tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/us-foreign-policy-4028/articlesUS foreign policy – The Conversation2024-03-29T08:30:04Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253952024-03-29T08:30:04Z2024-03-29T08:30:04ZWaiting for Trump to be re-elected is wrong – Nato leaders need to Trump-proof their policies now<p>The re-election of Donald Trump as US president would cause another enormous shock to international politics. The world is full of crises, such as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine">Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/09/gaza-strip-israel-hamas-explained/">Gaza</a>. But Trump casts a destabilising shadow over all these issues. </p>
<p>How do you cope with a crisis when you have no idea what a future US president will do about it – including potentially creating a further crisis? Many international leaders have largely shut down to <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-is-already-flustering-foreign-leaders-who-are-trying-to-prepare-for-a-possible-presidency-223767">wait and see</a> what happens after the US presidential election on November 5. But sitting tight is the wrong way to deal with Trump. Leaders need to be proactive and move now to Trump-proof their foreign policies as well as international organisations such as <a href="https://www.nato.int/">Nato</a>. </p>
<p>Trump is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2021.1877616">unpredictable</a>, and thinks that’s exactly what you should be as president. He is not simply chaotic but believes that an unpredictable foreign policy gives you the advantage. </p>
<p>Trump is also <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13587532/donald-trump-no-experience">inexperienced about international affairs</a> and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2019/1003/Diplomacy-is-in-part-transactional.-How-is-Trump-s-different">transactional</a> – only trying to find the benefit to himself, regardless of the political implications. He thinks that all of this makes you a strong player.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/13/donald-trumps-doctrine-unpredictability-world-edge">unpredictability is bad</a> for an international system in which other states rely on knowing what will happen to formulate their own foreign policies. It’s hardly surprising then that foreign leaders feel frozen – unable to act without knowing what the situation may be.</p>
<p>Not acting is a dangerous policy, though. It limits countries’ power and plays into Trump’s strategy. Letting him run the show strengthens his position at a cost to everyone else, by making others work to his agenda. Instead, leaders should step up now to protect their foreign policies. They need to fully articulate what they want – and work to get it (or as much of it as they can) <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-baltic-neighbours-to-create-massive-border-defences-as-trump-continues-undermining-nato-225944?notice=Article+has+been+updated.">irrespective of Trump.</a></p>
<h2>Nato’s future</h2>
<p>Much of this revolves around Nato. Its members, who are meeting on April 4 to celebrate its 75th anniversary, must now respond not only to Trump’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/politics/us-out-nato-second-trump-term-former-senior-adviser/index.html">threat of withdrawal</a> but also – if the US stays in and Trump is reelected – what it means to work with someone who doesn’t respect global norms and the international will. </p>
<p>Nato members are committed to a <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm">2% of GDP</a> budget contribution. Yet this level of defence investment is too meagre to build an organisation strong enough to stand up to Vladimir Putin without the support of the US. Poland recently proposed that a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-president-says-nato-members-should-spend-3-gdp-defence-2024-03-11/">3% contribution</a> would be more realistic. That will not be popular or easy – not least in an economic downturn. But it would give Nato members greater protection against Trump’s whims. </p>
<p>More money would also improve Nato forces. Europe has a capability gap in that it depends heavily on the US for military might – for example, on <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/warstudies/assets/paper-16-julia-muravska-european-integrated-air-and-missile-defence.pdf">missile defence</a>. Latvia’s president, Edgars Rinkēvičs, told <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aa03ef7f-7c09-4c8c-b78e-8e3d892dfb14">the Financial Times</a> that European countries needed to return to “cold war-era spending” levels and should consider the return of compulsory military service. </p>
<p>Building up security collaborations that do not put the US at their heart are the way forward, such as the <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2023C45_european_sky_shield_initiative.pdf">European Sky Shield Initiative</a>. This strategy has its issues but it’s an example of Europe standing on its own two feet.</p>
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<p>New military policies should be developed as a deterrence approach. You build up muscle now to avoid more costly action later, because no one will test you on it. As the president of the European Parliament’s Renew Europe group, <a href="https://www.aldeparty.eu/renew_europe_calls_for_leap_forward_in_eu_defence">Valerie Hayer</a>, said: “It’s high time for Europe to improve its own deterrence capabilities and take its security into its own hands.”</p>
<p>Nato members also need to unify and bolster organisational alliances to reduce their political dependency on the US. <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm">Increasing membership</a> beyond new recruit <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68506223">Sweden</a> is a possible option but a potentially difficult one, as this could <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/13/finnish-leader-says-russia-is-preparing-for-long-conflict-with-the-west">inflame Putin</a>.</p>
<h2>Dealing with crises</h2>
<p>The issues around Nato play into multiple international crises. For example, Trump has, so far, stopped <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0d3b1d88-7993-4240-bbef-e523194832b1">a US$60 million (£47 million) military aid package to Ukraine</a> by leaning on Republicans <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/25/ukraine-aid-house-republicans-mike-johnson">to vote against bills</a> and endorse a hands-off approach. </p>
<p>This means the world needs a Nato that can function without relying on Trump, if international support for Ukraine is going to continue. EU leaders recently demanded <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240322-eu-leaders-mull-ways-to-get-more-weapons-to-ukraine-amid-a-new-sense-of-urgency">increased arms provision</a> to Ukraine. Taking on responsibilities like this would not only help achieve foreign policy goals in relation to Ukraine, but would do so while removing a difficult dependency on the US.</p>
<p>Power changes at Nato would have to factor in <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/11/22/natos-china-and-indo-pacific-conundrum/index.html">relationships with China</a>, where the US has provided a major check in the past. Trump has signalled he is less likely to <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/donald-trumps-indecisive-remark-on-taiwan-sparks-concern-once-again-682512">come to Taiwan’s aid</a>, and this could embolden China in the region. Nato needs to unify and strengthen its military might to be able to push back against China.</p>
<p>Yet, the situation goes beyond Nato to concerns such as Gaza. National leaders will also need to engage more with, and empower, organisations including the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">UN</a> and the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">International Criminal Court</a> as a future balance against Trump. Admittedly, the UN doesn’t have the <a href="https://lawliberty.org/the-useless-united-nations/">best reputation</a> for responding to international conflict – but that doesn’t mean leaders can’t use these organisations more effectively. </p>
<p>Major UN reform is too optimistic, but there are opportunities here that are not being taken, such as using the UN as a forum for being more vocal on what other leaders want.</p>
<p>Standing back – even temporarily – on issues such as Ukraine and Gaza just allows these tragedies to continue. Every day is critical in crises of this magnitude. If the world sits on the sidelines for the next six months, it not only loses time and ground but puts Trump in a stronger position if he is elected. If national leaders dance to Trump’s tune now, it will be harder for them to act later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Bentley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the world sits on the sidelines for the next six months, it not only loses time and ground but puts Trump in a stronger position if he is elected.Michelle Bentley, Reader in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240862024-02-27T13:51:29Z2024-02-27T13:51:29ZMacron won’t rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?<p>The French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">has said</a> sending western troops to fight in Ukraine “could not be ruled out”. After hosting a meeting of 25 European leaders in Paris on February 26, Macron said that there was “no consensus” on committing ground troops to the conflict in Ukraine but added: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.” </p>
<p>Until now, Nato has confined itself to training Ukrainian military forces and supplying them with defensive weapons. Member states fear that directly confronting Russian forces in Ukraine would risk a massive escalation. And Vladimir Putin and his senior ministers have regularly issued <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-the-risks-that-russia-will-turn-to-its-nuclear-arsenal-178139">threats that</a> Russia could resort to using its nuclear arsenal in the case of a larger conflict.</p>
<p>At present, Nato is also conducting its largest military exercise since the cold war. <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/steadfast-defender-2024-signals-alliance-unity-and-preparedness/">Steadfast Defender</a> runs from January until May and involves all 31 member states. Aimed at enhancing the alliance’s collective defence capabilities and readiness, it is the largest exercise since <a href="https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/165109/1/165109.pdf">Reforger in 1988</a>, which involved 125,000 troops from the US, Germany, Canada, France and Denmark.</p>
<p>General Christopher Cavoli, Nato’s supreme allied commander for Europe, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/222847.htm">said</a>: “Steadfast Defender 2024 will be a clear demonstration of our unity, strength and determination to protect each other, our values and the rules-based international order.”</p>
<p>Importantly, one aspect of the exercises is the involvement of US and Canadian forces, which is designed to demonstrate the speed and size of Nato’s reinforcement capabilities. It acts both as a reassurance to European Nato member states and as a demonstration to potential enemies of the ability Nato has to put large forces into the field. Exercises are part of the communication of deterrence.</p>
<p>The exercise is meant <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-kick-off-biggest-drills-decades-with-some-90000-troops-2024-01-18/">to simulate</a> an, “emerging conflict scenario with a near-peer adversary”. This is a thinly disguised reference to Russia, which shows that Nato is beginning to take the threat of direct conflict with that country seriously.</p>
<p>During the cold war, Nato undertook regular large-scale exercises. For example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/18/world/british-start-war-games-on-continent.html">Exercise Lionheart, led by the UK in 1984</a>, involved nearly 58,000 British soldiers and airmen of a total force of 131,565, including troops from the US, the Netherlands and what was then West Germany.</p>
<p>Since the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, Nato has searched for a new identity. Its <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/reportch1.pdf">focus shifted</a> in the 1990s from protecting common territory to protecting members’ common interests, as it did by intervening in the wars in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm#">Bosnia in 1995</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#">Kosovo in 1999</a>, when it officially approved this new <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm">strategic concept</a>.</p>
<h2>Need for unity</h2>
<p>A demonstration of Nato unity and military capacity is important, coming after two years of disunity over how to respond to the war in Ukraine and amid wrangling over supplies of arms by Ukraine’s western allies. It has become more significant following recent remarks <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">by former president Donald Trump</a> that Nato members who did not meet the spending guidelines would no longer be protected by the US.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘I would not protect you’: Donald Trump threatens Nato members over defence spending.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Members are supposed to spend at least 2% of their annual GDP on defence – but it’s more complicated than that. Some nations’ defence spending is wholly allocated to Nato. Others, meanwhile, might set their defence spending at less than 2%, but their spending per head is greater than that of those who meet the Nato guideline. </p>
<p>For example, Luxembourg <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country">falls short</a> of the 2%, spending only 0.72%. But in per head terms it spends US$921 (£726), which is more than Poland (3.9%) or France (1.9%). </p>
<p>The US may spend 3.5% GDP on defence, but not all of that is allocated to Nato. Much of the US’s strength is deployed in the Pacific and on its home territories. So it’s misleading to judge the value of Nato membership in these terms. </p>
<p>They key clause in the Nato treaty is article 5, which governs collective security and compels members to respond if a fellow member is attacked by a hostile third party. The US is the only Nato member state to have invoked article 5, following the 9/11 attacks. It received assistance from other Nato members in Afghanistan and more widely in the “war on terror”.</p>
<h2>Is Nato battle ready?</h2>
<p>A significant problem Nato faces however, is not in deploying the troops it has, but in supplying them. As has been demonstrated by the efforts to provide equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, Nato has neither the stockpiles nor the manufacturing capacity to supply a lengthy modern war. </p>
<p>This is because Nato has long planned on what’s known as a “come as you are” war, which means it has the capacity to fight for only as long as the equipment and supplies last. For this reason, Nato’s strategy has always been, in the event of a conflict, to bring it to a conclusion as quickly as possible. </p>
<p>Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Nato’s most senior military commander and military adviser to its North Atlantic Council, spoke at the Warsaw Security Forum in October 2023. He <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66984944">said</a>: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.”</p>
<p>A number of European countries have already distanced themselves from Macron’s remarks, including Poland, the Czech republic and Sweden, whose Nato membership has finally been approved by Hungary and which is set to become the alliance’s 32nd member.</p>
<p>But Russia has seized on Macron’s remarks, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">telling reporters</a> that even discussing the idea of western troops being sent to fight in Ukraine represents a “very important new element”. He added: “In that case, we would need to talk not about the probability, but about the inevitability (of a direct conflict).”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending ground troops to Ukraine could provoke a wider and vastly more dangerous war with Russia,Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234172024-02-15T13:34:55Z2024-02-15T13:34:55ZWhy the United States needs NATO – 3 things to know<p>Former President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/13/politics/fact-check-trump-nato/index.html">long made it clear that he deeply resents</a> NATO, a 75-year-old military alliance that is composed of the United States and 30 other countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">Trump escalated his criticism</a> of NATO on Feb. 10, 2024, when he said that, if he is elected president again in November 2024, the U.S. would not defend any member country that had not “paid up.” </p>
<p>Trump also said that he would encourage Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, “to do whatever the hell they want” with a NATO member that was “delinquent” in paying for its defense. </p>
<p>NATO is the Western world’s foremost defense organization. It is headquartered in Brussels. The central idea behind NATO’s existence, as explained in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:%7E:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.">Article 5</a> of NATO’s 1949 treaty, is that all NATO countries agree to defend any other NATO country in case of an attack. </p>
<p>NATO has no standing army and relies on member countries to volunteer their military forces to carry out any operation. So all NATO countries agree to <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm#:%7E:text=In%202006%2C%20NATO%20Defence%20Ministers,ensure%20the%20Alliance%27s%20military%20readiness.">spend 2% of their annual gross domestic product</a> on military defense in order to support NATO. </p>
<p>Some countries, like the U.S., the U.K., Poland, Finland, Greece and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, devote more than 2% of their GDP to military defense. About half of NATO’s members, including Germany, France, Norway, Spain and Turkey, <a href="https://www.forces.net/news/world/nato-which-countries-pay-their-share-defence#:%7E:text=Ukraine%20war&text=Poland%20is%20the%20alliance%27s%20biggest,3.01%25%20the%20next%20closest.">spend less</a>. </p>
<p>NATO leader Jens Stoltenberg said in a written statement on Feb. 11 that <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html#">Trump’s suggestion</a> “undermines all of our security, including that of the U.S., and puts American and European soldiers at increased risk.” Other political leaders also criticized Trump’s comments as highly dangerous. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=bs9WVS0AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of history and international affairs,</a> it is clear to me that Trump does not seem to understand the many advantages the U.S. gets from being part of NATO. Here are three major benefits for the U.S. that come with NATO membership: </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two cookies are seen on a plate - one has frosting designed like the American flag, and the other is blue with a white compass on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575418/original/file-20240213-30-fy2sgt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">NATO and American flag cookies are seen at a meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Jan. 29, 2024, in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/and-american-flag-cookies-at-a-meeting-between-defense-news-photo/1963151870?adppopup=true">Julia Nikhinson/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>1. NATO gives the US reliable allies</h2>
<p>Militarily and economically, the U.S. is a hugely formidable power. It has the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">largest nuclear arsenal</a> on earth and continues to be the largest economy in the world. </p>
<p>Yet, without its allies in Asia, and above all without those in Europe, the U.S would be a much diminished superpower. </p>
<p>NATO provides the U.S. with a leadership position in one of the strongest military alliance networks in the world. This leadership goes well beyond the security realm – it has profound and very positive political and economic ripple effects. For instance, most Western countries <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/03/14/global-arms-sales-us-dominates-russia#">purchase their arms and military</a> equipment from the U.S. </p>
<p>Russia counts controversial regimes known for human rights violations such as Iran, North Korea and, to some extent, China, among its most important allies. The U.S. considers economically strong countries like Canada, Germany, France, Italy and many other established democracies as its friends and allies.</p>
<p>NATO has invoked <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> only once – immediately after the U.S. <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm#:%7E:text=12%20September%202001&text=Later%20that%20day%2C%20the%20Allies,abroad%20against%20the%20United%20States.">was attacked on Sept. 11, 2001</a>. America’s NATO allies were ready to come to the aid of the U.S. – and, for good or for bad, many subsequently participated in the United States’ war in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>2. NATO provides peace and stability</h2>
<p>NATO provides a blanket of protection and mutual security for all its members, helping explain why the vast majority of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/03/30/7-former-communist-countries-join-nato/476d93dc-e4bd-4f05-9a15-5b66d322d0e6/">countries in central and eastern Europe</a> clamored to join NATO after the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union">fall of the Soviet Union</a> in 1991. </p>
<p>Today, Ukraine continues to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3455199/leaders-agree-to-expedite-ukraines-nato-membership/">push for NATO membership</a> – though its application to join appears unlikely to be granted anytime soon, given the military commitment this would create for the alliance. </p>
<p>Russia fought short wars in recent <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91277">years with Moldova</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">Georgia</a> and also with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/">Ukraine prior</a> to 2022, but Putin has not invaded neighboring countries that are NATO members. Invading a NATO country would bring the entire alliance into a war with Russia, which would be a risky gamble for Moscow.</p>
<p>Despite international concern that Russia’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/us/politics/ukraine-war-expansion.html">war in Ukraine could spill over</a> into neighboring NATO countries, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/29/poland-says-russian-missile-briefly-entered-its-airspace#:%7E:text=%22Everything%20indicates%20that%20a%20Russian,from%20%5BNATO%5D%20allies.%22">like Poland</a> and the three Baltic nations, it has not yet happened. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Donald Trump enters a stage with an American flag on it, with blue-lit lighting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575424/original/file-20240213-24-8gq9w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Donald Trump arrives at a news conference during the July 2018 NATO summit in Brussels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-arrives-to-speak-to-the-media-at-a-news-photo/996942026?adppopup=true">Sean Gallup/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>3. NATO has helped the US get stronger</h2>
<p>The Soviet Union’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_138294.htm">military alliance, called the Warsaw Pact</a>, required the USSR and its satellite states in central and eastern Europe, including East Germany, Poland and Hungary, to join. NATO, on the other hand, is a voluntary military alliance, and countries must go through a demanding application process before they are accepted. </p>
<p>The United States’ current presence in Europe – and Asia – has not been imposed by force. Instead, U.S. troops and influence in Europe are generally welcomed by its allies. </p>
<p>By joining NATO and accepting the military leadership of Washington, the other NATO countries give the U.S. unprecedented influence and power. Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad called this an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338602300305">empire by invitation</a>.” This informal empire has deeply anchored the U.S. and its influence in Europe. </p>
<h2>A split in opinion</h2>
<p>President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that under his leadership the U.S. would “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-calls-trumps-nato-remarks-un-american-rcna138670#:%7E:text=%22As%20long%20as%20I%27m,a%20rally%20in%20South%20Carolina.">defend every inch</a> of NATO territory,” speaking primarily in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine. </p>
<p>Biden has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/30/biden-warns-putin-on-nato-threat-as-russia-annexes-ukraine-regions.html">repeatedly warned Putin</a> that he would face the consequences if Russia attacks a NATO member.</p>
<p>For Trump, however, transatlantic solidarity and mutual defense appear to count for nothing. For him, it seems to be all about the money and whether or not NATO countries spend 2% of their GDP on defense. And despite Putin having begun a terrible war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Trump has continued to voice his <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/trump-putin-ukraine-invasion-00010923">admiration of the Russian leader</a>.</p>
<p>Trump does not view Putin’s Russia as an existential threat to the U.S.-led global order. And thus he does not seem to realize that the U.S. and its European allies need protection from Putin’s Russia, the kind of protection offered by NATO. NATO’s existence gives the U.S. strong and reliable allies, provides Washington with great influence in Europe and makes sure that most of Europe remains stable and peaceful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus W. Larres does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump has threatened to not defend some NATO countries if Russia attacks them. But the US also benefits from the power that NATO gives it, as well as the stability it helped create in Europe.Klaus W. Larres, Professor of History and International Affairs, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229582024-02-13T12:45:09Z2024-02-13T12:45:09ZChina’s chip industry is gaining momentum – it could alter the global economic and security landscape<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574634/original/file-20240209-20-qhpgx6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4977%2C3337&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cropped-image-engineer-showing-computer-microchip-151125485">Dragon Images/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s national champions for computer chip – or semiconductor – design and manufacturing, HiSilicon and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), are making waves in Washington. </p>
<p>SMIC was long considered a laggard. Despite being the recipient of billions of dollars from the Chinese government since its founding in 2000, it remained far from the technological frontier. But that perception — and the self-assurance it gave the US — is changing. </p>
<p>In August 2023, Huawei launched its high-end Huawei Mate 60 smartphone. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (an American think tank based in Washington DC), the launch <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/327414d2-fe13-438e-9767-333cdb94c7e1">“surprised the US”</a> as the chip powering it showed that Chinese self-sufficiency in HiSilicon’s semiconductor design and SMIC’s manufacturing capabilities were catching up at an alarming pace.</p>
<p>More recent news that Huawei and SMIC are scheming to mass-produce so-called 5-nanometre processor chips in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5e0dba3-689f-4d0e-88f6-673ff4452977">new Shanghai production facilities</a> has only stoked further fears about leaps in their next-generation prowess. These chips remain a generation behind the current cutting-edge ones, but they show that China’s move to create more advanced chips is well on track, despite US export controls.</p>
<p>The US has long managed to maintain its clear position as the frontrunner in chip design, and has ensured it was close allies who were supplying the manufacturing of cutting-edge chips. But now it faces formidable competition from China, who’s technological advance carries profound economic, geopolitical and security implications.</p>
<h2>Semiconductors are a big business</h2>
<p>For decades, chipmakers have sought to make ever more compact products. Smaller transistors result in lower energy consumption and faster processing speeds, so massively improve the performance of a microchip. </p>
<p>Moore’s Law — the expectation that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles every two years — has remained valid in chips designed in the Netherlands and the US, and manufactured in Korea and Taiwan. Chinese technology has therefore remained years behind. While the world’s frontier has moved to 3-nanometre chips, Huawei’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/what-does-huaweis-homemade-chip-really-mean-for-chinas-semiconductor-industry/">homemade chip</a> is at 7 nanometres. </p>
<p>Maintaining this distance has been important for economic and security reasons. Semiconductors are the backbone of the modern economy. They are critical to telecommunications, defence and artificial intelligence.</p>
<p>The US push for <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/19/geopolitics-and-the-push-for-made-in-the-usa-semiconductors/">“made in the USA”</a> semiconductors has to do with this systemic importance. Chip shortages <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/07/28/how-the-world-went-from-a-semiconductor-shortage-to-a-major-glut.html">wreak havoc</a> on global production since they power so many of the products that define contemporary life. </p>
<p>Today’s military prowess even directly relies on chips. In fact, according to the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes">Center for Strategic and International Studies</a>, “all major US defence systems and platforms rely on semiconductors.” </p>
<p>The prospect of relying on Chinese-made chips — and the backdoors, Trojan horses and control over supply that would pose — are unacceptable to Washington and its allies.</p>
<h2>Stifling China’s chip industry</h2>
<p>Since the 1980s, the US has helped establish and maintain a distribution of chip manufacturing that is dominated by South Korea and Taiwan. But the US has recently sought to safeguard its technological supremacy and independence by bolstering its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/17/how-the-chips-act-is-aiming-to-restore-a-us-lead-in-semiconductors.html">own manufacturing ability</a>.</p>
<p>Through large-scale <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/">industrial policy</a>, billions of dollars are being poured into US chip manufacturing facilities, including a multi-billion dollar <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/aug/28/phoenix-microchip-plant-biden-union-tsmc">plant in Arizona</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large factory under construction on a clear, sunny day." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574637/original/file-20240209-16-wo3zz4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">TSMC, the world’s largest chipmaker, building an advanced semiconductor factory in the US state of Arizona.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/phoenix-arizona-march-08-2023-ongoing-2272665185">Around the World Photos/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The second major tack is exclusion. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has subjected <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-in-trumps-war-on-huawei-control-of-the-global-computer-chip-industry-124079">numerous investment and acquisition deals</a> to review, ultimately even blocking some in the name of US national security. This includes the high-profile case of <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/2018/03/08/cfius-intervenes-in-broadcoms-attempt-to-buy-qualcomm">Broadcom’s attempt to buy Qualcomm</a> in 2018 due to its China links.</p>
<p>In 2023, the US government issued an <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-issues-executive-order-restricting-us-outbound-investment-in-advanced-technologies-involving-countries-of-concern-china/">executive order</a> inhibiting the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technologies to China. By imposing stringent export controls, the US aims to impede China’s access to critical components. </p>
<p>The hypothesis has been that HiSilicon and SMIC would continue to stumble as they attempt self-sufficiency at the frontier. The US government has called on its friends to adopt a unified stance around excluding chip exports to China. Notably, ASML, a leading Dutch designer, has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/02/asml-halts-hi-tech-chip-making-exports-to-china-reportedly-after-us-request#:%7E:text=1%20month%20old-,ASML%20halts%20hi%2Dtech%20chip%2Dmaking%20exports%20to,China%20reportedly%20after%20US%20request&text=A%20Dutch%20manufacturer%20has%20cancelled,government%2C%20it%20has%20been%20reported.">halted shipments</a> of its hi-tech chips to China on account of US policy. </p>
<p>Washington has also <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/china-quietly-recruits-overseas-chip-talent-as-us-tightens-curbs/articleshow/103004607.cms?from=mdr">limited talent flows</a> to the Chinese semiconductor industry. The regulations to limit the movements of talent are motivated by the observation that even “godfathers” of semiconductor manufacturing in Japan, Korea and Taiwan <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/28/washington-shores-up-friends-in-the-semiconductor-industry/">went on to work</a> for Chinese chipmakers — taking their know-how and connections with them. </p>
<p>This, and the <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/taiwan/comments/154x9vt/tsmc_delays_us_chip_fab_opening_says_us_talent_is/">recurring headlines</a> about the need for more semiconductor talent in the US, has fuelled the clampdown on the outflow of American talent. </p>
<p>Finally, the US government has explicitly targeted China’s national champion firms: Huawei and SMIC. It banned the sale and import of equipment from <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/After-Huawei-5G-chip-debut-U.S.-lawmakers-call-for-tighter-export-controls#:%7E:text=After%20the%20U.S.%20government%20put,SMIC%20has%20also%20been%20blacklisted.">Huawei in 2019</a> and has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/9/15/us-republicans-demand-full-sanctions-charges-against-chinas-huawei-smic">imposed sanctions on SMIC</a> since 2020. </p>
<h2>What’s at stake?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://ig.ft.com/sites/business-book-award/books/2022/winner/chip-war-by-chris-miller/">“chip war”</a> is about economic and security dominance. Beijing’s ascent to the technological frontier would mean an economic boom for China and bust for the US. And it would have profound security implications.</p>
<p>Economically, China’s emergence as a major semiconductor player could disrupt existing supply chains, reshape the division of labour and distribution of human capital in the global electronics industry. From a security perspective, China’s rise poses a heightened risk of vulnerabilities in Chinese-made chips being exploited to compromise critical infrastructure or conduct cyber espionage. </p>
<p>Chinese self-sufficiency in semiconductor design and manufacturing would also undermine Taiwan’s “silicon shield”. Taiwan’s status as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">leading manufacturer</a> of semiconductors has so far deterred China from using force to attack the island.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>China is advancing its semiconductor capabilities. The economic, geopolitical and security implications will be profound and far-reaching. Given the stakes that both superpowers face, what we can be sure about is that Washington will not easily acquiesce, nor will Beijing give up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222958/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is making chip progress despite US efforts to contain its industry.Robyn Klingler-Vidra, Associate Dean, Global Engagement | Associate Professor in Entrepreneurship and Sustainability, King's College LondonSteven Hai, Affiliate Fellow, King’s Institute for Artificial Intelligence, King’s College London, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2221052024-02-09T16:50:28Z2024-02-09T16:50:28ZChina’s increasing political influence in the south Pacific has sparked an international response<p>Taiwan elected <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/taiwan-ruling-partys-lai-ching-te-wins-presidential-election">Lai Ching-te</a>, also known as William Lai, to be its next president on January 13. His election marks the continuation of a government that promotes an independent Taiwan. </p>
<p>Just two days later, the Pacific nation of Nauru <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/nauru-severs-ties-with-taiwan-switches-diplomatic-allegiance-to-china-20240115-p5exh1.html">severed ties</a> with Taiwan and transferred its diplomatic allegiance to Beijing. </p>
<p>More recently, on January 27, Tuvalu’s pro-Taiwan prime minister, Kausea Natano, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/27/tuvalus-pro-taiwan-prime-minister-kausea-natano-loses-seat-in-partial-election-results?ref=upstract.com">lost his seat</a> in the nation’s general election. Natano’s finance minister, Seve Paeniu, who is aiming for the prime ministership himself, was returned to his seat. In his campaign, Paeniu pledged to <a href="https://devpolicy.org/2024-tuvalu-general-election-a-changing-political-landscape-20240130/#:%7E:text=In%20Tuvalu%20elections%2C%20candidates%20run,both%20incumbents%20won%20re%2Delection.">review</a> Tuvalu’s relationships with China and Taiwan.</p>
<p>These examples indicate China’s growing influence in the south Pacific, a region that the world’s major powers are competing for influence over. But why is the region significant? And how are these major powers exerting their influence there?</p>
<h2>Preventing recognition of Taiwan</h2>
<p>Taiwan has been governed independently since 1949. But Beijing believes it should be reunited with the rest of China. It is not an option for states to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/04/not-about-the-highest-bidder-the-countries-defying-china-to-stick-with-taiwan">diplomatically recognise</a> both China and Taiwan – China forces them to choose. </p>
<p>For decades, the Chinese government has used a combination of carrots and sticks to pressure such states into transferring diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. </p>
<p>China has, for example, imposed significant political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on countries that continue to formally recognise Taiwan. In 2022, China curbed imports from Lithuania to <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/tough-trade-the-hidden-costs-of-economic-coercion/">punish the country</a> for allowing Taiwan to open a de facto embassy in the country.</p>
<p>But China also offers states – and their governing elites – economic and political incentives for <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-020-09682-8">withdrawing diplomatic recognition</a> of Taiwan. It has, in the past, used its influence in the UN and other international organisations to block assistance or elect specific people to international positions.</p>
<p>Nauru’s change of diplomatic position, and the political debate unfolding in Tuvulu, should be understood as part of China’s longstanding effort to prevent and reduce recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. </p>
<p>But they are a significant step forward for China. Nauru has a leading position in the Pacific Islands Forum – the main political decision-making body for the region – so the country’s change of stance could lead to wider formal diplomatic changes in the south Pacific. </p>
<p>China, of course, has legitimate economic and political interests in the south Pacific too. It is a vital export market for natural resources from Pacific island states and is a key source of incoming tourism. According to <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202205/t20220524_10691917.html">Chinese statistics</a>, total trade volume between China and Pacific island states grew from US$153 million (£121 million) to US$5.3 billion (£4.2 billion) between 1992 and 2021.</p>
<h2>Competing for influence</h2>
<p>Nauru’s decision is another diplomatic setback for Taiwan, which is now formally recognised by just 11 countries. However, this is not in itself a serious concern for the US, Australia and their allies. </p>
<p>They all formally recognise China, while at the same time maintaining close, informal links with Taiwan. Their focus is on trying to limit the depth of Chinese political and economic influence over Pacific island states and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. The US is concerned that growing Chinese political influence may ultimately result in it enjoying significant military presence in the region.</p>
<p>The Pacific region encompasses the US state of Hawaii, multiple US territories, and is also home to several crucial US military bases. So, the US has made an effort to <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11208">enhance its diplomatic relations</a> in the region by providing financial support for initiatives around climate change adaption, sustainable fishing and economic growth. </p>
<p>However, increased tension between China and the west over the past decade has made it increasingly challenging to reign in Chinese influence. China has been asserting its primacy in and around Taiwan in the South China Sea, and has increasingly <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-military-aggression-in-the-indo-pacific-region/">exerted military pressure</a>. </p>
<p>China’s struggle for influence in the region now also includes taking opportunities to challenge previously undisputed western security dominance in the south Pacific. In 2022, China put forward a proposal for a diplomatic, economic and security agreement with the region. The agreement was, however, later <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11208">abandoned</a> due to resistance from some Pacific island nations at the urging of the US and Australia.</p>
<h2>US strategy in the south Pacific</h2>
<p>When president, Donald Trump launched a number of deals with Pacific islands including Nauru, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Palau and Micronesia. However, Trump’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-trump-administration-and-the-free-and-open-indo-pacific/#:%7E:text=The%20administration%20has%20rolled%20out,programs%2C%20which%20support%20these%20goals">strategy</a> for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” had limited success. This was not only due to his confrontational posture towards China, but also to his threatening and protectionist “America first” rhetoric. </p>
<p>Joe Biden’s comparatively measured diplomacy has seen more success. In 2022, the Biden administration <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Pacific-Partnership-Strategy.pdf">announced</a> its “Pacific partnership strategy”.</p>
<p>The initiative included a commitment of US$810 million in development aid across the Pacific island region. And in May 2023, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/25/fact-sheet-enhancing-the-u-s-pacific-islands-partnership/#:%7E:text=Last%20year%2C%20the%20Biden%2DHarris,%24810%20million%20in%20new%20assistance">stated</a> that he would work with Congress to provide over US$7.2 billion to support the region. </p>
<p>Since then, the US has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/25/statement-by-president-biden-on-the-recognition-of-the-cook-islands-and-the-establishment-of-diplomatic-relations/">recognised</a> the Cook Islands and Niue as independent, sovereign nations, increased its diplomatic footprint in the region and has committed strongly to work with the Pacific Islands Forum to promote a “democratic, resilient and prosperous Pacific islands region”.</p>
<p>The shift of diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China does not mean that Pacific island nations want to reduce their ties with the west. But the US, Australia and their allies will need to invest a lot more in diplomatic, economic and security assistance if they want to counter China’s growing influence there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is asserting itself in the South Pacific, prompting efforts from the US and its allies to contain its influence.Owen Greene, Professor of International Security and Development, University of BradfordChristoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227182024-02-03T17:28:29Z2024-02-03T17:28:29ZUS raids in Iraq and Syria: How retaliatory airstrikes affect network of Iran-backed militias<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573194/original/file-20240203-29-7pf0p7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=2%2C126%2C1594%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The headquarters of an Iranian-linked group in Anbar, Iraq was among the sites targeted by U.S. bombers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-destruction-after-the-us-warplanes-carried-out-an-news-photo/1974225653?adppopup=true">Hashd al-Shaabi Media Office/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>U.S. bombers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-starts-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-officials-2024-02-02/">struck dozens of sites</a> across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.</em></p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes were the first following a deadly assault on a U.S. base in Jordan that U.S. officials blamed on Iranian-backed militias. Sites associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were among those hit by American bombs.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to American University’s <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch</a> and <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/nakissa_jahanbani">Nakissa Jahanbani</a> at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center – both experts on Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies – to explain what the U.S. strikes hoped to achieve and what could happen next.</em></p>
<h2>Who was targeted in the U.S. retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The U.S. response extended beyond targeting Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, or <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a>, the entity <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/29/us-troops-jordan-iraq-militias/">claiming responsibility</a> for the drone attack on Jan. 28. </p>
<p>This term, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, does not refer to a single group per se. Rather, it encompasses an umbrella organization that has, since around 2020, integrated various Iran-backed militias in the region. </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68126137#">officially denied</a> any involvement in the Jan. 28 drone strike. But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports with money, weapons and training through the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force</a>.</p>
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<p>In recent months, parts of this network of Iran-backed militias have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/">claimed responsibility</a> for more than 150 attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>As such, the U.S. <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">retaliatory strikes</a> targeted over 85 sites across Iraq and Syria, all associated with Iranian-supported groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<p>The U.S. operation’s stated aim is to deter further Iranian-backed aggression. Specifically, in Syria, the U.S. executed several airstrikes, reportedly resulting in the death of at least <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/03/world/middleeast/at-least-18-members-of-iran-backed-groups-were-killed-in-syria-monitoring-group-says.html#:%7E:text=The%20aftermath%20of%20the%20U.S.,16%20people%20had%20been%20killed%2C">18 militia group members</a> and the destruction of dozens of locations in <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/324467/">Al-Mayadeen and Deir el-Zour</a>, a key stronghold of Iranian-backed forces.</p>
<p>In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state security apparatus comprising groups backed by Iran, reported that U.S. strikes resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-launches-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-nearly-40-reported-killed-2024-02-03/">16 of its members</a>, including both fighters and medics. </p>
<p>The U.S. response was notably more robust than other recent actions against such groups, reflecting an escalation in efforts to counter the threats posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.</p>
<h2>What do we know about the network targeted in the strike?</h2>
<p>Initially, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a response to foreign military presence and political interventions, especially after <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war">the 2003 U.S.-led invasion</a> of Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner. Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Today, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity. That is to say, as a network its objectives often align with Iran’s goal of preserving its influence across the region, but on a national level – in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – the groups have their distinct agendas.</p>
<p>Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations. This was seen in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">deadly Jan. 28, 2024, attack on Tower 22</a>, a U.S. military base in Jordan. Although it is evident that an Iranian-supported militia orchestrated the drone assault, pinpointing the specific faction within this broad coalition is difficult.</p>
<p>This deliberate strategy of obscuring the particular source of attacks hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits. </p>
<h2>What are the strikes expected to accomplish?</h2>
<p>U.S. Central Command <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">said on Feb. 2</a> that the operation’s aim is to significantly impair the operational capabilities, weaponry and supply networks of the IRGC and its Iranian-backed proxies.</p>
<p>The strikes targeted key assets such as command and control centers, intelligence facilities, storage locations for rockets, missiles, drones and logistics and munitions facilities. The goal is not only to degrade their current operational infrastructure but also to deter future attacks. </p>
<p>The action followed the discovery of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-drone-that-killed-soldiers-was-iranian-made-sources-2024-02-01/">Iranian-made drone</a> used in an attack on Jordan. </p>
<p>In a broader strategy to counter these groups, the U.S. has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">implemented new sanctions</a> against IRGC officers and officials, unsealed criminal charges against individuals involved in selling oil to benefit Hamas and Hezbollah, and conducted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/us-iran-sanctions-charges.html">cyberattacks</a> against Iran.</p>
<h2>How will this affect Iran’s strategy in the region?</h2>
<p>Prior to the U.S. response on Feb. 2, Kataib Hezbollah, a group linked to Iran, announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-suspends-military-operations-us-forces-statement-2024-01-30/">a halt</a> in attacks on American targets – a move seen as recognizing the serious implications of the Jordan drone incident. </p>
<p>It is possible that the cessation was the result of pressure from Tehran, though this has been <a href="https://thehill.com/newsletters/morning-report/4443950-us-plan-retaliate-against-iran-takes-shape/">met with skepticism</a> in Washington.</p>
<p>But the development nonetheless speaks to the interplay of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">influence and autonomy</a> among the so-called Axis of Resistance groups, which oppose U.S. presence in the Middle East and are supported by Iran <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">to varying</a> degrees.</p>
<p>The U.S. airstrikes – <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">combined with sanctions and charges</a> – serve as a multifaceted strategy to deter further aggression from Iran and its proxies. By targeting critical infrastructure such as command and control centers, intelligence operations and weapons storage facilities, the approach aims to undermine Iran’s ability to project power in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">comprehensive and broad nature</a> of the U.S. response signals a robust stance against threats to regional stability and U.S. interests.</p>
<p>The aim is to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, while squeezing its support for regional proxies. This underscores a commitment by the U.S. to counter Iranian influence that could potentially weaken Tehran’s regional engagement strategies, negotiation positions and capacity to form alliances.</p>
<p>However, the effectiveness of airstrikes and sanctions in deterring Iranian-backed aggression remains uncertain. Historical <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">trends suggest</a> that similar U.S. actions since the Oct. 7 Hamas assault in Israel, and as far back as 2017, have not completely halted attacks from Iranian-backed groups.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s approach seeks to navigate this landscape without <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/02/politics/us-strikes-iraq-syria/index.html">escalating the conflict</a>, focusing on <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2024-01-31/iran-hamas-gaza-israel-war-terrorism">targeting</a> the financial mechanisms that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">support Iranian proxies</a>. Yet the impact and repercussions of such sanctions on Iran and the broader regional dynamics is complex.</p>
<p>In the short term, any direct U.S. retaliation against Iranian interests could heighten regional tensions and exacerbate the cycle of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-uk-airstrikes-risk-strengthening-houthi-rebels-position-in-yemen-and-the-region-221006">tit-for-tat strikes</a> between the U.S. and Iranian-backed forces, increasing the risk of a broader regional conflict. And given that the attack’s pretext involves the Israel-Hamas war, any U.S. response could indirectly affect the course of that conflict, impacting future diplomatic efforts and the regional balance of power. </p>
<p>Iran’s “<a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">forward defense” strategy</a> – focused on addressing threats externally before they become ones within its borders – would suggest that Iran will continue to support proxies through weaponry, funding and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/how-iran-and-its-allies-hope-to-save-hamas/">tactical knowledge</a> to reduce the influence and legitimacy of the U.S. and its allies in the region.</p>
<p>This underscores the delicate balance required in responding to Iranian-backed aggression – aiming to safeguard U.S. interests while preventing an escalation into a wider regional confrontation.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: Parts of this story were included in <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">an article</a> published on Jan. 29, 2024.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 85 locations linked to militias were hit in a robust response by Washington to an earlier deadly drone attack on a US base in Jordan.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226952024-02-03T13:35:03Z2024-02-03T13:35:03ZUS launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria − a national security expert explains the message they send<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573164/original/file-20240202-17-gyzhww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden attends the arrival of the remains of three U.S. service members killed in a drone attack in Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-attends-the-dignified-transfer-of-the-news-photo/1973658835?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United States mounted more than 125 retaliatory strikes against Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias at seven military sites in Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, after a drone strike <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">killed three U.S. soldiers</a> and injured 34 more in Jordan on Jan. 28.</em> </p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes, <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">which U.S. military officials say hit 85 targets, including command</a> and control operations centers, intelligence centers and munition supply chain facilities, are the latest chapter in the Middle East conflict, which President Joe Biden has tried to avoid escalating.</em></p>
<p><em>Biden announced on Jan. 30 that he had decided how to respond to the drone strike that killed the soldiers and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75WsnYkuTlI">said</a>, “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East.” The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed militia group, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68063741">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, while Iran denied any direct involvement in it.</em> </p>
<p><em>The U.S. retaliatory strikes happened hours after the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-witness-return-remains-us-soldiers-killed-jordan-2024-02-02/">remains of the American soldiers</a> were returned to the U.S.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/gregory-treverton/">Gregory Treverton</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, to understand the strategic thinking behind this retaliatory attack.</em> </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A satellite image shows a cleared area in a desert with beige and grey buildings, seen from high in the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A satellite image from 2022 shows Tower 22, the U.S. military base where three U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more were wounded on Jan. 28, 2024, in a drone strike by an Iranian-backed militia group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-of-tower-22-which-houses-a-small-news-photo/1963648340?adppopup=true">Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are some of the factors that likely played a role in the US deciding to launch a retaliatory strike and when to launch it?</h2>
<p>Regarding timing, the president may have wanted to get the bodies of the service people who were killed in Jordan back home and give some time for everyone to think. In the last few days, we saw that Iran and Iraq did put pressure on some of the proxy groups to wind down their operations. In one case, one of these Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/kataib-hezbollah-suspend-military-ops-us-intl/index.html">agreed to cease operations</a> this last week. Iran also said that they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news">do not want a wider war</a> with the U.S. </p>
<p>With the time it took Biden to authorize the strike, it also gave the Iranian soldiers and others time to move out of harm’s way, if they wanted to leave the military bases. </p>
<p>More strategically, Biden already committed earlier this week to make some kind of response, and he was under all kinds of political pressure to do something. But he still appears to be trying to avoid further escalating the conflict.</p>
<p>Biden, for example, avoided striking Iranian territory directly, though some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/republicans-pressure-biden-to-strike-iran-directly-after-deadly-drone-strike/">Republicans had pressured</a> him to do so. </p>
<h2>Iran says it wants to avoid a war with the US. But its proxy group just struck a US military base. Does that imply some sort of internal friction there?</h2>
<p>In our own country’s experience with proxy groups, we know that they have their own interests, and there are also the interests that we share. Sometimes, proxy groups that the U.S. has backed act in a way we don’t like and are just in their own interest. These proxy relationships are always complicated, in that sense. </p>
<p>Even if Iran wants to avoid further escalation with the U.S., my guess is that many of these groups would not mind a broader conflict happening, if their goals are more apocalyptic, such as destroying Israel. </p>
<h2>What do these retaliatory strikes accomplish?</h2>
<p>I think they accomplish fulfilling the Biden administration’s commitment to do something significant and respond to the drone strike killing U.S. soldiers. The response itself is measured enough so far that it is unlikely to escalate the conflict dramatically, though we could be surprised by that. </p>
<p>Overall, it is a calibrated measure that plainly is not going to entirely degrade the military capacity of any of these groups. But it should still have a pretty significant effect and weaken their military capabilities, at least to some extent. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms carry a casket draped in an American flag on a grey day. President Joe Biden stands nearby in a dark jacket." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On Feb. 2, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden watches as U.S. Army soldiers carry the remains of Army Sgt. Kennedy Sanders, who was killed in a drone strike in Jordan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/army-carry-team-moves-a-flagged-draped-transfer-case-news-photo/1980832024?adppopup=true">Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What else is most important to understand about these retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The wider context here is that the U.S. strikes make it all the more important to get to some cease-fire in Gaza. At least then, these proxy forces would lose that <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">rationale – of Israel’s attacks</a> on Gaza – to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-bolsters-defenses-around-jordan-base-as-it-readies-response-to-drone-attack/7468786.html">justify what they are doing</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to me we are still seeing no real sign from the Israelis of a sense of an endgame in this war. We presume that the Israeli government is thinking about some way to reform the Palestinian Authority or consider some coalition of Arab states, maybe the U.S. and European countries, to govern Gaza once the war ends. But we have not seen any sign of that publicly. </p>
<p>So, as long as the war continues in Gaza and as long as Palestinians are being killed, these proxy groups see this as their only way to respond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US attacks on military sites in Iraq and Syria are unlikely to further escalate conflict in the Middle East, he writes.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219652024-01-29T13:36:36Z2024-01-29T13:36:36ZIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a dilemma: Free the hostages or continue the war in Gaza?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571656/original/file-20240126-25-l606eo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">On Dec. 8, 2023, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends the funeral of a 25-year-old Israeli soldier who was killed in Gaza. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prime-minister-benjamin-netanyhu-attends-the-funeral-for-news-photo/1842633511?adppopup=true"> Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As Israel’s war with Hamas drags into its fourth month, some Israelis are becoming increasingly angry at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government’s inability to free the remaining <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/22/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-hostages">136 hostages in the Gaza Strip</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Israeli protesters have called for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/24/1226713168/in-israel-anger-at-netanyahu-is-getting-louder">Netanyahu’s resignation</a>, while dozens of <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/22/families-hostages-gaza-israel-parliament-00137069">family members of the hostages stormed</a> the Israeli parliament on Jan. 22, 2024, demanding a deal for the hostages’ release.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pgpEt8MAAAAJ&hl=en">Dov Waxman</a>, a scholar of Israeli politics and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to better understand the public pulse in Israel, and why some experts – including him – are saying that Netanyahu does not want to end the war.</em></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people, including several women, hold signs and shout in a nighttime shot, in front of tall, lit up buildings. One of the signs says 'Deal now.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571658/original/file-20240126-23-mzztut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Families of Israeli hostages protest in Tel Aviv, calling for the Israeli government to make a deal with Hamas and get the hostages released.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/families-of-israeli-hostages-carrying-photos-and-banners-news-photo/1950955826?adppopup=true">Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How is Israeli public opinion on the war shifting?</h2>
<p>For the first three months or so of the war, Israelis, specifically Jewish Israelis, strongly supported the war and the government’s declared goal of defeating and dismantling Hamas. That consensus and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/over-half-of-israelis-say-theyre-let-down-by-war-cabinets-handling-of-hamas-conflict/">unity are rapidly fraying</a>.</p>
<p>Netanyahu says continuing the war is the best way to release the hostages, but more and more Israelis, including the families of the hostages, are arguing that with every passing day that the war continues, the lives of the hostages are in greater danger. </p>
<p>There’s also growing doubts about whether Israel <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-777771">can actually decisively defeat and destroy Hamas</a>. More than three months into the war, Hamas is still standing and firing rockets into Israel. While Israel has assassinated mid-level Hamas commanders, Hamas leaders are still alive and able to call the shots. </p>
<h2>You have said that Netanyahu does not want to end the war. Why would that be?</h2>
<p>Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">widely unpopular</a> in Israel. Many Israelis, including some of Netanyahu’s supporters on the right, hold him accountable for the cascade of failures that resulted in Hamas’ massive incursion and horrific attack on Oct. 7, 2023. </p>
<p>To restore his domestic support, Netanyahu’s only hope is to continue the war and try to achieve the “total victory” over Hamas that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/netanyahu-insists-on-fight-until-total-victory-as-israel-marks-100-days-of-war">he has been promising</a>. If he fails to deliver on this, and on the release of the hostages, his Likud party is likely to lose the next election and he’ll be out of office. </p>
<h2>How does this political pressure influence Netanyahu’s response to the war?</h2>
<p>In order for Netanyahu to hold his coalition government together and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/why-is-israel-always-holding-elections-e671cfe22f9b045d2be3e65c5a60be61">avoid an election,</a> he has to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-06/ty-article/.premium/limits-to-surrender-if-pm-placates-haredim-hell-enrage-broad-public/0000018b-0127-d037-a9af-51ff9dc00000">appease the far-right</a> and ultra-Orthodox parties in his government. For the ultra-Orthodox parties, that means ensuring that their constituents receive the generous government subsidies and welfare benefits that they depend on, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2023/11/01/israel-hamas-haredi-idf/#">not requiring them</a> to serve in the Israel military – unlike other Israeli Jews – and maintaining the religious status quo in Israel. For the far-right parties, it means supporting <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-24/ty-article/.premium/israeli-army-weighs-plan-to-arm-west-bank-settlements-with-anti-tank-missiles/0000018d-3b7e-d32b-adcf-ff7e83330000">Israeli settlers in the West Bank</a> and expanding settlements there, and also preventing anything that will strengthen the Palestinian Authority, which the far-right wants to get rid of.</p>
<p>To keep his far-right allies in the government, Netanyahu has to block any post-war plan that gives the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-01-20-2024-ba66b165f3e5d1904d30b591199cface#">Palestinian Authority control over Gaza</a>. Merely discussing the question of post-war Gaza is treacherous for Netanyahu because the far-right is calling for Israel to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-24/ty-article/netanyahus-likud-ministers-far-right-mks-to-attend-gaza-resettlment-confab/0000018d-3b1e-d35c-a39f-bb5e38070000">reestablish Jewish settlements</a> there. The Biden administration opposes any long-term Israeli presence in Gaza and wants a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/revamped-palestinian-authority-should-govern-gaza-west-bank-says-senior-us-2023-12-14/">“revamped and revitalized”</a> Palestinian Authority to eventually return to oversee the territory. </p>
<p>Netanyahu’s way to evade these conflicting pressures is to avoid any discussion of the post-war governance of Gaza as much as possible. </p>
<p>Netanyahu has only said that Israel must have <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/damascus-airstrike-said-to-kill-iranian-revolutionary-guards/7448161.html#">security control over Gaza</a>, but what that actually entails is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/evasive-on-postwar-gaza-netanyahu-risks-saddling-israel-with-full-responsibility/">totally unclear</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier wearing a red beret carries a coffin covered in a blue and white cloth. People stand behind him crying." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571655/original/file-20240126-27-tloa3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners in Tel Aviv cry on Jan. 23, 2024, during the funeral ceremony for an Israeli soldier killed in Gaza.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mourners-cry-during-the-funeral-ceremony-of-major-ilay-levi-news-photo/1948671112?adppopup=true">Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What are most Israelis increasingly focused on, regarding the war?</h2>
<p>Most Israeli Jews are focused on the fate of the hostages and on Israeli military casualties – these are the stories that dominate Israeli media coverage. The families of the hostages have made sure that their plight is not forgotten. And since some of the hostages who were released back in November are recounting their harrowing experiences in captivity, this is also keeping public attention focused on the hostages still in Gaza. </p>
<p>The deaths of Israeli soldiers in Gaza also receive a lot of attention – on Jan. 23, the Israeli military had its deadliest day since the war began when <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/23/1226305928/israel-military-deadliest-gaza-hamas-war">24 soldiers were killed</a>. Most Israeli Jews have served in the military, and most have family members or friends currently serving. So they are very connected to the military, and military deaths resonate very powerfully in Israeli society.</p>
<p>What most Israelis are not focusing on is the suffering of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/unicef-state-palestine-humanitarian-situation-report-no-15-escalation-11-17-january-2024%20in%20Gaza">Palestinian civilians in Gaza</a>. Many are not even aware of what is happening to Palestinians in Gaza, because it receives little coverage in the Israeli media. </p>
<h2>Families of the hostages are speaking out against the Israeli government and its inability to free the hostages. What kind of pressure is this creating?</h2>
<p>It has a big effect. There is great empathy for what these families are going through. There is also a strong ethos that the state has a moral obligation to rescue its citizens, including its soldiers. </p>
<p>Many people feel that the state fundamentally failed its citizens on Oct. 7 because it failed to prevent or stop the massacre and abductions that took place. So it is now especially incumbent on the government to bring the hostages home. Even if Israel defeats Hamas but doesn’t free the hostages, it will leave an open wound in Israeli society and damage, if not rupture, the relationship between the Israeli state and its citizens. </p>
<h2>Why is it unlikely that the military can free the hostages?</h2>
<p>The hostages are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/world/middleeast/gaza-hamas-israel-tunnels-hostages.html">kept underground in tunnels</a> that are hundreds of miles long. It’s likely they are frequently moved around, so it is next to impossible to even locate them. And even if they are located, actually reaching them before they are killed by their captors would be very, very difficult. </p>
<p>The only feasible option to free the hostages is to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-rejects-hamas-conditions-hostage-deal-which-include-outright-2024-01-21/">strike another deal</a> with Hamas. But it will be very hard for Netanyahu to accept the terms that Hamas is demanding, particularly ending the war. Netanyahu and his defense minister argue that the more military pressure Hamas is under, the more likely it is to accept a deal on terms that are acceptable to Israel. But the other members of the war cabinet, and growing numbers of Israelis, now believe Israel should make a deal to release the hostages whatever the price, even if that means ending the war without defeating Hamas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Israeli politics explains why Israelis are increasingly turning against Netanyahu and his promise that Israel can quickly defeat Hamas and bring Israeli hostages home.Dov Waxman, Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Professor of Israel Studies, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219092024-01-25T16:16:34Z2024-01-25T16:16:34ZDonald Trump and the ‘madman theory’ of foreign policy<p>With Donald Trump now looking more and more likely to be the Republican nominee for November’s presidential election, the former president is now making the case that among other things, he would be much more effective than the incumbent, Joe Biden, in areas such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/oct/12/trump-biden-israel-hamas-war-florida-event">foreign policy</a>. For Trump’s supporters it is his unpredictable and risky nature that has led to some of his biggest <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/3/5/17059894/trump-north-korea-policy-work">foreign policy successes</a>. To his detractors he comes across as <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/trump-dangerous-foreign-policy/546230/">dangerous and unpredictable</a>. </p>
<p>Trump certainly has leaned in to the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/15/politics/donald-trump-richard-nixon-and-the-madman-theory/index.html">“madman theory”</a> of foreign policy – the idea that an unpredictable and irrational leader would have an advantage in international bargaining. But has Trump’s impulsiveness really been effective – or has it been destabilising?</p>
<p>This is not the first time that the madman theory of foreign policy has been applied to a US leader. Though the theory was first articulated by <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/madman-or-mad-genius-international-benefits-and-domestic-costs-madman-strategy">Daniel Ellsberg in 1959</a>, the phrase “madman” was popularised from statements made by <a href="https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/4/14165670/madman-theory-nuclear-weapons-trump-nixon">former US president Richard Nixon</a>. Nixon reportedly claimed that he wanted his adversaries to think that he was so obsessed with communism that he <a href="https://politicaldictionary.com/words/madman-theory/">could not be restrained</a> – and would even be crazy enough to start a nuclear war, forcing his enemies to beg for peace. </p>
<p>But while Nixon carefully crafted this image, it is not clear that Trump’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/4/14165670/madman-theory-nuclear-weapons-trump-nixon">madman tendencies</a> are part of a similar master plan.</p>
<p>Madman theory assumes that making seemingly unbelievable threats – such as embarking on nuclear war – are <a href="https://ndisc.nd.edu/assets/467565/mcmanus_madman_theory_book_proposal.pdf">more credible</a> if they are coming from someone who is unpredictable and possibly unstable. This idea flies in the face of traditional <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/6/article/447711/summary?casa_token=_0TolNV8Zv8AAAAA:jMHGF6g1d2pL0GFQpPCvp_muE6G-mCzNpwYq353q3NKFj7sn1GJkGwaT02nruaK5ajlvRROs31J_">neo-realist theories of international relations</a> that assume that people are rational and consider the consequences of their decisions. This explains the logic of nuclear deterrence, when there is mutually assured destruction – meaning that logical decision makers would never go as far as using their nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>Instead, madmen supposedly don’t consider the consequences of their actions – which should, in theory, instil fear in their enemies.</p>
<h2>Tool for dictators</h2>
<p>But who are these madmen? Do leaders actually behave this way, and if so have they had any success? Studies of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43279909">authoritarian regimes</a> have noted that certain types of dictatorships – namely <a href="https://politica.dk/fileadmin/politica/Dokumenter/Afhandlinger/matilde_thorsen.pdf">personalist dictatorships</a>, where power is vested in one person – are more likely to fit the madman stereotype. </p>
<p>But personalist dictators are also <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41495081">most likely to back</a> down after making threats, such as when Idi Amin threatened <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-day-idi-amin-wanted-to-annex-western-kenya--1304946">to annex western Kenya in 1976</a>, only to back down after Kenyan president, Jomo Kenyatta, threatened to block Uganda’s imports. Most of these “madmen” are often just full of hot air or their military intelligence is so poor (both inflating their capacities and downplaying their adversaries) that they feel emboldened to engage in risky behaviour that they can’t back up.</p>
<p>In Trump’s case, he led a country with tremendous military power, but rather than being strategic and calculated like Nixon, he has been described as <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/A_Trump_Doctrine/rc-AEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Republicans+claim+that+Trump%E2%80%99s+unpredictable+nature+led+to+some+foreign+policy+successes&pg=PT52&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">impulsive, ad hoc and incompetent</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="US president Richard M Nixon shakes hands with Chinese leader, Mao Zedong in 1971." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571437/original/file-20240125-15-psmxs5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mad and unpredictable, or just very clever? Richard Nixon meeting Chairman Mao in 1971.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These traits have certainly affected Trump’s foreign policy, but this mostly has resulted in reckless decisions. The list is long: quitting the Paris Climate Accords, dismantling the Iran-nuclear deal, withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council, threatening to withdraw from Nato and the World Health Organization and engaging in a bizarre back and forth with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, which resulted in a series of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/13/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-love-letters-diplomacy-nuclear-talks/">“love letters”</a> between the two.</p>
<h2>Madmen rarely prevail</h2>
<p>There is not only little evidence that Trump’s exploits have been effective, but also few examples of madman tactics actually working with other leaders. Idi Amin had little success with his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/28/archives/uganda-charles-a-tanzanian-invasion-fighting-said-to-be-in-tanzania.html">provocations with Tanzania</a> in 1978-1979. Nor did Muammar Gaddafi after he <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/32/Libyan+Conflicts+%281969+-+1994%29+%282011+-+%29">tried to annex</a> the Aouzou Strip, in northern Chad in 1980.</p>
<p>Research has pointed to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1810424?casa_token=BY_-I_NZk3sAAAAA:v1ktYuuXRUndsA2xNK5ko0Y2qT-Nad0c6gAlbF5ZZLVDQu1pgjEZeNN6XLOqrbH9o6i2DYGn7Zym2pk">several reasons</a> for why madmen are often unsuccessful. For a start it’s never clear if the other people involved actually understand what the “madman” is intending to signal. And even if that is obvious, because the “madman” is deemed crazy their threats are rarely taken seriously.</p>
<p>In Trump’s case it is also not clear if being perceived as “mad” is something to be feared or ridiculed. His unpredictability mostly played out on the world stage through a series of strange exchanges with autocrats – such as <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/16/politics/donald-trump-putin-helsinki-summit/index.html">fawning over Vladmir Putin in Helsinki</a> in 2018, where he took the word of the Russian president over his own intelligence agencies. Trump also allegedly <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/trump-assassinate-syria-assad-415093">threatened to kill</a> Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad in 2017, but then decided to pull US troops out of Syria in December of 2018. </p>
<p>And Trump’s <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/06/world/meanwhile-in-america-january-7-intl/index.html">antics with Iran</a> – pulling out of the nuclear deal and threatening to bomb Iranian cultural heritage sites – seemed to do little to deter the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, hardliners were then elected in the 2021 elections, which would have been the last thing US foreign policy planners wanted.</p>
<p>Prior to Trump and Kim Jong Un’s “love affair,” Trump engaged in reckless threats to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/9/19/trump-threatens-to-destroy-north-korea-if-necessary">destroy North Korea</a> (and was himself the recipient of insults from the opposing leader who referred to Trump as <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2018/03/donald-trump-s-offer-talk-north-korea-tests-madman-theory-limit">“mentally deranged”</a>. Though Trump boasted that his summit with North Korea is one of his <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/historic-summit-north-korea-tremendous-moment-world/">foreign policy wins</a>, he accomplished no more than any past presidents and Kim Jong-un remains as much a <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-ramps-up-military-rhetoric-as-kim-gives-up-on-reunification-with-south-213696">danger to regional stability</a> as ever. </p>
<p>In spite of this, Trump has embraced the madman theory. But not only does appearing mad provide limited advantages in negotiating, it actually erodes a leader’s credibility and undermines their nation’s long term foreign policy interests. Madmen theory isn’t really strategic – it’s just idiotic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s fans think that his unpredictability was an asset in terms of his foreign policy. It wasn’t.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189822023-12-06T13:28:36Z2023-12-06T13:28:36ZKissinger’s obsession with Chile enabled a murderous dictatorship that still haunts the country<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563455/original/file-20231204-25-6iv62u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C75%2C5064%2C3684&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet greets U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chilean-president-augusto-pinochet-greets-secretary-of-news-photo/515114332?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Noticing my nonappearance at the start of a black-tie dinner at the Johannesburg home of <a href="https://theconversation.com/harry-oppenheimer-biography-shows-the-south-african-mining-magnates-hand-in-economic-policies-205494">Harry Oppenheimer</a>, a mining magnate and Africa’s richest man, the host assumed I was boycotting the event on principle. It was a reasonable assumption: I was the Chilean ambassador to South Africa, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tortured-and-deadly-legacy-kissinger-and-realpolitik-in-us-foreign-policy-192977">Henry Kissinger</a> was the chief guest.</p>
<p>By then, a quarter century had passed since the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/10/1193755188/chile-coup-50-years-pinochet-kissinger-human-rights-allende">military coup that toppled</a> the democratically elected Chilean President Salvador Allende – an event that gave rise to Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s brutal 17-year-long military dictatorship – but the issue still lingered. Many Chileans bitterly remembered the role of the U.S. government, and of Kissinger in particular, in the breakdown of Chilean democracy.</p>
<p>It was something Kissinger himself acknowledged during that dinner – which I did attend, just late due to encountering a hailstorm. Kissinger explained that he always declined invitations to visit my home country out of fear over what “Allende Chileans” would do to him.</p>
<p>Plenty of Chileans still despise Kissinger. On news of his death at the age of 100 on Nov. 29, 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/jg_valdes/status/1730066974116323584">Juan Gabriel Valdes, Chile’s ambassador to the U.S.</a>, summed up that sentiment when he posted in Spanish on X, the platform previously known as Twitter: “A man has died whose historical brilliance never managed to conceal his profound moral misery.” </p>
<p>It’s hard to overestimate the role Kissinger played in Chile. As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/29/us/henry-kissinger-dead.html">national security adviser and secretary of state</a> during the Nixon and Ford administrations, he oversaw policies that helped install and then prop up a dictator.</p>
<h2>Chile’s 1973 coup</h2>
<p>Upon <a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/6399554/allende-wins-50-years-later-declassified-documents-show-reactions">Allende’s election on Sept. 4, 1970</a>, Kissinger became obsessed with blocking his inauguration. The measures approved by Kissinger included a botched kidnapping attempt of <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2020-10-22/cia-chile-anatomy-assassination">Chilean Army Chief René Schneider</a>, engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency, that ended with the general’s assassination.</p>
<p>Kissinger insisted on a hard line with the Allende administration. He did everything possible to make the “Chilean road to socialism” fail, among other things, by “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/abs/make-the-economy-scream-economic-ideological-and-social-determinants-of-support-for-salvador-allende-in-chile-19703/47F57E51ED3046DD69EFB93F221A4497">making the economy scream</a>,” as President Richard Nixon put it.</p>
<p>After a meeting with Kissinger in November 1970, a <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm">CIA cable to its station in Santiago stated</a> that “it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown in a coup.”</p>
<p>The <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/ch5">CIA’s covert financing of Chilean opposition parties</a>, funding of the country’s <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2017-04-25/agustin-edwards-declassified-obituary">right-wing media</a> and <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d311">support for the 1972 truckers strike</a> that snarled the nation’s freight and commerce for months were <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94chile.pdf">amply documented by a U.S. Senate committee</a> a few years after the coup.</p>
<p>Not content with having helped to topple Allende, Kissinger then wholeheartedly supported Pinochet’s regime.</p>
<p>When the U.S. ambassador to Chile relayed his efforts to persuade the military to act less brutally against political prisoners, Kissinger wrote on the margins of the cable, “<a href="https://web.mit.edu/hemisphere/events/kissinger-chile.shtml">… cut out the political science lectures</a>.” At a 1976 Organization of American States meeting in Santiago, far from urging Pinochet to tone down his regime’s repression, as some of Kissinger’s staff had recommended he do, he told the general, “<a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/">we want to help, not undermine you</a>.”</p>
<h2>Operation Condor</h2>
<p>Kissinger’s support for repressive military dictatorships extended beyond Chile’s borders.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in military uniforms chat in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563515/original/file-20231205-22-whmx65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1051&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Argentina’s dictator Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, right, confers with Chile’s Gen. Augusto Pinochet, in Mendoza, Argentina, in 1978.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ObitArgentinaVidela/5da45b83d8f74a63bee16d422fc13b9f/photo?boardId=37be9465fcce45d283d5431cccb20a6a&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=484&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Eduardo Di Baia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He supported <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/sep/03/operation-condor-the-illegal-state-network-that-terrorised-south-america">Operation Condor</a>, an international undertaking that coordinated intelligence and operations among many of South America’s right-wing military regimes – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay – from 1975 to 1983. The operations contributed to the widespread <a href="https://www.ox.ac.uk/research/research-impact/operation-condor">detention, torture and murder</a> of many left-wing opposition activists across three continents.</p>
<p>By September 1976, the excesses of Operation Condor were clear, and the U.S. State Department prepared an important diplomatic message, <a href="https://fam.state.gov/fam/07fam/07fam0030.html">known as a demarche</a>, strongly objecting to the repressive policies. Amazingly, <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21757-document-04">Kissinger stopped it</a> in its tracks. It was never delivered to those foreign ministries – and the timing was ominous.</p>
<p>Five days later, on Sept. 21, 1976, <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/car-bomb">Orlando Letelier, an exiled Chilean diplomat</a> who had served as Allende’s ambassador to the U.S. and in his cabinet in three different roles, was assassinated in Washington, D.C. He died after a bomb blew up the car he was driving – fatally injuring him and a colleague, <a href="https://ips-dc.org/remembering_ronni/">Ronni Karpen Moffitt</a>. Letelier was giving her and her husband, <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/05/13/Michael-Moffitt-who-survived-a-car-bomb-that-killed/4177358574400/">Michael Moffitt</a>, a ride to work. Michael was thrown from the vehicle but survived.</p>
<p>Preceding 9/11 by 25 years, the Letelier assassination was the first foreign-sponsored terrorist act on U.S. soil. Years of investigations revealed that Chile’s secret police planned and executed the plot to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/09/20/this-was-not-an-accident-this-was-a-bomb/">get rid of a prominent political figure</a> with influential contacts in Washington, D.C.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a brown suit crouches down to touch a plaque strewn with flowers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563516/original/file-20231205-27-jt2woa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chilean President Gabriel Boric touches a memorial to Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt at Sheridan Circle in Washington, D.C., in 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChileCoupAnniversary/cc733873aac14518b4e88a0196bf6d4f/photo?boardId=37be9465fcce45d283d5431cccb20a6a&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=484&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana</a></span>
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<h2>Breaking the mold</h2>
<p>Mocking Chile’s supposed lack of strategic significance, <a href="https://eltecolote.org/content/en/kissinger-the-last-condor-an-obituary-by-one-of-his-victims/">Kissinger once dismissed</a> the long and narrow country as “a dagger pointing straight at the heart of Antarctica.” Yet, he devoted full chapters to Chile in each of the <a href="https://www.librarything.com/nseries/25589/Kissingers-Memoirs">first two volumes of his memoirs</a>.</p>
<p>What made <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/">Kissinger take such deadly aim at Allende</a> was his new political model, a “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405198073.wbierp0329">peaceful road to socialism</a>.”</p>
<p>It represented something else entirely from the revolutionary movements that were coming to the fore in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Chile, an established and stable democracy had elected a Socialist president with an ambitious program of <a href="https://portside.org/2023-09-03/defending-allende">social and economic reforms</a>.</p>
<p>Allende’s Popular Unity coalition, which brought together an array of leftist and left-of-center political parties, could easily be replicated in Europe, in countries like France and Italy, leading to anti-U.S. governments – Washington’s worst nightmare. In this, Kissinger was not wrong. <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780312129088/francoismitterrand">French Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand</a> visited Chile in 1971, met with Allende, recreated such a coalition in France and repeatedly won presidential elections.</p>
<p>Successful democratic socialist countries did not fit Kissinger’s long-held design for the world, inspired by his realist perspective, to create a balance of power between the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.</p>
<p>This view <a href="https://classicsofstrategy.com/2016/02/05/henry-kissinger-a-world-restored-1957/">sprang from his studies</a> of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400844746-004">Europe’s long peace</a> in the 19th century, which was anchored in a balance of power between Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary.</p>
<p>To Kissinger, what in the 1970s was called the Third World, and today is known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">Global South</a>, played no role in this grand design – to him, nothing important could come from the South. History was shaped by the great powers, such as the U.S., China and the Soviet Union. </p>
<h2>Big body count</h2>
<p>It is estimated that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/chile-families-search-disappeared-pinochet">more than 3,000 people were killed</a> by Chile’s military dictatorship, at least 1,000 of whom are still “disappeared” – meaning their bodies were never found.</p>
<p>These numbers pale in comparison to the estimated <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/argentina-death-flight-plane-dictatorship-returned-home-florida/">30,000 deaths in Argentina</a> under its junta; the <a href="https://theconversation.com/henry-kissingers-bombing-campaign-likely-killed-hundreds-othousands-of-cambodians-and-set-path-for-the-ravages-of-the-khmer-rouge-209353">hundreds of thousands of deaths in Cambodia</a> caused by the U.S. bombings directed by Kissinger; the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/01/bangladesh-kissinger-henry-genocide-pakistan-east-legacy/">millions who died in Bangladesh</a> in their 1971 war of independence against a U.S.-backed Pakistan; and the estimated 200,000 killed by the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/12/06/indonesia.timor.us/">Indonesian armed forces in East Timor in 1975</a> with Kissinger’s explicit approval.</p>
<p>They were casualties of the misguided geopolitical obsessions of a man blinded by a 19th century European view of world affairs. That perspective casts all developing nations as mere pawns in the games played by the great powers.</p>
<p>To this day, Chile lives under the shadow of Pinochet’s 1980 constitution, which <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/120/823/43/115914/Chile-s-Constitutional-Moment">greatly expanded presidential powers</a> and enshrined the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691208626/the-chile-project">neoliberal economic model</a> he imposed on the country. On Dec. 17, 2023, Chileans will vote for a second time in two years on a referendum that could <a href="https://apnews.com/article/chile-constitution-boric-pinochet-hevia-e752d1656e7f3c648fb771ab786a3b48">replace Pinochet’s constitution</a> with a new one.</p>
<p>That referendum may or may not turn a page in Chilean history. Regardless of the outcome, the scars will remain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> I am a member of Diplomats Without Borders (DWB), of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and of the International Studies Association (ISA). I am also affiliated with the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), and I am a member of the Party for Democracy, a Chilean political party.</span></em></p>It’s hard to overestimate the role Henry Kissinger played in Chile. A former Chilean diplomat describes the mark that the powerful statesman made in his country and elsewhere in the Global South.Jorge Heine, Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189172023-11-30T05:02:58Z2023-11-30T05:02:58ZHenry Kissinger has died. The titan of US foreign policy changed the world, for better or worse<p>Henry Kissinger was the ultimate champion of the United States’ foreign policy battles. </p>
<p>The former US secretary of state <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-30/henry-kissinger-dies-aged-100/103171512">died</a> on November 29 2023 after living for a century.</p>
<p>The magnitude of his influence on the geopolitics of the free world cannot be overstated. </p>
<p>From world war two, when he was an enlisted soldier in the US Army, to the end of the cold war, and even into the 21st century, he had a significant, sustained impact on global affairs.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kissinger-at-100-his-legacy-might-be-mixed-but-his-importance-has-been-enormous-206470">Kissinger at 100: his legacy might be mixed but his importance has been enormous</a>
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<h2>From Germany to the US and back again</h2>
<p>Born in Germany in 1923, he came to the United States at age 15 as a refugee. He learned English as a teenager and his heavy German accent stayed with him until his death.</p>
<p>He attended George Washington High School in New York City before being drafted into the army and serving in his native Germany. Working in the intelligence corps, he identified Gestapo officers and worked to rid the country of Nazis. He won a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/30/henry-kissinger-nobel-prize-winning-warmonger">Bronze Star</a>. </p>
<p>Kissinger returned to the US and studied at Harvard before joining the university’s faculty. He advised moderate Republican New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller – a presidential aspirant – and became a world authority on nuclear weapons strategy. </p>
<p>When Rockefeller’s chief rival Richard Nixon prevailed in the 1968 primaries, Kissinger quickly switched to Nixon’s team. </p>
<h2>A powerful role in the White House</h2>
<p>In the Nixon White House, he became national security advisor and later simultaneously held the office of secretary of state. No one has held both roles at the same time since.</p>
<p>For Nixon, Kissinger’s diplomacy arranged the <a href="https://www.history.com/news/henry-kissinger-vietnam-war-legacy">end of the Vietnam war</a> and the pivot to China: two related and crucial events in the resolution of the cold war. </p>
<p>He won the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/summary/">1973 Nobel Peace Prize</a> for his Vietnam diplomacy, but was also condemned by the left as a war criminal for perceived US excesses during the conflict, including the <a href="https://theconversation.com/henry-kissingers-bombing-campaign-likely-killed-hundreds-of-thousands-of-cambodians-and-set-path-for-the-ravages-of-the-khmer-rouge-209353">bombing campaign in Cambodia</a>, which likely killed hundreds of thousands of people.</p>
<p>That criticism <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/henry-kissinger-dies_n_6376933ae4b0afce046cb44f">survives him</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nixon-mao-meeting-four-lessons-from-50-years-of-us-china-relations-176485">pivot to China</a> not only rearranged the global chessboard, but it also almost immediately changed the global conversation from the US defeat in Vietnam to a reinvigorated anti-Soviet alliance.</p>
<p>After Nixon was compelled to resign by the Watergate scandal, Kissinger served as secretary of state under Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford.</p>
<p>During that brief, two-year administration, Kissinger’s stature and experience overshadowed the beleaguered Ford. Ford gladly handed over US foreign policy to Kissinger so he could focus on politics and running for election to the office for which the people had never selected him.</p>
<p>During the turbulent 1970s, Kissinger also achieved a kind of cult status. </p>
<p>Not classically attractive, his comfort with global power gave him a charisma that was noticed by Hollywood actresses and other celebrities. His romantic life was the topic of many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/27/henry-kissinger-100-war-us-international-reputation">gossip columns</a>. He’s even <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1998/02/05/uncovering-the-sex-lives-of-politicians/3bb26a91-03ec-4a14-8958-f6ac0d95b260/">quoted</a> as saying “power is the ultimate aphrodisiac”.</p>
<p>His legacy in US foreign policy continued to grow after the Ford administration. He advised corporations, politicians and many other global leaders, often behind closed doors but also in public, testifying before congress well into his 90s. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nobel-peace-prize-offers-no-guarantee-its-winners-actually-create-peace-or-make-it-last-213340">The Nobel Peace Prize offers no guarantee its winners actually create peace, or make it last</a>
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<h2>Criticism and condemnation</h2>
<p>Criticism of Kissinger was and is harsh. Rolling Stone magazine’s <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/henry-kissinger-war-criminal-dead-1234804748/">obituary of Kissinger</a> is headlined “War Criminal Beloved by America’s Ruling Class, Finally Dies”. </p>
<p>His association with US foreign policy during the divisive Vietnam years is a near-obsession for some critics, who cannot forgive his role in what they see as a corrupt Nixon administration carrying out terrible acts of war against the innocent people of Vietnam. </p>
<p>Kissinger’s critics see him as the ultimate personification of <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tortured-and-deadly-legacy-kissinger-and-realpolitik-in-us-foreign-policy-192977">US realpolitik</a> – willing to do anything for personal power or to advance his country’s goals on the world stage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man sitting at a desk gives directions to three other men at the desk" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562590/original/file-20231130-19-h7o8mw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, leaves behind a controversial legacy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/washington-dc-usa-january-6-1983-1858047433">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>But in my opinion, this interpretation is wrong.</p>
<p>Niall Ferguson’s <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Kissinger.html?id=H_ujBwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">2011 biography</a>, Kissinger, tells a very different story. In more than 1,000 pages, Ferguson details the impact that world war two had on the young Kissinger. </p>
<p>First fleeing from, then returning to fight against, an immoral regime showed the future US secretary of state that global power must be well-managed and ultimately used to advance the causes of democracy and individual freedom.</p>
<p>Whether he was advising Nixon on Vietnam war policy to set up plausible peace negotiations, or arranging the details of the opening to China to put the Soviet Union in checkmate, Kissinger’s eye was always on preserving and advancing the liberal humanitarian values of the West – and against the forces of totalitarianism and hatred. </p>
<p>The way he saw it, the only way to do this was to work for the primacy of the United States and its allies. </p>
<p>No one did more to advance this goal than Henry Kissinger. For that he will be both lionised and condemned.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tortured-and-deadly-legacy-kissinger-and-realpolitik-in-us-foreign-policy-192977">A tortured and deadly legacy: Kissinger and realpolitik in US foreign policy</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lester Munson works for BGR Group, a Washington DC consultancy, Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Studies Centre. He is affiliated with George Mason University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.</span></em></p>Former US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger has died, aged 100. His legacy, including his involvement in the Vietnam war, is long, complicated and divisive.Lester Munson, Non-resident fellow, United States Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2157812023-11-29T13:37:58Z2023-11-29T13:37:58ZA brief history of the US-Israel ‘special relationship’ shows how connections have shifted since long before the 1948 founding of the Jewish state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561922/original/file-20231127-30-ocla3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C24%2C3269%2C2376&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. President Harry Truman holds a Torah given to him by Chaim Weizmann, the first president of Israel, in May 1948.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/washington-dc-president-truman-holds-the-torah-or-sacred-news-photo/514876256">Bettmann via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his first remarks after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, President Joe Biden affirmed the United States offered “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/07/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel/">rock solid and unwavering</a>” support to Israel, “just as we have (done) from the moment the United States became the first nation to recognize Israel, 11 minutes after its founding, 75 years ago.”</p>
<p>Vowing to destroy Hamas, Israel has launched a war on Gaza that as of the end of November had killed <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">more than 14,000 Palestinians</a>. The fighting has also destroyed much of Gaza and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip-palestinian-civilian-deaths-displaced-after-1-month/">displaced about 70% of its population</a>. </p>
<p>Israel, with U.S. backing, has not heeded <a href="https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/inter-agency-standing-committee/we-need-immediate-humanitarian-ceasefire-statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee">calls for an immediate cease-fire</a> or U.N. demands to <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-11-19/statement-the-secretary-general-gaza%C2%A0">stop targeting civilians</a>. The Biden administration appears to have played a key role in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/us/politics/biden-hostage-talks-israel-hamas.html">negotiating a temporary truce and an exchange</a> of hostages and prisoners between Israel and Hamas. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/fayez-hammad/">teach courses on Middle East politics</a> and the Arab-Israeli conflict, which includes the interconnected Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflict between Israel and Arab states. The roots of the U.S.-Israel relationship predate 1948 and provide context for what has long been characterized as a “special” relationship between the two countries – one that now appears crucial to Israel’s prosecution of a war in Gaza.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, it was the perception in the U.S. that Israel’s strategic value served as justification for the special relationship. While Israel has its own interests regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, a supportive Congress and American domestic lobbyists have presented them as consistent with those of the U.S.</p>
<p>The Bible, Christian Zionism, popular culture, memorialization of the Holocaust after 1967 and the shared approach in the U.S. and Israel toward the land and the indigenous populations have all led to the transformation of Jews and Israelis from “outsiders” to “insiders” in the U.S. </p>
<p>This cultural and political affinity is behind the U.S.’s current unconditional support for Israel, as well as the fact that the U.S. is seen in the region and beyond as deeply implicated in Israel’s actions.</p>
<p>But since President Harry Truman <a href="https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/recognition-israel">recognized Israel in 1948</a>, presidential policies show that the U.S.-Israel relationship has not always been “rock solid.”</p>
<h2>Pre-statehood: The United States and Zionism</h2>
<p>With an <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Palestine">Arab majority for more than a millennium until 1948</a>, the territory then called Palestine was <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/ottoman-empire">part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517</a> until <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/27/palestine-and-israel-brief-history-maps-and-charts">Britain captured it during World War I</a>.</p>
<p>The Zionist movement achieved a major objective in November 1917, when Britain, for strategic and religious reasons, issued the <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp">Balfour Declaration</a> in support of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson endorsed both this declaration and the League of Nations-sanctioned British administrative power over Palestine.</p>
<p>In Palestine, Britain used its administrative power, under what was called <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp">the Mandate over Palestine</a>, to advance the Zionist project. The rise of Hitler and U.S. entry into World War II led American Zionists in 1942 to adopt the <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-biltmore-conference-1942">Biltmore Program</a>, which called for unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and for turning the territory into a Jewish state. The revelation of the full scale of Nazi atrocities boosted U.S. support for Zionism, effectively shifting the center of political Zionism from London to Washington.</p>
<p>The 1944 Democratic Party platform backed the “opening of Palestine to <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1944-democratic-party-platform">unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization</a>” and the creation of a Jewish state. But fearing damage to U.S. war efforts, President Franklin Roosevelt wrote to several Arab governments shortly before his death in 1945 that no action toward Palestine would be taken “<a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d681">which might prove hostile to the Arab people</a>.”</p>
<h2>Israel, the United States and the Cold War</h2>
<p>President Harry Truman was sympathetic to Zionism because of his <a href="https://www.jpost.com/christianworld/article-704006">evangelical Christian upbringing</a>. He endorsed the 1947 U.N. <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185393/">Partition Plan for Palestine</a> to create an Arab state and a Jewish state and, despite <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/608624908">opposition</a> from within the administration, <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/press-release-announcing-us-recognition-of-israel#transcript">recognized the State of Israel</a> on May 14, 1948. </p>
<p>Truman, however, refused to send weapons to either side of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, because he viewed the conflict as a source of instability in the face of the emerging communist threat. In that war, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2023/11/03/israel-nakba-history-1948/">750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled</a>, becoming refugees from the land that became Israel. </p>
<p>President Dwight Eisenhower also sought to prevent Soviet penetration into the Middle East and attempted to maintain impartiality toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. He even threatened to cut off all official and private aid and to <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/The-Iron-Wall/">expel Israel from the U.N.</a> to force Israel’s withdrawal from Egyptian territory, the Sinai, in 1957.</p>
<h2>The conflict and US-Israeli special relationship</h2>
<p>President John F. Kennedy coined the term “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/dh/article-abstract/22/2/231/407328">special relationship</a>” about the two countries’ connection. He hoped that in exchange for U.S. defensive weapons, Israel would support <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-211174/">his plan</a>, based on <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/65/PDF/NR004365.pdf?OpenElement">U.N. Resolution 194</a>, which called for repatriation or compensation for the Palestinian refugees and allow effective inspections of <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/israel-and-the-bomb/9780231104838">its nuclear program</a>. Israel accepted the weapons but refused to cooperate on the other issues, neither of which was discussed again.</p>
<p>President Lyndon Johnson viewed Israel as a strategic asset and sent it advanced offensive weapons. Johnson supported Israel’s attack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the June 1967 war, when Israel first occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Johnson also endorsed the November 1967 <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SCRes242%281967%29.pdf">U.N. Resolution 242</a>, which conditioned Israeli withdrawal on Arab states’ recognition of, and entering into peace treaties with, Israel. Israel’s swift victory transformed the U.S.-Israeli relationship, elevating Israel into a critical component of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41805051">American Jewish identity</a> and solidifying pro-Israel policies in Washington.</p>
<p>President Richard Nixon provided Israel with a massive increase in military and economic aid because he accepted uncritically Israel’s claim that the Soviets were the main cause of tension in the Middle East, and because of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Generous aid packages have since become routine: In recent years, U.S. aid to Israel has been about US$3 billion to $4 billion annually, totaling almost <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2023/oct/18/us-aid-to-israel-what-to-know/">$318 billion since World War II</a>, including the value of weapons.</p>
<p>While President Jimmy Carter brokered the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Ronald Reagan administration later moved away from an active peace process and, within a Soviet-centered focus, signed with Israel memoranda on strategic cooperation, elevating the relationship to a new strategic level. The administration supported Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, refused to label <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/03/us/reagan-is-prepared-to-hold-arms-talks-if-soviet-is-sincere.html">West Bank settlements as illegal</a>, concluded with Israel and the U.S.’s <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/israel-fta">first free trade agreement</a> and designated Israel in 1987 “<a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-israel/">a major non-NATO ally</a>.”</p>
<p>President Bill Clinton brokered the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">Oslo Accords</a>, in which Israel agreed to withdraw from areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and cede some control to a new political entity, the Palestinian Authority. But Clinton failed to achieve a permanent Palestinian-Israeli agreement, and his administration, according to one U.S. negotiator, acted as “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2005/05/23/israels-lawyer/7ab0416c-9761-4d4a-80a9-82b7e15e5d22/">Israel’s attorney</a>, catering and coordinating with the Israelis at the expense of successful peace negotiations.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men shake hands while a third stands between them, smiling." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561936/original/file-20231127-27-vaazae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, left, shakes hands with PLO leader Yasser Arafat as U.S. President Bill Clinton looks on after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-bill-clinton-stands-between-plo-leader-yasser-news-photo/463575454">J. David Ake, Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>The ‘peace process’ and the ‘war on terrorism’</h2>
<p>In the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush accepted Israel’s narrative that it was waging its own war on terrorism and its condition that a change of Palestinian leadership must precede any further negotiations. But neither <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html">Bush’s call for a Palestinian state</a> nor the 2005 election of Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority led to an agreement.</p>
<p>In 2006, the Bush administration pushed for, and <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/112456/george-w-bushs-secret-war-against-hamas">endorsed the participation of Hamas</a> in, Palestinian legislative elections. When Hamas won and formed a new government, both Israel and the U.S. refused to deal with it, imposed sanctions on the Palestinian Authority and worked to widen the split between Hamas and Abbas’ Fatah party. Bush even supported a <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/04/gaza200804">covert plan to spark civil war between Palestinians</a>, which in fact led to a Hamas-Fatah military confrontation. That fight ended with Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, which led Israel to impose a blockade on Gaza in 2007.</p>
<p>President Barack <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/middleeast/obama-administration-defends-israeli-airstrikes-but-cautions-against-ground-war.html">Obama supported Israeli attacks on Gaza</a>, which failed to eliminate Hamas’ military threat. Diplomatically, Obama was reluctant to get directly involved, while Israel continued to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-offers-temporary-settlement-freeze/">refuse to permanently freeze settlement building</a>.</p>
<p>President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> and the recent discussions under the Biden administration to establish Israeli-Saudi diplomatic relations assumed that the Arab-Israeli conflict could be solved without solving the Palestinian conflict. But the current war challenges such an assumption and illustrates that current U.S. support for Israel is indeed “rock solid and unwavering.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fayez Hammad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A historian of the Middle East examines the decades-old ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the US.Fayez Hammad, Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166842023-11-12T16:14:07Z2023-11-12T16:14:07ZIsrael-Hamas War: What political consequences for Joe Biden?<p>On November 5, 2024, Americans will go to the polls to elect their next president. Traditionally, foreign policy doesn’t weigh much on the outcome of a American presidential election, but might the return of violence in the Middle East reverse this old trend?</p>
<p>What is certain is that the war between Israel and Hamas is <a href="https://civicscience.com/3-things-to-know-americans-following-the-israel-hamas-war-closely-1-in-3-holiday-shoppers-plan-to-spend-less-this-year/">being followed very closely in the United States</a>. While the Republican Party and all its primary candidates are <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/gop-presidential-candidates-compete-seen-closest-israel-debate-rcna124311">unambiguously on Israel’s side</a>, the Democrats appear more divided. President Biden, traditionally aligned with the interests of the Hebrew state, has been playing a particularly difficult juggling act since October 7, seeking to protect and support Israel, while not appearing insensitive to the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/11/10/israel-agrees-to-breaks-in-fighting-food-running-out-in-gaza-war-devastates-palestinian-ec">now 11,000 Palestinian victims</a> caused by the Israeli response, according to Gaza’s health ministry. </p>
<p><strong>Joe Biden, a “Zionist in his heart” forced to play a balancing act.</strong> </p>
<p>Faced with the scale and nature of Hamas’ massacre on 7 October, which left <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/11/1212458974/israel-revises-death-toll-hamas-attacks-oct-7">1,200 Israelis dead</a>, Joe Biden drew parallels between these events and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-18/ty-article/.premium/biden-evokes-holocaust-and-september-11-during-unprecedented-wartime-visit-to-israel/0000018b-4352-d614-abcf-eb7346480000">the Holocaust and the September 11th attacks</a>. He immediately pledged his <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/07/hamas-terrorism-attacks-on-israeli-civilians-00120480">unconditional support</a> to the Israeli government. This promise materialized not only in his visit to the Hebrew state on October 18, notwithstanding <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/16/us/politics/biden-israel-trip.html">the political and security risks</a> such a trip entailed, but also in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/us/politics/israel-aid-pentagon-us-hamas.html">the instruction to move navy warships closer to the country</a> and send out <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/19/us-israel-artillery-shells-ukraine-weapons-gaza">artillery shells initially destined for Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>This squares with President Biden’s historic <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/28/us/politics/biden-israel-netanyahu-gaza.html?smid=nytcore-android-share">ties with Israel</a>. Notwithstanding <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/netanyahu-biden-relationship-explained-us-israel-diplomacy-rcna119510">periods of friction</a> with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, whom he met extensively during his tenure as Barack Obama’s Vice President (2008-2016), Biden has undeniable pro-Israeli bias, even describing himself as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-israel-gaza-dachau-holocaust-hamas-919058eec36dca4c06cf9fc4355fe302">“Zionist in [his] heart” </a>. In fact, he is more <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-biden-more-popular-in-israel-than-almost-anywhere-else-poll-shows/">popular in Israel than in the United States</a>, and has received <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.php?ind=q05&cycle=All&recipdetail=S&mem=Y">financial support from pro-Israeli groups</a> throughout his career.</p>
<p>The current crisis makes such a position tricky to maintain. On the one hand, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/oct/28/democrats-biden-reelection-israel-palestine">left wing of the Democrats</a> accuse Biden of not taking sufficient account of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and being too complacent towards the Netanyahu government. And on the other, Republicans say <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/09/politics/republicans-blame-biden-israel-what-matters/index.html">he is responsible for the attack on Israel</a> by being too complacent towards Iran, which supports Hamas.
Aware of the stakes, and for only the second time in his presidency, President Biden <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTxDZ6D1A1E">addressed the nation in prime time from the Oval Office</a>, making the case for military aid to both Israel and Ukraine. Speaking of an “inflection point in history,” he denounced anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/antisemitism-has-moved-from-the-right-to-the-left-in-the-us-and-falls-back-on-long-standing-stereotypes-215760?s=03">are on the rise in the United States</a>. He also reiterated his plea to Israelis not to be “blinded by rage” and to learn the lessons of an American overreaction to 9/11, referring to the Bush administration’s 2003 intervention in Iraq.</p>
<p><strong>A divided left</strong></p>
<p>The president’s balancing act takes place amid a growing number of protests and heated debates across the country. Thousands of demonstrators have poured in <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/flood-wall-street-for-gaza/">New York City</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/campus-threats-israel-hamas-gaza-conflict-middle-east-rcna123975">university campuses</a> in solidarity with Palestine, while on Capitol Hill <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/23/us/jewish-palestinian-protest-israel-gaza/index.html">Jewish peace activists</a> called for an “immediate ceasefire” and justice for the Palestinians.</p>
<p>This is not entirely a surprise. For the last several years, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/15/us/politics/aipac-israel-democrats.html">the Democrats have been divided</a> on the Israel question. The left wing of the party has become <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/12/us/politics/democrats-israel-hamas-war-palestine.html">increasingly critical</a> both of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and, more generally, of Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2023/1/20/23561464/israel-new-right-wing-government-extreme-protests-netanyahu-biden-ben-gvir">far-right government</a>. This is reflected not only in divisions within the party but also in <a href="https://time.com/6295703/israel-herzog-visit-washington/">a shift in favour of the Palestinians</a> among Democrats and Independents in opinion polls. </p>
<p>The October 7 massacre has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-indicates-us-public-divided-over-support-for-israel-after-hamas-assault/">not reversed this trend</a>. Moreover, the significant generational and racial differences, are likely to remain, as young and non-white liberals become more critical of public and armed support for Israel.</p>
<p>While in October 72% of whites said the US should take a public stance supporting Israel in the war between Israel and Hamas, that figure dropped to 51% in the case of nonwhites, according to a poll by <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/13/1205627092/american-support-israel-biden-middle-east-hamas-poll">NPR</a>. The Black community, for instance, has <a href="https://www.vox.com/2023/10/17/23918689/black-palestinian-solidarity-jewish-alliance-israel">a long history of identification with the Palestinian cause</a>, especially since <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk-newspaper-coverage-of-the-1967-six-day-arab-israeli-war-foresaw-decades-of-conflict-in-middle-east-216593">the Six-Day War in 1967</a>. This cause was promoted by radical organizations such as The Black Panther Party and The Nation of Islam, whose leader Louis Farrakhan is <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/farrakhan-his-own-words">a notorious anti-Semite</a>. It gained momentum on the left with <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3012077">Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaign in 1988</a>. More recently, the death of George Floyd in 2020 had many young Americans, notably through <em><a href="https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/hlps.2020.0238">Black Lives Matter</a></em>, draw parallels between the structural violence and oppression of both Blacks in the USA and Palestinians in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank.</p>
<p>As for American Jews, <a href="https://www.ajc.org/news/ajc-survey-most-jews-approve-of-biden-leadership">traditionally more liberal</a>, the unity they had once enjoyed in their opposition to Netanyahu has splintered on the face of this crisis. Some are demonstrating against the strikes on Gaza and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/23/us/jewish-palestinian-protest-israel-gaza/index.html">calling for a ceasefire</a>, while others highlight the victims of Hamas and feel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/20/us/politics/progressive-jews-united-states.html">abandoned by their left-wing allies</a>.</p>
<p>President Biden has increasingly taken into account this public opinion. As the death toll in Gaza has increased, his focus has shifted toward <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/biden-defends-west-bank-civilians-his-most-sympathetic-remarks-to-palestinians-since-war-in-gaza/7327158.html">the suffering of a marginalized population trapped in Gaza</a>. Biden has also secured humanitarian aid to Gaza at the Egyptian border, and even <a href="https://apnews.com/article/blinken-turkey-gaza-israel-hamas-9ff3aae906aaae71613fb2a9afed2bdd">temporary pauses in the fighting</a>. His continuous <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/president-biden-said-theres-no-possibility-of-a-ceasefire-in-gaza-13004339">refusal to demand a cease-fire</a>, however, is unlikely to appease his critics, including those among <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/19/biden-jewish-americans-israel-gaza-call-for-ceasefire">Jewish-American intellectuals</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/17/letter-biden-israel-ceasefire-legal-scholars">legal scholars</a>, or <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/joe-biden-gaza-cease-fire-no-possibility_n_654d0b36e4b088d9a74da287">the Democratic party</a>. </p>
<p><strong>Republicans (finally) united</strong></p>
<p>The Republican Party, fractured on the issue of Ukraine, is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1206481356/republicans-israel-gop-middle-east-evangelicals-end-times-rapture-christians">united in its support for Israel</a>. The first act of the new Republican House Speaker, Mike Johnson, was to pass <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/25/us/politics/house-israel-vote.html">a resolution in support of Israel for “whatever it needs”</a> in its fight against Hamas, a resolution passed by an overwhelming majority despite a small group of (mostly) Democratic opponents. Following strong criticism from his rivals in the primaries, even Donald Trump backtracked after <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/trump-netanyahu-biden-rcna120078">lashing out at Netanyahu and praising Hezbollah</a>, calling it “very smart.” The vote of a $14.3b aid package to Israel, however, has been stalled by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/11/04/johnson-mcconnell-israel-ukraine-spending/">internal divisions over aid to Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>There are several reasons behind the party’s unwavering support for Israel. One of them is the influence of the white evangelicals, an important <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/06/evangelical-christians-republicans-2024-israel-palestinians">voting bloc for Republicans</a>. Most evangelicals, such as <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/176499/mike-johnson-israel-republican-rise-christian-zionism">new house speaker Mike Johnson</a>, read the events in Israel through <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/american-evangelicals-israel-hamas.html?smid=nytcore-android-share">a literal interpretation of biblical prophecy about the end times</a>), and God’s promise to Abraham of a land for his descendants. It is to please this group that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BitosOBeHLs">Trump moved the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem</a>. </p>
<p>Another important element is the great <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2023/10/america-first-republicans-isolationist-ukraine-israel-support.html">ideological proximity</a> between the MAGA Republicans and the far-right Israeli coalition in power in Israel. </p>
<p>Finally, let us not forget there has been a growing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/01/new-america-study-report-republicans-muslims-trump-midterms">Islamophobic sentiment among conservatives</a>, especially since 9/11 - a sentiment nurtured and exploited by Trump. In fact, the former president has recently promised to renew the travel ban on nationals of several Muslim-majority countries and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/oct/17/trump-muslim-ban-gaza-refugees">extend it to refugees from Gaza</a> if he wins the presidency.</p>
<p><strong>How might this crisis impact the 2024 elections?</strong></p>
<p>Since the war broke out, public opinion has essentially remained <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-israel-gaza-war-changing-us-public-attitudes/">divided along partisan lines</a>. Moreover, with a few exceptions, such as the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/29/biden-israel-war-jimmy-carter">hostage crisis in 1979</a> or <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43868288">the War on terror in 2004</a>, foreign policy issues have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/21/us/politics/biden-voters-approval-israel.html">rarely determined</a> a national election since the Vietnam war. Even the relatively swift victory in Iraq in 1991 did not prevent George Herbert Walker Bush, who had <a href="https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/234971/george-bush-retrospective.aspx">the highest approval rate</a> after the war, from losing the election 18 months later. What matters most to the American voter are day-to-day issues, particularly regarding <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-us-election-key-state-voter-polling/">the economy</a>, or social issues like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/10/opinion/abortion-presidential-election-biden.html">abortion</a>.</p>
<p>However, the political landscape has changed tremendously in the last two cycles. 2024 could very well be <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">a close election</a> determined by only a handful of electors in a few swing states, between <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/these-new-poll-numbers-show-why-biden-and-trump-are-stuck-in-a-2024-dead-heat">two uniquely unpopular candidates</a>. </p>
<p>Even if a majority of voters broadly support Israel, Joe Biden might be in trouble if some non-white voters, like <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67337159">Arab-Americans</a> and left-wing <a href="https://www.teenvogue.com/story/biden-risking-2024-over-no-israel-ceasefire">pro-Palestinian youth</a> protest against his stance by not turning out to vote in swing states. For example, a key state like Michigan, which Biden won in 2020 by a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/23/trump-election-michigan-results-439691">narrow margin of 150,000 voters</a>, has a large Muslim population (<a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/muslim-population-by-state">estimated at 240,000</a>) whose leaders are <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/muslim-arab-americans-rage-biden-michigan-israel-gaza-rcna121513">highly critical</a> of Biden’s policy toward the Palestinians.</p>
<p>The elections are a year away, and a lot can change between now and then. Much may depend on how the crisis evolves and on what makes the headlines by then. The official campaign season has not even begun yet. In the meantime, in the face of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/one-year-into-the-ukraine-war-what-does-the-public-think-about-american-involvement-in-the-world/">rising isolationist sentiment</a>, the American president will have to convince people that the United States is indeed the “indispensable nation” in the fight against tyrants and terrorists who threaten peoples and democracies. He will also have to demonstrate, as he said in his address to the nation, that Putin is as dangerous as Hamas. Above all, he will have to counter the image of a weakened US power, embodied by a president physically marked by his old age, at a time when voters seem more attracted by energy and strength than by experience and competence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216684/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jérôme Viala-Gaudefroy ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Given its unprecedented scale and nature, could the Israel-Hamas war reshuffle the cards in the U.S. 2024 presidential campaign?Jérôme Viala-Gaudefroy, Assistant lecturer, CY Cergy Paris UniversitéLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2141402023-10-29T14:00:56Z2023-10-29T14:00:56ZGeopolitical chess game: Why India has no interest in serving as a western pawn<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/geopolitical-chess-game-why-india-has-no-interest-in-serving-as-a-western-pawn" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Canada’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/19/india/canada-india-diplomats-removed-intl-hnk/index.html">deepening divide with India</a> following its accusation that the Indian government was responsible for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66860510">the murder of Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar</a> has revealed a cynical truth: the West’s interest in democracy and rules-based international order is largely empty rhetoric. </p>
<p>Canada’s western allies <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-19/asio-chief-says-no-reason-to-dispute-canada-india-spy-claim/102993480">have offered some support in its confrontation with India</a>. However, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/27/india-canada-trudeau-accusations-us-ties-intelligence/">this support is extremely limited</a>. India is too important to American efforts to contain China.</p>
<p>India understands this and is taking full advantage of its position in this ongoing geopolitical chess game by getting what it can from the West while keeping a clear focus on its own interests.</p>
<p>India is a regional rival of China. It <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/04/the-myths-and-realities-of-the-population-sweepstakes/">may have passed China as the world’s most populous country</a> and is, <a href="https://www.india.com/business/economic-survey-2022-23-key-takeaways-india-3rd-largest-economy-in-purchasing-power-economic-survey-5877020/">by purchasing power parity, the world’s third largest economy</a>. </p>
<p>The United States is trying to redirect global resources and <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-can-be-a-bigger-winner-in-the-supply-chain-shift-from-China">supply chains from China to India</a>. Supposedly, India is “safe” because it shares “democratic values” with the West. </p>
<h2>Modi regime</h2>
<p>However, India’s so-called liberal democracy has been severely damaged by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/09/opinion/india-modi-conflict-zone.html">Hindu-supremacist policies</a> of <a href="https://novaramedia.com/2023/02/23/white-and-hindu-supremacists-are-a-match-made-in-heaven/">the Narendra Modi regime</a>. </p>
<p>In modern India, religious minorities, especially Muslims, are regularly victims of mob violence, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/28/muslim-man-lynched-in-india-for-taking-a-banana-at-hindu-temple-event">including lynching</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/4/19/rape-as-a-political-tool-in-india">and sexual</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/indian-womens-struggle-against-sexual-violence-has-had-little-support-from-the-men-in-power-210318">assault</a>. </p>
<p>A rabid <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/indias-opposition-alliance-to-boycott-hate-filled-tv-news-anchors">nationalist media</a> pumps up government policies. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/india-arrests-and-raids-at-newsclick-signals-attack-on-media-critical-of-the-government/">Critical journalists</a> <a href="https://www.thepolisproject.com/research/mapping-violence-against-journalists-in-india-key-findings/">are brutalized and silenced</a>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/29/world/asia/modi-india-gandhi-judiciary.html">The judiciary and parliament have been cowed</a>. </p>
<p>Indian author Arundhati Roy argues that <a href="https://scroll.in/article/1055943/arundhati-roy-the-dismantling-of-democracy-in-india-will-affect-the-whole-world">India is well on its way to becoming a fully fascist state</a>. Roy was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/20/arundhati-roy-india-author-freedom-of-speech">recently charged by the Modi regime for supposedly “provocative” statements</a> she made in 2010.</p>
<p>The western world knows all of this, but its actions towards India aren’t motivated by “shared values.” The West, led by the U.S., is driven only by the desire to contain China.</p>
<p>India has rejected Canada’s accusations, but has also flagged western hypocrisy. Indian MP Shashi Tharoor has alleged the U.S. and Israel are the <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/politics/story/so-quick-to-judge-others-shashi-tharoor-lambasts-western-media-over-india-canada-row-399129-2023-09-21">“two foremost practitioners of extra-territorial assassinations in the past 25 years.”</a> American drone warfare <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2020-09-04/ten-years-investigating-us-covert-warfare">has killed thousands of people the U.S. accuses of terrorism and thousands of innocent bystanders</a> in the Global South.</p>
<p>India may be following the West’s lead, but on a much smaller scale. Also, it allegedly acted in a western state, which seemingly expect to be exempt from the kind of violence they have unleashed on the Global South.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-accusation-of-terrorism-is-a-ploy-to-hide-its-own-human-rights-abuses-214660">India's accusation of 'terrorism' is a ploy to hide its own human rights abuses</a>
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<h2>Not an American pawn</h2>
<p>India is happy to accept <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/09/indias-not-the-china-alternative-wall-street-thinks/">western economic, military and technological support to help it close its enormous gaps in wealth, infrastructure and overall development with China</a>. The West, meantime, needs India to maintain its global domination. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://iai.tv/articles/india-is-creating-a-new-world-order-auid-2118">India has no more interest in perpetuating western dominance of the global system than China does</a>. It is not an American pawn. </p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-ukraine-war-pub-86961">India is pursuing its own interests</a>, as its continuing relationship with Russia indicates. </p>
<p>India and China <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/should-we-expect-a-thaw-in-china-india-relations-soon/">have a major border dispute</a> and are militarily at odds. They <a href="https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/is-there-a-way-out-of-the-troubled-india-china-relationship/article66471168.ece">view each other with mutual suspicion</a> and, often, contempt.</p>
<p>But they understand that they will be neighbours forever and their relationship can be mutually beneficial <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/07/19/what-if-china-and-india-became-friends">if they can find diplomatic resolutions to their conflicts</a>. <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3232842/troubled-china-india-relationship-means-asian-century-remains-elusive">This may be easier said than done</a>, but the two countries <a href="https://hbr.org/2007/12/china-india-the-power-of-two">have improved relations in the past</a> and enjoy a growing economic relationship today. </p>
<p>Most Indians accept that <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/why-india-chinas-bitter-foe-wont-become-us-ally-1792564">making an active enemy of China is not in India’s best interests</a>.</p>
<p>The more aggressive the U.S. becomes towards China, <a href="https://inkstickmedia.com/india-is-well-positioned-to-take-advantage-of-the-us-china-rivalry/">the more leverage it gives to India to use against both the Americans and the Chinese</a>. India can extract benefits from the U.S.; simultaneously, American aggression provides China with incentives to improve its relations with India. </p>
<h2>Choosing a side</h2>
<p>But there is a point — perhaps fast approaching — at which regional states will feel forced to make a choice between China or the U.S. There’s a limit to how far both sides can be played off against the other. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231481/world-has-more-fear-aggressive-us-peaceful-china">Tensions between India and China</a> benefit U.S. interests. If India and China resolve their differences and choose to work together — or, at least, not to work against each other — it would complicate those interests. As unlikely as this may seem now, <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2023/07/19/what-if-china-and-india-became-friends">harmonious relations between China and India are a real long-term possibility</a>.</p>
<p>India is far from posing a threat to American power the way China is now. Nonetheless, if the U.S. succeeds in elevating India at China’s expense, it will eventually have to contend with challenges from India. It’s already clear that India doesn’t see itself as a western subordinate and has its own regional aspirations. </p>
<p>India’s alleged murder of a Canadian citizen may be a taste of how India will handle its relations with the West as it rises in power. India will be demanding privileges the West extends to itself and its allies, for whom <a href="https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/what-rule-based-international-order/">“rules-based international order” is a meaningless facade</a>. </p>
<p>Canada <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/canadas-trudeau-wants-india-cooperate-murder-probe-wont-release-evidence-2023-09-21/">has asked India to co-operate in its investigation</a> of Nijjar’s murder. The investigation will probably go nowhere and be quietly buried. There are suspicions that India may be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/08/sikh-activists-hardeep-singh-nijjar-killing">threatening other Sikh activists</a> and may have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/avtar-singh-khanda-inquest-1.6989059">committed another murder</a> in the U.K. </p>
<p>India has <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/india-visa-services-1.7007375#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20release%2C%20officials,currently%2C%22%20the%20announcement%20says">recently eased some visa restrictions on Canadians even as it has expelled 41 Canadian diplomats</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/india-canada-embassies-diplomats-1.7005303">threatening to revoke their diplomatic immunity</a>.</p>
<p>India will walk away untouched from its spat with Canada. It is too important to western strategies against China. But India has its own game to play and that does not necessarily accord with what the West wants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214140/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>India is far from posing a threat to American power the way China is now. But if the West elevates India at China’s expense, it will eventually have to contend with Indian challenges.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158522023-10-23T18:35:09Z2023-10-23T18:35:09ZThe Israel-Hamas war deepens the struggle between US and Iran for influence in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554866/original/file-20231019-22-45pt1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranians stage a rally outside the former U.S. embassy in Tehran in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pro-regime-iranians-stage-a-rally-outside-the-former-us-news-photo/1244484898?adppopup=true">Contributor#072019/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Israel readies for a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-b084e9c453cc99f7bec6f66d7b5913d9">ground invasion of Gaza</a>, and Palestinian and Israeli civilian deaths continue to mount, a broader struggle for influence continues in the Middle East between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has long played an important leadership role in the Middle East. American influence has hinged on <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-power-and-influence-middle-east-part-one">maintaining close ties</a> to diverse allies, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>And since the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, Iran’s leaders have sought to boost their regional influence and secure their domestic position in power by <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">undermining America’s relationships</a> in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/battle_lines/">built its own regional network</a>, composed largely of Shia Muslim entities, including Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.</p>
<p>Iran also has long <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">supported Hamas</a>, a Sunni Islamist movement and U.S.-designated terrorist group that controls Gaza. <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/iran-israel-and-war-in-the-middle-east/">Like Iran</a>, Hamas is committed to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">destruction of Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/john-ciorciari">scholar of international politics</a>, I am interested in how this rivalry between the U.S. and Iran has evolved and how this war may affect it. </p>
<p>The long-standing Israel-Palestinian dispute is central to Iran’s regional strategy, which aims to drive a wedge between Israel and its neighbors and complicate U.S. relations throughout the Arab world. So far, the Israel-Hamas war appears to be having precisely those effects.</p>
<h2>Iran’s role in the Gaza war</h2>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/iran-israel-hamas-attacks.html">denied direct involvement</a> in Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, atrocities in Israel, in which Hamas fighters <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed about 1,400 people</a> and kidnapped more than 200. </p>
<p>U.S. officials and others have said that it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-denies-it-had-role-in-hamas-attack-on-israel-claims-accusation-is-political/">is too soon to determine</a> Iran’s exact role in the violence. </p>
<p>Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/18/israel-hamas-war-how-iran-could-spread-gaza-conflict-through-middle-east/76d4e006-6dcf-11ee-b01a-f593caa04363_story.html">applauded the attacks</a>. </p>
<p>He has called Israel’s ensuing assault on Gaza “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-israeli-officials-should-face-trial-their-crimes-2023-10-17/">a genocide</a>,” as <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">Palestinian casualties</a> generate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/gaza-hospital-al-ahli-al-arabi-blast-explosion-protests-demonstrations-middle-east">large protests</a> against the Israeli offensive throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>Israeli strikes on Gaza since Oct. 7 have <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-13">killed more than 3,780 people</a>, according to the United Nations. </p>
<p>Iran has also threatened “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/17/iran-warns-of-preemptive-action-against-israel-amid-gaza-war">preemptive</a>” action against Israel if it continues its offensive. </p>
<p>Israel and Hezbollah are now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/19/world/middleeast/hezbollah-lebanon-israel-explained.html">exchanging daily artillery and rocket fire</a>. Israel has drawn a buffer zone near its border with Lebanon and has begun <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiEn_Ga_4SCAxVwlokEHVVMCQ4QvOMEKAB6BAgREAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Fisrael-evacuate-residents-town-near-lebanon-border-after-flare-up-2023-10-20%2F&usg=AOvVaw1k3eGVpjw_jNIskM4HpFmI&opi=89978449">evacuating its citizens</a> there. </p>
<p>Israel also has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67093081">bombed key airports</a> in Syria, its longtime adversary, which also has strong ties to Hezbollah. </p>
<p>These actions bring Israel, one of America’s closest allies, perilously closer to a wider war with a coalition backed by Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men stand on a city street with a police car nearby and burn a drawn Israeli flag. Behind them is a large billboard of a man with a white beard and black hat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554854/original/file-20231019-21-ftlqbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian demonstrators burn an Israeli flag in Tehran on Oct. 17, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/tehran-iran-in-the-aftermath-of-the-bombing-of-gazas-al-news-photo/1734088645?adppopup=true">Hossein Beris/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Iran’s push for regional clout</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, Iran has looked to grow its regional influence while exploiting the differences between the U.S. and Israel.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">helped build Hezbollah</a> in the early 1980s, backing deadly <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1696242955-iranian-official-admitting-tie-to-beirut-1983-attack-breaks-decades-of-denial">1983 attacks</a> on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. </p>
<p>In Iraq, Tehran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-iraq">built influence</a> by affiliating itself with friendly Shiite groups following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who was one of Iran’s top rivals. </p>
<p>In Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have helped the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/">Assad regime gain an upper hand</a> in the country’s ongoing civil war by giving the government weapons, intelligence and troops.</p>
<p>And in Yemen, Iran has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">backed Shiite rebel groups</a> that are fighting the government, which is in turn supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>Iran’s support for Palestinian militants</h2>
<p>In the Palestinian territories, meanwhile, Iran has supported militant groups since the 1980s. By the early 1990s, Iranian forces and Hezbollah were <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism">training Hamas fighters</a> in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Iran boosted aid to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjI4vOj_4SCAxWSl4kEHZ58DCkQFnoECCUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Firanprimer.usip.org%2Fresource%2Firan-and-palestinians&usg=AOvVaw2tFw0DL41km7oV3K1act-j&opi=89978449">Hamas during the Second Intifada</a>, a violent Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, and again after a 2006 election victory brought Hamas to power in Gaza. Iran <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GazaCrisis_ENG-151-157.pdf">also gave weapons and money</a> to Hamas during its 2008-09 and 2014 armed conflicts with Israel. </p>
<p>Recurrent fighting in Gaza has helped keep the Israeli-Palestinian conflict salient in Middle Eastern politics. This fighting and tension has advanced Iran’s aims of undermining U.S. and Israeli ties with Iran’s Arab rivals, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The United States therefore scored a major diplomatic victory by brokering the 2020 <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>, in which Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to have diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>Not to be outdone, Iran announced it made a deal to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal">restore diplomatic relations</a> with Saudi Arabia in March 2023, seven years after they broke ties. </p>
<p>After this announcement, U.S. officials tried to make a deal to formalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – an agreement that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13/">Gaza war has put on ice</a>. Some analysts have <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-is-the-only-one-likely-to-benefit-from-hamas-attack-on-israel/">speculated that Iran</a> may have encouraged Hamas to attack Israel precisely for this reason. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Joe Biden sits next to Benjamin Netanyahu, behind a row of Israel and US flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554856/original/file-20231019-27-ra6ml0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Joe Biden meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-listens-to-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/1730656163?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The diplomatic challenge ahead</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war poses serious diplomatic challenges for the U.S. </p>
<p>Israel’s bombing, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/19/israel-security-officials-signal-readiness-for-ground-offensive-into-gaza">threatened ground invasion</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/israel-says-it-wont-block-humanitarian-aid-entering-gaza-from-egypt">restrictions of aid to Gaza</a> have energized its enemies and created additional tensions with its partners. </p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called the Israeli assault a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israeli-siege-and-bombing-of-gaza-a-massacre">massacre</a>.” Qatar has <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231007-qatar-holds-israel-responsible-for-escalation-in-gaza/">blamed Israel</a> for the violence, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Israel’s campaign amounts to “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sissi-says-israeli-gaza-campaign-has-gone-beyond-right-to-self-defense/">collective punishment</a>” of the people of Gaza. </p>
<h2>Preventing a wider war</h2>
<p>Fraying diplomatic ties among some partners became even more apparent after Hamas accused Israel of the Oct. 17 explosion outside a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/world/middleeast/gaza-hospital-israel-hamas-explained.html">Gaza hospital</a>. Although Israel and the U.S. have maintained that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-hospital-blast-what-we-know-about-explosion-2023-10-18/">Palestinians caused the explosion,</a>, possibly in error, anti-Israel demonstrations quickly swept across the Middle East. </p>
<p>Shortly before President Joe Biden arrived in Israel for a regional visit on Oct. 18, Jordan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-cancels-summit-with-biden-egyptian-leader-amman-2023-10-17/">canceled his planned summit</a> with el-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. </p>
<p>The Biden administration has tried to balance strong support for Israel with a message of restraint.</p>
<p>During his visit to Israel, Biden defended Israel’s right to respond to protect its borders and people and tried to deter Iran and others from expanding the war. At the same time, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/joe-biden-urges-israel-not-be-consumed-by-rage-pledges-support-netanyahu-gaza-hamas">pressed Israel</a> to follow the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwir-5vN_4SCAxUUvokEHTspDo0QFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fhow-the-laws-of-war-apply-to-the-conflict-between-israel-and-hamas-215493&usg=AOvVaw2gJZ_OA0_IsqEijkwTksSG&opi=89978449">laws of war</a>, and he secured an Israeli agreement to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/20/1207370235/israel-rafah-border-crossing-gaza-humanitarian-aid">allow some aid</a> into Gaza through Egypt. The Egypt-Gaza border crossing opened to allowed some <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-captives-border-aid-f5976ed58ba508f14d45b72b428125ac">bottled war and medical supplies in to Gaza</a> on Oct. 21. </p>
<p>Despite tension and anger across the region, the Biden administration’s effort to deter Iran and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67128900">prevent a wider war</a> aligns with the priorities of most Arab governments, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/06/the-arabs-forlorn-envy-of-iranians.html">fear Tehran</a> and its allies are deeply wary about domestic and regional stability. </p>
<p>Perceptions that Tehran is causing escalation and regional instability could push other nations back toward Washington. Pressing for Israeli restraint may be the key both to mitigating the humanitarian crisis and to preventing Iran from emerging a winner from the war in Gaza.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Ciorciari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s long-term strategy includes eradicating Israel and driving a wedge between Israel and its regional neighbors. So far, the war seems to be accomplishing that goal.John Ciorciari, Professor of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2153842023-10-18T12:43:28Z2023-10-18T12:43:28ZBiden in Israel: How U.S. foreign policy has played a big role in the Israel-Hamas war<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/biden-in-israel-how-us-foreign-policy-has-played-a-big-role-in-the-israel-hamas-war" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/18/1206702426/biden-arrives-in-israel-as-gaza-reels-from-deadly-hospital-explosion">U.S. President Joe Biden is in Israel</a> to lend support to the country in the midst of an already bloody war between the Israelis and Hamas, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/18/they-believed-it-was-safe-death-toll-rising-blast-gaza-hospital">including the bombing of a Gaza City hospital that has left hundreds dead</a>.</p>
<p>Following Biden’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv, it’s worth looking back at American foreign policy and profound U.S. mismanagement of ongoing crises in the Middle East over a period of decades. It illustrates how badly American domination has served international peace and stability. </p>
<p>Some have argued that Hamas’s attack on Israel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/briefing/hamas-israel-war.html">is an indication of the chaos and disorder that will follow in an emerging “multipolar world,” meaning one in which the U.S. is no longer firmly in control of international affairs</a>. </p>
<p>But let’s look at how that U.S. control has worked out for the Middle East in the past. The current war in Gaza is a direct product of the failure of American foreign policy. It’s an argument in favour of a multipolar world, one in which the U.S. has less influence and other powers can act as countervailing forces. </p>
<h2>Destabilizing influence</h2>
<p>The U.S. has a long history of destabilizing the Middle East, a critically important region of the world. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days">In 1953, the U.S. and the U.K. engineered a coup against democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh</a> and strengthened the shah of Iran.</p>
<p>The shah’s hated regime fell to the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/four-decades-later-did-the-iranian-revolution-fulfill-its-promises/">Iranian revolution in 1979</a>. The result was the Islamic Republic of Iran, a state that has bedevilled the U.S. and its allies ever since. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-the-iraq-war">In 2003, the U.S. illegally invaded Iraq</a>, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/iraqi">killing more than 300,000 people</a>, and spreading chaos across the region. The so-called War on Terror has raged on, <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2023/IndirectDeaths">killing millions more, directly and indirectly</a>, for years.</p>
<p>The American mishandling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another substantial failure. Given its enormous leverage over both parties, the U.S. could have taken more neutral steps to bring about a just end to the conflict long ago. Instead, it catered to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/05/opinion/biden-middle-east-deal.html">increasingly radical Israeli governments</a>, facilitating the brutal subjugation of the Palestinians and creating the pressure cooker that has now exploded.</p>
<h2>Pressure cooker erupts</h2>
<p>The United Nations has called Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129722#:%7E:text=Israel's%20occupation%20of%20Palestinian%20territory,first%20report%2C%20published%20on%20Thursday.">unlawful under international law</a>.” For many decades, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/06/israel-occupation-50-years-of-dispossession/">Israel has built settlements in the West Bank</a> that amount to the de facto annexation of Palestine. Israel has also <a href="https://www.btselem.org/topic/jerusalem">annexed East Jerusalem</a>. <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/human-rights-council-hears-that-700000-israeli-settlers-are-living-illegally-in-the-occupied-west-bank-meeting-summary-excerpts/#:%7E:text=From%202012%20to%202022%2C%20the,from%20520%2C000%20to%20over%20700%2C000.">Today, the Israeli settler population in occupied Palestine stands at 700,000</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/07/israeli-settlements-amount-war-crime-special-rapporteur-tells-human-rights#:%7E:text=Israeli%20courts%20had%20been%20enforcing,laws%20to%20the%20occupied%20territory.">The settlements</a> violate <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49">Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention</a>. They are the single greatest obstacle to the “two-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-us-policy-israeli-palestinian-conflict">formally opposes Israeli settlements</a>, but has done nothing to actually stop them. Instead, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/57170576">it’s provided Israel with weapons and financial support</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/19/a-history-of-the-us-blocking-un-resolutions-against-israel">protected Israel from facing the consequences of its violations of international law in the United Nations</a> and other international institutions.</p>
<p>This protection has apparently instilled in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/5/israel-impunity-comes-home-to-roost">Israel an attitude of impunity</a>. Israel builds settlements and oppresses Palestinians; the U.S. either helps it do so or defends Israeli actions.</p>
<p>In 2021, the international NGO <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">Human Rights Watch issued a report</a> that said Palestinian “deprivations are so severe that they amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution.” Other groups like Amnesty International say Palestinians <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/">are subject to regular violence and humiliation from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Jewish settlers</a>.</p>
<p>The current Israeli government <a href="https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20230711_the_pogroms_deliver_another_palestinian_community_was_forcibly_transferred_yesterday">encourages and protects settler violence</a> and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-12-28/ty-article/.premium/natural-right-to-the-land-of-israel-netanyahu-lays-out-west-bank-annexation-plans/00000185-5955-dbd5-abe7-59f5c5d60000">has expressed an intent to annex what remains of Palestine</a>. Indeed, <a href="https://jewishcurrents.org/could-israel-carry-out-another-nakba">its push for controversial judicial reform is connected to its designs on Palestinian land.</a></p>
<h2>‘Open-air prison’</h2>
<p>Gaza has been described as an open-air prison. For 17 years, it’s been under an illegal blockade that violates <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-33#:%7E:text=12%20August%201949.-,Article%2033%20%2D%20Individual%20responsibility%2C%20collective%20penalties%2C%20pillage%2C%20reprisals,or%20of%20terrorism%20are%20prohibited.">Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention</a> that bans what’s known as collective punishment. </p>
<p><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/hell-earth-israel-unrest-spotlights-dire-conditions-gaza/story?id=103829699">Youth unemployment is 60 per cent</a>; <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/water-crisis-may-make-gaza-strip-uninhabitable-by-2020#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Gaza%20Strip%2C%2097,and%20supplies%20into%20the%20region.">97 per cent of the water is undrinkable</a>; <a href="https://www.foodnavigator-asia.com/Article/2022/05/31/acute-undernutrition-stunting-rife-among-kids-under-five-in-gaza-strip-palestine-study#">child malnutrition is rife</a>.</p>
<p>Had the U.S. used its global leverage to push Israel to adhere to international law, the situation might have been avoided. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/09/israel-hamas-gaza-war-battle/">Instead, it enabled Israel’s expansionist ambitions while undermining international law</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/trump-pro-israel-truth-social-netanyahu-abraham-accords/?tpcc=recirc_trending062921">The former Donald Trump administration abandoned any American pretense of even-handedness</a> in the Israel-Palestine conflict, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/23/abraham-accords-israel-palestine-two-years/">implementing the Abraham Accords, which were designed to sidestep the Palestinian issue altogether by creating economic ties between Israel and neighbouring Arab states</a>. </p>
<p>Biden’s administration <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/israel-saudi-arabia-normalisation-deal-in-reach-netanyahu-tells-biden">has doubled down on Trump’s efforts by pushing the normalization</a> of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, again sidestepping the Palestinians. </p>
<h2>Region on edge</h2>
<p>There is no excusing Hamas’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/opinion/israel-hamas-.html">incredibly violent actions</a> on Oct. 7. But the attack <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/08/normalization-peace-biden-hamas-attack">has been linked to Israeli efforts to build ties with Arab nations like Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>As Biden spends time in Israel, it’s a stark reminder that the U.S. is no longer qualified to mediate the conflict. </p>
<p>As the war claims thousands of Palestinian civilians, the region is in danger of exploding. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-spirit-of-resistance-arab-support-for-palestinians-swells">Arabs are enraged</a>; <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/09/hezbollah-lebanon-hamas-war-israel-iran/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921">Hezbollah may intervene</a>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/business/economy/global-economy-israel-gaza-war.html">The cost of oil may spike, further damaging the fragile world economy</a>. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/china-brokered-saudi-iran-deal-driving-wave-of-reconciliation-says-wang#:%7E:text=China's%20top%20diplomat%20has%20said,%E2%80%9Cissues%20concerning%20core%20interests%E2%80%9D.">helped re-establish diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia</a> because it gets more than <a href="https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-China-Overly-Reliant-On-Middle-Eastern-Oil.html">50 per cent of its oil</a> from the Middle East and has a powerful interest in regional peace. </p>
<p>Even so, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east-crisis-test-limits-chinas-diplomatic-push-2023-10-10/">it apparently has no desire to insert itself into a quagmire the U.S. helped create.</a>. Other powers that rely on Middle Eastern oil have to endure the consequences of unbalanced and inept American policy. </p>
<p>The United States causes and exacerbates many of the problems and conflicts that it later seeks to manage. American strength has meant the rest of the world has had to accept this reality. But the sooner a true multi-polar world emerges, the better it will likely be for global stability — and maybe even for the rule of law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215384/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, J Street and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>The current war in Gaza is an argument in favour of a multipolar world, one in which the U.S. has less influence and other powers can act as countervailing forces.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2158502023-10-18T11:22:53Z2023-10-18T11:22:53ZBiden’s Middle East trip has messages for both global and domestic audiences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554537/original/file-20231018-15-5inc0y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=89%2C224%2C5901%2C3763&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Biden meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on arriving in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BidenIsraelPalestinians/a064192aa42449e697f8a41bd2b318eb/photo?Query=biden%20israel&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1416&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Joe Biden’s decision to travel to an active war zone and the scene of an unfolding humanitarian crisis spoke volumes, even before his arrival.</p>
<p>The White House <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/16/statement-from-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-president-bidens-travel-to-israel-and-jordan/">has stated</a> that Biden’s purpose is to “demonstrate his steadfast support for Israel” after Hamas’ “brutal terrorist attack” on Oct. 7, 2023. But Israel wasn’t meant to be his only stop. </p>
<p>The president was also scheduled to travel to Amman, Jordan, to meet with Jordanian King Abdullah II, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. However, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-jordan-meeting-arab-leaders-cancelled/">the meeting was canceled</a> with Biden already en route to Israel.</p>
<p>The trip is a bold but risky move, a carefully orchestrated display of Biden’s belief that the United States should take an active leadership role in global affairs. It is a strategy Biden has used before, most notably in his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/02/20/world/russia-ukraine-war#heres-how-bidens-visit-to-kyiv-unfolded">February 2023 surprise visit to Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Wrt5_qIAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of U.S. presidential rhetoric and political communication</a>, I have spent the past decade studying how chief executives use their international travels to reach audiences at home and abroad. I see clear parallels between Biden’s trip and similar actions by other presidents to extend American influence on the world stage.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Roosevelt sits in the cab of a large steam shovel" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=934&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=934&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554392/original/file-20231017-29-n9owns.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=934&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Theodore Roosevelt, center, is seated on a steam shovel in the Panama Canal Zone during the first trip abroad by a U.S. chief executive, in November 1906.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Roosevelt_and_the_Canal.JPG">New York Times photo archive/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A paramount duty</h2>
<p>Prior to 1906, no U.S. president had ever traveled abroad while in office. A <a href="https://kansaspress.ku.edu/9780700615803/">long-standing tradition</a> held that the U.S. had left the trappings of monarchy behind, and that it was much more appropriate for chief executives to travel domestically, where Americans lived and worked.</p>
<p>President Theodore Roosevelt, who had an expansive view of presidential power, bemoaned what he called <a href="https://www.whitehousehistory.org/off-for-the-ditch">this “ironclad custom</a>” and ultimately bucked it. In November 1906, Roosevelt visited the Panama Canal Zone and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/tr-panama/">posed at the controls of a giant steam shovel</a> to shore up public support for constructing the canal. Beyond pushing this megaproject forward, the trip enabled Roosevelt to see and be seen on the international stage.</p>
<p>Other presidents followed suit as the U.S. began to take a more active role in global affairs. Just before Woodrow Wilson departed for the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at Versailles, where world leaders convened to set the terms for peace after World War I, <a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/sixth-annual-message-6">he stated in his annual message to Congress</a> that it was his “paramount duty to go” and participate in negotiations that were of “transcendent importance both to us and to the rest of the world.” </p>
<p>During World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt embraced this idea of bearing a moral responsibility to speak to, and for, both U.S. citizens and a global audience. Images of FDR seated between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Josef Stalin at <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/96522736/">Tehran</a> and <a href="https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3a10098/">Yalta</a> symbolized global leadership – a robust vision that endured after the U.S. president’s untimely death.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three world leaders seated side on the porch of a building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=610&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=610&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/554402/original/file-20231017-23-wzhcci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=610&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Soviet leader Josef Stalin, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the portico of the Russian Embassy in Tehran, Iran, during their conference, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1943.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3a33351/">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Embodying US foreign policy</h2>
<p>Going global quickly became <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo186006093.html">a deliberate rhetorical strategy during the Cold War</a>, as presidents from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan used trips abroad to symbolize American commitment to important places and regions. By choosing to visit certain destinations, presidents made clear that these places were important to the U.S. </p>
<p>This is exactly what Biden no doubt hopes to accomplish through his visit to Israel. When he <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/">condemned the Hamas attack on Israel</a> as “an act of sheer evil,” he also declared: “We stand with Israel.” Traveling to an <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-travel-israel-wednesday-war-hamas-rcna120729">active war zone</a> embodies this pledge far more clearly than words alone.</p>
<p>And this is how Israelis have interpreted the visit. Tzachi Hanegbi, the leader of Israel’s National Security Council, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/17/israel-hamas-war-news-gaza/#link-CDUZASQRRFDMZBBPHUASW47B4I">described the visit</a> as “a bear hug, a large rapid bear hug to the Israelis in the south, to all Israelis, and to every Jew.”</p>
<h2>Addressing both sides</h2>
<p>But Biden must also acknowledge the very real plight of Palestinians who are trapped <a href="https://theconversation.com/decades-of-underfunding-blockade-have-weakened-gazas-health-system-the-siege-has-pushed-it-into-abject-crisis-215679">in dire conditions</a> in Gaza as Israel prepares for a ground invasion. This is no doubt the reason his team sought a face-to-face meeting with Abbas. </p>
<p>I expect that Biden will demonstrate U.S. support for Israel while also drawing a clear distinction between Hamas and the Palestinian people. And Biden will likely draw on his <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/09/20/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-of-israel-before-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/">friendship of many years</a> with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to urge moderation in Israel’s military response.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wXhf2aYzGbw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden’s trip will embody U.S. commitment to Israel while giving the president an opportunity to moderate its actions.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The home audience</h2>
<p>Biden’s trip also has important meaning for U.S. electoral politics. A former <a href="https://wsp.wharton.upenn.edu/book_author/joe-biden/">chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee</a>, Biden has long maintained that the U.S. must take an active role in the world. In the 2020 presidential campaign, he argued that Donald Trump’s policy of “America First” had <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/biden-transition-updates/2020/11/10/933556440/biden-tells-world-leaders-its-not-america-alone-anymore">left “America alone</a>” by undercutting relationships with critical U.S. allies.</p>
<p>For Jewish voters, the president’s visit offers tangible evidence of an enduring U.S. commitment to Israel, especially after some far-left Democratic lawmakers <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/11/squad-democrats-israel-hamas-tensions">refused to criticize</a> the Hamas attack. And Biden’s willingness to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terrorist-attacks-in-israel-2/">condemn Hamas</a> as a “terrorist organization” may also speak to Republican voters, who are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/partisan-gap-support-israel-seems-permanent">much more likely</a> to back Israel. </p>
<p>Defining an appropriate role for the U.S. in world affairs is certain to be an important issue in the 2024 presidential election, especially with active conflicts in Ukraine and now in the Middle East. Biden has consistently called for U.S. engagement abroad – not only in words, but by showing up in places like Kiev and Tel Aviv.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Allison M. Prasch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Until 1906, no US president had ever traveled abroad in office. Then Teddy Roosevelt demonstrated the power of showing up.Allison M. Prasch, Associate Professor of Rhetoric, Politics and Culture, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2105372023-09-05T12:31:07Z2023-09-05T12:31:07ZSaudi reforms are softening Islam’s role, but critics warn the kingdom will still take a hard line against dissent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545381/original/file-20230829-17-2c62j3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C8%2C1762%2C1183&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaHistoryofSuccession/9eb082a3e58543aea3bc012814e60aad/photo?Query=saudi%20arabia%20mbs&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=25&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin, pool, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, or “MBS,” is bringing a new vision of a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476">moderate, balanced”</a> Saudi Islam by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/21/world/middleeast/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia.html">minimizing the role of Saudi religious institutions</a> once seen as critical to the monarchy. </p>
<p>For decades, Saudi kings provided support to religious scholars and institutions that advocated an austere form of Sunni Islam known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Wahhabism</a>. The kingdom enforced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047586.005">strict codes of morality</a>, placing restrictions on the rights of women and religious minorities, among others. </p>
<p>Under MBS, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html">women have been allowed to drive</a>; <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-police.html">co-educational classrooms</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/12/12/Saudis-welcome-decision-to-allow-public-cinemas">movie theaters</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/middleeast/saudi-arabia-biggest-rave-mime-intl/index.html">all-night concerts</a> in the desert – in which men and women dance together – are a new normal. </p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/1663">Yasmine Farouk</a> and <a href="https://politicalscience.columbian.gwu.edu/nathan-j-brown">Nathan J. Brown</a> call the diminishing role of Wahhabi religious scholars within Saudi domestic and international policy nothing short of a “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/07/saudi-arabia-s-religious-reforms-are-touching-nothing-but-changing-everything-pub-84650">revolution</a>” in Saudi affairs.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">MBS acknowledges</a> that these reforms risk infuriating certain constituents or could even provoke retaliation. As a scholar who studies <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/and-god-knows-the-martyrs-9780190092153?cc=us&lang=en&">interpretations of Islamic law</a> to justify or contest militancy, I’ve followed these reforms closely.</p>
<p>In the past, Saudis who challenged the authority of Wahhabis have provoked unrest. When King Fahd, who ruled between 1982-2005, rejected the advice of his Wahhabi scholars and allowed the U.S. military to station weapons and female service members on Saudi soil, several of them <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439">supported a violent insurrection</a> against him.</p>
<p>MBS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/">seems unconcerned</a> with such challenges. In an interview broadcast widely throughout the kingdom, MBS <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">chastised Wahhabi scholars</a>, accusing some of falsifying Islamic doctrines. He then detained a major Wahhabi scholar <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/middleeast/saudi-cleric-sheikh-salman-al-awda-intl/index.html">from whom he once sought counsel</a>, charging him with crimes against the monarchy. MBS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41747476#:%7E:text=Prince%20Mohammed%20defended%20the%20reforms,to%20live%20a%20normal%20life.">defended these actions</a>, claiming, “We are returning to what we were before. A country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe.”</p>
<h2>Negotiating Wahhabism</h2>
<p>This proclaimed return of “moderate Islam” echoes the reforms of MBS’s grandfather, King Abdulaziz, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511993510.008">founder of the modern Saudi kingdom</a>. This vision rejects policies toward Wahhabi Islam favored by his uncles, King Faisal and King Khalid.</p>
<p>Between 1925 and 1932, Abdulaziz suppressed Wahhabi scholars and militants who had demanded that he uphold <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/ebook/9780691241609/wahhabism">their version of “pure Islam”</a> and not open the kingdom to trade and development. He did the opposite and asserted the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<p>The booming Saudi oil economy developed by Abdulaziz required his son, King Faisal, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, to <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">reconsider the monarchy’s relationship</a> with Wahhabism. Unlike Abdulaziz, Faisal believed Wahhabis would help him save the kingdom.</p>
<p>Saudis who felt left behind in the emerging Saudi oil economy had found an inspirational symbol of liberation in Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who helped overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 and implemented plans to redistribute Egyptian wealth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674049642">Faisal encouraged</a> Wahhabi scholars to work with politically driven Islamists to reject the revolutionary politics of Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and craft a new vision of Islam for Saudi youth.</p>
<p>Faisal permitted Wahhabi scholars to reform Saudi educational institutions with their conservative Islamic curriculum. Abroad, Faisal’s scholars presented Wahhabism as <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25998">an authentic Islamic alternative</a> to the Cold War ideologies of the U.S. and USSR. Wealthy Saudis, these Wahhabi scholars argued, had a religious duty to promote Wahhabism across the globe.</p>
<h2>Resisting Wahhabism</h2>
<p>Faisal’s reforms met with success. King Khalid, who followed Faisal, continued to favor Wahhabi scholars, particularly while responding to two major challenges in 1979. </p>
<p>A group of Saudi students, who believed Faisal’s and Khalid’s reforms to be illegitimate, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred site, for two weeks in 1979. An attack on the Grand Mosque was viewed as an attack on the monarchy itself, which claims the mantle of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photograph showing smoke rising above the minarets of a mosque with other buildings in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545382/original/file-20230829-21-b5h148.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-dated-november-1979-of-burning-meccas-great-mosque-news-photo/51398174?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The seizure came to a violent end with combined action by French and Saudi military forces. Afterward, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/25/inside-the-kingdom-robert-lacey-book-review">Khalid agreed</a> to elevate religious officials who affirmed the Islamic credentials of the monarchy.</p>
<p>Also in 1979, other Saudi youth traveled to join the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One such Saudi who answered the call that year was Osama bin Laden, who would establish al-Qaida in 1988. </p>
<p>Bin Laden’s and al-Qaida’s grievances against the monarchy emerged following King Fahd’s acceptance of an increased deployment of U.S. soldiers to Saudi soil following Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/products/1952-messages-to-the-world">Bin Ladin proclaimed</a> the presence of American infidels in Saudi Arabia to be a defilement of Islamic holy lands, an “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809439.003">affront</a>” to Islamic sensibilities, and demanded the destruction of the monarchy. Al-Qaida launched anti-Saudi insurgent campaigns lasting through 2010.</p>
<p>Not all conservative Islamist leaders called for violence. As historian <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/middle-east-centre/people/madawi-al-rasheed">Madawi Al-Rasheed</a> notes, many Saudi scholars <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/muted-modernists/">framed themselves as reformers</a> who sought to correct Fahd’s departures from “authentic” Islam and restore Faisal’s vision.</p>
<p>When MBS speaks of a “moderate Islam” he is not just condemning the violence of al-Qaida. He’s abandoning the monarchy’s accommodations of the Wahhabi establishment. He <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/saudi-crown-prince-lambasts-his-kingdoms-wahhabi-establishment">blames some Wahhabi scholars</a> for the violence that the monarchy faced in 1979 and again in the the 1990s and 2000s. </p>
<p>He has worked quickly to erase those accommodations and, like his grandfather, affirm the supremacy of the monarchy.</p>
<h2>A ‘moderate Wahhabism’ for Saudi society?</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man, wearing a headdress, walking past a display sign of 'Vision 2030.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545383/original/file-20230829-21-zqby2y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Saudi Vision 2030’ aims to bring a complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these revolutionary changes occurred amid the 2016 unveiling of “Saudi Vision 2030,” a plan for complete Saudi political, economic, educational and cultural transformation. MBS believes that this will meet the demands of Saudis under the age of 30 – who <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/fuller20030601.pdf">number more than 60%</a> of the kingdom’s population.</p>
<p>The religious curriculum shaped by King Faisal is gone, replaced with a “Saudi first” education, which <a href="https://agsiw.org/the-saudi-founding-day-and-the-death-of-wahhabism/">removes Ibn abd al-Wahhab</a>, the founder of Wahhabism, from textbooks and emphasizes Saudi patriotism over a Wahhabi Islamic religious identity. Saudi Arabia <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200125-saudi-arabia-to-stop-funding-mosques-in-foreign-countries/">has announced it will no longer fund</a> mosques and Wahhabi educational institutions in other countries.</p>
<p>Saudi religious police, once tasked with upholding public morality, saw their <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/64501">powers curtailed</a>. They no longer have powers of investigation or arrest. They cannot punish behaviors deemed morally inappropriate.</p>
<p>Critics remain unimpressed, noting that demoting religious officials does not diminish the violence of the Saudi state. Religious police continue their online surveillance of social media. In 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was killed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/06/read-jamal-khashoggis-columns-for-the-washington-post/">following his calls</a> for a continued voice for Islamist reformers in Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/women-saudi-arabia-make-gains-overall-rights-remain-issue-n838296">Al-Rasheed argues</a> that the images of a new Saudi society conceal suppression of Saudi reformers. Some observers note that a growing Saudi “<a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/01/08/many-saudis-are-seething-at-muhammad-bin-salmans-reforms">surveillance state</a>,” with capacities to peek into the private lives of Saudis, underwrites these reforms. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://schar.gmu.edu/profiles/pmandavi">Peter Mandaville</a>, a scholar of international affairs, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/live/BbxJAWvM1tc">observes, the “moderate Islam” offered by MBS is complicated</a>. On the one hand, it characterizes a new tolerant Saudi Arabian Islam. Yet, inside the kingdom, Mandaville argues that the “moderate Islam” of MBS demands that Saudi youth – as good Muslims – will submit to the authority of the monarchy over the kingdom’s affairs.</p>
<p>Some observers believe this might not be enough. <a href="https://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty-staff/full-time-faculty/mohammad-fadel">Mohammad Fadel</a>, a professor of Islamic legal history, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-arabia-mbs-religious-reform-incoherent-modernism">argues that the current configuration of the Saudi monarchy is incompatible</a> with “the kind of independent thought the crown prince is calling for in matters of religion.” Saudi society will flourish, he adds, “when Prince Mohammed recognizes the right of Muslims to rule themselves politically.”</p>
<p>With these reforms to Wahhabism, MBS hopes to secure the loyalty of a generation of young Saudis. As Saudi history would indicate, however, such a bargain requires constant renegotiation and renewal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nathan French does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar who has closely followed reforms that MBS has made to Wahhabism, an austere form of Islam, explains the changes taking place in the Saudi kingdom and their impact.Nathan French, Associate Professor of Religion, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2118562023-08-22T12:26:51Z2023-08-22T12:26:51ZFirst Republican debate set to kick off without Trump – but with the potential to direct the GOP’s foreign policy stance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544022/original/file-20230822-17-xf9lph.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=37%2C0%2C8206%2C5487&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GOP candidates will likely debate whether the US should continue to pour support into Ukraine's effort to defeat Russia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-armored-vehicles-maneuver-and-fire-their-30mm-news-photo/1485528240?adppopup=true">Scott Peterson/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Republican presidential hopefuls take the stage in Milwaukee on Aug. 23, 2023, for the <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_debates,_2024">first debate of the 2024 campaign season</a>, attention will center on how the candidates position themselves <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/20/1194905052/republican-presidential-candidates-avoid-speaking-on-trump-at-a-party-conference">vis-à-vis former President Donald Trump</a> and his four criminal indictments. </p>
<p>What candidates say about foreign policy is another critical issue. </p>
<p>Republican leaders are sharply divided over how the United States should position itself in the world. While some <a href="https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/2022/what-is-a-maga-republican/">Trump supporters</a> are pressing for the U.S. to pull back from world affairs, more traditional Republicans are calling for robust international engagement.</p>
<p>Ever since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, most Republican leaders have <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/28/politics/gop-foreign-policy-debate-2024/index.html">supported an active U.S.</a> role in the world. This <a href="https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/30892">internationalist approach</a> was first fueled by Eisenhower’s view that the U.S. needed strong military and diplomatic alliances during the Cold War. </p>
<p>In my own <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=W1MuqgYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">research on U.S. foreign policy</a>, I have found that most Republican politicians continued to support international engagement after the Cold War ended in 1991. </p>
<p>From former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush to current Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, the prevailing <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hard-Line-Republican-Foreign-Policy/dp/0691141827">GOP view</a> has been that membership in military alliances like NATO, a strong U.S. military presence overseas and active American diplomacy make the U.S. safer. </p>
<p>But traditional Republican positions on foreign policy are now in flux. Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">“America First”</a> vision, which prioritizes American exceptionalism and isolation, challenges traditional Republican internationalism. The Republican primary campaign will help determine the GOP’s foreign policy platform and course. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Dwight Eisenhower is one of two men shown in an open-top car in a black and white photo. He waves his hat in the air at a crowd of people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543781/original/file-20230821-28-6lxefy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Dwight Eisenhower, left, a Republican, championed the idea that the U.S. should remain strongly engaged in the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-eisenhower-waves-to-well-wishers-sitting-news-photo/517833370?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trump’s split from the GOP</h2>
<p>Trump has pursued an <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">inward-looking</a> approach to the world, questioning the value of alliances and calling on other countries to take care of security problems themselves. </p>
<p>As president, he pulled out of several <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/nuclear-treaty-trump/index.html">international treaties</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-human-rights.html">councils that are part of the United Nations</a>. He toyed with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html">exiting NATO</a> and tried to withdraw all U.S. troops <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/10/13/trump-ordered-rapid-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-after-election-loss/">from Afghanistan</a>.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Room-Where-It-Happened/John-Bolton/9781982148034">senior advisers</a> and Republican <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/trump-s-foreign-policy-faces-growing-dissent-congress-n965641">Congress members</a> pushed back on these plans.</p>
<p>Today, as the U.S. actively supports Ukraine with arms and supplies, Trump advocates for a neutral U.S. stance on the war between Russia and Ukraine. He has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/ukraine-russia-putin-trump-town-hall/index.html">promised to resolve</a> the conflict within “24 hours” by talking with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.</p>
<p>Although Trump has been the dominant figure among Republicans for seven years, his brand of isolationism has been slow <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/27/trump-gop-foreign-policy-polling-490768">to catch on</a> with other Republicans. </p>
<p>Trump, for example, proposed in each year of his presidency to slash the State Department’s budget by about one-third. Republicans in Congress worked with Democrats to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3393170">reject these proposals</a> every time. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/trump-putin-ukraine-invasion-00010923">Trump also called</a> Putin a “genius” following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Congress then passed a series of laws in 2022 – with strong <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3781964-final-funding-bill-includes-45b-for-ukraine/">support from Republicans</a> – that imposed sanctions on Russia and provided Ukraine with large amounts of foreign aid. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Tim Scott is seen, partially obscured by a blue curtain, sitting in a beige chair on a stage." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543784/original/file-20230821-15-djqmdg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Republican presidential candidate Senator Tim Scott qualified to appear at the debate on Aug. 23, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-presidential-candidate-u-s-sen-tim-scott-speaks-news-photo/1608744302?adppopup=true">Megan Varner/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Republicans distancing themselves from Trump</h2>
<p>Nine <a href="https://www.wisn.com/article/milwaukee-first-republican-presidential-debate/44838820#">Republican candidates have qualified</a> for the Aug. 23 presidential debate, and eight of them – all but Trump – are likely to be on the debate stage. Trump has said that he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-wont-take-part-republican-debates-2023-08-21/">will not participate</a> in the debates.</p>
<p>While the top GOP presidential candidates are largely united in favoring a tough stance toward China, they differ sharply on Ukraine. </p>
<p>Several of the candidates, including former Vice President Mike Pence, former U.S. Ambassador to the <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/07/11/2024-presidential-candidates-on-ukraine/70325435007/">United Nations Nikki Haley</a>, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/07/11/2024-presidential-candidates-on-ukraine/70325435007/">Senator Tim Scott</a> and former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2023/jun/09/where-do-republican-presidential-candidates-stand/">advocate strong U.S. support</a> for Ukraine. </p>
<p>But some other high-profile candidates, including Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, have called for scaling back U.S. involvement in the war, arguing that America’s involvement is <a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2023/jun/09/where-do-republican-presidential-candidates-stand/">a distraction</a> from more important problems. </p>
<p>There are also signs that overall Republican support for Ukraine is slipping.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/04/politics/cnn-poll-ukraine/index.html">recent polls suggest</a> that most Republican voters oppose giving Ukraine additional military aid, on top of the more than US$46 billion that the U.S. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts?gclid=Cj0KCQjwrfymBhCTARIsADXTabljIE1qo4x7czQDkgXX8KFCPkk4knxAfniFbEaBQaICm9O8mFGYkC0aAqMjEALw_wcB">has already given</a>. </p>
<p>This flagging support for Ukraine aid may reflect the fact that the war continues unabated, without a clear sign of peace talks ahead. Ukraine, meanwhile, has only taken back a small portion of its territory from Russia during its current counteroffensive, leading some Ukraine supporters to <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/huddle/2023/08/17/ukraines-top-freedom-caucus-ally-gets-cold-feet-00111608">question whether U.S. military aid</a> is effective enough to merit its high cost. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Nikki Haley is seen sitting on a stage and speaking, as seen from multiple television screens in a dark roo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543782/original/file-20230821-31965-5w6nio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Presidential nominee Nikki Haley is one of the Republican politicians who has spoken out in favor of continued U.S. support for Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/republican-u-s-presidential-candidate-and-former-u-s-news-photo/1608484593?adppopup=true">Megan Varner/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The topic is: Ukraine</h2>
<p>When foreign policy comes up in Milwaukee or at future Republican primary debates, it will be telling whether candidates say they still strongly back U.S. efforts to help Ukraine, or not. </p>
<p>If some of them hold firm on their support, it will be a sign that the Republican debate over foreign policy remains alive. </p>
<p>But if they change their position, this may be a sign that Trump’s hold over the Republican Party is spreading to a policy area that he previously did not strongly influence. It would also suggest that the MAGA – Make America Great Again – movement has been effective in propagating Trump’s policy views, even while he is not in office. </p>
<p>Beyond the war in Ukraine, America’s global role is at stake this election season. Although the country has acted on its principles inconsistently and highly imperfectly, the U.S. – through Democratic and Republican administrations – over the past eight decades helped to <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/220215/the-world-america-made-by-robert-kagan/">foster a more peaceful, prosperous</a> and democratic world. </p>
<p>In the meantime, I think that Trump’s Republican rivals have an opportunity to make the case for preserving and strengthening the international alliances and partnerships that <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300271010/a-world-safe-for-democracy/">help keep the U.S.</a> safe. If they make this case effectively, the GOP debate over foreign policy will be primed to continue well beyond 2024.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Tama does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While a few Republican politicians have aligned with former President Donald Trump’s isolationist foreign policy position, most candidates continue to push for the traditional stance of engagement.Jordan Tama, Provost Associate Professor of International Relations, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116992023-08-17T15:17:25Z2023-08-17T15:17:25ZAmid growing tension between Russia, Iran and the US, Syria’s Kurds have been sidelined<p>In north-east Syria, the 12-year conflict is <a href="https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/coronavirus-the-conflict-continues-in-syria-what-can-be-done">far from over</a>. Russian fighter jets buzz US surveillance drones, threatening to bring them down. Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. The Assad regime maintains that it will “regain every inch” of Syria, ending Kurdish autonomy in the north-east. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Turkey — considering the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to be part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK — carries out periodic strikes, following its seizure of part of the border area in October 2019. And the Islamic State, expelled from its last village is March 2019, is still present. Its cells attack civilians and the Assad regime’s military buses, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/attack-bus-kills-23-syrian-troops-war-monitor-2023-08-11/">killing at least 23 troops on August 11</a>.</p>
<p>In a multi-sided confrontation where — amid the regime’s deadly repression — no one has “won”, the headline is of a possible Russian-Iranian-US showdown. But that is a diversion from a local story where Syria’s Kurds could be the biggest losers in the north-east.</p>
<p>On July 16, a Russian Su-35 fighter jet <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2023/07/syria-russia-harassing-us-military-aircraft/">flew close to a US MC-12 turboprop surveillance aircraft</a>, flying in support of operations against Islamic State cells. American officials said the MC-12’s four crew members were endangered, and added that Russian harassment had complicated strike against an IS leader earlier in July. Moscow disregarded the message. </p>
<p>On July 23, another Russian fighter jet damaged a US MQ-9 Reaper drone, carrying our surveillance over northern Syria, when it flew within a few metres and one of its flares struck the Reaper’s propeller. A drone operator kept the Reaper in the air and guided it home.</p>
<p>Lt. General Alex Grynkewich, commander of the 9th Air Force, said: “We call upon the Russian forces in Syria to put an immediate end to this reckless, unprovoked, and unprofessional behaviour.” Some analysts seized on the incidents to declare imminent confrontation. Citing movements of Iranian-backed militia and Assad regime troops and equipment as well as Russian harassment, the Washington-based <a href="https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-are-coordinating-expel-us-forces-syria">Institute for the Study of War declared</a>: “Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating to expel US forces from Syria.” </p>
<p>Despite a de facto “deconfliction” arrangement with US forces, Russia has discussed operations with Iran to prop up the Assad regime throughout the Syrian conflict. But ISW’s assessment is hyperbolic. The chair of the US Joint Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, said in July that additional military deployments <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/07/top-us-general-pumps-brakes-sending-more-forces-confront-russia-syria">were not needed</a> to fend off Russian harassment: “There’s been an uptick, but I wouldn’t overstate it too much. We’ve got adequate capabilities to defend ourselves.”</p>
<p>Equally important, assessments such as ISW’s play down – or even ignore completely – what is actually happening on the ground in Syria in favour of focusing on the interplay between foreign powers. Specifically, attention to a US-Russian-Iranian confrontation ignores the group at greatest risk in any showdown: Syria’s Kurdish population.</p>
<h2>A people without a home</h2>
<p>In 2015, the prospect was of an Islamic State caliphate across northern Syria. IS controlled about one-third of the country, with the prospect of further gains. But the Kurds, backed by US military assistance, held out. They repelled a four-month siege of Kobane by IS in January 2015, at the cost of thousands of lives, and then began the fightback to reclaim territory. </p>
<p>Raqqa, Syria’s seventh-largest city and the centre of the caliphate, was liberated in October 2017. The following September, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council declared the establishment of a statelet, the <a href="https://aanesgov.org/">Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)</a>.</p>
<p>But autonomy would inevitably be tenuous for a Kurdish population — estimated at between 30 and 45 million — struggling for decades for a state in Syria, Iran, Iraq or Turkey. The Assad regime, which suppressed Kurdish protests in 2004-05, was anxious to regain authority that it had lost after nationwide demonstrations began in March 2011. </p>
<p>Tehran’s regime not only chafed at US-supported Kurdish forces but also had its own problematic relations with Kurds in northwest Iran. Turkey’s Erdoğan government, because of its internal fight with the PKK, was also dedicated to breaking the Kurdish areas.</p>
<p>Ankara came close to doing so. Having already <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75419">overrun the Afrin canton in north-west Syria in 2016</a>, Erdoğan sought an opening to advance in the north and north-east. He got it from Donald Trump, who offered in phone calls in December 2018 and October 2019 to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-esper-syria-kurds-turkey.html#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20Defense%20Secretary%20Mark%20T,resurgence%20of%20the%20Islamic%20State.">withdraw all US troops</a>. The Pentagon checked Trump on the first occasion, but Erdoğan seized on the second “green light” to launch a cross-border invasion, occupying a strip along the border.</p>
<p></p><h2>Do “The Kurds Always Lose in the End”?</h2><p></p>
<p>In April 2013, at an international gathering in Oxford in the UK, a US military officer told me: “I can’t see us maintaining a presence. The Kurds always lose in the end.”</p>
<p>More than a decade later, about <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/6/15/23669622/syria-900-us-troops-forever-war-isis-assad">900 US troops remain in Syria</a>, many of them working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But Erdoğan is watching, waiting, and saying that the Kurds must capitulate. Assad still insists that he should be the leader of the north-east. </p>
<p>As Iran fences with the US over sanctions and Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. And Russia — entangled in what appears to be Vladimir Putin’s losing gamble in Ukraine — pursues Syrian “pinpricks” against the Americans, hoping that Washington will finally abandon the Kurds.</p>
<p>On August 4, as political and military analysts were watching Russia and the US, there was another statement from northeast Syria. A day earlier, a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syrian-kurds-urge-us-led-coalition-stands-turkish-102018755">Turkish drone strike</a> on a car killed four members of the Syrian Democratic Forces and wounded two.</p>
<p>The Kurdish-led AANES called on the US to take a public position over the Turkish attacks which have killed dozens of Syrian Kurdish fighters this year. Washington must “have a clear stance … regarding the targeting of our people and fighters”.</p>
<p>There was no immediate reaction from either the US military or the Biden administration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While analysts fret over what Iran and Russia are up to in Syria, Kurdish aspirations continue to be overlooked.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096522023-08-03T12:22:20Z2023-08-03T12:22:20ZHeadlines and front lines: How US news coverage of wars in Yemen and Ukraine reveals a bias in recording civilian harm<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539048/original/file-20230724-27-ct2t0q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. has provided Ukraine more than $75 billion in military and other aid to support its war efforts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-and-ukrainian-president-volodomyr-news-photo/1534873306">Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>War entails suffering. How and how often that suffering is reported on in the U.S., however, is not evenhanded.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemen-understanding-the-conflict-98296">Saudi-led intervention in Yemen</a> in March 2015 and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-invades-ukraine-5-essential-reads-from-experts-177815">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a> in February 2022. The media attention afforded to the crises reveals biases that relate less to the human consequences of the conflicts than to the United States’ role and relationship with the warring parties involved.</p>
<p>In Yemen, the <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/03/19/who-is-arming-the-yemen-war-an-update/">U.S. is arming</a> and <a href="https://quincyinst.org/report/the-yemen-war-in-numbers-saudi-escalation-and-u-s-complicity/">supporting the Saudi-led coalition</a>, whose airstrikes and blockades have caused immense human suffering. Meanwhile in Eastern Europe, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/russia-ukraine-war-us-arms-package">U.S. is arming</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/politics/russia-generals-killed-ukraine.html">aiding Ukraine’s efforts</a> by helping to counter missile strikes that have targeted civilian infrastructure and to retake occupied territories where <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russia-bucha-killings-war-crimes-genocide/629470/">horrific killings</a> have taken place.</p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tQr7IA0AAAAJ&hl=en">genocide and other mass atrocities</a>, as well as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=es&user=CNHYRTIAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">international security</a>, we compared New York Times headlines that span approximately seven and a half years of the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the first nine months of the conflict in Ukraine. </p>
<p>We paid particular attention to headlines on civilian casualties, food security and provision of arms. We chose The New York Times <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/272790/circulation-of-the-biggest-daily-newspapers-in-the-us/">because of its popularity</a> and reputation as a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/239784/credibility-of-major-news-organizations-in-the-us/">credible and influential source</a> on international news, with an <a href="https://www.nytco.com/journalism/journalists-on-the-ground/#:%7E:text=Our%201%2C700%20journalists%20report%20from,and%20celebrations%20of%20human%20achievement.">extensive network</a> of global reporters and over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/pulitzer-winners-new-york-times">130 Pulitzer Prizes</a>. </p>
<p>Purposefully, our analysis focused solely on headlines. While the full stories may bring greater context to the reporting, headlines are particularly important for three reasons: They frame the story in a way that <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/headlines-change-way-think">affects how it is read and remembered</a>; reflect <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2022.2138946">the publication’s ideological stance on an issue</a>; and, for many news consumers, are the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/19/americans-read-headlines-and-not-much-else/">only part of the story that is read</a> at all.</p>
<p>Our research shows extensive biases in both the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2228715">scale and tone of coverage</a>. These biases lead to reporting that highlights or downplays human suffering in the two conflicts in a way that seemingly coincides with U.S. foreign policy objectives.</p>
<h2>Ukraine in spotlight</h2>
<p>War in Ukraine is clearly seen as more newsworthy to U.S. readers. This double standard may have less to do with the actual events than that the victims are white and “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/western-media-coverage-ukraine-russia-invasion-criticism">relatively European</a>,” as one CBS News correspondent put it. </p>
<p>Our broad search of New York Times headlines concerning the overall civilian impact of the two conflicts yielded 546 stories on Yemen between March 26, 2015, and Nov. 30, 2022. Headlines on Ukraine passed that mark in under three months and then doubled it within nine months.</p>
<p>Front-page stories on Ukraine have been commonplace ever since the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-biden.html">Russian invasion</a> began in February 2022. In comparison, front-page stories on Yemen have been rare and, in some cases, as with coverage on food security in the country, came more than three years after the coalition initiated blockades that led to the crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters wrap themselves in a Ukrainian flag and hold signs that say 'Fight like Ukrainian' and 'Russia is a terrorist state'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in New York City call for more U.S. aid to Ukraine to help defeat Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-gathered-on-union-square-in-support-of-ukraine-news-photo/1381627299">Lev Radin/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first front-page article with explicit focus on the hunger crisis was published on June 14, 2018, with the headline “Saudi-Led Attack Deepens the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis.” By this point, 14 million Yemenis were already facing “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/11/bachelet-urges-states-power-and-influence-end-starvation-killing-civilians?LangID=E&NewsID=23855">catastrophic food insecurity</a>,” according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. </p>
<h2>More context on Ukraine</h2>
<p>When we analyzed headlines on Yemen and Ukraine, we classified them as either “episodic,” meaning focused on specific events, or “thematic,” meaning more contextual. An example of an episodic headline is “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/world/middleeast/apparent-saudi-strike-kills-at-least-nine-in-yemeni-family.html">Apparent Saudi Strike Kills at Least Nine in Yemeni Family</a>.” An example of a thematic headline is “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/27/world/russia-ukraine-war">Ferocious Russian Attacks Spur Accusations of Genocide in Ukraine</a>.”</p>
<p>New York Times headlines on Yemen were mostly focused on events, accounting for 64% of all headlines. In contrast, headlines on Ukraine involved a greater emphasis on context, accounting for 73% of total articles. The reason this is important is that by focusing more on either episodic or contextualized stories, newspapers are able to lead readers to different interpretations.</p>
<p>The largely episodic headlines on Yemen may give the impression that the harm reported is incidental, rather than symptomatic of the coalition’s violence. Meanwhile, contextual articles on Ukraine trace the broader implications of the conflict and reflect stories of continual Russian responsibility and accountability.</p>
<h2>Differences in assigning blame</h2>
<p>Accountability in coverage is also vastly different. We found 50 headlines on Yemen that reported on specific attacks carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. Of them, 18 – just 36% – attributed responsibility to Saudi Arabia or the coalition. An egregious example that omits responsibility is this headline from April 24, 2018: “Yemen Strike Hits Wedding and Kills More Than 20.” A reader could easily interpret that as meaning that Yemen rebels were behind the attack rather than the Saudis – as was the case.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine a Russian strike on a wedding in Ukraine headlined as “Ukraine Strike Hits Wedding and Kills More Than 20.”</p>
<p>Over the period we looked at, there were 54 headlines on specific attacks in Ukraine – 50 of which reported on Russian attacks, with the remaining four reporting on Ukrainian attacks. Here, of the 50 headlines about Russian attacks, 44 of them – or 88% – explicitly attributed responsibility to Russia. Meanwhile, none of the four headlines on Ukrainian attacks attributed responsibility to Ukraine. This shows the selectivity of responsibility attribution – clear in Ukraine when covering Russia’s actions, but often obscured when it comes to the Saudi-led coalition’s attacks in Yemen.</p>
<p>Furthermore, a June 2017 headline portrays the coalition as concerned about the destruction it has caused: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-arms-training-yemen.html">Saudis Move to Address Civilian Toll in Yemen</a>.” Compare this to how Russia’s attempts to address civilians are categorically dismissed: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/russian-civilian-attacks-ukraine.html">Russia’s Explanations for Attacking Civilians Wither Under Scrutiny</a>.”</p>
<h2>A tale of two humanitarian crises</h2>
<p>Both invasions have led to situations of food insecurity – in Yemen creating a <a href="https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/25f57d2bbfa54e41ae3fc1e5c4216f0b/download/?_ga=2.41222050.1090321873.1690389264-401591055.1690389264">national risk of famine</a>, and in Ukraine compromising <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/war-ukraine-global-food-shortage/31872861.html">global grain supply</a>. However, the way the news stories speak about hunger in both countries has little in common. </p>
<p>Russian actions blocking grain exports and destroying crops and agricultural infrastructure are portrayed as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/europe/russia-ukraine-food-supply.html">deliberate and weaponized</a>: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/mariupol-ukraine-russia-war-food-water.html">How Russia Is Using Ukrainians’ Hunger as a Weapon of War</a>.”</p>
<p>In contrast, the Saudi-led coalition’s blockade, despite being the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians">primary driver</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-are-starving-yemenis-to-death-mbs-khashoggi-famine-yemen-blockade-houthis/">of the famine</a> and even <a href="https://www.omct.org/site-resources/files/Torture-in-slow-motion_September-2022.pdf">equated to torture</a> by the World Organisation Against Torture, was rarely afforded this intent. In fact, coverage of the hunger crisis often did not mention the coalition at all, such as in this March 31, 2021, headline: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-war.html#:%7E:text=Six%20years%20into%20a%20war,vulnerable%20to%20disease%20and%20starvation">Famine Stalks Yemen, as War Drags on and Foreign Aid Wanes</a>.” </p>
<p>Out of 73 stories broadly about food security in Yemen, only four unequivocally attributed rising starvation to the actions of the coalition and condemned their role. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Mother holds her baby who receives medical treatment" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A child suffering from malnutrition receives treatment at a hospital in Sanaa, Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/child-suffering-from-malnutrition-is-being-treated-with-news-photo/1258305665">Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moral outrage vs. neutrality</h2>
<p>Headlines on Ukraine tend to invoke moral judgments, we found, compared with a more neutral tone on Yemen. Russia is portrayed as a violent, relentless and merciless villain: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/world/europe/ukraine-russia-putin.html">Russian Forces Pound Civilians …</a>” and “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-biden.html">Russia Batters Ukraine …</a>.” In turn, Ukrainians are presented as heroes who are fighting for the survival of their nation, and they are humanized in their suffering: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/world/europe/ukraine-family-perebyinis-kyiv.html">They Died by a Bridge in Ukraine. This Is Their Story</a>.”</p>
<p>This moral positioning on the conflict in Ukraine is not necessarily a problem. After all, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/public-editor/the-truth-about-false-balance.html">falsely equating</a> Ukraine’s actions with those of Russia fails to account for Russian aggression, which initiated the armed conflict, as well as Russia’s routine targeting of civilian sites. </p>
<p>However, it is noteworthy that New York Times headlines on Yemen fail to employ similarly condemnatory narratives toward the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. This is despite reports produced by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/2291/2015/en/">human rights</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/30/targeting-saada/unlawful-coalition-airstrikes-saada-city-yemen">organizations</a>, <a href="https://yemendataproject.org/">conflict</a> <a href="https://acleddata.com/middle-east/yemen/">trackers</a>, and <a href="https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/39/43">international and regional experts</a> that have blamed the coalition for the vast majority of civilian suffering. </p>
<p>As a consequence, Yemeni civilians become forgotten victims, unworthy of attention and obscured by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-war.html#:%7E:text=Six%20years%20into%20a%20war,vulnerable%20to%20disease%20and%20starvation">opaque numbers</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/world/middleeast/yemen-doctors-without-borders-hospital-bombing.html#:%7E:text=Bombing%20of%20Doctors%20Without%20Borders%20Hospital%20in%20Yemen%20Kills%20at%20Least%2015,-Give%20this%20article&text=SANA%2C%20Yemen%20%E2%80%94%20At%20least%2015,and%20local%20health%20ministry%20officials.">detached language</a> on the consequences of coalition violence, and narratives of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-biden.html#:%7E:text=War%20in%20Yemen.-,Ending%20the%20War%20Is%20Harder.,bombs%20are%20no%20longer%20used.">inevitability of war</a>. These editorial decisions obscure the role of the U.S. in Yemeni suffering – even if they do not reflect the underlying intent behind the reporting. </p>
<h2>Journalism of deference</h2>
<p>In both the Yemen and Ukraine conflicts, the U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars – more than <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">US$75 billion</a> in humanitarian, financial and military assistance to Ukraine and over <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105988">$54 billion</a> in military support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2015 and 2021 alone.</p>
<p>What’s different is that the U.S. is essentially on opposite sides in these conflicts when it comes to its relationship to those inflicting the most civilian casualties. Washington officials have made open and direct declarations about the inhumanity of atrocities in Ukraine while <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/07/us/politics/saudi-yemen-war-us-weapons.html">avoiding inquiry and condemnation</a> of those in Yemen. Our research suggests that such messaging may be supported by the news media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An analysis of over 1,000 headlines shows key differences in how US media portray the aggressors and victims in the two conflicts.Esther Brito Ruiz, Adjunct Instructor, American University School of International ServiceJeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089602023-07-24T10:34:51Z2023-07-24T10:34:51ZSyria’s attempts to rejoin the international fold are far from convincing – here’s why<p>In the carefully composed photograph released by their state news agencies at the beginning of May, Syria’s leader Bashar al-Assad has his arms outstretched to welcome the Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi. The two men are beaming.</p>
<p>Raisi’s visit was a sign of Tehran’s essential support for Assad, more than 12 years after the Syrian leader’s bloody repression of a popular uprising that called for reform and guarantees of human rights. The meeting was also an attempt to portray that both leaderships are stable and in control amid Assad’s quest for normalisation and re-entry into the regional community of nations. </p>
<p>But it’s a facade. The template agreements for “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-iran-sign-strategic-cooperation-accord-including-oil-mou-news-agency-2023-05-03/">strategic cooperation</a>” and declaration of Iranian support for Assad via “sovereignty” cannot knit together a Syria that is fractured, perhaps for the long term. They cannot provide relief for Syrians facing inflation and shortages of food, fuel and utilities, let alone the 11 million — almost half of the pre-conflict population — who are <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/740233/major-syrian-refugee-hosting-countries-worldwide/">refugees</a> or <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138202">internally displaced</a>.</p>
<p>Nor can they sweep aside <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">ten months of Iran’s nationwide protests</a>, sparked by the death in police custody of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/mahsa-amini-127580">Mahsa Amini</a> after her detention and reporting beaten for “inappropriate attire”. They cannot end the standoff over <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">Tehran’s nuclear programme</a> or lift US and European sanctions. And despite <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iranian-backed-attacks-on-us-forces-in-syria-caused-23-traumatic-brain-injuries-/7054091.html">Iran-backed attacks</a> on American personnel in the region, they cannot break US support for the Kurdish administration in northeast Syria.</p>
<p>Seven weeks after the Assad-Raisi photo in Damascus, another international meeting in mid-June testified to the illusions of an Iran-Syria “<a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-13-2023">Axis of Resistance</a>”.</p>
<p>In Kazakhstan’s capital, the Assad regime was joining the six and a half-year “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/kazakhstan-unexpectedly-proposes-ending-syria-talks-astana-2023-06-21/">Astana process</a>” – the <a href="https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4930&lid=1744">UN-sponsored agreement</a> between Iran, Russia, and Turkey to monitor its 2016 ceasefire for the first time in that part of Syria. This would be a sign of Damascus being actively involved in the supposed resolution of the March 2011 uprising.</p>
<p>But as soon as the session began, illusion met reality. The regime’s deputy foreign minister, Ayman Sousan, demanded Turkey withdraw its forces from opposition territory in northwest Syria. The Turks unsurprisingly refused. They wanted the gathering to put pressure on the Kurdish administration in northeast Syria, which Ankara sees as part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK.</p>
<p>But that raises the challenge of confronting the US, the backer of the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces, who had helped evict the Islamic State from the country in 2019. Russia, embroiled in Vladimir Putin’s failing invasion of Ukraine, showed no appetite for a showdown with Washington.</p>
<p>So everyone went home with nothing beyond Moscow’s declaration: “This is a very crucial process.”</p>
<h2>Moving pieces</h2>
<p>The two days in Astana highlighted the difficulty for both the Assad regime and Iran. In a Middle East kaleidoscope of many moving pieces, it is daunting for either to line up all of them.</p>
<p>Assad’s headline ploy has been the restoration of relations with Arab states, hoping to break political isolation and his economic bind. There has been success: <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/1/8/why-did-the-uae-and-bahrain-re-open-their-embassies-in-syria">UAE and Bahrain reopening embassies</a>; Assad’s visits to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-assad-arrives-uae-official-visit-state-media-2023-03-19/">Emirates</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-assad-visits-oman-first-post-earthquake-trip-2023-02-20/">Oman</a>; and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/syria-and-arab-league">re-entry into the Arab League</a> in May, with Saudi Arabia — once the leading supporter of anti-Assad factions — <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/05/19/Saudi-Arabia-s-Crown-Prince-meets-Syria-s-al-Assad-in-Jeddah">welcoming Assad to the summit in Jeddah</a>.</p>
<p>However, that process runs head-on into Assad’s reliance on Iran to maintain control over even part of Syria, given the longtime rivalry between Tehran and some Arab states — notably Saudi Arabia — throughout the region.</p>
<h2>An Arabian pipedream?</h2>
<p>The solution to the conundrum is a grand reconciliation, in which Iran would also repair its position in the region. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">resumption of diplomatic ties</a> more than seven years after they were broken. </p>
<p>The China-brokered deal was accompanied by a high-level Iranian visit to the UAE. Tehran spoke loudly about the prospect of billions of dollars of Gulf investments in its battered economy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">Saudi-Iran deal won't bring peace to the Middle East but will enhance China's role as power broker</a>
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<p>The manoeuvres freed the Iranian leadership from an immediate crisis. Amid the nationwide protests, its currency had almost halved in value, sinking to 600,000:1 against the US dollar. The easing of tensions with the Arab states, as well as talk of an “interim deal” with the US over the nuclear programme, helped lift the rial to 500,000:1, relieving pressure on an official inflation rate of 50%, with increases for food about 75% per year.</p>
<p>But this is a tentative respite. Saudi Arabia and Iran remain on opposite sides in the Yemen civil war. They back different factions in Lebanon’s long-running political and economic turmoil. Gulf States are wary about the renewal of Iran-backed attacks on Iraqi bases which host US personnel, as well as any further moves by Tehran towards the capacity for a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/normalising-relations-syria-how-significant">International Crisis Group</a> has highlighted the unending instability in the Assad-held part of Syria. No Gulf country is likely to want to spend significant sums in support of his regime. Syria is far from their top priority, and it offers poor returns on investment. They cannot realistically hope to compete with the influence that Tehran has built through years of military engagement. </p>
<p>Western sanctions limit potential economic gains – and <a href="https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/">US sanctions in particular</a> impose major legal barriers and political costs. Also, investing large amounts in Syria with a devastated infrastructure, an impoverished population with little purchasing power, a predatory regime and dismal security in the areas it nominally controls would be like pouring money into a bottomless pit. </p>
<p>Assad can still pose before the cameras to claim legitimacy. But his Iranian backers are entangled in domestic difficulties, his Russian backers are being sapped of strength by Putin’s deadly folly in Ukraine, and his would-be Arab escape route is far from assured.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite initiatives which appear to be normalising Suria’s relations with Arab states, Damascus remains isolated and insecure.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094832023-07-11T20:32:40Z2023-07-11T20:32:40ZUkraine is the hot topic at the NATO summit – the most important work is all in the details happening behind the scenes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536849/original/file-20230711-25-nrifv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden and other world leaders are together at the 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania on July 11, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1523566545/photo/nato-holds-2023-summit-in-vilnius.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=zRKRMEn8R7Wsu9PT-jMZkZmfjWkmRJjSJM4xOKlPyxY=">Pauline Peleckis/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A summit is literally the <a href="https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/summit">highest point on the mountain</a>. In diplomatic terms, summits like the NATO meeting, held on July 11 and 12, 2023, in Vilnius, Lithuania, mark important gatherings of world leaders.</p>
<p>The question of Sweden’s and Ukraine’s joining NATO, which is a political and military alliance of 31 countries from Europe and North America, was a central topic heading into this year’s summit. While <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-sweden-nato.html">Sweden is now set</a> to join the alliance, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-summit-seeks-agreement-ukraine-bid-after-turkey-deal-sweden-2023-07-10/">there is no firm timeline</a> for when countries will determine whether Ukraine is admitted.</p>
<p>Having worked on and attended summits as a diplomat in both the Clinton and Obama administrations, <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">I know how much</a> energy goes into planning the public and private diplomatic moments of these events. </p>
<p>NATO is convening this meeting as part of its regular work on major military and political concerns among its member countries. But make no mistake – the United States sees itself as pivotal in this summit. </p>
<p>For President Joe Biden, the meeting is a test of his personal commitment to help Ukraine win the battle against Russia. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/02/21/fact-sheet-one-year-of-supporting-ukraine/">U.S. has been leading</a> a coalition of countries helping Ukraine with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">military and humanitarian aid</a>. Biden has promised that the U.S. will help Ukraine “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/biden-us-will-support-ukraine-as-long-as-it-takes-/6953138.html">as long as it takes</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People sit around a large circular table with a compass on it in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536860/original/file-20230711-29-n03r6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">World leaders participate in a NATO summit in Paris in 1957.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/3295254/photo/nato-summit.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=3Y6Hgwx_3NNu4VlYK5ZbBYq7c-7Lhy_UG0IgjiHwxQ0=">Reg Birkett/Keystone/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>History of summits</h2>
<p>Political leaders <a href="https://www.gresham.ac.uk/watch-now/summit-diplomacy-some-lessons-history-21st-century-leaders">perfected the art of modern diplomacy</a> in routine face-to-face summits during the darkest days of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Winston Churchill, at the time the U.K. prime minister, helped form the concept of a political “summit” in 1950, when he suggested a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/09/27/the-ideal-summit/5f621ade-2aa4-4369-8676-2d648250a9e5/">parley at the summit</a>.” That meant that the U.K., United States and the Soviet Union <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue86.pdf">should sit down</a> and figure out who had which sphere of influence after World War II ended. </p>
<p>But the history of summits stretches further back in time.</p>
<p>Another British politician, Lloyd George, first pushed for in-person political meetings in the early 1900s, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20030500_cli_paper_dip_issue86.pdf">stating</a>, “If you want to settle a thing, you see your opponent and talk it over with him. The last thing to do is write him a letter.”</p>
<p>And it was the <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/histories/ancient-greek-diplomacy-politics-new-tools-and-negotiation/">Greeks who first elevated the idea of leaders talking</a> to leaders and debating issues as a form of building trust.</p>
<p>Since the Cold War, summits <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy/Summit-diplomacy">have taken many different shapes</a> and sizes, ranging from regional to international meetings.</p>
<p>While some of these meetings result in few tangible outcomes, others have helped pave the way for key policy changes, including <a href="https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/reagan-and-gorbachev-reykjavik-summit/">nuclear arms reductions</a> in the 1980s and a <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement">treaty to limit the rise in global temperatures</a> in 2015.</p>
<p>From an American perspective, summits are key moments when leadership is on display. </p>
<p>U.S. presidents have hosted <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/summit-for-democracy-2023#">summits on everything</a> from democracy to trade since the Cold War. And <a href="https://time.com/6190443/nato-summit-2022/">NATO summits have taken place</a> almost every year since the alliance’s founding in 1949. </p>
<p>But there is a particular level of pressure and anticipation surrounding this meeting, with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-air-attack-kyiv-hours-before-nato-summit-2023-07-11/">active war in Europe</a> caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. </p>
<h2>Backstage details</h2>
<p>These mega-events require massive planning. Member countries can volunteer to host the summits, and the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm">offers are evaluated</a> and decided upon by the political branch of NATO.</p>
<p>From the logistical advance teams that prepare the groundwork for presidential travel to the protocol officers ensuring that handshakes or hugs are timed for photography, every detail matters both publicly and privately at these sorts of affairs. </p>
<p>Fashion is also a choice – from tie selection to pantsuits or dresses. Not a hair can be out of place. Women’s fashion choices tend to receive outsize scrutiny and attention – as when <a href="https://www.instyle.com/fashion/espadrille-wedges-jill-biden-queen-letizia">first lady Jill Biden wore espadrilles</a>, a popular kind of shoe in Spain, to the NATO meeting in Madrid in 2022. </p>
<p>Hundreds of U.S. government officials work across multiple agencies behind the scenes at political summits, both on site and back home, to generate pages and pages of briefing materials for every minute of every hour of the meeting. Depending on the timing and importance of the summit, a secretary of state might accompany the president on the trip. </p>
<p>U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is with Biden in Lithuania, as a delicate diplomatic dance is happening with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The Ukrainian leader <a href="https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">has tweeted about</a> how his country is being discussed without his presence at the meeting.</p>
<p>There are secure documents to be written and read and private sessions to brief Biden.</p>
<p>Setting the table for a summit means the host country must make literal and figurative decisions around when <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/30/nato-summit-venue-madrid-serves-russian-salad">meals are served</a> and who attends the dinners. The host country of a summit can show off its local cuisine, considered a form of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/20/food-diplomacy-countries-identity-culture-marketing-gastrodiplomacy-gastronativism/">culinary diplomacy</a>. </p>
<p>Ambassadors of the other participating countries also send along menu guidelines or people’s particular dietary needs. </p>
<h2>Expecting the unexpected</h2>
<p>Despite all the scheduling and agenda-setting, there is an unpredictability to a political summit as people interact in real time.</p>
<p>Real-world events can also interfere in even a perfectly well-orchestrated summit. A terrorist incident or a natural disaster, for example, can turn a basic summit into an emergency meeting.</p>
<p>There are also human dynamics to summits. </p>
<p>It is one thing to read a briefing memo. It is quite another, as a leader, to look directly at people and see their expressions and body language. </p>
<p>This gives weight to closed-door meetings with just a few other people, as leaders often peel off from big group discussions to compare notes and plot strategies. </p>
<p>Throughout the summit, aides will pass notes to Biden, and there will be hallway huddles with diplomats and aides. Reporters will get bits and pieces of what is happening until the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_216418.htm">final press conference</a> on July 12, at which leaders will answer questions about any decisions made, the next steps and the overall question of whether the summit was a success or failure. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Volodymr Zelenskyy walks through a crowd with his wife, surrounded by men in suits." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536869/original/file-20230711-21-hwmlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived at the NATO summit on July 11, 2023, to push for Ukraine’s entry into the alliance.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1523567553/photo/lithuania-nato-defence-diplomacy.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=i-2S22TgHp49NbghKIWLTB7zg9lqBEeYZU5nD8z4mzQ=">Odd Andersen/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Elevating the event</h2>
<p>This meeting is happening in the middle of the summer. Many Europeans have flocked to beaches, as is their summer custom. Americans are off to national parks. Keeping the world’s attention on the NATO summit might be difficult. And, absent any major announcement, summits can be a humdrum affair. </p>
<p>But in this case, so much is riding on the NATO summit’s outcome. </p>
<p>Ukraine is at the center stage at this summit as countries debate extending a political invitation to Ukraine to join the alliance. Not only does NATO have to plot out its military response to an ongoing war, the U.S. and its allies have to plan for a future Ukraine once it emerges from the rubble. There is current division among NATO members <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-summit-seeks-agreement-ukraine-bid-after-turkey-deal-sweden-2023-07-10/">whether they should admit</a> Ukraine. </p>
<p>The stakes are enormous: Letting Ukraine join NATO would force the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-nato-and-why-does-ukraine-want-to-join-175821">military alliance to defend its new member</a> against Russia, which could then turn into a larger war across Europe. Hanging in the balance is the future of Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose aggression against Ukraine is really about a desire to stop the growth and power of NATO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The NATO summit is a chance for world leaders to hash out difficult topics, like the war in Ukraine – and for the US to show off its leadership, writes a former diplomat.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2061592023-05-26T12:26:26Z2023-05-26T12:26:26ZThe US signs a military deal with Papua New Guinea – here’s what both countries have to gain from the agreement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528088/original/file-20230524-19-9w9r0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Australian warship is seen off the coast of Papua New Guinea in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1060368656/photo/png-apec-summit.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=ET2Rg8ve12D1rgaZIrY9OWFmOybi4zvP5Z77i3qxRTE=">Ness Kerton/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States announced <a href="https://apnews.com/article/united-states-pacific-security-china-papua-new-guinea-blinken-a4a052e05ff3f03f9e392e66cca74018">a new military agreement</a> with Papua New Guinea, the most <a href="https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/papua-new-guinea/">populous Pacific island country</a>, on May 22, 2023.</p>
<p>The deal came shortly after U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/9/biden-to-be-first-sitting-us-president-to-visit-papua-new-guinea">announced plans to visit the small island country</a> – the first U.S. president ever to do so. However, continuing fraught <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65667783">budget negotiations</a> in the U.S. led Biden to cancel his plans on May 17. </p>
<p>The details of the military agreement <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-sign-new-security-pact-papua-new-guinea-99496252">will be made public</a> over the next few months – but U.S. and Papua New Guinea government officials have said that the deal is focused on supporting Papua New Guinea’s defense forces and increasing regional stability. </p>
<p>China is not mentioned explicitly in the announcement of the deal, but we would be remiss in failing to note the connection. </p>
<p><a href="http://ma-allen.com/">We are</a> <a href="https://www.m-flynn.com/">experts</a> in <a href="https://www.carlamm.com/">U.S. security cooperation</a> and recently published a book <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/beyond-the-wire-9780197633403?lang=en&cc=cl">about U.S. overseas military deployments</a>. In it, we discuss how U.S. commitments to weaker countries benefit the U.S. and how the broader geopolitical competition with China matters to U.S. military cooperation.</p>
<p><iframe id="9zOZ8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9zOZ8/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Papua New Guinea’s relevance</h2>
<p>Papua New Guinea is located on the eastern half of the island of New Guinea, about 90 miles north of Australia. It has a population of 10 million people and <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/papua-new-guinea/#military-and-security">a military</a> with approximately <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/papua-new-guinea/#military-and-security">3,000 active-duty personnel</a>. </p>
<p>The United States’ <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/FY2023_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf">proposed 2023 military spending budget</a> is over 8,400 times the island country’s annual <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=PG">military spending</a>. </p>
<p>Papua New Guinea has a long history of colonization. The British <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15593238">government took over control</a> of the southeast part of the overall island of New Guinea in the late 1800s, while Germany annexed the northern part. </p>
<p>Australia then took over control of Papua New Guinea in the early 1900s. Papua New Guinea gained independence in 1975. The western half of the island is called Papua and is part of Indonesia. </p>
<p>Papua New Guinea has also served as a <a href="https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/wapa/guides/first/sec5.htm">strategic location</a> for the U.S. in the past.</p>
<p>During <a href="https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/people-of-papua-new-guinea">World War II, for example</a>, Papua New Guinea was the site of a long and bloody campaign fought by the Americans and Australians against the Japanese military, who had occupied parts of the island. </p>
<p>Some Papuans have expressed concern about their independence following the U.S. military deal’s announcement. Papuan university students have been <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/490397/there-must-be-clarity-png-students-protest-us-defence-deal">protesting the agreement</a>, asking for more clarity on the pact’s details. </p>
<p>Today, Papua New Guinea remains strategically located. Anyone with military access to Papua New Guinea could easily reach Australia, a key U.S. ally, by air or sea, with no need for refueling. </p>
<p>And the United States’ <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720957713">military support and training</a> to Papua New Guinea itself could be a further way for the U.S. military to gain influence on the island and shift military policy to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231159582">fall more in line</a> with that of the U.S. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men wearing military uniforms and helmets stand on boats and walk through the water in a black and white photo, heading toward a wild looking shore." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528089/original/file-20230524-24-sqonlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. soldiers lead military vehicles through the waters off the coast of Papua New Guinea in December 1943, during World War II.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/3232067/photo/island-hopping.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=WXuAKcqA7hPBu62ojX3cH8aKRiOjuxeqzLZvAIpLSUc=">US Navy/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Who benefits from the deal</h2>
<p>What the U.S. gains from supporting a smaller country with a small military may not seem immediately obvious. </p>
<p>But while Papua New Guinea is a small country, it is important from a geographical and diplomatic position, given its <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/pacific/papua-new-guinea-china-04032023003207.html">proximity to Indonesia, Australia and the Solomon Islands</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, the U.S. has security agreements and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1684641/alliances-vs-partnerships/">and partnerships</a> with dozens of countries – such as <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/senators-menendez-kaine-unveil-us-colombia-strategic-alliance-act">Colombia</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-third-u-s-kenya-bilateral-strategic-dialogue/">Kenya</a> – that have weaker militaries and less money than the U.S. </p>
<p>We have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609007">long studied this question</a> of who benefits when the U.S. partners with a smaller country and found that both countries benefit. </p>
<p>When the U.S. gives military aid to another country, regardless of its wealth, that place generally <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1191482">tends to spend less</a> on its own defense. The one exception to that is when the U.S. gives money to support militaries in countries that are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12078">part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization</a> – in that case, countries may respond to U.S. help with spending more on their militaries, too, because of shared interests. </p>
<p>But there are also some strings attached. </p>
<p>Some scholars have argued that a smaller military power like Papua New Guinea gives up <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111499">sovereignty or autonomy over its foreign policy</a> in exchange for U.S. support. </p>
<p>In that case, the U.S. is exchanging money for Papua New Guinea to align its decisions with the U.S., instead of China. The U.S. gets a commitment from Papua New Guinea to make decisions that are more favorable to U.S. interests and less favorable to China. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man dressed in green shirt and shorts runs across tarmac with a helicopter visible in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528093/original/file-20230524-20-8ihbe0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Philippine Air Force soldier runs during joint U.S.-Philippines air force exercises in May 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1488520766/photo/philippines-and-u-s-hold-joint-military-exercises.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=2kUuos0ovY4jJYgL0t94nFfoFOqhVpOpQsH0CxQ40vU=">Ezra Acayan/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US-China competition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3201683/department-of-defense-releases-its-2022-strategic-reviews-national-defense-stra/">U.S. and China</a> are clearly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-hearing-china-draw-rare-biden-cabinet-trio-2023-05-16/">engaged in competition</a> with each other over military, political and economic might.</p>
<p>The U.S. is arguably the <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/united-states-remains-the-top-power-in-asia-as-china-fails-to-close-the-gap-of-influence/ewqzl4cxp">dominant global power</a>, but China’s strength and influence continue to rise across Asia and Africa, as it has been making military agreements with such countries as the <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/12/02/china-solomon-islands-security-agreement-and-competition-for-influence-in-oceania/">Solomon Islands</a>, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-chinese-troops-coexist-and-cooperate-in-djibouti-general-says-2022-7">Djibouti</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3189319/china-and-us-treaty-ally-thailand-bolster-military-ties">Thailand</a>.</p>
<p>There have been several incidents that recently escalated tensions between the U.S. and China. </p>
<p>One of these tension-raising events focused on the U.S. Air Force’s shooting down a <a href="https://theconversation.com/spy-balloon-drama-elevates-public-attention-pressure-for-the-us-to-confront-china-199484">Chinese balloon</a> – allegedly used for spying – that flew across the U.S. in early 2023. </p>
<h2>What’s next in the Pacific</h2>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/beyond-the-wire-9780197633403?lang=en&cc=cl">Our work</a> shows that a lack of transparency leads to more suspicion against U.S. military deployments abroad. </p>
<p>While the U.S.-Papua New Guinea deal may come with security benefits for both countries, <a href="https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/papua-new-guinea-us-ink-security-pact-amid-protests">continuing university protests</a> on the island highlight that not everyone in the country wants U.S. involvement – or the risk of giving up the country’s ability to make decisions, independent of any outside military pressure. </p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/beyond-the-wire-9780197633403?lang=en&cc=cl">our research</a>, we think that increased transparency on the deal may assuage some of these concerns and make it more likely to be successful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael A. Allen has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. The views expressed here are the authors' only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carla Martinez Machain has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. The views expressed here are the authors' only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E. Flynn has previously received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative, the Department of Defense, and the Army Research Office. The views expressed here are the authors' only and do not represent the views of any outside funder.</span></em></p>Papua New Guinea’s relative proximity to both China and Australia could give the US a military advantage in the Pacific region.Michael A. Allen, Professor of Political Science, Boise State UniversityCarla Martinez Machain, Professor of Political Science, University at BuffaloMichael E. Flynn, Professor of Political Science, Kansas State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2034652023-05-03T12:07:21Z2023-05-03T12:07:21ZWhat the Iraq War can teach the US about avoiding a quagmire in Ukraine – 3 key lessons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523660/original/file-20230501-14-qfd9p4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People protest outside of the United Nations headquarters in April 2023 demanding the return of Ukrainian children from Russia. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1252111785/photo/dozens-protested-in-front-of-un-headquarters-in-ralph-bunche.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=lagRLJ-VP1ZDU-lkpA1lRJggc0spvQu1-NT41QJi-9M=">Lev Radin/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Leaked Pentagon papers showed in early April 2023 that the U.S. is allegedly following the inner workings of Russia’s intelligence operations and is also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/us/politics/leaked-documents-russia-ukraine-war.html">spying on Ukraine</a>, adding a new dimension to the United States’ involvement in the Ukraine war. </p>
<p>While the U.S. has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/28/europe/nato-is-not-at-war-with-russia-intl-cmd/index.html">not actually declared war</a> against Russia, the documents show that it continues to support Ukraine with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/us/politics/ukraine-military-intelligence.html">military intelligence</a> as well as <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/">money and weapons</a> against the Russian invasion. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65030929">no end in sight</a> to the war between Ukraine and Russia – nor to U.S. involvement. While it is far from the first time that the U.S. became a third party to war, this scenario brings the Iraq War, in particular, to mind.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wLxAZk4AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of international relations and an expert on international conflicts</a>. A comparison with the Iraq War, I believe, offers a useful way to look at the case of Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Iraq and Ukraine wars have notable differences from a U.S. foreign policy perspective – chiefly, thousands of American soldiers died fighting in Iraq, while the U.S. does not have any ground troops in Ukraine. But assessing the Iraq War, and its long aftermath, can still help articulate concerns about the United States’ getting involved in intense violence in another faraway place. </p>
<p>Here are three key points to understand. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers in beige uniforms crouch down against a beige brick wall, while a young girl peers around the corner and watches them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523661/original/file-20230501-16-yohwc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=541&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi girl watches U.S. Army troops take cover in Mosul, Iraq, in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/2187982/photo/saddam-husseins-sons-confirmed-dead-in-u-s-raid.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=j4ro-cgb1LUaxhO5tJRybqAMTPW9xfVY_OPX58TsGRg=">Scott Nelson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1. Intervention doesn’t guarantee success</h2>
<p>Around the time former President George W. Bush announced the U.S. would invade Iraq in 2003, Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi Arabian Islamist who orchestrated the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/08/04/the-search-for-osama">remained at large</a>. While not obviously connected, the fact that bin Laden continued to evade the U.S. contributed to a general sense of anger at hostile regimes. In particular, Saddam Hussein defied the U.S. and its allies. </p>
<p>The Iraqi dictator <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect2.html">continued to evade inspections</a> by the United Nations watchdog group the International Atomic Energy Agency, giving the impression that he had weapons of mass destruction. This proved maddening to the U.S. and its allies as <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/03/1151160567/colin-powell-iraq-un-weapons-mass-destruction">the cat and mouse game dragged on</a>.</p>
<p>Bush reportedly had intense concerns about <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/17/9-11-and-iraq-the-making-of-a-tragedy/">whether Saddam could use alleged weapons</a> of mass destruction to attack the U.S., causing even more harm than 9/11 did. </p>
<p>A U.S.-led coalition of countries that included the United Kingdom and Australia invaded Iraq in March 2003. The “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/coalition-willing">coalition of the willing</a>,” as it became known, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/coalition-willing">won a quick victory</a> and toppled Saddam’s regime. </p>
<p>Bush initially enjoyed a <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx">spike in public support</a> immediately after the invasion, but his polls shortly after experienced a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna9332076">downward trajectory</a> as the war dragged on.</p>
<p>However, the U.S. showed very little understanding of the politics, society and other important aspects of the country that it had taken the lead in occupying and then trying to rebuild. </p>
<p>Many decisions, most notably <a href="https://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/">disbanding of the Iraqi Army</a> in May 2003, revealed poor judgment and even outright ignorance because, with the sudden removal of Iraqi security forces, intense civil <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/world/debate-lingering-on-decision-to-dissolve-the-iraqi-military.html">disorder ensued</a>. </p>
<p>Disbanding the army caused insurgent militant forces to come out into the open. The fighting intensified among different Iraqi groups and escalated into <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/the-long-lasting-impact-of-the-u-s-invasion-of-iraq">a civil war</a>, which ended in 2017.</p>
<p>Today, Iraq continues to be politically unstable and is <a href="https://theconversation.com/20-years-on-george-w-bushs-promise-of-democracy-in-iraq-and-middle-east-falls-short-201998">not any closer</a> to becoming a democracy than it was before the invasion. </p>
<h2>2. Personal vendettas cannot justify a war</h2>
<p>During his 24-year regime, Saddam <a href="https://azdailysun.com/iraqis-awed-angered-at-lavish-lifestyles-of-saddams-family/article_47dd8980-dcf4-540f-947b-a39323309923.html">lived an extravagant lifestyle</a> coupled with oppression of civilians and <a href="https://theconversation.com/saddam-hussein-how-a-deadly-purge-of-opponents-set-up-his-ruthless-dictatorship-120748">political opponents</a>. He engaged in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/4/14/hold-survivors-of-the-anfal-kurdish-genocide-long-for-closure">genocide of Kurdish people</a> in Iraq. Saddam was finally <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ten-years-since-saddam-husseins-execution/1830532.html">executed by his own people in 2006</a>, after U.S. forces captured him. </p>
<p>Putin is equally notorious and even more dangerous. He has a long track record of <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/putin-russia-totalitarianism-soviet-style-oppression.html">violent oppression</a> against his people and has benefited from leading one of the world’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/05/russia-corruption-security-threat/">most corrupt governments</a>.</p>
<p>He also actually possesses weapons of mass destruction and has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-update-russias-elite-ukraine-war-major-speech-2023-02-21/#:%7E:text=Putin%2C%20who%20has%20over%20the,West%20backs%20off%20in%20Ukraine.">threatened multiple times to use them</a> on foreign countries.
<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90764&page=1">Saddam</a> and Putin have also both been the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/16/biden-says-russian-leader-putin-is-a-war-criminal-for-ukraine-attacks.html">direct targets</a> of U.S. political leaders, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-putin-russia-trump-obama-1683646">who displayed a fixation</a> on toppling these foreign adversaries, which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/16/iraq9">was evident long before</a> the U.S. actually became involved in the Iraq and Ukraine wars. </p>
<p>The United States’ support for Ukraine is understandable because that country is fighting a defensive war with <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-10-april-2023#:%7E:text=From%2024%20February%202022%2C%20which,8%2C490%20killed%20and%2014%2C244%20injured.">horrific civilian casualties</a>. Backing Ukraine also makes sense from the standpoint of U.S. national security – it helps push back against an expansionist Russia that increasingly <a href="https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2022/10/the-china-russia-no-limits-partnership-is-still-going-strong">is aligned with China</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, I believe that it is important to keep U.S. involvement in this war within limits that reflect national interests.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People embrace in front of flowers and teddy bears, in front of a building that looks partially charred." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523665/original/file-20230501-22-swsnio.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainians mourn civilians killed by Russian strikes in the town of Uman on April 30, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1252441968/photo/ukrainians-lay-flowers-to-commemorate-victims-of-russian-attack.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=QkRInsxAGTOpRxXAcUVIaxx-9rumYwBjywjIJ73BkbA=">Oleksii Chumachenko/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. It can divide the country</h2>
<p>The Iraq War resulted in a rise in intense <a href="https://theconversation.com/20-years-on-george-w-bushs-promise-of-democracy-in-iraq-and-middle-east-falls-short-201998">partisanship in the U.S. over foreign policy</a>. In addition, recent opinion polls about the Iraq War <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/03/17/polls-show-support-for-iraq-war-drop-in-20-years-post-invasion/">show that most Americans do not think that the invasion</a> made the U.S. any safer. </p>
<p>Now, the U.S. faces rising public skepticism about getting involved in the Ukraine war, another <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/02/01/us-cautions-ukraine-aid-public-support-slips/">expensive overseas commitment</a>. </p>
<p>Polls released in January 2023 show that the percentage of Americans who <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/01/31/as-russian-invasion-nears-one-year-mark-partisans-grow-further-apart-on-u-s-support-for-ukraine/">think the U.S. is providing too much aid</a> to Ukraine has grown in recent months. About 26% of American adults said in late 2022 that the U.S. is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/01/31/as-russian-invasion-nears-one-year-mark-partisans-grow-further-apart-on-u-s-support-for-ukraine/">giving too much</a> to the Ukraine war, according to Pew Research Group. But three-fourths of those polled still supported the U.S. engagement. </p>
<p>The average American <a href="https://morningconsult.com/2022/02/09/can-americans-find-ukraine-on-a-map/">knows little to nothing</a> about Iraq or Ukraine. Patience obviously can grow thin when U.S. support for foreign wars becomes ever more expensive and the threat of retaliation, even by way of tactical nuclear weapons, remains in the realm of possibility. Aid to Ukraine is likely to become embroiled in the rapidly escalating conflict in Washington over the debt ceiling.</p>
<p>On the flip side, if the U.S. does not offer sufficient support for Ukraine to fend of Russian attacks and maintain its independence, adversaries such as Russia, China and Iran may feel encouraged to be aggressive in other places. </p>
<p>I believe that the comparison between the wars in Iraq and Ukraine makes it clear that U.S. leadership should clearly identify the underlying goals of its national security to the American public while determining the amount and type of support that it will give to Ukraine. </p>
<p>While many people believe that Ukraine deserves support against Russian aggression, current policy should not ignore past experience, and the Iraq War tells a cautionary tale.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick James does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s been more than 20 years since the US invaded Iraq, but the invasion still provides a cautionary tale about getting involved in an expensive war abroad.Patrick James, Dornsife Dean’s Professor of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.