tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/thai-war-on-drugs-31651/articlesThai war on drugs – The Conversation2022-10-07T06:16:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1920872022-10-07T06:16:58Z2022-10-07T06:16:58ZTragic Thai massacre raises issues of mental health, drug use and gun control ahead of next year’s election<p>At least <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-06/mass-shooting-thailand-daycare-centre-dozens-dead/101510188">37 people were killed</a> on Thursday by a lone assailant at a day care centre in Thailand’s north-eastern province of Nongbua Lamphu, local police say. Among the dead are at least 24 children, while the alleged gunman also killed his wife and child, then himself.</p>
<p>The alleged killer was a former member of the police force, who was facing trial on a methamphetamine possession charge after having been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-06/mass-shooting-thailand-daycare-centre-dozens-dead/101510188">dismissed over drug allegations</a>.</p>
<p>This shocking incident will trigger a national conversation around gun control and drug use, as well as on questions of mental health after a really difficult couple of years since the onset of COVID-19, ahead of the next election scheduled for around May 2023.</p>
<h2>Lone assailants rare</h2>
<p>Lone gunman massacres have been very rare in Thailand.</p>
<p>Aside from yesterday’s tragic killings, there’s only one other similar incident in the country’s modern history. That occurred in February 2020, when a disgruntled Thai soldier <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/thai-soldier-kills-at-least-17-people-in-shooting-rampage/2020/02/08/06ea65de-4a76-11ea-8a1f-de1597be6cbc_story.html">killed 29 people</a> and wounded 58 others in the city of Nakhon Ratchasima, most of whom were shot at a shopping mall.</p>
<p>Other mass shooting incidents have occurred when the military has put down popular demonstrations. For example, the “Black May” mass demonstrations in 1992 where <a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2311654/remembering-bloody-may-1992">over 50 civilians were killed</a>, and the 2010 military crackdown following the “red shirts” protests in which <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/21/a-thai-mothers-long-fight-for-justice-over-2010-deadly-crackdown">just under 100 people were killed</a>.</p>
<h2>COVID, poverty and mental health</h2>
<p>I think (and hope) this incident will trigger a national conversation in Thailand about issues surrounding mental health. But I have my doubts. There’s somewhat of an attitude of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/edens/thailand/buddhism.htm">Buddhist-informed</a> stoicism in the country, to accept the reality of suffering and just keep going in the face of hardship.</p>
<p>There has been serious adversity since the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic and there’s an accumulating resentment towards the current government. The country has had a very <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358249053_Thailand's_Covid-19_Crisis_A_Tale_in_Two_Parts">difficult time</a> over the last two years, as the national economy <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/06/21/na062121-5-things-to-know-about-thailands-economy-and-covid-19#:%7E:text=Like%20many%20countries%2C%20Thailand's%20economy,tourism%20sector%2C%20lost%20their%20jobs.">shrunk by more than 6% in 2020</a> and scores of workers lost their jobs particularly in the hospitality and tourism sectors. Some of the worst affected have been poorer families, whose kids stopped going to school. They may not return, which suggests this could turn out to be an ongoing generational issue.</p>
<p>Thailand isn’t very well-resourced when it comes to support for mental health. A 2015 <a href="https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.virtual.anu.edu.au/share/GXRUAMKKWKFV3TXAREUV?target=10.1111/appy.12200">study</a> found “an urgent need to invest in the policy, practice, and research capacity for mental health promotion” in Thailand.</p>
<p>While the country is better than a lot of parts of Southeast Asia in terms of welfare payments (they have been prepared to take on government debt during the pandemic), there are still problems rolling it out. Consequently, there’s been growing resentment directed towards the current prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who’s very unpopular.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/this-country-belongs-to-the-people-why-young-thais-are-no-longer-afraid-to-take-on-the-monarchy-146562">'This country belongs to the people': why young Thais are no longer afraid to take on the monarchy</a>
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<h2>Security force reform?</h2>
<p>This massacre has happened just ahead of the next election, which is scheduled for the first half of next year. Politicians are starting to get into campaign mode. </p>
<p>In the past, opposition parties have occasionally campaigned on issues around reforming the security forces, and in recent years there have been signs the government wants to be seen to be doing things on this issue. One such topic has been that of military conscription – all men over 21 years of age in the country must register for the draft, which takes the form of a lottery every April. </p>
<p>This practice is very unpopular, and became a political issue in the last election. The military has <a href="https://www.nationthailand.com/thailand/general/40020534">floated ways to scale back conscription</a>, but whether changes will actually be implemented is another matter.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Thai-Military-Power-Accommodation-Monographs/dp/8776942392">My studies</a> of the Thai military over a long period suggest such announcements are often quietly shelved later.</p>
<p>Indeed there’s relatively little oversight of the security forces, because of the country’s governance – in many respects, the military is the government. Other agencies of the government are reluctant to put any pressure on the security forces, as is the country’s anti corruption commission. Military reform is left to the military itself.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-good-coup-military-rule-is-unlikely-to-heal-thailand-28589">A good coup? Military rule is unlikely to heal Thailand</a>
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<h2>Drug use and gun control</h2>
<p>Another central issue that will likely be raised in the national conversation is methamphetamine. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has for some time been warning about the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2022/June/unodc-report_-over-one-billion-methamphetamine-tablets-seized-in-east-and-southeast-asia-in-2021-as-the-regional-drug-trade-continues-to-expand.html">volume of meth moving through the Mekong region</a>, a lot of which is being shipped through Thailand.</p>
<p>There’s a view among anti-drug agencies that such volumes of probably couldn’t be moved around without <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2019/SEA_TOCTA_2019_web.pdf">high-levels of the security forces being involved</a>. The issue of corruption among security forces isn’t new, and dates back to the mid-20th century where the “Golden Triangle” (at the confluence of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar) was a notorious haven for drug lords and opium production.</p>
<p>In the 1950s, Thailand’s most powerful generals Sarit Thanarat, Phao Sriyanond and Phin Choonhaven worked with Chinese syndicates in <a href="https://www.amazon.com.au/Opium-Uncovering-Politics-Pierre-Arnaud-Chouvy/dp/0674051343">opium and heroin trafficking</a>. </p>
<p>Manufacturing has been slowly pivoting from opium to meth, as the latter is much less visible than vast poppy fields.</p>
<p>Drug issues have from time to time become a national issue, such as in 2003 when Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched an <a href="https://theconversation.com/dutertes-war-on-drugs-bitter-lessons-from-thailands-failed-campaign-66096">anti-drug campaign</a>, which featured extra-judicial killings. Hence this period has since been compared to that of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s infamous war on drugs.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/dutertes-war-on-drugs-bitter-lessons-from-thailands-failed-campaign-66096">Duterte’s war on drugs: bitter lessons from Thailand’s failed campaign</a>
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<p>At least one prominent Thai, the Director of Thailand’s Moral Promotion Center Dr Suriyadeo Tripathi, <a href="https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/320207">has called for gun control</a> since the massacre, but it’s a relatively new debate in the country.</p>
<p>The alleged killer who carried out this week’s massacre <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-06/mass-shooting-thailand-daycare-centre-dozens-dead/101510188">legally purchased the gun</a> he used in the attack (though he mostly used a knife).</p>
<p>There’s a <a href="https://time.com/6220339/thailand-gun-control-mass-shooting/">significant number of weapons in the community</a> and it’s relatively easy to get your hands on one.</p>
<p>There’s never been mass community outrage about gun control (and there’s no United States’ style gun lobby in Thailand) though this latest massacre may spark a reckoning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Raymond does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lone gunman incidents have been very rare in Thailand’s history.Greg Raymond, Lecturer, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/727312017-02-14T07:28:20Z2017-02-14T07:28:20ZPhilippine opposition finds its voice as Duterte pauses his bloody drug war<p>After slow-drip revelations last month that several members of the Philippine National Police Anti-Illegal Drugs Group had kidnapped and killed a South Korean businessman in October 2016, a reluctant Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/rodrigo-duterte-orders-antidrugs-unit-closed-after-korean-jee-ickjoo-killed-by-police-20170129-gu168w.html">called off his “war on drugs”</a> at the end of January. </p>
<p>It was particularly embarrassing for the government that these criminal cops had taken Jee Ick-joo to police headquarters in Metro Manila where they strangled him before demanding a large ransom from his wife, who was led to believe he was still alive. </p>
<p>With guns falling silent in what had been a nightly crackdown over the past six months, this may prove to be the turning point in a bloody campaign that, <a href="http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines-war-drugs">at last count, has left more than 7,000 people dead</a>.</p>
<h2>Covering tracks</h2>
<p>Critics claimed that Jee’s killing was further proof that corrupt police had been using the war on drugs to commit crimes of their own – particularly against those involved in the drug trade – <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/866147/war-on-drugs-now-just-cover-for-cops-crimes">in order to cover their tracks</a>. But there’s also growing evidence that many of those killed in the drug war were innocent. </p>
<p>Of course, all of those murdered either in “police encounters” or by motorcycle assassins riding in tandem were denied any sort due process. But a number of stories have emerged that suggest <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/866147/war-on-drugs-now-just-cover-for-cops-crimes">mistakes were being made or scores settled</a> under the cover of the drug crackdown. </p>
<p>The fact that both kinds of killing have stopped since the suspension of the anti-drug campaign appears to confirm what critics always suspected: the murders by police and mysterious vigilantes were closely linked. </p>
<p>One of the most heart-wrenching stories is that of the Rosales siblings. The murder of Lauren Rosales led to one of the most <a href="http://www.esquiremag.ph/politics/butch-dalisay-war-on-drugs-a1574-20160919-lfrm">moving pleas</a> to end the “collateral damage” of the war on drugs. Her <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/26/16/rosales-siblings-brother-pursuing-slain-sisters-case-shot-dead">brother JR was killed by assassins</a> while investigating her murder. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs">2008 Human Rights Watch investigation</a> of a similarly violent crackdown on drugs in Thailand in 2003, in which nearly 3,000 people are estimated to have been killed, showed that more than half of those who died had no connection to drugs whatsoever.</p>
<p>As British academic and writer James Fenton pointed out in <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/murderous-manila-on-the-night-shift/">his recent account</a> of the drug killings, this underlines the truth of the words British writer GK Chesterton put in mouth of his <a href="https://chrisdale.wordpress.com/2009/11/02/where-does-a-wise-man-hide-a-leaf/">detective Father Brown</a>: </p>
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<p>Where does a wise man hide a pebble? … on the beach … Where does a wise man hide a leaf? … In the forest … And if a man had to hide a dead body, he would make a field of dead bodies to hide it in.</p>
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<h2>Penal populism for the poor</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-philippines-incomplete-people-power-revolution-paved-the-way-for-rodrigo-duterte-65972">Observers have often been at a loss to explain</a> why Duterte’s drug crackdown has enjoyed strong public support. But perhaps because of the drug war, a recent survey showed <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/859998/palace-duterte-in-full-control-of-war-on-drugs">more than three-quarters of Filipinos claim</a> it had reduced the drug menace in their neighbourhoods. </p>
<p>Drawing on the appeal of “<a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1011/1016">penal populism</a>”, which has been defined as “a political style that builds on collective sentiments of fear and demands
for punitive politics”, Duterte has implemented his authoritarian “Davao model” (named after the southern city of Davao, where he was mayor) nationally. </p>
<p>He uses <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1012">violence as spectacle to humiliate</a> friends and families of purported drug dealers and users, who are portrayed as subhuman and thus legitimate targets of extermination. And this discourages investigation of the killings and conveys the political message that he can protect ordinary people. </p>
<p>State-encouraged violence thus creates a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-philippines-incomplete-people-power-revolution-paved-the-way-for-rodrigo-duterte-65972">sense of political order amid weak institutions</a>.</p>
<p>The war on drugs in the Philippines has created “<a href="https://qz.com/900039/dutertes-war-on-drugs-has-created-an-economy-of-murder-in-the-philippines-says-amnesty-international/">an economy of murder</a>” according to a new report by Amnesty International. The human rights group has revealed that police are paid hundreds of US dollars for each extrajudicial killing – but not for arrests. And that the murders are staged to make they seem like legitimate police operations through planted evidence and falsified reports. </p>
<p>Besides often stealing from the home of the murder victims, police also have links to funeral homes, who pay to get the corpse delivered to them, according to the report, causing the usually destitute families of the victims additional hardship. </p>
<p>Police lock down poor neighbourhoods under a policy known as <a href="http://www.sciencecityofmunoz.ph/oplantokhang.html"><em>Oplan TokHang</em></a> – a portmanteau combining the Cebuano words tuktok (knock) and hangyo (plead) – to get drug dealers and users to surrender. This is in stark contrast to their <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/145320-oplan-tokhang-makati-villages">polite treatment of people in rich neighbourhoods</a>, where they go from house to house investigating people for possible drug use. </p>
<p>Most victims of police and vigilante “hits” are poor and defenceless people, making the war against the drugs appear more like a <a href="http://video.aljazeera.com/channels/eng/videos/hundreds-killed-in-philippines-drugs-crackdown/5047297943001">war against the poor</a>. </p>
<h2>Mounting resistance</h2>
<p>But it now seems that something like a “<a href="http://www.newmandala.org/poor-filipinos-lives-dont-seem-matter/">poor Filipino lives matter</a>” movement is gaining strength. </p>
<p>The country’s Catholic bishops, long intimidated by <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/05/22/16/duterte-calls-catholic-church-most-hypocritical-institution">Duterte’s threats to reveal the Church’s hypocrisy</a> over sex scandals, <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/160524-full-text-cbcp-letter-reign-of-terror-war-on-drugs">issued a pastoral letter on February 5</a> unequivocally condemning the violent anti-drug campaign as a “reign of terror” for poor communities of the country.</p>
<p>The communist left is involved in protracted peace negotiations to end a <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2007543/peace-talks-between-philippines-government-and-communist">five-decade long insurgency</a>, against the government. It had accepted three social welfare oriented cabinet-level positions in the current government, but has recently been distancing itself from its informal alliance with Duterte. </p>
<p>As the number of drug-related killings mounted, the hard left’s role in Duterte’s government <a href="http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/157166-rodrigo-duterte-fascist-original">became increasingly untenable</a>. Its position became particularly difficult as promises made by the government to improve the life of the poor in exchange for support failed to materialise. </p>
<p>There’s been no movement on land reform, and little sign that the administration is serious about fulfilling its promise to put a stop to the rampant practice of offering short-term contracts – a process that enables companies to roll over employee contracts to avoid paying benefits and keep wages low. </p>
<p>The Communists <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/asia/philippines-cpp-npa-communist-ceasefire.html?_r=0">suspended a ceasefire</a> after accusing the military of “encroaching” on territory they controlled in the countryside and of the government of reneging on a promise to release jailed comrades. Duterte retaliated by <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/867966/duterte-lifts-ceasefire-with-npa">cancelling peace negotiations</a>, warning the rebels to be “ready to fight” again.</p>
<p>It is telling that three of the most high-profile figures who oppose Duterte’s violent drug crackdown are women – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/05/philippines-vice-president-resigns-cabinet-differences-with-rodrigo-duterte">former vice president Leni Robredo</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38362274">Senator Leila de Lima</a>, and <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/12/06/16/fil-am-leader-joins-calls-for-duterte-to-resign">US-based activist Loida Nicolas-Lewis</a>. </p>
<p>These women stand in contrast to Duterte’s tough guy image and misogyny (he has gone so far as to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/04/25/after-disgusting-gang-rape-joke-philippine-presidential-contender-duterte-widens-lead/?utm_term=.9077b129bef1">joke about rape victims</a>).</p>
<p>All three “<a href="http://www.thevolatilian.com/three-stooges-leila-leni-loida/">loathsome ladies</a>,” as Duterte social media “trolls” have dubbed them, have been smeared, often using sexual innuendo and even faked sex videos. His congressional allies held hearings interrogating de Lima’s driver, who was also her lover (a dual sin in a class-bound society with double standards), about alleged links between de Lima and drug lords. </p>
<p>Duterte couldn’t resist giving the story a final machismo spin. “She was not only screwing her driver, she was screwing the nation,” <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/818038/duterte-de-lima-screwing-not-only-driver-but-also-the-nation#ixzz4Y45K1NbS">he said</a>.</p>
<h2>A pause in the killing</h2>
<p>Duterte’s early presidency has seen a <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1007/1014">monomaniacal commitment to his violent drug crackdown</a> during which he has <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/1010/1022">drawn on his deep-seated nationalism</a> to fend off Western criticism. </p>
<p>Although he has threatened to substitute the military for the police in order to resume his war on drugs and has won the <a href="http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/12/03/1649920/duterte-trump-wishes-philippines-success-drug-war">alleged support</a> of Donald Trump for the drug crackdown, the killings have ended for now. </p>
<p>This will spare dozens of lives daily, mostly in the poorest parts of Metro Manila and other areas in the Philippines targeted during the crackdown. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-southkorea-idUSKBN15R121">Pressure, from South Korea and also from the foreign business community</a> in the Philippines generally, was crucial in influencing the suspension. </p>
<p>But whether this form of state violence can be stopped in the long term will largely depend on how strong opposition becomes within the country itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark R Thompson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After more than 7,000 killings by police and vigilantes, an incident involving the death of a South Korea businessman has finally put an end of Rodrigo Duterte’s drug war.Mark R Thompson, Professor of Politics & Head of the Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong KongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/696522016-12-21T06:40:02Z2016-12-21T06:40:02ZSoutheast Asia’s war on drugs doesn’t work – here’s what does<p>Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/07/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-drugs-killings.html?_r=0">bloody war on drugs</a> is just the latest in a region where drug use has usually been met with draconian measures. Thailand embarked 13 years ago on a drug war that <a href="https://theconversation.com/dutertes-war-on-drugs-bitter-lessons-from-thailands-failed-campaign-66096">strikes eerie parallels with the Philippine situation</a>.</p>
<p>Today, lawmakers in the Philippines are plotting the <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/851505/house-justice-committee-approves-death-penalty-bill">restoration of the death penalty</a> to bolster the anti-drug campaign. But this, too, is par for the course in the region. </p>
<p>In July 2016, Indonesia <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/asia/indonesia-executions-drug-crimes.html">executed four convicted drug offenders</a>. On November 17, Singapore <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/two-drug-traffickers-hanged-for-their-offences">executed two men</a> – one Nigerian and one Malaysian – for similar offences. </p>
<p>Reflecting the position of its member states, <a href="http://asean.org/">ASEAN</a> has also adopted a hardline stance, reaffirming the region’s “<a href="http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/08/1621714/asean-vows-work-towards-drug-free-region">zero-tolerance approach</a>” to drugs in its annual summit in September.</p>
<p>But there’s <a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(16)00619-X/abstract">broad consensus</a> among researchers that the war on drugs, which typically consists of punitive measures and forced rehabilitation, doesn’t work. And that it’s marked by human rights violations as well as huge social, moral and medical costs. </p>
<p>In one of the most forceful arguments against the drug war, Columbia University neuroscientist Carl Hart stresses that harsh punishments do <a href="https://books.google.com.ph/books/about/High_Price.html?id=r8HKMgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y">nothing but prevent young drug users from integrating back into society</a>. And such measures ultimately end up being more harmful than the drugs themselves. </p>
<p>What’s worse is that the drug war disproportionately <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/06/28/the-war-on-drugs-is-a-war-on-minorities-and-the-poor/">affects the poor and other socially excluded groups</a>, including ethnic minorities. But if the war on drugs <a href="http://www.bmj.com/content/355/bmj.i6067">doesn’t work</a>, what does?</p>
<h2>Successes with harm reduction</h2>
<p>At the country level, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1464837">Portugal’s success story</a> is illustrative. In 2001, the European nation, while not changing the legal status of drugs, changed the way it dealt with drug users. </p>
<p>Instead of putting people in jail, a new law called for their referral to three-person local committees. These committees were given the freedom to consider a range of interventions depending on the user in question. </p>
<p>Those who demonstrate drug dependence are encouraged to seek treatment. Others are discouraged from using drugs through fines and penalties, such as driver’s licence suspensions. </p>
<p>Ten years on, <a href="https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact_Sheet_Portugal_Decriminalization_Feb2015.pdf">drug use rates have not increased</a>, while drug-related deaths, as well as problematic and adolescent drug use, have decreased.</p>
<p>Portugal’s success, although mirrored by countries such as the <a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/safe-and-effective-drug-policy-look-dutch">the Netherlands</a>, is far from the norm. But even in countries that continue to implement tough approaches, localised interventions are producing promising results. These include nations in Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>In Malaysia, for instance, the implementation of a needle-exchange program has led to a sharp drop in HIV infections among injecting drug users – <a href="http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/harm-reduction-programme-shows-results">from a peak of 5,176 in 2002 to 680 in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>In Vietnam, a 2009 <a href="https://harmreductionjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12954-015-0075-9">methadone maintenance therapy (MMT) program</a> involving 965 opiate users at two sites led to 85.4% and 77.1% reductions in heroin use two years later. This successful pilot led to a scaling-up of the project. By 2014, Vietnam was offering its MMT program in 162 clinics to 32,000 patients. </p>
<p>What these programs have in common is a harm-reduction framework – the idea that the government’s role is to reduce the negative effects of drugs rather than try to eliminate their use entirely. Critics allege that harm reduction actually encourages drug use, but the Portuguese experience, <a href="https://harmreductionjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1477-7517-11-7">among many others</a>, belies this claim.</p>
<h2>A different paradigm</h2>
<p>Inez Feria, director of <a href="http://nobox.ph/about/">NoBox Philippines</a>, an NGO committed to drug policy reform, <a href="http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=the-world&8217s-biggest-drug-policy-meeting-is-set-for-tomorrow&id=126115">has stressed</a> that drug users “have different lives with different stories, and it’s tremendously important to understand, without judgement, each one’s”. </p>
<p>Underpinning successful efforts to deal with drugs, then, must be a paradigm that is open to multiple approaches. This is especially applicable to amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) such as methamphetamine. As a <a href="https://www.tni.org/files/download/brief37.pdf">policy brief drawing from the Thai and Burmese experience</a> states: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since the pattern of ATS use extends from occasional and recreational use to heavy and dependent use, and only a minority of ATS users fall into the problematic category, the response should vary in accordance with the nature and severity of a person’s involvement with ATS. Different interventions are required to address the complexity of ATS use.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In my <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.06.011">research among young methamphetamine users</a> in the Philippines, I met youths who stopped using the drug when they managed to get jobs. Sadly, many were unable to do so, lacking education or the social connections through which to seek assistance. </p>
<p>What’s more, the very stigma associated with drug-use prevents them from being offered opportunities. These findings point strongly to the need to look at “<a href="http://www.ijdp.org/article/S0955-3959(02)00007-5/abstract">risk environments</a>” – that is, the social and economic contexts in which drug use occurs. They also make the case for considering <a href="http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/cbtx/cbtx_brief_EN.pdf">community-based interventions</a>.</p>
<h2>Finding common ground</h2>
<p>Harm-reduction approaches can only work if governments and policymakers alike recognise the complexity of the “drug problem”. No single solution exists for all kinds of drug users, or all kinds of drug use. </p>
<p>In what we can see as a silver lining, politicians are beginning to pay more attention to drug issues in their countries. Even in the Philippines, government officials are opening up to alternative approaches. Philippine Secretary of Health Paulyn Ubial, for instance, recently <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/149537-paulyn-ubial-drugs-public-health-emergency">spoke of drugs</a> as a “public health emergency” and a “mental health problem”, in a welcome departure from her president’s rhetoric.</p>
<p>Drug policy advocates can use this common ground as a starting point for engaging with governments. While the evidence is overwhelming that a zero tolerance approach to drugs doesn’t work, it’s also important to steer the conversation towards what does, and nudge leaders in that direction – even if the road is paved with incremental, localised changes. </p>
<p>The example from Vietnam – of a pilot study leading to a scaled-up response – is a promising sign of how research and evidence can change public perception and policies. </p>
<p>The stakes can’t be higher: suspected drug users are being extra-judicially killed and legally executed in the region, even as <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/asias-meth-habit-synthetic-drug-trade-has-exploded/a-17868210">drug use continues to rise</a>. </p>
<p>What little success harm-reduction advocates can achieve could form the wedge that may finally crack the iron-fisted approach toward drug users. And it may ultimately solve Southeast Asia’s long-standing drug problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gideon Lasco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As in other parts of the world, the war on drugs in Southeast Asian countries has huge social, moral and medical costs. Now, an approach that places harm reduction at its centre is gaining support.Gideon Lasco, PhD candidate in Medical Anthropology, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/697802016-12-06T07:13:50Z2016-12-06T07:13:50ZAsia is in the grip of a transnational crime crisis – but governments look away<p>The immense demand for methamphetamine (ice), ecstasy and new psychoactive substances <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842099">among the wealthy urban residents of East Asia and beyond</a> has <a href="http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTA-EA-Pacific.html">revitalised organised crime in the region</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-drugs-china-meth-ice-20160218-story.html">scale of recent drug seizures in underground laboratories</a> in China’s Guangdong province alone is staggering – and it’s jumped by 50% in the last year. In January 2015, for instance, 2.2 tonnes of solid and liquid <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-drugs-china-meth-ice-20160218-story.html">methamphetamine destined for Shanghai</a> were uncovered in the coastal county of Lufeng. In May that year, 1.3 tonnes of ketamine and 2.7 tonnes of its precursors were <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-drugs-china-meth-ice-20160218-story.html">found in the city of Yangjiang</a>, disguised as black tea bound for Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>Responding to the challenges posed by organised crime groups are a handful of capable law enforcement agencies; a patchwork of cross-border mutual legal assistance agreements; and a fledgling regional security response from ASEAN. These agencies struggle to have an impact on the scale of criminal enterprise in the region. They are also constrained by concerns about sharing intelligence with potentially compromised police, customs and military services.</p>
<h2>Crime and connectivity</h2>
<p>In 2013, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) <a href="http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTA-EA-Pacific.html">estimated that crime groups earned</a> about US$90–$100 billion a year from illicit sources. Narcotic production and trafficking in drug precursors were the most lucrative, followed by illegal wildlife and timber trading. UNODC found human trafficking, illegal e-waste disposal, maritime crimes ranging from piracy to illegal fishing, counterfeiting of medicines and “high street” products and underground gambling were the most damaging crimes.</p>
<p>It’s easy, then, to see why the burden of transnational crime is often borne by the poor people of Southeast Asia. A growing demand for timber and wildlife products <a href="https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2016/02/organized-crime-southeast-asia/story.html">puts pressure on cash-strapped communities</a> to collude with criminal groups in extracting and marketing these resources. And the Japanese yakuza and triads or “black societies” in Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea also seek opportunities to dump e-waste in under-regulated jurisdictions. </p>
<p>Southeast Asia’s lucrative markets, combined with the availability of and demand for consumer and medicinal products, have proved irresistible to criminal enterprises.</p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/qWbnn/1/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="620"></iframe>
<p>This is illustrated by the fact that cross-border <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2015/d_rugs/ATS_2015_Report_web.pdf">movement of illicit products</a> into and out of Southeast Asia, often via India and China, has intensified in recent years. This is <a href="https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2016/02/organized-crime-southeast-asia/story.html">due, in part,</a> to free-trade agreements between ASEAN and these countries, as well as the massive upgrade of the region’s infrastructure and connectivity now under way. </p>
<p>China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Trans-Asian Railway are all speeding up change and development in transport and commerce in the region. Yet <a href="https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2016/02/organized-crime-southeast-asia/story.html">a 2016 UNODC assessment</a> noted that, despite the existence of “thriving networks of cross-border criminals”, a “fully operational framework on tackling cross-border crime does not exist”.</p>
<h2>Organised crime in East Asia</h2>
<p>Organised crime groups in East and Southeast Asia are diverse and often ephemeral. Some, such as <a href="http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol5no4BroadhurstandLee.pdf">the triads of southern China</a>, have survived since the 19th century. Others form and disband in a generation or less. </p>
<p>The defining feature of organised crime is that <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674807426&content=reviews">it offers protection services</a> – the enforcement of contracts – for illicit markets. In circumstances where state-led conflict-resolution is weak, <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/hidden-power/">it can provide similar services</a> as legal institutions.</p>
<p>Law-enforcement agencies now <a href="http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol5no4BroadhurstandLee.pdf">routinely observe convergence and connectivity</a> among different Asian crime groups. Former ethnic or linguistic distinctions once associated with traditional organised crime groups, for instance, are now blurred. And major Chinese and Japanese crime groups are increasingly connected with Mexican, West African, Iranian and South Asian crime groups. </p>
<p>This reflects the impact of the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2115290">globalisation of trade and the increasing wealth</a> of China, India and the region. Opportunities abound for <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crime-areas/Organized-crime/Organized-crime">expanding into industries or locations</a> unhampered by existing protection providers.</p>
<p>Strategic violence still <a href="http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/content/50/5/851.short">plays a crucial role in enforcing contracts</a> in illicit markets and establishing distribution markets. Hong Kong triads, such as the Sun Yee On, merged with or rented local protection services in China and Southeast Asia as China opened up its economy.</p>
<p>These looser macro-criminal networks are <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2014.920148">often referred to as “red-black”</a> in Chinese, a euphemism for collaboration between the criminal world and corrupt elements of the state. This occurs at the county level in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2115290">China or at the sub-state level in the Golden Triangle</a>, as the tri-state confluence of Myanmar, Laos and China is known. </p>
<p>The Triangle is now also known for the mass production of amphetamine-type stimulants, such as ecstasy, built on the older tradition of opium production and heroin refinement. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148380/original/image-20161202-25674-1acpqcy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Along with amphetamine-type stimulants, ice pills and heroin are transported from production areas in northeast Myanmar in modest quantities of a kilogram or less — below the prevailing legal threshold for trafficking — to markets in Bangkok, Yangon or Kunming. This method, known as “<a href="http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/2/7/2/1/p127219_index.html?phpsessid=bh8ci6kbkg4gga6k1qrhd2b0t5">ants moving house</a>”, earns the successful smuggler US$2000 per run. </p>
<p>Larger amounts may be diverted via Cambodia for tran-shipment to highly profitable markets <a href="https://www.acic.gov.au/publications/intelligence-products/organised-crime-australia">such as Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.acic.gov.au/publications/intelligence-products/illicit-drug-data-report">Japan, where premium wholesale prices beckon</a>.</p>
<h2>Ineffective law enforcement</h2>
<p>The lack of effective action to suppress problems such as illegal drugs, counterfeiting and wildlife extraction reflects <a href="https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2016/02/organized-crime-southeast-asia/story.html">ASEAN’s relatively weak integration with regard to security problems</a>. Until there’s a sense that ASEAN is a community with a shared fate, effective co-ordination to combat organised crime is likely to be little more than window dressing. </p>
<p>Most Asian governments have given economic development priority over concerns about illicit trade and organised crime. Progress against organised crime will remain ad hoc unless this changes.</p>
<p>Worthy but nonsensical aspirations to be a “drug-free” region by 2015, set out at the <a href="http://asean.org/joint-statement-of-the-tenth-asean-ministerial-meeting-on-transnational-crime-10th-ammtc-consultation/">2010 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime</a>, and the Work Plan on Combating Illicit Drug Production, Trafficking and Use <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2115290">adopted in 2010 by the seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting</a> on Transnational Crime, signal this weakness.</p>
<p>Alternative policies that seek to regulate recreational drugs and the pursuit of harm-reduction strategies would help undercut the profits of criminal groups. Policies that reorient consumer choices to undercut the goods and services organised crime provides would also help. </p>
<p>The key to effective suppression of organised crime will be the action of the ASEAN+3 group (the three being China, Japan and South Korea). </p>
<p>China’s awakening to the high cost of fake and often dangerous products, as well as the perils of using “ice” for the young, should help reduce the scale of organised crime activities in the region. Chinese-led <a href="http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_PrecursorChemicalReport%20071816_0.pdf">restrictions on the export of precursor chemicals</a> – effective from late 2015 – could be significant if followed by India and ASEAN. </p>
<p>Harsh alternatives are brutal and undermine the rule of law. Attempts to curtail demand by resorting to extrajudicial police killings may have popular appeal, but as with former Thai prime minister <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs">Thaskin Shinawatra’s controversial 2003 war on drugs</a>, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s campaign against drug pushers may ultimately serve to <a href="http://theconversation.com/dutertes-war-on-drugs-bitter-lessons-from-thailands-failed-campaign-66096">consolidate crime groups, raise protection costs and temporarily displace activities</a> to less hostile locations.</p>
<p>By December 3, Duterte’s “war on drugs” had seen <a href="http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines-war-drugs">2,028 drug crime suspects killed</a> during police operations while <a href="http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines-war-drugs">3,841 deaths had been attributed</a> to vigilantes. The high risk of homicides involving vigilantism shows the campaign is out of control and corrosive of the independence of courts. </p>
<p>Any hope of reducing the impact of transnational crime will depend on reducing the demand for illicit products as well as enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of law enforcement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roderic Broadhurst does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Organised crime groups are profiting from the fruits of globalisation such as free-trade agreements as well as the massive upgrade of the region’s infrastructure and connectivity now underway.Roderic Broadhurst, Chair professor, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/660962016-09-29T06:35:22Z2016-09-29T06:35:22ZDuterte’s war on drugs: bitter lessons from Thailand’s failed campaign<p>The body count from Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs” is growing by the day. While he’s not the first national leader to condone violence and extrajudicial killings in the name of controlling illicit drug use, Duterte would be wise to learn from Southeast Asian history on what works, and what doesn’t.</p>
<p>Duterte’s policy has already resulted in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-16/duterte-drug-war-overkill-creating-crisis-in-philippines/7850424">more than 3,000 casualties</a>, leading to broad international condemnation. </p>
<p>The deaths have resulted in either police operations where suspects have resisted arrest or summary executions by unknown perpetrators. Drug pushers and users are voluntarily surrendering to the police in <a href="http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/14/16/60000-drug-users-pushers-have-surrendered-palace">huge numbers</a>, exacting a toll in the country’s already <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/21/asia/philippines-overcrowded-jail-quezon-city/">overcrowded jail system</a>. Nor are there enough <a href="http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/07/26/drug-rehab-program.html">drug rehabilitation centres</a> to absorb many of them.</p>
<p>Other countries have adopted similar policies in the past - only to see them <a href="http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/war-on-drugs/">fail</a>. </p>
<p>Colombia’s drug war resulted in the deaths of powerful members of drug cartels, for instance, but also in skyrocketing levels of violence, marginalisation, and human rights violations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139337/original/image-20160926-31837-537wn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Duterte wants to keep on his ‘bloody war’ against the drug dealers and takers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jorge Silva/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Thailand’s drug war</h2>
<p>The most salutary tale for Duterte comes from Thailand. The drug war waged in the early 2000s by former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra could hold important lessons for the Filipino government about the unforeseen political consequences of condoning violence in the name of controlling crime.</p>
<p>Launched in 2003, Thaksin’s war on drugs bears significant similarities to what’s happening in the Philippines. Like Duterte, Shinawatra was very popular, managing to lead a one-party administration in a country used to government by coalition. This strong electoral mandate allowed him to take on his country’s gargantuan and systemic drug problem.</p>
<p>As one of the world’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/WindleThailand-final.pdf">major transit points</a> for narcotics, drug-use had been common in Thailand since the 1950s. But in the 1990s, the use of methamphetamines (known in Thai as <a href="http://www.cesar.umd.edu/cesar/drugs/yaba.asp"><em>ya ba</em></a>) started to cause concern among Thai political elites. </p>
<p>Most methamphetamines were produced on the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/world/asia/07thai.html?_r=0">Thailand-Myanmar border</a> by ethnic Burmese rebels, who used sales to finance their armed struggle. But the drug was largely consumed by the rural working class Thais, due to its affordable price.</p>
<p>When the media began reporting rising methamphetamine use among young people, <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thai-drug-war.htm">key political figures</a>, particularly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm">King Bhumibol Adulyadej</a> and his privy council, expressed grave concern. </p>
<p>A former police lieutenant colonel himself, Thaksin declared an all-out war against <em>ya ba</em>. Drug dealers were labelled enemies of the state, and after <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7260127.stm">three months and 2,500 deaths</a>, the prime minister proclaimed victory.</p>
<p>Thailand’s war on drugs was carried out through collaboration between local governors and police officers. Government officials compiled “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2008/02/07/thaila17993.htm">blacklists</a>” which led to arrests and, in many cases, extrajudicial killings. As the bodies piled up, the police claimed that most deaths resulted from rival drug cartels killing each other to avoid betrayal by their <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/02/21/thailand.drugs/">accomplices</a>.</p>
<p>The pressure on the police to measure their success was paramount, and it was defined by the body count. This metric reinforced the existing hierarchy, already prone to abuse, corruption and even complicity in the drug trade. </p>
<p>Police targets normally consisted of the “small fish” within the drug network (low-level dealers, for instance, and hill tribe villagers). Rarely did the lists contain drug lords themselves but every death in the war counted as a step toward success. </p>
<p>According to an <a href="http://www.nationmultimedia.com/homeMost-of-those-killed-in-war-on-drug-not-involved-i-30057578.html">official investigation</a> launched after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/19/thailand">the 2006 military coup</a> that wrenched power from Thaksin, 1,400 people out of the 2,500 killed as part of the war on drugs had nothing to do with drugs. And profitable drug routes from Myanmar reportedly remained intact, protected by the Myanmar and Thai government bureaucracy and business <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/drug-trafficking-meth-cocaine-heroin-global-drug-smuggling">elites</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the violent and bloody crackdown, the Thai population <a href="https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/05/thai-m09.html">largely endorsed Thaksin’s war</a>. Prior to his downfall in 2006, the prime minister was admired by both his supporters and critics for his business-oriented efficiency, policy decisiveness and resilience in the face of harsh criticism. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139338/original/image-20160926-31853-qoppod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thailand’s former premier Thaksin Shinawatra launched a failed campaign against drugs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yuriko Nakao/Reuters</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The former prime minister successfully controlled the discourse of the war, even in the face of reports of human rights violations. He claimed the drug war was necessary, and that Thais should turn a blind eye to the inevitable “collateral damage” of his campaign. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm#_ftnref8">Public opinion</a> supported the campaign; some surveys showed support of 97.4%. </p>
<h2>Lessons for Duterte</h2>
<p>Thailand’s experience shows that the real culprits at the top of the drug pyramid often escape extralegal approaches to eradicating drug problems with impunity. After thousands of deaths, Colombia and Mexico discovered the same truth decades ago. </p>
<p>Networks of illegal drug supply go beyond any one country’s sovereign borders. The Philippines is a producer, a transit point, and a consumer of <a href="http://www.pctc.gov.ph/illicit-drug-trafficking.html">narcotics</a>. Each role requires specific policies that involve the entire state apparatus, as well as civil society. </p>
<p>The drug trade is a transnational threat; this means neighbouring states have to work together to fight. In this sense, Duterte’s plea for <a href="http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/06/1620914/duterte-laos-seeks-asean-unity-vs-terror-drugs">regional cooperation</a> on illegal drugs is a step in the right direction and should be supported by other ASEAN countries.</p>
<h2>Drugs and democracy</h2>
<p>Political leaders who want to wage wars against illegal drugs also open the possibility of power abuse from the security sector. In places with rampant corruption, lack of police professionalism, a culture of impunity, and links between drug lords and political elites, governments are susceptible to declare “regimes of exception” where security forces are given extra-legal powers in order to succeed in their mission. </p>
<p>Duterte has already hinted at <a href="http://www.rappler.com/nation/146824-duterte-revive-philippine-constabulary">militarising the police</a> to combat illegal drugs, a move that will erode the gains made from security sector reform and democratisation in the Philippines after 1986.</p>
<p>Duterte still has the chance to turn away from his current approach and form a more sensible policy that uses less force, involves the participation of local communities, and looks at the issue of illicit drugs in all its dimensions. </p>
<p>Illicit drug use is a health issue that requires targeted, non-criminal, interventions starting with the individual. It’s also a systemic problem that requires sociopolitical measures that address poverty, corruption and social exclusion. </p>
<p>Unlike Thaksin, Duterte can pivot away from his current approach toward a more comprehensive anti-drug framework. Thaksin’s drug war dealt a double whammy to Thailand’s democracy – the scorched earth policy not only undermined state accountability, but it was also used as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2008/09/2008935491945127.html">ammunition</a> by the elite opposition in the military coup that toppled him in 2006.</p>
<p>Critics of Duterte should not merely provide strong condemnation. Instead, they should understand the underlying political context of human rights in the Philippines and constructively argue for policy to turn away from lethal strategies. Stubborn opposition with the goal of <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/817072/duterte-ouster-plots-wont-be-taken-lightly-palace">destabilising</a> a popular government will be met with an equally bitter reaction from the state. </p>
<p>The Philippines can avoid being dragged into a downward spiral of political polarisation, something Thailand is currently experiencing. If not, then the Philippines might also end up with a tragic democracy just like its neighbour to the west.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aries Arugay is also Executive Director of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. a Manila-based policy think tank.</span></em></p>Can Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte learn anything from Thailand’s failed campaign against drugs in the early 2000s? Maybe to adopt a less bloody and more comprehensive approach.Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityAries Arugay, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of the PhilippinesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.