tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/tripartite-alliance-19147/articlesTripartite Alliance – The Conversation2022-01-10T15:48:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1744712022-01-10T15:48:43Z2022-01-10T15:48:43ZHistorian offers comprehensive and up-to-date take on South Africa’s Communist Party<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439822/original/file-20220107-33062-bo50di.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa addresses a meeting of the SACP in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS: Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Communist Party of South Africa was formed in July 1921. To mark its centenary last year, renowned South African historian Tom Lodge <a href="https://www.loot.co.za/product/tom-lodge-red-road-to-freedom/jssb-7247-ga90?referrer=googlemerchant&gclid=CjwKCAiA5t-OBhByEiwAhR-hm6OaW-KlOjRMByLvjvPZIQ1L1hYLP6oNj2xHlUqMgskisxFlC9cR5RoCBkUQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">published</a> Red Road to Freedom: A history of the South African Communist Party, 1921-2021.</p>
<p>It’s a welcome addition to the literature on the oldest communist party in Africa.</p>
<p>Most of the existing literature on the Party is about its early history until 1950. Some of the books were written by party members such as <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/eddie-roux-time-longer-rope-review">Eddie Roux</a>, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/class-and-colour-south-africa-1850-1950-h-j-and-r-e-simons">Jack and Ray Simons</a>, and <a href="https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/bunting-brian/kotane/index.htm">Brian Bunting</a>. </p>
<p>In the last two decades, a number of publications on the Party or leading members appeared. <a href="https://jacana.co.za/author-2/eddy-maloka/">Eddy Maloka</a> wrote two publications, <a href="https://monthlyreview.org/press/alan-wieder-morning-talk/">Alan Wieder</a> concentrated on Joe Slovo and Ruth First, while <a href="http://ukznpress.bookslive.co.za/blog/2015/02/16/steven-friedman-explains-why-the-contribution-of-harold-wolpe-is-still-relevant-today-video/">Steven Friedman</a> concentrated on Harold Wolpe. Some (auto)biographical publications or memoirs also appeared in this period on <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1200391.Slovo">Joe Slovo</a>, Govan Mbeki, Chris Hani, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347815776_The_Fabric_of_Dissent_Public_Intellectuals_in_South_Africa">Mzala</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-spy-bible-a-real-life-south-african-thriller-but-too-much-left-unsaid-134803">Moe Shaik</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Bram_Fischer.html?id=V4oFAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">Bram Fisher</a>.</p>
<p>Most of the publications are chronologically organised and few take a thematic approach. Policy analysis and exegesis are in most instances largely absent. A good example is what the party meant by its notion of <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/colonialism-of-a-special-type-lives-on">“colonialism of a special type”</a>. First formulated in 1950 and included in the party’s 1962 party programme, it remains a major ideological pillar of the party. </p>
<p>But its ideological and strategic implications aren’t explored. This includes explaining how the approach enabled a merger between socialism and liberatory nationalism, how it underscored the two-stage revolutionary strategy of a national democratic revolution followed by a socialist revolution, and for justifying the Tripartite Alliance between the party, the African National Congress and the trade union federation (first Sactu and later Cosatu).</p>
<p>Also largely absent is a history of the more recent developments, as well as a political analysis of the party’s role between 1960-1990 and as part of government since 1994. </p>
<p>Lodge’s book fills some of these gaps. It is therefore academically and historically very important. Eddy Maloka, also an author on the party’s history, assessed its value as follows (on the book cover):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tom Lodge takes us on a century-long tour of the history of the South African Communist Party, through the fractal coastline of this party’s ideological evolution, to the hinterland of its organisational dynamics and relations with other actors. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The Cold War</h2>
<p>The Communist Party of South Africa was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/suppression-communism-act-no-44-1950-approved-parliament">banned in 1950</a> by the new National Party (NP) government, which believed that the Soviet Union’s support for it would exploit South Africa’s domestic politics for its own purposes. After the party reestablished itself underground as the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1953, and after its ally, the African National Congress (ANC) was also banned by the apartheid regime in 1960, a close alliance between them developed. </p>
<p>After the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/sharpeville-massacre-21-march-1960">Sharpeville massacre</a> in 1960, followed by the banning of the ANC and other liberation organisations, and when the NP government refused to convene a national convention in 1961, leaders in the party and a number of prominent ANC leaders (but not the ANC’s President Albert Luthuli) decided to establish an armed wing, <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>. Its first sabotage acts were launched on 16 December 1961. </p>
<p>The resort to armed struggle and the party’s involvement in the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe, brought the two movements much closer together during their time in exile.</p>
<p>The members of Umkhonto we Sizwe’s High Command were arrested in 1962 in Rivonia, a Johannesburg suburb. They were busy with Operation Mayibuye as a blueprint to stage a revolutionary insurrection in South Africa. They included Party members such as Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada and ANC leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. They were charged with sabotage (and not treason) and therefore did not receive the death penalty but very long prison sentences.</p>
<p>If one looks at the Umkhonto we Sizwe accused in the Rivonia trial in 1963, most of them were also members of the Party.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men field questions at a press conference while seated with their backs to Communist Party posters" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/440001/original/file-20220110-25-1lfyd7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former South African Communist Party leaders Joe Slovo, left, and Chris Hani in Soweto in 1991.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Walter Dhladhla /AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During most of the Cold War, the South African Communist Party’s close alignment to the Soviet Union and to the ANC, pulled the liberation struggle in South Africa into the global ideological camps of the Cold War, in the same way as the movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and other liberation wars. In this respect, the South African Communist Party was often regarded as the power behind the ANC’s throne.</p>
<p>The 30 years in exile were divided between establishing bases in African countries, training Umkhonto we Sizwe mainly in Angola and establishing international relations with many continents. The Party’s main base was in London but with close relations especially in the Eastern bloc. Peace processes in Southwestern Africa and the demise of the Soviet Union as its main sponsor, created new opportunities for dialogue and radical political changes.</p>
<p>After its unbanning in 1990 together with the ANC, the relationship continued but its nature changed dramatically. The liberatory strategy changed from targeting the National Party government, to being the government itself. Party leaders became members of that government.</p>
<h2>What’s covered, and what’s not</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/tom-lodge-1256885">Tom Lodge</a> is a trained historian. Most of his early publications were good historiographies. He joined the University of the Witwatersrand’s Department of Political Studies and in the 1980s, and testified for the defence in several ANC trials. He published extensively on the ANC’s politics, and later also on elections.</p>
<p>This book is a return to his earlier works. In the more than 500 pages (excluding the end notes, index and bibliography) and in nine chapters, he presents the most extensive history of the South African Communist Party.</p>
<p>The first six chapters are focused on the period until 1950, and the last three chapters cover the last 70 years.</p>
<p>There are some areas and issues that could have done with more attention. For example, deeper political analysis of the latest 30 years after the Party was unbanned and decided to become a “mass party” as opposed to membership on invitation, as well as its role in the ANC governments. This would provide more insight into the party’s political approach.</p>
<p>In addition, the Party’s ideological evolution deserves special attention. For example, its 1962 party programme, “The Road to South African Freedom”, can be linked to the ANC’s Morogoro programme (1969), “The Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution”. The two documents created a common approach to their revolutionary strategy, which is very important for understanding their longstanding alliance. But Lodge only briefly discusses this on pages 354-355. </p>
<p>Another omission in my view, concerns Joe Slovo’s paper “Has Socialism Failed?” (1990). It is mentioned on page 457 but its implications for the party’s reassessment of its ideological position after the fall of the Berlin Wall were not considered. More recently, the Party has revised “The South African Road to Socialism” (2007, 2012) as its programme. It receives more attention than the other programmes on page 479 but it does not explain how a communist party in a multiparty democratic dispensation sets out a vision for itself.</p>
<p>Chapter 9 distinguishes itself from the others and presents a political analysis of the party dynamics, such as its choice to participate independently in elections. It includes brief references to the party’s milestones but a more in-depth discussion could have addressed the shortcomings of the older publications.</p>
<p>For readers who want a comprehensive, up-to-date and accessible publication on the South African Communist Party, this is without any doubt the best one. As a Wits academic, Lodge, who now is associated with Limerick University in Ireland, had many personal experiences with people and events discussed in this book. It was therefore not merely a research or academic exercise for him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resort to armed struggle brought the Communist Party and the African National Congress much closer together during their time in exile.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1745932022-01-08T19:27:16Z2022-01-08T19:27:16ZRamaphosa’s ANC birthday speech fails to inspire disillusioned South Africans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439884/original/file-20220108-33626-102gp1s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African and African National Congress party's President Cyril Ramaphosa speaks during the ANC's 110th anniversary celebrations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Phill Magakoe /AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The spectators to the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2022-01-08-watch-110-years-of-the-anc-president-cyril-ramaphosa-delivers-january-8-statement/">110th anniversary celebrations</a> of the African National Congress (ANC’s), South Africa’s governing party, looked bored. The dancers roped in to entertain its dwindling faithful were lackluster. Indeed, even during the singing of the national anthem, some in the audience could not even be bothered to stand up. </p>
<p>Then a tired-looking President Cyril Ramaphosa provided an unconvincing statement focusing on unity, renewal and defending democratic gains to an already skeptical South African public. </p>
<p>If ever one needed a reason to ditch the ANC, this <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-the-national-executive-committee-on-the-occasion-of-the-110th-anniversary-of-the-anc-2022/">January 8 statement</a>, which sets out the party’s agenda for the year, was it. It deliberately misdiagnosed the problems confronting the country, it provided no new vision and therefore little hope to the long-suffering citizens. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa admitted that the National Executive Committee (NEC) had gone through 15 drafts of the statement before he delivered it. It was still dismal, highlighting the intellectual deficit in the ANC’s highest decision-making body in between its five-yearly national conferences.</p>
<p>To exacerbate matters, the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/live-feed-january-8-statement-anc-celebrates-110th-anniversary-aff75a42-b1ce-4566-a4d1-1d06bc6aac91">speech</a> seemed to be tailored more to the 1960s than to 2021. It was replete with references to counter revolutionary forces, revolutionary discipline, democratic centralism and the developmental state. None of these leftist slogans, however, offer any tangible solutions for the deep political, economical and social malaise afflicting the country.</p>
<p>Consider here the case of the developmental state, the centre piece of which are the country’s parastatals. But not a single one can turn a profit and all seem to be in terminal decline. </p>
<p>This is a state which is battling to fill potholes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-revolting-against-inept-local-government-why-it-matters-155483">get drinkable water into residents’ taps</a>, keep the lights on, and cannot run an airline or keep trains on <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-20-what-broke-south-african-rail-and-can-it-be-fixed/">track</a>. When is the ANC going to acknowledge that South Africa will be better off privatising the lot of them? </p>
<p>Ramaphosa even acknowledged that a capable state needs an effective public service. But, this begs the question: why does he not start with his own cabinet? There is so much of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/letters/2021-07-21-time-to-chop-deadwood-in-the-cabinet-mr-president/">deadwood</a> around the table. Why not get rid of the incompetents as opposed to recycling them into new portfolios?</p>
<h2>Cold comfort</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa offered citizens leftist political rhetoric as opposed to any concrete plan of action. He provided cold comfort to South Africans who bothered to tune into the proceedings.</p>
<p>The misdiagnosis of the challenges confronting the country was deliberate in that it attempted to exonerate the party of misgovernance. Consider the case of the sluggish economy.</p>
<p>Much of the blame here was laid at the door of the Covid-19 pandemic. The truth is that the economy was already in trouble before the March 2020 lockdown. Much of the reason for the economic evisceration of large numbers of South Africans is precisely because of the ineptitude displayed by ANC deployees in government and its anti-growth policies.</p>
<p>Instead, Ramaphosa refered to the R350 (US$22.45) <a href="https://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits/social-relief-distress">Covid-19 relief grant</a> the ANC has initiated. According to him it lifted 5 million people above the food poverty line. One would expect that as a businessman Ramaphosa would realise that it is hardly sustainable for the majority of South Africans to receive social grants in the midst of a dwindling <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/462062/south-africas-shrinking-tax-base-piles-pressure-on-sars/">tax base</a>.</p>
<p>The emigration of skilled professionals is merely one result of the average South African taxpayer who, despite increasingly carrying a disproportionate tax burden, does not receive much in the way of services. </p>
<p>What is desperately needed for the higher growth path the President articulated is the adoption and urgent implementation of pro-investor and pro-business policies. </p>
<p>This the ANC has been loath to do. And so, the economic malaise continues.</p>
<h2>Safety and security</h2>
<p>On security, Ramaphosa acknowledged that stability was undermined by the July 2021 <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/21/explainer-what-caused-south-africa-s-week-of-rioting/">riots</a> that followed the jailing of former President Jacob Zuma. But, there was no acknowledgement that the riots were the result of the factionalism he referred to which is tearing up the ANC and the country.</p>
<p>If anything, the July riots showed the big lie in the January statement that South Africa needs the ANC to realise a stable and prosperous country providing a better life for all. To be frank, for South Africa to survive, the ANC needs to die. </p>
<p>As commander-in-chief, ultimately the July riots are on Ramaphosa himself. He was the one sitting on the High Level Review <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/analysis/explainer-what-the-2018-high-level-panel-report-into-ssa-found-and-what-was-done-20210202">Report</a> on the security services pointing to their politicisation and criminalisation. </p>
<p>The panel, chaired by academic <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-statement-jsci-welcomes-relocation-ssa-presidency-and-appointment-dr-sydney-mufamadi-national-security-advisor">Sydney Mufamadi</a>, completed its work in December 2018. But its recommendations were not really implemented and for that the dithering President needs to take the blame. Neither has he acted on the stand-off between the Police Minister and his National Police Commissioner which has paralysed the <a href="https://mg.co.za/news/2021-07-06-feud-between-cele-and-sitole-undermines-crime-fighting/">police</a>.</p>
<h2>Social front</h2>
<p>On the social front, Ramaphosa was correct to lay emphasis on gender based violence. But here again, the facts on the ground paint a dismal picture of incompetence. Over 76% of police stations do not have a <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/02/19/cele-denies-there-was-a-shortage-of-rape-kits-at-police-stations-last-year">rape kit</a>.</p>
<p>The president touted the <a href="https://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/2021/05/10/what-is-the-district-development-model/">district development model</a> as the panacea for the ills of local government. This was first touted ten years ago but <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2021/10/13/failure-of-govt-s-district-development-model-blamed-on-anc-infighting">experts</a> have already acknowledged its failure to make good on its promise of service delivery on account of ANC factionalism and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">cadre deployment</a>. </p>
<p>The ANC has largely deployed people on the basis of party loyalty as opposed to the requisite skill sets to staff parastatals and various government departments. <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2952688/anc-cadre-deployment-minutes-made-public-6-january-2022/">Minutes</a> of the ANC’s own cadre deployment committee show that in some cases, candidates applied directly to the ANC as opposed to the government department advertising the vacancy. The committee oversees the ANC’s policy of appointing members and sympathisers to key government positions.</p>
<p>As chair of the ANC’s deployment committee (when he was the deputy president of the ANC) Ramaphosa is equally responsible for the current state of affairs in the country. This includes the mounting evidence of corruption and state capture, most recently <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-report-chronicles-extent-of-corruption-in-south-africa-but-will-action-follow-174441">set out explicitly</a> in the first report from the Zondo commission of inquiry.</p>
<h2>Foreign policy</h2>
<p>On the foreign policy front, the ANC statement demonstrated why South Africa finds itself in such a weakened position in Africa and globally. </p>
<p>There was the expression of solidarity with Cuba – the usual sop to the ANC’s <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">tripartite allies</a> the South African Communist Party and labour federation Cosatu.</p>
<p>There was also the traditional denunciation of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands as well as standing firmly with the Polisario Front in the quest for an independent Saharawi Republic. </p>
<p>These populist positions hardly reflect the reality. In Cuba, the Castro era has already drawn to a close with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/17/cuban-opposition-group-calls-for-more-protests-denounces-arrests">protesting Cubans</a> looking forward to their own New Dawn.</p>
<p>As for the Israeli-Palestinian question, there are tectonic shifts taking place across the Middle East represented by the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/abraham-accords-one-year-later-assessing-impact-and-what-lies-ahead">Abraham Accords</a> and Israel forging ever closer ties with an increasing number of Arab – as well as African – states. </p>
<p>Finally, there is the issue of an independent Saharawi Republic. Given recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/1/31/morocco-rejoins-the-african-union-after-33-years">developments</a>, the realistic option would be for the Polisario Front to accept Morocco’s offer of greater autonomy.</p>
<p>In the final instance, South Africans are led by a dithering president at the helm of an inept political party which has already passed its sell by date.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174593/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Solomon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africans are led by a dithering president at the helm of an inept political party which has already passed its sell by date.Hussein Solomon, Senior Professor and Academic Head of Department: Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296442020-01-09T17:09:27Z2020-01-09T17:09:27ZANC’s anniversary statement – damp squib or new benchmark for South Africa?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309281/original/file-20200109-80148-8j3rgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa and the governing African National Congress. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The statement issued by the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s governing party, each January to mark the anniversary of its launch in 1912, is many things to many people. It is a multipurpose vehicle to celebrate the party’s milestones as well as to mobilise and lure followers. It is both a sermon and a show to keep the faithful close. It also provides a rare window into the state of the organisation. </p>
<p>The statement meshes into ANC election campaigns. The messages and slogans reflect what the organisation believes is necessary and useful to say. It plasters over cracks and is the stage for birthday praise songs and public relations exercises, rather than a frank assessment of the party’s performance and its government.</p>
<p>Yet, year after year the statement also reveals the soul of a former liberation movement that has been <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.18772/12015108844">enduring in government</a>. </p>
<p>Come Saturday 11 January 2020, when the party celebrates its 108th birthday, the statement will be big on popular mobilisation and keeping the poor and the young close. It will reflect on 108 years of the party’s existence and 25 years in power, and prepare for going into a fourth set of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-06-27-cabinet-sets-up-committee-to-prepare-for-2021-municipal-election/">local government elections in 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>Expectations</h2>
<p>This time around the prevailing political, <a href="https://theconversation.com/tough-times-and-bad-advice-are-holding-back-south-africas-economy-125990">economic</a> and government crises add layers of expectations to the January 8 anniversary statement. It will be interpreted as a test for the presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa and his command of the fractious governing party.</p>
<p>It will also be watched for signs of the president’s and his party’s ability to remain faithful to their 2019 election promises of ethical and effective governance, rooting out corruption, and for iterations on already agreed policy directions for the party and its government.</p>
<p>Given that the January 8 statement is not a state-of-the-nation address or a national budget statement, the most that may be hoped for is for it to provide evidence of a president who is confident, clear and courageous. That means a leader who can lead the governing party and the state to give effect to the 2019 statement, which confirms government policy and cleanup priorities for the year. Ramaphosa has allowed himself to be held back, so far, by the tenuous scale of his victory as party leader at the ANC’s national conference <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">in 2017</a>, and the internal threats to his authority. His leadership came to be seen as weak and wavering.</p>
<p>Even if the January 8 statement is a collective document by the ANC’s national executive committee, its highest decision-making body in between its five-yearly elective conferences, Ramaphosa’s tone and choice of words in his delivery will give clues as to the state of the organisation. This at a time of debilitating disunity and internal proxy-policy contests for position and influence <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-07-anc-anniversary-during-a-time-of-crisis/">over the state and its patronage networks</a>.</p>
<p>The ANC’s policy directions to government are by now agreed and confirmed. They have already been announced in the January 8 statements he delivered in 2018 and 2019, even if they are continuously used as weapons in factional party warfare against him. </p>
<p>For example, he is accused of failing to implement agreed party resolutions regarding the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-12-04-parliament-gives-go-ahead-for-land-expropriation-without-compensation/">expropriation of land without compensation</a>, and to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-06-06-no-nationalisation-of-reserve-bank-anc-top-six">nationalise the country’s Reserve Bank</a>. The processes to change land policy are unfolding in conformity with the policy resolutions, even if incrementally. The Reserve Bank resolution is tame enough to follow.</p>
<p>These policy directions have been transferred into government processes, and have been aligned with dire socio-economic needs and requirements for stable government. The questions that remain are the speed and determination of implementation. Ramaphosa’s delivery of the address could go a long way to confirming his ownership of “contested” policies, and his command of the ANC.</p>
<p>Other watermarks that will define the 2020 statement will be improved public service and administration, as promised in January 2019. And so will the trapeze act to restructure and rescue state-owned enterprises. Such a restructuring has to be done without alienating labour, in particular the ANC’s governing alliance partners – the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Congress of South African Trade Unions</a> and the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a>.</p>
<h2>Tough task</h2>
<p>The ANC’s task of positioning the 2020 statement will be complicated. There is hardly an angle, spin or tactic that has not yet been offered in the January 8 statements to date, especially in the 25 years since it assumed power. The increasingly cynical citizens have <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-january-8th-statements">heard it all before</a>.</p>
<p>With only minor exceptions, each statement has had an overarching theme, pertinent to the times, to help mobilise for organisational unity and people’s support of the ANC. These two frequent <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anc-january-8th-statements">past themes</a> also reflect problems in today’s ANC. </p>
<h2>Electioneering</h2>
<p>The 2020 January 8 statement will also be a typical pre-election-year statement. Expect emphasis on mobilisation and unity, and reassurances that the ANC remains on the side of the poor. All this despite lacklustre government performance, corruption and squandering of state resources.</p>
<p>A foretaste of the 2021 local elections could already be seen in ANC top officials saying that the statement will aim at <a href="http://www.702.co.za/podcasts/176/the-best-of-breakfast-with-bongani-bingwa/278075/the-anc-wants-to-revive-hope-ahead-of-8-jan-statement">instilling and reviving hope</a>. </p>
<p>The core ANC anniversary theme will be to bring the people back into its fold, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-05-16-the-2019-elections-partial-endorsements/">even if this task is progressively difficult</a>. </p>
<p>It will find the statistics to persuade South Africans that progress has been definitive, that the state can still turn the corner – just needing the ongoing endorsement of a former liberation movement that is valiantly challenging the monster of past injustices.</p>
<p>The electorate has become increasingly cynical and distrusting of the ANC government’s ability to <a href="https://www.bbrief.co.za/2018/03/06/2018-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-a-further-drop-in-trust-in-south-africa/">give substance to its aspirational statements</a>. But when it comes to elections and voter choices, the party remains largely unchallenged. This confidence is likely to be tangible in the January 8 statement.</p>
<h2>Towards a real “New Dawn”?</h2>
<p>The task for the ANC is to show that the arrogance of wielding such enormous power, despite its <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-05-16-the-2019-elections-partial-endorsements/">fractiousness and fragility as an organisation</a>, does not further contaminate government. That every ounce of time and resources is expended working for the people of South Africa. Only if and when that happens can the now clichéd <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-03-20-from-new-dawn-to-dust-the-implosion-of-ramaphoria/">New Dawn</a> promised by President Ramaphosa become reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129644/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Booysen is affiliated with Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA).</span></em></p>The most that may be hoped for from the party’s annual statement is evidence of a president who is confident, clear and courageous.Susan Booysen, Research director at Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (Mistra), Visiting Professor and Professor Emeritus, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1202362019-07-11T11:32:28Z2019-07-11T11:32:28ZSpat over toll roads in South Africa shows poor people don’t count<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283666/original/file-20190711-173338-1vzbhx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An electronic toll gantry on a Johannesburg highway.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Beate Wolte</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most South Africans are poor. But this does not prevent politicians treating them as though they don’t exist.</p>
<p>The invisibility of poor people in the country, who are estimated to make up <a href="https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-official-poverty-numbers/">55,5% of the population</a> was on display recently as David Makhura, Premier of Gauteng Province, the country’s economic heartland, and the Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/mboweni-vs-makhura-heated-twitter-war-over-e-tolls-saga-28756404">aired their differences on Twitter</a>. The topic was the electronic tolling (known locally as e-tolls) of freeways in Gauteng.</p>
<p>The Gauteng African National Congress (ANC), which Makhura leads, has responded to a backlash against the tolls by urging that they be <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2030791/anc-gauteng-peoples-march-against-e-tolls-another-election-ploy-da/">removed </a>. The national government in which Mboweni serves, and is also led by the ANC, imposed the tolls and continues to support them, at least in principle. So, while the spat transfixed people who believe that interesting human activity happens only on Twitter, the fact they were arguing was of no great moment: both were expressing the position of their sphere of government.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the exchange was revealing – but not for the reasons which fascinated the Twitter-struck media. It showed once again how invisible poor people are in South Africa’s politics.</p>
<h2>Opposition to e-tolls</h2>
<p>The battle against electronic tolls in Gauteng is usually portrayed as the fight of “the people” against an unjust government. In reality, it is a revolt by car owners who don’t want to pay for the freeways on which they drive. Buses and minibus taxis, the transport used by the poor, are exempt from the tolls. So, people who can afford to own a vehicle pay to use the freeways on which everyone drives. </p>
<p>This is a textbook example of progressive taxation -– those who have more pay for services so that they are available to the poor too.</p>
<p>Owners rebel against paying for public goods around the world and so it is not surprising that car owners have mobilised against the tolls. Nor is the fact that Makhura and the Gauteng ANC want the tolls gone -– people who can afford cars are plentiful in Gauteng, and so the tolls have dented the ANC’s <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/gauteng-anc-to-discuss-e-tolls-at-provincial-conference/">voter support in the province</a>. It’s also not surprising that the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which is in a governing alliance with the ANC, is a strong opponent of tolls: many union members own cars.</p>
<p>What is surprising is that opposition to e-tolls is an article of faith among organisations and people who claim to want a fairer distribution of society’s wealth: it is odd when people who claim to be fighting for the poor condemn anyone who suggests that car owners should be tolled so that poor people can use freeways without paying. If they take the side of the car owners, who speaks for the poor?</p>
<p>The obvious answer would surely be the government which has introduced the tolls. We should expect to hear national government explaining that e-tolls are a boon to the poor and so help to build a fairer economy. We might also expect that, when car owners are campaigning for the tolls to be scrapped, government politicians would be mobilising support among the poor, explaining that their right to ride on the highways for free is under threat.</p>
<p>But, as Mboweni’s response to Makhura shows, government representatives never defend the tolls as a pro-poor tax. The minister’s argument is an energetic defence of the “user pay” principle – the idea that public infrastructure should be paid for by those who use it. This is not necessarily pro-poor because it could mean that poor people who use it should pay the same as well-off users. Not once during the exchange does Mboweni suggest that e-tolls are a good idea because they help the poor.</p>
<h2>Pro-poor by default</h2>
<p>Mboweni’s lack of interest in pointing out that the tolls help the poor is standard – there is no record of any government politician defending tolls because they help poor people. And so, it comes as no great surprise that the decision to exempt buses and minibus taxis was taken some time after the government decided to introduce the tolls. It was a response to lobbying and was not the government’s idea. Nor is it surprising to hear complaints that minibus taxi drivers have difficulties in receiving exemptions to which they are entitled.</p>
<p>E-tolls help the poor not because the government wanted this but because this deflected pressure. They are pro-poor not because of the government but despite it.</p>
<p>So, the poor are ignored by those who claim to speak for them and by the government which seemed to care about them but doesn’t.</p>
<p>This reality is not restricted to the e-toll debate. It is common for debates about poverty to exclude poor people. The only group who have been ignored in the debate over land expropriation are landless people. A few were taken to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/04/parly-concludes-public-hearings-on-land-expropriation">public hearings</a> on the issue because the people who arranged for them to attend knew they would support their position. But no-one made a serious attempt to listen to what the landless had to say about land.</p>
<p>It is also common for measures which would hurt the poor – like scrapping e-tolls – to be portrayed as pro-poor. A well-known example is free higher education which would allow the rich to study for free. Another is the revival of the demand a couple of decades ago that <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/the-economics-of-south-african-townships-special-focus-on-diepsloot">township</a> residents – who are mostly poor – pay a <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/Soweto-residents-want-flat-electricity-rate-but-use-energy-hungry-appliances-20150510">flat rate</a> for services. This means that those who have more pay the same as those who have almost nothing.</p>
<p>Why is it so common for activists and politicians to pass off measures which help the better off as boons for the poor? One possibility is that this is a legacy of the fight against apartheid.</p>
<h2>Apartheid legacy</h2>
<p>A key apartheid strategy was to divide people – and black people in particular. And so, it became a key goal of the movements trying to free people from white minority rule to stress the unity of black people. They knew that some had more than others, but mentioning this would undermine the unity which the movements prized. Those who worried out loud that important differences were being ignored were told that they would be addressed after the system was defeated. </p>
<p>But old ways of thinking and acting become ingrained and so, ignoring the difference between the well-off and the poor survives, whatever slogans people use.</p>
<p>As long as this continues, poor people will remain unheard - and will be forced to endure plans to better their lives which do nothing for them and a great deal for those who don’t need help.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politicians oppose toll roads on Johannesburg’s highways, yet they are textbook example of progressive taxation that favours the poor.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1174282019-05-21T13:41:08Z2019-05-21T13:41:08ZRamaphosa’s cabinet: who and what’s needed to end South Africa’s malaise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275677/original/file-20190521-23820-vt85gc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C38%2C1806%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa won't have free reign when choosing his Cabinet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africans recently went to the polls in a national election which the African National Congress (ANC) won by a wide margin. The incumbent president Cyril Ramaphosa will shortly appoint a cabinet after parliament officially declares him president. Thabo Leshilo asked Mzukisi Qobo, Cheryl Hendricks and Seán Muller what he should focus on.</em></p>
<p><strong>Given that Ramaphosa probably has less than five years in the job, what cabinet posts should be his top priority?</strong></p>
<p><strong><em>Cheryl Hendricks:</em></strong> He needs to leave a legacy and live up to his promise of a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-promises-corruption-crackdown-at-maiden-sona-20180216">new dawn</a>. He therefore needs to concentrate on a few things that will make maximum impact. These include changing the conditions that generate high levels of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-seriously-consider-taxing-its-wealthy-citizens-116073">inequality</a>, as well as those that have made South Africa’s state institutions dysfunctional and have reduced its international standing. </p>
<p>So his top priority cabinet posts should be: basic education and higher education, economic development, finance, trade and industry, rural development and land reform, public enterprises, international relations and science and technology. </p>
<p>Finally, he needs to attend to the representation of women. South Africa has lost a lot of ground in the struggle to translate gender representation into gender equality and women’s peace and security. </p>
<p><em><strong>Seán Muller:</strong></em> There are four main dimensions that could be considered: strategic institutions, policy direction, effectiveness of the state and institutions for delivery. Ideally, Ramaphosa needs to pursue major improvements on each of the four dimensions in parallel.</p>
<p>What will be crucial in the context of rolling back the influence of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-14-00-definition-of-state-capture">state capture</a> on strategic institutions will be who he appoints to justice and correctional services, police, state security, as well as the economics cluster (notably finance and public enterprises). </p>
<p>Then there are the posts that will be important in determining policy and delivery of social services. These include social development, health, education, water and sanitation, transport, and human settlements. Many of these are also important for economic services, along with departments like energy, mineral resources, communications, telecommunications and postal services, tourism and agriculture, forestry and fisheries. </p>
<p>Finally, there are departments that should play a key role in the effectiveness of the state itself. These include the departments of public service and administration, and cooperative governance and traditional affairs. Within the presidency there’s performance monitoring and evaluation. </p>
<p>To the extent that prioritisation is necessary, Ramaphosa has to ensure that reform of critical institutions is placed first – for the simple reason that everything else will be compromised if this fails. </p>
<p><strong><em>Mzukisi Qobo</em></strong> There are limits to Ramaphosa’s reform agenda in the next five years. For him to succeed, he will need to rely on highly competent technocrats to drive change within government, take bold and decisive action in reforming institutions early on, and take measures that may make him unpopular but have good results. For this to happen he will have to stare his party down and be his own man. The last time he put his cabinet together, his party constrained his options. The result was <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2018/03/07/ramaphosa_dilemma-divided-cabinet">a watered down compromise</a>. He can’t afford that this time.</p>
<p>But it will be hard for him to find capable ministers. This is true even in the economic cluster, apart from <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/finance-ministry/tito-mboweni-mr">Tito Mboweni</a> in the finance ministry and <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/pravin-gordhan/">Pravin Gordhan</a> in the department of public enterprises. Yet the economy is an area that will likely define the next five years of his term (if he completes it). With unemployment at <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">27.6%</a>, economic performance and job creation in particular will be yardsticks against which his success will be measured.</p>
<p><strong>What attributes should he be looking for in these key positions?</strong></p>
<p><strong><em>Cheryl Hendricks:</em></strong> People with integrity, people who have leadership skills and people who have a vision for the positions they will be stepping into. People with fresh ideas to deal with old challenges and who are willing to do the hard work it will take to rebuild the country. He needs a cabinet with a healthy mix of experience and youthfulness and gender balance. </p>
<p><em><strong>Seán Muller:</strong></em> A common error is to think that ministerial positions should be filled on the basis of area-specific expertise. This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of ministers relative to senior officials (like the director general of a department). Ministers serve a political function and need not have any particular expertise in an area. </p>
<p>What matters is a general level of competence, commitment to their mandate and the public interest, and respect for the separation between political and bureaucratic competence. A minister’s core functions are arguably to ensure that the officials leading the department are the best – technically and ethically – and that they are allowed and enabled to do their job. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275681/original/file-20190521-23820-1x4czeh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Tito Mboweni will be hard to replace an Finance Minister.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
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<p>Public confidence in the integrity of members of Cabinet is an intangible factor that is also important. But there’s tension between this and the challenges Ramaphosa faces within his own party. It is these that are likely to lead to the greatest compromises in cabinet appointments. Ultimately, it will do the country little good if he appoints the best Cabinet possible without factoring in party political considerations, only to then be so weakened within his party that he and his appointees cannot pursue the public interest.</p>
<p><strong><em>Mzukisi Qobo</em></strong>: The cabinet is a reflection of the quality and depth of the governing party’s leadership bench, whose heft has been in decline over the years. Even the best of its parliamentarians will struggle to bring renewed energy to the job. Many of them are recycled, as they were part of the political arrangements in the last nine years of corruption and institutional decay under former President Jacob Zuma. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-anc-itself-is-the-chief-impediment-to-ramaphosas-agenda-108781">Why the ANC itself is the chief impediment to Ramaphosa’s agenda</a>
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<p>And, there is no evidence that they did much to ameliorate its damage. Some, such as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jeffrey-thamsanqa-radebe-mr">Jeff Radebe</a>, have been in government for two decades. There is no evidence of innovative thinking in their approach to governance. </p>
<p>Under such circumstances, Ramaphosa may find himself relying a lot on informal networks, especially business links, outside of government. But this could undercut his credibility among constituencies within the governing <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">tripartite alliance</a>.</p>
<p>Success requires a combination of experience, competence, integrity, and fresh ideas. This is particularly true in ministries such as the National Treasury, and those that interface with critical sectors of the economy such as agriculture, telecommunications, mineral resources, energy, and transport. </p>
<p>Since early 2018 there have been strong indications that Ramaphosa will overhaul the current structure of cabinet as part of institutional reconfiguration of government. The low-hanging fruit will be to reduce the size of the cabinet. Even a country like China, 20 times larger than South Africa, has a cabinet with 24 ministers compared to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-would-do-well-to-fire-all-its-deputy-ministers-58809">South Africa’s 35</a>. There is more emphasis on quality and meritocracy and less on viewing cabinet positions purely from the view of dispensing patronage.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has a very difficult task ahead. Constitutionally, he can only appoint two individuals who are not members of parliament to his cabinet. That means he has to choose his cabinet from the list of MPs who are political fossils and were, by and large, part of the problem during Zuma’s administration. </p>
<p>The reality is that most MPs have a poor grasp of their oversight roles, are often out of depth on how government works, are under-prepared, and many see themselves as no more than deployees of the ruling party.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seán Mfundza Muller receives funding from a European Union-funded project, "Putting People back in Parliament", led by the Dullah Omar Institute (University of the Western Cape), in collaboration with the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Public Service Accountability Monitor (Rhodes) and Heinrich Boell Foundation (South Africa). He is affiliated with the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (University of Johannesburg), regularly making inputs to Parliament oversight of the national budget, advising civil society groups on public finance matters and consulting for private sector organisations on an ad hoc basis. He resigned from the South African Parliamentary Budget Office in 2016. The views expressed are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks is the Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa at the Human Science Research Council which receives funding from multiple funding sources.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mzukisi Qobo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Cyril Ramaphosa has to ensure that reform of critical institutions is placed first. Everything else will be compromised if this fails.Seán Mfundza Muller, Senior Lecturer in Economics and Research Associate at the Public and Environmental Economics Research Centre (PEERC), University of JohannesburgCheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilMzukisi Qobo, Associate Professor: International Business & Strategy, Wits Business School, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101602019-01-22T13:56:28Z2019-01-22T13:56:28ZWhy Ramaphosa can’t stop the ANC’s decline, even with a win at the polls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254695/original/file-20190121-100279-1o18z6l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A victory at the polls might not be enough to give President Cyril Ramaphosa the leeway to fix South Africa's economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent months there has been conjecture that if South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa wins a suitably large majority of the upcoming national vote, he will be able to achieve two notable outcomes. </p>
<p>Firstly, he’ll be able reverse the governing African National Congress’s (ANC’s) slide into populism and factionalism. And he’ll be able to see off challenges from the radical <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/MelanieVerwoerd/how-the-anc-and-ramaphosa-can-counter-the-populist-eff-20181107">Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)</a>, the country’s third largest party. </p>
<p>The argument is that he would then have a sufficiently strong mandate to undertake economic reforms <a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/only-unpopular-decisions-will-lead-sa-out-of-zuma-ruins-20181113">needed to fix South Africa</a>. This includes broadening competition, limiting the size and scope of the state-owned entities and expanding the public transport system. Other things that need fixing include reducing red tape to boost entrepreneurship and small businesses, improving the education system and trade integration <a href="https://oecdecoscope.blog/2018/03/05/south-africa-it-is-time-to-rekindle-the-economy/">in the region</a>.</p>
<p>But critics and opposition party leaders hold a counter view. They argue that voters vote for the ANC – not for Ramaphosa. And that Ramaphosa only serves at the behest of the ANC’s National Executive Committee. Since the NEC is the principle executive arm of the party, this means that internal ANC factionalism <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-11-15-bigger-mandate-for-cyril-ramaphosa-in-2019-will-be-a-bigger-mistake/">is more important</a> than the electorate. </p>
<p>In reality, both these arguments ignore the extent to which Ramaphosa’s post-election reformist ability will be hampered by other factors. The most important of these is the outcome of the dysfunctional ANC <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/anc-postpones-conference-over-list-chaos-20181217">list process</a>. Historically, the compilation of the list of nominations for national and provincial MPs has been fraught with claims of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-01-the-anc-must-take-the-list-process-seriously-or-it-will-be-punished-at-the-polls">fraud and vote-rigging</a>. </p>
<p>Another important factor is the concessions made to the ANC’s alliance partners. These are the trade union federation Cosatu, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the South African National Civic Organisation. Based on recent pronouncements, it appears that the “radical economic transformation” <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-18-the-reserve-bank-and-the-national-democratic-revolutionary-alliance/">ideology</a> of the Zuma-faction has become accepted dogma among alliance members. </p>
<h2>Shortcuts</h2>
<p>Since coming to power in January 2018 Ramaphosa has made notable strides in dismantling <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-12-19-president-cyril-ramaphosa-and-his-team-what-a-difference-179-votes-make">Zuma’s “mafia state”</a>. But he is yet to gain the upper hand in the ANC’s collective policy making. </p>
<p>In addition to the <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/daniel-silke-fears-over-land-expropriation-are-undermining-the-economy-20180901-2">confused statements</a> about land expropriation without compensation, three other policy developments could prove damaging to Ramaphosa’s reformist agenda. </p>
<p>The first was the gazetting of changes to the Property Valuation Act of 2014 <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-13-latitude-for-expropriation-without-compensation-is-already-underway">in November 2018</a>. This seeks to change the formula that will be used to calculate the compensation payable when a property is targeted for land reform. Under the new formula, the value of a property will be determined based on its income. </p>
<p>Naturally, there are fears that if this new valuation formula is used irresponsibly, it could <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-13-latitude-for-expropriation-without-compensation-is-already-underway/">significantly affect</a> residential property values. </p>
<p>The second, contained in the ANC’s recent <a href="https://ewn.co.za/Topic/ANC-election-manifest">election manifesto</a>, is the issue of prescribed assets. The manifesto says the ANC must: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Investigate the introduction of prescribed assets on financial institutions’ funds to mobilise funds within a regulatory framework for socially productive investments (including housing, infrastructure for social and economic development and township and village economy) and job creation while considering the risk profiles of the affected entities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This will require the country’s pension funds and asset management companies to invest a significant portion of the savings of South African citizens in state-owned entities. The problem is that many are mired in corruption and delivery failure. There are fears that <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/prescribed-assets-wont-work-industry/">this capital will be lost</a>.</p>
<p>The third is the contradictory statements about the South African Reserve Bank. On the one side the Zuma-aligned ANC secretary-general, Ace Magashule, recently said that the national reserve bank will be nationalised. He said this would be in line with the resolutions at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-south-africas-anc-bent-on-radical-policies-heres-why-the-answer-is-no-89801">ANC 2017 national conference</a>. And that the aim would be to ensure <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-16-ramaphosa-and-magashule-contradict-each-other-on-reserve-bank-nationalisation/">the adoption</a> of a “flexible monetary policy regime”. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa countered that this resolution was simply a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-16-ramaphosa-and-magashule-contradict-each-other-on-reserve-bank-nationalisation/">“wish or aspiration”</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, the Communist Party claims that nationalisation of the central bank is a tenet of the National Democratic Revolution, which is the central ideology of the governing tripartite alliance. The SACP argues that it’s therefore <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-18-the-reserve-bank-and-the-national-democratic-revolutionary-alliance/">a requirement</a> if the alliance is to support the ANC in the upcoming election. The ANC needs the SACP’s support in the election if it wants to avoid losing votes.</p>
<p>The constitutionality and practicality of all these measures will undoubtedly be challenged in court. Nevertheless, they signal to investors that fixed and liquid assets in South Africa are potentially at risk of government intervention. And, as <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cupintorg/v_3a57_3ay_3a2003_3ai_3a01_3ap_3a175-211_5f57.htm">studies show</a>, financial markets respond negatively to this perception. </p>
<h2>Sunset</h2>
<p>Over the last two decades the goodwill extended towards South Africa after its liberation – as well as the country’s financial defences – have been exhausted. This has been because of poor governance, ill-conceived policy choices and implementation, and democratic immaturity. As with with numerous other national liberation movements in Africa, the ANC has increasingly turned to populist policies as a means to retain power.</p>
<p>Many South Africans are pinning their hopes of economic recovery on a strong Ramaphosa-aligned ANC victory. But the extent of his ability to pursue reforms after the poll depends largely on the outcome of processes outside of the election. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, indications over the last year suggest that despite his promise of a “new dawn”, a Ramaphosa-led ANC election victory is unlikely to reverse the party’s decline in popular support. This raises the prospect of heightened <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-01-21-the-zuma-power-elite-is-alive-kicking-and-preparing-to-replace-ramaphosa/">factional battles</a> in the alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110160/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Gossel receives funding from the University of Cape Town and the National Research Fund.</span></em></p>Indications are that even an ANC victory at the polls is unlikely to reverse the party’s decline in popular support.Sean Gossel, Associate professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1038772018-09-27T13:27:23Z2018-09-27T13:27:23ZSouth Africa’s ruling ANC can no longer count on union ally to win elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/238114/original/file-20180926-48659-dhyo3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa addressing the 13th Cosatu conference.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sowetan/Thulani Mbele</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), may have to fight next year’s general election without hundreds of thousands of votes which its trade union ally has delivered in the past. This isn’t because its alliance partner won’t organise votes for the ANC but because it can’t.</p>
<p>The ANC’s <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">union ally</a>, the Congress of SA Trade Unions (<a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/list.php?type=COSATU%20Press%20Statements&year=2018">Cosatu</a>), held its conference recently. In a now familiar ritual, it suggested it might not support the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-08-14-protect-workers-interests-or-pay-the-price--cosatu-warns-anc/">ANC next year</a>. It then <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2018-09-19-cosatu-confirms-its-support-for-the-anc-in-the-2019-elections/">declared it would</a> – but would expect policy concessions in exchange for support.</p>
<p>No-one except a few reporters looking for material took this seriously. Cosatu regularly insists that its support for the ANC is conditional on the governing party adopting union-friendly policies. But, having stamped its foot, it always supports the ANC. This was so when the ANC was run by former President Jacob Zuma, who many in <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=13611">Cosatu opposed </a>. It’s likely to be even more so now that it is led by President Cyril Ramaphosa, a former Cosatu unionist for whom it campaigned at last year’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/cosatu-endorses-cyril-ramaphosa-as-next-anc-leader-20161124">ANC conference</a>, and who received a rousing welcome when he addressed the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-speaks-out-against-counter-revolutionaries-plotting-to-oust-him-20180917">latest conference</a>.</p>
<h2>A useful past</h2>
<p>Union support at election time has, since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-april-27-in-1994-marked-a-point-of-no-return-for-south-africa-95681">end of apartheid in 1994</a>, been a huge asset for the ANC. </p>
<p>For some years after democracy’s advent, unions were the most organised force in South Africa. Cosatu, as the largest union federation, would use its organisation to mobilise its members – <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=1437">over 2 million</a> at its peak – and their families to support the ANC. No one is sure how many votes it got out for the ANC but it may well have run into millions. In theory, Cosatu backing it next year means that the ANC can rely on those votes again.</p>
<p>Again in theory, this would not only help the ANC to a comfortable majority. It would cement the implied bargain which has governed relations between the ANC and Cosatu since 1994. Its terms are that Cosatu would, despite complaining, allow the ANC to set economic policy as long as the ANC allowed it a veto over labour law changes. Cosatu would also continue campaigning for the ANC as long as the implied bargain held firm. A byproduct was that some Cosatu leaders would end up in parliament and government on the ANC ticket.</p>
<p>But in practice, both the votes which Cosatu mobilised and the implied bargain are in danger.</p>
<h2>A deeper malaise</h2>
<p>On the first score, Cosatu is no longer the organisational hub it was when it mobilised the ANC vote. Its membership has <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/labour/2018-09-21-new-leaders-believe-cosatu-is-rising-again/">dropped to 1.6 million</a>. </p>
<p>Part of the reason is that it expelled its biggest union, the National Union of Metalworkers of SA, which has over <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/labour/2018-05-02-cosatu-would-welcome-numsa-back/">300 000 members</a>. This prompted other splits and the formation of a rival <a href="http://saftu.org.za/">Federation of SA Trade Unions</a>, which has cost Cosatu members. Another reason is the constant loss of jobs in the smokestack industries which used to be Cosatu’s stronghold.</p>
<p>But the membership loss is also a symptom of a deeper malaise. The past few years have seen a weakening of the union movement as the gap between leaders and members has widened, and unions’ ability to mobilise members has declined. </p>
<p>The weakening of the union movement also reflects the country’s economic growth path: the gap between insiders who can enjoy the economy’s benefit and outsiders who can’t has remained. Union leaders have been absorbed into the insiders, leaving their members outside.</p>
<p>This doesn’t mean the end of strike action. Union members feel the economic pinch and so they need wage increases. They still enjoy the power to down tools to push for them. But it does mean the virtual collapse of unions’ ability to mobilise members behind campaigns. A general strike called by Cosatu in 2017 to protest against an unpopular ANC leadership <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-09-29-00-succession-politics-dilutes-cosatu-strike">was a flop</a> as union members ignored the call.</p>
<p>Inevitably, Cosatu’s ability to mobilise voters on the ANC’s behalf has also declined. This must have been a factor in the ANC’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-11-the-partys-over-anc-sees-decline-in-support">electoral setback in 2014</a> in Gauteng, the economy’s heartland, and in its countrywide decline in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-has-remained-dominant-despite-shifts-in-support-base-63285">2016 local elections</a>. </p>
<p>It may well mean that, while Ramaphosa is far more popular among voters than Zuma, the ANC will not reap as many rewards at the polls from the change of leadership as it expected. It may also mean that, since the ANC has no source of organisation which can replace Cosatu, it may never be able to recover much of the electoral ground it has lost and may face continued decline once the post-Zuma effect wears off. Cosatu’s decline could change South Africa’s electoral map.</p>
<h2>Reduced bargaining power</h2>
<p>So, while the national debate often assumes that unions are no longer politically important, Cosatu’s decline may be exerting a major impact on politics by making it much harder for the ANC to retain support.</p>
<p>If this is bad news for the ANC, it may signal further declines in Cosatu’s influence. While its alliance with the ANC is partly the product of a shared history, the ANC’s incentive to preserve Cosatu’s labour law veto has declined because it can no longer deliver millions of votes. </p>
<p>It may be no accident that laws limiting the right to strike are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-changes-to-south-africas-labour-laws-are-an-assault-on-workers-rights-88330">before Parliament</a>. Whatever the merits of these changes, they do mean that the implied bargain is no longer operating fully because they reduce union bargaining power.</p>
<p>So the question is not whether Cosatu will help the ANC win elections, but whether it still can. The signs suggest it cannot – to its own and the ANC’s cost.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Electoral support by trade union federation Cosatu has been a huge asset for South Africa’s governing ANC.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893172017-12-18T13:15:42Z2017-12-18T13:15:42ZVintage Zuma delivers a vengeful swansong, devoid of any responsibility<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199689/original/file-20171218-27607-1xxomej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Jacob Zuma sings before his opening address at the 54th National Conference of the governing ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The hope was that in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-16-in-full--president-jacob-zumas-final-speech-as-anc-president/">opening</a> the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/54th-national-conference">54th National Conference</a> of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma would rise to the occasion, seize the moment of his last address as party president with honesty and leave something worthy of history. For posterity to cherish.</p>
<p>It sounded as though he was taking the bull by the horns when he referred to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/jackson-mthembu-ending-slate-politics-cant-happen-like-instant-coffee-20151108">slate politics</a> as the function of ANC factionalism, which he acknowledged had fractured the governing party, including corrupting its systems and processes. Slate politics are the reason for internecine contests for leadership positions in the ANC, which, as he correctly pointed out, rob the ANC of good leadership.</p>
<p>But, in the end, his narcissistic streak shaped his swansong. It was largely couched in aspirational rather than diagnostic terms. For a political report of a leader whose 10-year tenure was coming to an end, it left much to be desired. </p>
<p>He claimed that he was leaving behind a stronger ANC, a statement he could only make if he’s suffering from delusions of grandeur, or because he’s indulging in self-gratification. Which ever it was, it exposed the dishonesty of the <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/anc-political-report-by-outgoing-president-jacob-zuma/">political report</a> he subsequently delivered, which was cluttered with rhetorical ploys and lacked a coherent theme for the august event. In truth, the divisions in the ANC are at their worst under him. So is its governing <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">Tripartite Alliance</a> - with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-communist-party-strips-the-anc-of-its-multi-class-ruling-party-status-88647">South African Communist Party</a> and labour federation <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-banned-from-speaking-at-cosatu-events-9300206">Cosatu</a> - that it leads.</p>
<h2>An attack on democracy</h2>
<p>Zuma missed the purpose of a valedictory address – to guide the future in the wake of leadership changes. Instead, he became vengeful, taking issue with what he termed ill-discipline in the organisation. Here he was referring to members who <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/just-in-anc-free-state-pec-several-branches-barred-from-attending-elective-conference-20171215">take the ANC to court</a> for violating its own constitution and processes. He suggested that they should be dismissed from the organisation immediately. </p>
<p>This is a strange way of dealing with issues, particularly for a president in a constitutional democracy who spent <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">half of his life</a> selflessly fighting for a more just system of organising society. The idea that someone’s membership of an organisation be immediately terminated when they take it to court to protect their rights is at variance with the principle of the supremacy of the constitution. </p>
<p>Zuma’s suggestion violates the right to external recourse for those aggrieved by internal organisational processes. That it’s even entertained by some in the leadership of the ANC demonstrates the extent of the crisis under Zuma. This is because ideas such as these pose a danger to the party’s <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/what-anc">foundational values</a> - of unity, non-racialism, non-sexism and democracy - as well as to the future of democracy in the country. That is because the ANC, despite its waning electoral performance, remains <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-has-remained-dominant-despite-shifts-in-support-base-63285">politically dominant</a>. Thus, what happens inside it ultimately affects the running of the country, hence it’s imperative <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-countrys-constitutional-court-can-consolidate-and-deepen-democracy-54184">internal party democracy</a> be entrenched in the ANC.</p>
<p>Had Zuma looked objectively and honestly into what led some members to take the ANC to court, his report would have perhaps managed to get to the core of the morass.</p>
<h2>Factional till the end</h2>
<p>Zuma also squandered the last opportunity he had to remove himself from petty factional politics of the ANC and assert himself as a unifier and a statesman. This was his chance to echo the voice of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/oliver-reginald-kaizana-tambo">Oliver Tambo</a>, the revered leader of the ANC who is attributed with holding the organisation together during its turbulent years as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">banned organisation</a>. </p>
<p>But he blew it by making a point of graciously thanking three senior members of the ANC who are leaders of the factions behind <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-03-anc-leadership-race-dlamini-zuma-supporters-in-battle-to-secure-the-final-prize-the-eastern-cape/">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s presidential campaign</a>. These were the ANC Women’s League President <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/the-judiciary-carries-itself-as-if-its-being-lobbied-ancwl-president-20171209">Bathabile Dlamini</a>, ANC Youth’s League <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/anc-conference-2017/2017-12-16-maine-accuses-judges-of-seeking-to-influence-outcome-of-anc-conference/">Collen Maine</a>, and ANC military veterans leader <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-12-16-mkmva-boss-launches-scathing-attack-on-judiciary">Kebby Maphatsoe</a>.</p>
<p>On top of this, his political report lacked the valedictory message of hope for the future. It tinkered at the edges, and largely misrepresented the reality about the state of the ANC. Instead, he fanned the flames of revenge, particularly against those who have consistently tried to hold him accountable. </p>
<p>He made references to corruption, but deflected attention from his alleged implication in it. He set out to create the impression that South Africans are outraged only about corruption in the public sector, not what’s happening in the private sector. A veiled retort to those who have questioned his moral credentials and ethical leadership was that: if you don’t talk about corruption in the private sector, you shouldn’t talk about it in the public sector.</p>
<p>And rather than denouncing slate politics and factionalism, he stuck to lamenting their existence. I believe that the only reason he mentioned them at all was because they have led to splinter groups that have affected the ANC <a href="https://www.power987.co.za/news/read-its-been-an-honor-zumas-full-speech">“quantitatively and qualitatively”</a> . If slate politics hadn’t led to the current malaise, I doubt he would have made any reference to organisational maladies, which have in fact been spawned and sustained by his leadership over the past 10 years.</p>
<p>Zuma has bequeathed the ANC (and the country) a highly divided party, one that is factionalised and a threat to its own existence. Even when history gave him the opportunity to apologise for the mess his leadership has left the country in, the vintage Zuma didn’t want to take responsibility. </p>
<p>It is now left to those picking up the baton to take on the challenging task of returning the ANC to its foundational values of selflessness and service and its stature as a leader of society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from the National Research Foundation(NRF) for his post-graduate studies. He is a member of the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM). He is the Chief Editor of the Journal of Public Administration.</span></em></p>Zuma’s last address to South Africa’s governing party, the ANC, as its president, betrayed his strange way of dealing with issues. He came across as delusional and self-indulgent.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/886472017-12-07T10:09:52Z2017-12-07T10:09:52ZSouth Africa’s communist party strips the ANC of its multi-class ruling party status<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197921/original/file-20171206-896-xftwg3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a fallout between alliance partners the South African Communist Party and the governing ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The South African Communist Party (SACP) has broken with history and challenged the governing African National Congress (ANC) in an election. The SACP’s decision to go it alone in the Metsimaholo municipality by-election marks a new low in relations within the tripartite alliance forged during the struggle against apartheid. The other alliance partner is the trade union federation Cosatu. The contest ended in a hung council, with the ANC taking 16 seats, the Democratic Alliance 11, the Economic Freedom Fighters eight and the SACP three. Politics and Society Editor Thabo Leshilo asked political scientist Professor Dirk Kotze about the development.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the significance of this development?</strong></p>
<p>The decision to contest an election on its own clearly represents a watershed event for the SACP. It is the first tangible step towards implementation of a <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/12th_congress/resolutions.pdf">resolution</a> taken by the SACP in 2007. Then, unhappy with the ANC’s policies in government, the communists raised the issue of contesting elections themselves. It proposed doing this either within a “reconfigured alliance” or having its own candidates contest elections, after which it would come to an agreement with the ANC on how to cooperate in government.</p>
<p>The SACP’s decision to go it alone is the culmination of a fallout dating back to 1996. Then, the ANC government under President Thabo Mbeki announced a macro economic framework, known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf">(Gear)</a>, without substantial consultations with the SACP and Cosatu. Both slammed the policy as being <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2957">anti-communist</a> and serving the interests of business at the expense of the poor working class.</p>
<p>The SACP, and Cosatu, thought that their fortunes had turned when, with their support, Jacob Zuma was elected president of the ANC in <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">Polokwane in 2007</a>. But it wasn’t to be. Both groups have subsequently fallen out with <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/142598/how-zumas-faction-is-starting-to-unravel/">Zuma</a>. The relationship has deteriorated so badly that SACP members in KwaZulu-Natal are being assassinated over <a href="http://ewn.co.za/Topic/Moerane-Commission-of-Inquiry">municipal council positions</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Why is this so unusual?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">Tripartite Alliance</a> can be traced back to the late 1940s and the Communist Party’s subsequent underground involvement in the ANC-led <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/significance-congress-people-and-freedom-charter">Congress of the People in 1955</a>. The Congress Alliance adopted the <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html">Freedom Charter</a> as its blueprint for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legacy-of-south-africas-freedom-charter-60-years-later-43647">democratic and prosperous South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>In the 1960s the formation of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">Umkhonto we Sizwe</a>, the armed wing formed by ANC and SACP members, was arguably the most concrete articulation of the ANC-SACP alliance. </p>
<p>In the decades that followed the SACP played a key role in facilitating the support of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc for the ANC and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/south-african-congress-trade-unions-sactu">South African Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The communists also shaped the ANC’s philosophy around national liberation as the <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=1850">“national democratic revolution”</a> and view of apartheid as <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/apartheid-south-africa-colonialism-special-type">“colonialism of a special type”</a>.</p>
<p>This influence on the ANC was personified by the likes of leading communists <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/moses-m-kotane">Moses Kotane</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/moses-mabhida">Moses Mabhida</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/dr-yusuf-mohamed-dadoo">Dr Yusuf Dadoo</a>. The SACP viewed the alliance as a <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=6249">popular front</a> uniting the working class and progressive forces in the struggle for freedom. </p>
<p>The SACP is unique in Africa because very few communist parties survived after independence. Most of them were either <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-communism-appears-to-be-gaining-favour-in-south-africa-45063">banned or integrated</a> into nationalist liberation movement governments. </p>
<p>The party’s independent participation in the Metsimaholo by-election takes it back to the period before 1950 when communists such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/09/southafrica.pressandpublishing">Brian Bunting</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/sam-kahn">Sam Kahn</a> represented the then <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03462.htm">Communist Party of South Africa</a> in Parliament. </p>
<p>But after that, and after the party was banned, the SACP’s revolutionary theory of <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2638">armed struggle and insurrection</a> excluded an electoral approach. </p>
<p>Once the first inclusive elections were planned in South Africa, the SACP deferred to the ANC as the leader of the national democratic revolution to pursue an electoral approach. </p>
<p><strong>What is the significance for South Africa?</strong></p>
<p>Firstly, no one can continue to argue that the Tripartite Alliance is still a coherent political front bringing together a working class union movement (Cosatu), working class party (SACP) and a multi-class governing party (ANC). </p>
<p>What this means is that the ANC’s social democratic character in terms of a partnership with working class organisations has come to an end. The ANC will now have to reconfigure its own identity as a social democratic party, similar to former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s reconfiguration of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10518842">“New Labour”</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, the SACP’s decision serves as an official recording of the radical changes the ANC’s identity has undergone in terms of how it defines its own interests or constituencies. It’s finally stating that its core interests and those of the ANC’s are in the process of parting ways. In socialist parlance, the ANC’s and SACP’s class interests have reached a crossroads. </p>
<p>This follows on the earlier decision by Cosatu’s largest affiliate the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa to part ways with the federation and to establish the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/01/19/Numsa-United-Front-structures-registered-to-contest-local-elections">United Front</a> as its own political vehicle. It’s still unclear whether this this will result in a new left political movement. But, all the socio-economic conditions - <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/economics-governance-and-instability-in-south-africa">such as high inequality, unemployment</a>, <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334">poverty </a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-protesters-echo-a-global-cry-democracy-isnt-making-peoples-lives-better-77639">social discontent</a> - provide fertile ground for just such a movement.</p>
<p><strong>What are the electoral prospects of the SACP?</strong></p>
<p>The SACP is not in a position to mobilise substantial support in the near future. The left is contested terrain and prone to fragmentation. This is partly the result of personality clashes and ideological hair-splitting. </p>
<p>It could possibly join forces with the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa which, for the last 30 years, has debated the ideal of a workers’ party. This would only be viable if the SACP combined its party programme with the social democratic (social welfare) needs of a rural, non-socialist populace. This would imply making ideological compromises, which is not uncommon for the SACP. It would also require it to establish a real party political infrastructure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African Communist Party’s decision to compete in an election against its alliance partner the ANC is a watershed moment for them, with important implications for the country.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812122017-07-24T19:43:11Z2017-07-24T19:43:11ZWhy South Africa’s communists need to cut the ANC umbilical cord. Or perish<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179249/original/file-20170721-28498-1cnwfnz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">SACP's Blade Nzimande, left, with Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Communist Party <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/">(SACP)</a> <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=6249">resolved</a> at its recent <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/eventslist.php?eid=18">14th Congress</a> to contest future elections in the country independent of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">African National Congress (ANC)</a>, its dominant alliance partner.</p>
<p>If implemented, the resolution would fundamentally change the governing <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">tripartite alliance</a> that’s been in place for more than 60 years. It was formed during the struggle for liberation and has governed South Africa since 1994. The other member of the alliance is the Congress of South African Trade Unions <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">(Cosatu)</a>.</p>
<p>Between the mid 1940s and 1950s, South African communists <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/A3299/A3299-G1-2-6-001-jpeg.pdf">differed</a> with their international counterparts in their interpretation of the role of class struggle in <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/A3299/A3299-G1-2-6-001-jpeg.pdf">liberation politics</a>. Despite <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/A3299/A3299-G1-2-6-001-jpeg.pdf">fears</a>that nationalism would invariably deliver a political settlement with little change in the material living conditions of the working class, the party tactically aligned itself with the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/significance-congress-people-and-freedom-charter">Congress Movement</a>, led by the ANC. It regarded the South African situation as “unique” and therefore <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/A3299/A3299-G1-2-6-001-jpeg.pdf">requiring</a> “more creativity in how the party sought to advance the class struggle”. </p>
<p>Relations within the alliance are now at an all time low. Ahead of the latest congress, the increasingly strained relations between the SACP and President Jacob Zuma, who is also president of the ANC, and thus the leader of the alliance, had reached an unprecedented low point.</p>
<p>This came amid <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2016-09-23-two-to-tango-the-story-of-zuma-and-the-guptas">growing claims</a> alleging that Zuma is the kingpin behind the <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">capture of the state</a> by private business interests. The party has called for the president’s resignation and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-11-sacp-congress-no-explosions--but-much-simmering/">barred</a> him from speaking at <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/eventslist.php?eid=18">its congress</a>. Zuma had earlier been subjected to similar treatment by <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=12763">Cosatu</a>. </p>
<p>Oddly, the SACP says it <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGlz_WtsFaQ">will remain</a> within the alliance despite its stated aim to contest elections, effectively in opposition to the ANC. Yet, the mere act of it contesting elections may be construed as a split in practical terms. </p>
<p>But, the party has been here before.</p>
<h2>A decade of indecision</h2>
<p>Relations among the alliance partners have been strained throughout the democratic period because of the policies of the ANC in power, with Thabo Mbeki’s administration <a href="https://www.mbeki.org/profile-of-former-president-thabo-mbeki/">from 1999 to 2008</a> associated with <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/neoliberalism.asp?lgl=rira-baseline-vertical">“neoliberalism”</a> or <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2816">“the class project of 1996”</a>. In turn, Mbeki was critical of what he called divisive <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/mbeki-accuses-ultra-leftists-of-abusing-anc-membership-1.1109299">“ultra-leftists”</a> in the alliance when closing the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/51st-national-conference-stellenbosch">51st ANC conference</a> at Stellenbosch in 2002, increasing <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC-poised-to-purge-ultra-leftists-20021019">fears</a> of a possible split. </p>
<p>Consequently, the leftist SACP first resolved to contest state power independently at its <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=3111">12th Congress</a> in 2007. But then the party deferred the final decision to implement the resolution to its central committee, the highest decision making body between congresses. </p>
<p>The central committee was mandated to either lobby for a <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=3111">“reconfigured alliance”</a> with greater leftist influence and control, or to decide on contesting elections independently. The idea of a reconfigured alliance won the day, with the SACP then pinning its hopes on an expected victory by leftists in the ANC. Zuma, its preferred supposedly leftist candidate for the position of ANC president, went on to defeat Mbeki in December 2007.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=904&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179250/original/file-20170721-28474-gwtlrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1136&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, had a fraught relationship with the SACP.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The party <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/decl/2012/13th_congress.pdf">“reaffirmed”</a> the decision to contest state power at its 13th congress in 2012. But, once again, it failed to empower its central committee to implement the decision. It only mandated it to <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/decl/2012/13th_congress.pdf">table “a report”</a> to “enable fuller discussion” in December that year. </p>
<p>Again at the 2017 congress, the party has resolved to contest elections but qualified the resolution by asking its central committee to conduct further analysis and engage its stakeholders on the best way to achieve this. </p>
<p>In essence, the SACP has been tiptoeing about the idea of contesting state power at its three conferences over the past 10 years. </p>
<p>The resolution from the 14th Congress, therefore, could have shown a bolder commitment by the SACP to contesting state power. But once again, decisive action has effectively been postponed by failing to instruct the central committee explicitly to implement it. </p>
<p>When pressed to clarify the tentative nature of the party’s resolution, SACP General Secretary, Blade Nzimande, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGlz_WtsFaQ">confirmed</a> that more discussions were to follow before a final decision could be made. This deferring of a final decision to another structure makes the resolution exactly the same as those of the past two conferences. </p>
<h2>Clinging onto the ANC’s coattails</h2>
<p>Despite successive disappointments, the party still appears to be hoping for an outcome that will favour it in the ANC succession race. Nzimande has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGlz_WtsFaQ">denied</a> this. This time, their key man is ANC presidential hopeful and deputy president of the country <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>.</p>
<p>This reliance on ANC succession politics may see the SACP fail to contest elections in 2019 once again. But the failure to stop relying on developments in the ANC and start implementing a now ten-year old resolution to contest elections will be more spectacular this time round. That’s because at the rate the governing party is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a4d6f4c2-5a03-11e6-9f70-badea1b336d4">losing support</a>, there might no longer be a dominant ANC in South African electoral politics. </p>
<p>That the ANC is leaking votes presents the SACP with its best ever chance to strengthen its hand within the alliance. It’s a golden opportunity to end the ANC’s abusive tendency to act unilaterally, regardless of the SACP’s position on key issues. </p>
<p>The SACP might have more direct and observable value from real electoral support, which can be translated into seats in municipal councils, provincial legislatures and in parliament.</p>
<h2>One more alternative to the ANC?</h2>
<p>There has not been a practical and scientific way to determine what the SACP brings to the ANC in terms of electoral support. The picture was complicated by the fact that SACP members are also often members of the ANC. The party could not take for granted that its <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-communism-appears-to-be-gaining-favour-in-south-africa-45063">close to 220 000 members</a> would vote for it if it left the alliance. </p>
<p>But with the ANC in its current crisis, the SACP might present a close enough alternative for supporters who are fed up with the governing party and who don’t have an alternative party to vote for. </p>
<p>But it will never know unless it breaks the perpetual indecisiveness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ongama Mtimka receives government-supported funding for his PhD studies. He chairs the boards of Bophelo-Impilo Development Agency. </span></em></p>After tiptoeing around the idea of contesting state power South Africa’s Communist Party is looking to strengthen its position now that the ANC is no longer the dominant force it used to be.Ongama Mtimka, Lecturer and PhD Candidate, Department of Political & Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/766092017-04-25T19:41:21Z2017-04-25T19:41:21ZSouth Africa has a new trade union federation. Can it break the mould?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166582/original/file-20170425-12468-17hcapr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the launch of the South African Federation of Trade Unions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Star/Nokuthula Mbatha</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The newly launched trade union grouping in South Africa – the South African Federation of Trade Unions <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/21/saftu-launch-marks-end-of-long-journey-since-numsa-left-cosatu">(Saftu)</a> – promises to be a voice for the growing numbers of unorganised and marginalised workers in the country. But, as the secretary of the South African Informal Traders Alliance warned delegates, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Don’t break our hearts with false promises.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Historically, trade unions in South Africa have played a significant role in shaping the political landscape, especially during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43157717">struggle against apartheid</a>. But the union movement has declined globally in influence as the growing informalistion of work has eroded its power and unions are seen as protecting the special interests of those in regular employment.</p>
<p>With increasing numbers of people outside the formal employment net, unions have had a tough time defining their role. Yet the rights won by South African workers in the struggle for democracy continues to give them a degree of influence unsurpassed in post-colonial Africa.</p>
<p>The new federation was conceived over two years ago in the wake of the <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Labour/News/Cosatu-to-lose-millions-over-Numsa-split-20141112">expulsion</a> of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa from trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The expulsion signified growing political realignment in the country given that Cosatu is in an alliance with the governing African National Congress. The union’s expulsion <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-30-cosatu-fires-zwelinzima-vavi">was followed by</a> that of the Cosatu general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi. </p>
<p>So what difference is the new federation likely to make to the lives of workers in South Africa, as well as the very large number of unemployed people and those in the informal economy?</p>
<p>Significantly, the new federation is not the outcome of a surge in worker militancy. Instead, it’s a response to the perceived failure of existing unions to provide an adequate voice and service to their members. The new federation is in fact the product of the crisis facing traditional trade unions across the globe.</p>
<p>A strength of the federation will be its ability to combine the experiences of long standing union leaders with a new generation of unionists disillusioned with the governing party and its two <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2051">alliance partners</a> – Cosatu and the South African Communist Party. </p>
<p>With nearly 700 000 members, it’s the second largest federation in South Africa after Cosatu. But the challenges facing an attempt to “cross the divide” between organised workers and the growing <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/precariat-global-class-rise-of-populism/">precariat</a> – those in casual, outsourced and informal jobs – will require strategic leadership willing to move out of the comfort zone of traditional unionism, recruit unfamiliar constituencies and experiment with new ways of organising.</p>
<h2>Challenges facing the new federation</h2>
<p>The first challenge will be to break with the bureaucratic practices that have seen many union leaders gradually distanced from their members. If the practices of “business unionism” – where unions come to mirror the values and practices of business – are to be challenged, two big issues will need to be revisited. These are union investment companies and the gap between the salaries of some union leaders and their members. </p>
<p>The new federation could make its mark within the labour movement by taking lifestyle issues seriously and, in particular, the wage gap within its own ranks.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=646&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166505/original/file-20170424-27254-f2svy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=812&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zwelinzima Vavi, secretary general of the new trade union federation Saftu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/John Hrusa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second challenge is around political diversity. What was striking at the launch was the wide range of political and ideological views. An illustration was the lively debate over the <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2017/04/24/new-union-federation-anti-politics-pro-workers/">relationship</a> between pan-Africanism and Marxist-Leninism. </p>
<p>But there was consensus that there should be no party political affiliation. Saftu, it was agreed, should be politically independent. The challenge will be for the new federation to be a genuine forum for political debate, respecting different views, and even allowing different ideological factions to be institutionalised.</p>
<p>The most difficult challenge arises from the shift from industrial unions to general unions. The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa led the way when it extended its scope to include a variety of economic activities beyond metalworkers. This included, for example, university cleaners and bus drivers. Furthermore, many of the Saftu affiliates are general unions. </p>
<p>How to deal with the danger of internal “poaching” of members was extensively discussed at the launch. Will the protocols proposed in the report of the steering committee prevent divisive conflict in the future? </p>
<p>Another major challenge facing Saftu is the need for innovative strategies on new ways of organising. It’s not clear how the federation intends to recruit the new constituencies of women, immigrants, low paid service workers, outsourced workers and the growing numbers of workers in the informal economy. Experiments in organising precarious workers, such as the <a href="http://www.cwao.org.za/contact.asp">Casual Workers Advice Office</a> in Germiston, need to be examined as they could provide ways of crossing the divide between the old and the new.</p>
<p>Another difficult challenge will be defining the federation’s position on economic policy. Harsh criticisms were made of the proposed national minimum wage of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-search-for-a-national-minimum-wage-laid-bare-south-africas-faultlines-69382">R20 an hour</a>. But maybe it is time to confront the dilemma that for many workers a bad job is better than no job. Has the time not arrived to go beyond the demand for decent work to explore what kind of role trade unions have in a developing country such as South Africa, in the context of a uni-polar world, dominated by neo-liberal capitalism? </p>
<h2>New ways of organising</h2>
<p>The leaders of the new federation are confident that a number of Cosatu affiliated unions will join, or if the unions don’t, their member will come across. But will the federation be able to break out of the old organising straight jacket? </p>
<p>To organise the low paid and the precarious is an ambitious task. There’s growing evidence that innovative strategies to bridge the informal-formal “divide” are emerging in the Global South with successful attempts emerging in <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:291569/FULLTEXT01.pdf">other parts of Africa </a>. For example, in Ghana an alliance of informal port workers with national trade unions has been formed and is proving to be effective.</p>
<p>Labour scholar, <a href="http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3755&context=jssw">Rina Agarwala</a>, has challenged the conventional view that informalisation is the “final nail in the labour movement’s coffin”. Informal workers in India, she demonstrates, are creating new institutions and forging a new social contract between the state and labour. New informal worker organisations are not attached to a particular party, nor do they espouse a specific political or economic ideology.</p>
<p>It’s too soon to pronounce on the future of the new federation. But it’s clear that workers are increasingly rejecting traditional trade unions and forming new types of organisations that bring workers together to promote their rights and interests. The future lies with unions that are forward looking and see the global economy as an opportunity for a new kind of unionism. </p>
<p>Saftu needs to draw on these experiences if it’s to fulfil the promise of its launch.</p>
<p><em>Edward Webster will soon be launching a collection of research based essays on precarious work in India, Ghana and South Africa. <a href="http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=518">Crossing the Divide: Precarious Work and the Future of Labour</a>, together with Akua O. Britwum and the late Sharit Bhowmik.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Webster does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Africa’s newest trade union federation, Saftu, comes at a time of declining political influence by unions, compared to during the struggle against apartheid. They are also seen as elitist.Edward Webster, Professor Emeritus, Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/695172016-11-29T09:48:26Z2016-11-29T09:48:26ZA new centre of power through mass mobilisation is needed in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/147900/original/image-20161129-10975-ppguyu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demands to recall South African President Jacob Zuma reached a climax at the governing ANC's national executive meeting.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing African National Congress <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">(ANC)</a> has long argued that the elected president of the party should also be the executive head of the country to avoid creating <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-27-anc-debates-two-centres-of-power">two centres of power</a>. Otherwise the centre of power in the party would inevitably be at odds with that of the president of the country. </p>
<p>But the idea that by taking this route it would avoid conflict has come to nought. Jacob Zuma is president of the party as well as the country. But the ANC and the government, the executive in particular, <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-27-zuma-to-launch-fight-back-as-anc-nec-present-motion-for-the-president-to-step-down">are at war</a>. </p>
<p>Senior members of the national executive committee of the ANC tabled a motion for Zuma <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/motion-for-zuma-to-step-down-tabled-at-anc-nec-meeting-reports">to step down</a>, echoing similar calls by <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/anc-icons-demand-jacob-zuma-resignation-vote-161109132942397.html">party stalwarts</a>. It is now evident that South Africa has two centres of political power. </p>
<p>One can speculate as to who holds the reins within the ANC and is increasingly at odds with the presidency. What is clear is that all is not well in the party structures. </p>
<p>Because of this my contention is that South Africa needs a third centre of power. The country needs a mass democratic movement to confront the mismanagement that will otherwise beset it. </p>
<p>To an extent South Africa has been down this road before, to great effect. In the 1980s leaders such as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cheryl-carolus">Cheryl Carolus</a> and Reverend <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/reverend-allan-aubrey-boesak">Allan Boasak</a> were instrumental in creating the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a> which rallied diverse people around a single purpose: co-ordinated mass action to oppose the apartheid regime. This time such a movement will need to focus on enhancing good governance to ensure socio-economic development. </p>
<p>This should draw together a host of players ranging from not-for-profit organisations to religious bodies and active citizens who want to save the country.</p>
<h2>Business is powerful, but not organised</h2>
<p>The business community has held a significant amount of sway over the direction the country has taken since democracy <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/business/2016/11/15/government-and-business---where-did-it-all-go-wrong">in 1994</a>. At its core, the policy regime of the last two decades has been a <em>de facto</em> settlement by way of compromise between political elites and big capital.</p>
<p>Organised labour, through the guise of its <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/kids/tripartite-alliance">alliance partnership</a> with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, has served to cement this corporatist pact between the <a href="http://unbc.arcabc.ca/islandora/object/unbc%3A6679/datastream/PDF/view">private and public sectors</a>. So while the business sector remains an influential actor on the national scene, the lack of unity and coordinated effort by business has neutralised its capacity to steer the state.</p>
<p>The country’s business sector is led by two main bodies; <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/busa-warns-eskom-on-nuclear-plans-2093258">Business Unity South Africa</a> and <a href="http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/blsa-appoints-mabuza-as-chair-as-it-unveils-new-leaders-2016-10-21/rep_id:4136">Business Leadership South Africa</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://cajnewsafrica.com/2016/11/25/exclusive-council-fears-lack-of-sa-transformation-could-spark-turmoil/">Contending voices</a> such as those of the Black Business Council and upstart Progressive Professionals Forum are eroding <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/05/some-relief-for-eskom-as-2-organisations-show-it-support">the voice of business</a>. The latter groupings are breakaway factions of <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2011-09-12-black-business-council-wrong-step-in-the-right-direction/">organised business</a> who favour a more aggressive <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/bbc-calls-for-radical-economic-transformation/">transformation</a> agenda and stronger alignment with President Zuma’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHKaIvMZqKg">administration</a>. </p>
<p>This erosion is laid bare by the fact that business only mobilised and <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/banks-showed-zuma-his-limits-1960890">reacted</a> once international markets had punished the president and the country after <a href="http://nenegate.biznews.com">Nenegate</a>. This was the scandalous expulsion of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015. Zuma’s appointment of a new finance minister has historically been handled with due care for the management of business confidence and <a href="http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2015/12/10/zuma-fires-finance-minister-nene-rand-crashes-to-record-r1538us">perceptions</a>, but BLSA and BUSA groupings were caught entirely unaware of the <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00040315.html">impending change</a>. </p>
<h2>Two centres, no progress</h2>
<p>The implication of a split in the political centre of power is that South Africa’s national development project will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-can-expect-zero-growth-its-problems-are-largely-homemade-62943">gridlocked</a>. Except for a handful of localised multi-stakeholder projects, such as those driven by Premier David Makhura’s <a href="http://www.southafrica.info/about/government/mega-projects-080415.htm#.WDwuxncy9E5">Gauteng government on a local level</a>, very little will be achieved between the social partners of government, business and labour under these conditions. </p>
<p>It also means that these two centres will drive different agendas. The party will be steering towards immediate political imperatives such as securing votes in the 2019 national and provincial elections. On the other hand, the increasingly isolated, defensive and desperate executive is likely to close ranks and attempt to <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/11/20/how-zuma-s-securocrats-are-closing-down-the-public-space">use the security cluster</a> with increasing vigour as a weapon against its opponents.</p>
<h2>New centre of power</h2>
<p>What remains to be done by those who continue to hold a vision of a democratic, progressive and increasingly equitable society?</p>
<p>Their task is to construct from civil society a <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/politics/2016/11/24/zuma-rattled-save-south-africa-campaigns-potential-says-section27s-heywood/">new centre of power</a> – people power, citizen power, built on the power of just claims, energised by the power of righteous indignation. After all, the power of a society rests in its people and only then in its <a href="http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPol_democSocPwrAnal.html">institutions</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa again needs a mass democratic movement. The main actors in such a force for common good will inevitably have to include <a href="https://theconversation.com/dangerous-echoes-of-the-past-as-church-and-state-move-closer-in-south-africa-65985">churches, mosques and temples</a>. These civil society groups enjoy a shared representation of the vast majority of citizens, with around 81% of the population self-identifying as Christians, many of whom regularly participate in faith community practices. This force will also have to include trade unions and community organisations, NGOs and rights activists. </p>
<p>There are early signs of the emergence of just such a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-06-05-i-am-the-third-force/">third force for good</a> in the likes of the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-25-save-south-africa-whose-protest-is-it-anyway">SaveSA movement</a>, the Socio-Economic Future of South Africa convened by the <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-02-18-a-return-to-civil-action-clergy-to-spearhead-new-movement-to-tackle-crises-in-south-africa/">Archbishop of Cape Town</a>, and the public call to prayer for a change in national leadership by <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/opinion-prayer-a-weapon-to-fight-injustice-2087156">Reverend Moss Ntlha</a>. </p>
<p>For a project of mass mobilisation to succeed, South Africans who have been deeply loyal to their liberation movement masters will have to take back their agency and right of refusal. ANC membership would need to become a choice and not a <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/06/10/anc-has-been-reduced-to-a-shady-network-of-patronage-and-corruption-maimane">birthmark for privilege</a>. Liberation credentials will again have to be hard earned. But this time liberation will mean holding one’s friends in high office and those in the boardrooms to account.</p>
<p>South Africa now has two centres of power. It needs a third if it is to navigate the polar risks of <a href="http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/11/25/zuma-turns-to-high-court-to-review-state-capture-report">state capture</a> and <a href="http://www.mistra.org.za/Library/ConferencePaper/Documents/South%20Africa's%20Developmental%20Capacity.pdf">state incapacity</a> and forge a path to inclusive prosperity. Is the country’s labour movement awake to this reality? If the clergy have come to this conviction, can the men, women and young people who do not benefit from the country’s system of patronage be mobilised to shoulder this task?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marius Oosthuizen has previously received funding from faith-based Foundations such as the Maclellan Foundation, agencies such as the British High Commission and a variety of research grants. He is affiliated with SEFSA, the Socio-Economic Future of South Africa, a civil society dialogue initiative to secure the future of South Africa.
</span></em></p>There are early signs of the emergence of a third force for good in South Africa in the likes of the Save SA movement and Socio-Economic Future of South Africa convened by the Archbishop of Cape Town.Marius Oosthuizen, Full time faculty, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/450632015-08-04T04:41:58Z2015-08-04T04:41:58ZWhy communism appears to be gaining favour in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90600/original/image-20150803-6008-8ltn2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Communist Party general secretary and South Africa's higher education minister Blade Nzimande addresses the party's 3rd special congress in Soweto in June. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sowetan/Vathiswa Ruselo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African Communist Party reported an upsurge in membership at its recent <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=4816">3rd special congress</a>. Its membership now stands at about 220 000. </p>
<p>Does this indicate that the Left is gaining momentum or is it only a cyclical spike? </p>
<p>The SACP’s membership has gone through cycles over the years reflecting important political developments (see table below). A comparison suggests that these figures are still relatively small weighed against those of its partners in South Africa’s governing alliance that brings together the communist party, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the African National Congress, which leads the alliance. </p>
<p>Cosatu had 1.9 million members before its biggest affiliate, the metals union Numsa, with 300 000 members, was expelled in 2014. The ANC passed the <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/04/04/new-anc-membership-no-threat-to-zuma">one million</a> mark in 2012.</p>
<p>The SACP, formed in 1921, is the oldest communist party in Africa. It is one of only 20 parties which survived the anti-communist purge after independence. Many other parties, like the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=5kfGGH5H3toC&pg=PA273&dq=MPLA++abandons+communism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC0Q6AEwA2oVChMIi9uRltCMxwIVBrgUCh3smgsy#v=onepage&q=MPLA%20%20abandons%20communism&f=false">Angola</a> and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=PwTWm-wMdqQC&pg=PA35&dq=Frelimo+abandons+communism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAGoVChMIsK_nzs-MxwIVSjs-Ch3_NAMW#v=onepage&q=Frelimo%20abandons%20communism&f=false">Mozambique Liberation Front</a>, officially changed their party ideologies in the 1990s from <a href="http://theredphoenixapl.org/2008/12/08/marxist-leninist-ideology/">Marxism-Leninism</a> to <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=_00SKFEabywC&printsec=frontcover&dq=What+is+Social+democracy?&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDIQ6AEwBGoVChMInrb299qMxwIVBVw-Ch2Dugs1#v=onepage&q=What%20is%20Social%20democracy%3F&f=false">Social Democracy</a>. </p>
<p>But the SACP continued to be <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/10thcongress/marxism.pdf">Marxist-Leninist</a>. It is the only communist party on the continent which is part of a governing alliance, similar to those in Brazil, Venezuela and Nepal in recent years. </p>
<h2>Membership trends</h2>
<p>Changes in SACP membership figures after its unbanning in 1990 and its decision to become an open party went through at least four periods. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The first was between 1990 and 1996 with an influx of new members, motivated by the SACP’s success with getting the ANC to adopt the Reconstruction and Development <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">Programme</a> (RDP), and its prominence in the first post-apartheid cabinet led by former President Nelson Mandela.</p></li>
<li><p>The second period was the demise of the RDP and appearance of Growth, Employment and Redistribution <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf">(Gear)</a> as a neoliberal macro-economic policy. The ANC leadership regarded it as “non-negotiable” and in the process then South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki started to marginalise the SACP and Cosatu. Arguably, its marginalisation within the alliance can explain the decline in membership between 1995 and 2002.</p></li>
<li><p>The third period was during President Mbeki’s last term when membership started to increase, presumably because his deputy, Jacob Zuma, solicited the SACP’s support against Mbeki. The expectation was that a Zuma government would restore the SACP’s prominence in government. Zuma’s victory at the ANC’s 52nd national conference in <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president">Polokwane in 2007</a> solidified it.</p></li>
</ul>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/89462/original/image-20150723-22821-yh8m2w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Five years later the SACP entered the fourth period at the <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2012/12/20/anc-mangaung-conference-latest-news-day-5">ANC’s Mangaung</a> national conference. Arguably it reached the 150 000 mark partly because of the ANC’s perceived shift to the right with the adoption of its new long-term macro-economic plan, the <a href="http://www.poa.gov.za/news/Documents/NPC%20National%20Development%20Plan%20Vision%202030%20-lo-res.pdf">National Development Plan</a>. The SACP gained support by opposing the plan. This attracted those who had formerly been part of Zuma’s “Polokwane alliance” but were increasingly unhappy with the President.</p>
<p>Organisational problems in the ANC and corruption scandals diverted attention away from a policy turn to the left. Alternative leftist moves were made in 2012-2015 by the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-15-is-the-eff-the-calm-before-a-real-leftist-storm">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> and the left in Cosatu. It is possible to argue that the same trend to the left is happening in the alliance in the form of a decline in ANC public support - evident in the <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2014/05/10/anc-wins-2014-election-with-reduced-majority">2014 elections</a> - and an increase in SACP membership.</p>
<p>Despite its recent difficulties with President Zuma, the SACP has had a resurgence of influence under his administration. At the moment <a href="http://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/7620">Senzeni Zokwana</a>, <a href="http://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/6935">Thulas Nxesi</a>, <a href="http://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/6396">Blade Nzimande</a>, <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=17477">Jeff Radebe</a> and <a href="https://www.thedti.gov.za/about_dti/minister.jsp">Rob Davies</a> are ministers while <a href="http://www.pa.org.za/person/jeremy-patrick-cronin/">Jeremy Cronin</a>, <a href="http://www.dmr.gov.za/about-us/the-ministry/deputy-minister.html">Godfrey Oliphant</a> and <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=17483">Buti Manamela</a> are deputies. They all serve as examples that the SACP is an access point to government.</p>
<p>The rise in membership could be attributed to the fact that it is seen as an alternative option for a political career.</p>
<h2>Official explanation</h2>
<p>SACP second deputy general secretary Solly Mapaila ascribed the growth to success with its campaigns, notably that aimed at <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/17-ways-the-financial-sector-must-be-reformed--sol">restructuring</a> the country’s financial sector. </p>
<p>Also, he said, some new members felt more comfortable to express their activism and criticism of corruption in the SACP than in the ANC. Between the lines it suggests an anti-Zuma sentiment, albeit not shared by most national leaders.</p>
<p>Fault-lines and <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sacp-membership-growing-cronin-1.1881800#.VbC3nfmqqko">frustrations</a> between the SACP and the ANC are evident. There is open friction between it and the ANC in <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2015/01/27/anc-sacp-clash-in-mpumalanga">Mpumalanga province</a>. In addition, the <a href="http://www.ycl.org.za/">Young Communists League</a> has taken an openly critical stance towards the ANC.</p>
<p>The idea that the SACP should break away from the ANC and stand as an independent political entity has once again emerged. Some delegates at the special congress called on the SACP to contest elections separately from the ANC in 2016. The issue also surfaced in 2008 at its National Policy Conference.</p>
<p>Several motivations for such a call are possible: a perception that the SACP leadership have been co-opted by President Zuma and his government. There have also been accusations that the Zuma government is no longer pro-worker and pro-poor. This is especially so in the light of Marikana massacre in 2012 and government’s <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-29-side-by-side-what-zuma-said-what-the-marikana-commission-wrote">minimalist response</a> to the findings of the <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=19997">Marikana Commission of Inquiry</a>. </p>
<p>The government has drawn flack for policies considered to be neo-liberal and that socio-economic inequality and poverty are increasing under the current government.</p>
<h2>The thinking wing of the party</h2>
<p>The party retains a cache. There is still prestige attached to it as the governing alliance’s “thought leader”. Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="http://www.sacp.org.za/docs/conf/2015/conf0709.html">referred</a> to it as such at the SACP’s latest special congress. He continued:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Throughout the years, the SACP has played a critical role in the ideological development of the liberation movement. Its contribution to the revolutionary theory of two stages and their notion of apartheid as a “colonialism of a special type” are a few examples. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Activists with a strong ideological inclination will be more attracted by the SACP than by the ANC. Being associated with it has its own pull factors, including the lure of intellectual sophistication.</p>
<p>The SACP’s growth is therefore symptomatic of several factors of which frustrations in the alliance are possibly the most important.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The SACP is the oldest communist party in Africa, formed in 1921. It is one of only 20 parties which survived the anti-communist purge post independence. Its membership went through cycles over years.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.