tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/strathmore-university-2081/articlesStrathmore University2024-02-20T13:12:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2225192024-02-20T13:12:43Z2024-02-20T13:12:43ZSouth Sudan: some spoilers want peace to fail, putting 2024 elections at risk<p>South Sudan is expected to hold its first general election in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-south-sudan-meet-its-election-deadline-this-time">December 2024</a>. It became an independent state in <a href="https://www.usip.org/programs/independence-south-sudan">2011</a>. </p>
<p>The long overdue election is one of the pillars of a <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">peace agreement</a> signed in 2018. It helped end the 2013-2018 civil war that killed <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IN10975.pdf#page=1">nearly 400,000 people and displaced millions</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the country has progressed in relative peace, with fewer incidences of conflict reported between 2018 and 2023. However, UN experts have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144822">voiced concerns</a> about the likelihood of elections being held within agreed timelines. </p>
<p>The election has been slated for December 2024, provided a number of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/s-sudan-risks-delayed-2024-elections-due-to-the-stuck-deal-4472812">issues</a> listed in the peace agreement are addressed. These include the making of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">permanent constitution</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-south-sudan-hinges-on-forging-a-unified-military-force-but-its-proving-hard-181547">unifying command of the military</a>.</p>
<p>But there have been major hurdles in the way of implementing the agreement. One of them is the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">presence of spoilers</a> within the South Sudanese political landscape. </p>
<p>Spoilers, as I define them, are detractors who attempt to undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements. </p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">South Sudan’s peace process</a> for eight years. I have studied the evolution of the country’s conflict since 2013, and the <a href="https://erepo.usiu.ac.ke/handle/11732/6971">various hurdles</a> that warring parties face in their quest for peace.</p>
<p>In my view, spoilers comprise leaders and parties who view peace as a major threat to their interests and power. They willingly risk using any means, including violence, to derail peace agreements due to feelings of exclusion or betrayal. </p>
<p>South Sudan’s elections were initially planned for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">2022, and then pushed to 2023 and now 2024</a>. These delays have been as a result of the lack of real peace. Instead, there’s negative peace: a peace deal exists but there are simmering tensions between warring factions and those left out of negotiations. </p>
<p>This exclusion has led to the proliferation of spoilers. As I warn in <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">my research</a>, in this context, a more inclusive process needs to be prioritised to save the country’s fragile peace and get the elections on track.</p>
<h2>What happened to negotiate peace in South Sudan</h2>
<p>A protracted <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan#:%7E:text=In%20December%202013%2C%20following%20a,ethnic%20groups%20in%20South%20Sudan.">political power struggle</a> between South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, and his deputy, Riek Machar, to lead the main political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, sparked a civil war in 2013.</p>
<p>Violence first broke out after a <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/interview-kiir-has-deliberately-destroyed-splm-and-is-not-interested-in-bringing-genuine-peace-pagan-amum">volatile meeting</a> in July 2013 to decide who – between Kiir, Machar and Pagan Amum, then the secretary-general of the party – would be its flagbearer in elections scheduled for 2015. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week">December 2013</a>, fighting between military forces loyal to either Kiir or Machar – who are from the country’s two largest ethnic groups – escalated. </p>
<p>The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement splintered into two factions in 2014. One is led by Kiir, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government; the other by Machar, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts#:%7E:text=The%20South%20Sudan%20peace%20process,a%20post%2Dconflict%20political%20transition.">International and regional interventions</a> led to a long peace process that resulted in the signing of several peace agreements. Between 2013 and 2018, six main agreements and five addenda were signed to help resolve the South Sudan conflict. </p>
<p>The key sticking points in these deals were around how power would be shared between the warring parties, military integration of armed forces, addressing the root causes of the conflict, and healing the nation through a truth, justice and reconciliation process. </p>
<p>The last peace agreement was <a href="https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/No.-17.-The-Revitalized-Agreement-for-Resolution-of-Conflict-in-South-Sudan-R-ARCSS-1.pdf#page=1">signed</a> in September 2018 by five key actors and a group of smaller opposition parties, signalling an end to the five-year conflict. </p>
<p>Elections were originally slated for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">December 2022</a>. They were later postponed due to delays in implementing the peace agreement. </p>
<h2>Who are the spoilers?</h2>
<p>Spoilers can destroy peace agreements. There are two main types of spoilers: <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">insiders and outsiders</a>. </p>
<p>Insider spoilers participate in the peace process, sign the peace agreement and even signal support for its implementation. However, they fail to follow through. Their motives for this include the need to achieve their goals by maintaining the guise of supporting the peace process. They are especially sensitive to decisions that would weaken them militarily. </p>
<p>In South Sudan, insider spoilers include <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kiir-puts-south-sudan-on-edge-4154634">the two breakaway parties</a> of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. They are the main signatories of the 2018 peace agreement. Their spoiling role has been exhibited by a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/is-south-sudan-s-peace-deal-holding-/7004434.html">lack of political goodwill</a> in upholding the spirit and letter of the agreement on various issues. A good example of this is a recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/30/s-sudan-president-appoints-defence-minister-breaching-peace-deal">breach</a> when Kiir unilaterally appointed a defence minister from his own faction in total disregard of the peace agreement. </p>
<p>Outsider spoilers exclude themselves from the peace process because they feel their demands won’t be addressed. They openly declare their hostility to the process. They eventually use any means, including open violence, to disrupt and upset the process.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/south-sudan-s-holdout-rebel-groups-resume-talks/7016828.html">New negotiations</a> were held in 2023 to include outsider spoilers like <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/gen-cirillo-we-were-right-not-to-sign-the-peace-agreement">General Thomas Swaka</a> of the National Salvation Front and <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/q-a-nss-gen-akol-koor-cannot-convince-me-to-return-to-juba-gen-paul-malong">General Paul Malong</a>, a leader of the South Sudan United Front. These two parties are new entrants into the South Sudan political space and generally accommodate former Kiir allies. The negotiations didn’t bear fruit.</p>
<p>In my view, insider spoilers are more likely to disrupt the South Sudan peace process. They span both the political and military landscape and are very influential. Insider spoilers tend to have a large support base within the population. </p>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>New threats continue to emerge in the South Sudanese landscape, particularly as December 2024 draws closer. There have been <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/jonglei-two-spla-io-generals-defect-in-major-blow-to-machar">major defections</a> of influential generals from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition. They have expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms and implementation of the current peace agreement. </p>
<p>This strains the delicate balance of power that has existed between the warring factions since 2018. These generals have a substantive following among the public and pose a serious risk to the South Sudan peace agenda. Failure to accommodate these generals could result in insecurity in the regions where they have influence, affecting the chances of holding peaceful elections.</p>
<p>South Sudan needs to reassess its commitment to peace. It can do this by including all aggrieved parties in the political peace process. This will help ensure that the country returns to normalcy under a government that’s legitimately in power after credible polls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edgar Githua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major hurdle in South Sudan is the presence of detractors who could undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements.Edgar Githua, Lecturer in International Studies, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1897342022-09-05T10:37:12Z2022-09-05T10:37:12ZCan social media be used as a source of evidence in Kenya’s election petitions?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482305/original/file-20220901-19-gbyywj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The conduct of Kenya’s elections has repeatedly come under close scrutiny in the courts. Petitions were lodged challenging the outcome of presidential races in <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/87380/">2013</a> and <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/140478/">2017</a>, as well as in the most <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/237697/kenya-2022-lies-damn-lies-and-statistics/">recent poll</a>. In addition to these, other elective seats invite dozens of petitions. An issue that has come to the fore is whether those who file petitions can use material from social media platforms as evidence. Law lecturer Claire Adionyi interrogates the role social media information plays as a source of evidence in election petitions.</em></p>
<h2>How is evidence from social media viewed in legal terms?</h2>
<p>There is a large amount of information posted on social media platforms that may be of value as evidence in a court of law. In law, this type of information is known as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf">open source information</a>. It is publicly available information that any member of the public can observe, purchase or request without requiring special legal status or authorised access. </p>
<p>Such open source information can be used for information and evidence gathering purposes in an investigation. This turns it into open source evidence. This is <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf">defined</a> as evidence that has been obtained from online social platforms – such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter – and may be used in a court of law.</p>
<h2>Why has the use of this kind of evidence become an issue?</h2>
<p>Kenya <a href="https://businesstoday.co.ke/kenya-leads-africa-smartphone-usage/">leads Africa</a> with a mobile phone penetration rate of 91%. Out of a population of about 52 million, a total of 43 million Kenyans have access to the internet. With this level of connectivity, the 9 August 2022 election was arguably the most well-documented election in the country’s history. </p>
<p>With the proliferation of mobile devices and affordable access to the internet, it has become an <a href="https://harvardhrj.com/2019/04/open-source-evidence-and-the-international-criminal-court/">accepted reality</a> that news spreads faster on social media than on traditional media. Citizens have posted unprecedented volumes of digital imagery and videos on social media platforms. </p>
<p>The power to record and share information was once the preserve of the country’s few media houses. Today, <a href="https://www.ca.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Sector-Statistics-Report-Q3-2021-2022.pdf#page=14">one in two Kenyans</a> owns a smartphone and has access to the <a href="https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2022-kenya">12 million</a> people in the country on social media.</p>
<p>The question that’s arisen in Kenya is whether open source information can be used in petitions challenging the outcome of elections. And are the courts ready for this development?</p>
<p>The simple answer to this is no, they aren’t. </p>
<p>Based on my experience as a law lecturer and PhD candidate studying this issue, my view is that open source information has changed the landscape of evidentiary processes. Kenyan practitioners will have to deal with this soon. This new type of evidence doesn’t fall within the confines of the traditional rules of evidence. This means Kenyan courts need to have standard operating procedures for litigating and evaluating open source evidence.</p>
<h2>What are the challenges with using open source material as evidence?</h2>
<p>The challenges relate to two main issues.</p>
<p>First, there are issues of discovery and verification of material within the context of an <a href="https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/open-source-evidence-on-trial">increasing volume</a> of online information. </p>
<p>Second, due to the nature of open source evidence, one has to contend with <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=dltr">issues</a> of misattribution, staging, technical manipulation and deep fakes, among other things.</p>
<p>So it’s not just a matter of getting this information from social media platforms and submitting it to court as legal evidence. There are various procedural and evidentiary legal loopholes that have to be navigated for such information to be of use. </p>
<p>These include ensuring the material is in its original form and that it’s reliable.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/143867/">2017 Steve Mbogo election petition</a> illustrates the challenges with this kind of evidence. It also points to why there needs to be recourse. </p>
<p>The petition was <a href="https://icj-kenya.org/news/sdm_downloads/compendium-of-2017-election-petitions/">one of dozens</a> filed after the country’s 2017 election.</p>
<p>In court, Mbogo attempted to cite evidence from social media platforms in support of his petition. He was challenging the outcome of elections held in August 2017 for a parliamentary seat in Nairobi’s Starehe constituency, where he was a candidate. </p>
<p>The High Court of Kenya did not admit the open source evidence he provided, due to procedural challenges based on section 106B(2) of the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%2080">Evidence Act</a>, which contains guiding principles on the production of digital evidence in court proceedings. Therefore, and unfortunately, the court didn’t evaluate the technical questions on the admissibility of open source evidence in this case.</p>
<p>The case points to two main loopholes.</p>
<p>Firstly, issues of discovery and verification of relevant material.</p>
<p>The second point relates to the procedural and evidentiary legal loopholes that have to be navigated for such information to be used.</p>
<p>An example of this existing gap in Kenyan law relates to <a href="https://cipit.strathmore.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Admission-of-Electronic-Evidence-Contradictions-in-the-Kenyan-Evidence-Act.pdf">section 78A</a> of the Evidence Act, which deals with the admissibility of electronic and digital evidence. </p>
<p>This section doesn’t set out the conditions to be considered prior to the admissibility of open source evidence. It instead addresses considerations as to the probative value of such evidence. This presents a challenge to anyone who seeks to use this type of evidence.</p>
<h2>So what needs to be done?</h2>
<p>Kenya could learn lessons from the International Criminal Court, which is a <a href="https://harvardhrj.com/2019/04/open-source-evidence-and-the-international-criminal-court/">standard setter</a> when it comes to the use of open source evidence. It continues to do a significant amount of work. This includes the creation of a technology advisory panel, working with academics and private actors to ensure that the court is able to tap into this rich source of evidence while still adhering to legal requirements.</p>
<p>These lessons would help Kenya fix the legal loopholes on the production and admissibility of open source evidence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Adionyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s a lot of information on social media that would support legal proceedings, but courts have yet to harness this.Claire Adionyi, Research Director, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1707212021-11-01T14:12:46Z2021-11-01T14:12:46ZWhy Kenya’s digital ID roll-out must face up to data protection risks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429032/original/file-20211028-19-856uie.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An officer of the National Integrated Identity Management system collects data for Mr Charles Chepkwony's digital ID in 2019 in Baringo, Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Billy Mutai/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Controversy has dogged Kenya’s pursuit of a digital identity database for all children, citizens and residents, intended to replace the physical identity card issued only to citizens over 18 years old. Concerns include lack of public participation in drawing up the digital ID law, potential to exclude vulnerable groups and the lack of a clear plan to protect the massive amounts of data collected. Grace Mutung'u, a researcher who specialises in digital rights, governance and development, explains what’s behind the Kenya high court’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/judge-orders-state-to-regularise-huduma-namba-roll-out-3582906">decision</a> to temporarily stop the digital ID roll-out.</em></p>
<h2>What is a digital identity and how does it work?</h2>
<p>Digital ID is the use of digital technologies to identify a person. Identification is usually through something one has, something one knows, or something one is. In a country like Kenya, people have long carried national identity cards with which they are identified. Banks also issue ATM cards which come with secret codes with which customers identify themselves. It’s the same with mobile money services. These are examples of things people know. Biometrics is an example of identification through who one is. During elections, voters may use their fingerprints on biometric identification machines to verify identify. All these are forms of digital ID.</p>
<p>Authentication is key to proving one’s identity. Many view biometrics as the most unique identifiers and these are increasingly relied on for authentication. Under Kenyan law, biometrics include fingerprints, hand geometry, earlobe geometry, retina and iris patterns, as well as voice waves. For this reason, it is becoming normal to find biometric scanners at airports. With digital ID programmes, biometrics will increasingly be used for access to day-to-day government services.</p>
<h2>How is Kenya – among other countries – implementing its digital ID system?</h2>
<p>Kenya’s digital ID system will replace the existing national ID card. The card has been <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/data-stories/2019/06/14/toa-kitambulisho-evolution-of-registration-of-persons-in-kenya/">in place since before independence</a>. It’s widely used to identify people when they use government and private services and apply for jobs, driving licences, bank accounts and mobile phone SIM cards. The national ID card is a citizenship document that is normally taken out when a person turns 18.</p>
<p>The new digital ID programme, popularised as “Huduma Namba” (Kiswahili for “service number”) has several aims. It includes everyone in the system – children, citizens and residents. It integrates all existing identity systems and makes them interoperable. And it centralises design and issuance of identity documents. The system will also integrate biometrics, shifting Kenya from the practice of validating identity documents to authenticating people.</p>
<p>To get a digital ID, one needs a primary identification document, for example a national ID, a passport for foreigners and a birth certificate for children. This has been problematic as there is a significant number of people without identity documents or who face barriers when acquiring these documents. They fear that once the new system is in place, they will become legally invisible to the state and be unable to access services, since services will only be available through digital ID. In a <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/189189/">case challenging</a> Huduma Namba, one of these groups, the Nubians, expressed fear that if Kenya migrated to digital ID, they would be legally invisible and therefore unable to access government and private services.</p>
<h2>The high court has stopped its implementation, citing data security risks. What are they?</h2>
<p>On 14 October 2021, the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/220495/">High Court</a> declared that the roll-out of Huduma Namba was illegal for want of a Data Protection Impact Assessment. This is a process of identifying the impact of data processing on the rights and freedoms of the people to whom the data relates, and mitigating those risks. Huduma Namba data processing poses high risks, since very personal data such as one’s address, family relations and more importantly, biometrics, are collected.</p>
<p>One way to think about risk is to imagine who would be affected were such data to be leaked. With biometrics, the greatest risk is that they are so unique that once leaked, the risk cannot easily be mitigated by resetting. It’s not like resetting a password or secret code. </p>
<p>Another risk with data in the custody of government is state surveillance. The government can <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/news/state-surveillance-of-citizens-going-unchecked-across-africa/">listen in to private conversations and track people</a>. We have seen governments using data for political campaigning, <a href="https://cipit.strathmore.edu/biometric-elections-privacy-kenya/">in ways that threaten democracy</a>.</p>
<p>The High Court in Kenya therefore ordered the government to stop further processing of Huduma Namba or giving out of Huduma cards until the system’s impact had been assessed. This means the government should systematically assess all the risks associated with Huduma Namba data and think about how to minimise those risks so that if data leaked, it wouldn’t have a big impact on the people whose data it is.</p>
<h2>What are the other challenges?</h2>
<p>One can view the challenges from two main perspectives – inclusion and protection from harm. With Kenya’s history of <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/09859.pdf">inequitable development across regions</a>, there are those who risk being left out of digital ID and therefore missing out on government and private services. Digital ID can therefore worsen existing inequalities among communities, genders and people with different incomes.</p>
<p>In the previous <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/189189/">judgement</a> on Huduma Namba, issues like the privacy of children were discussed. Their data should be protected from practices such as surveillance.</p>
<p>With digital ID data, governments can also make unfair decisions on various groups, intentionally or unintentionally. So it’s important for people to be able to participate in designing the system. Kenya’s digital ID law was developed without much participation, denying experts the opportunity to give input on issues such as data governance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grace Mutung'u is a student at the University of Nairobi studying digital ID and social justice. </span></em></p>Huduma Namba data processing poses high risks, since very personal data, including biometrics, is collected.Grace Mutung'u, Research Fellow, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT), Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1340482020-04-07T15:56:28Z2020-04-07T15:56:28ZHow Moi put foreign policy at the centre of his presidency<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321288/original/file-20200318-37382-12f7b7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi (left) during peace talks with Former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (right) in Khartoum in 2007. Between them is an interpreter. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Philip Dhil/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Scholars have described the years during which Daniel arap Moi served as Kenyan president as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2016.1254677?src=recsys">the golden age</a> of Kenya’s diplomatic practice. Moi was the longest serving president of Kenya – remaining in office from 1978 to 2002. </p>
<p>Prior to that he had served as vice-president from 1967 to 1978, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/kenya-and-the-contemporary-world-order/oclc/615341995">succeeding President Jomo Kenyatta</a> on his death.</p>
<p>Moi is credited with putting Kenya on the world map as a key player in conflict management, being itself an “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2016.1254677?src=recsys">oasis of peace</a>” in a volatile region of the Greater Horn of Africa. Moi was a foreign policy president, having enjoyed the latitude of representing Kenyatta in high level diplomatic functions globally. </p>
<p>And as Kenyatta’s vice-president, he received a great deal of training in foreign policy. For example, he represented Kenya in multilateral engagements such as United Nations, Commonwealth and various bilateral diplomatic meetings.</p>
<p>Moi promised to continue with the late Kenyatta’s foreign policy and leadership approaches. But by 1985, he had started reaching out to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436598308419697">non-traditional partners</a> such as China.</p>
<p>He hinged the country’s foreign policy on mediation and peace-making and even <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/kenya-and-the-contemporary-world-order/oclc/615341995">served as the chair</a> of the Organisation of African Unity for two terms. He used this position to champion the pan-African agenda of peace and security. For instance he <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/12/10/Organization-of-African-Unity-chairman-Kenyan-President-Daniel-Arap/4992408344400">condemned the invasion of Lesotho</a> by the apartheid regime of South Africa. Kenya also led the peace efforts in Sudan and Somalia. </p>
<p>In late 2002, President Moi <a href="http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/203732">hosted a Somali national reconciliation conference</a> in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. The conference took place under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.</p>
<p>As a pan-Africanist, Moi championed the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Daniel-moi-relations-with-others-in-region-stayed-firm/4552908-5448306-yobp6qz/index.html">establishment of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a> in 1986. He was one of the founding leaders of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which later became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. </p>
<p>In his pursuit of regional peace, Moi often reached out to other regional leaders and particularly pushed for peace processes in the greater Horn of Africa through the use of the authority. </p>
<p>He is credited with the push to <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Daniel-moi-relations-with-others-in-region-stayed-firm/4552908-5448306-yobp6qz/index.html">integrate conflict resolution and peace building</a> within the organisation, in addition to issues related to drought and desertification in the Horn of Africa. The Inter-governmental Authority on Development continues to <a href="https://igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office">play a key role</a> in securing peace and stability on the continent.</p>
<p>Kenya’s diplomacy was at its peak by 1989 when <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/kenya-and-the-contemporary-world-order/oclc/615341995">Kenyan troops joined the UN Transition Assistance Group</a> in Namibia. </p>
<p>Critics argue that <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/kenyans-remember-mixed-legacy-moi">Moi used foreign policy</a> to deflect attention from the internal governance and political challenges facing Kenya.</p>
<p>Pressure for change had been mounting since the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3991274?seq=1">end of the unipolar world order</a> that emerged under the US when the Cold War ended. Moi’s government was facing growing calls for political reforms such as multiparty democracy. </p>
<p>Ultimately, both external pressure from the liberal states such as the US and Britain, and internal agitation for political reforms, affected Moi’s steadfast focus on diplomacy, peace, and conflict management.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, he’s credited with some <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-02-06-mois-invaluable-role-in-regional-peace-processes/%20accessed%2004/04/2020">celebrated peacemaking achievements</a>. Possibly the biggest was his initiation and steering of the Sudan peace process that led to the independence of South Sudan from Sudan. </p>
<p>Even though the world’s newest country slid into <a href="https://theconversation.com/forgotten-south-sudan-tangled-in-factionalism-and-failed-politics-30994">crisis</a> in December 2013 following differences between President Salva Kiir and his vice-president Riek Machar, the fact that it became <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">an independent state in 2011</a> was important because the South Sudanese people desired to overcome marginalisation and resource conflicts, and to enjoy the fruits of self-determination.</p>
<h2>South Sudan</h2>
<p>South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011 following a series of negotiations and peace processes that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2015. The agreement ended 22 years of civil war – one of Africa’s longest-running internal conflicts. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-root-causes-of-ongoing-conflict-remain-untouched-133542">South Sudan: root causes of ongoing conflict remain untouched</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The path to peace was long and hard. In early 2002, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/sudan-moi-mandated-igad-merge-peace-initiatives">mandated Moi to lead efforts</a> to merge the parallel peace initiatives on Sudan. One was under the Authority and the other was a Libyan-Egyptian initiative. </p>
<p>On his appointment to chair the merger between the two peace initiatives, Moi dispatched Kenya’s special envoy for the Sudanese peace process, Lt-Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo, to Egypt for talks. The goal was to create a singular peace process. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/sudan-moi-mandated-igad-merge-peace-initiatives">Efforts to merge the two processes</a> were initiated by the US ambassador, John Danforth. The ambassador had written to both Moi and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt requesting them to work together.</p>
<p>Moi also played a great role in lobbying for international support for the Sudanese peace process. Towards this end he engaged envoys from Britain, US and Norway.</p>
<p>Even in his retirement, Moi followed the Sudan peace process closely.</p>
<h2>The legacy</h2>
<p>Moi laid the foundation that opened doors for peace in South Sudan. Gratitude for his role remains strong. He attended the country’s 2011 independence inauguration and was loudly cheered when his name was mentioned among those who helped the country attain independence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/daniel-arap-moi-the-making-of-a-kenyan-big-man-127177">Daniel arap Moi: the making of a Kenyan 'big man'</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>And at Moi’s funeral, President Kiir <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001360072/heads-of-state-and-government-eulogise-president-moi">affirmed Moi’s peace efforts</a>. Kiir stated that the independence of South Sudan would remain Moi’s legacy. Indeed, while eulogising Moi in Nairobi, Kiir summarised Moi’s role in South Sudan’s peace process, and the general perception of Moi by the people of South Sudan, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001360072/heads-of-state-and-government-eulogise-president-moi">saying</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We consider Moi the hero of our independence and freedom</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>WILFRED NASONG'O MULIRO has previously received a grant from the Social Science Research Council and African Leadership Centre for studies. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick Muthengi Maluki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s second president played a big role in steering South Sudan to freedom and independence.Patrick Muthengi Maluki, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of NairobiWilfred Nasong'o Muliro, Lecturer International Relations and Security, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1153442019-05-22T12:56:36Z2019-05-22T12:56:36ZZero-carbon electric transport is already in reach for small islands<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275901/original/file-20190522-187147-31s0f6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5607%2C3732&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Electric cars charging on Hainan Island, China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/china-hainan-island-sanya-bay-december-1263272644?src=qCOg7JUM64YaMc5dascptg-1-0">Evgenii mitroshin/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a recent talk on the UK’s energy sector, the head of an electric utility company claimed that “the problem of decarbonising our electricity sector is fixed”. Eyebrows were raised at this, but his point quickly became clear. The technologies needed to decarbonise the UK’s electricity system now exist, he explained. Indeed, grid operators in the UK expect <a href="https://www.current-news.co.uk/news/national-grid-set-for-zero-carbon-power-system-operation-by-2025">a zero carbon electricity system by 2025</a>.</p>
<p>But far greater challenges remain in <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-good-progress-100-low-carbon-energy-is-still-a-long-way-off-for-the-uk-114949">the heat and transport sectors</a>. Electrifying road transport will likely take longer than 2025 and more electric vehicles could cause the grid’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-has-shifted-30-of-its-electricity-away-from-fossil-fuels-in-just-nine-years-108969">current electricity demand</a> to double.</p>
<p>This is where small island states could help. They provide the perfect proving ground for the multifaceted challenge of transitioning to a transport system that’s 100% powered by electricity. The obstacles are many. <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/2017/09/07/an-infrastructure-for-charging-electric-vehicles-takes-shape">Massive infrastructure change</a> is needed, <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/unplugged-electric-vehicle-realities-versus-consumer-expectations.html">consumer expectations</a> have to be managed, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920913001065">a supportive policy structure</a> must be shaped, and the <a href="https://industrytoday.com/article/e-mobility-changes-the-way-we-live/">far reaching impacts of such a transition</a> will need careful consideration. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2018.09.006">Our recent paper</a> explains why islands can lead the way towards fully electrified transport. They can help to guide the transition challenges and inform how to scale up for larger, continental transport systems. We focused on the Caribbean and the rapid progress which is already underway on the island of Barbados – now the <a href="https://gisbarbados.gov.bb/blog/barbados-third-highest-user-of-electric-vehicles/">third highest user of electric vehicles in the world</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=622&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=622&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275897/original/file-20190522-187153-vvy5cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=622&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Over 100 years since Barbados underwent electrification, the island is a world leader in electric transport.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/st-petersburg-russia-may-11-2016-419119177?src=6rtN7BdHPwl_nltUj7hjHQ-1-6">Solodov Aleksei/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Supporting a green transition</h2>
<p>With excellent solar and wind resources, several Caribbean islands are now pursuing <a href="https://theconversation.com/jamaica-leads-in-richard-branson-backed-plan-for-a-caribbean-climate-revolution-105478">100% renewable energy transitions</a>. This is a remarkable goal given <a href="https://www.caribbeanclimate.bz/caribbean-needs-30-billion-of-investment-to-cut-fossil-fuel-use/">most are heavily reliant on fossil fuels</a>. As with any country that wants to target 100% renewable energy generation, islands will need to store excess energy for when demand exceeds the supply from wind and solar energy. </p>
<p>Here’s where electric vehicles offer a considerable advantage. <a href="https://www.drivingelectric.com/your-questions-answered/324/what-vehicle-grid-v2g-charging">Vehicle-to-grid</a> is a relatively new idea that would allow electric vehicle owners to sell electricity back to grid operators while their car is plugged in on their driveway or in parking spaces. This helps the grid meet demand when there is fluctuating electricity generation from intermittent sources such as solar and wind power.</p>
<p>If all 132,000 vehicles currently on Barbados were electric, and Vehicle-to-Grid charging were adopted, the cumulative effect of these 132,000 batteries could act as a distributed storage system. That would provide a storage capacity of 0.5 GWh. This would go some of the way towards the 3 GWh that is needed for a <a href="http://www.energy.gov.bb/web/draft-interim-report-re-prices-and-mechanisms">100% renewable energy system</a> on Barbados. </p>
<h2>Improving resilience to climate change</h2>
<p>Due to their relative isolation at sea, small islands have always been vulnerable to natural hazards. Acting as mobile storage, electric vehicles have the potential to help with recovery following natural disasters, particularly <a href="https://www.upi.com/Record-2017-hurricane-season-cost-370B-hundreds-of-lives/7711511317614/">hurricanes</a> and tsunamis by acting as back-up energy storage for rescue and recovery efforts. As this application becomes better understood, the lessons learned in the Caribbean could become significant for mainland countries, too.</p>
<p>One of the main barriers to people buying electric vehicles is <a href="https://electrek.co/2017/12/26/average-electric-car-range/">driver range anxiety</a>. This stems from typical driving ranges of ~180km on a full battery, <a href="https://www.energuide.be/en/questions-answers/how-long-does-it-take-to-charge-an-electric-car-battery/1621/">longer “refuelling” times</a> compared to conventional cars (30 minutes to ten hours depending on the charger and the vehicle), and too few charging points. Progress is certainly being made in this area - electric vehicle <a href="https://electrek.co/2017/12/26/average-electric-car-range/">range increased by 56% between 2011 and 2017</a> – but perhaps too slowly to encourage more drivers to choose electric.</p>
<p>On small islands, this barrier largely doesn’t exist. In Barbados, you can drive <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesellsmoor/2018/12/20/the-electric-vehicle-revolution-is-alive-in-barbados/#3413fa535ff8">around the whole country on one charge</a>. In effect, small islands offer an opportunity to fast forward to a time when battery capacities have increased, charging times have decreased, and driver range anxiety is <a href="https://www.hpi.co.uk/content/electric-cars-the-electric-era/the-hpi-check-electric-vehicle-study/">no longer an issue</a>.</p>
<p>Like many Caribbean islands, Barbados is particularly reliant on tourism, which contributes over <a href="https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/2018/caribbean-recovery-report---full-report.pdf">15% of Caribbean GDP</a>. With over <a href="http://www.bhta.org/index/resources/statistics.html">1.2m visitors each year</a> – more than four times the island’s population – and tourists typically interacting with taxis, public transport, hire cars and coach tours during their stay, islands like Barbados are well-placed to act as <a href="https://www.caribbean-council.org/electric-car-caribbean/">country-sized showrooms</a> for an electric transport transition.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/275893/original/file-20190522-187153-1irp4sz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Solar panels power an electric car charging point in Bridgetown, Barbados.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rebekah Shirley</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Flexible governance structures</h2>
<p><a href="http://newenergyevents.com/the-caribbean-and-the-ev-revolution-in-waiting/">Caribbean islands</a> have made considerable progress with rolling out electric vehicles, despite scant policy support and financial incentives. However, once a technology has been proven to benefit their economy, small islands tend to have fewer barriers between public ideas and executive decision making. Their relatively flexible governance structures mean they can support rapid adoption of new technology.</p>
<p>This was certainly the case in Barbados in the 1970s for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esd.2016.01.002">water heaters powered by solar energy</a>. A local manufacturer demonstrated their design to the prime minister at the time, highlighting its ability to drastically reduce a household’s monthly gas bill. Convinced, supportive policies were introduced, and the island is now <a href="http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/17-8652_GSR2018_FullReport_web_final_.pdf">first in the world</a> for solar water heating collector capacity.</p>
<p>Electric vehicles are held back in mainland countries due to cost, policy, driver distances and scant charging points, but these barriers are easily negotiated on islands like Barbados. Small islands can lead the way to full decarbonisation of the global transport sector – the rest of the world should take note.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263883/original/file-20190314-28475-1mzxjur.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=176&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/imagine-newsletter-researchers-think-of-a-world-with-climate-action-113443?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=Imagineheader1115344">Click here to subscribe to our climate action newsletter. Climate change is inevitable. Our response to it isn’t.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115344/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When it comes to eliminating greenhouse gas emissions from transport, the future is already here on small islands.Tom Rogers, Senior Lecturer in Renewable Energy & Energy Management, Coventry UniversityDestine Gay, PhD Researcher in Sustainability, The University of the West IndiesRebekah Shirley, Visiting Research Scholar in Renewable Energy, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1038452018-10-24T14:14:09Z2018-10-24T14:14:09ZWhat Kenya needs to do to better protect those working in the oil sector<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240415/original/file-20181012-119144-mkc6vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya is ill-prepared for the environmental, health and safety impacts that accompany oil production.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Signature Message/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After decades of failed attempts, Kenya finally <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012326174456726672.html">struck oil six years ago</a>. <a href="https://nationaloil.co.ke/pdf/NOCK_Newsletter.pdf">Commercially viable</a> reserves were discovered in Turkana – the northwest of the country– by British oil company, Tullow Oil. The basin is estimated to contain about <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">560 million barrels of oil</a>.</p>
<p>While commercial production is a few years away, there’s <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/epwg/EHS-Discussion-Paper-Policy-Dialogues.pdf">growing</a> concern that Kenya isn’t ready for the environmental, health and safety risks that accompany oil production. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/epwg/EHS-Discussion-Paper-Policy-Dialogues.pdf">recent forum</a> involving key stakeholders – community, civil society organisations and the Ministry of Health – outlined some of these concerns. These
include that; workers aren’t well protected, waste isn’t being well disposed of and water sources could be <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/water-quality-quantity-versus-turkana-oil-production-daniel-lagat/">contaminated</a>. Other problems identified included the fact that those regulating these issues don’t have clear mandates and that policies and standards that deal with managing risks don’t exist or aren’t clear. </p>
<p>Kenya has several state agencies that try to regulate the industry. This means that there’s an uncoordinated approach and a great deal of uncertainty. A framework is needed that speaks specifically to environment, health and safety for the oil sector. It must have a clear division of roles and responsibilities, ensuring the sector is efficient, and encouraging investment. </p>
<h2>Oil spills and pollution</h2>
<p>A key concern for communities in the Turkana area is how waste and pollution will be managed. This includes; the disposal of drill cuttings, reduced air quality due to flaring of gas and negative impacts on human and animal health. </p>
<p>There’s also concern over the technology used to handle hazardous waste as it doesn’t meet the standards of those in other countries. For instance, <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/Publications:%20Government/Final%20SESA%20Report%20March%202017.pdf">most</a> waste oil treatment facilities don’t meet international standards and are run by the informal sector. </p>
<p>Trying to deal with these risks is challenging and there are significant gaps in policies and laws. </p>
<p>For example, there’s a general <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2017/Petroleum_Exploration_DevelopmentandProductionBill_2017.pdf">requirement</a> that contractors be prepared in case of an emergency – like a fire. But there’s no direction of who is responsible for what and the procedures that must be followed. Kenya’s National oil Spill Contingency Plan is meant to make this clearer, but it has been in draft form for over four years. </p>
<p>There also needs to be clarity on who is responsible for damage incurred as a result of oil spills or other pollution. Currently the <a href="https://kma.go.ke/index.php/marine-environment/oil-spill-response">Kenya Maritime Authority</a> is responsible for coordinating this, but they are a maritime agency – authority should rest with the National Environment Management Authority.</p>
<h2>Worker safety</h2>
<p>There also need to be more policies that protect the health and safety of workers. An <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/OccupationalSafetyandHealth(No.15of2007).pdf">occupational safety and health act</a> in on the statute books. But there are no policy guidelines that look at how health and safety is monitored. These are needed to govern the industry’s hazardous work operations like; rigging safety, flaring of gas, drilling or chemicals handling. </p>
<p>Policies should be created by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining in collaboration with the other relevant ministries – like environment and health. </p>
<p>Other policies that need to be reviewed include those related to reducing the risk of fires – <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/lex/sublegview.xql?subleg=No.%2015%20of%202007#KE/LEG/EN/AR/O/NO.%2015%20OF%202007/SUBLEG/HC_17">current legislation</a> only deals with small workplace fires – and those related to first aid. </p>
<p>Regulations must also be drawn up to cover community health and safety. These don’t exist yet the impact of oil and gas operations goes beyond the workplace.</p>
<p>Finally, there are <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/Publications:%20Government/Final%20SESA%20Report%20March%202017.pdf">not enough</a> health facilities and emergency service providers should accidents occur.</p>
<h2>Regulation issues</h2>
<p>Three key bodies are meant to regulate environment, health and safety issues in the sector. These are the <a href="https://www.erc.go.ke/">Energy and Regulatory Commission</a>; the <a href="http://www.labour.go.ke/directorate-of-occupational-safety-and-health-services-doshs/">Directorate of Safety and Health Services</a> and the <a href="https://www.nema.go.ke/">National Environmental Management Authority</a>. But their activities aren’t coordinated. This means that companies aren’t being held to proper enforcement and compliance regulations. </p>
<p>Regulations can also clash. For instance, the <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/OccupationalSafetyandHealth(No.15of2007).pdf">occupational safety and health laws</a> require workplaces that use or produce toxic substances to <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/Publications:%20Government/Final%20SESA%20Report%20March%202017.pdf">ensure</a> they’re safely collected, recycled or disposed of. But there isn’t currently a body that can actually process waste coming from the oil and gas sector. The closest facility is in <a href="http://www.oilinuganda.org/features/environment/uganda-gets-its-first-oil-waste-treatment-plant.html">Uganda</a>. </p>
<h2>Developing policy</h2>
<p>There are attempts to improve on policy. Kenya’s occupational safety and health act, for example, is <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/862581530195474639/pdf/Plan-Archive-14.pdf">under review</a>. But it’s not easy.</p>
<p>Developing policies, and ensuring they’re adhered to, is a major challenge as government regulatory bodies lack skills and manpower. The Directorate of Safety and Health Services, for instance, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@safework/documents/policy/wcms_187632.pdf">has</a> 71 professional officers to inspect about 140,000 workplaces. This is a huge challenge for inspectors working in the remote areas where oil exploration is taking place. They <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/Publications:%20Government/Final%20SESA%20Report%20March%202017.pdf">can take</a> one to two years before they visit, leaving most workers exposed to hazards.</p>
<p>The goods news is that steps are being taken. the <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/862581530195474639/pdf/Plan-Archive-14.pdf">environmental and occupational health and safety</a> policies are under review by two different set of consultants to establish more robust policies and guidelines. </p>
<p>Legally, efforts are also being taken to coordinate an approach. The <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2017/Petroleum_Exploration_DevelopmentandProductionBill_2017.pdf">new bill is</a> being considered by the Senate. Among other things it proposes a new Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority. </p>
<p>Over the last three years, a technical assistance project has also <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/531591529359535996/pdf/Disclosable-Version-of-the-ISR-Kenya-Petroleum-Technical-Assistance-Project-KEPTAP-P145234-Sequence-No-07.pdf">trained</a> 220 government officers in lead agencies responsible for enforcement of environment, health and safety regulations. </p>
<p>These developments are all encouraging. But it’s important that policymakers don’t adopt a one-size-fits-all approach but rather develop methods that adequately address the specific needs and priorities of the oil industry and the risks it brings. </p>
<p><em>Laura Muniafu, of Strathmore University’s Extractives Baraza, assisted in the writing of this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melba K. Wasunna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya must address the needs and priorities of the oil sector in regards to environment, health and safety.Melba K. Wasunna, Director and Lecturer, Extractives Baraza, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1037892018-10-09T13:59:36Z2018-10-09T13:59:36ZWhat Kenya can do to ensure local people benefit from its oil industry<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239857/original/file-20181009-72124-167dy65.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya needs more skilled local workers who can be employed in the oil sector</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lydur Skulason/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Six years ago, Kenya <a href="https://theconversation.com/oil-discoveries-in-turkana-six-years-ago-havent-delivered-benefits-for-women-100101">discovered</a> commercially viable oil deposits in the Turkana region. The find is <a href="http://www.coastweek.com/3628-latest-news-kenya-oil-finds-improve-economy.htm">expected</a> to boost economic growth as about <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">560 million barrels</a> of oil are expected to be recovered from the South Lokichar Basin. Commercial oil production <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">is expected</a> in about three to four years.</p>
<p>But not all Kenyans are happy. Earlier this year, as road transfers of oil to Mombasa <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">started</a> under the ‘early oil pilot scheme’, the operations faced <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/06/27/no-oil-will-leave-turkana-without-security-and-jobs-protesters-say_c1778927">opposition</a> from local communities in Turkana. As a historically underdeveloped part of Kenya, the find was <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001234391/lokichar-oil-a-blessing-or-curse-for-turkana">expected</a> to bring great benefits to the Turkana people. But they have largely been excluded and are demanding jobs, business opportunities, security and a share of oil proceeds. </p>
<p>Some Kenyans and businesses <a href="https://theconversation.com/oil-discoveries-in-turkana-six-years-ago-havent-delivered-benefits-for-women-100101">have</a> gained employment or business contracts, but it’s not enough. British oil exploration company, Tullow Oil, the first to discover oil in Kenya, has <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">a history</a> of discovering significant oil resources in East Africa. By the end of 2017, 30% of the company’s supplier spend was with <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/Media/docs/default-source/3_investors/tullow-oil-plc-2017-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2">Kenyan businesses</a>, down from 33% in 2016. The bulk goes to foreign companies. Though Tullow Oil does work with some Kenyan firms – like Kapese Transporters and Lopii Contractors – the company has <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/Media/docs/default-source/3_investors/tullow-oil-plc-2017-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2">slowed down</a> on contracting local suppliers.</p>
<p>It is crucial that Kenya figures out how to encourage <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=87a225c8-cb72-47d2-929c-6c8ab8324383">the participation of Kenyans</a> in the oil sector through the use of local labour, goods and services. This was the topic at a <a href="http://www.extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/epwg/Kenya-Extractives-Policy-Dialogues-2-Local-Content-Discussion-Paper.pdf">recent forum</a> hosted by the <a href="https://www.extractives-baraza.com/">Extractives Baraza</a> – an information centre for the extractives sector based at Strathmore University – in Nairobi. </p>
<p>Major constraints that prevent Kenyans – particularly communities around the oilfields – from benefiting from the oil sector include: a <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/E4D_SOGA_Brochure-Web-high_resolution.pdf">lack of</a> specialised training or technical skills, <a href="https://www.extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/4209">a lack of</a> access to credit which would increase the competitiveness of small-to-medium businesses, low quality of local goods and services and a <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000207205/no-road-no-oil-turkana-leaders-threaten">lack of modern roads and highways</a> to link the Turkana region with other parts of the country.</p>
<h2>The challenges</h2>
<p>In terms of human capital, Kenya <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Human_Capital_Report_2017.pdf">ranks poorly</a> in the development of future skills (101 out of 130 countries according to the World Economic Forum) and in the use of specialised skills at work (74 of 130). </p>
<p>Tullow Oil <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/Media/docs/default-source/3_investors/tullow-oil-plc-2017-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2">cited this</a> burgeoning skills gap as the main reason for not including more locals in its workforce. This challenge is most <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-a-massive-skills-gap-how-it-can-fix-the-problem-91170">severe for technical and vocational skills </a> like welding, drilling, repair of heavy equipment and <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/05/31/tullow-picks-uk-firm-for-key-oil-pipeline-job_c1765859">pipeline design</a>– all in <a href="http://www.lundinfoundation.org/education-and-skills-training">demand</a> in the oil sector. </p>
<p>But human capital isn’t the only problem. <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Manufacturing-in-Kenya-Anzetse-Were.pdf">The low quality</a> of locally manufactured or available goods and services, compared to their high costs, has <a href="http://kam.co.ke/sme-development/">allowed</a> imported products to take over a large market share in Kenya. This could be attributed to a <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/analysis/Why-we-need-local-content-policy-now/539548-2754394-doyou4z/index.html">lack of understanding</a> as to what the oil sector needs in comparison to what is locally available. Local manufacturers also <a href="http://kam.co.ke/sme-development/">use obsolete technology</a> and there’s a low level of innovation.</p>
<p>A final, big challenge is the <a href="https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2015/february/24/local-content-in-kenyas-oil-and-gas-industry">lack</a> of a robust legal framework to promote local participation. For instance, the <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20308">Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1986</a> includes an obligation for contractors to give preference to locally available goods and services, and that Kenyan nationals be prioritised in employment and training. But the Act doesn’t provide for targets, outlining how much local representation is needed. It also doesn’t provide for monitoring or reporting. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>There needs to be a clear strategy to ensure <a href="http://www.extractives-baraza.com/assets/content/PDF/epwg/Kenya-Extractives-Policy-Dialogues-2-Local-Content-Discussion-Paper.pdf">local participation</a> in the oil sector. </p>
<p>To start with, the entire oil value chain must be assessed to identify which areas need to be focused on. This will reveal the size and capacity of local businesses, the capabilities of the local workforce, level of participation, and supplier landscape. </p>
<p>Skills need to be developed and there must be a requirement for investors to publicly certify that a local expert is not available before importing skills. </p>
<p>Local manufacturers must adopt modern technology and innovative solutions to produce products that align with the quality of goods and services needed in the sector.</p>
<p>Partnerships between the private sector, government (national and county) and academia are critical to bridge the knowledge gap. This will create awareness, ensure that training curricula and facilities are fit-for-purpose, and pool available skills and expertise. </p>
<p>Joint ventures between international companies and local companies are also critical for building links and transferring technology and skills. </p>
<p>Finally, the government must offer legal protection against unfair contractual arrangements, and guarantee recovery of delayed payments for local businesses. It should create a level playing field for local businesses to participate, for instance; by simplifying and fast-tracking business registration processes and ensuring equal access to project information for local businesses. Norway, for example, <a href="http://ella.practicalaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20160526-Grupo-Faro-Local-Content-Frameworks-in-Latin-America.pdf">included</a> a requirement for oil companies to split up supply contracts into smaller parts suitable for local companies.</p>
<p><em>James Ombaki Kirwa, a Legal Researcher at Strathmore Extractives Industry Centre, contributed to this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melba K. Wasunna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major constraint that prevents Kenyans from benefiting from the oil sector includes the lack of specialised training or technical skillsMelba K. Wasunna, Director and Lecturer, Extractives Baraza, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/922112018-04-19T15:00:27Z2018-04-19T15:00:27ZMillions of urban Africans still don’t have electricity: here’s what can be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209061/original/file-20180306-146650-1kgus7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Millions of people without electricity access in Africa live close to existing power grid infrastructure.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At least 110 million of the 600 million people still living without access to electricity in Africa live in urban areas. Most are within a stone throw from existing power grid infrastructure. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana and Liberia alone there are <a href="http://www.cgdev.org/blog/shedding-new-light-grid-debate-power-africa-countries">up to</a> 95 million people living in urban areas. All in close proximity to the grid. In Kenya about <a href="https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2013/07/15/power-africa-observations-from-kenya/">70%</a> of off-grid homes are located within 1.2km of a power line. And estimates for “under-the-grid” populations across sub-Saharan Africa range from <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/348741492463112162/pdf/114375-REVISED-4-18-PMWB-AfricasPulse-Sping2017-vol15-ENGLISH-FINAL-web.pdf">61% to 78%</a>. </p>
<p>Besides energy access being crucial for many basic human needs, these underserved populations represent a massive commercial opportunity for <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-deregulation-could-improve-reliability-for-african-utilities">cash-strapped</a> sub-Saharan African utilities. Electricity providers could reach tens of millions of densely packed customers without the cost of a last-mile rural grid extension.</p>
<p>So, why aren’t these potential consumers connected to the formal grid? </p>
<p>Urban communities often face many challenges in obtaining electricity access. These range from the prohibitively high cost of a connection, to the challenges of informal housing, the impact of power theft on services and socio-political marginalisation. In many cases, these obstacles are difficult to address successfully. </p>
<p>However, recent advances in distributed renewable energy technologies mean a more affordable, faster to deploy, cleaner alternative is at hand in Africa. One that can step in where policy and utility reforms are wanting. </p>
<h2>Barriers to grid connections</h2>
<p>One of the major barriers to electrification is the cost of a grid connection. A grid connection in Kenya, for instance, is estimated at <a href="http://dil.berkeley.edu/electrification-for-under-grid-households-in-rural-kenya-five-questions-for-ken-lee/">USD
$ 400 per household</a>. This is nearly one-third of the average per capita <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/gdp-per-capita">income</a> of a Kenyan.</p>
<p>Beyond pure cost barriers, urban communities often can’t access energy services for <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2512?WT.ec_id=NCLIMATE-201504&spMailingID=48302515&spUserID=ODkwMTM2NjQyMAS2&spJobID=643211240&spReportId=NjQzMjExMjQwS0">other</a> socio-economic reasons. For instance, not being metered because they <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21721141-making-slums-less-exploitative-may-be-africas-biggest-challenge-exploitation-and">don’t have</a> a formal address. Or living in in an area that is difficult to service – such as near flood plains or in informal housing settlements. </p>
<p>Corruption among electricity service providers, power theft by customers and the establishment of electricity cartels also complicates and limits electricity access. </p>
<p>Finally, the utilities themselves face many challenges in implementing reforms to get more people connected. Take the example of the Kenya Power and Lighting Company, which owns and operates most of the electricity transmission and distribution system. In 2015 it introduced a subsidised connection fee of US $150. This was done through the <a href="http://www.kplc.co.ke/content/item/1120/last-mile-connectivity">Last Mile Connectivity Project</a>. In one year, this installment-based payment plan led to a <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/08/17/bringing-electricity-to-kenyas-slums-hard-lessons-lead-to-great-gains">30-fold increase</a> in legal electricity connections in impoverished neighbourhoods.</p>
<p>But the project was <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/smartcompany/1226-3483888-miyytdz/">marred</a> by cost overruns and inflated and misreported new connection numbers. On top of this, newly connected households often have very low consumption levels and low-income customers were often unable to make payments, even at subsidised rates. </p>
<p>Without the necessary infrastructural development, experts <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001233193/shocking-kenya-power-details-of-fake-meter-activations-to-please-president-uhuru">argue</a> that the program puts a strain on the technical, commercial and financial resources of the utility. This means that the programme may find it difficult to generate revenue, recover costs or provide the service intended to new customers. </p>
<h2>Decentralised renewables</h2>
<p>Decentralised renewable energy technologies offer an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-senegal-needs-to-do-to-close-its-energy-gap-by-2030-88575">important solution</a> for “under-the-grid” electrification. They are simple, fast and agile. They have short installation times, and offer a reliable electricity service for informal settlements. </p>
<p>Pay-as-you-go solar systems and appliances, for example, <a href="http://www.wri.org/publication/stimulating-pay-you-go-energy-access-kenya-and-tanzania-role-development-finance">can provide</a> a much lower barrier to entry. Compared to the high upfront connection costs noted earlier in Kenya, a 15-watt solar home system costs <a href="http://www.wri.org/publication/stimulating-pay-you-go-energy-access-kenya-and-tanzania-role-development-finance">on average</a> USD $9 per month for 36 months after which point the household owns its system. </p>
<p>The renewable energy sector recognises this under-the-grid market. In fact, <a href="https://www.kenyacic.org/sites/default/files/publications/KCIC%20Solar%20Survey-3.pdf">about 35%</a> of solar lighting product sales in Kenya are made in peri-urban areas. And it’s a good bet. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2889673">Evidence</a> shows that the willingness to pay for decentralised renewables is much higher than a grid connection because they are seen as more reliable. </p>
<p><a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/532f79fae4b07e365baf1c64/t/58e3f73ce4fcb5a3a0989855/1491334979777/Decentralized-Renewables-From-Promise-to-Progress-March-2017.pdf">Policies to support</a> decentralised technologies include: integrated energy planning that incorporates these solutions, adopting and enforcing product quality control standards and providing financial incentives – like reduced import duties for products or local loan and grant programs.</p>
<p>These solutions show that with the right approach, and simple innovations, Africa’s prospective urban customers can finally get access to electricity.</p>
<p><em>Ben Attia, a Research Consultant with Greentech Media, contributed to the writing of this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92211/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebekah Shirley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are millions of energy poor people in sub-Saharan Africa who live in cities.Rebekah Shirley, Research Director at Power for All and Visiting Research Scholar, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911702018-02-22T14:15:15Z2018-02-22T14:15:15ZKenya has a massive skills gap: how it can fix the problem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205907/original/file-20180212-58352-e9vmhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya lacks skilled welders who can work on a live oil pipeline</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Light Writer 44/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s extractives sector – covering oil, gas and mining – is booming. There have been recent <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001238312/the-billions-buried-under-kenyan-soil">discoveries</a> of commercially viable resources, like oil and gold. The sector’s contribution to the country’s gross domestic product currently stands <a href="http://www.mining.go.ke/images/PUBLISHED_MINING_POLICY_-_Parliament_final_.pdf">at around</a> 1%. But the government expects this to reach 10% by 2030. <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/business/Oil-minerals-expected-to-contribute-over-5-pct-to-Kenya-GDP/996-2044408-6od9of/index.html">This suggests</a> there’s still a great deal to be exploited.</p>
<p>To support the sector’s growth, the government recently approved a <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Govt-inks-Sh7bn-China-loan-for-airborne-mineral-survey/3946234-4079136-4wdafnz/index.html">nationwide</a> geophysical survey that will map the country’s minerals and natural resources. It also enacted a new <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/MiningAct_No12of2016.pdf">Mining Act</a> and put forward a new <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2017/Petroleum_Exploration_DevelopmentandProductionBill_2017.pdf">petroleum bill</a> to provide new sector regulation. </p>
<p>But to realise the potential of these resources, more people with the right skills are needed. The number of skilled workers in Kenya’s labour market <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/E4D_SOGA_Brochure-Web-high_resolution.pdf">does not match</a> the extractives sector’s current needs. Although the size of the skills gap in Kenya is unknown because detailed research hasn’t been done, industry sources have made it clear that they are <a href="https://mobile.nation.co.ke/business/Turkana-Tullow-Oil-Drilling/1950106-2052298-format-xhtml-eg6gelz/index.html">struggling to fill posts</a>. According to a <a href="http://extractives-baraza.com/resources/publication/strategic-environmental-and-social-assessment">report</a> on Kenya’s petroleum sector, the extractives sector is still dominated by foreign expertise in technical, exploration and production skills. </p>
<p>In Turkana County for example, where most upstream petroleum operations are taking place, the <a href="http://www.turkana.go.ke/index.php/cidp-county-integrated-development-plan/">high unemployment rate is linked</a> to the mismatch between workforce skills and new employment opportunities. This challenge is most severe for vocational skills like pipe fitting, welding, drilling and operation and repair of heavy equipment – <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/E4D_SOGA_Brochure-Web-high_resolution.pdf">all</a> in high demand in the energy and natural resource sectors. </p>
<p>If not addressed urgently, the skills gap could inflate the cost of labour <a href="https://www.adamsmithinternational.com/documents/resource-uploads/Gap_Analysis_Report_07_10_15.pdf">because of an</a> over-reliance on foreign experts and compromise energy and mining projects. Industry players need to collaborate and support on-the-job and need-based training. </p>
<h2>Vocational skills</h2>
<p>One major challenge to addressing the skills gap is the lack of quality vocational training. The skills needed in energy and mining sectors in Kenya are usually acquired <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/industrialisation-and-trade-corner/post/developing-skills-for-industrialization-in-africas-extractive-industries-17290/">through</a> informal technical and vocational education and training institutions. </p>
<p>For example Kenya <a href="https://moneyandmarkets.co.ke/ps-laments-skills-crisis-energy-sector/">lacks</a> skilled welders who can work on a live oil pipeline. <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/dn2/Plenty-oil-jobs-coming-local-experts/957860-2308600-f1pxgqz/index.html">Most</a> polytechnics (higher education institutions with courses mostly in vocational or technical subjects) only offer artisan welding courses. The welding that is done in the petroleum sector is much more complex. This is a huge setback as Kenya <a href="http://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/upstream/exploration-production/2018/kenyas-oil-trucking-along">hopes</a> to begin crude oil exportation in 2019.</p>
<p>Kenya has <a href="http://www.tvetauthority.go.ke/">more than</a> 845 accredited technical and vocational education and training institutions, but the courses offered <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000212129/why-kenya-s-success-in-extractives-depends-on-our-schools">are not</a> aligned with global standards.</p>
<p>There is also demand for workers with <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/industrialisation-and-trade-corner/post/developing-skills-for-industrialization-in-africas-extractive-industries-17290/">more general</a> business skills, including information technology, accounting and project management, as well as geology and engineering skills. </p>
<p>Most universities in Kenya <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000212129/why-kenya-s-success-in-extractives-depends-on-our-schools">don’t</a> focus enough on practical skills, and there’s a bias towards social sciences. </p>
<p>Because of this mismatch, <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Leveraging_extractive_industries_for_skills_development_to_maximize_sustainable_growth_and_employment.pdf">even when there’s</a> skilled labour, the skills aren’t the right ones, or are inadequate. Employers can’t rely on certificates from formal technical and vocational institutions as a guide to an individual’s actual competencies. Instead they have to verify new recruits’ competencies to determine how much additional on-the-job training is required.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.unevoc.unesco.org/go.php?q=World+TVET+Database&ct=KEN">Other challenges</a> include outdated training curricula, inadequate facilities to cater for the large number of students who wish to undertake the vocational programmes and a <a href="http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/90799">low quality</a> of teaching staff. This all has a negative impact on the quality of individuals being channelled into the labour market. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Kenya’s situation isn’t unique on the continent. Other resource-rich countries like Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria are also grappling with a skills gap in the extractives sector. In <a href="http://saskpolytech.ca/about/organization/documents/needs-assessment-ghana-tvet-system.pdf">Ghana</a> the mismatch is primarily caused by training curricula that are developed with no input from key industry players. <a href="https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/13703/Arfo_Ezekiel_Bangalu_2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Nigeria</a>, meanwhile, faces a number of challenges including inadequate funding, teaching and learning facilities and poor governance. </p>
<p>In Kenya there is a way forward. It lies with developing more, specialised training centres. The Kenyan government has been <a href="http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/?p=121654">collaborating</a> with some private sector players to implement capacity building initiatives to support the oil and gas industry.</p>
<p>And some private companies like <a href="http://basetitanium.com/company-profile/company-overview">Base Titanium</a> and <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/">Tullow Oil Kenya</a>, considered leaders in Kenya’s mining and oil sectors, are taking the lead in professional skills development. This will ensure that curricula, training and standards match the sectors’ market and skills demand. And it will ease the transition from training to employment.</p>
<p>Some higher education institutions are also trying to plug the gap. Strathmore University’s <a href="https://serc.strathmore.edu/">Energy Research Centre</a>, for example, has <a href="http://www.energyfordevelopment.net/">partnered</a> with specialist centres to <a href="https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/E4D_SOGA_Brochure-Web-high_resolution.pdf">offer</a> short courses like energy auditing and technical solar skills. Their approach rests on three pillars: enterprise development, skills development and matching graduates with potential employers. Similarly, <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/campus/best-bridge-college-leads-way-solar-energy-vocational-training/">Best Bridge College</a> in Nairobi offers renewable energy training like solar installation.</p>
<p>But for these programmes to be successful, curricula must be modelled on global standards. The quality of teachers must also be improved and technical and vocational training institutions need to be equipped with modern tools and materials to ensure a shift from theoretical to practical teaching.</p>
<p><em>Author’s note: My colleague James Kirwa contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Melba K. Wasunna receives funding from UKAID. She works for Extractives Baraza, Strathmore University. She is also the Vice Chairperson for the Association of Women in Energy and Extractives in Kenya.</span></em></p>To realise Kenya’s oil, gas and mining potential, the sector needs more people with the right skills to support it.Melba K. Wasunna, Director and Lecturer, Extractives Baraza, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/854362017-11-07T15:34:40Z2017-11-07T15:34:40ZFive things the new government should do to help Kenya meet its energy needs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193388/original/file-20171106-1032-1t5zux8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya needs to expand its energy transmission network which is plagued by flaws dating back decades.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Without energy there would be no electricity to support the economic, social or political growth of any country. But to make it a real enabler of growth, there needs to be enough of it and it must be clean, affordable and reliable. </p>
<p>Kenya faces challenges around availability, affordability and reliability. Kenya ranks quite well on some scores compared to other countries on the continent, but quite badly on others. On the bright side Kenya’s electricity generation is clean compared to a country like South Africa which relies heavily on coal. Kenya’s power mix is <a href="https://makewealthhistory.org/2012/07/09/countries-with-100-renewable-energy/">85% plus renewable</a> based as it relies mostly on hydro and geothermal.</p>
<p>But in terms of <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/power-generation-alone-not-enough-kenya">supply</a> it doesn’t rank that well. If we divide the total installed capacity by the number of inhabitants, every Kenyan would have a meagre 50 Watts if we divided the total installed capacity between the country’s inhabitants. For their part, South African citizens would have 30 times more, or 1,500 Watts. </p>
<p>The inadequate supply of electricity for industrial and domestic needs is due to several challenges. These include the high cost of building new energy infrastructure as well as the inability to get electricity from the points of generation to rural areas which is where <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/rural-population-percent-of-total-population-wb-data.html">about</a> 74% of Kenyans live.</p>
<p>On top of these challenges, Kenya has made a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/24/kenya-pledges-to-cut-carbon-emissions-30-by-2030">the next 13 years</a>. There are five action points that the next government should focus on.</p>
<h2>Support renewable energy</h2>
<p>The government needs to support the expansion of solar, wind and geothermal power generation. The current situation is that wind and solar together account for <a href="https://energypedia.info/wiki/Kenya_Energy_Situation">less than 1% </a> of Kenya’s energy supply. By comparison Morocco has a combined installed capacity in wind and solar <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=fs0Fog7XneUC&pg=PA146&lpg=PA146&dq=Morocco+%2B+wind+and+solar+accounts+for+25%25+of+supply&source=bl&ots=UKSPdzLgoD&sig=VTHJcKnaE5eICo3AzC-2ilNFWWY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwix69vbhqzXAhUH2xoKHeEIB4QQ6AEIVjAI#v=onepage&q=Morocco%20%2B%20wind%20and%20solar%20accounts%20for%2025%25%20of%20supply&f=false">of about 25%</a>.</p>
<p>To achieve this, the government should be more dynamic in supporting investments in the renewable energy sector by aligning them with support from the international community. One possibility is for the Ministry of Energy to run auctions where private sector companies bid to invest in infrastructure. </p>
<p>The government should also ensure that incentives such as tax exemption, speedy approval processes and suitable regulations are available to interested parties and provide a framework for private sector investment.</p>
<h2>Promote solar energy</h2>
<p>South Africa <a href="http://www.irena.org/publications/2017/Oct/Electricity-storage-and-renewables-costs-and-markets">now accounts</a> for 65% (1 361 MW) of the continent’s cumulative installed solar PV capacity, Algeria for 13% (274 MW), Réunion for 9% (180 MW) and Egypt for 1% (25 MW). Uganda, Namibia and Kenya also account for around 1% each, with between 20 MW and 24 MW each. </p>
<p>One significant advance would be to make solar power affordable and available, particularly in rural areas where far fewer people are connected to the national grid. The main reason for this is cost given that grid extensions are incredibly expensive. Mini-grids make much more sense. </p>
<p>Solar could penetrate many more rural areas if government welcomed the support of international agencies willing to avail funds for investment capital at attractive interest rates.</p>
<p>Kenya has taken a few progressive steps. In 2012 it emulated Japan by putting in place a <a href="https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/japan/name-30660-en.php">feed-in tariff</a> under which electricity companies are obliged to purchase electricity generated from solar energy at a fixed price for 10 or 20 years. The effect of this regulation in Japan was that solar power became a national priority and went from <a href="https://japantoday.com/category/features/lifestyle/Japan-sees-potential-in-solar-power">meeting</a> 0.4% of Japan’s electricity demands in 2012 to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2017/01/23/japans-solar-boom-is-accelerating/">approximately</a> 5% in 2016. </p>
<p>The feed in tariff in Kenya didn’t have the same success as fewer people had the initial capital to install the panels to produce their own electricity.</p>
<h2>Invest in energy transmission</h2>
<p>Kenya needs to exponentially expand its energy transmission network which is plagued by flaws dating back decades. For example, power generated from the <a href="http://projects.worldbank.org/P001275/olkaria-geothermal-power-project?lang=en">Olkaria</a> geothermal power station, can’t be used by the households and businesses who need it in Kisumu – about 250 km away. As a result, Kenya has to make do with expensive diesel generators or, as it has done, import power from Uganda. This import <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenya-power-imports-from-Uganda-now-rise-32-per-cent-/2560-3371112-12t3q0e/index.html">grew by</a> 32% in 2016 – from 31 million kilowatt hours in 2015 to 40.7 million kilowatt hours. </p>
<p>The next government needs to seriously invest in expanding and modernising the transmission network to reach more parts of the country and minimise losses. </p>
<h2>Stay away from nuclear and coal</h2>
<p>For a sunny and <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-s-geothermal-capacity-fourth-largest-in-the-world--Report/996-3236228-12j8fq/index.html">geothermally-endowed</a> nation like Kenya, nuclear and coal power are a bad option. Yet Kenya has plans to generate 1,000 MW to 4,000 MW from <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-30/kenya-plans-first-nuclear-power-plant-by-2027-at-5-billion-cost">nuclear power plants</a> in the near future. </p>
<p>There <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/science/add_edexcel/radioactive_materials/radioactiveproblemsrev3.shtml">are many</a> problems with any nuclear plans, most crucially the issue of nuclear waste. In addition, there’s no economic justification for nuclear power as one KWh generated by this kind of plant is <a href="http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/articles/2015/04/renewables-vs-nuclear-do-we-need-more-nuclear-power.html">always more</a> expensive than the renewable options. </p>
<p>In terms of coal power, Kenya has plans to launch the <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/10/04/nssf-eyes-amu-coal-power-project-to-grow-revenue-base_c1646312">huge</a> Amu coal power plant expected to produce 5,000MW of power within a period of three years. With the country’s other options, it doesn’t make <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-lamu-coal-plant-doesnt-make-sense-kenya-has-better-energy-options-78479">economic</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-environmental-impact-of-a-coal-plant-on-kenyas-coast-is-being-underplayed-84207">environmental</a> sense to pursue coal-burning power stations. </p>
<h2>Technology and innovations</h2>
<p>The government should also expand and adopt the latest technology and innovations in the energy sector.</p>
<p>For instance, instead of committing resources to nuclear and fossil fuel studies, it should empower engineers to explore new technologies such as <a href="http://www.essentialenergy.com.au/asset/cms/pdf/energyanswers/TOUM.pdf">time-of-use</a> metering (charging higher rates during peak periods and cheaper rates during off peak periods), mini-grids, smart-grids and off-grid technologies. They should also look at applying the <a href="https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/focus/internet-of-things/iot-in-electric-power-industry.html">Internet of Things</a> in electrification – this is when devices can communicate information about their status to other systems, creating the opportunity to evaluate and act on this new information.</p>
<p>The government doesn’t need to start from scratch. Italy’s national utility, ENEL, for example is supporting <a href="https://www.enel.com/en/stories/a201705-horizon-africa.html">a project</a> called
Renewable Energy Solutions for Africa. In partnership with the Kenya Power Institute and Strathmore University, the project trains young engineers, economists, lawyers and environmentalists to support Kenyans in the pursuit of 100% access to reliable and affordable energy in the near future. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that access, by households and businesses, to sufficient and reliable energy is the bedrock of any modern economy. To get there the next Kenyan government must pursue solar energy, courageously cut ties with old technology and think innovatively.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85436/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Izael Pereira Da Silva received funding from USAID, GIZ and Africa-EU energy partnership. He is affiliated with the association of energy professionals eastern Africa.</span></em></p>Kenya’s inadequate electricity supply is due to an over-reliance on hydropower, high energy and infrastructure costs.Izael Pereira Da Silva, DVC Research and Innovation, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641852016-08-30T16:00:52Z2016-08-30T16:00:52ZLessons from Kenya about what’s holding back solar technology in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135790/original/image-20160829-17880-yukx9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa has the best solar resource in the world.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rogan Ward/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The spread of solar and other modern energy technologies in African countries is <a href="http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/13547/sunbelt-countries-could-have-1-1-tw-solar-pv-by-2030/">considerably</a> low. Despite the global viability and growth in the solar energy market, African countries continue to lag behind. They represent <a href="http://www.solar-aid.org/assets/Uploads/Publications/Small-PV-Conference-Paper.pdf">less than</a> 1% of the market demand for solar energy.</p>
<p>The region accounts for <a href="http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/13547/sunbelt-countries-could-have-1-1-tw-solar-pv-by-2030/">only</a> 9% of the global installed capacity of photo-voltaics (PV) which convert light into electricity using semi-conducting materials. The solar PV technology power generation rate rose from 1% in 2010 to just between 3% and 4% <a href="http://www.solar-aid.org/assets/Uploads/Publications/Small-PV-Conference-Paper.pdf">in 2013</a>. </p>
<p>This is despite the fact that Africa has the best solar resource in the world. Most countries on the African continent receive between 4 – 6 kWh/m2/day in most months of the year. This means that in a day, a square metre of solar panel can generate 4 to 6 kilowatt units of electricity. In simple terms, it could power 400 - 600 10-watt light bulbs for one hour.</p>
<p>In the past, the poor diffusion of modern energy technologies in developing countries, especially in rural areas, was attributed to poverty and ignorance. But recent market dynamics challenge this theory. Mobile telephony technologies, for example, have had huge success in market penetration in the same environments and under even tougher conditions.</p>
<p>So what is holding the solar energy sector back?</p>
<p>There is a range of factors that <a href="http://www.solarbuzz.com/news/recent-findings/solar-photovoltaic-demand-2012-falls-short-30-gw-mark-reports-npd-solarbuzz">affect</a> players at every level of the value chain - from the investors to the end user.</p>
<h2>Four challenges</h2>
<p><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2143123">A study</a> carried out in Kenya sheds light on what is holding solar back. It looked at the choice of lighting fuel in households, education levels and the household heads’ income brackets. It also examined the average household expenditure, ownership of the dwelling, potential grid access, rural/urban setting of the household and the prevalence of solar home systems in the area. </p>
<p>The findings of theat study, corroborated <a href="http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/4316/Louw.pdf?sequence=1">by others</a>, identifies four categories that can be seen to affect the growth of the solar energy industry in Africa. These are: an enabling environment, access to finance, awareness and access to technical support services. </p>
<p>An enabling environment refers to the conditions in a country or region that support the growth of a particular industry. It is mostly a function of the national government and regulatory bodies which can either be a hindrance or be helpful.</p>
<p>The “Kenya Least Cost Power Development Plan” provides a good example of how a regulatory body can fail to be of assistance. In its <a href="http://www.renewableenergy.go.ke/downloads/studies/LCPDP-2011-2030-Study.pdf">latest plan</a> the country’s energy commission makes no provision for the generation of electricity from solar energy resources at any point in the projected 20-year period. The decision to omit solar PV was based on previous assumptions that labelled this technology as too expensive, which is not the case today.</p>
<p>This plan limits solar energy applications to solar home systems, solar water heating and other off-grid uses in rural areas. These are far from the opportunities that large PV systems could provide when connected to the grid, generating cheaper electricity.</p>
<p>On the other hand, a <a href="http://www.roedl.de:10006/de-DE/de/medien/publikationen/fachaufsaetze/erneuerbare-energie/Documents/Kenya-article.pdf">positive example</a> is the Kenyan government’s VAT exemption which applies to all solar PV equipment such as solar panels, batteries and controllers. This reduces the cost of PV systems by 16% and increases the chances that they’ll be adopted.</p>
<h2>Access to finance and affordability</h2>
<p>Access to finance has been identified as the most significant challenge to the penetration of solar energy technology in Africa. The effects of limited financing options are felt by <a href="http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/4316/Louw.pdf?sequence=1">all players</a> from manufacturers to importers, distributors, dealers and end users. </p>
<p>Basically, local banks have <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201411191231.html">high</a> interest loans – between 15%-25% – making it very expensive to buy a solar system. All the savings obtained in not paying the utility are effectively “eaten” by the banks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile foreign investors, who could bring in more affordable interest rates, are <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032113007090">wary of entering</a> the market because of the perceived high risk of investing in developing countries. </p>
<h2>Awareness</h2>
<p>Consumer education is another key challenge, particularly in rural areas. Awareness about available energy options and their benefits needs to be increased. In addition, the hazards involved with using fossil fuels such as diesel and paraffin also need to be brought to people’s attention.</p>
<p>The marketing of solar products and other modern energy technologies to end users has also been limited. This is partly because there is a <a href="https://energypedia.info/images/e/e7/Innovative_Energy_Access_for_Remote_Areas_-_The_LUAV_Light_Up_a_Village_Project.pdf">shortage</a> of entrepreneurial capacity in the energy sector, particularly in rural areas. </p>
<p>Finally there is the issue of substandard products in the market which result in users not trusting the technology. <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:aCPYJ3CwL9UJ:light.lbl.gov/pubs/tr/Lumina-tr12-lighting-adoption.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk">A study</a> on LED torches in East Africa found that 90% of the users experienced quality related problems during the six-month study period.</p>
<h2>Access to technical support services</h2>
<p>End users having easy access to technical assistance is another key factor. The presence of technicians well versed in troubleshooting, repair and maintenance <a href="http://www.snv.org/public/cms/sites/default/files/explore/download/snv_kenya_solar_fact_sheet.pdf">would increase consumers’ trust</a>. But the fact that consumers live far apart, coupled with their low buying power, makes the notion of setting up service centres in the distribution regions <a href="http://www.snv.org/public/cms/sites/default/files/explore/download/snv_kenya_solar_fact_sheet.pdf">unsustainable</a>. </p>
<p>There are a few interventions that could mitigate some of these challenges. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Green credit lines</strong> - The French government, for example, <a href="http://africabusiness.com/2016/08/04/kenya-power-mini-grids/">provides loans</a> to Kenya, with affordable interest rates, which can be obtained to install solar systems. <a href="http://www.strathmore.edu/">Strathmore University</a> in Nairobi is another case in point. It became the first zero-carbon footprint university in Africa by installing a 600 kW roof-mounted solar system. The loan to achieve this will be paid back in 11 years’ time at 4% annual interest. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Tax exemption</strong> - This includes VAT exemption on solar PV equipment and the introduction of concepts such as <a href="http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/kenya/name-24779-en.php">Feed In Tariff</a> and net metering. In both concepts private individuals are allowed to produce electricity for themselves and feed the excess into the grid, so becoming independent power producers. This has been made possible in Kenya since 2012.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Training of technicians</strong> - This is rather obvious: would you buy a car if the closest mechanic was 200km away from you? Such is the case of most of Kenya’s rural population with regards to solar PV technicians. More are needed, within reach. USAID has partnered with Strathmore Energy Research Centre to get 1000 technicians trained in different parts of Kenya. This is ongoing. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>School campaigns</strong> - These are vital in helping to increase photo-voltaic penetration. This was done in Uganda where PV technology and other renewable energy resources <a href="http://www.issuelab.org/resources/2648/2648.pdf">were inserted</a> into the primary and secondary school syllabus. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>To close on a very positive note: all indicators point towards a massive adoption of solar technology in the developing world. All the above mentioned difficulties can be overcome as awareness increases, training is made more available, real and perceived financial risks decrease and the cost of solar technology becomes affordable. In a poetic manner we can say: you may pluck one flower, two flowers and three but you can never stop the coming of Spring.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Izael Pereira Da Silva received funding from USAID, GIZ and Africa-EU energy partnership. He is affiliated with the association of energy professionals eastern Africa. </span></em></p>Despite having some of the best solar radiation levels in the world, the diffusion of solar energy systems in Africa has been very lowIzael Pereira Da Silva, DVC Research and Innovation, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/434982015-06-21T05:31:40Z2015-06-21T05:31:40ZAl-Bashir: what the law says about South Africa’s duties<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/85727/original/image-20150619-3349-l7bm3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A judgment by South Africa's Constitutional Court unambiguously set out South Africa's legal obligations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government displayed an indefensible derogation of its international and domestic legal obligations when it failed to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during the African Union summit in Johannesburg and ignored a High Court order prohibiting his departure. The move has rightly sparked an outcry. </p>
<p>The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants of arrest for al-Bashir in <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/court%20records/chambers/ptci/Pages/1.aspx">2009</a> and <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/court%20records/chambers/ptci/Pages/95.aspx">2010</a> following his indictment for crimes against humanity and genocide committed in <a href="http://www.blackpast.org/gah/darfur-genocide-2003">Darfur</a>, Sudan, between 2003 and 2005.</p>
<p>How did South Africa’s obligations arise and why is the government’s failure to meet them so disheartening?</p>
<h2>South Africa’s obligations</h2>
<p>Two factors form the basis of South Africa’s obligation to arrest al-Bashir. The first is the country’s accession to the <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf">Rome Statute</a> of the ICC on November 27, 2000. This made it a state party to the court. </p>
<p>In terms of Article 86 of the statute, state parties are duty bound to “co-operate fully with the court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court”. To facilitate the <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/1.aspx">ICC’s</a> prosecution, the government was obliged to arrest al-Bashir as soon as he landed in South Africa.</p>
<p>The second is that in <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2002-027.pdf">2002</a>, the South African parliament passed the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27. This law domesticated the ICC Statute in line with the country’s constitution. The constitution states that “[a]n international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution” in both houses of parliament.</p>
<p>Section 8 of the act states that the director-general of the <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/">Department of Justice and Constitutional Development</a> must, on receipt of a warrant of arrest, forward it to a magistrate to have it endorsed and executed in any part of South Africa. </p>
<p>The government’s failure to forward the warrants of arrest for endorsement and execution was a violation of both the 2002 law and the constitution, which regarded the law as binding on the republic.</p>
<p>The government’s failure to arrest al-Bashir flies in the face of the South African Constitutional Court’s <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2014/30.html">reiteration</a> in 2014 that South Africa has a duty to abide by its international obligations. The court ruled that the observance of this duty is of particular importance international obligations. This required the state to ensure that those accused of committing serious international crimes are brought to justice. The constitutional court ruling was unanimous. Judge Majiedt said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our country’s international and domestic law commitments must be honoured. We cannot be seen to be tolerant of impunity … We must take up our rightful place in the community of nations with its concomitant obligations. We dare not be a safe haven for those who commit crimes against humanity.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Obligations not taken seriously</h2>
<p>The legal challenge in South Africa was preceded by a statement issued by the ICC on June 13. Judge Cuno Tarfusser of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber <a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1995566.pdf">held</a> that there was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… no ambiguity or uncertainty with respect to the obligation of the Republic of South Africa to immediately arrest and surrender Omar al-Bashir to the court. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A day later the Southern African Litigation Centre brought an urgent <a href="http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Notice-of-Motion-founding-affidavit.pdf">application</a> to the North Gauteng High Court to compel the government to arrest al-Bashir.</p>
<p>The court ordered that the Sudanese president be prohibited from leaving the country pending the application’s conclusion. Nevertheless, on June 15, al-Bashir <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Al-Bashirhas-left-SA-reports-20150615">left</a> South Africa for Sudan.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding the clarity of its obligations and the efforts by the ICC prosecutor and the <a href="http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/">Southern African Litigation Centre</a> to have al-Bashir arrested, the South African government’s reaction was lethargic at best and defiant at worst. </p>
<p>The only rational explanation of its failure to arrest al-Bashir is that it does not take its obligations seriously. This suggests it has joined ranks with other African governments that have vowed not to co-operate with the ICC. This is disheartening.</p>
<p>The arrest of al-Bashir would have been a huge opportunity for the promotion of international criminal justice and the rule of law in Sudan. Instead, the South African government has chosen to adhere to the view in the African Union that the ICC should be <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jack-healey/we-are-all-africa-the-icc_b_3128864.html">discredited</a>. This is argued on the basis that the court has pursued selective justice because it has so far targeted only African perpetrators in its pursuit of international criminal justice.</p>
<p>There is substance in this claim. But this is not a justifiable basis on which to renege on international obligations. The South African government’s decision is one of political expediency, preferring to be cajoled by the political rhetoric surrounding the fledgling ICC rather than abide by international law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Paul Ongeso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The South African government’s failure to arrest Omar al-Bashir flies in the face of the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2014 that South Africa has a duty to abide by its international obligations.John Paul Ongeso, Lecturer, Strathmore Law School, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.