tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/yonsei-university-2045/articlesYonsei University2021-12-14T02:35:43Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1737372021-12-14T02:35:43Z2021-12-14T02:35:43ZIn a changing region, Australia’s relationship with South Korea has been ignored for too long<p>South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Australia this week comes at a critical point in the relationship between the countries.</p>
<p>Moon is the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-13/australia-and-south-korea-billion-dollar-defence-contract/100694638">first world leader</a> to visit Australia since the COVID pandemic began and the federal government shut the country’s borders.</p>
<p>The two countries have signed a billion-dollar weapons contract, which has dominated the headlines in Australia. But while this contract is significant, it is only a very small step - there is much more to do.</p>
<h2>A relationship on the back burner</h2>
<p>Australia and South Korea haven’t really paid attention to the relationship in recent years. It’s basically been ignored for at least a decade, if not longer.</p>
<p>The problem is, the relationship is a victim of its own success. Australia and South Korea have a highly complimentary trade relationship and there are no major problems. As a result, they’ve just let it linger. </p>
<p>This means they are starting from an empty chair in terms of improving the relationship, so this visit is an important first step. </p>
<p>In South Korea, not many people think about Australia. There isn’t an option for students to focus on Australia in high school or university and see Australia as a place to invest their time and efforts for future careers.</p>
<p>As a result, there are cohorts of students going into government and business with absolutely no knowledge of, or interest in, Australia. </p>
<p>If you compare this to Australia, there are students who are studying Korean or are focused on Korean studies for business, defence, and pop culture, of course. But Australia isn’t doing anything to promote itself in South Korea.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tensions-rise-on-the-korean-peninsula-and-they-are-unlikely-to-recede-any-time-soon-140935">Tensions rise on the Korean peninsula – and they are unlikely to recede any time soon</a>
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<h2>Finding common ground</h2>
<p>There are some commonalities on which to build a stronger relationship. Both Australia and South Korea are mid-sized, secondary powers. This is important, as they are both facing similar challenges negotiating between major powers and with other regional powers. </p>
<p>They are also both advanced societies facing similar challenges on health care, the environment and governance. So, there are lots of areas where they can work together.</p>
<p>On strategic issues, the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-13/australia-and-south-korea-billion-dollar-defence-contract/100694638">major defence contract</a> announced this week is going to the South Korean defence giant Hanwha to build 30 self-propelled howitzers and 15 armoured ammunition resupply vehicles for the Australian army.</p>
<p>It’s part of a new <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211213000628">memorandum of understanding</a> on defence industry and materials cooperation, which comes after the previous agreement between the two nations lapsed a decade ago. </p>
<p>The Hanwha contract is certainly large, but there’s a big difference in the way South Koreans and Australians see the deal. </p>
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<p>Australians believe it’s of great strategic consequence, tied to regional tensions and China’s rising influence. But South Koreans don’t see it that way. They are viewing it as a commercial transaction that has nothing to do with China at all.</p>
<p>In fact, if you look at the <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211213000628">South Korean press</a> – and particularly the Korean language press – it doesn’t mention China in relation to Moon’s trip to Australia. Rather, it is focused on securing resources – <a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211115000770">in particular urea</a> – and maintaining those resource supplies. </p>
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<h2>South Korea’s future role in the region</h2>
<p>This shows the countries are on fundamentally different pages when it comes to regional security, and this is going to become more of an issue in the future.</p>
<p>A lot of it depends on what happens in the <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/12/05/tough-tests-for-south-koreas-next-president/">South Korean presidential elections</a> next year. If a conservative leader is elected, South Korea will be more willing to cooperate with Australia and the US, and play a larger role alongside the two of them (to a degree). This won’t happen if there’s a progressive administration.</p>
<p>But even if there’s a conservative leader, South Korea will never go as far as Australia in condemning China’s actions. It’s not in South Korea’s interests to do that. Not only does Seoul need China to help in its negotiations with North Korea, but South Korea’s largest businesses are heavily invested in China, and they won’t want to damage the relationship.</p>
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<p>So, the long-term trend of South Korea’s position is not towards lining up with Australia and the US.</p>
<p>However, South Korea will be making some major decisions over the next ten years or so, and these include reassessing its relationship with both the US and China and potentially securing its own independent nuclear weapons capacity. </p>
<p>South Korea has been reassessing its relationship with the US for some time. One issue, for instance, is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/21/why-doesn-t-south-korea-have-full-control-over-its-military-pub-79702">returning wartime operational command</a> of South Korean troops from the United States Forces Korea to the South Korean military. This is a small step towards South Korea becoming more independent from the US.</p>
<p>There’s even talk in security circles of South Korea aiming for a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/coming-soon-neutral-south-korea">neutral role</a> in the region, becoming the Switzerland of North Asia. Ten years ago, this wasn’t even talked about. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-century-old-dispute-between-japan-and-south-korea-threatens-the-global-supply-of-smartphones-122502">How a century-old dispute between Japan and South Korea threatens the global supply of smartphones</a>
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<h2>Where Australia fits in</h2>
<p>South Korea doesn’t view Australia as an important actor in its decisions. But there’s an important role for them to play together in the region, which is why these strategic discussions are so vital. Australia needs to increase its voice in South Korean policy circles and make its opinions heard.</p>
<p>This problem goes back to the Howard years, when Australian foreign policy decisions basically just followed the US. During the Rudd years, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-08-11/rudd-talks-with-s-korean-president-on-education/471930">there was some good collaboration</a> between Australia and South Korea, but at the end of those administrations, this deteriorated somewhat.</p>
<p>Now, there’s an opportunity for Australia to do much more. For instance, it should open a formal Australian Studies Institute in South Korea, similar to the ones it has in China and Japan, and try to establish more joint university degrees programs between the countries.</p>
<p>The Australian Strategic Policy Institute could also do more work on South Korea and translate this into Korean. These sorts of things can raise the profile of Australia as an independent thinker and actor in the region. Importantly, it could also make it more visible in South Korean policy circles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Robertson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The two countries are on fundamentally different pages when it comes to regional security, and this is going to become more of an issue in the future.Jeffrey Robertson, Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies, Yonsei UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/820462017-10-12T19:18:06Z2017-10-12T19:18:06ZTackling climate change could bring North and South Korea closer and help stabilise the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186155/original/file-20170915-16277-ci9szo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korea is no doubt watching closely as the region moves forward on energy cooperation.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">House Committee on Foreign Affairs/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf">Paris Agreement, signed in 2015</a> requires every country to make pledges to <a href="http://www.unep.org/climatechange/resources/pledge-pipeline">tackle climate change</a>. North Korea is <a href="http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Democratic%20People's%20Republic%20of%20Korea/1/DPRK-INDC%20by%202030.pdf">no exception</a>.</p>
<p>Given that air pollution doesn’t recognise borders, there are already several emissions-reduction projects underway that will require cooperation between Asian nations.</p>
<p>To meet its obligations, South Korea has pledged to buy emissions credits on the international market, <a href="http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html">offsetting 11.3% of its business-as-usual emissions in 2030</a>. That is 96.1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions – already more than North Korea’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2013 (<a href="http://cait2.wri.org/historical/Country%20GHG%20Emissions?indicator%5b%5d=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Excluding%20Land-Use%20Change%20and%20Forestry&indicator%5b%5d=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Including%20Land-Use%20Change%20and%20Forestry&year%5b%5d=2013&country%5b%5d=Korea%2C%20Dem.%20Rep.%20(North)&sortIdx=NaN&chartType=geo">78 million tonnes</a>). </p>
<p>Because North Korea has its own obligations now, foreign countries including South Korea can no longer earn carbon credits from their carbon-offsetting projects in the country.</p>
<p>But if South Korea provides technical assistance such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10784-016-9333-x">satellite monitoring of North Korea’s reforestation progression</a> and then can obtain the country’s “informed consent”, a mutual effort to generate carbon credits could be discussed.</p>
<h2>Air pollution</h2>
<p>Addressing transboundary air pollution is the latest development in regional cooperation. North Korea has been an inaugural member (since 1993) of the <a href="http://www.neaspec.org/member-states">North-East Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC)</a>, one goal of which is to mitigate transboundary air pollution. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://opengov.seoul.go.kr/research/11895404">recent study by the Seoul Metropolitan Government</a> (written in Korean) revealed that 38% of pollution particles in the city’s ambient air come from China, and another 7% from North Korea. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10962247.2013.845618">A Japanese air-transport model estimated</a> that more than 45% of ambient PM2.5 (fine particulate matter) concentration in Nonodake (350km north of Tokyo) is from China. Although reducing this pollution in a coordinated way will be a difficult task, real-time data exchange (as proposed by NEASPEC) might be relatively easier. </p>
<p>If the Northeast Asian countries share real-time emissions data as well as the currently available meteorological data, they could generate more reliable pollution forecasts and help people prepare for high-pollution events. The harder task of particle pollution mitigation will be better addressed when the level of negotiating partners is upgraded from the current ministerial level to head of state level.</p>
<h2>Developing neighbour-friendly energies</h2>
<p>If Northeast Asia is to have a sustainable energy future, more regional cooperation will be required. </p>
<p>The trilateral Russia-China-Korea natural gas pipeline is bringing Russian natural gas to South Korea. Natural gas is not a sustainable energy source, but it can be a “bridging fuel” to help countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by <a href="https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2016/08/is-natural-gas-a-bridge-fuel/">replacing coal</a> until their renewable energy technology and systems evolve. Then, a natural gas pipeline is an attractive option for <a href="http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/103419-World_IGU_Report_no%20crops.pdf">South Korea, the world’s second-biggest LNG importer after Japan</a>. </p>
<p>Currently, South Korea’s natural gas imports consist entirely of <a href="https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-gas/overview/ngas-ovr-lng-wld-pr-est.pdf">more expensive LNG</a>. In the early 2000s, the <a href="http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-98/issue-20/special-report/trans-korean-gas-pipeline-could-help-asia-energy-security-environmental-problems.html">Trans-Korean natural gas pipeline proposal</a> was planned to supply Russian natural gas to South Korea using a shortcut pipeline passing through North Korea. </p>
<p>Reportedly, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-russia-idUSKBN1881N0">South Korean President Moon has shown interest in the project</a> too. However, the project is not possible until the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula is resolved.</p>
<p>Instead, there is an alternative for South Korea to seek a regional détente with a natural gas pipeline. Russia’s <a href="http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/built/ykv/">“Power of Siberia” pipeline</a> is planned to connect into the capital region of China. If this happens, extending the supply chain to South Korea via <a href="http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2950386">an undersea pipeline between China’s Shandong peninsula and Korea’s Incheon</a> will be simpler. The pipeline would enhance the three countries’ economic ties and political cooperation.</p>
<h2>Asia clean grid connections</h2>
<p>The other energy option, the Asia international grid connection, is a project promoted by South Korea, Japan, and Mongolia. The basic idea is that vast solar and wind energy potential of Mongolia’s Gobi Desert can be utilised by South Korea and Japan. A <a href="http://blogs.worldwatch.org/gobitec-connecting-northeast-asia-to-renewables/">super grid</a> would connect the countries in Northeast Asia. </p>
<p>This option’s most prominent supporter is Masayoshi Son, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-21/softbank-s-clean-energy-goals-find-welcome-in-mongolia-s-desert">chief executive of SoftBank, Japan’s third-largest public company</a>. Several research institutions and the Korea Electric Power Corporation, South Korea’s only operator of the national grid, <a href="http://www.unescap.org/resources/session-2-technical-financial-and-political-dimensions-power-interconnection">have been studying its feasibility</a>. </p>
<p>The Asian Development Bank is conducting a <a href="https://www.adb.org/projects/48030-001/main">technical feasibility assessment</a>, at Mongolia’s request. In April, the Renewable Energy Institute, an organisation founded by Mr Son in Tokyo, found the project <a href="http://www.renewable-ei.org/en/activities/reports_20170419.php">will benefit all participating countries</a>, citing many successfully operating international grid connections. But it lacks <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=XAQyZXvjusEC&pg=PA182&lpg=PA182&dq=%22there+are+few+incentives+to+cooperate+with+Mongolia%22&source=bl&ots=IoKf4g-t7N&sig=4922kjhTK_M35HsXQnprWVT01P4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjanIu-sYDWAhXHxLwKHUzrD6IQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=%22there%20are%20few%20incentives%20to%20cooperate%20with%20Mongolia%22&f=false">China’s active participation.</a> </p>
<p>If further research can find evidence that the project will significantly improve China’s air quality by reducing coal consumption, national governments of the region might help make it happen.</p>
<p>Of course, true green détente in Northeast Asia cannot happen without North Korea’s support and participation. However, if any of the reviewed four options become reality, it will give North Korea a strong incentive to cooperate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82046/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hun Park receives funding from the National Research Foundation of Korea.</span></em></p>Green détente options could help South Korea ease the diplomatic tensions in the region.Hun Park, Research Professor, Sustainability, Yonsei UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/721942017-02-07T07:29:44Z2017-02-07T07:29:44ZStatue wars reveal contested history of Japan’s ‘comfort women’<p>On December 30 2016, a South Korean civic group placed a bronze statue of a girl in front of the Japanese consulate in the southern port city of Busan. It commemorates <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/30/opinions/japan-korea-china-comfort-women">as many as 200,000 enslaved military prostitutes</a>, known as “comfort women”, from Korea and other parts of East Asia under Japanese domination during the second world war. In response, <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/02/120_223175.html">Japan recalled its ambassador</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://apjjf.org/2012/10/50/Okano-Yayo/3863/article.html">first such statue was unveiled</a> by the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul on December 14 2011. It marked the 1,000th rally held there weekly without interruption since 1992 to press Japan to make just reparations. </p>
<p>Since then, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38526914">at least 37 more have sprung up in South Korea</a> with <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/nyregion/monument-in-palisades-park-nj-irritates-japanese-officials.html">additional statues erected abroad</a> elsewhere by local activists. This action has taken place despite a Japanese anti-statue lobby, and <a href="http://www.latimes.com/socal/glendale-news-press/news/tn-gnp-me-comfort-women-20160804-story.html">unsuccessful legal challenges</a>. Such statues now exist in the US, <a href="http://www.koreatimesus.com/toronto-gets-comfort-woman-statue">Canada</a>, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-14/japanese-group-launches-18c-case-against-uniting-church/8117234">Australia</a>, and <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/10/22/national/comfort-women-statues-unveiled-shanghai-university">China</a>. And <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/09/03/commentary/complicating-taiwans-love-affair-japan">a museum dedicated to the Taiwanese victims</a> opened in Taipei last year.</p>
<p>Japan claims the statues violate South Korea’s treaty obligations under the Vienna Conventions, which both countries have ratified. But a closer reading of international law suggests that the statues are protected by the freedom of expression.</p>
<h2>What international law?</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf">1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations</a> and <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf">1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations</a> lay out standard rules of diplomacy. They require host states to prevent “any disturbance of the peace of [the diplomatic mission/consular post] or impairment of its dignity”.</p>
<p>There’s undoubtedly a need to protect diplomatic and consular staff and their premises from any acts of violence or intimidation. And such outrages sadly do occur on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere. </p>
<p>In July 1996, for instance, a <a href="http://news.joins.com/article/17445601">Japanese ultranationalist rammed the gate</a> of the South Korean embassy in Tokyo with his car. About 16 years later, a <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/07/117_114738.html">South Korean truck driver returned the favour</a> at the Japanese embassy in Seoul. The <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/06/national/korean-consulate-smoke-bombed">South Korean consulate in Kobe</a> has also been smoke-bombed.</p>
<p>As the incidents above illustrate, the two neighbours have had fraught relations for some time. Many Koreans still resent Japan’s usurpation of their national sovereignty and harsh rule during the colonial period (1910-1945). </p>
<p>And prominent Japanese politicians, including Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have caused uproar in the region by <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/16/shinzo-abe-and-the-revisionists-denial-of-aggression">denying or downplaying Japan’s past aggression</a> or <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/18/opinion/la-oe-guttentag-japan-nanking-20130118">atrocities such as the “comfort women” or the 1937 Nanking massacre</a>. Nor is the Japanese <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21226068">education system conducive to historical introspection</a>, with regular outrage engendered by historical revisionism.</p>
<p>The recent row over the statues, then, is a part of this continuing struggle over history. But does an ostensibly innocuous display of a symbolic female figures disturb the peace or impair dignity in legal terms?</p>
<p>At issue is the freedom of expression and assembly, a fundamental human right enshrined in most national constitutions including those of <a href="http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html">Japan</a> and <a href="http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/images/eng/main/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf">South Korea</a>. That freedom is also protected by the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng">1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> and <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx">1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>, adhered to by 168 countries, including the two East Asian neighbours.</p>
<h2>State practice and domestic case law</h2>
<p>Protest at embassies and consulates are not confined to this region. In 1976, the <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/312/case.html">US Congress removed the provision banning picketing of diplomatic premises</a> outside Washington DC due to fears it violated the freedom of speech and peaceful assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. </p>
<p>And in 1988, the <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/312/case.html">US Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional</a> a DC statute banning the display of insulting signs within 500 feet (152 metres) of foreign legations. This was the result of a lawsuit brought by activists seeking to protest before the Soviet and Nicaraguan embassies. The DC statute, which dated back to 1938, was enacted to curb protests before the embassies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.</p>
<p>In 1984, a <a href="https://books.google.co.kr/books?id=g_IyCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144">British court held</a> that the dignity of mission premises was impaired only if abusive or insulting behaviour or actual violence occurred. The <a href="https://books.google.co.kr/books?id=g_IyCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144">UK government agreed</a>, stating that “the essential requirements are that the work of the mission should not be disrupted, that mission staff are not put in fear, and that there is free access for both staff and visitors.”</p>
<p>In 1992, an East Timorese group in Australia <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1992/165.html">planted 124 white crosses outside the Indonesian embassy</a> to protest an army massacre. But the Australian government removed them in accordance with a regulation purporting to implement its obligation under the Vienna Conventions.</p>
<p>The protesters challenged the regulation in court and <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1992/165.html">won the case</a>. But an appeals court <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1992/566.html">reversed by a two-one vote</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1992/566.html">forceful dissent</a> cited international precedents and reasoned that subjective criteria, such as “what the foreign country or its mission considers impairs its dignity” or “any personal desire of a Minister or government to please or placate the country concerned”, could not be decisive. Nor could the dissenting judge see why “fixed noiseless harmless objects bear on dignity” but people chanting or holding banners continue to be permitted.</p>
<p>In 2003, the South Korean Constitutional Court has similarly <a href="http://www.law.go.kr/detcInfoP.do?mode=1&detcSeq=58285">struck down a blanket ban</a> on demonstrations within 100 meters of diplomatic premises. In a 2000 decision, the court balanced the freedom of expression with the interests protected by the Vienna Conventions, namely the security and functioning of the foreign missions, <a href="http://www.law.go.kr/detcInfoP.do?mode=1&detcSeq=14492">by upholding protest bans only when such interests came under threat</a>.</p>
<h2>Other legal considerations</h2>
<p>In 2015, Seoul acknowledged Japanese concerns about the statue outside the latter’s embassy in a <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html">joint “announcement” on the “comfort women” issued</a> by the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers on December 28. </p>
<p>It pledged to “<a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html">strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through taking measures such as consulting with related organisations about possible ways of addressing this issue</a>”. But the convoluted wording of the announcement appears to tacitly recognise that the government cannot simply remove the statues by fiat.</p>
<p>It is worth noting that Japan can sue South Korea for the alleged violations of the Vienna Conventions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which can exercise jurisdiction only with the consent of both parties. </p>
<p>This is because both countries have given consent to ICJ jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the Vienna Conventions by ratifying the <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961_disputes.pdf">1961</a> and <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963_disputes.pdf">1963</a> Optional Protocols to the Vienna Conventions. </p>
<h2>What recourse?</h2>
<p>The dozens of “comfort girl” statues that have sprung up not only in South Korea but also in the US, Canada, Australia, China and Taiwan since 2011 may, in fact, be contributing to the nationalist reactions in the two nations.</p>
<p>For South Koreans, the issue comes down to anger at Japan for its brutal colonial rule (1910-1945), as much as human rights concerns for the victims. But the country’s failure to acknowledge <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2017/01/120_222942.html">atrocities committed by its own military during the Vietnam War</a> leaves it open to charges of hypocrisy.</p>
<p>None of this, of course, absolves Japanese responsibility for a crime against humanity that has been condemned as the “<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/121/text">largest human trafficking case of the past century</a>”. And it might be wiser for Japan to take measures to shore up the 2015 accord with South Korea.</p>
<p>Instead of being recalled, the Japanese ambassador could have met and spoken with the survivors. Japan could also extend compensation to the Taiwanese and Filipino “comfort women” as they have been demanding. </p>
<p>Such actions may induce the voluntary relocation of the statues. And they would mean Japan would also be living up to its professed commitment to the shared fundamental values of freedom, democracy and human rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ethan Hee-Seok Shin is affiliated with the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), a Seoul-based NGO, as its research fellow. TJWG works to promote transitional justice in East Asia and other parts of the world.</span></em></p>Japan claims that the placement of “comfort girl” statues outside the Japanese legations in South Korea violates international law, but state practice and jurisprudence suggests otherwise.Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, Ph. D. candidate in international law, Yonsei UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/433022015-06-17T10:27:54Z2015-06-17T10:27:54ZA tale of two borders: why North Koreans risk walking the DMZ<p>The “demilitarised zone” (DMZ) is a 4km-wide swath of land that cuts across the Korean peninsula from east to west. Highly militarised on both sides, with soldiers from both countries guarding their respective sides, it’s filled with landmines and barbed wire meant to make it virtually impossible to cross.</p>
<p>But some people do make it through – as apparently an unidentified North Korean man did on June 15. Reportedly a teenager, he is said to have <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11674550/North-Korean-soldier-walks-across-DMZ-to-defect-to-South.html">walked across the DMZ</a> and into the mountainous county of Hwacheon, South Korea and told the South Korean border guards he encountered that he wished to defect. As of that evening, the man was in custody undergoing questioning. </p>
<p>So long as the authorities are convinced that he isn’t a spy, South Korea will welcome him with open arms: it claims the entire peninsula as its territory and considers all North Koreans who defect to the South as <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-may-ship-all-north-korean-asylumseekers-to-south-korea-9891612.html">its own citizens</a> – just as North Korea makes a similar claim over South Korea. </p>
<h2>Two borders</h2>
<p>This pedestrian defector will join a growing population of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11674550/North-Korean-soldier-walks-across-DMZ-to-defect-to-South.html">about 50,000 North Koreans</a> who have made their way into South Korea over the years, almost always by way of China. He is one of the very few North Koreans who occasionally gamble everything and try to cross the DMZ despite all the formidable barriers that deter such crossings. </p>
<p>It might also explain recent reports that North Korea has been increasing patrols and planting more <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/06/14/0301000000AEN20150614000700315.html">landmines</a> along the DMZ while also forcing many residents who live near the border with China to <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/06/08/2015060801444.html">move further inland</a>.</p>
<p>All these developments will probably ramp up speculation among North Korea watchers that circumstances in the country or, more specifically, the military, might be driving more and more people to flee. But this latest DMZ crossing fits the general pattern of escape attempts; there’s no reason to see it as a signal of change. </p>
<p>To counter that assumption, we only need to place the North Korean soldier’s successful escape into South Korea through the DMZ against another incident that took place in China on June 11.</p>
<p>On that day, a North Korean man who had successfully crossed the Tumen River (separating North Korea and China) and had entered the Chinese town of Nanping, was reportedly <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/suspected-north-korean-defector-killed-chinese-border-guards-1962286">shot and killed by Chinese border guards</a> as he tried to defect. There were some reports he had <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/asia/china-issues-complaint-after-north-korean-defector-is-said-to-kill-4.html">killed four Chinese citizens</a> in a robbery. </p>
<p>In stark contrast with South Korea, China officially has zero tolerance for North Koreans seeking to leave the country, despite the fact that the Tumen River is relatively easy to cross and many North Koreans now live quietly, often clandestinely, in north-eastern China.</p>
<p>As an ally, patron and frequent enabler of the North Korean regime, China has long sparked the ire of human rights activists for its policy of sending North Korean defectors back where they came from rather than recognising them as prospective refugees. Many of these people are reportedly killed, tortured or thrown into prison camps once they are back in the hands of the North Korean government.</p>
<h2>Constant fear</h2>
<p>These two incidents at North Korea’s two separate borders are the opposite of what would usually be expected to happen. Anyone placing a bet would normally wager that North Koreans crossing into China would have higher chances of survival, despite the obstacles, than anyone brave enough to traverse the DMZ.</p>
<p>Given the way the North Korean regime controls the flow of information, the country’s everyday citizens probably won’t even hear about these incidents, and they will make little impact beyond the Korean peninsula. But they should remind us just how exceptional are the great lengths North Korea takes to confine its people to the country, just as East Germany once did. </p>
<p>That includes implications for the family members of North Koreans who leave the country without permission. Going on the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/north-korea-defectors-families-concern">long history of reports</a> regarding North Korean defectors, it’s very likely that both these men’s relatives will be harassed or worse by the North Korean government for guilt by association, even if they had absolutely no prior knowledge or involvement in the escape plans of their loved ones.</p>
<p>This is the human tragedy of the two Koreas remaining technically at war ever since the 1953 ceasefire. In many ways, the DMZ does its job quite well; maintaining an almost totally airtight border between North Korea and South Korea has helped maintain an uneasy peace for the past 60 years. But it also symbolises a terrible state of affairs. The two Koreas are condemned to a constant state of tension. And if North Koreans want better lives, they are forced to take the most desperate of risks with very slim chances of reward – and with dire consequences for those they love.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43302/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hans Schattle has received funding from the National Research Foundation in South Korea.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J. Galbreath receives funding from the ESRC and AHRC.</span></em></p>The demilitarised zone between the Koreas is an incredibly dangerous place to walk – but the Chinese border with North Korea isn’t much safer.Hans Schattle, Professor of political science and international relations, Yonsei UniversityDavid J Galbreath, Professor of International Security, Editor of European Security, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/420142015-05-20T10:36:25Z2015-05-20T10:36:25ZSouth Korean universities remain challenging places for foreign students and faculty<p>Spurred on by a globalisation of higher education, <a href="http://www.iie.org/%7E/media/Files/Services/ProjectAtlas/Website%202014/Project-Atlas-Trends-and-Global-Data-2014.ashx?la=en">over 4.5m students</a> from around the world studied abroad in 2012, more than double the number of students a decade earlier. While the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France and Germany remain the major destination countries, hosting more than 50% of foreign students worldwide, many countries which traditionally sent students abroad have started receiving them in recent decades – especially in Asia.</p>
<p>South Korea follows this general pattern: it is third place in Asia after China and India in the number of students it sends abroad to study. But at the same time, the <a href="http://kess.kedi.re.kr/eng/publ/view?survSeq=2014&publSeq=4&menuSeq=3645&itemCode=02&language=en">number of foreign students</a> in Korean universities reached 84,891 in 2014, most of them from China and less developed parts of Asia, especially Vietnam and Mongolia. The number of foreign faculty teaching in Korean universities has also increased from 1,373 (2.4%) in 2000 to 6,034 (6.8%) in 2014. Although the figures are still relatively low compared to the percentages in Europe and North America, they bring a potentially significant force of change to Korean society, which has 97% ethnic homogeneity.</p>
<p>The growing movement of students and faculty across societies naturally creates more culturally diverse campuses. In the US and Europe, such changes have led to significant efforts to create a culture of respect for diversity and inclusion, albeit with much regional and country-level variation in situations and strategies. Despite its critics, Europe has <a href="http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/News/Intercultural%20dialogue_EN.pdf">consistently articulated</a> the value of “interculturality”, “diversity” and respect for cultural differences in debates about higher education.</p>
<h2>Diversity, just for show</h2>
<p>However, this is not the case with Korea and most other Asian nations. One major reason is that Korean universities primarily attract foreign students as a means to clear ends. The universities want them to come to enhance university prestige or create “education hubs” and improving international higher education rankings. They can also help to fill the gap in a declining domestic college student population: the number of high school graduates is expected to fall short of the college entrance quota from 2018. As a result, Korean campuses have become much more diverse. However, appreciation of the intrinsic educational value of a culturally diverse student and faculty body has not been embraced by university leadership.</p>
<p><a href="http://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/research/diversity_and_tolerance_in_korea_and_asia">Our new study</a> on diversity in South Korean higher education shows a noticeable disjuncture between different aspects of diversity in the university environment. Korean universities may have accepted more students of varying racial and ethnic backgrounds, but the curriculum offers limited opportunities for students to think more deeply about assumptions concerning race, ethnicity and other individual or group differences. Courses focusing on racial and ethnic groups in Korea are conspicuously absent and those few addressing cultural differences focus on international (not internal) diversity, suggesting that diversity is viewed as something “out there” in the world that is still very unfamiliar and perhaps undesirable.</p>
<p>At the interpersonal level, both Korean and foreign students report very low levels of cross-cultural interaction. Foreign students often report experiencing cultural chauvinism and ethnocentrism in their encounters with Korean students. A female student from Iran studying at a top Korean university, for instance, said in an interview with us that: “my Korean acquaintances are not interested in getting to know other cultures. They seem to like to live among themselves in their own ways.” There is also a perception that foreign students gain easier admission to Korean universities than Korean students and often attend university on generous scholarships from the Korean government. As one Korean student put it: “We have to work really hard to get in, but international students can get in easy. It’s not fair.” </p>
<p>Foreign faculty, too, rather than being valued as full, contributing members of their academic communities, are often perceived as temporary skilled labour. Korean universities employ them largely to help boost their global credentials: the numbers of foreign faculty, their ability to publish in international journals and teach courses in English all help to raise domestic and international university rankings. There is also a tendency among Koreans to perceive foreign faculty as “second-tier” scholars who were unable to secure employment in their countries of origin. “I don’t feel valued here,” said one foreigner, explaining his reasons for choosing to leave his tenure-track position at a prestigious Korean university. </p>
<h2>Exclusive culture remains</h2>
<p>The Korean government and universities have worked closely together to promote structural diversity in university admissions, but core Korean values of <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Ethnic_nationalism_in_Korea.html?id=nNc2AzJmwPoC&hl=en">ethnic nationalism</a> remain firmly entrenched at the educational and interpersonal levels. At best, universities assist foreign students and attend to their adjustment needs but neglect to foster a tolerant, inclusive university culture where foreigners are considered full, valued members of Korean universities and society. Such an exclusive culture impedes Korean universities’ aspirations to become global.</p>
<p><a href="http://vserver1.cscs.lsa.umich.edu/%7Espage/thedifference.html">Much research</a> demonstrates the positive effects of diversity on various academic and social outcomes such as the ability to form wider friendship networks, increased cultural awareness, acquiring global citizenship skills, improving the campus climate and innovation. Universities are ideal settings for students from different backgrounds to meet, generate new ideas and interact with one another at an early stage in their lives. It is no accident that many of the innovative ideas associated with Microsoft, Yahoo, Google and Facebook were all born on American university campuses, where diversity is embraced. Facilitating diversity and recognising its long-term effects for <a href="http://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/can-asia-emulate-silicon-valley">innovation</a> and development should be a major goal of higher education in Korea.</p>
<p>Korean universities often proclaim that their mission is to become “global” but they should first realise that this requires more than simply recruiting foreigners and offering more courses in English. What is most urgent is to produce “global citizens” through the creation of a campus environment and culture that appreciates and respects diversity. The educational value of such an approach is even more important for a society like Korea that has been built on pride in ethnic nationalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On a mission to become global higher education players, Korean universities still fall short on diversity.Gi-Wook Shin, Director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford UniversityRennie Moon, Assistant Professor of Research Method , Yonsei UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.