tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/national-university-odesa-law-academy-3382/articlesNational University Odesa Law Academy2024-02-12T15:58:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232362024-02-12T15:58:05Z2024-02-12T15:58:05ZUkraine war: Kyiv needs a fundamental rethink of its strategy, not just a reshuffle of military leadership<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-popular-iron-general-replaced-war-grinds-2024-02-08/">recent replacement</a> of Valeriy Zaluzhnyi as commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces may have put a temporary end to the increasingly public disagreements between the very popular “iron general” and the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. But it has not answered the fundamental question of what a winning – or even surviving – strategy in the war with Russia could look like as it moves into its third year.</p>
<p>Several dynamics have come together that are deeper and more complex than just a major <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-fleshes-out-rebooted-military-team-2024-02-10/">reshuffle of the military leadership</a>. The bigger picture that will shape the future of the war – and with it the future of Ukraine and the European and international security order – comprises four main factors. These need to be analysed together to understand the present, and – most importantly – the future predicaments of Ukraine and its western partners. </p>
<p>First, the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023 and the increasing pressure that Russia has put on Ukraine’s frontlines and hinterland put into serious question the ability of Kyiv to win. This is especially the case if victory for Ukraine means forcing Russia’s complete withdrawal from all territory occupied since 2014. </p>
<p>The impending fall of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-attacks-avdiivka-all-directions-situation-difficult-mayor-2024-02-08/">Avdiivka</a>, a town about 20kms to the west of Donetsk in the east of Ukraine, suggests that Kyiv ultimately has a weaker hand to play in a battle of attrition when confronted by a ruthless adversary with greater resources.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of the battlefront in eastern Ukraine showing heavy fighting along a long frontline." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1111&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1111&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575000/original/file-20240212-28-7avo7e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1111&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">There is heavy fighting around the town of Avdiivka which is expected to fall to Russian forces in the next few days.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Much like the loss of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/25/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-russia-war.html">Bakhmut</a> in May 2023, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-bloody-battle-for-soledar-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future-of-the-conflict-197625">Soledar</a> in January 2023, this was a symbolic rather than strategic defeat for Ukraine. It also represents, at best, pyrrhic victories for Russia – as in the case of <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023">Bakhmut</a>.</p>
<p>But taken together, and seen in the context of the failed 2023 counter-offensive, these were not just symbolic defeats. They marked a real and extremely wasteful loss of financial resources, manpower and military equipment. </p>
<p>Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhny puts the blame for last year’s disappointed hopes clearly on the latter. It also indicates, more worryingly, a lack of learning the lessons of these setbacks on the part of the Ukrainian president. The fact that the new commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/five-facts-about-oleksandr-syrskyi-ukraines-new-army-chief-2024-02-08/">associated</a> with several of these costly defeats – notably Bakhmut – does not bode well for the necessary change in Ukrainian strategy.</p>
<p>To his credit, Syrsky also masterminded the defence of Kyiv in the early days of the war in 2022 and the successful counter-offensive the following summer which saw Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-push-to-recover-kherson-in-the-south-is-on-will-it-succeed-189640">recapture</a> significant territory first around Kharkiv in the north and then Kherson in the south. Notably, these successes happened before Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-calls-up-more-troops-and-threatens-nuclear-option-in-a-speech-which-ups-the-ante-but-shows-russias-weakness-191044">embarked</a> on the first of several mobilisations and shifted its economy to a war footing.</p>
<h2>Faltering international support</h2>
<p>The second key factor to keep in mind is that Ukraine’s battlefield successes in 2022 occurred at a time when western support for Ukraine was in full swing. Those days are long gone. This has been evident in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senate-faces-new-test-ukraine-aid-bill-2024-02-11/">protracted battles</a> in the US congress over sending more military aid to Ukraine. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-comments-russia-nato-appalling-unhinged-white-house-spokesperson-2024-02-11/">comments</a> by former president – and 2024 Republic nominee-apparent – Donald Trump on his lack of commitment to Nato should he be reelected in November are equally worrisome.</p>
<p>Despite some <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hungary-slovakia-criticise-more-aid-to-ukraine-as-eu-fights-over-budget/">detractors</a>, the EU remains committed to support for Ukraine. This became clear following the recent <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_621">agreement</a> on a new €50 billion (£42.7 billion) funding package for Ukraine through 2027. But this will barely cover Ukraine’s budget deficit, let alone make up for a potentially significant drop in US military aid. Combined with Ukraine’s own shrinking domestic capabilities to mobilise further resources, the war will have to be fought in far more difficult conditions than in the first two years.</p>
<h2>War fatigue</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is increasingly suffering from war fatigue. Military setbacks, economic decline, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">deteriorating</a> living conditions, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-corruption-scandals-and-high-level-rifts-could-become-an-existential-threat-as-kyiv-asks-for-more-military-aid-222432">corruption</a> and the scale of the loss of lives – among troops and civilians alike – makes sustaining the war effort at present levels more difficult as well. Especially if the goal remains retaking all the land that Russia has occupied since 2014.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/embattled-ukraine-moves-tighten-army-mobilisation-rules-2024-01-31/">amended law on mobilisation</a>, intended to underpin this strategy, was <a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-verhovna-rada-voiennyi-stan-mobilizatsia/32807577.html">adopted</a> in the Ukrainian parliament on February 6. Its provisions, including lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25 years, mandatory digital certificates and electronic prescription notifications and stricter penalties for evading military service, are further evidence of the waning enthusiasm in Ukrainian society for the war effort.</p>
<p>Together with yet another 90-day extension of martial law and several financial measures designed to tighten the government’s control over the economy, the more draconian provisions in the new mobilisation law also heighten the sense of uncertainty over Ukraine’s political direction. </p>
<p>Zelensky’s presidential term comes to an end in May 2024 and new parliamentary elections would normally be due in the autumn. While it is generally agreed that elections are close to impossible at present, both the president’s and parliament’s legitimacy after the expiry of their constitutional terms will be open to question. </p>
<p>This will ultimately be an issue for the constitutional court to resolve. But it has not stopped political forces within Ukraine opposed to Zelensky and his Servant of the People political party to pile pressure on the president to agree to a government of national unity. </p>
<p>Given the lack of popularity of this opposition, associated primarily with former president Petro Poroshenko – who Zelensky defeated in a landslide election in 2019 – this is hardly driven by popular demand. But it nonetheless signals further political turmoil at a time when Ukraine needs unity. </p>
<p>It is not clear whether Zelensky’s dismissal of Zaluzhny will strengthen or weaken any political opposition. In the short term, it is likely to benefit Zelensky whose popularity still dwarfs that of Poroshenko. Yet, because replacing Zaluzhny has not come with a signal that Ukraine’s war strategy will fundamentally change, this is a very risky move on the part of Zelensky. </p>
<p>Maintaining the current direction asks Ukrainians for yet more sacrifices. What Zelensky is offering in return depends on a range of at best highly uncertain returns that depend on many factors beyond the Ukrainian president’s control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and University of Regensburg, Germany </span></em></p>As the war against Russia moves towards its third anniversary, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky is facing a growing list of problems.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224322024-02-01T12:42:38Z2024-02-01T12:42:38ZUkraine war: corruption scandals and high-level rifts could become an existential threat as Kyiv asks for more military aid<p>The latest revelations about corruption in Ukraine tell a complex story. A <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68120973">scandal</a> has engulfed the Ukrainian ministry of defence, where 100,000 mortar shells worth about $40m (£31m) were paid for but never delivered. But within days of this story emerging, Ukraine achieved its best-ever <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/ukr">ranking</a> in the annual corruption perceptions index complied by Transparency International (TI). </p>
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<p>The improved standing in the TI index demonstrates that efforts by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to crack down on corruption – including in his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/graft-accusations-dog-top-zelenskiy-aides-2023-09-19/">inner circle</a> – have led to some improvements. On the other hand, the ammunition scandal is a clear indication of how pervasive and normalised corruption has become when senior defence officials and managers of an arms supplier collude to deprive their country of vital military supplies at a time when their country is facing an existential crisis.</p>
<p>Corruption has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine">long been a problem</a> in Ukraine. But over the past ten years, since annual corruption perceptions scores have been collated, the country has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bd7c9cfb-56ea-40e2-ad67-96cc9739c955">steadily improved</a>. Yet, with the exception of Russia and Azerbaijan, no other European country is perceived as <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023">more corrupt</a> than Ukraine.</p>
<p>Ukraine has survived two years of bitter conflict, despite this endemic corruption, and has showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russia’s aggression. But these high-profile scandals – and the general perception that Ukraine still battles everyday corruption – have become more existential threats at a time when Ukraine’s survival has, to a large extent, become dependent on the continued supply of western military and financial aid.</p>
<p>Sceptics in the EU – above all Hungary <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hungary-slovakia-criticise-more-aid-to-ukraine-as-eu-fights-over-budget/">and Slovakia</a>, but also influential right-wing populists currently in opposition like Germany’s AfD – have used undeniable corruption as one argument against further aid for Ukraine. Similarly, in the United States, Republicans have <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/02/19/oversight-ukraine-russia-military-aid/11271555002/">argued</a> that a lack of oversight could mean that US aid is diverted to line the pockets of corrupt officials. </p>
<p>As this debate becomes more heated and increasingly entangled with election campaigns for the European parliament and the US presidency, any alleged evidence of the misuse of funds makes it harder for Kyiv’s international supporters to win the argument for continued support. Moreover, it becomes less attractive to even make the argument. </p>
<p>This is likely to feed further into the sense of defeatism that has surrounded public debates on Ukraine since Ukraine’s performance on the battlefield in 2023 failed to live up to either Kyiv’s aspirations or the west’s expectations.</p>
<h2>Zelensky’s vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Beyond the precariousness of continued western support, Zelensky has also become more vulnerably domestically. Repeated high-profile corruption scandals undermine one of his key election promises back in 2019 that he would <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraines-zelenskiy-ran-on-a-reform-platform-is-he-delivering/">root out graft</a>.</p>
<p>While the Ukrainian president has strengthened anti-corruption agencies and been open about the problems Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-he-will-propose-tougher-corruption-measures-this-week-2023-08-27/">continues to face</a>, his continued crackdown can now also be framed as politically motivated by his domestic detractors. This will only serve to deepen and entrench political divides in Ukraine. And that’s the last thing Zelensky needs at a time when there is already a highly divisive debate over war strategy and when disagreements between the country’s political and military leaderships have become increasingly public.</p>
<p>On that front, it remains unclear whether Zelensky will replace his commander-in-chief, General Valeriy Zaluzhny, as has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aa9aacfc-c248-4550-bf28-d79ad4c553cb">widely reported</a>, or does not have the power to do so. The Ukrainian president is said to have offered Zaluzhny a new role as a defence adviser, which the military chief is understood to have refused. Relations between the two have soured in recent months, partly as a result of the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive to score any significant battlefield successes.</p>
<p>The president castigated his top general in November 2023 for publicly saying that the war was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/05/zelenskiy-denies-ukrainian-generals-claim-war-is-at-stalemate">in a “stalemate”</a>. There has also been speculation that <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/01/31/zelenskyys-top-general-presents-political-puzzle-00138647">Zaluzhny might enter politics</a> and stand against Zelensky for the presidency. A <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/poll-ukrainians-trust-in-zelensky-declines-trust-in-zaluzhnyi-is-high/">poll in December</a> found that while 62% of Ukrainians said they trusted Zelensky, 88% said they trusted Zaluzhny.</p>
<p>Taken together, the corruption scandal and the reported rift at the top of Ukraine’s power structure will do nothing to restore or sustain western confidence about whether Ukraine has a credible pathway to avoiding defeat, let alone to achieving victory. Without such confidence, more aid looks increasingly doubtful.</p>
<p>Without real headway being made in the fight against corruption, the broadly pro-western and pro-European constituency from which Zelensky draws most of his support is also likely to weaken. A European future will look less attractive to people who see western support as simply propping up a corrupt elite. </p>
<p>And even if, as is likely, support for European and transatlantic integration will remain high, Zelensky may no longer be seen as its only or most likely champion.</p>
<p>Corruption, therefore, remains central to Ukraine’s existential crisis. It is not the only problem that the country faces, and objectively it may not even be the biggest one. What makes it so critical for Ukraine to fight corruption more effectively, and to be seen to do so, is that corruption and the perception of corruption exacerbates other problems and undermines critical domestic and western support. </p>
<p>On its own hence, corruption is unlikely to break Ukraine. But in the midst of a war, it may be the final straw that breaks the country – because of the knock-on effects at home and abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As a new Russian offensive gets under way, Ukraine can ill afford to be mired in scandal and disunity.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211422024-01-18T16:05:49Z2024-01-18T16:05:49ZUkraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it<p>Analysis suggests that Russia may be in the early stages of a new offensive in Ukraine. On the ground, Moscow’s forces have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fighting-intensifies-ukraines-east-russia-steps-up-offensive-action-2024-01-17/">intensified their attacks</a> along major sections of the frontline. They have made small territorial gains over the past few weeks, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024">taking new territory or reclaiming territory</a> liberated by Kyiv’s forces during last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops have switched to “active defence”, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ground-commander-says-his-troops-now-active-defence-can-still-surprise-2024-01-15/">according</a> to the commander of the country’s ground forces, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi. </p>
<p>Does this imply that Ukrainian efforts to resist and ultimately defeat Russia’s aggression are in serious peril should the offensive begin? This will depend on an assessment of both Russian and Ukrainian capabilities and political will. Regarding the latter, neither side shows any signs of backing down.</p>
<p>Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was unequivocal at a <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73275">forum with local government leaders</a> on January 16 that he was unwilling to enter into any negotiations with Ukraine. Instead he predicted <a href="http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73275">“a very serious blow”</a> to Ukrainian statehood as a result of the war.</p>
<p>Putin’s Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-urges-western-unity-stop-russia-2024-01-16/">speaking at the World Economic Forum</a> in Davos this week, left little doubt about his determination to continue fighting for the complete liberation of all of Ukraine’s currently Russian-occupied territories.</p>
<h2>Men and materiel</h2>
<p>But do Russia and Ukraine have the military capabilities to match their leaders’ rhetoric? This is an issue of both equipment and manpower. As is obvious from the repeated and increasingly successful Russian airstrikes against a wide range of targets across Ukraine, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-massive-air-attack-ukraine-least-10-dead-kyiv-2023-12-29/">Kyiv</a> and the country’s second-largest city, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missiles-hit-ukraines-kharkiv-wounding-4-officials-say-2024-01-16/">Kharkiv</a>, Russia has the arms and ammunition to continue its air campaign while Ukraine still lacks adequate air defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Similarly, Ukrainian ground efforts are hampered by increasingly serious ammunition shortages. Summarising several press reports, non-profit policy organisation the Institute for the Study of War <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2024">reported</a> on January 8 2024, that Ukrainian troops “are struggling to completely compensate for artillery ammunition shortages” while their use of small drones for combat purposes was hampered by “insufficient electronic warfare capabilities”. </p>
<p>When it comes to manpower, both sides are struggling. In his year-end press conference Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72994">ruled out</a> any further mobilisation. And, <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/interview/russians-motivated-to-fight-for-money-1000-1705323575.html">according</a> to Vadym Skibitskyi, the deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Moscow can rely on a steady stream of some 30,000 volunteers a month. As a consequence, however, the question facing the Kremlin is how the Russian economy will deal with manpower shortages as workers are diverted to the frontlines. </p>
<p>The planned mobilisation of around 500,000 additional troops in Ukraine is also likely to be difficult and divisive for very similar reasons.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-increasingly-seen-as-fought-by-the-poor-as-zelensky-raises-taxes-and-proposes-strict-mobilisation-laws-220433">Ukraine war increasingly seen as 'fought by the poor’, as Zelensky raises taxes and proposes strict mobilisation laws</a>
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<h2>Friends and partners</h2>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1d1eb1dd-4fa0-4693-9512-23a219de5d77">benefited</a> enormously from Iranian and North Korean military supplies. As is obvious from the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/north-koreas-top-diplomat-in-moscow-for-talks-on-ties-amid-concerns-over-alleged-arms-deal/ar-AA1n3i6G">recent visit</a> of the North Korean foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, to Moscow, these links are likely to grow and further boost Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Ukraine is, in many ways, even more dependent on foreign aid to sustain its defence against Russia’s aggression – yet this aid has become much <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-and-shaky-international-support-putting-pressure-on-zelensky-216930">more precarious</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-stalemate-on-the-battlefield-and-shaky-international-support-putting-pressure-on-zelensky-216930">Ukraine war: stalemate on the battlefield and shaky international support putting pressure on Zelensky</a>
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<p>With no clear pathway to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d35e1a68-9bcc-43d3-80a1-ff6aeeebff3d">unlocking</a> further US military aid and <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/video/news/orban-versus-the-eu-on-ukraine-how-can-other-member-states-break-the-deadlock/vi-AA1mT2Xp">uncertainty</a> over future EU financial commitments, Ukraine has become dependent on a <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41LxvWwKZex-bar-stacked-horizontal-figure-2_csv_final">small number</a> of donors, including <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-raises-pressure-eu-countries-beef-up-military-aid-ukraine-budget-germany/">Germany</a> and the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9914/">UK</a>.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s predicament is exacerbated by the fact that its own defence sector is not yet fully on a war footing, which is partly why it has struggled to manufacture sufficient ammunition for its troops in the field. Even if this were to <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base">change soon</a>, including with the help of western investment, Ukraine’s lack of strategic depth would remain an impediment. Russian drones and missiles have the reach to target military production facilities anywhere in Ukraine. Ukraine, for now, lacks the air defence systems to effectively counter such attacks.</p>
<h2>Security guarantees</h2>
<p>This leaves the question of deterrence as potentially the last obstacle in the path of a Russian counteroffensive that could deliver Putin’s threatened serious blow to Ukraine’s statehood. First raised in a G7 joint <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/06/g7-leaders-statement-6/#:%7E:text=We%20continue%20to%20support%20Ukraine,term%20security%20commitments%20and%20arrangements.">declaration of support</a> for Ukraine in July 2023, bilateral agreements between Ukraine and several of its western allies to strengthen defence and security cooperation are now beginning to take more concrete shape. </p>
<p>The UK-Ukraine <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf">agreement</a> on security cooperation was signed on January 12 2024. French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-travel-ukraine-february-finalise-bilateral-security-deal-2024-01-16/">has announced</a> that a similar deal between France and Ukraine will be finalised in February. </p>
<p>The UK-Ukraine agreement <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65a14a6ae96df50014f845d2/UK-Ukraine_Agreement_on_Security_Co-operation.pdf">provides for</a> “comprehensive assistance to Ukraine for the protection and the restoration of its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders”. It pledges “prevention and active deterrence of, and counter-measures against, any military escalation and/or a new aggression by the Russian Federation”. It also promises “support for Ukraine’s future integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions”. </p>
<p>Considered side-by-side, enthusiasm in the west for supporting a Ukrainian victory on the battlefield and for Nato membership is, at best lukewarm. However, if this is a model for similar deals in the future, if the US and other key Nato members reach similar agreements with Ukraine, and if these – as yet untested – commitments are followed through and don’t suffer the fate of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-explainer-budapest-memorandum/25280502.html">Budapest memorandum</a> (a 1994 document that Ukraine agreed to remove all of its nuclear weapons in return for recognition from Russia and others of its statehood) whose <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf">security assurances</a> proved useless, this would indicate a clear western determination to prevent a major Russian counteroffensive resulting in yet another illegal Russian land grab. </p>
<p>These are many and significant “ifs” and Nato’s goal of preventing Ukraine’s defeat is far more modest than Zelensky’s war aims. Yet, precisely because they are more modest, and therefore more credible, they could prevent a much more dangerous broader escalation between Russia and west without condemning Ukraine to a permanent defeat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221142/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine is short of men and military equipment. It urgently needs security guarantees from the west.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204332024-01-04T16:21:56Z2024-01-04T16:21:56ZUkraine war increasingly seen as ‘fought by the poor’, as Zelensky raises taxes and proposes strict mobilisation laws<p>After the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, Kyiv finds itself at a major crossroads and with no easy options. </p>
<p>The demand late last year by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for the mobilisation of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-asks-additional-450000-500000-people-be-mobilised-zelenskiy-2023-12-19/">additional 500,000 troops</a> over the next few months signals both resolve and desperation. It will likely make Ukrainian domestic politics more fractious but it could also buy Zelensky time to reconsider his own endgame and how to get there.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">full-scale invasion in February 2022</a>, Ukraine’s armed forces have had a strength of around a million soldiers, with continuous regular mobilisation compensating for losses on the battlefield. Against this background, the target of an additional half a million troops constitutes a significant increase of 50% above the current baseline. There are several possible reasons for this.</p>
<p>First, it could be an indication of the real scale of losses at the front over the past year. Ukraine suffered high rates of attrition as a result of relentless Russian counterattacks, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024">including</a> along the long stretch of frontline in Donbas. </p>
<p>There is also increasing concern over the sustainability of western support. Kyiv may be anticipating a need to compensate for an expected decrease in western supplies of arms and ammunition by increasing human resources on the ground. </p>
<p>Russia’s recent mobilisation of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-army-expansion-a2bf0b035aabab20c8b120a1c86c9e38">170,000 new troops</a> brings the total strength of its armed forces to around 1.3 million. So Zelensky’s announcement may simply be an attempt to level the playing field in terms of troop numbers. </p>
<p>Taken together, all three of these possible explanations also indicate a concern about the likelihood of a new Russian offensive in 2024. Whatever the ultimate Russian war aims might be, Moscow’s territorial claim to the whole of the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia is one of the more concrete – and hitherto unachieved – objectives. </p>
<p>With the Kremlin’s relative military strength growing, denying Putin this success – which he is likely to want to achieve before his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/03/vladimir-putin-will-use-election-to-show-war-weary-russia-hes-still-calling-the-shots">all-but-certain re-election</a> in March and likely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-run-again-president-2024-2023-12-08/">inauguration</a> in May – will require a serious Ukrainian defence effort.</p>
<p>In turn, this implies that the Ukrainian leadership is currently less concerned about strategic prospects, but is motivated by the need to mobilise all available resources for this effort. </p>
<p>The two complementary <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/cabinet-of-ministers-submits-draft-law-on-mobilization-to-verkhovna-rada/">bills regarding on mobilisation</a> which were submitted by the government to parliament on December 30 2023, indicate that Zelensky and his inner circle are serious about this. At the same time, if adopted and implemented, the new approach to mobilisation will also add significant strain for already stretched the Ukrainian state institutions and society.</p>
<h2>Running out of men to mobilise?</h2>
<p>As publicly confirmed by senior Ukrainian officials, large numbers of volunteers for frontline service simply no longer exist. So the government proposes coercive measures to ensure continuing enlistment. These range from high fines for draft dodging, to seizure of real estate and the freezing of private bank accounts, to the cancellation of passports of Ukrainian refugees abroad. </p>
<p>The latter group in particular, including an <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=572558">estimated</a> 600,000 fighting-age men living in the EU, will become a key target of Kyiv’s mobilisation efforts. Addressing them directly in his <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/novorichne-privitannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelens-88037">new year’s speech</a>, Zelensky didn’t mince his words: “You need to decide whether you are a refugee or a citizen.” </p>
<p>In parallel, there will be further efforts to put Ukraine’s economy on a war footing, as <a href="https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/6745">announced</a> by Ukraine’s prime minister, Denys Shmyhal. The planned mobilisation will be accompanied by a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-budget-2024">new economic strategy</a> to increase the tax burden on individual citizens and small and medium-sized businesses, while social spending will be radically reduced.</p>
<h2>Deepening social divisions</h2>
<p>These measures are undoubtedly necessary from a strategic perspective – especially if Ukraine wants to regain the initiative on the battlefield. But taken together, these actions by the government have revived potentially divisive discussions in Ukrainian society about social justice, corruption and the social contract between elites and society. The level of public trust in elites is already <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1335&page=1">low, and decreasing further</a>, and the war is increasingly seen as a “war fought by the poor”. </p>
<p>What is more, the demographic trends in Ukraine’s society further exacerbate the unfavourable long-term prospects of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/world-bank-says-ukraine-has-tenfold-increase-poverty-due-war-2022-10-15/">ever-increasing</a> number of people living in poverty. Life expectancy of men has reduced from an already low 65 years in 2021 to <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-11/ukraines-demographic-drain-puts-its-post-war-recovery-at-risk.html">57 years</a> in 2023. </p>
<p>Birth rates remain very low, with some demographers <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">estimating</a> a fall to 0.55 babies per family in 2023. Meanwhile, emigration of the most skilled and economically active population has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2023/07/UNHCR-LIVES-ON-HOLD-4-INTENTIONS-AND-PERSPECTIVES-OF-REFUGEES-FROM-UKRAINE.pdf">accelerated</a> since the war began. This leaves predominantly the poor to do the fighting while seeing their living standards further decline.</p>
<p>Forced mobilisation, the reduction of the rights and freedoms of the population, further economic disruption and social hardship contrast sharply with what is widely perceived as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-government-30e547e614babcacff2e68cecd62b551">corruption-fuelled lifestyle</a> of an entrenched and unaccountable elite. Zelensky himself may not (yet) be directly associated with this – and his relative lack of success in rooting out corruption has yet to significantly harm his own popularity. </p>
<p>But several people in his inner circle have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/graft-accusations-dog-top-zelenskiy-aides-2023-09-19/">associated</a> with corrupt practices. If nothing else, more fractious domestic politics, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3ce63abc-9a71-427b-8e11-ab5309288845">including</a> between military and political elites, will undermine Ukraine’s resilience and combat effectiveness from the inside, further playing into Russian hands. </p>
<p>Thus, Ukraine needs a new social contract between elites and society as much as it needs a re-assessment of its military strategy. Yet, neither are likely. Zelensky and his foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-no-plan-b-unblocking-us-funding-2024-01-04/">insist</a> that there is a path to victory and that they “do not have a plan B”. This uncompromising position is reflected in the current mobilisation plans. </p>
<p>More men, however, do not constitute a strategy. At best, they can be part of a strategy. To justify the undoubted sacrifice that Zelensky is asking of Ukrainian society, he needs to articulate a clearer purpose and direction. Simply reiterating the desirable – Ukraine’s complete liberation – will sooner or later come to be seen in Ukraine and in western partner capitals as a fantasy dangerously detached from realities on the ground.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220433/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Ukrainian president has called for another half a million troops this year and his government has introduced strict conscription laws in an attempt to deter draft-dodging.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2200052023-12-21T11:58:15Z2023-12-21T11:58:15ZUkraine war: Kyiv digs in for the long haul with prospects looking bleak for 2024<p>Almost two years after Russia launched its <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/search?q=ukraine+invasion+2022">full-scale invasion of Ukraine</a>, there are no signs of a military victory for either side. Nor are there clear prospects of a ceasefire, let alone a negotiated settlement. Neither Kyiv nor Moscow are willing to compromise on their stated war aims – but neither has a clear path to achieving them. </p>
<p>All that Russia and Ukraine can muster for now are the resources to prevent the other side from winning, at the cost of more human suffering, in particular in Ukraine.</p>
<p>At the end of 2022, momentum appeared to be on Ukraine’s side. A successful counteroffensive had delivered significant territorial gains around Kharkiv in the north and forced Russia to withdraw from Kherson in the south. </p>
<p>Over the following months, Russia made a number of symbolic gains, capturing <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-bloody-battle-for-soledar-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future-of-the-conflict-197625">Soledar</a> in January 2023 and <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023">Bakhmut</a> in May. Both came at a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/aug/10/how-bakhmut-became-a-pivot-in-the-ukraine-war">huge cost</a> to Moscow, especially in terms of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html">human lives</a>. But they also demonstrated the Kremlin’s determination – and ability – to prevail. </p>
<p>A much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive began in June. But it took longer to get underway than had been planned and failed to replicate the successes of the previous year. As a result, Ukraine was able to make only small <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2023">territorial gains</a> by the end of the year – especially along the frontline in the Zaporizhia region in the south. </p>
<p>More successful, albeit less consequential for the overall war, were Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-reports-fresh-success-in-the-battle-of-the-black-sea/">successful efforts</a> to diminish Russian naval capabilities in the Black Sea and forcing the Black Sea fleet to redeploy from Crimea to bases on the Russian mainland. </p>
<p>Over the past few weeks, some of the most intensive fighting has been focused on Donbas, where Russia has made small territorial gains in its effort to consolidate control of the Luhansk region and capture all of the Donetsk region. Apart from its superiority in manpower, Russia also benefits from Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-troops-face-artillery-shortages-scale-back-some-operations-commander-2023-12-18/">shortages</a> of artillery munitions, something <a href="https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/setting_transatlantic_defence_up_for_success_0.pdf">likely</a> to continue into 2024. </p>
<p>This will not only put future Ukrainian offensives at risk but potentially also increase the likelihood of a new Russian offensive. For now, the Kremlin’s offensive operations <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1737401933919351290/photo/1">appear</a> localised and there is no expectation of major breakthrough. However, this could change as Russia ramps up its own war economy and receives more imports from allies such as North Korea. </p>
<p>It is not surprising that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">insisted</a> at his annual end-of-year press conference on December 14 that there will be no peace until Russia achieves its goals of “denazification, demilitarisation and a neutral status for Ukraine”.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-four-hour-qanda-is-a-valuable-insight-into-the-russian-presidents-version-of-reality-219985">Putin's four-hour Q&A is a valuable insight into the Russian president's version of reality</a>
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<p>This is hardly a basis for negotiations as Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JsYLnj0rhwU">made clear</a> in his own press conference. Insisting that his own ten-point peace formula was the only way forward to a just and stable peace, Zelensky, however, also admitted that he could see no clear end to the conflict. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/JsYLnj0rhwU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky: no end in sight to the conflict.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Both Zelensky’s foreign minister, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/path-victory-ukraine-dmytro-kuleba">Dmytro Kuleba</a>, and chief of staff, <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/ukraines-peace-formula-just-and-lasting-peace">Andriy Yermak</a>, have been more upbeat in recent public pronouncements about the likelihood of a Ukrainian victory. And recent opinion polls <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1332&page=2">confirm</a> that almost three-quarters of Ukrainians are unwilling to make any territorial concessions to Russia in exchange for peace. </p>
<p>Yet, the prospect of another year of mostly attritional warfare is particularly worrying for Kyiv as doubts over the sustainability of western military and financial support persist.</p>
<p>Western rhetorical support of Ukraine’s war aims – the complete restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity – appears in stark contrast with the continuing hesitation to provide Ukraine with the resources needed to win on the battlefield. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing Ukraine and the main areas of fighting and control." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/566867/original/file-20231220-23-eo1pgl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The state of the war in Ukraine as of December 19, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Not only has this <a href="https://time.com/6548816/ukraine-biden-administration-military-aid/">hampered</a> Ukraine’s efforts to liberate territories illegally occupied by Russia, it has likely also <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/west-s-inaction-over-ukraine-risks-dangerous-conclusions-in-moscow-pub-91290">emboldened</a> the Kremlin to refuse to engage in any meaningful negotiations. Unless there is a significant step-change in the quantity and quality of western military support for Ukraine, this is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2024-preview-the-west-must-decide-if-it-wants-ukraine-to-win/">unlikely to change</a>.</p>
<p>With the current deadlock in the US <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d35e1a68-9bcc-43d3-80a1-ff6aeeebff3d">congress</a> and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/52c67ea0-876c-43cf-9d9a-4bd84463d161">EU</a> over further funding for Ukraine, 2024 is unlikely to be the year in which Putin will be defeated in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Cause for optimism</h2>
<p>But another year of stalemate, costly though it will be, could also provide an opportunity for Ukraine. </p>
<p>Focusing on defence against further Russian attempts to occupy more Ukrainian territory will be a more realistic and more attainable campaign goal for Kyiv. It will create opportunities for an urgently needed rethink and refresh of military and political strategies for how to end the war. </p>
<p>This would also allow Ukraine to properly train and make the best strategic use of a possible 500,000 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-asks-additional-450000-500000-people-be-mobilised-zelenskiy-2023-12-19/">newly recruited</a> soldiers to beef up its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-front-line-troops-are-getting-older-physically-i-cant-handle-this-46d9b2c7">ageing and exhausted</a> frontline troops. </p>
<p>It will also give Kyiv’s European allies time to find a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/13ae7d1b-5d6c-4180-8e89-bccae8993276">way out</a> of the current impasse over funding for Ukraine. This would not only be an important lifeline for Ukraine’s economy but also a necessary contingency should US funding continue to be blocked in the run-up to, and possibly after, the 2024 election cycle. </p>
<p>At the same time, efforts in Ukraine to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/12/ukraine-corruption-issues-defense-industry/676337/">improve</a> its own defence production and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-says-israel-hamas-war-shows-west-must-ramp-up-arms-production/">joint ventures</a> with western defence companies could be important steps in creating a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1f9383b5-5cef-4e23-b7b1-c497727dc53c">military-industrial complex</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Cumulatively, these individual steps could allow Ukraine not only to deny Russia further territorial gains in 2024 but also change Moscow’s overall calculus about what its own endgame in the war will be. Like most other wars, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine will most likely also end at the negotiation table. Even if this does not happen in 2024, it does not mean that diplomatic efforts should be neglected. </p>
<p>While fighting may still be intense, yet inconclusive, in 2024, informal, unofficial, quiet diplomacy can explore the parameters of a future settlement that keeps Ukraine safe from future Russian aggression and deters the Kremlin from similar <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-russia-war-latest-putin-could-target-baltics-and-moldova-next-army-chief-warns-mouse-fever-outbreak-hits-hitting-russian-troops-12541713">adventures</a> in the Baltic states or Moldova. </p>
<p>To achieve this will require political and military leaders in Kyiv and in Ukraine’s western partner capitals to take a hard and honest look at what they really want, and can, achieve. If their aims remain victory in Ukraine and a renewed and stable European security order in the long term, they need to contemplate scaling down military objectives and scaling up diplomatic efforts in the short term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220005/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky admits there is no end in sight to the war with Russia.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188882023-12-11T15:50:07Z2023-12-11T15:50:07ZUkraine war: stakes are high for EU and Ukraine ahead of crucial European summit<p>When the EU’s heads of state and government come together in Brussels for their final European Council meeting of the year on December 14 and 15, their <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2023/12/14-15/">agenda</a> is likely to be dominated by the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>As you’d expect, the war has an agenda item of its own – but it is also central to discussions on enlargement, the budget and European defence. Decisions made at this meeting will have far-reaching implications – not only for Ukraine but also for the EU.</p>
<p>The EU has to balance its internal cohesion with its foreign and security policies, including preserving its appetite and capacity for further enlargement. This presents Brussels and member states with some important challenges.</p>
<p>First, Hungary’s prime minister, Victor Orbán, has been very <a href="https://twitter.com/PM_ViktorOrban/status/1731619765909647867">clear</a> that he does not support continued EU funding of Ukraine’s war effort. This is partly a gambit by Orbán to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/billions-frozen-funds-hungary-table-eu-seeks-ukraine-support-2023-10-03/">unlock</a> approximately €22 billion (£19 billion) of EU aid to Hungary <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/12/rule-of-law-conditionality-mechanism/">frozen</a> because of concerns over judicial independence, academic freedom and LGBTQ+ rights in Hungary. </p>
<p>Another issue concerns the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/08/ukraines-hungarians-in-spotlight-as-orban-threatens-to-block-eu-accession">situation</a> of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority, which Orbán claims has been neglected and discriminated against by Kyiv. </p>
<p>There <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6fabd355-c8ca-4ea6-b905-8a536f8d087b">appears</a> to be some progress on unfreezing EU aid to Hungary, with the European Commission approving an initial payout of about €900 million in November. And, in terms of minority rights, a bill addressing this issue was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-parliament-approves-minorities-bill-seen-key-eu-talks-2023-12-08/">signed into law</a> on December 8 as part of a tranche of legislation designed to ease Ukraine’s entry to the EU. </p>
<p>But given Orbán’s close <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-vladimir-putin-us-concerned-over-hungary-relationship-with-russia/">relationship</a> with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, it is not clear whether this will be enough to get Orbán to drop his veto.</p>
<p>Should the Hungarian premier persist, the EU’s next budget is also in peril. This would prevent the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6cd69168-aef4-4c8c-950c-62d7465fe5bb">unlocking</a> of €50 billion of <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3345">aid</a> for Ukraine and block a proposed <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/european-parliament-supports-increase-in-2024-defence-budgets/">increase</a> in the EU’s defence spending. </p>
<p>This will have to increase significantly in the years to come because developing European capabilities to deter future Russian aggression is essential for the EU’s security. </p>
<p>A potential second Trump presidency puts question marks on US commitments to Nato and there is a danger of further increasing tensions with China in the Pacific distracting the US from Euro-Atlantic defence. </p>
<h2>Where does this leave Ukraine?</h2>
<p>These and other challenges faced by the EU leave Ukraine in increasing peril. With US funding <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ca16e42d-fda9-4c1d-b2c9-410d764745b7">running out</a> by the end of the year and no clear path to its renewal, Kyiv depends more and more on its European partners. Equally <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/ukraine-support-tracker-new-aid-drops-to-lowest-level-since-january-2022/">worrying</a>, new aid commitments are now at their lowest level since January 2022. </p>
<p>The EU has <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Media/Images/News_Press_Releases/2023/mi2023-12-07_Cumulative-heavy-weapon-v02-EN.svg">overtaken</a> the US as the largest donor of committed military aid. However, this is not an indication of broad European support, but the result of the efforts of a small core of countries, including Germany and Scandinavia.</p>
<p>Military aid is essential to Ukraine’s survival, but it is not sufficient. If the EU does not approve its proposed €50 billion support for Kyiv, the country’s economic survival would be at risk because of the massive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/will-western-aid-plug-ukraines-gaping-budget-deficit-2024-2023-12-05/">budget deficit</a> that Ukraine keeps accumulating due to its war effort. </p>
<p>A failure by the EU to open accession negotiations would also exacerbate the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91182">blame game</a> at the top between Ukraine’s political and military leaders and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-ex-president-says-he-was-blocked-leaving-country-2023-12-01/">squabbling</a> between government and opposition over Kyiv’s war strategy.</p>
<h2>Is Kyiv fighting a losing battle?</h2>
<p>For now, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has doubled down on his efforts to defeat Russia militarily by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-change-needed-ukraines-mobilisation-system-2023-12-01/">announcing</a> more, and more effective, mobilisation of troops. But, in light of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">failed</a> counteroffensive this year, he has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67587331">conceded</a> that more needs to be done to increase defences across the entire almost 1,000km frontline with Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ukraine showing Russia's territorial demands and the territory it actually holds in Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564841/original/file-20231211-27-2x4006.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukraine’s largely unsuccessful counter-offensive in the summer may mean that Kyiv has to cede territory to Moscow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-increases-maximum-size-armed-forces-by-170000-servicemen-2023-12-01/">announcing</a> a further increase in its armed forces by 170,000 new recruits to over 1.3 million servicemen in total, there can be little doubt that the <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4350776-ukraine-stalemate-shifts-war-putin-russia/">shift</a> on the battlefield in Russia’s favour is gaining momentum.</p>
<p>Even if the European Council meeting in Brussels later this week delivers the opening of accession negotiations and more financial aid, further territorial losses, such as around <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/whats-stake-russias-assault-avdiivka-2023-12-01/">Avdiivka</a>, and another Russian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/12/zelenskiy-warns-ukrainians-to-prepare-for-russian-attacks-on-infrastructure">campaign</a> against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure over the winter would prove difficult for Kyiv and raise more questions about the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2447a4b4-bbff-4439-a96c-e3c5404ed105">sustainability</a> of western support.</p>
<p>This leaves Ukraine and the EU with difficult choices to make. The accession process will be long, costly and protracted. Major <a href="https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748917366-06/supporting-recovery-reintegration-and-accession-opportunities-and-challenges-for-the-osce-in-ukraine?page=1">challenges</a> lie ahead in terms of the necessary reforms Kyiv needs to carry out, the financial burden that the country’s post-war recovery will involve and the difficulties that Ukraine will face when it comes to reintegrating liberated territories and populations. </p>
<p>Depending on when and how the war will end, there are four scenarios that Kyiv and Brussels can contemplate. </p>
<p>If the war ends soon and with a ceasefire that freezes the current frontline, a German scenario of prolonged division but eventual reunification is conceivable that would integrate at least part of Ukraine early into the EU, probably with credible security guarantees against further Russian aggression. </p>
<p>Along similar lines, a Cyprus scenario could unfold where the EU membership issue is fudged at the time of accession. In both cases, the government-controlled part of Ukraine could see further democratic consolidation and economic recovery.</p>
<p>Two alternatives are possible to think of if the war ends soon and with the restoration of all or part of currently Russian-occupied territories to Ukrainian sovereignty. </p>
<p>A Croatia-style scenario would imply a military defeat of Russia and reintegration of the country as a result. Given the current realities on the battlefield, this is highly unlikely. A Bosnia-style negotiated settlement leading to a dysfunctional state and no reintegration, by contrast, may be more likely, but is undesirable because it would all but rule out EU accession. </p>
<p>The challenge for EU leaders at their year-end summit will be above all to find a way forward that enables Ukraine to survive militarily and economically what will be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-are-both-sides-preparing-for-stalemate-217848">challenging</a> winter and year ahead. This could then open a pathway to both a negotiated settlement with Russia and EU membership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the prospect of a second Trump presidency halting military aid for Ukraine, it is vital for Kyiv that the EU finds a way to unlock more funding.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178482023-11-22T11:49:34Z2023-11-22T11:49:34ZUkraine war: are both sides preparing for stalemate?<p>US president Joe Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/18/joe-biden-gaza-hamas-putin/">took</a> to the pages of the Washington Post last week to assure the American people that continuing economic and military support to Ukraine is an investment in US security. On October 20, the US defence secretary, Lloyd Austin, visited Kyiv to give the Ukrainian leadership a similar assurance together with the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-secretary-defense-austin-us-will-stand-with-ukraine-2023-11-20/">promise of</a> an additional US$100 million (£80 million) in <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3594318/biden-administration-announces-new-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">military aid</a>. </p>
<p>A day later, his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3789791-german-defense-minister-announces-eur-13b-military-aid-package-for-ukraine.html">announced</a> a new €1.3 billion (£1.1 billion) support package, focused on defensive equipment including four more IRIS-T SLM air defence systems and anti-tank mines. </p>
<p>This is an indication of a growing realisation that western emphasis is shifting to sustaining Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression – contrary to the <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/10/f8cbb26f1c68-no-cease-fire-until-russia-returns-ukrainian-territory-security-head.html">insistence</a> by Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest political allies that victory on the battlefield is not just possible but probable. This view is now even contested in Kyiv. </p>
<p>In an interview with <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia">The Economist</a>, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, said: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.” The US defence secretary echoed this view in Kyiv, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3594984/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-holds-a-press-gaggle-kyiv-ukraine/">emphasising</a> that Ukraine needs to “make the right adjustments” to its strategy. </p>
<p>Similar doubts have been voiced in western capitals for months. In July 2023, the then chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66075786">warned that</a> that Ukraine’s counteroffensive, then in its fourth week, would be “very long” and “very, very bloody”. </p>
<p>Less than two weeks later, a Nato <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm">communique</a> after its summit in Vilnius [failed to provide] more than the vague promise of future membership. The next day, the G7 leaders’ joint declaration of support for Ukraine <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100527905.pdf">noted that</a> G7 members were launching negotiations on “bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements” to support Ukraine.</p>
<p>There are further sobering signs of a significant reset of western strategy on Ukraine. An article in <a href="https://time.com/6329188/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-interview/">Time magazine</a> painted a bleak picture of deliberations in Zelensky’s inner circle over how difficult the war will be to win. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, an <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">NBC</a> story revealed mounting western pressure on Ukraine to consider a peace deal with Russia that would involve at least some territorial concessions.</p>
<h2>No appetite for endless conflict</h2>
<p>The underlying premise of this reset in western attitudes is that the outcome of this war will ultimately not be decided for a long time. </p>
<p>Bilateral security guarantees – especially from the US, UK, Germany and France – would go some way in assuring Ukraine that the west would continue to have its back while kicking the thorny issue of Nato membership into the long grass. </p>
<p>The west could also remain rhetorically committed to Zelensky’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/">peace formula</a>. And support for EU membership – likely to be a long and slow process – could also continue and assist Ukraine with both reforms and recovery. Such an approach would anchor Ukraine more clearly in the west in ways that might be less unacceptable to Russia than Nato membership.</p>
<h2>Stalemate reached?</h2>
<p>All of this, however, is predicated on the assumption of a stalemate on the ground, which Moscow and Kyiv would need to accept. It also assumes that neither side can see a clear opportunity to either escalate militarily to victory or do enough to have the advantage should the two sides end up at the negotiation table. </p>
<p>Both sides would also need to have grounds to believe that they have the political will and material resources to at least sustain the status quo. They must also be able to credibly signal this to the other side. </p>
<p>For Ukraine, the recent G7 statement, Biden’s article in the Washington Post, and Austin’s comments in Kyiv all contribute to this message without contradicting Zelensky’s stance of no surrender, which still has clear <a href="https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1301&page=3">majority support</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine 20 months ago. It has been a year since any significant movements on the battlefield. No major third-party peace initiatives are on the horizon that could change the calculations of the belligerents. Taken together, a status quo is emerging on the ground.</p>
<p>For this to become a preference for both Moscow and Kyiv over futile and costly attempts of escalation, several conditions need to be met. </p>
<p>For Ukraine, the kind of credible bilateral security guarantees embodied in the G7 Leaders’ joint declaration of support are required. For Russia, it would mean no Ukrainian Nato membership and no significant escalation of western support that could give Kyiv the technological edge it might need to defeat Moscow on the battlefield. </p>
<p>Making the current stalemate sustainable would imply thinking about the situation on the ground – not so much in terms of temporary stalemate to be overcome through military escalation, but more in terms of an acceptable, if imperfect, status quo that is worth preserving. </p>
<p>In practical terms, this would imply no significant fighting and no further mobilisations. As such, it would also likely have an immediate and tangible effect on the lives of people on both sides of the lines of contact.</p>
<p>Progress in this direction will not be linear, especially given upcoming presidential elections in Russia, the US, and – possibly – Ukraine. As the election campaigns get underway, there will be periods of escalation not only along the frontline but also in rhetoric. Neither side is likely to commit in public to a ceasefire. And neither side will disown their articulated maximum demands. </p>
<p>Yet, beyond this, there appears to be a realisation now on all sides that a stable status quo is in everybody’s interest. Moscow, Kyiv, and the west are likely to work towards such stabilisation, pursue humanitarian issues and possibly <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/redefining-success-ukraine">begin</a> negotiations on a ceasefire. </p>
<p>None of this is equivalent to the just and lasting peace that Ukraine and Ukrainians deserve. But it does embody the hope of ultimately achieving such a peace at the negotiation table and not on the battlefield.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After nearly two years of bloody battle, there are signs that both sides are nearing exhaustion and might be prepared, for now, to accept a stalemate and an end to the fighting.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169302023-11-06T13:01:44Z2023-11-06T13:01:44ZUkraine war: stalemate on the battlefield and shaky international support putting pressure on Zelensky<p>More than 20 months into the war in Ukraine and over five months into Ukraine’s latest counteroffensive, the situation on the front is bleak and no breakthrough imminent, the country’s commander-in-chief <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia">admitted in a recent interview</a> with the Economist. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-mixed-signals-among-kyivs-allies-hint-at-growing-conflict-fatigue-213913">doubts increasing</a> over the sustainability of western aid to Ukraine amid a shift of attention to the war in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b5e575fd-7bc2-4359-84d6-f2ed0196ffa9">continuing Russian air strikes</a> across Ukraine as far as the western city of <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/russian-strike-drones-hit-infrastructure-103100019.html">Lviv</a> do not bode well for the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/aea600e6-2c19-42ab-ad13-5c6507c00579">winter ahead</a>.</p>
<p>Little wonder then that there are apparently new efforts underway to push Ukraine towards <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628">negotiations with Russia</a>. This is unlikely to lead to actual talks between Moscow and Kyiv for now, but calls to end the war at the negotiation table will not go away. Both Kyiv and its western allies need a clearer vision of an endgame.</p>
<p>Domestically, Zelensky has no incentives to enter into negotiations with Russia at the moment. As he is apparently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-ponders-idea-2024-election-during-war-2023-11-03/">considering elections next spring</a>, the Ukrainian president will keep an eye on public opinion polls in Ukraine. </p>
<p>According to a survey <a href="https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1301&page=3">published in October 2023</a>, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are opposed to making any territorial concessions to Russia, even if this means a longer and costlier war. This is the case across all sections of the population. Even among Russian speakers, 65% said they rejected a compromise that involved trading Ukrainian territory for peace, as did people living close to the frontlines in the east (73%) and south (74%) of the country. </p>
<p>Challengers of Zelensky for the presidency, such as his <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/zelenskyy-s-former-advisor-arestovych-to-stand-in-future-elections-50365048.html">former adviser Oleksiy Arestovich</a>, right now stand little chance of advancing their prospects of defeating the incumbent president in elections if they push for negotiations.</p>
<p>However, this might change over the coming months. First, Ukrainians’ support for Zelensky’s course of no concessions to Russia is predicated on at least the maintenance of the status quo, which is far from certain. The Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraines-counteroffensive-has-struggled-so-far-2023-11-03/">counteroffensive</a> has made few gains over the past several months. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Russian onslaught on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67095103">Avdiivka</a> in eastern Ukraine has made steady progress. Russian forces are likely to capture the city – despite the enormous human cost of the operation – like they did <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023">Bakhmut</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-bloody-battle-for-soledar-and-what-it-tells-us-about-the-future-of-the-conflict-197625">Soledar</a> before. </p>
<p>On the political front, the absence of China from the recent <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23605">meeting in Malta</a> on Zelensky’s ten-point peace plan represents a significant blow to efforts to convene an international peace conference on Ukraine’s terms. Significantly, China participated in a similar gathering in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talks-in-jeddah-give-kyiv-an-opportunity-to-push-its-ten-point-plan-to-brics-and-the-global-south-211049">Jeddah</a> as recently as August. </p>
<h2>Doubts over international support</h2>
<p>Second, maintaining the status quo depends heavily on continuing western military, economic and political support. This cannot be taken for granted, especially in the US. In May 2022, the then Democrat-led House of Representatives <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/10/politics/house-vote-ukraine-aid-bill/index.html">passed</a> a US$40 billion (£32 billion) support bill with 368 votes to just 57 opposing. In September this year, a US$300 million bill was also <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4229414-house-overwhelmingly-approves-ukraine-aid/">approved</a>, but with more than twice the no votes (117). </p>
<p>Now, the Republican-majority House <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/us-house-to-vote-on-republicans-143-billion-israel-aid-bill/ar-AA1jhHos">has passed a bill</a> excluding aid for Ukraine, which is unlikely to succeed in the Democrat-led Senate and will probably be vetoed by the US president, Joe Biden. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/white-house-says-us-sending-smaller-military-packages-ukraine-due-congress-2023-11-03/">stalemate over aid to Ukraine</a> in the US is particularly problematic as the last US$425 million from the US$18 billion Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has now been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-send-additional-weapons-aid-ukraine-2023-11-03/">committed</a>. Given the contentious nature of US politics, aid to Ukraine will be a political football to be kicked around between the House, Senate and White House. As the US heads into an election year, this is likely to get worse, not better.</p>
<p>In Europe, the situation is only slightly better. The Italian prime minister, Georgia Meloni, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-ukraine-fatigue-prank-call-russia-war/">admitted</a> to widespread “Ukraine fatigue” in a prank call with two Russian comedians in which she thought she was speaking with officials with the African Union. </p>
<p>As EU leaders <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/positions-not-matching-yet-eu-leaders-fight-slice-budget-pie-2023-10-26/">debated their next four-year budget</a> at the end of October in Brussels, Hungary and Slovakia both opposed more aid for Ukraine. Meanwhile, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-von-der-leyen-visits-kyiv-ahead-report-accession-progress-2023-11-04/">expressed continuing support</a> for Ukraine. </p>
<p>This includes a proposal for the opening of accession talks on the country’s EU membership, likely to be agreed by EU leaders at a summit in December, subject to a favourable <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-eu-membership-bid-be-assessed-report-due-nov-8-2023-10-24/">assessment</a> by the commission. </p>
<p>While the EU can provide Zelensky with political support in the form of opening accession talks and keep Ukraine financially afloat, its €5bn (£4.3bn) military aid package <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/02/eu-foreign-ministers-convene-kyiv-ukraine-russia-war">pales in comparison</a> to US support hitherto.</p>
<h2>Uncertain outcome</h2>
<p>There is a third issue which illustrates the pressure on Zelensky. He may have <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/no-pressure-from-us-or-eu-for-concessions-to-russia-zelensky-says/ar-AA1jnGBx">swiftly denied</a> that he is under pressure to contemplate negotiations with Russia and one of his officials <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/presidential-office-on-zaluzhnyis-article-military-should-refrain-from-disclosing-front-line-situation/">reprimanded</a> Zaluzhny for his comments in the Economist. </p>
<p>But he has yet to demonstrate that his political and military strategy will achieve their aim of restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in full. </p>
<p>How long this window of opportunity will remain open for Zelensky, will significantly depend on the level of western support over the coming months. Even if western countries are disillusioned after 20 months of war, they must continue, and arguably increase, their support for Ukraine. </p>
<p>The likely alternative to this is no longer simply a stalemate on the ground. Withdrawing support brings with it the very real possibility of a Ukrainian defeat on the battlefield and a subsequent humiliation at the negotiation table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine needs some successes on the battlefield if it is to maintain international support.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139132023-09-25T16:21:33Z2023-09-25T16:21:33ZUkraine war: mixed signals among Kyiv’s allies hint at growing conflict fatigue<p>It is now almost 600 days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war that has followed has tested the resilience of both countries. But it has also tested those in the west that have supported Ukraine from the start. </p>
<p>This much was evident from the mixed reception Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, received last week when he visited the US and Canada. Meanwhile, tensions in Europe over support for Ukraine have flared up again. </p>
<p>With the Ukrainian counteroffensive still not living up to – the perhaps inflated – expectations, we are beginning to see the first serious signs of a fraying consensus in the west about how seriously different governments are committed to supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes.</p>
<p>Zelensky’s North American visit started with a <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/en/78/ukraine">speech at the UN general assembly</a> in New York in which he made a passionate appeal to fellow world leaders to uphold international law and order and support his country. While there remains widespread backing for the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, it gets fuzzier when it comes to how to end the war. </p>
<p>There are two camps: many western leaders following Ukraine’s line that the country’s territorial integrity needs to be restored first. Others – including a large number of countries in the global south – prefer to emphasise the importance of dialogue and an early cessation of violence.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky’s savages Russia at the United Nations.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This pattern was repeated the following morning at the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15416.doc.htm">UN security council’s open debate</a> on the war in Ukraine, with a predictable clash between Zelensky and the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who presented very different accounts of causes and dynamics of the war. But before the debate could conclude, the security council <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm">turned its attention</a> to the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, a clear indication that Ukraine is not the only urgent issue on the global agenda.</p>
<p>Zelensky continued to Washington DC where he <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3534283/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">secured another military aid package</a> worth US$325 million (£192 million). This aid can be allocated by US president Joe Biden directly under the so-called <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3509657/aim-9m-missiles-250-million-in-additional-security-assistance-headed-for-ukraine/">presidential drawdown authority</a>. </p>
<p>A further US$24 billion in aid, which is subject to congressional approval, is more problematic. The Republican House majority leader, Kevin McCarthy, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-09-21-23/h_799534c38ffd8d5f474b2cf1592bdb02">would not commit</a> to putting a bill to that effect on the legislative schedule before the end of the year. </p>
<p>McCarthy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/20/us/politics/mccarthy-zelensky-republicans.html">also denied</a> the Ukrainian president an opportunity to address a joint session of the House and the Senate, another sign of growing Republican resistance to the enthusiastic support offered to Ukraine by the Biden administration.</p>
<p>Moving up to Canada, Zelensky received a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/zelensky-gets-standing-ovation-as-he-calls-on-canada-to-stay-with-ukraine-moscow-must-lose/ar-AA1h8kwm">universally warm reception</a> and left with a <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-volodymyr-zelenskyy-canada-trudeau-visit/">military aid package</a> worth C$650 million (£394 million).</p>
<h2>Europe: growing division</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, in Europe, three of Kyiv’s neighbours inside the EU – Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/16/europe/ukraine-grain-imports-pland-slovakia-hungary-intl/index.html">defied</a> the end of an EU-wide ban on grain imports from Ukraine. Poland then went one step further and also put a – temporary – halt on any <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/20/europe/poland-ukraine-weapons-grain-intl-hnk/index.html">weapons deliveries</a> to Ukraine. This was decried by Zelensky <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/%5Bvariable%3Acurrent_session%5D/ua_en_rev.pdf">in his speech</a> before the UN general assembly as “political theatre” and a gift for Moscow. </p>
<p>The grain dispute between Poland and Ukraine has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/12/ukraine-poland-tensions-grain-war">simmering for some time</a>, and it was a question of when, not if, it would ultimately escalate. Importantly, it foreshadows other potential obstacles in Ukraine’s path to EU membership. </p>
<p>Some of these are potentially within Ukraine itself. As Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_4426">noted in her annual state-of-the-union</a> address at the European parliament, “accession [to the EU] is merit-based”, she acknowledged “the great strides Ukraine has already made”. </p>
<p>But accession negotiations will not be opened before a positive recommendation from the commission on Kyiv’s progress concerning seven conditions set in June 2022 when Ukraine was granted candidate status. This decision is <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/06/22/ukraine-has-fully-met-two-of-the-seven-conditions-needed-to-start-eu-accession-talks">expected</a> before the end of 2023.</p>
<p>Once accession talks start, the interests of individual EU member states will play a greater role in determining the speed at which Ukraine can progress. The current spat with Poland is but one indication of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8de02993-9713-4350-9bc5-9bd9e8e91b44">potential trouble ahead</a>, albeit in the particularly sensitive area of the EU’s common agricultural policy. This will be deeply affected if Ukraine – a global agricultural superpower – joins.</p>
<p>Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, clearly wants to be seen to be <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/poland-says-it-will-stop-arming-ukraine-how-did-we-get-here-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-war/ar-AA1h3bvR">protecting his country’s farmers</a> from uncompetitive practices by Ukrainian exporters, particularly in the run-up to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/morawiecki-ukraine-zelensky-insult-poland-intl-hnk/index.html">a parliamentary election</a> next month. </p>
<p>But this is also about leadership and the potential challenge that Ukrainian EU membership would pose to Poland’s ambitions to be the main voice of the bloc’s eastern members. </p>
<p>Such an open attack on Zelensky and his policies significantly shifts the dial in what is considered acceptable criticism of the highly charismatic Ukrainian president. It comes in the wake of growing western unease about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/22/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war.html">course</a> and <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/x67vE7NsM3NeQu7z-atlas-slideshow_v4-atlantic/fY83zKIZpbLi3ll5-choro-ukraine-aid-tracker-final-data">cost of the war</a>.</p>
<p>This is not to say that Ukraine has not made progress since its offensive began just before the summer. In recent days, Ukraine <a href="https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023">has made further gains</a> in the south and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66887524">launched a spectacular attack</a> on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet in occupied Crimea at the weekend.</p>
<p>But Ukraine’s recent successes are almost certainly not enough to dispel the growing sense that the war is becoming a lasting stalemate. Until now, western support has underwritten Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself. But it has done no more than that and is not sufficient to enable a Ukrainian victory. </p>
<p>If the events of last week are a sign that this support begins to weaken, the prevention of a Ukrainian defeat can no longer be taken as a given. Nor could it be argued that this was merely a defeat for Ukraine – it would also mean that the western alliance did not have the stamina to prevail in the current confrontation with Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. She is affiliated with the Regensburg University, Germany as a Philipp Schwartz research fellow</span></em></p>As the war nears 600 days, there are signs that support for Ukraine could be beginning to waver in some parts.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2128902023-09-11T15:42:20Z2023-09-11T15:42:20ZUkraine war: Russian-held elections seek to normalise illegal occupation and reveal reality of a long war ahead<p>Russia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-regional-vote-delivers-strong-result-putin-amid-claims-rigging-2023-09-10/">has recently held local elections</a>, including – for the first time since the invasion of Ukraine last February – counting votes in the four territories annexed to Russia after a series of illegal and illegitimate referendums last September. The outcome of these elections – that is, another “triumph” for the Putin regime – was never in doubt. </p>
<p>But the way in which they were conducted – with <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/08/vote-fraud-reported-as-russian-local-regional-elections-get-underway-a82399">hundreds of complaints and reports of irregularities</a> – is telling, both about the state of the illegal occupation and about Russia’s plans and expectations for the next stage of the war. </p>
<p>From a Russian perspective, the elections add supposed legitimacy to its claim that these four regions are now and forever Russian territory. But this claim rings hollow, even by Moscow’s standards. </p>
<p>Apart from anything else, Russia doesn’t even occupy significant portions of these regions. And, since their formal annexation in September 2022 – which is <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/10/05/russias-annexations-in-ukraine-are-a-legal-and-strategic-mess">not even recognised</a> by Russia’s closest allies, including China and Iran – Russia has lost further territory. </p>
<p>And, while it may be progressing only slowly, Ukraine’s counteroffensive has chipped away at both actual Russian control of territory and the sense that the annexed regions are beyond the reach of Ukraine’s armed forces.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing the conflict in Ukraine, Russian-held areas in red." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=847&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/547471/original/file-20230911-17-op4og6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1064&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The conflict in Ukraine according to the Institute for the Study of War, September 10 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The elections, as far as Moscow is concerned therefore, also serve the purpose of conveying a degree of normality. These four regions and their residents are seen to apparently participate in Russia’s political system. </p>
<p>This normalisation, in turn, is important to justify the so-called “special military operation” – as the Kremlin prefers to call its illegal invasion of Ukraine – as a worthy cause in the defence of Russia.</p>
<h2>Russification campaign</h2>
<p>Yet, these are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-elections-ukraine-vladimir-putin-are-a-charade/">not normal elections</a> even by the warped standards that generally prevail in Russia in this regard. </p>
<p>Russia’s efforts to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/03/russia-forcing-ukrainian-passports-us-report">passportise</a>” the occupied territories and confer Russian citizenship on their occupants have made only modest progress. So the Kremlin issued a special decree allowing residents with Ukrainian citizenship but registration in the occupied territories to <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-sham-election-ukraine-occupied-territories-donestsk-luhansk-kremlin/">participate in the vote</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Russian pressure on these residents continues unabated. People are <a href="https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/items/e280a7eeb7bf4dc588ed50ee655b9858/data">leaned on</a> to “apply” for Russian citizenship and then presented by Moscow as its “new citizens” – accepting, and indeed enthusiastically embracing, the new and welcome reality of their acquisition by Russia. </p>
<p>Allowing non-citizens to vote and converting them to citizens does not, of course, legalise or legitimise the Russian occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory. But it normalises it in the eyes of ordinary Russians living in Russia itself. </p>
<p>The likelihood is that it will, over time, have a similar effect in the occupied territories – especially in those areas that Russia captured back in 2014 and that have been under Russian control now for nine years now. </p>
<p>With elections in these areas now, for the first time, conducted according to the Russian legal system, their predictable results will also extend the Kremlin’s control of the occupied territories. </p>
<p>In the proper Soviet style of elections, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-sham-election-ukraine-occupied-territories-donestsk-luhansk-kremlin/">all candidates were pre-approved by the government</a>, so there is no political competition and hence no real choice for voters. Meanwhile no free media or civil society group has been able to monitor the election campaign or vote counting. </p>
<p>As a result, Moscow can rest assured that a slew of Kremlin loyalists will prevail in the elections and do its future bidding in administering these occupied territories. This seeks to convey a sense of local participation without the risk of any real dissent. </p>
<h2>Slow road to liberation</h2>
<p>These elections are unlikely to change the attitude of the Ukrainian government and its western partners in terms of their declared goal. That is, liberating all Russian-occupied territories and restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in its internationally recognised boundaries at the time of independence in 1991. This, however, is unlikely to be achieved any time soon.</p>
<p>Even the most optimistic assessments about the success of the current counteroffensive now estimate that Ukrainian forces are still some months away from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/05/ukraine-slow-progress-piles-pressure-on-west-to-keep-up-supply-of-weapons">reaching the Azov Sea</a> by 2024. This is a central part of their strategy to disrupt Russia’s land bridge to Crimea. </p>
<p>It’s a key condition for liberating the peninsula and also for breaking Russia’s grip on the Donbas region. In light of the effective defence that Russia has mounted of its illegally annexed territories and the insufficient military resources that Ukraine has, at present, to overcome well entrenched Russian defence lines, neither of these two goals will be easy or quick to achieve. </p>
<p>At the same time, Kyiv is taking a tougher line on its citizens still living in the occupied territories. Iryna Vereschuk, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for the temporarily occupied territories, recently <a href="https://us.firenews.video/war-in-ukraine-news/the-cabinet-of-ministers-may-stop-some-payments-to-ukrainians-under-occupation-there-will-be-an-audit-vereshchuk-ukrainian-news-politics/">announced a review of social payments</a> for Ukrainians living in those territories with a view to stopping some of them. This includes pensions.</p>
<p>These steps are similar to measures taken after 2014 with respect to the self-declared so-called people’s republics of <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/thousands-eastern-ukraine-lose-access-pensions">Donetsk and Luhansk</a>. It’s a logical and understandable thing to do from the perspective of Ukraine’s government. </p>
<p>Yet for Ukrainians holding on to their citizenship in what is one of the few acts of defiance left to them, it also means payments from Russia – which are impossible to receive without Russian citizenship – is now the only way to survive.</p>
<p>So, in different ways, Moscow and Kyiv appear to be settling into the reality of a war that will continue for some time. Both sides are also settling into a normality of occupation, the human consequences of which will be more difficult to reverse the longer it goes on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union.</span></em></p>Elections to install pro-Moscow puppets in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine should not be taken seriously. Here’s why.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086722023-06-28T14:23:08Z2023-06-28T14:23:08ZPutin dilemahkan oleh Wagner – tetapi Ukraina juga melewatkan kesempatan ini<p>Sekali berkedip dan hilanglah satu kesempatan. Dalam waktu 36 jam, tantangan yang diajukan terhadap Kremlin oleh Yevgeny Prigozhin, pemimpin perusahaan militer swasta bayaran Grup Wagner, telah berakhir. </p>
<p>Pada Jumat, 23 Juni 2023, Prigozhin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-mercenary-boss-says-moscows-war-ukraine-based-lies-2023-06-23/">memerintahkan</a> 25.000 pasukannya melakukan “pawai untuk keadilan”, yang berangkat untuk menghadapi Presiden Rusia Vladimir Putin di Moskow. Sore berikutnya, dia <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66006860">membatalkannya</a>.</p>
<p>Pada saat itu, pasukannya telah sampai di sepanjang jalan raya M4, lebih dari setengah jalan antara Moskow dan markas selatan militer Rusia di Rostov-on-Don. Pasukan swasta itu berada <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/wagner-head-suggests-his-mercenaries-headed-moscow-take-army-leadership-2023-06-24/">dalam jarak 200 km</a> (125 mil) dari ibu kota Rusia.</p>
<p>Krisis tersebut tampaknya dapat dihindari berkat kesepakatan yang <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-says-russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-has-agreed-de-escalate-situation-2023-06-24/">di tengahi</a> oleh Presiden Belarusia, Alexander Lukashenko, dan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-move-belarus-under-wagner-deal-kremlin-says-2023-06-24/">dikonfirmasi</a> oleh Kremlin. Meski demikian, situasi kekacauan yang singkat ini akan berdampak lama bagi Rusia dan perang di Ukraina.</p>
<p>Konflik antara Prigozhin dan petinggi militer Rusia telah berlangsung selama beberapa waktu. Tensi <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-yevgeny-prigozhin-and-the-warrior-constituency-that-could-threaten-putin-from-the-right-206875">meningkat</a> saat pertempuran Bakhmut semakin intensif – Prigozhin menyatakan bahwa lebih dari <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/25/wagner-chief-says-20000-of-its-troops-killed-in-bakhmut-battle#:%7E:text=Some%2020%2C000%20troops%20from%20Russia's,Ukraine%2C%20its%20founder%20has%20said.">20.000 anak buahnya</a> telah terbunuh.</p>
<p>Pada Mei, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/24/yevgeniy-prigozhin-war-backfired-revolution/">Prigozhin memperingatkan</a> tentang revolusi Rusia lainnya. Dia berusaha memenuhi janji ini 4 minggu kemudian. Namun, pemberontakan kali ini sangat jauh berbeda dari pemberontakan massa Revolusi Oktober 1917. Sebaliknya, konflik ini pada akhirnya memperlihatkan kuatnya pertikaian antara 2 kubu: militer Rusia dan sektor industri.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-yevgeny-prigozhin-and-the-warrior-constituency-that-could-threaten-putin-from-the-right-206875">Ukraine war: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the 'warrior constituency' that could threaten Putin from the right</a>
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<p>Namun, jika ditarik garis lurus, perang asing adalah bagian dari latar belakang terjadinya Revolusi Bolshevik dan upaya perebutan kekuasaan Prigozhin. Dan kemudian, seperti sekarang, sang penantang menghadapi rezim yang semakin rapuh yang tergambar oleh masalah struktural yang dalam dan ketidakpastian layaknya yang ditimbulkan oleh perang manapun.</p>
<p>Dugaan pemicu pemberontakan Prigozhin adalah <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66005256">serangan udara</a> di kampnya - yang berlokasi di garis depan perbatasan Ukraina - oleh pasukan militer Rusia. Serangan udara itu sendiri, jika memang terjadi, merupakan indikasi bahwa Kremlin sadar akan sesuatu yang sedang terjadi.</p>
<p>Faktanya, kecepatan dan ketepatan Prigozhin dalam memindahkan pasukannya dengan jauh dan ke lokasi strategis – termasuk <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/24/wagner-chief-claims-to-have-seized-military-sites-in-rostov-as-moscow-implements-anti-terror-measures">Rostov-on-Don</a> – menunjukkan bahwa ini adalah operasi yang sudah dipersiapkan dengan baik.</p>
<p>Operasi ini mungkin gagal, tetapi akan menjadi pelajaran untuk setiap penantang Kremlin pada masa depan. Seperti yang dikatakan Lenin secara ringkas dalam bukunya tahun 1920 “<a href="https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/C29-Left-Wing-Communism-1st-Printing.pdf">Komunisme Sayap Kiri, Gangguan Kekanak-kanakan</a>”, bahwa tanpa “gladi resik” tahun 1905, kemenangan Revolusi Oktober tahun 1917 “tidak mungkin terjadi”. Hal itu seharusnya sangat mengkhawatirkan bagi Putin dan lingkaran dalamnya.</p>
<h2>Rusia – terkuaknya rezim yang rapuh</h2>
<p>Terlebih lagi, Putin memiliki masalah lain untuk dipertimbangkan dan diurus. Pidatonya pada Sabtu pagi sangat agresif; ia <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/23/europe/russia-mod-wagner-yevgeny-prigozhin-intl/index.html">bersumpah</a> untuk menghancurkan apa yang ia sebut sebagai “pemberontakan bersenjata”.</p>
<p>Dalam 12 jam, Putin telah membuat kesepakatan yang, untuk saat ini, tidak akan membuat Prigozhin atau tentara bayarannya dapat dihukum. Apalagi Putin mendukung Menteri Pertahanan, Sergey Shoigu, dan Kepala Staf Umum, Valery Gerasimov, selama persaingan mereka dengan Prigozhin.</p>
<p>Saat ini, ada <a href="https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/1958">indikasi</a> bahwa keduanya mungkin diganti. Shoigu akan digantikan oleh <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksey_Dyumin">Aleksey Dyumin</a>, yang pernah menjadi pemimpin operasi yang menghasilkan aneksasi Krimea oleh Rusia pada 2014 dan saat ini menjabat sebagai gubernur regional Tula. Gerasimov diduga akan digantikan oleh <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergey_Surovikin">Sergey Surovikin</a>, salah satu wakilnya saat ini, yang sempat bertanggung jawab atas perang di Ukraina selama musim gugur dan musim dingin 2002-2023. </p>
<p>Ini semua tidak mencerminkan citra pemimpin yang kuat, baik di dalam maupun di luar negeri. Selain itu, fakta bahwa Putin harus membuat kesepakatan sejak awal dan bahwa tentara bayaran Prigozhin bisa maju begitu dekat ke Moskow tanpa menghadapi perlawanan apa pun di lapangan adalah hal yang signifikan. </p>
<p>Ini mengindikasikan keterbatasan kapasitas Rusia untuk menanggapi krisis dan mengerahkan sumber daya militer dan keamanan di luar perang di Ukraina.</p>
<p>Kurangnya perlawanan terhadap Prigozhin dan <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/crowds-cheer-wagner-rostov-on-don-prigozhin-russia-uprising-2434832">dukungan publik</a> yang tampak jelas diterima Wagner di Rostov-on-Don juga menunjukkan kurangnya antusiasme perang di Ukraina di antara elit regional dan orang-orang di luar gelembung Kremlin. Ini kemudian menimbulkan pertanyaan tentang bagaimana perasaan masyarakat biasa tentang perubahan rezim yang pilihannya adalah antara Putin dan Prigozhin.</p>
<p>Terungkapnya kelemahan ini juga seharusnya menimbulkan kekhawatiran bagi beberapa sekutu Rusia yang tersisa. Presiden Turki, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-urges-russias-putin-act-with-common-sense-2023-06-24/">menjadi salah satu</a> di antara para pemimpin asing pertama yang berbicara dengan Putin setelah pidatonya di televisi pada Sabtu pagi.</p>
<p>Kremlin juga <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-diplomat-flies-beijing-putin-faces-heat-home-2023-06-25/">mengirim</a> Wakil Menteri Luar Negeri Rusia, Andrey Rudenko, <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202306/t20230625_11103234.shtml">ke Beijing untuk berbicara</a> dengan Menteri Luar Negeri Cina, Qin Gang, untuk “bertukar pandangan tentang hubungan Cina-Rusia dan isu-isu internasional serta regional yang menjadi perhatian bersama”.</p>
<p>Turki dan Cina akan melihat gejolak di negara tetangga yang bersenjata nuklir ini dengan beberapa kekhawatiran. Dan kedua negara, juga <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turmoil-russia-reactions-foreign-governments-2023-06-24/">Kazakhstan</a>, dan negara tetangga Rusia lainnya di Asia Tengah, akan memiliki keraguan yang semakin dalam tentang seberapa andal Putin sebagai mitra mereka pada masa depan.</p>
<h2>Peluang yang terlewatkan bagi Ukraina</h2>
<p>Pemberontakan Wagner ini mungkin akan menjadi catatan untuk Ukraina dan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turmoil-russia-reactions-foreign-governments-2023-06-24/">sekutu Barat-nya</a>. Sebagian besar sekutu Kyiv umumnya membatasi diri mereka hanya pada pernyataan keprihatinan dan mencatat bahwa mereka memantau peristiwa yang sedang berlangsung. Presiden Ukraina, Volodymyr Zelensky, sementara itu, <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/18684">menyoroti kekacauan</a> di Rusia dan penghinaan yang ditujukan untuk Putin.</p>
<p>Penasihat senior Zelensky, Mykhailo Podolyak, menyatakan <a href="https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1672677573287878660">kekecewaannya</a> karena Prigozhin menyerah begitu cepat. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjvSq3lLEcQ">Oleksiy Danilov</a> (Sekretaris Jenderal Dewan Keamanan Nasional Ukraina) dan sejarawan Ukraina <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/06/23/7408050/">Georgiy Kasianov</a> melihat pemberontakan Prigozhin sebagai tanda akan terjadinya perpecahan di Rusia pada masa mendatang.</p>
<p>Ini mungkin menjadi poin utama dari perspektif Kyiv. Seandainya kekacauan di Rusia berlanjut cukup lama, maka akan tercipta peluang nyata untuk kemajuan lebih lanjut dalam serangan balasan yang, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65971790">diakui</a> sendiri oleh Zelensky minggu lalu, menunjukkan kemajuan yang lebih sedikit kurang cepat dari yang diperkirakan.</p>
<p>Dalam hal ini juga, pemberontakan Prigozhin yang gagal dapat dilihat sebagai “gladi resik” penting yang menawarkan pelajaran berharga, terutama bagi sekutu Barat Ukraina.</p>
<p>Militer Ukraina yang diperlengkapi persenjataan dan terlatih dengan lebih baik dapat memanfaatkan lebih banyak, bahkan dalam periode singkat, kekacauan di Rusia ini. Lebih banyak tank dan artileri, sistem pertahanan udara yang lebih banyak dan lebih baik, dan lebih banyak pesawat tempur tidak akan membantu salah satu penjahat perang Rusia - Putin dan Prigozhin - untuk mengalahkan yang lain.</p>
<p>Tapi mereka bisa membawa Kremlin lebih dekat ke titik menerima kegagalan perangnya melawan Ukraina.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff pernah menerima dana hibah dari Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programs 6 dan 7 dan Horizon 2020, serta Program Jean Monnet UE. Dia adalah Peneliti Senior di Pusat Kebijakan Luar Negeri di London dan Koordinator Jaringan Lembaga Pemikir OSCE serta Institusi Akademik.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko menerima dana dari Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Jerman.</span></em></p>Presiden Rusia telah “terluka parah” oleh pertunjukan pemberontakan terbuka ini. Masih harus dilihat apakah Ukraina dapat memanfaatkan kelemahan ini.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2084262023-06-25T17:28:05Z2023-06-25T17:28:05ZPutin seriously weakened by Wagner Group mutiny – but it was a missed opportunity for Ukraine too<p>Blink and you could have missed it. Within 36 hours, the challenge mounted against the Kremlin by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the mercenary private military company the Wagner Group, was over. On Friday June 23 2023, Prigozhin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-mercenary-boss-says-moscows-war-ukraine-based-lies-2023-06-23/">ordered</a> 25,000 of his troops on to a “march for justice”, which duly set out to confront the Russian president in Moscow. The following afternoon he <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66006860">called it off</a>.</p>
<p>At that point his troops had advanced along the M4 motorway more than halfway between Moscow and the Russian military’s southern headquarters at Rostov-on-Don. His private army was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/wagner-head-suggests-his-mercenaries-headed-moscow-take-army-leadership-2023-06-24/">within 200km</a> (125 miles) of the Russian capital. </p>
<p>The crisis was apparently averted thanks to a deal <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-says-russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-has-agreed-de-escalate-situation-2023-06-24/">brokered</a> by Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-move-belarus-under-wagner-deal-kremlin-says-2023-06-24/">confirmed</a> by the Kremlin. But this brief episode of turmoil will have lasting repercussions for Russia and for the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The conflict between Prigozhin and the top brass of the Russian military has been going on for some time. But it <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-yevgeny-prigozhin-and-the-warrior-constituency-that-could-threaten-putin-from-the-right-206875">escalated</a> as the battle over Bakhmut intensified, during which Prigozhin complained more than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/25/wagner-chief-says-20000-of-its-troops-killed-in-bakhmut-battle#:%7E:text=Some%2020%2C000%20troops%20from%20Russia's,Ukraine%2C%20its%20founder%20has%20said.">20,000 of his men</a> had been killed. </p>
<p>Back in May, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/24/yevgeniy-prigozhin-war-backfired-revolution/">Prigozhin warned</a> of another Russian revolution. He attempted to make good on this promise four weeks later. But this was a far cry from the mass uprising of the 1917 October revolution. Instead, it was ultimately a showdown between competing factions of the Russian military-industrial complex.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-yevgeny-prigozhin-and-the-warrior-constituency-that-could-threaten-putin-from-the-right-206875">Ukraine war: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the 'warrior constituency' that could threaten Putin from the right</a>
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<p>If there is a parallel, however, it is that foreign wars were part of the background against which both the Bolshevik revolution and Prigozhin’s attempted power play occurred. And then, as now, the challenger confronted an increasingly fragile regime plagued by deep structural problems and uncertainty that any war brings.</p>
<p>The alleged trigger for Prigozhin’s mutiny was an apparent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66005256">airstrike</a> on his camp at the front in Ukraine by Russian forces. The airstrike itself – if indeed it happened – is an indication that the Kremlin was aware that something was afoot. </p>
<p>But the speed and precision with which Prigozhin moved his troops over large distances and to strategic locations – including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/24/wagner-chief-claims-to-have-seized-military-sites-in-rostov-as-moscow-implements-anti-terror-measures">Rostov-on-Don</a> – indicates that this was a well-prepared operation. </p>
<p>It may have failed, but there will be lessons even in that for any future challenger to the Kremlin. As Lenin put it succinctly in his 1920 book <a href="https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/C29-Left-Wing-Communism-1st-Printing.pdf">Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder</a>, without the “dress rehearsal” of 1905, the victory of the October Revolution in 1917 “would have been impossible”. That should deeply worry Putin and his inner circle.</p>
<h2>Russia – a fragile regime exposed</h2>
<p>More immediately, Putin has other problems to consider and take care of. The Russian president’s speech on Saturday morning was fiercely combative, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/23/europe/russia-mod-wagner-yevgeny-prigozhin-intl/index.html">vowing</a> to crush what he called an “armed uprising”. </p>
<p>Within 12 hours, he had made a deal which, for now, will not see Prigozhin or any of his mercenaries punished. What’s more, Putin stood by his defence minister, Sergey Shoigu, and chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov, throughout their rivalry with Prigozhin.</p>
<p>But there are now <a href="https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/1958">indications</a> that both of them may be replaced. Shoigu by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksey_Dyumin">Aleksey Dyumin</a>, who led the operation that resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and currently serves a regional governor of Tula. And Gerasimov by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergey_Surovikin">Sergey Surovikin</a>, one of his current deputies, who was briefly in charge of the war in Ukraine during the autumn and winter of 2002-23. </p>
<p>This does not project an image of a strong leader either at home or abroad. Moreover, the fact that Putin had to cut a deal in the first place and after Prigozhin’s mercenaries advanced so close to Moscow without facing any resistance on the ground is significant. It says something about the limitations of Russia’s capacity to respond to the crisis and deploy military and security resources beyond the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>This lack of resistance to Prigozhin and the apparent <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/crowds-cheer-wagner-rostov-on-don-prigozhin-russia-uprising-2434832">popular support</a> Wagner received in Rostov-on-Don also speaks volumes about the lack of enthusiasm for the war in Ukraine among regional elites and people outside the Kremlin bubble. It also raises questions about how ordinary people might feel about a change in regime in which the choice is between Putin and Prigozhin. </p>
<p>The exposure of these weaknesses must also be worrying for Russia’s few remaining allies. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-urges-russias-putin-act-with-common-sense-2023-06-24/">was apparently</a> among the first foreign leaders to speak with Putin after his televised address on Saturday morning. </p>
<p>The Kremlin also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-diplomat-flies-beijing-putin-faces-heat-home-2023-06-25/">dispatched</a> Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Andrey Rudenko, <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202306/t20230625_11103234.shtml">to Beijing for talks</a> with China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang, to “exchange views … on China-Russia relations and international and regional issues of common concern”. </p>
<p>Turkey and China will have viewed the turmoil in their nuclear-armed neighbour with some concern. And both they, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turmoil-russia-reactions-foreign-governments-2023-06-24/">Kazakhstan</a>, and other Russian neighbours in central Asia, will have deepening reservations about how reliable a partner Putin can be going forward.</p>
<h2>An opportunity missed for Ukraine</h2>
<p>This will probably be noted by Ukraine and its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turmoil-russia-reactions-foreign-governments-2023-06-24/">western partners</a>. Most of Kyiv’s allies generally limited themselves to statements of concern and noted that they were monitoring events as they were unfolding. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/18684">highlighted the chaos</a> in Russia and the humiliation that this meant for Putin. </p>
<p>Zelensky’s senior advisor, Mykhailo Podolyak, expressed his <a href="https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1672677573287878660">disappointment</a> that Prigozhin had given up so quickly. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjvSq3lLEcQ">Oleksiy Danilov</a> (the general secretary of Ukraine’s national security council) and Ukrainian historian <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/06/23/7408050/">Georgiy Kasianov</a> both saw Prigozhin’s mutiny as another sign of the coming fragmentation of Russia.</p>
<p>And this is perhaps the main point from Kyiv’s perspective. Had the chaos in Russia continued long enough, it may have created a real opportunity for further advances in a counteroffensive that Zelensky himself had to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65971790">admit</a> last week is making less progress less fast than had been envisaged.</p>
<p>In this sense, too, Prigozhin’s failed rebellion can be seen as an important dress rehearsal that offers valuable lessons, especially for Ukraine’s western partners.</p>
<p>A better equipped and trained Ukrainian military could have capitalised significantly more on even this short period of disarray in Russia. More tanks and artillery, more and better air defence systems, and more fighter aircraft would not have helped either one of the Russian war criminals – Putin and Prigozhin – to defeat the other. </p>
<p>But they could have brought the Kremlin closer to the point of accepting the failure of its war against Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208426/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany</span></em></p>The Russian president has been severely wounded by this open show of defiance. It remains to be seen whether Ukraine can take advantage of this weakness.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2078752023-06-23T10:02:54Z2023-06-23T10:02:54ZBerlin blockade 75 years on: how Russian occupation tactics in Ukraine echo Soviet actions in East Germany<p>A <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/berlin-blockade">Soviet blockade</a> of the three western sectors of Berlin started on June 24 1948. At that point, the city, like the rest of Germany, was split into areas of Russian, British, US and French control as part of the post-second world war <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/tehran-yalta-and-potsdam-three-wartime-conferences-that-shaped-europe-and-the-world/">settlement</a> that was shaped in allied conferences in <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/tehran-conf">Tehran</a>, Yalta and <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/potsdam-conference">Potsdam</a>.</p>
<p>For a short period immediately after the end of the war in May 1945, <a href="https://www.berlin.de/berlin-im-ueberblick/en/history/berlin-after-1945/">cooperation</a> between the victorious powers administered the city and its residents jointly. But within a year, this initial cooperation was becoming ever more fractious.</p>
<p>By 1948, the rift between the Soviet Union and its one-time western allies had further <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2618926?seq=1">deepened</a> as a result of the merger of the British and American occupation zones into “Bizonia” – the nucleus of the future west German state. Following Soviet withdrawal from the <a href="https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2298">allied control council</a>, France, <a href="https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GermanEconomicMiracle.html">Britain and the US introduced</a> a new currency – the Deutschmark – in their sectors on June 24 1948. </p>
<p>The Soviets responded by introducing a separate currency of their own and by blocking all road, rail and canal access to Berlin, <a href="https://www.berlin.de/berlin-im-ueberblick/en/history/berlin-after-1945/">triggering the Berlin airlift</a> which supplied civilians and allied forces in the city with food, medicine and coal. </p>
<p>From June 26, the western allies landed flight after flight to sustain the city in the face of Soviet pressure. Realising the futility of their actions, the Soviets <a href="https://www.berlin.de/berlin-im-ueberblick/en/history/berlin-after-1945/">lifted the blockade</a> on May 12 1949 and gradually allowed the full restoration of all land and sea connections to the western sectors of Berlin.</p>
<p>None of this would have been possible without the <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0606598.pdf">massive effort</a> of the western allies to sustain the city. But the determination of the people of west Berlin, led by their social democratic mayor, Ernst Reuter, not to give in to Soviet blackmail was also vital.</p>
<p>Reuter’s <a href="https://connect.fes.de/trending/peoples-of-the-world-look-upon-this-city-ernst-reuter-1887-1953">speech</a> on September 9 1948 to a crowd of 300,000 Berliners had a message for the “peoples of America, England, France, Italy”. He called on them not to abandon Berlin, and this was critical in mobilising both the local and international support.</p>
<p>The years between the unconditional German surrender in May 1945 and the autumn of 1949 (the Russian-occupied zones officially became the German Democratic Republic on October 7 1949) were characterised by Soviet efforts to rapidly start building a new communist state.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/berlin-airlift-and-ukraine-war-the-importance-of-symbols-during-conflicts-207873">Berlin airlift and Ukraine war: the importance of symbols during conflicts</a>
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<p>This was part of a Soviet/Russian military culture that is <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/new-wild-fields-how-the-russian-war-leads-to-the-demodernization-of-ukraines-occupied-territories/9F3EDE8420FF5E2846E066B247F43FA9/share/74cb3947abf546a9d7cb0bc32759843783f5a607">characterised</a> by brutal violence against civilians and cutting off occupied territories as much as possible from the outside world. </p>
<p>The Berlin blockade and later the Berlin wall <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/georgias-responses-to-borderisation/">foreshadowed</a> similar events in the Russian-occupied territories of Georgia after the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/">Russian-Georgian war of 2008</a>. And in relation to today’s Ukraine, this Russian policy is once again on display. The Kremlin continues to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137472">deny</a> access for UN aid teams to Russian-controlled territories damaged by the huge <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-we-know-about-the-nova-kakhovka-dam-and-who-gains-from-its-destruction-207130">Kakhovka dam disaster</a>, which flooded a huge area forcing thousands of people to evacuate and inundating towns and villages.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">A report on the ‘referendums’ held in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Similar occupation tactics</h2>
<p>The Soviet military administration in Germany had overall control of the eastern occupation zone, as well as east Berlin. German communist party officials, who had fled to Moscow from Nazi persecution and survived Stalin’s purges in the 1930s, coordinated the restoration of local authorities, initially in cooperation with other opponents of the Nazi regime. </p>
<p>Other political parties were officially permitted, but they were quickly marginalised. Within a few years, the system was dominated by pro-Moscow local communists. </p>
<p>This political dominance was further entrenched by reorganisation of other key sectors. On July 1 1945, a local police force was established in east Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone. A year later, the (east) German administration of the interior was created to coordinate various security services including a committee for the protection of all nationalised property, which gradually evolved into the ministry for state security.</p>
<p>This was a similar <a href="https://theconversation.com/self-styled-peoples-governor-of-donetsk-tells-us-these-areas-have-always-been-russian-29708">tactic</a> to the occupied territories of Ukraine from 2014, where the Russians quickly installed local political puppets that are loyal to Moscow. In the summer of 2014, for example, experienced military and secret police operatives were <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Dynamics-of-Emerging-De-Facto-States-Eastern-Ukraine-in-the-Post-Soviet/Malyarenko-Wolff/p/book/9781032094076">sent</a> to Russian-controlled areas of Donbas with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28546157">task</a> of setting up security institutions. </p>
<p>Back in July 1945, a fundamental reform of the education system was launched in east Berlin and the rest of the Soviet zone. It was aimed at indoctrinating the young with Soviet propaganda – similar to the Kremlin’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/01/moscow-forcing-teachers-in-ukraine-to-sign-up-to-russian-curriculum">introduction</a> of the Russian school curriculum in the occupied territories of Ukraine in the summer of 2022. </p>
<p>In east Berlin and elsewhere in Soviet-occupied Germany, newspapers and <a href="https://www.lboro.ac.uk/subjects/communication-media/research/research-projects/screening-socialism/television-histories/tvinthegdr/">radio stations were either directly controlled</a> by local communists or their allies. While the nature of media and media consumption has obviously changed since the 1940s, the importance of controlling the media has not – and Moscow has been very effective in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61154066">taking over</a> local media in the occupied territories of Ukraine, and establishing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/09/technology/ukraine-internet-russia-censorship.html">internet censorship</a>.</p>
<p>As part of de-nazification efforts, “special camps” were established where supporters of the Nazi regime and opponents of Moscow’s Sovietisation policy were <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-postwar-soviet-special-camps/a-54759064">interned for years without trial</a>. Similarly, Russia and its local proxies set up “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-filtration-camps-osce/31825625.html">filtration camps</a>” soon after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – where Ukrainian civilians face <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61208404">abhorrent conditions</a>. Previous instances of wide-scale abuses – abductions, illegal detentions and torture of civilians – in the occupied territories of Donbas were <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_Report_15July2014.pdf">recorded</a> by the UN as early as July 2014.</p>
<h2>An unwinnable war for Russia</h2>
<p>There is a potential third parallel. No matter how hard today’s Russia might try to break the will of Ukraine and its allies, any occupation may not be permanent. It took almost half a century for the eastern part of Germany to be liberated from Soviet domination. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50013048">fall of the Berlin wall in 1989</a> ushered in changes that ultimately saw a reunited Germany. </p>
<p>Continuing western support for Ukraine’s counteroffensive is essential to ensure Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory does not become as entrenched as it did in East Germany. The lesson from the Berlin airlift must, hopefully, be that any Russian victory will ultimately be pyrrhic and temporary.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207875/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.</span></em></p>The Soviets controlled the media, set up camps for dissenters and installed politicians who would do their bidding in east Berlin and east Germany.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062062023-05-25T12:25:25Z2023-05-25T12:25:25ZUkraine war: Zelensky’s diplomatic tour has improved the ground for a fresh military offensive – but it needs to come soon<p>Ukraine’s offensive is in full swing – at least diplomatically. President Volodymyr Zelensky has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/zelenskys-european-tour-has-won-critical-support-for-ukraines-counter-offensive-205703">touring capitals and summits</a> over the past several weeks, trying to keep Ukraine on top of the international agenda while securing military, economic and political support for the war that was forced upon his country by Russia’s invasion in February last year.</p>
<p>Judging by the outcomes, Zelensky’s diplomacy has been relatively successful, offsetting recent setbacks that the Ukrainian military has suffered around the embattled city of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-claims-foothold-part-bakhmut-aims-encircle-city-2023-05-21/">Bakhmut</a>. Zelensky’s visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London between May 13 and 15 gained Ukraine critical military support from its European allies, boosting the country’s offensive and defensive military capabilities.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/zelenskys-european-tour-has-won-critical-support-for-ukraines-counter-offensive-205703">Zelensky's European tour has won critical support for Ukraine's counter-offensive</a>
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<p>On Friday May 19, Zelensky visited Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on his way to the G7 summit in Hiroshima. He was given a platform to address all the 22 member states of the Arab League and had an audience with the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. This allowed Zelensky to push his 10-point peace plan and urge condemnation of Russia’s invasion, while President Putin was reduced to <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/05/19/Putin-tells-Arab-Summit-Russia-willing-to-help-resolve-conflicts-in-the-region">sending a letter</a>, offering support for resolving the region’s conflicts in Libya, Sudan and Yemen. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Zelensky did not secure either a commitment to his peace plan or a clear stance against Russia. But the <a href="http://www.leagueofarabstates.net/ar/summits/Documents/Jeddah%20Declaration--En%20Version.pdf">Jeddah Declaration</a> adopted at the summit included an explicit reference to Arab leaders’ “respect for … the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states”. This was in clear contrast to the <a href="http://www.leagueofarabstates.net/ar/summits/Documents/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1.pdf">Algiers Declaration</a> of the previous summit in November 2022, which only noted the importance of “respect for sovereignty of states and the non-interference in their internal affairs”. </p>
<h2>Headlining in Hiroshima</h2>
<p>From Jeddah, Zelensky flew to Hiroshima, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3a6bba72-11f5-489d-8ce7-bde33c8f413a">timing his arrival</a> to address the gathering in the presence of the prime minister of India, Narendra Modi, and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. This gave him a rare opportunity to directly confront two key figures from the global south who have yet to to condemn Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>As was to be expected, both the <a href="https://www.g7hiroshima.go.jp/documents/pdf/Leaders_Communique_01_en.pdf">G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué</a> and a separate <a href="https://www.g7hiroshima.go.jp/documents/pdf/230519-01_g7_en.pdf">statement on Ukraine</a> included the usual strong condemnation of Russia and pledges of support for Ukraine. </p>
<p>This positive momentum was sustained at separate meetings on May 23 and 24 between Ukrainian and western defence officials from the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-us-austin-reznikov-talks/32425401.html">US</a> and <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/17444">UK</a>. Pledging continuing support to Ukraine, these meetings came ahead of the 12th gathering of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, scheduled online for May 25, which is likely to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-kherson-russia-bakhmut/32425272.html">focus on Ukrainian hopes</a> for the expedited delivery of F-16 fighter jets. </p>
<h2>Paving the way for a fresh offensive</h2>
<p>So, is this the diplomatic lull before the military storm? Clearly, Ukraine is gearing up for its long-expected offensive, at least rhetorically. Zelensky’s diplomatic offensive seems to have secured him further commitments of military support, but crucially also for Ukraine’s war aims of restoring the country’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>While western support has not been in doubt, subtle shifts in the global south are no less important. Being hosted in person at the Arab League summit and having an opportunity to speak directly with Indian prime minister Modi are important diplomatic wins for Zelensky. But they do not change the situation on the ground along the nearly 1000km-long frontline behind which Russia still occupies approximately one-sixth of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. This situation has not changed much in more than six months since Ukraine’s successful counter offensive at the end of last summer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-push-to-recover-kherson-in-the-south-is-on-will-it-succeed-189640">Ukraine war: the push to recover Kherson in the south is on – will it succeed?</a>
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<p>By that timeline, Kyiv has several more months to prepare another push. This creates more opportunities to beef up its military supplies, train troops and build broader international support for its peace plan. </p>
<p>While these are all positive factors, time is not necessarily on Ukraine’s side. As Kyiv builds up offensive capabilities on its side of the frontline, Moscow has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7582506b-1337-4570-abcc-31f5f602bde7">dug in deep</a> on the other side. This will make for very likely different dynamics in a future offensive, with Russia less likely to give up territory as easily as it did last autumn. </p>
<p>And, with significantly larger manpower resources than Ukraine, this might dim the prospects of large-scale success or even a game-changing breakthrough. </p>
<p>The other “danger” for Ukraine’s ambitions to free all of its territories from Russian occupation is that momentum will build up behind the <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">Chinese peace initiative</a>, which focuses on an unconditional ceasefire. This would favour Russia because it would freeze the territorial status quo on the ground and reduce the need – and prospects – for a properly negotiated settlement that would restore Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>A ceasefire, rather than a peace agreement, would also diminish Ukraine’s prospects for swift Nato accession. The alliance’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/stoltenberg-ukraine-join-nato-war-agenda/32426056.html">has ruled out</a> membership “in the midst of war”. </p>
<p>Momentum behind a Chinese mediation could increase with more support from the global south where countries have suffered significant consequences as a result of food and energy shortages and inflation. If Saudi Arabia were to throw its support behind Beijing’s efforts, and if the <a href="https://www.brics2023.gov.za/">Brics summit</a> in South Africa at the end of August leads to an unequivocal endorsement of Chinese peacemaking efforts, it would be difficult for Ukraine and its partners to resist calls for the opening of negotiations.</p>
<p>All of this indicates that the time for a Ukrainian counteroffensive may need to come sooner rather than later. The question that remains is whether this is also the time for its success. If it is not, what already seems like a forever war will head into another difficult winter.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206206/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.</span></em></p>The Ukrainian president’s latest diplomatic forays have been effective in boosting support for his country’s territorial integrity.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2046292023-04-28T10:59:10Z2023-04-28T10:59:10ZUkraine war: what China gains from acting as peacemaker<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523402/original/file-20230428-27-hmppm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Xi is positioning himself as the leader who could bring the Ukraine war to an end.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kaliva/Shutterstock </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After more than a year of no direct communication, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had a phone conversation on April 26 2023. According to the Chinese <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230426_11066785.html">record</a> of the call, “the two sides exchanged views on China-Ukraine relations and the Ukraine crisis”, but <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/27/china/china-ukraine-xi-jinping-zelensky-call-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">globally it was seen</a> as an attempt by Beijing to step in as peacemaker. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Zelensky <a href="https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1651184756623802368">tweeted</a> that he “had a long and meaningful phone call” with Xi, and later <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/6006">expanded</a> on his Telegram channel saying that particular attention was “paid to the ways of possible cooperation to establish a just and sustainable peace for Ukraine”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1651184756623802368"}"></div></p>
<p>The most concrete outcome of the call is <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/04/26/zelensky-says-held-meaningful-talks-with-china-s-xi_6024442_4.html">Xi’s confirmation</a> that China will appoint a special representative on Eurasian affairs to Ukraine “to have in-depth communication with all parties on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis”. If nothing else, this signals that China is getting serious with its mediation efforts and judges the time to be right for this, not least because of increasing tensions in the western alliance and doubts about the success of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-anger-over-chinas-ambiguity-on-ukraine-cannot-hide-growing-divisions-in-eu-over-support-for-kyiv-204213">Western anger over China’s ambiguity on Ukraine cannot hide growing divisions in EU over support for Kyiv</a>
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<p>China’s move is another indication of a changing international order that Beijing is keen, and increasingly able, to shape. What is immediately at stake for China is its relationship with the EU. For the EU’s member states, the war in Ukraine, including a possible further escalation, is of much more acute security concern than it is for China. European officials have repeatedly urged Beijing to use its influence over Moscow to “bring Russia to its senses”, as French president Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/macron-counting-on-china-to-bring-russia-to-its-senses/a-65243318">put</a> it on his recent visit to China. </p>
<p>Other senior EU officials, from European Commission president <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063">Ursula von der Leyen</a> to European Council president <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/19/speech-by-president-charles-michel-to-the-verkhovna-rada-in-kyiv/">Charles Michel</a> and the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/my-view-china-and-eu-china-relations_en">Josep Borrell</a> have similarly left no doubt that China’s stance on the war in Ukraine will shape the future of EU-China relations. Given how important the EU and China are for <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics">each other economically</a>, both sides have an interest in a stable and constructive relationship. </p>
<p>China-EU relations are, of course, part of a bigger picture of relations between China and the west. Yet even here, there are some signs of a possible opening. US treasury secretary Jane Yellen <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1425">acknowledged</a> that “negotiating the contours of engagement between great powers is difficult” but also noted that Beijing and Washington “can find a way forward if China is also willing to play its part”.</p>
<p>The Xi-Zelenskiy phone call fits into a careful and fragile choreography of moves that might gradually see a more effective management of the war in Ukraine that would, initially, prevent further escalation and eventually pave the way towards a settlement. While it would not resolve all of the contentious issues in China-west relations, it would remove one particularly problematic issue from the list of immediate concerns.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier returning fire in Bakhmut, Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523407/original/file-20230428-27-tivqr1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">President Xi is now appointing a special envoy to Ukraine as part of moves from China to push forward peace talks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Alamy</span></span>
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<p>At the same time, China <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/599644-three-reasons-why-the-china-russia-alliance-is-deepening/">needs</a> Russia as leverage in its great power competition with the west, and Xi is unlikely to abandon his partnership with Putin. But China also needs a Russia that is more controllable, and this means China needs an end to the war in Ukraine, which still has the potential to escalate further. By reigning in Russia over Ukraine, Xi can firmly establish China as an indispensable guarantor of sustainable security and stability in Europe.</p>
<h2>Risks for the west</h2>
<p>If the Chinese initiative is given the benefit of the doubt in Brussels and Washington and gains traction in Kyiv and Moscow, it gives Beijing a major opportunity to begin shaping a new <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Eurasia">Eurasian</a> security order. While the west may be able and willing to contain the Kremlin militarily and isolate Russia economically, Xi will have a major role to play in managing Putin politically. In other words, Beijing’s calculation may well be that for Europe to regain a measure of stability and security, China’s cooperation will be essential. This does not diminish the importance of the transatlantic security relationship embodied by Nato, but it would mean an acknowledgement of the fundamentally changed dynamics of the European order and the far more critical role of China within it.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-korea-us-presidents-to-meet-in-washington-amid-wary-glances-in-the-direction-of-pyongyang-beijing-and-moscow-204418">South Korea, US presidents to meet in Washington – amid wary glances in the direction of Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow</a>
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<p>Bringing about a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine may take some time and require more than just Beijing’s mediation. But even an end to the fighting in Ukraine in the form of a stable ceasefire could benefit China. Such an intermediate outcome would make it more likely, for example, that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russia-u-turns-on-grain-deal-after-putins-attempt-at-escalation-fails-193367">Black Sea deal</a>, which allows Ukraine to export its grain, would be extended again, easing the global food crisis. This would consolidate China’s influence and leadership in the developing world, further cementing its status as an important power broker in the new bipolar order sketched out in a 2019 white paper <a href="https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/28/WS5d8ec524a310cf3e3556e02d_1.html">China and the World in the New Era</a>.</p>
<h2>Building a new international order</h2>
<p>While China’s more open engagement in mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine could significantly advance Beijing’s vision of a new international order, it is not without risks for Xi. As Zelensky <a href="https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/6006">noted</a> in his call with Xi, the “territorial integrity of Ukraine must be restored within the 1991 borders”. Russia’s predictable reaction, <a href="https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1865668/?lang=en">delivered</a> by foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, was to accuse Ukraine of linking its willingness to negotiate “with ultimatums containing … unrealistic demands”. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the question for Beijing, which has consistently affirmed its support for the international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, becomes whether it can find a way to square the circle between Moscow’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-latest-un-vote-shows-world-wants-conflict-to-end-but-cant-agree-on-how-to-prevent-putin-going-nuclear-192219">internationally isolated</a> insistence that its illegal war and land grab in Ukraine be recognised and Kyiv’s rightful demand that its borders not be subject to change by force.</p>
<p>This is a fundamental question for European and global order, and since the <a href="https://www.osce.org/mc/58376">1975 Helsinki Final Act</a> the inviolability of borders was the foundational principle of European security. Whatever the fate of China’s mediation efforts in the war are, they will be a major test of the skill and leverage that Chinese diplomats have and they will be an indication of how China intends to play its future role in a re-imagined Eurasia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204629/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s approach to ending the Ukraine war will determine the future of the European security order.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1995692023-02-20T15:14:10Z2023-02-20T15:14:10ZUkraine: 12 months at war – Biden visit to Kyiv sets the seal on a year of growing western unity and Russian isolation<p>Ukraine undoubtedly remains on top of the global political agenda. Not only did it dominate discussions at the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/19/1158184942/4-takeaways-from-this-years-important-munich-security-conference">Munich security conference</a>, but the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/feb/20/russia-ukraine-war-live-updates-latest-news-foreign-ministers-eu-ammunition-deal#top-of-blog">surprise visit</a> of the US president, Joe Biden, to Kyiv sent an unmistakable message to Russia, and the rest of the world: the west stands with Ukraine and will not let Vladimir Putin get away with his violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>What’s more, Biden’s visit also underscores that the west has every confidence that the Russian president will not win this war and is finally coming round to the idea of providing Ukraine with what it needs to defeat Russia.</p>
<p>One year ago, things looked very different. After a prolonged military build-up, and amid heightening tensions between Russia and the west, Putin <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-what-the-west-needs-to-do-now-expert-view-177860">gave the order to invade</a> Ukraine in the early hours of February 24 2022. Three days earlier, he had <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-whats-really-behind-putins-deployment-of-peacekeeping-troops-experts-explain-177585">recognised</a> the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics that pro-Russian proxy forces had occupied for eight years, with significant military and economic backing from the Kremlin.</p>
<p>What Putin still insists on calling a “special military operation”, which he expected to be completed swiftly and successfully, has gone anything but to plan. One year on, the war has ground to a very costly political, economic and above all military stalemate for both sides with no end in sight.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our weekly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>This situation on the ground is mirrored by a divided international community, albeit one in which Russia has few significant allies left. Ultimately, the outcome of the war will be decided as much on the battlefield as it will be in capitals from Beijing to Brussels and Washington.</p>
<h2>Ebb and flow on the battlefield</h2>
<p>Initial Russian gains in the early days and weeks of the war were <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-victory-day-celebrations-cant-mask-how-badly-things-are-going-for-vladimir-putin-182609">unsustainable</a>, as Ukrainians put up a determined defence of their country and were supported early on by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/us/politics/us-ukraine-weapons.html">western military aid</a>. Russian attempts to take the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, had failed by April, and the Kremlin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-assesses-russia-completes-withdrawal-around-kyiv-us-defense-official-2022-04-06/">withdrew</a> its forces from there, redeploying them to Donbas and south-eastern Ukraine. </p>
<p>This enabled Russia to establish a secure land bridge to Crimea, eventually taking the southern port city of Mariupol after a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61035565">prolonged and bloody siege</a> by the middle of May and capturing all of Luhansk region by early July. As Ukraine <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/ukraine-russia-war-himars-weapons-donbas-b2132037.html">received</a> more advanced western artillery, Russian efforts to take all of Donetsk stalled. </p>
<p>Buoyed by more western <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/29/himars-patriot-russia-ukraine-biden-00075708">military support</a>, Ukraine launched a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-push-to-recover-kherson-in-the-south-is-on-will-it-succeed-189640">counter-offensive</a> in August, regaining significant territory along the entire front and prompting a Russian <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-kherson-is-ours-says-zelenskyy/a-63723431">retreat</a> from Kherson in November.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1627496280279642112"}"></div></p>
<p>This was the most significant tactical defeat Putin had suffered since the withdrawal of troops from Kyiv seven months earlier and came despite a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-calls-up-more-troops-and-threatens-nuclear-option-in-a-speech-which-ups-the-ante-but-shows-russias-weakness-191044">partial mobilisation</a> in Russia at the end of September and an <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fbd6dc6e-4a41-4bfa-977b-8c3ef4482dcc">air campaign</a> to cripple Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure. </p>
<h2>A united front in the west</h2>
<p>Ukrainians’ determination to defend their country against Russian aggression from the very start of the invasion was not the only surprise for Putin. The western reaction – unprecedented sanctions and massive military and economic support for Kyiv – must have been a similarly rude awakening, in particular as the western coalition has remained largely united despite the <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/gas-pipeline-nord-stream-shutdown-europe-russia-blackmail-lift-sanctions-2924831">challenges</a> it has faced. </p>
<p>Military support, of course, has been the most crucial. More than €40 billion (£33.25 billion) worth of military assistance was offered to Ukraine by mid-November 2022, <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/KJpesgWQv1CmxoMr-bar-stacked-horizontal-figure-5_scv">according</a> to the Ukraine Support Tracker by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. More than half of this support has been provided by the US, with the UK, EU institutions, and Germany being the next-largest contributors of arms, ammunition, equipment and training.</p>
<p>The EU, meanwhile, is on its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_23_907">tenth package of sanctions</a> against Russia now. It has also give <a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/international-economic-relations/candidate-and-neighbouring-countries/neighbouring-countries-eu/neighbourhood-countries/ukraine_en">unprecedented financial assistance</a> to Ukraine: €9 billion of macro-financial assistance were disbursed to Ukraine by early August 2022, a further €5 billion by mid-December, and the first €3 billion of a new €18 billion package were disbursed in January 2023. </p>
<p>While the <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41LxvWwKZex-bar-stacked-horizontal-figure-2_csv_final">bulk of the EU’s support</a> has been financial and humanitarian assistance, there is also a significant military assistance component of more than €3 billion. This includes more than €100 million for the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-military-assistance-mission-ukraine-eumam_en">European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine</a>, which will train some 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers over the next two years. </p>
<h2>A not-so-divided international community</h2>
<p>If the west has remained united in its response to the invasion, the rest of the world remains warily divided. But this hardly provides a ringing endorsement for Russia’s aggression. On the contrary, a closer look at voting patterns on the five resolutions in the UN general assembly to date shows that Russia remains relatively isolated with only the support of a handful of dubious allies including Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Nicaragua and Syria. </p>
<p>Three resolutions: on Russia’s aggression (on <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039?ln=en">March 2 2022</a>), on the invasion’s humanitarian consequences (on <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965954?ln=en">March 24</a>), and on Ukraine’s territorial integrity (on <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990400?ln=en">October 12</a>), saw only four countries <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting%20Data&p=&f=&rm=&ln=en&sf=&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting%20Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fct__2=General%20Assembly&fct__3=2022&fct__8=UKRAINE--POLITICAL%20CONDITIONS&fti=0">voting with Russia</a> against the resolution, while 140, 141, and 143 states, respectively, condemned Russia’s violation of key principles of international law.</p>
<p>In two other votes – on suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council (on <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3967778?ln=en">April 7</a>) and on future prosecutions of war crimes and reparations (on <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3994052?ln=en">November 13</a>) – support for Russia was somewhat higher with 24 and 14 votes, respectively, against the two resolutions. But more than six times as many countries <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Voting%20Data&p=&f=&rm=&ln=en&sf=&so=d&rg=50&c=Voting%20Data&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fct__2=General%20Assembly&fct__3=2022&fct__8=UKRAINE--POLITICAL%20CONDITIONS&fti=0">voted</a> in favour on both occasions.</p>
<p>Considering that no country has recognised the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-west-condemns-sham-referendums-in-russian-occupied-areas-191432">annexation</a> by Russia of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions, Moscow is clearly on its own when it comes to its illegal land grab in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Most crucially, while <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-chinas-lukewarm-support-for-russia-is-likely-to-benefit-kyiv-heres-why-191790">China</a> has repeatedly <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/could-china-be-a-partner-for-the-west-in-managing-the-ukraine-crisis/">indicated</a> sympathy for Russia’s decision to invade, it has remained steadfast in supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity to date. Beijing has also <a href="https://akorda.kz/en/president-kassym-jomart-tokayev-held-a-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-china-1484612">warned</a> Russia against meddling in others of its neighbours.</p>
<h2>Enabling Ukraine to win</h2>
<p>Backing Ukraine against Russia “for as long as it takes”, has been the key message from western capitals for a year now – as the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/davos-23-special-address-by-ursula-von-der-leyen-president-of-the-european-commission/">reiterated in her speech</a> at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 13 this year.</p>
<p>There can be no question that this is what the west intends to do. What is less clear, though, is whether this means just enough assistance aimed at preventing Putin from winning or providing Ukraine with the support it needs to defeat Russia. Until now, it seems, western strategy has been too focused on the former, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-12-months-at-war-why-kyivs-western-allies-must-rethink-the-limits-of-their-military-aid-200028">driven by anxieties about further escalation</a>. </p>
<p>This has come at a significant cost to Ukraine. At the front lines, Kyiv still lacks the artillery, ammunition and armoured vehicles to push back Russian forces more decisively again in a future offensive. And behind the front lines, the lack of advanced air defence capabilities has made the country vulnerable to the crippling Russian attacks against its infrastructure.</p>
<p>Western leaders should not become comfortable with a “forever war”. They must step up their support and enable Ukraine to defeat this Russian aggression and restore its full sovereignty and territorial integrity – two principles of international law that still enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of UN member states.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199569/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK. He is also a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.</span></em></p>The message is clear: this war must end in Ukraine and the west will do all it can to ensure this outcome.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1984502023-01-25T14:30:16Z2023-01-25T14:30:16ZUkraine war: why Zelensky’s corruption purge could be key to the outcome of the conflict<p>The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has announced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/24/zelenskiy-anti-corruption-drive-15-ukrainian-officials-exit">sweeping clear-out</a> of senior national and regional government officials and the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-naftogaz-supervisory-board-imf/32237528.html">appointment</a> of a new supervisory board for the state-owned natural gas giant, Naftogaz. This is a move to reassure both the Ukrainian public and the country’s western allies that the fight against corruption remains a priority, despite the ongoing war with Russia. </p>
<p>The <em>Verkhovna Rada</em>, Ukraine’s parliament – in which Zelenskiy’s Servant of the People party has a commanding majority – quickly followed the president’s lead by presenting a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-lawmakers-draw-up-defence-transparency-bill-after-graft-claims-2023-01-24/">draft bill</a> aiming to boost transparency in defence procurement to avoid, for example, artificially <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/defense-minister-reznikov-ukraine-corruption-probe-war-russia-zelenskyy/">inflated</a> prices being paid for troops’ rations. </p>
<p>The move has been likened in the international press to a <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/governors-government-officials-lose-jobs-in-biggest-reshuffle-since-start-of-full-scale-war">major reshuffle</a> at the top of Ukrainian politics. Among the senior national government officials to go were the deputy prosecutor general, the deputy ministers of community and territorial development, the deputy minister of social policy, and the deputy minister of defence. </p>
<p>In addition, the heads of four frontline regional administrations – Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson – were dismissed. Among them, the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region, Valentyn Reznichenko, had already been implicated in a scandal around the “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-investigation-road-reconstruction-fbi-dnipropetrovsk-public-funds/32205244.html">Great Reconstruction</a>” project, accused of giving US$41 million (£33 million) of funds earmarked for road reconstruction in his region – 65% of the total allocation – to a company co-owned by his girlfriend, Yana Khlanta. </p>
<p>Another key figure to lose his job is Oleksiy Symonenko, the deputy prosecutor general of Ukraine. Symonenko <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/24/zelenskiy-anti-corruption-drive-15-ukrainian-officials-exit">has been accused</a> of spending a holiday in Spain in late December, which was partially financed by prominent Ukrainian businessman. </p>
<p>Also dismissed was the leader of the Kyiv capital region, Oleksii Kuleba. However, Kuleba was immediately <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/422023-45657">appointed</a> by Zelensky as the deputy head of his presidential office. He replaces the most <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3657982-deputy-head-of-presidents-office-tymoshenko-writes-resignation-letter.html">visible figure to resign</a>, Kyryl Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko was mired in <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/01/24/7386360/">public scandals</a> last year, including about his personal use of a car donated by General Motors to Ukraine for humanitarian purposes.</p>
<p>This kind of personal abuse of power and position has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/15/how-problematic-is-corruption-in-ukraine">long been endemic</a> in Ukraine and didn’t suddenly end with the Russian invasion. But it has infuriated many ordinary Ukrainians. </p>
<p>And it clearly does not reflect well on a government publicly committed to rooting out corruption – not least at a time when official unemployment in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraine-economy-seen-shrinking-by-30-2022-first-deputy-prime-minister-2022-10-24/">reached 30%</a> and real incomes of the population <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/ukraines-wages-and-job-loss-trends-during-war">fell by 21%</a>. </p>
<p>Most people have made extraordinary sacrifices in defence of their country, enduring increasing hardship over the past 11 months. In stark contrast are the so-called “<a href="https://babel.ua/en/news/83172-monaco-battalion-the-sbi-is-investigating-the-departure-of-more-than-80-wealthy-ukrainians">Monaco battalion</a>”. These are present and former high-ranking officials and businessmen who used their position to leave the country with their families. Many of these elites took with then significant assets to finance their new luxury lives in resorts in France, Spain, Switzerland and Austria. </p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>Zelensky’s emphatic and swift response to the latest <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/media-defense-ministry-purchases-food-for-soldiers-at-inflated-prices">revelations</a> reflects his recognition that ordinary Ukrainians may become disaffected with their president. But up to now corruption scandals have not tainted Zelensky himself who continues to enjoy unprecedented levels of public trust – rising from 27% in December 2021 to <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/01/13/trust-in-ukraines-president-increased-three-fold-in-2022-army-still-most-trusted-institution-poll/">84% in December 2022</a> as reported by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). The armed forces were found in the same survey to have the highest trust of any institution in Ukraine at 96%, up from 72% in December 2021.</p>
<p>The “reshuffle” is less sweeping than it seems. As already noted here, many of the national government officials dismissed, for example, were deputy ministers. These are people regarded as more “technical figures” within a minister’s team. So the basic make-up of the current government is unlikely to change and neither will the balance of power in the Ukrainian government. Key figures such as the prime minister, Denys Shmyhal, and the defence minister, Oleksiy Reznikov, remain in place. </p>
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<img alt="Ukraine's prime minister Denys Shmygal speaks at a press conference." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/506375/original/file-20230125-18-uglgzm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ukraine’s prime minister, Denys Shmygal, remains in post.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KMU via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>There is no suggestion that either of them was involved in the current corruption scandals, but these episodes clearly happened under their watch – <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/national/nabu-opens-case-into-alleged-corruption-in-defense-ministry-procurement">defence procurement</a>, after all, is at the heart of current government business.</p>
<p>Sorting out corruption will remain a key factor in the war – how and when it ends, and what kind of Ukraine will emerge from it. Being able to demonstrate moves to ensure transparency and integrity will also be key for the country’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-chief-ukraine-needs-to-give-anti-corruption-reforms-teeth/a-62324723">progress towards EU membership</a>. The Ukrainian president is clearly aware of this – he <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/nam-potribna-micna-derzhava-i-ukrayina-bude-same-takoyu-zver-80597">devoted</a> much of his nightly address to the nation on January 24 to the issue.</p>
<p>This was a message clearly expected and received among key allies, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-lawmakers-praise-zelenskiy-fighting-corruption-back-continued-aid-2023-01-24/">Democratic and Republican US senators</a> who welcomed Zelenskiy’s purge and promised a continuation of Washington’s support for Kyiv’s war effort. </p>
<p>The subsequent <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-tanks-germany-us/32238622.html">announcement</a> that both Germany and the US would send the main battle tanks that Kyiv has been demanding for so long is clearly linked to the perception that Zelensky is redoubling his anti-corruption efforts. </p>
<p>This in turn signals not only a determination of Ukraine’s western partners to help Kyiv succeed in the war against Russia but also a commitment that a strong and democratic Ukraine emerges from it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK. He is also a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation</span></em></p>The Ukrainian president’s corruption purge will be important both for public morale and for reassuring his western allies.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1968882022-12-21T15:52:40Z2022-12-21T15:52:40ZUkraine war: Putin’s Belarus visit ends with talk of increased defence cooperation and nuclear sabre-rattling<p>Vladimir Putin’s recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/19/belarus-ukraine-war-putin-meets-lukashenko">visit to Minsk</a> has raised renewed fears that Belarus might be drawn into the war in Ukraine. Putin discussed closer military cooperation with his Belarusian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko, including the establishment of a “unified defence space” and the continuation of regular joint military exercises. </p>
<p>While Russia used Belarus as one of its launchpads for its invasion in February, so far no Belarusian troops have participated in the fighting in Ukraine. This is unlikely to change anytime soon, despite months of Russian-Belarusian military manoeuvres, the creation of joint military forces, and the delivery of advanced weapons systems from Russia to Belarus. </p>
<p>But Putin’s visit to Minsk highlights the continued implementation of the so-called “<a href="https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/an-ever-closer-union/2-historical-and-legal-context/">union state</a>” with an even <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70143">deeper economic integration</a> of the two countries. This will also support Russia’s war effort by supplying weapons, ammunition and other military equipment.</p>
<p>There is wide <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19">agreement</a> among western analysts that Belarus is unlikely to put troops into Ukraine. In any case, Belarusian forces are thought to be <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/regional/Does-Belarus-military-have-the-capacity-to-attack-Ukraine">too poorly trained, equipped and motivated</a> to pose a serious threat to Ukraine. </p>
<p>But at the same time, several months of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/flurry-military-activity-belarus-stirs-concern-ukraine-2022-12-07/">Russian-Belarusian war games</a> have been used to test, and to signal, Belarusian forces’ combat readiness. And during a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-belarus-defence-ministers-hold-talks-minsk-state-media-2022-12-03/">recent visit</a> by Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu to his Belarusian counterpart Viktor Khrenin, both sides agreed on the “joint provision of regional security” – although it remains unclear what exactly this implies.</p>
<p>At a minimum, what these various activities have achieved is a degree of uncertainty over the Kremlin’s intentions. This uncertainty, in turn, requires Ukraine to <a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/yak-novyi-nastup-rosii-z-bilorysi-mozhe-vdaryty-po-zsy/32182059.html">prepare</a> for the possibility of another invasion from Belarusian territory by keeping some of its forces and equipment deployed at the border.</p>
<p>This means that while Russia can use Belarus as a training ground for reservists and new recruits, Ukraine has to divert some of its forces away from the key battle lines in the south and east of the country. This reduces Kyiv’s potential offensive capacities and thereby relieves Russia from the pressure Ukraine has been able to put on its forces in Donbas and around Kherson over the past few months, and around Kharkiv before then. </p>
<p>Moreover, keeping forces <a href="https://www.volyn24.com/news/195690-ukrainski-vijskovi-provely-navchannia-na-kordoni-z-bilorussyu">deployed at the border with Belarus</a> also means reduced defensive capacities, especially in the fiercely contested areas of the Donbas. Given Russia’s longstanding war aim to “liberate” all of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the east, this creates potential advantages for Russia to stage another large-scale offensive later in the winter.</p>
<h2>Russia’s continuing nuclear threat</h2>
<p>Both the west and China have repeatedly emphasised that any nuclear escalation by Putin would be unacceptable – and Nato has threatened a clear and decisive response if it were to happen. While Russia has toned down its nuclear rhetoric over the past several weeks, Lukashenko <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70148">commented during his press conference</a> with Putin that Belarus has tested its nuclear-capable, Soviet-era war planes in Russia and is “now working with the Russians to train our crews to pilot planes carrying special warheads”. The fact that Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70148">appeared to confirm this</a> suggests the tactic of threatening a deployment of nuclear weapons is not off the table yet. </p>
<p>This does not increase the likelihood of an all-out nuclear confrontation between Russia and the west, but it does create yet more uncertainty. Putin might allow Belarus – or Russian forces masquerading as Belarusians – to use tactical nuclear weapons under some pretext and then deny any knowledge of, let alone responsibility for, such an act of barbarism. </p>
<p>The timing of this renewed nuclear sabre-rattling is ominous, as it comes at a point when the US is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fbd6dc6e-4a41-4bfa-977b-8c3ef4482dcc">expected</a> to announce its first delivery of the <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/projects/patriot/">Patriot missile long-range air defence system</a> to Kyiv. If supplied in sufficient quantities, these missiles would be a potential game changer in an air war that has seen Ukrainian critical infrastructure severely degraded by massive Russian missile and drone attacks.</p>
<h2>Bolstering Ukraine’s military capacity</h2>
<p>Strengthening Ukrainian air defences is a crucial task that the country’s western partners must not delay much longer. Without this, Russia is likely to continue its pounding of Ukraine’s infrastructure, particularly its power grid. This could trigger a severe humanitarian crisis far beyond the suffering that the Ukrainian people have already endured during almost ten months of war.</p>
<p>But strengthening Ukrainian defences alone will not be enough. Without equally improved offensive capacities, regaining territory will be immeasurably more difficult for Ukrainian forces either to credibly threaten or actually accomplish. And without even the credible threat of a successful offensive, Russia will dig in deeper in the currently occupied territories while rebuilding its own offensive capacity.</p>
<p>There is a third reason why Kyiv – and its western partners – would be best served by bolstering Ukraine’s military capacity. A well-trained and well-equipped Ukrainian military would be the best defence of Ukrainian democracy against future Russian aggression. It would also help Ukraine to become a net contributor to European security. </p>
<p>A strong and democratic Ukraine that is sustainably integrated in Nato and the EU would represent the ultimate defeat for Putin. It would also send a powerful signal to others in the post-Soviet space that standing up to Russia is worthwhile and possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK. He is also a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union.</span></em></p>Belarus is unlikely to put troops into Ukraine, but it can make life very difficult for Kyiv’s war planners.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917902022-10-04T13:14:25Z2022-10-04T13:14:25ZUkraine war: China’s lukewarm support for Russia is likely to benefit Kyiv – here’s why<p>Things are not going well for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. On September 30 he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/extracts-putins-speech-annexation-ceremony-2022-09-30/">announced</a> the annexation of four Ukrainian regions that are partially controlled by Russia. Yet less than a day later, Ukrainian troops <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63102220">captured</a> the strategic town of Lyman in the north of the annexed Donetsk region.</p>
<p>Before the lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, could even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lower-house-approves-annexation-four-ukrainian-regions-2022-10-03/">approve the annexation</a> on October 3, the Russian front in the southern Kherson region had <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f7e3420b-4443-4784-99a3-fa8658932de9">collapsed</a> in parts. These successes showed how tenuous the Kremlin’s grip was on the regions it had proclaimed to be “forever Russian”. </p>
<p>By the morning of October 4, Ukrainian forces had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-forces-break-through-russian-defences-south-advance-east-2022-10-03/">advanced some 30km</a> beyond their positions over the weekend, indicating that there was still significant momentum behind their counteroffensive. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/reaction-putin-proclaiming-annexation-ukrainian-land-2022-09-30/">Western condemnation</a> of the annexation was hardly a surprise. Nor was a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/36ca9f0b-d287-47ac-8944-36171dbd9a10">warning</a> from Nato’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, that there would be “severe consequences” if Putin made good his threat to use nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Against the background of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63065943">the alleged sabotage</a> of the Nordstream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea, the alliance also issued a <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_207733.htm">statement</a> that “any deliberate attack against allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response”.</p>
<p>The increasingly tense and volatile situation in and around Ukraine now clearly has more potential than ever to escalate into a full-blown conflict between Russia and the west. This makes it even more of a global security concern and raises the question of how China – Russia’s most significant strategic ally – positions itself.</p>
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<h2>China: the sum of all ambiguities</h2>
<p>A UN security council resolution condemning the referendums and denouncing the annexation was predictably vetoed by Russia on September 30. Putin may consider it a success that China – alongside Brazil, Gabon and India – was among the four security council members that abstained. But nothing in the Chinese representative’s subsequent <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15046.doc.htm">statements</a> indicated that Beijing would recognise the annexations. </p>
<p>So China’s stance remains ambiguous. It stops short of condemning Russia, but at the same time has not rowed back on its long-established position on the sanctity of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>An <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1276526.shtml">editorial</a> in China’s state-owned Global Times on Sunday October 2 put the blame for the escalating crisis squarely on the US. But it also noted that, in the case of a nuclear war: “There will be no security for anyone, not for Ukraine, and not for the world.” </p>
<p>A day later, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-prefers-balance-after-putin-ally-suggests-using-nuclear-bomb-ukraine-2022-10-03/">paddled</a> back on earlier comments by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/truth-or-bluff-why-putins-nuclear-warnings-have-west-worried-2022-09-28/">Putin</a> and Chechen leader <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-troops-left-lyman-avoid-encirclement-2022-10-01/">Ramzan Kadyrov</a> that had suggested the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.</p>
<p>Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi recently met with the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell. <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220923_10770474.html">Wang noted China’s concerns</a> about the negative spillover effects from the conflict and its support for EU mediation efforts. </p>
<p>Less than a week earlier, Chinese president Xi Jinping had met with Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. There, Xi sent a <a href="https://akorda.kz/en/president-kassym-jomart-tokayev-held-a-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-china-1484612">clear message</a> of China’s “strong support to Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Kazakhstan – a country with a large ethnic Russian population and justifiable <a href="https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ex-president-deletes-post-claiming-27637839">fears</a> of Russian interference – now has effectively a Chinese security guarantee against Moscow.</p>
<p>Much like China’s abstention from the vote in the security council, taken on their own, these actions leave a lot of ambiguity in Bejing’s position. But taken together, they seem to indicate China’s red lines: no nuclear escalation and no recognition of the recent annexations. </p>
<p>This limits Putin’s options and explains the increasingly frantic and desperate moves by the Russian president. He is trying to create a situation on the ground that might eventually lead to some kind of negotiated deal, leaving him with at least some territorial gains in Ukraine.</p>
<p>But Beijing’s ambiguity also reveals something about China’s game plan. Putin’s humiliation in Ukraine would also be something of a defeat for Xi who is seeking to secure an unprecedented third term as China’s leader at the congress of the Chinese Communist party later this month. </p>
<p>Xi still considers Putin a useful ally in his quest for a new global order. There is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/22/china/russia-mobilization-china-intl-hnk-mic/">little sign</a> that the partnership that Xi and Putin <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/world/asia/olympics-beijing-xi-putin.html">committed</a> to just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine is coming to an end. </p>
<p>China benefits from the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62922747">increasing asymmetry</a> of its relationship with Russia, with Putin more and more in the role of a junior, rather than equal, partner. This means that the ambiguity in China’s position is unlikely to come to an end either any time soon.</p>
<h2>Xi’s limitations</h2>
<p>Yet, the problem for Xi – and even more so for Putin – is that the longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the weaker Russia will become and the less valuable an ally. Given that there are no indications so far that China will throw its full weight behind Russia in the war in Ukraine, time is not on either of their sides. </p>
<p>In turn, this creates a prospect for a Ukrainian victory, not necessarily on the battlefield, but at future negotiations. The concessions required from Kyiv for an end to the war will diminish as the pressures on Moscow – militarily, domestically and globally – increase to make a deal. </p>
<p>So Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-applying-nato-membership-2022-09-30/">rejection of any negotiations</a> with Putin for now makes sense. Improving its position on the battlefield ahead of a probable lull in military activity over the winter will further drain Russia’s capacity to sustain its war effort. </p>
<p>This will likely lead to more pressure from Beijing on Moscow, not necessarily in the open, but behind closed doors. China will continue “to play its role in its own way” as <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220923_10770474.html">the country’s foreign minister said</a> during his recent meeting with the EU’s high representative.</p>
<p>Like any other war, the one in Ukraine will sooner or later end at the negotiating table. Putin may not be the one to sign the inevitable deal, but Xi is almost certainly going to be there to oversee it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union.</span></em></p>Beijing remains a friend of Moscow, but the relationship is becoming increasingly unequal as Russia is weakened by war.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1914322022-09-28T09:34:03Z2022-09-28T09:34:03ZUkraine war: west condemns ‘sham’ referendums in Russian-occupied areas<p>Polls <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-voting-annexation/32053737.html">have closed</a> in four Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine after four days of voting in referendums on their future status. Predictably, the results showed “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-annexation-votes-end-amid-russian-mobilisation-exodus-2022-09-26/">overwhelming support</a>” for joining Russia.</p>
<p>Tass, Russia’s state-owned news agency, <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1514213">has reported</a> that early counting has revealed more than 97% of votes were cast in favour of the occupied regions joining the Russian Federation. </p>
<p>The very idea that people who lived under a hostile occupying power for months and in many cases were forced to participate in the vote have had a free choice, or that their choice mattered, is laughable even by Russian standards. </p>
<p>In 2014, Russia at least kept up some facade of a campaign in the equally illegal and shambolic <a href="https://theconversation.com/crimea-votes-to-secede-from-ukraine-as-eu-considers-sanctions-against-russia-24426">Crimean referendum</a>. This time, there were merely three days between the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/medvedev-says-moscow-backed-separatists-must-hold-referendums-join-russia-2022-09-20/">announcement</a> of the referendums on September 20 and their start on September 23. </p>
<p>The referendums <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63052207">violate</a> almost every conceivable democratic standard. Ballot boxes were reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63013356">carried</a> from house to house to force people to cast their votes. There was an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63032705">intimidating</a> military presence in polling stations. No credible international observers were <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/27/europe/russia-ukraine-referendum-intl/index.html">monitoring</a> the vote in the occupied areas or in Russia or Crimea, where refugees from Ukraine have also been called upon to vote. </p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26">increasingly precarious situation</a> of Russian forces on the ground in Ukraine, the rush to cement a new status quo is understandable. In the Kremlin’s logic, once these territories have become part of Russia as a result of the referendums and an act of the Russian parliament – possibly as <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1574633113598283777/photo/1">early</a> as September 30 – they will enjoy Russia’s “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/sep/25/ukraine-annexed-territory-will-have-russia-protection-says-sergei-lavrov-video">full protection</a>”. </p>
<p>To drive home this point, Putin ordered a partial mobilisation and threatened nuclear strikes. The former Russian president and now deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, subsequently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-warns-west-that-nuclear-threat-is-not-bluff-2022-09-27/">repeated</a> this warning. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putin-calls-up-more-troops-and-threatens-nuclear-option-in-a-speech-which-ups-the-ante-but-shows-russias-weakness-191044">Ukraine war: Putin calls up more troops and threatens nuclear option in a speech which ups the ante but shows Russia's weakness</a>
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<p>But, like many times before in this disastrous war, it is hard to see what – if anything – Putin is likely to gain. Ukrainian military operations to liberate the Russian-occupied territories <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-fighting-mobilization-protests/32053755.html">continue</a>. Potential conscripts are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/00ee8cef-446b-4042-9278-a7603965a698">fleeing Russia en masse</a> to neighbouring countries. In Russia itself, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63035427">protests</a> against mobilisation continue. </p>
<p>Countries otherwise considered relatively friendly with Russia, such as Kazakhstan, have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-ukraine-referendums-recognize-russia/32052907.html">already announced</a> that they will not recognise the results of the illegal referendums. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-uk-sanctions-russians-referendums/32052857.html">UK</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-impose-new-sanctions-russia-over-sham-referendums-ukraine-2022-09-28/">Canada</a> and the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-sanctions-russia-referendums/32054285.html">European Union</a>, meanwhile, are planning to put sanctions on individuals associated with organising them. </p>
<p>The United States is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-preparing-new-11-billion-arms-package-ukraine-us-officials-2022-09-27/">preparing</a> another military support package for Ukraine worth US$1.1 billion (£1.03bn). Nato has warned Russia in no uncertain terms of “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-warns-russia-severe-consequences-case-nuclear-strike-2022-09-27/">severe consequences</a>” in case of a nuclear strike.</p>
<h2>Putin’s strategic objectives</h2>
<p>Despite all of these predictable consequences, the Kremlin carries on regardless. And despite multiple setbacks, Putin is holding on to some of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-whats-really-behind-putins-deployment-of-peacekeeping-troops-experts-explain-177585">objectives</a> that have been at the centre of his invasion of Ukraine since its very start at the end of February 2022. </p>
<p>Once it became clear to Russia that the self-declared so-called people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk had lost their value of political leverage over Ukraine because Kyiv was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-whats-really-behind-putins-deployment-of-peacekeeping-troops-experts-explain-177585">unwilling</a> to accept Moscow’s terms for a peace settlement in the east of the country, Putin opted for war to capture more of Ukraine’s territory. </p>
<p>This way, he was hoping to secure a durable land bridge to Crimea, potentially cutting off access to the Black Sea completely and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-stage-two-of-russias-war-is-ringing-alarm-bells-in-nearby-moldova-heres-why-181813">connecting</a> Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine to the Russian-controlled breakaway of Transnistria in Moldova.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-stage-two-of-russias-war-is-ringing-alarm-bells-in-nearby-moldova-heres-why-181813">Ukraine invasion: 'stage two' of Russia's war is ringing alarm bells in nearby Moldova – here's why</a>
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<p>There was always some degree of uncertainty over exactly how Russia’s well-established “<a href="https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-changing-de-facto-state-playbook-from-opportunism-to-strategic-calculation/">de-facto state playbook</a>” would play out in Ukraine. But the installation of some form of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-putin-could-try-to-split-the-country-into-regional-puppet-governments-179214">Russian-controlled administration</a> in the occupied areas had always been part of that plan. </p>
<p>Moscow’s early withdrawal from Kyiv in April and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-surprise-counteroffensive-kharkiv-russia-land-east-rcna46805">now from Kharkiv</a> indicates where the Kremlin puts the strategic emphasis of the aggression – in the Donbas and the southeast of Ukraine. These are areas where Russia is still making modest advances and where Ukraine’s liberation of occupied territories is progressing much more slowly. </p>
<p>Putin and his generals may not have much manpower and material resources left, but they use them in areas that make, from a Russian perspective, the most strategic sense.</p>
<h2>Senseless human sacrifice</h2>
<p>Holding the referendums in the territories currently controlled by Russia, therefore, fits into a strategy to shore up domestic support for an increasingly unpopular war at home. If nothing else, defending Russian territory – however ludicrous a notion that is with reference to Ukraine – makes it legally possible for Putin to use not only the reservists being currently mobilised, but also new conscripts due to arrive in Russian army barracks in the coming weeks and months as part of Russia’s regular autumn conscription cycle.</p>
<p>What Putin may achieve, at huge cost, is that these likely poorly trained and equipped soldiers will hold on to some of the territories now claimed as Russian as a result of the referendums. They will, though, no more turn the tide in the war decisively in Moscow’s favour as the referendums will persuade the international community that Russia is engaged in anything but the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The results of the referendums will not be accepted by any significant international actor. Western military support for Ukraine will not diminish and sanctions against Russia will not soften. </p>
<p>But the danger of further escalation remains, and with it the ever-increasing human and material costs of this senseless Russian war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191432/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Union</span></em></p>The Kremlin claims 97% of votes counted are for the four occupied regions to join the Russian Federation.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.