tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/central-european-university-1430/articlesCentral European University2020-04-28T13:43:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1371472020-04-28T13:43:25Z2020-04-28T13:43:25ZMusic-making brings us together during the coronavirus pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/330539/original/file-20200426-163126-1rj1c53.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4992%2C3458&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People dance on their balcony in Barcelona, Spain, on April 25, 2020, as the lockdown to combat the spread of coronavirus continues. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As cities all over the world shut down to slow the spread of the novel coronavirus, a new crop of videos emerged on the internet: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NySV_U_voc&t=7s">Italians</a> singing from their balconies, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEpkUawiLKA">policemen in Spain playing guitar</a> while on patrol and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hcjO_cETMUI">New York City apartment dwellers</a> singing along to The Beatles’ “Yellow Submarine” from their windows. </p>
<p>People across the globe started making music together from their windows and balconies. As music neuroscientists who study how music affects our bodies and brains, we would like to shed light on the question: why do we turn to collective music-making in times of crisis?</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">New Yorkers sing Frank Sinatra’s “New York, New York” on April 16, 2020 in celebration of health-care workers during the city’s lockdown.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Universal response</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05724.x">Music is universal</a> — no human culture exists without it. Even if we only tap or move along, our universal response to music is to join in. This inclination is deeply rooted in neurobiology — our brain’s neural motor, or movement, system <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2152">lights up</a> when we hear music, even if we appear to be remaining still. </p>
<p>Our research has shown that the motor system is particularly <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2007.19.5.893">responsive to the beat</a>, the regular pulse in music that people typically tap or dance along with. The beat has a privileged role in music, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-9280.00458">capturing our attention</a> and sometimes driving us to move without us even being aware of it.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">On March 13, 2020, Italians took to their balconies to sing the national anthem to raise morale on the fourth day of a nationwide lockdown.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The process by which we synchronize movements to the beat is called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0411-11.2011">entrainment</a>. Entrainment occurs when ongoing brain activity aligns in time with the beat of the music. Entrainment has been observed not only in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.11.037">auditory brain areas</a> but also in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1705373114">motor brain areas</a>. </p>
<p>Entrainment is central to our ability to accurately perceive and produce the beat with our bodies, as we do during tapping, singing or dancing to music. In fact, research suggests that the better our brain entrains to the beat, the more accurate we are at <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1508431112">perceiving</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht261">synchronizing</a> with music. Our desire to move to music may be rooted in our brain’s spontaneous alignment of its activity to the beat.</p>
<h2>Making music together</h2>
<p>The ability to entrain to a musical beat may also be what allows us to produce music with others. Group music-making is a remarkable phenomenon when considered from the perspective of neurobiology: not only are individuals playing music together, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13738">their brains are finding the same beat</a>.</p>
<p>Entrainment allows us to achieve what researchers call interpersonal synchrony, or the alignment of behaviour in time. Being in sync with others is important for many kinds of human behaviour. It enables us to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0394">coordinate synchronized actions</a> as a group, from singing in a choir to rowing a boat, as well as the turn-taking behaviours that make for good conversations. The desire for interpersonal synchrony may drive humans to perform music together during this pandemic.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Neighbours singing The Beatles’ “Yellow Submarine” from their apartment windows as coronavirus restrictions went into effect in New York City.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Interpersonal synchrony is a powerful tool that creates a sense of belonging and participation. When people produce actions in synchrony, they later feel more connection or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0394">affiliation</a> towards one another, and are also more likely to <a href="http://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000173">trust</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.03.004">co-operate</a>. </p>
<p>The social benefits of interpersonal synchrony have been observed early in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.009">child development</a>. One well-known study shows that toddlers are more likely to help an adult — for example, retrieving more dropped items — <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/infa.12140">when the child has previously been bounced in synchrony with that adult</a>. </p>
<p>The bonding that arises through group synchrony serves practical societal functions: army troops march in step, children bond with parents by singing songs together and now groups clap, bang pots and cheer for health-care workers to signal solidarity. Interpersonal synchrony can also improve one’s emotional state, increasing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10865-004-0006-9">mood</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01064">self-esteem</a>. </p>
<h2>Music’s cultural role</h2>
<p>There is a reason music is found in every known culture. Music moves us at the level of the body, the brain and the group. The interpersonal synchrony that we achieve through making music links our minds and bodies, enhancing social cohesion, bonding and other positive outcomes. </p>
<p>Right now, in the midst of a period in which the need for social bonding is perhaps greater than ever, we are glad to see socially isolated people still finding a way to make music together. Sing on, together!</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137147/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Grahn receives research funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the James S. McDonnell Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna-Katharina R. Bauer receives funding from the German Research Foundation.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Zamm is currently employed under the EU-FP7 European Consolidator Research Grant "JAXPERTISE" to Prof. Natalie Sebanz (CEU, Budapest). She will begin a Marie Curie Individual Fellowship in Fall 2020.</span></em></p>From balcony concerts to Zoom choirs, neuroscience shows why people are compelled to connect through music while the pandemic keeps them under stay-at-home orders.Jessica Grahn, Associate professor, Psychology, Western UniversityAnna-Katharina R. Bauer, Postdoctoral research fellow in Cognitive Sciences (German Research Foundation), University of OxfordAnna Zamm, Postdoctoral research fellow in Cognitive Science, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1184122019-10-30T12:04:48Z2019-10-30T12:04:48ZAcademic freedom: repressive government measures taken against universities in more than 60 countries<p><em>This article is part of a series on <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/academic-freedom-series-76963">academic freedom</a> where leading academics from around the world write on the state of free speech and inquiry in their region.</em></p>
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<p>Universities around the world are increasingly under threat from governments restricting their ability to teach and research freely. Higher education institutions are being targeted because they are the home of critical inquiry and the free exchange of ideas. And governments want to control universities out of fear that allowing them to operate freely might ultimately limit governmental power to operate without scrutiny.</p>
<p>My recent <a href="https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Uni-restrictions-rpt-final-March-2019.pdf">report</a>, co-authored with researcher Aron Suba <a href="http://icnl.org">for the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law</a>, has found evidence of restrictive and repressive government measures against universities and other higher education institutions in more than 60 countries. </p>
<p>This includes government interference in leadership and governance structures to effectively create state-run institutions that are particularly vulnerable to government actions. It also includes the criminalisation of academics for their work as well as the militarisation and securitisation of campuses through the presence of armed forces or surveillance by security services. We also found evidence that students have been prevented from attending university because of their parents’ political beliefs, while others have been expelled or even imprisoned for expressing their own opinions.</p>
<p>Some of the more shocking examples of repressive practices have been widely publicised, such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44519112">firing of thousands of academics</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/turkey-academic-jailed-raids-professors-activists-181115085605059.html">jailing of others</a> in Turkey. But much of what is happening is at an “administrative” level – against individual institutions or the entire higher education system.</p>
<p>There are examples of governments that restrict access to libraries and research materials, censor books and prevent the publication of research on certain topics. Governments have also stopped academics travelling to meet peers, and interfered with curricula and courses. And our research also found governments have even interfered in student admissions, scholarships and grades. </p>
<h2>Repression, intimidation</h2>
<p>Hungary provides a particularly glaring recent example of government interference with university autonomy. The politicised targeting of the institution I work at –- Central European University –- has been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/george-soros-viktor-orban-ceu/588070/">well documented</a>. But the government has also recently acted against academic life in the country more broadly. It has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-government-education/hungary-to-stop-financing-gender-studies-courses-pm-aide-idUSKBN1KZ1M0">effectively prohibited the teaching of a course</a> (gender studies) and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0306422018800258">taken control</a> of the well-regarded Hungarian Academy of Social Sciences. </p>
<p>What makes the Hungarian example especially disturbing is that it is happening within the European Union – with seemingly no consequences for the government. This is despite the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT">EU Charter of Fundamental Rights</a> which states that: “The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected.” Meanwhile the Hungarian government still has all the privileges of being an EU member state, which includes receiving large sums of EU money.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290675/original/file-20190903-175700-17ljeow.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Public demonstration in front of the Hungarian Academy of Science building against the removal of the Academy Science Research Institute’s autonomy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/budapest-hungary-07022019-public-demonstration-front-1440894773?src=-1-0">Istvan Balogh/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The inexplicable failure by the EU to enforce its own standards is particularly troubling and helps to normalise this behaviour. Indeed, there are clear signs such repressive practices are spreading. Anti-human rights legislation, policy and practice that begins in one country is frequently copied in another. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ACT3096472019ENGLISH.PDF">Anti-civil society legislation</a> recently adopted in Hungary and Israel, for example, which aims to stop protests and minimise the number of organisations receiving funds from abroad, was previously adopted in Russia.</p>
<p>Repressive practices against universities are starting to spread in Europe. Earlier this year it was <a href="https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-ministerstwo-sprawiedliwosci-pozwie-profesorow-uj-za-opinie-,nId,3045949#utm_source=paste&utm_medium=paste&utm_campaign=chrome">reported</a> that the Ministry of Justice in Poland planned to sue a group of criminal law academics for their opinion on a new criminal law bill.</p>
<h2>Academics in distress</h2>
<p>The freedom of academics and university autonomy is not entirely without scrutiny. There are some excellent organisations, such as <a href="https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/about/">Scholars At Risk</a> and the <a href="https://www.eua.eu/">European University Association</a> who actively monitor this sector. But, at an international level, university autonomy is rarely raised when governments’ human rights records are being examined. And there is no single organisation devoted to monitoring the range of issues identified in our recent report. </p>
<p>Without proper monitoring, universities, academics and students are even more vulnerable because there is little attention paid to these issues. And there is little pressure on governments not to undertake repressive measures at will.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290676/original/file-20190903-175673-1o7xdxx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Thousands demonstrate in central Budapest against higher education legislation seen as targeting the Central European University.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/budapest-12-april-2017-thousands-demonstrate-620278883?src=-1-4">Drone Media Studio/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>A global monitoring framework is needed, underpinned by a clear definition of university autonomy. The UN and EU institutions also need to pay more attention to the dangers that such attacks on universities pose to democracy and human rights. A stronger line against governments who are acting in violation of existing standards should also be taken.</p>
<p>Universities should be autonomous in their operations and exercise <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c22.pdf">self-governance</a>. These institutions are crucial to the healthy functioning of democratic societies. Yet academic spaces are closing in countries around the world. This should be a concern for all. The time for action is now, before this trend becomes the new norm.</p>
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<p><strong><em>Read more from our series on academic freedom <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/academic-freedom-series-76963">here</a> .</em></strong></p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirsten Roberts Lyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Universities are increasingly under threat everywhere.Kirsten Roberts Lyer, Associate Professor of Practice, Acting Director Shattuck Centre, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148312019-04-10T08:34:15Z2019-04-10T08:34:15ZIslamic State: the ‘caliphate’ is off the map for now, but will evolve in dangerous ways<p>The so-called Islamic State (IS) recently lost its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45547595">last remnant of territory in Syria</a>, but observers were quick to remind the world that the war against the organisation is <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/18/trump-isis-terrorists-defeated-foreign-policy-225816">far from over</a>. What then does this loss of territorial control actually mean for IS?</p>
<p>At its height, the self-proclaimed “caliphate” controlled an estimated <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-times-view-on-the-fall-of-isis-state-of-collapse-2xx9dt9cl">34,000 square miles</a> across Syria and Iraq, so its defeat on the ground is clearly a severe blow for it. Nevertheless, IS is now <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Frukmini-callimachi&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=inline&version=latest&contentPlacement=18&pgtype=collection">expected</a> to evolve. Its networks will disperse into virtual, online spaces and become largely invisible. It will focus on insurgency tactics and terror attacks with a wider reach.</p>
<p>In the face of this evolution, it may seem like maintaining IS in a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-02-18/isis-not-terrorist-group">contained</a> geographic pocket would have been better than eradicating its primary territorial base altogether. With its defeat on the ground in Syria and Iraq, however, IS and its offshoots will have a more limited capacity for recruitment, indoctrination and growth.</p>
<h2>The importance of territory</h2>
<p>The success of rebel groups to survive protracted armed conflicts is dependent on their ability to maintain territorial <a href="https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/rebelocracy-a-theory-of-social-order-in-civil-war">control</a>. They require it to extract resources and enlist local recruits. </p>
<p>Territorial control allows armed groups to force local populations into <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/07/the-logic-of-violence-in-islamic-states-war/?utm_term=.a02d92013da8">compliance and conformity</a> with their ideological outlook. Since its inception, IS understood that its radical “Islamic” community does not locally exist. Instead, the organisation set about creating it, reshaping communities under its control in its own image. </p>
<p>Comparative evidence from civil wars around the world demonstrates how territorial control does not depend on a local population’s ideological agreement with the forces in place. Instead, in his book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/logic-of-violence-in-civil-war/3DFE74EA492295FC6940D58CA8EF4D5C">The Logic of Violence in Civil War</a>, Stathis Kalyvas argues that a combination of coercive measures and local administrative bodies allows a force to maintain order, stability and compliance.</p>
<p>For example, during the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s, NPFL (The National Patriotic Front of Liberia) rebels, led by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41509896">Charles Taylor</a>, used administrative bodies and courts in the territory they controlled to create an alternative order backed up by displays of brutality and violence. This <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436599550036266">led</a> to an intricate system of patronage and loyalty that created new dependencies between local communities and the new regime.</p>
<p>These Taylor-era Liberian courts are comparable to IS’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html">religious courts</a> which controlled the issuing of permits for cross border activities, defined the educational content of local schools, distributed social services – and carried out extreme public punishments. </p>
<p>In enduring armed conflict, these administrative bodies, social services and displays of order encourage the cooperation of the local population. In other words, territorial control allows the occupier to manage the behaviour and, potentially, the ideology of the people under its control. </p>
<h2>Instruments of control</h2>
<p>Under IS, spectacles of brutality and violence were a key part of this. Public executions involved people being incinerated, stoned, decapitated, and thrown off towers. Staged in front of local people, these executions were carefully choreographed, and meticulously documented and disseminated – both locally and internationally. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268464/original/file-20190409-2914-1w5m035.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">At its height, Islamic State controlled large swathes of Syria and Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU1NDg2NDA3NSwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMjIwODYyMDExIiwiayI6InBob3RvLzIyMDg2MjAxMS9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJaRnkza1pDbXdqZWRtT2hvdStMblRsNXNKMFkiXQ%2Fshutterstock_220862011.jpg&pi=33421636&m=220862011&src=JJCm7jxbmTTwGitAD46kAQ-1-14">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>IS explicitly <a href="https://clarionproject.org/docs/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf">claimed</a> that these acts of brutality were intended to create a vacuum by disrupting local societal structures that could then be “filled” and “managed” by them. Essentially, displays of violence were used as an instrument of social organisation.</p>
<p>Data <a href="https://www.strikingmargins.com/news-1/2018/9/21/dr-harout-akdedian-at-university-of-utrecht-workshop-on-syira">personally collected</a> between 2012 and 2014 shows that many living under the rule of radicalised groups such as IS judge these groups based on their own immediate day-to-day conditions rather than the organisation’s overall performance or outlook.</p>
<p>If administrative structures function and people have access to food and basic services, for example, local populations may overlook – or even adhere to – the occupying force’s ideology (albeit under duress). And those that don’t are severely and publicly punished as an “example” to others. </p>
<p>The 2014 executions of members of the Sunni Arab al-Sheitaat tribe, in Deir el-Zor, Syria, are a case in point. IS took the lives of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-execution/islamic-state-executed-700-people-%20from-syrian-tribe-monitoring-group-idUSKBN0GG0H120140817">more than 700</a> of its members for revoking a pledge of allegiance. In addition, IS incessantly targeted <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda/">other</a> Jihadi or predominantly Sunni rebel formations. Indeed, the tally of those killed continues to <a href="https://www.apnews.com/01c50935854b425295ef8731cdfc42a4,%20a">increase</a> as more mass graves are discovered. </p>
<h2>Violent consolidation</h2>
<p>Such atrocities were examples of IS consolidating its power through the elimination of rivals and the suppression of potential or real dissent within its area of control. Faced with this, local populations had no choice but to imitate expressions of religiosity as defined by IS and to demonstrate compliance. For local people, this was a method of adaptation and survival – but IS’s loss of territorial control now greatly reduces its capacity to control and indoctrinate local residents in this way.</p>
<p>The question of how IS’s methods impacted local populations in the long run is yet to be answered. A lot will depend on what happens next in its former territory and to those living there now. </p>
<p>Either way, while IS is badly incapacitated, it certainly is not finished. It will most likely splinter into new organisations which might try to establish territorial control <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/178-how-islamic-state-rose-fell-and-could-rise-again-maghreb">elsewhere</a>. Parts of North Africa and the Maghreb are particularly susceptible, where control over vast swathes of land remain <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/93/4/883/3897522?redirectedFrom=fulltext">contested</a>. In the meantime, IS will continue to try to nurture its virtual communities and seek new audiences online.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114831/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harout Akdedian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Its defeat in Syria may now give way to new dangers.Harout Akdedian, Carnegie SFM Postdoctoral fellow, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1043342018-10-03T12:57:48Z2018-10-03T12:57:48ZWill Jeremy Hunt’s Soviet Union comments affect Brexit talks? Experts react<p>Foreign secretary Jeremy Hunt caused a stir after his Conservative party conference <a href="https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2018/09/never-mistake-british-politeness-for-british-weakness-hunts-conference-speech-full-text.html">speech</a>, during which he compared the European Union to the Soviet Union, stating:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What happened to the confidence and ideals of the European dream? The EU was set up to protect freedom. It was the Soviet Union that stopped people leaving. The lesson from history is clear: if you turn the EU club into a prison, the desire to get out won’t diminish it will grow … and we won’t be the only prisoner that will want to escape … If you reject the hand of friendship offered by our prime minister … you turn your back on the partnership that has given Europe more security, more freedom and more opportunities than ever in history … and a setback for the EU will become a wholly avoidable tragedy for Europe.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Academics give their view on how Hunt’s remarks will affect Brexit negotiations at this critical stage. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Richard Whitman, Professor of Politics and International Relations at University of Kent</strong></p>
<p>Hunt’s speech was a crowd pleaser at the Conservative party conference but it generated considerable negative coverage in other European capitals. Using language that compared the EU to the Soviet Union was spectacularly mistimed. The UK is about to embark on a final push for a withdrawal agreement from the EU and can’t afford to antagonise it. </p>
<p>Thus far, the UK has pursued a “workaround” diplomatic strategy for Brexit. Instead of focusing entirely on dealing with Brussels, it has attempted to influence the European Commission’s stance by appealing to national governments and by sending ministers to visit <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-chequers-plan-theresa-may-michel-barnier-eu-uk-commission-ministers-a8458126.html">European capitals</a> to sell the Chequers deal.</p>
<p>The EU’s Baltic member states have been seen as relatively sympathetic to the UK in the Brexit negotiations so far. The strength of the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-jeremy-hunt-soviet-union-dirty-rats-backlash-against-red-october/">reaction</a> coming from the region’s diplomats after Hunt’s comments illustrates just how ill-advised they were. Tiina Intelmann, the Estonian ambassador to London, described the comparison as “insulting”.</p>
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<p>When Hunt was chosen to replace Boris Johnson as foreign secretary, the news was greeted positively in European capitals. Johnson was seen as a detrimental influence on UK Brexit policy and a poor performer in his diplomatic role. Hunt had the opportunity to reset relationships with his fellow EU foreign ministers. The party conference speech will not have eased this task. </p>
<p>Hunt’s remarks fall in line with the rhetoric adopted by the UK government since the EU’s Salzburg summit, but will do him no favours in his new position. The UK government has held to its line that the Chequers deal is the basis for an agreement with the EU. </p>
<p>For the future, Hunt could usefully reflect on Harold Macmillan’s comment on the role of foreign secretary, delivered in the House of Commons in 1955: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Nothing he can say can do very much good, and almost anything he may say may do a great deal of harm.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p><strong>Agnes Batory, Professor of Public Policy at Central European University</strong></p>
<p>The EU is not the Soviet Union – it simply cares more about continuing members than quitters. Jeremy Hunt’s recent comparison of the EU to the Soviet Union, during his Conservative party conference speech, was rightly rebuked by <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/10/01/eu-diplomats-hit-back-jeremy-hunt-soviet-union-comparison/">EU policy-makers</a>, as well as former <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/brexit/jeremy-hunt-conservative-party-conference-2018-speech-compare-eu-soviet-union/">senior British civil servants</a>. The reasons are obvious: the EU was formed voluntarily by like-minded states and is governed by the rule of law – unlike that other union, which was created and maintained by coercion and oppression.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1046491511821668353"}"></div></p>
<p>Looking at the comment from the perspective of one of the “new” member states, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, many will see the comparison as offensive. Having suffered under Soviet rule, their countries worked hard to join this current union, and feel that EU membership has delivered peace and prosperity. Of course, not everyone would agree: Hunt has the dubious distinction of parroting Hungary’s populist prime minister, Viktor Orban, who <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/13c1a046-9931-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae">drew a parallel</a> between “Moscow” and “Brussels” years ago.</p>
<p>Hunt himself seemed to recognise that the comment was ill-advised, when <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/02/uk-foreign-secretary-jeremy-hunt-backtracks-on-soviet-union-eu-comments.html">he tried</a> – and failed – to explain himself, claiming that he simply reacted to the EU trying to “punish” the UK for wanting to leave. And this is where an observer from the continent throws up her hands in despair. </p>
<p>It beggars belief that the head of the British Foreign Office still seems to fail to grasp the nature of the Brexit negotiations – even if the speech was delivered to Tory party faithful. It implies that Hunt and his colleagues continue to believe that the UK is somehow entitled to demand the EU puts Britain first, ahead of the interests of its member states. This simply will not happen. Cherry picking is not an option, and never has been. An obstinate insistence that it be allowed, lest the UK feels punished, will not serve the British public well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Whitman received funding from the ESRC's UK in a Changing Europe programme in 2016. He is affiliated with Chatham House. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agnes Batory receives funding from a research grant under the EU's Horizon 2020 programme. </span></em></p>Hunt might have pleased the Conservative party faithful, but he’s offended Britain’s closest allies.Richard Whitman, Visiting Fellow, Chatham House and member of the Global Europe Centre, University of KentAgnes Batory, Professor in Public Policy, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014892018-08-21T20:55:59Z2018-08-21T20:55:59ZLa neutralisation de l’info : enquête chez les trolls russes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232457/original/file-20180817-165949-6bwzoj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C27%2C5997%2C3980&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Les trolls russes sont les maîtres de la « neutrollisation » de l'info. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/photo-of-person-typing-on-computer-keyboard-735911/">Soumil Kumar/pexels</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Les <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/russia-troll-factory.html">« usines à troll »</a> en Russie font régulièrement la Une des journaux. Et sont suspectées d'être derrière de nombreuses campagnes de désinformation, comme <a href="https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2018/08/22/facebook-annonce-avoir-mis-fin-a-des-campagnes-d-ingerence_5344761_4408996.html?">l'a souligné Facebook</a> ce mardi.</p>
<p>Elles ont tout d’abord surnommé les « gardiennes digitales » du <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/russias-online-comment-propaganda-army/280432/">Kremlin</a> dans la blogosphère russe puis perçues comme de véritables cyber-légions subversives capables de perturber les <a href="https://theconversation.com/piratage-informatique-les-dilemmes-de-washington-face-a-la-russie-70663">élections américaines</a>.</p>
<p>Au-delà du sensationalisme et des discussions passionnées au sujet de ces trolls plus ou moins impersonnels, des enquêtes ont également été menées avec eux, voire <a href="http://mr7.ru/articles/112478/">grâce à eux</a>. En effet plusieurs de ces (ex) trolls russes ont souhaité <a href="http://time.com/5168202/russia-troll-Internet-research-agency">témoigner</a> et expliquer <a href="http://www.svoboda.org/a/27970298.html">leurs agissements</a>.</p>
<p>Nous savons désormais que certains d’entre eux n’ont pas pris leurs tâches – assurer une certaine propagande politique – très au sérieux, et nous connaissons, grâce à eux, le fonctionnement et l’organisation interne de la <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html">« ferme à trolls »</a> nommée l’<a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/what-we-know-about-the-Internet-research-agency-and-how-it-meddled-in-the-2016-election.html">Internet Research Agency</a>, un lieu où ont aussi travaillé de nombreux individus devenus ensuite lanceurs d’alerte.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wAUIOrHD-sM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Rencontre avec un ex-troll.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>En plus d’employer un large nombre de commentateurs et blogueurs dont le discours a été pré-construit et orienté, l’agence a également recruté des « reporters » et chercheurs qualifiés, <a href="http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-nws-russia-troll-american-accent-20180219-story.html">souvent polyglottes</a> afin de mener un <a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-infamous-troll-factory-is-now-posing-as-a-media-empire-57534">véritable travail d’enquête</a>.</p>
<p>Plusieurs analyses statistiques sur un échantillon de posts de trolls ont par ailleurs montré que le <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2015/07/13/open-source-information-reveals-pro-kremlin-web-campaign/">trolling politique et institutionel</a> et l’utilisation de <a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/big.2017.0038">bots</a> appartiennent désormais à une pratique très généralisée, affectant l’espace public virtuel.</p>
<p>Ce qui est resté obscur jusqu’à présent est l’institutionnalisation politique des trolls au quotidien.</p>
<p>Nous manquons de recul et de connaissances quant à leur impact sur la relation entre état et société en général ainsi que sur les processus de sécurité en particulier.</p>
<h2>Neutraliser les trolls</h2>
<p>Lors de nos dernières <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010618785102">recherches</a>, nous voulions comprendre ce que font les trolls pro-Kremlin et comment ils évoluent dans la blogosphère russe.</p>
<p>Nous avons analysé comment les journalistes d’investigation sur les trolls <a href="https://www.mk.ru/social/article/2013/11/17/946434-taynyi-trollinga-kak-nanimayut-virtualnyih-killerov-dlya-politicheskih-ubiystv.html#loaded-37">se font troller</a>, et avons remonté la piste des trolls encore chaude juste après l’assassinat du leader officieux de l’opposition <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061">Boris Nemtsov</a>. Nous avons également interviewé d’anciens employés de l’Internet Research Agency par chats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Connectés mais pas ensembles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTUzMzY2NTI5MSwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMTE0NTM0NDE1NyIsImsiOiJwaG90by8xMTQ1MzQ0MTU3L2h1Z2UuanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJyUUQ3Q1hXSkUxU0JVS3BBbjNTVER0S0U3Y2siXQ%2Fshutterstock_1145344157.jpg&pi=33421636&m=1145344157&src=LvbwVAzS8G6rnGvP2_Brwg-1-31">Map Design/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Durant cette recherche nous avons trouvé un phénomène particulier que nous avons appelé « neutrollisation ». Cette pratique autoritaire fonctionne sur la co-optation, en puisant dans les discours de trolls anti-establishment et les retournant au profit du régime.</p>
<p>La neutrollisation empêche la société civile d’exposer le régime comme étant une menace puisqu’elle parvient à montrer que toute mobilisation politique est absurde.</p>
<p>Et tout engagement politique ne pourra que « nourrir le troll », c’est-à-dire, être aspirer par la spirale de trolls qui contribuent ainsi à atténuer toute velléité politique dans la sphère publique.</p>
<h2>Trolls en actions</h2>
<p>Contrairement à des opérations plus classiques de propagande, la neutrollisation ne pousse pas un agenda politique plus qu’un autre.</p>
<p>Les trolls pro-Kremlin font tellement de « bruit » en ligne qu’ils semblent porter la voix de tous les citoyens.</p>
<p>Ils propagent différentes rumeurs conspirationnistes et créent un espace public quasi-politique, mais vide, rempli uniquement de diverses opinions préfabriquées qui brouillent la toile.</p>
<p>C’est exactement ce qui s’est passé lors du meurtre de Boris Nemtsov. En mars 2015, les journaux Moy Rayon et Novaya Gazeta <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/03/10/63342-kak-stat-trollhanterom">ont publié</a> la liste de plus de 500 comptes appartenant à des trolls, ainsi que les instructions qui avaient été données ces trolls afin de gérer l’événement.</p>
<p>Ces sites ont également publié la liste des mots-clefs que les trolls devaient utiliser afin de faciliter la présence de leurs discours via les moteurs de recherches.</p>
<p>Ces instructions avaient pour but de propager l’idée selon laquelle le meurtre de Nemtsov avait été une provocation en aucun cas bénéficiant aux autorités officielles. Les trolls devaient également mettre en avant le fait que la mort de Nemtsov était en réalité une opération de communication destinée à soutenir ses camarades de l’opposition et montrer par ailleurs que des Ukrainiens étaient impliqués dans l’assassinat.</p>
<p>De plus, il leur était demandé de critiquer les « interférences » occidentales dans les affaires internes russes et de suggérer que l’assassinat était un prétexte afin d’exercer plus de pression sur la Fédération russe.</p>
<p>L’objectif n’était ainsi pas de blâmer une opposition politique concrète ou de trouver le commanditaire mais de générer de telles contradictions dans les informations diffusées et leur logique que tout usager lambda serait dégoûté et ne pourrait plus rien prendre au sérieux.</p>
<p>En brouillant ainsi les facultés cognitives critiques du citoyens – l’attirant dans un flux d’informations et le confondre – la neutrollisation va bien plus loin que la censure. Le processus n’a pas pour but de cacher la vérité ou d’imposer ses propres idées. Mais bien d’exploiter les limites de la libre expression et de l’action militante en conduisant les citoyens à se retirer d’eux-mêmes de la vie politique.</p>
<p>Contrairement à <a href="http://opinion.inquirer.net/91678/the-manufacture-of-consent">des formes plus classiques de propagande</a> – où les médias encouragent l’opinion à prendre position – la neutrollisation encourage le cynisme.</p>
<p>Pendant ce temps, les trolls préservent un semblant de sincérité et d’authenticité en suivant les instructions données. Ils ne peuvent par ailleurs pas être « convaincus » car leurs tâches sont de faire imploser toute conversation importante.</p>
<p>Cette position rend quasiment impossible le travail de lanceurs d’alerte sur les trolls. Et les exposer comme « professionnels » du nihilisme est tout aussi insuffisant. Leur force est la précarité de leur travail utilisée au sein d’une puissante stratégie politique.</p>
<p>La neutrollisation n’est d’ailleurs pas limitée à la Russie et s’internationalise.</p>
<p>Le déploiement de bots destinés à <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/how-400-russia-run-fake-accounts-posted-bogus-brexit-tweets">interrompre le dialogue politique</a> montre l’ampleur du phénomène. Certes l’impact sera peut-être moins fort qu’une opération de trolling menée avec le soutien d’un gouvernement, mais cette stratégie créée tout autant panique et désillusion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Des trolls russes témoignent : une enquête inédite révèle leurs modes opératoires.Xymena Kurowska, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow, Aberystwyth UniversityAnatoly Reshetnikov, PhD Researcher, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009942018-08-08T09:59:45Z2018-08-08T09:59:45ZWe researched Russian trolls and figured out exactly how they neutralise certain news<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230799/original/file-20180806-191019-r6n8x9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hacker-dark-red-hoody-front-digital-596787839?src=xaH2H0KZNI8qg9w-gXmxgw-1-3">BeeBright/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russian “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/russia-troll-factory.html">troll factories</a>” have been making headlines for some time. First, as the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/russias-online-comment-propaganda-army/280432/">Kremlin’s digital guardians</a> in the Russian blogosphere. Then, as subversive cyber-squads <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43419809">meddling with US elections</a>.</p>
<p>While there has been much sensationalist talk about troll brigades, there have also been thorough investigations of first party sources <a href="http://mr7.ru/articles/112478/">and genuine leaks</a>. Indeed, some (mostly former) Russian trolls have been <a href="http://time.com/5168202/russia-troll-internet-research-agency/">willing</a> <a href="http://www.svoboda.org/a/27970298.html">to talk</a>.</p>
<p>We now know that at least some of those who have come out from the shadows were not taking the political agenda they were tasked with promoting <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wAUIOrHD-sM">all that seriously</a>. We also <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/how-to-guide-russian-trolling-trolls/26919999.html">know</a>, in some detail, the internal organisation and work schedule of the so-called “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html">troll farm</a>” <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/what-we-know-about-the-internet-research-agency-and-how-it-meddled-in-the-2016-election.html">Internet Research Agency</a> – where most whistleblowers used to work. As well as quantity-oriented commenters and bloggers, the agency employed skilled researchers who <a href="http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-nws-russia-troll-american-accent-20180219-story.html">spoke foreign languages</a> and undertook <a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-infamous-troll-factory-is-now-posing-as-a-media-empire-57534">high-quality investigative work</a>. </p>
<p>A few statistical analyses of large samples of trolling posts also show that <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2015/07/13/open-source-information-reveals-pro-kremlin-web-campaign/">institutionalised political trolling</a> and <a href="https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/big.2017.0038">the use of bots</a> have become a consolidated practice that significantly affect the online public sphere.</p>
<p>What has been shrouded in mystery so far, however, is how institutionalised, industrialised political trolling works on a daily basis. We have also lacked a proper understanding of how it affects the state’s relations with society generally, and security processes in particular. </p>
<h2>Neutralising trolls</h2>
<p>For our recently <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010618785102">published research</a>, we wanted to understand what pro-Kremlin trolling does and how it works in the Russian blogosphere. We analysed how investigative journalism of trolling <a href="https://www.mk.ru/social/article/2013/11/17/946434-taynyi-trollinga-kak-nanimayut-virtualnyih-killerov-dlya-politicheskih-ubiystv.html#loaded-37">gets trolled</a>, worked our way through the trolling trails generated after the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31669061">assassination of Boris Nemtsov</a> – Russia’s unofficial opposition leader – and interviewed a former employee of Internet Research Agency in a series of online chats. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230886/original/file-20180807-1652-1a55ev9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Connected but not in concert.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTUzMzY2NTI5MSwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMTE0NTM0NDE1NyIsImsiOiJwaG90by8xMTQ1MzQ0MTU3L2h1Z2UuanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJyUUQ3Q1hXSkUxU0JVS3BBbjNTVER0S0U3Y2siXQ%2Fshutterstock_1145344157.jpg&pi=33421636&m=1145344157&src=LvbwVAzS8G6rnGvP2_Brwg-1-31">Map Design/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During this research we found a distinct phenomenon which we called “neutrollization”. This authoritarian practice co-opts trolling as an, in principle, anti-establishment (if inflammatory) activity, and turns it into a method of regime consolidation.</p>
<p>Neutrollization prevents civil society’s attempts to expose the regime as a security threat by creating conditions where political mobilisation becomes absurd, so any risk to the regime is neutralised. Meaningful political engagement only “feeds the troll” – that is, it gets sucked into the trolling spiral of ironising the public sphere. </p>
<h2>Trolls in action</h2>
<p>Unlike conventional operations of propaganda, neutrollization does not advocate a distinct political agenda. Pro-Kremlin trolls generate a stupefying noise through internet activism which seems to originate from citizens. They spread various conspiratorial theories and create a quasi-political, yet completely hollow, public space with a multitude of diverse but prefabricated opinions that jam the web. </p>
<p>This is precisely how some sections of the Russian blogosphere were neutralised after the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. In March 2015, newspapers Moy Rayon and Novaya Gazeta <a href="https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/03/10/63342-kak-stat-trollhanterom">leaked</a> a list of more than 500 troll accounts, together with instructions that the trolls had been given on how to approach the event. The papers also published lists of corresponding key words that the trolls were told to use in order to facilitate searchability.</p>
<p>The instructions included proliferating the view that the murder of Nemtsov was a provocation and that it was not beneficial to the official authorities. Trolls were also told to broadcast the alleged PR benefit to the opposition of the death of their comrade, and the involvement of Ukrainian persons in the assassination. In addition, they were told to criticise Westerners’ interference in Russian internal affairs, and to suggest that the murder was being used as an excuse to put pressure on the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>The objective, in other words, was not to put the blame on any concrete political opponent. The interest was not in finding an actual assassin. The logic was to imbue the discussions with such contradiction and filth that any bona fide user felt disillusioned and despondent. This flooding effect deters the audience from taking anything seriously. </p>
<p>Vitally, neutrollization plays on citizens’ own critical faculties by first drawing them in and then confusing them. It is not about merely pulling the wool over their eyes, and it has little to do with coercion or silencing. Instead, it exploits and twists the idea of self-expression and citizenry action in a way that leads to withdrawal from politics. </p>
<p>Unlike the <a href="http://opinion.inquirer.net/91678/the-manufacture-of-consent">more common forms of propaganda</a> – which see mass media encouraging support for the political system – neutrollization encourages cynicism. All the while trolls preserve the semblance of sincerity and authenticity by following instructions. They cannot be “convinced” as their task is to implode any meaningful conversation.</p>
<p>This position makes it near impossible to blow a whistle on a troll. But exposing trolls as professionals of nihilism is insufficient anyway. They are but precarious labour in a powerful political strategy.</p>
<p>Neutrollization isn’t limited to within Russia’s borders. It is increasing internationally, too. The deployment of bots to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/how-400-russia-run-fake-accounts-posted-bogus-brexit-tweets">disrupt political dialogue</a> is just one example of the spillover. And while this does not have the same power as an operation backed by the trolled nation’s own government, this strategy can wreak havoc.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100994/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After following trails and speaking to a former professional troll, researchers have uncovered the tricks.Xymena Kurowska, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow, Aberystwyth UniversityAnatoly Reshetnikov, PhD Researcher, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/771852017-05-10T06:14:36Z2017-05-10T06:14:36ZHungary cracks down on foreign funding, dealing a harsh blow to NGOs — and to European democracy<p><em><strong>This article, which was originally published on May 10 2017 with the headline “Hungary’s bill on civil society funding is a harsh blow for European democracy”, has been updated to reflect latest developments.</strong></em></p>
<hr>
<p>Hungary has officially become Europe’s first “illiberal democracy”, an outcome prime minister Viktor Orban all but <a href="http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592">promised</a> a few years back.</p>
<p>On June 13 Hungary’s parliament voted to turn a <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/orban-criticised-as-hungary-tightens-grip-on-civil-society-1.3118490">much-critised bill</a>, <a href="http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/14967_NGO_bill_20170407_with_reasoning.pdf">On the Transparency of Organisations Supported from Abroad</a>, which tightens control over non-governmental organisations that receive financing from abroad, into law.</p>
<p>The law requires organisations that annually receive more than 7.2 million Hungarian forints (around US$26,000) from foreign institutions or individuals to be placed on a register and compelled to publicly state that they receive “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39640474">foreign funding</a>”. Foreign donors must be individually identified.</p>
<p>Organisations that <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/hungary-new-bill-hampers-ngos-access-to-funding-and-seriously">fail to comply</a> can see financial sanctions or be shuttered.</p>
<p>In Budapest in mid-April, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-12/hungarians-return-to-street-protests-as-pressure-mounts-on-orban">thousands marched</a> against the law and in support of NGOs, which are also under pressure <a href="http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/333701-nasz-wywiad-wicepremier-glinski-madre-panstwo-powinno-wzmacniac-slabszego-z-funduszy-publicznych-zaczna-korzystac-male-lokalne-organizacje?strona=1">in Poland</a> as the government there seeks to control civil society funding. </p>
<p>Amnesty International, whose branch in Hungary is directly impacted by the legislation, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/hungary-ngo-law-a-vicious-and-calculated-assault-on-civil-society/">called</a> the new law “the latest in an escalating crackdown on critical voices and will hamper critically important work by civil society groups”. </p>
<h2>Display of authoritarianism</h2>
<p>Orban’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-liberal-democracy-in-hungary">tactic</a> is to target civil society with debilitating laws and regulations that are presented as mere “technical requirements” necessary to promote transparency or national security.</p>
<p>Similar provisions implemented in other parts of the world reveal that this move often represents a sneaking <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578039/EXPO_STU(2017)578039_EN.pdf">authoritarianism</a>, limiting freedom of association and of expression and silencing critical voices.</p>
<p>The government has all but admitted as much. In January 2017, Szilárd Németh, a right-wing politician and a deputy chair of parliament’s national security committee, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/13/hungary-defends-planned-crackdown-on-foreign-backed-ngos">was cited in both the Guardian</a> newspaper and in Reuters as <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-fidesz-soros-idUSKBN14V0P2">saying</a> that the proposed law was aimed at NGOs that receive funding from organisations related to American-Hungarian businessman and philanthropist George Soros. His <a href="http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org">Open Society Foundations</a> supports pro-democracy groups around the world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168619/original/file-20170509-11023-mxmb7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">George Soros is an American-Hungarian businessman and known philanthropist.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:George_Soros_-_World_Economic_Forum_Annual_Meeting_2011.jpg">World Economic Forum/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On April 25, government spokesperson Zoltán Kovács also referred to the “danger” of “so-called NGOs”, specifically <a href="http://www.kormany.hu/en/government-spokesperson/news/the-problem-is-with-ngos-not-charities-and-volunteer-organisations">mentioning Open Society Foundations-funded groups working on immigration issues</a>. </p>
<p>The civil society law comes shortly after a <a href="https://bbj.hu/politics/parliament-expected-to-fast-track-lex-ceu-tuesday_131030">fast-track law targeting the Soros-founded Central European University </a>, which may force the prestigious academic institution to <a href="https://theconversation.com/central-european-university-has-become-the-battleground-in-hungarys-war-of-ideas-75535">leave Budapest</a>. Soros <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/george-soros-attacks-hungarian-president-building-mafia-state">responded</a> by calling the Orban government a “mafia state”.</p>
<h2>An age-old tactic</h2>
<p>Restrictions to foreign funding is an increasingly common <a href="http://muse.jhu.edu/article/504620">way for governments to dampen civil society</a>. The International Centre for Non-Profit Law found that 36% of restrictive civil society laws <a href="http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol17ss1/Rutzen.pdf">enacted globally between 2012 and 2015</a> targeted international funding.</p>
<p>International standards require that associations should be free to seek, receive and use foreign or international funding, <a href="http://www.osce.org/odihr/132371?download=true">and not be stigmatised for doing so</a>.</p>
<p>As early as 2016 the UN’s Human Rights Council had already <a href="http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/32/L.29">expressed concerns</a> about the trend in funding restrictions. The Carnegie Endowment for Peace’s Thomas Carothers, an expert in the field, describes the attacks on foreign <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/02/closing-space-challenge-how-are-funders-responding/ikrg?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRohvKvKZKXonjHpfsX57O0oXqKg38431UFwdcjKPmjr1YQETMV0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D">funding as the</a> “leading edge of wider crackdowns on civil society”. </p>
<p>Across the globe, <a href="http://www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2016-en.pdf">activists are operating in increasingly dangerous conditions</a>: they face threats, physical assaults and assassination. In April <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/apr/25/democracy-campaigner-governments-are-scared-of-the-participation-revolution">the head of the international organisation CIVICUS declared</a> called the situation of civil society a “global emergency”. </p>
<p>In the Hungarian government’s approach, the “foreign” tag is a stigma for both the funders and the NGOs, according to the group <a href="https://transparency.hu/en/news/civiltorveny-nincs-mirol-egyeztetni/">Transparency International</a>. It implies that “everything that is ‘foreign’ is necessarily against the Hungarian nation” and might be <a href="http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/14967_NGO_bill_20170407_with_reasoning.pd">representing foreign interests</a></p>
<p>For Amnesty International, the bill <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/hungary-plan-to-brand-ngos-has-sombre-echoes-of-russias-foreign-agents-law/">has echoes of the draconian foreign agents law</a> adopted under Russian President Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-foreign-agents-law-to-shackle-and-silence-ngos/">which has restricted, closed down or silenced</a> almost 150 Russian human rights and social justice organisations since 2012. </p>
<p><a href="http://freeassembly.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN-funding-report-April-2013.pdf">As noted in 2013 by Maina Kiai</a>, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, the Russian term for “foreign agent” is synonymous with the phrase for “foreign spy”.</p>
<p>The 2012 Russian law ushered in increasingly harsh legal measures against civil society organisations, including <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/05/19/russia-undesirable-ngos_n_7337842.html">a 2015 “undesirables” law</a> that allows organisations to be banned <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6922/statement-spokesperson-criminal-charges-brought-against-russian-human-rights-defender-valentina_en">and individuals</a> fined or imprisoned for violating the foreign agents law. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/russian-authorities-ban-khodorkovskys-organization-open-russia-as-undesirable/">Seven non-profit organisations have since been declared</a> “undesirable”, including The National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Foundations, International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, and, in April 2017, an organisation run by former Russian prisoner of conscience Mikhail Khodorkovsky. </p>
<h2>The European Union reacts</h2>
<p>The European Commission and European Parliament vice president both expressed concerns about the <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-1116_en.htm">Hungarian law’s incompatability with EU laws</a> when it was in draft form.</p>
<p>Prior analysis jointly carried out by the <a href="http://www.ecnl.org/">European Centre for Non-Profit Law</a> and the <a href="https://tasz.hu/en">Hungarian Civil Liberties Union</a>, among other NGOs, argued that the draft law <a href="http://ecnl.org/analysis-on-how-hungarys-draft-ngo-law-would-violate-eu-law/%5D%20%5D">violates EU law on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing</a>, as well as provisions enabling the free movement of capital. </p>
<p>The government had “provided no evidence”, it asserted, that NGOs were at risk of money laundering or terrorist financing or demonstrated that existing national transparency measures are inadequate.</p>
<p>Despite all evidence to the contrary, Viktor Orban has repeatedly <a href="http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-in-the-european-parliament20170426%5D">reiterated that the NGO law was intended to promote increased transparency</a>, saying it <a href="http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-in-the-european-parliament20170426">follows the example of an American law</a>.</p>
<p>But as Human Rights Watch noted, this argument, which Russia also invoked in 2012, refers to the US <a href="https://www.fara.gov">Foreign Agent Registration Act</a>, which “covers those organisations and individuals that operate ‘under direction and control of a foreign principle’”. It <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/24/briefing-shrinking-space-civil-society-russia">does not relate to advocacy-oriented NGOs</a> with international donors. </p>
<p>The law’s passage puts the EU in a bind. A member state has now severely weakened the rights to free speech and association. </p>
<p>In engaging with the Hungarian government over the past months, including, in April, when announcing <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-1116_en.htm">infringement proceedings after the Higher Education Law that targeted the Central European University</a>, the Commission and European Parliament have emphasised the importance of these fundamental freedoms.</p>
<p>But if the bloc is to continue to claim that it is a union based on democratic values, it will have to do more than just voice concerns. Failure to protect and defend democracy within its own borders will undermine the EU’s credibility to do so elsewhere in the eyes of its own citizens, and that of the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirsten Roberts Lyer is Associate Professor of Practice at Central European University's School of Public Policy</span></em></p>FROM OUR ARCHIVES (UPDATED) Hungary has passed a law monitoring the finances of foreign-funded NGOs, another blow to civil society in Viktor Orban’s increasingly “illiberal democracy”.Kirsten Roberts Lyer, Associate Professor of Practice, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760422017-04-10T15:21:46Z2017-04-10T15:21:46ZHungary’s assault on academic freedom is a threat to European principles<p>Tens of thousands of people recently demonstrated in the Hungarian capital of Budapest against attempts by their government to close the Central European University (CEU).</p>
<p>This was the second large-scale demonstration in Budapest in as many weeks – with protesters turning out en masse to challenge recent amendments to the national law on higher education that have been <a href="https://www.ceu.edu/category/istandwithceu">adopted by the Hungarian parliament</a>.</p>
<p>As a university, CEU has a dual identity, and offers degrees accredited in both the US and Hungary. But the latest amendments make the university’s continued operation in Hungary virtually impossible. This is because the bill would require CEU to operate under a <a href="https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/basic_page/18010/summaryoflegislativechangesandimpact7.4.17.pdf">binding international agreement</a> and to provide higher education programmes in its country of origin – the US – all within a very short time-frame.</p>
<p>At the time of writing, the legislation is on the desk of the Hungarian president for signature or referral to the Constitutional Court. Signature of the law would mean that the legislative changes would come into force, requiring a binding international agreement to be signed within six months of the publication of the law. </p>
<p>Referral to the Constitutional Court – a move which many of the protesters were calling for at the demonstration in Budapest – would mean that the law could be scrutinised for its legality and constitutionality. </p>
<h2>Campaign against liberalism</h2>
<p>CEU is a privately funded university with more than 1,400 students from more than 100 countries, that offers degrees accredited in both the US and Hungary. It is ranked among the top 200 universities in the world in eight disciplines. It excels in political science and international studies.</p>
<p>It has had its home in Budapest for more than 25 years, and is part of the life of the city. That CEU was founded after the fall of communism to promote democracy makes the current move against it all the more reprehensible.</p>
<p>The university, ably led by the rector Michael Ignatieff – a former Canadian politician and internationally renowned academic – has mobilised an <a href="https://www.ceu.edu/category/istandwithceu">impressive campaign for support</a>.</p>
<p>The response has been huge – with leading academic institutions in Hungary and around the world, as well as governments, politicians and individuals condemning the <a href="https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithCEU/support-statements">moves by the Hungarian government</a>. The hash-tag <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/istandwithceu?f=tweets&vertical=news&src=refgoogle">#IStandWithCEU</a> has also been trending on Twitter. </p>
<h2>Freedom to teach</h2>
<p>This outpouring of support underscores the importance placed in institutions that promote education and critical thinking. </p>
<p>Academic freedom is also a prized European value, and countries across Europe rightfully take pride in the quality of their universities and support their development. </p>
<p>The freedom of universities to teach, research, and publish is fundamental to a free and open society. <a href="http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/13-freedom-arts-and-sciences">Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights</a> of the European Union provides that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The need for such explicit protection of academic freedom is clear: universities and academics have long been targeted by autocrats because of the threat that free and critical thinking poses to their continued existence. And for an attack of this nature to take place within the EU should be cause for concern across Europe. </p>
<p>This is because the precedent it would set puts all academic freedom at risk. It is also a stark reminder of the need for constant vigilance to safeguard European democracies. </p>
<h2>Targeting European values</h2>
<p>While CEU has said that it will take all legal steps available to it to challenge the Hungarian law, this is not just a legal fight. </p>
<p>This move to shut an independent university poses a fundamental question as to the extent to which European values can be ignored by an EU member state. Rule of law is supposed to be central to the operation of member states – and targeting freedom of expression through the closure of academic institutions runs directly counter to this.</p>
<p>This is not the only recent move by the Hungarian Government that potentially contradicts the rule of law. In October, a major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/09/protests-in-hungary-at-closure-of-main-leftwing-opposition-newspaper">national newspaper</a> – Népszabadság – closed alleging <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/world/europe/hungary-newspaper-nepszabadsag.html">government pressure</a>. And the government has also recently targeted civil society with the proposed introduction of <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/04/07/hungary-submits-bill-targeting-ngos">restrictive legislation</a> justified by national security concerns and the need for additional transparency.</p>
<p>There also doesn’t seem to be much understanding within Hungary as to why the threatened closure of CEU is causing such outrage. Just a few days ago, in response to the protests and influx of letters in support of CEU, the Hungarian <a href="http://www.kormany.hu/en/government-spokesperson/news/there-are-no-conditions-in-the-new-legislation-that-cannot-be-met">government spokesman called the situation</a> a “storm of political hype” that was part of a “political circus”.</p>
<p>The European Commission has said it will discuss the situation in Hungary – and this is an important opportunity to reinforce fundamental EU principles.</p>
<p>But for now, individuals, institutions and governments in the UK, and across Europe, need to take note of what is happening in Hungary, and take action to make the closure of CEU a red line that cannot be crossed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirsten Roberts Lyer is Associate Professor of Practice at the School of Public Policy, Central European University. </span></em></p>A move that could shut an independent university in Budapest poses fundamental questions about European values.Kirsten Roberts Lyer, Associate Professor of Practice, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/755742017-04-07T07:07:24Z2017-04-07T07:07:24ZWill the US missile strike be the turning point in Syria’s shifting war?<p>The US has struck the Syrian airbase used to launch a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/the-dead-were-wherever-you-looked-inside-syrian-town-after-chemical-attack">suspected sarin gas attack against Khan Sheikhun</a> that killed more than 80 civilians. US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson cited the chemical attack as the reason for their country’s first direct involvement in Syria’s six-year war. </p>
<p>A Pentagon spokesman said Russia was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/07/us-syria-response-donald-trump-assad-pentagon-live">informed ahead</a> of the attack on the al-Shayrat airbase. According to the Associated Press, opposition group the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/07/us-syria-response-donald-trump-assad-pentagon-live">Syrian Coalition, has welcomed the intervention</a>. The rebel commander whose district was hit by the suspected chemical weapon attack has said he hopes the strike will be a “turning point” in the war. </p>
<p>But the long-running conflict has had many such apparently pivotal moments. </p>
<h2>The fall of Aleppo</h2>
<p>By the end of 2016, for instance, opposition forces in the Syrian city of Aleppo <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/12/13/fall-aleppo">had been overwhelmingly defeated</a>, raising doubts about their ability to endure the fight against the Assad regime. Especially as the latter receives <a href="http://www.middleast4change.org/civil-war-in-syria-interview-with-aziz-al-azmeh/">active support</a> from the Russian government and Shi’a militias.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-battle-for-aleppo-syrias-stalingrad-ends">The battle of Aleppo</a>, much like <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-battle-for-aleppo-syrias-stalingrad-ends">the Battle of Stalingrad</a> in the second world war, was characterised by close-quarters combat, massive displacement, great destruction and recurring air raids on civilian populations and infrastructure. </p>
<p>Scholars and researchers were largely divided after the Aleppo assault. Some viewed the outcome as <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2392677/fall-of-aleppo-spells-the-begining-of-the-end-for-syrian-rebels-like-stalingrad-for-hitler/">the beginning of the end</a> for the losing party – the Stalingrad moment of the Syrian war. Others recognised the importance of the events without <a href="https://theconversation.com/aleppos-fall-marks-a-turning-point-not-the-end-of-the-syrian-war-70409">considering them decisive</a>.</p>
<p>And, like the US missile strike, the suspected <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39493854">chemical attack</a> on April 5 was perceived as another watershed moment. But, on the ground, the question is how these critical moments will shape the immediate options of warring factions.</p>
<p>Recent military developments in Hama and Damascus might indicate the direction the war is taking, with the rebels trying to recover from the battle of Aleppo and launching new offensives. </p>
<h2>Aftermath the fall</h2>
<p>After their defeat in Aleppo, many opposition groups <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-ahrar-al-sham-fighting-itself-and-how-impacts-battle-syria-1997438926">reconsidered</a> their inter-factional alliances. In the Idlib governorate and the countryside around Aleppo, for instance, a number of factions <a href="http://www.aymennjawad.org/2017/01/syrian-rebel-mergers-a-harakat-nour-al-din-al">merged</a> with what used to be known as the Nusra Front, or <em>Jabhat Fath el-Sham</em>, to form the new <em><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38934206">Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham</a></em>. </p>
<p>Simultaneously, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/syrian-opposition-factions-join-ahrar-al-sham-170126133928474.html"><em>Ahrar al-Sham</em></a>, one of the most powerful opposition groups in Syria, <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-formation-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-wider-tensions-in-the-syrian-insurgency">was absorbing</a> other factions in the northwest.</p>
<p>Tensions heightened between these two prominent opposition groups as a number of <em>Ahrar al-Sham</em> combatants <a href="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/what-going-idlib-between-tahrir-and-ahrar-al-sham">defected</a> to the recently formed <em>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham</em>. The outcome so far has been a delicate balance of power between these two large groups, which represent the most powerful opposition forces in Idlib and its vicinity. </p>
<p>Together they govern the last opposition stronghold, and Assad’s ultimate victory in Syria depends on the divisions and tensions between them. If these groups are not able to unite when and if pro-Assad forces rally again, Idlib, which is the only area under comprehensive rebel control, might go the way of Aleppo. Its fall would leave the opposition controlling only small isolated patches of territory.</p>
<h2>Idlib and beyond</h2>
<p>Given that <em>Ahrar al-Sham</em> and <em>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham</em> have maintained their cooperation thus far, Idlib promises to be a much bigger challenge for the Assad regime than landlocked Aleppo. A siege on Idlib is practically impossible as long as its border with Turkey stays under opposition control. </p>
<p>The weakest point for the opposition in Idlib is the main passage between the governorate and Turkey, <a href="http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/53896?lang=en">the Bab al-Hawa Crossing</a>. If pro-government forces were to capture this strategic spot in an all-out siege of Idlib, it could enable another battle of attrition.</p>
<p>To disrupt the regime’s momentum and prevent it from regrouping its forces, this time around Idlib, both <em>Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham</em> and <em>Ahrar al-Sham</em> have launched an offensive on the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-insurgents-launch-major-offensive-against-assad-regime-in-hama-province.php">Hama front</a>. Since March 21 2017, opposition forces have taken dozens of government-held villages, <a href="https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/jihadist-rebels-advance-within-3km-hama-city/">coming within a few kilometres of the city of Hama</a>. </p>
<p>Though the southward expansion from Idlib has thus far not reached isolated territories in Homs, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16958715">a city bombarded</a> by the government in 2012, the territorial gains provide a number of advantages. The Hama offensive creates a buffer zone for Idlib, and mobilises and positions opposition forces in threatening strategic locations. This compels pro-regime forces to either engage on insufficiently fortified fronts or withdraw to other defensive positions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=748&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=748&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164187/original/image-20170405-14626-hwukep.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=748&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/MIDEAST-CRISIS-SYRIA-C-ET1ED450WO6NC.html">Reuters/Institute for the Study of War</a></span>
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<p>In light of these conditions, opposition forces near southern Aleppo may also attempt an offensive on the town of <a href="https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-reopens-vital-supply-route-to-aleppo-after-routing-isis/">Khanasir</a>, cutting off the government’s supply route to its forces in Aleppo and forcing pro-regime troops to disperse in different directions.</p>
<p>From that perspective, the suspected chemical attack could be seen as an attempt by Assad to distract the opposition from its advance southwards. </p>
<h2>The Hama offensive</h2>
<p>The Hama offensive opens new possibilities for the opposition. But to succeed on this front government forces must be kept occupied elsewhere. So, while opposition forces were mobilising in Hama, other rebel factions such as <em>Faylaq al-Sham</em> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170319-syria-regime-opposition-battle-outside-damascus/">reopened the Damascus front</a> in the areas of Qabun and Jobar, less than six kilometres from the heart of Syria’s capital.</p>
<p>Opposition forces have not made any significant gains yet. But the proximity of these new clashes to Damascus is sufficient to keep the regime’s forces in the area occupied and committed.</p>
<p>Another condition favouring opposition forces is the current vacuum in Syria’s sparsely populated <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/03/30/syrian-rebels-seize-swathes-of-south-as-islamic-state-retreats">Badiya desert region</a>, resulting from the ongoing battle for Raqqa. </p>
<p>As the Kurdish-led <a href="http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/u-s--backed-forces-say-taken-control-of-tabqa-military-airport-from-is/43060254">Syrian Democratic Forces gathered north</a> in the past few weeks, Islamic State forfeited southern areas to reinforce <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/battle-raqqa-explained-isil-170327072023253.html">its positions in Raqqa and Tabqa</a>. Meanwhile, <em>Ahrar al-Sham</em> and Western-backed Free Syrian Army forces <a href="http://syriadirect.org/news/fsa-rebels-claim-capture-of-key-islamic-state-territory-in-southeastern-desert/">expanded in eastern Qalamoun</a> and reinforced their presence on the Jordanian and Iraqi borders in the southwest. </p>
<p>Islamic State has antagonised all armed factions in Syria, but the geographic proximity of the Syrian Democratic Forces to Raqqa makes them the likely inheritors of its abandoned territories in the north.</p>
<p>If the Syrian Democratic Forces were to expand towards Raqqa, it might lead Islamic State to redirect its forces southward to find safe havens in the Syrian desert. This would create an undesired distraction for opposition forces that recently captured territories in the southeast.</p>
<p>While battles are raging in Damascus in the areas around the districts of Jobar and Qaboun, different factions in the north and south are rallying against Islamic State to capitalise on its defeats. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>These developments show that, following the battle of Aleppo, whatever advantage the Assad regime enjoyed heading into the latest round of Geneva talks in February may not last. And the proactive <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587">foreign support</a> that pushed the Assad regime forwards on the ground could dissipate in light of recent events.</p>
<p>The key to Assad’s future may well lie with the Russian reaction to the US move. As the country woke to the news of the overnight attack, the head of the defence and security committee of the Russian upper house of parliament said <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/apr/07/us-syria-response-donald-trump-assad-pentagon-live">his country would call for an urgent meeting</a> of the UN Security Council.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, on the ground, government forces and opposition groups continue to mobilise, and territorial control keeps shifting. The irregular methods of warfare employed by armed rebels reinforce their resilience, flexibility and longevity in a war now entering its sixth bloody year. </p>
<p>Opposition groups may also find further <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/turkey-urges-international-air-support-for-its-assault-on-isil-held-syria-town">air support</a> from Turkey to expand their presence in Islamic State territories. While opposition groups will not be able to oust the regime, the regime will not be able to eliminate the opposition either. </p>
<p>A shift of US foreign policy on Syria could have been the game-changer. But the US airstrike is more likely to reinforce the balance of power between the combating factions rather than lead to a turning point.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75574/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Harout Akdedian does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The question now is how recent critical changes will impact on-the-ground military strategy.Harout Akdedian, Postdoctoral research fellow, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/713632017-01-20T07:19:54Z2017-01-20T07:19:54ZWhat does the world expect of a Trump presidency?<p>Today, Donald J Trump, the New York City real estate mogul whose outsider campaign led to an upset electoral victory became the 45th President of the United States.</p>
<p>The Conversation Global has invited a panel of international scholars – many of whom also shared their <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-wins-us-election-scholars-from-around-the-world-react-68282">reactions to Trump’s win</a> – to reflect on his presidency and assess its significance for their region.</p><p></p>
<p>As a candidate, Trump’s campaign promises included <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-wall-and-the-beast-trumps-triumph-from-the-mexican-side-of-the-border-68559">building a border wall with Mexico</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/misunderstanding-confusion-and-relief-the-muslim-world-and-president-elect-donald-trump-69068">banning Muslims immigrants</a> from the US. As president-elect, he called NATO <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nato-obsolete-idUSKBN14Z0YO">“obsolete”</a> and the European Union <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1f7c6746-db75-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce">“basically a vehicle for Germany”</a>, put the One China policy up for <a href="http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2017/01/14/489403/Trump-says.htm">negotiation</a>, and threatened to <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-u-s-trade-policy/">renegotiate most trade agreements</a>. </p>
<p>On inauguration day, all eyes are on Washington, with the world hoping to better understand the unpredictable leader now entering the White House – and determine what comes next. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Richard Maher: European leaders brace themselves</strong></p>
<p>While campaigning for president, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/us/politics/unnerved-by-donald-trump-european-diplomats-seek-reassurance-from-democrats.html?_r=0">unnerved European leaders</a> by disparaging the NATO alliance, celebrating the British vote to exit the European Union, and praising Russian President Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Following his surprise victory last November, many European leaders hoped that, now elected and poised to assume the presidency, he would clarify his earlier remarks and adopt positions on NATO’s relevance and the value of a strong and united EU more in line with those of his predecessors over the past six decades.</p>
<p>But that was not to be, as <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/17/politics/donald-trump-nato-europe/">Trump’s interview last weekend with two European newspapers</a> confirmed. He again called NATO “obsolete,” proclaimed that the British vote to leave the EU would “end up being a great thing”, described the EU as “basically a vehicle for Germany,” and condemned German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to let in more than a million refugees fleeing violence and persecution as a “catastrophic mistake.” </p>
<p>He also <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-germany-autos-idUSKBN1500VJ">threatened</a> to impose duties of 35% on German and other foreign cars made in Mexico and imported into the United States, predicted that other countries would follow Britain’s lead and vote to leave the EU, and stated that he would start his presidency <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-avoids-trust-vladimir-putin-angela-merket-russia-president-germany-chancellor-interview-a7529271.html">trusting</a> Putin — who once led the FSB, the KGB’s successor organisation — just as he will Merkel, the leader of one of America’s closest allies.</p>
<p>European leaders still do not know how much — if any — of Trump’s comments will become official US policy. They are thus bracing themselves for perpetual
unpredictability and inconsistency regarding Trump’s intentions and beliefs, as well as his tendency to contradict himself and his cabinet. (In their senate confirmation hearings, for example, his nominees for secretary of state and defence <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/trump-nato-cabinet/">affirmed</a> the vital role NATO and the EU continue to play in US foreign policy.)</p>
<p>Europe faces an inflection point. No American president in modern history has entered office with such ambivalence over the core institutions linking the United States and its European allies. Trump’s actions will unite or yet further divide Europeans. Or as Merkel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/16/europes-fate-is-in-our-hands-angela-merkels-defiant-reply-to-trump">said</a> in response to his latest comments, “We Europeans have our fate in our own hands.”</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Andrea Peto and Weronika Grzebalska: Trump is good news for populist right-wing leaders in Europe</strong> </p>
<p>For right-wing populists in Central Europe, Trump’s presidency is a game changer. It signifies the steady decline both of the United States as a guarantor of military security in the region and of the dominant global paradigm of the connections between the free market, liberal democratic values and human rights. </p>
<p>In Hungary and Poland, Obama <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25/remarks-president-obama-address-people-europe">criticised</a> the dismantling of the rule of law and attacks on civil liberties under the radical-right parties FIDESZ and PiS. Trump, on the other hand, has begun his presidency <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-hungarian-pm-viktor-orban-invited-washington-a7438291.html">by cordially inviting</a> Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán to Washington. </p>
<p>With Trump in power, these leaders are no longer the black sheep among Western political elites but rather partners in the building of a new <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy">illiberal international order</a> that rejects liberal democratic values and freedoms.</p>
<p>Among the first victims of transnational illiberalism in Central Europe will surely be <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-van-til/whos-afraid-of-the-big-ba_5_b_7478806.html">progressive and human rights NGOs</a>, already struggling with cuts to government funding. That money has been redirected to faith-based and conservative organisations supporting the right-wing populist party agenda. </p>
<p>President Trump opens a window of opportunity to go even further toward de-globalisation, including – we predict – restricting the presence of international organisations like Amnesty International and expelling foreign-funded human rights donors like <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/george-soros-donald-trump-open-society-foundation-hungary-crackdown-a7521381.html">the Open Society Foundations</a>.</p>
<p>In the short run, restructuring the NGO sector will harm feminist and human rights causes in the region, and activists may face personal security risks. In the long run, though, losing their financial and institutional basis will force activists to reconceptualise their political strategy. That could be a good thing: the <a href="https://euroalter.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Civil-Society-in-Eastern-Europe.pdf">post-1989 NGO-isation of Central Europe’s civil society</a> has largely depoliticised resistance, turning it into a technocratic process. </p>
<p>By returning to older forms of political resistance, social activism might also regain grassroots support and find a new voice in the process. At least, that’s what we hope. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrives at a European Union leaders summit in Brussels, December 15 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/EU-SUMMIT--RC1F9BA5D240.html">Francois Lenoir/Reuters</a></span>
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<p><strong>Jonathan Rynhold: Hope for Israel, concern over Iran and Syria</strong></p>
<p>We should see a generally positive tone toward Israel from Donald Trump, but there are very large questions about what the administration’s policies will be on the substantive issues affecting the country.</p>
<p>For example, his son-in-law Jared Kushner has been tapped <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-to-tap-kushner-to-broker-mideast-peace-deal/">to deal with the peace process</a>. He has no background whatsoever in this area, and we have no idea what his positions might be. </p>
<p>Regarding the settlement issue, my sense — in contrast to what the settlement movement believes — is that the administration is not necessarily pro-settlement. His nominee for the UN said that settlements could “<a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.765916">hinder peace</a>” and when the UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement was passed, Trump’s comment was that “<a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.761134">this makes peace harder</a>” — not that it was wrong. </p>
<p>Israel may follow the line suggested by Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman, which is to try to reach an agreement with the US about stopping settlement building outside the blocs, but allowing it <a href="http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4880028,00.html">within them</a>. It would fit in with <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html">George W Bush letter of 2004</a> and follows <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-27/obama-fulfills-his-prophecy-on-israeli-settlements">Obama’s statements</a> on different kinds of settlements. That would be a step forward, and relatively doable. The Obama administration wasn’t prepared to do that, perhaps Trump might be.</p>
<p>On a symbolic level, we will probably see something regarding the idea of <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21712098-death-knell-or-defibrillator-peace-process-moving-us-embassy">moving the American embassy to Jerusalem</a>, which may be that the ambassador will work from the consulate there; but I doubt we will see a shift America’s position on Jerusalem. </p>
<p>In any case, it is accepted that at least West Jerusalem will be formally recognised as the capital of Israel in any peace deal and the consulate is in West Jerusalem. In Israel everyone is <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-envoy-urges-trump-to-move-us-embassy-to-jerusalem/">in favor</a> of moving the embassy. But some would say it’s not necessarily the most important thing to deal with now, because it could possibly lead to an upsurge of violence.</p>
<p>The largest concerns for Israel is how the Trump administration will deal with Iran. On one hand, Trump seems to have a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nuclear-deal-is-in-the-crosshairs-and-may-not-survive-a-trump-administration/2017/01/11/b56313d4-d744-11e6-9f9f-5cdb4b7f8dd7_story.html?utm_term=.e869c48d07f4">stronger stance</a> than the Obama administration, which Israel felt did not hold Iranians to account sufficiently. </p>
<p>But there’s also concern that Trump’s good relations with Russia may actually lead to a worsening of the situation in Syria from an Israeli point of view. If he gives <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-assad-iran-and-russia-are-the-only-partners-i-see-in-syria_us_57fb0087e4b0e655eab57d13">a free hand to Russia in Syria</a>, it could strengthen Iran there, which is the strongest force on the ground. The Russians would then give Tehran greater freedom to operate.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Miguel Angel Latouche: Latin America is seen as a problematic region</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37049855">Trump is an enigma</a>. For the first time in the contemporary history of the US, a genuine <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/306851-outsiders-take-power-in-trumps-washington">outsider has become president</a>. </p>
<p>We do know a few things about Trump, though. He is a strongman who <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-global/trumpus-andronicus-what-t_b_14232606.html">does not belong to the establishment and enjoys polemics</a>. He is intolerant of criticism and seems perfectly willing to use force, in the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/donald-trump-has-a-coherent-realist-foreign-policy/">style of an old political realist</a>. But Trump’s vision on Latin America is uncertain. </p>
<p>What priorities will <a href="http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/12/30/latin-america-and-donald-trump/">guide foreign policy toward the region</a>? </p>
<p>We don’t know whether the Trump administration perceives Latin America as a potential partner or a threat. If it’s the former, there should be opportunities to do business and strengthen open markets. If it’s the latter, there is little good to come of it. Indeed, Trump is most likely to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/10/donald-trump-britain-greatest-fear-isolationist-president">promote an isolationist stance</a>. </p>
<p>Trump does appear to perceive Latin American as a problematic region. <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2016/11/16/what-will-the-trump-presidency-mean-for-latin-america/#b98a5d9d45cf">He has expressed concerns</a> about illegal immigration and US jobs lost as a consequence of trade agreements, open markets and industrial relocation.</p>
<p>Would Trump build a wall along the US-Mexican border? He certainly seems capable of it, and to want to do it. Regardless of whether he can make it happen, we must consider that he is <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-latin-america-policy-economy-violence-2016-11">disposed to impose an ideological barrier</a> on Latin America. </p>
<p>So far, all we know to expect is the reduction of concessions to Cuba, a strongman’s posture towards strongman-led Venezuela and a distancing from Mexico. For other countries in the region, there is a huge question mark.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cuban Caridad Hernandez celebrates the death of Fidel Castro in Miami.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Javier Galeano/Reuters</span></span>
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<p><strong>Salvador Vazquez del Mercado: Uncertainty for Mexico</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump’s campaign was geared towards pushing the buttons of voters who, as the result of shifting economic opportunities, have seen their economic prospects decline in recent years: it was Mexico that took the jobs, and Mexico that sent the bad immigrants. </p>
<p>In a clear example of what Robert Shiller calls the power of <a href="http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2069.pdf">narratives</a> to shift economic and social outcomes, Trump put Mexico in the centre of his attacks. He made economic and cultural insecurity the topics that would attract the attention of his voters, framed as the purported fight against fleeing employment and the assumed woes of immigration.</p>
<p>For Mexico, that’s quite a vulnerable position to be in. The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-18/why-trump-s-tariff-threats-get-taken-so-seriously-quicktake-q-a">imposition of tariffs</a> has the potential to spark a trade war that Mexico, with its smaller share of goods exported to the US, will find difficult to win. The threatened renegotiation of NAFTA will, by itself, damage the Mexican economy by aggravating investment expectations. Then there’s the eventual results of the negotiation itself: imposing taxes on remittances or blocking their delivery will deprive many Mexican families of much needed resources. </p>
<p>In fact, Trump’s campaign has already damaged the Mexican economy: the peso continues to slide as Trump keeps making <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-peso-trump-idUSKBN14V20S">announcements</a> related to the transnational automobile industry. </p>
<p>It is to be expected, then, that it will fall further when he begins earnestly pursing his agenda. As a result, the International Monetary Fund has already <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-growth-idUSKBN1501P9">downgraded</a> its forecast for the growth of the Mexican economy.</p>
<p>It is difficult to know what Trump will do in power because of the lack of clarity in his policy proposals. This uncertainty will be aggravated as his cabinet picks continue to sort out whether to follow <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-cabinet-nominees-keep-contradicting-him/2017/01/12/dec8cccc-d8f3-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.dab0bf4e0d7f">their policies</a> or his. </p>
<p>Some of this uncertainty may benefit Mexico: while the Republican love affair with free trade seems to have <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/gop-senators-trade-228403">ended</a> during the campaign, the passion could be rekindled once the president is sworn in and trade negotiations start.</p>
<p>A weaker peso will also benefit Mexican exports, and Mexican <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-mexico-deal-with-the-donald-71067">diplomatic efforts</a> and public relations should profit from the rifts that will open between Trump, his cabinet and the Republican-led congress. </p>
<p>These benefits are not minimal, if the country plays them right, which only serves to underscore the many challenges that Mexico will face starting January 20 2016.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Subarno Chattarji: a welcome change, but points of conflict in India</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump’s election was welcomed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Rajnath Singh, who said that India could take some credit for Trump’s victory since he used <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-ad-indian-american-vote-2016-10">a version of Modi’s election slogan</a> to appeal to Indian American voters (“<em>Ab ki Baar, Trump Sarkar</em>” – “Next time, a Trump government”). </p>
<p>The welcome message reveals the ideological and political affinities between Modi and Trump, particularly regarding attitudes toward Muslims, terrorism, political correctness, liberal elites and minorities.</p>
<p>Policy outlooks, however, are mixed. For instance, Trump’s call with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif whom he described as “<a href="http://time.com/4586503/donald-trump-pakistan-prime-minister-readout-nawaz-sharif/">a terrific guy</a>” didn’t go down well in India. Trump has also said <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/1300758">he can solve the Kashmir crisis</a> – again a touchy subject, since India’s official position is that all Kashmir is an integral part of India and any dispute must be resolved bilaterally. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/153316/original/image-20170118-26536-1w4h6ny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A member of Hindu Sena, a right wing Hindu group, holds a placard of Donald Trump during a protest in New Delhi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adnan Abidi/Reuters</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Another area of contention and anxiety is the lottery of H1-B Visas given for workers in technology and computing industries, which are largely corralled by Indians. Trump has promised <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/us/politics/donald-trump-wants-to-cut-visa-program-he-used-for-his-own-models.html?_r=0">to reduce these visas</a>. In keeping with his promise to “Make America Great Again”, he also plans to push back against the outsourcing of jobs – an additional potential point of conflict.</p>
<p>While ideologically distinct from Modi, president Obama forged <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/asia/india-narendra-modi-obama.html">a close connection with India</a>, part of his administrations’ broader pivot toward Asia. That pivot may or may not be sustained by the Trump administration. Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has made no public statements on India. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding these misgivings, Trump will receive a warm welcome from the Indian government (and members of the Hindu Sena) should he visit the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71363/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado is a director of public opinion in the office of the President of Mexico. All opinions and errors herewithin are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Peto, Jonathan Rynhold, Miguel Angel Latouche, Richard Maher, Subarno Chattarji, and Weronika Grzebalska do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world is on edge as Donald Trump enters the White House.Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteAndrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityJonathan Rynhold, Director, Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan UniversityMiguel Angel Latouche, Associate professor, Universidad Central de VenezuelaSalvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Subarno Chattarji, Associate Professor, University of DelhiWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/682822016-11-09T08:28:07Z2016-11-09T08:28:07ZDonald Trump wins US election: scholars from around the world react<p>Donald J Trump has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/election-day-2016-highlights/index.html">declared victory</a> in the US presidential election. The candidate took the stage in New York just before 3am local time to announce that his rival, Hillary Clinton, had called him to concede the race.</p>
<p>“The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer,” the president-elect told a packed room of supporters at the Hilton hotel.</p>
<p>“We will get along with all nations willing to get along with us,” he added. </p>
<p>What does this stunning turnaround mean for the rest of the world? The Conversation Global asked a panel of international scholars to reflect on Trump’s election and assess its significance for their region. </p>
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<p><strong>Salvador Vazquez del Mercado: Mexico will face hardships under Trump</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump has won the election against all expectations – except for those of his supporters. The Brexit-like failure to predict his victory will surely haunt pollsters and hurt public confidence in polls for a long time. </p>
<p>The consequences of his victory will, of course, be much graver than the crisis of prediction. Even if Trump comes through with only a fraction of his campaign promises – which seems more likely now that both chambers of Congress will be controlled by Republicans – <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-markets-tell-us-president-trump-is-worse-than-brexit-68501">markets will react quite negatively</a>, the Mexico peso, which has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDMXN:CUR">already suffered a significant depreciation</a>, may fall further. And these are only the short-term consequences of Trump’s victory. </p>
<p>The wall along the US-Mexico border may well be <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/trump-wall-impractical-impolitic-impossible-459802?rm=eu">impossible to build</a> and the millions of undocumented immigrants in the US may not be immediately deported. And, hopefully Trump will not use the nuclear codes at all. But his victory still spells severe trouble ahead for Mexicans, and many other minorities living in the US, who were continually vilified during his campaign. </p>
<p>For Mexico, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/upshot/donald-trump-trashes-nafta-but-unwinding-it-would-come-at-a-huge-cost.html">the end of NAFTA</a> would lead to a severe restriction of trade with the US, which, added to an expected increase in interest rates south of the border and a reduction in the remittances sent by Mexicans up north, will quite probably lead to a severe economic crisis. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the relationship between Mexico and the United States will undergo a severe reconfiguration because, come January, Trump will probably take a very aggressive stance against the country. The future is uncharted and, in the short term, quite complicated. </p>
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<p><strong>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: the end of the liberal democracy project?</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s rise to power may put an end to liberal democracy as propagated by the US and its western allies in the post-Cold War era. Thailand is a good place to contemplate the trajectory and consequences of the end of this project.</p>
<p>Having been dominated by military governments, Thailand underwent democratisation in the early 1990s. It joined other countries in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the “<a href="http://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf">third wave of democracy</a>”. This period saw the proliferation of civil society groups and institutionalisation of progressive ideas, particularly rights and justice. Unfortunately, elected governments faced allegations of corruption and inefficiency. And Bangkok’s middle class eventually lost patience, demanding a return to strong military rule.</p>
<p>Trump’s presidency potentially hints to authoritarian governments in Thailand and other societies that certain norms attached to liberal democracies can now be suspended. It’s likely that the coming Trump administration could be more silent than previous administrations about the crackdown on rights groups and dissidents in Thailand, and elsewhere. American pressure on the incumbent Thai junta to hold an election soon could also lessen.</p>
<p>In the age of anti-liberal democracy, fighting for retaining its norms will be harder in Thailand and elsewhere. If liberal democracy is no longer defensible and authoritarianism is not an option, progressive forces around the world need to gather pace and create a new political alternative that goes beyond this dead-end street.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Jonathan Rynhold: for Israel, less tension but less security</strong></p>
<p>Under Donald Trump, relations between US and Israel are likely to be smoother than under Obama. However, in an underlying sense Israel will be less secure.</p>
<p>There are three reasons for this: first, Trump’s erratic temperament, second his extensive <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/donald-trump-gop-israel/418737/">flip-flopping</a> on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/election-affect-middle-east-policy-161105125945727.html">Middle East policy</a>, and third, and most importantly, his isolationist instincts.</p>
<p>Although Trump has said contradictory things about Israeli-Palestinian relations, he is likely to pay less attention to the issue and thus allow Israel’s right-wing government greater leeway on issues of contention such as settlements. Paradoxically, this will encourage Obama to promote a UN Security Council resolution on the issue, the prospect of which very much concerns Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p>
<p>Israel benefits hugely from an internationalist America. When the US takes a step back, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">as it did under Obama</a>, the vacuum is filled by greater instability and hostile forces. Trump is more isolationist than Obama and he has openly questioned whether the US would stand behind its alliance commitments. This may embolden Israel’s enemies. Still, Israel can look after itself, and fears of American unreliability may push Egypt and Saudi Arabia to deepen their strategic co-operation with Israel. </p>
<p>Finally, Israel views Iran as the major strategic threat. Trump has said he would take a harder line on Iran, but in the interim his disengaged approach would allow Iran to increase its power, thereby multiplying the costs of confronting Iran in the future.</p>
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<p><strong>Rut Diamint: Trump doesn’t care about human rights</strong></p>
<p>Before Barack Obama’s election in 2008, largely due to the policies of George W Bush, some sectors of the American inteligentsia were suggesting that the US had abdicated world leadership. The Council on Foreign Relations specifically wrote on the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279">loss of American relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean</a>. </p>
<p>In truth, though, the US is and continues to be the single most determining nation for Latin America. Trump’s election will have particular impact in four areas.</p>
<p>First, the economy. Between January and August of 2016, the US-Mexico trade balance ran a deficit on the US side <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html">of US$ -41,568.1 million</a>. With Central and South America, on the other hand, the US shows a <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0009.html">positive trade balance</a> of US$20,199.0 million. Note that commercial exchange between Mexico and the US is four times that of the rest of the region. Trump’s promise to separate the two nations by building a wall, even if it never happens, will be profoundly damaging economically and politically.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean">High levels of violence</a>, organised crime and drug trafficking are top concerns for Latin America. Under Trump, Congress will continue to be influenced by the defence industry and invest heavily in a militarised drug war. And Trump has the <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/nra-endorse-donald-trump-president/story?id=39253893">support of the powerful NRA gun lobby</a>. </p>
<p>Trump has promised to undo recent advances in US policy toward Cuba, which under Obama had <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba">transitioned from isolation to diplomacy</a>. Where negotiation and economic bonds had begun to strengthen, he will reimpose the embargo and counterintelligence efforts. This will divide the region.</p>
<p>Finally, Trump’s <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/immigration/?/positions/immigration-reform">proposed “task force”</a> to deport immigrants already in the US, block others from coming in and build a Mexico border wall (paid for by Mexico) is xenophobic, discriminatory and alienating. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Andrea Peto and Weronika Grzebalska: Trump a boost for illiberial regimes in Europe</strong></p>
<p>For Central Eastern Europe, Trump’s victory is a green light for the consolidation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hungary-and-poland-have-silenced-women-and-stifled-human-rights-66743">illiberal majoritarian regimes</a> which promise people a sense of existential security at the cost of individual freedoms, minority rights and checks and balances. </p>
<p>Trump’s election will definitely strengthen the neo-conservative, fundamentalist networks and shift the global political balance in the direction of familialism, nationalism and further away from human rights and an open society. Weak states such as Poland and Hungary in which democratic transition privileged free market measures over social and cultural ones are all the more vulnerable to the loss of a strong, democratic, pro-human rights voice. </p>
<p>Clinton’s defeat might also serve as a wake up call to the last of the hard-headed supporters of the neoliberal status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. Those who still believe illiberal turns in Poland and Hungary are just a local, provisional backlash, who think it is still possible to go back to the political solutions from the pre-illiberal era will have to rethink their position. </p>
<p>With the victory of Trump, human rights supporters are pushed into a doubly difficult situation. Not only do they have to protect the little provisions there are left and create a space of resistance but also at the same time reformulate their message. This message should be different from going back to the pre-Trump era, which has been the prison of technocratic, quasi-rational policy discourse for way too long. Instead it should revive great ideologies and offer an equally captivating political vision capable of re-enchanting voters.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Subarno Chattarji: Trump and India</strong></p>
<p>It is in some ways too early to think about the impact of a Donald Trump presidency on India-US relations. Some patterns between the 2014 elections in India and the current one in the US are, however, discernible.</p>
<p>Trump’s election represents the victory of a strong man – “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-rnc-speech-alone-fix-it/492557/">I alone can fix it</a>” – railing against media, political, and intellectual elites in whose favour the system is “<a href="https://theconversation.com/dear-donald-trump-this-is-what-a-rigged-election-looks-like-67757">rigged</a>”. His victory is indicative of the insecurities and resentments of the majority and the desire to return to a purer, better, “original” America, which was largely white and where everyone knew their place.</p>
<p>While American isolationism, exceptionalism, and xenophobia are not new, they find unique expression in Trump. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was similarly elected on premises and promises of better days and the idea of a charismatic strong man leading the nation out of the morass of poverty, unemployment, secular politics, elites, minority appeasement etc.</p>
<p>Like Trump, the current political leadership in India is emblematic of an us-versus-them mentality, intolerant of dissent, critical thinking, or inconvenient institutions. Unsurprisingly, Trump has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trump-is-winning-over-many-american-hindus-67518">many fans in India and among Indian immigrants</a> in the US. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Richard Maher: the view from Europe</strong></p>
<p>In a stunning electoral upset, Donald Trump has defeated Hillary Clinton to become the 45th President of the United States. Virtually every <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/08/a-comprehensive-average-of-election-forecasts-points-to-a-decisive-clinton-victory/">pre-election forecast</a> suggested a comfortable or even decisive Clinton victory. Instead, Trump – a man that many European leaders and citizens view as <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-leaders-would-see-a-donald-trump-victory-as-total-calamity-67619">manifestly unqualified</a> and unprepared for the position – will become president of the world’s sole superpower in January.</p>
<p>Trump’s victory is almost certainly being met across European capitals this morning with alarm, shock, and dread. Trump has called the NATO alliance “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0f397616-f9b8-11e5-8e04-8600cef2ca75">obsolete</a>”, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37303057">spoken admiringly</a> of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and said the British vote in June 2016 to exit the European Union was “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-36606184">a great thing</a>”.</p>
<p>Unlike in the United States, the European public was solidly against the idea of a Trump presidency. In a poll published by the Economist on November 8 showing how other countries would vote in the US election, huge majorities <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/11/daily-chart-4">favoured Clinton</a>. According to a <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/29/2-obamas-international-image-remains-strong-in-europe-and-asia/">Pew Research survey</a> published in June, overwhelming majorities of Europeans polled said they had “no confidence” that Trump “would do the right thing regarding world affairs”.</p>
<p>Now European leaders must anticipate how a Trump administration will affect transatlantic relations and the many common challenges the United States and Europe face, from an increasingly assertive Russia, a relentless migration crisis that threatens to tear Europe apart, and Britain’s future in the EU.</p>
<p>More broadly, Trump’s election questions the future of US global leadership. Since the end of World War II, the United States, along with key European partners, built and then sustained an open, rules-based international order defined by free trade, military alliances, and international institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. With Trump’s victory, the very future of this liberal international order is in peril.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>William Case: what Trump’s victory means for Southeast Asia</strong> </p>
<p>With so many countries in the region already leaning toward China, does Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency matter for Southeast Asia? It does, at least a little. </p>
<p>To see understand how, imagine what the impact would have been if Hillary Clinton had won. She maintained a strong interest in trade, even if forced by voters during the election campaign to backtrack on the Trans Pacific Partnership. She vigorously denounced China’s takeover of the South China Sea, even as claimants in Southeast Asia have begun to cave in. And she might have retained some of the good will in Indonesia — and in Myanmar — that Barack Obama was able to generate. So Clinton might have slowed, though not reversed, China’s suffocating embrace of Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>After all, Southeast Asia is not a topmost concern for the US. But for China, it is. And China offers leaders in the region irresistible inducements, namely, near bottomless investment and lending for high speed railways, ports, and energy grids. To be sure, as the bills come due and exclusive economic zones are lost, citizens may rue the terms into which their leaders have entered. But by then, Hillary Clinton’s presidency would have passed.</p>
<p>By contrast, with Donald Trump in the White House, Southeast Asia’s entry into China’s orbit will quicken. Indeed, his repudiation of trading relations and security commitments seems to leave countries in the region with no alternative. And his anti-Muslim vitriol will add steam, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. </p>
<p>Trump’s presidency, then, will accelerate Southeast Asia’s progress along China’s new Silk Road. But interestingly, by doing so, the costs for Southeast Asia may grow apparent much sooner. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Jay Batongbacal: issues in the South China Sea will go on the back-burner</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump taking the reins of the US presidency could mark the sunset on Pax Americana in the Asia Pacific, and clear away any remaining resistance to China’s rise to regional preeminence. </p>
<p>A relatively isolationist and localised focus on the part of his administration as he attempts to fulfil his electoral promises would likely leave issues such as the South China Sea on the back-burner. ASEAN hedging patterns will cause member states to gravitate towards China even more. </p>
<p>The US rebalancing in Asia under President Barack Obama, and the country’s alliance commitments in the region could also be severely undermined given Trump’s lack of appreciation for the role played by America’s security relationships in US global political and economic leadership. The only hindrance to this lies in the fact that US geostrategic policy for the Asia-Pacific has been a largely bipartisan matter in the US Congress.</p>
<p>But Trump’s tenuous links to the Republican Party, lack of real leadership thereof, and non-attachment to Republican ideals, puts into question the responsiveness and effectiveness of that policy in the face of more solid and coordinated leadership within regional powers such as China and Russia, which will have an unparalleled opportunity to fill in any voids the US may leave. </p>
<p>For the Philippines and its President Rodrigo Duterte, this is a fortunate coincidence as it accommodates his oft-stated aversion to US influence and commentary on his domestic policy, and distrust of the US.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Miguel Angel Latouche: the triumph of anti-politics</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump has proved something that we Venezuelans have known since the 1998 election that <a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9812/06/venezuela.results/index.html">catapulted Hugo Chávez to the presidency</a> of our country: when people perceive problems and feel politicians don’t represent society’s broad interests; when the demands of certain sectors are not satisfied, leading to a sense of exclusion; when people want change – then a “strong man” figure becomes really electorally attractive. </p>
<p>With Trump, we saw an aggressive campaign by a man who said what he thought without ever thinking it over much, who called things as he saw them and who proposed simple solutions to complex problems (whether they’re feasible responses or not). For the first time in a long time, the US has a president who genuinely does not belong to Washington, nor to the party logic of his country. It’s a triumph of anti-politics.</p>
<p>Beyond Trump’s business endeavours, television experience and some of his scandals, we know little about the new US president. Who is Donald Trump, really? What are his political ideas and proposals? </p>
<p>It’s interesting to observe, for example, the profound contradiction between the aggressive tone of his campaign and the conciliatory style he adopted for his <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/09/trump-declares-victory-thanks-clinton-for-hard-fought-battle.html">3 am acceptance speech</a>. But one can’t act against one’s own nature, and fundamentally Trump has shown himself to be a charismatic populist.</p>
<p>For Latin America, he’s promised to harden relations with Cuba and Venezuela, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37243269">build a wall</a> along the Mexico border, and <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/11/9/13572030/donald-trump-immigration">tighten immigrant policies</a>. We’re looking at a strong presidency here, perhaps too strong, with <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/500711970/republicans-keep-control-of-the-senate-as-democrats-largely-falter">Congress on his side</a>, and a leader who has espoused conservative positions but is also changeable when it comes to tough topics. This makes him hard to predict and susceptible to shifting with public opinion. </p>
<p>It’s quite possible that Trump will return the US to a modified version of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097396">Cold War power politics</a>. Only time will tell if Trump is leading us to a more orderly and secure world or on a march toward insanity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay Batongbacal holds a Fulbright Visiting Fellowship.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado is a director of public opinion in the office of the President of Mexico. All opinions and errors herewithin are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Peto, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Jonathan Rynhold, Miguel Angel Latouche, Richard Maher, Rut Diamint, Subarno Chattarji, Weronika Grzebalska, and William Case do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald J Trump has emerged victorious in the historic, and historically acerbic, 2016 American presidential election. What does this outcome mean for the world?William Case, Professor of Comparative Politics, City University of Hong KongAndrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityJanjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityJay Batongbacal, Associate Professor of Law, University of the PhilippinesJonathan Rynhold, Director, Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan UniversityMiguel Angel Latouche, Associate professor, Universidad Central de VenezuelaRichard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteRut Diamint, Profesora, Torcuato di Tella UniversitySalvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Subarno Chattarji, Associate Professor, University of DelhiWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671952016-10-19T20:00:01Z2016-10-19T20:00:01ZEn Pologne et en Hongrie, les droits des femmes en péril<p>En Pologne, grâce à un vaste mouvement de protestation, les femmes ont réussi à éviter l’<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37573938">interdiction totale de l’avortement</a> qui faisait l’objet d’une proposition de loi : rares sont les victoires des mouvements féministes en Europe centrale, mais celle-ci est de taille.</p>
<p>Dans tout le pays, des femmes ont fait la grève et se sont vêtues de noir, en signe de deuil pour leurs droits menacés. Il y a lieu de se réjouir que ce <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-women-abortion-strike-protests-black-monday-polish-protestors-industrial-action-a7343136.html">« lundi noir »</a> ait porté ses fruits. Cependant, une question troublante reste en suspens.</p>
<p>Comment est-il possible qu’un pays membre de l’UE puisse songer à forcer des femmes à porter des enfants malformés ou à emprisonner les médecins qui pratiquent l’avortement ?</p>
<p>En guise de réponse, l’opposition polonaise clame que le parti au pouvoir, PiS, <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21708179-catholic-backed-bill-puts-conservative-government-tough-spot-polish-women-skip-work">veut revenir au Moyen Age</a>. Une théorie populaire mais peu satisfaisante, qui repose sur le mythe d’une histoire de la libération des femmes faite de contrecoups politiques, où les progrès constants vers l’égalité des sexes seraient interrompus par des embûches qu’il faudrait surmonter par l’action commune.</p>
<p>Par chance, l’action commune a fonctionné dans le cas de cette proposition de loi. Mais si les groupes progressistes ne sont pas capables de comprendre les nouveaux défis qui s’imposent en matière de droits des femmes dans les États peu libéraux d’Europe centrale, les progrès de ces droits pourraient être sérieusement compromis.</p>
<h2>L’État polypore</h2>
<p>Ces dernières années, la Hongrie et la Pologne ont vécu une série de changements institutionnels et vécu une seconde transition, de l’État libéral vers une « démocratie antilibérale ».</p>
<p>Car les régimes émergents de Viktor Orbán en Hongrie et de Beata Szydło en Pologne ne représentent pas une résurgence de l’autoritarisme, mais bien une nouvelle forme de gouvernance. Ce nouveau système prend racine dans les échecs de la globalisation et du néolibéralisme, qui ont créé des États faibles pour les plus forts et forts pour les plus faibles.</p>
<p>Pour décrire le <em>modus operandi</em> de ces régimes d’un nouveau genre, nous avons inventé une expression : l’État « polypore ».</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Les polypores en pleine action.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polypore#/media/File:Fungi_in_Borneo.jpg">Cayce</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Un polypore est un champignon parasite des arbres, qui se nourrit en détruisant le bois.</p>
<p>A l’image des polypores, les gouvernements de Pologne et de Hongrie se nourrissent des ressources vitales de leurs prédécesseurs libéraux pour produire une structure étatique totalement dépendante de ces ressources. Ce type de gouvernement implique le phagocytage des institutions, des mécanismes et des sources de financements du projet démocratique libéral européen.</p>
<p>La Hongrie a offert un exemple flagrant de ce fonctionnement en 2011, avec une <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-funds-used-for-hungarian-anti-abortion-campaign/">campagne d’affichage anti-avortement</a>. Une campagne lancée sous la houlette d’un programme gouvernemental voué à l’équilibre entre vie professionnelle et vie privée et qui a été, à ce titre, financé par le programme pour l’emploi et l’innovation sociale de l’UE, ironiquement nommé… <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=327">PROGRESS</a>.</p>
<p>L’État polypore prive la société civile séculaire et moderne préexistante de ses ressources, au profit de sa base antilibérale, afin de la renforcer et de l’élargir. Cette année, en Pologne, le ministre de la Justice a refusé de financer plusieurs ONG dédiées à la défense des droits des femmes et des enfants. Ces fonds ont été attribués à des <a href="https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/dlaczego-niektore-organizacje-pozarzadowe-nie-moga-liczyc-na-dotacje-minister-sprawiedliwosci">organisations catholiques comme Caritas</a>.</p>
<p>Comme le champignon polypore qui s’en prend à des arbres en mauvaise santé, les régimes antilibéraux accèdent au pouvoir dans des contextes d’affaiblissement des normes démocratiques, endommagées par les crises financières, sécuritaires et migratoires.</p>
<p>En Europe centrale, après 1989, les gouvernements ont favorisé les <a href="http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/374/1/SzB_TA_foreign_aid_CEE2.pdf">réformes économiques</a> et délaissé les réformes civiques et sociales. Les normes et les pratiques libérales n’ont pas pu s’enraciner dans ces sociétés. D’où une situation paradoxale : les forces antilibérales s’épanouissent à la faveur d’une révolution libérale inachevée.</p>
<p>Pour comprendre le succès de ces formes de gouvernement, il faut intégrer trois de leurs préceptes clés : la société civile parallèle, le récit sécuritaire et la famille.</p>
<h2>Une société civile parallèle</h2>
<p>Les régimes antilibéraux d’Europe cherchent à transformer l’infrastructure post-communiste au profit de la nouvelle élite au pouvoir et des ses électeurs.</p>
<p>La clé de cette transformation consiste à remplacer les organisations dédiées aux droits de l’homme et à la société civile par des ONG pro-gouvernementales qui soutiennent l’agenda étatique. Tandis que ces nouvelles infrastructures ressemblent à s’y méprendre aux précédentes, leur cadre d’intervention – religieux et antimoderniste – est totalement différent.</p>
<p>En Hongrie par exemple, il existe deux ONG importantes qui se consacrent au rôle des pères dans les familles et à l’équilibre entre vie privée et vie professionnelle : d’un côté, <a href="http://jol-let.com/">Jol-let</a>, une ONG libérale qui existe depuis longtemps, et de l’autre, une ONG récente et conservatrice, <a href="http://haromkiralyfi.hu/">Harom Kiralyfi</a>. Ces derniers temps, seule cette dernière a reçu des financements pour <a href="http://www.haromkiralyfi.hu/apa_is_csak_egy_van">mener à bien ses projets</a>.</p>
<p>C’est ainsi que le secteur des ONG se transforme peu à peu, par la distribution de financements européens et nationaux à des groupes qui partagent l’idéologie gouvernementale au détriment des organisations progressistes qui dépendent de dons – très insuffisants – venus de l’étranger, et sont désormais incapables d’influencer la politique nationale.</p>
<h2>Récit sécuritaire</h2>
<p>Afin de légitimer leur rejet d’une société civile plurielle, les gouvernements antilibéraux utilisent le langage de la sécurité. Les organisations dédiées aux droits de l’homme sont décrites comme dangereuses pour la souveraineté nationale et on les dit <a href="http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/hungary-ngo-war">pilotées depuis l’étranger</a>.</p>
<p>Égalité des genres, société ouverte et droits des minorités sont vus comme une menace existentielle à la survie de la nation. En 2013, Orbán a <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism-barring-non-governmental-organisations">commandé une enquête</a> sur certaines ONG financées par la Norvège, dont le Roma Press Centre et Women for Women against Violence, accusées d’être des organisations d’activistes politiques « payées pour soutenir des intérêts étrangers ».</p>
<p>L’enquête est désormais <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/orban-backs-down-in-battle-with-norwegian-ngos/">close</a>, mais elle a fait beaucoup de dégâts dans les ONG concernées.</p>
<p>Dans ce contexte, les problématiques liées aux droits de l’homme sont dépolitisées, et les groupes de plaidoyer en faveur de ces droits sont désignés comme des ennemis d’État et non plus comme des adversaires démocratiques.</p>
<h2>Privilégier la famille plutôt que les droits des femmes</h2>
<p>La Hongrie et la Pologne attaquent les droits de l’homme en utilisant des concepts nationalistes sur le thème de la famille, mettant en avant les droits et les intérêts des familles « traditionnelles » plutôt que celui des individus et des minorités.</p>
<p>Les partis au pouvoir en Hongrie et en Pologne, le Fidesz et le PiS, ont tous deux mis le concept de « family mainstreaming » au cœur de leurs politiques. Dans la <a href="http://www.genderkompetenz.info/eng/gender-competence-2003-2010/Gender%20Mainstreaming/Strategy/Family%20Policy/family_mainstreaming.html">littérature politique de L’UE et des Nations unies</a>, le « family mainstreaming » se définit comme un outil d’identification de l’impact des politiques familiales et de renforcement des fonctions familiales. Dans les mains des acteurs antilibéraux, il est devenu une alternative aux droits des femmes et un instrument de promotion des valeurs « traditionnelles ».</p>
<p>Les problématiques liées aux femmes sont progressivement remplacées par des problématiques familiales, et les instituions responsables de l’égalité des genres sont remplacées par des institutions en charge de la famille et de la démographie. En Hongrie, le Conseil pour des Chances Égales entre Hommes et Femmes – la plus haute instance en matière d’égalité des genres – <a href="http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/structures/hungary/council-gender-equality">n’a pas tenu d’assemblée depuis 2010</a>, et son portefeuille a été délégué à une institution en charge de la démographie (Demographic Roundtable).</p>
<h2>Pas un simple accident de l’histoire</h2>
<p>S’ils ne sont pas identifiés comme tels, les États antilibéraux peuvent entraîner des conséquences désastreuses pour les droits des femmes et des minorités. Quand l’État s’approprie les structures démocratiques préexistantes, cela éteint toute velléité de résistance.</p>
<p>Sous financées, diabolisées, travaillant dans un contexte où l’équilibre des pouvoirs a disparu, les ONG féministes et progressistes ne sont plus en mesure d’utiliser le plaidoyer, la concertation, ou les médias - les ressorts classiques qui étaient les leurs. </p>
<p>Il ne faut pas voir les démocraties antilibérales comme un accident de parcours après lequel tout va rentrer dans l’ordre, mais bien comme une nouvelle forme de gouvernance. À ce titre, la récente victoire des femmes polonaises ne sera peut-être pas durable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>En Europe centrale, les régimes en place utilisent les ressources de leurs prédécesseurs libéraux pour financer des programmes qui compromettent l’égalité hommes-femmes.Andrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667432016-10-14T06:19:32Z2016-10-14T06:19:32ZHow Hungary and Poland have silenced women and stifled human rights<p>In the women’s movement in Central Europe, there are few moments to celebrate. Polish women <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37573938">successfully preventing</a> a total ban on abortion from coming into law recently was one of them. </p>
<p>While we may praise the success of Polish women’s “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-women-abortion-strike-protests-black-monday-polish-protestors-industrial-action-a7343136.html">black protest</a>” – where women across the country went on strike and dressed in black to mourn the loss of their reproductive rights – one troubling question remains unanswered. </p>
<p>Why did an EU member state even consider forcing women to carry deformed fetuses and imprisoning doctors for terminating pregnancies? </p>
<p>The popular view voiced by the Polish opposition – that the governing Law and Justice Party (PiS) wants to <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21708179-catholic-backed-bill-puts-conservative-government-tough-spot-polish-women-skip-work">bring back the Middle Ages</a> – is insufficient. It relies on the “backlash” narrative of women’s emancipation, which sees nations making linear progress towards equality, interrupted by setbacks that can be overcome by joint action. </p>
<p>Luckily, joint action worked in this case. But if progressive groups do not understand the new challenges posed to women’s rights by the illiberal states of Central Europe, future progress may be elusive.</p>
<h2>The polypore state</h2>
<p>In recent years, Hungary and Poland have experienced a series of radical institutional changes aimed at a second transition from liberal to illiberal democracy. </p>
<p>The emergent regimes of Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Beata Szydło in Poland do not represent a revival of authoritarianism, but a new form of governance. This new system stems from the failures of globalisation and neoliberalism, which created states that are weak for the strong, and strong for the weak. </p>
<p>To describe the <em>modus operandi</em> of these new regimes, we have coined a new term: the “polypore” state. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=802&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1008&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Polypores at work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polypore#/media/File:Fungi_in_Borneo.jpg">Cayce</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A polypore is a parasitic fungus that feeds on rotting trees, contributing to their decay. </p>
<p>In the same way, the governments of Poland and Hungary feed on the vital resources of their liberal predecessors, and produce a fully dependent state structure in return.</p>
<p>This style of government involves appropriating the institutions, mechanisms and funding channels of the European liberal democratic project. </p>
<p>One widely publicised example in Hungary was a controversial <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-funds-used-for-hungarian-anti-abortion-campaign/">2011 anti-abortion poster campaign</a>. The campaign was launched as part of a government work-life balance project and as such was funded from the EU employment and social solidarity program, ironically called <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=327">PROGRESS</a>.</p>
<p>The “polypore state” divests resources from the already existing secular and modernist civil society sector towards the illiberal base, to secure and enlarge it. This year in Poland, the Ministry of Justice denied funding to several progressive women’s and children’s rights NGOs. As noted by the <a href="https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/dlaczego-niektore-organizacje-pozarzadowe-nie-moga-liczyc-na-dotacje-minister-sprawiedliwosci">Commissioner for Human Rights</a>, the funds were instead granted to Catholic organisations such as Caritas.</p>
<p>Just as the polypore fungus usually attacks already damaged trees, illiberal regimes rise to power in the context of democratic standards weakened by the financial, security and migration crises. </p>
<p>In Central Europe, post-1989 regime transformation <a href="http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/374/1/SzB_TA_foreign_aid_CEE2.pdf">gave preference to economic reform measures</a> over civic and social ones. Liberal norms and practices have never been fully embedded in these societies. This creates a paradoxical situation where illiberal forces have flourished amid an unfinished liberal revolution.</p>
<p>There are three key tenets of this type of government that need to be understood to account for its success: parallel civil society, security narratives, and the family.</p>
<h2>Parallel civil society</h2>
<p>The goal of illiberal regimes in Central Europe is to transform post-communist infrastructure to benefit the new ruling elite and its voter base. </p>
<p>The key aspect of this transformation is replacing previous civil society and human rights organisations with pro-government NGOs, which support the state’s agenda. While the new groups seemingly have the same profile and target group as the previous ones, they operate within a blatantly different framework that is predominantly religious and anti-modernist.</p>
<p>For instance, there are two key women’s NGOs in Hungary that deal with the role of fathers in families and work-life balance: the long-established, liberal <a href="http://jol-let.com/">Jol-let</a> and the newly founded, conservative <a href="http://haromkiralyfi.hu/">Harom Kiralyfi</a>. Recently only the latter has received signficant state funding for its <a href="http://www.haromkiralyfi.hu/apa_is_csak_egy_van">projects</a>. </p>
<p>Thus the NGO sector is transformed by the distribution of EU and state funding to groups that share the governments’ ideology, leaving progressive organisations reliant on increasingly scarce foreign donations and largely unable to influence domestic policy.</p>
<h2>Security narratives</h2>
<p>To legitimise their disregard for a plural civil society, illiberal governments use the language of security. Human rights groups are framed as foreign-steered and potentially <a href="http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/hungary-ngo-war">dangerous for national sovereignty</a>.</p>
<p>Gender equality, open society and minority rights are portrayed as an existential threat to the survival of the nation. In 2013, Orbán ordered an <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism-barring-non-governmental-organisations">investigation</a> into certain Norwegian-funded NGOs, including the Roma Press Centre and Women for Women against Violence, which were accused of being “paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests”. </p>
<p>The investigation has <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/orban-backs-down-in-battle-with-norwegian-ngos/">since been resolved</a>, but not without <a href="http://politicalcritique.org/cee/hungary/2016/kretakor-ngo-in-hungary/">significant damage</a> being inflicted on many NGOs. </p>
<p>In this context, human rights issues become depoliticised – and advocacy groups are presented as state enemies rather than democratic adversaries. </p>
<h2>Privileging family over women’s rights</h2>
<p>Hungary and Poland use nationalist ideas about the family to attack human rights, emphasising the rights and interests of “traditional” families over those of individuals and minorities. </p>
<p>Fidesz and PiS, the Hungarian and Polish ruling parties respectively, have both introduced the concept of “family mainstreaming” as central to their policy making. In EU and UN <a href="http://www.genderkompetenz.info/eng/gender-competence-2003-2010/Gender%20Mainstreaming/Strategy/Family%20Policy/family_mainstreaming.html">policy literature</a>, family mainstreaming is presented as a tool to identify the impact of policies on families and strengthen the functions of the family. In the hands of illiberal actors, it’s become an alternative to women’s rights and an instrument for promoting “traditional” values.</p>
<p>Women’s issues are gradually substituted with family issues, and institutions responsible for gender equality are replaced with ones dealing with family and demography. In Hungary, the highest coordinating government body for gender equality, the Council of Equal Opportunity of Men and Women, <a href="http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/structures/hungary/council-gender-equality">has not convened</a> since 2010, and its portfolio has been delegated to the Demographic Roundtable.</p>
<h2>This is not a backlash</h2>
<p>If not properly recognised, illiberal states can have seriously detrimental consequences for the rights of women and minorities. When the state appropriates previously existing democratic structures, it shuts down opportunities for resistance. </p>
<p>Underfunded, demonised, and operating outside a system of liberal checks and balances, feminists and progressive NGOs are unable to influence government policy through previously existing channels – advocacy, consultations or media.</p>
<p>Illiberalism is not a backlash, after which one can go back to business as usual, but a new form of governance. Sadly, this means the recent success of the women’s protests in Poland might be impossible to sustain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war on reproductive rights in Central Europe is not a backlash but a key tenet of a new illiberal form of governance.Andrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/610952016-06-16T04:42:32Z2016-06-16T04:42:32ZCette crise de l’eau qui met le Venezuela en danger<p>Le Venezuela est confronté à de graves pénuries, faisant craindre une <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/b033-venezuela-unnatural-disaster.aspx">crise humanitaire</a> dévastatrice pour ce pays d’Amérique du Sud pourtant si riche en pétrole. Nourriture, soins, liquidités, électricité et eau sont soit rationnés, soit non disponibles au moment même où le gouvernement de Nicolás Maduro se trouve également confronté à une récession profonde et à une intense sécheresse.</p>
<p>La <a href="http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx?timeframe=2y">chute de 50 %</a> du prix du pétrole sur le marché international, pour ce pays qui tire <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm">95 %</a> du revenu de ses exportations de cette ressource, a fait considérablement reculer les progrès réalisés au milieu des années 2000 dans la <a href="http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/poverty-reduction-venezuela">lutte</a> contre la pauvreté et les inégalités.</p>
<p>Mais les difficultés du pays vont bien au-delà de cette dépendance à l’or noir. Depuis <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-election-maduro-claims-close-victory-but-opposition-to-challenge-13384">son élection en 2013</a> à la suite du décès d’Hugo Chávez, Maduro a en effet échoué à résoudre les problèmes liés à une mauvaise gestion économique, à une planification défaillante ainsi qu’à la corruption.</p>
<p>Son gouvernement a poursuivi une politique de <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/heterodox-economics-venezuela-collapse-by-ricardo-hausmann-2016-05">prix élévés</a> et de <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-political-and-economic-guide-venezuela">contrôles de changes</a> qui a alimenté l’inflation, les marchés noirs et les pénuries. Dans sa quête d’élaboration du socialisme du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle, le gouvernement vénézuélien a également engagé de trop coûteux <a href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/tag/expropriations">programmes de nationalisation</a>.</p>
<p>Des milliards de dollars sont en effet susceptibles d’être réclamés par les entreprises nationalisées pour des affaires d’expropriations et de saisies foncières, tandis que l’accumulation de factures et de contrats non payés ont entraîné la spéculation ; et la compagnie pétrolière nationale, PDVSA, pourrait bien <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-pdvsa-debt-analysis-idUSKCN0W00DA">ne plus pouvoir payer</a> les intérêts de ses dettes.</p>
<h2>Pénuries dramatiques</h2>
<p>Le rationnement perpétuel de l’eau est la parfaite illustration des ambitions, des limites et, au final, des échecs d’Hugo Chávez – et par conséquent de Nicolás Maduro. Face à une sévère sécheresse déclenchée en mars dernier par <a href="https://theconversation.com/el-nino-is-over-but-has-left-its-mark-across-the-world-59823">El Niño</a>, le gouvernement n’aura pu faire autrement que de <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/venezuela-to-shut-down-for-a-week-as-electricity-crisis-mounts">prolonger les vacances de Pâques</a>, de fermer tous les centres commerciaux et d’écourter une semaine ouvrée courant avril.</p>
<p>Ces mesures ont été prises pour économiser l’électricité, car le niveau des eaux du <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/water-shortage-cripples-venezuela-1459717127">barrage électrique de Guri</a> – qui fournit 65 % de l’électricité du pays – est exceptionnellement bas.</p>
<p>Aujourd’hui, tout comme en 2007 et en 2010, ces réserves <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34827034/ns/world_news-venezuela/t/venezuela-starts-nationwide-energy-rationing/#.V0xRbZN96T8">ont chuté</a>, passant de 244 mètres au-dessus du niveau de la mer à 240 mètres, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-energy-idUSKCN0WY5TK">limite</a> qui oblige à ralentir la production en mettant à l’arrêt les huit turbines produisant 5 000 mégawatts.</p>
<h2>Une histoire troublée</h2>
<p>Le Venezuela est riche en eau, mais ses réserves sont <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/venezuelans-thirsty-in-a-land-of-abundant-water/">mal placées</a>. Selon des estimations officielles, 85 % des stocks se trouvent dans la partie sud-est du pays, où réside seulement 10 % de la population. À l’inverse, seules 15 % des ressources en eau se situent dans le nord du pays, où l’urbanisation est galopante et où se concentre le gros de la population.</p>
<p>Les investissements dans les infrastructures des années 1950 et 1960 ont amélioré l’approvisionnement en eau, permettant à 80 % des foyers d’y avoir accès. Mais ces développements n’ont pas permis de contenter la demande grandissante et la consommation moyenne de <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=_BqpcXQcFgMC&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=350+litres+per+day+venezuela&source=bl&ots=YOwhjCc6AH&sig=qpqUwKocuZVPVr4sR-_aN0vqrCw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiYrbrZkYTNAhWIDBoKHbu-C4wQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=350%20litres%20per%20day%20venezuela&f=false">350 litres d’eau par jour</a> et par habitant (<a href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11822">450 litres</a> pour les quatre millions d’habitants de Caracas).</p>
<p>En 1989, la célèbre grogne au sujet des rationnements, des services publics défaillants, de la pollution, de l’approvisionnement clandestin et de la détérioration de la qualité a conduit à la création d’un nouveau cadre réglementaire. Ce dernier a enclenché la décentralisation de la gestion de l’eau au profit de dix structures régionales coordonnées par une nouvelle agence : <em>Empresa Hidrológica de Venezuela</em> (<a href="http://www.hidroven.gob.ve/">Hidroven</a>).</p>
<p>Pour l’agglomération surpeuplée de Caracas, l’approvisionnement était assuré par <em>Hidrocapital</em>, une compagnie créée en 1991 et qui avait décidé de faire de la rénovation des aqueducs acheminant l’eau de la rivière Tuy une priorité. Mais les difficultés et l’instabilité sociale se sont poursuivies à travers tout le pays au cours des années 1990. Et l’hostilité de la population à l’égard de la politique de privatisation des services de l’eau a compliqué l’afflux de capitaux étrangers.</p>
<h2>Les années Chávez</h2>
<p>Comme pour tout le reste, la politique de gestion de l’eau a connu de profondes transformations pendant la présidence de Chávez. Le gouvernement prit ainsi des décisions radicales pour régler le problème de l’approvisionnement en eau des bidonvilles, base électorale du président.</p>
<p>À la suite d’une <a href="http://www.ine.es/censo2001/">étude menée en 2001</a> par l’Institut national des statistiques, on découvrit que sur les 335 agglomérations du pays, 231 n’avaient aucun accès à l’eau courante et que huit millions de personnes étaient dépourvues d’installations sanitaires. Une loi fut adoptée par décret présidentiel. Dans la lignée de <em>l’empowerment</em> populaire et de la <a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/researchcentres/osrc/events/geographies-of-power-a-lecture-on-venezuela-by-doreen-massey">« nouvelle géométrie du pouvoir »</a> souhaités par le gouvernement, cette loi offrit de décentraliser la politique de l’eau en s’appuyant sur 7 000 structures locales (des associations gérant ce dossier au niveau des quartiers) en lien avec la compagnie nationale des eaux, Hidroven.</p>
<p>Il incomba donc aux populations locales d’identifier leurs besoins et les investissements à réaliser. Parallèlement à cette relocalisation de la gestion des services, le gouvernement <a href="http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/1D4EF25E12C57738C1257D9E00562542/$file/Buxton.pdf">nationalisa</a> des secteurs clés de l’économie, à l’image de celui de l’électricité en 2007.</p>
<h2>Promesses non tenues</h2>
<p>La vision de Chávez de communautés s’assumant et d’une énergie nationale autosuffisante a, comme les plans de ses prédécesseurs dans les années 1990, échoué à améliorer la situation. Pour l’eau et l’électricité, les investissements, estimés à <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/water-shortage-cripples-venezuela-1459717127">10 milliards pour l’eau</a> et 60 milliards pour l’électricité au cours de la dernière décennie, n’ont pu répondre aux besoins d’une population et d’une économie en plein développement.</p>
<p>La gestion des problèmes a souffert d’un fort <em>turnover</em> ministériel et d’un manque d’efficacité technique, tandis que la gabegie administrative prospéra en l’absence de véritable contrôle. Comme ce fut le cas pour d’autres initiatives relatives à la <a href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2129">démocratie participative</a> voulue par Chávez, les associations locales de gestion de l’eau furent mal gérées. </p>
<p>Le pays se trouve aujourd’hui à la croisée des chemins. La faillite financière empêche le gouvernement de pouvoir investir massivement dans le secteur de l’eau, tandis que la crise politique continue à renvoyer les problèmes de gestion et de conservation des ressources au second plan.</p>
<p>Les conséquences sanitaires d’une telle situation sont en outre préoccupantes. En conservant l’eau qui se fait rare, les foyers vénézuéliens, déjà en position de vulnérabilité, pourraient s’exposer encore davantage aux risques de maladies véhiculées par les moustiques comme <a href="http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices/alert/zika-virus-venezuela">Zika</a>, la fièvre jaune, la dengue ou le <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/chikungunya/">chikungunya</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61095/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Buxton ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Les pénuries qui frappent régulièrement les Vénézuéliens illustrent les profonds dysfonctionnements de gestion des ressources naturelles dont le pays est pourtant riche.Julia Buxton, Professor of Comparative Politics, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/599322016-06-07T12:15:31Z2016-06-07T12:15:31ZVenezuela: how a water crisis brought an entire country to its knees<p>Venezuela is experiencing critical shortages, prompting concerns that a <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/b033-venezuela-unnatural-disaster.aspx">humanitarian crisis</a> will engulf this oil-rich South American country. Food, medicine, money, electricity and water are all either rationed or unavailable, as Nicolas Maduro’s government confronts deep recession and drought.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx?timeframe=2y">halving of the international oil price</a> in a country dependent on oil for <a href="http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm">95% of its export earnings</a> has sharply reversed advances made in <a href="http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/poverty-reduction-venezuela">reducing poverty and inequality</a> in the mid-2000s. </p>
<p>But Venezuela’s problems run deeper than an over-reliance on a volatile commodity. Since his <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-election-maduro-claims-close-victory-but-opposition-to-challenge-13384">election as president in 2013</a>, following the death of Hugo Chavez, Maduro has significantly failed to address chronic problems of economic mismanagement, poor planning, opacity and corruption. </p>
<p>His administration has retained debilitating <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/heterodox-economics-venezuela-collapse-by-ricardo-hausmann-2016-05">price</a> and <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-political-and-economic-guide-venezuela">exchange controls</a> that fuel inflation, black markets and shortages. In its ongoing quest to construct 21st-century socialism, the government has continued ad hoc and unaffordable <a href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/tag/expropriations">nationalisation programmes</a>.</p>
<p>Billions of dollars may yet be drained from the country in litigation for asset and land seizures, while an accumulation of unpaid bills and contracts have prompted speculation the state oil company, PDVSA, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-pdvsa-debt-analysis-idUSKCN0W00DA">may default on upcoming interest payments</a> on its debts. </p>
<h2>Critical shortages</h2>
<p>No sector better represents the ambitions, limitations and ultimately the failure of Hugo Chavez – and subsequently Nicolas Maduro – than Venezuela’s perennially rationed water. Currently struggling with drought caused by <a href="https://theconversation.com/el-nino-is-over-but-has-left-its-mark-across-the-world-59823">El Niño</a>, the government announced <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/venezuela-to-shut-down-for-a-week-as-electricity-crisis-mounts">extended Easter holidays</a> in March, and the closure of shopping malls and a reduced working week in April. </p>
<p>These measures were intended to conserve electricity as <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/water-shortage-cripples-venezuela-1459717127">water levels in the Guri hydroelectric dam</a>, which supplies 65% of the country’s power, has fallen to critical levels. </p>
<p>In 2007, 2010 and currently, Guri’s <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34827034/ns/world_news-venezuela/t/venezuela-starts-nationwide-energy-rationing/#.V0xRbZN96T8">water reserves dropped</a> to 244 metres above sea level, just above the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-energy-idUSKCN0WY5TK">240-metre limit</a> at which it has to wind down generation, closing eight turbines at the loss of 5,000 MW. </p>
<h2>A troubled history</h2>
<p>Venezuela has huge water resources, but <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/venezuelans-thirsty-in-a-land-of-abundant-water/">in the wrong place</a>. According to official estimates, 85% of water resources are located in the south-east of the country, home to only 10% of the population. By contrast, only 15% of water resources are in the rapidly urbanised north of the country where the bulk of the population lives. </p>
<p>Infrastructure investment in the 1950s and 1960s improved supply, providing 80% of Venezuelan households with access to water. But investment and planning did not keep up with demand and average consumption of an estimated <a href="https://books.google.fr/books?id=_BqpcXQcFgMC&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=350+litres+per+day+venezuela&source=bl&ots=YOwhjCc6AH&sig=qpqUwKocuZVPVr4sR-_aN0vqrCw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiYrbrZkYTNAhWIDBoKHbu-C4wQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=350%20litres%20per%20day%20venezuela&f=false">350 litres per day</a> (<a href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11822">450 litres per day</a> among the 4m residents of the capital Caracas). </p>
<p>In 1989 popular frustration with shortages, inefficient services, pollution, clandestine tapping and deteriorating quality standards prompted the formation of a new regulatory framework. This decentralised the state monopoly of water services to ten regional utilities and created a new agency: <em>Empresa Hidrologica de Venezuela</em> (<a href="http://www.hidroven.gob.ve/">Hidroven</a>). </p>
<p>The overcrowded federal district was served by <em>Hidrocapital</em>, created in 1991, which prioritised renovation of aqueducts bringing water from the Tuy river basin complex. But rolling water bans and social protest continued across the country in the 1990s. Popular antipathy to privatisation of water services made it difficult for the government to generate foreign investment. </p>
<h2>The Chavez years</h2>
<p>Like so much in Venezuela, water policy changed during Chavez’s presidency. The government took radical steps to address an intensifying water crisis that largely affected residents of the shanty towns – a bedrock of support for the Chavez government. </p>
<p>After a <a href="http://www.ine.es/censo2001/">2001 study</a> by the National Statistics Institute found that 231 of Venezuela’s 335 municipalities had insufficient water and sanitation services, 4.2m people had no access to piped water and 8m lacked adequate sanitary facilities, the Water and Sanitation Law was introduced by presidential decree. In line with the government’s vision of popular empowerment and a “<a href="http://www.open.ac.uk/researchcentres/osrc/events/geographies-of-power-a-lecture-on-venezuela-by-doreen-massey">new geometry of power</a>” this law decentralised water policy down to 7,000 community “roundtables” (associations involved in monitoring water at neighbourhood level) linked to the national water company Hidroven. </p>
<p>It became the responsibility of local populations to identify their needs and investment priorities. Running parallel with localisation of utilities management, the government <a href="http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/1D4EF25E12C57738C1257D9E00562542/$file/Buxton.pdf">nationalised key sectors</a>, including electricity in 2007. </p>
<h2>Failed promises</h2>
<p>Chavez’s vision of empowered communities and national energy self-sufficiency has, like the plans of his predecessors in the 1990s failed to deliver improvement. Investment and supply in both water and electricity (an estimated <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/water-shortage-cripples-venezuela-1459717127">$10 billion investment in water</a> and $60 billion in electricity over the past decade) has failed to keep up with accelerating demand driven by demographic and economic growth. </p>
<p>Management has been poor due to high ministerial turnover and a lack of technical capacity, while administrative waste and profligacy thrived due to poor oversight and limited accountability. As with other examples of Chavez’s vision of <a href="http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2129">community-led democracy</a>, the water roundtables were quickly undone by – among other problems - unresponsive officials. </p>
<p>The country is now at a fateful juncture. Financial collapse precludes any state capacity for large-scale water investment. The country’s ongoing political crisis has pushed questions of resource management and conservation to the back seat. </p>
<p>There could also be dangerous health consequences. Households stockpiling scarce water resources could increase the exposure of an already vulnerable population to mosquito-borne diseases including <a href="http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices/alert/zika-virus-venezuela">Zika</a>, yellow fever, dengue and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/chikungunya/">chikungunya</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59932/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Buxton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A drought in the socialist South American country has led to blackouts, political conflict and increased exposure to Zika.Julia Buxton, Professor of Comparative Politics, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/583292016-05-13T10:23:46Z2016-05-13T10:23:46ZEastern Europe is shunning liberal democracy – but it’ll come back in the end<p>What’s happening to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? A new authoritarianism, what one leader has called “<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-liberal-democracy-in-hungary">illiberal democracy</a>”, has taken over in Hungary and Poland. Propelled in part by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/paris-terror-attacks-france-now-faces-fight-against-fear-and-exclusion-50703">Paris</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/brussels-terror-attacks-a-continent-wide-crisis-that-threatens-core-european-ideals-56723">Brussels</a> attacks and the fear of terrorism, parts of Europe are drifting away from democratic pluralism.</p>
<p>There’s a growing sense that the world is spinning out of control, and that liberal democracy is only making matters worse.</p>
<p>This turn to the illiberal has been coming for a long time. After 1989, the people of Central and Eastern Europe hoped that democracy would bring immediate economic benefits. These hopes went largely unfulfilled. Standards of living failed to keep pace with popular expectations, especially after the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. In this grim climate, Eastern Europeans were attracted to political leaders who claimed they could defend them against outsiders – including the foreign banks who called in their mortgages when the financial markets collapsed.</p>
<p>These festering resentments were the building blocks of a new nationalism, one founded on both the politics of national identity and the politics of fear. </p>
<p>In Hungary, the nationalist narrative based on partial truths depicted Hungarians as victims, stripped of two thirds of their lands after World War I, then occupied by Nazi Germany towards the end of World War II, and after the war by the Soviets. Stoking fear, the governing parties in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland have called Muslim refugees “a threat to Christian civilisation”. The Hungarian government has warned that all the terrorists in Europe are refugees, and it is now preparing to enact an anti-terror law to give the government emergency powers to declare “a state of terror threat” and suspend the constitution.</p>
<p>In July 2014, Prime Minister Viktor Orban declared that the Hungarian government is an illiberal democracy. He asserted that Hungary and its neighbours were rejecting the liberal values of individual rights, and declared that “the Hungarian nation is not a pile of individuals” like people in the West.</p>
<h2>Surviving illiberal nationalism</h2>
<p>On the face of it, the risk these regimes pose to Europe seems dire. On one hand, the EU is vulnerable. Without major structural reforms, its institutions make easy targets for nationalist movements, and so far, other states’ leaders have shown little inclination to discipline member states who defy EU rules and principles – probably because they want to reserve the right to do so themselves.</p>
<p>But Eastern Europe’s illiberal governments may not be as big a threat to the EU as they now appear.</p>
<p>The benefits these countries receive far outweigh the costs of staying in. The money is plentiful, and flows freely in the form of structural funds with few strings attached. Hungary is currently guaranteed to receive <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/opinion/hungarys-crackdown-on-the-press.html">€22 billion in economic assistance</a> from the EU. Many of the country’s major capital projects, public investment opportunities and employment strategies depend on this beneficent and benign funding.</p>
<p>The EU is also a useful political target for Eastern European nationalists, who need it as a bogeyman. They gain popularity precisely by biting the hand that feeds them, with the rallying cry that “Brussels is the new Moscow”. Leaving it, or diminishing its influence, would rob them of their main political platform. </p>
<p>And despite their assault on the EU’s liberal values, Eastern European governments benefit substantially from the EU’s guarantee of employment mobility for their citizens.</p>
<p>Without the EU, Hungary and its neighbours would be cast adrift in a chaotic world. They have few to no natural resources to speak of, and would likely become economic vassals of the two big illiberal states to the east, Russia and Turkey, whose economic and security situation is far more uncertain than the EU’s. This is why Hungary’s prime minister is trying to stop the EU from detaching Eastern Europe from the Schengen zone, and also why he is seeking to maintain social benefits for Hungarian workers in the UK. </p>
<p>These may be losing battles, especially if Hungary continues to resist the EU quota rules on accepting refugees, but they show how much Orban and his neighbors need the EU.</p>
<h2>Doomed to fail?</h2>
<p>And so the EU looks likely to survive the challenge from the East. But we should not underestimate the forces that have been unleashed by this lurch towards illiberalism – or how unstable these countries may yet become.</p>
<p>If an illiberal government can be changed by democratic means, then the system may be sustainable. But if power becomes so centralised that the government can fend off any democratic challenge, the system may become unsustainable in the long run.</p>
<p>It can be very difficult for centralised illiberal regimes to deliver economic benefits to their citizens without liberalising their political institutions. <a href="https://theconversation.com/forget-putins-global-posturing-russias-biggest-challenges-for-2016-are-domestic-52340">Russia</a> and <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/china-gap-between-m2-and-credit-asian-financial-crisis-2016-5?r=US&IR=T">China</a>, the two main countries cited by Viktor Orban as models of illiberal governance, are both facing economic challenges traceable to the way they are governed.</p>
<p>Illiberal governance also tends to incubate corruption, which is a drag on economic growth and a source of instability, as the <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/939659ae-b67d-11e3-b230-00144feabdc0.html">situation in Russia</a> demonstrates. Eastern European countries have <a href="http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/">unfavourable ratings</a> compared to other EU member states on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.</p>
<p>Another problem for these regimes is that while the traditional media may have fallen under the control of illiberal governments, online media generally have not. Countries that rein in freedoms are vulnerable to the digital revolution, which both promotes increased peer-to-peer flows of information and creates horizontal pressures for change. In Hungary, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in 2014 when the government <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29846285">threatened to tax the use of the internet</a>, and the government had to back down.</p>
<p>Most unsustainably of all, illiberal regimes offer few safety valves for citizen discontent. When popular pressures build, they must either back down or resort to coercion. The Euromaidan protests in Ukraine showed that physical coercion can lead to greater popular discontent and pressure for more radical change, and can even spill over into serious conflict.</p>
<p>If it continues down this road, Eastern Europe’s turn to illiberal democracy is a serious challenge to the European order, and it carries serious risks – both for Europe at large and for the people living under the governments concerned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Shattuck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Economic slowdown and a refugee influx have rattled Europe deeply, and some countries seem to have had enough.John Shattuck, President and Rector, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/270922014-05-24T08:58:55Z2014-05-24T08:58:55ZEU election: Hungary’s governing party alliance hopes for a big win<p>Hungary faces a series of elections in 2014. Its European Parliament (EP) elections are to be held on May 25, between the Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 6 and the local elections in October – and it is tempting to think that the EP elections are the least important of the three. </p>
<p>Hungary’s national parliamentary elections seem to mobilise citizens more, and Hungarians turn out for the EP elections at [a rate lower than the EU average](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009). EP elections do not seem to be as important for political parties as national elections, and the perception is that being a member of the EP is a detour in a political career, not a step up. </p>
<p>But this year’s EP elections are clearly being taken rather more seriously than they have been before. For instance, even as it may be less immediately pressing, the EP campaign has seen more televised debates than the national parliamentary elections did. No public debate among prime ministerial candidates was held this year, while aside from the debate <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2014/05/14/candidates-for-eu-commission-presidency-debate-brussels/">among the presidential candidates for the European Commission</a> (broadcast in Hungary on channels with low ratings), a televised debate for the Hungarian EP party list leaders was held two days before the vote. </p>
<p>In another sign that EP election dynamics are changing, there are now a few examples of politicians finding a way back into Hungarian politics after serving in the EP. One prominent example is <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/CF3407ED-797F-4E94-AC5B-EF33B3695718/0/CurriculumvitaeofJanosAder_ENG.pdf">János Áder</a>, the current president.</p>
<p>All in all, <a href="http://nvi.hu/en/ep2014/419/419_0_index.html">eight parties (or party alliances) are participating</a> in the 2014 EP elections: the governing Fidesz-KDNP, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Jobbik, Seres Mária Szövetségesei (SMS), The Homeland is Not For Sale Movement, Politics Can Be Different (LMP), Together-Dialogue for Hungary (Együtt-PM) and the Democratic Coalition (DK).</p>
<p>This year’s EP elections hold special significance for both right-wing and left-wing parties. The current governing party alliance, the right-wing Fidesz-KDNP, has a somewhat tense relationship with the EU; a strong victory after <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/04/07/fidesz-have-won-a-clear-victory-in-hungarys-elections-but-their-supermajority-hangs-in-the-balance/">the one they earned at the national parliamentary level</a> in April could further strengthen their position. </p>
<p>And while many left-wing parties (MSZP, Együtt, DK, PM and MLP) participated at the national parliamentary elections by way of a joint list, at the EP elections they have separate ones (except for Együtt and PM who run together and for MLP who does not participate). The results will therefore reveal a lot about their relative strengths and popularity.</p>
<p>The Fidesz-KDNP government’s hope of a big win shows every sign of coming true. In a widely cited <a href="http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/Working_Papers/Marsh-Hix-JOP2007.pdf">paper</a>, Simon Hix and Michael Marsh show that the timing of the EP elections within national election cycles matters a lot; when EP elections come hot on the heels of national elections, a “honeymoon effect” boosts the vote shares of governing parties (who otherwise usually suffer a decline). </p>
<p>Forecasts for Hungary support Hix and Marsh’s findings: Fidesz-KDNP is <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/05/22/european-parliament-elections-a-final-look-at-the-national-campaigns/">expected to have a higher vote share</a> than at the April national parliamentary elections. However, their result may still be lower than the 56% they won in the <a href="http://nvi.hu/en/ep2009/291/291_0_index.html">2009 EP elections</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, radical right-wing Jobbik may get the second highest number of votes and the Hungarian Socialist Party the third. Using both a <a href="http://www.valasztasirendszer.hu/epmandatum/">mandate calculator</a> and some of the <a href="http://www.electio2014.eu/pollsandscenarios/polls#country">published</a> <a href="http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2014/kitekint/20140521_valasztas.html">polls</a> (by Nézőpont, Ipsos and Tárki), we can predict that Fidesz-KDNP are set to win 13 seats, Jobbik to win four seats, the Hungarian Socialist Party three and LMP one seat in the EP. There is of course some uncertainty in the polling, meaning that Jobbik and the socialists may switch places in this ranking, DK and Együtt-PM may get a seat, and some quite different predictions altogether are being aired – but this remains the expected outcome. </p>
<p>Finally, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=2202&nationID=16,22,&startdate=2004.10&enddate=2013.11">general trends</a> show that attitudes to the EU in Hungary are similar to the average EU level, with levels of Euroscepticism fluctuating over the years. And based on the most recent polls, 37% of Hungary’s citizens <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_data_en.pdf">have a positive image of the EU</a>, against the EU average of 34%. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.republikon.hu/upload/5000338/EU_szkepticiizmus_angol.pdf">A survey by a Hungarian research institute</a> shows that although there are differences among the supporters of different parties as regards their positive or negative opinions on the EU, as you would expect, Jobbik voters are by far the most negative.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gergo Zavecz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hungary faces a series of elections in 2014. Its European Parliament (EP) elections are to be held on May 25, between the Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 6 and the local elections in October…Gergo Zavecz, PhD student, Central European UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.