tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/terrorism-risk-12413/articlesTerrorism risk – The Conversation2024-02-07T12:03:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224082024-02-07T12:03:02Z2024-02-07T12:03:02ZUsing AI to monitor the internet for terror content is inescapable – but also fraught with pitfalls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573450/original/file-20240205-17-4tssh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C0%2C3693%2C2460&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/technology-security-concept-personal-authentication-system-709257292">metamorworks/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every minute, millions of social media posts, photos and videos flood the internet. <a href="https://www.socialpilot.co/blog/social-media-statistics">On average</a>, Facebook users share 694,000 stories, X (formerly Twitter) users post 360,000 posts, Snapchat users send 2.7 million snaps and YouTube users upload more than 500 hours of video. </p>
<p>This vast ocean of online material needs to be constantly monitored for harmful or illegal content, like promoting terrorism and violence. </p>
<p>The sheer volume of content means that it’s not possible for people to inspect and check all of it manually, which is why automated tools, including artificial intelligence (AI), are essential. But such tools also have their limitations. </p>
<p>The concerted effort in recent years to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2222901">develop tools</a> for the identification and removal of online terrorist content has, in part, been fuelled by the emergence of new laws and regulations. This includes the EU’s terrorist content online <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0784">regulation</a>, which requires hosting service providers to remove terrorist content from their platform within one hour of receiving a removal order from a competent national authority.</p>
<h2>Behaviour and content-based tools</h2>
<p>In broad terms, there are two types of tools used to root out terrorist content. The first looks at certain account and message behaviour. This includes how old the account is, the use of trending or unrelated hashtags and abnormal posting volume. </p>
<p>In many ways, this is similar to spam detection, in that it does not pay attention to content, and is <a href="https://www.resolvenet.org/research/remove-impede-disrupt-redirect-understanding-combating-pro-islamic-state-use-file-sharing">valuable for detecting</a> the rapid dissemination of large volumes of content, which are often bot-driven. </p>
<p>The second type of tool is content-based. It focuses on linguistic characteristics, word use, images and web addresses. Automated content-based tools take <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">one of two approaches</a>. </p>
<p><strong>1. Matching</strong></p>
<p>The first approach is based on comparing new images or videos to an existing database of images and videos that have previously been identified as terrorist in nature. One challenge here is that terror groups are known to try and evade such methods by producing subtle variants of the same piece of content. </p>
<p>After the Christchurch terror attack in New Zealand in 2019, for example, hundreds of visually distinct versions of the livestream video of the atrocity <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/technical-update-on-new-zealand/">were in circulation</a>. </p>
<p>So, to combat this, matching-based tools generally use <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/open-source-photo-video-matching/">perceptual hashing</a> rather than cryptographic hashing. Hashes are a bit like digital fingerprints, and cryptographic hashing acts like a secure, unique identity tag. Even changing a single pixel in an image drastically alters its fingerprint, preventing false matches. </p>
<p>Perceptual hashing, on the other hand, focuses on similarity. It overlooks minor changes like pixel colour adjustments, but identifies images with the same core content. This makes perceptual hashing more resilient to tiny alterations to a piece of content. But it also means that the hashes are not entirely random, and so could potentially be used to try and <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/black-box-attacks-on-perceptual-image-hashes-with-gans-cc1be11f277">recreate</a> the original image.</p>
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<img alt="A close up of a mobile phone screen displaying several social media apps." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Millions of posts, images and videos are uploaded to social media platforms every minute.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-29072023-new-elon-musks-2339442245">Viktollio/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p><strong>2. Classification</strong></p>
<p>The second approach relies on classifying content. It <a href="https://www.cambridgeconsultants.com/insights/whitepaper/ofcom-use-ai-online-content-moderation">uses</a> machine learning and other forms of AI, such as natural language processing. To achieve this, the AI needs a lot of examples like texts labelled as terrorist content or not by human content moderators. By analysing these examples, the AI learns which features distinguish different types of content, allowing it to categorise new content on its own. </p>
<p>Once trained, the algorithms are then able to predict whether a new item of content belongs to one of the specified categories. These items may then be removed or flagged for human review. </p>
<p>This approach also <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">faces challenges</a>, however. Collecting and preparing a large dataset of terrorist content to train the algorithms is time-consuming and <a href="https://oro.open.ac.uk/69799/">resource-intensive</a>. </p>
<p>The training data may also become dated quickly, as terrorists make use of new terms and discuss new world events and current affairs. Algorithms also have difficulty understanding context, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719897945">subtlety and irony</a>. They also <a href="https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf">lack</a> cultural sensitivity, including variations in dialect and language use across different groups. </p>
<p>These limitations can have important offline effects. There have been documented failures to remove hate speech in countries such as <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/why-facebook-keeps-failing-in-ethiopia/">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/the-thread/facebooks-content-moderation-language-barrier/">Romania</a>, while free speech activists in countries such as <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-seven-years-later-how-facebook-shuts-down-free-speech-egypt">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://syrianobserver.com/news/58430/facebook-deletes-accounts-of-assad-opponents.html">Syria</a> and <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-required-is-facebooks-effort-to-clean-up-operation-carthage-damaging-free-expression-in-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> have reported having their content removed.</p>
<h2>We still need human moderators</h2>
<p>So, in spite of advances in AI, human input remains essential. It is important for maintaining databases and datasets, assessing content flagged for review and operating appeals processes for when decisions are challenged. </p>
<p>But this is demanding and draining work, and there have been <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-content-moderators-ireland">damning reports</a> regarding the working conditions of moderators, with many tech companies such as Meta <a href="https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/faculty-research/who-moderates-social-media-giants-call-end-outsourcing">outsourcing</a> this work to third-party vendors. </p>
<p>To address this, we <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">recommend</a> the development of a set of minimum standards for those employing content moderators, including mental health provision. There is also potential to develop AI tools to safeguard the wellbeing of moderators. This would work, for example, by blurring out areas of images so that moderators can reach a decision without viewing disturbing content directly. </p>
<p>But at the same time, few, if any, platforms have the resources needed to develop automated content moderation tools and employ a sufficient number of human reviewers with the required expertise. </p>
<p>Many platforms have turned to off-the-shelf products. It is estimated that the content moderation solutions market will be <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/content-moderation-solutions-market-to-cross-us-32-bn-by-2031-tmr-report-301514155.html">worth $32bn by 2031</a>. </p>
<p>But caution is needed here. Third-party providers are not currently subject to the same level of oversight as tech platforms themselves. They may rely disproportionately on automated tools, with insufficient human input and a lack of transparency regarding the datasets used to train their algorithms.</p>
<p>So, collaborative initiatives between governments and the private sector are essential. For example, the EU-funded <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/">Tech Against Terrorism Europe</a> project has developed valuable resources for tech companies. There are also examples of automated content moderation tools being made openly available like Meta’s <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2022/12/meta-launches-new-content-moderation-tool/">Hasher-Matcher-Actioner</a>, which companies can use to build their own database of hashed terrorist content. </p>
<p>International organisations, governments and tech platforms must prioritise the development of such collaborative resources. Without this, effectively addressing online terror content will remain elusive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Macdonald receives funding from the EU Internal Security Fund for the project Tech Against Terrorism Europe (ISF-2021-AG-TCO-101080101). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashley A. Mattheis receives funding from the EU Internal Security Fund for the project Tech Against Terrorism Europe (ISF-2021-AG-TCO-101080101).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Wells receives funding from the Council of Europe to conduct an analysis of emerging patterns of misuse of technology by terrorist actors (ongoing)</span></em></p>The complex task of tackling online terror needs human eyes as well as artificial intelligence.Stuart Macdonald, Professor of Law, Swansea UniversityAshley A. Mattheis, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Law and Government, Dublin City UniversityDavid Wells, Honorary Research Associate at the Cyber Threats Research Centre, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1888392022-08-19T13:21:59Z2022-08-19T13:21:59ZNo justification for fines imposed on Nigeria’s media houses over bandits documentary<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479886/original/file-20220818-10361-iv0tqo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Recent fines on media houses in Nigeria are attempts to gag them. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/nigerian-news-concept-microphone-news-on-the-map-of-royalty-free-image/823000262?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigeria’s <a href="https://fmic.gov.ng/tag/national-broadcasting-commission-nbc/">National Broadcasting Commission</a> recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/nbc-fines-multichoice-startimes-others-over-documentary-on-banditry">imposed</a> a fine of N5 million (about US$11,922) each on <a href="https://multichoiceafrica.com/country/nigeria">MultiChoice Nigeria Limited</a>, <a href="https://www.nta.ng/startimes/">NTA-Startimes</a> and <a href="https://www.dnb.com/business-directory/company-profiles.telcom_satellites_limited.8a2ad2c0e0f4094010c0980284ad218e.html">Telcom Satellites Limited</a> for airing a BBC Africa Eye documentary titled <a href="https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=836558110682248">The Bandit Warlords of Zamfara</a>. It said the documentary “glorified the activities of bandits and undermines national security in Nigeria”. It <a href="https://dailytrust.com/breaking-nbc-fines-trust-tv-n5m-for-exposing-bandits">imposed</a> a fine of the same amount on Trust TV for broadcasting the documentary <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3ywVlS8zGM">Nigeria’s Banditry: The Inside Story</a>. The Conversation Africa asked constitutional law expert Abiodun Odusote to weigh in on the implications of the commission’s action.</em></p>
<p><strong>Are the fines consistent with <a href="https://www.nta.ng/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/1494416213-NBC-Code-6TH-EDITION.pdf">the broadcasting code</a>?</strong></p>
<p>I cannot see the justification for the claim by the broadcasting commission that The Bandits Warlords of Zamfara documentary glorified the activities of bandits and undermines national security in Nigeria. </p>
<p>The essence of <a href="https://www.nta.ng/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/1494416213-NBC-Code-6TH-EDITION.pdf">the code</a> is to ensure compliance with the minimum standard for broadcasting in Nigeria. And this standard is to ensure that broadcasting serves the interests of the people through information, education and entertainment. </p>
<p>The documentary educated Nigerians by providing insights into the factors driving insurgency, terrorism and banditry. Such factors include ethnic rivalry, clashes of livelihoods, poverty and corruption. </p>
<p>These insights confirm <a href="http://medien.bwv-verlag.de/9783830539643_p.pdf">my research findings</a> on conflicts between farmers, herdsmen and communities in West Africa.</p>
<p>My findings include the fact that the conflicts in northern Nigeria are driven by poverty. The conflicts manifest in terrorism, banditry and kidnapping. Herders want grazing land and cattle passages, while farmers seek to protect their farmlands, plantations and produce from cattle. I also discovered that ethno-religious undertones worsened the conflicts. I recommended that military intervention alone would not solve them. Credible legal and institutional frameworks were needed to promote peaceful co-existence.</p>
<p>The documentary also highlights deep rooted issues of injustice and oppression that must be addressed for there to be reconciliation, forgiveness and peace. In addition, it addresses the devastating role that corruption is playing in exacerbating terrorism. It challenges the emphasis on religion alone as the root cause of the conflicts.</p>
<p>All this support the conclusion that the documentary has informed and educated Nigerians. It does not in any way incite crime or glorify terrorism. It is not repugnant to public feeling and does not contain an offensive reference to any person. It is not likely to incite crime or conflict. It actually throws light on the nature of the problems. </p>
<p>My conclusion is that the Commission’s action is inconsistent with its code and is very provocative.</p>
<p><strong>What options are available to media organisations seeking redress?</strong></p>
<p>There are a variety of judicial and non-judicial remedies media organisations can pursue. One is to write a protest letter to the Commission, demanding that it withdraw its letter.</p>
<p>If that fails, they can approach the <a href="https://pcc.gov.ng/?fbclid=IwAR19_H4KPtlPjAk4___KitYF30IxMEDu9BuP3-cz6iSQkv8kNEGJNDcbEDA">Public Complaint Commission</a> for redress. If they are not satisfied with the outcome they can challenge the imposition of the fine in the courts. They can then seek an order of court declaring the imposition of fine as illegal, null and void. They can ask the court to restrain the Commission from withdrawing or suspending their licences on account of this documentary. And they can ask for exemplary damages. </p>
<p>The regional and international adjudicatory bodies like the <a href="http://www.courtecowas.org/">ECOWAS Court</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ccpr">UN Human Rights Committee</a> can also be approached for intervention.</p>
<p><strong>Are the fines an attempt to muzzle the media?</strong></p>
<p>Yes. In my view it is a calculated attempt to gag the media, to prevent and obstruct freedom of expression in relation to insecurity. Any objective bystander knows that the media houses have done no legal wrong.</p>
<p>They have not violated any law or regulation or code of conduct. They have merely embarked on risky investigative journalism and should be commended and encouraged. The media houses have merely exposed the truth that the kidnappers are not ghosts, that the terrorists are known and can be reached, that our soldiers are not adequately equipped and that some government functionaries appear to be benefiting from the crisis. </p>
<p>It has also been shown that there are other ways to solve the problems of insecurity apart from military engagement. </p>
<p>The documentary was accurate, objective and fair. The media houses have a constitutional right to freedom of expression and freedom to inform and educate the public. They should refuse the gagging penalty or fine. </p>
<p><strong>Are there not enough provisions in Nigeria’s constitution for the government to sanction erring media organisations?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.lawglobalhub.com/section-6-of-the-nigerian-constitution-1999/">Section 6(1) of Nigeria’s constitution</a> confers general adjudicatory powers on the courts to address this type of grievance. Chapter IV of the constitution protects fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of expression. The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 under chapter IV of the constitution also empower any person to apply to the court if they believe their fundamental rights are being, or are likely to be, infringed.</p>
<p>We have seen instances in the past where imposition of fines by regulatory authorities has been successfully challenged. The media houses can equally apply for a judicial review or injunctive relief.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188839/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abiodun Odusote does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Media houses fined recently by Nigeria’s Broadcasting Commission for documentaries on terrorism should approach the courts for redress.Abiodun Odusote, Senior Lecturer, University of LagosLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785112022-05-06T12:32:38Z2022-05-06T12:32:38ZBillions spent on overseas counterterrorism would be better spent by involving ex-terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461093/original/file-20220503-28209-o2b2fh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Machmudi 'Yusuf' Hariono, left, a former Indonesian terrorist, holds a book about former terrorists with an Islamic jihadist.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy of Yusuf Hariono</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the U.S. government has sent aid to countries plagued by terrorism, believing that the money could help other nations tackle extremism. Money matters, but it alone isn’t enough to prevent terrorism.</p>
<p>An explosion <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html">at a mosque</a> in northern Afghanistan killed more than 30 people on April 22, 2022, just days after blasts at schools in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-schools-attacked.html">Kabul killed six</a>.</p>
<p>These were the latest in a long string of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-tops-2021-global-survey-of-islamic-state-casualties-/6415735.html">Islamic State conducted</a> 365 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that caused 2,210 casualties in 2021 alone.</p>
<p>The United States, meanwhile, has spent approximately <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-did-the-us-spend-in-aid-to-afghanistan/">US$91.4 billion</a> on foreign aid to Afghanistan since 2001, while other countries gave <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-did-billions-in-aid-to-afghanistan-accomplish-5-questions-answered-166804">billions more</a>. Most of this money went toward Afghanistan’s military. </p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov">spent more than</a> $1.1 billion on Afghanistan in fiscal 2021, and $1 billion on aid in fiscal 2020.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/people/frederick-bernard-loesi/">a doctoral candidate</a> researching how to get militants to adopt more moderate positions and stop committing violence, I have spoken with 23 former Indonesian terrorist detainees since October 2020 to study their experiences. These people planned, facilitated or otherwise took part in bombings and attacks on civilians. </p>
<p>My research shows that international aid does not stop terrorists from carrying out violent acts, because most counterterrorism projects do not directly involve or appeal to detained and released terrorists. </p>
<h2>Speaking with terrorists</h2>
<p>I have found that listening to ex-terrorists is the best approach to understanding how and why they walk away from terrorism.</p>
<p>When I spoke with former Indonesian terrorists through video meetings and calls, they all told me that they once cared only about exterminating America and its allies. This is because they thought these countries were trying to repress Muslims worldwide. </p>
<p>They also justified their violent jihad as a way to enforce a caliphate, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/10/5884593/9-questions-about-the-caliphate-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask">a term</a> that refers to an all-encompassing Muslim state. </p>
<p>Less than half of the 23 former terrorists that I spoke with participated in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf">deradicalization programs</a>, designed to move people away from extremism, while they were in prison. But all of them were part of such programs, sponsored by nonprofit organizations and the Indonesian government, after their release. </p>
<p>All of the former terrorists also went on to receive vocational training, and some also got money from the Indonesian government and nonprofits to start small businesses. </p>
<p>Others received psychological counseling, or participated in talks on religion. Some participated in outdoor retreats organized by the Indonesian police, with hiking and other recreational activities. </p>
<p>A few of the ex-terrorists I spoke with acknowledged that the government helped them pay for their children’s school tuition. </p>
<p>These people began to shift their views, and move away from extremism, after they developed a strong sense of community support and respect for government and police authorities. </p>
<p>“I started to change when the police treated me well, and my community accepted me for who I am,” explained one female former terrorist who was a “bride” – a term used to describe a suicide bomber. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/04/indonesian-women-being-radicalised-into-would-be-suicide-bombers-report">The police captured her</a> just before she could carry out an attack in Bali in 2016. </p>
<h2>Terrorism funding</h2>
<p>Parts of Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population, are considered a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorism-havens-indonesia">haven for terrorism</a> – though the number of terrorist attacks <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/indonesia-becomes-sixth-member-state-brief-ctc-developments-july-2019-follow-visit">has recently declined</a> there. It remains a transit and destination hub for Islamic militants. </p>
<p>Indonesia received <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1881/FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Supplementary-Tables.pdf">almost $5 million in 2020</a> from U.S. Agency for International Development alone to contain violent extremism. It received the third largest amount of money from the U.S. for this kind of programming after Somalia and Bangladesh. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf">spent an estimated</a> $2.8 trillion on counterterrorism from fiscal 2002 through 2017, according to the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>But even extensive international aid isn’t a sure fix for ending terrorism. </p>
<p>Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-announces-humanitarian-assistance-for-iraq/">Iraq are</a> two examples of countries that receive big donations from the U.S. and other countries each year but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">still struggle with violent radicalism</a>.</p>
<p>Most of this money and work focuses on helping governments and local organizations carry out programs to fight extremism. These might include workshops for government officials focused on addressing terrorism and training sessions for women on how to start small businesses. </p>
<p>However, these programs typically do not directly involve former terrorist inmates and their families. This matters, because it mattered to the individuals I spoke with when they were included in counterterrorism projects. This is one of the big reasons they changed their ways, they told me. </p>
<h2>Aid doesn’t reach former terrorists</h2>
<p>Major donor countries like the U.S. have increasingly acknowledged <a href="https://institute.global/policy/role-aid-and-development-fight-against-extremism">the role of foreign aid</a> in fighting against extremism. Many countries, including the U.S., see that extremism can be politically destabilizing and pose international security concerns. </p>
<p>But at the same time, <a href="https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Aid%20as%20Counterterrorism.pdf">the incidence of terrorism in countries</a> that get large amounts of international funding, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/aswp.12184">Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.738263">Mali</a>, shows that international aid is an insufficient counterterrorism measure.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, for example, the USAID gave $24 million from 2018 to 2023 for an anti-extremism project called Harmoni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sfcg.org/harmoni-towards-inclusion-and-resilience/">This project</a> carries out workshops for state officials about prison management and handling terrorist detainees, among other programs. </p>
<p>But Harmoni does not include a key constituency – <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/download/L3NpdGVzL3B1c2F0L0RvY3VtZW50cy9KdXJuYWwvSnVybmFsJTIwSHVidW5nYW4lMjBMdWFyJTIwTmVnZXJpLyhGSU5BTCklMjBKVVJOQUwlMjBWT0wlMjA2JTIwTk8lMjAyLnBkZg==">detained or released terrorists</a> and their families – in their work. </p>
<p>This kind of strategy makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to actually reform extremists.</p>
<p>This model, according to my research, is common in counterextremism projects funded by international aid. </p>
<h2>Involving terrorists</h2>
<p>Donor countries, governments and partner organizations working to prevent extremism can involve released terrorists and their families in various ways – including providing vocational, financial, psychological, religious, educational and even recreational programs. </p>
<p>Many countries still need international aid to fight terrorism, but it will work more effectively only when also embracing former terrorist convicts and their families. </p>
<p>Without targeted, inclusive interventions in extremism, I believe the world will continue to see more wasted aid when addressing terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernard Loesi receives funding from Southeast Center, the University of Washington. </span></em></p>The US gives money to help Indonesia and other countries fight terrorism. But research shows that this money might not be effective, unless it directly reaches former extremists.Bernard Loesi, PhD Candidate, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1760722022-02-08T07:28:12Z2022-02-08T07:28:12ZKenya terror alerts: political scientist unpacks the intelligence behind them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443436/original/file-20220131-13-73ocyj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Special forces arrive at the scene of a terrorist attack at the DusitD2 hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Terror alerts are issued in Kenya periodically by foreign governments and international institutions due to the threat posed by the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab. Kenya has, over the years, suffered several deadly terror attacks which have been claimed by the group. Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, who has studied Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies and strategies, unpacks the intelligence behind terror alerts and what you need to know about them.</em></p>
<h2>How is intelligence on impending terrorist attacks gathered?</h2>
<p>Cooperation between governments and security agencies is a crucial element in combating terrorism. This is more so for transnational terrorism. Effective <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2016.1264436">inter-agency cooperation</a> depends on the timely and accurate sharing of intelligence through established channels. </p>
<p>Kenya cooperates with various western countries to arrive at the conclusion that a terror attack is imminent. For instance Kenya and the UK have a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-kenya-sign-new-defence-cooperation-agreement-to-tackle-shared-threat-from-al-shabaab">mutual agreement</a> to counter Al-Shabaab’s threat. The two countries share information and identify new ways to disrupt the group’s operations in east Africa and beyond. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence">UK</a> and <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf">Kenya</a> gather information in a number of ways. These include covert human intelligence sources, directed surveillance, intercepting communications, data obtained from communications service providers, bulk personal data, intrusive surveillance and equipment interference. </p>
<p>The National Counter Terrorism Centre also provides <a href="https://counterterrorism.go.ke/countering-terrorism/">online channels</a> where the public can, anonymously, report terrorism-related activities.</p>
<p>Kenya’s government also <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Country_Reports_on_Terrorism_2020.pdf">cooperates</a> with the US. For instance the General Service Unit counterterorrism response team is funded by the US.</p>
<p>In addition, information on imminent attacks is also provided by terrorist groups themselves. As part of its publicity, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/addressing-enemy-al-shabaabs-psyops-media-warfare/">information on imminent attacks</a> through its media outlet, Al-Kaitab Media Foundation. </p>
<p>Individual states are responsible for providing travel advisories to their citizens based on the information shared. </p>
<h2>How reliable is the intelligence prompting alerts?</h2>
<p>Sound intelligence research and analysis identifies trends and specific terrorist groups’ strategies and tactics. </p>
<p>For the most part this means that sufficiently reliable data on imminent attacks is produced.</p>
<p>However, it’s not a perfect science. <a href="https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/03/Handbook-Ch-20-Duncan-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-Prevention-of-Terrorism.pdf">Intelligence sources</a> sometimes offer opinions rather than hard evidence. Hence the analysis can at times be subjective rather than objective.</p>
<p>The reliability of the intelligence is determined by how correct or true the information is. The UK’s MI5, for example, records <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence">credible intelligence</a> correctly by recording its origin and validity. Assessments of valid threats are regularly adjusted in view of new intelligence. </p>
<p>But terrorist groups behave in unpredictable ways. Some terrorist attacks are <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">commemorative</a>, that is to celebrate prior successful attacks. Attacks can be <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">symbolic</a>, intended to advance ideological aims and objectives. They can also be carried out in response to the target state’s counterterrorism interventions. </p>
<p>Diplomatic advisories or alerts are adjusted frequently as they are based on security information that is <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/ReiseUndSicherheit/10.2.8Reisewarnungen#content_3">constantly changing</a>. </p>
<p>In the case of Kenya, terror threat warnings have been vindicated time and again. Between January 2019 and December 2021, the US government <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/category/messages-for-citizens/">published</a> nine travel advisories and alerts warning of terrorist attacks around the Kenya-Somalia border and the country’s coastal areas. During this period, five attacks and two foiled attacks were reported in these areas. </p>
<p>On 5 January 2022, the US embassy in Nairobi issued a <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/january-5-2022-travel-advisory-for-u-s-citizens-kenya-level-3-reconsider-travel/">travel advisory</a> to US citizens warning them not to travel to some coastal areas because of terrorism. Kenya has since <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220103-several-people-killed-in-suspected-al-shabaab-attack-in-kenya">witnessed attacks</a> conducted by Al-Shabaab in the coastal county of Lamu. </p>
<h2>Why are alerts usually general, rather than specific?</h2>
<p>It is often difficult to predict an imminent terrorist attack in a place or time. Terrorism, as a special form of political violence, is a <a href="https://www.language-and-society.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/7-Mwangi-_-Mwangi-For-Publication.pdf">complex and dynamic</a> phenomenon. Its strategies and tactics keep mutating rapidly to adapt to changing local-level, national, regional and international circumstances. </p>
<p>The tactics have been described as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344530">asymmetric warfare</a> – they are both ideological and military. The unconventional tactics aim at winning over marginalised local-level communities. Asymmetric warfare is therefore long-term and more sustainable than conventional warfare.</p>
<p>The unpredictability of this type of warfare based on ideological motives is a key defining feature of terrorism as a special form of political violence. Hence forecasting terrorism is problematic. </p>
<p>The more complex a terrorist group is in terms of organisation and ideology, the more difficult it is to predict its strategies and tactics. </p>
<h2>What steps should the public and security forces take?</h2>
<p>The public, once aware of the threats, are supposed to take precautions. These include avoiding crowded public spaces and avoiding specific areas where prior attacks have occurred. </p>
<p>The public should perceive these alerts and react to them in a positive rather than negative way. The primary responsibility of securing oneself begins with the individual. </p>
<p>It is also the responsibility of the state to provide basic security. The government should take additional security measures. Measures include additional installation of surveillance cameras, scanners, security barriers, and enhancing visible policing. </p>
<p>But a robust security response risks unintended consequences. For example, certain areas can become viewed as hotspots of terrorism. Communities in these areas can be unfairly profiled as “suspects”. This has a tendency of increasing suspicion and distrust, including intolerance between communities.</p>
<p>Security actors should also avoid employing repressive counterterrorism operations that target specific individuals and communities who live in volatile areas. Such operations only serve to entrench perceptions about human rights violations committed by the state. </p>
<p>The state and its security agencies should react to alerts using alternative methods. These include preventing and countering violent extremism and employing soft approaches. These are often ideological, communicative and social. They are based on trust not fear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is often difficult to place an imminent terrorist attack in a location or time.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, National University of LesothoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650542021-08-30T12:28:27Z2021-08-30T12:28:27ZWhy is it so difficult to fight domestic terrorism? 6 experts share their thoughts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417904/original/file-20210825-21-7ji19h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C0%2C4328%2C2883&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Domestic extremists were involved in the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CapitolRiotSeattlePolice/13bcd4eca17e43b182f003faa18e9173/photo">AP Photo/John Minchillo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States’ first-ever <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/15/us/politics/biden-domestic-terrorism-extremists.html">national strategy for countering domestic terrorism</a> calls for better information-sharing among law enforcement agencies and efforts to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf">prevent extremist groups from recruiting online</a>. Published in June 2021, the document is bolstered by the recent introduction of several <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/964/text?r=8&s=1">counterterrorism bills</a>. The Department of Homeland Security has earmarked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/04/us/politics/domestic-terrorism-biden.html">hundreds of millions of dollars</a> in funding to prevent attacks. </p>
<p>After two decades of <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2079/BUSH-OBAMA-AND-TRUMP#gsc.tab=0">successive administrations</a> focusing almost exclusively on the foreign militant Islamist threat, it appears that domestic far-right extremism, especially white supremacy and militia violence, is now at the top of the national security agenda. However, far-right political violence is not new, nor are coordinated efforts to eliminate it. </p>
<p>America has a long history of failed anti-terrorism programs, from the much-neglected <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/17/politics/ku-klux-klan-act-lawsuit-trump/index.html">Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871</a> to the quick and forceful <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/21/us/terror-oklahoma-congress-anti-terrorism-bill-blast-turns-snail-into-race-horse.html">legislative response</a> to the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.</p>
<p>Experts are concerned that this latest plan will not represent a new direction, but rather a continuation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-government-surveillance-will-americans-accept-42719">past counterterrorism efforts</a>, including <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/bidens-domestic-terrorism-strategy-entrenches-bias-and-harmful-law-enforcement-power/">violations of citizens’ rights</a> and discrimination against people of certain ethnic or religious backgrounds.</p>
<p>I, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=4skKJa4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Mikkel Dack</a>, am a historian of Germany who studies far-right violence and counter-radicalization projects in that country after World War II. But while what Germany called “<a href="https://www.alliiertenmuseum.de/en/topics/denazification.html">denazification</a>” does hold many lessons for today, the American context is vastly different from postwar Europe. So I asked a panel of counterterrorism experts what they see as the greatest practical challenges to fighting far-right violent extremism in the United States.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-important">Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.</em>]</p>
<h2><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=IwjBNRIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Gary LaFree</a>, University of Maryland</h2>
<p>Excluding the coordinated attacks of 9/11, domestic right-wing terrorism has caused <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42536.pdf">more harm</a> to American citizens at home than radical Islamist attacks over the past two decades.</p>
<p>However, the urge to develop immediate legislation to confront the threat of domestic terrorism could cause trouble. Domestic attacks like the one that occurred on <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/capitol-riot-100238">Jan. 6, 2021</a> are rare, yet they encourage immediate and far-reaching responses that are not easily rolled back. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281">USA PATRIOT Act</a> of 2001, which sailed through Congress in just three days after the 9/11 attacks, addressed very different circumstances than those involved in domestic extremism.</p>
<p>In particular, one provision of the Patriot Act criminalizes anyone who raises money, supplies propaganda or otherwise provides what the law calls “material support” to terrorist organizations, even if the person has no other connections to terrorism. If applied to U.S. citizens supporting groups based in the U.S., that would likely raise huge legal challenges under the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of assembly and association.</p>
<p>In addition, it’s politically complicated to even consider labeling domestic groups as terrorist organizations, as seen in the fractious efforts to decide whether <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-or-who-is-antifa-140147">antifa</a> or the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/proud-boys-extremist-group-fbi-2018-11?op=1">Proud Boys</a> are <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/05/02/992846086/proud-boys-named-terrorist-entity-in-canada">terrorist organizations</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two people wearing military-like gear" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/361973/original/file-20201006-18-1k4gfyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two members of the Proud Boys wear military-like gear at a rally in Oregon in September 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-proud-boys-a-right-wing-pro-trump-group-are-heavily-news-photo/1228752071">John Rudoff/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=en3_dNwAAAAJ">Kurt Braddock</a>, American University</h2>
<p>Following (Donald) Trump’s election loss, some conservative politicians have rushed to appear ideologically consistent with the former president, including his <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/proud-boys-stand-back-and-stand-by-trump-refuses-to-condemn-white-supremacists/">allusions of support</a> for the far-right. Many make <a href="https://www.al.com/news/2021/01/mo-brooks-today-patriots-start-kicking-ass-in-fighting-vote-results.html">statements</a> that tacitly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/technology/twitter-matt-gaetz-warning.html">approve</a> of <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/01/02/gop-rep-gohmert-says-violence-is-only-recourse-after-election-lawsuit-dismissal/?sh=7499496d66c0">violence</a> in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/02/05/madison-cawthorn-capitol-riot-rally/">the service</a> of political objectives.</p>
<p>These politicians tend to avoid overt directives, providing them with plausible deniability should violence occur. But when statements reach millions of people, at least some will <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html">interpret them as orders</a>.</p>
<p>The difficulty posed by this phenomenon, called “<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/jargon-watch-rising-danger-stochastic-terrorism/">stochastic terrorism</a>,” is couched in the speech protections of the First Amendment and judicial precedents. In 1969, the Supreme Court decided that <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/">speech in support of terrorism</a> is protected by the First Amendment unless it incites violence immediately. This renders the link between speech and violence subjective. </p>
<p>In some cases, politicians have been prosecuted for <a href="http://houserepublicans.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/RampartGroupReport.pdf">influencing extremist violence</a>. In others, the speaker <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html">avoided punishment</a>. Because implied support for violent extremism remains only subjectively punishable, some politicians will likely continue to make implicit statements that increase the likelihood of right-wing domestic terrorism.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit stands with his arms spread on a platform lined with U.S. flags, in front of the White House and a crowd of people" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417882/original/file-20210825-21-zoxc6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Right-wing politicians, including former President Donald Trump, at times make statements that seem right on the line between free speech and incitement to violence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CapitalBreachRecords/33e8b2b0b95441e3b42c1dc58ddff80f/photo">AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=e_JYQCkAAAAJ">John Horgan</a>, Georgia State University</h2>
<p>On July 19, 2021, 38-year-old Florida resident Paul Hodgkins received an <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/19/1017916061/capitol-rioter-who-walked-on-senate-floor-on-jan-6-sentenced-to-8-months-in-pris">eight-month prison sentence</a> for his role in the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. His conviction, and dozens more <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/capitol-riot-arrests-latest-2021-07-29/">expected to follow</a>, raises questions of what will happen to them while in prison – and after their release. </p>
<p>In the past, neither the national security agencies nor the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons has seriously considered how to handle extremist inmates while they serve their sentences, nor how to offer them a road to reintegration with the country they attacked, or planned to.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.resolvenet.org/system/files/2021-08/RSVE%20Policy%20Note_Horgan_August%202021.pdf">Deradicalization</a> efforts to address the increasingly diverse population of homegrown terrorists could include <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/20200729-pw_163-violent_extremist_disengagement_and_reconciliation_a_peacebuilding_approach-pw.pdf">psychological counseling and restorative justice</a>. The benefits could extend beyond the decreased risk of future extremism, to rebuilding trust in government agencies and <a href="https://www.resolvenet.org/research/violent-extremist-disengagement-and-reintegration-lessons-over-30-years-ddr">communities torn apart by political and cultural discord</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people link arms and stand together in a line as one person walks in front of them" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417883/original/file-20210825-23-1f1btzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Boko Haram fighters mark the end of their deradicalization training in Niger in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-boko-haram-fighters-attend-a-ceremony-marking-the-news-photo/1189312339">Boureima Hama/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=IEFeHiAAAAAJ">Colleen Murphy</a>, University of Illinois, and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=3sQFwYYAAAAJ">Monika Nalepa</a>, University of Chicago</h2>
<p>The problem of domestic terrorism is not just something to be tackled by the government, but is a fundamental challenge within government agencies. Radicalization is particularly dangerous within <a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/white-supremacist-links-law-enforcement-are-urgent-concern">law enforcement</a> and the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/21/958915267/nearly-one-in-five-defendants-in-capitol-riot-cases-served-in-the-military">military</a>, whose members are armed and hold positions of power in society.</p>
<p>Screening military and other government officials for <a href="https://theconversation.com/americans-arent-worried-about-white-nationalism-in-the-military-because-they-dont-know-its-there-147341">ties to extremist groups</a> is key to the success of the other components of the White House strategy. But most government background checks rely heavily on friends and family members. That system will not be reliable if many of those people themselves have deep distrust in the government and may be radicalized or otherwise misguided by <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/01/971436680/from-the-u-s-capitol-to-local-governments-disinformation-disrupts">disinformation</a>.</p>
<p>Vetting systems could be adapted to include questions that will elicit information about radicalism. In addition, government agencies could require job candidates – or existing employees – to disclose their own connections to extremist groups and ideologies, coupled with penalties for failing to do so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165054/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gary LaFree receives funding from the National Institute of Justice and the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Horgan receives funding from the National Institute of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. He has conducted research and co-authored with Kurt Braddock, another author on this piece.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kurt Braddock receives funding from the US Department of Homeland Security to perform research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monika Nalepa receives funding from The National Science Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colleen Murphy and Mikkel Dack do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Addressing American domestic radicalism will require new ways of thinking about the nation’s problems, and new ways of solving them.Mikkel Dack, Assistant Professor of History, Research Director of Rowan Center for the Study of the Holocaust, Genocide, and Human Rights, Rowan UniversityColleen Murphy, Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy and Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignGary LaFree, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of MarylandJohn Horgan, Distinguished University Professor of Psychology, Georgia State UniversityKurt Braddock, Assistant Professor of Public Communication, American University School of CommunicationMonika Nalepa, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1062712018-11-15T14:33:16Z2018-11-15T14:33:16ZAirport security threats: combating the enemy within<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245774/original/file-20181115-194497-7yk83r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cctv-camera-surveillance-operating-crowded-people-188792162">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2011/sep/06/9-11-attacks-guardian-archive">9/11</a> al-Qaeda attacks on the US, most travellers have got used to the sight of fortified airports around the world. Few people these days are surprised to see barriers and other physical protection measures around them, as well as the presence of armed police patrols.</p>
<p>An airport is an enormous, complex operation, and while on the surface one that is more physically secure is reassuring for travellers – and acts as a bulwark against a possible terror attack – there is also a hidden threat from inside the airport environment. This threat has no boundaries and exists across all airports and countries. Here, the “insider” has the ability to overcome many of these overt security measures if they want to target and threaten passengers or the wider population.</p>
<p>As soon as the term insider is used, people think of terrorism in the context of the “<a href="https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q929.htm">radicalised</a>” or “terrorist” insider. But the subject is far more complex: insiders can include individual criminals, organised crime gangs, disgruntled employees or even unwitting members of staff who, through failure to follow proper security processes, leave airports vulnerable to external threats.</p>
<h2>Terrorists, smugglers, gangs and thieves</h2>
<p>Probably one of the best-known UK terrorist insiders in recent times is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/28/british-airways-bomb-guilty-karim">Rajib Karim</a>. Karim was a British Airways software engineer who had been radicalised, and plotted to place a bomb on board a BA plane. His plot was subsequently foiled, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison for terrorist activities.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, there have also been terrorist insider successes. On October 31, 2015, Russian Metrojet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/01/metrojet-ordered-suspend-all-flights-egypt-air-crash-russia-sinai">flight 9268 crashed</a> over the Sinai Peninsula after taking off from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. A bomb hidden in a drinks can is believed to have caused the aircraft to crash, and a group associated with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State</a> claimed the attack, which killed 224 people. It is <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/03/egyptair-metrojet-flight-9268-airport-security-462784.html">suspected</a> the bomb may have been placed onboard by an airport employee at Sharm el-Sheikh airport.</p>
<p>The most common examples of insider threat lie with individual members (or groups) of staff who commit low-level crime in the airport. This can range from smuggling drugs to theft from bags as they are processed through the handling system. Organised crime networks also see airports as a legitimate route to traffic drugs from South America to the rest of the world.</p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/1330-139-years-for-heathrow-airport-insider-cocaine-smuggling-group">recent case at Heathrow</a> involved corrupt baggage handlers who were part of a criminal network planning to smuggle at least £16m worth of drugs into the UK from Brazil. The gang was caught after a surveillance operation and sentenced to more than 139 years in prison. </p>
<p>But it’s not only drugs that are smuggled through airports. In the US, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-georgia-state-crime-guns-idUSKBN0K11FD20141223">firearms smuggling plot</a> by five men, including an employee and an ex-employee of Delta Airlines, was foiled by authorities. These individuals were involved in the trafficking of over 150 firearms (including assault weapons) from Atlanta to New York. This plot took advantage of a security vulnerability which involved access passes which were available to the insiders, and enabled the transportation of firearms by the group of employees.</p>
<h2>Dealing with threats</h2>
<p>While it is important to highlight past examples of insider activity within the aviation sector, it is also essential that suspicious behaviours and indicators are recognised. Research has been carried out to identify <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/PE/Documents/4---2017-AEP_Aviation-Insider-Paper.pdf">behavioural indicators</a>, and use this as a predictive technique to detect current and future insider threats.</p>
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<p>Suspicious acts by employees may include nervous or secretive behaviour, turning up for work in uniform on days off, showing interest in security matters outside their normal scope, and undertaking hostile reconnaissance for future exploitation of airport weaknesses.</p>
<p>Insider threat has now been recognised as a <a href="http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/a-clear-and-present-danger.html">clear and present danger</a> within the international aviation sector and organisations such as the <a href="https://www.iata.org/about/Pages/index.aspx">International Air Transport Association</a> (IATA) has produced <a href="https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/insider-threats-position.pdf">guidelines</a> on how to manage this threat. The threat from <a href="https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Americas-Airports-The-Threat-From-Within.pdf">insider activity</a> within the aviation sector has also been recognised by governments and law enforcement agencies.</p>
<p>Everyone has an opportunity to do more to combat the aviation insider threat, through a “community approach” at airports. This involves everyone from operators, airlines and third party contractors, to law enforcement working in collaboration and sharing key information (such as Project Servator, which seeks to “detect, deter and disrupt” criminal activity, including terrorism). Addressing personnel security weaknesses in airports which could allow hostile insiders to gain work there, is essential. And, of course, this approach also includes the general public who are encouraged to report anything suspicious to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-counter-terrorism-security-office">counter-terrorist</a> hotline or airport authorities.</p>
<p>Pre-employment screening, vetting and ongoing security management of employees can all be improved. Training programmes for management and supervisors are essential for airports, and will provide them with skills to identify, manage and resolve these threats. The value of managing the insider risk should not be underestimated. By acknowledging and identifying the threat and developing measures to combat it, we can make our airports safer places for all passengers and the staff who service them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106271/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David BaMaung works for Camor, a specialist aviation security company.</span></em></p>From terrorism to drug smuggling and theft, the hostile insider is an often overlooked threat to airport security and safety.David BaMaung, Honorary professor human resource development, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/846182017-09-27T20:02:03Z2017-09-27T20:02:03ZFrom tourism to terrorists, fast-moving space industries create new ethical challenges<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187502/original/file-20170926-17379-1tb7i52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Medical data from space tourists will be fascinating, but is it ethical? </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/news/releases/2004/moon/moon_images.html">Rick Guidice/NASA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s an exciting time to be working in the space sector - particularly with Australia’s recently-announced commitment to developing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-australia-will-have-a-space-agency-what-does-this-mean-experts-respond-84588">space agency</a>. </p>
<p>But with advances come new challenges. Similar to technologies such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/downside-of-fitness-trackers-and-health-apps-is-loss-of-privacy-69870">digital communications</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-researchers-must-learn-ethics-82754">robotics</a>, advances in space science bring ethical dilemmas. What rights do space tourists have? How can we prevent space terrorism? Who should regulate space activities? </p>
<p>Now is the time to turn the spotlight on concerns about the operations of new and future stakeholders in space. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-researchers-must-learn-ethics-82754">Artificial intelligence researchers must learn ethics</a>
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</em>
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<h2>A shift in access</h2>
<p>In the not-too-distant-past, operations in space were only available to the world’s superpowers: in particular the <a href="https://theconversation.com/lost-in-space-australia-dwindled-from-space-leader-to-also-ran-in-50-years-83310">USA and Russia</a>. We’ve seen the number of countries with space programs slowly increase over the years.</p>
<p>In recent times the cost of operating in space has dramatically decreased, allowing a large number of countries, and even some private companies, to become involved in space operations on a serious scale. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the increase in the number of players operating in space brings with it new problems. One issue is that some newcomers might use their new-found abilities in problematic ways, such as space terrorism. </p>
<p>Another is linked to the fact that some of these new space ventures – such as <a href="http://www.virgingalactic.com/">Virgin Galactic</a>, <a href="http://www.spacex.com/">Space X</a> and <a href="http://www.spaceadventures.com/">Space Adventures</a> – are working to create opportunities never seen before, by allowing ordinary people to become space tourists. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="InstagramEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.instagram.com/p/BZdZdSZAtQf/?hl=en","accessToken":"127105130696839|b4b75090c9688d81dfd245afe6052f20"}"></div></p>
<h2>Space tourists</h2>
<p>We currently do not know what rights space tourists will have. </p>
<p>Undoubtedly they will be exceedingly rich members of our society, as only a very small proportion of the population is likely to be able to afford space travel as a destination in the foreseeable future. However, just because a person is rich does not make them immune to the dangers of space travel. </p>
<p>The risky nature of the launch and re-entry are perhaps the most easily identifiable concerns. However, there are other issues which are not immediately obvious. </p>
<hr>
<p><em><strong>Read more:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/stronger-faster-and-more-deadly-the-ethics-of-developing-supersoldiers-71086">The ethics of developing supersoldiers</a></em> </p>
<hr>
<p>For example, the physical and mental health of astronauts is <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/experiments/1025.html">assessed very thoroughly</a> during and after space travel. Scientifically it would make sense to extend such monitoring to space tourists, since this will eventually increase the data set considerably.</p>
<p>But can space tourists truly give valid informed consent to such activities? It’s difficult to fully anticipate the long-term effects of space travel, let alone the effects of any medical experimentation that might go alongside it.</p>
<p>This may be a particular concern if becoming a space tourist is made conditional on giving consent to such monitoring, since in such cases the consent would, at the very least, appear to be coerced.</p>
<h2>Space terrorism</h2>
<p>A larger concern to the wider community is the prospect of space terrorism. </p>
<p>Rogue states (and at some point in the future, even non-state groups such as ISIS) could potentially make large political statements through space. </p>
<p>An electromagentic pulse (<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-advised-ncis-la-on-e-bombs-but-theyre-not-a-work-of-fiction-5095">EMP</a>) terrorist attack on a satellite could leave it “dead” in orbit indefinitely. Or, a large debris field could be created through an explosion in space, making a whole range of orbits unusable for both civilian and military purposes for years to come. </p>
<p>The effect of either of these events could be to cripple communication and navigation worldwide, with flow-on effects felt in financial markets, hospitals, transportation, food distribution and many elements of everyday life. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-some-acts-are-classified-as-terrorism-but-others-arent-76013">Explainer: why some acts are classified as terrorism but others aren't</a>
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</em>
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<p>Efforts to stop terrestrial terrorism involve <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-authorities-are-doing-all-they-can-to-combat-terrorism-78989">multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approaches</a> through the intelligence and justice systems. </p>
<p>These approaches revolve around intelligence gathering to identify and prevent terrorist attacks, as well as limiting access to raw materials that might be used to effect large numbers of people (force multipliers), such as bomb making materials, bio-weapon ingredients and nuclear weapon components. These approaches have been effective in limiting the amount of damage terrorists are able to inflict, and so reduce the effect of terrorist actions. </p>
<p>The impact of space terrorist actions by rogue states and non-state actors can plausibly be limited by similar approaches, largely through the diplomatic and intelligence community. </p>
<p>A second approach might be to regulate those few countries and companies that have launch capabilities. However, as we have seen in recent times, engaging in diplomatic negotiations to try to limit the actions of states like <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-it-launches-another-missile-we-must-realise-there-are-no-easy-options-for-dealing-with-north-korea-83139">North Korea</a> and Iran is certainly no easy task.</p>
<p>It is important that we start discussing the ethical concerns raised by the entry of new stakeholders into the space community. It is vital that decisions we make now foster innovation, while also mitigating the risks of the dramatic increase in space operations.</p>
<p>This will allow us to ensure that theoretical problems of the present do not become insurmountable, real problems in the future. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is based on a paper presented at the <a href="http://www.iac2017.org/">68th International Astronautical Congress</a> taking place this week in Adelaide, South Australia.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84618/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nikki Coleman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Space terrorism and testing of space tourists are theoretical problems today. But let’s have conversations right now to make sure they don’t become real problems in the future.Nikki Coleman, Military Space Bioethicist, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/802192017-07-09T10:59:23Z2017-07-09T10:59:23ZA man called Hope: the legacy of Namibia’s Andimba Toivo ya Toivo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177144/original/file-20170706-16389-xqzvwf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Funeral of Namibian liberation struggle hero Herman Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo at Heroes' Acre in Windhoek.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Namibia has seen an unprecedented outpouring of grief following the death of liberation struggle hero <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/andimba-herman-toivo-ya-toivo">Andimba Toivo ya Toivo</a>. It was matched by vibrant social media commentary.</p>
<p>Comments suggest that many regarded him as an icon of the Namibian liberation struggle, although he never became the official leader of the liberation movement, South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), nor independent Namibia’s President. </p>
<p>These political leadership positions were firmly occupied by Sam Nujoma, who served three terms as president after 1990. On his retirement in 2005 he was declared the official <a href="http://www.lac.org.na/laws/2005/3567.pdf">“Founding Father of the Namibian Nation”</a>.</p>
<p>In the wake of Toivo’s death some commentators claimed that he would perhaps have been a more deserving recipient of such an honorary title. These contestations are indicative of the internal politics of SWAPO, still Namibia’s ruling party by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-on-the-rise-as-south-africa-and-namibia-gear-up-to-elect-new-presidents-77887">large margin</a>. They were dismissed quickly though, most publicly by <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/56186/read/Nujoma-is-founding-father-%E2%80%93-Geingos">Namibia’s First Lady Monica Geingos</a>. </p>
<p>Irrespective, Toivo (92) received unprecedented accolades as a “revolutionary hero”. Thousands attended memorial services held for him across the country. <a href="https://theconversation.com/tribute-to-a-namibian-icon-andimba-toivo-ya-toivo-80236">Innumerable tributes</a> were published in Namibia, South Africa, and on the continent, and beyond. </p>
<p>Namibian President Hage Geingob delivered an extraordinary eulogy during the national memorial service of 23 June. He emphasised Toivo’s significance, saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have lost a man who epitomises the core ideals that make us the nation we are today. … His durable principles and inexhaustible reservoir of compassion, forgiveness, patience and sense of justice allowed him to shun the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=835039316652560">murky waters of greed and factionalism</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>A day later Geingob called at the burial site to honour Toivo’s legacy through commitment to fighting tribalism and racism, <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201706250206.html">poverty and corruption</a>. He was given a state funeral at the Namibian National Heroes Acre in Windhoek. </p>
<p>Remarkably, Geingob’s historical account named a full list of the <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=Mls4H1mnN_0C&pg=PA333&lpg=PA333&dq=Ovamboland+People's+Congress&source=bl&ots=_FKzsEJNzD&sig=NaP4xCPciDd68JXlyUNGek4Wxxo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjInOeM8PTUAhXLaVAKHZLlDI0Q6AEITzAI#v=onepage&q=Ovamboland%20People's%20Congress&f=false">Ovamboland People’s Congress</a> founders in Cape Town in 1957, which included a number of early activists who later fell out of favour with SWAPO, such as Emil Appolus, Andreas Shipanga, Otillie Schimming Abrahams, and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=835039316652560">Kenneth Abrahams</a>.</p>
<p>This historical honesty paid due respect to the man. In the party he co-founded Toivo’s frank attitude was not always welcome. In 2007 he failed to be re-elected to the SWAPO Politburo. Rumours had it at the time that he was too sympathetic to the Rally for Democracy and Progress, a break-away party from SWAPO. <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=31095&page=archive-read">He denied this</a>. In 2012 he was finally made a permanent member of <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201212040893.html">SWAPO’s Central Committee</a>.</p>
<p>Who was this inspiring man, and what remains of his legacy?</p>
<h2>A revolutionary hero</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/andimba-toivo-ya-toivo-remember-namibia-independence-leader-nelson-mandela-in-prison-dead-died-92-a7789716.html">Herman Andimba Toivo ya Toivo</a> was born in 1924 in Omangudu in northern Namibia. He received primary school education from the Finnish Lutheran mission (‘Toivo’ means ‘hope’ in Finnish). During World War 2 Toivo was a soldier with the South African Native Military Corps. He then attended the Anglican St Mary’s Odibo school, where he qualified and worked as a teacher. </p>
<p>In 1951 Toivo moved to Cape Town. In the Cape he became involved with South African anti-apartheid organisations, including the African National Congress and left-wing student movements. In 1957 he formed the Ovamboland People’s Congress, forerunner of the Namibian liberation organisation South West Africa People’s Organisation <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/andimba-toivo-ya-toivo-remember-namibia-independence-leader-nelson-mandela-in-prison-dead-died-92-a7789716.html">(SWAPO)</a>. </p>
<p>Because of his activism he was deported to Namibia, where he continued his anti-apartheid and Namibian nationalist politics. In 1966 Toivo was arrested by the South African authorities. The following year <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/andimba-herman-toivo-ya-toivo">“The state v. Tuhadeleni and 36 Others” </a> trial opened in Pretoria. Toivo appeared as Accused No. 21. The trial was the first under South Africa’s <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-mercury/20170622/281715499616810">Terrorism Act of 21 June 1967</a>.</p>
<p>With a powerful speech from the dock Toivo drew international attention to the Namibian liberation struggle. He is <a href="https://theconversation.com/tribute-to-a-namibian-icon-andimba-toivo-ya-toivo-80236">best remembered</a> internationally for his statement that Namibians were not South Africans and that they should not be tried by South Africans under “foreign” law.</p>
<p>Sentenced to 20 years in prison he spent 16 years on Robben Island, where he became close to Mandela. In 1984 he was released and <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/10/mandela-foundation-remembers-namibian-freedom-fighter-toivo">joined SWAPO in exile</a>.</p>
<p>After Namibian independence in 1990 Toivo served in the SWAPO government in various portfolios.</p>
<h2>Against greed and division</h2>
<p>In 2005 Toivo retired from official politics with a farewell speech in the Namibian parliament. The veteran liberation fighter issued a stern warning against greed and self-enrichment among those who had come to power in post-liberation governments: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Being a member of parliament or even a minister should not be seen as an opportunity to achieve status, to be addressed as “honourables” and to acquire riches. If those are your goals, you would do better to <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/166110/archive-read/Toivo&ampamp39s-message--to-Namibia--and-the">pursue other careers.</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Toivo did not only speak out against post-liberation scourges raising their ugly heads in Namibia. In 2014 he also addressed a warning to South African politicians.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1j2xcFEJK9U">We did not struggle for you to loot</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his later years Toivo also raised his voice against what he perceived as the rise of tribalism in post-colonial Namibia. In an interview with the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation he called on his compatriots to, “forget about this tribalism. It will never take you anywhere, but it causes destruction.”</p>
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<p>At a time when ethnicity had become a frequent concern in the post-colonial politics and society, Toivo called on the solidarities of anti-colonial nationalism. He urged that Namibians <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/166110/archive-read/Toivo&ampamp39s-message--to-Namibia--and-the">“should not allow ourselves to be divided.”</a></p>
<p>On various occasions during the mourning period Toivo’s children, family members, old comrades and friends praised his exceptional and stubborn commitment to <a href="http://namibian21.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=44586264&item=8086">revolutionary morality</a>. His widow Vicki Erenstein ya Toivo used the occasion of the state funeral to chastise those who exploited their positions <a href="http://www.namibian.com.na/56064/read/Goodbye--Nation-bids-farewell-to-Ya-Toivo">to get rich</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional and international significance</h2>
<p>Toivo was not just a Namibian freedom fighter. As an activist against apartheid he was part of a generation who bore Southern Africa’s long struggles against apartheid and colonialism in regional solidarity. To these men and women the freedom struggle was a continental, even a global rather than just a nationalist endeavour. </p>
<p>Geingob’s eulogy made a special point in emphasising the significance of international solidarity in the pursuit of Namibian independence. He equally stressed the commonality of the Namibian and South African struggles against the shared common enemy of apartheid. The Namibian president called for a pan-Africanist commitment to honour Toivo’s legacy in the post-colonial struggles against what he described as the “common enemy” of inequality, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=835039316652560">poverty and corruption</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heike Becker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Namibian hero and former Robben Island prisoner Toivo ya Toivo was part of a generation who contributed to the struggles against apartheid and colonialism in the region.Heike Becker, Professor of Anthropology, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/767262017-06-22T11:33:17Z2017-06-22T11:33:17ZAre autistic people at greater risk of being radicalised?<p>Terror recruits often seem to come from vulnerable backgrounds. But <a href="http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/JIDOB-11-2016-0022">new research</a> suggests that those with traits of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) could be more at risk of being radicalised. It follows a number of high-profile cases where autism appears to have played a role in the offender’s behaviour. So if people with ASD could be at higher risk, how can we protect them from falling under the spell of terror organisations such as the so-called Islamic State? </p>
<p>Terrorism involves committing violent acts for political, religious or ideological reasons. It can either be committed as part of an organised group or alone but it is traditionally characterised and understood as a <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/231">group phenomenon</a>. But a new type of terrorist threat has emerged in recent years – the “<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177295">lone wolf</a>”. Over the last decade, the rise of lone wolf terrorists has necessitated the need for an understanding of the pathway from radical ideology to radical violence. A greater understanding of this issue would inform the development of more effective <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Buggy_IPSP_Final.pdf">identification strategies</a>. </p>
<p>Given that the examination of any connection between ASD and terrorism is in its infancy, a simple categorical model describing different levels of commitment to a terrorist cause may be one step forward. Arie Kruglanski and colleagues <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12163/full">describe</a> a “degree of radicalisation” scheme where different levels of commitment to different terrorist-related activities was identified. According to their scheme, the most prevalent group of individuals are those who are “passive supporters” (those who are sympathetic to the cause). Next, are individuals who are more active in the organisation (they may have an administrative function or recruit others). The next category involves individuals who actively support violence and are ready to fight for the cause. Lastly, they identify suicide bombers who are willing to give their lives. Lone wolf terrorism would fit this last category. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/JIDOB-11-2016-0022">examining the link</a> between ASD and terrorism in collaboration with <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lino_Faccini">Lino Faccini</a>, a New York State psychologist. Together we presented specific examples of people with ASD who had engaged in each level of commitment to different terrorist-related activities. We did this to illustrate how some of the symptoms of ASD can “help” make a pathway towards being inspired to act on behalf of a terrorist cause, join a terrorist organisation, engage in directed attacks – or indeed carry out lone wolf terrorism.</p>
<h2>‘Active supporters’ and lone wolves</h2>
<p>In 2015, <a href="http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a47390/alabama-isis-peyton-pruitt/">Peyton Pruitt</a> – a youngster diagnosed with Autism, mild intellectual disability and Attention Deficit Disorder – was arrested in Alabama for sending bomb making instructions to a person he believed was part of IS. This case may be about a naive and vulnerable person, who spent an exceptional amount of time scouring the internet without supervision. But in doing so he became fascinated or fixated with terrorism. Subsequently he found some affiliation with others whom he could relate to, via the safety of the internet. As a result, he was then exploited and/or became sympathetic to and inspired by IS. </p>
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<p>Another case we discussed was that of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/may/25/uksecurity.terrorism">Nicky Reilly</a>, an 18-year-old man, diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome. Reilly did not have many friends and lived in a poor area of Plymouth, England. Reilly clearly had difficulties relating to other people and had a fixation with terrorism and martyrdom. He sought and found affiliation (and also what he believed was the right life). He became a practising Muslim in 2002. After his girlfriend left him, he befriended a group of Muslim men. Reilly became obsessed with martyrdom and with the Twin Tower attacks. He had posters of the attacks on his wall and as wallpaper on his computer. He would watch videos of the 9/11 attacks and watch video clips of beheadings. Reilly believed that he would be entitled to a better life if he died a Muslim. </p>
<p>Eventually, he changed his name to Mohammed Rasheed. Reilly also turned on his family calling them “infidels”. He devised a plan to make three crude bombs, and strap them to his chest as a suicide bomber, then run out in a crowded restaurant killing as many people as possible. Reilly went into the bathroom of a restaurant with bottles containing sodium hydroxide, paraffin and nails. But when he activated the bomb, he had difficulty opening the bathroom stall door and it exploded. He was seriously injured. Tragically, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-37721020">Reilly took his own life</a> while in prison some eight years later in 2016. </p>
<h2>Risk factors</h2>
<p>It is important to caution here that there is no substantial link between ASD and terrorism. However, there may be specific risk factors which <a href="http://europepmc.org/abstract/med/27236173">could increase the risk of offending</a> among people with ASD. Autistic special interests such as fantasy, obsessiveness (extreme compulsiveness), the need for routine/predictability and social/communication difficulties can all increase the vulnerability of an person with ASD to going down the <a href="http://programme.exordo.com/autismeurope2016/delegates/keynote/12/">pathway to terrorism</a>.</p>
<p>Searching for a “need to matter” or social connection and support for someone who is alienated or without friends may also present as risk factors. People with an ASD may be more vulnerable to being drawn into increasingly more involved commitment. They also have a tendency to hyper-focus in on their fascinations and interests at the expense of other attachments and life interests. These are potentially the conditions which extremists are increasingly exploiting in people they <a href="http://hub.salford.ac.uk/salfordpsych/2016/03/15/certain-mental-disorders-put-people-risk-radicalised/">target for recruitment</a> and training.</p>
<p>Our findings clearly highlight the need for clinicians carrying out forensic evaluations of people who have engaged in terror-related actions to investigate whether ASD may be related to their behaviour. Such evaluations are vital – not just in delivering justice – but also to ensure rehabilitation and offender management are informed by an understanding of the ASD diagnosis in each case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clare Allely receives funding from the Gillberg Neuropsychiatry Centre. She is affiliated with the Gillberg Neuropsychiatry Centre at Gothenburg University, Sweden. Clare is also an Honorary Research Fellow in the College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences affiliated to the institute of Health and Wellbeing at the University of Glasgow.</span></em></p>People suffering from autism could be far more vulnerable to falling under the spell of terror organisations on the look-out for new recruits.Clare Allely, Lecturer in Psychology, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/797742017-06-21T09:59:24Z2017-06-21T09:59:24ZThe security services need to get a handle on ‘low level’ terror threats … and fast<p>The UK’s security services are under the spotlight as the country still reels from major terror attacks in Manchester and London. But MI5 and Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee have been in a period of limbo while the country was waiting for a government to be formed following the snap election. There is now a desperate need to review the security failings that led to these shocking attacks. It is impossible to stop all terrorists – but the first thing that needs to be assessed is how so-called “low level” threats managed to fall through the cracks and then re-emerge carrying bombs and knives. </p>
<p>Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba killed eight people and injured 48 others in an attack on <a href="https://theconversation.com/eight-minutes-on-london-bridge-years-of-training-led-to-lightning-police-response-78815">London Bridge</a> and Borough Market. Butt was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/05/police-and-mi5-face-further-scrutiny-after-third-attack-since-march">already on MI5’s radar</a>, having links to al-Muhajiroun, a banned extremist group. Information that Zaghba was watched by Italian security sources was reportedly forwarded to Britain – a claim denied by MI5 – while Redouane was not known to the security services. </p>
<p>The pattern now seems familiar. In May, 22-year-old Salman Abedi <a href="https://theconversation.com/manchester-arena-attack-amid-the-horror-the-strength-of-an-incredible-city-took-hold-78202">killed 22 people at the Manchester Arena</a>. Like Butt, Abedi was investigated by MI5. One security source was reported to have <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/28/missed-opportunities-stop-salman-abedi-investigated/">said of Abedi</a>: “Nothing came of this investigation and, tragically, he slipped down the pecking order.” Westminster Bridge attacker, 52-year-old <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/25/khalid-masood-profile-from-popular-teenager-to-isis-inspired-terrorist">Khalid Masood</a>, also had links to “violent extremism” but was judged not to pose an imminent threat. </p>
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<h2>Security guarantees are ‘impossible’</h2>
<p>All this prompts criticism. Just before the general election, foreign secretary Boris Johnson put pressure on MI5 believing the service “<a href="http://news.sky.com/story/mosque-chairman-terrorist-seemed-quiet-and-gentle-10905657">must answer questions</a>” over Butt’s monitoring while Theresa May said MI5 would try to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/mi5-to-review-handling-of-london-bridge-attack-says-theresa-may">learn lessons </a> from the London attacks. </p>
<p>Dominic Grieve, who was the Conservative chair of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) until parliament broke for the election, said “<a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/dominic-grieve-100-per-cent-guarantees-of-security-not-possible-to-provide">100 per cent guarantees of security</a>” were impossible. He’s right. Intelligence can never provide certainty. To quote Lord Butler’s 2004 <a href="news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf">review of intelligence</a>, it “seldom acquires the full story”. Yet lessons still need to be learnt.</p>
<p>In the wake of the Manchester attack, MI5 <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/mi5-review-procedures-for-dealing-with-warnings-after-manchester-attack">announced</a> a review of its procedures, while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/06/mi5-to-scrutinise-counter-terrorism-operations-after-may-calls-for-review">similar commitments</a> were made following the London attacks. But internal reviews aren’t enough. </p>
<p>Parliament’s <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/">Intelligence and Security Committee</a> – established by the 1994 Intelligence Services Act to oversee the policy, management and funding of Britain’s spy agencies – needs to conduct its own review. Previously, the ISC has provided oversight on past “failures”. In the area of UK counter-terrorism, the ISC conducted reviews of the 2005 London bombings in 2006 and 2009. A review of intelligence and the killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby was completed in 2014.</p>
<h2>An ‘unattended’ watchdog</h2>
<p>The work of parliament’s ISC is currently suspended following the snap general election. As a result, a report on diversity and inclusion in the intelligence community by Fiona Mactaggert was held back. Grieve <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/">said of the situation</a>: “It is not in the public interest for oversight of the intelligence community to be left unattended for any period of time.” </p>
<p>One priority needs to be the ISC’s reorganisation. Several former members are no longer in parliament. MI5’s own internal reviews are necessary but an ISC review would be welcomed, possibly helping to restore confidence in the security services.</p>
<p>Previous reports acknowledge the problems of monitoring those linked to radical groups. In 2009, the ISC reported that, before the 7/7 attacks, MI5 was in a position to provide only “a reasonable level of coverage” in just six percent of cases. In <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-reports/special-reports">60 percent</a> there was “inadequate” or no information.</p>
<p>The ISC’s review into the killing of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2014/nov/25/-sp-lee-rigby-woolwich-report-in-full">Lee Rigby</a> also highlighted problems. The committee noted a serious delay in MI5’s investigation into one of the killers, Michael Adebowale. It said there was “insufficient co-ordination” between the police and MI5. The ISC noted MI5’s lack of strategy for dealing with “low level” subjects of interest (SoI) who appear peripheral to investigations. </p>
<p>Michael Adebolajo, the second killer, was linked to extremist groups, arrested in Kenya supposedly trying to join the group Al-Shabaab and involved in drug dealing – but MI5 concluded he didn’t pose a significant risk at the time. </p>
<h2>The ‘low level’ problem</h2>
<p>The ISC’s 2013 report lays bare the problem. In 2007, MI5 and the police launched <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2014/nov/25/-sp-lee-rigby-woolwich-report-in-full">Programme AMAZON</a>, aiming to highlight individuals known to have been involved in extremist groups who could potentially pose a risk. </p>
<p>Individuals included were “assessed through regular reviews of police and MI5 databases” for new intelligence and ranked in one of four categories. Category 1 (individual “poses a threat to life/property in the UK”) to Category 4 (“further work” was needed to establish extremist links). AMAZON ended in 2010 because of the “volume of suspects”. Other projects – Programme BELAYA and Programme CONGO – tried to deal with similar issues, ending in 2012. By late 2013, yet another initiative – Programme DANUBE – was set up, taking a “more holistic view”. Few details, or differences to earlier programmes were provided.</p>
<p>The ISC itself was sceptical, stating: </p>
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<p>Previous attempts … have failed: we have not yet seen any evidence that the new programme, established in late 2013, will be any better.</p>
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<p>The committee promised to keep a “close interest”. Yet <a href="http://isc.independent.gov.uk/committee-reports/special-reports">it remains to be seen</a> whether the ISC scrutinised DANUBE or any similar programmes.</p>
<p>What is clear is that Programme DANUBE, like those before it, has failed to tackle the problem of “low level” suspects carrying out terrorist activity. Butt, Abedi and Masood – three recent attackers – were marginal, yet carried out attacks. </p>
<p>I am not trying to attack the security services here. They face an “unparalleled threat” – a list of up to 3,000 home-grown extremists – and have disrupted <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/25/five-uk-terror-plots-disrupted-past-two-months-mi5-battles-unparalleled/">five plots</a> in recent months. DANUBE, AMAZON and others may be trying to do the impossible. But the ISC needs to review the security services’ methods for dealing with “low level” subjects of interest … and fast. </p>
<p><em>Now, read this: <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-media-reporting-of-finsbury-park-attack-differs-from-other-terrorist-incidents-79797">Media reporting of Finsbury Park attack explained</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dan Lomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Security guarantees are impossible, but too many dangerous individuals are falling through the cracks.Dan Lomas, Programme Leader, MA Intelligence and Security Studies, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/781992017-05-23T12:11:15Z2017-05-23T12:11:15ZManchester attack: as bombs return, what can be done to make venues safer?<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-40010124">bomb attack on Manchester Arena</a> comes at a time when the whole of the UK is on high terror alert. Across Europe, there recently have been <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39359158">a number of attacks using vehicles</a> and knives – and that has focused many people’s minds on these being the types of terrorist assault to expect. But Manchester has now taught us that we should never forget the acute danger presented by bomb attacks.</p>
<p>Only last year we saw bombs <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/28/brussels-attacks-the-confirmed-victims">in Brussels, Belgium, and Aachen</a>, Germany. With the UK at <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels">threat level 4</a> – indicating that an attack is “highly likely” or “severe” – violence in various forms is to be expected. </p>
<p>Now the police and security services are ascertaining whether the Manchester bomber was acting on his own or as <a href="http://www.gmp.police.uk/Live/Nhoodv3.nsf/TriageWebsitePages/5C071E8A3B6E6761802581290023AD7E?OpenDocument">part of a network</a> – or indeed whether or not ISIS is responsible for the attack <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/world/europe/manchester-arena-attack-ariana-grande.html">as it claims</a>. Using an improvised explosive device does require a degree of sophistication and knowledge. We saw this during the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/troubles">Irish Troubles</a>, when pipe bombs were used, as well as in the 2013 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/explosions-reported-at-site-of-boston-marathon.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">Boston Marathon attack</a> when a pressure cooker was converted into an IED and ball bearings, nuts and bolts were released at high velocity as shrapnel to maximises the impact of the explosion.</p>
<h2>Swift response</h2>
<p>The effectiveness and efficiency of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/gallery/2017/may/23/manchester-arena-explosion-emergency-services-react-in-pictures">emergency services</a> in dealing with the aftermath of the Manchester attack is already apparent. Over the last few years, a number of practical terrorism training exercises have been run in various locations in the UK – including at the <a href="http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/terrorist-training-exercise-success-police-11327800">Trafford Centre</a> in Manchester. The aim of these exercises is to test responses to various forms of attack, from terrorists using small arms fire in the likes of a shopping centre to bomb attacks. This is part of the Prepare strand of the UK‘s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest">CONTEST</a> terrorism strategy.</p>
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<p>As we saw in Manchester on Monday night, the usefulness of these exercises clearly paid dividends and emergency services effectively were able to seal off an area around the location of the attacks and deal with casualties.</p>
<p>But can these types of attacks ever always be prevented? There appears to have been a degree of planning in selecting the <a href="http://www.manchester-arena.com/">Manchester Arena</a>, which is a large concert venue where high profile entertainers perform to big audiences, as a target. The timing also seems to have been considered – the end of the concert when it would have been easier to walk from the street to the entrance/exit and detonate an explosive device. </p>
<p>Similarly, attacks using knives or vehicles as weapons are very hard to prevent. Nevertheless, we have seen that physical barriers can diminish the threat posed by vehicles.</p>
<p>Security is usually strict upon <em>entering</em> sporting and concert venues such as the Manchester Arena. Bags are searched and tickets closely checked. But perhaps we need stricter measures at these venues when people are <em>leaving</em>. This is not an easy task, as we saw in Manchester – friends and relatives were also waiting near the exit to pick people up and take them home. </p>
<p>But perhaps we shouldn’t lose perspective: thankfully, terrorist attacks are still rare, in part thanks to the work the police and security services do in preventing them. And we should not let terrorism affect our movements as we live as normal a life as possible. Nevertheless, we now have to expect the possibility of an attack and, unfortunately, we all need to become more vigilant.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lowe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An attack at Manchester Arena has sent shock waves around the world, and again raised questions about safety in public places.David Lowe, Senior Lecturer Liverpool Centre for Advanced Police Studies, LJMU, Liverpool John Moores UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776602017-05-17T00:03:09Z2017-05-17T00:03:09ZWhy banning laptops from airplane cabins doesn’t make sense<p>Recent reports suggest that terrorists can now create bombs so thin that they cannot be detected by the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/race-to-prevent-airline-terror-turns-to-laptops-thin-bombs">current X-ray screening</a> that our carry-on bags undergo. </p>
<p>In an effort to protect against such threats, the U.S is <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-europe-flight-laptop-ban-20170512-story.html">considering banning laptops and other large electronic devices</a> in the passenger cabins of airplanes flying between Europe and the United States. This would extend a ban already in place on flights from eight Middle Eastern countries. </p>
<p>Given the significant disruption such a policy would cause tens of thousands of passengers a day, a logical question any economist might ask is: Is it worth it? </p>
<p>It is tempting to think that any level of cost and inconvenience is sensible if it reduces the risk of an attack even a little. But risks, inherent in flying and <a href="http://traveltips.usatoday.com/air-travel-safer-car-travel-1581.html">even driving</a>, can never be avoided entirely. </p>
<p>So when weighing policies that are designed to make us safer, it is important to consider both their costs and potential effectiveness.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, whether the benefits justify the costs is <a href="https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/04/counterterroris.html">too often not the yardstick used</a> by officials determining whether to pursue these types of policies. Instead, as law professors who have researched how the government’s travel policies affect civil liberties, we have found that it is more likely that political considerations motivate the adoption of restrictive policies, which in the end <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2647779">actually do little to protect citizens’ security</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169622/original/file-20170516-11941-l4ex1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Placards at Casablanca Mohammed V International Airport inform passengers that laptops and other electronic devices must be checked on flights to the U.S. and the U.K.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abdeljalil Bounhar/AP Photo</span></span>
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<h2>Expanding a ban</h2>
<p>The current laptop policy regarding some flights from the Middle East was put in place in March apparently as a result of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/15/politics/trump-russia-classified-information/">intelligence</a> that ISIS militants were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-revealed-highly-classified-information-to-russian-foreign-minister-and-ambassador/2017/05/15/530c172a-3960-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html">training</a> to get laptop bombs past security screeners and onto planes. The U.K. adopted a similar rule.</p>
<p>The Department of Homeland Security <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/brace-for-chaos-if-u-s-expands-airline-laptop-ban">wants to extend</a> that ban to transatlantic flights. This would cause major disruption and “<a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-europe-flight-laptop-ban-20170512-story.html">logistical chaos</a>.” Approximately 65 million people a year fly between Europe and the United States. </p>
<p>Business travelers are concerned about the loss of productivity and the risk that a checked laptop with sensitive information could be damaged, stolen or subjected to intrusive search. Families worry about traveling without electronic distractions to soothe tired and uncomfortable children. Airlines <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/15/trumps-expected-widening-laptop-ban-has-european-airlines-worried.html">expect a loss of business</a> as people opt out of transatlantic travel altogether. </p>
<p>Past policies such as limiting the liquids that can be carried on and requiring passengers to remove shoes are a case in point. They have increased burdens on both travelers – who must pay to check baggage and face added inconvenience – and taxpayers – who bear the costs of every policy change – <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/tsa-business-security-theater-not-security/357599/">while likely doing little to nothing</a> to improve security.</p>
<h2>Benefits and costs</h2>
<p>Regulators throughout the government typically must rely on <a href="http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3470">a cost-benefit analysis</a> to determine levels of acceptable risk, weighing the potential safety gain of a new policy against its costs and added risks.</p>
<p>But when dealing with a fear of terrorism, it is common to find policies that are <a href="http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/JATMfin.pdf">not cost effective</a>. And if we subjected the laptop bans (the original and expansion) to a cost-benefit analysis, they would likely fail. The costs are high, the potential security gains are small, and the policy adds hazards of its own. </p>
<p>To make its case, the government seems to be relying on several purported benefits of stowing laptops in the luggage hold. First, checked bags undergo <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/race-to-prevent-airline-terror-turns-to-laptops-thin-bombs">additional screening for the presence of explosives</a>. Second, it is possible that luggage in the cargo area could provide <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-16/race-to-prevent-airline-terror-turns-to-laptops-thin-bombs">some insulation</a> from an explosion. Finally, bombs placed in the cargo area require a <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/03/21/airplane-bombs-carryon-cargo-electronics-ban/99447258/">sophisticated timing device</a>, unlike simpler explosives that could be set off manually. </p>
<p>But these benefits appear dubious as support for a laptop ban. Carry-on luggage could go through expanded screening, for example, while the notion that checked luggage might make an explosion more survivable is speculative – and such gains might in any case be offset by the dangerous <a href="https://cosmosmagazine.com/chemistry/airline-laptop-ban-good-policy-or-poor-science">greater vibration found in cargo</a> cabin. Lithium batteries have, after all, been forbidden from the cargo compartment for a reason – and <a href="https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/hazmat_safety/more_info/?hazmat=7">must instead be carried on</a> – to avoid the risk of fire.</p>
<p>And of course, this does little to protect against the risk of an explosive device in the cargo cabin. It just moves the risk to an isolated area of the plane.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/169625/original/file-20170516-11937-1791yxm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lithium batteries were considered the likely cause of a UPS cargo plane crash in 2010 near Dubai that killed both crew members.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kamran Jebreili/AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Moving the devices to the hold could actually make such devices harder to detect if they slip past airport screening. The exploding lithium batteries in Samsung devices, for example, show how even ordinary fire risks can be greater when passengers are not there to <a href="http://gizmodo.com/samsung-galaxy-2-spews-smoke-and-sparks-on-flight-to-si-1786998437">notice a smoking battery</a> in a bag in the overhead compartment.</p>
<p>Similarly, the presence of observant passengers can help thwart terrorist activity when it does occur, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/16/justice/michigan-underwear-bomber-sentencing/">as happened with the underwear bomber</a>. One should keep in mind that one of the greatest airline tragedies of all times, the attack on Pan Am flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie and claimed 270 lives, was caused by a bomb that went off in a suitcase in the <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-lockerbie-bombing-pictures-photogallery.html">cargo hold</a>.</p>
<p>On the economic side, the financial costs of the policy change would likely be very high. Based on statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce, travel industry professionals estimate that the cost of lost productivity alone for business travelers unable to work on flights between the U.S. and Europe is estimated to be <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/u-s-laptop-ban-cost-economy-500000000-year-173629493.html">as great as $500 million</a> a year.</p>
<p>The potential <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/03/29/trumps-travel-ban-could-cost-18b-us-tourism-travel-analysts-say/99708758/">loss of tourism revenue</a> may be even greater, as families avoid vacationing in the United States and business travelers <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/brace-for-chaos-if-u-s-expands-airline-laptop-ban">choose to meet by teleconference instead of in person</a>. </p>
<h2>Questionable politics</h2>
<p>So if the laptop ban would be ineffective – or worse yet, even make airline travel <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinenegroni/2017/05/10/in-airplane-laptop-ban-us-discounts-faa-concerns-about-in-flight-fires/#78432a794ace">less safe</a> – and be very costly, why would the government consider it? </p>
<p>The answer is likely politics. And that is because people <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/overreaction_risks.pdf">overestimate the likelihood</a> of being harmed by a terrorist attack, which lends extreme actions like the laptop ban public support, while they underestimate the risks of more ordinary occurrences like <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/death-risk-statistics-terrorism-disease-accidents-2017-1">car accidents</a> or <a href="http://www.pennlive.com/news/2017/03/harrisburg_fire_write-through.html">defective batteries</a>. </p>
<p>From 1975 to 2015, <a href="https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis">fewer than 84 Americans a year</a> died due to terrorism, and that includes the attacks on 9/11. Meanwhile, in 2015 alone a total of <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/2015-brought-biggest-us-traffic-death-increase-50-years-427759">38,300 people died</a> in traffic-related accidents in the U.S. And lithium batteries have been blamed for <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lithium-battery-fire-risk-samsung-galaxy-note-7/">dozens of aircraft fires</a> and <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/exploding-batteries-in-mh370-cargo-hold-2015-10">may have been what brought down</a> Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, which <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/malaysia-airlines-flight-370-likely-crash-location-reaffirmed-with-new-analysis/">disappeared</a> in 2014 with more than 200 passengers and crew. </p>
<p>At the same time, officials on whose watch an attack or other disaster occurs <a href="http://sobelrs.people.cofc.edu/All%20Pubs%20PDF/Hurricane%20Katrina%20Public%20Choice%20Analysis.pdf">receive disproportionate blame</a>, something that does not carry over to more ordinary risks. People fear terror attacks <a href="https://qz.com/898207/the-psychology-of-why-americans-are-more-scared-of-terrorism-than-guns-though-guns-are-3210-times-likelier-to-kill-them/">more than the common threats</a> that are actually more likely to cause them harm. Politicians may respond to their voters’ concerns, and may even share the same <a href="http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/why-americans-are-so-scared-of-terrorism.html">cognitive biases</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, government decision makers have an incentive to overvalue measures taken to prevent terror attacks, even at the expense of increasing more ordinary – <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/10/samsung-isnt-one-lithium-ion-problems-just-ask-nasa/">yet more likely</a> – safety risks. </p>
<p>While there may not be much we can do about Americans’ misconceptions about the risk of terrorism, public policy on an issue as important as airline safety should not blindly follow them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77660/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cassandra Burke Robertson is a board member of the 11/9 Coalition, a nationwide, non-partisan, grassroots organization working for the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Irina D. Manta is the founding president of the 11/9 Coalition, a nationwide, non-partisan, grassroots organization working for the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law.</span></em></p>The U.S. is considering expanding a ban it imposed in March on several Middle Eastern countries to all flights from Europe. A close look suggests the meager benefits just aren’t worth the high costs.Cassandra Burke Robertson, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Professional Ethics, Case Western Reserve UniversityIrina D. Manta, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law, Hofstra UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/772012017-05-07T12:41:49Z2017-05-07T12:41:49ZIntegrating radical fighters who return home isn’t easy, but can be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167957/original/file-20170504-20192-zwzt25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tunisians demonstrate against the return of jihadists fighting for extremist groups abroad </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Zoubeir Souissi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thousands of youths have been recruited by terrorist groups from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia and America. Between 2011 and 2016 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_foreign_fighter_returnees_reintegration_challenge_112016_en.pdf">the number of “foreign fighters”</a> rose to more than 42,000 – among them <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20161011-europe-prisons-jihadists-recruitment-study-islamic-state-group-terrorism">5000 Westerners</a> and close to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil">7000 North Africans</a>. They had travelled to the Middle East to join jihadist organisations such as the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) and the Syrian Fateh al-Sham Front (ex-Al-Nusra), a former al Qaeda affiliate. </p>
<p>By early 2016, almost a third of these foreign fighters had returned to their <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_foreign_fighter_returnees_reintegration_challenge_112016_en.pdf">countries of origin</a>. Now that IS is suffering serious military setbacks, the flow of foreign fighters seems to have dwindled. More returnees can be expected to follow in the near future. </p>
<p>In North Africa, hundreds of men and women who joined IS or Fateh al-Sham Front have returned home with combat experience. They pose a major security threat to the region. At least <a href="http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/02/25/around-400-tunisians-have-returned-from-war-in-syria-interior-minister-says">400</a> Tunisians have, so far, returned to the country. Authorities are concerned they could be coordinating new attacks with terrorist networks.</p>
<p>These fears are not without foundation. Terrorist groups like IS continue to encourage those within Europe and Africa (whether returnees or supporters) <a href="http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-council-ctc-foreign-fighters-returnees-policy-options-14799-16.pdf">to carry out attacks from their home nations</a>.</p>
<p>So how should governments manage these returnees? It’s not an easy question to answer but <a href="http://prishtinainsight.com/syria-returnee-seeks-prevent-others-becoming-violent-extremists/">accounts</a> of <a href="https://www.apnews.com/b9b54744173746beb1e07502904ec56f">returnees</a> provide some insights. What’s clear is that there are many facets of radicalised youth – and that there’s no single solution to eradicate this social evil.</p>
<p>What the available evidence suggests is that governments must respond realistically to a complex problem. And they need to accept that opting for the reintegration of (former) terrorists to minimise the possibilities of future violence is not adopting a soft approach. Realistically, it’s the only approach.</p>
<h2>Refugees and migrants are not terrorists</h2>
<p>The fear of further attacks has driven the media to draw a link between anti-terror measures and immigration policy that is “analytically and statistically unfounded, and must change”, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-terrorism-link-migration-un-expert-report-no-evidence-isis-uses-route-human-rights-a7377961.html">according to Ben Emmerson</a>, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights. </p>
<p>The report recommends that countries should realise the vast majority of Syrian refugees and others are victims of terrorism. They must not be regarded as potential suspects. It also calls on states to respect migrants’ fundamental rights and warns that attempts to snub asylum seekers or detain migrants are a violation of human rights and international refugee law. Emmerson warned that operations to stop migration may also increase <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-terrorism-link-migration-un-expert-report-no-evidence-isis-uses-route-human-rights-a7377961.html">the risk of attacks in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>This suggests the vital need for strategies that address issues of migration and refugees, and the risks that returning foreign fighters may pose.</p>
<p>Unlike refugees or migrants, foreign fighters returning from the conflict in Syria and Iraq are a serious security threat at home and internationally. While in the war zone, they joined terrorist networks, adopted techniques like suicide bombings and beheadings, and set up ties with other jihadists around the globe.</p>
<p>Different countries have different mitigating factors that limit the danger. The presence of tough and focused security services is particularly important. Several countries in Africa and Europe have developed an individual risk management and analysis for returnees. These people are categorised according to the duration they spent in the war zone, what they did there and their goal after their return.</p>
<p>Criminal trials are favoured in most European and African countries for dealing with returnees. But trials don’t usually result in convictions; evidence against the returnees is often lacking.</p>
<p>This shows the critical need for a comprehensive approach that gets local authorities and social partners involved. These could include, for example, Child Protection Services, Social Services and the health sector. </p>
<h2>Strategies to combat the risks</h2>
<p>North African nations must decide how to handle returnees.</p>
<p>Tunisia has around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tunisia-breeding-ground-islamic-state-fighters">2,400</a>. The country has <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/2/28/tunisia-returning-jihadists-highlight-desperate-need-for-prison-reform">poor rehabilitation processes and policies in place</a>.
Morocco had an estimated <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C46_msb.pdf">1,500</a> citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq as of October 2015. Some returnees have been jailed, but the country still needs to develop an effective strategy to deal with others. </p>
<p>Some decision makers seem to feel that returnees will always be terrorists who present a permanent threat to national security. But a dialogue is necessary with the returnees. They must be retrained and reintegrated into their own societies. </p>
<p>To make reintergration feasible, the government must take an all-inclusive approach. This would entail including returnees’ families, neighbourhoods and local communities in the process. It also requires partnership with government, schools, universities, civil society organisations, and the private sector. </p>
<h2>Deradicalisation and reintegration</h2>
<p>The deradicalisation of (former) terrorists or extremists can be viewed as a process geared at ensuring their reintegration into society in a way that minimises the chances they will resort to terrorism-related activity.</p>
<p>Reintegration plans must therefore be flexible and tailored to an individual’s specific background and motives. </p>
<p>The deradicalisation programme, which combines education with anti-violence training, is an attempt to disentangle the individual’s sense of hatred from his or her political vision of the world and address both the motives behind their hate sentiments. It also aims to reintroduce them to democratic values and peaceful ways of expressing their feelings and viewpoints.</p>
<p>Numerous <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/sr402-returning-foreign-fighters-and-the-reintegration-imperative.pdf">reintegration programmes</a> are already underway in Tunisia, Morocco, and many European countries. Most cover a range of activities such as religious and psychological counselling, vocational skills training, education and recreation.</p>
<p>Reintegration programmes should include both deradicalisation and disengagement-based efforts. Deradicalisation, which emphasises erasing violent ideologies from extremists’ minds, is very crucial. But it should be considered one of many possible options through which to limit the possibilities of recidivism.</p>
<p>In this context information sharing, as well as social media monitoring relevant to conflict zones, is of paramount importance.</p>
<p>More research initiatives should be carried out in close cooperation with policy makers and experts. This will enable the successful reintegration of terrorists and extremists in society.</p>
<p>Finally, there is a need for an optimistic environment to send a clear message of hope to migrants, refugees, youth and communities. Governments should continue building relations with them, gaining their trust – and deriving intelligence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77201/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moha Ennaji does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trying to reintegrate foreign fighters who return home shouldn’t be considered the soft option. Governments in countries like Morocco and Tunisia need to respond realistically to a complex problem.Moha Ennaji, Professor of Linguistics, Gender, and Cultural Studies, International Institute for Languages and CulturesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750922017-03-23T19:23:01Z2017-03-23T19:23:01ZLondon attack: Terrorism expert explains three threats of jihadism in the West<p>Details about the man who attacked the British Parliament on March 22, <a href="https://gu.com/p/66byc/sbl">identified</a> by London police as British national Khalid Masood, are still emerging. With four victims confirmed dead, the attack is the worst in London since the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598">July 7, 2005 bombings</a> on the London transport system.</p>
<p>A day after the attack, the Islamic State media organization Amaq released a statement <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-london-attack-westminster-terror-responsibility-latest-islamic-state-daesh-a7645696.html">claiming responsibility</a>. The statement read: “The attacker yesterday in front of the British Parliament was a soldier of the Islamic state.”</p>
<p>The language of the statement can help us understand the nature of not just this attack, but the nature of jihadist attacks in the West. Based on 10 years of research on the topic, I have identified three categories into which this attack is likely to fall.</p>
<h2>Directed attack</h2>
<p>The first and least probable scenario is that the attack in London was planned and directed by individuals within the IS hierarchy. In such a situation, the attacker would be part of a wider IS network.</p>
<p>Those types of attacks, such as the ones conducted by IS in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994">Paris</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985">Brussels</a> (the anniversary of which was also on the same day as the London attack) in 2015 and 2016, respectively, are usually deadlier and more sophisticated than what we saw in London. The crude nature of the killings, in which Masood <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/22/attack-houses-parliament-london-what-we-know-so-far">used a car</a> as a battering ram before rushing police officers with knife, suggests that this act falls into one of the two following categories.</p>
<h2>Inspired attack</h2>
<p>This may have been a so-called “inspired” attack. This refers to a terrorist act undertaken by someone with no known ties to IS or other jihadist groups. These individuals <a href="http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Literature_Review.pdf">see themselves</a> as part of the wider global jihad movement after consuming jihadist propaganda and interacting with like-minded individuals online. They plan the attack alone, with no input from a terrorist organization. </p>
<p>The last such “inspired” incident in London was the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/19/world/europe/uk-soldier-killing-trial/">killing</a> of British Army soldier Lee Rigby in May 2013. The attackers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, were inspired by al-Qaida and used a similar tactic to that seen in the Parliament attack, ramming their target with a car before stabbing him repeatedly. </p>
<p>Amaq’s announcement is instructive when it states that the attacker was acting “in response to calls to target citizens of coalition nations.” This is likely a reference to the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-official-calls-for-lone-wolf-attacks-in-us-and-europe-during-ramadan-a7042296.html">repeated announcements</a> by IS members, most notably the group’s now deceased former spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, for Western IS sympathizers to use any means at their disposal to conduct terror operation in their home nations. In addition, IS usually refers to such individuals as its “soldiers” only when the group had no direct role in the attack. </p>
<p>These inspired acts are often referred to as lone-wolf attacks. While the term is widely used, recent research shows that few attacks in Europe are genuinely conducted by lone actors. For example, one study <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/553/html">found</a> that out of 38 IS-linked plots in Europe between 2014 and 2016, only six “were based on inspiration only.” However, even then the authors of the study concede that the plotters “usually had contacts in extremist circles, albeit not IS-related.” Such findings suggest that true lone-wolf attacks are in fact much rarer than many assume.</p>
<h2>Remote-controlled attack</h2>
<p>The final possible category of attack the London incident falls into is “remote-controlled.” This represents something of a hybrid of the two other forms of jihadist terrorism in the West. This occurs when a radicalized Westerner receives encouragement, and often direct instruction, from an IS member over the internet. These individuals, who my colleague Seamus Hughes and I refer to as “virtual entrepreneurs,” in a recent <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-threat-to-the-united-states-from-the-islamic-states-virtual-entrepreneurs">report</a> are often based in IS-held territory and have built up respected reputations within the IS online milieus.</p>
<p>As IS has spread its influence over social media, and its virtual entrepreneurs have made use of a wide range of encrypted messaging apps such as Telegram, Surespot and WhatsApp, this has become one of the main ways the group plans attacks in the West. In the same study cited above, researchers found that 50 percent of the 38 IS-linked plots in Europe between 2014 and 2016 were found to have involved “online instruction from members of IS’ networks.” </p>
<p>This phenomenon is also apparent in the United States. </p>
<p>My colleague and I discovered that out of 38 IS-inspired plots and attacks in the United States between March 1, 2014, and March 1, 2017, eight involved digital communication with virtual entrepreneurs. This includes the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/texas-shooting-gunmen/">attempted shooting</a> in Garland, Texas in May 2015. One of the attackers, Elton Simpson, was receiving encouragement and direction via encrypted chats with Junaid Hussain, a British IS member based in Syria. Virtual entrepreneurs have also been involved in at least six other terrorism-related cases, including helping Americans intending to travel to join the Islamic State. This brings the total number of U.S. terrorism cases linked to IS virtual entrepreneurs to 14.</p>
<p>Based on what we know so far, and after analyzing recent trends and the latest research, it is likely that the man who killed three people in London was acting either in the name of IS without any direct links, or was in possible contact with a virtual entrepreneur.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the only certainty is that this will not be the last such attack in the West. As IS loses ground in Iraq and Syria, it will do all it can to retain an ability to strike in the West. While their key aim is to inspire attacks like those in Paris and Brussels, they will be increasingly difficult to conduct. This is due both to its dwindling resources and the increasing readiness of European security agencies who will be learning from recent attacks.</p>
<p>Lone actors, while rare, will continue offer IS a cost-free method of attack. Meanwhile, virtual entrepreneurs will be doing all they can to help their Western contacts plot and execute mass killings from afar.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens is affiliated with the Program on Extremism at George Washington University.</span></em></p>Was the London attacker acting alone? Was he really a soldier of the Islamic State? Research on the nature of jihadism in the West reveals possible answers.Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Research Director of the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750762017-03-23T17:00:53Z2017-03-23T17:00:53ZBanning laptops at secure airports won’t keep aircraft safe from terror attacks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162211/original/image-20170323-4965-1ivg61p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Introducing new security measures for the airline industry is rarely done lightly by governments. Certainly it’s underpinned by the responsibility to ensure passenger safety. But it’s not clear how effective the recent ban on laptops and large electronic devices in aircraft cabin baggage on flights from certain Middle Eastern airports to the US and UK will be.</p>
<p>There is evidence that airport baggage scanners in many developing world airports aren’t sophisticated enough to detect the latest explosive devices that can be hidden in electronic devices. But limiting the restrictions to just ten specific airports leaves open significant other risks that could be exploited.</p>
<p>The laptop ban is reportedly due to “evaluated intelligence” about attempts to smuggle explosive devices in <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/03/21/qa-aviation-security-enhancements-select-last-point-departure-airports-commercial">various consumer items</a>. This is almost certainly linked to the attack on the Daallo Airlines Flight from Mogadishu, Somalia in February 2016, when an explosive device hidden in a laptop was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35521646">detonated shortly after take-off</a>.</p>
<p>Since this incident, there has been concern that the bomb-making capabilities of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS and Al-Qaeda may have become sophisticated enough to <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolving-challenges-for-explosive-detection-in-the-aviation-sector-and-beyond">bypass airport X-ray machines</a>.</p>
<p>However, CNN terror analyst <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-evolving-challenges-for-explosive-detection-in-the-aviation-sector-and-beyond">Paul Cruikshank has argued</a> that the “layered state-of-the-art detection systems that are now in place at most airports in the developed world make it very hard for terrorists to sneak bombs onto planes”. He believes that, due to the levels of technology in place, it is unlikely that any explosive device would go undetected in the screening process used in many international airports.</p>
<p>But security threats must still be addressed and, given that many airports in the developing world do not have this level of screening, there is no doubt that banning electronic devices from the cabin goes some way towards addressing this threat. Yet perhaps the ban implemented across ten airports, including major hubs in Doha, Istanbul and Dubai (which has the world’s third busiest airport), does not go far enough.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162213/original/image-20170323-4938-8ent8q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nowhere to hide … with the right equipment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Only outbound direct flights to the US and UK run by specifically named airline operators are bound by the restrictions. All the airports on the list are in countries that are either at risk from terrorism or are seen as a particular focus of terrorist activity.</p>
<p>But a number of the above airports operate the highly sophisticated state-of-the-art detection systems that Cruikshank refers to. If the ban is implemented at these airports, then what of those many airports in the developing world which do not have state-of-the-art machines, or benefit from highly qualified staff? And the threat of terrorism exists in other parts of the Middle East, Africa and Asia, where there is support for Al Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist networks.</p>
<p>We also need to consider potential terrorist behaviour. We can’t ignore the fact that terrorists may simply take an alternative route to the US or UK that isn’t subject to these restrictions. In this case, the vulnerability just shifts somewhere else.</p>
<h2>Unresolved risks</h2>
<p>It would also be very naïve to assume that simply forcing customers to pack their electronic devices into hold baggage would be safer than taking them in the cabin. If a bomb would go undetected in carry-on luggage, there is a strong chance it wouldn’t be found if it were <a href="https://www.asi-mag.com/cargo-screening-technological-options/">screened for the cargo hold</a>. </p>
<p>Another key security risk area is not just the technology used in airports but the vulnerabilities within it. If terrorist groups are intent on attacks on aircraft, they can do so from any airport in the world by recruiting sympathisers <a href="http://link.springer.com/journal/12198/7/4/page/1">among airport staff</a>. As happened during the Somali attack <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/08/somalia-plane-blast-airport-worker-handed-device-to-bombing-suspect">last year</a>, some airports may place their staff under less scrutiny than others, allowing access to restricted areas where devices could be placed on aircraft.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that terrorists will continually try and find ways to avert detection and bypass security. But shifting the vulnerability is not the solution. Only by the whole of the international aviation industry working together will the threat be minimised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Preddy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ban on electronic devices in cabin luggage overlooks the airports that would be least likely to detect a bomb.Michaela Preddy, Lecturer in Airport Security Management and Policing, School of Forensic and Applied Sciences, University of Central LancashireLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750362017-03-23T11:20:05Z2017-03-23T11:20:05ZWestminster attack raises spectre of new ‘rings of steel’ to boost security in urban centres<p>The car and knife assault <a href="https://theconversation.com/terrorism-in-westminster-london-had-expected-attack-for-some-time-and-police-reaction-was-rapid-75024">on Westminster</a> is the latest in a long line of attacks targeting Western cities. It raises new questions about how to respond proportionately to demands to increase security in urban centres. </p>
<p>Since the early 1990s, London has led the way in advancing counter-terrorist security in the form of “rings of steel”. In the financial zones of the City and Docklands there are strategically positioned entry checkpoints, bollards and hi-tech surveillance combined with vigilant and visible policing at times of high threat. </p>
<p>In the last decade, additional measures have been deployed throughout London, centered upon the so-called Government Security Zone encompassing Whitehall and the Palace of Westminster. Lines of crash-rated bollards, concealed barriers in the forms of balustrades and imposing steel barriers outside the Houses of Parliament, have <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0309-1317.2004.00511.x/abstract">become an everyday</a> feature of London life. </p>
<p>These most recent measures were put in place in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 due to fears of indiscriminate attacks against public places. But over time, terrorist attacks have become more sophisticated, employing tactics and targeting locations which negate such traditional security architectures. In 2016, attacks in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/paris-attacks-2015-22621">Paris</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/brussels-attacks-26004">Brussels</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/nice-attack-29339">Nice</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/berlin-attack-34467">Berlin</a> highlighted the perpetual threat faced by cities in the “war on terror”. </p>
<h2>Defence of crowded places</h2>
<p>Defending vulnerable urban spaces against terrorism has long occupied state security services, but until recently these seldom impacted everyday life. As we have seen from these recent attacks, the modus operandi of terrorists has changed significantly in the new millennium. </p>
<p>Car and truck bombs targeting major financial or political centres – such as the IRA bombs in the City of London in <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ira-city-bombers-identified-by-police-1533278.html">1992</a> and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/24/newsid_2523000/2523345.stm">1993</a> and London’s Docklands in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/10/newsid_2539000/2539265.stm">1996</a> – have been superseded by person-borne devices, especially suicide attacks. Subsequently, attacks have taken the form of Fedayeen-style mass shootings and the deliberate targeting of crowds with fast-moving vehicles.</p>
<p>Traditional territorial counter-terrorism approaches such as the construction of defensive cordons are now seen as largely inadequate and have had to be rethought. The methods and tactics adopted by terror groups are increasingly novel, innovative and tactically aimed at soft targets and more generally crowded places that cannot be altered without radically changing how citizens experience the city. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162173/original/image-20170323-3528-jjrvdv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Security barricades outside the Houses of Parliament have been in place for years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/funfilledgeorgie/14327308147/sizes/l">Georgie R/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Security aesthetics</h2>
<p>Over the last two decades, urban revitalisation and improvements in the public realm have increasingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/privatised-public-spaces-can-breathe-new-life-into-cities-20976">emphasised</a> inclusivity, liveability and accessibility. However, these “quality-of-life” issues sit uneasily beside concerns to design-out terrorism as security becomes part of the urban design process. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the US, many highly obtrusive security features – notably concrete planters or steel bollards – were literally “thrown” around key sites in major cities to stop car bombings. They were not necessarily aesthetically pleasing within the public realm. </p>
<p>In the last decade, this initial swathe of security features has slowly given way to subtler alterations to the landscape – although in many cases bollard-type solutions still prevail. There is a predominant view among security experts that security features, where possible, should be as unobtrusive as possible. This had led to them being increasingly camouflaged and subtly embedded within the cityscape. </p>
<p>Examples of such camouflaged features <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010609343299">include</a> balustrades or artwork erected as part of “streetscape” improvement. These designs are still capable of stopping a seven-tonne truck travelling at 50 miles per hour.</p>
<h2>Evolving urban security</h2>
<p>Today, counter-terrorism strategies seek to balance security effectiveness with social and political acceptability. As a result, more integrated approaches to “designed-in” counter-terrorism have emerged. Instead of reacting at pace, a more reflexive response <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00921.x/full">is now possible</a>, taking into account issues such as proportionality and design aesthetics, as well as giving greater responsibility to planners, architects and designers to deliver more humane security solutions. </p>
<p>Yet, the implementation of design-based counter-terrorism has remained in flux, tempered by the increasing cost of urban security in an age of austerity combined with the reluctance of urban developers to consider significant security improvements within their designs. This lack of a regulatory requirement for designed-in security was reemphasised in a <a href="https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/londons_preparedness_to_respond_to_a_major_terrorist_incident_-_independent_review_oct_2016.pdf">2016 independent report</a> on London’s preparedness for a major terrorist incident. It argued that London should become a city where security is designed-in and is part of the city’s fabric. It also suggested that a statutory obligation should be introduced for such resilience to be designed into new and existing buildings. </p>
<p>This will not be easy to achieve in the short term. The international reaction to the attack on a Berlin market in December 2016 showed how the difficulties in balancing reactive and proactive counter-terrorism elements within cities has brought us full circle, returning us to immediate post-9/11 security responses. </p>
<h2>Increased security inevitable</h2>
<p>In the wake of the Berlin attack, the media was awash with security experts promoting the virtues of mitigation measures to restrict access to “Trojan Horse” vehicle attacks. On the ground, markets and other public spaces rushed to put in place makeshift security and extra visible policing to quell public fears. </p>
<p>In a repeat of events in the early 1990s, “ring of steel” security approaches resurfaced in the City of London based on armed checkpoints, rising security bollards and crash-proof barricades. This was in response to a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/24/ring-steel-plan-protectlondons-skyscrapers-terror-attack/">commissioned report</a> that identified newly established areas of London’s Square Mile as “highly sensitive” to a hostile vehicle-borne attack. </p>
<p>Such an approach, where one area of a city receives extra security protection, has been a long-held aspiration of counter-terrorism professionals. It could become a prominent vision of how to proceed with designing for terrorism threat if attacks remain an everyday fear in crowded city locations. </p>
<p>The attack in central London will once again raise the spectre of a city under siege with talk of lockdowns and war zones and with the deployment of armed police on the streets to keep us all safe. This is an understandable short-term reaction. But a longer term question remains: how do you protect soft targets from terrorism through urban design and do so in a way that is both effective and does not destroy the vibrancy of an open and accessible city? </p>
<p>In time, the provision of security in central London will undoubtedly be enhanced but this may well have an impact on the public realm. To paraphrase a design critic writing about the initial steel barriers placed around the Houses of Parliament a decade ago, the hope would be that while we might live in dangerous times, they don’t have to be ugly ones, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Coaffee receives funding from Research Councils UK and the European Commission. </span></em></p>In recent years, anti-terrorism defences have become more subtle. That might be about to change.Jon Coaffee, Professor of Urban Geography, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/738822017-03-02T16:48:41Z2017-03-02T16:48:41ZFive decades of reporting terrorism: Has there been too little or too much coverage?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/159042/original/image-20170301-5525-1mvs1or.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">START Global Terrorism Database Terrorist Attacks Concentration Intensity Map</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/images/START_GlobalTerrorismDatabase_TerroristAttacksConcentrationIntensityMap_45Years.png">University of Maryland</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On February 6, 2017, US president Donald Trump stated that media coverage of terrorist attacks under-represented the extent of terrorist actions. To support this assertion, White House staff released a list of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/02/06/here-are-the-78-terrorist-attacks-the-white-house-says-were-largely-under-reported/">78 attacks</a> they said were “under-reported” by the media. Some were perhaps inappropriately included because they were either committed by deranged individuals without political motivation or were prevented.</p>
<p>Many news organizations responded by enumerating <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/the-white-house-list-of-terror-attacks-underreported-by-media.html">how often they reported on the listed events</a>, while also noting some terrorist attacks they covered that were not included. However, the back and forth between journalists and officials does not shed much light on the overall level of reporting around the world of terror events.</p>
<h2>What do the data tell us?</h2>
<p>To better understand journalistic reporting of terror attacks over the past several decades and the real risk of terrorism risk for Americans, the Dow Jones <a href="https://www.dowjones.com/products/factiva/">Factiva service</a> was queried. This database contains articles from more than 33,000 sources, 74% of which are not available on the free web, reaching as far back as the 1960s. </p>
<p>Four searches were conducted on February 12: The general term “terrorist attacks” yielded 1,280,835 articles, while “terrorist attack” – more likely to refer to a specific terrorist event – produced 581,839, half as many. Combining “terrorist attack” with the term “killed” yielded 197,633 citations, one-sixth as many. “Terrorist attack” combined with “wounded” received the least coverage, with a little over 50,000. (Note that all the search terms were in English which almost certainly under-represents the number of article worldwide reporting terrorist events.)</p>
<p>While articles with the keywords “terrorist attacks” may or may not refer to a single attack, they do indicate an increased focus on terrorism, suggesting both public interest in and exposure to the subject. This may also lead readers to have a heightened sense of insecurity, whatever the reality of the situation. For example, air ticket and hotel bookings to Paris from America significantly declined after terrorist attacks in the French capital.</p>
<p>The distribution of the articles over time, region, reporting sources, and authors offers further information. First, citations containing the words “terrorist attacks” rose dramatically in 2001:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158960/original/image-20170301-5529-xp3sfw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 9/11 attacks moved terrorism from under-reported (by comparison) news that happened somewhere else to a major concern by a broad collection of media outlets. Assuming that independent media attempt to satisfy their readers’ demands for information, this suggests that the public wanted, or at least consumed, stories about deadly terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>Let’s put the number of these articles into perspective. The combined number of stories found by the terms “Super Bowl”, “World Cup” or “Olympic Games” was 7,528,026. “Marijuana”, “LSD”, “cocaine”, or “heroin” were featured in 3,282,773. Other examples: “right to life” or “abortion”, 1,154,722; “Holocaust”, 755,001; “Academy Awards” or “Oscar”, 303,375; “nuclear war”, just 103,103. It appears that deadly terrorist attacks have an enduring interest for journalists and their readers, falling somewhere between competitive sports or conflictual social issues at the top and entertainment awards or nuclear war at the bottom.</p>
<p>The news organizations that met this demand were not evenly distributed globally or within individual countries:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=328&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158961/original/image-20170301-5540-e20b70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>North America is by far the region most referenced in the articles. The deadly attacks in Asia nudged Europe into third place. Given the large number of deadly attacks in the Middle East, there are relatively few cited reports. This is probably because the search terms were in English, so local language news outlets are undoubtedly under-represented. Curiously, this was not the case of Asia, which is home to many different languages.</p>
<p>Fewer than half of the American states were referenced in the articles on deadly terrorist attacks according to the Factiva database: </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158962/original/image-20170301-5514-404p74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>States with recent and major terrorist attacks are unsurprisingly referenced in many articles. What is interesting is the large number of articles which mention states with few terrorist events. For example, while the Midwest states of Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio suffered few terrorist events relative to other regions, they were frequently referenced in the articles.</p>
<p>Factiva searches export the top 100 news organizations producing the articles. Those reporting more than 10,000 articles over the period examined are represented below.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158964/original/image-20170301-5507-5i4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The Associated Press is by far the leader as are other English-language organizations. French and Chinese agencies are strong contributors collectively accounting for over 3% (43,000) of the global articles on deadly terrorist attacks. The top 18 reporting news agencies contribute nearly 40% of the world’s total articles about terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>There has been much discussion in the press and among academic researchers about the motives and social consequences of publishing articles about terrorist attacks. Some question whether widely reporting terrorist attacks leads to more of them in the future. (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/aug/01/media-coverage-terrorism-further-violence">Doward 2015</a>; <a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp8497.pdf">Jetter, 2014</a>.) Although this is not the question of this report, it is interesting to note that some of the most prolific writers about deadly terrorist attacks are located in countries that have experienced few, if any, terror attacks:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158974/original/image-20170301-5529-13zysrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Two of the top three writers are in Canada, while the number-two writer is in New Zealand, a country that has had extremely few terrorist events.</p>
<h2>Specific terrorist attacks with mortal effects</h2>
<p>Over the past several years, articles about deadly terrorist events surpassed the press reporting of the September 11, 2001 attacks.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158966/original/image-20170301-5507-h6408p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd">START Terrorist Incident Database</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More than 14,000 articles related to deadly acts of terrorism were published in 2013, a 55% increase over the 9,245 published in 2001. In 2016, 23,548 were published, a 155% rise over 2001. It is evident that there has been a very large increase in articles published in recent years about specific deadly attacks.</p>
<p>Some of the increase could be attributed to the introduction of new publication sources indexed by Factiva. However, restricting the search to four publications founded before Factiva’s creation and continuously included – the <em>Washington Post</em>, <em>New York Times</em>, <em>Wall Street Journal</em>, and <em>Financial Times</em> – shows a similar U-shaped curve. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158967/original/image-20170301-5504-110l8hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The natural conclusion is that the pattern of reporting has not been overly influenced by the increase in the number of indexed sources, which was also confirmed by Factiva’s curators.</p>
<h2>More reporting or more killing?</h2>
<p>There is strong evidence that journalists report more terrorist attacks when there are fatalities. But what is the trend in the number of deaths? In 2015 deaths due to terrorist attacks were nearly eight times greater than in 2003, the low point after 9/11. However, much of the increase from 2012 stems from new reporting methods used in the <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd">START Terrorist Incident Database</a>. </p>
<p>Deaths were trending downwards before 2012. After a high point in 2007, deaths due to terrorism declined steadily while the reporting of terrorist attacks by the world’s English-language press generally continued to rise, roughly doubling between 2007 and 2012. Apparently, there was no shortage of journalists writing about terrorism, especially when there were victims. </p>
<p>There does seem to be an upper limit on the number of articles published about terrorist attacks, however. If we examine the number of articles published annually and divide this figure by the number of people killed during these attacks, we find that there were proportionally fewer articles published over the past few years:</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158968/original/image-20170301-5507-9j69bt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>In 2003, more than three articles were published for every reported death, while in 2014 there were 0.6. Does this indicate that terrorist attacks are currently under-reported in relation to their impact if not in actual number? This judgment is best left to future researchers but it is a fact that the vast number of deaths related to terrorism over the past decade occurred in countries in the Middle East and Africa, where reporting would most likely be in languages other than English.</p>
<h2>Putting it in perspective</h2>
<p>The current controversy in the USA about protecting residents of America appears unwarranted in relation to the extremely small number of American victims over the past decade. Few Americans are killed in terrorist attacks compared to the total number of victims around the world. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161883/original/image-20170321-24884-1kkz519.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">START 2013 Terrorist Incident Database</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In fact, the average annual number of American deaths due to terrorism is 195, and if the unusual year of 2001 is removed from the calculation it is 65. Compare this other causes of mortality in the USA and it is clear that death due to terrorism is about as risky as death due to “accidental handgun discharge and malfunction” – there were 83 such deaths in 2015 <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm">according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</a> – or “unintentional cuts” (109 deaths in 2014). Death due to terrorist attack appear absolutely insignificant compared to death due to “poisoning” (51,966), “motor-vehicle crashes” (33,804), or “falling” (33,018). (All statistics from the CDC’s <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm">National Center for Health Statistics</a>, 2014, 2015.)</p>
<p>Overall, the risk of death by terrorism in North America is extremely low – in fact, it is among the lowest in the world. According to the <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">START Terrorist Incident Database</a>, since 2012 the number of terrorism-related deaths was highest in the Middle East and North Africa (52,105), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (30,580), South Asia (30,277), Eastern Europe (2,587), and Southeast Asia (2,508). The database lists 173 deaths in North America. Yet the rising number of articles about terrorist attacks may create a climate of fear among Americans, who in reality are exposed to very little risk.</p>
<h2>Perception versus reality</h2>
<p>American worries, and to some extent those of Europeans, about terrorist attacks are exaggerated. Even the tragic deaths in France and other European countries over the past few years are dwarfed by the deaths in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Terrorism is not just a problem for Americans and Europeans; it is a world problem that often indiscriminately kills people regardless of their religion or nationality.</p>
<p>People certainly have a right to know the reality and risk of terrorism and journalists have a duty to inform them. However, when does reporting cross over into fear-mongering? Disproportionate levels of reporting terrorism can also have emotional, social and economic costs that are poorly examined. The <a href="https://stories.fbi.gov/oklahoma-bombing/">1995 terrorist bombing</a> in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols was deadly, killing 168 people, injuring 680, and causing more than $600 million dollars in property damage. But was it really more dangerous to visit the city afterward? It is worth noting that the American government did not create an “extreme vetting” procedure for rental trucks entering Oklahoma – perhaps because it would have been too expensive, invasive, and ultimately futile.</p>
<p>Whatever the subject, journalists should report the truth supported by fact. Creating alarm to sell ads or promote a political agenda is inappropriate, even dishonest. If further statistical analysis finds that the 78 terrorist attacks listed by the White House were indeed under-reported, perhaps the reason will be that they were under-important for the average American and not reflective of the true risks of living in America.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73882/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Segalla travaille pour HEC Paris School of Management. Il a reçu des fonds de recherche de la Fondation HEC.</span></em></p>President Trump has asserted that media coverage of terrorist attacks under-represents their actual extent. Analysis of 50 years of news coverage answers this question, and raises others.Michael Segalla, Professor of Management, HEC Paris Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/676762016-10-28T01:02:32Z2016-10-28T01:02:32ZIs the Islamic State finished? Five possible scenarios<p>Most military <a href="http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/08/28/battle-for-mosul-appears-to-be-entering-final-stage.html">analysts believe</a> it’s only a matter of time before Mosul falls. </p>
<p>Mosul is Iraq’s third largest city. The Islamic State captured it in June 2014 during a campaign that left it in control of territory <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/16/mapped-the-islamic-state-is-losing-its-territory-and-fast/">the size of</a> the United Kingdom. But on Oct. 16, 2016, a coalition of the Iraqi army, military forces from Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region and paramilitary units, began an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/world/middleeast/in-isis-held-mosul-beheadings-and-hints-of-resistance-as-battle-nears.html?_r=0">attack</a> to recapture the city.</p>
<p>Military prowess does not explain IS’ initial success in Iraq. Rather, it depended on the collapse of the Iraqi army and Sunni disaffection with the Shi’i-dominated Iraqi government. </p>
<p>But, then, between 2015 and 2016, IS territory in Iraq <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9457cc02fcc54ecbae66905a9396ffb3/us-official-says-has-lost-half-its-territory-iraq">shrank</a> by an estimated 50 percent. IS has lost major population <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/fleeing-residents-detail-the-horrors-of-ramadi-under-islamic-state-rule-1451693379">centers</a>, including the cities of Tikrit, Ramadi, Kobani, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqi-city-of-fallujah-fully-liberated-from-islamic-state-iraqicommander-says-1466934423">Fallujah</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explained-strategy-behind-the-battle-to-rescue-the-ruins-of-palmyra-56948">Palmyra</a>.</p>
<p>The next target on the coalition’s agenda is Raqqa, Syria, the capital of IS. It may only be a matter of time before IS’ territorial “caliphate” is no more.</p>
<p>What then will be the fate of IS? Can the group survive without controlling any territory? Will it rebound? Or will it disappear?</p>
<h2>Five possible scenarios</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #1: IS goes underground, only to emerge in the future. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This scenario is not very likely. It ignores the <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/">unique circumstances</a> that gave rise to IS and enabled it to win victory after victory in 2014: the political and military vacuum created by the Syrian civil war, the dysfunction of the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki, the collapse of the Iraqi army and the indifference of much of the world to the group’s ambitions until it was too late. A similar set of circumstances is unlikely in the future.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #2: IS will simply set up shop elsewhere. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Over the years, IS has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-goes-global">established franchises</a> in West and North Africa, Libya, Yemen, the Sinai and other locations. In some places, such as Libya, IS deployed fighters from Syria and Iraq to establish its franchises. In others, preexisting groups pledged allegiance to the caliphate. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-virtual-significance-of-boko-harams-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isis-38690">Boko Haram in West Africa</a> is one such group. </p>
<p>IS assumed that each of its franchises would expand the territory under its control until it met up with other franchises and, eventually, with the caliphate based in Syria and Iraq. Observers call this an “ink spot” strategy because each affiliate would widen like an ink spot on blotting paper. </p>
<p>This scenario, too, is unlikely. None of IS’ franchises is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/27/whats-beyond-the-defeat-of-isis/">doing well</a>, and those that have not already failed are on the verge of failing. Internal conflicts tore some apart, including those in Yemen and West Africa. External enemies have rolled back others, such as those in Libya and Algeria. </p>
<p>IS franchises have not been able to forge alliances with similar-minded groups because IS doesn’t play well with others. Rather than building partnerships, IS insists on unconditional loyalty to its caliphate project and organizational uniformity. It has thus turned potential collaborators into enemies.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #3: IS fighters continue to wage an insurgency in Syria or Iraq, or both. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is exactly what the Taliban did in Afghanistan after the American invasion in 2001. Indeed, after the American invasion in Iraq, al-Qaida in Iraq – a precursor of IS – and members of the disbanded Iraqi army who joined IS did the same.</p>
<p>This is a more likely scenario than the first two. However, fighting an insurgency is quite a step down from establishing, defending and expanding a territorial caliphate – what IS devotees consider an epochal event. And establishing, defending and expanding a territorial caliphate is precisely what differentiated IS from al-Qaida and similar groups. IS true believers deem a territorial caliphate cleansed of non-Islamic influences necessary for the survival of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-paper-state-to-caliphate-the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state/">true Islam</a>.</p>
<p>IS fighters might continue the struggle. Revenge is a powerful motivator. But IS would no longer be IS were its fighters to limit their vision to waging a guerilla-style campaign. It would be indistinguishable from Jabhat al-Nusra, for example, the former <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/">al-Qaida affiliate</a> and IS spin-off fighting the Syrian government. Jabhat al-Nusra’s goal of overthrowing the government of Syria – less grandiose than reestablishing a territorial caliphate that would unite all Muslims – was one of the reasons the split between the two groups occurred.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #4: IS disappears. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>What if IS fighters just give up, or move on to other criminal enterprises? For true believers, the defeat of their caliphate might persuade them that their goal is unobtainable. It might therefore be extraordinarily dispiriting. Those who signed on for the thrill might find their kicks elsewhere, or merely fade back into the woodwork. </p>
<p>This too is a strong possibility, particularly if other nations <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/denmark-isis-fighters-warmly-welcome-home-by-psychiatrists-1470546">besides Denmark</a> offer their citizens who have joined IS incentives for returning home. Similar groups, such as al-Qaida, have experienced <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/why-terrorists-quit-gaining-from-al-qaida%E2%80%99s-losses">defections</a> in their ranks as members became disillusioned or discouraged or isolated.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Scenario #5: Former fighters and freelancers continue their attacks globally with or without organizational backing. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This too is a possibility, if only for a while. After all, a number of attacks outside of IS-held territory – including the attack in San Bernardino, California – occurred without the knowledge and assistance of IS.</p>
<p>The destruction of IS’ caliphate could reduce its capacity to produce and disseminate propaganda. This would diminish IS’ ability to capture the imagination of would-be followers in the future. Nevertheless, in the short term, the world is not lacking in gullible and <a href="https://theconversation.com/psychology-expert-why-extremists-use-violence-in-their-quest-for-significance-62594">disturbed individuals</a>.</p>
<h2>Short shelf-life</h2>
<p>Whatever the case, history provides lessons on how to effectively deal with movements and individuals who wage war against the international order. </p>
<p>During the 19th and early 20th centuries, anarchists struck out at rulers and symbols of capitalism <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100802671009?src=recsys">throughout the world</a>. Anarchists assassinated the presidents of France and the United States, an empress of Austria, a king of Italy and numerous government ministers in Russia. They also bombed symbols of oppression, from the haunts of the bourgeoisie to Wall Street itself. </p>
<p>Then, suddenly, the wave of anarchist violence ceased. By the onset of the Great Depression, anarchist activity was limited to a few isolated pockets. Historians point to a number of reasons the anarchist moment passed. Anarchism competed for hearts and minds with other dissident groups. Nations undertook political and social reforms that addressed the grievances of potential anarchists. They adopted new methods of policing and surveillance. Police agencies cooperated across borders. </p>
<p>But perhaps most important was the fact that high-risk movements that attempt to realize the unrealizable have a short shelf life. Such might be the case for IS.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What happens to the Islamic State if it loses the battle for territory in Iraq and Syria? Here’s a list of ways it might go down.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/644742016-09-09T04:35:23Z2016-09-09T04:35:23ZDefeating terrorism through design: Think souks, not office buildings<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136954/original/image-20160907-25266-ltqg2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Embodiment of defiance... or foolhardy design?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/86502566@N03/16267367576">Paul Silva</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>To fight terrorist networks, <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/designing-our-way-to-a-better-world">we need to understand them and learn from them</a>. Obviously that doesn’t mean training to become terrorists ourselves. But we can learn from the way many terrorist organizations operate – via highly networked, decentralized connections. This kind of setup has a lot in common with the networked way in which many of us will live and work in the decades ahead.</p>
<p>Since the wake-up call of 9/11, terrorism has come to characterize many of the <a href="http://knopfdoubleday.com/book/234879/the-terror-years/9780385352079/">military conflicts in the 21st century</a>. Today’s terrorist networks demonstrate a highly resilient way of organizing diverse and often distantly located people toward a common goal. This system of organization helps explain why, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/">as journalist Steven Brill argues</a>, we are not much safer now than we were before 9/11, even after spending US$1 trillion on homeland security. As <a href="http://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/product/War-of-the-Flea,676555.aspx">studies of guerrilla warfare</a> have shown, centralized, hierarchical, top-down systems, like our current Department of Defense, have a hard time defeating a decentralized, nonhierarchical, networked ones, like the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>Centralized, hierarchical systems may appear stronger, with more power and efficiency on their side. But networked, nonhierarchical ones have much greater capacity to take a hit and to keep functioning, as the sizable literature on <a href="http://www.resalliance.org/publications">ecosystem resilience</a> has repeatedly shown. Networked systems even have an “antifragile” quality, as <a href="http://www.randomhousebooks.com/books/176227/">scholar Nassim Nicholas Taleb has argued</a>, with an ability to bounce back even stronger after a shock. All of which suggests we need to fight terrorist networks in networked ways of our own.</p>
<p>I am an architect and urban designer by training and so I leave it to policymakers and defense strategists to contemplate what this means militarily. I want to focus on what I know: the target side of the equation. How can we reduce the targets of terrorism, getting rid of concentrations of people of a particular type to reduce the likelihood of a devastating strike? How can we rethink our cities and our buildings so that instead of trying to fortify our architectural bull’s-eyes, we eliminate them with a denser weave of diverse activities across a metropolitan area? </p>
<h2>Designing away targets, not fortifying them</h2>
<p>The idea of doing away with the targets of large concentrations of people doing the same type of activity may seem like a restraint of Americans’ freedom, a violation of the First Amendment right to “peaceably assemble” in whatever kind of conglomeration we choose. But it’s really a call for us to assemble in new ways, aided by digital technology, so we can do so with peace of mind. </p>
<p>In some ways, the 9/11 terrorists were sending us an unintended message: Concentrating the military command in the Pentagon, or financial and governmental organizations in the World Trade Center towers, makes them – and all of us commuting to workplaces like this every day – more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Taleb captures this idea in the title of one of his book chapters: “The Souk and the Office Building.” The modern office building may seem efficient by gathering so many people in an organization together. Such structures, though, remain vulnerable to what Taleb calls “fat tails,” in which <a href="http://www.randomhousebooks.com/books/176227/">distant events have inordinate effects</a> on their operation – think of a power failure that can incapacitate an entire corporate headquarters.</p>
<p>Office towers also have what I describe as a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Designing-To-Avoid-Disaster-The-Nature-of-Fracture-Critical-Design/Fisher/p/book/9780415527361">fracture-critical nature</a>; they’re subject to catastrophic failure when hit by an unanticipated force like a commandeered airplane.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136965/original/image-20160907-25231-btolu6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A souk, with many access points and a diffuse layout.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bhaktiamsterdam/7426935774">Bhakti Dharma</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Taleb contrasts the familiar U.S. urban landscape with the Arab bazaar or souk. Comprising a network of small shops along covered streets, without any center or clear boundaries, there are multiple ways in and out. Souks might seem more vulnerable to attack, given their accessibility. Such complex webs of human activity, however, are also highly resilient – not just economically because of their diversity of small businesses, but also militarily because of their distributed nature.</p>
<p>In the heavily damaged souk in Aleppo, Syria, one businessman still <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2016/03/29/witness-the-stunning-devastation-inside-aleppos-destroyed-souks/">opens his shop to serve coffee</a> to patrolling soldiers, an act of resistance as well as a sign of resilience. Can you imagine an accounting department on a bombed-out skyscraper’s 43rd floor, for instance, opening for business after an attack? </p>
<p>It’s significant that an Arab urban form, the souk, may serve as one of the best defenses against a type of attack emanating from the Arab world. Unlike most shopping malls that stand like isolated targets in the midst of parking lots, souks typically cover existing streets and turn them into pedestrian precincts, as Milan, Italy, did long ago with <a href="http://www.ingalleria.com/en">its Galleria</a> and as Las Vegas did more recently with <a href="http://vegasexperience.com/">Fremont Street</a>. The mall and the city become an integral whole. </p>
<h2>We’re already living with digital souks</h2>
<p>Souks may seem far removed from modern life, just as office buildings seem to epitomize it. But that’s begun to change with the rise of a sharing, collaborative or on-demand economy. Many people now work anywhere that has a high-bandwidth internet connection. We shop anytime for goods and services that are delivered to our doors. We meet anyplace some good food or coffee allows us to linger.</p>
<p>We have, in other words, already created a kind of digital version of the souk, with service platforms providing people access to experiences as diverse as those encountered by the customers in Arab markets. <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/Platform-Revolution/">Such platform companies have great resilience</a> because of their accessible, distributed character and their ability to compete successfully against gatekeeper organizations. Look at how quickly Uber has overtaken taxi companies and Airbnb traditional hoteliers by leveraging excess capacity to meet people’s needs at a lower cost. These companies also exist everywhere and nowhere, not concentrated in an office building or a hotel, but spread across a city or region, in individual apartments and cars. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136935/original/image-20160907-25257-ro85jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hey! Here’s where we keep our top brass!</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/la-citta-vita/6040339754">La Citta Vita</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Our greatest weakness comes from the old thinking that still pervades not just our military, but also our public policies and development assumptions. We continue to zone our cities as if the sharing economy didn’t exist, build our roads as if driverless cars won’t happen, and pursue economic development strategies as if the platform revolution doesn’t matter. And, despite the message that terrorists have sent us, we continue to maintain and construct targets for their attacks: The Pentagon remains a bull’s-eye from the air, as do the office towers recently built around the World Trade Center site. Such buildings may embody defiance and feel like proof of our resilience; really they only show how little we’ve learned from our enemies. A physically strengthened or more highly defended target is still a target.</p>
<p>The fight against terrorism requires that we start thinking in new ways about how to live and work in a 21st-century economy. Just as we need to acknowledge and embrace the distributed, on-demand nature of how many people will create and exchange goods and services in the near future, we also need to start imagining a more distributed and diverse built environment in line with that economy and in defense against those who might want to attack us.</p>
<p>America began as a nation of small shopkeepers and small communities scattered across the land. While the movement of people chasing economic opportunities to metropolitan areas seems unstoppable, we need to inhabit our cities and suburbs in much more networked ways. While this will take at least a generation to accomplish, we can already see it in trends like the home office, flextime, and walkable mixed-use neighborhoods. These should become the norm, even as we reduce, as much as possible, the number of big, symbolic structures that only tempt terrorists – foreign or domestic. We need to think souks, not office buildings.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Fisher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are terrorist attacks also an implicit design critique of our urban landscape? An architect and urban designer suggests we can fight terrorism by not building obvious targets.Thomas Fisher, Professor of Architecture, Director of the Metropolitan Design Center, and Dayton Hudson Chair in Urban Design, University of MinnesotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/614162016-07-19T10:06:21Z2016-07-19T10:06:21Z3D printing: a new threat to gun control and security policy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130617/original/image-20160714-23320-1dge3ui.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A computer design for home manufacturing of a receiver, the trigger and firing part, of a semi-automatic rifle.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/simonov/21739928933">simonov/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the recent <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/06/16/482322488/orlando-shooting-what-happened-update">mass shooting in Orlando</a>, and the shootings <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/falcon-heights-shooting-minnesota/">in Minnesota</a> <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-alton-sterling-protests/">and Dallas</a>, the sharp political divisions over gun control within the U.S. are once again on display. In June, House Democrats even <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/politics/senate-gun-control.html?_r=0">staged a sit-in</a> to advocate for stronger laws. </p>
<p>There is <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/ip.2006.013714">some evidence</a> that more restrictions can reduce gun violence, but another recent shooting highlighted some limitations of regulation. British Member of Parliament Jo Cox <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/what-was-the-makeshift-gun-that-killed-british-mp-jo-cox">was murdered with a “makeshift gun”</a> despite the United Kingdom’s restrictive gun-control laws.</p>
<p>The threat of self-manufactured firearms is not new, but a critical barrier is collapsing. Until recently, most people didn’t have the skills to make a weapon as capable as commercially available ones. However, recent developments in the field of additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, have made home manufacturing simpler than ever before. The prospect of more stringent legislation is also fueling <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/06/orlando-homemade-ar-15-industry-surges/">interest in at-home production</a>.</p>
<p>Plans for basic handguns that can be created on consumer-grade 3D printers are readily available online. With more advanced 3D printers and other at-home technologies such as the <a href="http://ghostgunner.net">Ghost Gunner</a> computer-controlled mill, people can even make more complex weapons, <a href="https://3dprint.com/21109/3d-print-metal-gun-reason">including metal handguns</a> and <a href="https://www.wired.com/2015/06/i-made-an-untraceable-ar-15-ghost-gun/">components for semi-automatic rifles</a>. </p>
<p>These technologies pose challenges not only for gun regulation but also for efforts to protect humanity from more powerful weapons. In the words of Bruce Goodwin, associate director at large for national security policy and research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “<a href="http://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/201504/revolution.cfm">All by itself, additive manufacturing changes everything, including defense matters</a>.”</p>
<h2>Policymakers and researchers respond</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/130592/original/image-20160714-23353-1cwa9nf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘The Liberator,’ a 3D-printed handgun that raised the concern of the U.S. State Department.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/31290193@N06/14579895300">Justin Pickard/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Government officials have recently begun to react to this emerging threat. The U.S. State Department argued that posting online instructions to make a 3D-printed single-shot handgun <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/us/cody-wilson-who-posted-gun-instructions-online-sues-state-department.html">violated federal laws barring exports of military technology</a>. At the local level, the city of Philadelphia <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/3d-gun-philadelphia_n_4344733.html">outlawed the possession</a> of 3D-printed guns or their components in 2013.</p>
<p>Those of us in the research community have also been addressing the security implications of additive manufacturing. A 2014 conference of <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2533681">intelligence community and private sector professionals</a> noted that current at-home and small-scale 3D printing technology can’t produce the same quality output as industrial equipment, and doesn’t work with as wide a range of plastics, metals and other materials. Nevertheless, participants recommended a number of policies, such as more rigorous intellectual property laws, to counter the evolving threat of unregulated 3D-printed weapons. These types of policies will become increasingly important as at-home manufacturing of firearms weakens traditional gun control regulations such as those focusing on the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2186936">buying and selling of weapons</a>.</p>
<h2>Expanding the security threat</h2>
<p>The danger goes well beyond firearms. Countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons could use additive manufacturing to <a href="http://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/201504/revolution.cfm">evade international safeguards against nuclear proliferation</a>. Traditional nuclear weapon control efforts include <a href="https://fas.org/spp/starwars/ota/9344.html">watching international markets for sales of components</a> needed for manufacturing a nuclear device. Additional measures place restrictions on the types of technology nuclear capable states can export. Additive manufacturing could avoid these efforts by letting countries make the equipment themselves, instead of buying it abroad.</p>
<p>Research into this threat led <a href="http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/icsa/Staff/gchristopher.aspx">nonproliferation scholar Grant Christopher</a> to recommend that governments <a href="http://local.droit.ulg.ac.be/jcms/service/49/pdf/str01/2_3D_Printing_A_Challenge_to_Nuclear_Export_Controls.pdf">enact export restrictions</a> on certain types of 3D printers. Nuclear policy experts <a href="http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/mhk32/">Matthew Kroenig</a> and <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1076">Tristan Volpe</a> proposed other approaches to limit additive manufacturing’s dangers to nuclear security. One way could be <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1099022">increasing international cooperation to regulate the spread</a> of 3D printing technology. </p>
<p>Beyond regulating the hardware, governments and industry professionals can also work to more effectively secure the files needed to build components for weapons of mass destruction. <a href="http://www.cfr.org/experts/defense-and-security-arms-industries-and-trade-defense-technology/amy-j-nelson/b20953">Arms control analyst Amy Nelson</a> points out that the risk this kind of data will spread increases as <a href="http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-truth-about-3-d-printing-and-nuclear-proliferation/">it becomes increasingly digital</a>.</p>
<p>Terrorist groups and other nongovernment forces could also find ways to use 3D printing to make more destructive weapons. We argue that despite these groups’ interest in using weapons of mass destruction, they don’t use them regularly <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1089636">because their homemade devices are inherently unreliable</a>. Additive manufacturing could help these groups produce more effective canisters or other delivery mechanisms, or improve the potency of their chemical and biological ingredients. Such developments would make these weapons more attractive and increase the likelihood of their use in a terror attack.</p>
<h2>Where to go from here</h2>
<p>The worst threats 3D printing poses to human life and safety are likely some distance in the future. However, the harder policymakers and others work to restrict access to handguns or unconventional weapons, the more attractive 3D printing becomes to those who want to do harm.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kids-are-key-to-unlocking-the-potential-of-3d-printing-54985">Additive manufacturing holds great promise</a> for improvements across many different areas of people’s lives. Scholars and policymakers must work together to ensure we can take advantage of these benefits while guarding against the technology’s inherent dangers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beyond making guns at home, 3D printing could help countries secretly develop nuclear weapons and terrorists stage more effective attacks. How do we protect innovation and ourselves?Daniel C. Tirone, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Louisiana State University James Gilley, Instructor of International Studies, Louisiana State University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608342016-06-10T13:52:02Z2016-06-10T13:52:02ZHow can French authorities prevent a terrorist attack during Euro 2016?<p>As the UEFA European Championship kicks off in France, the memory of last November’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34818994">terrorist attacks</a> on the Stade de France and other venues across Paris looms large. French authorities will be examining the previous attacks – including the January 2015 shootings at <a href="https://theconversation.com/charlie-hebdo-attack-this-is-not-a-clash-of-civilisations-36030">Charlie Hebdo</a> – to secure the tournament against any terrorist threat. Even if that means disappointing fans by <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/dont-go-into-the-water-chilling-terror-warning-to-england-fans-at-euro-2016-a3267446.html">shutting down Marseilles’ famous beaches</a>. </p>
<p>To start with, authorities will be thinking carefully about what kinds of attacks are possible. Both the Paris and Hebdo attacks were made using small arms. Such attacks are popular with terrorist groups, because they are relatively easy to plan and carry out, can cause a high number of casualties and effectively spread terror throughout the population. It’s very likely that security forces will be preparing for the potential of a similar style of attack. </p>
<p>Authorities will also be wary of potential attacks by suicide bombers, like the one witnessed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/mar/22/brussels-airport-explosions-live-updates">in Brussels</a> earlier this year. Suicide bomb attacks are frequently used by Islamist-inspired groups, and can be carried out in different ways. Individuals may wear home-made bomb vests, or drive vehicles with explosives into places where many people have gathered. </p>
<p>Of course, bombs can also be planted in specific locations. But static bombs are easier to deal with than suicide bombers, as areas and stadiums can be swept for these devices. What’s more, entrances to stadiums will be tightly controlled, with strict security requirements, similar to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97983/olympic-safety-security-strategy.pdf">London 2012 Olympics</a>. </p>
<p>Authorities will also be considering how to police more accessible areas like the fan zones and host cities, as these places will attract thousands of supporters on any given day throughout the tournament. France is already on high security alert, having maintained its state of emergency <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21695368-france-realising-its-state-emergency-may-last-long-time">since November</a>, so many of the locations linked to the tournament will be hard for terrorists to penetrate. </p>
<p>Attacks like the ones we’ve witnessed in Europe recently are not easy to carry out – they require planning, and a support network. Of course, this does not stop individuals from launching rogue attacks, like the one at [Leytonstone Tube station](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35018789](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35018789) in December 2015. </p>
<p>But while such attacks can cause casualties – as seen in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/10/people-injured-knife-attack-train-station-near-munich-grafing">Munich last month</a> – they cannot have the same impact as well-planned, well-resourced attacks. And fans attending the tournament can take comfort from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/ukraine-detained-french-citizen-plotting-euro-2016-attacks">recent arrest of a French man</a> who was caught transporting weapons, reportedly in order to launch an attack on the tournament.</p>
<p>France is deploying 90,000 police and security personnel to protect citizens. They are likely to be deployed at strategic locations, and no doubt briefed on what to look for. This can include potential terrorist suspects, which intelligence reports have highlighted as possible threats, or keeping an eye out <a href="https://theconversation.com/airport-security-measures-arent-good-enough-heres-a-fix-34456">for behaviour</a> that looks out of the ordinary. Security cordons will also be strategically placed to maximise safety and security. </p>
<p>Intelligence will also play a major part in the security operation. On June 7, 2016, <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/about-europol-17">Europol</a> – the EU’s law enforcement agency – <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsletter/europol-supports-france-throughout-euro-2016-tournament">announced that</a> it was directing 200 of its staff to assist French policing agencies and ensure the rapid exchange of any relevant information.</p>
<h2>Contingency plans</h2>
<p>The French will also be developing contingency plans, based on which responses worked – and which didn’t – during the Paris and Brussels attacks. Police and emergency services will have carefully planned a series of responses, tailored to the type of attacks that are likely to occur. This will include ensuring the tactics deployed by police firearms units are suitable to address specific threats, and identifying suitable evacuation zones where people can stay safely and the injured can be treated in the event of an attack. </p>
<p>When attending the games themselves, supporters will be encouraged to get to the stadium well ahead of time, as the security procedure will be strict and time consuming. Further security checks on public transport systems such as the Metro are also likely. People should not be overly concerned about the large police presence; officers are there to keep them safe, as well as deal with any violence from rival supporters. The French government has also <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36479720">released a mobile app</a> to alert the public in the event of a terrorist attack. </p>
<p>The threat of a terrorist attack is real. As <a href="http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-provos-9780747538189/">the Provisional IRA said</a> during the Irish Troubles: the state has to be lucky 100% of the time, the terrorist only once. But when you consider the proportion of attacks which have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34276525">been prevented</a>, the likelihood of one occurring is still remote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lowe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent attacks in Paris and Brussels have taught the French some important lessons about how to deal with the threat of terrorism.David Lowe, Principal Lecturer in Law, Liverpool John Moores UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608042016-06-09T11:30:42Z2016-06-09T11:30:42ZTerror threats and turmoil: a bad time for US-South Africa relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125895/original/image-20160609-7059-170djtb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The US embassy in South Africa has warned of terror threats to the country's upmarket malls.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Mike Hutchings</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Saturday June 4 2016 the United States embassy in Pretoria issued a <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/security-message-u-s-citizens-threats-shopping-areas-malls/">warning</a> to its citizens in South Africa that there was a heightened threat of terror attacks in the country’s upscale shopping malls in Johannesburg and Cape Town. The threat was tied to the jihadist group <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State’s</a> <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate-idUSKCN0YC0OG">appeal</a> to its followers to undertake attacks on Western targets during the Islamic holy month of <a href="http://www.alternet.org/belief/ramadan-9-essentials-you-should-know">Ramadan</a>. For the next several days, skittish South African shoppers strode through Sandton and Rosebank’s fancy shopping centres wondering if and how their own government would respond to the apparent threat.</p>
<p>Four days later, on June 8, the South African government did indeed respond. A joint <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2016/alerts0608.htm">announcement</a> by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (<a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/">DIRCO</a>) and the State Security Agency (<a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/">SSA</a>) stated: “The information provided as a basis for the latest terror alerts on South Africa has been found to be very sketchy. On closer examination, we have found the information to be dubious, unsubstantiated and provided by a ‘walk-in’ source based on questionable conclusions.”</p>
<p>Put simply, South Africa disagreed with the assessment of the US (as well as the United Kingdom and Australia) that a credible terror threat existed. This is not unusual. There are often disagreements both within and across intelligence agencies as to the seriousness of a potential threat. </p>
<h2>Informed debate</h2>
<p>The question of how “credible” the threat was (or is) is also vexing because for the public it is unanswerable. Without access to the various pieces of information that the intelligence agencies used to form their judgment about the severity of the threat, the public cannot engage in an informed debate. They cannot decide for themselves whether South African or American officials came to a more accurate conclusion about the gravity of the danger posed.</p>
<p>But the joint DIRCO-SSA statement did more than dismiss the credibility of the American warning. It also indicated that the American motive for issuing the warning was not necessarily to keep its citizens safe. In an accusation unmistakably directed at the US, the statement read: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the South African government rejects attempts by foreign countries to influence, manipulate or control our country’s counter-terrorism work. We reject attempts to generate perceptions of government ineptitude, alarmist impressions and public hysteria on the basis of a questionable single source.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a serious allegation. It suggests that the US issued the terror advisory to undercut the South African government’s integrity and sow confusion within the country. </p>
<h2>Regime change</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, the theme of this accusation is not new. In February 2016 African National Congress (ANC) Secretary-General <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-02-23-analysis-mantashes-conspiracy-theories/#.V1ki_EbmPTo">Gwede Mantashe</a> suggested that the US <a href="https://yali.state.gov/">Young African Leadership Initiative</a> was designed to foment regime change in South Africa. </p>
<p>In 2014, Deputy Minister of Defence and Military Veterans <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/thuli-a-cia-spy-says-deputy-minister-1747300">Kebby Maphatsoe</a> labelled Public Protector Thuli Madonsela a CIA spy. He claimed she was attempting to undermine the ruling ANC and put a regime friendly to Washington in power. None of these accusations have been substantiated.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125894/original/image-20160609-7083-yi5zkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South Africa’s Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thus the latest DIRCO-SSA statement accusing the US of attempting to destabilise South Africa must be seen in a broader context of mistrust and paranoia that continues to plague relations.</p>
<p>This mistrust matters. It could result in not just hurt feelings, but an actual breakdown in cooperation on key issues between South Africa and the US. And cooperation, especially in the realm of counter-terrorism, is vital.</p>
<h2>Effective counter-terrorism</h2>
<p>The DIRCO-SSA statement confidently proclaims: “The South African government is fully capable of securing our country, protecting our people and taking care of the safety of foreign citizens on our soil.” </p>
<p>But this is not true. Global threats, such as terrorism, do not respect borders and therefore are difficult for any one state to combat. Effective counter-terrorism demands cooperation across states, and is impeded by petty conflicts between them. Casting wild allegations that the US warning is based on malevolent intent hinders rather than helps this cooperation.</p>
<p>While unproductive, South Africa’s pique might be somewhat understandable. That is if the US did not follow the correct channels to issue its warning, as the DIRCO-SSA statement suggests. The facts regarding what channels ought to be followed, and which ones actually were, are unclear. At the very least the South African government felt it was not consulted sufficiently before the US warning went public.</p>
<p>There is room here for growth in the relationship. Developing a clear understanding as to how to handle these types of terror alerts in the future would be a small but important trust-building step in a sometimes strained relationship.</p>
<p>But broader questions must also be addressed. A more <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=22182">measured statement</a> found on the South African Presidency website affirms that, “South Africa and the United States continue to enjoy strong and cordial relations in various areas of cooperation including political, economic, social and security matters.” But friends don’t openly accuse friends of seeking to undermine them. If South Africa and the US want fruitful collaboration to continue, an end to public accusations and increased communication would be a good start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments need to build trust, especially during a time of heightened tensions around the threat of international terror attacks.Christopher Williams, Visiting Lecturer and Researcher, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/591362016-05-20T01:06:39Z2016-05-20T01:06:39ZIs commercial aviation as safe and secure as we’re told?<p>On Thursday, May 19, EgyptAir flight MS804, traveling from Paris to Cairo, crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. All 66 passengers and crew members aboard were killed. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36330879">Terrorism</a> is suspected. </p>
<p>This is the <a href="http://www.airsafe.com/events/last_15.htm">fifth major airline crash</a> since the beginning of this year, a fact that may cause some people to wonder if flying is as safe as we’ve been taught to believe.</p>
<p>As a criminologist who studies security and safety leadership, I have reviewed how the airline industry measures its safety record and examined four different kinds of threats – airport security, flight safety, regulations violations and cybersecurity – in order to depict a more accurate picture of the risks that face travelers.</p>
<h2>How safety is measured</h2>
<p>The level of security and safety in the commercial airline industry is mainly judged by examining specific types of fatal incidents and compliance with existing regulations. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.airlineratings.com/safety_rating_criteria.php">A recent report</a> published by the airline safety and product rating review website Airline Ratings identifies the top 20 safest commercial airliners using criteria such as safety and security certifications, being blacklisted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or other foreign transportation agencies and the number (or absence) of fatal accidents in the past 10 years. </p>
<p>It’s important to note, however, that <a href="http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2016-02-15-01.aspx">according to the International Air Transport Association</a>, only six percent of airline accidents in 2015 included fatalities. This fact seriously skews the measurement of risks. Risk measurement should also, in my view, take into account close calls and incidents in which passengers are hurt, even if they aren’t killed. </p>
<p>Now let’s look at the four different categories of risks.</p>
<h2>1. Airport security risks</h2>
<p>Risk starts with several security gaps at the airport. </p>
<p>One of the first concerns is airport employee screening. In 2015, a report published by the inspector general <a href="https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-98_Jun15.pdf">stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>TSA [Transportation Security Administration] lacked effective controls to ensure that aviation workers did not have disqualifying criminal histories and that they possessed lawful status and the authorization to work in the United States. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The problem of employee screening is even more critical in countries like Egypt where screening practices are weak and have been associated with previous <a href="http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/egypt-probe-metrojet-crash_us_564b560fe4b08cda348aa850">fatal incidents</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive-undercover-dhs-tests-find-widespread-security-failures/story?id=31434881">reported</a> that security checkpoints operated by TSA failed 67 out of 70 tests operated by a DHS red team. A red team is a covert government agent group that challenges organization performance and effectiveness. These failures occurred in several large cities across the country.</p>
<p>The red team’s tests resulted in a <a href="http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/03/ny_congressman_calls_for_revie.html">failure rate of 95 percent</a>. What is more, agents failed to intercept individual dangerous items in baggage, including a fake bomb at Newark Liberty Airport. </p>
<p>Other covert operations have also shown that airport secure areas were breached by a red team. The results of those operations are classified, but speaking before a house committee, DHS Inspector General John Roth <a href="https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/11-3-2015-Committee-Hearing-on-TSA-Roth-DHS-OIG-Testimony.pdf">indicated</a> they were disappointing. </p>
<h2>2. Flight safety risks</h2>
<p>According to <a href="http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/reportsets.html">data</a> collected by the Aviation Safety Reporting System (FAA), the commercial aviation industry experiences nonfatal incidents on a regular basis. </p>
<p>These self-reported incidents include critical altitude deviation, fuel management issues, smoke and fire in the cabin, in-flight weather encounters, mechanical issues due to unreliable maintenance, crew fatigue, medical fitness of pilots, near midair collisions with another plane and near midair collisions with unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones. Despite the fact that all these incidents reported to the ASRS were not associated with any direct loss of life, many of them pose severe risk to passenger security. </p>
<p>For instance, FAA statistics suggest that there were more than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-records-detail-hundreds-of-close-calls-between-airplanes-and-drones/2015/08/20/5ef812ae-4737-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html">700 near midair collisions</a> between airplanes and drones in 2015. </p>
<p>For the same year, FAA has reported <a href="http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:34:0::NO:::">28 critical near midair collisions</a> between planes in United States. </p>
<p>Also last year, some 1,546 personnel charged with airline safety, including 38 pilots, tested positive for one or more of five <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/04/27/danger-in-cockpit-faa-records-show-pilots-fly-drunk-engage-in-criminal-activity.html">illegal drugs</a>. </p>
<p>In nonfatal accidents, turbulence is the leading cause of injuries to airline passengers and flight attendants, causing <a href="https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14195">at least 430</a> injuries between 2002 and 2013. </p>
<p>What’s important to note here is that what causes nonfatal incidents can also cause fatal accidents. This is why, to my mind, we should also look at the incidence of non fatal accidents when assessing safety and security risks in aviation. </p>
<h2>3. Regulation violations</h2>
<p>Recently the FAA cracked down on several airline companies for failure to comply with regulations. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2015, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/faa-hits-southwest-airlines-with-proposed-325-000-fine-1439844153">FAA fined Southwest</a> for safety violations related to one aircraft that was flown on 120 flights before it was checked for damage from a depressurization incident. The year before, <a href="https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=16754">Southwest was facing fines</a> of up to US$12 million for failing to follow procedures in repairs on Boeing 737 jetliners. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2015/07/14/skywest-faa-fine/#11f014f514ed">SkyWest in 2015 was fined</a> $1.23 million for failing to do regular inspection of landing gear as required after every 6,700 flights. SkyWest also didn’t conduct inspection on cracked cargo doors of two passenger planes. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18176">United Airlines was facing $1.3 million in fines</a> for 120 violations of regulations involving hazardous material cargo on passenger flights. The hazardous material included lithium metal batteries, dry ice, corrosive liquids, detonating fuses, phosphoric acid and ethanol solutions. </p>
<p>Finally, in 2009, the FAA alleged that <a href="http://nytimes.com/2009/10/15/business/15air.html?referer=">US Airways and United Airlines</a> had flown planes multiple times – in one case eight planes on a total of 1,647 flights – despite the fact that the planes were in an unsafe condition. </p>
<p>These cases are not outliers. Each year, the FAA releases <a href="https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/operations/agc300/reports/quarters/">a quarterly report</a> on regulation violations made by airlines. These reports show that negligence in following maintenance procedures and laxity in implementing the response to a given incident required by protocol are more frequent that we think.</p>
<p>In the first three quarters of 2015, for example, FAA fined <a href="https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/operations/agc300/reports/quarters/">more than 100</a> airlines as well as maintenance servicing companies for regulation violations. </p>
<p>Most of these violations were not associated with flight incidents, but they do tell a story about safety and security culture in the aviation industry.</p>
<h2>4. Emerging risk: cybersecurity</h2>
<p>The aviation industry increasingly operates high-technology planes that require sophisticated systems and programs. These, in turn, are vulnerable to hacking. </p>
<p>For instance, most planes use Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast, which sends unencrypted data on a plane’s position. This data <a href="http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2012-08-21/hackers-faa-disagree-over-ads-b-vulnerability">could be tampered with</a> by an ill-intentioned person who could alter the real positioning of an aircraft.</p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/18/hacker-chris-roberts-told-fbi-he-took-control-of-united-plane-fbi-claims/">the hacker Chris Roberts</a> claimed that he was able to access critical plane functions, including the engine, via the entertainment system of the plane. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669627.pdf">Government Accounting Office</a> has also identified several vulnerabilities related to the information systems used by air traffic control. </p>
<p>My point is that information systems and computer programs used by the aviation industry were developed to respond to performance challenges rather than security issues. Therefore, the design of aviation information systems presents vulnerabilities that can be exploited by hackers and jeopardize safety of aircraft and air traffic control.</p>
<h2>Not quite as safe as we assume</h2>
<p>The problem is that by limiting our measurement of security to fatal incidents, we narrow our appraisal of risk. Aviation from this perspective appears to be very secure. Crashes, after all, are rare events. </p>
<p>However, I would argue that if you take into account all the nonfatal incidents, which most people are not aware of, then the actual risk of accident in the airline industry is higher.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59136/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frederic Lemieux does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Only six percent of airline accidents in 2015 included fatalities. A security expert argues that a more accurate risk assessment of airline travel would take into account close calls.Frederic Lemieux, Professor and Program Director of Bachelor in Police and Security Studies; Master’s in Security and Safety Leadership; Master’s in Strategic Cyber Operations and Information Management, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/570942016-04-13T10:02:05Z2016-04-13T10:02:05ZHow to protect nuclear plants from terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118395/original/image-20160412-15858-1cye2vn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Temelin nuclear power plant, Czech Republic</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/8357352656/in/album-72157631878373178/">IAEA/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the wake of terrorist attacks in Brussels, Paris, Istanbul, Ankara and elsewhere, nations are rethinking many aspects of domestic security.</p>
<p>Nuclear plants, as experts have long known, are potential targets for terrorists, either for sabotage or efforts to steal nuclear materials. </p>
<p>Currently there are <a href="https://www.iaea.org/pris/">444 nuclear power plants operating in 30 countries</a> around the world and <a href="https://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx?rf=1">243 smaller research reactors</a>, which are used to produce <a href="http://chemistry.about.com/od/chemistryglossary/a/isotopedef.htm">isotopes</a> for medical uses and to train nuclear engineers. The nuclear industry also includes <a href="https://infcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/Facilities">hundreds of plants that enrich uranium and fabricate fuel for reactors</a>. Some of these facilities contain materials terrorists could use to build a nuclear or <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.html">“dirty” bomb</a>. Alternatively, power plants could be <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/opinion/could-there-be-a-terrorist-fukushima.html?**__r=0">“hijacked”</a> to create an accident of the sort experienced at Chernobyl and Fukushima, sending clouds of radioactivity over hundreds of miles. </p>
<p>At last month’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., representatives from 52 countries <a href="http://static1.squarespace.com/static/568be36505f8e2af8023adf7/t/56fef01a2eeb810fd917abb9/1459548186895/Communiqu%C3%A9.pdf">pledged to continue improving their nuclear security</a> and adopted <a href="http://www.nss2016.org/2016-action-plans/">action plans</a> to work together and through international agencies. </p>
<p>But significant countries like Russia and Pakistan are not participating. And many in Europe are just beginning to consider physical security measures. From my perspective as a former nuclear regulator and now as director of the Center for International Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University, it is clear that nuclear plants are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. </p>
<h2>Physical and cyber threats</h2>
<p>It is not news that security is weak at many civilian nuclear power and research facilities. </p>
<p>In October 2012, Greenpeace activists <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/100154908">entered two nuclear power plants in Sweden</a> by breaking open a gate and scaling fences without being stopped by guards. Four of them hid overnight on a roof at one reactor before surrendering the next morning. </p>
<p>Just this year, Sweden’s nuclear regulatory agency adopted a requirement for armed guards and additional security measures at the plants. However, these upgrades <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/sweden-nuclear-security-idUSL8N15K3SS">do not have to be in place</a> until early 2017.</p>
<p>In 2014 French nuclear plants were plagued by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/world/europe/unidentified-drones-are-spotted-above-french-nuclear-plants.html">unexplained drone overflights</a>. And Greenpeace activists broke into the Fessenheim nuclear plant near the German border and <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2583435/Greenpeace-activists-storm-Frances-oldest-nuclear-power-station.html">hung a large banner from the reactor building</a>. </p>
<p>In light of the recent Brussels attacks, reports from Belgium are more alarming. In 2012 two employees at the country’s Doel nuclear power station left Belgium to fight in Syria. In 2014 an unidentified saboteur tampered with lubricant in the turbine at the same reactor, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/world/europe/belgium-fears-nuclear-plants-are-vulnerable.html">causing the plant to shut down for five months</a>. And earlier this year authorities investigating the Paris attacks discovered <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/world/europe/belgium-nuclear-official-video-paris-attacks.html">video surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear official</a> in the home of one of the Paris suspects. </p>
<p>One has to assume that potential attackers may understand how the sites and materials can be used. </p>
<p>Given the heightened state of alert in Europe, governments should, I believe, immediately increase security at civilian nuclear facilities. They could emulate the United States, where security at nuclear facilities has substantially increased since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. </p>
<h2>American role model</h2>
<p>U.S. nuclear power plants now are some of the most well-guarded facilities in the world. </p>
<p>The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates both safety and security at nuclear power plants. After 9/11, these sites were <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/security-enhancements.html">required to add multiple layers of protection</a>, with the cores of reactors (where the fuel is located) the most highly defended areas. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118397/original/image-20160412-15858-xnr8cr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hand scanner at U.S. nuclear plant.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/9677249447/in/album-72157632817500380/">U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Up to one-third of the workforce at many U.S. nuclear plants now is security-related. Many nuclear utilities used to hire contract security forces; now guards at many of these plants are employed directly by plant owners and have opportunities to move to other jobs at their sites, increasing employee satisfaction and improving performance.</p>
<p>NRC regulations require U.S. nuclear plants to hold <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/force-on-force-bg.html">regular drills</a> in which well-trained former military units attack the plants with up-to-date materials and techniques. NRC observers evaluate these exercises, and facility owners face stiff penalties for failure.</p>
<p>The United States has also adopted <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/cyber-security-bg.html">regulations to ensure cybersecurity at reactors</a>. As new, entirely digital reactors come online, such measures will be more necessary than ever. </p>
<p>The successful 2010 <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet">Stuxnet attack</a>, for example, in which a computer worm infiltrated computers at Iranian nuclear facilities and caused machines to malfunction, showed how vulnerable unprotected computer networks can be.</p>
<h2>Improving security worldwide</h2>
<p>There are no global standards for physical protection at civilian nuclear facilities. Each country adopts its own laws and regulations dictating what nuclear site owners are required to do to protect plants from attack. </p>
<p>As a result, measures at plants can vary widely, with some countries <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/10/unarmed-guards-bogus-terror-drills-and-96-tons-of-plutonium/">depending on the local police force for protection and leaving guards unarmed</a>. Often the level of security depends on cultural norms and attitudes, but the recent attacks in Europe suggest a rapid adjustment is needed.</p>
<p>Here are steps that, in my view, all countries can take to make nuclear plants more secure. </p>
<p>One priority is to provide enough funds to the <a href="https://www.iaea.org/">International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</a>, which has recently <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/nuclear-security-new-directions-21st-century">elevated its physical security section</a> to assist member countries looking for ways to protect their nuclear plants more effectively. Since 2010 the agency has <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-at-nuclear-security-summit">trained more than 10,000 people</a> in nuclear security, including police and border guards. It also tracks illicit trafficking and other activities involving nuclear material, and has recorded nearly 3,000 such events since 1995. </p>
<p>Countries that have nuclear power plants or research reactors understandably tend not to spotlight the challenges of protecting these sites. But we know from instances like the ones cited above that they exist. In many countries nuclear regulatory agencies oversee safety but not security. Each of these nations needs to empower an independent regulator to enforce new requirements and inspect security at nuclear sites. Most importantly, security forces at nuclear facilities should be required to practice attack scenarios regularly under the gaze of independent observers.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118399/original/image-20160412-15858-1n2dlg0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visits the Barakah nuclear plant construction site in the United Arab Emirates, 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABarakah_2013-01-29_1.jpg">IAEA/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Countries such as the United States that already have solid physical security requirements for nuclear facilities can help. </p>
<p>Nuclear regulators from all countries meet regularly and could easily share information and train their counterparts on plant physical security. In December 2012, for example, the U.S. NRC organized the first-ever <a href="http://www.nrcsecurityconference.org/about">International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security</a>. No other government has offered to head up a follow-on meeting since then. </p>
<p>And countries with existing reactors aren’t the only problem. At least 60 countries have <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx">expressed a desire to acquire nuclear power</a>. The United Arab Emirates is in the process of constructing four reactors. Turkey and Vietnam have made deals with the Russian manufacturer, Rosatom, in which construction, financing, operation, even waste disposal, will be handled solely by the Russians. Many of these “emergent” countries do not regularly attend Convention on Nuclear Safety peer review meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency. Without a security regime in place, how can we expect them to do any better than the existing plants?</p>
<p>To prevent an attack at a nuclear site, governments must take security at nuclear sites seriously now, not a year from now. </p>
<p>In light of the current terrorist threat and with four Nuclear Security Summits completed, countries with nuclear plants need to up their game with regards to physical security at nuclear power facilities before it’s too late.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Allison Macfarlane served as Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 2012 to 2014. She receives funding from the MacArthur Foundation. </span></em></p>Recent terrorist attacks have heightened concerns about the security of nuclear plants. A former top U.S. nuclear regulator says security is weak at many sites worldwide.Allison Macfarlane, Professor of Public Policy and International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/511922015-11-29T19:15:09Z2015-11-29T19:15:09ZFactCheck Q&A: have any refugees who came to Australia gone on to be terrorists?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103151/original/image-20151125-23825-j1n1uq.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tasneem Chopra, cross cultural consultant, speaking on Q&A.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Q&A</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Conversation is fact-checking claims made on Q&A, broadcast Mondays on the ABC at 9:35pm. Thank you to everyone who sent us quotes for checking via <a href="http://www.twitter.com/conversationEDU">Twitter</a> using hashtags #FactCheck and #QandA, on <a href="http://www.facebook.com/conversationEDU">Facebook</a> or by <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">email</a>.</strong></p>
<hr>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Snx5pFBzh3c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Excerpt from Q&A, November 23, 2015.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>I know that since 1976, there have been 70,000 asylum seekers settled in Australia who arrived by boat. Not one of them has been found to have a link to terrorism. – Tasneem Chopra, cross cultural consultant, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4335768.htm">speaking on Q&A</a>, November 23, 2015.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since the recent Paris terrorism attacks, Chopra and <a href="https://twitter.com/kon__k/status/667242100161777664">others</a> have argued that Australians have nothing to fear from refugees arriving by boat.</p>
<p>But others have linked national security concerns to refugees.</p>
<p>Liberal Senator Cory Bernardi recently <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-23/terrorists-could-be-among-syrian-refugees-bernardi-says/6963608">told the ABC</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In our previous refugee intake, we’ve had examples where people who’ve been accepted as refugees have gone on to commit terrorist acts or plan terror attacks in this country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So are Chopra and Bernardi right in making those two claims?</p>
<p>The answer is not entirely black and white, partly because of a lack of publicly available information. But based on my knowledge of this area, research and contacting senior police investigators, this is the best evidence available. </p>
<h2>Boat vs plane arrivals</h2>
<p>The first thing to remember is that the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1415/AsylumFacts">majority</a> of asylum seekers arriving in Australia do so by plane. </p>
<p>It’s also true that of the handful of former refugees who went on to involve themselves in terrorist activities, most grew up in and were radicalised in Australia. Most arrived as children. They did not step off planes or boats in Australia as fully formed terrorists who somehow evaded security checks and slipped into Australia.</p>
<p>When asked for a source for her assertion, Chopra sent a comment from the <a href="http://www.asrc.org.au/">Asylum Seekers Resource Centre</a> that said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The statistic is based on the past 15 years of work in that sector where not one asylum seeker who arrived by boat has been charged with domestic terrorism. Man Haron Monis, the perpetrator of the Lindt Cafe seige, arrived by plane. And regarding the numbers of boat arrivals, this was drawn from stats with <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/Quick_Guides/BoatTurnbacks">this parliamentary library link</a>, indicating around 69,000 since 1976.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=308&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/103255/original/image-20151126-23816-4lvjj3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=387&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Boat arrivals by calendar year 1976 to 2014 and financial year 1989-90 to 2014-15.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/Quick_Guides/BoatTurnbacks">Parliamentary Library</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I know this is not a very satisfying answer, but we can’t say with absolute certainty that <em>no</em> refugees who arrived by boat have been linked to terrorism. That’s because the police who have investigated the handful of terrorist plots in Australia that have been perpetrated by former asylum seekers didn’t always collect information on their mode of arrival.</p>
<p>It’s also true there’s no obvious, compelling evidence proving Chopra is wrong. As an expert advising the Australian government and courts on terrorism and counter-terrorism, I am not aware of any perpetrators or plotters who arrived in Australia by boat.</p>
<p>Some people who have arrived by boat may have gone on to break Australian laws or commit crimes, but that is obviously not the same as saying they are terrorists.</p>
<h2>What about the Lindt Cafe seige, the Paramatta shooting and others?</h2>
<p>It is true the man behind the 2014 Lindt cafe seige, Man Haron Monis, was a refugee who arrived in Australia from Iran. However, he did not arrive by boat – <a href="https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/170215_Martin_Place_Siege_Review_0.docx">he came on a plane</a>, just like most refugees. In fact, he arrived on a business visa. </p>
<p>Whether or not the Lindt Cafe seige qualifies as a terrorist act is also contested. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-26/experts-divided-over-sydney-siege-as-terrorism-or-mental-illness/6726772">Some experts say it was</a>; others contend that while Monis latched onto Islamic State as his cause, there’s no compelling evidence to indicate that Monis had any confirmed links with them. </p>
<p>Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar, the IS-inspired 15-year-old who shot <a href="http://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/3429079/curtis-chengs-eulogy/">police accountant Curtis Cheng</a> outside the NSW Police Parramatta headquarters in October, was of Iraqi-Kurdish background. His <a href="http://www.minister.border.gov.au/peterdutton/2015/Pages/ray-hadley-08102015.aspx">family moved to Australia</a>. No reliable evidence has emerged so far to suggest he arrived in Australia by boat.</p>
<p>A spokesperson for Senator Bernardi also <a href="http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/three-would-be-terrorists-jailed-for-plotting-sydney-army-base-attack/story-fn6mh6b5-1226224313684">referred</a> The Conversation to a plot to attack the Holdsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney. </p>
<p>One of the plotters in that case, Saney Edow Aweys, arrived in Australia as a 15-year-old refugee, but we don’t know for sure if he came by boat or plane. The <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/681.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=saney">judgement</a> in that case doesn’t say.</p>
<p>Senator Bernardi’s spokesperson sent another <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/who-is-mohammad-ali-baryalei-the-man-accused-of-conspiring-to-behead-a-stranger-in-australia-20140918-10ixjp.html">news article</a> on Mohammad Ali Baryalei, accused of conspiring to behead an Australian in a random attack.</p>
<p>Baryalei’s aristocratic Afghan family came to Australia as refugees when he was a child, the ABC has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-08/australias-most-senior-is-member-funnels-fighters-onto-frontline/5728734">reported</a>. </p>
<p>Again, it’s not clear whether Baryalei arrived in Australia by boat or plane. There’s no compelling evidence suggesting it was one or the other. We do know he was a child when he arrived.</p>
<p>So Bernardi is also correct to say that, in general terms, there are a handful of documented cases of refugees who have settled in Australia being linked to terrorism. These refugees did not arrive as fully formed terrorists who slipped through security measures.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Let’s look at the two claims separately.</p>
<p>We can’t say with absolute certainty that Tasneem Chopra is correct to say that <em>no</em> refugees who arrived by boat have been linked to terrorism. However, there’s no obvious compelling evidence showing she is wrong.</p>
<p>With the current intake of the 12,000 Syrian refugees, there are tight selection processes and comprehensive screening procedures conducted before refugees enter Australia that dramatically reduce any chances of terrorists (or criminals) slipping into Australia.</p>
<p>Bernardi is correct. There have been a handful of asylum seekers who arrived in Australia by plane who we know have been eventually linked to terrorism.</p>
<p>It’s also worth noting what Chopra’s co-panellist, former Greek finance minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/yanis-varoufakis-9969/articles">Yanis Varoufakis</a> said on Q&A the same evening:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… when you have a massive exodus of refugees, there may very well be a couple of insurgents that infiltrate but it’s neither here nor there. Both the terrorist attacks and the refugee influx are symptoms of the same problem but one doesn’t cause the other. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>– Clarke Jones</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a sound analysis. There is an unfortunate trend in the debates about national security and border security towards both hyperbole and generalisation. This article is careful to avoid these. It examines the publicly available material and ultimately concludes that it is impossible to say whether or not any Australian terrorists arrived in this country by boat. While this lack of certainty may be frustrating for some readers, there are two important points to be taken from this article.</p>
<p>The first is that extremely few - if indeed any - of the people who have arrived in Australia by boat have later had any involvement with terrorism.</p>
<p>Secondly, this article highlights the irrelevance (including to the police) of how terrorism suspects arrived in Australia. In my experience - both in co-authoring a book, <a href="https://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/books/Inside_australias_anti-terrorism_laws/">Inside Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Laws and Trials</a>, and also appearing as junior defence counsel for Saney Aweys (linked to the Holdsworthy Army barracks plot) in his trial before the Victorian Supreme Court - whether a person arrives in Australia by boat or plane has no bearing on their likelihood of later being involved in terrorism. To the best of my knowledge, the mode of arrival was not even something that we discussed with Aweys during our pre-trial interviews.</p>
<p>The only thing that I would add to this article about Aweys’ background is that he spent many years in a refugee camp in Ethiopia before coming to Australia and being granted a humanitarian visa. </p>
<p>This - in combination with the fact that his arrival coincided with the Australian government’s decision to accept a significant number of refugees from Somalia and that I have no recollection of him spending any time in immigration detention - would suggest that he did <em>not</em> arrive here by boat. This could be confirmed by speaking to Aweys but that is of course easier said than done, given his current detention in a maximum security gaol. <strong>– Nicola McGarrity</strong></p>
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<p><em><strong>Correction, January 23, 2018</strong>: the original version of this FactCheck named Curtis Cheng as a police officer. Mr Cheng was a NSW Police Force accountant. We apologise for this mistake, and thank the reader of The Conversation who brought this to our attention.</em></p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicola McGarrity co-authored the book, Inside Australia's Anti-Terrorism Laws and Trials and also appeared as junior defence counsel for Saney Aweys, who was linked to the Holdsworthy Army barracks plot.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clarke Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tasneem Chopra told Q&A that of the 70,000 refugees who’ve arrived in Australia by boat since 1976, none have been found to be linked to terrorism. We examine the best evidence out there.Clarke Jones, Research Fellow, Research School of Psychology, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.