tag:theconversation.com,2011:/id/topics/venezuela-2510/articlesVenezuela – The Conversation2024-03-13T12:41:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254222024-03-13T12:41:26Z2024-03-13T12:41:26ZWhat is the Darien Gap? And why are more migrants risking this Latin American route to get to the US?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581331/original/file-20240312-22-hvlt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C140%2C3347%2C2084&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Migrants wade through the Tuquesa River as they traverse the Darien Gap.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PanamaMigrants/2c51a3fc202e44459d50d668897f80eb/photo?Query=Darien%20Gap&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=288&currentItemNo=62">AP Photo/Arnulfo Franco</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Much of the discussion over illegal immigration to the U.S. has in recent weeks <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-latin-america-venezuela-ukraine-mexico-712d00c90114568fe8a1b5c9e26fdadd">moved its focus south to the Darien Gap</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>This treacherous route that spans parts of Central and South America has seen an increasing number of people attempting to pass on their way to claiming asylum in the U.S.</em></p>
<p><em>To explore the reasons why, The Conversation turned to Sara McKinnon, an <a href="https://commarts.wisc.edu/staff/mckinnon-sara/">immigration scholar at University of Wisconsin-Madison</a>, who knows the region well and has interviewed people who have traversed the jungle crossing.</em></p>
<h2>Where is the Darien Gap?</h2>
<p>The Darien Gap is a stretch of densely forested jungle across northern Colombia and southern Panama. Roughly 60 miles (97 kilometers) across, the terrain is muddy, wet and unstable.</p>
<p><iframe id="QA5lJ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/QA5lJ/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>No paved roads exist in the Darien Gap. Yet despite this, it has become a major route for global human migration.</p>
<p>Depending on how much they can pay, people must walk anywhere from <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/dari%C3%A9n-gap-migration-crossroads">four to 10 days</a> up and down mountains, over fast-flowing rivers and through mud, carrying everything they have – and often carrying children who are too young to walk – to make it through the pass. Those who make it through then take buses through most of Central America and make their way north through Mexico to the U.S. border zone.</p>
<p>Cellphone service stops once people enter the dense forest; migrants rely on the paid “guides” and fellow migrants to make it through. </p>
<p>In the decade prior to 2021, <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/dari%C3%A9n-gap-migration-crossroads">10,000 people annually</a> took this route on their way north to seek residence in the United States and Canada. </p>
<p>Then, in 2021, the Panamanian government documented <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/number-migrants-who-embarked-dangerous-darien-gap-route-nearly-doubled-2022">133,000 crossings</a>, a dramatic increase in human movement in such a volatile stretch of land. In 2023, more than <a href="https://www.datosabiertos.gob.pa/dataset/migracion-irregulares-en-transito-por-darien-por-pais-2023">half a million people</a> transited through this part of the Isthmus of Panama.</p>
<h2>Why is it so dangerous?</h2>
<p>The route, and really the entire trajectory that people take when they migrate from South America to North America, is controlled by criminal organizations that <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/immigration-crisis-migrant-smuggling-darien-gap-cfb40940">make millions, if not billions of dollars</a>, annually in the human migration economy.</p>
<p>It is impossible to cross this stretch of land without the help of a smuggler, or guide, because the criminal organizations who control the territory demand payment for passage.</p>
<p>Payment does not, however, assure safe passage. Sometimes the very people paid to facilitate the journey extort migrants for more money. There are also <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia-central-america/102-bottleneck-americas-crime-and-migration">reports of armed groups</a> ambushing those in transit to seize their belongings and steal what money they may have stowed away and sewn into clothing seams.</p>
<p>Extortion and kidnapping are common occurrences, and the medical aid charity Doctors Without Borders recently reported a surge in instances of <a href="https://www.msf.org/lack-action-sees-sharp-rise-sexual-violence-people-transiting-darien-gap-panama">mass sexual assault</a> in which hundreds of people have been captured, assaulted and raped – often in front of family members. In December 2023, one person was sexually assaulted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/05/darien-gap-sexual-attacks-panama-colombia-migrants">every 3½ hours</a> while crossing, according to Doctors Without Borders.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/crossing-darien-gap-migrants-risk-death-journey-us">extreme nature of the swamplike jungle</a> also makes the journey dangerous.</p>
<p>The paths can be very muddy, especially in the rainy season. In mountainous sections, it is often necessary to climb over steep rocks, or cling to a rope to not slip and fall off a cliff. </p>
<p>The Missing Migrant Project reported <a href="https://missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl601/files/publication/file/MMP%20Americas%20briefing%202022%20-%20ES_3.pdf">141 known deaths</a> in the Darien Gap in 2023, which is likely a fraction of the actual number due to the challenges in reporting and recovering bodies.</p>
<p>Many of the people I interviewed who had made the journey talked about seeing bodies along the path covered in mud, likely the result of slipping or falling to their death. </p>
<p>Fellow migrants left markers close to the bodies, such as pieces of fabric tied to a tree, and took photos of the dead in the hopes that this evidence might someday help recover the bodies.</p>
<p>The rivers are also dangerous. Flash floods and rushing rapids mean that many people are swept away and drown in the muddy waters. Bruises, cuts, animal bites and fractures are common. The high humidity and heat each day, combined with a lack of clean drinking water, mean that many fall sick with symptoms of severe dehydration. </p>
<p>Vector-borne, water-borne and fungal-related illnesses are <a href="https://www.unocha.org/news/migration-through-darien-jungle-7-things-know-about-perilous-trek">also quite common</a>.</p>
<h2>What is behind the recent surge in crossings?</h2>
<p>Violence, insecurity and instability in their home countries cause many people to move. They may move to elsewhere in their region. But when the level of violence and insecurity is similar in that country, they keep moving to find a safer place to live.</p>
<p>Options for legally allowed immigration are increasingly limited for those in low-income countries. For example, when governments implement travel visa restrictions for certain nationalities, it impacts the options available to the people of that country for movement. </p>
<p>In 2021, with pressure from the United States, Mexico started requiring <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/mexico-restrictive-visa-policy-limits-venezuelans-ability-flee-us/">Venezuelans traveling to Mexico to carry travel visas</a>. This meant that Venezuelans hoping to seek asylum in the United States could no longer first fly to Mexico as a tourist and then present themselves at the border to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent to express their fear of returning to their home country.</p>
<p>Venezuelans had to find another route to move, and for many, that was and continues to be irregular transit through the Darien Gap without travel documents. </p>
<h2>Who is making the journey?</h2>
<p>In 2023, of the 520,085 people who moved through the region, <a href="https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2023/pdf/IRREGULARES_X_DARIEN_2023.pdf">Venezuelans counted for over half at 328,650</a>. But the total also included 56,422 Haitians, 25,565 Chinese, 4,267 Afghans, 2,252 Nepali, 1,636 Cameroonians and 1,124 Angolans.</p>
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<img alt="A child is hoisted onto an adult's shoulders as a woman and man wade through water." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581334/original/file-20240312-28-i0czkw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Haitian migrants wade through water as they cross the Darien Gap.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/YEMigration/4294f14f09a24ca0beeba0b14dc0120f/photo?Query=Darien%20Gap&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=288&currentItemNo=95">AP Photo/Ivan Valencia</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Human migration in the Americas is a global phenomenon.</p>
<p>It is also increasingly gender and age diverse, as <a href="https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2023/pdf/IRREGULARES_X_DARIEN_2023.pdf">figures from the Panamanian government</a> show. Adult men made up just over half of those moving through the Darien Gap in 2023, and adult women counted for 26% of the population. </p>
<p>Children under 18 constituted 20% of those crossing, with half of those children under the age of 5. Parents may be carrying children for long stretches of the journey, or children may have to walk even though they are tired. The stress and fatigue add to the likelihood of injury along the way. </p>
<h2>How have authorities responded?</h2>
<p>The travel visa restrictions of many governments has only pushed more people to attempt this dangerous route. Governments have also been lukewarm to the presence of humanitarian groups who assist migrants in transit. On March 7, 2024, <a href="https://www.msf.org/msf-forced-suspend-medical-care-people-move-panama">Doctors Without Borders reported</a> that the Panamanian government would no longer permit the organization to provide medical support to those in transit through the Darien Gap. This reduced access to health care will certainly mean a more dangerous passage.</p>
<p>In May 2022, countries across the Americas jointly announced the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/fact-sheet-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection-u-s-government-and-foreign-partner-deliverables/">Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection </a> to improve regional coordination to manage migration.</p>
<p>Through this, the U.S. government implemented a series of <a href="https://migrationamericas.commarts.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2087/2023/09/MIAP-Policy-Report-0923-1.pdf">new legal programs to move to the U.S.</a> and <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/04/27/fact-sheet-us-government-announces-sweeping-new-actions-manage-regional-migration">application processing offices</a> in South American and Central American countries that give people the opportunity to apply for U.S. refugee resettlement, humanitarian parole and family reunification, and have the visas processed while waiting abroad. </p>
<p>But these programs are not available to people of all nationalities. And some of the programs also require official documents like passports, a requirement that excludes many of those who make their way through the Darien Gap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara McKinnon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than half a million people made the treacherous crossing in 2023 – far higher than in previous years.Sara McKinnon, Professor of Rhetoric, Politics & Culture, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248802024-03-11T17:18:50Z2024-03-11T17:18:50ZVenezuelan migrants are boosting economic growth in South America, says research<p>Venezuela is engulfed in a political and economic crisis, which has forced over <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9870179/">6 million people</a> – some 20% of the population – to flee the country since 2015. The mass exodus began when Venezuela’s economy collapsed, giving rise to rampant inflation, political turmoil and pervasive violence. </p>
<p>Over 80% of those who have left Venezuela have set up a new life in <a href="https://www.iom.int/venezuelan-refugee-and-migrant-crisis">17 countries</a> across Latin America and the Caribbean. According to a <a href="https://www.acnur.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/spotlight-note-socioeconomic-integration_ibd-oecd-unhcr.pdf">recent report</a>, these displaced migrants are having a positive effect on the economies of their host countries. </p>
<p>Between 2017 and 2030, migrant workers will boost the economies of their host countries by 0.10%–0.25% on average each year. The report, which was published by several leading international financial institutions and the UN Agency for Refugees, focuses on Venezuelan migrants but also covers Cubans and Salvadorans, among others.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-soaring-murder-rate-has-plunged-the-nation-into-a-public-health-crisis-116771">Venezuela's soaring murder rate has plunged the nation into a public health crisis</a>
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<p>The economic impact of migrants in Latin America is significant. But their <a href="https://www.acnur.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/spotlight-note-socioeconomic-integration_ibd-oecd-unhcr.pdf">integration</a> into local job markets and society is poor. The economic benefits derived from migrants across Latin America could be even greater if they are given better access to jobs.</p>
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<img alt="A crowd of Venezuelan protestors blocking a highway." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580921/original/file-20240311-22-dwm91w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protesters closed a highway in Caracas, Venezuela, while demonstrating against the government of Nicolás Maduro in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/caracasvenezuela04262017-protesters-closed-highway-caracas-while-1093703018">Edgloris Marys/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Boosting economic growth</h2>
<p>Migration has clear <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/06/19/blog-weo-chapter4-migration-to-advanced-economies-can-raise-growth">economic benefits</a> for local economies. It leads to an <a href="https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/economic-letter/2023/02/role-of-immigration-in-us-labor-market-tightness/">expansion</a> of the workforce, thereby <a href="https://data.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/en/labor-market-forecast-2022/?_gl=1*1afuj9x*_ga*MTk0Nzk1NjQzNS4xNzA5NTUzNTg3*_ga_W0MSMD2GPV*MTcwOTU1MzU4Ni4xLjAuMTcwOTU1MzU4Ny4wLjAuMA.">alleviating labour shortages</a> and enhancing economic output.</p>
<p>Migrants bring a diverse range of skills and specialised knowledge to their host countries, which can improve the overall skill level of the local workforce. Their <a href="https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/fall-2021/effects-immigration-entrepreneurship-innovation">productive capabilities</a> bridge skill gaps in local labour markets and heighten overall productivity. </p>
<p>Most migrant workers will also pay <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23056953">income tax</a>, which increases government revenues. In <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/7277e925bdaa64d6355c42c897721299-0050062023/original/WDR-Colombia-Case-Study-FORMATTED.pdf">Colombia</a>, for instance, the income tax contribution of Venezuelan migrants in 2019 was approximately US$38.7 million (£30.1 million), equivalent to 0.01% of Colombia’s GDP.</p>
<p>And when migrants gain employment, they will spend their wages in the host country and create new demand in various other sectors. Greater demand leads to <a href="https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/benefits-immigration-addressing-key-myths">higher growth</a>, which in turn attracts more investment and increases employment opportunities both for local people and migrants.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-gives-nearly-1-million-venezuelan-migrants-legal-status-and-right-to-work-155448">Colombia gives nearly 1 million Venezuelan migrants legal status and right to work</a>
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<h2>Underemployed</h2>
<p>However, xenophobia and discrimination prevent many migrants from finding jobs in Latin America and integrating into society. According to the report, roughly 30% of the migrants residing in Chile, Colombia and Peru experience discrimination because of their nationality. </p>
<p>Thus, many migrants are forced to take jobs within the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/12/what-is-the-informal-economy-basics">informal sector</a>. Over <a href="https://www.undp.org/latin-america/publications/how-do-migrants-fare-latin-america-and-caribbean">50% of migrants</a> in Latin America work informally compared to 44.5% of locals. </p>
<p>Migrant workers also often earn lower wages than their local counterparts. In <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099022024085522704/p17578013f69d804019f8516ffbb072fc34">Colombia</a>, the average monthly salary of locals with post-secondary school education is US$1,140. Venezuelan migrants with the same level of education earn just US$644 per month. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man cleaning a car's windshield as it stops at a traffic light." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580924/original/file-20240311-20-jwh460.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A man cleaning a windshield at a traffic light in Lima, Peru.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/lima-peru-may-12-2020-poor-1729866145">Myriam B/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Despite this, immigrants still <a href="https://www.undp.org/latin-america/publications/how-do-migrants-fare-latin-america-and-caribbean">outperform</a> the native-born population in their labour force participation and employment rates. Yet many of the migrants who are in formal employment are overqualified for their roles. In <a href="https://www.acnur.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/spotlight-note-socioeconomic-integration_ibd-oecd-unhcr.pdf">Chile</a>, for instance, 34% of highly educated locals are overqualified for their jobs, compared to over 60% of migrants. </p>
<p>Migrants are often <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/org/science/article/abs/pii/S2049879923000360">mistakenly assumed</a> to be exclusively low-skilled workers. But the Venezuelan migrant crisis has seen many highly skilled people flee the country too. For example, <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099022024085522704/p17578013f69d804019f8516ffbb072fc34">65% of the Venezuelans</a> living in Chile and 48% residing in Ecuador have post-secondary school education.</p>
<p>However, most Venezuelans have not officially <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099022024085522704/p17578013f69d804019f8516ffbb072fc34">validated</a> their academic credentials in their host countries. In fact, only 10% of those residing in Chile have completed the certification process.</p>
<p>Many migrants are <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099022024085522704/p17578013f69d804019f8516ffbb072fc34">unaware</a> of the process so lack sufficient documentation about their qualifications. And the complexity of the process also demands investment that many migrants may not have the resources to cover.</p>
<p>To further enhance productivity in Latin America, it is essential to <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099022024085522704/p17578013f69d804019f8516ffbb072fc34">integrate migrant workers</a> into professions that allow them to use their skills.</p>
<h2>Access to services</h2>
<p>Several other factors hinder the integration of migrants into society across Latin America. The report indicates that migrant workers have significantly lower access to health insurance relative to the native-born population. In Colombia, for example, 96% of local workers have access to health insurance, compared to just 40% of migrants.</p>
<p>Similarly, there are often <a href="https://www.undp.org/latin-america/publications/how-do-migrants-fare-latin-america-and-caribbean">barriers</a> limiting access to education for migrants. Foreign-born residents and their family members have the right to access public primary and secondary education in the majority of South American countries. But school attendance rates are lower among displaced children than among native children, while the propensity for dropping out of school early appears to be significantly higher among migrant children.</p>
<p>Some people argue that immigration comes with costs, such as the perceived notion that migrants deprive locals of jobs. Nevertheless, the contribution of migrants to Latin American economies underscores the potential benefits. Improving their access to labour markets is thus a crucial tool for fostering long-term growth in Latin American economies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than 6 million people have fled Venezuela seeking better living conditions – now they are boosting economic growth in their host countries.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193522023-12-08T15:25:50Z2023-12-08T15:25:50ZWhy Venezuela is threatening to annex Guyana’s oil-rich province of Essequibo<p>The US air force has taken the unusual step of holding joint drills <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/guyana-venezuela-conflict-essequibo-oil-us-military-flight-drills/">with Guyana</a> as the United Nations scheduled an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-guyana-un-dispute-oil-essequibo-fc2437e2c566ee0c9f2b340404d4724f">emergency meeting of the security council</a> to discuss Venezuela’s threat to annex more than two-thirds of the oil-rich South American country.</p>
<p>Guyanese president, Irfaan Ali, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/06/venezuela-annex-guyana-maduro#">appealed to Washington and to the UN</a> after the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, announced that he had taken steps to formalise the incorporation of Essequibo – an oil-rich 160,000sq km region of neighbouring Guyana – as part of Venezuela.</p>
<p>Maduro is a populist nationalist and a dictator, whose country is wracked by poverty. This has contributed to the exodus of <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/venezuela-crisis-facts#:%7E:text=As%20of%20August%202023%2C%20more,crisis%20has%20affected%20numerous%20lives.">more than seven million citizens</a>. Mindful of the fact that presidential elections are due in Venezuela in 2024, Maduro has turned to an issue that he hopes will lead to a rapid turn-around in his popularity. </p>
<p>Venezuela’s territorial dispute with neighbouring Guyana is a <a href="https://dpi.gov.gy/update-timeline-of-guyana-venezuela-border-controversy/">longstanding one</a>. It is arguably made worse by the news that there might be oil and gas potential in Essequibo – not just on land but also <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/120123-infographic-guyana-oil-output-drilling-fangtooth-production">under the seabed</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, Maduro <a href="https://www.stabroeknews.com/2015/06/07/news/guyana/venezuela-makes-new-claim-to-guyanas-territorial-waters-potential-oil-block/">issued a decree</a> reiterating Venezuela’s claim and repudiated any plans to exploit resources in Guyana’s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. Most recently, he has been seen on national television holding a revised map of Venezuela, depicting a country that now includes about 70% of Guyana.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Map of Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname showing disputed territory." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564326/original/file-20231207-29-bsbuje.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Venezuela and Guyana with the disputed territory shaded.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guayana Esequiba</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2022, Guyana began an oil licensing round, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/booming-guyana-sets-offshore-oil-auction-under-revamped-fiscal-terms-2022-11-04/">auctioned off</a> 14 exploration blocks. It is thought that the region has the potential to produce at least 12-15 billion oil-equivalent barrels overall – and possibly even as high as 25 billion oil-equivalent barrels. </p>
<p>The oil licensing <a href="https://oilnow.gy/glr2022/">reference map</a> itself is interesting because it displays the entire licensed area and highlights that the initial 14 blocks lie towards the east of the country and closer to the undisputed international maritime boundary with Suriname.</p>
<p>At least <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/guyana-receives-bids-eight-oil-gas-blocks-including-exxon-total-2023-09-13/#">eight blocks received bids</a>, which have not been disclosed, involving a suite of oil and gas companies including Qatar Energy and the Brazilian operator, Petrobras. The larger offshore licence area runs right up to the current international boundary with Venezuela. </p>
<p>Major western companies such as Exxon-Mobil and Total Energies are interested in this potential. All of which suggest that third-party companies (and their sponsoring national governments) recognise Guyanese sovereignty and the international boundary with Venezuela as legitimate.</p>
<h2>Longstanding dispute</h2>
<p>Venezuela claims that a great deal of what is modern day onshore and offshore Guyana is Venezuelan. In 1899, an international arbitration ruling in Paris settled the border between Venezuela and what was then British Guiana – with an independent Guyana <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1966-05-04/debates/ec997344-9295-4d30-8ce8-e552a55eeced/GuyanaIndependenceBill">emerging in 1966</a>. </p>
<p>Successive Venezuelan governments and dictatorial regimes have disputed the positioning of the international boundary. They have argued that the territory, in and around the Essequibo River, is not Guyanese. </p>
<p>Maduro does not want to relitigate the 1899 Paris decision – he simply wants to ignore it. But the International Court of Justice (ICJ) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/world-court-orders-venezuela-refrain-action-border-dispute-with-guyana-2023-12-01/">already warned Caracas</a> not to take any action about the recognised international boundary. They did not, however, comment on the proposal by Maduro to hold an internal referendum on the matter. </p>
<p>The referendum in question was held in Venezuela on December 3. Citizens were asked a series of questions about whether a new province should be established called Guyana Esequiba. According to presidential supporters, 10 million citizens cast their vote with the vast majority <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/venezuela-claims-95-percent-support-for-oil-region-grab-3w5k3ns0r">in favour</a> of such a proposal. International observers remain deeply sceptical of both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/maduro-venezuela-guyana-essequibo-referendum-vote-turnout">voter engagement</a> and the strength of feeling expressed for such a proposal. </p>
<p>Either way, Maduro has pushed on with his plan to annex the territory. Venezuelan companies have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/06/venezuela-guyana-takeover-mines-oil-gas-exploit">been encouraged</a> to prepare to enter Guyanese territory. The Venezuelan parliament was tasked with establishing a new licencing framework to authorise such extractive intrusions. </p>
<p>Guyanese operators would be given three months to abandon any operational sites in the claimed area of the country. Around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/maduro-venezuela-guyana-essequibo-referendum-vote-turnout">120,000 Guyanese citizens live</a> in the 61,000 sq mile territory that Venezuela wants to incorporate.</p>
<h2>‘Direct threat’</h2>
<p>The Guyanese president issued a <a href="https://www.upstreamonline.com/politics/guyana-puts-armed-forces-on-alert-as-venezuelan-president-raises-temperature-of-land-dispute/2-1-1566938?zephr_sso_ott=WaGjq6">televised statement</a> that warned about a “direct threat” to Guyana’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. He condemned the “desperate actions” of the Venezuelan president. He asked that Guyana’s small defence force was placed on high alert. Venezuela’s armed forces dwarf Guyana’s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Brazil is mobilising its forces to ensure that there is no conflict spillover as the country borders both affected parties. Guyana will need international assistance if the situation turns ugly. Regional bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) <a href="https://usoas.usmission.gov/oas-resolution-condemns-the-fraudulent-elections-in-venezuela/">have condemned</a> Venezuela’s actions. </p>
<p>What is disconcerting is that Venezuela’s closest <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/venezuelas-maduro-expected-visit-russia-putins-oil-point-man-says-2023-10-16/">geopolitical ally</a> is Putin’s Russia. </p>
<p>The relationship with Moscow strengthened under the late Hugo Chavez’s tenure and expanded to include multiple agreements in the oil, agricultural and technological sectors. Venezuela did not condemn the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. </p>
<p>Maduro will have watched events unfold in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and perhaps picked up some lessons from Putin about how bully a near-neighbour, launch false-flag operations – and then choose your moment to strike.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus Dodds does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A longstanding territorial dispute could flare into open confrontation in South America.Klaus Dodds, Professor of Geopolitics, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2149282023-11-05T13:01:57Z2023-11-05T13:01:57ZUnpacking Elon Musk’s convoluted U.S.-Mexico border visit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557510/original/file-20231103-17-agxdj5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C67%2C680%2C438&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elon Musk and Texas congressman Tony Gonzales stand in front of a group of South American migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/TonyGonzales4TX/status/1708142923626209519">(Twitter/Tony Gonzales)</a></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/unpacking-elon-musks-convoluted-us-mexico-border-visit" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In late September, Elon Musk, the tech billionaire behind Tesla and SpaceX, set the internet ablaze with his visit to the Texas-Mexico border to provide what he called an “<a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/why-did-elon-musk-visit-texas-mexico-border-and-what-did-he-say-about-the-migrants/articleshow/104034433.cms?from=mdr">unfiltered</a>” perspective on the border crisis as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/migrants-cross-into-texas-undeterred-by-razor-wire-or-new-asylum-rules-2023-09-28/">thousands of migrants</a>, mostly from Venezuela, crossed the Rio Grande River.</p>
<p><a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1707565081750290910?s=20">In a video at Eagle Pass, Texas</a>, Musk calls for a “greatly expanded legal immigration system” that would welcome “hard-working and honest” people and “<a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1707525800830828619?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1707525800830828619%7Ctwgr%5E3df67ff84fb408e2c51eceefcad89b5db37b30d0%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dailysignal.com%2F2023%2F09%2F29%2Felon-musk-visits-eagle-pass-livestreams-real-story-of-whats-happening-at-southern-border%2F">not let anyone in the country who is breaking the law</a>.”</p>
<p>Many were quick to highlight the absurdity of the world’s richest person, who is himself an immigrant, standing before a group of other immigrants calling for stricter policies. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1708283629665927576"}"></div></p>
<h2>Pro-immigrant but anti-asylum?</h2>
<p>Musk’s position on immigration appears convoluted. On the one hand, he says he is “<a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1707525800830828619?s=20">extremely pro-immigrant</a>,” given he is an immigrant to the United States himself. This also makes sense from the perspective of his businesses, which rely on <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7z5px/twitter-employees-on-visas-cant-just-quit">highly skilled migrant workers</a>.</p>
<p>While Musk said he supports legal immigration, he said the U.S. should “not be allowing people in the country if they are breaking the law.” A day before his visit to the border, Musk <a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1707146779894951982?s=20">tweeted</a> support for a <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-trump-wall-us-mexico-border-2023-9">Trump-style wall</a> to securitize the border. He implied that asylum seekers were entering without evidence to support their claims and they could “literally Google to know exactly what to say” to border officers.</p>
<p>Musk’s peddling of right wing anti-refugee rhetoric isn’t surprising, but the misinformation shared in Musk’s self-proclaimed “unfiltered” video may inadvertently bolster border militarization, increased repatriations and the criminalization of vulnerable asylum seekers. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1707565081750290910"}"></div></p>
<p>For example, during Musk’s border visit, congressman Tony Gonzales shares an anecdote about an asylum seeker he saw that had teardrop tattoos on their face. Musk calls this person a “serial murderer and proud of it” and made the leap that America has become the place people “go to escape the law.” </p>
<p>This kind of language plays into tropes that paint immigrants as dangerous and criminal. However, research has demonstrated that immigrants are not more likely to commit crimes. <a href="https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/immigration/u-s-citizens-most-likely-to-commit-crimes-than-immigrants/">Research from 2022</a> found U.S. citizens are more than two times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime than undocumented immigrants. </p>
<p>In the video, Gonzales claimed there has been zero repatriation. However, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-border-doesnt-need-elon-musks-citizen-journalism">3.6 million people who have crossed into the U.S. illegally have been repatriated</a> since Biden took office. Soon after Musk’s visit, Biden announced that the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/us-resume-direct-deportation-flights-venezuelan-migrants-rcna119107">U.S. was resuming direct repatriation flights for Venezuelans</a> who unlawfully cross the border and have no legal basis to stay. </p>
<h2>An open border for all of Earth?</h2>
<p>The most troubling and sensationalist claim that Musk makes is that the U.S. southern border is an “<a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1707565081750290910?s=20">open border for all of earth…an open border to 8 billion</a>.” Not only is this statement far from the truth, it plays into tropes that immigrants and refugees from the Global South are invading western countries. </p>
<p>It’s a dramatic misconception of the realities of global migration and displacement. The vast majority of refugees are hosted by countries in the Global South. </p>
<p>For example, displacement from <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/immigration-venezuela-refugee-crisis-us-border-policies/?fbclid=IwAR0qEfobBJ98gamFou7F0KpdQMo0XvcXivdfeccOs5NGC6-22oxyYbNnplI">Venezuela is now the largest refugee crisis</a> in the world, outpacing refugees from Ukraine and Syria. Of the <a href="https://www.r4v.info/es/refugiadosymigrantes">7.7 million displaced</a>, 85 per cent have moved to neighbouring Latin American countries. Only around <a href="https://www.r4v.info/es/refugiadosymigrantes">700,000 are in the U.S. under temporary protection status</a>, which is only nine per cent of the total displaced population. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1707146779894951982"}"></div></p>
<p>The claim that the U.S. border is open “for all of earth” is plainly wrong, and gives the U.S. credit for what has been a Latin American-led humanitarian response to the Venezuelan crisis. </p>
<p>Musk has been criticized for meddling in international affairs, most recently the <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2022/10/21/23415242/elon-musk-starlink-ukraine-dod-twitter-david-sacks-russia">Ukraine war</a>. He has <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000?">tweeted a peace proposal</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/19/elon-musk-ukraine-starlink/">provided</a> then <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/07/ukraine-rips-musk-disrupting-sneak-attack-russian-navy.html">shut off Starlink’s satellite</a> network over Crimea and <a href="https://twitter.com/panoparker/status/1318157559266762752">seemingly supported</a> a U.S.-backed coup in Bolivia.</p>
<p>And we are seeing the implications for his misinformation at the border impact the lives of people seeking asylum in the U.S. being portrayed as “serial murderers” and “breaking the law.” As Musk wades into yet another political issue, it is crucial for the public to get their information from credible news sources and research, not billionaires on Twitter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yvonne Su does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Elon Musk’s visit to the U.S.-Mexico border played into false tropes that paint asylum seekers as dangerous criminals.Yvonne Su, Assistant Professor in the Department of Equity Studies, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2011192023-05-17T12:39:52Z2023-05-17T12:39:52ZHow China uses ‘geostrategic corruption’ to exert its influence in Latin America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526566/original/file-20230516-23-rcqcyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C95%2C5762%2C3746&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The successful courting of Honduras is the latest example of China's influence in Latin America.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-foreign-minister-qin-gang-and-honduras-foreign-news-photo/1476447324?adppopup=true">Lintao Zhang/Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Corruption has long been a <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/01/radical-transparency-the-last-hope-for-fighting-corruption-in-latin-america%EF%BF%BC/">scourge in parts of Latin America</a>. </p>
<p>Traditionally, it has funneled down domestic routes, with <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/press/2022-corruption-perceptions-index-cycle-corruption-organised-crime-instability-americas">local politicians, business interests</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels">drug lords</a> benefiting from graft and dodgy dealings. Indeed, a 2022 report from Transparency International found that 27 out of 30 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have shown <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">stagnant corruption levels</a> with no improvement in recent years.</p>
<p>But over the last two decades, a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption">new form of corruption</a> has taken hold in countries in the region, a phenomenon we call “geostrategic corruption.” </p>
<p>It is characterized by external countries using corrupt methods – no-bid contracts, insider financial deals, special relations with those in power – to become stakeholders in multiple facets of the politics, economy and society of a country. China is <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/08/12/adm-faller-china-exploiting-corruption-in-latin-america-493948">a master of the art</a>; the United States, less so.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/political-science-graduate-students/valeriia-popova1/valeriia-popova.html">scholars of</a> <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/faculty-a-z/eduardo-gamarra1/eduardo-gamarra.html">Latin American politics</a>, we have seen how China has used geostrategic corruption to gain a foothold in the region as <a href="https://time.com/6186494/americas-summit-biden-china/">U.S. influence has waned</a>.</p>
<h2>What is geostrategic corruption?</h2>
<p>Geostrategic corruption builds on <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">traditional pervasive patterns</a> of clientelism and patronage. In Latin America in particular, the growth of the drug gangs since the 1980s introduced “narco-corruption” in which police and local officials collude with organized gangs, which are able to “<a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2021-Report-Resisting-corruption-along-drug-trafficking-routes-Crimjust.pdf">buy protection</a>” from prosecution. </p>
<p>As a result, police, local governments and elected representatives are considered by watchdogs as among <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/latin-america/corruption-on-the-rise-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean">the most corrupt political entities</a> in Latin America, with the region consistently scoring low in annual global <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">corruption perception rating</a>.</p>
<p>This pattern of corruption has coincided with a period in which the U.S. has turned its attention away from Latin America and toward <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/07/reflections-on-the-long-term-repercussions-of-september-11-for-us-policy-in-the-middle-east/">first the Middle East</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy">and then Asia</a>.</p>
<p>The vacuum has largely been filled by China. Trade between the region and China skyrocketed from <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america/">US$10 billion worth of goods in 2000</a> to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">$450 billion in 2021</a>. China is now the top trading partner of South America, making up to 34% of total trade in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">Chile, Brazil and Peru</a>.</p>
<p>China’s expansion in the region is largely driven by the country’s <a href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america/">search for resources</a> such as cobalt, lithium, rare earths, hydrocarbons and access to foodstuffs, which are abundant in Latin America. In the past 20 years, China has also poured <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">massive investments</a> into infrastructure, energy and financial sectors of Latin America.</p>
<p>And China isn’t alone in upping its interest in Latin America. The last two decades have also seen an increase in investment and influence in the region <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228">from Russia</a> <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/foreign-authoritarian-influence-in-latin-america-irans-growing-reach/">and Iran</a>. </p>
<p>These countries have found Latin America a fertile ground due in no small part to the region’s culture of corruption and weak institutions, we argue. Local criminal networks and the disregard of democratic norms on the ground have made it easier for countries that themselves are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/bribes-transparency/chinese-and-russian-firms-fare-worst-in-bribery-index-idINL5E7LV31T20111101">perceived to be dogged by corruption</a> to gain a foothold in Latin America.</p>
<h2>US-China global competition</h2>
<p>China’s presence in the region forms part of the country’s long-term strategic objective to <a href="https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-embajador-stanley-admitio-que-eeuu-necesita-mas-herramientas-para-poder-competir-con-china-en-nid04052023/">challenge U.S. influence across the globe</a> through economic, military, financial and political means.</p>
<p>That process has been aided by global trends. Countries such as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-brazil-lula-xi-jinping-91c34b4a9fb78f263d6f81f1e9a16f49">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/argentina-china-in-americas">Argentina</a> have increasingly sought to diversify bilateral relationship and become less dependent on U.S. trade.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russian aggression in Ukraine has seemingly given China more weight on the international scene, with Beijing positioning itself as an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-saudi-arabia-iran-global-mediator-45ec807c8fd2b2aa65eef4cc313b739d">alternative diplomatic force</a> to Washington, especially to countries that feel nonaligned to the West. A recent example was seen in March, when Honduras announced it would <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/27/1166177955/honduras-establishes-ties-with-china-after-break-from-taiwan">establish diplomatic relations with Beijing</a> and break off ties with Taiwan – a development that Taiwanese officials say followed the “<a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202303230006">bribing” of Honduran officials</a>.</p>
<p>What gives China an added competitive edge as it extends its influence is that it is able to eschew constraints that bind many would-be investors in the West – such as environmental concerns or hesitation over a country’s labor rights and level of corruption. Chinese companies are <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road">judged by international watchdogs to be</a> <a href="https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2016_transparencyincorporatereporti?e=2496456/37122985">among the least transparent</a> in the world, and bribery watchdogs have long noted Beijing’s <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2018_Report_ExportingCorruption_English_200402_075046.pdf">reluctance to prosecute Chinese companies or individuals</a> accused of bribery in regard to foreign contracts. A 2021 study found that <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road">35% of China’s “Belt and Road” projects</a> worldwide have been marked by environmental, labor and corruption problems.</p>
<p>The U.S. administration, in contrast, is more restricted by <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/29/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-abiding-commitment-to-democratic-renewal-at-home-and-abroad/">commitments to encourage democratic development</a> as well as public pressure and international image. Washington does not have the same privilege of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm">diplomatic pragmatism</a> as China. </p>
<p>U.S. companies are, of course, not spotless when it comes to engaging in corrupt practices overseas. But unlike China, the U.S. government is bound to an <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm">international treaty</a> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/governments-turn-a-blind-eye-to-foreign-bribery-transparency-international/a-55252806">prohibiting the use of bribes</a> to win contracts. Moreover, the U.S. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78dd-1">Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</a> strictly prohibits American companies from bribing foreign officials; China has no such equivalent.</p>
<h2>Chinese corruption in the region</h2>
<p>Chinese investment <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/populism-china-and-covid-19-latin-americas-new-perfect-storm">has been easier where populist regimes govern</a> and where the rule of law has long been undermined, such as <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Argentina">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Bolivia/">Bolivia</a> and <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Venezuela%2C%20RB/">Venezuela</a>.</p>
<p>For example, in Bolivia during the 14-year tenure of President Evo Morales, Chinese companies <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-lithium-china/bolivia-picks-chinese-partner-for-2-3-billion-lithium-projects-idUSKCN1PV2F7">achieved a major foothold</a> in key sectors of the economy that has translated into a monopoly over the lithium industry there, despite a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-consortium-to-develop-lithium-deposits-in-Bolivia">strong anti-mining movement in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Geostrategic corruption in Argentina is firmly rooted at the local level, in provinces and regions across the country, <a href="https://icaie.com/2023/03/new-report-the-prc-feudal-governors-and-no-accountability-lithium-mining-in-argentinas-northwest-district/">feudal-like governors</a> have enabled a <a href="https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-retains-low-score-in-global-corruption-ranking.phtml">sophisticated corruption network</a> that China has seemingly used to invest in everything from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/argentina-wants-china-fully-fund-83-bln-nuclear-plant-amid-cash-shortfall-2022-04-05/#:%7E:text=The%20South%20American%20nation%20signed,faces%20a%20tighter%20fiscal%20outlook.">nuclear plants</a> and building lithium battery plants to constructing a satellite-tracking <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/us-military-warns-of-threat-from-chinese-run-space-station-in-argentina/">deep-space ground station</a>, railroads, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/23/argentina-china-us-imf-bri-debt-economy-summit-americas/">hydroelectric plants</a>, research facilities and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3213774/argentina-revives-possibility-chinese-fighter-jet-purchase-renewing-beijings-hopes-jf-17-south">maybe even fighter jets</a>.</p>
<p>In Ecuador, such projects <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html">include a dam</a> built in exchange for <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/12/latin-america-and-china-choosing-self-interest/">oil contracts</a>; the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-power-china-idUSL1N2OW10M">developed massive cracks soon after construction</a>; and the Quijos hydroelectric project, which <a href="https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/empresa-china-electrica-ecuador-incumplida.html">failed to generate promised volumes of power</a>. Similarly, the Chinese-financed Interoceanic Grand Canal in Nicaragua was estimated by opponents of the project to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/nicaraguas-chinese-financed-canal-project-still-in-limbo/">irreversibly impact the ecosystem and displace about 120,000 people</a>, while local activists faced <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/6515/2017/en/">harassment, violence and unlawful detention</a>. </p>
<p>In Venezuela, China initiated but never completed construction of a multibillion dollar <a href="https://apnews.com/article/3367297bb5cc4fc497579164f679ec75">bullet train line</a>, and an iron mining deal not only allowed the Asian country to buy Venezuela’s iron ore at a price 75% below market, but also turned out to be an instance of Chinese predatory financing, leaving Venezuela in a catastrophic <a href="https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/40016-a-dream-deal-with-china-iron-ore-that-ended-in-nightmarish-debt-for-venezuela/">$1 billion debt</a>. Likewise, in Panama, port concessions and a high-speed train line were <a href="https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/34472-has-chinas-winning-streak-in-panama-ended/#:%7E:text=A%20Chinese%20proposal%20for%20a%20US%244.1%20billion%20high,was%20cancelled%20and%20recast%20as%20a%20public-private%20partnership">frozen or canceled</a>, while the investor is under <a href="https://www.newsroompanama.com/business/big-time-chinese-investor-in-panama-under-probe-cloud">investigation</a> in China.</p>
<p>Throughout the region, Chinese firms have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-corruption/venezuela-charges-five-officials-with-embezzling-china-funds-idUSBRE9670VW20130708">cited in numerous</a> <a href="https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/bolivias-roads-agency-raided-following-bribe-allegation">cases involving bribery</a> <a href="https://cuencahighlife.com/attorney-general-opens-bribery-investigation-of-chinese-construction-company-projects/">and kickback schemes</a> that have enriched local officials in return for contracts and access.</p>
<h2>What does it mean for the US?</h2>
<p>This use of geostrategic corruption works to the direct detriment of U.S. interests. </p>
<p>In Argentina and Bolivia, Chinese expansion means that sectors that are crucial for the success of the U.S.’s green energy goals are increasingly under Beijing’s hold. It also undermines U.S. efforts to counter corruption and human rights abuses in the region. </p>
<p>And U.S. companies are unable to compete. The Biden administration has set <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Nearshoring%20and%20Renewable%20Energy-%20Building%20on%20the%20Los%20Angeles%20Summit%20of%20the%20Americas.pdf">high standards for U.S. investment</a> in the very sectors where the Chinese have a strong foothold. These include <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">transparency and accountability</a>, as well as commitments to environmental, labor and human rights standards.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden has stated that adherence to these standards is what distinguishes U.S. foreign investments from its competitors. But it does hamstring American companies when it comes to competing with China.</p>
<p>In the meantime, while the U.S. is looking for answers and trying to figure out how to reestablish influence in Latin America, China is quietly and pragmatically increasing its presence in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As an academic and as director of a university research center, I've received funding from foundations, US government agencies, and multilateral institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Valeriia Popova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As US influence in Latin America has waned, Beijing has been able to expand business interests in the region on the back of shady practices.Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityValeriia Popova, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2033682023-04-12T21:18:39Z2023-04-12T21:18:39ZThe disturbing trend of state media use of deepfakes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520004/original/file-20230410-14-pmb2rl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C68%2C9144%2C5981&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An image made from video of a fake video featuring former U.S. president Barack Obama showing elements of facial mapping used in new technology that lets anyone make deepfake videos.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Social media has been awash with fake images of a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/style/article/pope-francis-puffer-coat-ai-fashion-lotw/index.html">stylish Pope Francis</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CqyGx2xoUAX/">Elon Musk protesting in New York</a> and <a href="https://nypost.com/2023/03/22/chilling-deepfakes-claiming-to-show-trumps-arrest-spread-across-twitter/">Donald Trump resisting arrest</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="an older white man (the pope) wearing a long white puffer jacket and a white skullcap" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520362/original/file-20230411-28-74gkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An AI-generated image of Pope Francis wearing a white puffer jacket went viral online, with users wondering if it was real.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.reddit.com/r/midjourney/comments/120vhdc/the_pope_drip/">(Reddit)</a></span>
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<p>Such AI-generated images and videos, or <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3425780">deepfakes</a>, have become increasingly accessible due to advances in artificial intelligence. As more sophisticated fabricated images spread, it will become increasingly difficult for users to differentiate the real from the fake.</p>
<p>Deepfakes get their name from the technology used to create them: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cviu.2022.103525">deep-learning neural networks</a>. When unleashed on a dataset, these algorithms learn patterns and can replicate them in novel — and convincing — ways.</p>
<p>While this technology can be used for entertainment, it also has dark potential, raising <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4g1yEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT9&dq=ethical+artificial+intelligence+schoenherr&ots=6fbnULsVRy&sig=nPCglnifLw5daLKARroY-DkIXKU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">social and ethical concerns</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike simple stories or memes which differ little from propaganda techniques used by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511101">Nazi Germany</a> and photo editing by <a href="https://shop.tate.org.uk/the-commissar-vanishes/15415.html">Communist Russia</a>, deepfakes have a high degree of realism. Their accessibility to the public and states could erode our sense of reality.</p>
<h2>Fake news anchor</h2>
<p>Beyond the growing concern that <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/epzkwm/artificial-intelligence-art-creatives-ai">AI-generated art threatens human art and artists</a>, deepfakes can be used as the unchecked mouthpieces for organizations and states.</p>
<p>Leading the way, <a href="https://petapixel.com/2023/03/17/chinese-ai-news-anchor-works-24-hours-a-day-365-days-a-year/">China’s state media has experimented with an AI news anchors, named Ren Xiaorong</a>. Ren, although <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/09/worlds-first-ai-news-anchor-unveiled-in-china">not the first AI news anchor developed by China</a>, illustrates both the commitment to the technology and the incremental increases in realism. </p>
<p>Other countries such as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65238950">Kuwait</a> and <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sogou-launches-worlds-first-russian-speaking-ai-news-anchor-300865159.html">Russia</a> have also launched AI generated anchors.</p>
<p>When looking at these anchors, we might object that only the most naive viewer would mistake them for real humans, such as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47981274">Russia’s first robotic news anchor</a>. Yet, these technologies are still in their infancy. We cannot dismiss them.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1645753239134978052"}"></div></p>
<h2>Fabricated news</h2>
<p>China’s transparency in using AI-generated news anchors stands in contrast to Venezuela’s fabricated news coverage. Venezuelan state media presented favourable reports of the country’s progress, purportedly created by international English-language news outlets. However, <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/02/21/2023/venezuela-uses-ai-avatars-to-disseminate-propaganda">the stories and anchors were fabricated</a>.</p>
<p>The use of these videos in Venezuela is particularly troubling because they are used as external validation for the government’s activities. By claiming the video comes from outside of one’s country, it provides another source to bolster their claims.</p>
<p>Venezuela is not the only country to adopt these methods. Fabricated videos of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-60780142">Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy discussing surrender to Russia</a> were also circulated during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. </p>
<p>Fabricated images and videos are merely the tip of the deepfake iceberg. In 2021, Russia was accused of using <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/22/european-mps-targeted-by-deepfake-video-calls-imitating-russian-opposition">deepfake image filters to simulate opponents during interviews with international politicians</a>. The ability to mimic political figures and interact with others in <em>real time</em> is a truly disturbing development. </p>
<p>As these technologies become increasingly accessible to everyone, from harmless meme-makers and would-be social engineers, the boundaries of the real and imagined become progressively indistinguishable.</p>
<p>The proliferation of deepfakes foreshadow a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war">post-truth world</a>, defined by a fractured geopolitical landscape, opinion echo chambers and mutual distrust that can be exploited by governmental and non-governmental organizations.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-use-of-deepfakes-can-sow-doubt-creating-confusion-and-distrust-in-viewers-182108">The use of deepfakes can sow doubt, creating confusion and distrust in viewers</a>
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<h2>Disinformation and believable fakes</h2>
<p>The spread of disinformation requires that we understand how ideas, innovation or behaviour spread within a social network, referred to as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1116502109">social contagion</a>.</p>
<p>Cognitive science is concerned with “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00005-0">information</a>” — anything that reduces our uncertainty about the actual state of the world. <em>Disinformation</em> has the appearance of information, except uncertainty is reduced at the expense of accuracy.</p>
<p>Observations that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559">disinformation spreads faster that facts</a> likely stems from the fact that when a message is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.1.22">simple</a>, it increases our confidence.</p>
<p>Disinformation spreads for a variety of reasons. It must appear close enough to the “truth” that it is believable. If a new “fact” is incompatible with what we know, we are inclined to reject it even if it is true. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652">People don’t like the feeling of inconsistency</a> and seek to resolve it. People will also ignore the structure and quality of an argument, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(92)90019-E">focus on the believability of its conclusion</a>.</p>
<p>Deepfakes move us beyond text-based persuasion, because <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315785233">images make a message far more memorable</a> — and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2016.1157096">persuasive</a> — than abstract concepts alone. Its use in spreading disinformation is therefore far more concerning.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a book is held up with a renaissance style illustration of a woman and a snake on the cover and the words LA VERITÀ VI FARÀ LIBERI" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/520363/original/file-20230411-917-schgcz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">In 2018, Pope Francis published his annual social communications message, titled ‘The Truth Will Set You Free,’ after facing unprecedented bad press during his South American tour.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini)</span></span>
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<p>The structure of the environment is also critical. People attend to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.61.2.195">available information</a>, focusing on information that confirms their prior beliefs. By increasing the frequency of images, ideas and other media, we increase people’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.5.722">confidence in their own knowledge</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105023">the illusion of consensus</a>.</p>
<h2>Social networks and contagion</h2>
<p>While we look for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02547.x">credible sources of information</a> — experts or peers — our memory stores information separately from its source. Over time, this <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3">failure of source monitoring</a> results in our retrieval of information from memory without understanding its origin. </p>
<p>Through <a href="https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506878jobem5004_1">product placement</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/technology/zuckerberg-facebook-project-amplify.html">algorithms that control our exposure to media</a>, marketers and <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism">governments</a> have exploited these techniques for generations. Most recently, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/25/world/europe/disinformation-social-media.html">social media influencers have been paid to spread disinformation</a>. </p>
<p>The introduction of AI will only accelerate this process by permitting tighter control of the information environment through dark <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3173574.3174108">patterns of design</a>.</p>
<h2>Legal, social and moral issues</h2>
<p>Producing, managing and disseminating information grants people authority and power. When information ecosystems become flooded with disinformation, truth is debased.</p>
<p>The accusation of “fake news” has become a tactic used to discredit any argument. Deepfakes are variations on this theme. Social media users have already falsely claimed that real videos of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62338593">U.S. President Joe Biden</a> and <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/katienotopoulos/no-that-trump-video-isnt-green-screened">former U.S. president Donald Trump</a> are fake.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fake-news-grabs-our-attention-produces-false-memories-and-appeals-to-our-emotions-124842">Fake news grabs our attention, produces false memories and appeals to our emotions</a>
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<p>Social movements such as <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-threat-posed-by-deepfakes-to-marginalized-communities/">Black Lives Matter</a> or claims about <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/xinjiang-footage-sheds-new-light-on-uyghur-detention-camps/a-59880898">the treatment of the Uyghurs in China</a> rely on the compelling qualities of videos. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.04.010">Once we form a belief, it is difficult to counter</a>. The time required for verification — especially if left to the user — allows disinformation to propagate. <a href="https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/">Private</a> and public fact-checking websites can help. But they need legitimacy to foster trust. </p>
<p>Brazil provides a recent demonstration of such an attempt. After the government launched a verification website, <a href="https://latamjournalismreview.org/articles/brazilian-government-launches-official-fact-checking-website-and-draws-criticism-from-independent-agencies/">critics</a> accused it of pro-government bias. However, <a href="https://en.mercopress.com/2023/04/07/brazilian-gov-t-s-website-not-enough-against-fake-news-pimenta-says">government officials</a> noted that the site was not meant to replace private initiatives.</p>
<p>There is <a href="http://www.jatit.org/volumes/Vol97No22/7Vol97No22.pdf">no simple solution to unmasking deepfakes</a>. Rather than passive consumers of media, we must actively challenge our own beliefs. </p>
<p>The only way to combat harmful forms of artificial intelligence is to cultivate human intelligence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203368/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Richard Schoenherr has previously received funding from Army Research Laboratory and has served as a visiting scholar at the United States Military Academy and has worked as a consultant for the Canadian Department of National Defence.</span></em></p>The use of deepfakes and AI by groups with various interests, including governments and media, is the latest and most sophisticated tool in information and disinformation campaigns.Jordan Richard Schoenherr, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002402023-02-24T13:12:56Z2023-02-24T13:12:56ZI assisted Carter’s work encouraging democracy – and saw how his experience, persistence and engineer’s mindset helped build a freer Latin America over decades<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511514/original/file-20230221-28-xfcklt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C2048%2C1272&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jimmy Carter answered reporters' election-monitoring questions in Caracas, Venezuela, May 29, 2004. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-us-president-jimmy-carter-answers-questions-during-a-news-photo/481972699?adppopup=true">Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When former President Jimmy Carter and his wife Rosalynn Carter founded the nonprofit <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/">Carter Center</a> in 1982, one of their goals was to help Latin American countries – many of which were emerging from decades of military dictatorship – transition to democracies.</p>
<p>Already a hero to many in the region for promoting human rights and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/dec99/14/panama.htm">giving up U.S. control of the Panama Canal</a> during his presidency, Carter pioneered the center’s international election monitoring and conflict mediation with the work he did in Latin America.</p>
<p>I was on staff of The Carter Center from 1987 to 2015, first as a senior adviser and then as <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/current_qa/jennifer_mccoy_aug2005.html">director of its Americas Program</a>. In those roles, I worked closely with him, often accompanying the former president on trips to Latin America, where he tried to strengthen democracies and achieve peace.</p>
<p>I saw a man with great determination and self-discipline, driven by his faith and confidence that he could make a difference. He was always willing to take risks to tackle seemingly intractable problems.</p>
<p>The Jimmy Carter I remember was results-oriented rather than process-driven. He brought an engineer’s mind to every problem and was ready with possible solutions. He could be stubborn. But he was always willing to make principled decisions, even if they cost him politically.</p>
<p>For example, when – as president in 1977 – he signed the <a href="https://billofrightsinstitute.org/e-lessons/the-panama-canal-treaties-jimmy-carter">Panama Canal Treaties</a> to turn over control of the canal to Panama by 1999, he was heavily criticized by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/08/18/house-opponents-mount-attack-on-panama-treaties/bd42bdad-62e6-4b82-a737-b52bc3845bdf/">many members of Congress</a>. But with the treaties, Carter ended an arrangement that, from 1903, had allowed the U.S. to control the canal and was viewed as colonialism by many Latin Americans.</p>
<p>Since taking over the canal, Panama <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/an-expanded-panama-canal-opens-for-giant-ships/2016/06/26/11a93574-37d1-11e6-af02-1df55f0c77ff_story.html">has expanded its capacity</a>. </p>
<h2>Democracy first</h2>
<p>Carter always believed that negotiation was more fruitful than force. As president, he leaned into this philosophy with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2151620">Israeli-Egyptian peace accords</a> and did the same thing to <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/166260">help Haiti reestablish democracy</a> as leader of The Carter Center.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A gray-haired white man wearing a short-sleeved white shirt shakes the hand of a Black man, who is wearing glasses and a short-sleeved white shirt." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511516/original/file-20230221-28-ixe603.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Former President Jimmy Carter greets Haitian presidential candidate Jean-Bertrand Aristide on the eve of the Haitian presidential elections in 1990. Carter led an international team of observers that monitored the election process.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-us-president-jimmy-carter-greets-haitian-news-photo/481997355?phrase=jimmy%20carter%20in%20haiti&adppopup=true">Thony Belizaire/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In 1994, the U.S. was set to invade Haiti on a <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti">United Nations-approved mission</a> to reinstall the country’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Carter had monitored voting there in 1990, when Haitians elected Aristide. The Haitian leader was ousted in a military coup soon after, though.</p>
<p>When Carter informed President Bill Clinton that Haitian military general <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc218.html">Raoul Cedras had asked for Carter’s help</a> in mediating the crisis and avoiding a U.S. invasion, Clinton allowed for a last-ditch diplomatic effort to seek a solution.</p>
<p>Carter led a team, including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, to Haiti on a very short timeline <a href="https://greensboro.com/carter-hailed-for-peace-intervention/article_77ed2622-c529-554b-b352-4d814b8ea07c.html">to negotiate a peaceful end</a> to the situation. With the U.S. forces already en route, the men managed to persuade the generals to accept amnesty and exile to avoid a potentially deadly U.S. invasion. </p>
<h2>The Carter art of mediation</h2>
<p>In my view, Carter’s genius as a mediator is his belief that there is some innate goodness in every person, no matter the harm they may perpetrate. He strove to develop a connection with even the most detestable dictators because he knew their decisions could change the future of a society. Once he had a relationship with those leaders, he presented them with the hard choices they needed to make. And he always kept his compass. He focused on the well-being of the people in the countries he was helping, not his personal successes or failures.</p>
<p>His approach opened him to criticism that he <a href="https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19940926&slug=1932656">cozied up to dictators</a>. But, to me, he just exercised realism and persistence. </p>
<p>The Sandinista revolutionary government of Nicaragua, led by Daniel Ortega, came to power during the Carter presidency, when a broad coalition overthrew the dictator Anastasio Somoza. </p>
<p>The Reagan administration responded to Ortega’s Sandinista government by imposing an <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993096">economic embargo and supporting a counterinsurgency</a> from rebel forces known as the Contras. President Ortega needed help to end that conflict and believed that he could gain international legitimacy and pressure the U.S. to change its policy if he held internationally monitored elections. So, Ortega invited The Carter Center, the U.N. and the Organization of American States to mount an <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1153.pdf">unprecedented election-monitoring mission</a> that ended up terminating the Sandinista revolution.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="One man, on the left, stands leaning over a table as he speaks with a man, center, a woman and man on the right, who are also standing and leaning over the table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511519/original/file-20230221-16-wj9092.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Jimmy Carter and Jennifer Lynn McCoy, to his left, speak with members of the signature’s checking board, May 29, 2004, in Caracas. Carter served as an observer as Venezuelans sought a referendum to recall President Hugo Chavez.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-us-president-jimmy-carter-speaks-with-members-of-the-news-photo/50909679?adppopup=true">Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>I was The Carter Center’s field representative in Managua at the time. The former president had developed his relationship with Ortega over the course of five trips to Nicaragua during the election campaign in 1989 to 1990, mediating disputes along the way. But election night was the most important moment. The initial vote count reports mysteriously stopped, and around midnight Carter went to see Ortega, along with the U.N. and OAS representatives. Carter told him that our data indicated the Sandinista-backed candidate had lost and that Ortega should acknowledge the loss and take credit for the democratic elections and everything the Sandinista revolution had accomplished.</p>
<p>Ortega acceded and the next day we accompanied him as he visited <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k8hWsuZNb-YC&oi=fnd&pg=PP13&dq=violeta+chamorro+president&ots=_2eCRJqBxb&sig=QWqlOs-d8UVF2__KtvdwN0bXrXM#v=onepage&q=violeta%20chamorro%20president&f=false">President-elect Violeta Chamorro’s house</a> to congratulate her on her victory.</p>
<h2>He was persistent</h2>
<p>But Carter didn’t stop there, knowing the transition would be rocky. He gathered the two sides together in my little house in Managua and, sitting on rocking chairs on the patio, he negotiated a three-point agreement to frame the transition’s most difficult points – confiscated property and land reform, the integrity of the security forces and demobilization of the Contras. </p>
<p>Another time Carter’s persistence paid off was <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2023.html">in Venezuela</a>. That country’s democracy became unmoored with plummeting oil prices and hyperinflation in the 1990s, and The Carter Center was <a href="https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1998-12-15-1998349030-story.html">invited to monitor the 1998 elections</a>, which populist outsider <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Venezuela/The-Hugo-Chavez-presidency">Hugo Chávez</a> won.</p>
<p>After a failed military coup attempted to oust him in 2002, a shaken Chávez asked Carter to mediate between him and his political opposition. We partnered with the U.N. and OAS to form a tripartite mediating group – the OAS secretary general, trusted by the opposition; Carter, trusted by Chávez; and the U.N. as a neutral party providing background support.</p>
<p>Although the opposition was initially skeptical of Carter, given that he was invited by Chávez, it came to value Carter’s entree with Chávez and held high expectations he could hold Chávez to any commitments.</p>
<p>When an eventual agreement led to a recall referendum petition process, Carter forcefully pushed a stalling Chávez and his team to acknowledge that the opposition had gathered sufficient signatures to hold the referendum to decide whether to end Chávez’s term early.</p>
<p>But when the vote finally happened in August 2004, Chávez had managed to <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/177518">turn the tide in his favor</a> in the opinion polls by spending on social programs. He won the vote decisively. The opposition alleged the vote count was fraudulent, while the <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2023.html">OAS and The Carter Center audits of the count did not detect fraud</a>. I received many messages from irate Venezuelans blaming Carter and me for ignoring fraud and allowing Chávez to continue in power in Venezuela. </p>
<p>I learned then what a thick skin a public figure must have to withstand the fury of severely disappointed people.</p>
<p>I have always admired Carter for the countless controversial decisions he made over the years. And I believe he will be remembered for his vision of a free and peaceful world and his willingness to tackle seemingly insurmountable problems with high risk of failure.</p>
<p>His interventions at key moments helped save lives – and encouraged Latin American democracy, at least for a time. And his center’s ongoing, lower-profile programs that promote citizens’ <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/ati/index.html">rights to information</a>, <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html">election integrity</a>, <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/health/index.html">mental and public health</a> and media freedom have made life better for people in many countries in the hemisphere.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A suited, smiling gray-haired man walks on stage, with his left hand raised high, as he waves to the audience before him. Behind him, a large video screen captures his actions." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=967&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1215&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1215&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511515/original/file-20230221-16-cc5l3k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1215&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Jimmy Carter takes the stage during the Democratic National Convention in 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/former-u-s-president-jimmy-carter-walks-on-stage-during-day-news-photo/82547453?adppopup=true">Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200240/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Lynn McCoy is professor of political science at Georgia State University and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She was Associate Director and Senior Associate from 1987-1998 and Director of the Carter Center's Americas Program from 1998-2015.</span></em></p>A former staffer with The Carter Center saw how Jimmy Carter’s efforts to bring democracy to Latin America improved conditions, prevented bloodshed and saved lives.Jennifer Lynn McCoy, Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992652023-02-08T19:51:12Z2023-02-08T19:51:12ZCorruption and war: two scourges that feed off each other<p>In the world championship of corruption, the competition is fierce. The NGO Transparency International has just published its list of countries according to the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb">level of perceived corruption</a>.</p>
<p>The gold medal in the competition for the most corrupt country has just been awarded to Somalia, followed by South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Libya, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and North Korea.</p>
<h2>How do you measure corruption in a country?</h2>
<p>Since its inception in 1995, the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated">Corruption Perceptions Index</a> (CPI) has become the world’s leading indicator of public sector corruption.</p>
<p>It ranks 180 countries and territories as more or less corrupt, using data from 13 external sources, including the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, private consulting and risk management firms, think tanks and others.</p>
<p>The scores given – on a scale ranging from zero (0 = high corruption) to one hundred (100 = no corruption), depending on the degree of perceived corruption in the public sector – reflect the opinions of experts and business figures.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 shows perceived levels of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When corruption eats away at the state…</h2>
<p>Holding the unenviable title of the most corrupt country on the planet since 2007, Somalia has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747730701695729">something in common</a> with its “challengers” that explain their high level of corruption. What are the reasons for the link between increased corruption and the multiplication of conflicts?</p>
<p>The first is that highly corrupt societies are characterised by a great weakness of the state. As the most corrupt country, Somalia has almost no state. Over the past 30 years, it has experienced catastrophic famines, failed international interventions, refugee flows, deaths by the hundreds of thousands, and endless corruption, leading to a continued lack of even rudimentary state services and institutions.</p>
<p>Thus Somali law enforcement forces serve only to terrorise the population and enrich themselves and serve their warlord. Somalis live in an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240500329379">environment of pervasive predation, threats and deprivation</a>. Another example is <a href="http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.522">Syria</a>, in which corruption and the civil war have challenged the functioning of the judicial system, a jungle where those who corrupt the judges win the most.</p>
<h2>Decaying public institutions</h2>
<p>Second, corruption leads to a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2">loss of trust in public institutions</a>, which leads to near-permanent violence. Corruption deteriorates the democratic system in an endless cycle: impoverished citizens receive money to vote for the tyrant in power; electoral commissions are bought and become masquerades to proclaim plebiscites for despots hated by their people; and independent candidates in power are threatened and even sometimes murdered…</p>
<p>For example, South Sudan is a democratic nightmare with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-sudan">permanent violations of human rights</a> – arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, torture and murder. Venezuela, one of the five most corrupt countries in the world, such crimes have infiltrated all levels of the state and corruption has effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-corruption-kill-democracy-110637">killed the country’s democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Another reason is that corruption fuels war is the lack of press freedom. A tyrannical political system nourished by corruption further reinforces its authoritarianism by destroying press freedom. For example, without any media capable of thwarting his power, Vladimir Putin strengthened his hold on Russia and made it impossible to challenge his country’s territorial ambitions such as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2019.1625279">2014 annexation of Crimea</a> and the <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD281.pdf#page=2">2022 attack on Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>As for Yemen, a particularly corrupt territory with very little press freedom, the NGO Reporters Without Borders <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/yemen">says</a>: “The Yemeni media are polarised by the war’s different protagonists and, to avoid reprisals, have no choice but to toe the line of whoever controls the area where they are located”. As a result, Yemen has been ravaged by war since 2014, fuelled by corruption and an authoritarian press.</p>
<p>The final reason for the link between corruption and war is the importance of <a href="http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I4-P240.pdf">economic inequalities and the weakness of economic development</a>.</p>
<h2>Rising inequality</h2>
<p>In a country where corruption reigns, a small minority monopolises national wealth, especially since <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1056492615579081">corruption is the use of its personal power for private interests against the collective interest</a>. When social injustice reigns, tensions develop and civil wars can break out. South Sudan has been portrayed as a kleptocracy, a governmental system in which the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/113/452/347/78186">ruling class appropriates public resources for its own benefit</a> at the expense of public welfare.</p>
<p>In the end, the vicious circle has set in: corruption leads to permanent tensions, and then violent conflicts, and then crimes and wars. As the latest Transparency International report shows, highly corrupt countries are all economically, politically and socially unstable territories that are gradually being destroyed by incessant wars. Over the course of the conflicts, all the institutions of governance have been destroyed.</p>
<p>Insecurity encourages the people to engage in trafficking. In the absence of national watchdog agencies, a feeling of total impunity sets in and corruption becomes systemic. The spread of corruption then makes it a social norm, leading populations of the most affected countries to eventually regard it as the only way to survive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertrand Venard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>A review of Transparency International’s recently released global corruption ranking confirms that corruption fuels war, and vice versa.Bertrand Venard, Professeur / Professor, AudenciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1980542023-01-29T14:27:15Z2023-01-29T14:27:15ZMigrants don’t cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506635/original/file-20230126-27856-ra28za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3956%2C1812&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Venezuelan migrant child cries after the police told his family to break up a camp they had set up on the seashore in El Morro, a neighbourhood of Iquique, Chile, in December 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Matias Delacroix)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Immigration is a critical topic in contemporary political and academic debates. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx039">Politicians</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2021.1925321">the general population alike</a> in countries around the world have often shown hostility towards immigrants.</p>
<p>A typical argument made by those who oppose immigration is that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108626286">it increases crime</a>. If people believe immigrants cause crime rates to climb, it’s not hard to understand a backlash. But what if immigration doesn’t actually increase crime, but affects perceptions about crime anyway?</p>
<p>Although most <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01085.x">research shows immigration has either no impact or a minimal impact on crime</a>, many people seem to believe the connection exists. It seems hostility against immigrants isn’t crime itself but false perceptions about crime.</p>
<h2>The scene in Chile</h2>
<p>My fellow researchers and I have explored this hypothesis in the case of Chile, a country recently exposed to a massive influx of immigrants. <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/chile-immigrants-rising-numbers">From 2002 to 2012, the proportion of migrants grew from one per cent to two per cent of the population.</a> </p>
<p>In 2017, the same indicator represented close to five per cent and surpassed <a href="https://serviciomigraciones.cl/estadisticasmigratorias/estimacionesdeextranjeros/">6.5 per cent the following year</a>. </p>
<p>Not only did the magnitude change, but also the composition of immigrants changed strongly in recent years, with the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20211002-disappointed-haitians-hopeful-venezuelans-caught-up-at-chile-border">arrival of people from Venezuela and Haiti,</a> similar to what happened in other Latin American countries. </p>
<p>A change of this magnitude raises a series of concerns, both regarding its impact on Chilean society as well as the country’s ability to accommodate diverse groups. </p>
<p>For example, a <a href="https://espaciopublico.cl/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Informe-Ipsos-Espacio-Publico-2018_cap2.pdf">nationally representative survey</a> on urban perceptions found that the main concern of Chileans about migration was citizen security (59 per cent), with economic concerns ranking third (46 per cent).</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, politicians often refer to the effect of migrants on specific aspects of the lives of Chileans.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a mask among other people in masks holds up a sign that reads 'close the border now' in spanish" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3482%2C2272&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506633/original/file-20230126-24317-6xvcd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A demonstrator holds a sign that reads in Spanish ‘close the border now!!!’ as people take part in a march against illegal migration, in Iquique, Chile, in January 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ignacio Munoz)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Not likely to be crime victims</h2>
<p>In recent work with Chilean academics Patricio Dominguez and Raimundo Undurraga to be published soon in the <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210156&&from=f"><em>American Economic Journal</em></a>, we evaluate the impact of this wave of migration on the main concern of Chileans: crime. </p>
<p>We first document an interesting disparity: immigration has significantly impacted people’s perceptions of crime but has no effect on actual crime. </p>
<p>People more exposed to immigration inflows are more likely to rank crime as their first or second biggest concern. They’re more likely to believe that crime is affecting their quality of life, and more likely to believe that they will be a victim of a crime soon. </p>
<p>However, those citizens weren’t any more likely to have been victims of any type of crime in the previous months. Nor did the number of homicides grow disproportionately in the municipalities where they live.</p>
<p>In other words, misconceptions about crime increase when immigrants arrive in large numbers in a city. We also show that not only do people become scared, but they also take action, such as installing more alarms or paying for private security.</p>
<p>We then explore potential mechanisms underlying these main effects, testing different hypotheses. </p>
<p>A plausible explanation could be plain discrimination against certain types of immigrants. Specifically, we assess the role of ethnic-related inter-group threats. Those belonging to marginalized “out-groups” (people viewed as different) could be perceived as threatening to the extent that interactions with them foster anxiety and concerns for physical safety.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man sits with his head bowed on a beach as police offers surround him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506634/original/file-20230126-14416-dvfdvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chilean police protect a Venezuelan migrant who was attacked by a demonstrator opposed to migration at a beach in Iquique, Chile, in January 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ignacio Munoz)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The role of the origin region</h2>
<p>Using a measure of bilateral ethnic distance <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.2633">widely used in economics</a>, we demonstrate that our results don’t vary based on the immigrants’ level of ethnic distance to Chile. </p>
<p>In other words, immigrants coming from ethnically similar or different countries than Chile elicit, on average, the same fear. Interestingly, we find that the effects on crime-related concerns are mainly driven by immigrants that do not have ethnically European origins. This result suggests that immigrants with European origins enjoy different status compared to other immigrant groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Children smile and laugh as they ride an amusement park ride." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506644/original/file-20230126-35203-o6u60a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian refugee children and their helpers ride a chain carousel in Frankfurt, Germany, in April 2022 after about 180 children were invited by the fun fair for free rides.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Probst)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Additionally, we investigate the extent to which certain specific characteristics of the immigrant group may influence our results. </p>
<p>We show that the arrival of immigrants with lower levels of educational attainment may drive false perceptions of crime, even though the null effect on crime rates is the same for educated and lesser educated groups. Nonetheless, the impact on citizens in terms of behavioural reactions, such as installing alarms, appear to be more pronounced when immigrants are less educated.</p>
<p>Finally, we explore whether local media influences crime perceptions by measuring local radio stations per capita in municipalities.</p>
<p>Independent of whether they have a high or low number of local radio stations per capita, our findings suggest the effect of immigration on crime is minimal in all municipalities. But the effects on both crime-related fears and behavioural reactions are only significant in municipalities with a relatively large number of local radio stations.</p>
<h2>Fears unfounded</h2>
<p>Our findings hold significant implications for policy. </p>
<p>As Latin America is currently grappling with a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/14/americas/migration-latin-america-violence-intl-latam/index.html">severe migration crisis</a>, our research demonstrates that the concerns of citizens and governments over the potential relationship between immigration and crime in Chile appear to be unfounded. </p>
<p>This is a noteworthy conclusion, particularly as crime is frequently cited in anti-immigration narratives <a href="https://www.latercera.com/noticia/pinera-muchas-las-bandas-delincuentes-chile-extranjeros/">by politicians</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/es/la-marcha-antiinmigrantes-que-mostr%C3%B3-el-lado-m%C3%A1s-inhumano-de-chile/a-59331923">extremist groups</a>. </p>
<p>Our results provide formal documentation for what has already been suggested by anecdotal and survey evidence — increasing fears about crime in the region can be attributed to the recent influx of immigrants, but those fears aren’t based in reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198054/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas Ajzenman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Increasing fears about crime in Chile can be attributed to the recent influx of immigrants, but research shows those concerns aren’t based in reality.Nicolas Ajzenman, Assistant Professor of Economics, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1873622022-07-27T14:55:28Z2022-07-27T14:55:28ZInflation is spiking in Zimbabwe (again). Why high interest rates aren’t the answer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475471/original/file-20220721-14568-r73rro.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Jekesai Njikizana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The central bank of Zimbabwe has raised its benchmark rate from <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-62059711">80% to a fresh record of 200%</a>. This increase comes as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-61036715">driving global commodity prices higher</a>, exacerbating inflation in many countries around the world, including Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube’s thinking is that aggressive tightening of monetary policy is necessary to counter these inflationary pressures. In Zimbabwe too there has been a rise in the prices of imported food, fuel, fertiliser and other essential commodities. </p>
<p>This is why, according to the minister, <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">inflation accelerated to 192% in June</a>.</p>
<p>In fact inflation was highly elevated prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. From 2000, it rapidly increased from single digits to <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/455290/inflation-rate-in-zimbabwe/">114% in 2004, climbed even higher to hit 157% in 2008, and then peaked at 558%</a> in 2020.</p>
<p>There are two longstanding fundamental drivers of inflation in Zimbabwe. The first is monetary expansion that is not supported by economic growth. When there is more money in the economy than goods and services that can be purchased with it, its purchasing power falls and prices increase.</p>
<p>The second relates to what Zimbabweans now expect when it comes to inflation. Expectations are usually anchored when prices of goods and services are stable over time and consistent with what people expect to pay for them. In Zimbabwe this is no longer the case – expectations have been de-anchored. This happens when prices significantly differ from what people expect. If they are getting higher, this can have an inflationary effect by driving up wages and demand for goods and services. Higher wages and demand in turn could push prices even higher, thus making inflation expectations self-fulfilling.</p>
<p>An example of another country that was gripped by hyperinflation and a de-anchoring of expectations is <a href="https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/pb19-13.pdf">Venezuela in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>But there are risks to the Zimbabwe central bank’s decision to hike rates too aggressively. Higher rates could reduce output, while prices continue to rise as in <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">the 1970s</a>. These conditions are referred to as stagflation.</p>
<p>This is concerning as growth in Zimbabwe and other African countries is already <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">projected to decelerate in the next few years</a> due to higher global inflation, tighter global financing conditions, debt distress, additional supply disruptions and increased risk of geoeconomic fragmentation for the world economy.</p>
<h2>The backdrop</h2>
<p>After independence in 1980, the central bank of Zimbabwe managed to keep prices from running out of control. During that decade inflation ranged between <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">10% and 20%</a>. The situation radically changed in the 1990s when the economy slumped after the government introduced <a href="https://theconversation.com/global-and-historical-lessons-on-how-land-reforms-have-unfolded-127627">a land reform programme</a>. </p>
<p>This was meant to redistribute land from the white minority (which owned most of the country’s fertile agricultural land) to the majority black Zimbabweans who had been disenfranchised under the colonial period. But the programme was poorly implemented and benefited mostly <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n">senior government officials and people closely connected to them</a>. </p>
<p>The result was a sharp drop in <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2002/06/27/from-breadbasket-to-basket-case">agricultural output</a>, which had been an important source of exports, foreign currency and employment.</p>
<p>At the same time tax revenues plummeted as the economy <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=ZW">contracted</a>, prompting the government to finance higher spending by printing money. Because this monetary expansion was not accompanied by greater economic growth, inflation quickly accelerated.</p>
<p>In the 2000s, the inflation problem became so severe that Zimbabwe was gripped in a bout of hyperinflation which spurred a sharp weakening of the local currency and triggered a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. </p>
<p>Initially, the government attempted to rein in inflation by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zimbabwe-prices/zimbabweans-hunt-for-food-in-price-control-crisis-idUKNOA53023120070705?edition-redirect=in">imposing price controls</a>. without much success. Instead, this move sparked <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zimbabwe-prices/zimbabweans-hunt-for-food-in-price-control-crisis-idUKNOA53023120070705?edition-redirect=in">widespread shortages of products and promoted an underground economy</a> where price controls were not enforced. </p>
<p>The first episode of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45523636">hyperinflation ended in 2009</a> when the government decided to replace the worthless Zimbabwe dollar with the US dollar. This move quelled inflation until 2018, when a new local currency was introduced. </p>
<p>This new currency soon set off a second episode of hyperinflation. Confidence in the Zimbabwe dollar had been severely dented by the previous episode of hyperinflation and the US dollar continued to be the preferred currency to use by households and firms, even with the new local currency in circulation. </p>
<p>Additionally, it was feared that the government would again revert to printing money to finance a swelling budget deficit. For these reasons, the new Zimbabwe dollar wasn’t popular and its purchasing power quickly eroded, setting in motion a steep increase in prices. </p>
<p>Inflation surged to a staggering <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">255% in 2019, up from a modest 11% in 2018</a>. It further accelerated in 2020, peaking at 558% that year. It has come down since then, but has nevertheless remained elevated.</p>
<h2>Difficult times</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2022/06/measures-to-stabilise-exchange-rate-and-control-inflation/">New measures announced by the minister of finance</a> include re-introduction of the US dollar, which will be used along with the Zimbabwe dollar. This is the second time the government has taken this step. The first was in 2009, when the Zimbabwe dollar was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45523636">abandoned</a> after its value had collapsed following the first bout of hyperinflation.</p>
<p>In addition, the central bank will <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/index.php/publications-notices/notices/press-release/1193-introduction-of-gold-coins">introduce gold coins</a>, which will serve as a store of value and can also be used as collateral and to conduct transactions.
By doing so, the central bank is implicitly admitting that the printed Zimbabwe dollar in circulation has failed to perform its role as a store of value and means of exchange.</p>
<p>The cost of living crisis stoked by high inflation has already fuelled numerous strikes by government employees. Most recently, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-health-workers-strike-after-rejecting-100-pay-rise-2022-06-20/">teachers and health workers</a> went on strike to demand higher pay. </p>
<p>The prospect that growing labour unrest will radiate across other sectors looms large. Therefore, with expectations of higher inflation now firmly entrenched, the central bank’s aggressive policy tightening will most likely temper demand, while doing little to fix the economy’s enduring weak production capacity. </p>
<p>If this happens, the more hawkish response from the central bank raises the risk of stagflation – the combination of faltering demand and accelerating prices. This raises the risk that the economy could descend into a recession. </p>
<h2>Better options</h2>
<p>The fundamental and longstanding drivers of inflationary pressures in Zimbabwe are lax monetary policy and de-anchored inflation expectations, not the war in Ukraine, which is currently receiving the most attention from policy makers.</p>
<p>The central bank should therefore focus more on tackling the underlying drivers of inflation. </p>
<p>To restrain monetary growth, it should start by scrapping the Zimbabwe dollar and legalise use of the US dollar as planned. This would help as the US dollar provides a superior store of value and would force the government to wean itself off dependence on printing money. </p>
<p>Finally, sound and credible central bank communication plays a key role in anchoring views that Zimbabwean people have about inflation. This is worth noting because Zimbabwe’s central bank has not maintained a strong record of keeping inflation low and stable for more than a decade. Trust in the institution is low.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187362/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s central bank should focus on tackling the underlying drivers of inflation rather than blaming the war in Ukraine.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1769282022-06-09T12:33:31Z2022-06-09T12:33:31ZSuper Moustache: how a Venezuelan cartoon turned into a political campaigner<p>“Stupid idiots! Can’t you overthrow him? He’s just a bus driver!” rages a blonde, coiffed character from inside a White House-style building located “somewhere on planet Earth”. The cartoon villain looks like a cross between Donald Trump and The Incredibles antagonist Syndrome. He’s shrieking in Spanish, with a heavy US accent, into a mobile phone.</p>
<p>“We’ve tried everything!” simper the two characters he’s addressing, who look very much like Venezuelan opposition politicians Henry Ramos Allup and Julio Borges. The villain presses a red button that jettisons a drone through the roof of the “White House”. A cartoon map shows the drone heading towards a region that closely resembles the northern coast of South America, before targeting a country shaped very much like Venezuela.</p>
<p>So begins the first episode of the Venezuelan animated cartoon, <a href="https://twitter.com/Superbigote21">Súper Bigote</a> (Super Moustache) – starring a heroic character with a moustache like that of the Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1465778623399485446"}"></div></p>
<p>The Venezuelan government is so fond of Súper Bigote that it promotes the cartoon via social media. President Maduro recently encouraged his followers to download Instagram filters to take photographs of themselves as <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oNSjtbhYUTM&ab_channel=MovimientoRojo">Súper Bigote</a>. And when sharing an episode in which the US attempts to block the entry of COVID-19 vaccines into Venezuela, vice-minister of business Luis Villegas Ramírez <a href="https://twitter.com/luis_villegasr/status/1479564069455765507">tweeted</a>: “It’s great! Don’t miss it!”</p>
<p>Throughout the country, images of Súper Bigote appear to be multiplying. In northern Venezuela, governor Rafael Lacava has controversially <a href="https://www.todosahora.com/noticias-de-venezuela/noticias-de-carabobo/lacava-renombro-plaza-super-bigote-playa-waikiki/">renamed a plaza</a> after Súper Bigote and included an image <a href="https://twitter.com/NicolasMaduro/status/1530017154032091136/photo/1">of him</a> on the walls of a remodelled hospital. In the carnival <a href="https://twitter.com/delcyrodriguezv/status/1498105741244342274?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1498105741244342274%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Frdnoticiasven.net%2Fel-nuevo-disfraz-de-los-ninos-super-bigote-es-tendencia-en-venezuela%2F">processions this year</a>, a time when children traditionally parade in fancy dress, Súper Bigote was a popular costume, at least according to vice-president Delcy Rodríguez. </p>
<p>While government supporters celebrate the cartoon and their solidarity with an “indestructible” president who is “hero and defender” of the country against threats and difficulties, many others see Súper Bigote as a cynical attempt to create a personality cult. With low popularity ratings, Maduro needs to strengthen his image for the 2024 <a href="https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mundo/super-bigote-el-superheroe-basado-en-nicolas-maduro-que-combate-eu-y-opositores-de-venezuela">presidential elections</a>, argues Venezuelan sociologist Trino Márquez.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-york-times-ends-daily-political-cartoons-but-its-not-the-death-of-the-art-form-118754">The New York Times ends daily political cartoons, but it's not the death of the art form</a>
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<p>The cartoon was first broadcast on Venezuela’s state TV channel Venezolana de Televisión (VTV) in December 2021. To date, nine episodes of Súper Bigote have been broadcast on VTV. Each depicts the character using his superpowers to foil dastardly plots devised and financed by the “great villain” to the north, with the aim of sowing chaos and division in a fictional version of <a href="https://ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/especial/super-bigote-el-animado-que-revoluciona-las-redes/">Venezuela</a>. It was recently announced that <a href="http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/super-bigote-ahora-en-historieta-ilustrada/">an illustrated comic strip</a> is now planned based on the same character.</p>
<h2>Cartoon culture</h2>
<p>Latin America has a long tradition of using cartoons, comics and humour to provoke discussion around national and international <a href="https://revistas.udesc.br/index.php/tempo/article/view/2175180308182016040/6039">stories</a>. In Peru, cartoonist Juan Acevedo uses a <a href="https://fsp.duke.edu/speakers/juan-acevedo/">rodent</a>, El Cuy, to explore social and political issues, including the <a href="https://elcomercio.pe/luces/comic/el-cuy-vs-la-pandemia-entranable-personaje-de-juan-acevedo-ensena-a-enfrentar-la-muerte-noticia/">pandemic</a>; in Argentina, Quino’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-mafalda-with-love-three-lessons-from-the-late-quino-and-his-immortal-creation-147311?fbclid=IwAR0V9njPWtd6iEoP1YJi1znEfL_sfA9f3gioBjD5YWHFL0q4QfhFM2uJREs">Mafalda</a> character challenges middle-class values; and in Chile, Pepo’s cartoon condor <a href="https://www.diarioconcepcion.cl/cultura-y-espectaculos/2019/09/29/condorito-testigo-de-la-historia-de-chile-y-del-mundo.html?fbclid=IwAR1mxh2E-NyA0tX2m9GHe5hYbjjSD9IxcU0fSvsPhRPGYKwhhRMl9cwIM1k">Condorito</a> has commented on political events for decades.</p>
<p>When then-Ecuadorian president Lenin Moreno <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Lenin-Moreno-is-Out-of-Reality-President-Maduro-Warns-20191009-0005.html">accused</a> Maduro of causing protests in Ecuador in October 2019, the cartoonist joked on state TV:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>President Lenin Moreno comes along and says that what’s happening there is my fault. That just by wiggling my moustache I can overthrow governments. I’m already wondering what government I can overthrow next with my <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=I9C1POJKPew&ab_channel=LuiginoBracciRoadesdeVenezuela">moustache</a>. I’m not Superman, I’m Super Moustache!</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>According to Omar Cruz, who created Súper Bigote: “Venezuelan humour is part of our idiosyncrasy.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At good times and bad, we resort to humour. So much so that it’s humour, and not politics, that can unite the government and the opposition. In round table discussions, humour has always been there because we know that for us, humour is a very serious matter.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2004, during the government of Hugo Chávez, Juan Forero wrote in The New York Times that, in a political situation with "more than its share of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/01/world/caracas-journal-venezuela-in-turmoil-can-t-keep-from-laughing.html">absurdities</a> and larger-than-life characters”, humour could be used to skewer the powerful and snicker at their perceived failures. </p>
<p>In a political situation with more than its share of absurdities and larger-than-life characters, Súper Bigote, in poking fun at a seemingly indestructible leader and his inept opposition, throws humorous light onto profound and serious tensions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Marsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Venezuelan cartoon character has been adopted by the government to help their popularity.Hazel Marsh, Associate professor, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1783562022-03-06T12:15:09Z2022-03-06T12:15:09ZUkraine invasion: Why Canada should rethink its approach to economic sanctions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449928/original/file-20220303-3137-1fp7md3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C4854%2C3221&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women look at a screen displaying exchange rate at a currency exchange office in St. Petersburg, Russia. The Russian currency has plunged against the U.S. dollar after the West imposed severe economic sanctions. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Western countries have imposed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659">massive sanctions</a> against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/">West has increasingly relied on economic sanctions</a> to punish or change the policies of foreign governments in the last several decades. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions are an effective and peaceful foreign policy tool.</p>
<p>Some sanctions regimes, such as the current effort against Russia, may be both effective and lawful. </p>
<p>But as I explored in a <a href="https://rideauinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Martin_RI_Econ_Sanctions_Ottawa_2021.pdf">recent research report</a>, some economic sanctions may violate international law principles, including those the sanctions are intended to enforce. They may therefore undermine the very legal regimes that Canadians like to champion.</p>
<h2>The nature of economic sanctions</h2>
<p>Many economic sanctions are authorized by the United Nations Security Council or regional organizations. But countries are increasingly imposing sanctions without such <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sanctions-law-9781509900145/">legal authority</a>. It’s these so-called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2019.20">unilateral or autonomous sanctions</a> that raise legal questions.</p>
<p>Economic sanctions typically involve a mix of trade restraints, constraints on financial transactions and travel restrictions. These may take the form of broad <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/57jqap.htm">trade and financial embargoes (like against Iraq in the 1990s</a>) or they may target certain industries or sectors (like the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1179/204243410X12674422128957">arms embargo against South Africa in the 1970s</a>).</p>
<p>While countries are the primary target, there is an increasing deployment of so-called targeted sanctions against people and companies within the target state as a means of exerting pressure on the government (like the <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/global-magnitsky-sanctions">Magnitsky sanctions against Russian oligarchs</a>).</p>
<p>The United States has also imposed secondary or extra-territorial sanctions against countries other than the primary target, and even against individuals and companies outside of the target state, to deter business with the target state (like the <a href="https://mcmillan.ca/insights/the-next-wave-of-us-extraterritorial-sanctions-regarding-cuba-potential-impacts-for-canadian-companies/">Helms-Burton sanctions relating to Cuba</a>).</p>
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<img alt="Men sit in the sun with empty fuel tanks." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449929/original/file-20220303-17-djtw89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Men wait for a cooking gas store to open as they sit with their empty canisters in Havana in early 2020. The Cuban government warned citizens to prepare for shortages of cooking gas due to U.S. sanctions on the island.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ismael Francisco)</span></span>
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<h2>Human rights objections</h2>
<p>But there is <a href="http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics-global-justice/asl%C4%B1-u-b%C3%A2li-aziz-rana-sanctions-are-inhumane%E2%80%94now-and-always">growing criticism</a> that comprehensive sanctions may inflict serious harm and suffering on the people of the target state. The sanctions against <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/09/world/un-sanctions-led-to-400000-deaths-ministry-in-iraq-says.html">Iraq in the 1990s</a> are thought to have contributed to tens of thousands of deaths. </p>
<p>More recently, the American sanctions against Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-the-double-jeopardy-of-sanctions-and-covid-19/">may have caused</a> increased loss of life during the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>Whether states have human rights obligations to the people of other countries is a matter of some debate. But there is an emerging recognition that, at a minimum, comprehensive economic sanctions that significantly impact food security within the target state would constitute a violation of human rights law. </p>
<p>Recent developments therefore require sanctions include <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf">humanitarian safeguards and exemptions</a> for food and medical supplies, though these are often ineffective.</p>
<p><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-402/05">International courts</a> have also ruled that it’s a violation of human rights not to provide people subjected to targeted sanctions with reasons and a process for challenging their sanctions. </p>
<h2>Unlawful intervention</h2>
<p>Economic sanctions may also violate the principle of non-intervention that prohibits countries from engaging in coercive interference in the internal affairs of other states. What kind of pressure exactly comprises coercive interference is <a href="https://doi.org/10.7574/cjicl.04.03.616">debated and somewhat unsettled</a> in international law.</p>
<p>Western states have consistently maintained that economic sanctions do not comprise unlawful intervention. The well-established practice of employing sanctions would tend to corroborate that view. But the developing world has long held that economic sanctions are not only a form of unlawful intervention, but a perpetuation of imperialistic policies against countries of the Global South.</p>
<p>There is a growing body of <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dda1f104.html">soft law</a>, such as UN resolutions, that condemn autonomous economic sanctions as a “means of political and economic coercion.” Canada has even supported some of <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/ga10083.doc.htm">these resolutions</a>. But sanctions that are designed to bring about regime change, as with the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-04-29/sanctions-cant-spark-regime-change">U.S. measures against Venezuela</a>, are coercive in nature.</p>
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<img alt="A man in a baseball cap holds up a sign that says Yankee Go Home." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449930/original/file-20220303-23-iuag2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2015 photo, a protester holds up an anti-U.S. poster of Uncle Sam during a pro-government rally at Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas, Venezuela, after the U.S. imposed sanctions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos)</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Secondary sanctions</h2>
<p>There are also objections to the American practice of imposing secondary sanctions against third-party states, and companies and people outside the target state. </p>
<p>There is a basic prohibition in international law, with a few specific exceptions, against the extra-territorial application of domestic law. Secondary sanctions will <a href="https://academic.oup.com/bybil/advance-article/doi/10.1093/bybil/braa007/5909823">frequently violate this principle</a>.</p>
<p>Canada has been caught up in such secondary sanctions, from the <a href="https://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/cuba/highlights-faits/2019/2019-04-18-helms-burton.aspx?lang=eng.">Helms-Burton Act</a> sanctions against Canadian businesses in Cuba to Canada’s detainment, at the behest of the United States, of <a href="https://asialawportal.com/2021/02/19/tracing-the-origins-of-the-case-against-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhou-how-global-banks-extend-the-reach-of-u-s-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-directly-and-indirectly-impacting-the-global-expansion-of-chin/">a Huawei executive</a> for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran.</p>
<p>Canada and other western countries have even <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/f-29/index.html.">enacted legislation</a> to block American secondary sanctions.</p>
<h2>Canadian sanctions</h2>
<p>Canada has <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/legislation-lois.aspx?lang=eng">several laws in place</a> to implement sanctions. While the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/u-2/index.html">United Nations Act</a> is specifically for implementing UN-authorized sanctions, the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (the Magnitsky Law), provide for autonomous sanctions regimes.</p>
<p>Canada has sanctions under SEMA against 13 countries for human rights violations. It also has sanctions against Iran and North Korea for nuclear non-proliferation, and it had sanctions against both Russia and Ukraine even before the recent invasion. Canada has targeted sanctions in place against people in states that include Russia, Venezuela and Myanmar under the Magnitsky Law for human rights violations.</p>
<p>Canada has not engaged in secondary sanctions, and so isn’t vulnerable to criticism on this front. <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2017CanLIIDocs119#!fragment//BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoByCgSgBpltTCIBFRQ3AT0otokLC4EbDtyp8BQkAGU8pAELcASgFEAMioBqAQQByAYRW1SYAEbRS2ONWpA">Some scholars</a> <a href="https://umanitoba.ca/centres/media/Canadian-Economic-Sanctions-Workshop_finalreport_Nov-2019.pdf">have suggested</a> that Canada should actually consider being more aggressive in this regard. But Canada has been wise not to follow the U.S. down this increasingly controversial path. Indeed, Canada itself <a href="https://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/cuba/highlights-faits/2019/2019-04-18-helms-burton.aspx?lang=eng">has objected</a> to U.S. secondary sanctions.</p>
<p>Some autonomous Canadian sanctions are more vulnerable to criticism on human rights and intervention grounds. Sanctions against <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/iran.aspx?lang=eng">Iran until 2016</a> and <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng">against Venezuela</a> as part of U.S. sanctions regimes were quite comprehensive in their scope. These multilateral sanctions regimes may be viewed as coercive, and may undermine the food security and public health of the target populations. </p>
<p>Unlike the European Union, Canada doesn’t provide due process rights to individuals targeted for sanctions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A bald boy is seen in silhouette as he looks out a window." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449933/original/file-20220303-8354-rhndvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A five-year-old Iranian boy suffering from eye cancer sits in a hospital in Tehran. From imported chemo and other medicines, many Iranians blame medical shortages on U.S. sanctions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Champion of human rights?</h2>
<p>Canada has traditionally viewed itself as a <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/advancing_rights-promouvoir_droits.aspx?lang=eng">champion of human rights</a> and the international rule of law. It also casts itself as a <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/1016956/mandelas-deep-respect-for-canada-mulroney/">friend of the developing world</a>.</p>
<p>It should therefore be sensitive to claims that some of its sanctions may violate international human rights law and constitute unlawful intervention in states of the Global South. </p>
<p>Aside from the apparent hypocrisy, there’s also a risk that Canada could undermine the international law principles that it seeks to champion and betray the broader legal and ethical values that are part of Canada’s sense of identity in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Martin received some funding from the Rideau Institute for the research on economic sanctions reflected in the referenced report. The research was independent and the funding was not conditioned upon any specific findings or conclusions. Martin is a Senior Fellow at the Rideau Institute. </span></em></p>Some economic sanctions may violate international law principles, including those the sanctions are intended to enforce. They may therefore undermine the very legal regimes Canadians champion.Craig Martin, Professor of Law, Washburn UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1596052021-04-22T21:40:24Z2021-04-22T21:40:24ZFor Vladimir Putin and other autocrats, ruthlessly repressing the opposition is often a winning way to stay in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396660/original/file-20210422-15-1ybx3ri.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=84%2C91%2C4423%2C2909&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police arrest a protester at a Moscow rally in support of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, who fell ill while in prison and is now hospitalized.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/law-enforcement-officers-detain-a-participant-in-an-news-photo/1232442492?adppopup=true">Alexander Demianchuk\TASS via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most important opposition leader, is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/17/world/alexey-navalny-health-gets-worse/index.html">emaciated, hospitalized and reportedly nearing death</a> after developing a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny/jailed-kremlin-critic-navalny-says-he-has-temperature-and-cough-some-inmates-may-have-tb-idUSKBN2BS1C0">fever and cough</a> in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/europe/navalny-prison-russia.html">remote penal colony</a> where he is imprisoned. Navalny was also on a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/20/hunger-strike-russia-navalny/">weekslong hunger strike</a> to protest the government’s refusal to let outside doctors treat him in prison.</p>
<p>Navalny’s troubles began in 2019, when he was arrested for “leading an unauthorized protest.” In 2020, while on parole for that crime, <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-suspected-poisoning-why-opposition-figure-stands-out-in-russian-politics-144836">Navalny was poisoned</a> in an apparent assassination attempt linked to Russian leader Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>In critical condition, Navalny was flown to Germany for emergency medical treatment. He survived the poisoning. But in February 2021, a Russian court said the Germany trip was a parole violation. It sentenced Navalny <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/russian-court-sentences-alexei-navalny-35-years-prison">to three years in prison</a>. </p>
<p>The ruling infuriated Russians and spurred thousands to protest. The nationwide demonstrations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/world/europe/russia-protests-navalny-putin.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article">united disparate opposition groups</a> into one movement that is challenging President Vladimir Putin’s 20-year rule. Navalny’s current ill health is <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/21/europe/russia-putin-address-navalny-protests-intl/index.html">again galvanizing protesters</a> and spurring a further government crackdown on <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/putin-warns-west-russian-police-060437752.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMHBvpIttnT8-P3ZJ4fV3zklgEBuCTzz1U9Ebn3rsviyln9q7ypiQfbUmh_rrn1ywOnMqMScAts1MQr_DIDJlvFwSap8ffSIyI3ZhnDdQC7Rs0-pyaqhP_LF7WmvP8xKlrkMhbdeF1HpC_FMbYaCBjqJcLC8Qo7RALsMvEWuojAg">the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>If Navalny dies, it will even further <a href="https://theconversation.com/navalny-returns-to-russia-and-brings-anti-putin-politics-with-him-153964">energize the opposition against Putin</a>. </p>
<p>So has persecuting him been a political misstep by Russia’s leader?</p>
<p>As an international legal scholar and professor of human rights, I’ve found that <a href="https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030354763">strong-arm tactics by autocratic leaders</a> can sometimes trigger a reaction that ultimately topples their regime. Often, though, repressive tactics like detention, torture and prosecution help autocrats like Putin stay in power.</p>
<h2>Political prisoners</h2>
<p>Many historic pro-democracy leaders, including <a href="https://www.mkgandhi.org/biography/arrest.htm">India’s Mahatma Gandhi</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/13/burma-chronology-aung-san-suu-kyis-detention#">Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi</a> and the United States’ <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/mlk-topic/martin-luther-king-jr-arrests">Martin Luther King Jr.</a>, were arrested or imprisoned. In these cases, <a href="http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/05/05/the-resisters-toolkit/">political repression mobilized</a> – rather than destroyed – their movements. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa052">Political prisoners</a>, in particular, can turn into international celebrities who rally people around their cause. </p>
<p>South Africa is an iconic example. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography-timeline">Imprisoned for 27 years</a>, Nelson Mandela became the face of an anti-apartheid movement that evolved from its South African resistance roots into the <a href="https://theconversation.com/boycotts-rallies-and-free-mandela-uk-anti-apartheid-movement-created-a-blueprint-for-activists-today-134857">largest international campaign</a> for regime change in history. Anti-apartheid groups around the globe coalesced to harness <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/british-anti-apartheid-movement">punitive economic tactics</a>, such as boycotts of South African products, and to pressure their governments to apply sanctions. </p>
<p>Eventually, South Africa’s leaders folded to international demands, releasing Mandela in 1990. Mandela was elected president, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24595472?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents">ushering in the end of</a> the world’s most racially oppressive system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Mandela holds his right hand in the air, next to a judge" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mandela is sworn in as South Africa’s first democratically elected president in 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nelson-mandela-is-sworn-in-as-the-first-democratically-news-photo/585857374?adppopup=true">Louise Gubb/Corbis Saba/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Belarus example</h2>
<p>Autocrats in the 21st century aren’t like past dictators. Most now claim legitimacy through rigged elections, which is why votes in authoritarian countries are often accompanied by repression.</p>
<p>Last August, Belarusian autocrat Alexander Lukashenko – in power since 1994 – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53637365">faced an unprecedented electoral challenge</a>. He <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/8/leading-belarus-opposition-candidates-campaign-manager-detained">jailed opposition leaders</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53411735">barred rival candidates</a> from running. The elections were held, and Lukashenko <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/10/europe/belarus-election-protests-lukashenko-intl-hnk/index.html">claimed a landslide victory</a>. </p>
<p>But his only remaining opponent in the presidential race, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b728b6a0-b84d-4f96-97da-2903575cbc9a">was so popular</a> that neither she nor the Belarusian people bought his win. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/09/belarus-election-lukashenko-landslide-victory-fixing-claims">Widespread protests erupted</a> demanding Lukashenko’s ouster. </p>
<p>Lukashenko – a Putin ally – <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/17/belarus-crackdown-escalates">cracked down again</a>, including with brutal police violence. Tikhanovskaya went into exile.</p>
<p>Far from quelling popular anger in Belarus, <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">recent research</a> shows the regime’s violent repression of protests mobilized many people. Protesters <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/winters-quiet-belarus-opposition-prepares-protests-75737562">plan to renew their demonstrations soon</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women in red stand in the snow, holding fists in the air, with pictures of other women" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Feminists in Minsk protest dozens of women imprisoned for demonstrating after Belarus’ presidential election, Aug. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/feminist-activists-take-part-in-a-flash-mob-with-news-photo/1231161058?adppopup=true">Atringer/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Still, Lukashenko continues in power. In large part, that’s because many of the nation’s elite and key institutions – like security services and courts – remain loyal to him. </p>
<p>The most successful autocrats don’t use just repression to stay in office. They also retain control through a spoils systems and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860">corruption that aids</a> those who protect their power. </p>
<h2>International condemnation</h2>
<p>Putin is a master of both repression and corrupt bargains – so notorious for both that the United States created new ways to punish such behavior.</p>
<p>A few years after the 2009 death of corruption whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky in a Russian prison in 2009, the U.S. adopted the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/13/us-global-magnitsky-act#">Magnitsky Act</a>, which <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10576">now authorizes</a> the president to impose sanctions, including barring entry into the U.S., on “any foreign person identified as engaging in human rights abuse or corruption.” </p>
<p>Canada, the United Kingdom and <a href="https://www.universal-rights.org/uncategorized/eu-adopts-magnitsky-style-individual-sanctions-regime-for-grave-human-rights-violations">European Union</a> later passed similar laws. </p>
<p>These laws <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2020/12/eu-introduces-magnitsky-style-human-rights">allow countries</a> to punish repressive leaders, as well as any groups or businesses that back their regimes, with asset freezes and travel bans. They have not yet, however, been used against Putin.</p>
<p>On April 15, the Biden administration did significantly <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-04-19/pdf/2021-08098.pdf">expand existing sanctions against Russia</a>, adding new restrictions on the ability of U.S. institutions to deal in Russian <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/sovereign_debt_prohibition_directive_1.pdf">sovereign debt</a>. The new sanctions appear aimed at ratcheting up the economic pressure on Putin and inviting <a href="https://www.gibsondunn.com/biden-administration-imposes-additional-sanctions-on-russia/">similar measures from allies</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to employing <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions">targeted</a> and national sanctions, democratic countries have other ways to reproach states that violate international law. These include severing diplomatic ties and mandating global scrutiny by international bodies like the United Nations. </p>
<p>Such responses have had <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-02/biden-s-sanctions-on-russia-saudis-spark-grumblings-of-weakness">limited success</a> in forcing autocratic leaders to respect democracy and human rights. </p>
<p>Take Venezuela, for example. There, President Nicolás Maduro has been in power since 2013, and mass protests against his government began in 2015. </p>
<p>In a series of damning reports, the United Nations has characterized the Maduro regime’s killing and imprisonment of protesters as “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26247&LangID=E">crimes against humanity</a>.” Many countries have imposed <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/02/22/venezuela-19-officials-added-to-the-eu-sanctions-list/">increasingly harsh sanctions on Venezuela</a> over <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf">many years</a>. </p>
<p>Eventually, in 2019, Maduro <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-48887453">released 22 political prisoners</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53985277">pardoned 110 more</a>.</p>
<p>But in December, Venezuela held elections that, once again, failed to meet <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-55211149">democratic standards</a>. </p>
<p>Maduro’s party, unsurprisingly, won. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Maduro in a military hat surrounded by soldiers speaks at a microphone with his hand raised" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Maduro of Venezuela speaks at a military parade in Caracas on April 13, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-of-venezuela-nicolas-maduro-speaks-beside-head-of-news-photo/1136941388?adppopup=true">Lokman Ilhan/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An evolving playing field</h2>
<p>Mass protest campaigns can succeed and have succeeded in ousting dictatorial leaders, as seen recently in Ukraine. There, protests in 2004 and then <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement">again in 2014</a> reoriented the country away from Russia and toward democracy. </p>
<p>History shows successful protest movements must involve at least <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world">3.5% of the population</a> – including the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/704699">urban middle class and industrial workers</a> – engaged in coordinated, nonviolent tactics like general strikes and boycotts. That may not seem like a lot of people, but in a country with the population size of Russia’s, this would require over 5 million people to participate in an organized resistance.</p>
<p>In these circumstances, sanctions and global scrutiny can add real weight to a pro-democracy uprising.</p>
<p>But experts <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/14/new-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-breakthrough-or-distraction-pub-83415">worry that the international community’s tools</a> are inadequate given the challenges authoritarianism presents worldwide. Today <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">54% of the global population</a> lives in an autocracy like Russia, Belarus or Venezuela – the highest percentage in 20 years. </p>
<p>Perhaps not coincidentally, pro-democracy movements are also on the rise. <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">Mass pro-democracy protests in 2019</a> took place in 44% of countries, up from 27% in 2014.</p>
<p>As the battle between autocracy and democracy plays out in Russia, Belarus and beyond, the world’s historic defenders of democracy – especially the U.S. and European Union – <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy">face their own democratic struggles</a>. </p>
<p>That’s good news for Putin – and more cause for democracy advocates to be concerned.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-autocrats-like-vladimir-putin-ruthless-repression-is-often-a-winning-way-to-stay-in-power-156172">story</a> originally published April 9, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s not much the world can do to stop authoritarian rulers from persecuting their political opponents, as shown by the standoff over Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, who is ill and imprisoned.Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1554482021-04-14T19:19:17Z2021-04-14T19:19:17ZColombia gives nearly 1 million Venezuelan migrants legal status and right to work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394624/original/file-20210412-21-1bf4hu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5472%2C3637&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Venezuelans wait at the Colombian border to be processed and housed in tents in 2020. All Venezuelans now in Colombia will receive a 10-year residency permit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/venezuelans-queue-as-they-are-being-transferred-from-the-news-photo/1219988930?adppopup=true">Schneyder Mendoza/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Colombia will <a href="https://idm.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/presidente-duque-anuncia-decision-historica-de-crear-estatuto-de-proteccion-210208">grant legal status</a> to all Venezuelan migrants who fled there since 2016 to escape their country’s economic collapse and political crisis. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/2/60214cf74/unhcr-iom-welcome-colombias-decision-regularize-venezuelan-refugees-migrants.html">bold new policy</a> – which will give nearly 1 million undocumented migrants rights to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/11/columbia-is-letting-hundreds-thousands-venezuelans-stay-what-can-other-countries-learn/">legal employment, health care, education and Colombian banking services</a> for 10 years – is driven by both empathy and pragmatism, says Colombian president Ivan Duque.</p>
<p>“They’ll likely stay for more than a decade,” Duque <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/972907206/colombias-president-on-amnesty-for-venezuelans-we-want-to-set-an-example">told NPR on March 3, 2021</a>. “So it’s better to…open them the opportunity to contribute also to the Colombian economy.”</p>
<p>Venezuelan arrivals to Colombia are <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-from-venezuela-are-fleeing-to-latin-american-cities-not-refugee-camps-103040">not confined to refugee camps</a>, so they live scattered across the country. Documenting and absorbing so many migrants – who often arrive on foot, with only a handful of personal belongings and no valid ID – has been a challenge. Even rich countries like the U.S. struggle to handle mass migration. </p>
<p>But in some ways Colombia – itself no stranger to political strife and displacement – is uniquely prepared for this migration crisis.</p>
<h2>History of conflict</h2>
<p>Colombia has received the brunt of the exodus from neighboring Venezuela since 2015. </p>
<p>When many other South American countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-america-shuts-out-desperate-venezuelans-but-colombias-border-remains-open-for-now-123307">closed their borders</a> with Venezuela, Colombia offered a series of two-year permits giving <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2542#_ga=2.110002501.1926605164.1616027328-1253781668.1616027328">about 700,000 Venezuelans</a> the right to <a href="https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/venezuela/pep">work and access to health care</a> between 2017 and 2020. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Migrants in a line wearing face masks in a verdant, warm-weather climate" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394610/original/file-20210412-15-8g2ljo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Venezuelan migrants receive food and medicine from the Red Cross near the Colombia-Venezuela border, February 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/venezuelan-migrants-wear-a-face-masks-as-they-queue-to-news-photo/1230935924?adppopup=true">Schneyder Mendoza/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Together with the new legalization plan covering 1 million additional migrants, nearly all the roughly <a href="https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/distribucion-de-venezolanos-en-colombia-corte-31-de-enero-de-2021">1.7 million Venezuelans</a> who have come to Colombia since 2015 will have some form of legal status. New <a href="https://idm.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/abece-del-estatuto-temporal-de-proteccion-para-migrantes-venezolanos-210209">arrivals who are legally processed in the next two years</a> will also be covered.</p>
<p>Colombia is not wealthy. But Colombians understand better than many what it means to be <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=gPQ6h6">driven from your home</a>. </p>
<p>Over 8 million of Colombia’s 50 million people have been <a href="https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394">displaced by ongoing civil conflict</a> since the 1990s. At least <a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf?language=es">1 million</a> moved into neighboring Venezuela, seeking safety and opportunity. A government <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-has-a-new-peace-agreement-but-will-it-stick-69535">peace agreement with the FARC guerrilla group</a> in 2016 quelled but <a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-and-killings-havent-stopped-in-colombia-despite-landmark-peace-deal-111232">did not end violence in Colombia</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="Q3HnF" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Q3HnF/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Because of this history, international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and World Food Program have worked in Colombia for decades. Today, the <a href="https://www.acnur.org/colombia?gclid=CjwKCAjw9r-DBhBxEiwA9qYUpQuDbdwOF7khiSLdQlGTQQumhCQJmSy3QtNvypGkCYLloyeoSJ8KWBoCtaIQAvD_BwE">U.N.’s refugee agency</a> and <a href="https://www.iom.int/countries/colombia">International Organization for Migration</a> are leading <a href="https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform/location/10044">a group of 73 international organizations and agencies</a> to align their work with Colombia’s national humanitarian efforts. <a href="https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform/location/10044">The group</a> works in 14 states across Colombia, providing assistance that ranges from <a href="https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiY2M0Mjc1YjAtYWViNy00MTdlLTllNjgtODk5MTk1NTljMmJhIiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9">distributing COVID-19 hygiene kits to enrolling migrant children in school</a>.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian networks adapt</h2>
<p>The Colombian government also has some <a href="http://www.portalsnariv.gov.co/node/1000">50 agencies</a> dedicated to helping Colombians displaced by armed conflict. Now many are adapting that experience to help Venezuelan migrants.</p>
<p>Since 2019 we have interviewed over a dozen government officials, lawyers and civil society representatives in two Colombian “departments,” or states, that have received <a href="https://r4v.info/en/documents/details/85410">high numbers of Venezuelan migrants</a>: <a href="https://www.atlantico.gov.co/index.php/departamento">Atlántico</a> and <a href="http://www.nortedesantander.gov.co/">Norte de Santander</a>. This work was <a href="https://www.storymodelers.org/absorptivecapacity">part of a broader study</a> on how countries manage mass migration. </p>
<p>At the religious charity <a href="https://pastoralsocialbaq.org/">Secretariado de Pastoral Social-Cáritas</a>, part of the Catholic Archdiocese of the city of Barranquilla, in Atlántico, the longtime director said the migrant situation today looks a lot like it did decades ago when Colombia’s civil conflict peaked in the Atlántico region, with people wandering around, not knowing anyone and not sure what to do or where to go. Then as now, they slept in the parks and on the streets. </p>
<p>“We already lived it in the ‘90s,” said the director of Pastoral Social.</p>
<p>Back then, the group helped the Colombians displaced by fighting to find food and shelter. Now many of its clients are Venezuelan. </p>
<p>The nonprofit <a href="https://opcionlegal.org/">Opción Legal</a> – an umbrella organization that manages refugee programs for the U.N. – has a similar origin story. </p>
<p>At its start 21 years ago, staffers worked in some of the most difficult conflict regions in Colombia, training the nonprofits that help displaced Colombians in accounting and legal processes, among other technical functions.</p>
<p>Now Opción Legal offers Venezuelan migrants free legal advice about getting Colombian health care and education, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/1/9/Venezuela-babies-Colombia-protection">among other services</a>. Using a nationwide network of 22 Colombian universities developed over many years, it trains students and professors to extend the reach of its legal support programs to Venezuelan migrants.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A green hillside with shacks on it" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/394613/original/file-20210412-23-ot4e2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An informal settlement housing many displaced Colombians, on the outskirts of Bogotá.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-the-improvise-settlement-at-the-paraiso-news-photo/1228425652?adppopup=true">Juancho Torres/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Troubles ahead</h2>
<p>In 2019, nearly <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html">80 million people across the globe</a> – mostly Syrians, Venezuelans, Afghans and South Sudanese – were driven from their homes by crime, climate change, chronic poverty, war, political instability and disaster, according to the U.N. – <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/wmr_2020.pdf">an all-time high</a>. Many will spend <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/2019-update-how-long-do-refugees-stay-exile-find-out-beware-averages#:%7E:text=%22The%20average%20length%20of%20time,are%20spinning%20out%20of%20control.">years or decades</a> waiting for a permanent solution, whether that be settling locally, returning home or finding a new country to make a life. </p>
<p>Colombia’s new legalization plan reflects an assessment that Venezuela’s collapse is a long-term challenge and that integrating migrants is a better solution, economically and socially, than trying to keep out or expel them.</p>
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<p>Colombia is being <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/2/60214cf74/unhcr-iom-welcome-colombias-decision-regularize-venezuelan-refugees-migrants.html">internationally applauded</a> for its humanitarianism. But equipping <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2331502419860138">hospitals</a> and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/imig.12839?casa_token=hJTDRD9tfEMAAAAA%3AuWzE3ohN--QrLpsKRfu2lBMGwVttuDh20GxwtB2d9sQN9j8MNNNV3FIjjmxg1JN2--NXtMoE02lspF2s">schools</a> to handle the needs of this rapidly growing and often very needy population will require a lot of money. And most of it will have to come from the international community, because Colombia does not have the money to do it single-handedly. Yet the Venezuelan migrant crisis is a <a href="https://r4v.info/en/situations/platform/location/10044">chronically underfunded</a> area of humanitarian work. </p>
<p>The legalization plan also risks inflaming anti-migrant sentiments in Colombia. Particularly in border areas, some <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/migration-crime-latam-eng-final.pdf">blame rising violence on migration</a> – though evidence shows <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelan-migrants-face-crime-conflict-and-coronavirus-at-colombias-closed-border-137743">Venezuelan migrants are more likely to be crime victims</a> than perpetrators. </p>
<p>And Colombia still has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-violence/violence-in-some-areas-of-colombia-has-worsened-since-peace-deal-red-cross-says-idUSKCN1R926I">domestic migration problems of its own</a>. Dissident FARC members, other guerrilla groups, drug cartels and insurgencies <a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-and-killings-havent-stopped-in-colombia-despite-landmark-peace-deal-111232">continue to battle over territory and resources</a>, displacing <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/col">70,865 more Colombians last year alone</a>. </p>
<p>The Colombian government is betting that the U.N. and international agencies will help it fulfill its ambitious goal of welcoming 1.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants. </p>
<p>If it works, that money would improve government services for all Colombians, too. </p>
<p><em>Lia Castillo, Liss Romero and Lydia Sa conducted research, documentation and analysis for this story.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erika Frydenlund receives funding from the Office of Naval Research through the Minerva Research Initiative. None of the views reported in the study are those of the funding organization.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose J. Padilla receives funding from the Office of Naval Research through the Minerva Research Initiative. None of the views reported in the study are those of the funding organization.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katherine Palacio receives funding as a consultant from the Minerva Research Initiative. None of the views reported in the study are those of the funding organization.</span></em></p>Though not a rich country, Colombia is unusually well equipped to handle mass migration because of its own history with political strife and displacement.Erika Frydenlund, Research Assistant Professor, Old Dominion UniversityJose J. Padilla, Research Associate Professor, Old Dominion UniversityKatherine Palacio, Assistant professor and data analyst, Universidad del NorteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1561722021-04-07T12:29:58Z2021-04-07T12:29:58ZFor autocrats like Vladimir Putin, ruthless repression is often a winning way to stay in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393634/original/file-20210406-23-121zchs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C31%2C5168%2C3414&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian police officers beat people protesting the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Jan. 23, 2021 in Moscow.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-policemen-beat-participants-of-an-unauthorized-news-photo/1230750514?adppopup=true">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny/jailed-kremlin-critic-navalny-says-he-has-temperature-and-cough-some-inmates-may-have-tb-idUSKBN2BS1C0">sick with a cough and fever</a>, has been moved to the hospital ward of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/world/europe/navalny-prison-russia.html">remote penal colony</a> where he is imprisoned. </p>
<p>Navalny landed in prison after legal troubles that began in 2019, when he was arrested for “leading an unauthorized protest.” In 2020, while on parole for that crime, <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-suspected-poisoning-why-opposition-figure-stands-out-in-russian-politics-144836">Navalny was poisoned</a> in an apparent assassination attempt linked to Russian leader Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>In critical condition, Navalny was flown to Germany for emergency medical treatment. In February 2021, a Russian court said the Germany trip was a parole violation and sentenced Navalny <a href="https://www.voanews.com/europe/russian-court-sentences-alexei-navalny-35-years-prison">to three years in prison</a>. </p>
<p>The ruling infuriated Russians and spurred thousands to protest. The nationwide demonstrations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/world/europe/russia-protests-navalny-putin.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article">united disparate opposition groups</a> into one movement that is challenging President Vladimir Putin’s 20-year rule. Now Navalny’s current ill health is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny/allies-of-kremlin-critic-navalny-raise-alarm-over-his-health-after-lawyers-denied-prison-access-idUSKBN2BG2GK">again galvanizing protesters</a>.</p>
<p>If persecuting Navalny <a href="https://theconversation.com/navalny-returns-to-russia-and-brings-anti-putin-politics-with-him-153964">energizes the opposition against Putin</a>, is it a misstep by Russia’s leader?</p>
<p>As an international legal scholar and professor of human rights, I’ve found that sometimes, <a href="https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030354763">strong-arm tactics by autocratic leaders</a> do trigger a reaction that ultimately topples their regime. Often, though, repressive tactics like detention, torture and prosecution help autocrats stay in power.</p>
<h2>Political prisoners</h2>
<p>Many historic pro-democracy leaders, including <a href="https://www.mkgandhi.org/biography/arrest.htm">India’s Mahatma Gandhi</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/13/burma-chronology-aung-san-suu-kyis-detention#">Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi</a> and the United States’ <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/mlk-topic/martin-luther-king-jr-arrests">Martin Luther King Jr.</a>, were arrested or imprisoned. In these cases, <a href="http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/05/05/the-resisters-toolkit/">political repression mobilized</a> – rather than destroyed – their movements. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa052">Political prisoners</a>, in particular, can turn into international celebrities that rally people around their cause. </p>
<p>South Africa is an iconic example. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/page/biography-timeline">Imprisoned for 27 years</a>, Nelson Mandela became the face of an anti-apartheid movement that evolved from its South African resistance roots into the <a href="https://theconversation.com/boycotts-rallies-and-free-mandela-uk-anti-apartheid-movement-created-a-blueprint-for-activists-today-134857">largest international campaign</a> for regime change in history. Anti-apartheid groups around the globe coalesced to harness <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/british-anti-apartheid-movement">punitive economic tactics</a>, such as boycotts of South African products, and to pressure their governments to apply sanctions. </p>
<p>Eventually, South Africa’s leaders folded to international demands, releasing Mandela in 1990. Mandela was elected president, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24595472?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents">ushering in the end of</a> the world’s most racially oppressive system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Mandela holds his right hand in the air, next to a judge" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393637/original/file-20210406-17-fhokw7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mandela is sworn in as South Africa’s first democratically elected president, 1994.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nelson-mandela-is-sworn-in-as-the-first-democratically-news-photo/585857374?adppopup=true">Louise Gubb/Corbis Saba/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Belarus example</h2>
<p>Autocrats in the 21st century aren’t like past dictators. Most now claim legitimacy through rigged elections, which is why votes in authoritarian countries are often accompanied by repression.</p>
<p>Last August, Belarusian autocrat Alexander Lukashenko – in power since 1994 – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53637365">faced an unprecedented electoral challenge</a>. He <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/8/leading-belarus-opposition-candidates-campaign-manager-detained">jailed opposition leaders</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53411735">barred rival candidates</a> from running. The elections were held, and Lukashenko <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/10/europe/belarus-election-protests-lukashenko-intl-hnk/index.html">claimed a landslide victory</a>. </p>
<p>But his only remaining opponent in the presidential race, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b728b6a0-b84d-4f96-97da-2903575cbc9a">was so popular</a> that neither she nor the Belarusian people bought his win. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/09/belarus-election-lukashenko-landslide-victory-fixing-claims">Widespread protests erupted</a> demanding Lukashenko’s ouster. </p>
<p>Lukashenko – a Putin ally – <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/17/belarus-crackdown-escalates">cracked down again</a>, including with brutal police violence. Tikhanovskaya went into exile.</p>
<p>Far from quelling popular anger in Belarus, <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494">recent research</a> shows the regime’s violent repression of protests mobilized many people. Protesters <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/winters-quiet-belarus-opposition-prepares-protests-75737562">plan to renew their demonstrations soon</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women in red stand in the snow, holding fists in the air, with pictures of other women" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393639/original/file-20210406-19-be0a0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Feminists protest dozens of women imprisoned for demonstrating after Belarus’s presidential election, Aug. 9, 2020, Minsk.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/feminist-activists-take-part-in-a-flash-mob-with-news-photo/1231161058?adppopup=true">Atringer/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Still, Lukashenko continues in power. In large part, that’s because many of the nation’s elite and key institutions – like security services and courts – remain loyal to him. </p>
<p>The most successful autocrats don’t just use repression to stay in office. They also retain control through a spoils systems and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860">corruption that aids</a> those who protect their power. </p>
<h2>International condemnation</h2>
<p>Putin is a master of both repression and corrupt bargains – so notorious for both that the United States created new ways to punish such behavior.</p>
<p>A few years after a corruption whistleblower, Sergei Magnitsky, died in a Russian prison in 2009, the U.S. adopted the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/13/us-global-magnitsky-act#">Magnitsky Act</a>, which <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10576">now authorizes</a> the president to impose sanctions, including barring entry into the U.S., on “any foreign person identified as engaging in human rights abuse or corruption.” </p>
<p>Canada, the United Kingdom and <a href="https://www.universal-rights.org/uncategorized/eu-adopts-magnitsky-style-individual-sanctions-regime-for-grave-human-rights-violations">European Union</a> later passed similar laws. </p>
<p>These laws <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2020/12/eu-introduces-magnitsky-style-human-rights">allow countries</a> to punish repressive leaders, as well as any groups or businesses that back their regimes, with asset freezes and travel bans. They have not yet, however, been used against Putin.</p>
<p>In addition to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions">targeted</a> and national sanctions, democratic countries have other ways to reproach states that violate international law. These include severing diplomatic ties and mandating global scrutiny by international bodies like the United Nations. </p>
<p>Such responses have had <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-02/biden-s-sanctions-on-russia-saudis-spark-grumblings-of-weakness">limited success</a> in forcing autocratic leaders to respect democracy and human rights. </p>
<p>Take Venezuela, for example. There, President Nicolás Maduro has been in power since 2013, and mass protests against his government began in 2015. </p>
<p>In a series of damning reports, the United Nations has characterized the Maduro regime’s killing and imprisonment of protesters as “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26247&LangID=E">crimes against humanity</a>.” Many countries have imposed <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/02/22/venezuela-19-officials-added-to-the-eu-sanctions-list/">increasingly harsh sanctions on Venezuela</a> over <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf">many years</a>. </p>
<p>Eventually, in 2019, Maduro <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-48887453">released 22 political prisoners</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53985277">pardoned 110 more</a>.</p>
<p>But in December, Venezuela held elections that, once again, failed to meet <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-55211149">democratic standards</a>. </p>
<p>Maduro’s party, unsurprisingly, won. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Maduro in a military hat surrounded by soldiers speaks at a microphone with his hand raised" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/393641/original/file-20210406-13-1hcyhef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Maduro of Venezuela speaks at a military parade, Caracas, April 13, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-of-venezuela-nicolas-maduro-speaks-beside-head-of-news-photo/1136941388?adppopup=true">Lokman Ilhan/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An evolving playing field</h2>
<p>Mass protest campaigns can succeed and have succeeded in ousting dictatorial leaders, as seen recently in Ukraine. There, protests in 2004 and then <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement">again in 2014</a> reoriented the country away from Russia and toward democracy. </p>
<p>History shows successful protest movements must involve at least <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world">3.5% of the population</a> – including the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/704699">urban middle class and industrial workers</a> – engaged in coordinated, nonviolent tactics like general strikes and boycotts. That may not seem like a lot of people, but in a country with the population size of Russia’s, this would require over 5 million people to participate in an organized resistance.</p>
<p>In these circumstances, sanctions and global scrutiny can add real weight to a pro-democracy uprising.</p>
<p>But experts <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/14/new-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-breakthrough-or-distraction-pub-83415">worry that the international community’s tools</a> are inadequate given the challenges authoritarianism presents worldwide. Today <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">54% of the global population</a> lives in an autocracy like Russia, Belarus or Venezuela – the highest percentage in 20 years. </p>
<p>Perhaps not coincidentally, pro-democracy movements are also on the rise. Forty-four percent of countries saw <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">mass pro-democracy protests in 2019</a>, up from 27% in 2014.</p>
<p>As the battle between autocracy and democracy plays out in Russia, Belarus and beyond, the world’s historic defenders of democracy – especially the U.S. and European Union – <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy">face their own democratic struggles</a>. </p>
<p>That’s good news for Putin – and more cause for democracy advocates like Navalny to be concerned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156172/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>And there’s not too much the rest of the world can do to stop them.Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540032021-02-15T13:12:38Z2021-02-15T13:12:38ZHow the U.S. can move beyond mass protests in the aftermath of Donald Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383811/original/file-20210211-13-bfx4iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C26%2C6000%2C3925&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of President Donald Trump are confronted by U.S. Capitol Police officers outside the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Does the world seem in turmoil? COVID-19 has certainly caused great upheaval, but it’s not alone in confusing our sense of what life should be like. Over the past five years, the world has experienced a constant stream of mass protests.</p>
<p>If you live in the United States and Canada, you’ve been a witness to the Black Lives Matter protests, which <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/12/31/2020-the-year-black-lives-matter-shook-the-world">started here</a> and spread to other countries, and the often <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21432330/counterprotests-black-lives-matter-violent">violent counter-demonstrations</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-rally-idUSKBN1ZJ15B">pro-gun</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/24/washington-march-for-our-lives-gun-violence">anti-gun</a> rallies in <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/7331295/pro-gun-rally-parliament-hill/">both countries</a>, and both <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/truck-convoy-red-deer-ottawa-arnprior-1.5023646">pro-pipeline</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/world/canada/gas-pipeline-protests.html">anti-pipeline</a> demonstrations, the latter of which included <a href="https://torontosun.com/news/national/pipeline-protests-timeline-of-how-we-got-here">Indigenous protests</a>.</p>
<p>There have also been demonstrations against violence against women, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/americas/mexico-women-strike-protest.html">particularly in Mexico</a>, loosely tied to the #MeToo movement, which started <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html">in the U.S.</a> but became <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/08/metoo-around-the-world/">international in scope</a>.</p>
<p>The final days of Donald Trump’s presidency saw the storming of the Capitol building, considered the shrine to American democracy, by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html">xenophobes, militia members and QAnon supporters along with other core Trump supporters</a>. They were there to support their president in his bid to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, and Trump’s second impeachment trial featured <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-impeachment-trial-trump/2021/02/10/17863674-6bbe-11eb-9f80-3d7646ce1bc0_story.html">previously unseen footage</a> of lawmakers running for their lives from the mob.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-donald-trump-do-better-than-expected-in-the-u-s-election-149779">Why did Donald Trump do better than expected in the U.S. election?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>This was perhaps a fitting end to a tumultuous half decade in the American republic, a time when forces demanding change and forces insisting upon a return to an idealized, largely fictional past struggled for control. But the U.S. has not been alone in the battle over the future direction of society. </p>
<h2>Worldwide protests</h2>
<p>Citizens in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/13/hong-kong-protests-arrests-as-thousands-sing-protest-anthem-on-anniversary-of-clashes">Hong Kong</a> have been fighting for their democracy. Protests have broken out <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50486646">in Iran</a> on several occasions since 2017, directed at the country’s stagnant economy and at the Iranian leadership. </p>
<p>Chile too was rocked by violent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/americas/why-chile-protests.html">protests over economic inequality</a> in 2019 and more recently <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/police-shooting-sets-off-fiery-protests-southern-chile-75728112">over police brutality</a>. Economic protests in Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/zimbabwe-mugabe-loses-power-what-could-happen-next-2017-11">brought down</a> President Robert Mugabe in 2017, but continued corruption and economic hardship led to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/world/africa/zimbabwe-coronavirus-protest.html">more demonstrations</a> in 2020. </p>
<p>Venezuela has seen repeated mass protests <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-how-the-crisis-in-venezuela-unfolded/">against the Nicolas Maduro government</a> over political corruption and a rapidly deteriorating economy. Indian farmers are carrying on a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/world/asia/india-farmer-protest.html">large-scale campaign</a> to bring relief from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agricultural reforms, which the farmers feel will lead to the destruction of family farms. Protests have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55778334">escalating in Russia</a> since 2020 over political corruption.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/indias-farmers-are-right-to-protest-against-agricultural-reforms-152726">India's farmers are right to protest against agricultural reforms</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>This is just a sampling of multiple mass protests in recent years. Understanding why they occur will help to explain the frequency. There are some common elements in most mass movements.</p>
<h2>For and against change</h2>
<p>Some movements are about change and some are against change. All start with people who feel something they urgently need is being denied by authorities. If that denial persists, eventually frustration leads to protest. </p>
<p>Protests that are sustained by strong frustrations, or even desperation, will endure, grow and eventually usually lead to violence, either by the demonstrators or their opponents. </p>
<p>At that point, authorities have to decide whether to crush the protest movement or provide concessions. At the moment, the Chinese government is imposing a law that essentially sends anyone who opposes or criticizes the Chinese-controlled government of Hong Kong <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/asia/china-hong-kong-arrests.html">to mainland China for trial</a> on what would be loosely termed charges of sedition or treason. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in masks carrying signs outside a courthouse." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383836/original/file-20210211-20-18hl6he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Various groups of pro-democracy activists arrive at a court in Hong Kong in February 2021 charged with joining an unauthorized assembly in June 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kin Cheung)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The pandemic has made large public protests dangerous, and the number of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hos.%20ngkong-security-emigration/">people fleeing Hong Kong</a> suggests the Chinese government has won, as governments usually do.</p>
<p>Social media often fuels today’s mass protests. Citizens can now connect with others who are equally frustrated about political and economic issues and inequities, and can organize demonstrations. The first real cross-country protest by Indigenous people in Canada, the Idle No More movement, was largely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/11/canada-indigenous-people-demand-better-deal">organized on Facebook</a>.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, dictatorships, and even some democratic governments, often <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/06/myanmar-generals-shut-down-internet-as-thousands-protest-coup.html">shut down the internet</a> and cell phone service during mass protests.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Will millions continue <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/venezuela-emergency.html">to flee Venezuela</a> because the government has successfully used <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/25/venezuela-arrests-killings-anti-government-protests">brutal repression</a> to control demonstrators while the economy implodes? </p>
<p>Will Vladimir Putin’s widespread <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/membership/2021/feb/08/covering-the-russia-protest-police-usually-let-western-reporters-go">use of force</a> in Russia curb protests against corruption and abuse of power? </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Detained protesters walk are escorted by police" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383810/original/file-20210211-21-1dav4gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Detained protesters walk are escorted by police on Jan. 31, 2021, during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in St. Petersburg, Russia. Governments usually win when it comes to resolving mass protests.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Will the Modi government in India turn to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/india-government-must-stop-crushing-farmers-protests-and-demonizing-dissenters/">increased use of force</a> if farm protesters become frustrated with the lack of action on their grievances and turn to violence?</p>
<p>And what about the U.S. now that Trump is out of power?</p>
<p>I’ve previously identified groups who were core Trump supporters, such as evangelical Christians; industrial workers who have lost their jobs because of globalization and those whose livelihood depends on those workers; xenophobes; and white supremacists.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hard-core-trump-supporters-ignore-his-lies-144650">Why hard-core Trump supporters ignore his lies</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>These are among the people who came to Washington on Jan. 6 to demand Congress refuse to recognize the outcome of the election. All claim they feel ignored by government. But their view of what America should be was leveraged by the president, who gave frustration a voice. While <a href="https://www.fox10tv.com/news/us_world_news/trump-takes-no-responsibility-for-capitol-attack/article_8839962f-5081-5be5-a2d4-6ac5f0864a4d.html">not all</a> took part in the insurrection, many did, having been given permission by the president to do so. Here we have a variation on usual protests — authority encouraged rather than opposed protest.</p>
<h2>Biden’s attempts to ease tensions</h2>
<p>President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/joe-biden-policies.html">is making efforts</a> to address some economic grievances. He’s supporting a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/10/stimulus-update-biden-white-house-builds-business-coalition-to-support-plan.html">massive aid</a> package for Americans, and his Buy American policies will sit well with those who are angry over the flight of manufacturing from the U.S. He’s also proposed subsidies for certain industries that could create jobs, taxing products made overseas by American companies and boosting wealth taxes.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Biden wears a mask while sitting in the Oval Office." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383895/original/file-20210211-15-1vyd52s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Biden speaks during a meeting with lawmakers on investments in infrastructure in the Oval Office of the White House on Feb. 11, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Evangelical Christians will be harder to pacify. Though he’s a devout Catholic, Biden’s liberal <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/evangelical-christians-take-measure-of-biden-after-finding-unlikely-ally-in-trump-01607279720">views on abortion</a> likely mean evangelicals will stick with the Republican Party.</p>
<p>Some xenophobes will be placated by America First policies, but many will be angered by Biden’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/11/house-democrats-biden-immigration-plan-468720">easing of restrictions</a> on immigration from Latin American countries. </p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/capitol-arrests-far-right-militia-1.5879722">prosecuting identifiable attackers</a> in the Capitol insurrection, the government is doing the right thing to prevent a similar violent protest. </p>
<p>Militias and other right-wing extremists seem to be <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/where-protesters-go-armed-militias-vigilantes-likely-follow-little-stop-n1238769">a feature of American life</a>. They have largely remained in the shadows until Donald Trump gave them legitimacy. With the current prosecutions, and undoubtedly increased surveillance, they will once again be pushed into the background. </p>
<p>If the Biden administration can show that it’s taking action to address widespread hardships — particularly those of African Americans, who have endured generations of systemic racism and inequality — the U.S. should be able to move forward from this period of sustained mass protest. It remains to be seen whether that’s possible in other regions of the world, where the same governments remain ensconced — for now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154003/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ron Stagg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the new U.S. administration can show that it’s taking action to address widespread grievances, it should be able to move forward from this period of sustained mass protest.Ron Stagg, Professor of History, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1508952020-12-17T13:26:04Z2020-12-17T13:26:04ZPresident Trump’s use of the authoritarian playbook will have lasting consequences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374849/original/file-20201214-21-1rcvg29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=123%2C84%2C3958%2C2288&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. President Donald Trump greets Russian President Vladimir Putin during their bilateral meeting in Osaka, Japan, June, 28, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-greets-russian-president-vladimir-news-photo/1152460290?adppopup=true">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Six weeks after the U.S. election, President Donald Trump had still not <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/09/bidens-transition-continues-trump-refuses-concede-timeline/3801714001/">accepted defeat</a>. This behavior is not typical in mature democracies. And it’s reminiscent of countries with what political scientists call “<a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/11/the-unmaking-of-a-constitutional-coup-in-pakistan/">hybrid regimes</a>” – nations that have elements of democracy but in practice are not democracies. </p>
<p>For us – politics scholars studying <a href="https://www.umb.edu/academics/cla/faculty/luis_jimenez">Latin America</a> and the <a href="https://behrend.psu.edu/person/olena-surzhko-harned">former Soviet Union</a> – Trump’s resistance to election results underscores the fragility of democratic institutions when confronted with authoritarian practices. These include deligitimizing election results, interfering with judicial independence and attacking independent media and opposition.</p>
<p>Trump is part of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat">global trend in authoritarianism</a>. The United States can learn a great deal from other countries where democracies fell victim to <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/70544/trumps-moves-are-right-out-of-the-authoritarian-playbook/">the authoritarian playbook</a>. </p>
<h2>Rigging elections</h2>
<p>Trump and members of the Republican Party claimed fraud in the presidential elections. They attempted to overturn <a href="https://whyy.org/articles/a-cheat-sheet-for-the-trump-election-lawsuits-still-alive-in-pa/">legally cast ballots in Pennsylvania</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/brad-raffensperger-georgia-vote/2020/11/16/6b6cb2f4-283e-11eb-8fa2-06e7cbb145c0_story.html">Georgia</a>, Wisconsin and Michigan. Trump, furthermore, has urged state leaders to ignore the will of voters and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/trump-allies-target-compromised-pennsylvania-votes-nix-certification-pick-electors-1550925">give their electoral votes to him</a>.</p>
<p>Disregard for voters and electoral rules are tactics well documented in hybrid regimes. Although Trump has charged that the U.S. election was rigged, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/voting-fraud.html">it was not</a>. </p>
<p>Truly rigged elections involve practices like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/observers-detail-flaws-in-russian-election.html">ballot box stuffing</a> – adding false ballots to legitimate ones, or <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/18/massive-vote-buying-campaign-claimed-ahead-of-vote-on-putins-term-limits-report-a70609">buying the electorate</a> by offering citizens money or jobs in exchange for votes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/25/573394432/russian-opposition-leader-barred-from-running-against-putin-in-2018">Barring opposition candidates</a> from running for office, as Russia has done, is another tactic.</p>
<p>Other regimes, like Alexander Lukashenko’s in Belarus, pressure electoral officials to <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-09-01/belarus-poll-workers-describe-fraud-presidential-election">falsify electoral results</a> to ensure victories with wide margins. This triggered massive protests in August.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374851/original/file-20201214-15-nzd8oe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of people gather in Minsk to call for the resignation of President Alexander Lukashenko, on Aug. 23, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/august-2020-belarus-minsk-thousands-of-people-gather-for-a-news-photo/1228167689?adppopup=true">Ulf Mauder/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Venezuela, since roughly 2005, former President Hugo Chávez seized control of vote processing and counting through the <a href="http://www.cne.gob.ve">National Electoral Council</a>, a branch of government that oversees elections. This way, any election irregularities <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-authoritarian-resurgence-autocratic-legalism-in-venezuela/">always hurt the opposition</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-authoritarian-resurgence-autocratic-legalism-in-venezuela/">And Chávez encouraged the electorate</a> to vote for him if they were state employees or received government benefits. At times, they <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/venezuelas-upcoming-election-wont-be-any-fairer-than-the-last-one/274881/">received outright threats</a> that they would lose their jobs if they did not vote for him. </p>
<p>Other forms of “encouragement” in Venezuela included “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/6d66dcd4776e4ab4a03106f5d42187dc">red tents</a>” next to polling stations. These were government stations where people could sign up for government benefits and receive small gifts.</p>
<p>President Trump did something similar by putting his name on stimulus checks in April, which <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/these-lawyers-say-donald-j-trumps-name-should-not-be-on-stimulus-checks/2020/04/29/086ac1bc-88cc-11ea-9759-6d20ba0f2c0e_story.html">may have been illegal</a> but was never adjudicated.</p>
<p>He also tried to rig the U.S. election by insisting that <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/11/01/930140373/fact-check-trump-falsely-claims-that-votes-shouldnt-be-counted-after-election-da">mail-in votes should not be counted</a> after Election Day, and then attempted to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-legal-challenges-factbox/factbox-trump-suffers-major-defeat-in-legal-battle-to-overturn-the-election-but-presses-on-idUSKBN28317I">overturn election results</a> based on that claim.</p>
<h2>‘Enemies of the people’</h2>
<p>Coined by the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/01/16/why-trumps-enemy-of-the-people-bluster-cant-be-compared-to-stalins-rule/">Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin</a>, the phrase “enemies of the people” – used against all who disagreed with him – has entered Trump’s vocabulary. </p>
<p>Earlier in his presidency, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/trump-and-the-enemies-of-the-people">Trump called the press</a> the “enemies of the people.” More recently, Brad Raffensperger, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/brad-raffensperger-trump-georgia-election-b1763010.html">Georgia’s Republican secretary of state</a>, earned this title from Trump after defending his state’s election process. </p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has been in power since 2000 and consolidated his autocratic rule by amending the Russian constitution, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Putins-Opponents-Enemies-Associated-Press-ebook/dp/B015EO0C7W">has a long list</a> of opposition leaders, civil groups and journalists who have become “enemies of the people.” </p>
<h2>Pet judiciaries</h2>
<p>Before the election, Trump insisted mail voting was riddled with fraud and tried to <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/8/6/21355564/trump-nevada-vote-by-mail-ab4-cegavske-sisolak-supreme-court">overturn Nevada’s vote-by-mail law</a>. He insisted that there would be election disputes and that filling the Supreme Court seat was <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/09/23/trump-need-fill-supreme-court-seat-quickly-because-election/3501368001/">crucial for that reason</a>.</p>
<p>Yes, the high court has rejected <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-texas-election-trump/2020/12/11/bf462f22-3bc6-11eb-bc68-96af0daae728_story.html">Trump’s efforts to overturn election results</a>. But Trump’s audacious attempt mirrors tactics used by authoritarian leaders. </p>
<p>Similar scenarios to the one Trump hoped for played out with <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3140529">Evo Morales in Bolivia</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-honduras-reelection-ruling/top-honduran-court-paves-way-for-presidents-to-seek-re-election-idUSKBN0NE2TA20150423">Juan Orlando Hernández in Honduras</a>. </p>
<p>Morales and Hernández were able to install judges who ruled that clauses in the constitutions prohibiting reelection were unconstitutional. That, in turn, allowed both leaders to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/bolivians-protest-after-supreme-court-allows-president-evo-morales-to-run-for-fourth-term/a-46622525">run successfully for reelection</a>.</p>
<h2>‘Law and order’</h2>
<p>Authoritarian leaders also favor “law and order” arguments to justify their legitimacy. They paint themselves as the ultimate arbiters of what presents a threat. </p>
<p>Russia’s Putin has emphasized his commitment to stability and security, elevating the status of security forces loyal to him, known as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438706001141?via%3Dihub">siloviki</a>. These security forces now hold high positions in <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0202/Oligarchs-out-siloviki-in-Why-Russia-s-foreign-policy-is-hardening">Russian politics, business and society</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/trump-the-coronavirus-and-what-happens-when-strongmen-fall-ill">Trump has also cultivated the image of a strongman</a>, calling for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-amassed-a-red-state-army-in-the-nations-capital--and-could-do-so-again/2020/10/01/2f10e17c-f9d6-11ea-a275-1a2c2d36e1f1_story.html">the mobilization of the National Guard</a> to quell racial justice protests.</p>
<p>Similar to autocratic leaders in <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/04/30/venezuela-maduro-often-uses-colectivos-rather-than-his-military/3616362002/">Venezuela</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/they-took-my-humanity-pro-government-paramilitaries-terrorize-nicaraguan-protesters/2018/08/02/349f8914-900a-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html">Nicaragua</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/titushki-the-ukrainian-presidents-hired-strongmen/a-17443078">Ukraine</a>, Trump has refused to denounce <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/09/us-militias-trump-election-day-covid-guns">far-right militias</a> like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-debate-white-supremacist-question/2020/09/30/366df500-02c7-11eb-a2db-417cddf4816a_story.html">the Proud Boys</a>, telling them instead to “stand back and stand by,” which was interpreted as a command.</p>
<p>And he suggested that people <a href="https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/17/trump-tweets-liberate-michigan-other-states-democratic-governors/5152037002/">“liberate” Michigan</a> from the state’s social distancing measures amid the pandemic, a move <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/04/17/liberate-michigan-trump-constitution/">critics denounced for inciting insurrection</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374855/original/file-20201214-14-nxi6td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is seen during the United Socialist Party of Venezuela’s annual congress on July 31, 2014, at Caracas’ Mountain Barracks, where the remains of former President Hugo Chavez rest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-and-the-president-of-news-photo/452988656?adppopup=true">Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lasting effects</h2>
<p>Trump has used ploys from the autocratic playbook throughout his presidency, and that will have lasting consequences. </p>
<p>Trump’s rejection of election results damages the legitimacy of the democratic process. </p>
<p>In general, it encourages other autocrats and would-be autocrats to challenge the electoral process if they don’t like the results. For the U.S., it promotes the belief that President-elect Joe Biden’s presidency will be illegitimate. </p>
<p>A country’s stability largely depends on people <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990120">accepting the results if their side loses</a>. If a significant portion of the public refuses to, history shows that violence will not be far behind.</p>
<p>For the United States, the lesson is stark. Surviving the recent electoral turmoil does not guarantee it will outlast a similar scenario the next time. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/11/house-republicans-texas-election-lawsuit-supreme-court">Republican leaders’</a> failure to repudiate baseless allegations of electoral fraud – and some Republicans’ willingness to pursue legal action <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/us/politics/republicans-trump-election-lawsuit.html">based on these claims</a> – further undermines the legitimacy of the democratic process. </p>
<p>Trump was defeated, but <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-long-term-damage-of-trumps-antidemocratic-lies">Trumpism will have a lasting effect</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re too busy to read everything. We get it. That’s why we’ve got a weekly newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybusy">Sign up for good Sunday reading.</a> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Throughout his presidency, Donald Trump has exposed the fragility of democratic institutions, mirroring a global trend in authoritarianism, and that will have a lasting effect on the United States.Lena Surzhko Harned, Assistant Teaching Professor of Political Science, Penn StateLuis Jimenez, Associate Professor of Political Science, UMass BostonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1509242020-12-03T13:33:02Z2020-12-03T13:33:02ZTiny treetop flowers foster incredible beetle biodiversity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372608/original/file-20201202-19-1ciln4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=498%2C220%2C5281%2C4045&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hundreds of beetle species seem to be specialists that feed only from small white flowers on trees.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Susan Kirmse</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/research-brief-83231">Research Brief</a> is a short take on interesting academic work.</em></p>
<h2>The big idea</h2>
<p>Biologists have long known that rainforest treetops support a huge number of beetle species, but why these canopies are so rich in beetle diversity has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-4598.2012.00221.x">remained a mystery</a>. New research by my colleague <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Susan_Kirmse">Susan Kirmse</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=e6hlMXwAAAAJ">me</a> shows that flowering trees play a critical role in maintaining this diversity, and that beetles may be among the most diverse pollinators in the animal kingdom.</p>
<p>We carried out a one-year study in a remote part of the Amazon rainforest in Venezuela. We used a specially built crane to collect a total of 6,698 adult beetles representing 859 species. These were gathered from 45 individual trees of 23 different tree species.</p>
<p>We were surprised to discover that the majority of these beetles - 647, or 75.3% of species found – <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00222933.2020.1811414">were living on flowering trees</a>. In fact, 527 beetle species in 41 families were associated exclusively with flowers. Interestingly, the majority of these species – almost 60% – were exclusively found on trees that produce lots of small white flowers.</p>
<p>Overall, this discovery shows that flowering trees are likely among the most important drivers for maintaining the high diversity of beetles in rainforests. But this relationship goes both ways. Our study also suggests that beetles may be among the most underappreciated pollinators in tropical forests. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A tall metal structure emerging from the forest canopy in Venezuela." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372610/original/file-20201202-15-bzidn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Using a specialized crane, the team was able to collect beetles from the very top of the forest canopy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Susan Kirmse</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Tropical rainforests are the very heart of Earth’s biodiversity. They harbor about <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/35002501">65% to 75% of all terrestrial species</a>, including the most tree species and the most insects.</p>
<p>After finding such a tight relationship between beetles and flowering trees, we wondered: How many beetle species could be involved in pollination in the Amazon? Our study found an average of 26.35 unique beetle species for every species of tree. With an estimated <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/srep29549">16,000 Amazonian tree species</a>, this suggests that there might be more species of flower-visiting beetles than any other insects on Earth, potentially surpassing by far the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2020.10.053">20,000 species of bees</a> and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-ento-031616-035125">19,000 species of butterflies</a>.</p>
<p>Our study shows that flowering tree species play an important role as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00222933.2020.1811414">diversity hotspots in tropical rainforest canopies</a>. For policymakers and biologists hoping to preserve or restore rainforests, promoting the cultivation of trees and other plants – especially those with lots of small white flowers that beetles love – could help to maintain species-rich communities. Flowers are a very important resource, providing food and shelter for thousands of insects in addition to beetles. Thus, preserving plant diversity or selecting many different indigenous tree species for reforestation can enhance the diversity of insects. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a iridescent green-blue beetle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=898&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/372625/original/file-20201202-23-p6lwqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1129&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Beetles like the <em>Griburius auricapillus</em> are just some of the hundreds of species that can be found in treetops.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Susan Kirmse</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What still isn’t known</h2>
<p>Our research was the first to describe this tight relationship between beetles and rainforest trees, especially with trees that produce thousands of small, simple flowers. But how this association came to be is still unclear. </p>
<p>Many of the beetle species were found only on trees with this particular type of flower. The trees get an obvious benefit: pollination. But what specifically these trees offer to the beetles requires further study. The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1034/j.1600-0706.2001.950121.x">simpler flowers are easier for beetles to access</a>, but is the appeal food, like petals, pollen or nectar? Or maybe a home to find mates or lay eggs for the young to grow?</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>To fight the worldwide rapid <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2009.01327.x">declines in insect diversity</a>, researchers and conservationists must understand the ecological connections between insects and their food plants. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10342-018-1151-y">Long-term studies</a>, particularly in research plots like the one we used in Venezuela, allow researchers to collect layers of information that help unravel the complexity of diversity.</p>
<p>Yet such sites rely on political interest and stability. <a href="https://www.state.gov/a-democratic-crisis-in-venezuela#:%7E:text=A%20Country%20in%20Crisis&text=9.3%20million%20Venezuelans%20are%20moderately,Venezuelans%20have%20fled%20the%20country">Political instability in Venezuela</a> is preventing our fieldwork from continuing at the Venezuela plot.</p>
<p>While we can’t return to our study site in Venezuela, it is clear that researchers must work together to understand the mysteries of life on Earth. But biologists are racing the clock as large rainforests are destroyed forever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline S. Chaboo receives funding from the United States National Science Foundation and the National Geographic Society.. </span></em></p>In the Amazon, beetles and flowering trees have developed a tight bond. Hundreds of beetle species thrive off of and pollinate blossoms, helping to maintain some of the highest biodiversity on Earth.Caroline S. Chaboo, Adjunct Professor in Insect Systematics, University of Nebraska-LincolnLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1494722020-11-04T13:09:16Z2020-11-04T13:09:16ZDonald Trump takes leaf out of autocrat playbook by falsely declaring victory before all votes counted<p>In the months leading up to US election day, it was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/24/politics/trump-election-warnings-leaving-office/index.html">predicted</a> that Donald Trump would not accept the results if he lost, would cast doubt over the legitimacy of mail-in voting and would <a href="https://www.axios.com/trump-claim-election-victory-ballots-97eb12b9-5e35-402f-9ea3-0ccfb47f613f.html">try to declare a victory</a> before all votes had been counted. So far, he has done two of three. </p>
<p>These predictions were made easier by taking Trump’s words at face value. Trump had <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/08/28/906676695/ignoring-fbi-and-fellow-republicans-trump-continues-assault-on-mail-in-voting?t=1604480632666">falsely claimed</a> that mail-in ballots would be purposely sent to Democrats and not Republicans. He also spent months delegitimising the vote-by-mail process, even trying to defund the US Postal Service in efforts to derail Democrats, <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/516521-democrats-more-likely-to-mail-in-ballots-early-than-republicans-poll">who were more likely to vote by mail</a>.</p>
<p>In a press conference from the White House early in the morning on November 4, Trump said he would <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/524404-trump-says-hell-go-to-supreme-court-to-stop-votes-from-being-counted">go to the Supreme Court</a> to stop votes being counted. Equally concerning was his early, false declaration of victory, and his incorrect claim to have won in states that had not been called yet, such as Georgia and Pennsylvania.</p>
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<h2>The early declaration</h2>
<p>While Trump’s manoeuvres are a rare occurrence in a liberal democracy, calling elections early is a hallmark of non-democratic regimes – and particularly presidential ones. As <a href="http://repository.essex.ac.uk/22303/">my own research</a>, one of the notable trends in authoritarian regimes is that they have adopted democratic institutions in order to prolong their power while paying lip service to international and domestic demand for “democracy”.</p>
<p><a href="http://aceproject.org/main/samples/em/emx_o010.pdf">International observers</a> have made it more difficult for autocrats to engage in outright fraud since the cold war ended. This has meant that autocrats have had to figure out ways in which to win elections without stealing them in obvious ways, or engaging in <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=NpnCZnQDjEIC&dq=international+observers+fraud+sarah+birch&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s">electoral malpractice</a> rather than electoral fraud. In addition to the usual tricks of physically harming the opposition, controlling media narratives and stacking electoral commissions with lackeys, authoritarian leaders are also quick to declare victory in close elections.</p>
<p>In the case of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was quick to declare himself the winner of the 2018 June presidential election, even <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/erdogan-clings-power-polls-tighten-ahead-turkey-s-snap-election-n885986">before all the votes were counted</a> or the results ratified by the electoral commission. Erdoğan represents one of the most glaring cases of executive aggrandisement and democratic backsliding, as the country has seen its civil liberties threatened and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-judges/">judiciary politicised</a>.</p>
<p>In 2013, when there was not a full consensus that Venezuela was firmly authoritarian, the political heir to Hugo Chávez, Nicolas Maduro, narrowly won the presidential election by less than two percentage points. Maduro was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/15/nicolas-maduro-wins-venezuela-election">quick to declare victory</a>, leaving the opposition crying foul and demanding a recount. In 2018, Maduro “won” by a much larger margin, but again the opposition called into <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-44187838">question the validity of the results</a>.</p>
<p>Another example is Côte d’Ivoire, currently in the middle of a turbulent election cycle. An opposition boycott of the race <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/48878/cote-divoire-alassane-ouattara-re-elected-for-a-3rd-term-with-94-27/">led to victory</a> for the president, Alassane Ouattara, with 94% of the vote according to provisional results announced on November 3. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cote-divoires-turbulent-past-remains-front-and-centre-in-presidential-poll-148931">Côte d’Ivoire's turbulent past remains front and centre in presidential poll</a>
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<p>In 2013, it was former Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, who controversially declared an early victory with 51% of the votes – despite earlier results pointing to a 54% share for Ouattara, then the opposition challenger. The discrepancy was due to the Gbagbo-backed Constitutional Council annulling the results in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11913832">opposition strongholds</a>. Violence ensued and eventually, Gbagbo paid a price for this and was put on trial at the International Criminal Court – though <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-gbagbo-acquittal-is-a-bigger-blow-for-the-icc-than-the-bemba-decision-109913">later acquitted</a>. </p>
<h2>Mastering electoral manipulation</h2>
<p>There have also been many cases of early electoral victories declared in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. This is a region that has mastered electoral manipulation and the creation of false narratives about the level of support of presidential incumbents. In Belarus, for example, Alexander Lukashenko has tended to declare victory by a large margin, but in 2020 protests erupted in August <a href="https://theconversation.com/belarus-election-contested-result-sparks-massive-unrest-as-europes-last-dictator-claims-victory-144139">disputing the validity of the result</a>.</p>
<p>Incumbents elsewhere have also refused to accept electoral results. In the case of the Gambia, long-time leader Yahya Jammeh <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38271480">would not concede</a> after he narrowly lost the presidential election in December 2016 to Adama Barrow, citing “abnormalities”. Jammeh then appealed to the country’s supreme court for the results to be annulled and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/13/gambian-military-takes-over-offices-of-electoral-commissionyahya-jammeh">sent in armed soldiers</a> to take control of the electoral commission. Jammeh only surrendered after Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38682184">deployed troops</a>.</p>
<p>Some observers of American politics are bracing themselves for unrest in the aftermath of the 2020 election. With Trump given an early impressive lead in some key swing states due to in-person voting being counted first, the election may be disputed no matter who the winner is. </p>
<p>Part of the problem is Trump’s refusal to support the counting of all the votes, something that is antithetical to democracy. As presidential elections are often emotional, high-stakes affairs, delegitimising the counting process puts the US at risk of greater instability in the next few weeks, and deeper questions about the strength of its democracy in the face of a leader who openly challenges democratic norms and processes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prematurely declaring election victory is a hallmark of non-democratic regimes.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1473092020-10-07T16:40:53Z2020-10-07T16:40:53ZUnder what conditions are international sanctions effective?<p>According to US government data, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information">32 sanctions regimes</a> are currently in effect. Canada, for its part, currently imposes sanctions on <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/current-actuelles.aspx?lang=eng">20 different states</a> and on terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The EU is currently implementing sanctions against some <a href="https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/">30 countries and international actors</a>. As for the United Nations, since 1966, the Security Council has put in place <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/fr/sanctions/information">30 sanctions regimes</a>, from apartheid South Africa to Gaddafi’s (and according to him) Libya, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p>
<p>The imposition of sanctions is a relatively inexpensive political instrument compared to armed conflict, and is more popular with the public. However, when a sanctions regime is promulgated, it is impossible to determine the exact level of measures that must be taken in order for sanctions to have an impact on the policy of the sanctioned state.</p>
<p>In order to determine the effectiveness of a sanctions regime, we will examine nine factors that we believe to be <a href="https://corpus.ulaval.ca/jspui/handle/20.500.11794/27745">decisive</a>: the economic cost to the sanctioned state; the nature of its political regime; its political and economic stability; the relationship between the sanctioning state and the sanctioned state; the type of objective; international cohesion; the phenomenon of rallying around the flag; the reputation and image of the sanctioned state; and time.</p>
<h2>1. The economic cost</h2>
<p>This factor is considered to be the most critical by the reference study by <a href="https://www.piie.com/bookstore/economic-sanctions-reconsidered-3rd-edition-paper">Gary Haufbauer and colleagues</a>. The 70 cases that the authors judge as successes of sanctions had imposed considerable costs on the pariah state. The higher the cost imposed on a state, the more likely it is that the state will change its policy line.</p>
<h2>2. The type of regime</h2>
<p>Sanctions are far more effective when used against a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/international-sanctions-as-international-punishment/6BB4A39BF1BA569A6C5D94CB30E2FE4D">democracy</a> than against an autocracy. The leader of a democratic state will be much more inclined to seek a solution without using violence. For the sake of his citizens and his own position at the head of government, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586113?seq=1">leader</a> will not allow his country’s economic situation to deteriorate for long.</p>
<p>On the other hand, an <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor).pdf">autocratic leader</a> generally has no fears about his or her position within the state, and can thus pursue his or her own policies without worrying too much about the discontent that sanctions may generate in public opinion or civil society. His survival depends more on its ability to satisfy its entourage or its personal supporters. An autocrat will thus be much less likely to seek a political solution for the sake of peace. Following this logic, <a href="https://www.piie.com/bookstore/economic-sanctions-reconsidered-3rd-edition-paper">Haufbauer</a> and his colleagues explain that it is difficult to bully a bully.</p>
<h2>3. Economic and Political Stability</h2>
<p>If a regime is <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1989.tb00200.x">rather weak</a>, if the country is on the brink of civil war (Venezuela 2017) – or in civil war -, if the population is starving, or if the regime faces significant and growing opposition, sanctions are much more likely to be effective.</p>
<p>A state with economic problems will be more vulnerable to the application of a sanctions regime. Even an autocrat with little concern for the welfare of its people will have difficulty managing a state on the brink of chaos.</p>
<h2>4. The link between the sanctioning state and the sanctioned state</h2>
<p>For sanctions to be effective, the economic relationship between the sanctioning state and the sanctioned state must be <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/425755?seq=1">significant</a> and developed. If trade is significant, the sanctioned state will lose a greater source of revenue than if trade is limited. To be optimal, sanctions must affect critical sectors whose imported goods will be difficult to replace by other states.</p>
<h2>5. The type of objective</h2>
<p>Sanctions are also much more likely to succeed when the objectives are modest. The political scientist and economist <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691101750/economic-statecraft">David Baldwin</a> has shown that an approach that consists of imposing on the sanctioned state a set of annoyances, even minor ones (increase in its production or import costs, damage to its international reputation, etc.), can end up producing more results than, for example, a stated requirement for a regime change at the outset.</p>
<h2>6. International cohesion</h2>
<p>The effects of sanctions regimes can be limited by several factors. First, any economic sanctions must be accompanied by a significant diplomatic effort. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2620046">James Mayall</a> explains that sanctions must be implemented by the majority of the economic partners of the sanctioned state to maximize their chances of success. When there is a lack of international cohesion, the sanctioned state can find alternative suppliers to the one imposing the sanctions.</p>
<p>The involvement of one or more international organizations when imposing a sanctions regime helps to maintain this cohesion among the various <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/425755">allies and partners</a>.</p>
<p>Otherwise, a sanctions regime remains vulnerable to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636419608429288">“black knights”</a>. These states, attracted by potential profits, undermine the overall cohesion effort. They may be stingy partners or states that place their personal profits above considerations such as international security or respect for international law. On several occasions during the Cold War, sanctions regimes were undermined by the USSR or by the United States supporting its allies against enemy sanctions. The USSR thus replaced American products embargoed in Cuba in the 1960s. The United States did the same when the USSR applied sanctions against <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636419608429288">Yugoslavia</a> in 1948, limiting in both cases the initially desired effect. The sanctions imposed by the United States against the USSR during the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 suffered from this lack of cohesion: the effects were limited because the Soviets were able to find suppliers attracted by the substantial profits from these exchanges.</p>
<h2>7. The phenomenon of the rally around the flag</h2>
<p>Sanctions can also have an undesirable effect on civil society in the targeted state; this is the phenomenon of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/60/4/631/2406011?redirectedFrom=fulltext">rallying around the flag</a>. In some cases, if civil society feels that its country should not be placed under sanctions, this can lead to a strengthening of national cohesion around power.This is what happened with Russian civil society in 2014 after the annexation of the Crimea and the ensuing Western sanctions.</p>
<p>This phenomenon can also take place in a completely different context: if people are too dependent on their leaders for food and basic necessities, civil society can rally behind its leaders because, as <a href="https://carnegie.ru/commentary/61641">Andrei Kolesnikov</a>, professor of law at Moscow University explains, “<em>They’d better vote for the hand that feeds them or there might be nothing to eat at all</em>.” </p>
<h2>8. The importance given to reputation</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.2.409">some situations</a>, the sanctioned state feels that the cost of sanctions is not high enough to justify a change in its policies. A state may choose this position when, for example, it wants to preserve its reputation as tough: it prefers to endure sanctions and maintain its reputation, rather than secure its economy and see its reputation degraded. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/117145?seq=1">Cuba</a> has been resisting US sanctions since 1990, even though its economy has been hit hard, just as Russia has been resisting EU sanctions since 2014.</p>
<p><strong>9. Time</strong></p>
<p>Time is also a significant variable. Haufbauer et al. conclude that, on average, sanctions remain in place for 16 years. Sometimes the sanctioned state eventually complies with the sanctioners’ requirements; but sometimes sanctions are eventually lifted for <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/106591290005300202">lack of convincing results</a>.</p>
<p>Sanctions often force sanctioned states to turn inward and develop their own industries in order to become self-sufficient (Russia, for example, has been boasting about its <a href="https://www.meta-defense.fr/2019/08/22/la-substitution-des-importations-au-sein-de-lindustrie-de-defense-russe-enjeux-et-realisations/">“import substitution”</a> policy since 2014). In the long run, this has the effect of making the sanctioned state more self-sufficient and less dependent on imports and goods from other states. If a state succeeds in becoming self-sufficient, the effects of sanctions become extremely limited, making it almost impossible for the measures to influence its <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/eeehdechp/2-27.htm">behaviour or policies</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636419608429288">Elizabeth S. Rogers</a> points out, sanctions are often more effective in containing conflict than in preventing or stopping it. Some sanctions are also simply insufficient to bring major political change.</p>
<p>In summary, a sanctions regime has <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/economic-sanctions-reconsidered/9780881324129">limited chances of success</a> if the targeted state is strong, politically and economically stable, hostile and autocratic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Marineau ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Countries or international organizations regularly enact sanctions against individual states. But how can the effectiveness of these measures be evaluated?Sophie Marineau, Doctorante en histoire des relations internationales / phD candidate History, International relations, Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1400362020-06-08T19:02:44Z2020-06-08T19:02:44ZUsing the military to quash protests can erode democracy – as Latin America well knows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340354/original/file-20200608-176564-b579mk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C2977%2C1998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chilean soldier stands guard at a ransacked supermarket in Santiago, October 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chilean-soldier-stands-guard-at-a-supermarket-after-it-was-news-photo/1177544361?adppopup=true">Marcelo Hernandez/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump on June 7 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/us/politics/trump-military-troops-protests.html">withdrew National Guard troops</a> from Washington, D.C., but his threat to “deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem” of <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-trump-mobilize-federal-resources-stop-violence-restore/story?id=71008802">civil unrest following the police killing of George Floyd</a> continues to fuel a firestorm of debate.</p>
<p>Calling upon the armed forces to restore order is rare in a democracy. Militaries are trained for warfare, not policing, and their use to quell protests politicizes the armed forces. </p>
<p>Latin America knows this all too well. The region has a long history of using the armed forces for political purposes under civilian, elected governments. In many cases, the result was <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-warning-from-latin-america-trump-is-opening-the-door-to-military-rule-73592">military dictatorship</a>. Even after civilian government resumed, restoring full democracy was a challenging process, my research on <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Democratization_and_Military_Transformation_in_Argentina_and_Chile_Rethinking_Rivalry">the region’s civil-military relations</a> shows. For <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/5569-the-argentine-military-in-democracy">democracy to succeed</a>, militaries have to respect civilian authority and renounce internal policing.</p>
<p>Even strong democracies have unraveled when the military was brought in to quell protest. Uruguay in the 1960s, Venezuela in the 1980s and Chile just last year provide insights. </p>
<h2>Uruguay</h2>
<p>Historically, Uruguay has been known for its social welfare policies, respect for civil rights and longstanding democracy. But in 1968, economic instability triggered mass protests by university students and labor unions, leading President Juan Pacheco to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521266529">declare a state of emergency</a> and call upon the military to quash the demonstrations.</p>
<p>Instead of disbanding, <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520290013/uruguay-1968">social movement activism increased</a> and the nascent <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198606963.001.0001/acref-9780198606963-e-1311?rskey=RHaEGx&result=6">Tupamaros</a>, a Marxist guerrilla group, were emboldened.</p>
<p>Responding to Pacheco’s show of force, the Tupamaros took up high-profile kidnappings to show that the government was, in fact, weak. In defending against the insurgency, government became dependent on the military as a political ally. </p>
<p>By 1973, the military took over in a coup that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511528200">inaugurated a brutal 12-year dictatorship</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340347/original/file-20200608-176560-1g33gia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Families of those ‘disappeared’ during Uruguay’s military dictatorship outside the Legislative Palace in Montevideo in 2005.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-mothers-and-relatives-of-disappeared-during-the-news-photo/52260015?adppopup=true">Pablo Porciuncula/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Uruguayan military’s transformation was remarkable: It went from being relatively obscure to becoming the most brutal component of the Uruguayan state. Between 1973 and the restoration of democracy in 1985, hundreds were killed, and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3338122">one in every 30 adult Uruguayans</a> was detained, interrogated or imprisoned. </p>
<p>Despite the return to democracy, the military has largely avoided accountability for its crimes. To date <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/uruguay/report-uruguay/">fewer than 10%</a> of nearly 200 cases of human rights violations from that period have been prosecuted. </p>
<h2>Venezuela</h2>
<p>Venezuela today is a chaotic authoritarian state. But from the 1960s through the 1980s, it had a stable two-party democracy and oil-fueled prosperity. Those pillars collapsed in 1989, after oil prices tanked and the country faced a debt crisis. </p>
<p>In response, President Carlos Andrés Pérez imposed austerity measures. In the capital of Caracas, the public reacted with protests and riots in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3875580">wave of unrest known as the “Caracazo.”</a> </p>
<p>Pérez suspended civil rights, declared martial law and put Venezuela’s military on the streets for the first time in decades. In quelling the revolt, security forces killed at least <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3875580">400 civilians</a>. </p>
<p>The brutal repression – carried out mostly against the country’s poorest populations – produced division within the armed forces. Many junior officers resented the order to repress their people. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_RIPC_172_0127--caracazo-1989-twenty-years-on-from.htm">Among these officers was Hugo Chávez</a>, who would go on to stage a failed coup attempt in 1992. Six years later, he legitimately won the presidency with an anti-establishment agenda. Ultimately, Chávez’s election marked the complete dissolution of Venezuela’s two-party system and the birth of a <a href="https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/crucial-role-military-venezuelan-crisis">militarized, autocratic state</a> that blooms in full failure today under his successor, Nicolás Maduro.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340345/original/file-20200608-176595-v38q9h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lt. Hugo Chávez in 1994 being freed from jail after an attempted coup in Venezuela.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/army-lieutenant-colonel-hugo-chavez-who-headed-the-1992-news-photo/151344613?adppopup=true">Bertrand Parres/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Chile</h2>
<p>Chile is often heralded as Latin America’s “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/03/12/can-chile-reinvent-itself">model</a>” democracy for its economic growth and political stability. Yet last year, it became the epicenter of mass protests that shook Latin America.</p>
<p>Chile’s protests began over transit fare hikes driven by President Sebastian Piñera’s economic belt-tightening but quickly grew to a wave of demonstrations in multiple cities calling for <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2020/02/24/chile-struggle-democratize-state-plebescite">long-pending reforms</a> to address inequality. Soon, protesters were demanding a new constitution to replace the one <a href="https://theconversation.com/chiles-political-crisis-is-another-brutal-legacy-of-long-dead-dictator-pinochet-126305">drafted 40 years earlier during the Pinochet military dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>In response, Piñera declared “we are at war” and deployed the military to oversee a state of emergency – its first political policing role since the dictatorship ended in 1990. In the ensuing months, dozens of protesters were killed, hundreds more injured and over 28,000 arrested.</p>
<p>Though <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/chile-responsable-politica-deliberada-para-danar-manifestantes/">the most violent repression</a> is attributed to police, Piñera’s move created challenges for Chile’s military, which struggled in the post-Pinochet era to redefine its image by focusing on national defense and <a href="http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-chile/">United Nations-led international missions</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/340338/original/file-20200608-176550-5q8ccy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chile’s militaristic national police are alleged to have used excess force during Chile’s 2019 mass protests.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fernando Lavoz/NurPhoto via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“I’m not at war with anybody,” said the general tasked with overseeing security in the capital last year, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/americas/chile-protests-riots.html">distancing himself from the president</a>. The military also apparently <a href="https://interferencia.cl/articulos/ffaa-se-niegan-nuevo-estado-de-emergencia-obligando-pinera-recurrir-policias-retirados">resisted</a> Piñera’s efforts to extend the state of emergency, arguing that the protests were a “political problem.”</p>
<p>Although Chile’s democracy has not unraveled, its political culture has been upended. Public <a href="http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp">support for democracy</a> had already declined 20% before the protests, yet the military remained one of Chile’s most trusted institutions. The militarized repression that occurred will likely erode <a href="https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/docs/20200116/20200116081636/encuestacep_diciembre2019.pdf">confidence in the armed forces</a>, too. </p>
<p>This widespread distrust occurs just as Chileans decide whether, and how, to write a new constitution.</p>
<h2>Slow slide into authoritarianism</h2>
<p>As in Chile, in the U.S. numerous officials – including former <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-02/robert-gates-overmilitarization-american-foreign-policy">Pentagon officials</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/politics/mattis-protests-statement/index.html">retired military officers</a> – are raising alarm over President Trump’s threat to militarize the protest response. Yet 58% of American voters approve of his stance, according to a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/06/02/58-of-voters-support-using-military-to-help-police-control-protests-poll-finds/#67311c6c2417">recent survey</a>.</p>
<p>One key lesson from Latin America is that democracy rarely breaks down suddenly. Countries <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/562246/how-democracies-die-by-steven-levitsky-and-daniel-ziblatt/">slide gradually into authoritarianism</a> as leaders curtail civil rights, demonize opposition groups and muzzle the press.</p>
<p>Another is that professing “law and order” through militarization does not solve a country’s systemic problems. It only deepens divides – and imperils democracy.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristina Mani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Latin American history shows that sending out troops to quell unrest is a perilous move even in strong democracies. Usually, protesters die. Sometimes, the end result is authoritarianism rule.Kristina Mani, Associate Professor of Politics and Chair of Latin American Studies, Oberlin College and ConservatoryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1377432020-06-05T12:08:05Z2020-06-05T12:08:05ZVenezuelan migrants face crime, conflict and coronavirus at Colombia’s closed border<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339908/original/file-20200604-67368-1b6037.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5184%2C3437&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Venezuelans try to enter Colombia at the closed Simon Bolivar international bridge borders crossing, March 16, 2020. Normally, 40,000 Venezuelans come into Colombia every day.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/venezuelan-citizens-wearing-protective-face-masks-to-news-photo/1207394061?adppopup=true">Schneyder Mendoza/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/4-charts-show-venezuelas-worsening-migrant-crisis-102464">Millions of Venezuelans fleeing their crisis-ridden country</a> already had plenty to worry about on their journeys, from food to transport and shelter. <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/trochas-colombia-venezuela-criminal-enclave/">Crime is also rampant along the border</a> between Venezuela and neighboring Colombia, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-america-shuts-out-desperate-venezuelans-but-colombias-border-remains-open-for-now-123307">destination for many migrants seeking a better life</a>. </p>
<p>Now there’s a pandemic, too – and its consequences for Venezuelan migrants go beyond health concerns. </p>
<p>Criminal groups that operate in the border zones are capitalizing on the closure of all seven official border crossings to smuggle migrants <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-04-21/pandemic-could-bring-power-latin-americas-criminal-gangs">in and out of Colombia illegally</a>, extort this poor and vulnerable population and recruit new members.</p>
<h2>Risks to migrants and refugees</h2>
<p>Oil-rich Venezuela used to have one of Latin America’s most robust economies, but its <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">fortunes have declined massively</a> since the death of president Hugo Chávez in 2013. </p>
<p>His successor, Nicolás Maduro, left with a steeply unbalanced budget and dropping oil prices, has led the South American country into the abyss. By 2019, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html">hyperinflation in Venezuela</a> had reached 10,000,000%, and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-11-12/introduction">9 out of 10 Venezuelans lived in poverty</a>. </p>
<p>To date, 5 million people have fled persecution, poverty and political turmoil in Venezuela – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in-modern-history/">a mass migration rivaling that of war-torn Syria</a>. Around <a href="https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/noticias/265-abril-2020/mas-de-1-millon-825-mil-venezolanos-estarian-radicados-en-colombia">1.8 million</a> of them settled in Colombia. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1036&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1036&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1036&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1302&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339909/original/file-20200604-67347-105ty0j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1302&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Colombia and Venezuela share a long, porous and historically open border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/13/Mapa_de_la_frontera_Colombia-Venezuela.svg/365px-Mapa_de_la_frontera_Colombia-Venezuela.svg.png">Shadowxfox/WIkimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We have been monitoring this migratory crisis for years as part of our <a href="https://epicenter.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/armed-groups-are-watching-you">extensive</a> <a href="https://conpeace.ccw.ox.ac.uk">research</a> on the <a href="https://conpeace.ccw.ox.ac.uk/files/policybriefconpeaceapril2020pdf">overlapping humanitarian and security crises</a> in Colombia’s <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/borderland-battles-9780190849153?lang=en&cc=us#">borderlands</a>.</p>
<p>Before the pandemic, up to 40,000 Venezuelans were crossing the porous 1,378-mile Colombia-Venezuela border daily. Most of them remained in the country for a short period of time before passing onto other countries or returned to Venezuela that day after buying food, medicine and other items that are extremely scarce in Venezuela. <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/hungry-venezuelans-seek-food-colombian-border-maduro-blocks-entry-supplies-n969106">Goods purchased in Colombia and resold across the border</a> are one way Venezuelans survive, and a major source of income for border-area residents. </p>
<p>But, typically, about 2,000 Venezuelans would end up staying for good in Colombia each day, according to <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/events/covid-latin-america-health-care-impacts-migrant-populations">Christian Krüger, former director of Migración Colombia</a>, Colombia’s customs agency. </p>
<p>Despite efforts by international aid groups, the United Nations Refugee Agency and the Colombian government to assist the migrants, the situation along the border was “overwhelming,” a Bogotá official told us in February. </p>
<h2>Xenophobia, violence and victimization</h2>
<p>The border’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-colombia-borders/colombia-closes-border-with-venezuela-over-coronavirus-idUSKBN211088">closure</a> on March 14 due to the COVID-19 outbreak has only made a bad situation worse, our research finds. </p>
<p>Transit across the border is now permitted essentially only for <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ground-truth-briefing-coronavirus-response-colombia-views-leading-practitioners">Venezuelans leaving Colombia</a> – not the thousands still clamoring to get in to buy urgently needed food and medicine. </p>
<p>But no government is entirely in charge of what happens at the Colombia-Venezuela border, which is nearly as long as the U.S.-Mexico border and runs through desert, dense jungles and the towering Andes mountains. </p>
<p>An array of rebels, criminals and corrupt officials control informal border crossings, where they <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2019/07/31/the-border-effect-is-allowing-venezuelas-crisis-to-fuel-political-violence-in-colombia/">sneak Venezuelans into Colombia</a> in exchange for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1744130">“taxes” or forced sex</a>. Human trafficking groups also prowl the region looking for potential victims, <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-venezuela-children-sexual-exploitation/">especially children, who are sold into prostitution</a>.</p>
<p>Venezuelans arriving further south in Colombia, to the Arauca region, may also be targeted for recruitment by insurgent groups like the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14702436.2017.1421859?needAccess=true">National Liberation Army, Colombia’s largest active rebel group</a>. </p>
<p>The recent arrival of <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/deployment-us-troops-colombia/">U.S. military troops</a> in the border region, officially to support Colombian anti-drug efforts, adds to the tense climate. And, our research shows, the militarization of the border further increases the risks for vulnerable people on the move.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/339913/original/file-20200604-67347-xktgjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Criminal groups are a longstanding threat along the Colombia-Venezuela border. Here, an apparent victim of an armed group is carried along an illegal border-area trail, or ‘trocha,’ in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-the-colombian-national-police-criminology-unit-news-photo/1142131009?adppopup=true">Schneyder Mendoza/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, in the deserts of La Guajira, hundreds of homeless Venezuelan migrants are <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/coronavirus-hoy-migrantes-venezolanos-siguen-saliendo-del-pais-por-la-guajira-493296">sleeping on the streets</a>. This makes them extremely vulnerable not only to the coronavirus, a humanitarian worker in the region told us, but also to violent assault and harassment by criminal groups and youth gangs. </p>
<p>Colombia is one of the many countries where criminals have been indirectly empowered by <a href="https://theconversation.com/megacity-slums-are-incubators-of-disease-but-coronavirus-response-isnt-helping-the-billion-people-who-live-in-them-138092">COVID-19 lockdowns</a>. </p>
<p>Some armed groups are <a href="https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheconversation.com%2Fterrorists-militants-and-criminal-gangs-join-the-fight-against-the-coronavirus-135914">imposing curfews to enforce quarantines</a> and bringing in nurses to care for the sick in slum areas, strengthening their power over residents as a kind of shadow government. <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-03-26/el-coronavirus-no-detiene-la-violencia-en-colombia.html">Other criminal organizations</a> are using the climate of uncertainty to intimidate, displace or kill those who do not comply with their own arbitrarily defined “public health rules.” </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/borderland-battles-9780190849153?lang=en&cc=us#">past studies</a> on civilian behavior in such contested territory have found that Venezuelans who have only recently arrived in Colombia are particularly subject to harassment and exploitation because they don’t know the rules of the game.</p>
<h2>Return migration</h2>
<p>Lacking shelter, safety, health care and jobs in Colombia as the coronavirus surges, many Venezuelans <a href="https://www.france24.com/es/20200416-migrantes-retorno-venezolanos-covid19-pandemia-crisis">have been driven to despair and have returned home</a>. By late May, over 68,000 Venezuelans had <a href="https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/migrantes-que-buscan-regresar-a-venezuela-reciben-atencion-en-la-frontera/675341">returned to their country</a>.</p>
<p>Theirs is usually not a happy, or lasting, return. </p>
<p>Some Venezuelan migrants come back with COVID-19, a Venezuelan primary teacher in the border state of Zulia told us. Her school, like many others in the area, now shelters newly returned migrants for 14 days, in accordance with Venezuelan government rules. </p>
<p>The return migrants receive some assistance from local humanitarian organizations and the regional government – but not enough. And the sick are <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/venezuela-hospitals-face-crisis-meds-run-low">unlikely to get treatment or aid in crisis-stricken Venezuela</a>. </p>
<p>With the “regular” black market of Colombian products smuggled into Venezuela disrupted, a local social worker in the border regions explained to us, people are desperate for medicine and food. </p>
<p>As we learned from a U.N. official working with migrants in the region, a recent U.N. survey found that 70% of Venezuelans who left Colombia because of the pandemic hope to return once the situation improves. </p>
<p>The prospects for this are uncertain, to say the least. </p>
<p>[<em>You need to understand the coronavirus pandemic, and we can help.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-help">Read The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annette Idler receives funding from Global Affairs Canada. She also receives funding from the UK Arts & Humanities Research Council and the Economic & Social Research Council through the Partnership for Conflict, Crime & Security Research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Markus Hochmüller receives funding from Global Affairs Canada.</span></em></p>The coronavirus-related closure of the Colombian border hasn’t stopped desperate Venezuelans from entering – but it has made the trip more dangerous.Annette Idler, Visiting Scholar, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Director of Studies at the Changing Character of War Centre, and Senior Research Fellow, Dept. of Politics and International Relations, University of OxfordMarkus Hochmüller, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Changing Character of War Centre, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1383562020-05-18T10:57:28Z2020-05-18T10:57:28ZVenezuela failed raid: US has a history of using mercenaries to undermine other regimes<p>Members of the Venezuelan opposition have been accused of conspiring with an American private military company, Silvercorp USA, to invade Venezuela and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/05/venezuela-detains-two-americans-allegedly-involved-in-failed-raid-to-remove-maduro">overthrow the government of Nicolás Maduro</a>. </p>
<p>In early May, the Venezuelan military intercepted a group of dissidents and American mercenaries. The Venezuelan military said it killed eight of the insurgents and captured <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/12/venezuela-arrests-botched-maduro-kidnap-attempt">many others</a>. It also <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/05/the-invasion-of-venezuela-brought-to-you-by-silvercorp-usa/">arrested</a> two men it claims are former US Special Forces soldiers. No evidence has surfaced to link the US government to the recent attempted invasion – and it has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-venezuela-invasion-attempt/2020/05/05/8b4d64ec-8ee7-11ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html">denied responsibility</a> for the incident.</p>
<p>Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan opposition leader, has also denied involvement in the thwarted coup attempt. Some of his advisers who were allegedly involved in planning the mission <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/guaido-advisers-quit-bungled-venezuela-raid-200511200002059.html">have resigned</a>.</p>
<p>The Washington Post subsequently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-the-attachments-to-the-general-services-agreement-between-the-venezuelan-opposition-and-silvercorp/e67f401f-8730-4f66-af53-6a9549b88f94/?no_nav=true&p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098">published</a> an agreement between members of the Venezuelan opposition and Silvercorp, including <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/07/the-venezuela-silvercorp-usa-saga-keeps-getting-weirder/">signatures</a> of two of Guaidó’s advisers, though not Guaidó, and the chief executive of Silvercorp. The US$1.5 million (£1.2 million) contract outlined Silvercorp’s role in the invasion. One of the detained Silvercorp mercenaries made a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p23nt9Lsm-Y&feature=youtu.be">televised confession</a> (possibly under duress) that he was hired to capture Maduro and bring him to the US. </p>
<p>The incident has worsened relations between the US and Venezuela, which were already tense. In March 2020, the US charged Maduro with “<a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism">narco-terrorism</a>” and offered a US$15m reward for his capture. The Trump administration has also previously <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/03/us-mulls-military-options-in-venezuela-trump-maduro-guaido/">considered military options</a> to remove Maduro from power. </p>
<p>These events in Venezuela echo past US secret sponsorship of private armies to overthrow governments elsewhere. The US has an extended <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745337036/outsourced-empire/">history of sponsoring insurgents and mercenaries</a> to undermine unwanted foreign regimes. </p>
<h2>From Guatemala to Indonesia</h2>
<p>In 1954 the US supported ex-Guatemalan military officer Carlos Castillo Armas in his efforts to overthrow Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz. Armas was the leader of a guerilla army that was trained by <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674019300">the CIA</a> of Guatemalan to invade from Honduras and Nicaragua. The CIA also hired a US company called <a href="https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/history/">Civil Air Transport</a> to bomb Guatemala. Arbenz resigned under pressure and went into exile. Armas became president of a new authoritarian regime. </p>
<p>Similarly, President Dwight Eisenhower authorised the CIA to subvert the Sukarno government in Indonesia in 1957-58. The <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/feet-fire">CIA supported</a> local insurgent factions to carry out guerrilla attacks and also hired mercenary airline companies for logistics and combat missions. </p>
<p>The American role was exposed in 1958 when the Indonesian authorities downed the aeroplane of Allen Pope, a contractor for Civil Air Transport, the company that had been involved in Guatemala. The US government tried to deny involvement, stating Pope was a “soldier of fortune” motivated by profit. But the <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/subversion-foreign-policy">US later quietly withdrew its plans</a> for the forced removal of Sukarno. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Allen Pope on trial in Jakarta in 1959.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allen_Lawrence_Pope#/media/File:Allen_Pope.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bay of Pigs and Nicaragua</h2>
<p>In 1961 the CIA tried to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba by organising an invasion of Cuban dissidents and mercenary forces in a notorious incident known as the Bay of Pigs. According to <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d481">US government documents</a>, the CIA sponsored Cuban exiles that opposed Castro to “avoid any appearance of US intervention”. <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB564-CIA-Releases-Controversial-Bay-of-Pigs-History/">The CIA trained</a> a Cuban insurgent force called Brigade 2506 and also hired mercenary airline companies for airborne attacks. Castro’s military defeated the US-sponsored invasion. </p>
<p>During the 1980s, the US also secretly hired mercenary forces to support the Contra insurgency against the socialist Sandanista government of Nicaragua. The CIA mobilised mercenaries to <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Reagan-Versus-The-Sandinistas-The-Undeclared-War-On-Nicaragua/Walker-Williams-Kornbluh-Gold/p/book/9780367285104">sabotage oil refineries and Nicaraguan ports</a>. Later, the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/70">International Court of Justice ruled against the US</a> for employing mercenaries to place underwater mines in Nicaraguan ports. The CIA <a href="https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit/mode/2up">also asked a company</a> called Keenie Meenie Services to conduct “sabotage operations for the resistance” against the Sandanista government. </p>
<p>In October 1986, <a href="https://aadl.org/node/244995">Eugene Hasenfus</a>, a pilot hired by the CIA, was captured when the Nicaraguan military shot down his plane. His confessions exposed secret US arms shipments to the Contras and also helped unravel the <a href="https://www.abebooks.co.uk/9780862325756/David-Goliath-Washingtons-Against-Nicaragua-0862325757/plp">Iran-Contra scandal</a>, which revealed secret weapons sales to Iran in order to fund the Contras in Nicaragua in violation of US law. </p>
<h2>Irregular war on terror</h2>
<p>More recently the US has renewed its commitment to what it calls <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510">“irregular warfare”</a>. This includes supporting <a href="https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf">insurgents, militias and mercenaries</a> to weaken unwanted governments, as well as in its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/aug/30/roundupreviews5">counter-terrorism</a> efforts. </p>
<p>The US has covertly supported private armed forces in countries across the Middle East in the “war on terror”. For example, in 2001 the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/War_on_Terror_9.htm">CIA and Special Forces paid warlord factions</a> to help remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Before the US military invasion of Iraq in 2003, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/11/usa.iraq2">US also supported militias</a> fighting against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The US secretly trained <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/middleeast/cia-arming-syrian-rebels.html">insurgents</a> in attempts to oust President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. </p>
<p>Of course, an extensive record of supporting insurgents and mercenary forces is not evidence that the US was involved in the recent events in Venezuela. But it does demonstrate that there are precedents for such activities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Thomson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US denies backing failed raid to remove Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro – but it has a long history of sponsoring private armies elsewhere.Andrew Thomson, Lecturer, Politics and International Studies, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1355912020-04-17T12:11:27Z2020-04-17T12:11:27ZCatholic Church urges Venezuela to unite against coronavirus<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327471/original/file-20200413-146889-1mpf93t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C20%2C4649%2C3073&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">He may be praying, but so far the Pope has declined to intervene in Venezuela's crisis to aid a unified coronavirus response.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/venezuelan-faithful-holds-a-sign-as-he-waits-for-the-news-photo/1087321398?adppopup=true">LUIS ACOSTA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Coronavirus hasn’t yet hit Venezuela <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/where-coronavirus-latin-america">as hard</a> as neighboring Brazil and Colombia. But after <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">years of economic and political crisis</a>, the country’s institutions are in ruins and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/venezuela-coronavirus-health-hospital-maduro-guaido/2020/03/19/74ad110c-6795-11ea-b199-3a9799c54512_story.html">experts agree</a> Venezuela is ill-prepared for a pandemic. </p>
<p>As the stalemate between <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-power-struggle-reaches-a-tense-stalemate-as-human-suffering-deepens-114545">interim President Juan Guaidó and de facto President Nicolás Maduro</a> enters its second year, civil society and world leaders <a href="https://venezuelablog.org/venezuela-weekly-coronavirus-leads-multiple-pushes-political-accord/">are pushing</a> for an emergency agreement that would enable Venezuela to mount a coordinated response to coronavirus. </p>
<p>It will be next to impossible for Maduro’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/nobody-is-going-to-bail-out-venezuela-87428">cash-strapped government</a> to address the coming crisis without significant international financial assistance. Only Guaidó, who is recognized as Venezuela’s legitimate leader <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-venezuela-iadb/argentina-and-brazil-support-venezuelan-opposition-candidate-at-iadb-idUSKBN1QT1RH">by the United States and most countries in the Americas and Europe</a>, can secure that help.</p>
<p>Many advocates <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/04/venezuela-could-coronavirus-threat-be-opportunity#.Xo-vzoA9lFs.twitter">are calling upon</a> international actors like the European Union, United Nations or the Vatican to engage the conflicting parties. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://venezuelablog.org/positive-neutrality-can-vatican-effective-venezuela/">sociologists</a> who have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mG5rPFUAAAAJ&hl=en">studied religion in Venezuela</a> for <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-catholic-church-and-the-venezuela-crisis-20-years-on">years</a>, we are tracking this last possibility closely. We find the Catholic Church is in some ways well positioned to aid Venezuela in this latest crisis. But its power to help is also limited. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327483/original/file-20200413-125133-obtl7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Venezuelan Catholics at a Holy Week procession in Caracas, April 8, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/catholic-faithful-wearing-face-masks-against-the-spread-of-news-photo/1209512149?adppopup=true">Cristian Hernandez/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Broad approval for Catholic Church</h2>
<p>On March 30, Venezuela’s Catholic Church issued <a href="https://conferenciaepiscopalvenezolana.com/downloads/mensaje-de-la-presidencia-de-la-cev-abrazar-al-senor-para-abrazar-la-esperanza">a widely circulated message</a> asking all political leaders to “act decisively to reach a fundamental consensus” that would enable Venezuela to “overcome the serious current public health and socio-economic juncture.” </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-pope-francis-easter-sunday-urbi-et-orbi-blessing-43012">Easter message</a>, Pope Francis called for a cease of conflicts around the world. He added “in Venezuela, may [God] enable concrete and immediate solutions” to “permit international assistance to a population suffering.”</p>
<p>But so far, neither the Venezuelan Catholic Church nor the Vatican have followed up with concrete efforts to broker an agreement between the Maduro government and the opposition. </p>
<p>Historically, faith leaders have played an important role in <a href="https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268044312/religious-responses-to-violence/">addressing conflict and violence in Latin America</a>, helping gang members start a new life, supporting peasants confronting landowners or mediating between conflicting parties. In nearby Colombia, the church <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/religion-the-catholic-church-and-peace-in-colombia">was a fundamental player in the peace process</a> that ended the FARC guerrillas’ 52-year insurgency against the government. </p>
<p>The Church’s ability to engage in conflict resolution has come about in Latin America in part because it has a bureaucratic structure and administrative districts across the entire region. The Vatican also has an experienced <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/udetmr83&div=46&id=&page=">diplomatic corps</a>. </p>
<p>Seventy-three percent of Venezuelans <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/">identify as Catholic</a>. And in a society in which the courts, parties and most every other institution of public life are discredited or deeply polarizing, <a href="http://www.gumilla.org/biblioteca/bases/biblo/texto/SIC2012745_211-222.pdf">opinion polls</a> consistently show that the Catholic Church has high approval ratings.</p>
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<p>Pope Francis – the first Latin American to lead the Catholic Church – has shown considerable interest in Venezuela since assuming office in 2013, sending Vatican participants to <a href="https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-americas/2019/06/vatican-takes-part-in-dialogue-to-resolve-crisis-in-venezuela/">two rounds of dialogue</a> between the Maduro government and the opposition. </p>
<p>The Pope even has some Venezuela experts in his administration. His secretary of state, Msgr. Pietro Parolin, was the Vatican’s ambassador to Venezuela from 2009 to 2013. And Arturo Sosa, Superior General of the Jesuit order – the religious order that Francis is part of – is himself Venezuelan.</p>
<h2>The perils of principles</h2>
<p>But past efforts to mediate in Venezuela’s conflict reveal the limits of the Catholic Church’s capacity to influence the political stalemate there. </p>
<p>The Church’s power, in Venezuela and worldwide, is symbolic. It has no way of actually enforcing political agreements. That makes <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0149-0508.00035">the Church sensitive to</a> conflicting parties actually respecting its authority. </p>
<p>In 2016 <a href="https://venezuelablog.org/government-and-opposition-agree-on-one-big-thing/">both the opposition and the Maduro government requested Vatican involvement</a> in negotiations. That process eventually resulted in an agreement to recognize Venezuela’s opposition-dominated National Assembly and rid the national electoral authority of its Maduro-dominated directors.</p>
<p>But the Maduro government failed to follow through in good faith. So in January 2017 the <a href="https://venezuelablog.org/no-miracles-in-venezuela-conflict-i-dialogue/">Vatican withdrew from further involvement</a> in Venezuela’s conflict and recalled its envoy. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/327486/original/file-20200413-157316-tvi7x4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A temporary hospital for COVID-19 patients goes up in Cucuta, Colombia, on the border with Venezuela, March 28, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/firegighters-soldiers-and-workers-from-the-office-of-the-news-photo/1208490865?adppopup=true">SCHNEYDER MENDOZA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Two years later, amid a crisis caused by the National Assembly’s designation of Juan Guaidó as interim president, Maduro <a href="https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/maduro-envio-carta-al-papa-para-buscar-dialogo-en-venezuela-322696">asked Pope Francis</a> for renewed Vatican mediation. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://apnews.com/f950d904fc804d639867f75c04a4f545">private letter</a> that was later leaked, the Pope demurred “because what had been agreed in the meetings was not followed by concrete gestures.”</p>
<h2>‘Positive neutrality’</h2>
<p>Since the failed 2016 negotiations, both the Vatican and Venezuela’s national Catholic Church hierarchy have maintained what they call “<a href="https://venezuelablog.org/positive-neutrality-can-vatican-effective-venezuela/">positive neutrality</a>.” </p>
<p>By positive neutrality, Church leaders mean the effort to engage leaders on both sides of the conflict while pushing for <a href="https://conferenciaepiscopalvenezolana.com/downloads/mensaje-de-la-presidencia-de-la-cev-abrazar-al-senor-para-abrazar-la-esperanza">democratic elections, humanitarian aid and political dialogue</a>. They <a href="https://conferenciaepiscopalvenezolana.com/downloads/comunicado-comision-de-justicia-y-paz">denounce the Maduro government</a> for its bleak human rights record and <a href="https://www.diariolasamericas.com/iglesia-venezolana-critica-el-regimen-totalitario-e-inhumano-maduro-n4190826">denial of Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis</a>. They also criticize the opposition for violent protests and unwillingness to negotiate.</p>
<p>Our tracking of the Church’s public discourse in Venezuela shows that its message has been remarkably consistent throughout the government of Nicolás Maduro.</p>
<p>But in polarized Venezuela, neutrality of any kind is rarely well received. </p>
<p>Opposition members have <a href="https://america.periodistadigital.com/sociedad/20190313/maria-corina-machado-papa-crimen-justicia-hay-punto-medio-noticia-689400558514/">long complained</a> about the Vatican’s willingness to stay on the margins of a conflict that has seen protesters beaten, opposition leaders jailed and democracy dismantled. They see Pope Francis as appeasing an authoritarian with dictatorial plans.</p>
<p>The Maduro government, for its part, views the local Catholic hierarchy as an ally of the opposition. Indeed, Venezuela’s bishops have <a href="https://www.religiondigital.org/america/Cardenal-Urosa-Presidencia-Interina-Guaido-venezuela-asamblea_0_2191880817.html">openly supported</a> the presidential claims of Juan Guaidó.</p>
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<h2>Religious authority</h2>
<p>Nonetheless, political leaders on both sides consistently seek the blessing of the Venezuelan Catholic Church and the Vatican’s involvement on their behalf.</p>
<p>Our research confirms that the Church has a level of approval and moral authority in Venezuela that crosscuts political powers. That gives it the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-society-for-the-21st-century/religions-and-social-progress-critical-assessments-and-creative-partnerships/F4DCFDEB009BB27E6536EC776A9F2EA6">potential to alter</a> a conflicted equilibrium. </p>
<p>But this moral authority is fragile, and both the Venezuelan Church and the Vatican jealously guard it. Having been defied once by Maduro, the Pope may be disinclined to back another mediation that might fail.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic appears certain to deepen what is already a tragic humanitarian emergency.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Smilde is affiliated with the Washington Office on Latin America, an human rights organization.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugo Pérez Hernáiz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If anyone can convince the Maduro government and the Venezuelan opposition to come together to fight COVID-19, it’s the Pope. But the Church’s power to negotiate an emergency deal is limited.David Smilde, Professor of Sociology, Tulane UniversityHugo Pérez Hernáiz, Professor of Sociology, Universidad Central de VenezuelaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1307492020-02-11T15:13:54Z2020-02-11T15:13:54ZBrazil’s humane refugee policies: Good ideas can travel north<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314004/original/file-20200206-43069-6iy17t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5760%2C3837&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this March 2018 photo, Venezuelan children wait for a meal at a migrant shelter set up in Boa Vista, Roraima state, Brazil. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Eraldo Peres)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The global north tends to view the global south as a source of refugees, and it often implements policies aimed at preventing those refugees from reaching the global north. </p>
<p>Brazil recently set a <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2019/12/5dea19f34/unhcr-welcomes-brazils-decision-recognize-thousands-venezuelans-refugees.html">bold precedent</a> that should make those northern states adjust the lens. Its policy toward Venezuelan refugees, in contrast to its wealthier peers, is pragmatic, humane and sensible.</p>
<p>Venezuela’s political, economic and social collapse has generated a population hemorrhage: More than 4.5 million, or one in seven Venezuelans, have left, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-brazil-usa/u-s-backs-program-to-help-venezuelan-migrants-settle-in-brazil-idUSKBN1ZR2I8?utm_source=Unknown+List">and most remain in the region.</a> Colombia <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/25/dont-let-venezuelas-crisis-take-down-colombia-too-refugees/">hosts around 1.5 million.</a> About 260,000 have entered Brazil through its northern border with Venezuela, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-brazil-usa/u-s-backs-program-to-help-venezuelan-migrants-settle-in-brazil-idUSKBN1ZR2I8?utm_source=Unknown+List">at a rate of about 500 per day.</a> Three elements of the Brazilian response stand out.</p>
<p>First, Brazil has provided basic shelters and services — not detention — to meet the urgent and immediate needs of people streaming across the Venezuelan border into Roraima province. Brazil partners with United Nations agencies, as well as international, regional and domestic aid agencies that contribute financial and logistical assistance. The Brazilian government has also initiated a policy to redistribute arrivals to the interior of Brazil <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/brazil/venezuelan-migration-brazil-analysis-interiorisation-programme-july-2019">to reduce the burden on Roraima</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314005/original/file-20200206-43113-cszasf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">In this February 2019 photo, Venezuelans stand behind the Spanish sign reading ‘Venezuela-Brazil Limit’ near a border checkpoint in Pacaraima, Roraima state, Brazil, on Venezuela’s southern border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ivan Valencia)</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Next, Brazil has expanded the scope of entitlement to refugee status. The 1984 <a href="https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf">Cartagena Declaration</a> adopted a regional approach to refugee protection, mindful of the history of Latin American states as both producers and recipients of refugee flows.</p>
<p>The international refugee definition contained in the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">UN 1951 Refugee Convention</a> is individualistic and requires proof that applicants fear personal persecution. But the Cartagena definition supplements that narrow approach by including people who have fled their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order. </p>
<p>In June 2019, Brazil’s National Committee for Refugees <a href="https://news.un.org/pt/story/2019/07/1681741">issued a detailed report</a> concluding that the crisis in Venezuela falls under the purview of the Cartagena Declaration. People labelled as migrants elsewhere because they fall outside the narrow terms of the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html">UN Refugee Convention</a> definition are included as refugees under Cartagena. </p>
<h2>Bolder step</h2>
<p>In December 2019, Brazil took an even bolder step: It dispensed with the requirement of individualized refugee status determination for each Venezuelan asylum applicant. </p>
<p>Applicants in Brazil, with documentary proof of identity and without a criminal record, will receive refugee status without an interview. Refugee status, in turn, entitles them to permanent resident status, access employment, public health care, education and other social services available to Brazilians. </p>
<p>After four years, they may apply for naturalization. Within the first month of the policy, about <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/06/brazil-grants-asylum-21000-venezuelans-single-day">21,000 Venezuelans were processed</a> under this new system. </p>
<p>Put this in comparative perspective: Unlike the United States and Australia, Brazil has not set up detention centres, separated families and caged children in order to punish Venezuelans for fleeing intolerable circumstances. </p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-world-without-immigration-detention-is-possible-116626">A world without immigration detention is possible</a>
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<p>That means that Brazil has not wasted scarce resources on vicious and futile deterrence strategies. Brazil also applies a refugee definition that responds to contemporary patterns of forced migration. And unlike other states with sophisticated refugee status determination regimes, Brazil’s group-based recognition of Venezuelans avoids the creation of a mammoth backlog of Venezuelan asylum applications. </p>
<p>Resources that would have been wasted processing individual Venezuelan asylum claims will be directed at managing settlement and integration, and on determining asylum claims from other places.</p>
<h2>Some are just passing through</h2>
<p>Not all Venezuelans who arrive in Brazil seek asylum. </p>
<p>Many transit <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-brazil-usa/u-s-backs-program-to-help-venezuelan-migrants-settle-in-brazil-idUSKBN1ZR2I8?utm_source=Unknown+List">through Brazil</a> in order to rejoin family or friends in nearby states, such as Argentina or Chile. Others go back and forth between Brazil and Venezuela to deliver food, medicine and other necessities to family and communities who remain there. And some do not wish to see themselves as refugees and so do not claim that legal status.</p>
<p>Brazil also allows Venezuelans to obtain <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2018-issue-1-venezuelan-crisis-deepens-south-america-braces-more-arrivals-and">two-year renewable temporary resident permits</a> that also give them access to employment and to public services like health care and education. </p>
<p>There is good reason to believe that whether they are admitted on temporary permits, or permanently as refugees, most Venezuelans will go home voluntarily if and when the circumstances that caused them to flee have improved. That’s another advantage of regional integration programs that enable people to live, work and continue their lives in proximity to their country of origin.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314003/original/file-20200206-43084-xm3m0h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro plays with a Venezuelan boy at an event for beneficiaries of a program to receive Venezuelan migrants in January 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Eraldo Peres)</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>Regional solidarity plays a paradoxical role in Brazil’s initiative. The Cartagena Declaration, as well as a <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-south-america-emergence-alternative-model">regional free movement initiative under the Mercosur</a> trade bloc, show the emergence of South American co-operation in migration. </p>
<p>On the other hand, President Jair Bolsonaro has not distinguished himself in the past as a champion of refugees and displaced people. One wonders whether his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/18/bolsonaro-maduro-venezuela-video-message-democracy-reestablished">antipathy toward</a> Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro might have more to do with the Brazilian hospitality shown to Venezuelans fleeing Maduro’s regime than solidarity. One is reminded here of <a href="https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Refugee-Policies-Refugees-and-the-cold-war.html">refugee politics during the Cold War</a>. But whatever the motive, the current policy has much to commend it. </p>
<h2>Not perfect</h2>
<p>The system is certainly imperfect. Brazil is a middle-income country, and so the quality and availability of public services is uneven. </p>
<p>Bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of co-ordination among different branches of the state cause delay and confusion. Venezuela is not the only source of asylum-seekers; Brazil also receives asylum seekers from Haiti, Africa and the Middle East.</p>
<p>Local aid organizations struggle to fill service gaps, but their resources are also strained by the surge in Venezuelan arrivals.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/more-protection-urgently-needed-for-venezuelan-lgbtq-refugees-in-brazil-129040">More protection urgently needed for Venezuelan LGBTQ+ refugees in Brazil</a>
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<p>The absence of habitable and affordable accommodation is also a massive and critical problem in Brazil. Refugees may have no alternative but to live in extremely dangerous and violent places. Language training is weak, though Portuguese is relatively easy for Spanish speakers to learn. Even though refugees can lawfully seek employment, some employers still take advantage of newcomers by overworking and underpaying them. </p>
<p>These are problems. But they are better problems to have than thousands of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/758199418/migrant-children-traumatized-after-separations-report-says">severely traumatized children</a>, thousands of drowning deaths in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/the-list-europe-migrant-bodycount">the Mediterranean</a> and the abuse, torture, rape and killing of people <a href="https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/libya">seeking refuge</a>in the detention centres of Libya or <a href="https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/asia-pacific/australia">Manus Island.</a></p>
<p>We have something to learn from the Brazilians. If Brazil can find an efficient, pragmatic way to welcome, protect and integrate hundreds of thousands of forced migrants arriving at its border, so can more affluent states. Good ideas — like good people — can migrate north, and we should welcome them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Audrey Macklin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If Brazil can find an efficient, pragmatic way to welcome, protect and integrate hundreds of thousands of forced migrants arriving at its border, so can more affluent states.Audrey Macklin, Professor and Chair in Human Rights Law, Director of the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.