Kontoleon <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/05/greek-intelligence-chief-resigns-over-alleged-spying-scandal">suddenly resigned</a> in August 2022 – although again denying Predator was involved in the wiretapping, admitting only that “incorrect actions” had taken place during “legal surveillance”. Grigoris Dimitriadis, the general secretary of the prime minister’s office (and nephew of Mitsotakis) stepped down within an hour of his departure. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Androulakis claims an independent analysis <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-09-12-INT-1-112-0000_EL.html">found Predator software on his phone</a> and is taking a case to Greece’s supreme court.</p>
<h2>A special inquiry goes nowhere</h2>
<p>Mitsotakis promised to shed “significant light” on what had happened in these cases and announced a special parliamentary inquiry. This was a huge risk since he had brought the EYP under his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/07/greek-pm-kyriakos-mitsotakis-under-pressure-over-tapping-of-opponents-phone">personal control</a> after winning the 2019 general election. It was an unusual move, heavily criticised by opposition parties at the time. Now Mitsotakis was leaving himself vulnerable to personal liability by ordering the inquiry. </p>
<p>Questions about how he could not have known about surveillance were bound to arise, as would questions about what prompted Kontoleon and Dimitriadis to resign if no wrongdoing had taken place. Mitsotakis insisted their departure was not an admission of guilt, but both resignations remain unexplained.</p>
<p>Anyone hoping that answers could be given through the inquiry were sorely disappointed when it <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/greek-spyware-inquiry-ends-in-stalemate/">wrapped up</a> without the various parties involved agreeing on any findings. According to Mitsotakis’s party, the allegations about phone hacking “collapsed like a house of cards” under scrutiny. According to opposition parties Syriza and Pasok, the government deliberately sped up the inquiry process to <a href="https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/134278/SYRIZA---PS:-Prwtofanhs-metapoliteytika-methodeysh-fimwshs-twn-boyleytwn-h-mystikh-Olomeleia-gia-tis-ypoklopes---Me-kathe-kinhsh-sygkalypshs-o-k.-Mhtsotakhs-epibebaiwnei-thn-enochh-toy.html">cover up</a> wrongdoing.</p>
<p>Mitsotakis claimed the inquiry proved no wrongdoing had taken place and declared the matter closed.</p>
<p>The fact that key witnesses, including Kontoleon and Dimitriadis, refused to cooperate or answer any questions, citing <a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1192345/wiretapping-probe-veiled-in-confidentiality/">confidentiality</a>, has only added to the sense of injustice among the other parties. The “significant light” Mitsotakis promised to shed is currently missing. Instead, he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivFkoZVAWz8">blamed</a> “dark forces outside Greece” for destabilising the country – although did not make clear what these dark forces were. </p>
<h2>The EU steps in</h2>
<p>Nor is this scandal solely an internal matter anymore. The European Union has sent a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/greek-pm-on-alert-as-eu-parliament-predator-mission-goes-to-athens/">fact finding delegation</a> to Greece to investigate further. This is part of wider work by the European Parliament to investigate the abuse of spyware among EU governments – a mission that Brussels takes seriously enough to have set up a <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022DP0071">dedicated committee</a>.</p>
<p>The committee has already expressed concern about evidence that the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LciskOzRD4Y">Polish government</a> was using spyware and has been investigating similar reports about the Hungarian government monitoring the press. </p>
<p>When Mitsotakis came to power in 2018, he pledged to take on <a href="https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/455961/mitsotakis-o-laikismos-stin-ellada-tha-nikithei-stis-eperhomenes-ekloges">populism</a>. Now he is under investigation alongside the populist leaders who have become notorious in the EU for straining democratic norms. </p>
<p><a href="https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/press-conference-by-sophie-in-t-veld-rapporteur-on-pega-draft-report_20221108-1100-SPECIAL-PRESSER">Presenting the findings</a> of its draft report on the use of spyware by European governments the committee called on the Greek government to provide more information to enable the inquiry to draw accurate conclusions.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether his government is guilty of using spyware against journalists and political opponents, Mitsotakis is behaving like a populist leader by making a sham of the inquiry set up to investigate the problem. Such a lack of commitment to accountability is never a welcome sign in a democratic system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Samaras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis admits his intelligence agency surveilled journalists but denies using illegal Predator software on them.Georgios Samaras, Lecturer in Political Economy, Department of Political Economy, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1860772022-07-27T12:54:18Z2022-07-27T12:54:18ZThe cold war double agent abandoned by the spy agencies he risked his life for – podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472028/original/file-20220701-20-rqp22b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4760%2C3270&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/conceptual-picture-foreign-spy-embedded-government-1957231399">Ivan Serebryannikov/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast, new research reveals the story of a cold war double agent who feels abandoned after 22 years of service. </p>
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<p>As soon as Eleni Braat and Ben de Jong met the man they now call “M”, they knew they wanted to interview him. Braat, a historian at Utrecht University, and De Jong, an intelligence expert at Leiden University, both in the Netherlands, are fascinated by the relationships spies had with their secret service handlers.</p>
<p>What particularly intrigued them about M, a Dutchman, was that he’d worked for three different secret service agencies during more than two decades as a spy. First recruited into the Dutch secret service as a young man in the 1960s, he’d then been approached by the East German Stasi, and began work as a double agent still loyal to the west. In 1981, his Dutch handlers transferred him over to the CIA and he continued to work for the Americans until the dying days of the cold war. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2022.2088951?src=">his interviews with the researchers</a>, M reflected back on his life as a spy and the important work he feels that he did. “He was in a sense a convinced cold warrior, on the western side against communism,” says de Jong. “But at the same time he felt that he has been treated rather badly by two of the services that he worked for, namely the Dutch security service and the CIA.” </p>
<p>At times, M felt his life was in real danger – and that he’d been betrayed. Braat says M’s account provides insights into the loneliness of life as a spy, but also “the importance of aftercare” for secret agents, once their spying work ends.</p>
<p>Listen to a full account of M’s experiences on <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a> podcast. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/revealed-untold-story-of-the-ciastasi-double-agent-abandoned-after-22-years-of-service-174668">read an article for our Insight series</a> that Braat and De Jong wrote based on their interviews with M. </p>
<p>This episode was produced by Gemma Ware and Mend Mariwany, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also sign up to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">how else to listen here</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186077/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleni Braat and Ben de Jong do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The story of a Dutch double agent who spied on the Stasi. Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1746682022-07-27T12:02:55Z2022-07-27T12:02:55ZRevealed: untold story of the CIA/Stasi double agent abandoned after 22 years of service<blockquote>
<p>I was naked, tied to a hard chair with handcuffs. Three or four burly fellows in uniform are standing around me, one of them behind me with a truncheon… ‘Sie sind ein Verräter! [You are a traitor!],’ they snap.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These are the words of double agent “M”, who operated for the Dutch security service and the CIA against the East German Stasi for 22 years. In early 1985, it appeared that the Stasi may have uncovered his deception – and his true loyalty to the west. He was in East Berlin at the time and the men had rudely awoken M around 4am. Still in pyjamas, he was taken from the safe house where he was staying for debriefing sessions with his Stasi handlers to a van with darkened windows that transported him, under armed guard, to a prison.</p>
<p>They told him he was in the <em>Untersuchungshaftanstalt</em> (pre-trial detention center) Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, a notorious site during the cold war under the control of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi). M was forced to undergo a degrading and extremely painful cavity inspection, before being taken – still naked – to an interrogation room.</p>
<p>His captors intimidated him by pouring cold water over him from a bucket until the afternoon. They taunted him constantly, saying things like “You betrayed Marxism-Leninism” and “You are a CIA agent”. Yet M said he felt strangely reassured because these accusations were not specific – they were meant to provoke him. In other words, his interrogators seemed to lack proof.</p>
<p>We interviewed M extensively between 2019 and 2021 about his career as a spy during the cold war. He told us about his life as a “double agent” and how, in the end, he was abandoned by the masters he had served. We checked and cross-referenced his account and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2022.2088951?src=">our research</a> has been peer-reviewed and published in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. But it is hard to know the full truth when it comes to the secretive world of espionage, so we have tried to highlight those areas which are impossible to verify.</p>
<p>It’s important to underline just how rare it is for a former secret service agent to open up and talk on the record about their experiences. M gave us a truly unique insight into the secret workings of three different intelligence agencies. He spoke about issues he hadn’t even told his wife about.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This story is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> and is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects to tackle societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<p>M’s spying career began in the second half of the 1960s when the Dutch security service, the BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst) – the predecessor of the present-day <a href="https://www.aivd.nl/">AIVD</a> (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) – recruited him. He was working for a Dutch multinational that we have agreed not to name. That career would go on to provide excellent cover for his clandestine work, as it involved a lot of international travel.</p>
<p>M worked for the Dutch service for many years and subsequently for the CIA. The Americans were keen to use him when they learned he had also been recruited by the foreign intelligence arm of the Stasi – the renowned Hauptverwaltung (Chief Administration) A, known by its acronym HVA.</p>
<p>Over a period of more than 20 years, from the late 1960s until the end of the cold war, the HVA considered M their agent and he gave the East Germans information – much of it acquired through the multinational he worked for. But throughout this time, his primary loyalty was to the Dutch service and the CIA. From the perspective of the East Germans, M was indeed a traitor.
After seeing the evidence he provided to us, we believe his account of working against the Stasi is credible.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Listen to Eleni Braat and Ben de Jong talk about M’s life <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-cold-war-double-agent-abandoned-by-the-spy-agencies-he-risked-his-life-for-podcast-186077">in an episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>.</em></p>
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<h2>A double-cross?</h2>
<p>M’s motive in sharing his story stems from his desire to learn more about certain episodes from his spying career. He wants to find out, in particular, why his East German handlers, whom he had managed to deceive so successfully for so many years, suddenly seemed to turn against him in the mid-1980s.</p>
<p>It transpired that the humiliating interrogation was in fact a mock arrest led by Stasi handlers to test his mettle. But the episode planted a seed of doubt in M’s mind about whether the Stasi was on to him. A seed that would grow over the years to become an obsession. He would go on to believe that he had been betrayed.</p>
<p>According to M, only “treason” within the CIA could explain it – that a mole within the American intelligence service had betrayed him as a double agent to the Soviet KGB. During the cold war, the KGB, of course, worked very closely with the Stasi. On several occasions, M discussed the possibility that someone like <a href="https://books.google.nl/books/about/Nightmover.html?id=7a-vA1_Dv_4C&redir_esc=y">Aldrich Ames</a>, a notorious KGB <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/aldrich-ames">mole</a> inside the CIA between 1985 and 1994, was responsible for betraying him. </p>
<p>In all six of our interviews, M emphasised the distinctive nature of his relationships with the three different services he dealt with. His two long-time Stasi handlers were known to him as Wolfgang and Heinz. M’s meetings with them often took place in East Berlin, and sometimes in other venues in the Eastern Bloc such as Bulgaria or Yugoslavia. M could easily make such trips behind the Iron Curtain without raising suspicions.</p>
<h2>Finding the CIA mole</h2>
<p>By 1985, M was a seasoned double agent and seemingly getting on very well with his Stasi handlers, Wolfgang and Heinz. Nothing, therefore, had prepared him for the interrogation in the Hohenschönhausen prison.</p>
<p>While M spoke eagerly of the excitement and disillusionment he felt as a result of his spying career, he initially was reluctant to talk about this traumatising “mock arrest”. In the end, however, he told us about it in great detail – something he had never done before, not even to his wife of many years. He told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It was early spring and pretty cold. Their behaviour was rough, to say the least. After they have taken you in, they examine you. You are ordered to undress completely. All body openings are being inspected rather roughly. They threw me in a prison cell, and after a while they took me out again. Naked through the corridors on my way to the interrogation room. The corridors were lit. And if somebody would arrive from the opposite direction, they would push your face against the wall… It was overwhelming, to put it mildly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He added: “You become totally demoralised. You can’t do anything and you are absolutely powerless. They rob you, as it were, of your identity and take away every shred of humanity.” Mentally, he recited the mantra: “Keep denying, do not give in. Keep insisting that as a foreigner you devoted yourself to the good cause, to socialism…”</p>
<p>Why the Stasi subjected M to such a harsh and intimidating interrogation has remained a puzzle. Was there a suspicion on the part of the HVA, based on a lead from a KGB mole in the CIA? Or was it just a way for the East Germans to test his mental resilience, to check if they could count on him in a stressful situation? In later years, he would ask himself these questions repeatedly. The possibility of treason from within the CIA became an obsession. </p>
<p>Either way, the interrogation ended suddenly and bizarrely. Wolfgang and Heinz entered the room unexpectedly and approached him in the most cordial manner: “Congratulations! You passed the test, you are now one of us!”</p>
<p>M was untied from his chair, handed back his clothes and taken to a room to freshen up. He was then taken to another safe house where he was given an award: a Golden Distinguished Service Medal of the National People’s Army (Verdienstmedaille der Nationalen Volksarmee).</p>
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<img alt="Both sides of a merit medal." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451897/original/file-20220314-26-1i6xftd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Both sides of the Medaille der Waffenbrüderschaft (Medal for Comrades-in-Arms) that M received from the Stasi in 1984.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photograph: M</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>None other than <a href="https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/markus-wolf/man-without-a-face/9781891620126/">Markus Wolf</a>, the legendary chief of the HVA (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/10/germany.mainsection">dubbed</a> The Man Without a Face) officially handed him the medal. Wolf had arrived at the safe house in a Volvo, the favourite car of high officials in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), escorted by motors at the front and rear.</p>
<p>“We shook hands,” M told us. “I found him a very friendly, amicable man… At a certain point, he told me: ‘You did important work for us’, but he did not go into specifics.” When M wanted to bring up his earlier unpleasant experience in the prison, Wolf cut him off by saying: “We will not discuss it.” </p>
<p>The meeting with Wolf lasted about an hour. A strange detail is that Wolf apparently put strawberry jam in his tea. As a young man during the Nazi period, Wolf had lived in exile in Russia, where this is a common habit. </p>
<p>The mock arrest and meeting with Wolf were unsettling for M, as he often said during our interviews. The day has clearly left a deep impression on him:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was mentally put off-balance, I couldn’t wrap my mind around it. Even though the medal from the chief of the HVA flattered my ego, it also contributed to mixed feelings. I was a double agent after all, I was also a traitor.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘I was a soldier in the cold war’</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2022.2088951?src=">Our research</a> focuses on the relationship between intelligence services and their agents – and in particular, how signs of gratitude and trust affect this relationship. </p>
<p>The case of M is illuminating because it allows for comparisons between the behaviour of three different secret services towards the same agent. We see the varying degrees of gratitude and recognition that the Dutch security service, the CIA and the Stasi showed for M’s work, from personal attention and verbal expressions of gratitude to material gifts.</p>
<p>Clearly, M felt a strong ideological commitment to the west and had no moral qualms about betraying the Stasi. As he put it: “I did not consider myself as someone who was deceiving others. I was a soldier in the cold war.” </p>
<p>The CIA was instructing M in techniques the Americans used to recruit KGB intelligence officers who might know about penetrations inside the US intelligence community. This operation started in 1987, amid investigations into the “1985 losses” the FBI and the CIA had suffered during a wave of arrests among their agents in the USSR. Potential approaches of KGB officers were preceded by psychological assessments that could estimate their willingness to collaborate. </p>
<p>M was tasked by the CIA to analyse the behaviour of his East German handlers using these techniques. The operation, codenamed RACKETEER by the CIA, used the Personality Assessment System designed by the agency’s former star psychologist John Gittinger. The CIA instructed M to observe the behaviour of Wolfgang and Heinz because the Stasi and KGB collaborated closely.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, M bonded most with these two handlers that he was deceiving. Their meetings always took place behind the Iron Curtain and the two East Germans showed their appreciation for M’s work on numerous occasions. In between debriefings, they drank Georgian cognac with him, covered his expenses without much ado, took him for day trips and copious dinners in restaurants and accompanied him on visits to nightclubs in East Berlin and elsewhere. “We visited nightclubs or a museum in Leipzig, we went for rides… In Budapest we went to those hot baths on [Margaret Island].”</p>
<p>M has fond memories of the time he spent with his two Stasi companions, who addressed him with the informal “<em>du</em>” [you] in German:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>They were good at giving presents. I had once bought a very nice book of fairy tales for myself in Denmark, and sometime later they gave me a similar book as a present. I received medals from them, whereas the BVD never gave me a medal or another sign of recognition, not even a ballpoint. At another meeting with Wolfgang and Heinz in the East, I received all kinds of special treats because I had gotten married six months earlier [in 1970]. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One of the wedding gifts the Stasi gave him was an exquisite Bohemian crystal vase. They would even take M to toy shops where – at their expense – he could indulge his love for model trains. But with the BVD, it was different. Years later, when M got access to his BVD file, he found that at the time of his marriage, the service decided M would not be given a special present as he had been declaring too many expenses. </p>
<p>At a meeting in East Berlin shortly after his marriage, Wolfgang and Heinz asked M if he would appreciate a <em>Frauenbesuch</em> (a female visitor) on a particular evening. This surprised him. “I think the HVA wanted to find out: ‘How far will this agent go? What does he accept? How honest is he?’ Also, I would have put myself in a vulnerable position with the East Germans by saying yes.” In other words, M always had to be on guard in his dealings with the Stasi, even with his “friends” Wolfgang and Heinz. </p>
<p>New <a href="https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/GiesekeHistory">publications</a> on the Stasi and the HVA started coming out in large numbers after the collapse of the GDR. With these new resources, M managed to trace the full names of what he believes to be his handlers, Wolfgang Koch and Heinz Nötzelmann. But his attempts to contact them were unsuccessful. The full names of Wolfgang and Heinz also appear in publications by the Stasi archives in Berlin, and a man said to be Koch even appears in a photograph in <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/john-o-koehler/stasi/9780813337449/">a book</a> on the history of the Stasi. </p>
<h2>Recruited by ‘Herr Gerber’</h2>
<p>We were able to corroborate some, but not all of M’s claims about his spying career with documents from his personal files. M has avidly documented everything that happened to him, including correspondence, some of it fairly recent, with the three services. He also has the medal he officially received from the Stasi. In addition, we applied to the AIVD for access to M’s file, but our request was refused several times.</p>
<p>M was from a working-class background. After completing his secondary education in the Netherlands, he spent a year at a high school in the US which proved to be a formative experience. After obtaining a degree in engineering, he fulfilled his military service with the Dutch army and began his career at the large multinational. By then, he had already become familiarised with the practice of espionage, including its basic techniques, during his military service. </p>
<p>Through his career in several European, African and Asian countries, M acquired many international contacts and was able easily to obtain information that was of interest to intelligence services. Initially, Dutch security tasked him with infiltrating local extremist organisations, both on the left and right, that were part of international networks. However, in 1981, they handed him over to the CIA because his spying activities had become too international for the national orbit of the Dutch security service. </p>
<p>In the winter of 1967-68, during an internship in Israel that was part of his studies, a somewhat older German-speaking man introducing himself as “Gerber” approached M and invited him for dinner. Gerber showed a keen interest in M’s background, such as the year he had spent at an American high school and – a rather unusual topic for a casual conversation among strangers – Israeli nuclear developments in the Negev desert. </p>
<p>Later, in West Germany, through a stranger who approached M in the street, “Herr Gerber” sent him his regards and asked for a meeting in East Berlin. M’s Dutch handlers correctly interpreted this approach as a recruiting attempt by the Stasi, and encouraged him to respond favourably. He became a double agent: by successfully pretending to be a Stasi agent, M would acquire valuable information on the personalities of his Stasi handlers for the Dutch service. </p>
<p>He also gathered information on the type of short-wave radio receivers, communication devices and codes the East Germans used, as well as the kind of intelligence they wanted him to acquire in the many different countries where he was stationed for his job. To his Stasi contacts, M explained his willingness to work with them as a consequence of the defects he saw in western capitalism, in particular the many forms of social and racial injustice he had personally observed.</p>
<p>When he became engaged to his future wife, M confided during an intimate dinner at a restaurant that he was working as an agent against the Stasi. His wife did not know the details of his spying, but she was aware of the many trips he made behind the Iron Curtain to meet his Stasi handlers. Indeed, she told us she could see for herself how M was always completely exhausted when he came back home from these meetings, having spent several days in the company of Wolfgang and Heinz.</p>
<p>All this time he would have to pay attention to every detail, however small, and make sure that he didn’t betray himself as a double agent by a careless remark or gesture. On a few occasions, his wife even played an operational role. Several times after M’s return from the Eastern Bloc, she was the one who made a phone call to transmit a pre-arranged coded message to the CIA, implying that M had come back safely.</p>
<h2>Trust and gratitude</h2>
<p>Our research has found that agents and double agents desire a relationship with their handlers that involves trust and gratitude, not just one based on financial compensation. This desire can be explained by the often-hostile environment an agent operates in, which involves distrust, fear, danger and social isolation.</p>
<p>But suddenly, in 1988, M’s relationship with Wolfgang and Heinz cooled. In his debriefings with the CIA, M had given elaborate descriptions of the personalities of both – mentioning Wolfgang’s brown eyes as a striking physical attribute. Then, during a subsequent meeting, Wolfgang said out of the blue: “You don’t like brown eyes, do you?” M was shocked. His shock was even greater because Wolfgang said this in English, in the precise wording M had used in his CIA debriefing. M told us he barely managed to control his emotions:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I could no longer trust anyone… I had to be constantly alert and wary… To remain in this position over such a long period of time requires much stamina… There is a line of appreciation, trust, but also of abandonment… You are being used as a pawn by something amorphous, by an entity that you cannot enter. No, they will approach you… You are appreciated for your efforts, but [these services] remain a dark cloud that you cannot enter.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This episode ushered in a period when both Wolfgang and Heinz became more distant. The male bonding and the toasting were over and their body language had changed. M kept wondering if he had made some error or, again, whether a CIA mole had blown his cover.</p>
<p>Finally, in early 1990 – less than a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall – the HVA cancelled a meeting abruptly, and that concluded his career as a double agent. No gunshots, no bomb explosion, no Stasi dungeon. It wasn’t like the movies. A meeting was simply cancelled, and the door on his spying career slammed shut.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A white pawn on a chessboard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=303%2C311%2C5127%2C2932&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451913/original/file-20220314-22-upq588.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">M felt used and alone when his career ended.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/photographed-on-chess-board-308017556">Shutterstock/carlofornitano</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The end of the friendship with his East German handlers and “the insecurity and threat” that it generated, in M’s words, had a considerable impact on his wellbeing. It contributed, in his view, to his ensuing depression and nervous breakdown in the early 1990s for which he would receive psychiatric treatment. “You do not have any colleagues in espionage,” he said.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You are left entirely to your own devices. [The separation from my handlers] was really a turning point. Until then I was engaged in all kinds of geopolitical developments, I was right on top of them. I had interesting contacts. And then suddenly, all this ended, and I was sitting at home. That was a shock.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Enjoying the excitement</h2>
<p>M’s story is convincing, even though not all details can be verified, as is often the case in intelligence history. The existing literature on intelligence history allows us to confirm parts of M’s story or assess the likelihood of certain episodes by comparing them with <a href="https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Operation-Solo-by-John-Barron-author/9780895264862">other known cases</a>. And many details in M’s story about the modus operandi of the three services he dealt with can be confirmed from <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/catch-spy">other sources</a>. </p>
<p>Most importantly, recent correspondence between M and the Dutch AIVD about access to his file shows that he had been their agent. M also received some material relating to his case that survived the destruction of the HVA archives in 1989-90, through the <a href="https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/en/">German government agency</a> in Berlin that administers them. He allowed us to see and check all of these documents. They prove that he had also been a Stasi agent. </p>
<p>The Stasi supplied M with Dutch, American, Swiss, British and West German passports that enabled him to travel inconspicuously under different names, especially when he was on his way to a rendezvous with his Stasi handlers. He also communicated with them through dead drops (pre-arranged sites where both parties could leave messages, money or documentation) and written or oral messages. M received messages from the Stasi through short-wave radio transmissions in code from a so-called <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24910397">numbers station</a> in the GDR. These messages consisted of numbers read out monotonously according to a pre-arranged transmission schedule. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic passports." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452452/original/file-20220316-21-p93zu7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">M was supplied with a number of fake passports to carry out his undercover work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/union-soviet-socialist-republics-cccp-passport-541686454">Shutterstock/Chintung Lee</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sometimes M would also exchange messages and material the East Germans were interested in by way of fleeting meetings in hotel lobbies with East German diplomats. Such meetings are called “brush passes” in spy-speak. </p>
<p>M clearly enjoyed the role he played behind the scenes during the cold war and the excitement that came with it – a common phenomenon in the intelligence world. It is also clear, however, that traumatic memories from that period continue to be a considerable burden to him. His obsessive interest in spies, agents and treason is striking. His former CIA handler (who M managed to get back in touch with in recent years) advised him in an email: “Let it go, man, let it go.” But this was clearly to no avail.</p>
<h2>Abandoned after all those years</h2>
<p>Traumatic memories that come back to haunt people many years later are a common phenomenon for war veterans. M feels the CIA abandoned him after the cold war, when he was no longer useful for them. He feels the BVD did the same when they handed him over to the CIA in 1981, renouncing any further responsibility towards him.</p>
<p>When M finally got access to his BVD file in the mid-2010s, he was not allowed to make notes or copies. To his amazement, he came across a document he had completely forgotten about which he had signed himself. It concerned his transfer to the CIA in 1981. It stated that from then on the BVD would no longer bear any responsibility for him. He told us: “The BVD abandoned me completely… after all those years that I had risked my life…” This document came to play a role in his dealings with the Dutch service after his spying career had ended.</p>
<p>In 2016, M’s emotional problems became acute, and he spent a night in an hospital emergency ward. This episode coincided with his approaching the AIVD about receiving access to his file. He asked for their assistance in getting treatment from an agency “with experience in treating the emotional burdens of a long-time double agent”. After nine days, he received an answer from the AIVD’s legal department (which we have seen) saying that “at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and/or Defence there are no facilities for the psychological help you requested. I advise you to contact your GP, so he/she can put you in touch with a regular therapist.” </p>
<p>This lack of cooperation on the part of the AIVD intensified M’s feelings of bitterness. He told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In that world, they just fuck you. This is not how they should treat people that have worked for them for so many years. After all, I went behind the Iron Curtain for them on many occasions.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the end, with a bit of luck, M managed to find help at an institution that specialises in the treatment of war veterans. This treatment is still ongoing. Without a doubt, it was also his bitter feelings that made him eager to share his fascinating life story with us. </p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A double agent who operated for the CIA and the Dutch security service against the Stasi tells his story for the first time.Eleni Braat, Associate professor of international history, Utrecht UniversityBen de Jong, Research Fellow, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1848002022-07-13T12:29:58Z2022-07-13T12:29:58ZIt’s getting harder for scientists to collaborate across borders – that’s bad when the world faces global problems like pandemics and climate change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472614/original/file-20220705-1817-5scvcu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=71%2C59%2C7916%2C3928&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">International scientific collaboration has boomed since the end of the 20th century.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/world-map-of-network-communication-royalty-free-image/1278866306?adppopup=true">Yuichiro Chino/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/ecosoc7083.doc.htm">United Nations</a> and many researchers have emphasized the <a href="https://www.springernature.com/gp/advancing-discovery/springboard/blog/blogposts-sustainability-inclusion/un-must-explicitly-recognise-role-of-science/19664158">critical role international collaborative science plays</a> in solving global challenges like climate change, biodiversity loss and pandemics. The rise of non-Western countries as science powers is helping to drive this type of global cooperative research. For example, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa <a href="https://bricstb.samrc.ac.za/committee.html">formed a tuberculosis research network in 2017</a> and are making significant advancements on basic and applied research into the disease. </p>
<p>However, in the past few years, <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220422%7Ec43af3db20.en.html">growing tensions among superpowers</a>, <a href="https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/02/in-europe-nationalisms-rising/">increasing nationalism</a>, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have contributed to nations’ behaving in more distrustful and insular ways overall. One result is that it is becoming increasingly difficult for researchers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-01386-0">to collaborate with scholars in other nations</a>. </p>
<p>The near-global <a href="https://phys.org/news/2022-03-russia-west-scientific-collaboration-casualty-ukraine.html">cessation of collaboration</a> with Russian scholars following the invasion of Ukraine – in everything from humanities research to <a href="https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/04/11/ukraine-war-how-western-sanctions-on-russia-are-hurting-science-and-climate-change-researc">climate science in the Arctic</a> – is one example of science being a victim of – and used as a tool for – international politics. Scientific collaboration between <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-021-00712-9">China and the U.S.</a> is also breaking down in fields like <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-02015-y">microelectronics and quantum computing</a> because of national security concerns on both sides.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=9POPVI4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">policy expert who studies</a> international research collaboration as it relates to global problems and geopolitical polarization. I understand the need for democratic countries to respond to the the growing strength of authoritarian countries such as China and acute crises like the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But reducing or stopping international research comes with its own risks. It slows down the production of knowledge needed to address long-term global problems and reduces the potential for future scientific collaboration. </p>
<p><iframe id="QAymv" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/QAymv/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Growth of non-Western science</h2>
<p>Since the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, global <a href="https://sciencebusiness.net/news-byte/international-science-collaboration-rise-and-it-leads-increased-productivity">collaboration in science has increased</a> dramatically. There are several reasons for this development. </p>
<p>First, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to an increased openness in global scientific exchange. In particular, there was growth in the number of students from developing and non-Western countries going to universities in the West. This movement formed networks of researchers from many countries. Second, massively collaborative scientific efforts – such as the <a href="https://www.yourgenome.org/stories/who-was-involved-in-the-human-genome-project">Human Genome Project</a> – as well as the ever-growing importance of expensive, large research laboratories and instruments have fueled international collaboration. Finally, the digital revolution has made it much easier to communicate and share data across borders. This all resulted in collaborative and fruitful research in many fields including <a href="https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/genetic-technologies/international-work/">gene technology</a>, <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/">climate science</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/11/30/why-international-cooperation-matters-in-the-development-of-artificial-intelligence-strategies/">artificial intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>While Western countries dominated the scientific landscape of the 20th century, globalization has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/25/The-Winners-and-Losers-of-Globalization-Finding-a-Path-to-Shared-Prosperity">benefited many non-Western countries</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="qIdia" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/qIdia/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In the latter half of the 20th century, China, India, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and many other nations all significantly improved their scientific capabilities. In doing so they have greatly contributed to human knowledge. China in particular has invested heavily in its scientific capabilities and today is the world’s <a href="https://www.rathenau.nl/en/science-figures/process/collaboration/china-scientific-superpower-making">largest producer of scientific publications</a>.</p>
<p>The development of scientific capacity in many parts of the world and the building of academic ties is critical when it comes to <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/global-science-collaboration-open-source-covid-19/">responding to a new virus</a> or tracking changes in climate. The more countries that share data and coordinate policy responses, the easier it should be to contain a virus or understand global warming.</p>
<h2>Western concern of a rising China</h2>
<p>Generally speaking, there are three global superpowers competing for scientific and technological leadership today: the <a href="https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/PC-19-2017.pdf">U.S., China and the European Union</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Joe Biden and Xi Jinping facing away from each other in a room." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472615/original/file-20220705-12588-55xkmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Both the U.S. and Europe have taken steps to slow down China’s scientific rise, and these efforts have dampened research collaboration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USChina/fe8d6115121e46e1a5b80c6f3f12e03b/photo?Query=Biden%20Xi%20jinping&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=217&currentItemNo=23">AP Photo/Charles Dharapak</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">U.S. government</a> and the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_661">European Union</a> frame the loss of scientific and technological leadership as not only about diminished economic opportunities, but also as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/18/newly-important-american-political-axis-democracy-vs-autocracy/">a threat to fundamental values of democracy</a>, free market competition and rule of law. </p>
<p>In May 2022, U.S. Secretary of State <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">Antony Blinken said</a>: “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.”</p>
<p>China’s rise in science and technology has been met with stern responses from the West. Australia passed legislation in 2020 that gave the federal government veto power over foreign agreements in research. In the U.S., the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2019)644187">Export Control Reform Act</a> of 2018 was designed to reduce dependence on China for emerging and foundational technologies.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The International Space Station in space." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472616/original/file-20220705-12-muirgq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western-imposed sanctions, Russia threatened to pull out of the International Space Station.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nasa2explore/51749924967/in/photostream/">NASA/Flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Science as a tool of politics</h2>
<p>Given this framing of research as a part of international competition between China and the West, it is not surprising that science is increasingly being used as a political tool. </p>
<p>The U.S. government has taken significant steps to try to limit China’s scientific progress and international influence. In 2018, the U.S. launched a large-scale anti-espionage effort called the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00555-z">China Initiative</a>. Under this initiative, the FBI broadly investigated U.S.-Chinese links within the corporate and academic sectors. The China Initiative failed to find any Chinese spies. But three U.S.-based scholars were convicted for <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/u-s-math-professor-found-guilty-latest-china-initiative-trial">failing to disclose Chinese ties</a>. </p>
<p>The China Initiative has faced heavy criticism from researchers, university leaders and civil rights organizations <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/repair-the-damage-done-by-doj-wrongly-targeting-chinese-scientists/ar-AAZ0RyV">because of claims of ethnic profiling</a>. The Biden administration <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/23/politics/justice-department-china/index.html">officially canceled the initiative in February 2022</a>. But efforts to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/where-is-china-us-technology-competition-going/">curtail China’s science and technology</a> industries through <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-accused-of-exporting-authoritarian-technology-but-the-west-has-done-so-too-more-covertly-168190">trade sanctions on companies like Huawei</a> restrict American companies from doing business with Chinese tech firms. The China Initiative and sanctions have also made researchers on both sides wary of collaboration. </p>
<p>The European Union has taken a similar stance. It calls China simultaneously a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf">partner, competitor and systemic rival</a>. The EU has outlined goals of increasing European scientific and technological autonomy to reduce reliance on other countries, especially China, and started to <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/eu-unveils-strategy-to-reduce-dependency-on-china/">implement the strategy in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>China is also using science, technology and scholarly research generally to serve national interests. The government has explicitly pushed the idea that research shall primarily <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00638-3">serve national needs</a>, and Chinese scholars are increasingly under <a href="https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20191212160548739">political control</a>. In 2021 there were <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2021/08/28/research-centres-promoting-xi-jinpings-ideas-are-proliferating">18 research centers</a> devoted to studying and promoting Xi Jinping’s ideas on matters such as rule of law, economics and green development.</p>
<h2>Global consequences</h2>
<p>Many researchers in the U.S., Europe and China <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-01386-0">have voiced concerns</a> that geopolitical rivalries are curtailing international research collaboration at a time when the world needs it the most. </p>
<p>There is a major risk that the <a href="https://sciencebusiness.net/news/how-keep-science-open-also-secure-g7-nations-work-answer">impediments to international scientific collaboration</a> will further increase, further harming data sharing, the quality of research and the ability to disseminate results that contributing to solving problems. I often hear researchers, university leaders and funding agencies in Europe, the U.S. and China vent their frustration with the current situation. Many in the research community would like to see a more open and global science landscape.</p>
<p>It is possible to work toward a future where science is more separate – but not naively isolated – from changing power dynamics. As issues like climate change increase in severity, it will become only more important that researchers build international relationships that are responsible, reciprocal, transparent and equitable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184800/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tommy Shih is a consultant to the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education.</span></em></p>Scientific research done through international collaboration has boomed in the past 30 years. But recently, powerful countries are using science as a tool of politics, threatening that work.Tommy Shih, Associate Professor in Business Administration, Lund UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1860462022-06-30T07:20:56Z2022-06-30T07:20:56ZAfter Roe v Wade, here’s how women could adopt ‘spycraft’ to avoid tracking and prosecution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471799/original/file-20220630-16-yytsyn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=90%2C40%2C5373%2C3596&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sashenka Gutierrez/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The art of concealing or misrepresenting one’s identity in the physical world has long been practised by spies engaged in espionage. In response, intelligence agencies designed techniques and technologies to identify people attempting to hide behind aliases.</p>
<p>Now, following the US Supreme Court ruling overturning Roe v Wade, women in the United States seeking assistance with unwanted pregnancies have joined the ranks of spies. </p>
<p>The ruling has resulted in several trigger laws coming into effect in conservative states to outlaw abortions in those states. These laws, coupled with groups targeting women’s reproductive rights protests, have raised fear among women of all ages about their data being used against them.</p>
<p>Thousands have engaged with online posts calling on women to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/28/why-us-woman-are-deleting-their-period-tracking-apps">delete their period tracking apps</a>, on the premise that data fed to these apps could be used to prosecute them in states where abortion is illegal. At the same time, abortion clinics in New Mexico (where abortion remains legal) are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-mexico-shields-abortion-providers-ahead-expected-patient-surge-2022-06-27/">reportedly</a> bracing for an influx of women from US states.</p>
<p>As someone who has served as a special agent for the United States Army and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and as a Senior Intelligence Officer with the US Defense Intelligence Agency, I can tell you deleting period tracking apps may not be enough for vulnerable women now. </p>
<p>But there are some tools women can use to conceal their identities, should this be necessary – the same tools once reserved for professional spies.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1541456351414583297"}"></div></p>
<h2>The privacy myth</h2>
<p>Apart from espionage, the emergence of the internet created a new impetus for widespread data collection by data aggregators and marketers. The modern surveillance economy grew out of a desire to target products and services to us as effectively as possible. </p>
<p>Today, massive swathes of personal information are extracted from users, 24/7 – making it increasingly difficult to remain unmasked.</p>
<p>Data aggregation is used to assess our purchasing habits, track our movements, find our favourite locations and obtain detailed demographic information about us, our families, our co-workers and friends. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/post-roe-women-in-america-are-right-to-be-concerned-about-digital-surveillance-and-its-not-just-period-tracking-apps-185865">Post Roe, women in America are right to be concerned about digital surveillance – and it’s not just period-tracking apps</a>
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<p>Recent events have demonstrated how tenuous our privacy is. <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/22/20926585/hong-kong-china-protest-mask-umbrella-anonymous-surveillance">Protests in Hong Kong</a> have seen Chinese authorities use cameras to identify and arrest protesters, while police in the US deployed various technologies to identify <a href="https://theconversation.com/police-surveillance-of-black-lives-matter-shows-the-danger-technology-poses-to-democracy-142194">Black Lives Matter</a> protesters. </p>
<p>Articles appeared in Australian <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2022/06/29/protests-police-government-surveillance-how-to-avoid/">media outlets</a> with advice on how to avoid being surveilled. And people were directed to websites, such as the <a href="https://www.eff.org/wp/behind-the-one-way-mirror">Electronic Frontier Foundation</a>, dedicated to informing readers about how to avoid surveillance and personal data collection.</p>
<p>What we’ve learned from both spy history and more recent events is that data collection is not always overt and obvious; it’s often unseen and opaque. Surveillance may come in the form of <a href="https://theconversation.com/surveillance-cameras-will-soon-be-unrecognisable-time-for-an-urgent-public-conversation-118931">cameras</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-hide-from-a-drone-the-subtle-art-of-ghosting-in-the-age-of-surveillance-143078">drones</a>, automated number plate readers (<a href="https://theconversation.com/number-plate-recognition-the-technology-behind-the-rhetoric-17572">ANPR/ALPR</a>), <a href="https://www.q-free.com/reference/australia/">toll payment devices</a>, <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/publication/acoustic-surveillance-devices">acoustic collectors</a> and of course any internet-connected <a href="https://theconversation.com/smartphone-data-tracking-is-more-than-creepy-heres-why-you-should-be-worried-91110">device</a>. </p>
<p>In some cases when your fellow protesters upload images or videos, crowd-sourced intelligence becomes your enemy. </p>
<h2>Data deleted, not destroyed</h2>
<p>Recently, a lot of the focus has been on phones and apps. But deleting mobile apps will not prevent the identification of an individual, nor will turning off location services. </p>
<p>Law enforcement and even commercial companies have the ability to access or track certain metrics including:</p>
<ul>
<li>international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), which is related to a user’s mobile number and connected to their SIM card</li>
<li>international mobile equipment identity (IMEI), which is directly related to their device itself.</li>
</ul>
<p>Ad servers may also exploit device locations. Private companies can create advertisements targeting devices that are specific to a location, such as a women’s health clinic. And such “geofenced” ad servers can identify a user’s location regardless of whether their location settings are disabled. </p>
<p>Further, anonymised phone track data (like call signals pinging off nearby towers) can be purchased from telecommunications providers and de-anonymised. </p>
<p>Law enforcement can use this data to trace paths from, say, a fertility clinic to a person’s home or “bed down” location (the spy term for someone’s residence). </p>
<p>The bottom line is your phone is a marker for you. A temporary cell phone with an overseas SIM card has been the choice for some people wishing to avoid such tracking.</p>
<p>Adding to that, we recently saw headlines about <a href="https://theconversation.com/bunnings-kmart-and-the-good-guys-say-they-use-facial-recognition-for-loss-prevention-an-expert-explains-what-it-might-mean-for-you-185126">facial recognition technology</a> being used in Australian retail stores – and America is no different. For anyone trying to evade detection, it’s better to swap bank cards for cash, stored-value cards or gift cards when making purchases.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bunnings-kmart-and-the-good-guys-say-they-use-facial-recognition-for-loss-prevention-an-expert-explains-what-it-might-mean-for-you-185126">Bunnings, Kmart and The Good Guys say they use facial recognition for 'loss prevention'. An expert explains what it might mean for you</a>
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<p>And using public transport paid with cash or a ride-share service provides better anonymity than using a personal vehicle, or even a rental. </p>
<p>In the spy world, paying attention to one’s dress is critical. Spies change up their appearance, using what they call “polish”, with the help of reversible clothing, hats, different styles of glasses, scarves and even masks (which are ideally not conspicuous these days). In extreme cases, they may even use “appliances” to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cias-former-chief-of-disguise-drops-her-mask-11576168327">alter their facial characteristics</a>.</p>
<p>Then again, while these measures help in the physical world, they do little to stop online detection. </p>
<h2>Digital stealth</h2>
<p>Online, the use of a virtual private network (<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-a-virtual-private-network-vpn-12741">VPN</a>) and/or the onion browser, <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-dark-web-46070">Tor</a>, will help improve anonymity, including from internet service providers.</p>
<p>Online you can create and use multiple personas, each with a different email address and “personal data” linked to it. Aliases can be further coupled with software that removes cookies and browser history, which will help conceal one’s online identity.</p>
<p>One example is <a href="https://www.ccleaner.com/ccleaner/download">CCleaner</a>. This program removes privacy-violating cookies and internet history from your device, while improving your device’s privacy.</p>
<p>There are also plenty of online applications that allow the use of <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-be-phish-food-tips-to-avoid-sharing-your-personal-information-online-138613">temporary email addresses</a> and phone numbers, and even temporary accommodation addresses for package deliveries.</p>
<p>To some, these may seem like extreme privacy measures. However, given the widespread collection of identity data by commercial companies and governments – and the resultant collaboration between the two – there’s reason to be concerned for anyone wanting to fly under the radar.</p>
<p>And for women seeking abortions in the US, these measures may be necessary to avoid prosecution. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1541527897273409536"}"></div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186046/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis B Desmond received funding from the US government and the Australian government</span></em></p>Women taking precautions to conceal their identities while seeking reproductive advice is akin to spies using tradecraft to avoid enemy agents.Dennis B. Desmond, Lecturer, Cyberintelligence and Cybercrime Investigations, University of the Sunshine CoastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778152022-02-24T12:07:28Z2022-02-24T12:07:28ZRussia invades Ukraine – 5 essential reads from experts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448297/original/file-20220224-32797-x86quq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C20%2C6968%2C4537&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Damaged radar arrays and other equipment is seen at a Ukrainian military facility outside Mariupol, Ukraine, Feb. 24, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UkraineTensions/8382ce68062e4d1e9080a40359c42103/photo?Query=Ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=92082&currentItemNo=45">AP Photo/Sergei Grits</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is a frightening moment. Russia has invaded Ukraine, and certainly those most frightened right now are the people of Ukraine. But violent aggression – a war mounted by a country with vast military resources against a smaller, weaker country – strikes fear in all of us. As a Washington Post headline writer recently wrote: The Ukraine crisis is “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/23/5000-miles-away-hitting-home-how-russias-advance-ukraine-is-rattling-americans/">5,000 miles away but hitting home</a>.”</p>
<p>The Conversation U.S. has spent the past couple of months digging into the history and politics of Ukraine and Russia. We’ve looked at their cultures, their religions, their military and technological capacities. We’ve provided you with stories about NATO, about cyberwarfare, the Cold War and the efficacy of sanctions. </p>
<p>Below, you’ll find a selection of stories from our coverage. We hope they will help you understand that today may feel both inevitable – yet inexplicable. </p>
<h2>1. The US promised to protect Ukraine</h2>
<p>In 1994, Ukraine got a signed commitment from Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. in which the three countries promised to protect the newly independent state’s sovereignty. </p>
<p>“Ukraine as an independent state was born from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union,” write scholars <a href="https://hls.indiana.edu/about/founding-dean.html">Lee Feinstein of Indiana University</a> and <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/person/mariana-budjeryn">Mariana Budjeryn of Harvard</a>. “Its independence came with a complicated Cold War inheritance: the world’s third-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. Ukraine was one of the three non-Russian former Soviet states, including Belarus and Kazakhstan, that emerged from the Soviet collapse with nuclear weapons on its territory.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier wearing a helmet peeks out of a tank." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448300/original/file-20220224-12782-1snqc4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian serviceman rides atop a military vehicle past Independence Square in central Kyiv on Feb. 24, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-serviceman-rides-atop-a-military-vehicle-past-news-photo/1238721286?adppopup=true">Daniel Leal/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 1994 agreement was signed in return for Ukraine giving up the nuclear weapons within its borders, sending them to Russia for dismantling. But the agreement, not legally binding, was broken by Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014. And today’s invasion is yet another example of the weakness of that agreement.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in-1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggression-now-173481">Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin's aggression now?</a>
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<h2>2. Clues to how Russia will wage war</h2>
<p>During the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Russia invaded Georgia, a country on the Black Sea. In 2014, Putin ordered troops to seize Crimea, a peninsula that juts into the Black Sea and housed a Russian naval base.</p>
<p>West Point scholar and career U.S. special forces officer <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mHR1GJYAAAAJ&hl=en">Liam Collins</a> conducted field research on the 2008 and 2014 wars in Georgia and Ukraine.</p>
<p>“From what I have learned, I expect a possible Russian invasion would start with cyberattacks and electronic warfare to sever communications between Ukraine’s capital and the troops. Shortly thereafter, tanks and mechanized infantry formations supported by the Russian air force would cross at multiple points along the nearly 1,200-mile border, assisted by Russian special forces. Russia would seek to bypass large urban areas.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-recent-invasions-of-ukraine-and-georgia-offer-clues-to-what-putin-might-be-thinking-now-175489">Russia's recent invasions of Ukraine and Georgia offer clues to what Putin might be thinking now</a>
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<h2>3. Spies replaced by smartphones</h2>
<p>If you love spy movies, you’ve got an image of how intelligence is gathered: agents on the ground and satellites in the sky.</p>
<p>But you’re way out of date. These days, writes <a href="https://azcast.arizona.edu/person/craig-nazareth-ms">Craig Nazareth</a>, a scholar of intelligence and information operations at the University of Arizona, “massive amounts of valuable information are publicly available, and not all of it is collected by governments. Satellites and drones are much cheaper than they were even a decade ago, allowing private companies to operate them, and nearly everyone has a smartphone with advanced photo and video capabilities.”</p>
<p>This means people around the world may see this invasion unfold in real time. “Commercial imaging companies are posting up-to-the-minute, geographically precise images of Russia’s military forces. Several news agencies are regularly monitoring and reporting on the situation. TikTok users are posting video of Russian military equipment on rail cars allegedly on their way to augment forces already in position around Ukraine. And internet sleuths are tracking this flow of information.”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/technology-is-revolutionizing-how-intelligence-is-gathered-and-analyzed-and-opening-a-window-onto-russian-military-activity-around-ukraine-176446">Technology is revolutionizing how intelligence is gathered and analyzed – and opening a window onto Russian military activity around Ukraine</a>
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<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A rocket is stuck coming through the ceiling of a damaged apartment with rubble around it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/448301/original/file-20220224-9042-19i0rnw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The body of a rocket stuck in a flat after recent shelling on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv, Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-body-of-a-rocket-stuck-in-a-flat-after-recent-shelling-news-photo/1238721713?adppopup=true">Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>4. Targeting the US with cyberattacks</h2>
<p>As Russia edged closer to war with Ukraine, cybersecurity scholar <a href="https://www.rit.edu/computing/directory/jxpics-justin-pelletier">Justin Pelletier</a> at Rochester Institute of Technology wrote of the growing likelihood of destructive Russian cyberattacks against the U.S. </p>
<p>Pelletier quoted a Department of Homeland Security bulletin from late January that said, “We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyberattack against the Homeland if it perceived a U.S. or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security.”</p>
<p>And that’s not all. “Americans can probably expect to see Russian-sponsored cyber-activities working in tandem with propaganda campaigns,” writes Pelletier. The aim of such campaigns: to use “social and other online media like a military-grade fog machine that confuses the U.S. population and encourages mistrust in the strength and validity of the U.S. government.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-could-unleash-disruptive-cyberattacks-against-the-us-but-efforts-to-sow-confusion-and-division-are-more-likely-175471">Russia could unleash disruptive cyberattacks against the US – but efforts to sow confusion and division are more likely</a>
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<h2>5. Will war sink Putin’s stock with Russians?</h2>
<p>“War ultimately requires an enormous amount of public goodwill and support for a political leader,” writes <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/arik-burakovsky-1243696">Arik Burakovsky</a>, a scholar of Russia and public opinion at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Putin’s support among Russians has been rising as the country massed troops along the Ukrainian border - the public believes that its leaders are defending Russia by standing up to the West. But Burakovsky writes that “the rally ‘round the flag effect of supporting political leadership during an international crisis will likely be short-lived.” </p>
<p>Most Russians, it turns out, don’t want war. The return of body bags from the front could well prove damaging to Putin domestically.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-public-approval-is-soaring-during-the-russia-ukraine-crisis-but-its-unlikely-to-last-177302">Putin’s public approval is soaring during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, but it's unlikely to last</a>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p>
<p><em>Want to learn more? Here’s <a href="https://flipboard.com/@conversationus/ukraine-russia-and-the-threat-of-war-essential-reading-lvd1d4ofptudmenv/">an even bigger collection of our coverage</a> of the crisis in Ukraine.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177815/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
As war begins between Ukraine and Russia, a range of stories provides context to help readers understand the conflict.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543002021-02-05T14:19:34Z2021-02-05T14:19:34ZDonald Trump spying allegations: more likely useful idiot than Putin’s agent<p>The question of Donald Trump’s relationship with the Kremlin has surfaced once again, this time in a new book by veteran US journalist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/29/trump-russia-asset-claims-former-kgb-spy-new-book">Craig Unger</a>. The book, American Kompromat, claims that the former US commander-in-chief was cultivated as a Russian intelligence asset for more than four decades. </p>
<p>It’s not the first time this has been reported. In 2017 the former Moscow correspondent for The Guardian Luke Harding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/dec/14/collusion-how-russia-helped-trump-win-the-white-house-by-luke-harding-review">published a book</a>: Collusion: Secret Meetings, Dirty Money, and How Russia Helped Donald Trump Win, which propounded roughly the same idea – that Trump had been courted for years after marrying his first wife, Ivana Zelnickova, a model from Czechoslovakia. And then there’s the Christopher Steele dossier, published in 2017 with its allegations of honey-trap blackmail and bizarre sexual practices. Although this came with a big “<a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/trump-russiagate-steele-dossier/">handle-with-care</a>” caveat.</p>
<p>Could it really be true that one of Washington’s bitterest adversaries would have a stooge at the very top of its ranks? To consider this question it’s important to understand the distinction between an asset and an agent (or spy).</p>
<p>Former KGB major, Yuri Shvets, who appears to be Unger’s key source, compares Trump to the infamous <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/spies_cambridge.shtml">Cambridge Five</a> – a group of ideologically motivated agents in the heart of the British establishment, who willingly and systematically supplied the Soviet Union with state secrets over several decades to advance the communist cause. When you compare their story with that of the former US president, something looks wrong. </p>
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<p>During Trump’s tenure, NATO turned its heels towards Russia, and the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-european-magnitsky-law-a-milestone-with-a-lot-of-potential/">Magnitsky Act</a> has made life very difficult for a lot of powerful Russians by targeting their assets in the west. British intelligence has reclassified Russia as a <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/comment/mi6-lays-bare-the-growing-russian-threat-sg6vcvl22">“tier one” threat</a>, putting it on at least equal footing to transnational terrorism. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in 2018, the US expelled more than <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/26/596966272/us-expels-dozens-of-russian-diplomats-closes-consulate-in-seattle?t=1611942959410">60 Russian officials</a> after identifying them as intelligence officers. To put it bluntly, any gains Russia might have achieved through Trump’s good offices are far outweighed by the strategic, economic, and counterintelligence realities that have emerged during his presidency.</p>
<h2>Assets vs agents</h2>
<p>“Assets” in intelligence jargon, can mean anything from full-blown agents (people who knowingly offer their country’s secrets to a foreign intelligence agency) to those who might serve some use along the way. But they are far more likely to be at the more casual end of that spectrum. To identify and handle agents, intelligence officers need to expand their social circles (to meet more people in sensitive positions), find private safe houses and develop plausible cover stories to explain why they are meeting.</p>
<p>On the other hand, making friends with a masseuse who gives massages to oligarchs while they gossip about Kremlin affairs could represent a perfect asset. An elderly babushka who attends dissident rallies and owns a private B&B? Perfect asset. An overworked secretary who arranges scientific conferences in China? Perfect asset.</p>
<p>Few assets ever become spies proper. The simple proposition “would you like to work for our intelligence agency?” is never an easy sell. If a source panics or overreacts, they might tell the authorities. At which point, that relationship is either swiftly ended, or the asset becomes a counterintelligence pawn, playing the intelligence officer at his or her own game. <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/01/19/spy-games-how-the-spectre-of-surveillance-impacts-the-lives-of-moscows-foreigners-a56865">When one overly eager Russian officer</a> tried to recruit an American diplomat a few years ago, he made the mistake of playing his cards too early. The result? The diplomat reported the encounter, and the FBI then set up their own meeting with the Russian, “turning the game back on him”.</p>
<p>As such, an intelligence officer never asks a useful asset to become an agent unless they’re confident of a positive answer. In many cases, an asset doesn’t even know they’re an asset. In what’s known as “tradecraft” in the world of espionage, it’s often better to let assets exist in blissful ignorance of the intelligence officer’s intentions, trading friendly favours and gossip. That isn’t really espionage, it’s just business.</p>
<p>Just look at <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/03/carter-page-nunes-memo-216934">Carter Page</a>, one of Trump’s former foreign policy advisers. Despite his strong pro-Kremlin views, despite living in Moscow in 2004, and despite being a target of Russian intelligence, there is no evidence that Page crossed the threshold. Russian intelligence officers certainly attempted to cultivate Page, but even the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-if-everything-mueller-told-us-was-new/587590/">Mueller report</a> couldn’t determine whether or not he was a full-blown agent. </p>
<p>But why should he be? Carter was a fan of Putin, so Russian officers could bank on him taking the Kremlin’s interests straight to Trump’s team even without explicit instruction. He needn’t be anything more than a friend, and the Russians needn’t risk asking for anything more. </p>
<h2>Trump, a useful fool?</h2>
<p>Now compare this to the allegations levied against the 45th president. According to Unger, once Trump came on to the KGB’s radar in 1977, he was fed a cocktail of flattery and subtle manipulation, which is nothing new for asset cultivation. The Steele dossier, largely discredited, made allegations of blackmail, which fits within the Russian proclivity for seeking out compromising information about their targets. </p>
<p>But any Russian intelligence officer would need to consider whether Trump really cares enough about <em>kompromat</em> and Russian money. Indeed, why enrol him as an <a href="https://www.spymuseum.org/education-programs/spy-resources/language-of-espionage/">agent of influence</a> – a move that carries enormous consequences for both parties – when Russia could opt for a convenient friend in Washington? </p>
<p>In reality, even if Russia sees Trump as an asset, we’re not talking about Trump being a new Kim Philby (of Cambridge Five fame). We’re talking about Trump being a self-interested businessman who’s happy to do a favour if it works to his own best interests – and that includes staying out of jail. There’s no evidence that Trump knowingly associated with any Russian intelligence officers. And there’s a big distinction between making the wrong kind of friends and committing treason.</p>
<p>Simply put, an agent is a partner for life, whereas an asset is a friend with benefits. And, most likely, if Trump has been one of the two, it’s the latter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154300/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kyle Cunliffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Once again allegations have surfaced that the former US president was a Russian ‘asset’. Maybe so, but that doesn’t mean he was their agent.Kyle Cunliffe, PhD candidate, School of Arts and Media, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.