tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/university-of-antwerp-2454/articlesThe University of Antwerp2024-02-28T15:40:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244202024-02-28T15:40:23Z2024-02-28T15:40:23ZColère des agriculteurs européens : traiter l’origine des maux pour éviter la polarisation<p>Jeudi 1<sup>er</sup> février, j’ai assisté, à Bruxelles, à la manifestation des agriculteurs autour du Parlement européen. À un kilomètre de la place Luxembourg, je voyais déjà les longues files de tracteurs portant des plaques d’immatriculation belges, françaises et néerlandaises. Klaxons et pneus brûlés saturaient mes sens à mesure que je m’approchais du cœur de la manifestation.</p>
<h2>Voix multiples et dissonantes</h2>
<p>En tant que juriste, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=mN-xJAMAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">j’ai passé les dernières années</a> à étudier la façon dont le droit économique européen et international peut saper les tentatives de mise en place de systèmes alimentaires durables. J’étais donc impatient de participer à cette « manifestation des agriculteurs ». Cependant, une fois sur place, j’ai dû nuancer l’idée que je me faisais de cet événement, plus complexe que je l’avais imaginé.</p>
<p>Derrière l’uniformité des tracteurs, la place rassemblait des identités bien différentes, chacune conservant sa spécificité tout en contribuant à la visibilité de l’action collective. Vue d’en haut, la place aurait ressemblé à un patchwork de gilets bleus, jaunes et verts, traversé de ballons jaunes, et éclaboussé ici et là de copieux tas de fumier, de banderoles vertes et jaunes de syndicats et de groupes de gauche, ainsi que de drapeaux belges et flamands exprimant des aspirations nationalistes.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Certains des agriculteurs les plus progressistes montent sur scène le 1ᵉʳ février à Bruxelles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomaso Ferrando</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>En réalité, il y avait au moins deux manifestations en une.</p>
<p>Près de l’entrée, une bannière recouvrant la statue de John Cockerill, un industriel d’origine anglaise, appelait les agriculteurs à « dire non au despotisme » et à s’organiser contre les mesures prises par l’UE au nom de la protection de l’environnement. Du côté du jardin central, des membres d’une confédération agricole italienne donnaient des interviews sur la nécessité de libéraliser les nouvelles technologies génomiques pour stimuler la productivité, tandis que d’autres discutaient des limites des lois sur le bien-être animal, tout en faisant la queue pour manger un hot dog.</p>
<p>Un peu plus loin, la situation était très différente. Près du Parlement, les drapeaux d’organisations militant pour l’agriculture paysanne et biologique telles que <em>La Via Campesina</em>, la Confédération paysanne et le <em>Forum Boeren</em> flottaient aux côtés de ceux d’<em>Extinction Rebellion</em> et de <em>Grandparents for Climate</em>. Depuis la scène, les orateurs exhortaient le public et les décideurs politiques à s’attaquer au pouvoir des distributeurs, à la concentration du marché, aux prix bas et à l’exploitation de la main-d’œuvre.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">La place Luxembourg, à Bruxelles, le 1ᵉʳ février 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomaso Ferrando</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Si nous voulons vraiment tirer des leçons de ce qui se passe et élaborer des réponses politiques, il est essentiel de reconnaître que la <a href="https://vientosur.info/el-enfado-en-el-shared">contestation n’est pas uniforme</a>, et que les visions de l’avenir des protestataires sont divergentes, bien qu’elles découlent probablement des mêmes problèmes structurels.</p>
<h2>Des réactions opposées à un même problème</h2>
<p>Dans son dernier livre <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-doppelganger-naomi-klein-says-the-world-is-broken-conspiracy-theorists-get-the-facts-wrong-but-often-get-the-feelings-right-209990"><em>Doppelganger</em></a>, Naomi Klein souligne que la pandémie de Covid-19 et l’état d’incertitude qui l’a accompagnée ont conduit à des manifestations exceptionnelles de solidarité, mais aussi à un renforcement de l’individualisme, de la compétitivité et de la peur de l’autre. Bien qu’incompatibles, ces deux réactions seraient nées d’un sentiment d’isolement, d’insatisfaction et de frustration, et de la prise de conscience que la société – et son économie – a échoué à répondre aux aspirations de bon nombre d’entre nous.</p>
<p>Selon Naomi Klein, ces deux réactions seraient le « Doppelgänger » l’une de l’autre (les Doppelgänger sont des doubles, souvent maléfiques, dans le folklore et la mythologie germaniques et nordiques) ; mais nous avons tendance à considérer notre double (l’autre) comme différent ou séparé de nous, au point de nous en moquer : plutôt que d’affronter et d’identifier l’origine commune de notre état, nous refusons de le reconnaître. Et cela ne peut, selon l’essayiste, que conduire à davantage de divergences et de conflits qui, au final, favorisent l’extrême droite.</p>
<p>Pourtant, nous ne sommes pas condamnés à la polarisation, nous dit Klein. Si nous reconnaissons que ces réactions apparemment opposées ont une origine commune, nous pouvons commencer à créer un espace commun de compréhension et donc, dans ce cas, à élaborer une vision à long terme pour le système alimentaire de l’UE, loin des solutions hâtives telles que l’<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/von-der-leyen-to-withdraw-the-contested-pesticide-regulation/">affaiblissement de la régulation des pesticides</a> ou l’<a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/fr/press-room/20240202IPR17320/nouvelles-techniques-genomiques-et-transition-ecologique-des-agriculteurs">autorisation de nouvelles techniques génomiques</a> (dites NTG, pour <em>new genomic technologies</em>).</p>
<p>Sur la place Luxembourg, l’origine commune des griefs des agriculteurs m’a semblé bien exprimée par ce slogan : « Free Farmers ! Stop Free Trade ! » (soit « Libérez les agriculteurs, pas le commerce international »).</p>
<h2>Des piliers essentiels pour nourrir l’Europe</h2>
<p>En effet, indépendamment de leurs tendances politiques, la plupart des agriculteurs semblaient s’accorder sur le fait qu’un système alimentaire qui traite la nourriture comme n’importe quel autre produit commercialisable était à l’origine de tous les maux – comme l’illustre le surnom donné à l’accord commercial UE-Mercosur <a href="https://www.veblen-institute.org/The-draft-trade-agreement-between-the-EU-and-the-Mercosur-countries-remains-a.html">« cars for cows »</a> (« des voitures contre des vaches »).</p>
<p>Car, dans l’agriculture, le libre-échange sans entraves et l’obsession de la compétitivité ont entraîné une baisse des revenus, une concentration des marchés, une dépendance accrue à l’égard des distributeurs, l’exploitation de la nature, des animaux et de la main-d’œuvre et l’<a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/652241/IPOL_ATA(2021)652241_EN.pdf">abandon de terres</a>.</p>
<p>Il y a d’autres raisons pour lesquelles la pandémie de Covid mentionnée par Klein peut constituer un modèle utile pour l’analyse de la crise des agriculteurs. Au début de cette crise, les agriculteurs et les travailleurs de l’alimentation furent estimés essentiels, indispensables pour nourrir l’Europe. En fait, « essentiels » signifiait souvent « exploités » : ces personnes étaient fortement exposées au virus, à la fragilité des marchés, et à l’absence de stratégies à long terme pour consolider leur position et leurs moyens de subsistance. Le temps est peut-être venu de traiter les piliers « essentiels » de notre société comme ils le méritent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tracteurs alignés dans le centre de Bruxelles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomaso Ferrando</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Des politiques tangibles pour surmonter la polarisation</h2>
<p>Si nous voulons surmonter la polarisation actuelle, il est essentiel que nous adoptions des politiques qui s’attaquent aux causes profondes du problème.</p>
<p>De 2020 à 2023, j’ai dirigé un projet de recherche-action <a href="https://fassfood.eu/">FASS-Food EU</a>, qui a rassemblé des agriculteurs, des consommateurs, des travailleurs, des organisations environnementales et des décideurs politiques de l’UE afin de décortiquer et d’améliorer le système agro-alimentaire européen. L’objectif était de réfléchir collectivement aux obstacles réglementaires et politiques qui empêchent l’UE de bénéficier de chaînes alimentaires équitables, accessibles, durables et courtes (<em>Fair, Accessible, Sustainable and Short</em>, FASS).</p>
<p>La première leçon qui est ressortie de ce projet est qu’il est essentiel de reconnaître que ce ne sont pas seulement les agriculteurs qui souffrent, mais l’ensemble du système alimentaire : celui-ci se trouve dans un état de crise permanente et nécessite une transformation rapide.</p>
<p>Combien de temps l’UE pourra-t-elle accepter un système qui est à l’origine de <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/meps-call-for-mental-health-initiative-in-farming/">suicides d’agriculteurs</a>, d’insécurité alimentaire et de régimes alimentaires malsains, de dégradation de l’environnement, de souffrances animales et de conditions de travail précaires ?</p>
<p>Le débat autour d’une <a href="https://foodpolicycoalition.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/SUSTAINABLE-FOOD-SYSTEMS-LAW-Recommendations-for-a-meaningful-transition.pdf">législation-cadre sur les systèmes alimentaires durables</a> a été une première tentative de la Commission européenne d’enrichir la <a href="https://theconversation.com/de-la-fin-des-quotas-de-la-pac-a-aujourdhui-20-ans-de-politiques-agricoles-en-echec-222535">Politique agricole commune</a> avec un texte législatif qui aurait favorisé la transition durable de la production et de la consommation de denrées alimentaires dans l’UE.</p>
<p>Cependant, après des mois de retards et de frictions entre les différentes directions générales, la possibilité d’une discussion systémique sur les systèmes alimentaires a été oubliée dans un tiroir de la <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/health-and-food-safety_en">DG-Santé</a>. Nous sommes maintenant revenus à la case départ, avec un <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_417">Dialogue stratégique sur l’avenir de l’agriculture européenne</a> qui renforce la séparation entre l’agriculture et l’alimentation.</p>
<p>Dans notre projet de recherche, nous avons identifié d’autres possibilités pour trouver un terrain commun, dont certains ont été mentionnés sur la place Luxembourg :</p>
<ul>
<li><p>La révision de la <a href="https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/agri-food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en">directive de 2019 sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales</a> pourrait donner à l’UE et aux États membres la possibilité de sanctionner les grands acteurs commerciaux qui achètent des denrées alimentaires à un prix qui ne garantit pas un salaire décent aux agriculteurs et aux travailleurs.</p></li>
<li><p>Grâce au droit de la concurrence, l’UE et les autorités nationales peuvent briser les oligopoles du commerce et de la distribution. Le droit commercial peut également être utilisé pour repenser les accords commerciaux existants et l’impact de la compétitivité mondiale sur les systèmes alimentaires, tant en Europe que chez ses partenaires commerciaux.</p></li>
<li><p>Les initiatives des gouvernements peuvent aider les citoyens à mieux se nourrir. La <a href="https://www.fian.be/+-Sociale-Voedselzekerheid-+">Sécurité sociale de l’alimentation belge</a> en est un exemple : à partir des recettes fiscales, les administrations publiques émettent des bons alimentaires pour les citoyens, qui peuvent être utilisés pour acheter des denrées alimentaires respectant des normes sociales et environnementales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Ces solutions – quelles que soient celles que nous choisirons – n’émergeront pas des dynamiques de marché dominantes à l’heure actuelle ni d’approches purement technologiques. La boîte à outils est grande, mais pour pouvoir l’utiliser, nous devons accepter que la nourriture n’est pas une marchandise comme les autres, et que les protestations des agriculteurs ne sont que la partie émergée de l’iceberg.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tomaso Ferrando ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Si les agriculteurs divergent sur les remèdes à apporter à leurs maux, ceux-ci ont une origine commune : l’alimentation ne peut pas être traitée comme une marchandise comme les autres.Tomaso Ferrando, Research Professor of Law, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239902024-02-21T09:04:30Z2024-02-21T09:04:30ZManifestations en RDC : pourquoi la colère des Congolais contre l'Occident est justifiée et utile au gouvernement<p>Depuis le début du mois de février, la capitale de la République démocratique du Congo, Kinshasa, est secouée par des <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/rdc-manifestations-anti-occidentales-%C3%A0-kinshasa/3134986">manifestations dirigées contre des ambassades occidentales</a>. Des manifestations ont eu lieu devant les ambassades britannique et française, ainsi que devant les bâtiments des Nations unies. Dans toute la ville, des drapeaux américains et belges ont été brûlés. </p>
<p>Les manifestants dénoncent ce qu'ils estiment être la complicité de l'Occident dans la guerre dans l'est de la RDC. Ces manifestations ont été déclenchées par la <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-68275585">nouvelle avancée du mouvement rebelle M23</a>.</p>
<p>Le M23, dirigé par les Tustsi congolais, est le plus récent des groupes rebelles rebelles soutenus par le Rwanda. Il a émergé en avril 2012, a pris le contrôle de la ville orientale de Goma en novembre 2012 et a été vaincu en 2013. Fin 2021, le groupe est réapparu, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/11/15/rdc-les-rebelles-du-m23-ont-repris-kishishe-ou-ils-sont-accuses-d-un-massacre-en-2022_6200208_3212.html">alimenté</a> par des tensions géopolitiques de longue date entre la RDC et le Rwanda. Il a depuis lors pris le contrôle de vastes portions de territoire.</p>
<p>Le mouvement <a href="https://www.lesoir.be/548015/article/2023-11-07/rd-congo-goma-encerclee-sans-electricite-senfonce-dans-la-guerre">contrôle désormais l'accès à Goma</a>. Cette ville, dont la population est estimée à 2 millions d'habitants, est symboliquement et stratégiquement importante en tant que plus grande ville de la province du Nord-Kivu, située à la frontière avec le Rwanda. </p>
<p>Le groupe rebelle a maintenant encerclé la ville, ce qui lui permet de couper les approvisionnements ou de conquérir la ville. La possibilité que cela se produise - comme en 2012 - a provoqué une panique généralisée et davantage de déplacements.</p>
<p>J'ai <a href="https://kristoftiteca.be/research">étudié</a> la RDC et sa géopolitique pendant près de deux décennies. Dans cet article, j'explique les raisons et l'ambiguïté des manifestations. </p>
<p>Tout d'abord, il est frappant de constater à quel point la communauté internationale <a href="https://www.voaafrique.com/a/a-goma-des-manifestants-d%C3%A9noncent-le-rwanda-et-ses-soutiens-/7493979.html">reste silencieuse à l'égard du Rwanda</a>. De nombreux rapports récents des Nations Unies ont largement documenté le <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/19/rdc-les-usa-accusent-le-rwanda-de-soutenir-le-m23//">soutien militaire direct</a> du Rwanda à la rébellion du M23 - un soutien que Kigali lui-même nie. </p>
<p>Un certain nombre de pays, comme la Belgique et la France, ont demandé au Rwanda de mettre fin à son implication. Plus récemment, le 17 février, les États-Unis ont publié une déclaration ferme <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2024/02/19/rdc-les-usa-accusent-le-rwanda-de-soutenir-le-m23//">condamnant</a> le soutien du Rwanda au M23. Pourtant, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/12/16/drc-we-know-the-m23-is-backed-by-rwanda-but-france-has-looked-the-other-way_6007956_23.html">peu d'actions concrètes</a> ont été entreprises : le Rwanda reste <a href="https://www.lesahel.org/tribune-rwanda-un-modele-economique/">la coqueluche</a> des bailleurs de fonds occidentaux. </p>
<p>Deuxièmement, les manifestations actuelles témoignent du manque d'attention de la communauté internationale à l'égard de la crise congolaise. La comparaison avec l'Ukraine et Israël/Palestine est souvent évoquée dans le pays : où est l'attention portée à la crise congolaise ? </p>
<p>Pour Félix Tshisekedi, qui a récemment entamé un second mandat en tant que président de la RDC, les manifestations sont opportunes. Elles permettent au gouvernement de rejeter la responsabilité sur les pays occidentaux. Et ce, après cinq années marquées par des progrès limités, au mieux, dans la résolution de la crise dans l'est du pays.</p>
<h2>L'échec des politiques</h2>
<p>Le gouvernement congolais n'a pas réussi à résoudre la crise armée dans l'est du pays. La région reste en proie à une multitude de groupe armés, dont la rébellion du M23. </p>
<p>Depuis la <a href="https://larepublica.cd/kongopaedia/22042/">Deuxième Guerre du Congo</a>, les conflits n'ont cessé d'éclater dans l'est du Congo, motivés par des intérêts et des griefs aux niveaux local, national et régional. Cette situation a donné naissance à une multitude de groupes armés, estimés à plus de 100 à l'heure actuelle. L'accès aux ressources naturelles - qui sont abondantes dans l'est du Congo - est l'un des moteurs du conflit <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/conflict-minerals-inc/">mais pas nécessairement le plus important</a>. Au niveau régional, les pays voisins tels que l'Ouganda et le Rwanda ont continué à protéger leurs intérêts économiques, politiques et sécuritaires dans l'est du Congo. </p>
<p>Lorsque Tshisekedi est devenu président en 2019, il a pris des mesures pour rétablir la stabilité dans l'est du pays.</p>
<p>Mais ces mesures ont eu des résultats limités. </p>
<p>Tout d'abord, il a permis à certains pays voisins, tels que l'Ouganda et le Burundi, d'opérer à nouveau militairement dans l'est. Cette décision était controversée pour de nombreux Congolais, compte tenu de l'implication de l'Ouganda dans le pillage des ressources naturelles congolaises pendant la deuxième guerre du Congo. </p>
<p>Cette politique, et en particulier la présence de militaires ougandais sur le sol congolais, <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/rapport-gec-ebuteli-operation-shujaa-ouganda-rdc-combattre-adf-ou-securiser-interets-economiques-1.pdf">est tenue pour responsable</a> par le groupe de recherche congolais Ebuteli d'avoir ravivé la rébellion du M23 en 2022. La présence de ces troupes étrangères en RDC a été perçue comme une menace pour les intérêts rwandais.</p>
<p>Deuxièmement, Tshisekedi a déclaré “l'état de siège” dans les provinces en conflit du Nord-Kivu et de l'Ituri, où l'armée a pris le contrôle de l'autorité civile. Mais cette mesure s'est également révélée inefficace. La violence s'est intensifiée. Et, comme l'ont montré <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-stop-using-prolonged-state-siege-excuse-crush-protests">Amnesty International</a> et <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/dr-congo-martial-law-brings-crackdown-east">Human Rights Watch</a>, les militaires ont abusé des pouvoirs conférés par l'état de siège pour réprimer davantage et cibler l'opposition dans ces provinces. </p>
<p>Troisièmement, il y a eu une série d'autres interventions militaires. Mais elles n'ont eu, elles aussi, qu'un succès limité. </p>
<p>Cela inclut :</p>
<ul>
<li><p>le déploiement de <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/01/06/foreign-private-military-contractors-flood-into-north-kivu,109879278-eve">1 000 mercenaires roumains</a>, dirigés par un <a href="https://osintteam.blog/meet-the-romanian-ex-legionnaire-turned-businessman-part-1-3a5fd1f28726">ancien légionnaire roumain</a> à la tête de sa propre société militaire privée. Ils ont été spécifiquement engagés pour combattre le M23. </p></li>
<li><p>Leur engagement spécifique pour combattre le M23, en collaboration avec des groupes d'autodéfense locaux et des groupes armés existants, dont beaucoup ont été combattus par l'armée congolaise. Ces combattants sont appelés <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/12/13/les-wazalendo-des-patriotes-en-guerre-dans-l-est-de-la-rdc_6205635_3212.html">Wazalendo</a> (patriotes en kiswahili). Cette opération visait également à vaincre le M23.</p></li>
<li><p>Le déploiement d'une force de la Communauté de développement de l'Afrique australe (SADC). A la mi-février 2024, il a été annoncé que l'Afrique du Sud enverrait <a href="https://actualite.cd/2024/02/12/cyril-ramaphosa-ordonne-le-deploiement-de-2900-soldats-sud-africains-en-rdc-pour">2.900 soldats supplémentaires</a> dans le pays. Il s'agit de la dernière des organisations régionales qui se sont impliquées dans la résolution du conflit depuis l'arrivée au pouvoir de Tshisekedi. Parmi les autres organisations, on peut citer la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est, la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs et l'Union africaine. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Dans l'ensemble, ces initiatives et ces accords n'ont donné que des résultats limités et n'ont guère contribué à changer la situation humanitaire qui se détériore dans le pays. </p>
<p>Depuis octobre de l'année dernière, le nombre de personnes déplacées dans le pays a atteint <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/rdc-69-millions-de-deplaces-internes-un-record-selon-lonu-2673598">6,9 millions</a> – le chiffre le plus élevé jamais enregistré.</p>
<h2>Le rôle de l'Occident</h2>
<p>Les récentes manifestations arrangent dans une certaine mesure le gouvernement Tshisekedi, car elles lui permettent de rejeter la responsabilité sur l'Occident.</p>
<p>Il a été remarqué que le gouvernement est resté relativement tolérant à l'égard des manifestations. Les manifestations anti-occidentales ont été autorisées à se poursuivre pendant plusieurs jours, avec une mobilisation publique sur les médias sociaux. Cette approche contraste nettement avec la réaction face à d'autres manifestations publiques récentes. Les manifestations de l'opposition contre les <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2023/12/31/presidentielle-en-rdc-lopposition-conteste-par-avance-les-resultats//">résultats contestés</a> des élections en décembre <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/video/rdc-une-manifestation-de-lopposition-interdite-par-le-gouvernement-2684319#:%7E:text=RDC%20%3A%20une%20manifestation%20de%20l'opposition%20interdite%20par%20le%20gouvernement,-Le&text=Six%20jours%20apr%C3%A8s%20la%20pr%C3%A9sidentielle,mobilisation%20interdite%20par%20le%20gouvernement.">ont été interdites</a> ou rapidement dispersées.</p>
<p>Dans le même temps, la colère de la population à l'égard du rôle de l'Occident dans la région - à la fois son attitude protectrice à l'égard du Rwanda et son apparente indifférence à l'égard de ce qui se passe en RDC - est justifiée. </p>
<p>Tout d'abord, les manifestations s'appuient sur des frustrations de longue date à l'égard de la force de maintien de la paix des Nations unies dans le pays, mieux connue sous l'acronyme de Monusco. La Monusco a toujours eu un <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">problème de crédibilité</a> majeur en RDC en raison de <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepers-problem">son piètre bilan</a> en matière de protection de la population civile. Cette frustration a, à plusieurs reprises, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">conduit à des manifestations violentes</a> contre l'ONU dans le pays.</p>
<p>Deuxièmement, un certain nombre d'initiatives diplomatiques occidentales ont contribué à ancrer l'idée que la politique occidentale dans la région n'avait pas les intérêts des Congolais à cœur. En décembre 2022, l'Union européenne <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">a annoncé sa décision de donner 20 millions d'euros</a> (environ 21,6 millions de dollars) à l'armée rwandaise pour ses opérations militaires au Mozambique. A cette époque, de nombreux éléments de preuve attestaient du soutien rwandais au M23. Cette initiative a donc été perçue par l'opinion publique congolaise comme un soutien direct de l'Europe au M23. </p>
<p>Les initiatives diplomatiques ultérieures visant à réparer les dégâts, telles que <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">le même montant d'aide européenne à l'armée congolaise</a>, n'ont guère contribué à modifier cette perception.</p>
<p>Il est également vrai que la crise congolaise n'a pas bénéficié d'une attention suffisante de la part de la communauté internationale, y compris de l'Occident. L'une des raisons directes des manifestations est que lors de la récente demi-finale de la Coupe d'Afrique des nations (que la RDC a disputée contre la Côte d'Ivoire), les manifestations anti-guerre des supporters congolais dans le stade <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/sports/football/dr-congo-protest-censorship-during-afcon-semi-final-4520850">n'ont pas été retransmises</a>. Bien qu'il appartienne à la Confédération africaine de football de décider diffuser de telles manifestations, la décision a été interprétée comme ayant été prise par la chaîne française Canal+. Elle a été perçue comme une nouvelle illustration de l'attitude occidentale à l'égard du conflit congolais. </p>
<p>Cela a conduit à des attaques contre les points de distribution de Canal+ et à des manifestations contre l'ambassade de France. </p>
<p>À l'instar d'autres crises en Afrique subsaharienne, comme celles du Soudan ou de l'Éthiopie, la crise en RDC est particulièrement reléguée au bas de la hiérarchie des priorités des préoccupations internationales, notamment en Occident. Les manifestations contre les symboles occidentaux à Kinshasa peuvent donc également être considérées comme des signaux de détresse : “nous sommes là nous aussi”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Les manifestations à Kinshasa témoignent du manque d'attention porté à la crise congolaise.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238272024-02-19T11:00:44Z2024-02-19T11:00:44ZDRC protests: expert explains why Congolese anger against the west is justified – and useful to the government<p>Since early February, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, has been rocked by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68273900">protests directed against western embassies</a>. Protests took place in front of the British and French embassies, and in front of United Nations buildings. Throughout the city, American and Belgian flags were burned. </p>
<p>The protesters are denouncing what they believed to be western complicity in the war in the east of the DRC. These protests were triggered by <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/m23-rebels-continue-battle-in-drc/7487566.html">the renewed advance of the rebel movement M23</a>. </p>
<p>M23 is led by Congolese Tutsi, and is the latest in a history of Congolese rebel groups supported by Rwanda. It emerged in April 2012, took control of the eastern city of Goma in November 2012, and was defeated in 2013. In late 2021, the group reemerged, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/why-congos-m23-crisis-lingers">fuelled</a> by longstanding geopolitical tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. It has since gained control over large parts of territory.</p>
<p>The movement <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/02/13/dans-l-est-de-la-rdc-l-etau-du-m23-se-resserre-autour-de-goma-faisant-craindre-une-deflagration-regionale_6216376_3212.html">now controls access to Goma</a>. The city of an estimated 2 million people is symbolically and strategically important as the biggest city of the northern Kivu province, bordering Rwanda. </p>
<p>The rebel group has now effectively surrounded the city, allowing it to cut off supplies or conquer the city. The possibility of this happening – as it did in 2012 – has led to widespread panic and more displacement.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://kristoftiteca.be/research">studied</a> the DRC and its geopolitics for close to two decades. In this article, I’ll explain the reasons for, as well as the ambiguity of, the protests. </p>
<p>First, it is striking how <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">silent the international community remains towards Rwanda</a>. Multiple recent United Nations reports have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/12/23/un-report-shows-rwandan-army-intervened-in-drcs-troubled-east/">extensively documented direct Rwandan military support for the M23 rebellion</a> – support that Kigali itself denies. </p>
<p>A number of countries, such as Belgium and France, have called on Rwanda to end its involvement. Most recently, on 17 February, the United States released a strong statement <a href="https://www.state.gov/escalation-of-hostilities-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">condemning Rwanda’s support</a> for M23. Yet, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/12/16/drc-we-know-the-m23-is-backed-by-rwanda-but-france-has-looked-the-other-way_6007956_23.html">not much concrete action</a> has been taken: Rwanda remains a w<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/14/why-us-and-uk-fund-rwanda-while-atrocities-mount-up-in-drc-vava-tampa">estern donor darling</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the current protests are an indictment of the lack of global attention to the Congolese crisis. The comparison with both Ukraine and Israel/Palestine is frequently made in the country: where is the attention to the Congolese crisis? </p>
<p>For Felix Tshisekedi, who recently began a second term as president of the DRC, the protests are convenient. They’re allowing the government to shift the blame to western countries. This is after five years of at best limited progress in resolving the crisis in the eastern part of the country.</p>
<h2>Failed policies</h2>
<p>The Congolese government has failed to solve the armed crisis in the east. The region continues to be plagued by a range of armed groups, including the M23 rebellion. </p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">Second Congo War (1998-2003)</a>, conflict has kept brewing in eastern Congo, driven by interests and grievances at local, national and regional levels. This has spawned a multitude of armed groups, estimated to be over 100 at the moment. Access to natural resources – which are plentiful in eastern Congo – is one, <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/conflict-minerals-inc/">but not necessarily the most important</a>, driver of conflict. At the regional level, neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda have continued to protect their economic, political and security interests in eastern Congo. </p>
<p>When Tshisekedi first became president in 2019 he took measures to restore stability in the east.</p>
<p>But these had limited results. </p>
<p>First, he allowed some neighbouring countries, such as Uganda and Burundi, to once again operate militarily in the east. This was controversial for many Congolese, given the involvement of Uganda in the looting of Congolese natural resources during the Second Congo War. </p>
<p>This policy, and particularly the presence of Ugandan military on Congolese soil, has been <a href="https://www.ebuteli.org/publications/rapports/https-lh6-googleusercontent-com-b-wr-fq4j-bw-o-yap-fc-pyp4p1uv9-uc-6-rusd27hl6v-f-oo-p-wdls75l-z-umwgv-la-wn-cju-gd-ji-l-mj-bswu-9-y5-mzm-1-llz-azq7fvjtv-hxm-bg7y-rrs-43-j-dd-wa-e-aqr-xt5-q-i-i-ee3-v1c-f-poim-tuj4-mu-ua-n-qi">blamed</a> by the Congolese research group Ebuteli for rekindling the M23 rebellion in 2022. The presence of these foreign troops in the DRC was seen to threaten Rwandan interests.</p>
<p>Second, Tshisekedi declared “martial law” in the conflict-ridden provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, in which the military took over civilian authority. But this too was ineffective. Violence escalated. And, as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-stop-using-prolonged-state-siege-excuse-crush-protests">as shown by Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/22/dr-congo-martial-law-brings-crackdown-east">Human Rights Watch</a>, the military misused the martial law powers to deepen repression by targeting the opposition in these provinces. </p>
<p>Third was a series of other military interventions. But these too have had limited success. </p>
<p>They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the deployment of <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2023/01/06/foreign-private-military-contractors-flood-into-north-kivu,109879278-eve">1,000 Romanian mercenaries</a>, led by a <a href="https://osintteam.blog/meet-the-romanian-ex-legionnaire-turned-businessman-part-1-3a5fd1f28726">Romanian ex-legionnaire</a> running his own private military company. They were specifically contracted to fight M23. </p></li>
<li><p>a collaboration with local vigilante groups and existing armed groups, many of which had been fought by the Congolese army. These fighters are referred to as <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/12/19/the-wazalendo-patriots-at-war-in-eastern-drc_6356363_4.html">Wazalendo</a> (patriots in Kiswahili). This too was specifically aimed at defeating M23.</p></li>
<li><p>the deployment of a force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In mid-February 2024 it was announced that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-deploy-2900-troops-fight-armed-groups-eastern-congo-2024-02-12/">South Africa would send another 2,900 soldiers to the country</a>. This is the latest of a range of regional organisations which have became involved in trying to resolve the conflict since Tshisekedi came to power. Others include the East African Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>On the whole, these initiatives and agreements have yielded limited results, and done little to change the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the country. </p>
<p>Since October last year, the number of internally displaced people in the country has risen to <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/record-high-displacement-drc-nearly-7-million">6.9 million</a> – the highest number recorded yet.</p>
<h2>The role of the west</h2>
<p>The recent protests are to some extent convenient for the Tshisekedi government, allowing it to shift the blame to the west.</p>
<p>It has not escaped notice that the government remained relatively tolerant towards the protests. Anti-west protests were allowed to continue for several days, with public mobilisation on social media. This is markedly different from the response to other recent public protests. Opposition demonstrations against the <a href="https://www.egmontinstitute.be/a-quoi-servent-les-elections-en-rdc/">disputed election results</a> in December <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231226-dr-congo-s-government-bans-protests-against-election-irregularities">were banned</a> or rapidly stopped.</p>
<p>At the same time, there is merit in people’s anger over the west’s role in the region – both its protective attitude towards Rwanda and its apparent indifference to what’s happening in the DRC. </p>
<p>First, the protests build on longstanding frustrations with the United Nations peacekeeping force in the country, better known by its acronym Monusco. Monusco has historically had a major <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">credibility problem</a> in the DRC due to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepers-problem">its appalling record</a> in protecting the civilian population. This frustration has on a number of occasions <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/08/23/MONUSCO-Rwanda-Congo-M23">led to violent protests</a> against the UN in the country.</p>
<p>Second, a number of western diplomatic initiatives helped to entrench the idea that western policy in the region did not have the interests of the Congolese at heart. In December 2022, the European Union <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">announced its decision to give €20 million</a> (about US$21.6 million) to the Rwandan army for its military operations in Mozambique. By this time, there had been much evidence documenting Rwandan support to M23. The initiative was therefore understood by Congolese public opinion as direct European endorsement of M23. </p>
<p>Subsequent diplomatic initiatives to repair the damage, such as the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-in-support-of-the-armed-forces-of-five-countries/">same amount in European aid to the Congolese army</a>, did little to change this perception.</p>
<p>It is also true that there has been a lack of global – including western – attention to the Congolese crisis. A direct reason for the protests was that during the recent Africa Cup of Nations semi-final (which the DRC played against Côte d'Ivoire), anti-war <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/sports/football/dr-congo-protest-censorship-during-afcon-semi-final-4520850">protests by Congolese supporters in the stadium were not broadcast</a>. Although it’s up to the Confederation of African Football to sanction such broadcasts, in the DRC the decision was understood to have been made by the French TV broadcasting channel Canal+. It was seen as another illustration of the western attitude to the Congo conflict. </p>
<p>This led to attacks on Canal+ distribution points and protests against the French embassy. </p>
<p>Similar to other crises in sub-Saharan Africa, such as those in Sudan or Ethiopia, the crisis in the DRC is particularly low in the hierarchy of global attention politics, particularly in the west. The protests against western symbols in Kinshasa can therefore also be seen as distress signals: “we’re here too”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223827/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Protests in Kinshasa are an indictment of the lack of attention to the Congolese crisis.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229492024-02-12T16:15:17Z2024-02-12T16:15:17ZEuropean farmers are angry: addressing root causes would overcome polarisation<p>On Thursday February 1, I stood side-by-side with the farmers who had taken over Place Luxembourg and the streets adjacent to the European Parliament in Brussels. On my way, long lines of tractors with Belgian, French and Dutch plates could be seen almost a kilometre away from the square. As I drew closer to the scene, the sound of their horns and the smell of burned tires saturated my ears and nose. </p>
<h2>Farmers’ multiple voices</h2>
<p>As a legal scholar who had spent the past years researching how EU and international economic law may undermine attempts at building sustainable food systems, I was keen to join that day’s ‘farmers’ protest’. However, once I entered the square the idea that I was participating to such an event became much more nuanced and complex. Behind the uniformity of tractors, the square revealed itself as an assemblage of different identities, each one maintaining their specificity while contributing to the action’s visibility. From above, the square would have looked like a patchwork of blue, yellow, and green jackets, shot through with yellow balloons and splattered, here and there, with copious piles of manure. Green and yellow banners of left-wing unions and groups, along with Belgian and Flemish flags crying out their nationalist aspirations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575019/original/file-20240212-22-3jkw1c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some of the more progressive farmers take to the stage on February 1 in Brussels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomaso Ferrando</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In truth, there were at least two squares in one. Close to the entrance, a banner cloaking the statue of English-born industrialist John Cockerill called on farmers to “Say no to despotism” and organize against environmental measures. Further down to the central garden, members of an Italian farmers’ confederation gave interviews on the need to liberalize New Genomic Technologies to boost productivity, and yet others discussed the limitations of animal welfare laws, while lining up to eat a sandwich with some grilled meat. </p>
<p>But there was also a second area that looked and sounded differently. Close to the Parliament fluttered flags of organic organisations such as La Via Campesina, La Confédération Paysanne and Boeren Forum alongside those of Extinction Rebellion and Grandparents for Climate. From the stage, speakers urged the public and policy-makers to address retailers’ power, market concentration, cheap prices and exploited labour. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575025/original/file-20240212-16-q3b7b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of Place Luxembourg in Brussels on February 1.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomaso Ferrando</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Far from a mere matter of urban landscape, understanding the complexity of the struggles that day matters for politics. If we truly want to learn from what is happening and elaborate policy responses, it is essential we acknowledge that <a href="https://vientosur.info/el-enfado-en-el-shared">there was not one uniform square</a> but rather diverging visions for the future likely stemming from the same structural weaknesses. </p>
<h2>Farmers’ doppelgangers?</h2>
<p>In her latest book <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/in-doppelganger-naomi-klein-says-the-world-is-broken-conspiracy-theorists-get-the-facts-wrong-but-often-get-the-feelings-right-209990">Doppelganger</a></em>, Naomi Klein suggests that the Covid-19 crisis and its associated state of uncertainty led to exceptional manifestation of care and solidarity, but also to an entrenchment into individualism, competitiveness, and fear of the other. Although incompatible, both responses arose from a common sense of isolation, dissatisfaction, frustration, and realisation that society – and its economy – had failed many of us. According to Klein, the two reactions act as each other doppelganger, but we tend to look at our ‘double’ (the other) as different or separate, to the point of mocking them. Rather than confronting and identifying the common origin of our condition, we fight. And this can only lead to further divergence and conflict that favours the far right. </p>
<p>And yet, we are not doomed to polarisation, Klein tells us. If we recognise the shared origin of apparently opposite responses, we can begin to create a common space of understanding and thus, in this case, to carve out a long-term vision for the EU food system, away from quick fixes such as watered down <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/von-der-leyen-to-withdraw-the-contested-pesticide-regulation/">pesticide regulation</a> or l’<a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17320/new-genomic-techniques-meps-back-rules-to-support-green-transition-of-farmers">New Genomic Technologies</a>. In Place Luxembourg, I believed I could trace back the common origin of farmers’ grievances to one slogan above all: “Free Farmers! Stop Free Trade!”. </p>
<h2>‘Free Farmers! Stop Free Trade!’</h2>
<p>Regardless of their political leanings, most farmers appeared to agree that a food system that treats food like any other tradable commodity was at the root of all ills. Hence the renaming of the Mercosur trade agreement: “<a href="https://www.veblen-institute.org/The-draft-trade-agreement-between-the-EU-and-the-Mercosur-countries-remains-a.html">cars for cows</a>” deal. In agriculture, untrammelled free trade and the obsession with competitiveness have led to lower income, market concentration, dependency on powerful buyers, exploitation of nature, animals and labor, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/652241/IPOL_ATA(2021)652241_EN.pdf">and land abandonment</a>.</p>
<p>There are other reasons why the Covid pandemic mentioned by Klein may offer a useful blueprint for us to analyse the farmers’ crisis. At the outset of those months, farmers and food workers were recognized as essential and celebrated for their bravery and role in feeding Europe. In fact, essential often meant exploited, and they were highly exposed to the virus, to the fragility of the market and the lack of long-term strategies to consolidate their position and their livelihood. Time may have come to treat essential pillars of the our society in the way they deserve.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/575054/original/file-20240212-18-jef0q3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tractors line up in central Brussels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tomaso Ferrando</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tangible policies to overcome polarisation</h2>
<p>If we want to overcome the current polarisation, it is key that we adopt policies that address the root causes of the problem. From 2020 to 2023, I led a research-action project <a href="https://fassfood.eu/">FASS-Food EU </a>, which brought together farmers, consumers, workers, environmental organizations and EU policy makers to unpack and improve the EU’s agri-food system. The aim was to collectively reflect on the regulatory and policy obstacles prevented the bloc from enjoying food chains that are Fair, Accessible, Sustainable and Short (FASS-Food). </p>
<p>The first lesson is that it is essential to recognise that it is not only farmers who are suffering, but the whole food system that lives in a state of permanent crisis and requires rapid transformation. How long can the EU accept a system that drives <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/meps-call-for-mental-health-initiative-in-farming/">farmers suicides</a>, food insecurity and unhealthy diets, environmental degradation, animal sufferance and precarious work conditions from farm to fork? The discussion around a <a href="https://foodpolicycoalition.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/SUSTAINABLE-FOOD-SYSTEMS-LAW-Recommendations-for-a-meaningful-transition.pdf">Sustainable Food Systems Framework Legislation</a> was a first attempt by the EU Commission to enrich the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-eu-common-agricultural-policy-56329">Common Agricultural Policy</a> with a piece of legislation that would favour the sustainable transition of both production and consumption of food in the EU. However, following months of delays and frictions between different Directorate Generals, the proposal and the possibility of a systemic discussion around food systems lie forgotten in a drawer at <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/health-and-food-safety_en">DG-Sante</a>. On the contrary, we are back to square one with a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_417">Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture</a> that reinforces the separation between agriculture and food.</p>
<p>The research for FASS-Food project identified other starting points, some of which were mentioned on Place Luxembourg: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Revising the 2019 <a href="https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/agri-food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en">Unfair Trading Practices Directive</a> could give the EU and Member States the possibility of sanctioning large commercial players that purchase food at a price that does not guarantee living wage of farmers and workers.</p></li>
<li><p>Via competition law, EU and national authorities can break up the trade and distribution oligopolies, while trade law can also be deployed to rethink existing trade agreements and the impact of global competitiveness on food systems both in Europe and among trading partners. </p></li>
<li><p>Governments initiatives can help citizens to better feed themselves. Belgium’s <a href="https://www.fian.be/+-Sociale-Voedselzekerheid-+?lang=fr">Sécurité sociale de l'alimentation</a> is one such example: drawing from fiscal revenues, public administrations issue food vouchers for citizens, which can be used to purchase food that respects social and environmental standards.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Whichever solutions we opt for, we will not find them in more of the same market dynamics or in another round of technological fixes. A vast toolbox exists, but unlocking it requires that we accept that food is not just like any another global commodity, with farmers’ protests just the tip of the iceberg.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tomaso Ferrando ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>At the farmers’ protests in Brussels in February, there were some who demanded for authorities to cut back red tape, while others rallied against market concentration. But such a polarisation isn’t insurmountable.Tomaso Ferrando, Research Professor of Law, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224582024-02-07T17:30:26Z2024-02-07T17:30:26ZThe brain is the most complicated object in the universe. This is the story of scientists’ quest to decode it – and read people’s minds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573721/original/file-20240206-26-8guoy5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=299%2C119%2C3586%2C2874&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">HuthLab researchers (l-r) Alex Huth, Shailee Jain and Jerry Tang behind an fMRI scanner in the University of Texas's Biomedical Imaging Center.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cns.utexas.edu/news/podcast/brain-activity-decoder-can-reveal-stories-peoples-minds">Nolan Zunk/UT Austin</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the middle of 2023, a <a href="https://news.utexas.edu/2023/05/01/brain-activity-decoder-can-reveal-stories-in-peoples-minds/">study</a> conducted by the HuthLab at the University of Texas sent shockwaves through the realms of neuroscience and technology. For the first time, the thoughts and impressions of people unable to communicate with the outside world were translated into continuous natural language, using a combination of artificial intelligence (AI) and brain imaging technology.</p>
<p>This is the closest science has yet come to reading someone’s mind. While advances in neuroimaging over the past two decades have enabled non-responsive and minimally conscious patients to control a computer cursor with their brain, HuthLab’s research is a significant step closer towards accessing people’s actual thoughts. As Alexander Huth, the neuroscientist who co-led the research, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/science/ai-speech-language.html">told the New York Times</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This isn’t just a language stimulus. We’re getting at meaning – something about the idea of what’s happening. And the fact that’s possible is very exciting.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Combining AI and brain-scanning technology, the team created a non-invasive brain decoder capable of <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.09.29.509744v1">reconstructing continuous natural language</a> among people otherwise unable to communicate with the outside world. The development of such technology – and the parallel development of <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2516-1091/ac23e6/meta">brain-controlled motor prosthetics</a> that enable paralysed patients to achieve some renewed mobility – holds tremendous prospects for people suffering from neurological diseases including <a href="https://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-information/disorders/locked-syndrome#:%7E:text=Locked%2Din%20syndrome%20is%20a,communicate%20with%20blinking%20eye%20movements">locked-in syndrome</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/quadriplegia">quadriplegia</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/9YLvDAqDJAE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Report on HuthLab’s ‘mind reading’ research by CBS Austin.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the longer term, this could lead to wider public applications such as fitbit-style <a href="https://insider.fitt.co/a-50k-fitbit-for-your-brain/">health monitors for the brain</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-94544-6_4">brain-controlled smartphones</a>. On January 29, Elon Musk <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1752098683024220632">announced</a> that his Neuralink tech startup had implanted a chip in a human brain for the first time. He had previously told followers that Neuralink’s first product, <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1752118131579867417">Telepathy</a>, would one day allow people to control their phones or computers “just by thinking”.</p>
<p>But alongside such technological developments come major <a href="https://theconversation.com/mri-scans-and-ai-technology-really-could-read-what-were-thinking-the-implications-are-terrifying-205503">ethical and legal concerns</a>. It’s not only privacy but the <a href="https://theconversation.com/freedom-of-thought-is-being-threatened-by-states-big-tech-and-even-ourselves-heres-what-we-can-do-to-protect-it-220266">very identity of people</a> that may be at risk. As we enter this new era of so-called <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2408019-mind-reading-ai-can-translate-brainwaves-into-written-text/#:%7E:text=Using%20only%20a%20sensor%2Dfilled,person's%20thoughts%20into%20written%20words.">mind-reading technology</a>, we will also need to consider how to prevent its potential to help people being outweighed by its potential to do harm.</p>
<h2>Humanity’s greatest mapping challenge</h2>
<p>The brain is the <a href="https://today.uconn.edu/2018/03/complicated-object-universe/">most complicated object in the universe</a>. It contains more than 89 billion neurons, each connected to around 7,000 other neurons that send between ten and 100 signals every second. The development of AI was based on the brain and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ai-will-soon-become-impossible-for-humans-to-comprehend-the-story-of-neural-networks-tells-us-why-199456">concept of neurons working together</a>. Now, the way AI works with deep learning is helping us understand much more clearly how the brain works.</p>
<p>By fully mapping the structure and function of a healthy human brain, we can determine with great precision what goes awry in diseases of the brain and mind. In 2009, <a href="https://humanconnectome.org/">the Human Connectome Project</a> was launched by the US National Institute of Health with the goal of building a map of the structure and function of a healthy human brain. Similar initiatives were launched in Europe in 2013 (<a href="http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/">the Human Brain Project</a>) and China in 2016 (<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0896627316308005?via%3Dihub">the China Brain Project</a>).</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Ud8gOmkxI7E?wmode=transparent&start=4" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Human Connectome video by BrainFacts.org.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This daunting endeavour may still take generations to complete – but the scientific ambition of mapping and reading people’s brains dates back more than two centuries. With the world having been circumnavigated many times over, Antarctica discovered and much of the planet charted, humanity was ready for a new (and even more complicated) mapping challenge – the human brain.</p>
<p>These efforts began in earnest in the late 18th century with the development of a systematic framework for scientists to ask how the brain and its regions produce psychological experiences – our thoughts, feelings and behaviour. One of the earliest attempts was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/phrenology">phrenology</a>, pioneered by the Austrian physician and anatomist Franz Joseph Gall.</p>
<p>While this long-discredited science may now be best known for the <a href="https://artsci.case.edu/dittrick/online-exhibits/explore-the-artifacts/phrenology-bust-1850/">decorative busts</a> sold in flea markets, it was all the rage by the early 19th century. Gall and his assistant Johann Spurzheim suggested that the brain was organised along 35 psychological functions, each linked to a different underlying region.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Across the world, we’re seeing unprecedented levels of mental illness at all ages, from children to the very old – with huge costs to families, communities and economies. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/tackling-the-mental-health-crisis-147216?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=ArticleTop&utm_campaign=MentalHealthSeries">In this series</a>, we investigate what’s causing this crisis, and report on the latest research to improve people’s mental health at all stages of life.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Just as you might start lifting dumbbells if you want larger biceps, phrenology argued that the more you use a particular psychological function, the more the brain region underlying it should grow – leading to a corresponding lump in your skull. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1445-2197.2005.03426.x">According to Gall and Spurzheim</a>, some of these functions (including memory, love of offspring and the instinct to kill) were shared with animals, whereas others (such as wit, poetic ability and morality) were uniquely human.</p>
<p>Throughout the British empire and later in the US, phrenology was used to justify classism, colonialism, slavery and white supremacy. Queen Victoria had readings done on her children, but Napoleon Bonaparte was not a fan. When Gall moved to Paris in 1807 to perform much of his phrenological theorising, France’s emperor pronounced: “It is an ingenious fable which might seduce the <em>gens du monde</em>, but could not stand the scrutiny of the anatomist.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An old shop window with a large phrenology sign" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572529/original/file-20240131-15-j86pu0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A phrenology shop in New Orleans in 1936.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Phrenology_Shop_in_New_Orleans_1936_by_Peter_Sekaer.jpg">Peter Sekaer/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 1860s, “locationist” views of how the brain worked made a comeback – though the scientists leading this research were keen to distinguish their theories from phrenology. French anatomist Paul Broca discovered a region of the left hemisphere responsible for producing speech – thanks in part to his patient, Louis Victor Leborgne, who at age 30 <a href="https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/literally-psyched/the-man-who-couldnt-speakand-how-he-revolutionized-psychology/">lost the ability to say anything</a> other than the syllable “tan”. Today, <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-0-387-79948-3_655">Patient Tan</a> remains one of psychology’s most famous case studies, and <a href="https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/brocas_area_is_the_brains_scriptwriter_shaping_speech_study_finds">Broca’s area</a>, in the frontal cortex, is one of the most important language regions of the brain, playing a critical part in putting our thoughts into words.</p>
<p>Similarly, German neuroanatomist Korbinian Brodmann’s <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/461884a#:%7E:text=Korbinian%20Brodmann's%20Localisation%20in%20the,cell%20type%20and%20laminar%20structure.">map of 52 distinct regions of the cerebral cortex</a>, first published in 1909, is still an important tool of contemporary neuroscience – and today’s neuroscientists continue to ask <a href="https://psu.pb.unizin.org/psych425/chapter/locationist-and-one-network-views-of-emotions-in-the-brain/">some of the same questions</a> as these pioneers: are our thoughts, feelings and behaviour produced by the collective action of the brain, or specific brain regions?</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of different areas of the brain" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=763&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572528/original/file-20240131-15-6poatr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=959&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brodmann’s brain map.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brodmann_areas.jpg">Vysha/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In modern neuroscience studies, hi-tech scanning tools such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allow researchers to map the brain by measuring changes in local blood flow that are linked to changes in local neural activity. This approach depends on <a href="https://academic.oup.com/brain/article-abstract/51/3/310/309681?redirectedFrom=fulltext">the findings</a> of American physiologist John Fulton almost a century ago. Fulton was treating Walter K, a 26-year-old sailor suffering from headaches and vision failure. When using his eyes after leaving a dark room, the patient sensed a noise in the back of his head, located over the visual cortex. This stronger pulse of activity was not replicated by other sensory inputs, for example when smelling tobacco or vanilla.</p>
<p>Over the remainder of the 20th century, this first observation of the link between local cerebral blood flow and brain function was built on by neuroscientists including American <a href="https://dm5migu4zj3pb.cloudfront.net/manuscripts/101000/101994/JCI48101994.pdf">Seymour Kety</a> and Swedish collaborators <a href="https://karger.com/ced/article-pdf/11/1/71/2335730/000047614.pdf">David Ingvar</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24955823">Neils Lassen</a>. Their pioneering work paved the way for modern brain mapping, led by the ground-breaking work of <a href="https://www.braingate.org/about-braingate/">BrainGate</a> – a multidisciplinary research unit originating in the neuroscience department at Brown University in the US state of Rhode Island.</p>
<h2>The first clinical trial</h2>
<p>Prototype brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) record and decode a patient’s brain activity, translating it into actions that can be carried out by a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8979628/">neural cursor, prosthetic limb or powered exoskeleton</a>. The ultimate goal is wireless, non-invasive devices that help patients communicate and move with precision in the real world. AI is critical to this goal, and is <a href="https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/fulltext/S1364-6613(21)00096-6#secst0015">already being used to help BCI systems</a> produce finely controlled, rapid <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1741-2552/abfaaa/meta">motor movements</a>.</p>
<p>In 2004, <a href="https://www.braingate.org/about-braingate/">BrainGate</a> began the first clinical trial using BCIs to enable patients with impaired motor systems (including spinal cord injuries, <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32809731/#:%7E:text=Brainstem%20infarction%20is%20an%20area,provide%20precise%20diagnosis%20and%20management.">brainstem infarctions</a>, locked-in syndrome and muscular dystrophy) control a computer cursor with their thoughts.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
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<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.patientcareonline.com/view/paralyzed-man-thinks-robotic-devices-motion">Patient MN</a>, a quadriplegic since being stabbed in the neck in 2001, was the trial’s first patient. After neuroscientist Leigh Hochberg’s team implanted electrodes over the hand-arm region of the patient’s primary motor cortex, they <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature04970">reported</a> that Patient MN was able to open emails, draw figures using a paint program, and operate a television using a cursor. In addition, brain activity was linked to the patient’s prosthetic hand and robotic arm, enabling rudimentary actions including grasping and transporting an object. What’s more, these tasks could be done while the patient was having a conversation, suggesting they did not even demand the full concentration of the patient.</p>
<p>Other quadriplegic patients subsequently used BCI devices connected to multi-joint robotic arms to <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature11076">pick up and drink from a cup</a> – and in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1545968314554624">2015</a>, a patient with locked-in syndrome was shown operating a point-and-click keyboard five years after the device’s implantation. Advanced decoding algorithms saw their cursor control <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3953">improve</a> such that patients went from typing <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/scitranslmed.aac7328">24 characters per minute</a> in 2015 to <a href="https://elifesciences.org/articles/18554">39 characters per minute</a> two years later.</p>
<p>Also in 2017, BrainGate clinical trials reported the first evidence that BCIs could be used to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140673617306013?via%3Dihub">help patients regain movement</a> of their own limbs by bypassing the damaged portion of the spinal cord. One patient with a <a href="https://www.spinalinjury101.org/details/levels-of-injury">high-cervical</a> spinal cord injury was able to reach and grasp a cup eight years after sustaining his injury.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/cg5RO8Qv6mc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">BrainGate breakthrough video by Brown University.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Then in 2021, the Braingate team reported that quadriplegic patients were now using a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8218873/">wireless system in their own homes</a> to control a tablet computer – an important first step toward a future where BCI devices can help people move and communicate outside the confines of the hospital or laboratory. Furthermore, the researchers said they anticipate “significant advances and paradigm shifts in neural signal processing, decoding algorithms and control frameworks” in the quest to make such devices available to the wider public.</p>
<p>Beyond Braingate’s successes, another team led by American neurosurgeon Edward Chang <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06443-4">recently reported</a> using surgically implanted <a href="https://www.jneurosci.org/content/jneuro/39/22/4299.full.pdf">electrocorticogram</a> electrodes to create a “digital avatar” that could convey what a paralysed patient wants to say. With the help of AI, the BCI decoded muscle movements related to speech the patients were thinking in their minds (as opposed to decoding the actual semantic content).</p>
<p>Activity patterns emerging from the specific brain region that is critical for speech are the key focus for this type of BCI. One expert not involved in the research <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2023/aug/23/paralysed-woman-able-to-speak-through-digital-avatar-for-first-time">told the Guardian</a>: “This is quite a jump from previous results. We’re at a tipping point.”</p>
<h2>A new era of ‘mind reading’ technology</h2>
<p>Brain activity has long been recorded by non-invasive imaging methods such as fMRI and electroencephalography (EEG). But having been primarily envisaged as a tool for diagnostics and monitoring, it is now also a core element of the latest neural communication and prosthetic devices.</p>
<p>A landmark moment came in 2012, when a team led by Canada-based neuroscientist <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvUvY_JrUgA">Adrian Owen</a> used neuroimaging to establish a <a href="https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/75999517/Sorger_2012_Brain_computer_interfaces_for_communcication_with.pdf">line of communication</a> with people suffering from <a href="https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/disorders-of-consciousness/">disorders of consciousness</a>. Despite being behaviourally non-responsive and minimally conscious, these patients were able to answer yes-or-no questions just by using their minds. For patients unable to communicate via facial or eye movements (methods that had been available to locked-in patients for many years), this was a very promising evolution.</p>
<p>Now, a decade on, the <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.09.29.509744v1.full">HuthLab research</a> at the University of Texas constitutes a paradigmatic shift in the evolution of communication-enabling neuroimaging systems.</p>
<p>In the study’s first stage, participants were placed in an fMRI scanner and their brain activity was recorded while they listened to 16 hours of podcasts (the model training dataset consisted of 82 five to 15-minute stories taken from the <a href="https://themoth.org/radio-hour">Moth Radio Hour</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/column/modern-love-podcast">Modern Love)</a>. This brain activity data was then linked to audio fragments the participants were listening to, in order to map what their brain activity patterns looked like when they had specific semantic content in their minds.</p>
<p>Next, the same participants were exposed to new audio fragments they had never heard before, or alternatively were asked to imagine a story. The decoder was then applied to this new set of brain activity data, to “reconstruct” the stories the participants had been listening to or imagining – with some <a href="https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.09.29.509744v1.full">striking results</a>. For instance, when a patient was played this audio:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I don’t have my driver’s licence yet and I just jumped out right when I needed to, and she says: ‘Well, why don’t you come back to my house and I’ll give you a ride?’ I say OK.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>… the decoder reconstructed it as follows:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>She is not ready – she has not even started to learn to drive, yet I had to push her out of the car. I said: ‘We will take her home now’ and she agreed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While there were also a considerable number of mistakes over the entirety of the trial, the reconstruction of continuous language solely on the base of brain activity patterns, including some exact word matches, is arguably the closest we have yet come to truly reading someone’s thoughts.</p>
<p>Whereas the brain’s capacity to produce motor intentions is shared across species, the ability to produce and perceive language is uniquely human. Thus, decoding actual semantic content from brain activity in regions used in language perception (primarily the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11109/#:%7E:text=The%20association%20cortices%20include%20most,and%20the%20generation%20of%20behavior.">association</a> and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK499919/">prefrontal</a> regions of the brain’s cortex) seems more fundamental to what makes us human.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Columns of text comparing actual words with those decoded by the HuthLab brain technology" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=201&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=201&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=201&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=252&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=252&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572526/original/file-20240131-19-2rcmmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=252&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Semantic examples from the HuthLab study.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">UT Austin</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Also, the HuthLab study used non-invasive fMRI technology – a form of neuroimaging that measures oxygen levels of blood in the brain in order to make inferences on brain activity. The disadvantage of fMRI is that it can only take slow measurements of brain signals (typically, one brain volume every two or three seconds). The study overcame this by using <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_artificial_intelligence">generative AI</a> language models (akin to ChatGPT) that predict the probability of word sequences, and thus what words are most likely to come next in someone’s thoughts.</p>
<p>The researchers also worked with patients watching silent short film clips. They demonstrated that the system could be used not only to decode semantic content entertained through auditive perception, but also through visual perception.</p>
<p>Importantly, they also explicitly addressed the potential threat to a person’s mental privacy posed by this kind of technology. Jerry Tang, one of the study’s lead researchers, <a href="https://cns.utexas.edu/news/podcast/brain-activity-decoder-can-reveal-stories-peoples-minds">stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We take very seriously the concerns that it could be used for bad purposes and have worked to avoid that. We want to make sure people only use these types of technologies when they want to and that it helps them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The very fact this semantic decoder has to be trained on each person separately, with their cooperation over a long period of time, constitutes a robust safeguard. In other words, one of the major hurdles in the development of language decoders – the fact they are not universally applicable – constitutes one of the strongest safeguards against privacy violations.</p>
<p>However, while there is no risk of a malevolent company being able to read the thoughts of a random person in the street any time soon, there are nonetheless important ethical, legal and data protection concerns that must be considered as this technology develops.</p>
<p>We have already seen the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html">consequences</a> of unfettered corporate access to personal data and online behaviour. Although we are a long way off from neural data being collected and processed at such scale, it is important to consider burgeoning ethical questions in the early stages of technological progress.</p>
<h2>The ethical implications are immense</h2>
<p>Losing the ability to communicate is a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17483107.2022.2146217">deep cut to one’s sense of self</a>. Restoring this ability gives the patient greater control over their lives and their ability to navigate the world – but it could also give other entities, such as corporations, researchers and other third parties, an uncomfortable degree of insight into, or even control over, the lives of patients.</p>
<p>Even other types of intimate biological data, such as that about our genomes or our biometrics, do not come as close to approximating our private inner lives as neural data. The ethical implications of providing access to such data to scientific and corporate entities are potentially immense.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Text of UN resolution 51/3" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=668&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=668&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572536/original/file-20240131-25-g07hqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=668&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">UN resolution 51/3.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/525/01/PDF/G2252501.pdf?OpenElement">UNHRC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is reflected in <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2023/call-inputs-study-human-rights-council-advisory-committee-neurotechnology-and#:%7E:text=At%20its%20fifty%2Dfirst%20session,promotion%20and%20protection%20of%20all">Resolution 51/3</a> of the UN Human Rights Council, which commissioned a study on “the impact, opportunities and challenges of neurotechnology with regard to the promotion and protection of all human rights” in time for the council’s 57th session in September 2024. However, whether the introduction of novel human rights is warranted to address the challenges posed by neurotechnology remains a hotly debated issue among human rights experts and advocacy groups.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://neurorightsfoundation.org/mission">NeuroRights Foundation</a>, based at Columbia University in New York, argues that novel rights surrounding neurotechnologies will be needed for all humans to preserve their privacy, identity, and free will. The potential vulnerability of disabled patients makes this a particularly important problem. For example, Parkinson’s disease, a neurodegenerative disease that affects movement, is co-morbid with dementia, which affects the ability to reason and think clearly.</p>
<p>In line with this approach, <a href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/neurotech-neurorights">Chile was the first country</a> that adopted legislation to address the risks inherent to neurotechnology. It not only <a href="https://courier.unesco.org/en/articles/chile-pioneering-protection-neurorights">introduced a new constitutional right</a> to mental integrity, but is also in the process of adopting a bill that bans selling neurodata, and subjects all neurotech devices to be regulated as medical devices, even those intended for the general consumer. The proposed legislation recognises the intensely personal nature of neural data and considers it <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/chile-neuro-rights/">akin to organ tissue</a> which cannot be bought or sold, only donated. But this legislation has also faced criticism, with legal scholars <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2589295921000059?casa_token=A9_9ASQthlMAAAAA:FXJiHZARnjPp6IjA7jHBqHzrHCAxoTY0s9um1nWWi9rE5so52ssahLBwwwkb5YTQGKR-sznGAg">questioning</a> the need for new rights and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-022-09504-z#Sec1">pointing out</a> that this regime could stifle beneficial BCI research for disabled patients.</p>
<p>While the legal action taken by Chile is the most impactful and far-reaching to date, <a href="https://spanish-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/leon-declaracion-european-neurotechnology-human-rights/">other countries</a> are considering following suit by updating existing laws to address the developments in neurotechnologies.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ybUnmQ05vX4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Chile’s pioneering neurotechnology regulation – report by Al Jazeera English.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the cornerstones of ethical research is the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK430827/#:%7E:text=Introduction,undergo%20the%20procedure%20or%20intervention.">principle of informed consent</a>. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26497727/">Particular attention</a> must be paid to the capacity of paralysed patients and their family members to understand and consent to novel experimental therapies. Patients with a very limited ability to communicate may not be able to answer more extensive questions associated with the obtaining of informed consent, which is often more complex than a simple opt-in procedure. Also, not all potential risks and side-effects (both physical and mental) can be foreseen, making it difficult for physicians to adequately inform their patients.</p>
<p>At the same time, it is important <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-015-9712-7">to keep in mind</a> that denying treatment to a patient whose only hope may be communicating through BCI presents a significant opportunity cost, such as a lifetime without communication, that may be very well greater than the costs of participation in experimental treatments. The appropriate balance to strike for clinicians and researchers will be challenging to determine.</p>
<p>In a burgeoning new era of big (brain) data, longstanding ethical concerns about the hacking, leaking, unauthorised use or commercial exploitation of personal data will be amplified in the case of sensitive data on a person’s thoughts or movements (as controlled through neuroprosthetics). Paralysed patients may be particularly vulnerable to neurodata theft given their reliance on caregivers, and increasingly, the BCI technologies themselves, to communicate and move around the world. Care must be taken to ensure that information disclosed by a BCI represents a patient’s true and consensual thoughts.</p>
<p>And while it is likely that the first advances in neurotech will be therapeutic in nature, such as for disabled and neurodivergent patients, future advances are likely to involve consumer applications such as <a href="https://bci.games/">entertainment</a>, as well as for <a href="https://theconversation.com/brain-computer-interfaces-could-allow-soldiers-to-control-weapons-with-their-thoughts-and-turn-off-their-fear-but-the-ethics-of-neurotechnology-lags-behind-the-science-194017#:%7E:text=For%20example%2C%20a%20soldier%20in,more%20rapid%20response%20to%20threats.">military and security</a> purposes. The growing availability of neurotechnology in a commercial context that is generally subject to far less regulation only amplifies these ethical and legal concerns.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/freedom-of-thought-is-being-threatened-by-states-big-tech-and-even-ourselves-heres-what-we-can-do-to-protect-it-220266">Freedom of thought is being threatened by states, big tech and even ourselves. Here’s what we can do to protect it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Data protection laws should be assessed on their ability to account for the new risks arising from increasing access to and collection of neurodata by organisations and entities of different types. Take the example – for the time being completely hypothetical – of using BCI to infer the thoughts of suspects in police interrogations.</p>
<p>One might say that BCI cannot be used in police interrogations as the error rate of misinterpreting a person’s neural data is currently unacceptably high, although accuracy could improve in the future. Or, one might say that BCI should never be used to “read” a person’s brain without their consent, regardless of the technology’s accuracy. Or, one might say that using BCI for interrogations is justified under certain extreme circumstances, such as when crucial information is needed to save someone’s life, and the suspect is refusing to cooperate.</p>
<p>Different people, societies, and cultures will disagree on where to draw the line. We are at an early stage of technological development and as we begin to uncover the great potential of BCI, both for therapeutic applications and beyond, the need to consider these ethical questions and their implications for legal action becomes more pressing.</p>
<h2>Decoding our neuro future</h2>
<p>This is a groundbreaking moment in our quest to understand the inner workings of our brains and minds. In the past year alone, neuroscientists have <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06094-5">reversed spinal disabilities</a>, translated MRI data into text to <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41593-023-01304-%209.epdf">understand what someone is thinking</a>, and begun to <a href="https://twitter.com/neuralink/status/1661857379460468736?cxt=HHwWgMDSoeqejZAuAAAA">conduct clinical trials</a> to help people interact with objects using thoughts alone, something already seen in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zcz-Hq1NP98">trials with monkeys</a> two years ago. Such developments could all lead to transformative impacts on people’s lives.</p>
<p>At the same time, it’s important to note that research such as the HuthLab study uses a very small sample, and that the training process for its semantic decoder is complex, time-consuming and expensive. Add to this the fact that fMRI, although non-invasive, is a non-wearable neuro-imaging technique, and it is clear these methods are not set to leave a strictly organised laboratory setting any time soon.</p>
<p>However, the HuthLab researchers <a href="https://cns.utexas.edu/news/podcast/brain-activity-decoder-can-reveal-stories-peoples-minds">suggest</a> that in time, fMRI could be replaced by functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNRIS) which, by “measuring where there’s more or less blood flow in the brain at different points in time”, could give similar results to fMRI using a wearable device.</p>
<p>Certainly, the <a href="https://www.neurotech.com/investment-digest">exponential global investment</a> in the development of neurotechnologies such as this, by governments and private actors alike, shows that the world is eager to create accessible BCIs that are suited to function as medical devices, but also as commercial consumer goods. By the middle of 2021, the total investment in neurotechnology companies amounted to just over US$33 billion (around £26 billion).</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/M-slagG1OKE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Neuralink’s first human brain implant – report by Sky News.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of the most high-profile companies is Musk’s <a href="https://neuralink.com/">Neuralink</a>. “Initial results show promising neuron spike detection,” Musk tweeted on January 29, of his neurotech startup’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/30/1227850900/elon-musk-neuralink-implant-clinical-trial">first implanted chip in a human brain</a>. The implant is said to include 1,024 electrodes, yet is only slightly larger than the diameter of a red blood cell. <a href="https://twitter.com/neuralink/status/1716973591684653555">According to Neuralink</a>: “Its small size allows threads to be inserted with minimal damage to the [brain] cortex.”</p>
<p>While this wireless implant is currently being developed as a medical device, aiming at enhancing the quality of life for patients suffering from various neurological diseases (Neuralink’s clinical trial has enlisted people aged 22 and above living with quadriplegia), Musk <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1752119586470949056">stated on X-Twitter</a> that the ultimate aim is to create a device that “enables control of your phone or computer, and through them almost any device, just by thinking”.</p>
<p>Indeed, commercial neuro-imaging devices are already on the market. The <a href="https://www.spiedigitallibrary.org/journals/journal-of-biomedical-optics/volume-27/issue-07/074710/Kernel-Flow--a-high-channel-count-scalable-time-domain/10.1117/1.JBO.27.7.074710.full?webSyncID=cc96715c-8678-b272-ce9d-a31d41322dc9&sessionGUID=467762ac-1ce5-a61d-96e9-9042d3bc6d99&_ga=2.177093349.1194737154.1696754253-1060044912.1696754253&cm_mc_uid=86756417056816967542535&cm_mc_sid_50300000=84585101696754253521&SSO=1">Kernel Flow</a>, for example, is a commercially available, wearable headset that uses fNRIS technology to monitor brain activity. Another prominent player in commercial neuro-imaging, Emotiv, has developed <a href="https://www.emotiv.com/?campaignid=17057185126&adgroupid=138768698289&network=g&device=c&utm_term=emotiv%20eeg&utm_source=google&utm_medium=ppc&utm_content=644974459432&utm_campaign=Brand&hsa_acc=5401365090&hsa_cam=17057185126&hsa_grp=138768698289&hsa_ad=644974459432&hsa_src=g&hsa_tgt=kwd-343485221404&hsa_kw=emotiv%20eeg&hsa_mt=p&hsa_net=adwords&hsa_ver=3&gad=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwpompBhDZARIsAFD_Fp9Pf4GC78tnxQw2h90QpHzibYCJenjkzWEsTArqRrXxCWkfdVmK1VkaAjeREALw_wcB">earpods incorporating EEG technology</a> that are able to monitor brain activity for signs of focus, attention and stress – with the stated ambition of boosting the wearer’s productivity at work.</p>
<p>While the era of big data has enabled increasingly personalised and complex approximations of people’s inner lives through our biometrics, genetics and online presence, nothing has been so powerful as to capture the inner workings of our minds – yet.</p>
<p>But as HuthLab’s research suggests, and Musk’s pronouncements claim, this may now not be so very far away. The dawn of a new era of brain-computer interfaces should be treated with great care and great respect – in acknowledgement of its immense potential to both help, and harm, our future generations.</p>
<hr>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/unlocking-new-clues-to-how-dementia-and-alzheimers-work-in-the-brain-uncharted-brain-podcast-series-194773?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Unlocking new clues to how dementia and Alzheimer’s work in the brain – Uncharted Brain podcast series
</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/freedom-of-thought-is-being-threatened-by-states-big-tech-and-even-ourselves-heres-what-we-can-do-to-protect-it-220266?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Freedom of thought is being threatened by states, big tech and even ourselves. Here’s what we can do to protect it
</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/ocd-is-so-much-more-than-handwashing-or-tidying-as-a-historian-with-the-disorder-heres-what-ive-learned-219281?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">OCD is so much more than handwashing or tidying. As a historian with the disorder, here’s what I’ve learned
</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/noise-in-the-brain-enables-us-to-make-extraordinary-leaps-of-imagination-it-could-transform-the-power-of-computers-too-192367?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Noise in the brain enables us to make extraordinary leaps of imagination. It could transform the power of computers too
</a></em></p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephanie Sheir received funding from the EPSRC (grant number EP/V026518/1). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timo Istace receives funding from Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Vlaanderen.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas J. Kelley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Elon Musk’s Neuralink begins inserting chips into human brains, we trace the history of ‘mind reading’ technology and assess the potential risks and rewardsNicholas J. Kelley, Assistant Professor in Social Psychology, University of SouthamptonStephanie Sheir, Research Associate, Trustworthy Autonomous Systems Hub, University of BristolTimo Istace, PhD Researcher in Neurotechnology and the Law, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177022024-01-30T10:09:59Z2024-01-30T10:09:59ZBurundi’s quota for women in politics has had mixed results, but that’s no reason to scrap it<p>Since 2005, Burundi has <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">set quotas</a> to ensure that the country’s three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa), as well as women, are represented in its parliament, central government and municipal administrations. Its constitution states that women should make up at least <a href="https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/BURUNDI_Constitution.pdf#page=23">30% of these institutions</a>. </p>
<p>The senate, Burundi’s highest chamber of parliament, recently started a <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/review-constitutionalized-ethnic-quotas-burundi-turning-point">process of evaluating</a> ethnic quotas in political institutions. This <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/burundi--ethnic-quota-system-under-senate-evaluation/7210281.html">process</a> is expected to lead to recommendations on whether quotas should continue to be used. Regrettably, the evaluation lacks methodological rigour and transparency.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=hAOjiu8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">researchers</a> with a focus on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=fr&user=9Gwdmm8AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">gender representation</a> in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/search?q=Stef%20Vandeginste">politics</a>, we believe this is a missed opportunity. Gender and ethnic quotas have been adopted in Burundi as a forward-looking solution to sustainable peace. A decision about removing them should be based on whether they have met (or can meet) their goals. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/00020397231203021">recent paper</a>, we examined whether gender quotas foster Burundian women’s political representation. </p>
<p>We drew on data covering the period between October 2001 and June 2020 to determine three things:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>whether Burundian political actors abide by the gender quotas</p></li>
<li><p>the relative importance of ministerial portfolios allocated to women </p></li>
<li><p>whether these gender quotas have had an effect on government positions where they aren’t mandated. </p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-representation-ethnicity-trumps-gender-in-burundi-and-rwanda-104146">Political representation: ethnicity trumps gender in Burundi and Rwanda</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We found that gender quotas have gradually resulted in women being assigned to prominent ministerial portfolios. The impact of this, however, has been mixed. </p>
<p>Women have remained confined to typically “feminine”, care-giving ministerial portfolios, such as health and education, over nearly two decades. They have been excluded from portfolios such as defence, security and foreign affairs. Their representation as senior advisers to the president or as CEOs of parastatals has remained marginal. </p>
<p>Our research illustrates that embedding gender quotas in the constitution can fast-track representation. But it doesn’t necessarily spiral beyond the targeted positions and institutions. This implies that any policy targeting an increase in women’s representation needs to take into account the broader political setting. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13537113.2022.2047248">formal mechanisms</a> to enforce gender quotas in government and parliament in Burundi are in place, they are absent in other important and sought-after positions, such as parastatal CEO or provincial governor.</p>
<h2>Meeting the gender quota</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have been consistently respected in Burundi since 2005. </p>
<p>The country has one of the highest shares of women in parliament. It ranks <a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf#page=18">41st</a> out of 145 countries in the 2023 global political empowerment metric. </p>
<p>This is mostly because gender quotas are compatible with clientelistic politics. Most women positions are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=4">allocated</a> to people related to key regime figures. This has led to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021">increasing assignment</a> of women to key portfolios like justice, health and education. </p>
<p>In theory, one might <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/CBA8C55CF243B6364C5DCE5D0D0AAAC6/S1743923X15000434a.pdf/div-class-title-rules-of-ministerial-recruitment-div.pdf">expect</a> that gender quotas would affect both the supply and demand side of women political elites, triggering an upsurge in women’s representation. </p>
<p>Burundi’s cabinet ministers, of whom 30% are women, nominate individuals to head departments under their jurisdiction. The pool of qualified candidates for such positions has increased as more women take on political responsibilities. Ideally, this should facilitate the nomination of women, even when there are no quotas.</p>
<p>But the gender quotas in Burundi have <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundian-women-want-greater-say-running-country">fallen short</a> of spilling over into quota-free positions. Women are still under-represented as senior advisers to the president, permanent secretaries in ministries or CEOs of parastatals.</p>
<p>Our interviews with political elites and women civil society activists revealed two ways women are sidelined.</p>
<p>First, women are not fully embedded in the formal and informal structures that decide who to appoint where and when. </p>
<p>For instance, women are not in the ruling party’s main decision-making body, <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004355910/B9789004355910_031.xml">Conseil des Sage</a> (council of the wise). They are also not part of the ruling party’s Cercle des Généraux (circle of generals). This is a group of former army and police generals who enjoy a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2017.1381819">de facto veto right</a> to any important decisions. Equally important, women aren’t appointed as provincial and municipal party executive secretaries. These are the career brokers and connectors between grassroots ruling party structures, the party’s leadership and the president.</p>
<p>Second, the ruling party has increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">relied on coercion</a> to maintain its dominance in politics since 2005. It relies heavily on hardliners, most of whom are former combatants in Imbonerakure, the party’s youth league, or Abahumure, party veterans. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13698249.2016.1205561">paramilitary power configuration</a> that has prevailed in Burundi since the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pierre-Nkurunziza">ruling party’s accession to power</a>, the ability to wage violence has become a valued “skill set”. This is a comparative disadvantage for women, leading to their under-representation in appointed positions where gender quotas don’t apply.</p>
<h2>Opportunistic use of quotas</h2>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00020397231203021#page=11">Our research found</a> that women made important gains in high-value ministerial positions, in cabinet positions and in provincial governor positions in the 2015-2020 legislature. Their representation in high-visibility ministries increased, growing their political role. </p>
<p>On the surface of it, it may appear to be due to the gender quota policy. However, this would have taken a longer time to produce the desired effects. In our view, the 2015-2020 legislature resulted from a <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=hrbregionalcoverage-spring2016#page=2">chaotic and contested electoral process</a> in 2015 that was marred by massive human rights violations. </p>
<p>This election prompted key donors, such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government">European Union</a>, to withdraw support to the government. We see what resulted as an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2CB1F142F6235323B08B506601376DE9/S0017257X2200032Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-appointment-of-women-to-authoritarian-cabinets-in-africa-div.pdf">opportunistic use</a> of gender quotas as a window dressing strategy. It was an effort to sanitise a regime that had become an international pariah. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Gender quotas have the potential to increase women’s representation in decision-making positions. However, to lead to sustainable change, governments need to take into account informal political practices. These include the role played by multiple layers of clientelistic networks in accessing key political positions. Women’s integration in political parties’ formal and informal structures would better level the playing field.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Any state policy looking to increase women’s representation must take into account formal and informal political practices.Reginas Ndayiragije, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpPetra Meier, Professor of Politics, University of AntwerpStef Vandeginste, Associate Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216162024-01-23T13:29:43Z2024-01-23T13:29:43ZEducation has a huge role to play in peace and development: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570556/original/file-20240122-20-g5icoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children's education is frequently disrupted in conflict-fraught areas.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Beloumou Olomo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nelson Mandela was a famous advocate for the value of education. In 1990, the man who would become South Africa’s first democratically president four years later <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/24/us/the-mandela-visit-education-is-mighty-force-boston-teen-agers-are-told.html">told a high school in Boston</a>: “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”</p>
<p>The United Nations agrees. In 2018 its General Assembly adopted a resolution that proclaimed 24 January as the <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/days/education">International Day of Education</a>. It’s an annual opportunity to shine a spotlight on the role that education can and should play in promoting peace and development. This year the theme is “learning for lasting peace” – a critical focus in a world that, the UN points out, is “seeing a surge of violent conflicts paralleled by an alarming rise of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and hate speech”.</p>
<p>To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the many articles our authors have contributed since we launched in 2015 that examine the intersection of education and conflict – and how to wield this powerful “weapon” for positive change.</p>
<h2>Education under attack</h2>
<p>Education systems in a number of African countries <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/GCPEA_NSAG_ScopingPaper.pdf">have been identified</a> by international advocacy groups as “very heavily affected” by conflict. These include Sudan, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Central Sahel, which includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, is another region of high concern. In 2020 alone (and before COVID lockdowns), 4,000 schools in the Central Sahel <a href="https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/Central-Sahel-Paper-English.pdf">closed because of insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>Craig Bailie <a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">explains</a> what drives armed groups to attack schools in the Central Sahel, leaving hundreds of thousands of students high and dry.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/education-is-both-the-victim-and-the-best-weapon-in-central-sahel-conflict-148472">Education is both the victim and the best weapon in Central Sahel conflict</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Long-term effects</h2>
<p>Education systems, of course, do not exist in a vacuum. Where conflict meets long-term governance failures, poor resourcing and other societal issues, schooling comes under even more pressure. Ethiopia, for instance, has not only had to reckon with <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">internal conflict since 2020</a>; it’s also grappling with deeply rooted systemic crises.</p>
<p>Tebeje Molla and Dawit Tibebu Tiruneh <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">unpack</a> how these crises are colliding to leave Ethiopian children and teenagers floundering.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-education-system-is-in-crisis-nows-the-time-to-fix-it-217817">Ethiopia’s education system is in crisis – now’s the time to fix it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Rebuilding is possible</h2>
<p>That’s not to say education systems can’t bounce back after conflict. During Somalia’s civil war in the late 1980s more than 90% of schools were destroyed. In the wake of the war the north of the country declared itself as the Republic of Somaliland. </p>
<p>Tobias Gandrup and Kristof Titeca <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">examine how</a>, together, the state, NGOs and the diaspora have succeeded in rebuilding the education system.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-schools-are-kept-afloat-in-somaliland-121570">How schools are kept afloat in Somaliland</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Solutions exist</h2>
<p>Researchers also have a role to play in strengthening education systems. All over the continent, projects that aim to keep children learning even amid devastating conflicts are being developed, rolled out and tested.</p>
<p>One example comes from north-eastern Nigeria, which has been beset by Boko Haram attacks. Margee Ensign and Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob <a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">used</a> a combination of radio and tablet computers to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of 22,000 children forced out of school.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disasters-interrupt-schooling-regularly-in-parts-of-africa-heres-a-solution-156345">Disasters interrupt schooling regularly in parts of Africa: here's a solution</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>In the classroom</h2>
<p>Conflicts seem inevitable in a world racked by many “wicked problems” like climate change, inequality and poverty. But what’s taught in Africa’s classrooms could play a role in solving them. The ability to think critically, and to engage with facts rather than fiction, is key. </p>
<p>To this end, Ayodeji Olukoju <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">explains</a> why it was so important that Nigeria reintroduced history as a school subject in 2019, a decade after scrapping it from the curriculum. Understanding history, he argues, helps to explode myths and stereotypes, leading to a more cohesive society.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-studying-history-at-school-can-do-for-nigerians-165339">What studying history at school can do for Nigerians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221616/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Education can spur peace and development. Here are five essential reads on the topic.Natasha Joseph, Commissioning EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107282023-08-13T09:13:34Z2023-08-13T09:13:34ZHow to grow rhinos in a lab: the science that could save an endangered species<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540701/original/file-20230802-27-i9629h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Najin, one of two northern white rhinos left in the world, grazes in a paddock in Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are several parallel projects running across the world to save the northern white rhinoceros (<em>Ceratotherium simum simum</em>), one of Africa’s captivating and iconic wildlife species. With the death of last male in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43468066">2018</a> and with only two females alive, the species is functionally extinct.</p>
<p>The most famous of these projects is an international research consortium called <a href="https://biorescue.org/en/home-0">BioRescue</a>. It was founded in 2019 by a team of scientists and conservationists under the leadership of the <a href="https://www.izw-berlin.de/en/mission-vision.html">Leibniz Institute for Zoo & Wildlife Research</a> in Berlin, Germany.</p>
<p>In one of its research lines, the BioRescue team collects mature eggs – scientifically called oocytes – from one of the only two northern white females. They reside in Kenya’s <a href="https://www.olpejetaconservancy.org/">Ol Pejeta Conservancy</a>, a privately run wildlife sanctuary. These eggs will be fertilised with frozen sperm that were collected from several northern white male rhinos before their death. </p>
<p>The two remaining females, Najin and Fatu, are not capable of delivering offspring anymore. Najin’s back legs are too weak to carry a pregnancy and Fatu has problems with her uterus. Therefore, the resulting embryos from the fertilised eggs will be transferred into surrogate mothers. </p>
<p>The most suitable surrogate mother would be a southern white rhino as it is the closest related species. But, placing a northern white rhino embryo in a southern white female rhino isn’t an easy task. However, there was <a href="https://phys.org/news/2023-07-embryos-surrogate-mothers-added-northern.html">promising news</a> in May 2023. Next to the addition of five more northern white embryos – which brings the total to 29 – two wild southern white rhinos were identified as suitable surrogates, as they can still get pregnant and are able to carry the pregnancy through. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-for-introducing-rhinos-to-australia-99585">The case for introducing rhinos to Australia</a>
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<p>The goal of producing a new northern white rhino calf now seems more realistic than ever before. </p>
<p>Sometimes people <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-northern-white-rhino-should-not-be-brought-back-to-life-94153">question the funding and effort</a> spent on one species, but the science behind the rhinoceros story is much bigger. Any species going extinct has huge consequences on the ecosystem, and people’s survival depends on resources provided by this same ecosystem. As a recognisable, impressive and majestic animal, rhinos certainly have a role as a flagship of conservation efforts. </p>
<p>Further, joint efforts on one species can provide scientific knowledge that allows for a multi-species conservation approach. These techniques would not only save the northern white rhinoceros, but also other rhino species, related species with a common ancestor, and all other creatures in need.</p>
<h2>Different approaches</h2>
<p>Despite the great scientific strides made in efforts to save the northern white rhino, the success rate of embryo transplantation followed by pregnancy to term is <a href="https://raf.bioscientifica.com/view/journals/raf/4/3/RAF-23-0020.xml">extremely low</a>. Parallel initiatives focusing on different conservation approaches are indispensable to ensure the future of this species. </p>
<p>While BioRescue is collecting matured eggs after hormonal stimulation, the <a href="https://www.wrh.ox.ac.uk/research/rhino-fertility-project-1#:%7E:text=Prof%20Suzannah%20Williams%20and%20her,eggs%20in%20a%20laboratory%20setting.">Rhino Fertility Project</a> at the University of Oxford in the UK is focusing on growing follicles, which are structures found in the ovary containing an immature egg surrounded by a few layers of supporting cells. These supporting cells provide signals and components essential for the development of the eggs. The idea is to make use of the much greater potential of the ovary by collecting the very small follicles and growing them all in a petridish in the lab. </p>
<p>This would bypass atresia, which is the degradation of follicles that occurs during a natural hormonal cycle. As member of this project, one of us, Ruth Appeltant, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/only-two-northern-white-rhinos-remain-and-theyre-both-female-heres-how-we-could-make-more-147608">hopeful</a> that this method had the potential to quickly provide a vast number of in vitro-grown oocytes, or mature eggs. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, it became clear that the ovarian tissue of older rhinoceroses contained extremely few to no oocytes. These eggs were needed as the starting material for the project. Without eggs, there is nothing to grow. Ongoing efforts are now looking to establish ways to localise and process the few remaining follicles in old ovarian tissue.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540161/original/file-20230731-21-xk1xya.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An overview of the focus of different initiatives around the world to save the northern white rhino.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruth Appeltant</span></span>
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<p>This bottleneck led us to the area of <a href="https://blog.uantwerpen.be/fbd/meet-our-researchers-prof-ruth-appeltant/">stem cell technologies</a>. At the <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/research-groups/veterinary-physiology-biochemistry/research-mission-and-members/research-mission/">Gamete Research Centre</a> of the University of Antwerp in Belgium, our group is aiming to produce eggs outside the body from stem cells. These could be used to conserve endangered species like the rhinoceros.</p>
<p>The BioRescue project and a <a href="https://science.sandiegozoo.org/species/white-rhino">research group at the San Diego Zoo</a> in the US are also aiming to produce artificial eggs from body cells present in tissues. </p>
<p>The common thread is turning cells into <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/induced-pluripotent-stem-cell">induced pluripotent stem cells</a>, which are immature cells generated from mature cells, and that can in turn differentiate into eggs. In fact, this process can transform a skin cell into an egg. The procedure has so far been <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature20104">completed successfully</a> in mice and could already provide a kind of precursor to oocytes in the northern white rhino. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-you-were-the-last-rhino-on-earth-why-populations-cant-be-saved-by-a-single-breeding-pair-93733">Even if you were the last rhino on Earth... why populations can't be saved by a single breeding pair</a>
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<p>The collection of oocytes is a really tricky process due to the technical difficulties in reaching the site of the ovaries in living animals. Advanced artificial reproductive techniques using body cells, such as skin cells, introduce a spectrum of new possibilities. Most biological samples stored to date consist of small skin samples, but not of oocytes. </p>
<p>A downside to this approach is the fact that scientists first need to succeed in producing stem cells in the species of interest. </p>
<p>At the University of Antwerp’s <a href="https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/research-groups/veterinary-physiology-biochemistry/research-mission-and-members/research-mission/">Gamete Research Centre</a>, we’re not only interested in developing stem cell technologies based on induced pluripotent stem cells, but are currently establishing the in vitro gametogenesis – or “in vitro oocyte-creation” technique – based on stem cells present in the ovary. Due to a scarcity of tissues from endangered species, we are using the pig as a large animal model. This will give us more in-depth knowledge on how to approach egg creation from stem cells already present in the animal, termed endogenous stem cells. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>When we do not have eggs, let’s create them. When we have stem cells, let’s use them. Researchers now know that samples of the northern white rhino individuals currently stored in biobanks have enough genetic variability to establish a viable and sustainable population. </p>
<p>A decade ago, we would have never imagined eggs could be produced from other cells. This is becoming a reality that gives us hope, motivation and energy to save the northern white rhino.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruth Appeltant receives funding from the University of Antwerp.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rita L. Sousa receives funding from the University of Antwerp.</span></em></p>Efforts to save one species can provide scientific knowledge that enables us to save other creatures in need.Ruth Appeltant, Assistant research professor, University of AntwerpRita L. Sousa, PhD Candidate, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1985202023-01-25T13:05:27Z2023-01-25T13:05:27ZEn RDC, comment l'élite utilise le football pour asseoir sa réputation et se maintenir au pouvoir<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506312/original/file-20230125-22-156gk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Des jeunes jouent au football dans une rue de Goma, dans l'est de la RDC.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>En République démocratique du Congo (RDC), comme dans une grande partie du monde, le football est intimement lié à la politique.</p>
<p>Dans ce pays d'Afrique centrale, les clubs de football ont longtemps été un moyen pour le régime en place de se constituer un capital politique. De nombreux politiciens s'impliquent dans les clubs pour renforcer leur image. D'autre part, le football est également un espace d'opposition politique.</p>
<p>Dans notre <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">récent article</a>, nous montrons comment la politique et le football se rejoignent de plusieurs manières à Kinshasa, la capitale du pays.</p>
<p>Le football a été particulièrement important pour le régime de Joseph Kabila, de 2001 à 2019. Il s'agissait d'un régime <a href="https://fr.africanews.com/2018/01/02/rdc-le-regime-de-kabila-appele-a-mener-des-enquetes-sur-le-comportement-des/">contesté et répressif</a>. Tout au long de son mandat de président, Kabila et les membres de son parti ont cherché des moyens d'améliorer leur réputation pour gagner des voix. L'un de ces moyens consistait à soutenir financièrement des clubs de football. Cela a fonctionné parce que ces clubs ne bénéficient pas d'un soutien commercial ou étatique structurel ou suffisant.</p>
<p>Mais <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">notre étude montre</a> que la politique du football peut également jouer contre un régime. Pendant les années Kabila, les stades de football et les foules de supporters offraient un lieu relativement sûr pour protester contre le régime répressif. Des chansons anti-Kabila, par exemple, étaient souvent entendues lors des matchs.</p>
<p><strong>Football et pouvoir</strong></p>
<p>Nos entretiens avec des supporters, des personnalités du régime et d'autres personnes ont révélé que, pendant les années Kabila, les supporters et les responsables des clubs faisaient une distinction entre les personnalités du régime qui soutenaient le club et le régime. Il revenait souvent dans les propos cette déclaration: </p>
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<p>les supporters appréciaient toujours les politiciens associés à Kabila tant qu'ils étaient en mesure de leur apporter un soutien financier.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee">Gabriel Amisi</a> (communément appelé Tango Four), par exemple, était un proche allié de Kabila et occupe actuellement le poste de général d'armée et d'inspecteur général de l'armée congolaise. Amisi a été accusé d'un large éventail d'abus des droits de l'homme pendant qu'il était <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2019/05/15/il-faut-engager-des-poursuites-contre-le-general-amisi-en-rd-congo">commandant rebelle</a> et <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres">commandant de l'armée</a>. Un article de presse le décrit comme <a href="https://afridesk.org/whos-who-le-general-amisi-tango-four-le-boucher-du-kivu-jj-wondo/">“le boucher de l'est du Congo”</a>.</p>
<p>Entre 2007 et 2020, Amisi a été président de l'AS Vita Club, l'un des plus grands clubs de Kinshasa et de la RDC. Avant 2007, les performances de l'équipe étaient médiocres. Sous la direction d'Amisi, l'équipe a remporté trois titres nationaux et s'est illustrée sur la scène internationale. Les joueurs se souviennent que son leadership leur a apporté une stabilité financière, avec des salaires réguliers et de qualité, et des fournitures en matériels.</p>
<p>Cela l'a rendu très populaire. Lorsqu'Amisi a tenté de démissionner en 2012 après l'élimination de l'AS Vita Club de la Ligue des Champions de la Confédération africaine de football, la direction de l'équipe et les supporters du club n'ont pas accepté sa décision. Lorsque des manifestations ont commencé contre le régime de Kabila en <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20160919-rdc-heurts-kinshasa-entre-police-manifestants-opposition">2016</a> à Kinshasa, les supporters de l'AS Vita ont protégé la maison d'Amisi.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">Human Rights Watch</a> a documenté la manière dont Amisi (et d'autres figures de l'élite) a utilisé les membres de la ligue des jeunes des clubs de football pour infiltrer les manifestations contre le régime Kabila “et <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">inciter les manifestants</a> à piller et à commettre des violences”.</p>
<p>Une association avec des personnalités du régime donne aux clubs de football des avantages, tels que la protection contre les poursuites si des supporters sont impliqués dans des violences dans les stades. Il est donc peu intéressant pour les clubs de s'associer à des personnalités de l'opposition, qui ont généralement moins d'argent à investir et moins de pouvoir politique.</p>
<p>En ce sens, le football congolais n'est pas très différent du football du reste du monde. Il a été démontré comment <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=VIlcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA463&lpg=PA463&dq=Armstrong,+G.,%20+%26+Mitchell,+J.+P.+(2001).+%E2%80%9CPlayers,+patrons,+and+politicians:+oppositional+cultures+in+Maltese+football.%E2%80%9D+Fear+and+loathing+in+world+football,+137-158.%20&source=bl&ots=6GcJZyJ7BE&sig=ACfU3U3YaJGbpHXEt6nnlRXMeLAYfrrpVw&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiorpSsspz8AhUROewKHQ0BDxAQ6AF6BAgHEAM#v=onepage&q&f=false">à travers le monde</a> – non seulement sur le <a href="https://polaf.hypotheses.org/5030">continent africain</a> mais aussi dans divers endroits tels que <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2013.792482">Turquie, Indonésie</a> et <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10117/">Malte</a> – le football aide les régimes à reproduire leur hégémonie, notamment en créant du capital politique.</p>
<p><strong>Football et protestation</strong></p>
<p>Mais l'inverse a également été démontré. Le football a joué un rôle important dans la contestation du pouvoir. Il a, par exemple, joué un rôle dans les luttes de décolonisation au <a href="https://experts.arizona.edu/en/publications/visualizing-politics-in-african-sport-political-and-cultural-cons">Zimbabwe</a>, à <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/kickin-it-leisure-politics-and-football-in-colonial-zanzibar-1900s1950s/A97494FF2D4FEB7BFA1252B4A11A6309">Zanzibar</a> et au <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=N65pbr2hC4wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP12&dq=Martin,+P.+(2002).+%E2%80%9CLeisure+and+society+in+colonial+Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D+Cambridge+University+Pr&ots=2MF69toPoN&sig=6yK6P7RbPAWkvnTOo0XuYu3Tp6U#v=onepage&q=Martin%2C%20P.%20(2002).%20%E2%80%9CLeisure%20and%20society%20in%20colonial%20Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D%20Cambridge%20University%20Pr&f=false">Congo-Brazzaville</a>, ainsi que dans <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24122012-pitched-battles-the-role-of-ultra-soccer-fans-in-the-arab-spring-analysis-2/">le Printemps arabe</a> des années 2010.</p>
<p>Ces dynamiques se sont également jouées à Kinshasa, où les supporters de football ont participé aux luttes de décolonisation. Le <a href="https://dialectik-football.info/16-juin-1957-lunion-saint-gilloise-au-congo-et-la-premiere-emeute-anti-coloniale/">16 juin 1957</a>, un match entre le FC Léopoldville de Kinshasa et l'Union Saint Gilloise de Bruxelles de Belgique a donné lieu aux premières émeutes qui ont mené à l'indépendance. Un an et demi plus tard, les supporters de <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=bF5Vx8cCnrMC&printsec=frontcover&hl=nl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">l'AS Vita Club</a> ont joué un rôle important dans les émeutes décisives contre les autorités coloniales. En 1960, la RDC obtient son indépendance de la Belgique.</p>
<p>Pendant la période postcoloniale, le football a également joué un rôle dans la contestation du pouvoir. Sous Kabila, alors que <a href="https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2018/06/29/rd-congo-la-repression-perdure-tandis-que-la-date-limite-fixee-pour-les-elections">la répression politique s'intensifiait</a> dans presque tous les autres espaces, le stade de football est devenu un lieu important de protestation politique.</p>
<p>Pour reprendre les mots d'un fan de football interrogé dans <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">notre étude</a> :</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Puisque nous sommes dans le stade, nous ne serons pas arrêtés. La police le sait : elle ne tentera rien parce que nous sommes beaucoup plus nombreux qu'elle.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Les paroles des chansons et slogans de protestation - appelés “hymnes des opprimés” - incluaient : “Dieu fait tout pour que Kabila meure !” et “Eeeh, nous refusons (d'être) la machine à voter”.</p>
<p>Pendant la <a href="https://www.cncd.be/RDC-un-glissement-vers-l">période de “glissement”</a> à partir de 2015 - lorsque Kabila a dépassé les limites formelles de son mandat - les slogans anti-Kabila sont devenus encore plus populaires.</p>
<p>L'engagement des personnalités du régime auprès des clubs de football n'a pas permis de surmonter les sentiments hostiles à l'égard du régime.</p>
<p><strong>Contrôles du régime</strong></p>
<p>L'impact de ces protestations sur le régime était toutefois limité.</p>
<p>Par exemple, sous Kabila, les stations de radio et de télévision coupaient leurs émissions lorsque des chansons politiques étaient entonnées lors de matchs impliquant l'équipe nationale. Et fin 2016, le ministre des Sports a <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">temporairement suspendu</a> le championnat national de football. La raison officielle en était <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">“une violence excessive dans les stades”</a>. Mais elle a été largement comprise comme une mesure politique du régime, craignant des protestations de la part des supporters en réaction à la fin du mandat officiel de Kabila pendant cette période. Un ancien ministre nous l'a confirmé lors d'interviews.</p>
<p>En résumé, le football à Kinshasa, c'est de la politique - surtout pour le régime en place. Même si l'opposition politique peut s'exprimer à travers le football, on peut se demander quel est le potentiel de changement que cela représente.</p>
<p>Sous le régime autoritaire de Kabila, le rôle protestataire du football était limité. Il en est de même sous le régime actuel de Félix Tshisekedi, qui utilise le football comme un outil politique. Les principaux clubs de Kinshasa (Daring Club Motema Pembe et AS Vita Club), par exemple, ont des présidents qui sont de proches alliés de Tshisekedi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Le football permet aux élites impopulaires de se constituer un capital politique, mais il offre également aux citoyens un espace pour exprimer leur désaccord.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpAlbert Malukisa Nkuku, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976412023-01-24T14:34:50Z2023-01-24T14:34:50ZFootball and politics in Kinshasa: how DRC’s elite use sport to build their reputations and hold on to power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504456/original/file-20230113-26-o6a4dx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people play football on a street in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guerchom Ndebo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Football in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – as in much of the world – is intertwined with politics. </p>
<p>In the central African country, football clubs have long been a way for the regime in power to build political capital. Many politicians involve themselves with clubs to bolster their image. On the other hand, football is also a space for political opposition. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our recent paper</a>, we show how politics and football come together in a number of ways in Kinshasa, the country’s capital city. </p>
<p>Football was particularly important for Joseph Kabila’s regime, from 2001 to 2019. His was a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/01/kabila-must-go-the-congolese-see-this-why-cant-the-west/">contested and repressive regime</a>. Throughout his tenure as president, Kabila and his party members looked for ways to improve their reputation to gain votes. One way was by financially supporting football clubs. This worked because these clubs don’t have structural or sufficient commercial or state support. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study finds</a> that football politics can also work against a regime. During the Kabila years, football stadiums and supporter crowds offered a relatively safe place to protest the repressive regime. Anti-Kabila songs, for example, were often heard at matches. </p>
<h2>Football and power</h2>
<p>Our interviews with supporters, regime figures and others found that during the Kabila years, supporters and club officials made a distinction between regime figures supporting the club, and the regime. A common statement we heard was: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>supporters still appreciated Kabila-associated politicians as long as they were able to provide financial support.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gabriel Amisi (commonly known as Tango Four), for example, was a close ally of Kabila’s and currently serves as an <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee/">army general and inspector general of the Congolese army</a>. Amisi has been accused of a wide range of human rights abuses during his time as a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/20/congo-war-crimes-kisangani">rebel commander</a> and an <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres">army commander</a>. One press article describes him as “<a href="https://afridesk.org/whos-who-le-general-amisi-tango-four-le-boucher-du-kivu-jj-wondo/">the butcher of Eastern Congo</a>”. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2020, Amisi was president of the AS Vita Club, one of the biggest clubs in Kinshasa. Before 2007, the team was performing poorly. Under Amisi’s leadership, the team won three national titles and excelled internationally. Players remember his leadership as providing financial stability, with regular and good salaries, and material supplies. </p>
<p>This made him very popular. When Amisi tried to resign in 2012 after AS Vita Club’s elimination from the national league, the team’s management and club supporters didn’t accept his submission. When protests began against the Kabila regime in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-politics-idUSKBN14800C">2016</a> in Kinshasa, AS Vita supporters protected Amisi’s house. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">Human Rights Watch</a> has documented how Amisi (and other elite figures) used youth league members of football clubs to infiltrate protests against the Kabila regime “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/16/dr-congo-profiles-individuals-sanctioned-eu-and-us">and incite protesters to loot and commit violence</a>”. </p>
<p>An association with regime figures gives football clubs advantages, such as protection from prosecution if supporters are caught up in stadium violence. This makes it unattractive for clubs to associate with opposition figures, who generally have less money to invest and less political power. </p>
<p>In this way, Congolese football isn’t very different from football elsewhere in the world. It has been shown how <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=VIlcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA463&lpg=PA463&dq=Armstrong,+G.,+%26+Mitchell,+J.+P.+(2001).+%E2%80%9CPlayers,+patrons,+and+politicians:+oppositional+cultures+in+Maltese+football.%E2%80%9D+Fear+and+loathing+in+world+football,+137-158.&source=bl&ots=6GcJZyJ7BE&sig=ACfU3U3YaJGbpHXEt6nnlRXMeLAYfrrpVw&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiorpSsspz8AhUROewKHQ0BDxAQ6AF6BAgHEAM#v=onepage&q&f=false">worldwide</a> – not only on the <a href="https://polaf.hypotheses.org/5030">African continent</a>, but in a variety of places such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14660970.2013.792482">Turkey, Indonesia</a> and <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10117/">Malta</a> – football helps regimes to reproduce their hegemony, particularly by creating political capital. </p>
<h2>Football and protest</h2>
<p>But the opposite has also been shown. Football has played an important role in contesting power. It has, for example, played a role in decolonising struggles in <a href="https://experts.arizona.edu/en/publications/visualizing-politics-in-african-sport-political-and-cultural-cons">Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/kickin-it-leisure-politics-and-football-in-colonial-zanzibar-1900s1950s/A97494FF2D4FEB7BFA1252B4A11A6309">Zanzibar</a> and <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=N65pbr2hC4wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP12&dq=Martin,+P.+(2002).+%E2%80%9CLeisure+and+society+in+colonial+Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D+Cambridge+University+Pr&ots=2MF69toPoN&sig=6yK6P7RbPAWkvnTOo0XuYu3Tp6U#v=onepage&q=Martin%2C%20P.%20(2002).%20%E2%80%9CLeisure%20and%20society%20in%20colonial%20Brazzaville.%E2%80%9D%20Cambridge%20University%20Pr&f=false">Congo-Brazzaville</a>; and in the <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24122012-pitched-battles-the-role-of-ultra-soccer-fans-in-the-arab-spring-analysis-2/">Arab spring</a> in the 2010s. </p>
<p>These dynamics also played out in Kinshasa, where football supporters participated in decolonisation struggles. On <a href="https://dialectik-football.info/16-juin-1957-lunion-saint-gilloise-au-congo-et-la-premiere-emeute-anti-coloniale/">16 June 1957</a>, a match between Kinshasa’s FC Leopoldville and Belgium’s Union Saint Gilloise de Bruxelles led to the first riots leading up to independence. A year and a half later, AS Vita Club supporters played <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=bF5Vx8cCnrMC&printsec=frontcover&hl=nl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">an important role</a> in decisive riots against colonial authorities. In 1960, the DRC got its independence from Belgium. </p>
<p>In the postcolonial period, football has also played a role in challenging power. During the Kabila regime, as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/dr-congo-repression-persists-election-deadline-nears">political repression escalated</a> in almost every other space, the football stadium became an important venue for political protest. </p>
<p>In the words of a soccer fan in <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/fa1af368-d443-41cc-88b9-38bcdcb90449.pdf">our study</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since we’re in the stadium, we won’t be arrested. The police knows this: they won’t try anything because we’re way more numerous than them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The lyrics of protest songs and slogans – referred to as “hymns of the oppressed” – included: “God is doing everything so that Kabila dies!” and “Eeeh, we refuse (to be) the voting machine”. </p>
<p>During <a href="https://qz.com/africa/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-to-a-third-term">the “slippage” period</a> from 2015 onwards – when Kabila went beyond the formal limits of his mandate – anti-Kabila slogans became even more popular. </p>
<p>The engagement of regime figures with soccer clubs didn’t overcome hostile feelings about the regime. </p>
<h2>Regime controls</h2>
<p>The impact of these confrontations of regime power was limited, though. </p>
<p>For example, during the Kabila regime, radio and TV stations would cut their broadcasting when political songs were sung during games involving the national team. And in late 2016, the minister of sports <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">temporarily suspended</a> the national football competition. The official reason for this was “<a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2016/12/14/actualite/sport/rdc-le-ministre-des-sports-suspend-le-championnat-national-de-foot">excessive violence in the stadiums</a>”. But it was widely understood as a political measure by the regime, fearing protests by supporters in reaction to the end of Kabila’s official mandate during this period. The former minister confirmed this to us during interviews. </p>
<p>In sum, football in Kinshasa is politics – but primarily regime politics. Even though political opposition can be expressed through football, it is questionable how much potential for change this carries. </p>
<p>During the authoritarian Kabila regime, the protest role of football was confined. It’s similar under the current Felix Tshisekedi regime, which uses football as a political tool. Kinshasa’s main clubs (Daring Club Motema Pembe and AS Vita), for example, have club presidents who are close allies of Tshisekedi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197641/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Football provides a way for unpopular elites to build political capital – but also creates space for citizens to voice dissent.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpAlbert Malukisa Nkuku, Associate researcher, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979252023-01-17T06:08:51Z2023-01-17T06:08:51ZL'exploitation minière et le conflit armé menacent la biodiversité de l'est de la RDC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504647/original/file-20230116-24-dn9nej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Getty Images</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Les provinces orientales de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), touchées par le conflit, abritent de nombreuses aires protégées. Ces zones abritent une biodiversité unique et plusieures espèces menacées, comme l'okapi, l'éléphant de forêt et le gorille de montagne. Elles font également partie de la forêt tropicale du bassin du Congo, qui constitue une ligne de <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000126494_fre">défense cruciale</a> contre le changement climatique.</p>
<p>Ces mêmes zones protégées regorgent de gisements de minerais d'importance mondiale, notamment d'or, de coltan et de cassitérite.</p>
<p>L’<a href="https://medd.gouv.cd/les-enjeux-de-lexploitation-miniere-en-rdc-tous-ensemble-pour-un-developpement-durable-a-la-fois-propre-et-createur-de-valeur-pour-tous-les-citoyens/">exploitation minière</a> est très répandue dans ces zones, y compris dans la réserve naturelle d'Itombwe, le parc national de Maiko et la réserve de faune à okapis.</p>
<p>La plupart de ces mines sont des mines artisanales à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre, qui utilisent des technologies de base. Toutefois, ces dernières années, on a constaté une forte augmentation de l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle, qui nécessite un capital de départ important pour l'achat de technologies intermédiaires, telles que des dragues et des pompes.</p>
<p>Les deux formes d'exploitation minière ont des <a href="https://www.justicepaix.be/les-etudes-d-impact-environnemental-en-rd-congo-outil-pour-qui-pour-quoi-1202/?pdf=14225">impacts négatifs</a> sur la conservation de la biodiversité. Les effets directs comprennent la déforestation, la dégradation des sols et la pollution de l'eau.</p>
<p>Des effets plus indirects découlent de la construction de nouvelles routes pour rendre les sites miniers accessibles, et de la croissance de la population à proximité des mines. Cela entraîne une exploitation accrue des ressources naturelles, comme l'extraction de bois de chauffage et de construction, la chasse à la viande de brousse et l'agriculture itinérante.</p>
<p>Cette exploitation minière destructrice dans les zones protégées se déroule souvent avec la complicité d'acteurs armés étatiques et non étatiques, qui s'approprient une partie des revenus. Des milliers de personnes dépendent également de ces activités minières pour leur subsistance.</p>
<p>L'importance économique de l'exploitation minière rend difficile l'arrêt de l'extraction dans les zones protégées. Elle est également au cœur des liens complexes entre l'exploitation minière, les conflits armés et la protection de l'environnement dans l'est de la RDC. Notre <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">étude</a> a cherché à saisir ces liens, ce qui est crucial pour concevoir des mesures efficaces de sauvegarde des aires protégées.</p>
<p>Sur la base de recherches dans les réserves d'Okapi et d'Itombwe, nous avons constaté que l'exploitation minière suscite des conflits entre les différents démembrements de l'État, entre les entrepreneurs et les populations locales, et entre les mineurs artisanaux et semi-industriels. Dans un environnement militarisé, ces conflits peuvent déclencher des violences.</p>
<p><strong>Moyens de subsistance et enrichissement</strong></p>
<p>L'exploitation minière est très répandue dans les zones protégées car elle génère des revenus pour les citoyens, les fonctionnaires et les acteurs armés.</p>
<p>Les barrières d'entrée sont faibles et les <a href="https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/enfants-mineurs-la-face-cachee-de-labondance-du-coltan-en-rdc">revenus des mineurs</a> sont plus élevés que ceux de groupes comparables de la population. Pour de nombreuses familles, l'exploitation minière est l'une des rares opportunités de mobilité sociale.</p>
<p>Les revenus miniers permettent également de compléter les maigres salaires de nombreux administrateurs, soldats et autres fonctionnaires de l'État. En RDC, <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2022/04/20/actualite/politique/rdc-le-gouvernement-augmente-de-30-le-salaire-de-base-des">les salaires officiels</a> des agents de l'État sont faibles ou restent impayés. La plupart de ces travailleurs gagnent de l'argent à côté et soutirent des revenus aux citoyens par le biais de diverses formes de taxes, de frais de protection et d'extorsion. Ils subissent également des pressions de la part de leur hiérarchie, qui attend une part de ces revenus.</p>
<p>Les fonctionnaires du Service d'assistance et d'encadrement de l'exploitation minière artisanale et à petite échelle (<a href="https://saemape.cd/">SAEMAPE</a>) et le ministère provincial des Mines taxent souvent les activités minières dans les aires protégées. Les forces armées congolaises s'enrichissent aussi considérablement en protégeant cette exploitation minière, qui est interdite dans la plupart des zones de conservation. Les groupes armés en <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/accompanying-note-interactive-map-militarised-mining-areas-kivus/">profitent</a> également en imposant des taxes sur les sites miniers et aux barrages routiers.</p>
<p>L'augmentation récente de l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle, souvent dirigée par des <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/sino-congolese-scandal-illegal-exploitation-minerals-and-forests-chinese">entrepreneurs chinois</a>, a considérablement profité à l'armée congolaise. Les officiers supérieurs qui protègent ces opérations minières déploient des unités de l'armée pour garder les installations et interdirent l'accès à la zone aux visiteurs indésirables.</p>
<p>L'administration minière a également profité de cette évolution. Par exemple, le Cadastre minier, l'agence responsable de l'émission et de la gestion des titres miniers, a commencé à faire circuler <a href="http://www.faapa.info/blog/le-ministere-de-mines-et-liccn-se-contredisent-sur-la-provenance-de-31-lingots-dor-saisis-a-mambasa/">une nouvelle carte</a> de la réserve de faune à okapis avec un périmètre différent. Cela a permis à l'agence de délivrer des concessions à l'intérieur des limites de la réserve, tout en soutenant qu'elles sont situées à l'extérieur de celle-ci.</p>
<p><strong>Provoquer le conflit</strong></p>
<p>L'exploitation minière étant lucrative pour de nombreuses personnes, <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">nos recherches</a> montrent qu'elle a des effets d'entraînement considérables sur la dynamique des conflits.</p>
<p>Tout d'abord, l'exploitation minière crée des frictions entre les différents services de l'État et les différents niveaux administratifs. Le ministère de l'Environnement a contesté la nouvelle carte de la réserve de faune à okapis diffusée par le Cadastre minier. Le gouverneur et le ministère des mines de la province du Sud-Kivu ont pris des mesures pour réglementer l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle par des sociétés chinoises autour de la réserve d'Itombwe. Ces mesures ont cependant été <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/mwetaminwa_vircoulon_scandale_sino_congolais_2022.pdf">stoppées </a>par les autorités nationales qui ont affirmé que celles au niveau provincial n'avaient pas les attributions pour le faire. </p>
<p>Sur le terrain, l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle a déclenché des conflits en provoquant <a href="https://actu7.cd/2022/04/12/ituri-kimya-mining-accusee-dordonner-le-deguerpissement-des-creuseurs-artisanaux-dans-deux-sites-miniers-pres-de-badengaido/">le déplacement</a> parfois violent des mineurs artisanaux. Cela a conduit certains d'entre eux à rejoindre des groupes armés, ou à une recrudescence du banditisme violent.</p>
<p>L'exploitation minière semi-industrielle a également entraîné des <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/10/15/rdc-fizi-la-societe-chinoise-beyond-mining-et-une-cooperative-locale-exploitant-lor-au">désaccords</a> entre les sociétés minières et les populations locales concernant les investissements sociaux, l'emploi et les compensations pour la destruction des champs agricoles.</p>
<p>Combinés à la concurrence pour l'accès aux revenus, ces conflits ont contribué à une vague d'attaques de groupes armés contre les opérations minières chinoises.</p>
<p><strong>Pas de solutions faciles</strong></p>
<p>L'implication de hauts fonctionnaires et l'importance des revenus miniers font qu'il est difficile d'empêcher l'exploitation minière destructrice dans les zones protégées.</p>
<p>En outre, la fermeture par la force des exploitations minières artisanales sans offrir d'autres possibilités de gagner sa vie s'est souvent avérée <a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">contre-productive</a>. Les mineurs déplacés peuvent tout simplement retourner sur les sites miniers, obtenant parfois l'aide de groupes armés pour ce faire, parfois avec l'aide de groupes armés.</p>
<p>Lorsque les groupes armés et les unités de l'armée perdent les revenus qu'ils tirent de l'exploitation minière, ils peuvent recourir à d'autres moyens pour se procurer de l'argent, comme le banditisme violent.</p>
<p>Le fait que différents services de l'État soient en désaccord les uns avec les autres pose d'autres difficultés. Il est impossible de freiner ou de mieux réglementer l'exploitation minière dans les zones protégées lorsque les autorités nationales et provinciales ne suivent pas la même politique ou lorsque les militaires violent les restrictions imposées par les autorités civiles.</p>
<p>L'Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN), qui est responsable de la gestion des aires protégées, n'a pas le poids politique et les <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2017/seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/">ressources</a> nécessaires pour faire la différence.</p>
<p>Par exemple, la réserve de faune à okapis couvre plus de 13 000 kilomètres carrés, mais l'ICCN ne dispose pas de suffisamment de gardes forestiers. Ils n'effectuent des patrouilles régulières que dans 15 % de cette zone. Dans certaines zones, il a été constaté que le personnel de l'ICCN était <a href="https://24sur24.cd/parc-de-lupemba-face-au-presume-braconnage-entretenu-par-certains-gardes-parcs-de-liccn-long-tprdc-exige-des-enquetes-sur-terrain/">complice</a> de l'exploitation illégale des ressources.</p>
<p><strong>Prochaines étapes</strong></p>
<p>Que peut-on faire alors pour améliorer cette situation ?</p>
<p>Pour commencer, il est important de faire la différence entre l'exploitation minière semi-industrielle et artisanale. L'exploitation minière semi-industrielle, en particulier le dragage de l'or, est plus destructrice pour l'environnement et profite à moins de personnes. Il est plus urgent et plus facile de l'interdire dans les zones protégées.</p>
<p>Il semble difficile d'interdire l'exploitation minière artisanale, par conséquent une meilleure réglementation et un meilleur contrôle serait une stratégie plus efficace à court terme. C'est ce qui s'est passé dans la réserve naturelle d'Itombwe, où les activités minières artisanales sont encore autorisées dans certaines parties.</p>
<p>Il est également crucial que les différentes agences et services de l'État coopèrent. Pour promouvoir cette collaboration, les donateurs internationaux qui soutiennent la réforme de l'administration et du secteur de la sécurité doivent faire passer le message selon lequel il est inacceptable de tirer profit de l'exploitation minière dans les zones protégées.</p>
<p>Toutefois, c'est au gouvernement congolais qu'il incombe en dernier ressort de veiller à ce que les fonctionnaires soient correctement payés et respectent la loi.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197925/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Judith Verweijen receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fergus O'Leary Simpson and Peer Schouten do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Les activités minières destructrices dans les zones protégées du RD Congo sont monnaie courante car elles génèrent de l'argent pour les citoyens, les fonctionnaires et les groupes armés.Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, University of GroningenFergus O'Leary Simpson, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of AntwerpPeer Schouten, Senior researcher, Danish Institute for International StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945652023-01-13T09:16:00Z2023-01-13T09:16:00ZMining and armed conflict threaten eastern DRC’s biodiversity in a complex web<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504421/original/file-20230113-24-h4zyhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GettyImages</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflict-affected eastern provinces are home to numerous protected areas. These areas host unique biodiversity and a range of threatened species, such as the okapi, forest elephant and mountain gorilla. They are also part of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is a crucial <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/02/carbon-timebomb-climate-crisis-threatens-to-destroy-congo-peatlands">line of defence</a> against climate change. </p>
<p>The same protected areas overlap with globally significant deposits of minerals – including gold, coltan and cassiterite.</p>
<p>Mining is <a href="https://www.levinsources.com/assets/pages/Global-Solutions-Study.pdf">rampant</a> in these areas, including in the Itombwe Nature Reserve, Maiko National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve. </p>
<p>Most of this mining is labour-intensive artisanal mining, which makes use of basic technologies. However, in recent years, there has been a sharp increase in semi-industrial mining, which requires significant start-up capital for the purchase of intermediate technologies, such as dredges and pumps.</p>
<p>Both forms of mining have <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/abs/10.1098/rspb.2018.1926">negative impacts</a> on biodiversity conservation. Direct impacts include deforestation, soil degradation and water pollution. </p>
<p>More indirect effects stem from the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-019-0310-6">construction of new roads</a> to make mining sites accessible, and population growth in the vicinity of mines. This leads to further natural resource exploitation, such as fuel and construction wood extraction, bushmeat hunting and shifting agriculture. </p>
<p>This destructive mining in conservation areas often happens under the protection of state and non-state armed actors, who take a portion of the revenues. Thousands of people also depend on such mining for their livelihoods. </p>
<p>The economic importance of mining makes it difficult to stop extraction in protected areas. It’s also at the heart of the complex linkages between mining, armed conflict and conservation in eastern DRC. <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">Our study</a> set out to grasp these linkages, which is crucial for designing effective measures to safeguard protected areas. </p>
<p>Based on research in the Okapi and Itombwe reserves, we found that mining sparks conflict between different branches of the state, between entrepreneurs and local populations, and between artisanal and semi-industrial miners. In a militarised environment, these conflicts can spark violence.</p>
<h2>Livelihoods and enrichment</h2>
<p>Mining is rampant in protected areas because it generates incomes for citizens, officials and armed actors. </p>
<p>Entry barriers are low, and miners’ earnings are <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/much-miner-earn-assessment-miners-revenue-basic-needs-study-drc/">higher</a> than those of comparable groups in the population. For many families, mining is one of the few opportunities for <a href="https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy-ub.rug.nl/science/article/pii/S0301420720309247#sec6">social mobility</a>.</p>
<p>Mining revenue also tops up the meagre wages of numerous administrators, soldiers and other state officials. In the DRC, the official salaries of state workers are low or remain unpaid. Most of these workers make money on the side and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240902863587">extract revenue from citizens</a> through various forms of taxation, protection fees and extortion. They are also under pressure to do so from their hierarchy, which expects a share of the income. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-extractive-industries-manage-to-carry-on-harming-the-planet-155323">How extractive industries manage to carry on harming the planet</a>
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<p>Officials from the agency responsible for regulating artisanal and small-scale mining (SAEMAPE), and the provincial ministry of mines often tax mining activities in protected areas. The Congolese armed forces also substantially enrich themselves by protecting this mining, which is forbidden in most conservation areas. Armed groups also <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/accompanying-note-interactive-map-militarised-mining-areas-kivus/">benefit</a> by imposing taxes in mining sites and at roadblocks.</p>
<p>The recent increase in semi-industrial mining, often run by <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/sino-congolese-scandal-illegal-exploitation-minerals-and-forests-chinese">Chinese entrepreneurs</a>, has substantially benefited the Congolese army. The senior officers who protect these mining operations deploy army units to guard the installations and seal off the area from unwanted visitors. </p>
<p>The mining administration, too, has benefited from this development. For instance, the Mining Cadastre, the agency responsible for issuing and managing mining titles, has started to <a href="http://www.faapa.info/blog/le-ministere-de-mines-et-liccn-se-contredisent-sur-la-provenance-de-31-lingots-dor-saisis-a-mambasa/">circulate a new map</a> of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve with a different perimeter. This has allowed the agency to issue concessions inside the boundaries of the reserve, while arguing that they are located outside it. </p>
<h2>Sparking conflict</h2>
<p>Because mining is lucrative for many people, <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">our research shows</a> it has considerable knock-on effects on conflict dynamics. </p>
<p>To start with, mining creates friction between different branches of the state and different administrative levels. The environment ministry has contested the new map of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve circulated by the Mining Cadastre. The governor and mining ministry of South Kivu province took measures to regulate semi-industrial mining by Chinese companies around the Itombwe Reserve. These, however, were <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/mwetaminwa_vircoulon_scandale_sino_congolais_2022.pdf">halted</a> by national authorities who claimed the provincial level didn’t have the authority to do so.</p>
<p>On the ground, semi-industrial mining has sparked conflict by prompting the sometimes violent <a href="https://actu7.cd/2022/04/12/ituri-kimya-mining-accusee-dordonner-le-deguerpissement-des-creuseurs-artisanaux-dans-deux-sites-miniers-pres-de-badengaido/">displacement</a> of artisanal miners. This has led some of them to join armed groups, or to an upsurge in violent banditry. </p>
<p>Semi-industrial mining has also led to <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/10/15/rdc-fizi-la-societe-chinoise-beyond-mining-et-une-cooperative-locale-exploitant-lor-au">disagreements</a> between mining companies and local populations around social investments, employment and compensation for the destruction of agricultural fields. </p>
<p>Combined with competition around accessing revenues, these conflicts have contributed to a spate of armed group attacks on Chinese mining operations. </p>
<h2>No easy solutions</h2>
<p>The involvement of high-level officials and the importance of mining income make it difficult to stop destructive mining from taking place in protected areas. </p>
<p>Moreover, closing down artisanal mining operations by force without offering other opportunities to make a living has often proven to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">counterproductive</a>. Displaced miners may simply return to mining sites, sometimes getting the help of armed groups to do this. </p>
<p>Where armed groups and army units lose their income from mining, they may resort to other ways to get money, such as violent banditry.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">Shedding light on why mining companies in eastern Congo are under attack</a>
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<p>The fact that different branches of the state are at odds with each other poses further difficulties. It’s impossible to curb or better regulate mining in protected areas when national and provincial authorities toe a different line or when the military violates restrictions imposed by civilian authorities. </p>
<p>The Congolese agency for nature conservation (ICCN), which is responsible for protected area management, lacks the political clout and <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2017/seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/">resources</a> to make a difference. </p>
<p>For instance, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve covers over 13,000 square kilometres, but the ICCN has only enough rangers to conduct regular patrols in 15% of this area. In some areas, ICCN staff have been found to be <a href="https://24sur24.cd/parc-de-lupemba-face-au-presume-braconnage-entretenu-par-certains-gardes-parcs-de-liccn-long-tprdc-exige-des-enquetes-sur-terrain/">complicit</a> in authorising illegal resource exploitation.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>What can be done to improve this situation? </p>
<p>To start with, it’s important to differentiate between semi-industrial and artisanal mining. Semi-industrial mining, in particular gold dredging, is more destructive for the environment and benefits comparatively fewer people. Banning it from protected areas is more urgent and more feasible.</p>
<p>Banning artisanal mining appears difficult, so better regulating and containing it may be a more successful strategy in the short term. This is what has happened in the Itombwe Nature Reserve, where artisanal mining activities are still permitted in certain parts.</p>
<p>It is also crucial that different agencies and layers of the state cooperate. To promote such collaboration, international donors supporting administrative and security sector reform need to get the message across that profiting from mining in protected areas is not acceptable. </p>
<p>However, it is ultimately up to the Congolese government to ensure that state servants are properly paid and respect the law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Judith Verweijen receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fergus Simpson receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peer Schouten receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Destructive mining in Congo’s protected areas is rampant because it generates money for citizens, officials and armed groups.Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, University of GroningenFergus O'Leary Simpson, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of AntwerpPeer Schouten, Senior researcher, Danish Institute for International StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915252022-10-08T05:00:57Z2022-10-08T05:00:57ZUganda’s fuel smugglers: are the Opec Boys (anti-)heroes of the marginalised?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488040/original/file-20221004-17-1onk58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Boureima Hama/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Smuggling in the Ugandan border region of West Nile has a long and chequered history. It straddles the <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FTJhFP1FK1wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=abraham+and+van+schendel+2005&ots=hcL7cIKofK&sig=czwJFPyXuvAh0jtOHbYq5wNGyvY#v=onepage&q=abraham%20and%20van%20schendel%202005&f=false">fine line</a> between legitimacy and legality. Governance and conflict researcher Kristof Titeca has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2012.664703?scroll=top&needAccess=true">studied</a> smuggling in the border region <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">since 2003</a>. He explains the dynamics.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the history of smuggling in Uganda’s West Nile region?</h2>
<p>The term smuggling often brings strongly negative connotations, and is often associated with criminality and violence. However, smugglers aren’t always associated with these negative connotations by the communities in which they are embedded.</p>
<p>The West Nile region in Uganda illustrates this dynamic. This area is located in northwestern Uganda, and borders the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.</p>
<p>When colonialists introduced the borders demarcating Uganda, Zaire/Congo and Sudan, this divided ethnic groups but <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp63.2-changing-cross-border-trade-dynamics.pdf">didn’t stop the interaction</a> between them. Continued untaxed trade – or smuggling – was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/regulation-crossborder-trade-and-practical-norms-in-west-nile-northwestern-uganda/DF13D59E5184A27637447D169F4D7291">considered legitimate</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, smuggling – both then and now – is viewed as a survival mechanism. </p>
<p>For example, during successive wars and rebellions affecting the region, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346912534_A_Historical_Perspective_on_State_Engagement_in_Informal_Trade_on_the_Uganda-Congo_Border">many people fled across borders</a>. When former Ugandan president Idi Amin (a West Niler) was ousted from power in 1979, the residents of West Nile feared revenge and fled to eastern Congo and southern Sudan. Similarly, violence in southern Sudan in the early 1990s, and in more recent times, forced many (South) Sudanese to flee to northern Uganda. Smuggling constituted an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249008703848">important livelihood</a> for many during these times, and laid the basis for contemporary trading networks and practices.</p>
<p>Smuggling is also linked to people feeling marginalised or oppressed. And the West Nile region <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas">feels marginalised</a> by the Yoweri Museveni regime. </p>
<p>Smuggling in this border region has to be understood in this context: as a way of making ends meet despite of – and in opposition to – a regime perceived to marginalise them. Smuggling is regarded as legitimate employment. And an important form of social mobility, a rags-to-riches story present in the wider social imaginary of the population. </p>
<h2>How pervasive is smuggling in Uganda?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/borderland-policy-briefing-series-informal-cross-border-trade-along-drc-uganda-border">Data</a> from the Bank of Uganda and Uganda Bureau of Statistics shows that in 2018, Ugandan informal exports – or smuggled products – were worth US$546.6 million. For their part, smuggled imports were worth US$60 million. </p>
<p>But these numbers are an underestimation as they are based on data from official border posts, which excludes goods smuggled through <a href="https://westniletodaynews.com/122-illegal-entry-points-fuel-silent-gold-trade-along-uganda-drc-border-in-west-nile/">many unofficial smuggling routes</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, the <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/borderland-policy-briefing-series-informal-cross-border-trade-along-drc-uganda-border">data shows</a> that for the DRC – which in 2018 accounted for almost half of Uganda’s informal trade value – informal export and import figures are almost always higher than the formal ones.</p>
<h2>What does the story of the Opec Boys tell us?</h2>
<p>The Opec Boys – a term used to refer to fuel smugglers operating in the region – are a telling illustration of the dynamics of smuggling in the West Nile.</p>
<p>In my research, I have studied the Opec Boys at <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-africaine-2006-3-page-143.htm">different moments</a> in their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2012.664703">history</a> over the last 20 years. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">Their roots</a> can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was when much of the population of north-western Uganda fled to neighbouring DRC and Sudan after the overthrow of the Amin regime. </p>
<p>During this time, a number of exiled young men made a living from smuggling fuel. They didn’t stop doing so upon their return to Uganda. They started an organisation that came to be known as the Opec Boys. Many other young men returning to their home areas, with no education or assets, were drawn into this fuel business. </p>
<p>They would sell smuggled fuel in jerrycans on street corners in the region’s major urban centres. There was a general shortage of petrol stations in the area, and their fuel was cheaper. The Opec Boys got their smuggled fuel in different ways: some smuggled it themselves from Congo, others used “transporters” who were mostly young(er) boys on bicycles, smuggling the fuel via back roads to avoid security officials. Others bought their fuel from truck drivers, who equally smuggled their fuel into Uganda. </p>
<p>The Opec Boys were the most important supplier of fuel in the area until the late 2000s. Around this time, the increased number of fuel stations, and the changing tax regime in DRC pushed many of them out of business. While they still exist, their activities are less prominent.</p>
<h2>What did they come to represent?</h2>
<p>The Opec Boys were considered an important social-economic and political force in two major ways. </p>
<p>First, they came to constitute an important manifestation of what sociologist Asef Bayat’s calls “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436599715055">un-civil society</a>”. This is an unconventional, uninstitutionalised form of civil society. It operates through ad hoc, direct and sporadic action through which it represents the interests of the urban informal sector. This definition applies to the Opec Boys. </p>
<p>Particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, they would – led by <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/kaku-arua-opec-boys-supremo-rabble-rouser-3942538">a charismatic leader</a> – come to the defence of actors within the urban informal sector, such as market vendors or motorcycle taxi riders. They, for example, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">intervened</a> when urban authorities wanted to forcefully remove streetside kiosks by blocking roads and organising protests. </p>
<p>Second, in doing so, they are an illustration of historian Eric Hobsbawm’s “<a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Bandits-Revised-Edition-E.J-Hobsbawm-Pantheon/5603239895/bd">social bandits</a>”. This is through their links to the population and their composition – young, unemployed men, and (certainly in their early phase) often ex-rebels considered “<a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Bandits-Revised-Edition-E.J-Hobsbawm-Pantheon/5603239895/bd">natural material for banditry</a>”. </p>
<p>Their smuggling activities provide employment to, and absorb, a potentially dangerous group: low-skilled, landless young men. In a region with a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas">history of rebel groups</a>, this is seen as an important stabilising factor, allowing for the voicing of discontent through trading activities rather than illegality. </p>
<p>For these reasons, attempts to take formal action against smuggling in the West Nile region often lead to demonstrations and riots.</p>
<p>In February 2022, for instance, <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/one-shot-dead-ura-office-torched-in-clashes-with-boda-boda-cyclists-3727616">riots erupted</a> in Koboko town. These were directed against Uganda’s tax collecting agency – the Uganda Revenue Authority. </p>
<p>Protestors set the authority’s offices on fire after tax collectors allegedly hit and injured a suspected fuel smuggler (the authority <a href="https://twitter.com/URAuganda/status/1496886523933126656?s=20&t=PMBLUpWUtHgMH8uIcZ2wkQ">denied</a> this happened). The smuggler was reportedly carrying 320 litres of fuel in sixteen 20-litre jerrycans from the DRC. During the riots, one person was shot dead and several others wounded.</p>
<p>Months earlier, the shooting of a suspected smuggler also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/one-shot-dead-as-ura-officers-impound-numberless-motorcycles-in-arua-3557294">led to violent demonstrations</a>. </p>
<p>However, this doesn’t mean all smuggling is romanticised. Smuggling in goods such as <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/suspected-ugandan-drug-dealer-arrested-in-congo?districtId=553">drugs</a> or <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201008240002.html">weapons</a> is looked at very differently, and doesn’t have the same legitimacy and popular support. </p>
<p>In sum, smuggling is looked at as more than a strictly economic activity; it’s a social and political one. In local social imaginaries, it’s seen as an act of resistance, a way to fend for oneself in difficult circumstances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191525/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Smuggling in Uganda’s West Nile region is seen as an act of defiance – a way to make ends meet in the face of perceived state neglect.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1768612022-03-10T15:01:23Z2022-03-10T15:01:23ZRwanda has reopened the border with Uganda but distrust could close it again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445494/original/file-20220209-1970-10db1fl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda has fully re-opened the Gatatuna-Katuna border with Uganda, ending a three-year impasse. Cyril Ndegeya/Anadolu Agency via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-cross-the-katuna-border-crossing-between-uganda-news-photo/1238095524?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Rwanda has now fully <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/gatuna-border-fully-reopens-ordinary-passengers-after-3-years">reopened</a> the Gatuna border with Uganda, ending a three-year impasse on the <a href="http://www.ttcanc.org/page.php?id=11">Northern Corridor</a>, one of East Africa’s key transport arteries that funnels goods from the Indian Ocean seaport of Mombasa to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47495476">abruptly closed</a> the border in February 2019 after it accused Uganda of abducting its citizens and supporting rebels seeking to topple President Paul Kagame. Legal scholar Filip Reyntjens takes us through the nature of Rwanda-Uganda relations.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the brief history of Uganda-Rwanda relations?</h2>
<p>The presidents of Uganda and Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, were close allies during the civil wars of <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4386/5071">Uganda</a> (1981 to 1986) and <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/civil-war-erupts-in-rwanda">Rwanda</a> (1990 to 1994). They were also on <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1640692.stm">the same side</a> in the first (Democratic Republic of Congo) war that removed <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0782891/bio">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>, between 1996 and 1997. </p>
<p>But the two leaders <a href="https://eyalama.com/part-1how-six-day-kisangani-war-pushed-museveni-and-kagame-from-friends-to-nemesis/">fell out</a> during the second Congo war (between 1998 and 2003). Uganda and Rwanda clashed over the exploitation of Congolese resources and the management of the rebellion against <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240208704645">Laurent Kabila</a>, whose forces had deposed Mobutu Sese Seko. Rwandan and Ugandan armies fought each other in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 and 2000.</p>
<p>A semblance of peace was restored between the two leaders in the early 2000s but trust never returned. A new <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/12/frenemies-for-life-has-the-love-gone-between-uganda-and-rwanda/">round</a> of hostile verbal exchanges erupted in 2017, and they escalated considerably in early 2019. This time, Rwanda accused Uganda of harbouring armed dissidents and victimising Rwandans. </p>
<p>A 2018 UN <a href="https://www.undocs.org/S/2018/1133">report</a> found Uganda had provided support to Rwandan dissidents. Uganda too claimed that Rwanda was engaging in acts of espionage and attempts to destabilise Uganda. </p>
<p>Other issues included air traffic rights, the construction of a standard gauge railway, and energy projects. </p>
<p>In March 2019, Rwanda’s closure of the Gatuna/Katuna border crossing sealed the rupture. Influential opinion makers close to both countries’ regimes didn’t rule out the possibility of direct war. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-africa-should-intervene-to-defuse-rwanda-uganda-war-of-words-114202">East Africa should intervene to defuse Rwanda-Uganda war of words</a>
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<p>Later that year, the two leaders signed an agreement brokered by the Angolan and Congolese presidents. The <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/422686492/Memorandum-of-Understanding-of-Luanda">Luanda Memorandum of Understanding</a> called on both countries to desist from “acts such as the financing, training and infiltration of destabilising forces”. It also <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-rwanda-leaders-sign-pact-aimed-at-ending-tensions-1425494">called</a> for respect of rights, freeing of each other’s nationals and resumption of cross-border activities. </p>
<p>But there was very little progress. The two leaders continued to trade accusations. It seemed unlikely that, as long as Museveni and Kagame were at the helm, bilateral relations would ever improve. </p>
<h2>How important is the Gatuna border crossing?</h2>
<p>Gatuna is one of the most important borders in East Africa as it connects Kenya’s Mombasa port to various cities in the region. On <a href="https://www.ssatp.org/sites/ssatp/files/publications/SSATPWP96-border-crossing_1.pdf">average</a>, 2,518 trucks pass through the Gatuna border every month (84 trucks per day) into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The East African Community has since <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/works-gatuna-one-stop-border-post-near-completion">upgraded</a> it into a one-stop border post.</p>
<p>Its closure had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwanda-re-opens-border-with-uganda-says-grievances-remain-2022-01-31/">choked off commerce</a> in East Africa. Its re-opening is set to spark <a href="https://www.eac.int/press-releases/2354-eac-applauds-the-re-opening-of-the-gatuna-katuna-border-post-by-the-republics-of-rwanda-and-uganda">social and economic activities</a> and also benefit the informal cross-border traders.</p>
<h2>What’s fuelling the border conflict now?</h2>
<p>The border stalemate is about two presidents who know each other well, and their mutual dislike and distrust is deeply ingrained. </p>
<p>On 22 January, Kagame met Lt. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s senior presidential advisor on special operations and commander of the Uganda People Defence Forces. Kainerugaba has no official function in Uganda’s foreign affairs apparatus, but he is Museveni’s son. </p>
<p>Three days after the visit, in a gesture of goodwill, Museveni replaced intelligence chief Major General Abel Kandiho, who is considered in Kigali as “anti-Rwanda”. Three days later, Rwanda announced a <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/crossing-at-reopened-border-as-rwanda-uganda-3700576">partial reopening</a> of the Gatuna/Katuna border crossing.</p>
<p>But on 31 January, Rwandan deputy government spokesman Alain Mukuralinda told Rwanda TV that Uganda had not yet addressed all of Kigali’s grievances. </p>
<h2>Has the East African region seen the last of this conflict?</h2>
<p>The border issue is not a settled matter. The initial border reopening, which took place on 1 February, was made subject to COVID-19 protocols. Even with full reopening on 7 March, the situation at the border remains confused over the conflicting handling of the COVID-19 protocols by national agencies. </p>
<p>Ominously, on 8 February, Kagame told Parliament that Rwanda was ready to respond to any external <a href="https://chimpreports.com/why-museveni-cancelled-ex-cmi-boss-abel-kandihos-transfer-to-south-sudan/">threat</a>. He said: “We wish everybody in the region peace, but anyone who wishes us war, we give it to him”. </p>
<p>Kagame referred to rebel forces in the DRC, but the Ugandan army has been deployed there cooperating with the Congolese army against the Allied Democratic Forces, and a Rwandan intervention would carry the risk of a new confrontation with the Ugandan troops. </p>
<p>The next day, Museveni <a href="https://www.watchdoguganda.com/news/20220208/129901/gen-kandiho-bounces-back-as-polices-chief-of-joint-staff.html">appointed</a> Kandiho as Chief of the Joint Staff of the Uganda Police Force. </p>
<h2>How can this dispute be resolved?</h2>
<p>The mutual aversion between Museveni and Kagame is so deep that it has become hard to expect a long lasting solution to a conflict that has poisoned relations for over 20 years. </p>
<p>After the 2015 constitutional amendment Kagame can potentially stay in power until 2034. Although Museveni is not bound by term limits, he will be 82 years old at the time of the 2026 presidential election. Kainerugaba is often mooted as the <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/muhoozis-2026-presidential-bid-is-impossible/">anointed successor</a> and he appears to want to make peace with Rwanda. </p>
<p>In the absence of initiatives by regional leaders, change will have to come from inside Rwanda and Uganda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tension persists between the neighbours as Kampala is yet to address all of Kigali’s grievances.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1622572021-07-08T14:57:01Z2021-07-08T14:57:01ZWhy payroll fraud in the DRC’s education sector will be hard to fix<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407644/original/file-20210622-28-9b31dg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pupils wear face masks in their classroom while a teacher writes on the board at a school in Kinshasa on August 10, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The primary and secondary education sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faces massive challenges. These include insufficient budgets, payroll fraud, a lack of infrastructure and teaching material, and poor opportunities for teacher professional development. Educational officials aren’t being held accountable for policy failures.</p>
<p>One of the biggest hurdles has to do with the teacher payroll. In general, the country’s teachers – more than 500,000 – work under dire conditions. In particular, a significant number of school teachers in the DRC have gone <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/teachers-observe-strike-in-dr-congo/2011572">without</a> government pay for several years. Since the early 1990s, parents have been <a href="https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/drc-students-drop-parents-struggle-pay-rising-required-teachers-bonuses/">called upon</a> to step in to support teachers and schools financially by paying substantial school fees. Providing quality education <a href="https://educationanddevelopment.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/cyril-owen-brandt-masterthesis-teachers-struggle-for-income-in-drc1.pdf">isn’t always</a> at the top of teacher priorities as they struggle to supplement their income with other activities. </p>
<p>Two years ago, the government decided to abolish primary school fees. The idea was that the government would pay all teachers. However, drawing on our long engagement with the DRC’s education sector and political system, we believe that this will be a challenge because of political, budgetary and administrative issues. </p>
<p>In April this year, Tony Mwaba, one of the most ferocious critics of corruption in the education sector, was appointed the new minister of education. This followed the <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2021/04/30/actualite/justice/rdc-willy-bakonga-condamne-3-ans-de-servitude-penale">conviction</a> of former education officials, including the former minister of education, for corruption and money laundering. </p>
<p>Is this the start of a serious reform of the battered education sector? </p>
<p>We believe that sustainable change in this system would require a thorough restructuring of the mechanisms of political accountability. In the meantime, we can only expect a realignment of existing patronage networks to the political agenda of the current president.</p>
<h2>Patronage networks</h2>
<p>In November 2020, the DRC’s auditor general published a <a href="https://www.mediacongo.net/article-actualite-79332_secope_l_enquete_de_l_igf_revele_la_dilapidation_de_62_milliards_cdf.htm">report</a> which revealed the depths of the payroll crisis. Masses of teachers remained unpaid while new ones were being added to the payroll. There was also an influx of administrative staff, diverting resources from teacher salaries. The report revealed the embezzlement of 62 billion Congolese francs (about US$30 million) and other forms of payroll fraud.</p>
<p>Payroll fraud <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20210324-la-rdc-recense-ses-fonctionnaires-pour-lutter-contre-les-cumulards-et-emplois-fictifs">permeates</a> the public sector, and this has been a persistent problem in the DRC. The report <a href="https://actualite.cd/2020/11/18/rdc-ligf-decouvert-lexistence-de-faux-arretes-de-recrutement-des-agents-et-de-creation">implicated</a> senior civil servants and staff from the ministries of budget and finance, education and the teachers’ payroll agency. The issue reverberated in the provinces as well. Several officials were <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/02/09/lomami-le-directeur-provincial-du-secope-aux-arrets">placed under</a> arrest.</p>
<p>The boundary between “state” and “society” has become a twilight area in the DRC, whose dynamics are governed by specific social pressures, economic rents and political considerations. For example, relationships with politicians, due to party affiliation or origin, increase a school’s chances of being added to the payroll. Another example is the attempted removal of 1,179 schools from the payroll. As <a href="https://www.radiookapi.net/2021/04/15/actualite/education/rdc-600-ecoles-conventionnees-catholiques-desactivees-de-la-liste-de">reactions</a> by educational leaders suggest, some of these schools have properly functioned for decades. In the past, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2017.1367920?journalCode=crea20">masses</a> of other schools have obtained their decree via informal processes, void of any educational planning. What is the difference between schools functioning on “false” decrees, and schools functioning on decrees based purely on patronage without any technical preparation and monitoring?</p>
<p>Government actors who benefit from the current structures have few incentives to clean up the payroll. However, teacher union politics also partially explains these continued dynamics. There’s a <a href="https://www.ei-ie.org/fr/item/25128:an-online-union-academy-made-in-dr-congo">lack</a> of strong, independent unions and a lack of trust between teachers and unions. Also the political co-option of union leaders, for example by mobilising them as consultants or by inviting them into party politics, has weakened the unions’ impact. Out of 40 unions, only a handful can be considered to be functioning properly. With a dozen pseudo-unions and a high number of unions which hardly function, Congolese teacher unions have been effectively silenced.</p>
<h2>Possibility of reform?</h2>
<p>Trying to reform human resource and payroll management means taking away a massive resource of patronage and electoral politics from hundreds of bureaucrats and politicians.</p>
<p>Public statements to fight against payroll fraud seem to materialise at strategic moments. In 1979, the former president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Mobutu Sese Seko, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/22/archives/mobutu-says-imf-will-give-zaire-aid-asserts-in-paris-after-talks.html">stated</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We’re going to wipe out the imaginary schools and the fake teachers who exist only on paper. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Mobutu, it was a way to attract World Bank funding. </p>
<p>So, what was the reason for the most recent announcement? The investigations, and Mwaba’s appointment, are nested within Congolese political dynamics, and it is necessary to look beyond the education sector. </p>
<p>For 15 years, according to our sources, the education ministry functioned as a cash cow for long-term ruler Joseph Kabila’s party. When Félix Tshisekedi was elected president in 2019, in what is seen as a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/10/drc-election-results-analysis-implausible/">rigged election</a>, he formed a coalition with Kabila. The investigations and sentences of high-level educational officials sit within Tshisekedi’s much wider use of “<a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/making-sense-of-dr-congos-stunning-political-turnaround/">judicial harassment</a>” against key persons from Kabila’s camp. </p>
<p>Given that Tshisekedi’s coalition remains unstable and based on members of parliament who will “<a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/making-sense-of-dr-congos-stunning-political-turnaround/">condition their support upon payments or extractive opportunities</a>”, he will need all possible sources to gather funds. This is all the more the case as the DRC looks forward to a new round of elections in 2023.</p>
<p>So this is the situation in which the president finds himself: while the judicial investigations and new appointment indicate that using the payroll for patronage purposes is being addressed, now that he’s completely in power himself, Tshisekedi might be tempted to deviate from the norms through which he won his position. </p>
<p>With an education sector struggling to cope through patronage politics and informal arrangements, and with all of the high level dynamics at play, can the new education minister bring much needed change? We truly hope so, but he would have to swim against a strong tide. </p>
<p><em>For a longer French version of this article, please see <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/blog-invite-fraude-dans-leducation-en-rdc-le-nouveau-ministre-peut-il-changer-la-donne/?lang=fr">here</a></em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stylianos Moshonas receives funding from the FWO (Research Foundation Flanders), through a fundamental research project entitled 'Understanding the political economy of Congo's civil service recruitment and remunerations system', in which he works as a postdoctoral researcher.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cyril Owen Brandt, Gauthier Marchais, Jacques Taty Mwakupemba, and Tom De Herdt do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Public statements against payroll fraud seem to materialise at strategic moments.Cyril Owen Brandt, Associate Researcher, Institute of Development Policy, University of AntwerpGauthier Marchais, Research Fellow, Institute of Development StudiesJacques Taty Mwakupemba, PhD candidate, Université catholique de BukavuStylianos Moshonas, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpTom De Herdt, Professor, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1601242021-05-24T15:18:11Z2021-05-24T15:18:11ZHow COVID-19 affected informal cross-border trade between Uganda and DRC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401635/original/file-20210519-17-kkgnpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Congolese women at the border crossing with Uganda at Bunagana in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Phil Moore/AFP/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Informal cross-border trade, which includes smuggling, is hugely important for <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231927336_Regulation_Cross-Border_Trade_and_Practical_Norms_in_West_Nile_North-Western_Uganda">survival</a> in, around and beyond <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/issue-briefs/borderland-policy-briefing-series---informal-cross-border-drc-ug.html">border regions</a>. Across the border between Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28477/">informal trade pays</a> the bills and puts food on the table; it stocks the provision shops and pharmacies; and it keep youths out of trouble, communities on the move, and people employed.</p>
<p>This trade is carried out both through unofficial crossings (where goods are smuggled across the border) and over official border points – where goods are not declared. Considered a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231927336_Regulation_Cross-Border_Trade_and_Practical_Norms_in_West_Nile_North-Western_Uganda">legitimate source of livelihood</a> this trade not only supplies the borderlands, but is also a vital supply line for the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/44789476_The_changing_cross-border_trade_dynamics_betweennorth-western_Uganda_north-eastern_Congo_and_southern_Sudan">wider region</a>. </p>
<p>Different reasons account for the informality of cross border trade. These include cumbersome border procedures, shortages of particular commodities on either side of the border, and different taxation levels (with the consequent price difference offering attractive margins for smugglers). Added to these is corruption, and harassment of traders by state officials. For these reasons many traders avoid border controls altogether. </p>
<p>Uganda’s central bank has been collecting data on undeclared goods passing through official border points. Between 2010 and 2018, Uganda’s informal exports to the DRC <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/issue-briefs/borderland-policy-briefing-series---informal-cross-border-drc-ug.html">nearly doubled</a>, from US$ 143.2 million to US$ 269.8 million. Given that formal exports to the DRC for those years respectively were US$ 184 million and US$ 204 million, these <a href="https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/Statistics/Reports/ICBT.html">figures</a> highlight the importance of informal cross-border trade. </p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/covid-19-and-state-global-mobility-2020">cross-border mobility worldwide</a> and its policy consequences are therefore <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/blog/2020/covid-19-and-the-challenge-of-african-borderlands.html">particularly visible around borders</a>. </p>
<p>But, what has been the impact of the pandemic on informal cross-border trade along the Uganda-DRC border? Our <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/issue-briefs/borderland-policy-briefing-series---informal-cross-border-drc-ug.html">new research</a> in a number of key border points found that cross-border trade has been severely affected, with knock-on effects on various aspects of lives far beyond the borderlands. For example, as north-eastern DRC largely depends on imports from Uganda for much of its commodities (such as salt, sugar or soap), their supply in basic goods was strongly affected. </p>
<p>However, we also found that players in the informal trade adapted to various changing COVID-19 policies and contexts, including differences in pandemic responses in Uganda and DRC. </p>
<h2>COVID measures</h2>
<p>Uganda has imposed some of <a href="https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/22075331-when-going-gets-tough-effects-covid-19-pandemic-informal-entrepreneurs-uganda/">the strictest COVID-19 lockdown</a> rules in the world. At the start in March, 2020, Uganda ordered a stay-at-home lockdown and the closure of all its borders - except for cargo truck drivers. Soon after, it suspended all public transport and non-food markets, and a nationwide curfew.</p>
<p>This led to a severe disruption in supply and distribution channels – both formal and informal. Uncertain supplies and speculative behaviour led to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/east-africa-cross-border-trade-bulletin-july-2020-volume-30">increasing and fluctuating prices</a> throughout the borderlands region. </p>
<p>In order to reduce risk, most informal traders deal in a variety of items. These traders adjusted in a variety of ways. As the initial ban in Uganda excluded food markets, traders would shift from nonfood to food items. Yet, particularly in the initial phase of the lockdown, this was not easy, as it remained difficult to transfer goods across the border.</p>
<p>Second, the cost of trading increased as truck drivers had to undergo screenings leading to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-africas-borders-vast-jams-as-truckers-are-tested-for-covid-19-11591963201">long waiting times</a>. Formal exports and imports were “<a href="https://www.ug.undp.org/content/uganda/en/home/library/un-socioeconomic-impact-report-of-covid-19-in-uganda.html">slowed down or completely halted by the COVID-19 restrictions</a>.” This had a range of impacts, such as the loss of perishable and short-life items due to the restrictions on demand and supply.</p>
<p>Border areas are traditionally vulnerable to economic, political and mobility-related shocks. Cross-border trade run mostly by small-scale traders with fragile supply chains is especially prone to insecurity and upheaval.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 control measures in Uganda therefore had a <a href="https://twitter.com/newvisionwire/status/1253287493119676417">severe impact</a> on informal cross-border trade. Many traders lost merchandise, such as agricultural produce or livestock, that they were unable to sell. This led to increased financial stress among informal traders, who then often relied on informal loans, resulting in spiralling debt.</p>
<h2>Surviving COVID-19 restrictions</h2>
<p>While Uganda employed a heavy-handed approach, with the military shutting off official and unofficial border crossings, this was not the case on the Congolese side of the border. Congo’s president did announce the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-congo-idUSKBN21B3GT">closure of the country’s borders and a state of emergency</a> in March 2020. But these directives remained largely ineffective with Congolese authorities making no effort to limit crossings.</p>
<p>This allowed some limited opportunities for informal cross border trade. For example, while markets were forcibly closed on the Ugandan side of the border, they remained open on the Congolese side. As a result, many small-scale Ugandan traders shifted to the DRC to reside there. Many were unable to return due to the closed border, and often stayed in precarious conditions. </p>
<p>To move goods across the border, traders on either side of the border would pay truck drivers to transship goods. Overall, these were fairly small quantities, but still allowed traders to survive. But there were risks too. Traders complained about being duped or shortchanged by truck drivers entrusted with moving or sourcing goods. For example, a driver entrusted with buying Congolese coffee for sale in Uganda may deliver inferior quality beans. </p>
<p>Moreover, traders complained that Ugandan security officials were more vigilant in levying trade taxes but also irregular “foreigner taxes”, more so in the Rwenzori border region.</p>
<h2>Informal trade is here to stay</h2>
<p>Many COVID-19 border restrictions for traders in Uganda have now been <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/uganda-now-okays-opening-of-borders-airport-and-churches--2715592">lifted</a>. In theory, travellers need to present a COVID-negative test issued no more than 120 hours before travel – but in practice this is not enforced for small-scale traders. Most security personnel have also been withdrawn from unofficial border crossings, through which cross-border mobility has improved again.</p>
<p>In sum, <a href="https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/issue-briefs/borderland-policy-briefing-series---informal-cross-border-drc-ug.html">our research </a> demonstrates once more how informal border trade is a historically grounded reality, constituting an important source of livelihood, and supplier of goods, for many far and beyond. Formalisation of these dynamics should therefore not be seen as the solution, as it will <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34884">threaten trade operations and endanger the economic viability of border communities</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, what is key here is improving the trade environment for these traders. This can be achieved by tackling various other financial and non-financial obstacles, such as harassment by security officials. Doing so will help <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34884">to deepen regional integration and foster development in these border communities</a>.</p>
<p><em>Innocent Anguyo, a research consultant based in Kampala, is the co-author of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160124/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Field research on this topic was funded through the UNDP Africa Borderlands Centre. </span></em></p>Within already economically perilous border areas, informal cross border trade is even more vulnerable during a pandemic.Kristof Titeca, Senior Lecturer in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1610452021-05-20T15:08:24Z2021-05-20T15:08:24ZLow trust in authorities affects vaccine uptake: evidence from 22 African countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401683/original/file-20210519-21-9c0dnd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A health worker administers an injection to a child below the age of one year during a routine immunisation at a health center in Kampala, Uganda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Xinhua/Nicholas Kajoba via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a time when the world is focusing on <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/covid-19">COVID-19 vaccines</a>, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has highlighted the importance of routine immunisations for diseases such as measles, tetanus and polio. </p>
<p>Although immunisation saves millions of lives each year, progress in vaccine <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1656-7">coverage</a> remains highly uneven, both between and within countries. Despite considerable progress over the past two decades, the situation is particularly worrying in Africa. <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/progress-and-challenges-with-achievinguniversal-immunization-coverage">Nearly half</a> of the world’s unvaccinated and under-vaccinated children live in this region.</p>
<p>Even where vaccines are available, one barrier to progress is vaccine hesitancy: the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate. In 2019, the WHO listed vaccine hesitancy among the <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/spotlight/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019">top ten threats to global health</a>. <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/events/detail/2021/04/24/default-calendar/world-immunization-week-2021">Building trust in vaccination</a> is a key aspect of this year’s WHO immunisation campaign. </p>
<p>Vaccine hesitancy is not new. Mistrust in authorities has been <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29617183/">shown</a> to negatively affect vaccine uptake in high and upper middle income countries such as Russia, the US, France and Croatia. But there is less research quantifying vaccine hesitancy in lower income countries.</p>
<p>Our latest <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-004595">research</a> shows that child vaccination rates in African countries are lower in areas where the local population displays high levels of mistrust in local authorities. </p>
<p>Finding ways to improve vaccination uptake may help countries to reach the Sustainable Development Goals target of reducing under 5 mortality to no more than 25 per 1,000 live births by 2030. Currently, <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/332070">two-thirds</a> of the 53 countries that are not on course to meet this goal are located in Africa.</p>
<h2>Linking vaccination uptake and trust in authorities</h2>
<p>We looked at the status of vaccinations for more than 160,000 children across 22 African countries, and matched it with information on the levels of trust people had in local and national authorities. </p>
<p>Information on vaccination status was obtained from the <a href="https://dhsprogram.com">Demographic and Health Surveys</a>. Information on institutional trust comes from the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer surveys</a>. We measured the degree of trust at the highest subnational region within each country. We calculated the share of the population that said they had no trust at all in the president, parliament, electoral system, courts or local government. </p>
<p>Various socio-economic characteristics at the individual, household and regional level may affect the affordability and accessibility of vaccination services, and hence vaccine uptake. In our statistical analysis we isolated the effect of institutional mistrust from these variables. To do so, we compared households with similar socio-economic characteristics, in the same area, with similar access to healthcare facilities. </p>
<p>We found that higher mistrust was associated with lower vaccination uptake.</p>
<p>When mistrust in local government increased by 10 percentage points, children living in that region were 11% more likely not to receive any of the eight basic vaccines. These were the BCG vaccine (to protect against tuberculosis); three doses of the combined diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus vaccine; three doses of the polio vaccine; and a dose of measles-containing vaccine. And these children were 3.4% less likely to receive all eight of the basic vaccines.</p>
<p>Our study is the first comprehensive attempt to quantify the role of institutional mistrust on vaccine uptake in Africa. But our findings are in line with qualitative case studies from many African countries. These include the <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(19)30063-5/fulltext">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953616306256">Liberia</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17441692.2019.1680724?journalCode=rgph20">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27265459/">South Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>The most famous case of vaccine hesitancy on the continent is the boycott of the polio vaccination campaign in the early 2000s in <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/stuck-9780190077242?cc=be&lang=en&">Nigeria</a>. It led to the outbreak of a disease that had nearly been eradicated. </p>
<p>The importance of institutional mistrust was also highlighted during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014. For instance, in Liberia, communities rejected health workers and did not follow the health recommendations. Such resistance was not explained by people’s understanding of Ebola symptoms or transmission. Respondents rather <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953616306256">indicated</a> that they could not trust the capacity and integrity of the government institutions to protect them.</p>
<h2>Policy implications</h2>
<p>There is an urgent need to recognise the importance of mistrust in vaccination campaigns. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1656-7">Research</a> has shown that immunisation is one of the most cost-effective public health interventions. The World Health Organisation <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/spotlight/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019">estimates</a> that vaccination prevents 2-3 million deaths each year. </p>
<p>In a world where the global rollout of vaccines is considered crucial in bringing the COVID-19 pandemic to an end, boosting immunisation seems more relevant than ever. The pandemic has caused the cancellation of supplementary measles immunisation campaigns and puts the delivery of critical routine immunisation services at <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/369/6501/261">risk</a>. </p>
<p>An obvious implication of our findings is that the benefits of vaccines should be communicated better. Myths and misunderstandings must be addressed. But raising awareness is unlikely to be enough unless people trust those providing the information and delivering vaccination services. </p>
<p>It takes considerable effort to build trust. Building trust usually starts by recognising people’s concerns and then providing reliable information from credible sources, using terms that are not confusing or too technical. </p>
<p>To guide policy, it is important to identify where mistrust comes from and engage with communities and trusted leaders. One <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6776099/">example</a> is the so-called <a href="https://coregroup.org/our-work/programs/core-group-polio-project/">CORE</a> projects that managed to address vaccine hesitancy in North East Nigeria. They created trusted spaces for community dialogue in a challenging environment. </p>
<p>Our study calls for scaling up and adapting such initiatives to protect the 2.6 million children under 5 who are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21645515.2018.1522921">estimated</a> to be at risk of dying from vaccine-preventable diseases by 2030.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nik Stoop acknowledges financial support from Research Foundation Flanders through a post-doctoral scholarship (nr.: 12W8320N).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Francois Maystadt and Kalle Hirvonen do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even where vaccines are available, one barrier to progress is vaccine hesitancy: the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate.Jean-Francois Maystadt, Professor, Lancaster UniversityKalle Hirvonen, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Nik Stoop, Post-doctoral researcher, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1575292021-04-12T15:23:55Z2021-04-12T15:23:55ZHow large miners and states stifle local capital and innovation in DR Congo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394437/original/file-20210412-17-14pdrxa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rescuers work in Kamituga, South Kivu, at the entrance of one of the mines which collapsed following torrential rains trapping dozens of artisanal miners in September 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Stringer/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the last few decades, African governments have removed restrictions on and privatised their mining industries, <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/550381468330990173/pdf/605130NWP0Mini10BOX358322B01PUBLIC1.pdf">attracting significant foreign direct investment</a>. As a result, the continent’s mining industry has become dominated by transnational corporations such as <a href="https://www.glencore.com/world-map">Glencore</a>, <a href="https://www.angloamerican.com/about-us/where-we-operate">AngloAmerican</a> and <a href="https://www.barrick.com/English/operations/default.aspx">Barrick Gold</a>.</p>
<p>Alongside these corporate giants, operating largely beyond the formal reach and control of African governments, sits the artisanal and small-scale mining sector. This is <a href="http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-minerals-edition3.pdf">defined by the OECD</a> as </p>
<blockquote>
<p>mining operations with predominantly simplified forms of exploration, extraction, processing, and transportation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Roughly <a href="https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/igf-asm-global-trends.pdf?q=sites/default/files/publications/igf-asm-global-trends.pdf">one quarter of the global gold, tin and tantalum supply</a> is produced by artisanal and small-scale miners. In 2019, there were <a href="https://www.planetgold.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/Delve-2019-State-of-the-Artisanal-and-Small-Scale-Mining-Sector.pdf">an estimated 10 million people</a> working in the sector across sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>The mass privatisation of mining and the turn to foreign direct investment has created conflict with these miners. They have been displaced and marginalised. Displacement is often financed by corporations and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11077-009-9091-5">carried out as government military-led ‘sweeps’</a>.</p>
<p>The African mining literature (especially the more influential <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/109601.pdf">policy papers</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2014afrecooutlook-afdb.pdf">flagship development agency reports</a>) has been centrally preoccupied with how African firms can integrate into industrial mining value chains led by foreign corporates. It seldom considers how and from whom value is transferred when industrial mines interact with small-scale mining economies.</p>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2020.1865902">recently published research</a> looking at the case of South Kivu province in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we document these ‘<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1068/a43505">everyday practices and struggles over value</a>’. We demonstrate how a coalition between foreign corporate capital and the Congolese state has held back local processes of adopting technology and forming capital. We direct attention towards the important role played by small-scale mining in African societies and economies, and how transnational corporations hobble the potential of this sector.</p>
<h2>Capital formation and mechanisation</h2>
<p>Artisanal mining is the most important source of livelihood after agriculture in South Kivu. Nevertheless, transnational corporations have hoovered up the most valuable and strategically important deposits, forcing artisanal miners to more marginal and less productive areas.</p>
<p>Hundreds of thousands working in the province produce <a href="https://www.eca-creac.eu/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-08-kamundala-marysse-mukotanyi.pdf">an estimated 4,800 kilograms of artisanal-mined gold annually</a>. In 2020, this equated to a market value of around $265 million. The value of Congo’s total gold production is approximately $2 billion annually.</p>
<p>Artisanal miners extract gold from underground pits, alluvial sites and riverbeds. In Kamituga, South Kivu’s largest mining town, where we conducted our research, drillers and diggers go down in pits of up to 100 metres deep.</p>
<p>Outside the pits, the extracted ore is ground and processed using mercury amalgamation. The gold is sold to local traders, who in turn sell to master traders, who smuggle most of the gold production to neighbouring countries. It’s then taken to destinations such as Dubai.</p>
<p>Of the estimated $265 million in artisanal gold South Kivu produced in 2020, our research in Kamituga has shown that artisanal and small-scale Congolese miners and traders captured between 90% and 95% – $240 million to $250 million. This estimate is based on survey and financial logbook data collected from mine workers and managers in 2009-2010, 2015, 2016 and 2017. </p>
<p>The bottom category of mine workers, such as transporters and diggers, earn between $56 and $136 per month. Skilled workers such as timber workers, drillers and machine operators earn between $116 and $180 per month. Technical directors and team leaders earn between <a href="https://blog.uantwerpen.be/sustainable-global-society/artisanal-gold-mining-pays/">$172 and $412 per month</a>. Successful shaft managers can make a profit of between $764 and $1670 per month. Small traders make between $200 and $400 per month, while master traders make much more, up to several thousands of dollars per month.</p>
<p>Shaft managers and traders invest part of their profits in farming and livestock, real estate, commerce, transport, and non-mining productive activity (such as brick making). Managers and traders also import consumer goods, construction material and food into the country for resale.</p>
<p>They also reinvest in gold production, which drives investment in production technologies and mechanisation. As a result, artisanal mining in South Kivu has become more productive. Around 2010, shaft managers noticed a decrease in the quality of the extracted ore in Kamituga. In response, they introduced machinery that grinds large rocks into fine powder. Initially imported from Tanzania and eventually manufactured in local workshops, it allowed exhausted pits to become productive again. Shaft managers also started constructing their own pylons to connect sites to the local electricity grid.</p>
<p>Congolese managers and traders in Kamituga have driven a process of semi-mechanised gold mining, all of it based on locally made machinery. Their major problem, however, has been that they were working in an area under concession of the Canada-based multinational Banro Corporation.</p>
<h2>Corporate-state suppression</h2>
<p>Banro’s permits made any artisanal and small-scale mining on its grounds illegal. It initially tolerated this on its Kamituga concession, but its attitude changed when artisanal miners mechanised. Banro saw mechanisation as depleting the deposits on its concession far more rapidly than the traditional artisanal mining methods.</p>
<p>In response, in early 2013 Banro laid charges against owners of the grinding machinery in Kamituga. Eventually, their mills were appropriated by state agents with the support of local military and police. </p>
<p>By 2017, there was still no judgement on the case against the mill owners. The president of a miners’ association in Kamituga reflected that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Since 2012, artisanal miners have been leading a life of uncertainty. They continue in their work, not knowing what day their enemy will surprise them. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/banro-announces-intention-to-proceed-with-recapitalization-plan-675809993.html">Banro has since gone into Canadian government creditor protection</a> and the DRC has got a new president and South Kivu governor. These developments have shifted the balance of power away from foreign corporations. </p>
<p>But the breathing space for small miners might not last long. The Congo has a long history of the state and mining corporations working together to suppress artisanal and small-scale miners in South Kivu. This has happened across different political regimes since the 1970s.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>The World Bank continues to promote the potential benefits of foreign-led industrial mining across Africa. Yet African governments are beginning to depart from this prescription <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-14/the-fight-between-miners-and-african-governments-is-just-getting-started">and confront foreign mining corporations</a>. This shift might represent an ideological break with the past, and the emergence of alternatives to a disruptive model.</p>
<p><em>This article was first published in an extended format on the <a href="https://roape.net/2021/03/09/struggles-over-value-suppression-of-locally-led-capital-accumulation-in-the-congo/">Review of African Political Economy blog</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157529/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Radley received funding from the Leverhulme Trust under grant number SAS-2016-047/7.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Geenen received funding from FWO-EOS under research grant G0G4318N.</span></em></p>The mass privatisation of mining and the turn to foreign direct investment has created conflict with small-scale miners.Ben Radley, Lecturer in International Development, University of BathSara Geenen, Assistant professor in Globalisation, International Development and Poverty, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532982021-01-19T20:05:36Z2021-01-19T20:05:36ZTrump’s time is up, but his Twitter legacy lives on in the global spread of QAnon conspiracy theories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379409/original/file-20210119-13-ods0n2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C0%2C4210%2C2821&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“The lie outlasts the liar,” writes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/magazine/trump-coup.html#click=https://t.co/yl15iUIX3Ghttps://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/magazine/trump-coup.html">historian Timothy Snyder</a>, referring to outgoing president Donald Trump and his contribution to the “post-truth” era in the US.</p>
<p>Indeed, the mass rejection of reason that erupted in a political mob storming Capitol Hill mere weeks before the inauguration of Joe Biden tests our ability to comprehend contemporary American politics and its emerging forms of extremism.</p>
<p>Much has been written about Trump’s role in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mats_Hyvoenen/publication/323242772_Post-Truth_Fake_News_Viral_Modernity_Higher_Education/links/5dc5791792851c81803ac662/">spreading misinformation</a> and the <a href="http://polecom.org/index.php/polecom/article/viewFile/74/264">media failures</a> that enabled him. His contribution to <a href="https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-05/trump-officials-have-redirected-resources-from-countering-far-right-racism-fueled-domestic-terrorism">fuelling extremism</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2017.1313649?casa_token=k5v1AocDaP4AAAAA:bQF04MH30k7lM0UMWTSxnIGAFVy6Y2396-Q9eQq2VGBrF0enf8fSrg3DeQqsa7RDiB8-yeKw-RAR">flirting with the political fringe</a>, <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2020/10/trumps-long-history-with-conspiracy-theories/">supporting conspiracy theories</a> and, most of all, <a href="https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/q432v/digital-demagogue-authoritarian-capitalism-in-the-age-of-trump-and-twitter">Twitter demagogy</a> created an environment in which he has been seen as an <a href="https://www.vox.com/21506029/trump-violence-tweets-racist-hate-speech">“accelerant”</a> in his own right.</p>
<p>If the scale of international damage is yet to be calculated, there is something we can measure right now.</p>
<p>In September last year, the London-based <a href="https://www.media-diversity.org">Media Diversity Institute</a> (MDI) asked us to design a research project that would systematically track the extent to which US-originated conspiracy theory group QAnon had spread to Europe.</p>
<p>Titled <a href="https://getthetrollsout.org/resources/conspiracy-theories">QAnon 2: spreading conspiracy theories on Twitter</a>, the research is part of the international Get the Trolls Out! (<a href="https://getthetrollsout.org">GTTO</a>) project, focusing on religious discrimination and intolerance.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1341353472055238658"}"></div></p>
<h2>Twitter and the rise of QAnon</h2>
<p>GTTO media monitors had earlier <a href="https://www.media-diversity.org/resources/report-qanon-and-the-growing-conspiracy-theory-trend-on-social-media/">noted</a> the rise of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/53498434">QAnon</a> support among Twitter users in Europe and were expecting a further surge of derogatory talk ahead of the 2020 US presidential election. </p>
<p>We examined the role religion played in spreading conspiracy theories, the most common topics of tweets, and what social groups were most active in spreading QAnon ideas.</p>
<p>We focused on Twitter because its increasing use — some <a href="https://www.oberlo.com/blog/twitter-statistics">sources estimate</a> 330 million people used Twitter monthly in 2020 — has made it a powerful political communication tool. It has given politicians such as Trump the opportunity to promote, facilitate and mobilise social groups on an unprecedented scale.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/qanon-and-the-storm-of-the-u-s-capitol-the-offline-effect-of-online-conspiracy-theories-152815">QAnon and the storm of the U.S. Capitol: The offline effect of online conspiracy theories</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Using AI tools developed by data company <a href="https://www.textgain.com/">Textgain</a>, we analysed about half-a-million Twitter messages related to QAnon to identify major trends. </p>
<p>By observing how hashtags were combined in messages, we examined the network structure of QAnon users posting in English, German, French, Dutch, Italian and Spanish. Researchers identified about 3,000 different hashtags related to QAnon used by 1,250 Twitter profiles.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protestors with flag showing US flag and QAnon logo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379408/original/file-20210119-14-1mvego5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Making the connection: demonstrators in Berlin in 2020 display QAnon and US imagery.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An American export</h2>
<p>Every fourth QAnon tweet originated in the US (300). Far behind were tweets from other countries: Canada (30), Germany (25), Australia (20), the United Kingdom (20), the Netherlands (15), France (15), Italy (10), Spain (10) and others. </p>
<p>We examined QAnon profiles that share each other’s content, Trump tweets and YouTube videos, and found over 90% of these profiles shared the content of at least one other identified profile. </p>
<p>Seven main topics were identified: support for Trump, support for EU-based nationalism, support for QAnon, deep state conspiracies, coronavirus conspiracies, religious conspiracies and political extremism.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-activists-on-social-media-telegraphed-violence-weeks-in-advance-of-the-attack-on-the-us-capitol-152861">Far-right activists on social media telegraphed violence weeks in advance of the attack on the US Capitol</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Hashtags rooted in US evangelicalism sometimes portrayed Trump as Jesus, as a superhero, or clad in medieval armour, with underlying Biblical references to a coming apocalypse in which he will defeat the forces of evil. </p>
<p>Overall, the coronavirus pandemic appears to function as an important conduit for all such messaging, with QAnon acting as a rallying flag for discontent among far-right European movements. </p>
<h2>Measuring the toxicity of tweets</h2>
<p>We used Textgain’s hate-speech detection tools to assess toxicity. Tweets written in English had a high level of antisemitism. In particular, they targeted public figures such as Jewish-American billionaire investor and philanthropist George Soros, or revived old conspiracies about secret Jewish plots for world domination. Soros was also a popular target in other languages.</p>
<p>We also found a highly polarised debate around the coronavirus public health measures employed in Germany, often using Third Reich rhetoric.</p>
<p>New language to express negative sentiments was coined and then adopted by others — in particular, pejorative terms for face masks and slurs directed at political leaders and others who wore masks. </p>
<p>Accompanying memes ridiculed political leaders, displaying them as alien reptilian overlords or antagonists from popular movies, such as Star Wars Sith Lords and the cyborg from The Terminator.</p>
<p>Most of the QAnon profiles tap into the same sources of information: Trump tweets, YouTube disinformation videos and each other’s tweets. It forms a mutually reinforcing confirmation bias — the tendency to search for, interpret, favour, and recall information that confirms prior beliefs or values.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-being-permanently-banned-trumps-prolific-twitter-record-lives-on-152969">Despite being permanently banned, Trump's prolific Twitter record lives on</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Where does it end?</h2>
<p>Harvesting discontent has always been a powerful political tool. In a digital world this is more true than ever.</p>
<p>By mid 2020, Donald Trump had <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/28/trump-twitter-by-numbers/">six times more followers</a> on Twitter than when he was elected. Until he was suspended from the platform, his daily barrage of tweets found a ready audience in ultra-right groups in the US who helped his misinformation and inflammatory rhetoric jump the Atlantic to Europe.</p>
<p>Social media platforms have since attempted to reduce the spread of QAnon. In July 2020, Twitter suspended 7,000 QAnon-related accounts. In August, Facebook deleted over 790 groups and restricted the accounts of hundreds of others, along with thousands of Instagram accounts.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-twitter-feed-shows-arc-of-the-hero-from-savior-to-showdown-152888">Trump's Twitter feed shows 'arc of the hero,' from savior to showdown</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In January this year, all Trump’s social media accounts were either <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/technology/2021/01/every-social-media-platform-that-s-banned-or-restricted-donald-trump.html">banned or restricted</a>. Twitter suspended 70,000 accounts that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55638558">share QAnon content at scale</a>.</p>
<p>But further Textgain analysis of 50,000 QAnon tweets posted in December and January showed toxicity had almost doubled, including 750 tweets inciting political violence and 500 inciting violence against Jewish people. </p>
<p>Those tweets were being systematically removed by Twitter. But <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/08/us/online-extremism-inauguration-capitol-invs/index.html">calls for violence</a> ahead of the January 20 inauguration continued to proliferate, Trump’s QAnon supporters appearing as committed and vocal as ever. </p>
<p>The challenge for both the Biden administration and the social media platforms themselves is clear. But our analysis suggests any solution will require a coordinated international effort.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153298/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom De Smedt is the co-founder of Textgain.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Verica Rupar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Analysis shows how Trump and Twitter spread QAnon extremism from the US to Europe, and how hard it will be to undo the damage.Verica Rupar, Professor, Auckland University of TechnologyTom De Smedt, Postdoctoral research associate, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1425082020-07-28T14:14:39Z2020-07-28T14:14:39ZHow refugees resolve disputes: insights from a Ugandan settlement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349372/original/file-20200724-25-1kp952h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugee children in Bidibidi resettlement camp, northern Uganda</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Typically, refugee camps or settlements, whether in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/greece-extends-lockdown-more-120000-migrants-refugees">Greece</a>, <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/expert-opinion/syrians-at-the-berm-surviving-in-nightmarish-conditions-and-with-an-uncertain-status">Jordan</a> or <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/no-solace-for-syrian-refugees-in-lawless-libya/a-17657208">Libya</a>, are seen as lawless environments. They are characterised by a lack of structure, rules and norms. </p>
<p>But, based <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jrs/feaa037/5827895">on our study</a> with South Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda, we bring a different story. We show there are a lot of rules and regulations that people abide by in the settlements. These include South Sudanese customary norms, Ugandan law and international human rights promoted by implementing agencies.</p>
<p>We also found that refugees invested a great amount of effort in solving disputes among themselves, and with surrounding host community members.</p>
<p>This isn’t exclusive to this geography. Earlier research, for instance in camps in <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/human-rights-in-translation-dispute-resolution-in-the-bhutanese-r">Nepal</a> and in <a href="https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/human-rights-in-translation-dispute-resolution-in-the-bhutanese-r">Zambia</a> already described the existence of dispute resolution by refugees alongside other actors, such as host state authorities and humanitarian actors. </p>
<p>When it comes to dispute resolution in Ugandan settlements, there are many different programmes and courses organised by agencies within and around the settlements. These include the introduction of <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/govt-strengthens-community-policing-among-south-sudan-refugees-host-communities/">community policing</a>, <a href="https://uganda.lutheranworld.org/content/call-peace-meet-south-sudanese-refugees-upholding-peace-nyumanzi-settlement-106">peace promoters</a> and radio talkshows.</p>
<p>We argue, however, that more attention is needed to also support existing structures within refugee communities: to mediate disputes in ways more familiar to them. Though the added value of resolution efforts by customary authorities <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85748/7/Ibreck_Community-security.pdf">is acknowledged</a>, they’re not officially recognised by humanitarian partners. Investing in and supporting mediation techniques by formal and informal leaders could prove highly valuable.</p>
<h2>Patchwork regulation</h2>
<p>More than <a href="https://ugandarefugees.org/en/country/uga">800 000 South Sudanese refugees</a> have remained on Ugandan soil after fleeing the violence that erupted in their newly independent nation at the end of 2013. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Refugee-influx-takes-toll-Adjumani-/688342-3377066-egy602z/index.html">Adjumani district</a>, for example, the population has doubled over the past seven years since refugees arrived. This puts heavy pressure on the meagre resources and facilities, a situation that is rife with potential conflict and tension.</p>
<p>Overall, life in the settlement is regulated by a patchwork of local practices and norms, Ugandan law and international ‘best practices’ introduced by the implementing agencies. </p>
<p>We conducted more than 100 interviews with South Sudanese refugee leaders, chiefs, elders, host community members, NGO representatives and Ugandan authorities. The interviews took place in the Adjumani district, northern Uganda, specifically the Boroli and Alere settlements. We wanted to examine which disputes occur within and around the settlements and which actors intervene to mediate and solve them.</p>
<p>From these discussions, we came to the conclusion that the settlements were far from lawless places.</p>
<p>When a dispute occurred, we found that a variety of different actors get involved. These included individuals from within the refugee community, from the greater society, Ugandan authorities, implementing agencies - such as Lutheran World Federation and Danish Refugee Council - and refugee leaders. </p>
<p>Refugee leaders, either elected representatives or chiefs and elders of particular communities, played an important role. Depending on the nature of the case, it was handled individually, or settled in local courts created for the purpose. </p>
<p>We found that mediation efforts covered a wide range of disputes. These included marital disagreements, defusing communal tensions and dissatisfaction towards official authorities. </p>
<p>Take the case of Elizabeth, a South Sudanese refugee living in Alere refugee settlement, northern Uganda. One day she found that the crops she had planted to feed her family had been destroyed by cattle. Devastated, she went to report the matter to the chief. After she’d explained her story, the chief started an investigation along with other respected elders of the community. Soon, the owner of the cattle was found and Elizabeth was compensated for her loss.</p>
<h2>The role played by mediators</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/news/new-book-the-global-governed-refugees-as-providers-of-protection-and-assistance">ability of refugees to</a> govern themselves are too often underestimated or undermined by external actors.</p>
<p>We found, in fact, that <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/44183b7e2/10-administration-justice-refugee-camps-study-practice-rosa-da-costa.html">refugee-led resolution systems</a> were indispensable in the camps.</p>
<p>Being accessible and, most importantly, familiar to the refugees, the refugee leaders provided an important forum where cases - such as the payment of dowry and divorce, fighting and minor thefts - could be mediated and solved. </p>
<p>There were, however, also some downsides. Refugee leaders, for example, tended to go beyond their authority. They sometimes tried to resolve conflicts that were too serious to handle without the involvement of the Ugandan authorities, such as rape cases.</p>
<p>Another problem was that, given the patchwork of how things are regulated, refugee leaders were sometimes put in a difficult position when it came to making decisions. Which practices had been applied in the past? Which solutions were accepted in the new environment?</p>
<p>We found that refugees recognised and respected Ugandan law. But a number of South Sudanese practices and values, were considered too important to let go of particularly as most refugees envisaged ‘going home’ at some point. For example, they may cross the border into South Sudan to enact customs that are strictly monitored in the Ugandan settlements, such as early age marriages.</p>
<p>We found that they were imperfect in other ways too. Similar to other <a href="https://gsdrc.org/document-library/access-to-justice-in-sub-saharan-africa-the-role-of-traditional-and-informal-justice-systems/">informal justice systems</a>, they are dominated by men, with little or no representation of women and young people. Also, verdicts are focused on the security and interests of the community as a whole, instead of individual victims. This raises questions about their legitimacy.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>The refugee leaders playing a mediating role were also not funded. Formal representatives work on a voluntary basis, barely able to take care of themselves. </p>
<p>Given the indispensable nature of their mediation work, we argue it is crucial that refugees leaders are better supported in their role. Concretely, official authorities, such as the Ugandan government, UN refugee agency and implementing partners could foresee more training in resolution techniques and host state law. </p>
<p>Fundamentally, refugee leaders complained that they are only seen as ‘beneficiaries’, instead of stakeholders. Including community leaders into dialogues with the official authorities would enhance understanding at both sides. It would provide refugees with a better understanding of host state law and camp regulations. But more importantly, it would clarify underlying dynamics in dispute resolution for the agencies as well.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142508/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Vancluysen has received funding from FWO and the Institute of Development Policy to conduct fieldwork for her research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bert Ingelaere does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Refugees invest a great amount of effort in solving disputes among themselves, and with surrounding host community members.Sarah Vancluysen, PhD researcher - Development Studies, University of AntwerpBert Ingelaere, Assistant Professor , University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.