tag:theconversation.com,2011:/nz/topics/yemen-civil-war-39810/articlesYemen civil war – The Conversation2024-01-22T16:59:46Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213922024-01-22T16:59:46Z2024-01-22T16:59:46ZWestern strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The United States and the United Kingdom <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/22/us/politics/houthi-yemen-strikes.html">are launching ongoing missile and drone strikes</a> against the Yemeni armed group Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. A faction in the ongoing Yemen civil war, the Houthis had been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/21/world/middleeast/houthi-hijack-ship-galaxy-leader.html">attacking ships</a> in the Red Sea in the months preceding the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-houthis-yemen-shipping-attacks-fc5c1ed40f4e370bed81670bfdda0899">U.S.-British strikes.</a></p>
<p>These kinds of strikes, however, don’t dissuade the Houthis, a predominately Shia minority group in Yemen. They’re continuing <a href="https://time.com/6563864/us-strikes-houthis-yemen-red-sea/">to attack ships in the region</a>.</p>
<p>Continuing to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, furthermore, will undoubtedly escalate tensions in the Middle East. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911">The Houthis have said</a> they’re attacking ships affiliated with Israel in response to Israel’s ground invasion and blockade of the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>With the U.S. reputation in the region already in tatters amid mass opposition to Israel’s attack on Gaza, these strikes are creating unintended consequences.</p>
<h2>Yemen’s civil war</h2>
<p>The Yemen civil war is one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. It officially started in 2014 when the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-29380668">Houthis seized the capital of Sana'a</a>, but multiple entities have become involved since then.</p>
<p>Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict and subsequent blockade <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/middleeast/yemen-famine-saudi-fuel-intl/index.html">helped create ongoing famine and food insecurity</a> in Yemen.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Yemen’s civil war, the Houthis have received Iranian support. For both ideological and geopolitical reasons, Iran has helped the Houthis in their efforts to seize the country. While Iran has continually denied claims that it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/21/iran-giving-houthis-significant-and-lethal-support-us-envoy">provides military aid</a> to the Houthis, most <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/12/22/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#iran-has-helped-the-houthi-militia-target-ships-us-intelligence-says">outside observers</a> agree that it has done so in the past and continues to now.</p>
<p>The Houthis are invaluable partners to Iran because of their position along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This narrow channel is responsible for a significant portion of the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/bab-al-mandan-red-sea-suez-shipping-crisis-houthis-gaza">world’s cargo</a> <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073">and oil</a> shipping. While most vessels can avoid the region by sailing around Africa, this detour <a href="https://time.com/6553141/red-sea-houthi-attacks-consumer-prices-cost/">increases costs</a> for shipowners and, by extension, consumers.</p>
<p>The Houthis, either acting in their own interests or for Iran, escalated their attacks against ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Israel’s attack on Gaza. Outside of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09">one cargo ship</a> the Houthi seized in November, however, their attacks have been <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/first-images-released-houthi-damage-153119479.html">largely unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<h2>More time needed for anti-piracy efforts</h2>
<p>Piracy in maritime shipping is not a new phenomenon <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv21r3j8m">and has been a persistent scourge throughout human history</a>. In contemporary history, however, multilateral efforts to combat piracy have been largely successful in limiting its impact. </p>
<p>Multinational efforts off the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872">coast of Somalia</a> and in the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/">Malacca Strait</a> in southeast Asia significantly reduced the piracy threat in those regions.</p>
<p>Given the past success of such measures, American Defense Secretary <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220216698/pentagon-announces-new-international-maritime-protection-force-for-the-red-sea">Lloyd Austin’s announcement in late December</a> of an international maritime task force was both practical and had the potential to solve the issue. The problem, however, is that such efforts take time to succeed. The U.S. didn’t give the initiative the time it needed.</p>
<p>U.S.-led strikes against the Houthis in Yemen only stood a chance of success if neighbouring states, most notably Saudi Arabia, combined the American air presence with a ground threat. Saudi Arabia, however, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/16/saudi-arabia-red-sea-conflict-houthis-us-strike/">won’t get involved</a> as it seeks to extricate itself from Yemen.</p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-10-13/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-on-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say">anger towards</a> Israelis in the region, as well as the Houthi’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/how-houthi-anger-with-israel-is-reshaping-the-middle-east-conflict?ref=mc.news">avowed goal</a> to strike Israel, countering the Houthi would be politically dangerous for Riyadh’s government.</p>
<p>The Houthis know the Americans lack regional allies and therefore they’ve not been deterred, but emboldened. In the aftermath of the U.S.-U.K. strikes, Houthis have vowed to continue <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-red-sea-houthis-1.7083030">to target ships</a> in the Red Sea and are making good on the threat.</p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has even been forced to admit that the <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/us-again-targets-yemen-s-huthis-in-new-strikes-9cac37d1">ongoing airstrikes</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/18/politics/biden-houthi-strikes/index.html">are not having the desired effect</a> of deterring the Houthis, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/13/us-launches-fresh-strikes-on-yemens-houthi-as-conflict-escalates">but says they’re necessary to protect merchant and military vessels</a>.</p>
<h2>Blowback in the broader region</h2>
<p>International norms and laws are effective so long as everyone adheres to them. Norms and laws, furthermore, are most vulnerable immediately after a state has breached them, which the U.S. did when it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-says-us-british-attacks-on-yemen-a-clear-violation-of-the-countrys-sovereignty/ar-AA1mQIsa">violated Yemen’s sovereignty</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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<p>Nowhere is this more evident than in Iran’s actions in the aftermath of the strikes against the Houthis.</p>
<p>Because the Houthis are a key partner of Iran, Tehran’s government apparently believed it had to take action in case their credibility became compromised. Iran <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/iran-strikes-targets-in-northern-iraq-and-syria-as-regional-tensions-escalate/ar-AA1n1xOP">conducted strikes</a> against targets in Iraq and Syria. Iran claims the strikes in Iraq were against an Israeli spy installation. </p>
<p>While these events <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/16/iran-claims-it-has-attacked-an-israeli-spy-base-in-kurdistan">would have been troubling in their own right in terms of the impact on regional stability</a>, Iran followed up these strikes with ones in Pakistan, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/17/world/asia/pakistan-iran-strike.html">Pakistan retaliated</a>.</p>
<p>Fortunately, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67999465">both Iran</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pakistan-conducts-strikes-in-iran-retaliating-for-earlier-hit-by-tehran/ar-AA1n9O2J">and Pakistan</a> are emphasizing that they’re not targeting the other country, but rather <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/paistan-cnucstrike-in-iran-in-retaliation-to-drone-and-missile-strikes-hits-baloch-separatist-groups/ar-AA1n9AwW">non-state militants</a>.</p>
<p>That said, Iran’s strike against Pakistan occurs as the country is <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/01/imran-khan-loses-his-battle-with-pakistans-army">politically vulnerable</a> in the aftermath of the army’s takedown of Prime Minister Imran Khan. With the Pakistani military unable to appear weak as the country faces crucial elections next month, the potential for events to escalate are very real.</p>
<p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the goal of nearly everyone involved, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/15/us/politics/us-israel.html">particularly the U.S.</a>, has been to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. Recent events are compromising this goal, including <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-blames-israel-for-strike-that-killed-four-senior-military-officials-in-syria-as-mid-east-conflict-spirals/ar-BB1gZPbm">strikes by Israel in Syria</a> and an Iranian-backed militia’s <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/01/21/us-troops-iraq-getting-evaluated-traumatic-brain-injuries-after-iran-backed-militia-attack.html">missile-and-rocket</a> attack against U.S. forces in Iraq.</p>
<p>By abandoning the focus on building a maritime coalition force and instead resorting to air strikes, the U.S. and its allies may have inadvertently created the situation they sought to avoid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the outset of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the West has aimed to prevent the conflict from escalating regionally. But strikes on the Houthis in Yemen by the U.S. and the U.K. may ensure it will.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210062024-01-12T18:57:11Z2024-01-12T18:57:11ZUS-UK airstrikes risk strengthening Houthi rebels’ position in Yemen and the region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569063/original/file-20240112-29-67u6k4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C15%2C5276%2C3382&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Houthi supporters rally in Yemen following U.S.-U.K. airstrikes.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S.- and U.K.-led <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/us/politics/us-houthi-missile-strikes.html">strikes on the rebel Houthi group</a> in Yemen represent a dramatic new turn in the Middle East conflict – one that could have implications throughout the region.</p>
<p>The attacks of Jan. 11, 2024, hit around 60 targets at 16 sites, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-biden-retaliation-attacks-0804b93372cd5e874a0dd03513fe36a2">according to the U.S. Air Force’s Mideast command</a>, including in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, the main port of Hodeida and Saada, the birthplace of the Houthis in the country’s northwest.</p>
<p>The military action follows weeks of warning by the U.S. to the Houthis, ordering them to stop attacking commercial ships in the strategic strait of Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. The Houthis – an armed militia backed by Iran that controls most of northern Yemen following a bitter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">near-decadelong civil war</a> – have also <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-houthi-attacks-affect-both-the-israel-hamas-conflict-and-yemens-own-civil-war-and-could-put-pressure-on-us-saudi-arabia-216852">launched missiles and drones toward Israel</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">expert on Yemeni politics</a>, I believe the U.S. attacks on the Houthis will have wide implications – not only for the Houthis and Yemen’s civil war, but also for the broader region where America maintains key allies. In short, the Houthis stand to gain politically from these U.S.-U.K. attacks as they support a narrative that the group has been cultivating: that they are freedom fighters fighting Western imperialism in the Muslim world.</p>
<h2>For Houthis, a new purpose</h2>
<p>The Israel-Gaza conflict has reinvigorated the Houthis – giving them a raison d'etre at a time when their status at home was diminishing.</p>
<p>By the time of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">Oct. 7 attack by Hamas militants</a> in Israel, the Houthis’ long conflict with Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover">government ousted by the Houthis</a> at the start of Yemen’s civil war in 2014, had quieted after an April 2022 cease-fire drastically reduced fighting.</p>
<p>Houthi missile strikes on Saudi cities ceased, and there were hopes that a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">truce could bring about a permanent end</a> to Yemen’s brutal conflict.</p>
<p>With fewer external threats, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/yemens-civilians-besieged-on-all-sides/">domestic troubles</a> that <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1925121/extreme-poverty-threatens-yemenis-living-under-houthi-rule">surfaced in Houthi-controlled areas</a> – poverty, unpaid government salaries, crumbling infrastructure – led to growing disquiet over Houthi governance. Public support for the Houthis slowly eroded without an outside aggressor to blame; Houthi leaders could no longer justify the hardships in Yemen as a required sacrifice to resist foreign powers, namely Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israels-military-campaign-in-gaza-is-among-the-most-destructive-in-history-experts-say">Israel’s attacks in Gaza</a> have provided renewed purpose for Houthis. <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/houthis-involvement-in-gaza-war-a-tactical-move/">Aligning with the Palestinian cause</a> has allowed Houthis to reassert their relevance and has reenergized their fighters and leadership.</p>
<p>By <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/14/yemens-houthis-say-they-fired-ballistic-missiles-towards-israel">firing missiles toward Israel</a>, the Houthis have portrayed themselves as the lone force in the Arab Peninsula standing up to Israel, unlike regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The militia is presenting to Yemenis and others in the region a different face than Arab governments that have, to date, been unwilling to take strong action against Israel.</p>
<p>In particular, Houthis are contrasting their worldview with that of Saudi Arabia, which prior to the October Hamas attack had been <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-israel-normalization-still-table">looking to normalize ties</a> with Israel.</p>
<p><iframe id="P6Wxe" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/P6Wxe/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Houthi’s PR machine</h2>
<p>The U.S. and U.K. strikes were, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen/">the governments of both countries say</a>, in retaliation for persistent attacks by Houthis on international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and followed attempts at a diplomatic solution. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3643830/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-coalition-strikes-in-ho/">aim is to</a> “disrupt and degrade the Houthis’ capabilities,” according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.</p>
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<img alt="A blurry picture shows an aircraft at night." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569069/original/file-20240112-23-x6hitm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A U.K. military aircraft takes off en route to Yemen on Jan. 11, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-handout-image-provided-by-the-uk-ministry-of-news-photo/1918198443?adppopup=true">UK Ministry of Defence via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But regardless of the intent or the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/how-the-us-uk-bombing-of-yemen-might-help-the-houthis">damage caused to the Houthis militarily</a>, the Western strikes may play into the group’s narrative, reinforcing the claim that they are fighting oppressive foreign enemies attacking Yemen. And this will only bolster the Houthis’ image among supporters.</p>
<p>Already, the Houthis have managed to rally domestic public support in the part of Yemen they control behind their actions since October 2023. </p>
<p>Dramatic <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-houthi-rebel-attacks-in-the-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping">seaborne raids</a> and the taking hostage of ships’ crews have generated viral footage that taps into Northern Yemeni nationalism. Turning a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67632940">captured vessel into a public attraction</a> attracted more attention domestically. </p>
<p>Following the U.S.-U.K. strikes on Houthi targets, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree has said the group would <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/yemen-houthi-general-says-attacks-will-not-pass-without-punishment-13046755">expand its attacks in the Red Sea</a>, saying any coalition attack on Yemen will prompt strikes on all shipping through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects to the Arabian Sea at the southern end of the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Weaponizing Palestinian sympathies</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have successfully managed to align the Palestinian cause with that of their own. Appeals through mosques in Yemen and cellphone text campaigns have raised donations for the Houthis by invoking Gaza’s plight. </p>
<p>The U.S.-U.K strikes may backfire for another reason, too: They evoke memories of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/30-years-after-our-endless-wars-in-the-middle-east-began-still-no-end-in-sight/">Western military interventions</a> in the Muslim and Arab world. </p>
<p>The Houthis will no doubt exploit this. </p>
<p>When U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin initially <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/19/us-announces-10-nation-force-to-counter-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea">announced the formation of a 10-country coalition</a> to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on Dec. 18, 2023, there were concerns over the lack of regional representation. Among countries in the Middle East and Muslim world, only Bahrain – home to the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet</a> – joined.</p>
<p>The absence of key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti – where the U.S. has its only military base in Africa – raised <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2023-12-17/ty-article-magazine/.premium/under-irans-auspices-houthis-turn-red-sea-to-an-independent-strategic-threat-zone/0000018c-7452-d48b-a5ec-745308440000">further doubts among observers</a> about the coalition’s ability to effectively counter the Houthis.</p>
<p>Muslim-majority countries were no doubt hesitant to support the coalition because of the sensitivity of the Palestinian cause, which by then the Houthis had successfully aligned themselves with.</p>
<p>But the lack of regional support leaves the U.S. and its coalition allies in a challenging position. Rather than being seen as protectors of maritime security, the U.S. – rather than the Houthis – are vulnerable to being framed in the region as the aggressor and escalating party. </p>
<p>This perception could damage U.S. credibility in the area and potentially serve as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap">al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</a> and similar groups.</p>
<p>The U.S.’s <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/history-us-support-israel-runs-deep-growing-chorus/story?id=104957109">military and diplomatic support for Israel</a> throughout the current conflict also plays into skepticism in the region over the true objectives of the anti-Houthi missile strikes.</p>
<h2>Reigniting civil war?</h2>
<p>The Houthis’ renewed vigor and Western strikes on the group also have implications for Yemen’s civil war itself.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/moment-truth-yemens-truce">the truce between</a> the two main protagonists in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the Houthis – fighting between the Houthis and other groups in Yemen, such as the Southern Transitional Council, the Yemen Transitional Government and the National Resistance, has reached a deadlock. </p>
<p>Each group controls different parts of Yemen, and all seem to have accepted this deadlock. </p>
<p>But the U.S.-U.K. strikes put Houthi opponents in a difficult position. They will be hesitant to openly support Western intervention in Yemen or blame the Houthis for supporting Palestinans. There remains widespread sympathy for Gazans in Yemen – something that could give Houthis an opportunity to gain support in areas not under their control.</p>
<p>The Yemeni Transitional Government <a href="https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/25465/">issued a statement</a> following the U.S.-U.K. strikes that shows the predicament facing Houthi rivals. While blaming the Houthis’ “terrorist attacks” for “dragging the country into a military confrontation,” they also clearly reaffirmed support for Palestinians against “brutal Israeli aggression.”</p>
<p>While Houthi rivals will likely continue this balancing act, the Houthis face no such constraints – they can freely exploit the attacks to rally more support and gain a strategic advantage over their local rivals.</p>
<p>An emboldened Houthi group might also be less likely to accept the current status quo in Yemen and seize the moment to push for more control – potentially reigniting a civil war that had looked to be on the wane.</p>
<p>The Houthis thrive on foreign aggression to consolidate their power. Without this external conflict as a justification, the shortcomings of the Houthis’ political management become apparent, undermining their governance. During the civil war, Houthis were able to portray themselves as the defender of Yemen against Saudi influence. Now they can add U.S. and U.K. interference to the mix.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The raid follows warnings from Washington to cease attacks in the Red Sea − but it could serve to strengthen rebels and reignite civil war.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168522023-11-01T23:51:23Z2023-11-01T23:51:23ZHow Houthi attacks affect both the Israel-Hamas conflict and Yemen’s own civil war – and could put pressure on US, Saudi Arabia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557170/original/file-20231101-23-25znxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C78%2C3494%2C2243&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A poster of rebel leader Abdul-Malek al-Houthi is held aloft during anti-Israel protests in Yemen.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yemens-houthi-supporters-hold-banners-and-flags-as-they-news-photo/1745360875?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Yemen’s Houthi movement <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-houthis-iran-34eab8bc1d3cf3606d874166fef2f018">launched missiles and drones at Israel</a> on Oct. 31, 2023 – provoking fears of a dangerous escalation of the Middle East conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>With the militia – which <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">controls part of the Arabian Peninsula state</a> – vowing further attacks, Israel countered by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-deploys-missile-boats-red-sea-regional-tensions-surge-2023-11-01/">sending missile boats</a> to the Red Sea. They join <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/10/30/uss-bataan-uss-carter-hall-will-linger-in-red-sea">U.S. warships already deployed</a> in the area.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. turned to <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/mmahad/">Mahad Darar</a>, a Yemeni politics expert at Colorado State University, to explain what is behind the Houthis’ involvement in the war – and how it could risk not only widening the conflict but reigniting hostilities in Yemen itself.</em></p>
<h2>Who are the Houthis?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Houthi group</a>, also known as Ansar Allah, is an armed militia of the Zaydi Shia sect in Yemen. They ousted Yemen’s transitional government led by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in a 2014 coup and have since been engaged in a bloody civil war with the ousted administration, which is backed by Saudi Arabia. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-envoy-visits-gulf-help-expand-yemen-truce-launch-peace-process-state-dept-2023-08-14/">truce has stemmed fighting</a> in the country, with the Houthis currently in control of most of northern Yemen.</p>
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<h2>Why did the Houthis attack Israel?</h2>
<p>In the first analysis, one can argue that the Houthis are part of a broader regional alliance with Iran. As such, the attack on Israel can be seen as showcasing both the Houthis’ – and Iran’s – military capabilities to both local and regional audiences. Indeed, some analysts argue that the reason <a href="https://www.state.gov/illegal-iranian-flow-of-weapons-to-yemen/">Tehran supplied the Houthis with long-range missiles</a> was so it could <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-771066">pose a threat to both Israel</a> and also Tehran’s rival in the region: Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>However, although it may seem that the Houthis are acting as an Iranian proxy, the main reason the militia launched the attack could be to gain domestic support. Houthi leadership may be trying to present the group as the dominant force in Yemen willing to challenge Israel – a country that is <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-726753">generally unpopular in the Arab world</a>.</p>
<p>This approach helps the Houthis outmaneuver local rivals and unite the Yemeni public behind the cause of Palestinian liberation. It also allows the militia to carve out a unique stance in the region, setting them apart from Arab governments that have so far been unwilling to take strong action against Israel – such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-after-israel-gaza-conflict-says-it-does-not-mix-trade-with-politics-2023-10-10/">severing ties</a> in the case of more Israel-friendly states, such as United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and others. </p>
<p>In particular, the Houthis will want to present a different face to the Arab world than Saudi Arabia, which had been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-israel-saudi-arabia-normalization-hamas-246213034afa75e4dff27e71362a1979">looking to normalize ties with Israel</a>. Saudi Arabia, it should be added, is the main backer of the internationally recognized Yemeni government – one of the Houthis’ main opponents in the civil war.</p>
<p>It is also important to note that there appears to be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/25/uae-egypt-lebanon-leaders-israel-hamas-war/">growing popular discontent in Arab countries</a> over the perceived weak stance of their governments toward Israel. But due to the authoritarian nature of many of these regimes, public opinion has little influence on policy.</p>
<p>This does not, of course, change the fact that the Houthis themselves <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/02/06/the-houthi-model-of-government">run a theocratic regime</a> with no democratic values.</p>
<p>Plus, launching a missile or a couple of drones is relatively cheap for the Houthis, especially considering the benefits they might gain from the action.</p>
<h2>How could the Houthi attack affect the Israel-Hamas conflict?</h2>
<p>Some analysts have suggested that an attack by the Houthis heightens the chances of overwhelming Israel’s defense systems, if it forms part of a
<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-warns-israel-of-axis-response-as-fears-grow-of-regional-war-/7309548.html">coordinated effort</a> involving
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hezbollah-alone-will-decide-whether-lebanon-already-on-the-brink-of-collapse-gets-dragged-into-israel-hamas-war-212078">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.</p>
<p>But this idea falls short for two reasons:</p>
<p>First, the Houthis likely have fewer <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/">ballistic missiles than Hezbollah</a> and Hamas and realistically stand little chance of inflicting much damage on Israel. Moreover, they will be mindful of keeping these missiles for their own use in the ongoing civil war in Yemen – which poses a more immediate threat to the group than Israel does.</p>
<p>The threat from the Houthis toward Israel is far smaller than both Hezbollah and Hamas, whose fighters can cross a land border to enter Israel.</p>
<p>Second, the imprecision of the Houthi missiles means that any attack also poses a risk to countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, as these projectiles could land in their territories and cause damage. In fact, drones reportedly launched by the Houthis have already caused explosions after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosion-heard-egyptian-red-sea-town-near-israeli-border-witness-2023-10-27/">erroneously crashing in Egypt</a>.</p>
<h2>Could the Houthi attack affect US thinking on the conflict?</h2>
<p>There is a scenario in which the Houthi attacks may benefit Israel. The strike plays into a narrative that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-warns-multi-front-war-far-more-likely-for-israel-than-limited-conflicts/">Israel is facing a multi-front war</a> sponsored by Iran, potentially escalating tensions between Iran and both Israel and the United States.</p>
<p>And this could bolster the arguments of <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/us-iran-war-bad-idea-why">hawks within the U.S. foreign policy establishment</a> who are pushing the U.S. toward a more confrontational stance against Iran. </p>
<p>On the flip side, any perceived threat from the Houthis gives Iran more of a negotiation card in the wider context of regional disputes such as over Tehran’s nuclear program. Iran will be keen to position itself as a country with an array of proxies, capable of wreaking havoc in the region should it wish. </p>
<h2>Could the attack be Iran’s bidding?</h2>
<p>Houthi actions <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/">primarily serve their own interests</a> rather than those of Iran. </p>
<p>And unlike Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Syria – which have <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/attacks-us-forces-iraq-syria-american-airstrikes/#:%7E:text=U.S.%20troops%20have%20been%20attacked,proxies%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria.">recently attacked U.S. troops</a> – the Houthis have not targeted U.S. forces in the region. If the Houthis were truly in the same basket as other Iranian proxies, I believe they would have targeted the <a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/">nearest U.S. stationed base</a>, which is Djibouti. </p>
<p>But Houthi leadership will be mindful that such an attack would not only be unpopular among the Yemeni population but also would potentially come at a high cost to themselves.</p>
<p>Unlike Hezbollah and Hamas, which are focused on resisting Israeli occupation, the Houthis are <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">primarily concerned with local issues</a> within Yemen. Historically, members of the Zaydi Shia sect have managed Yemen’s issues without foreign support, going back hundreds of years <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">before they were overthrown in 1962</a>.</p>
<p>That said, the Houthis haven’t shied away from appearing aligned with Iran of late, mainly because they rely heavily on Iranian supplies of weapons.</p>
<h2>What could this mean for the Yemen civil war?</h2>
<p>Negotiations between Houthis, Saudis and the Saudi-led coalition backing the Yemeni government forces <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-01-23/yemen-s-fragile-truce-needs-more-than-talks-to-survive">are at a delicate point</a>.</p>
<p>Recently, it was reported that the Houthis <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-30/saudi-arabia-clashes-with-yemen-s-houthis-rebels-putting-kingdom-on-high-alert?embedded-checkout=true">killed four Saudi soldiers</a> just days after Saudi Arabia <a href="https://allarab.news/saudi-arabia-shoots-down-houthi-missile-from-yemen-heading-towards-israel/#:%7E:text=The%20Wall%20Street%20Journal%20reported,intercepted%205%20missiles%20towards%20Israel.">shot down a missile</a> from the Houthis that was headed for Israel. </p>
<p>In the latest Houthi attack, the missiles passed through Saudi territory uninterrupted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-yemen-houthis-iran-34eab8bc1d3cf3606d874166fef2f018">before being shot down by Israel</a>. It is unclear whether this is an indication that the Saudis heeded the Houthis’ warning, which is potentially why they didn’t shoot down the latest missiles. To know more about the true state of Saudi-Houthi negotiations, there needs to be greater evidence, such as increased clashes between the Saudis and Houthis, or even a direct attack by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>But if Houthi missile attacks escalate in the coming days, it could put Saudi Arabia in a difficult spot. At that point, the Saudis would face a difficult choice. They could allow the Houthis’ missiles to continue passing through their land or they could try to shoot them down. But that would risk jeopardizing diplomatic efforts with both the Houthis and Iran. And that, I feel, seems very unlikely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Missiles from rebel Yemeni groups risk widening the Middle East conflict. But the motivation behind the attacks could be more about self-interest.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116272023-09-04T14:06:53Z2023-09-04T14:06:53Z‘My home city was destroyed by war but I will not lose hope’ – how modern warfare turns neighbourhoods into battlefields<p>It has been almost 12 years since I left my city. And I have never been able to return. Homs, the place I was born and grew up, has been destroyed and I, like many others, have been left in exile: left to remember how beautiful it once was. What can a person do when their home – that place within them that carries so much meaning – has effectively been murdered?</p>
<p>I have spent my academic career studying the impact of war on architecture and cities and researching acts of deliberate destruction of home, termed by scholars as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Domicide.html?id=6t_KSirfEnsC&redir_esc=y">domicide</a>. <em>Domus</em> is the Latin word for home and domicide refers to the deliberate destruction of home – the killing of it. I have investigated how architecture, both at the time of war and peace, has been weaponised; wilfully targeted, bombed, burnt and contested. It has led me to publishing my first book, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/domicide-9781350248106/">Domicide: Architecture, War, and the Destruction of Home in Syria</a>.</p>
<p>From the burning of housing, land and property ownership documents, to the destruction of homes and cultural heritage sites, the brutal destruction in Homs, and other cities in Syria, has not only erased our material culture but also forcibly displaced millions.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/syria-situation#:%7E:text=Over%2012%20million%20Syrians%20remained,from%205.7%20million%20in%202021.">over 12 million people</a> have been displaced from their homes within Syria, and beyond in countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Germany and Egypt. This destruction has been “justified” by the Syrian government and its allies, who claim these ordinary neighbourhoods are in fact “battlefields” in what they call a “war on terror and on terrorists”.</p>
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<img alt="Aerial photo showing a city devastated by bombing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An aerial photo shows the devastation caused in Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/city-homs-syria-1057305518">Shutterstock/FlyandDive</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>In March 2011, peaceful protests against the government <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35806229">began to grow</a>. The protests evolved into a violent insurgency when the government responded with force. Syrians were protesting over issues like oppression and a lack of political freedom.</p>
<p>Amid the brutal crackdown, there were soldiers from the Syrian army who switched sides and formed the breakaway Free Syrian Army to support the revolution. Throughout the years, more armed and rebel groups emerged. But powerful allies also came to the government aid, such as Russia and Iran. This has <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/07/13/syria-between-civil-and-proxy-war-the-question-of-terminology/">led the country into war</a>. To date, more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-war-factbox-idUSKCN1GR2VT">half million</a> people have been killed.</p>
<p>The government destroyed and bombed rebel held areas as well as issuing new urban planning laws to carry out further devastation without the need for a military justification. The new planning <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/syria-new-property-law-punishes-the-displaced-and-could-obstruct-investigation-of-war-crimes/">decrees</a> led to the erasure of entire neighbourhoods which were largely populated by people who opposed the government. These sites were labelled as “illegal” or “built without permission”. These wanton acts of destruction were carried out to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2016.1158527">punish opponents of the government</a>.</p>
<h2>My home</h2>
<p>I sometimes wish there were cameras that could livestream the streets of Homs in Syria. I wonder, how is my city getting on? How are the people? Can I see their faces again, and can I, even through a camera, see every corner of the streets of Homs. </p>
<p>I search for every new video published on the city, looking at the new shops that opened, and the many that have remained in ruins. I look in these videos at the people. What is happening in their minds? Who have they lost? Is their home still intact? They have endured so much pain. I wonder how they are after 12 years of suffering that left over half of the neighbourhoods in ruins.</p>
<hr>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
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<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<p>It feels like a dream now when I see Homs. Even after being so privileged to visit so many cities around the world (from New York and Berlin, to Rome, Istanbul and Athens). Every city reminds me of the city of my birth.</p>
<p>When my well-meaning friends tell me to forget about Homs, forget about the past – “Syria is no longer for us”, I refuse to forget, even when the world seems to do exactly that. I don’t want to live in a landscape of forgetting.</p>
<p>Now, when walking the streets of my newly adopted home city of Oxford, Homs remains in my mind. I remember the day I left on November 17, 2011. The departure day was filled with tears to leave as tanks were positioned across different parts of the city and Homs was being divided and shelled. I feel a deep sense of grief for the people who have been killed since the start of the revolution - and for those who remain, for those who are forcibly displaced: for us. Grief was aching my heart for my friend who was killed while marching in a peaceful demonstration. His name was Taher Al Sebai. He was killed on October 16, 2011, a month before my departure from Homs to Manchester.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Homs City Centre before the war." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newly built clock tower in Homs city centre in 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author</span></span>
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<p>Protests in Homs were spreading across neighbourhoods, with men, women and children calling for a new future inspired by the waves of protests sweeping countries as part of the wider movements of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2011.632900">Arab Spring</a>. “Death but not indignity”, people in Homs chanted, “One. One. One. The Syrian People Are One”, they called in the streets, and “Freedom Forever”. The protests were brutally attacked.</p>
<p>When protests were targeted and oppressed, people chanted from their own homes; from their balconies. I watched this from my own bedroom. I remember women in the neighbouring buildings breaking the silence of the dark nights; “where is everyone”, a woman cried to encourage our neighbours to start chanting.</p>
<p>This became a daily practice in the early days of the revolution when the streets became no-go zones because bullets were being shot randomly from cars to spread fear and prevent protest. There were times I sheltered in the corridors of my home with all the lights off, away from the windows, for fear of being hit by a stray bullet.</p>
<p>Despite the constant threat and fear of death, the people stood up. Walls of fear and silence were knocked down as thousands of Homsis gave the streets new purpose, turning them into sites of resistance and protest. 2011 will forever be engraved in my mind because it was a historical moment of discovery built on the hopes of everyday people who dared to imagine and construct a new way of life based on the simplest of things: freedom. Homs, often known for its jolly people and their sense of humour, took a new name, “The Capital of the Revolution”.</p>
<p>When a peaceful demonstration marched in my street on October 16, it was targeted. I remember the screams and the shouting in the street. Soon I was told that Taher was killed. A martyr, everyone wrote on social media. How did I, at the age of 23, come to have a martyr as a friend?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women protesting in Homs on October 31, 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Given to the author with a request of anonymity.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And not only Taher, two other young children were killed too. I knew Taher from the Department of Architecture, as we both studied there. I remember his smile; his face radiated with kindness, tranquillity and goodness. His name in Arabic means “pure” or “virtuous” and everyone who knew him described him like that.</p>
<p>Even when writing this piece on a rainy and cloudy summer day in Oxford, the images of Taher return as if it all was just yesterday. Can someone tell me how to live after death? Is there a life after destruction?</p>
<h2>From Ukraine to Syria: civilians as the frontline</h2>
<p>This is surely a question which occupies the minds of the many millions of ordinary people caught up in today’s wars - wars which have transformed streets, towns and neighbourhoods into battlefields.</p>
<p>On February 20, 2022, I contacted <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c2e418d0zxqt">Lyse Doucet</a>, the BBC’s chief international correspondent to invite her to write the foreword to my book. She replied from the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. Throughout her career, Doucet has covered several conflicts around the world, including Afghanistan and Syria, by taking the audiences globally to the intimate stories and lives of those civilians who suffer the horrors of war.</p>
<p>At the time of her response, the emerging videos and photos from Ukraine, reminded me of the trauma that the Syrian people have suffered through. “All the images were trembling into our lives again”, Doucet wrote in her foreword, adding:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Moscow’s cruise missiles smashing into high-rise residential blocks, exposing wrecked homes within: tidy rooms turned topsy-turvy; crockery shattered; children’s torn toys strewn across the floor. Heartbreaking images of petite suburban bungalows with pocket gardens swallowed up by flames. Stomach-churning images of bodies sprawled out along the streets.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/MG8waU7Evpo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Cities have become the battlefields making the everyday urban life the site of contestation, division, siege and destruction. And we have all seen this destruction, which has been wiping out peoples’ intimate and cherished places causing a deep sense of grief and rupture. This is Domicide. As Doucet adds:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Wars of our time, sometimes fought in our name, are not in the trenches; they’re fought street-to-street, house to house, one home after another. Why does a hospital, a kindergarten, always seem to be hit in every outbreak or hostilities? After nearly four decades of reporting on conflict, I now often say: civilians are not close to the front lines; they are the frontline.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is what we have seen in Ukraine, and before that in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and many other countries. Civilians are the frontline. In my city, some people have been displaced multiple times within the last 12 years. </p>
<p>As a London-based citizen from Homs, who I interviewed in 2019 told me: “We left Homs in 2012. We lived in rural Damascus for a year and a half. During that time, we rented another house, we furnished it, and we wanted to start over, but then again, we had to leave, and we went back to Homs. It was bombed again. So I think my mother lost two houses. After that, she decided she does not want to furnish any house, she doesn’t want to buy any luxurious things because she was afraid it might be destroyed again.”</p>
<h2>Architecture at the time of war</h2>
<p>When I tell people that I am researching the impact of war on architecture and cities, they often get surprised, even some of those within the field of architecture. For some, architecture is about shiny buildings, luxurious design and skyscrapers.</p>
<p>But then I start explaining that architectural questions are central at the time of war. Questions like: How do we rebuild cities after war? What should we remember and what should we forget? Who decides the shape of the future of cities? How do you protect endangered heritage? And how can you engage with local communities in the process of reconstruction so that their voices are heard?</p>
<p>Once I unpack these questions, the people I meet start reflecting on these themes by telling me of an example they are aware of, such as the preservation of the remains of the Berlin Wall after its fall, or the reconstruction of Coventry after World War II, or Beirut after the civil war, or struggles to decide how to rebuild Mosul, or the destruction of peoples’ ways of living in Gaza.</p>
<p>Architecture is a fundamental part of the process of making and unmaking a home, an essential debate to be discussed and researched in our times as many cities remain in ruins around the world.</p>
<p>These questions and more have been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/14696053221073992">researched</a> by architects and academics writing about their own cities and countries, either from within or from <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/05/15/syria-s-reconstruction-between-discriminatory-implementation-and-circumscribed-resistance-pub-81803">exile</a>. Bringing this personal attachment to the research is, in my opinion, fundamental when it comes to explaining the impact of destruction on people who cherish their own architecture and cultural heritage. As Doucet added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In many realms, from journalism to academe to literature and art, there is now a deepening appreciation that whoever asks the questions and seeks the answers can have a decisive impact on how much, and what kind of knowledge we gain. A new generation of scholars, researchers and writers bring to their work a fluency in relevant languages and a more visceral understanding of their own cultures and societies, including its deepest pain and greatest joys. This is lived experience.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In Ukraine, Ievgeniia Gubkina wrote about the destruction and reconstruction of cities. In her book, <a href="https://dom-publishers.com/products/being-a-ukrainian-architect-during-wartime">Being a Ukrainian Architect During Wartime: Essays, Articles, Interviews, and Manifestos</a>, Gubkina included a letter titled Unseen Realities: Let History Be Told by the Victims.</p>
<p>In the letter, she emphasised the need to bring trauma to the surface, instead of hiding it. By doing so, Gubkina centralised the concept that architecture is not just about stones and buildings, it is about people and their pain and hopes. This is the reality that Gubkina lived at the time of war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>My reality is thousands of missiles that have been fired at civil infrastructure and all-day shelling aimed at residential areas. My reality is thousands of people and hundreds of children that have been killed. My reality is millions of people that have been forced to leave their homes. My reality is my substantially destroyed home city of Kharkiv … My world, my reality, is being destroyed, bombed, exterminated, erased, exploded, demolished, deconstructed and killed.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bombed out school viewed from the play ground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kharkiv school destroyed by Russian bombs in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/kharkiv-ukraine-1006-russianukraine-war-destroyed-2166429019">Shutterstock/MagicGeorge</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And through this new history, written by the victims, we are able to enter the worlds and the realities of others. Through these entries, we are able to create spaces of solidarity and understanding and construct narratives that are often kept hidden, silenced and unspoken. </p>
<p>Gubkina adds: “The pain that, when people see Saltivka, a residential district in Kharkiv, is felt not just in the rest of Ukraine but in Paris and London too and can bring tears to eyes from Palmyra to New York. This is the pain of loss, loss of what we all, regardless of nationality, social status, and place of residence, understand as life, way of living, and memory of lives. These are tears of shared despair at our inability to stop these lives being destroyed.”</p>
<p>In the case of Syria, there are several architects who lived there and are writing about cities and war, such as the work of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ve6pC8Vfm34">Nasser Rabbat</a>, <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/informal-settlements-in-syria-what-approach-after-the-conflict/">Sawsan Abou Zainedin, Hani Fakhani, Ahmad Sukkar,</a> and <a href="https://thamesandhudson.com/the-battle-for-home-the-memoir-of-a-syrian-architect-9780500292938">Marwa al-Sabouni</a>.</p>
<p>On Iraq, Sana Murrani, has researched questions of memory, belonging and refuge through interviews with Iraqis from different parts of the country, and through deep-mapping and storytelling methods. Murrani left Iraq in June 2003 shortly after the US-led invasion. She has never been able to return. Now two decades later, she has written a <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2023/04/20220403vATR/Ruptured-Domesticity">book</a> on her beloved country which will be published in 2024; Rupturing architecture: spatial practices of refuge in response to war and violence in Iraq.</p>
<p>I have been privileged to talk to some of these architects, including Abou Zainedin, Rabbat, Murrani and Gubkina. Today, as we live in a world of ruins, it is vital that we have conversations and exchange ideas, to support each other and learn – perhaps, to write a new history together.</p>
<h2>Deconstructing reconstruction</h2>
<p>As wars continue to destroy many cities around the world, reconstruction has become an important word of our times. From Syria to Ukraine, this word has been debated and discussed.</p>
<p>Syria was a fashionable conflict site, covered widely in the media and studied in academia – unlike other conflicts, such as Yemen and Libya. Conversations and debates about reconstruction have already been discussed both inside and outside the country. </p>
<p>Today, however, 12 years into the conflict, no reconstruction project has been implemented. In Homs, some partially damaged buildings have been rehabilitated but most of the heavily damaged buildings remain in ruins. The continuation of the war, the collapsed economy and the financial sanctions, have all contributed to a country in ruins.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">'Every day is war' – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It feels like the world moved on from Syria. All the eyes have now turned to a new conflict site: Ukraine. It has attracted significant attention in the media and academia. The <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/school-of-public-policy/The-ukraine-Reconstruction-Forum">reconstruction question</a> has become highly debated in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ukraine-recovery-conference-2023">conferences</a> and architecture <a href="https://www.reconstruct.in.ua/">symposiums</a> both inside and outside of Ukraine.</p>
<p>One of these conversations that has fuelled big debates and discussions is “a <a href="https://unece.org/media/press/367310">vision for the Master Plan for the city of Kharkiv</a>”. <a href="https://unece.org/housing/un4kharkiv-rehabilitation#:%7E:text=1.,2.">The Master Plan</a>, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “is being developed under the leadership of and with substantial expert contribution from the Norman Foster Foundation on a pro bono basis”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2st3hQoZTx4">In his presentation at MIT</a> in January 2023, the British architect and designer, Sir Norman Foster, explained that thinking about reconstruction does not start after the end of the war, but at the time of war. He referenced the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/davehillblog/2014/mar/22/london-county-plan-abercrombie-forshaw">Greater London Plan of 1944</a> which was developed by Patrick Abercrombie.</p>
<p>But as he referenced the case of London, Foster did not note that the architect at the time was British, not Iraqi, Polish or Ukrainian. In other words, would the UK have let a foreign star architect lead its master plans for the destroyed cities of Coventry, Manchester and London? Would they hire someone who knows nothing about the history and culture of these cities?</p>
<p>If this seems like harsh criticism, it is not, as Foster himself admitted in the presentation that: “I knew nothing about the city other than I might find out from a Google search.”</p>
<p>Responses to Foster’s involvement have varied between those who say that star architects bring money and attention to those who fear that the voices of local architects will be marginalised. Oleg Drozdov, the founder of the Kharkiv School of Architecture, said in a webinar earlier in 2023 that Ukraine’s leaders should be wary of <a href="https://architecturetoday.co.uk/kharkiv-must-be-rebuilt-by-architects-with-experience-in-ukraine/">“intellectual colonisation”</a>, and the deputy vice chancellor of the school, Iryna Matsevko, <a href="https://architecturetoday.co.uk/kharkiv-must-be-rebuilt-by-architects-with-experience-in-ukraine/">emphasised the need</a> for “architects who have deep knowledge of the local context to avoid a ‘copy paste’ rebuilding programme”.</p>
<p>Foster explained that the work they have been doing on the city included a questionnaire where over 16,000 people responded. In one of his slides, he showed two pie charts with questions that read: “Are you satisfied with the quality of the house you live in?” and “Are you satisfied with the neighbourhood you live in?”</p>
<p>Imagine your city is being bombed, that your world is collapsing, that you are escaping in a search of a shelter and thousands of homes are being destroyed. Next, imagine you are being asked about your “satisfaction”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2st3hQoZTx4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Oleksii Pedosenko, an urban planning specialist, has <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/progressingplanning/2023/06/19/planning-in-ukraines-kharkiv-when-radical-hope-meets-starchitecture-is-there-a-place-for-local-voices/">written</a> an excellent reflection on the questions of reconstruction in Ukraine. He raises ethical points about the transparency of the work being done on Kharkiv’s master planning. Pedosenko writes that even though the project continues to engage with Kharkiv architects and local government officials, it only reports limited information to the public. He has also asked for the written report of the plan, but the foundation never responded to him. </p>
<p>Pedosenko asks: “How can solidarity be created if the very process of plan development is left to be constantly hidden from the very people who will live with the outcomes of the master plan long into the future? Also is it reasonable and practical for international actors to work remote from the local context if a truly collaborative process is the goal?”</p>
<p>These are important questions to think about at the time of reconstruction, and I have come across the same dilemmas when researching the reconstruction in Syria. Who has the right to write history? How could architects engage with local communities? And whose voice is heard? These questions matter, and they matter the most, when people have lost so much including their choices to shape their own future.</p>
<p>Star architects can bring with them power, money, fame, prestige and attention. But there are times where none of these are needed. Who knows what it means to lose home but the victim?</p>
<p>Good intentions are important. Global solidarity is important. But sometimes good intentions are not enough. As Pedosenko writes, there needs to be a more critical approach towards reconstruction.</p>
<h2>Reconstructing hope</h2>
<p>Despite everything we have lost, we should not lose hope. And despite the destruction of war, we must not let the war defeat us on the inside. It is hard to believe what has happened, it is hard to believe how death and destruction have shaped our lives in Syria. But at moments of despair and hopelessness, I return to the words of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, who wrote in 1970:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanisation resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair but for hope, leading to the incessant pursuit of the humanity denied by injustice. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In moments of despair, I also return to the words of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/middleeast/fadwa-suleiman-actress-and-voice-of-syrian-opposition-dies-at-47.html">Fadwa Souleimane</a>, a Syrian artist who became an icon of the revolution. In the early days of the revolution she led protests in Homs and was one of the few women who spoke publicly about the situation in Homs – from within Homs. I still remember when she was asked live by the news reporter if she was aware that her face was visible on the screen, or whether she thought it was a phone call only. She replied confidently that she was aware of being visible.</p>
<p>Her belonging to the revolution put her life under threat. She fled to Paris and continued her struggle from exile until she died from cancer at the age of 47. During her time in Paris, she advocated for peaceful tools and devices to face war. She remembered the art, culture, dance and music of the people who protested in the streets. Until her last moments, she remembered hope, and reconstructed it, reminding people to not live in a landscape of despair. In 2016, she said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Even if they erase everything, we should not let them erase our dream. If there is only one Syrian left, I am sure he [or she] will build the Syria that we love. Syria is not a country, a geography. It’s an idea. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>And as time passes, as the years move with new degrees of pain, let us remember this hope. Let us think and work towards the rebuilding of Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Palestine. Let’s fight the bulldozers that destroy our memories and presence. Let’s remember.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz receives funding from British Academy for his research at the University of Oxford. </span></em></p>Wars are no longer fought in the trenches, they’re fought in the streets and civilians are on the frontline.Ammar Azzouz, Research Fellow, School of Geography and the Environment, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096522023-08-03T12:22:20Z2023-08-03T12:22:20ZHeadlines and front lines: How US news coverage of wars in Yemen and Ukraine reveals a bias in recording civilian harm<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539048/original/file-20230724-27-ct2t0q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. has provided Ukraine more than $75 billion in military and other aid to support its war efforts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-and-ukrainian-president-volodomyr-news-photo/1534873306">Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>War entails suffering. How and how often that suffering is reported on in the U.S., however, is not evenhanded.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemen-understanding-the-conflict-98296">Saudi-led intervention in Yemen</a> in March 2015 and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-invades-ukraine-5-essential-reads-from-experts-177815">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a> in February 2022. The media attention afforded to the crises reveals biases that relate less to the human consequences of the conflicts than to the United States’ role and relationship with the warring parties involved.</p>
<p>In Yemen, the <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2019/03/19/who-is-arming-the-yemen-war-an-update/">U.S. is arming</a> and <a href="https://quincyinst.org/report/the-yemen-war-in-numbers-saudi-escalation-and-u-s-complicity/">supporting the Saudi-led coalition</a>, whose airstrikes and blockades have caused immense human suffering. Meanwhile in Eastern Europe, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/31/russia-ukraine-war-us-arms-package">U.S. is arming</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/politics/russia-generals-killed-ukraine.html">aiding Ukraine’s efforts</a> by helping to counter missile strikes that have targeted civilian infrastructure and to retake occupied territories where <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russia-bucha-killings-war-crimes-genocide/629470/">horrific killings</a> have taken place.</p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tQr7IA0AAAAJ&hl=en">genocide and other mass atrocities</a>, as well as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=es&user=CNHYRTIAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">international security</a>, we compared New York Times headlines that span approximately seven and a half years of the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the first nine months of the conflict in Ukraine. </p>
<p>We paid particular attention to headlines on civilian casualties, food security and provision of arms. We chose The New York Times <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/272790/circulation-of-the-biggest-daily-newspapers-in-the-us/">because of its popularity</a> and reputation as a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/239784/credibility-of-major-news-organizations-in-the-us/">credible and influential source</a> on international news, with an <a href="https://www.nytco.com/journalism/journalists-on-the-ground/#:%7E:text=Our%201%2C700%20journalists%20report%20from,and%20celebrations%20of%20human%20achievement.">extensive network</a> of global reporters and over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/pulitzer-winners-new-york-times">130 Pulitzer Prizes</a>. </p>
<p>Purposefully, our analysis focused solely on headlines. While the full stories may bring greater context to the reporting, headlines are particularly important for three reasons: They frame the story in a way that <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/headlines-change-way-think">affects how it is read and remembered</a>; reflect <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2022.2138946">the publication’s ideological stance on an issue</a>; and, for many news consumers, are the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/19/americans-read-headlines-and-not-much-else/">only part of the story that is read</a> at all.</p>
<p>Our research shows extensive biases in both the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2228715">scale and tone of coverage</a>. These biases lead to reporting that highlights or downplays human suffering in the two conflicts in a way that seemingly coincides with U.S. foreign policy objectives.</p>
<h2>Ukraine in spotlight</h2>
<p>War in Ukraine is clearly seen as more newsworthy to U.S. readers. This double standard may have less to do with the actual events than that the victims are white and “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/western-media-coverage-ukraine-russia-invasion-criticism">relatively European</a>,” as one CBS News correspondent put it. </p>
<p>Our broad search of New York Times headlines concerning the overall civilian impact of the two conflicts yielded 546 stories on Yemen between March 26, 2015, and Nov. 30, 2022. Headlines on Ukraine passed that mark in under three months and then doubled it within nine months.</p>
<p>Front-page stories on Ukraine have been commonplace ever since the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-biden.html">Russian invasion</a> began in February 2022. In comparison, front-page stories on Yemen have been rare and, in some cases, as with coverage on food security in the country, came more than three years after the coalition initiated blockades that led to the crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Protesters wrap themselves in a Ukrainian flag and hold signs that say 'Fight like Ukrainian' and 'Russia is a terrorist state'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539986/original/file-20230728-21-677g37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters in New York City call for more U.S. aid to Ukraine to help defeat Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-gathered-on-union-square-in-support-of-ukraine-news-photo/1381627299">Lev Radin/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first front-page article with explicit focus on the hunger crisis was published on June 14, 2018, with the headline “Saudi-Led Attack Deepens the World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis.” By this point, 14 million Yemenis were already facing “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/11/bachelet-urges-states-power-and-influence-end-starvation-killing-civilians?LangID=E&NewsID=23855">catastrophic food insecurity</a>,” according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. </p>
<h2>More context on Ukraine</h2>
<p>When we analyzed headlines on Yemen and Ukraine, we classified them as either “episodic,” meaning focused on specific events, or “thematic,” meaning more contextual. An example of an episodic headline is “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/05/world/middleeast/apparent-saudi-strike-kills-at-least-nine-in-yemeni-family.html">Apparent Saudi Strike Kills at Least Nine in Yemeni Family</a>.” An example of a thematic headline is “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/27/world/russia-ukraine-war">Ferocious Russian Attacks Spur Accusations of Genocide in Ukraine</a>.”</p>
<p>New York Times headlines on Yemen were mostly focused on events, accounting for 64% of all headlines. In contrast, headlines on Ukraine involved a greater emphasis on context, accounting for 73% of total articles. The reason this is important is that by focusing more on either episodic or contextualized stories, newspapers are able to lead readers to different interpretations.</p>
<p>The largely episodic headlines on Yemen may give the impression that the harm reported is incidental, rather than symptomatic of the coalition’s violence. Meanwhile, contextual articles on Ukraine trace the broader implications of the conflict and reflect stories of continual Russian responsibility and accountability.</p>
<h2>Differences in assigning blame</h2>
<p>Accountability in coverage is also vastly different. We found 50 headlines on Yemen that reported on specific attacks carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. Of them, 18 – just 36% – attributed responsibility to Saudi Arabia or the coalition. An egregious example that omits responsibility is this headline from April 24, 2018: “Yemen Strike Hits Wedding and Kills More Than 20.” A reader could easily interpret that as meaning that Yemen rebels were behind the attack rather than the Saudis – as was the case.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine a Russian strike on a wedding in Ukraine headlined as “Ukraine Strike Hits Wedding and Kills More Than 20.”</p>
<p>Over the period we looked at, there were 54 headlines on specific attacks in Ukraine – 50 of which reported on Russian attacks, with the remaining four reporting on Ukrainian attacks. Here, of the 50 headlines about Russian attacks, 44 of them – or 88% – explicitly attributed responsibility to Russia. Meanwhile, none of the four headlines on Ukrainian attacks attributed responsibility to Ukraine. This shows the selectivity of responsibility attribution – clear in Ukraine when covering Russia’s actions, but often obscured when it comes to the Saudi-led coalition’s attacks in Yemen.</p>
<p>Furthermore, a June 2017 headline portrays the coalition as concerned about the destruction it has caused: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-arms-training-yemen.html">Saudis Move to Address Civilian Toll in Yemen</a>.” Compare this to how Russia’s attempts to address civilians are categorically dismissed: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/russian-civilian-attacks-ukraine.html">Russia’s Explanations for Attacking Civilians Wither Under Scrutiny</a>.”</p>
<h2>A tale of two humanitarian crises</h2>
<p>Both invasions have led to situations of food insecurity – in Yemen creating a <a href="https://api.godocs.wfp.org/api/documents/25f57d2bbfa54e41ae3fc1e5c4216f0b/download/?_ga=2.41222050.1090321873.1690389264-401591055.1690389264">national risk of famine</a>, and in Ukraine compromising <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/war-ukraine-global-food-shortage/31872861.html">global grain supply</a>. However, the way the news stories speak about hunger in both countries has little in common. </p>
<p>Russian actions blocking grain exports and destroying crops and agricultural infrastructure are portrayed as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/europe/russia-ukraine-food-supply.html">deliberate and weaponized</a>: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/mariupol-ukraine-russia-war-food-water.html">How Russia Is Using Ukrainians’ Hunger as a Weapon of War</a>.”</p>
<p>In contrast, the Saudi-led coalition’s blockade, despite being the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockade-imperils-civilians">primary driver</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-are-starving-yemenis-to-death-mbs-khashoggi-famine-yemen-blockade-houthis/">of the famine</a> and even <a href="https://www.omct.org/site-resources/files/Torture-in-slow-motion_September-2022.pdf">equated to torture</a> by the World Organisation Against Torture, was rarely afforded this intent. In fact, coverage of the hunger crisis often did not mention the coalition at all, such as in this March 31, 2021, headline: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-war.html#:%7E:text=Six%20years%20into%20a%20war,vulnerable%20to%20disease%20and%20starvation">Famine Stalks Yemen, as War Drags on and Foreign Aid Wanes</a>.” </p>
<p>Out of 73 stories broadly about food security in Yemen, only four unequivocally attributed rising starvation to the actions of the coalition and condemned their role. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Mother holds her baby who receives medical treatment" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539985/original/file-20230728-16043-styjwb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A child suffering from malnutrition receives treatment at a hospital in Sanaa, Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/child-suffering-from-malnutrition-is-being-treated-with-news-photo/1258305665">Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Moral outrage vs. neutrality</h2>
<p>Headlines on Ukraine tend to invoke moral judgments, we found, compared with a more neutral tone on Yemen. Russia is portrayed as a violent, relentless and merciless villain: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/world/europe/ukraine-russia-putin.html">Russian Forces Pound Civilians …</a>” and “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-biden.html">Russia Batters Ukraine …</a>.” In turn, Ukrainians are presented as heroes who are fighting for the survival of their nation, and they are humanized in their suffering: “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/world/europe/ukraine-family-perebyinis-kyiv.html">They Died by a Bridge in Ukraine. This Is Their Story</a>.”</p>
<p>This moral positioning on the conflict in Ukraine is not necessarily a problem. After all, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/public-editor/the-truth-about-false-balance.html">falsely equating</a> Ukraine’s actions with those of Russia fails to account for Russian aggression, which initiated the armed conflict, as well as Russia’s routine targeting of civilian sites. </p>
<p>However, it is noteworthy that New York Times headlines on Yemen fail to employ similarly condemnatory narratives toward the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. This is despite reports produced by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/2291/2015/en/">human rights</a> <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/30/targeting-saada/unlawful-coalition-airstrikes-saada-city-yemen">organizations</a>, <a href="https://yemendataproject.org/">conflict</a> <a href="https://acleddata.com/middle-east/yemen/">trackers</a>, and <a href="https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/39/43">international and regional experts</a> that have blamed the coalition for the vast majority of civilian suffering. </p>
<p>As a consequence, Yemeni civilians become forgotten victims, unworthy of attention and obscured by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/world/middleeast/yemen-famine-war.html#:%7E:text=Six%20years%20into%20a%20war,vulnerable%20to%20disease%20and%20starvation">opaque numbers</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/world/middleeast/yemen-doctors-without-borders-hospital-bombing.html#:%7E:text=Bombing%20of%20Doctors%20Without%20Borders%20Hospital%20in%20Yemen%20Kills%20at%20Least%2015,-Give%20this%20article&text=SANA%2C%20Yemen%20%E2%80%94%20At%20least%2015,and%20local%20health%20ministry%20officials.">detached language</a> on the consequences of coalition violence, and narratives of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-biden.html#:%7E:text=War%20in%20Yemen.-,Ending%20the%20War%20Is%20Harder.,bombs%20are%20no%20longer%20used.">inevitability of war</a>. These editorial decisions obscure the role of the U.S. in Yemeni suffering – even if they do not reflect the underlying intent behind the reporting. </p>
<h2>Journalism of deference</h2>
<p>In both the Yemen and Ukraine conflicts, the U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars – more than <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts">US$75 billion</a> in humanitarian, financial and military assistance to Ukraine and over <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105988">$54 billion</a> in military support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2015 and 2021 alone.</p>
<p>What’s different is that the U.S. is essentially on opposite sides in these conflicts when it comes to its relationship to those inflicting the most civilian casualties. Washington officials have made open and direct declarations about the inhumanity of atrocities in Ukraine while <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/07/us/politics/saudi-yemen-war-us-weapons.html">avoiding inquiry and condemnation</a> of those in Yemen. Our research suggests that such messaging may be supported by the news media.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An analysis of over 1,000 headlines shows key differences in how US media portray the aggressors and victims in the two conflicts.Esther Brito Ruiz, Adjunct Instructor, American University School of International ServiceJeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2077172023-06-23T12:27:51Z2023-06-23T12:27:51ZThere is no legal reason the US can’t supply cluster bombs to Ukraine – but that doesn’t justify Biden’s decision to do so<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533480/original/file-20230622-5172-r9f59p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=19%2C25%2C4214%2C2799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The remains of a rocket that carried cluster munitions found in a Ukrainian field.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-remains-of-a-rocket-that-carried-cluster-munitions-news-photo/1258233929?adppopup=true">Alice Martins/For The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Biden administration announced on July 7, 2023, that it would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cluster-munitions-ukraine-expected-fridays-800m-aid-package-2023-07-07/">send cluster bombs to Ukraine</a> – a deeply controversial move given the munition is prohibited by more than 120 countries because of risks to civilian populations.</p>
<p>The U.S. has been here before. It <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/29/politics/saudi-arabia-us-cluster-bombs-on-civilians/index.html">provided Saudi Arabia with cluster munitions</a> – which <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/what-is-a-cluster-bomb.aspx">contain bomblets that can scatter</a> across a wide area, often not exploding until later – during the kingdom’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44466574">military intervention in Yemen</a>.</p>
<p>Washington <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/exclusive-white-house-blocks-transfer-of-cluster-bombs-to-saudi-arabia/">suspended sales of cluster bombs to the Saudis</a> in 2016 following mounting concern over the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/yemen-children-among-civilians-killed-and-maimed-in-cluster-bomb-minefields/">toll they were taking on civilian lives</a>. But the U.S. is still <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2022/03/09/coalition-calls-us-swiftly-ratify-global-treaty-banning-cluster-bombs">holding out from joining</a> an <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/home.aspx">international ban on cluster bombs</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/goldman/bio">scholar of the law of war</a>, I know that cluster bombs highlight a reality about the use and regulation of weapons, even those that can cause widespread civilian suffering: These munitions are not in themselves illegal, but their usage can be. Furthermore, the decision by the U.S. to provide Ukraine with cluster bombs could weaken the argument against others’ doing likewise. And that, in turn, could increase the chances of cluster bombs’ being deployed illegally.</p>
<h2>Effective or indiscriminate?</h2>
<p>Cluster munitions have been <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/cluster-munitions-factsheet-230710.htm#:%7E:text=Cluster%20munitions%20were%20first%20used,to%20kill%20or%20injure%20combatants.">part of nations’ arsenals since World War II</a>. Delivered by air or ground artillery, they have been used by the <a href="https://asiasociety.org/northern-california/legacies-war-laos">United States in Laos and Vietnam</a> during the Vietnam War, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/8/13/life-among-israeli-cluster-bombs-in-lebanon#:%7E:text=Four%20million%20cluster%20munitions%20were,spread%20across%2015.23%20square%20kilometres.">Israel in southern Lebanon</a>, <a href="http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/cluster-bombs/use-of-cluster-bombs/a-timeline-of-cluster-bomb-use.aspx">the U.S. and U.K. in Iraq</a>, Russia and Syria <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/28/russia/syria-widespread-new-cluster-munition-use">in the ongoing Syrian civil war</a>, and the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/06/yemen-saudis-using-us-cluster-munitions">Saudis in Yemen</a>. And now they are being <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">deployed in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="v689T" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/v689T/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>If deployed responsibly, they can be an effective military tool. Because they can spread hundreds of bomblets across a wide area, they can prove a potent weapon against concentrations of enemy troops and their weapons on a battlefield. In 2017, a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-POLICY-ON-CLUSTER-MUNITIONS-OSD071415-17.pdf">U.S. Department of Defense memo</a> said cluster munitions provided a “necessary capability” when confronted with “massed formation of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a defined area, targets whose precise location are not known, and time-sensitive or moving targets.” And on June 22, 2023, <a href="https://twitter.com/laraseligman/status/1671935568664559632">it was reported</a> that the Department of Defense has concluded that cluster bombs would be useful if deployed against “dug-in” Russian positions in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-POLICY-ON-CLUSTER-MUNITIONS-OSD071415-17.pdf">the Department of Defense argued</a> that in some limited circumstances cluster bombs can be less destructive to civilians. In Vietnam, the U.S. sanctioned the use of cluster bombs – over more powerful bombs – to disrupt transport links and enemy positions while <a href="https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/nat-sec/Vietnam/Linebacker-and-the-Law-of-War.html">minimizing the risk of destroying nearby dikes</a>, which would have flooded rice fields and caused widespread suffering to villagers.</p>
<p>Still, their use has always been controversial. The problem is that not all the bomblets explode on impact. Many remain on the ground, unexploded until they are later disturbed – and that increases the chances of civilians’ being maimed or killed. Their use in urban settings is particularly problematic, as they cannot be directed at a specific military target and are just as likely to strike civilians and their homes.</p>
<h2>Cluster bombs under international law</h2>
<p>Concern over the risk to civilian harm led in 2008 to a <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/2008-convention-cluster-munitions#:%7E:text=The%20Convention%20on%20Cluster%20Munitions,international%20treaty%20prohibiting%20these%20weapons.">Convention on Cluster Munitions</a>, which bans their use, production or sale by member states.</p>
<p>But as of 2023, the convention is legally binding for only the 123 states that are signatories – and Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. are not among them. Nor can they – or any of the other countries yet to sign up to the convention – be compelled to join the ban.</p>
<p>As such, there is no legal reason that Ukraine or Russia cannot deploy cluster bombs in the current conflict – as <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">both have done</a> since the invasion of February 2022. Nor is there any legal reason the Biden administration can’t sell the munitions to Ukraine.</p>
<p>But there are laws that set out how cluster bombs can be used, and how they must not.</p>
<p>The relevant part of international humanitarian law here is 1977’s <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977">Additional Protocol I</a> to the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a>, which both Ukraine and Russia have ratified. The additional protocol sets out rules the warring parties must observe to limit harm to civilians. Acknowledging that civilian deaths are an inevitable part of war, <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-51">Article 51 of Additional Protocol I</a> prohibits “indiscrimate” attacks. Such attacks include those employing a weapon that cannot be directed at a specific military target or of such a nature to strike military targets and civilians and civilian objects without distinction.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-57">Article 57 of the additional protocol</a> stresses that attacking armies have a duty of care to spare civilian populations. This includes taking “all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack.”</p>
<p>Neither article specifies any weapons deemed off-limits. Rather, it is how the weapons are used that determines whether the attack constitutes an indiscriminate one and hence a crime under international law.</p>
<h2>More than an ‘optical’ risk?</h2>
<p>Even if cluster bombs are not inherently indiscriminate – a claim that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/06/anyone-can-die-at-any-time-kharkiv/">advocates of an international ban</a> put forward – their use in urban settings greatly increases the chance of civilian harm. In 2021, <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348668/CMM2022_PPT.pdf">97% of cluster bomb casualties were civilians</a>, two-thirds of whom were children. And the experience of cluster bomb use in Syria and Yemen shows that it can be difficult to hold governments to account.</p>
<p>Which is why Ukraine’s request for U.S. cluster munitions has led to concerns. The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3348257/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2022-Web_HR.pdf">Cluster Munitions Monitor</a>, which logs international use of the bombs, found that as of August 2022, Ukraine was the only active conflict zone where cluster bombs were being deployed – with Russia using the weapon “extensively” since its invasion, and Ukraine also deploying cluster bombs on a handful of occasions.</p>
<p>Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-seeks-us-cluster-bombs-adapt-drone-use-lawmakers-2023-03-06/">reportedly sought some of the United States’ stockpile</a> of Cold War-era MK-20 cluster bombs to drop on Russian positions via drones. The White House had previously <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/biden-administration-ukraine-cluster-munitions-00073316">aired “concern</a>” over the transfer.</p>
<p>In announcing the decision to send U.S.-made cluster bombs to Ukraine, Jake Sullivan, President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cluster-munitions-ukraine-expected-fridays-800m-aid-package-2023-07-07/">noted that</a> “cluster munitions create a risk of civilian harm from unexploded ordnance,” adding: “This is why we’ve deferred the decision for as long as we could.”</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s earlier hesitancy was <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/09/biden-administration-ukraine-cluster-munitions-00073316">reportedly over the “optics</a>” of selling cluster bombs and that it may introducing a wedge between the U.S. and other NATO countries over the weapon’s use. </p>
<p>Certainly, there would be very little legal risk under international law of providing cluster bombs to Ukraine – or any other nation – even if that country were to use the weapon illegally.</p>
<p>There is no case I know of in which a state has been found legally responsible for providing weapons to another that flagrantly misuses them – there is no equivalent to efforts in the U.S. seeking to hold gun manufacturers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/can-us-gunmakers-be-liable-mass-shooting-2022-05-25/">legally responsible for mass shootings</a>, or state “<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dram_shop_rule">dram shop laws</a>” that hold the suppliers of alcohol culpable for the actions of an inebriated driver.</p>
<p>Yet one of the things that worried people in Congress regarding the sale of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia was that the Saudis’ <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/07/yemen-coalition-drops-cluster-bombs-capital">consistently indiscriminate use of those weapons</a> in Yemen could be seen at home and abroad as making the U.S. complicit in those violations.</p>
<p>I would argue that it became difficult for Washington to continue to supply the Saudis on moral ground. But still, there was and is presently no clear-cut legal obligation for the U.S. to stop supplying other nations with cluster bombs.</p>
<p>In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine will deliberately use U.S.-supplied cluster munitions to target civilians and their environs. </p>
<p>And Ukraine provided “written assurances that it is going to use these in a very careful way,” Sullivan said in announcing the transfer.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, providing Ukraine with cluster weapons could serve to destigmatize them and runs counter to international efforts to end their use. And that, in turn, could encourage – or excuse – their use by other states that may be less responsible.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story was updated on July 7, 2023, in light of the Biden administration’s decision to supply Ukraine with cluster bombs.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Goldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US administration said that it had received ‘written assurances’ from Ukraine that it would use cluster bombs carefully. Nonetheless, the munition will provide an additional risk to civilians.Robert Goldman, Professor of Law, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2047242023-05-05T12:13:03Z2023-05-05T12:13:03ZCan China broker peace in Yemen – and further Beijing’s Middle East strategy in the process?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/524428/original/file-20230504-17-av4fuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5742%2C3837&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Houthi fighter patrols an area during Yemen's civil war.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fighter-of-the-houthi-group-stands-while-patrolling-at-al-news-photo/1409540631?adppopup=true">Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After nearly a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">decade of grinding conflict</a>, Yemen looks to be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/11/progress-on-yemen-peace-talks-despite-prisoner-swap-delay">inching toward a peace deal</a>.</p>
<p>Talks between the Houthi movement controlling much of the country’s north and Saudi Arabia, the regional power backing an anti-Houthi coalition in the war, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-houthi-peace-talks-yemens-sanaa-conclude-with-further-rounds-planned-2023-04-14">are ongoing</a> and being <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm">encouraged by international observers</a>.</p>
<p>On May 1, 2023, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-yemen-lenderkings-travel-to-the-gulf-4/">U.S. announced that it had sent</a> Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking to the Persian Gulf to “advance ongoing efforts to secure a new agreement and launch a comprehensive peace process.”</p>
<p>But the U.S. has far less of a role in steering negotiations than <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/04/07/yemen-war-ceasefire-china-saudi-arabia-iran/">Washington’s great global rival: China</a>. The recent breakthrough in Yemen has been undergirded by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia</a>, facilitated by Beijing in March 2023.</p>
<p>As an academic who specializes in <a href="https://polisci.colostate.edu/faculty-and-staff/mmahad/">U.S. and Chinese strategic engagement</a> across eastern Africa and the Middle East, I appreciate that the diplomatic breakthrough brokered by Beijing has implications for the region. It has the potential to reduce rivalries and strengthen stability in Yemen, along with other countries prone to sectarian violence, including Lebanon and Iraq.</p>
<p>But it has also led to speculation over China’s emergence as a major regional player in the Middle East. The development not only <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/15/world/us-saudi-china-relations-intl/index.html">challenges the United States’</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/world/asia/china-saudi-arabia-iran-us.html">long-established dominance</a> in the Gulf, but it also raises questions about Beijing’s strategic agenda and motives.</p>
<h2>Fragmentation and regional dynamics</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/the-broader-context-behind-chinas-mediation-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi-Iran breakthrough</a> might contribute to a lasting peace in Yemen.</p>
<p>But given the role that the rivalry between the regional powers has had in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/10/world/middleeast/yemen-peace-talks.html">fueling the fighting</a>, international observers have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1135477">expressed optimism</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis">disintegration of Yemen</a> began with the collapse of its central government in 2011 after the Arab Spring uprising. In 2014, the Houthi group, a Shiite militia backed by Iran, took control of the capital, Sanaa, and forced transitional President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee to Aden. Hadi’s government struggled to establish itself in Aden and eventually relocated to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he resigned in 2022.</p>
<p><iframe id="OBxKE" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/OBxKE/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Viewing the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia">Houthis as an Iranian proxy</a>, Saudi Arabia intervened in the Yemeni conflict, backing those loyal to Hadi and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">bombarding Houthi areas from the air</a>. These <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/23/un-yemen-recovery-possible-in-one-generation-if-war-stops-now">Saudi-led attacks</a> contributed to a massive humanitarian crisis. The conflict has resulted in the <a href="https://yemen.un.org/en/176632-yemenunct-annual-report-2021">deaths of at least 377,000 Yemenis</a>, the United Nations projected in 2021, many through indirect causes such as starvation and disease. It has also led to widespread displacement of civilian populations and the breakdown of infrastructure.</p>
<p>The country remains fragmented, with militias controlling separate territories and no functional central government.</p>
<h2>China’s path through Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>So where does China come in? Beijing has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/">no formal diplomatic, economic or political ties</a> with any the numerous militias that currently govern parts of the country. But before 2014, China had a healthy trading and economic relationship with Yemen. According to the World Bank, in 2013 China was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=CN">Yemen’s second-largest trading partner</a> after Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Since 2014, trade between China and Yemen persisted, albeit in a mostly informal manner. Data from the international trade-tracking Observatory of Economic Complexity indicates that <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/yem">China imported US$411 million worth of products</a>, mainly crude oil but also copper, from Yemen in 2021. What remains unclear is which rebel factions have received revenue through the trade. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China has maintained formal <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/china-and-yemens-forgotten-war">diplomatic and economic ties</a> with Iran, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – each of which back militias involved in Yemen’s war. In fact, China has been intensifying its economic and political connections with all three regional powers. </p>
<p>In recent years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-china/xis-visit-to-uae-highlights-chinas-rising-interest-in-middle-east-idUSKBN1KA26K">visited both the UAE</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/08/1141202088/xi-jinping-saudi-arabia-china">Saudi Arabia</a> to underscore Beijing’s growing role as a partner in the region. Xi also <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230216_11025776.html">recently hosted Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi</a> during a state visit to China.</p>
<h2>What’s to gain from peace?</h2>
<p>This expanding relationship with key players in the Yemeni conflict puts China in a unique position as a potential peace broker. Yet uniting the three regional powers around a common peace plan has to date proved difficult.</p>
<p>The UAE can influence Yemeni factions it has provided military and financial support to, including the “<a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b728d5ba.html">Security Belt” forces</a> affiliated with the transitional government. However, the Emiratis’ goals may differ from those seeking a unified, independent Yemen. Since the conflict broke out, the UAE has displayed a tendency to undermine Yemen’s territorial integrity through, for example, taking <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/28/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-consolidating-strategic-positions-in-yemens-east-and-islands/">control of some Yemeni islands, such as Socotra</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, Iran may be reluctant to accept any peace agreement that would diminish its influence in Yemen. Tehran’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">relationship with the Houthis</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/the-limits-of-irans-influence-on-yemens-houthi-rebels">has not been as consistently</a> solid as some outside observers suggest, but ties have <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/houthis-and-iran-a-war-time-alliance-121951">grown as a result of the conflict</a>. Should hostilities cease, the Houthis’ military dependence on Iran would decrease, diminishing Iran’s leverage.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, of the three, stands to gain the most from peace in Yemen. Cessation of conflict would likely halt <a href="https://apnews.com/article/4338ea6186ebefcd752c2c6e8f45d7a3">Houthi attacks</a> on the kingdom, save the Saudis money and resources dedicated to the Yemeni war, and potentially restore an international reputation tarnished by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">alleged war crimes in the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>To broker peace in Yemen, China would presumably need to concentrate efforts on working with the Saudis. </p>
<p>The Chinese-backed rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran could be a first step to this end. Although no direct mention of Yemen is made in the language of the agreement, it <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202303/t20230311_11039241.html">does talk of</a> both sides’ support for “the non-interference in internal affairs of states” and “keenness to exert all efforts towards enhancing regional and international peace and security.”</p>
<p>And since that agreement in March, there has been progress toward peace in Yemen. A Saudi delegation led by the kingdom’s ambassador to Yemen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-omani-delegations-arrive-sanaa-hold-talks-with-houthi-leader-2023-04-09/">held talks with Houthi leaders in Sanaa</a> on April 9. The talks were the first direct negotiations between the two sides on Yemeni soil since the war began in 2015.</p>
<h2>The thinking in Beijing</h2>
<p>But why is China invested in what happens in an ongoing conflict far from its borders – especially when it is already consumed with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-military-taiwan-us-7549c646a377f1f199d2cda983573279">perceived strategic and military threats</a> closer to home?</p>
<p>The argument that a cessation of hostilities in Yemen would <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/chinas-role-in-the-yemen-crisis/">grant China economic benefits</a> by <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/bab-al-mandab.htm">providing access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait</a> – a key strategic channel on the Arabian peninsula for commerce and trade, with an estimated 4% of global oil supply passing through it – ignores some critical factors, I believe. Rebuilding a war-shattered Yemen and establishing a stable government may take time – and the investment required to do so might outweigh short-term economic gains.</p>
<p>Moreover, China already has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3">a military base in Djibouti</a>, giving it access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait even without peace in Yemen.</p>
<p>It could be that China is seeking to be seen as a global peacemaker as part of a strategy that has been referred to as “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/02/olympics-china-uyghurs-genocide-boycott/">diplomatic whitewashing</a>” – that is, making friends overseas and playing the “nice guy” to distract from China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037">treatment of its Uyghur minority</a> at home and Xi’s increasingly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/20/world/asia/xi-china-us.html">confrontational posture on Taiwan</a> and the South China Sea.</p>
<p>But it also fits a wider geopolitical trend. The counterbalance to China’s growing role in the Middle East is the declining influence of the United States in the region.</p>
<p>Priorities in Washington have shifted to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">strategic concerns in East Asia</a> <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/why-the-united-states-must-stay-the-course-on-ukraine/">and Ukraine</a>, leading to a diplomatic opportunity for China – one Beijing is seemingly keen to exploit.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia have cooled, in part due to the Yemeni war. And Washington has had <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-iran/">no formal diplomatic relations with Iran</a> for decades.</p>
<p>As a neutral player, China can engage with Tehran and Riyadh in a way the U.S. simply cannot. That was evident in China’s role in the rapprochement, and it could be the case in resolving Yemen’s war.</p>
<p>For China, it provides opportunities for another diplomatic success from which it could emerge as a reliable partner in a changing geopolitical landscape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204724/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahad Darar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Yemen’s brutal civil war has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. But a recent Beijing-brokered rapprochement between two regional powers could unlock a path to peace.Mahad Darar, Ph.D. Student of Political Science, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016922023-03-13T16:29:19Z2023-03-13T16:29:19ZSaudi-Iran deal won’t bring peace to the Middle East but will enhance China’s role as power broker<p>After more than four decades as seemingly implacable enemies on either side of a deep political-religious divide in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-64906996">restore diplomatic relations</a> and reopen embassies. The deal, which was signed in Beijing, comes seven years after diplomatic relations were severed in the aftermath of the execution in Saudi Arabia of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-war-nimr-al-nimr-execution">Shia cleric Nimr Al Nimr</a> and has been heralded as a “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/11/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-normalization-china-analysis-intl/index.html">game-changing moment</a>” for the Middle East. </p>
<p>While undeniably a positive move, the agreement will not end conflict in the region – with serious domestic issues continuing to drive conflict and violence in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Yet serious economic challenges have prompted the Saudis and Iranians to engage in diplomatic talks over the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/iran-and-saudi-arabia-from-rivalry-to-mending-ties-a-timeline">past few years</a> to create a more stable regional order, allowing their countries to engage in domestic reform programmes as a result.</p>
<p>The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has fractious roots, shaped by the interplay of security concerns, claims to leadership over the Muslim world, ethno-sectarian rivalries, and differing relationships with Washington. Lazy analysis has often reduced the rivalry to a sectarian conflict, a consequence of “ancient hatreds”. But such a reading of events is xenophobic and orientalist and ignores the context and contingencies shaping relations between the two states. </p>
<p>Despite the fractious roots, relations between the two states have oscillated between overt hostility and burgeoning detente since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, playing out in different ways across the Middle East.</p>
<h2>Troubled region</h2>
<p>The presence of shared religious, ethnic and ideological identities across the region has also prompted others to view conflict across the region through the lens of “proxy wars”. Various groups in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere have been seen as merely doing the bidding of paymasters in Riyadh or Tehran. This ignores the internal drivers of conflict and division, reducing analysis to a simplistic binary pitting Sunni against Shia. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Middle East, 2023" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Middle East is riven with conflict, both political and sectarian. Reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran is unlikely to fundamentally change that.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://picryl.com/media/middle-east-graphic">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Across the region, states where Saudi and Iranian interests have clashed, have also been beset by a range of their own complex socioeconomic and political challenges. </p>
<p>Since Saddam Hussein was deposed, Iraq has been characterised by a struggle among various factions to dominate the state. Shia parties, representing the country’s majority, have typically won elections, often with the support of Iran and much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. Yet to think of Iraqi politics purely as representing a proxy war between its two neighbours would be wrong. It ignores the domestic concerns of many and efforts to create a political landscape that works for Iraqis and is not just an arena for Riyadh and Tehran to increase their power. </p>
<p>In Yemen, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have both played a prominent role in the civil war, the key drivers of conflict are domestic, amid a broader struggle over territory, politics, visions of order, tribalism, resources and sectarian difference. The involvement of Riyadh and Tehran – in different ways – exacerbates these tensions. Fears about gains by Iran-backed Houthi rebels across Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia to embark on a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">devastating bombing campaign</a> to curtail the group’s actions.</p>
<p>Tehran’s <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">support for the Houthis</a> – and the group’s attacks on the Saudi mainland – exacerbated the kingdom’s fears. Yet the war in Yemen is also a consequence of the fragmentation of the state and the emergence of several different groups vying for influence across a landscape beset by serious environmental challenges and food shortages.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, a devastating socioeconomic crisis plays out in the shell of the state, with sectarian groups providing support and protection to their constituencies in place of a functioning government. Key groups have received support from Saudi Arabia and Iran – most notably <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which possesses strong ideological links with the Islamic Republic, and the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/can-lebanon-s-future-movement-provide-moderate-sunni-alternative">Future Movement</a> the party of government across most of the past decade, which has a complex relationship with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Clearly the Saudis and Iranians have a keen interest in Lebanese politics. But in reality any conflict here is driven by competition between local groups seeking to impose their visions of order on a precarious political, social and economic landscape.</p>
<p>While there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia and Iran have the means to exert influence on politics across the region, local groups have their own agendas, aspirations and pressures. It remains to be seen how the reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran will resonate in spaces beset by division. </p>
<p>There are undeniably positives for regional security. The reconciliation improves the possibility of a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-revival-nuclear-deal-political-victory-over-west/32004644.html">revived nuclear deal with Tehran</a> – although it remains to be seen what Saudi Arabia has offered Iran to facilitate the agreement, and vice versa. Also, there are questions as to what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms have been put in place by China.</p>
<h2>The role of China</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of all of this concerns <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/12/china-saudi-iran-middle-east-united-states-relations-peace/">China’s role in proceedings</a>. While diplomatic efforts aimed at improving relations between the two rivals have been taking place for several years, China’s ability to forge an agreement out of these talks points to Beijing’s growing influence in the region. </p>
<p>China has long had <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/02/25/iran-china-cooperation-fraught-with-contradictions/">close economic ties with Iran</a>, but in recent years Beijing has sought to <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221130-pentagon-china-significantly-increased-engagement-with-middle-east-in-2021/">increase its engagement with Arab states</a>, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Deteriorating relations between the two major Gulf powers would have had a negative impact on Chinese engagement and investment across the Middle East, both in terms of its infrastructure projects and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>Although the US has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/47e26a9f-0943-4e65-b8a0-604da6289153">publicly celebrated the initiative</a>, privately there are several concerns about the broader implications for the Middle East and for global politics. This comes at a time when relations between Riyadh and Washington are tense. </p>
<p>This was perhaps best seen in the visit of the US president, Joe Biden, to Saudi Arabia after his vocal criticism of the kingdom’s human rights record and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/26/jamal-khashoggi-mohammed-bin-salman-us-report">publication of a report</a> stating that Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman approved the operation to kill journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a US citizen. During the visit, Biden and bin Salman endured a tense meeting which <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87662">largely failed to improve relations</a> and highlighted the precarious nature of relations. </p>
<p>In such an environment, rising Chinese influence in the kingdom and across the Middle East is hardly surprising. China’s move into mediation offers some semblance of hope that an agreement can also be reached to end the war in Ukraine, but at what cost? The Chinese model of investment and the provision of “untied aid” – the provision of financial support without conditions – has long ignored concerns about democracy and human rights. So the agreement between the Saudis and the Iranians has been read by some as a victory for authoritarianism, further marginalising reform movements in both countries.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1634608154112835585"}"></div></p>
<p>Much like the US, Israel is also concerned about the deal. For successive Israeli governments, Iran has long occupied the role of regional
bete noire, ultimately feeding into the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/two-years-what-state-abraham-accords">signing of the Abraham Accords</a> in the summer of 2020 which normalised relations between Israel, the UEA, Bahrain and Morocco as a strategic alliance against Tehran. The Netanyahu government has long sought to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and hoped to use the Iranian threat as a means of achieving this goal. </p>
<p>Additionally, the deal raises questions about the future of regional security. The US has long been a mediator in regional disputes and has been viewed as a security guarantor by Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. China’s actions here suggest that it is seeking to assert itself more keenly in the region’s politics. Reports suggest that Beijing is to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-plans-summit-of-persian-gulf-arab-and-iranian-leaders-as-new-middle-east-role-takes-shape-357cfd7e">host a meeting of Arab and Iranian leaders</a> later in the year. If accurate, it positions China firmly as a – if not <em>the</em> – dominant actor across the Middle East.</p>
<p>A reconciliation between the Saudis and the Iranians is certainly good for regional order. But it will not address the causes of conflict in Yemen or elsewhere across the region. It also raises several serious issues around regional security and global order, the salience of democracy and human rights, and the future of US engagement with the Middle East. </p>
<p>While the initiative is a positive step, it is not a solution for the region’s conflicts. This Beijing-mediated agreement may in fact lead to further significant challenges for the people of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Fellow atthe Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>Detente between Tehran and Riyadh will not magically solve all the political and sectarian tensions in the Middle East.Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1953782022-12-04T08:55:56Z2022-12-04T08:55:56ZHalf a million Ethiopian migrants have been deported from Saudi Arabia in 5 years - what they go through<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497645/original/file-20221128-22-rxcezh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian migrants stranded in Saudi Arabia arrive at Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Tens of thousands of migrant Ethiopian workers have been <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/funding-needed-assist-over-100000-ethiopian-migrants-returning-kingdom-saudi-arabia">forcibly repatriated</a> from Saudi Arabia each year since the early 2010s. Although this is carried out as part of a crackdown on illegal migrant workers, legally documented workers have frequently been caught in the dragnet. Another 102,000 Ethiopian citizens will soon be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/01/saudi-arabia-repatriates-hundreds-detained-ethiopians">repatriated in another round</a> that began in April 2022. Girmachew Adugna, who has researched Ethiopian migration for years, explains the background to the deportations along with concerns about <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/15/ethiopians-abused-gulf-migration-route">human rights violations</a> and the challenges that returnees face.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What is the broad picture of Ethiopian labour migration to the Gulf?</h2>
<p>There are over <a href="https://mena.iom.int/news/iom-launches-its-first-strategy-gulf-countries-2021-2024-focusing-migration-governance-mobility-and-resilience">30 million migrant workers</a> in the more than half-a-dozen Gulf countries. As the third highest destination for international migrants in the world in 2019, Saudi Arabia is the main destination. Ethiopia makes a <a href="https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/saudi-arabia/">sizeable number</a> of the kingdom’s 13,122,300 migrant workers. It is estimated that about 750,000 Ethiopians currently reside and work in the kingdom. </p>
<p>However, the exact number is unknown due to routine deportation and irregular entry and overstaying visas. <a href="https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/saudi-arabia/">As many as 90%</a> of the migrants entering Saudi Arabia illegally <a href="https://www.acaps.org/special-report/eastern-migration-route-ethiopia-saudi-arabia">through Yemen</a> are Ethiopian. Along with Ethiopians and Yemenis, the three largest immigrant groups in the kingdom are from India (2.4 million), Indonesia (1.7 million), and Pakistan (1.4 million).</p>
<p>There are a number of factors responsible for outward migration from Ethiopia. Although the economy is <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview#:%7E:text=Over%20the%20past%2015%20years,particular%20through%20public%20infrastructure%20investments.">one of the fastest growing in the world</a>, this growth has not been accompanied by considerable poverty reduction and job creation, particularly for young people. With migrant workers in Saudi Arabia earning <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_569654.pdf">five times</a> what they could earn for similar work back home, the incentive to migrate is strong.</p>
<p>Ethiopians who migrate to the Gulf countries are <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---africa/---ro-abidjan/---sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_569654.pdf">mainly</a> single, uneducated young people. Women account for about 95% of all documented migrants going to the Gulf. </p>
<p>Ethiopian workers in Saudi Arabia are mainly engaged in domestic work. Other popular jobs include cleaning, casual work and herding. </p>
<h2>What is the backdrop to the intermittent deportations?</h2>
<p>In recent years, the large number of undocumented workers has become a source of diplomatic friction between Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. At the height of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring">Arab Spring</a> which spread across North Africa and the Middle East in the early 2010s, Saudi Arabia began imposing strict immigration policies targeted at foreign workers. As a result, around 170,000 Ethiopians were deported in late 2013 and early 2014. </p>
<p>More than half a million Ethiopian migrants have been deported from Saudi Arabia since 2017. Overall, over <a href="https://www.siasat.com/over-6-4-million-illegal-foreigners-arrested-in-saudi-arabia-2389489/">6.4 million people</a> have been detained since 2017 and 2.1 million undocumented migrant workers deported from Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The latest round of repatriations involves 102,000 migrants. It began in April 2022 and is expected to be completed by the end of the year, according to the Ethiopian government. So far, 70% of the 102,000 citizens have been returned home on 198 flights.</p>
<p>While both governments haggle over the deportations in <a href="https://www.ena.et/en/?p=40640">regular diplomatic exchanges</a>, deportees suffer the direct consequences. </p>
<p>On many occasions, returnees end up as internally displaced. They do not realise their migration objectives and they return home in the context of poverty and conflict. </p>
<p>In Saudi Arabia, migrants repeatedly have their <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/deported-ethiopian-migrants-tell-of-suffering-in-saudi-arabia-detention/a-62223624">human rights violated</a>. They are routinely placed in detention centres indefinitely. </p>
<p>Once back home, they are faced with a difficult reintegration into their communities. This happens if they are perceived as having “failed” to achieve the economic objectives of migration.</p>
<p>The Ethiopian government banned labour migration to the Gulf and Sudan after the first wave of deportations in the early 2010s. This was in order to come up with policy and legislation to improve the protection of its migrant workers. </p>
<p>The ban was lifted in February 2018. At the same time, Ethiopia proclaimed that workers could migrate to only those Gulf countries that had signed <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ethiopia-origin-refugees-evolving-migration">bilateral agreements</a>: Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Signing a bilateral agreement increases legal migration pathways for Ethiopian domestic workers. It also addresses the safe, dignified return of undocumented migrants.</p>
<p>But these arrangements don’t go far enough. Negotiations should also address the conditions of the detention camps and protection assistance for Ethiopian migrant workers. They should widen legal pathways for more Ethiopian migrants to work and live legally in Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Lastly, the Ethiopian side should press to regularise the status of irregular Ethiopian migrants. Saudi authorities are likely to resist this.</p>
<p>For its part, Ethiopia should do more for returning migrants. Lack of financial resources and skills makes it harder for returnees to re-enter the local labour market. This is partly because there are limited resources allocated for reintegration. Conflict in parts of Ethiopia makes the reintegration efforts difficult too.</p>
<p>Female returnees face stigma and discrimination from families and communities. This is partly because they are believed to be engaged in socially unacceptable practices such as commercial sex work. </p>
<p>Prioritising the reintegration of vulnerable migrants is key. This should seek to address individual needs as well as those of the family, community and structural problems. Community-based approaches to address stigma, prejudices and discrimination should be encouraged.</p>
<p>This task calls for a lot of resources. Ethiopia doesn’t have what’s needed and should look to the international community for help. But it will require hard work. The issue attracts little or no attention from international donors such as the European Union, which <a href="https://www.themigrantproject.org/eu-ethiopia/">prioritises the return, readmission and reintegration of far fewer Ethiopian migrants</a> working and living in Europe illegally. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has drafted the <a href="https://www.ena.et/en/?p=34895">first ever national migration policy</a>. This could possibly help improve the migration governance including return and reintegration efforts. It is key to strengthening the implementation capacity of government institutions at all levels and involving civil society, media, and the private sector in the reintegration process as they help facilitate labour market absorption, reduce stigma and discrimination.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195378/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Girmachew Adugna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More than half a million Ethiopian migrants have been deported from Saudi Arabia since 2017.Girmachew Adugna, Advisory Board Member, Research Center for Forced Displacement and Migration Studies, Addis Ababa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909612022-11-04T12:30:08Z2022-11-04T12:30:08ZGenerous aid to Ukraine is diverting resources away from other refugee crises around the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490970/original/file-20221020-12-ulz8rc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=938%2C131%2C4236%2C3313&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this picture taken Sept. 29, 2022, Rohingya refugees line up to gather relief supplies at a refugee camp in Bangladesh.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-picture-taken-on-september-29-rohingya-refugees-news-photo/1244092851?phrase=Rohingya%20&adppopup=true">Munir Uz Zaman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nearly 10 months since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the ongoing war has produced over <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">7.7 million refugees</a>.</p>
<p>An additional <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/internally-displaced-persons">7 million</a> Ukrainians have lost their homes and are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/millions-in-ukraine-face-critical-shortages-un-agencies-say/6642506.html">struggling</a> with acute shortages of food, water, shelter and other basic needs. </p>
<p>Though the delivery of humanitarian assistance has suffered as a result of Russian airstrikes and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-six-months-war-and-humanitarian-response-amid-global-food-crisis">disruption of commercial supply lines</a>, the international response to the Ukraine crisis has been remarkable. </p>
<p>Since January 2022, the U.S. government, for instance, has committed more than US$18.2 billion in <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3189571/725-million-in-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">security assistance to Ukraine</a>, with approximately $17.6 billion dedicated to train and equip Ukrainian armed forces.</p>
<p>The humanitarian response – including policies to absorb Ukrainian refugees and provision of emergency relief – has also been remarkable. The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2382">2022 “Stand Up for Ukraine”</a> global pledging campaign raised $8.9 billion.</p>
<p>U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113052">stated</a>: “This is among the fastest and most generous responses a humanitarian flash appeal has ever received.” </p>
<h2>A protracted refugee crisis in Bangladesh</h2>
<p>The international attention focused on Ukraine comes at a time when other humanitarian crises around the world are receiving less attention and assistance than they need.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=VjFPaPEAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">a scholar of refugees and forcible displacement</a>, I spent the summer of 2022 researching the changes in Bangladesh’s policies toward <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/4/18/who-are-the-rohingya">the Rohingya, an ethnic group</a> that is largely Muslim.</p>
<p>Since 2017, in what was recognized as the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis">fastest and largest refugee influx</a> since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, more than 773,000 Rohingya crossed the border to neighboring Bangladesh to flee the Myanmar government’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/21/myanmar-genocide-rohingya/">genocidal campaign</a> against them.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three children are walking in garbage and mud." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491137/original/file-20221021-14-hl5rbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rohingya refugees stand amid the garbage at a refugee camp in Bangladesh on Sept. 29, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-picture-taken-on-september-29-rohingya-refugees-news-photo/1244091955?phrase=Rohingya%20&adppopup=true">Munir uz Zaman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over 1 million Rohingya are currently living in the world’s largest refugee camp in Bangladesh, where there are issues with overcrowding, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/indefinite-hosting-of-rohingya-refugees-a-growing-concern-for-bangladesh/">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/new-report-reveals-miserable-conditions-in-rohingya-refugee-camps-102616">violence</a>.</p>
<p>My interviews with national and international NGOs and camp administrators revealed growing anxiety about the ongoing financial and social pressures on Bangladesh as a result of serving as one of the world’s largest refugee hosts. </p>
<p>They also revealed concerns about the possibility that the Ukraine crisis is <a href="https://www.southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/world-must-not-forget-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh">diverting attention and financial assistance</a> from the protracted Rohingya situation.</p>
<p>Despite the fact that housing the over 1 million Rohingya in Bangladesh costs <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/cost-supporting-rohingyas-dhaka-now-saddled-12b-year-1804855">$1.21 billion</a> per year, the Rohingya crisis has never received enough financial assistance. Instead, the amount of assistance has been decreasing over time.</p>
<p>In 2020, donors contributed only <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/funding-decline-challenges-2160016">65% of the required funding</a>, down from around 72% to 75% two years earlier. </p>
<p>In 2022, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reduced its funding expectations for the Rohingya in Bangladesh. The <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1082/donors?order=total_funding&sort=desc">Rohingya Refugee Crisis Joint Response Plan 2022</a> sought approximately <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1115012">$881 million</a> to support the refugees. To date, Bangladesh has received <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1082/summary">32.9%</a>, or about $290 million.</p>
<p>“It is difficult to get the world’s attention to … those places where children are suffering in the same way that the children of Ukraine are suffering,” said Gregory Ramm, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/humanitarians-cheer-generous-aid-to-ukraine-but-fear-cost-to-other-crises-/6528342.html">a spokesperson for the international charity Save the Children</a> in April 2022. </p>
<h2>‘Aid void’</h2>
<p>Funding for other protracted crises in 2022 seems to coincide with overwhelming political interest in, and donor pledges for, Ukraine.</p>
<p>For instance, while the 2021 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan was very well funded, at <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1031/summary">112.8%</a>, so far this year it has received only <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1100/summary">45.6% </a>of its funding appeal.</p>
<p>At the 2022 international donor conference on Yemen – a country of 23.4 million people in dire crisis with war and famine – the United Nations appealed for $4.3 billion for humanitarian aid. World leaders offered <a href="https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/the-war-in-ukraine-is-bad-news-for-the-worlds-refugees/">less than one-third</a> of that.</p>
<p>This so-called “aid void” is also increasing in <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/03/22/aid-void-India-Myanmar-border-Chin">Myanmar</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">the Sahel</a> and <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2022/03/24/funding-shortages-thwart-ethiopia-drought-response-as-crises-multiply">Ethiopia</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_22_6263">European commissioner for crisis management</a> had explicitly stated that the European Commission <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/eu-aid-chief-vows-not-to-neglect-other-crises-amid-ukraine-needs-102767">would not pull funds</a> from other crises around the world as it responds to the conflict in Ukraine. Other EU ministers made <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2022/03/24/Takeaways-European-Humanitarian-Forum">similar commitments</a>. </p>
<p>But individual EU member states have already begun diverting funds, as real-time aid data shows. For instance, <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/ukraine-crisis-diverted-aid-what-we-know/">Sweden and Denmark</a> have announced cuts to other aid priorities that equate to <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/ukraine-crisis-diverted-aid-what-we-know/">14% and 10%</a> of their respective 2021 aid budgets. Sweden has already reallocated <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/07/07/Ukraine-aid-Russia-invasion-funding-donors">$150,000 from Sri Lanka</a> – where millions face poverty following its severe <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/16/sri-lanka-economic-crisis-puts-rights-peril">economic crisis and political turbulence</a> since March 2022 – to Ukraine. Denmark announced that it would defer development aid it had <a href="https://www.thelocal.dk/20220324/four-countries-lose-danish-development-aid-as-funds-diverted-to-help-ukrainian-refugees/">earmarked for Syria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Bangladesh</a> to fund the reception of fleeing Ukrainians.</p>
<p>The U.K. has recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jul/25/uk-ministers-urged-reverse-freeze-non-essential-overseas-aid">announced</a> that it will halt all “nonessential” aid spending. It is estimated this may result in <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/ukraine-crisis-diverted-aid-what-we-know/#e9d95065">that spending budget being reduced by 25%</a> with further <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/war-ukraine-adding-humanitarian-needs-elsewhere-diverting-aid-ukraine-will-make-worse">cuts to aid to countries like the Sudan and Syria</a> in addition to those already implemented since 2020. Germany has shown a similar trend.</p>
<p>Excluding the generous support for Ukraine, the U.S. has also cut its humanitarian budget by <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/few-hits-and-many-misses-development-fy22-us-spending-package">$1 billion relative to 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>International assistance crisis</h2>
<p>Even before the current Ukraine crisis, a gap between global humanitarian needs and requisite funding to address them was growing.</p>
<p>In West Bank and Gaza, critical programs had already been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/05/un-palestine-aid-agency-is-close-to-collapse-after-funding-cuts">curtailed</a> and food rations had been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/22/wfp-forced-to-cut-food-aid-to-yemen-amid-lacking-funds">severely reduced</a> in Yemen. </p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic compounded preexisting humanitarian crises and increased funding needs. Yet, in its humanitarian appeal for 2021, the U.N. received <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/overview/2021">less than half</a> of the funding it requested. </p>
<p>This funding shortfall is even more stark given that the number of people without food, clean water, housing and medical care has passed 300 million, according to the <a href="https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2022/">2022 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report</a>. The number is 90 million more than before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Humanitarian <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/03/24/ukraine-aid-funding-media-other-crises">experts have expressed concern</a> that the the overwhelming attention on Ukraine is diverting resources – both financial and human – from other crises that are already facing unprecedented funding shortages.</p>
<p>The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia have also fueled a <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/3-ways-ukraine-conflict-will-drive-hunger-other-crisis-zones">shortage in global food production</a> and a spike in <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115852">global food</a> and <a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/un-gcrg-ukraine-brief-no-3_en.pdf">energy</a> prices. These spikes are already <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/ukraine-war-deepening-global-food-insecurity-what-can-be-done">affecting</a> emergency aid delivery and food scarcity in several conflict-affected contexts, as well as major refugee-hosting countries like Bangladesh.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Dozens of sleeping cots are seen on the middle of a gymnasium floor." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491138/original/file-20221021-22-uciicg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">People fleeing Ukraine rest inside the temporary shelter organized in a sports hall in Krakow, Poland, on March 15, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-fleeing-from-ukraine-rest-inside-the-temporary-news-photo/1239228005?phrase=ukraine%20refugees%20camps%20poland&adppopup=true">Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>As the attention to and support for Ukraine continues, the impact of the war together with other crises – economic, political and environmental – in places like the Horn of Africa continues to have <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/07/07/Ukraine-aid-Russia-invasion-funding-donors">devastating impacts</a> on the lives of civilians.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/deep-dive-the-humanitarian-crises-overshadowed-in-2022-103612">Norwegian Refugee Council noted</a>, “The war in Ukraine has highlighted the immense gap between what is possible when the international community rallies behind a crisis, and the daily reality for the millions of people suffering far from the spotlight.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tazreena Sajjad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The international response to the refugee crisis in Ukraine has been impressive. But humanitarian aid is falling short to help refugees in other countries such as Bangladesh, Yemen and Ethiopia.Tazreena Sajjad, Senior Professorial Lecturer of Global Governance, Politics and Security, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1717922021-11-18T16:27:06Z2021-11-18T16:27:06ZJobs are no excuse — Canada must stop arming Saudi Arabia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432522/original/file-20211117-18-zyyl5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2220%2C1522&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed Bin Salman, looks towards Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, bottom right, as they arrive at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick </span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 175px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/jobs-are-no-excuse-—-canada-must-stop-arming-saudi-arabia" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>In a federal election campaign dominated by domestic issues, <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/election-2021/richter-the-failure-to-discuss-foreign-policy-during-the-election-says-something-depressing-about-this-country">foreign policy received scant attention</a>. Nonetheless, few issues bridge the divide between domestic concerns and Canada’s role in the world like Canadian arms exports to Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Re-elected for a third term, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government can forge a progressive foreign policy that weds concern for human rights abroad with its desire for a strong economy and good jobs at home — but that will require ending the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a dark suit, red tie and white shirt with grey hair and glasses stands in front of a light armoured vehicle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=734&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=734&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=734&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432520/original/file-20211117-25-1qaw6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Stephen Harper, then prime minister, tours the General Dynamics Land Systems—Canada plant and stands next to a LAV being built at the facility in London, Ont., in May 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Dave Chidley</span></span>
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<p>The bulk of Canadian arms exports to the Saudis are light armoured vehicles, known as LAVs — <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-arabia-lav-canada-armoured-vehicles-1.5340087">wheeled military vehicles armed with various weapons, including automatic cannons and machine guns</a>. In 2014, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/4/14/canada-saudi-arms-deal-has-significant-risk">Stephen Harper’s Conservative government brokered the sale of hundreds of LAVs</a>, manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada in London, Ont., to Saudi Arabia’s National Guard. Trudeau’s Liberals <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-lav-deal-1.4585035">formally approved LAV exports soon after coming to power in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Harper <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-stephen-harper-says-he-remains-proud-of-15-billion-arms-deal-with/">recently defended the LAV deal</a>, saying he was “proud this constructive relationship [with Saudi Arabia] helped secure jobs for Canadians through the largest export manufacturing contract in Canada’s history.” </p>
<p>Under pressure from critics, the Liberals <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2020/04/canada-improves-terms-of-light-armored-vehicles-contract-putting-in-place-a-new-robust-permits-review-process.html">have defended LAV exports on similar terms</a>, claiming that cancelling the contract would “put the jobs of thousands of Canadians at risk, not only in southwestern Ontario but also across the entire defence industry supply chain, which includes hundreds of small and medium enterprises.” </p>
<p>Worth an estimated $14 billion, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-khashoggi-canada-arms-idUSKCN1N65FV">contract supports an estimated 3,000 jobs in London</a>. In a city hard hit by <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/the-province-is-partly-to-blame-for-kelloggs-plant-closure-in-london-ont/">plant closures</a>, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/732414876/for-saudi-military-vehicle-deal-canada-weighs-jobs-and-human-rights">the jobs argument has gained traction</a>.</p>
<h2>Canada complicit in human rights violations</h2>
<p>Yet Canadian complicity in Saudi <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7762919/">violations of human rights and international humanitarian law</a> have become too difficult for many to ignore. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/saudi-arabia">dismal human rights record</a>, both at home and abroad. Domestically, Saudi authorities repress dissidents, women’s rights activists and independent clerics. Internationally, Saudi Arabia has since 2015 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">led a coalition in a military intervention in Yemen</a>, where it seeks to prop up the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, engaged in armed conflict with Houthi rebel forces.</p>
<p>Since the Saudi-led coalition began its intervention, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1079232">it has been widely condemned for serious and repeated violations of international humanitarian law</a>, including the deliberate targeting of civilians.</p>
<p>Saudi airstrikes have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/yemen#">indiscriminate and disproportionate</a>, killing thousands of civilians while destroying critical infrastructure, including water facilities and hospitals. In 2018, <a href="https://www.savethechildren.org/us/charity-stories/yemen-saudi-led-coalition-school-bus-attack-on-children-follow-up">a coalition airstrike on a school bus killed 40 Yemeni children, injuring dozens more</a>. </p>
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<img alt="A young boy in a striped T-shirt with a bandage on his head and wrists and wounds on his face stares at the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432530/original/file-20211117-15-1ajx2j4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A child injured in a deadly Saudi-led coalition airstrike rests in a hospital in Saada, Yemen, in August 2018. The United Nations called for an investigation into the airstrike in the country’s north that hit a school bus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Hani Mohammed)</span></span>
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<p>To its shame, Canada has twice been named by the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-urged-to-stop-fuelling-war-in-yemen-with-saudi-arms-sales-un/">United Nations Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen as one of several world powers helping to perpetuate the conflict by continuing to supply weapons to Saudi Arabia</a>. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.oxfam.ca/story/open-letter-to-justin-trudeau-on-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/">September 2020 letter to Trudeau</a>, 40 civil society organizations raised concerns about the ethical, legal, human rights and humanitarian implications of Canada’s arms exports to Saudi, calling for their immediate suspension. </p>
<h2>Protesting the arms sales</h2>
<p>Peace activists have <a href="https://cupe.on.ca/event/stop-arming-saudi-day-of-action-for-peace/">protested the LAV deal outside General Dynamics in London and other cities across Canada</a> and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-protestors-urge-canada-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-amid-ongoing/">have attempted to blockade a shipping company said to be transporting LAVs to port</a>, <a href="https://london.ctvnews.ca/red-tank-tracks-painted-at-london-ont-mp-offices-and-home-of-general-dynamics-president-1.5539983">among other actions</a>. </p>
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<p>But still, defenders of the deal ask: what about the jobs? </p>
<p>Recognizing that ending arms exports to Saudi Arabia could affect workers in Canada’s defence sector, the civil society organizations, including Oxfam Canada and Amnesty International Canada, used the open letter to call on the Trudeau government “to work with trade unions representing workers in the arms industry to develop a plan that secures the livelihoods of those who would be impacted by the suspension of arms exports to Saudi Arabia.” </p>
<p>For its part, the federal NDP has said that <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/military-vehicles-london-saudi-arabia-1.5901646">jobs at General Dynamics can be secured with local Canadian contracts, arguing that the Canadian Forces need similar vehicles</a>.</p>
<p>In opposing arms exports to Saudi, the <a href="https://twitter.com/canadianlabour/status/1271104394902343680">Canadian Labour Congress</a>, the largest labour group in the country, has called for “public investment in a rapid transition to peaceful green jobs that protects workers and their communities — and the rest of the planet.” </p>
<h2>‘Principled approach’</h2>
<p>The highly skilled workforce at General Dynamics could build, for instance, the high speed rail infrastructure that will be an important part of Canada’s response to the climate crisis. </p>
<p>The government should not ignore such arguments from defenders of good jobs.</p>
<p>During the election campaign, the <a href="https://liberal.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/292/2021/09/Platform-Forward-For-Everyone.pdf">Liberals pledged </a> a principled approach to foreign policy that places the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law at its centre, while promising to create good jobs and “grow the middle class.” </p>
<p>A progressive government can and should do both. It’s long past time for the Liberals to stop pitting good jobs at home against human rights abroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171792/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Black is affiliated with Labour Against the Arms Trade. </span></em></p>A progressive government can and should take a principled approach to foreign policy. That means Canada’s Liberals must stop pitting good jobs at home against human rights abroad.Simon Black, Associate Professor of Labour Studies, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1718482021-11-15T15:22:43Z2021-11-15T15:22:43ZDeaths from landmines are on the rise – and clearing them all will take decades<p>Nearly quarter of a century after most of the world <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/anti-personnel-landmines-convention/">signed a convention outlawing</a> the use of antipersonnel landmines, the number of people being killed or maimed by these insidious and lethal weapons remains high – and rising. The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/landmine-monitor-2021.aspx">Landmine Monitor for 2021</a>, released on November 10, reported 7,073 casualties in 2020, including 2,492 people killed and 4,561 wounded. </p>
<p>This is a significant increase on the 5,554 people killed and wounded in 2019. Syria was the worst affected country, reporting 2,729 casualties. The report says that the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by insurgents, many of which were deliberately aimed against the civilian population. Other countries with more than 100 recorded casualties in 2020 were Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen, </p>
<p>One of the worst things about this is that many of these people will have died or been maimed by a mine that was laid years, perhaps even decades, previously, but which have not yet been detected and neutralised.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspa.2019.0791">research at the University of Sheffield</a> has, for the past decade, been looking at quantifying how the soil around landmines changes how deadly they are. According to the Landmine Monitor report, about 5,000 square kilometers are known to need clearing of mines. By my calculation, at the current rate of clearance this will take about 34 years and cost around £14 billion.</p>
<h2>Indiscriminate war crimes</h2>
<p>Historically, military forces deployed anti-personnel mines (those designed to explode in the presence, proximity or contact of a person) to create defensive barriers or to deny access to specific regions or facilities. Military use requires regions to be marked as minefields – not marking out mine-infested regions is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.40_CCW%20P-II%20as%20amended.pdf">regarded as a war crime</a> under the Geneva Convention. Once conflicts are over, these mines are left behind, which has a devastating effect on the local population for decades to come.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/two-decades-after-they-were-banned-its-time-to-make-landmines-war-crimes-88054">Two decades after they were banned, it's time to make landmines war crimes</a>
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<p>Landmines are indiscriminate in their destructive power, being triggered by soldiers and children alike (more than half the casualties in the 2021 report were children). This, combined with the fact that they can lie unexploded for decades before then killing or maiming innocent people, led to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known informally as the <a href="https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text_status/Ottawa_Convention_English.pdf">Ottawa Convention</a>. </p>
<p>While 164 states have signed up to the treaty – including the UK – many of the world’s major military powers still have not, notably Russia, China, and, thanks to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-51332541">Trump administration’s U-turn</a>, the USA. Other non-signatories include many of those countries with active mine fields, including Syria, Egypt and Myanmar.</p>
<p>The difficulties in rehabilitating mined areas are not to be underestimated, taking both time and money to complete – which is why many mine-strewn areas take such a long time to clear. A common misconception is that if the production of anti-personnel mines ceased and stockpiles destroyed that the problem would start to diminish. </p>
<h2>IEDs – the next generation</h2>
<p>Sadly, in areas such as Afghanistan, where the highest number of casualties <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/landmine-monitor-2021/major-findings.aspx">have been recorded</a> over the past 20 years, the threat is not from standard landmines but from homemade buried IEDs. Unmarked, with a range of different triggering techniques from pressure plates to triggers placed under innocuous objects such as rocks, it is easy to see why children are disproportionately injured and killed due to their inquisitive nature. </p>
<p>Improvised mines are used by anti-government elements as a <a href="https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June21/statements/7-afghanistan.pdf">“weapon of choice”</a>. The flexibility in deployment and triggering mechanisms of these improvised mines make the clearance of areas even more dangerous, especially in areas that are still in a state of political unrest – where the demining personnel can themselves become the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57410265">target of attacks</a>.</p>
<p>One often-overlooked aspect is the lasting effect on local communities. In areas such as Syria, occupying forces in retreat actively target both the local facilities and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-sinai-booby-traps-homes-islamic-state">homes of those</a> displaced. This has the effect of prolonging the trauma of the conflict for populations returning after the supposed end of a conflict. </p>
<p>The type of homemade device is also always evolving, making it more difficult – and dangerous – to train demining staff. While mines were once used purely as a military tactic to deny hostile military forces access to a strategically important area, now they are often used to impose the values of retreating forces. Islamic State is one terrorist group that uses mines to target community education facilities like <a href="https://icct.nl/publication/the-threat-of-the-islamic-states-extensive-use-of-improvised-explosives/">schools and swimming pools</a>, adding to the oppression of local people.</p>
<h2>Making a difference</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.undp.org/blog/how-landmines-hinder-development">United Nations Development Programme</a> with the help of charities such as the <a href="https://www.halotrust.org/">Halo Trust</a> work with local volunteers to clear these areas once the occupying forces have left. It’s a process which requires specialist equipment, training and time. A key part of the process is learning to live around active minefields. </p>
<p>Governments and charities <a href="https://www.halotrust.org/what-we-do/our-work/teaching-people-to-stay-safe/">provide training</a> to local children on how to keep themselves safe while the minefields are awaiting clearance. This can greatly reduce the casualties in post-conflict areas.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/landmine-monitor-2021/major-findings.aspx">Landmine Monitor report</a> doesn’t just focus on minefields and casualties, but also on the work of charities and governments in clearing afflicted areas. In 2020, 146km² of land was cleared of mines, with more than 135,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed. That’s potentially 135,000 lives protected. </p>
<p>So while the timescales involved seem long, the impact for those living and working in mined areas cannot be underestimated. Hopefully, we will be able to see a mine-free world within our lifetimes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Clarke receives funding from Dstl and EPSRC.</span></em></p>The number of casualties from landmines remains high, with the most people killed and wounded in Syria.Sam Clarke, Senior Lecturer in Geotechnical Engineering, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1708362021-11-01T14:12:37Z2021-11-01T14:12:37ZThe three key mistakes UN must avoid in search for peace in Ethiopia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429322/original/file-20211029-19-1aubfhl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">United Nations Security Council.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/JOHN MINCHILLO / POOL</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are growing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/15/un-security-council-needs-act-ethiopias-tigray-region">demands</a> for the UN Security Council to act on the war in Tigray. The Security Council has held 11 sessions <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_diplomats-un-security-council-meet-thursday-ethiopias-tigray/6202788.html">on the war that started</a> in Tigray a year ago. But each session ended without even a single official statement. Russia and China —- shielding themselves behind the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/02/un-security-council-end-inaction-ethiopia">position</a> of the three African members of the Council Kenya, Niger and Tunisia —- defined the Tigray problem as an Ethiopian internal problem. </p>
<p>There is no place in the world where the global asymmetry of power plays out as vividly as in the Security Council. Whether or not the rest of the members of the Security Council agree, there can be no resolution if any one of the permanent five members objects to it. This has so far left the Security Council in the default position of leaving the matter to the government of Ethiopia.</p>
<p>The balance of power in the conflict has <a href="https://epc.ae/whatif-details/98/ethiopia-new-conflict-balances">changed in favour</a> of the Tigray Defence Forces. This new development might create a renewed appetite for the council to adopt a resolution. In such a case the council should learn from previous mistakes and particularly from its <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm">resolution 2216</a> on Yemen and its consequences. The resolution was taken in 2015.</p>
<p>A Security Council resolution can be an instrument for peace – but it can also be an obstacle to it.</p>
<h2>UN resolution 2216</h2>
<p>By the time the Security Council convened and adopted Resolution 2216 and recognised the regime of Abd Rabbu Mensour Hadi – who had been appointed on interim basis – as the only legitimate entity to rule and demanded the Houthis to disarm and withdraw to their pre-2014 positions, the civil war in Yemen <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/21/yemen-war-5-years-since-the-houthis-sanaa-takeover">had escalated</a>. Despite the good intention of the decision, some articles of the resolution ended up being a millstone around the UN’s neck. </p>
<p>The three key mistakes of the resolution are: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>its complete and unconditional legitimisation of the interim government of Mansour Hadi</p></li>
<li><p>its call for the complete and unconditional disarmament of the Houthis</p></li>
<li><p>its demand for the withdrawal of the Houthi forces to their pre-2014 positions.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Simply put, a resolution the UN Security Council adopted to address the Yemeni crisis ended up constraining its efforts to bring peace to Yemen. </p>
<p>There are some parallels with the situation in Tigray. These include the contested nature of the legitimacy of the central government; a regional force being the lead belligerent to the central government; and the shift of power balance towards the regional force.</p>
<h2>Avoiding the same mistakes</h2>
<p>The original cause of the war in Tigray is rooted <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html">in the Federal Government</a> replacing the Federal Constitution with a unitary regime run from the centre. </p>
<p>One year on the war in Tigray is now at its climax with reports that the Tigray Defence Force has taken <a href="https://epc.ae/whatif-details/98/ethiopia-new-conflict-balances">back lost ground</a>, and that it’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/30/ethiopia-tigrayan-forces-seize-strategic-town-in-amhara-region">expanded into</a> the Amhara. </p>
<p>Whatever happens next, the Tigray Defence Force has shown that a complete military triumph for federal forces is out of the question. </p>
<p>Ethiopia therefore stands on the brink of <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10/17/ethiopia-dayton-peace-process-516117">escalating civil war and state failure</a>. This is the moment to prepare for concerted international action to prevent further drift and complete collapse for this nation of more than <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ET">114 million people</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-unions-mediation-effort-in-tigray-is-a-non-starter-169293">Why the African Union's mediation effort in Tigray is a non-starter</a>
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<p>The Security Council must take care not to make Yemen-like mistakes in its deliberations and decisions. Three key issues need to be handled with care: legitimisation of the parties involved; redeployment of forces; and disarmament and arms control. </p>
<p><strong>Legitimisation:</strong> By definition, in a civil war, each party is contesting the legitimacy of the other. The Security Council naturally inclines towards respecting the authority of the government of the day, but it is unwise to award that government unconditional legitimacy. What’s needed is an all-inclusive national dialogue for charting the future of a peaceful and prosperous Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government is not competent to organise and lead such an experiment. The design, organisation and leadership for such a forum should be part of the negotiation for political settlement.</p>
<p><strong>Redeployment of forces:</strong> The <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-resolution/97/text">US government</a> and the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2021-0486_EN.html">European Union</a> have demanded a cessation of hostilities and the redeployment of forces to their pre-November 2020 positions. So has the African Union. </p>
<p>The problem with such a proposition is its attempt to implicitly or explicitly link the provision of humanitarian assistance to Tigray with a ceasefire. But the obligation on the belligerent parties to respect international humanitarian law should not be conditional on a ceasefire.</p>
<p><strong>Disarmament and arms control:</strong> The war thus far has ended up creating two conventional armies. The Tigray Defence Forces has captured large amounts of arms in the course of the war. These include includes tanks, howitzers, and armoured vehicles but also missile systems. It did not exist prior to this war: it was created in response to it. </p>
<p>This army is now fighting for the full realisation of the right of the people of Tigray for self-determination. This includes secession. It is therefore impossible to talk about disarmament at this time. All that can be on the table is arms control and management.</p>
<h2>Political settlement</h2>
<p>To secure peace, the Security Council could keep in its sites a three-phased peace process that, in my view, has the potential to secure a political settlement. </p>
<p>Phase one could include the immediate suspension of hostilities for the limited purpose of unimpeded humanitarian access; restoration of essential services; and withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Amhara militia from Tigray. </p>
<p>Along with these there would need to be an end to hostile propaganda and incitement of violence. </p>
<p>Finally, the release of political prisoners as an essential pre-condition for negotiations. </p>
<p>Phase two would entail direct negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire done directly between the federal government and the regional administration of Tigray. The parties would negotiate key principles, key actions, time lines and so on, for a complete political settlement. </p>
<p>This would lead to phase three, in which an all-inclusive national political dialogue would begin. This would hopefully end in a complete and national level political settlement.</p>
<p>By following this route the Security Council would ensure that it didn’t repeat the mistakes in made in Yemen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulugeta G Berhe (PhD) is affiliated with the Tigrayan Defense Forces. </span></em></p>The UN Security Council resolution adopted to address the Yemeni crisis ended up constraining its efforts to bring peace.Mulugeta G Berhe, Senior Fellow, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1550582021-02-11T19:57:14Z2021-02-11T19:57:14ZArab Spring: when the US needed to step up, it stood back – now, all eyes are on Biden<p>The tenth <a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-ten-years-on-the-middle-east-is-still-impoverished-divided-and-angry-154314">anniversary of the Arab Spring</a> has been an opportunity for some to declare the protests a failure – not least in the face of ongoing conflict in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Looking back on those turbulent events, it’s become fairly common for analysts <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egypt-us-policy/409537/">to blame</a> shortcomings in American foreign policy for this failure and the unrest still seething in many parts of the Arab world. </p>
<p>It would be wrong to hold America responsible for all of this. Yet we also cannot ignore the consequences of decades of US involvement in the Middle East. Nor can we overlook the way the US has effectively <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/">pulled back</a> over the past decade in particular – refusing to get fully involved in a political crisis that it helped start.</p>
<h2>Obama’s legacy</h2>
<p>The Arab Spring’s failure connects back to Barack Obama’s lack of action ten years ago. After the former president’s famous <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html">Cairo speech</a> in 2009, in which he talked about a “new beginning” for US foreign policy in the region, many expected that he would help install democracy once the protests started. But this was not the case.</p>
<p>Blindsided and unprepared for the uprisings – and also fearful of getting bogged down in the Middle East the way the previous administration had after the War on Terror and the 2003 invasion of Iraq – Obama was cautious of anything that looked like a US project to promote democracy. Perhaps overly so. He thought he could simply let autocratic rulers – such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria – fall, and democracy would take care of itself. </p>
<p>Obama was wrong. Assad fought back, setting his military on the protesters. Syria descended into civil conflict as he <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/29/obama-never-understood-how-history-works/">reasserted his position</a>.</p>
<p>When America did get involved, its efforts were severely limited. Obama went into Libya with Nato under the guise of humanitarian intervention, but was accused of exceeding his mandate and quickly left the situation to France and Britain to clean up. Obama would later call failure to plan for the aftermath of the Gaddafi regime the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/12/barack-obama-says-libya-was-worst-mistake-of-his-presidency">worst mistake</a>” of his presidency.</p>
<p>In Yemen, US action was less overt. While Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced to resign in response to the uprising, Obama allowed both Saleh and forces loyal to him to continue to exert influence in the country, further fuelling the civil unpheaval. Saudi Arabia then intervened in 2015 to protect its interests against the rebellion and its Iranian backers.</p>
<p>Donald Trump proved no better. With no commitment to democracy in the region, Trump looked on as the autocrats continued to reassert power – and actually backed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39478096">Egypt’s crackdown on dissent</a> as well as shoring up Saudi action in Yemen through arms sales and vetoing a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/trump-veto-yemen.html">Congressional bill to end US support</a> for the conflict. He also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/trumps-turkey-deal-hands-power-to-ankara-and-leaves-syrian-kurds-for-dead">effectively abandoned</a> Syria’s Kurds by refusing to use American troops to help protect them against Turkey.</p>
<h2>Whose fault?</h2>
<p>It would be easy to say that the US should not have intervened in the Arab Spring, or that this was not Washington’s fight. The problem with these arguments is that the US was already involved – not least in terms of bolstering the very regimes the uprising sought to bring down. While Obama tried to portray the protests as none of America’s business, the US was instrumental in the history of why they happened.</p>
<p>But when the US did intervene, it did so only out of self-interest. This meant policies concerned with regional stability and not democracy. The US did not focus foreign policy on the core issues of the uprisings and by this neglect, effectively undermined protesters. As a nation supposedly committed to democracy as the cornerstone of its own identity, the apparent hypocrisy of this pullback reduced America’s credibility.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-after-a-decade-of-conflict-the-same-old-problems-remain-154314">Arab Spring: after a decade of conflict, the same old problems remain</a>
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<p>Intervention was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-administrations-half-hearted-push-for-mideast-democracy/2012/02/03/gIQAPa1znQ_story.html">half-hearted</a>, as seen in Libya – hardly surprising then that this has not been effective. A partial response is sometimes worse than none at all.</p>
<p>The US has also lacked a clear foreign policy that could have supported the region better. That Washington did not see the uprisings coming says more about a wider failure to understand the Middle East than anything else. Successive administrations have repeatedly and naively gone along with policies of simply sustaining their interests in the area – to the extent that they were unprepared for a crisis or how to deal with it. As such, the US was never in a position to give real support to the region.</p>
<p>All this creates an interesting position for the new US president. Joe Biden <a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-first-foreign-policy-speech-an-expert-explains-what-it-means-for-the-world-154757">recently announced</a> an ostensibly strong vision for future foreign policy. This plan includes a commitment to the Middle East – specifically, Biden said he would deal with Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Yemen.</p>
<p>But for someone who was vice president when Obama stood by on the Arab Spring, it remains to be seen whether Biden will take a more proactive line. Biden is clearly assertive in his words and his commitment to democracy, but would he actually take a stronger line? Or is the Arab Spring now just a page in the history books?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Bentley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A decade ago, the lack of a clear policy by the Obama administration let the region down. But might US have another opportunity in the Middle East?Michelle Bentley, Reader in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1543142021-02-10T13:34:25Z2021-02-10T13:34:25ZArab Spring: after a decade of conflict, the same old problems remain<p>As the popular refrain of “<em>ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam</em>” rang out across the Middle East in the early months of 2011, the nature of political life and relations between rulers and ruled began to fragment. The chant – which roughly translates as “the people want the fall of the regime” – became the slogan of the Arab uprisings, a wave of protests in states across the region. </p>
<p>The uprisings highlighted the fractious nature of political life and relations between the people and their governments, resulting in the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-27/arab-spring-showed-autocracy-is-anything-but-stable">toppling of authoritarian rulers</a> in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. </p>
<p>But these were limited victories – and protesters elsewhere were not as successful. Over the course of the following ten years, close to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/29/the-guardian-view-on-the-arab-spring-a-decade-on-a-haunting-legacy">1 million people have been killed</a> and more than 10 million displaced from their homes. The protests revealed a profound political crisis that continues to resonate across the region. And in most cases, the issues that provoked the protests – economic inertia, a lack of political accountability, rampant corruption and a growing gap between rich and poor – continue today. </p>
<h2>It begins</h2>
<p>Triggered by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/16/he-ruined-us-10-years-on-tunisians-curse-man-who-sparked-arab-spring">self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi</a>, a Tunisian street vendor, the protest movements emerged from longstanding frustration at the economic conditions facing many across the region, fuelled by endemic corruption. With a burgeoning youth population facing serious obstacles to employment, the opulent wealth of those in power and unwillingness to offer even token reforms meant that latent frustrations erupted in protests from Tunis to Muscat. </p>
<p>The responses of regimes varied across the region, ranging from <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/oman-ten-years-after-the-arab-spring-the-evolution-of-state-society-relations/">token reforms in Oman</a>, which involved the removal of unpopular ministers, and economic incentives designed to engender support in the other Gulf states, to more draconian strategies deployed elsewhere. This included the use of emergency powers, detention, torture, the closing down of space for political engagement, citizenship revocation and death. In Syria, Libya and Yemen, the violent repression that followed protests culminated in the onset of devastating conflict that continues today.</p>
<p>Developments in Tunisia and Egypt initially offered hope to many following the toppling of the authoritarian regimes of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zine-al-Abidine-Ben-Ali">Ben Ali</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51630142">Hosni Mubarak</a>. But in Egypt, the coup d’etat that toppled Mubarak’s successor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/mohamed-morsi-death-of-egypts-former-president-shows-deep-state-was-always-going-to-triumph-119031">Mohamed Morsi</a> – the country’s first democratically elected president – reflected broader regional trends of regimes using mechanisms of control to prevent the emergence of protest movements, seemingly crushing the dreams of protesters in the process. </p>
<h2>Divide and rule</h2>
<p>One of the most common strategies was the manipulation of sectarian strife, which saw regimes capitalise on social divisions for their own ends – a form of “divide and conquer”. The repercussions of such processes were devastating. The increased divisions within – and between – states may have arisen from sectarian differences but were manipulated by political self-interest by elites seeking to secure their position in the face of a range of serious challenges. </p>
<p>In Syria, members of violent Sunni Islamist groups who were in jail <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war">were released</a> by Bashar al-Assad in an attempt to frame the struggle against the Arab Spring protesters as a fight against Islamic extremism. Similarly, in Bahrain, the government sought to frame protesters as “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12753727">fifth columnists</a>”, doing the bidding of Iran – albeit with very little evidence to support such claims. </p>
<p>In pursuit of this, key regime officials <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mei/mei/2019/00000073/00000001/art00003;jsessionid=al44536h19ffu.x-ic-live-02">spoke of</a> nefarious Iranian involvement supporting protesters by providing arms and training. After Bahrain’s protest movement was defeated, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/king-of-bahrain-says-subversive-external-plot-has-been-foiled-1.600506">King Hamad declared</a> that an “external plot” had been foiled, with a clear nod to Iran. </p>
<p>In the years that followed, acts of protest became more isolated as regimes cracked down on oppositions. In Bahrain this involved the revocation of citizenship from <a href="https://salam-dhr.org/?p=3967">990 Bahraini nationals</a> while elsewhere – in other Gulf states and Egypt – it resulted in increasingly draconian terrorism laws designed to prevent both violent extremism and challenges to regime power. In the years after the protests, the spectre of war in Syria loomed large – an example regularly used by those in power across the Gulf to <a href="https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526126474/9781526126474.00013.xml">caution against demands for democracy</a>. </p>
<p>The years after the uprisings were largely shaped by this broader struggle for survival and efforts to reassert sovereign power in the face of shifting national and international pressures. At the same time, many of the structural factors that had caused the protests of 2011 remained unresolved. </p>
<p>This unwillingness to address underlying social, economic and political factors is hardly surprising. It reflects decades in which such grievances have remained unresolved, prompting often violent confrontations between rulers and ruled over the nature of the state and its resources. </p>
<h2>Crisis and collapse</h2>
<p>Moments of unrest punctured the region across the 20th century – leaving aside interstate conflict – predominantly emerging from the ability of rulers to address underlying grievances around social, economic and political issues. Processes of <em><a href="https://www.fekr-magazine.com/articles/what-is-neoliberalism-and-infitah">infitah</a></em> (economic liberalisation) took place as part of a broader global move towards neoliberal agendas during the 1980s. </p>
<p>But across the Arab world rising birth rates, institutional weakness and bureaucratic ineptitude left a gloomy picture of unbalanced development and systematic exclusion. This was often exacerbated by regimes becoming extractors rather than distributors – leaders and their coteries taking out money from state resources for personal needs and desires – leading to widespread failures of governance. By 2004, a UN report titled Towards Freedom in the Arab World referred to the Arab “state” as a “<a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/arab-human-development-report-2004">black hole</a>”. </p>
<p>The economic crisis of 2008 had a dramatic impact on the Middle East. At the height of the crisis, Saudi Arabia lost a range of contracts <a href="https://gfintegrity.org/report/2011-global-report-illicit-financial-flows-from-the-developing-world-over-the-decade-ending-2009/">worth US$958 billion</a> (£693 billion) while the UAE lost US$354 billion in contracts. </p>
<p>Estimates of a further US$247.5 billion in capital flight from the Middle East only exacerbated these challenges. The impact on people was devastating. By 2011, the situation was dire: 41% of people across the Middle East were <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_2014_Arab_Opinion_Index_In_Brief.aspx">living in need</a>. </p>
<p>Underpinning this was the loss to economies across the region caused by the endemic corruption, which some estimates put at <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/arab-human-development-report-2016-youth-and-prospects-human-development-changing-reality">around US$1 trillion</a> in the five decades leading up to the Arab uprisings. </p>
<h2>Unhappy ending?</h2>
<p>It was hardly surprising that having faced neglect, repression and corruption over the course of the 20th century <a href="https://www.manchesteropenhive.com/view/9781526126474/9781526126474.00009.xml">people turned to groups</a> such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Fatah, Hezbollah and Hamas. Many of these groups, as well as political and sometimes paramilitary activities, engaged in huge social welfare programmes and accrued a great deal of popular support as a result. </p>
<p>Over the years that followed, structural grievances that had triggered the protests in 2011 once again rose to the surface. But this time they were played out across an increasingly divided region beset by sectarian schisms and geopolitical rivalries, frustration with political elites, and – most recently – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-middle-east-and-north-africa-and-covid-19-gearing-up-for-the-long-haul/">exacerbated by COVID-19</a>. </p>
<p>By 2015, 53% of the region’s population <a href="https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_2014_Arab_Opinion_Index_In_Brief.aspx">required financial support</a> from non-state actors. In Lebanon and Iraq, protesters <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/19/heres-what-protests-lebanon-iraq-are-really-about/">took to the streets in 2019</a> articulating their frustration at the status quo. It is hardly surprising that widespread anger has resulted in further instances of protest across the past decade, driven by anger at many of the same issues. Understanding the roots of the protest movement and their evolution are essential in gaining awareness of the region’s trajectory into a new decade and under a new US administration.</p>
<p>The root causes of the protests <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/arab-spring-10-year-anniversary-lost-decade/">remain unaddressed</a> – and the situation may have even deteriorated as economic crises are worsened by the pandemic. While turning towards authoritarianism has given regimes additional measures to regulate life, until these deeper political issues have been addressed, latent frustrations will result in intermittent acts of protest and broader processes of repression.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154314/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Simon Mabon is a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>The underlying issues of inequality, corruption and poverty are still dogging the region, ten years after the protests.Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1249612019-10-17T22:54:47Z2019-10-17T22:54:47ZTrading values to sell weapons: The Canada-Saudi relationship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296603/original/file-20191011-188787-h0y5d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C224%2C5389%2C3017&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this August 2018 photo, Yemeni people attend the funeral of victims of a Saudi Arabia-led airstrike in Saada, Yemen. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Hani Mohammed)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In August 2018, the relationship between Canada and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appeared to break down in a most public and modern way: over Twitter. </p>
<p>This began with mild criticism by Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland of some of the kingdom’s long-standing <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/saudi-arabia">human rights abuses</a>. The Saudi government responded by immediately <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-retaliation-canada-memo-1.5085832">suspending diplomatic relations with Canada and halting a number of trade, investment and education deals</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-major-trade-implications-of-the-canada-saudi-arabia-spat-101306">The major trade implications of the Canada-Saudi Arabia spat</a>
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<p>In the eyes of many, Canada appeared to be taking a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/08/saudi-arabia-canada-latest-egypt-russia">principled stand</a> that placed human rights ahead of monetary gain. This appeared befitting of Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who presents himself and his government as leaders in the fight against <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/11/30/busy-day-for-trudeau-at-paris-climate-change-talks.html">climate change</a>, international law, human rights, LGBTQ rights and women’s rights. This includes an <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/fiap_action_areas-paif_champs_action.aspx?lang=eng">explicit feminist foreign policy agenda</a>. </p>
<h2>The polar opposite?</h2>
<p>Trudeau’s Canada also appeared the polar opposite of a conservative kingdom infamous for <a href="https://www.theweek.co.uk/60339/things-women-cant-do-in-saudi-arabia">denying women basic rights</a>, such as the right to drive or travel without a male guardian’s consent. The infamy includes frequent use of the death penalty. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabias-human-rights-abuses-10-examples-a6794576.html">Public beheadings</a> and crucifixions are regularly meted out in cases of public protest, homosexuality <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/saudi-arabias-war-on-witchcraft/278701/">and sorcery</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296467/original/file-20191010-188807-11jgl3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Deera Square in Riyadh is also known colloquially as ‘Chop Chop Square’ for the executions by beheading that take place there.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">WikiMedia Commons, Photographer: Luke Richard Thompson, 2011</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Canada-Saudi rift appeared <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/trudeau-says-canada-wants-saudi-answer-on-its-role-in-khashoggi-killing-1.4178098">to deepen</a> after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/12/how-jamal-khashoggi-disappeared-visual-guide">the October 2018 abduction and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul</a>. Khashoggi was a Saudi dissident living in exile in Washington, D.C., where he worked as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/jamal-khashoggi/">a journalist for the <em>Washington Post</em></a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296594/original/file-20191011-188787-hlnnfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The murder of Khashoggi further strained the Canada-Saudi Arabia relationship.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/AP/Hasan Jamali</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Khashoggi had been due to visit Canada that autumn. In Canada, he was collaborating with another Saudi in exile, <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2018/10/how-a-canadian-permanent-resident-and-saudi-arabian-dissident-was-targeted-with-powerful-spyware-on-canadian-soil/">Omar Abdulaziz</a>. They were <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/khashoggi-israel-lawsuit-omar-abdulaziz-saudi-arabia-1.4929952">working on a project</a> meant to challenge and <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/khashoggi-israel-lawsuit-omar-abdulaziz-saudi-arabia-1.4929952">rein in pro-Saudi monarchy internet trolls</a>. </p>
<p>This was part of a broader effort by Saudi liberal reformers to open up the kingdom to change, starting with avenues for freedom of speech. That was in fact the point of contention behind the August 2018 rift. Freeland’s tweet had been on behalf of imprisoned Saudi human rights blogger, Raif Badawi, and his liberal-reformist sister, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/saudi-women-rights-activist-samar-badawi-appears-court-190627074012916.html">Samar Badawi</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1025030172624515072"}"></div></p>
<p>Less publicly, Canada has supported independent investigations into <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2019/09/26/un-yemen-war-crimes-investigation-extended/">war crimes allegations against Saudi Arabia in Yemen</a>. Canada also joined several EU states to applaud recent Saudi reforms <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/geneva-saudi-statement-1.5294025">while condemning ongoing human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>Yet these actions are outweighed by Canada’s troublesome support for Saudi Arabia’s role in the Yemeni civil war. </p>
<h2>Tory support</h2>
<p>It started in March 2015, immediately after the entry of a Saudi-led coalition into the civil war. Rob Nicholson, the Conservative foreign affairs minister at the time, <a href="https://twitter.com/HonRobNicholson/status/599295989879541760?s=20">publicly lauded Saudi Arabia for its actions</a>: </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"599295989879541760"}"></div></p>
<p>Ottawa backed up those comments with <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/the-saudi-arms-deal-what-weve-learned-so-far/article28180299/">large-scale arms exports</a> to help Saudi Arabia wage war.</p>
<p>The Trudeau government is well aware of the purpose of these sales. After the Liberals came to power in late 2015, approval was given to export light armoured vehicles (LAVs), manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems Canada (GDLS), to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=545&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=685&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=685&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296587/original/file-20191011-188840-1fx7asm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=685&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The GDLS LAV II.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">General Dynamics Land Systems Canada</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/documents/Memorandum_for_Action-eng.pdf">now-declassified memo</a> states, the reasoning was that they would be useful for Saudi Arabia’s efforts at “<em>countering instability</em>” in Yemen. </p>
<p>Most would agree the Saudi-led coalition’s impact on the war in Yemen has been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPa6HUxy11w">anything but stablizing</a>. </p>
<p>A recent report for the United Nations by the organization Group of Experts on Yemen <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_42_17.pdf">stated that</a> “ … the continued supply of weapons to parties involved in the conflict in Yemen perpetuates the conflict and the suffering of the population.”</p>
<p>This includes the loss of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/20/human-cost-of-yemen-war-laid-bare-as-civilian-death-toll-put-at-100000">100,000 lives</a> <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035501">and millions of starving people</a>. </p>
<h2>Trouble finding weapons to buy</h2>
<p>As a result, Saudi Arabia is now having difficulties purchasing weapons for war. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-arms-export-freeze-on-saudi-arabia-extended/a-50481984">Germany</a> announced the cancellation of arms deals to Saudi Arabia following the Khashoggi murder. British courts have ruled that arms exports to Saudi Arabia were unlawful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/20/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-for-use-in-yemen-declared-unlawful">in light of</a> Yemen. Other countries like <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-norway-emirates/norway-suspends-arms-sales-to-uae-over-yemen-war-idUSKBN1ES0HG">Norway</a> and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/denmark-suspends-arms-exports-uae-over-yemen-war-report">Denmark</a> have even suspended arms transfers to Saudi’s coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), over Yemen. </p>
<p>Most recently, Belgian authorities cancelled weapons shipments to Saudi Arabia, though it is unclear if the ban includes <a href="https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_le-conseil-d-etat-annule-les-licences-d-exportations-d-armes-wallonnes-en-arabie-saoudite?id=10246413">turrets bound for Canada</a> to be installed on Saudi-bound GDLS LAVs. </p>
<p>Despite these efforts and those by the United States Congress <a href="https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_le-conseil-d-etat-annule-les-licences-d-exportations-d-armes-wallonnes-en-arabie-saoudite?id=10246413">to block</a> arms sales over the human rights situation in Yemen, Canada has not followed suit. While the Trudeau government announced “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/canadians-seek-cancellation-major-arms-deal-saudi-arabia-190809191316431.html">a review</a>” of arms deals with Saudi Arabia in October 2018, it allowed this to drag on while permitting weapons shipments on an undisclosed number of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-saudi-arms-deal-1.4579772">existing permits</a>. </p>
<p>This includes <a href="https://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cimt-cicm/topNCommodity-marchandise?lang=eng&getSectionId()=0&dataTransformation=0&scaleValue=0&scaleQuantity=0&refYr=2019&refMonth=8&freq=9&countryId=369&getUsaState()=0&provId=1&retrieve=Retrieve&country=null&tradeType=1&topNDefault=10&monthStr=null&chapterId=87&arrayId=9800087&sectionLabel=XVII%20-%20Vehicles,%20aircraft,%20vessels%20and%20associated%20transport%20equipment">at least CDN$1.34 billion worth of exports since Khashoggi’s murder</a>.</p>
<h2>Ongoing Canadian involvement</h2>
<p>Though the Trudeau government announced it would not authorize <a href="https://globalnews.ca/video/5862537/freeland-says-no-deals-with-saudi-arabia-have-been-done-since-death-of-journalist-jamal-khashoggi">new export permits</a> during the review, this may be little more than a symbolic gesture. A resolute Saudi government had <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-retaliation-canada-memo-1.5085832">already announced</a> its own ban on any new deals with Canadian companies. </p>
<p>While none of the newly produced LAVs have yet been spotted in Yemen, older-model Canadian-made LAVs and <a href="https://twitter.com/Silah_Report/status/973996196976119808">sniper rifles</a> are <a href="https://lostarmour.info/yemen/">regularly seen</a> in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NZhv-IlPNEE">battle footage uploaded by Saudi and Yemeni forces</a>. The Yemen war has also been flooded with armoured vehicles made by other Canadian companies, like <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/documents/memorandum-memo.pdf">the UAE-based Streit Group, Terradyne Armored</a> and <a href="https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2019/10/07/ottawa-reviews-footage-of-destroyed-canadian-made-saudi-armoured-vehicles/">IAG</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/NZhv-IlPNEE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pratt--whitney-celebrates-the-inauguration-of-a-new-middle-east-propulsion-company-facility-159993065.html">Canadian-made engines</a> <a href="https://www.journaldemontreal.com/2019/01/12/fabriques-ici-pour-tuer">power</a> the Saudi-led coalition’s airplanes, <a href="https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-11-08/iomax-production-archangel-ready-uae-forces">attack aircraft</a> and <a href="https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/saudi-arabia-ah-64d-apache-uh-60m-blackhawk-ah-6i-light-attack-and-md-530f-light">helicopters</a>. <a href="https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/11/30/news/experts-say-theres-proof-canadian-made-weapons-are-being-used-saudi-war-yemen">Canadian-made targeting systems</a> are <a href="https://www.wescam.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/WESCAM_TAQNIA-for-IDEX-2017_FINALFeb19_2017_rev.pdf">installed on these same aircraft</a>. Canada has <a href="https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/639073928091189248">supplied drones</a> to Saudi Arabia and <a href="https://www.journaldemontreal.com/2019/01/18/lametti-vantait-des-avions-destines-aux-forces-emiraties">surveillance aircraft</a> to <a href="https://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2009/business/0227n13.htm">the UAE</a>, while a <a href="https://gbp.com.sg/stories/uae-air-force-rq-1e-rpa-training-track/">Canadian company trains</a> UAE predator <a href="https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/simulation/2894-uae-predator-training-underway.html">drone pilots</a>.</p>
<p>There are also <a href="https://en.arij.net/report/the-end-user-how-did-western-weapons-end-up-in-the-hands-of-isis-and-aqap-in-yemen">unconfirmed reports that Canadian weapons may have been illegally diverted to Yemeni forces fighting alongside the coalition</a>. </p>
<p>Much of this “Canadian content” is the result of increasing government support for the Canadian defence industry’s attempt to gain a foothold in the lucrative Middle East <a href="https://defence.frontline.online/article/2019/2/11332-Canadian-companies-vie-for-global-attention">arms market</a>. This got underway with Stephen Harper’s <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-exporting-arms-to-countries-with-suspicious-human-rights-records/article15817569/">Conservative government</a>, but has been <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-advised-to-deepen-ties-with-saudi-arabia-brace-for-change-in-iran-1.3394669">maintained</a> <a href="https://defence.frontline.online/article/2019/1/11186-Representing-Canada-in-the-UAE">by Trudeau</a>. </p>
<h2>Business as usual</h2>
<p>Regardless of a few <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46873796">high-profile cases of Canada providing support for individual women and reformers in the kingdom</a>, it appears to be favouring perceived economic gains over human rights values. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1168533942313652230"}"></div></p>
<p>While Canada has been increasing its aid budget for Yemen, this means little compared to the destruction wrought by the weapons and training it sells — sales that power a conflict that has <a href="https://www.oxfam.ca/blog/canada-joins-the-arms-trade-treaty-while-still-selling-arms-to-saudi-arabia/">deepened gender inequality</a> while threatening a devastated Yemen with division into three parts. </p>
<p>Freeland recently said, however, that the kingdom remains “<a href="https://globalnews.ca/video/5862537/freeland-says-no-deals-with-saudi-arabia-have-been-done-since-death-of-journalist-jamal-khashoggi">an important partner for Canada</a>.”</p>
<p>Whether Trudeau or Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer form a government after the Oct. 21 election, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-arabia-g20-summit-trudeau-1.5205665">both appear</a> set to travel to Saudi Arabia in November 2020 for a G20 summit that will be used to rehabilitate the image of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, sullied by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/19/jamal-khashoggi-killing-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-evidence-un-report">his involvement in Khashoggi’s gruesome murder</a>. </p>
<p>During the current election campaign, only <a href="https://ricochet.media/en/2717/jagmeet-singh-stakes-out-clear-opposition-to-canada-saudi-arms-deal">the NDP</a> and <a href="https://www.greenparty.ca/sites/default/files/platform_2019_web_update_oct_6.pdf">Green Party of Canada</a> have committed to cancelling the LAV deal with Saudi Arabia. And only the New Democrats have suggested its government <a href="https://www.ndp.ca/news/ndp-statement-upcoming-g20-meeting-saudi-arabia">would not attend</a> the G20 summit in Riyadh.</p>
<p>Such a visit will otherwise offer the Canadian government the chance to make up with Saudi Arabia while telling the Canadian public that they pressed the kingdom on human rights, all while continuing with business as usual. </p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124961/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Wildeman is affiliated with the Rideau Institute and the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the University of Ottawa. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Fenton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A year after an infamous Twitter spat and the gruesome murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, the Canada-Saudi relationship appears poised to return to business as usual, if it hasn’t already.Jeremy Wildeman, Research Associate in International Development, University of BathAnthony Fenton, PhD Candidate (ABD), York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1199312019-07-07T09:03:33Z2019-07-07T09:03:33ZHow glow of the historic accord between Ethiopia and Eritrea has faded<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282851/original/file-20190705-51305-n6h8ph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) and Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki at the re-opening of the Eritrean embassy in Addis Ababa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Exactly a year ago Eritreans could hardly contain their joy as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/ethiopia-pm-abiy-ahmed-eritrea-landmark-visit-180708083000438.html">touched down in Asmara</a>. The city had seen nothing like it in a generation that knew war rather than peace. Men and women lined the streets and waved Ethiopian flags as Abiy arrived to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44764597">seal a peace deal</a>. </p>
<p>Less than a week later Eritrea’s president Isaias Afwerki made a reciprocal visit, landing in Addis Ababa to an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44824676">equally rapturous welcome</a>. In September a formal treaty was signed between the two leaders in the Saudi capital, Jeddah, witnessed by King Salman and the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who described it as an <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1372886/saudi-arabia">“historic event.”</a></p>
<p>The treaty <a href="http://shabait.com/news/local-news/27076-agreement-on-peace-friendship-and-comprehensive-cooperation-between-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-state-of-eritrea-">covered a number of things</a>. It ended the state of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; declaring a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation.</p>
<p>As part of this deal, there were two important provisions. One called for “the establishment of joint special economic zones. The other was a pledge to establish a high-level joint committee, as well as sub-committees where needed to guide and oversee the implementation of this agreement.</p>
<p>But there has been little apparent progress on either front. Economic co-operation was probably one of the key drivers of this reconciliation. These included plans to develop a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/eritrea-mulls-new-port-as-ethiopia-rapprochement-spurs-investors">massive potash mine that would straddle the border</a>. But little has been heard of the project in recent months.</p>
<p>Much the same can be said of the joint committees that were given the job of sorting out the many issues bedevilling relations between the two countries. </p>
<p>What’s become clear is that the warmth of a year ago has largely gone. With little progress on implementing and institutionalising the relations between the two countries an air of uncertainty and suspicion is <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/01/31/politicized-eritrea-peace-perpetuates-conflict-cycle/">creeping back</a>.</p>
<h2>Disputed border</h2>
<p>One of the sticking points between the two countries is the disputed border. The border was <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/eritrea-ethiopia-boundary-commission-decision-regarding-delimitation-border">formally designated</a> by the Boundary Commission established after the 1998–2000 border war. The conflict had many causes: rivalry between the liberation movements that had been operating in both countries and economic competition. But it was competing claims to the insignificant border town of Badme that was the spark that <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/why-eritrea-border-ethiopia-conflict-zone-469739">ignited the war.</a> </p>
<p>The two countries signed what became known as the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2000. The agreement made clear that the boundary commission could only make decisions based strictly on legal and historical grounds. This barred it from being able to allow for what might be considered just and fair – what’s known as <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/eritrea_ethiopia_12122000.pdf">ex aequo et bono</a>. </p>
<p>As a result, the border the Boundary Commission came up with resulted in settlements being dissected and villagers separated from their farmlands. And it left some people on both sides of the border concerned at being transferred from one state to the other. </p>
<p>Changes could only be made by both countries agreeing to any adjustments. This was one of the questions that the joint commissions agreed to in Jeddah was meant to resolve. Others included the terms of trade between Eritrea and Ethiopia, for example exchange rates and economic relations which were seen as important <a href="http://www.dehai.org/conflict/analysis/alemsghed2.html">contributing factors</a> in the 1988 – 2000 border war.</p>
<h2>Distractions</h2>
<p>Rather than working to consolidate the peace, the leaders of both countries have drifted elsewhere. Ethiopia has been caught up in increasingly <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-needs-act-fast-solve-its-internal-displacement-problem">complex and bloody ethnic conflicts</a> that have driven more than a million people from their homes. Coming to grips with this is taking much of Abiy’s time and attention. </p>
<p>He has also been working <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXHBo4Sug6k">on behalf of the African Union</a> to help resolve the political crisis in Sudan. Eritrea’s Isaias has also been to Sudan, but with a rather different remit. <a href="http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67719">Welcomed warmly by</a> by the deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemetti”, Isaias issued a statement that showed his agenda was quite <a href="http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67719">different</a>, as shown by his recent statement:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Government of Eritrea requests the AU to refrain from internationalising and exacerbating the situation in Sudan. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>His approach isn’t difficult to understand. Isaias enjoys <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201904110180.html">strong relations</a> with Saudi Arabia and the UAE both of which have been embroiled in a war in Yemen. Eritrea has <a href="http://www.madote.com/2016/09/how-eritreas-assab-port-became-major.html">allowed its ports and airfields</a> to be used by both countries to prosecute this war. At the same time the Sudanese military <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67591">provide troops</a> to fight in Yemen and have been open in their support for the Saudi and UAE in their war aims. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia was therefore <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/05/saudi-arabia-sudan-uprising-omar-al-bashir">alarmed</a> at the challenge posed to the Sudanese government by the popular uprising in Khartoum and other Sudanese towns and cities. </p>
<h2>Border remains tense</h2>
<p>Even though the glow of last year’s events has faced, Eritrea has nevertheless reaped many gains from the rapprochement with Ethiopia. One consequence is that it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47934398">signalled</a> the end of its international isolation. Limited United Nations sanctions were <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-are-being-lifted-against-eritrea-heres-why-106881">lifted</a> and the country now holds a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eritrea-in-the-un-human-rights-council-fox-guarding-the-henhouse/a-49378901">seat on the UN Human Rights Council</a>, a body that frequently criticised its lack of adherence to international human rights norms.</p>
<p>Eritrea has also taken the chair of the <a href="https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/actors-and-governance">Khartoum Process</a>. This is a critical position, since it is the key forum in which African states negotiate with the European Union.</p>
<p>But the situation along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border remains tense. The Ethiopian government attempted to move its heavy artillery away from the border, but this was <a href="https://ecadforum.com/2019/01/09/military-trucks-blocked-in-tigray-region/">blocked by local residents</a> of Tigray, fearful that there might be renewed conflict with Eritrea. </p>
<p>Their concerns are hardly surprising. Isaias has made <a href="http://www.shabait.com/news/local-news/26520-president-isaias-speech-on-martyrs-day">vituperative statements</a> about his immediate neighbours, describing the Trigrayan ruling party - the TPLF – as “vultures”, and accusing them of following a “toxic and malignan” agenda.</p>
<p>It is difficult to know how relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara will develop. The fear is that Isaias has gone back to his unpredictable ways, making any predictions difficult.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>It’s unclear how relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara will develop but the warmth has largely gone.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1177182019-07-01T10:53:20Z2019-07-01T10:53:20ZAl-Qaida is stronger today than it was on 9/11<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281190/original/file-20190625-81766-1dhs77f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yemen's al-Qaida branch, called al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, is the most dangerous and sophisticated offshoot of the terror group Osama bin Laden founded in Afghanistan in 1988. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-France-Attack-Yemen/cf65ce1632c946e9b5de026158f30171/2/0">AP Photo/Hani Mohammed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Al-Qaida has recruited an estimated <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection">40,000 fighters</a> since Sept. 11, 2001, when the Osama bin Laden-led extremist group attacked the United States, according to the not-for-profit Council on Foreign Relations.</p>
<p>Despite a United States-led global “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/sept-15-2001-president-declares-war-terror-10877347">war on terror</a>” that has <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/research/2018/59-trillion-spent-and-obligated-post-911-wars">cost US$5.9 trillion</a>, killed an estimated <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Human%20Costs%2C%20Nov%208%202018%20CoW.pdf">480,000 to 507,000 people</a> and assassinated bin Laden, al-Qaida has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">grown and spread</a> since 9/11, expanding from rural Afghanistan into <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/12/world/12aqmap.html?_r=0">North Africa, East Africa, the Sahel, the Gulf States, the Middle East and Central Asia</a>. </p>
<p>In those places, al-Qaida has developed new political influence – in some areas even supplanting the local government.</p>
<p>So how does a religious extremist group with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">fewer than a hundred members</a> in September 2001 become a transnational terror organization, even as the world’s biggest military has targeted it for elimination? </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.warzone.cc/current-projects/">my dissertation research on the resiliency of al-Qaida</a> and the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">work of other scholars</a>, the U.S. “war on terror” was the catalyst for al-Qaida’s growth.</p>
<h2>Bin Laden and the ‘war on terror’</h2>
<p>Al-Qaida was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida">founded in Pakistan in 1988</a> in response to the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan. </p>
<p>For decades, it was a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">small, weak and uninspiring movement</a>. Bin Laden sought to raise an Islamic coalition of forces to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/06/what-does-al-qaeda-want/">establish a caliphate</a> – an Islamic state governed with strict Islamic law – across the Muslim world. But as late as 1996 he had <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">just 30 fighters</a> willing to die for the cause.</p>
<p>For years, bin Laden <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">tried to merge</a> with such extremist groups as Egypt’s Ibn al-Khattab and the Libyan Islamic Fighting group, hoping to create a global Islamist movement.</p>
<p>These organizations rejected bin Laden’s overtures. These disparate groups lacked a common enemy that could unite them in al-Qaida’s fight for an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/06/what-does-al-qaeda-want/">Islamic caliphate</a>.</p>
<p>So bin Laden <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">shifted his strategy</a>. He decided to make the United States – a country most Islamic extremist groups see as the enemy of Islam – his main target. </p>
<p>In 1998 al-Qaida waged successful <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/index.html">attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya</a>. In 2000, it bombed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/index.html">the USS Cole</a>, a military ship refueling in a Yemen harbor, killing 17 sailors. </p>
<p>Bin Laden hoped the U.S. would respond with a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">military invasion</a> into Muslim majority territory, triggering a holy war that would put al-Qaida at the forefront of the fight against these unholy invaders. </p>
<p>After al-Qaida operatives flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html">killing 2,977 people</a>, bin Laden got his wish. The United States <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">invaded Afghanistan</a> on Oct. 7, 2001. Eighteen months later, it invaded Iraq. </p>
<h2>How al-Qaida grew</h2>
<p>Islamic groups and individual extremists <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21?highlight=al+qaeda">flocked to bin Laden’s cause</a> after 9/11. Al-Qaida became the nucleus of a global violent Islamist movement, with affiliates across the Middle East and Africa swearing their allegiance.</p>
<p>At the same time, the war in Afghanistan was decimating al-Qaida’s core operations. </p>
<p>Leaders were killed by drone strikes or driven into <a href="https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/fearlait.pdf">hiding</a>. The Bush administration claimed <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jun/7/20050607-121910-3725r/">killing 75%</a> of al-Qaida leadership. Bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders sought refuge in places like the <a href="https://arizona.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/drone-warfare-in-yemen-fostering-emirates-through-counterterroris">Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan</a> and Yemen – remote areas <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28717532/The_Global_and_the_Local_Al-Qaeda_and_Yemen_s_Tribes_2017_">outside the easy reach of U.S. ground forces</a>.</p>
<p>To evade U.S. detection, al-Qaida had to <a href="https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/MEI%20Policy%20Paper_Kendall_7.pdf">limit communication</a> between its newly decentralized fronts. That meant the group’s global leadership had to have autonomy to operate relatively independently. </p>
<p>Bin Laden expected al-Qaida affiliates to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-isis-madness-lies-extremism-islamic-state-terrorist-groups-compete-a7526271.html">adhere to certain core values, strategies</a> and, of course, pursue the objective of establishing an Islamic caliphate.</p>
<p>But newly minted regional al-Qaida leaders – people like <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, Ahmed Abdi Godane</a> in Somalia and <a href="https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/MEI%20Policy%20Paper_Kendall_7.pdf">Nasir al-Wuhayshi in Yemen</a> – enjoyed enough autonomy to pursue their own agendas in these unstable places. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida Iraq, al-Shabaab and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, as their groups came to be known, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf">embedded themselves in the local political scene</a>. They began building credibility, establishing alliances and recruiting fighters.</p>
<p>By 2015, when bin Laden was killed, al-Qaida was a network of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/world/africa/al-shabaab-explainer/index.html">regional caliphates</a>. Today its territory <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/21?highlight=al+qaeda">spans from Afghanistan and Pakistan to North Africa, the Middle East and beyond</a>.</p>
<h2>Manipulation of a sectarian divide</h2>
<p>Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, headquartered in Yemen, is a case study in how the group now wields its power more locally. </p>
<p>Yemen has been in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44466574">civil war</a> since 2015, when a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Houthi Shiite armed group</a> declared war against the country’s Sunni Muslim government.</p>
<p>Although this conflict appears sectarian in nature, the Yemen scholar Marieke Brandt argues it is largely about political power – namely, the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28717532/The_Global_and_the_Local_Al-Qaeda_and_Yemen_s_Tribes_2017_">Yemeni government’s longstanding neglect of the Houthi</a> minority, who come from northern Yemen.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, al-Qaida – a Sunni terror group – saw political opportunity in Yemen’s civil war. </p>
<p>The group has <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base">played up religious divisions in the civil war</a>. Using its <a href="https://www.academia.edu/15757466/Al-Qaida_and_Islamic_State_in_Yemen_A_Battle_for_Local_Audiences">Arabic magazine, martyrdom videos, poetry and popular songs</a>, al-Qaida has endeared itself to the local Sunni people and Yemen’s powerful Sunni tribal leaders. It has also ingratiated itself to Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-backed government and <a href="https://www.academia.edu/15757466/Al-Qaida_and_Islamic_State_in_Yemen_A_Battle_for_Local_Audiences">fought alongside Sunni tribal militias to battle the Houthi incursion</a>. </p>
<p>The strategy has been remarkably effective for al-Qaida. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had <a href="https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Dawsari_FINAL_180201.pdf">hundreds of fighters</a> at its founding in 2009. It now has about <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?%20symbol=S/2018/705&referer=/english/&Lang=E">7,000 fighters in Yemen</a>, most of them Sunnis recruited from territory the Houthis have attempted to take over. </p>
<p>It has planted <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/07/06/feature/as-a-u-s-shadow-war-intensifies-in-yemen-al-qaeda-is-down-but-not-out/?utm_term=.addac74fd4e5">landmines</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/suicide-bombing-in-yemen-kills-scores-at-military-parade-rehearsal/2012/05/21/gIQA3Ug2eU_story.html?utm_term=.a588e03182dc">bombs</a> across Yemen that have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/30/world/middleeast/yemen-al-qaeda-us-terrorism.html">killed hundreds</a>, held <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/family-of-american-held-hostage-in-yemen-pleads-for-his-safe-release-1417806069">journalists hostage</a> and, in 2015, orchestrated the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237">massacre at the offices of the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. government considers al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to be the <a href="https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Dawsari_FINAL_180201.pdf">most sophisticated and threatening branch</a> of al-Qaida.</p>
<h2>Adapt the tactic, keep the mission</h2>
<p>In adapting its methods to Yemeni culture, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has made some missteps. </p>
<p>In 2011, the group attempted to impose extremely strict <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base">Islamic rule</a> over two areas it controlled in south Yemen. Al-Qaida instituted rigid punishments of the sort common in Afghanistan, such as cutting off the hands of a thief and banning the chewed stimulant plant called khat. </p>
<p>These extreme rules got al-Qaida <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/9779-ansar-al-sharia-and-governance-in-southern-yemen">run out of town</a> by Sunni tribal militias. </p>
<p>The next time al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula asserted its political power over parts of Yemen left ungoverned in the chaos of civil war, in 2015, it did not rule directly over these territories. Rather, it allowed a local council to govern according their own norms and customs. And it <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/9779-ansar-al-sharia-and-governance-in-southern-yemen">kept the khat</a> market open. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida also paid for long-neglected public services like schools, water and electricity – effectively becoming the state.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda-expanding-base">International Crisis Group</a>, a humanitarian organization, this softer stance <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Rebel-Governance-Civil-War-Arjona/dp/1107102227">helped garner the acceptance of the local population</a>. That, in turn, ensured al-Qaida could keep using Yemen as a regional headquarters.</p>
<p>A similar <a href="https://www.academia.edu/28717532/The_Global_and_the_Local_Al-Qaeda_and_Yemen_s_Tribes_2017_">shift from global to local</a> has occurred in al-Qaida affiliates in <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-asia/2011-02-20/how-al-qaeda-works">Somalia, Iraq and Syria</a>. </p>
<p>Al-Qaida is no longer a hierarchical organization taking orders from its famous, charismatic leader, as it was on 9/11. </p>
<p>But it is stronger and more resilient than it was under bin Laden. And the “war on terror” has helped, not hurt it.</p>
<p><em>This story has been updated to correct an error introduced during editing. Al-Qaida was founded in Peshawar, Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was not founded in Afghanistan.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Taylor is affiliated with Warzone Initiatives, a nonprofit organization working to address conflicts involving non-state armed groups. </span></em></p>Bin Laden’s extremist group had less than a hundred members in September 2001. Today it’s a transnational terror organization with 40,000 fighters across the Middle East, Africa and beyond.Christian Taylor, Doctoral Student, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1185102019-06-25T23:13:55Z2019-06-25T23:13:55ZCanada’s labour movement must take a stand against the Saudi arms deal<p>As Canada’s largest labour organization and the political arm of the labour movement, <a href="https://canadianlabour.ca/">the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)</a> has long been a voice for peace, human rights and social justice. </p>
<p>But on one of the most controversial issues in Canadian politics, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5021709/saudi-arabia-canada-arms-deal/">Canada’s arms deal with Saudi Arabia</a>, it has failed to take a meaningful stand. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners are waging war in Yemen. The war has plunged the country into what <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811">the United Nations calls “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</a></p>
<p>According to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HRP_V21.pdf">a recent UN report</a>, approximately 70,000 Yemenis have died since the beginning of 2016. Hospitals, schools, markets and mosques are common targets for Saudi coalition airstrikes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explained-how-the-arab-spring-led-to-an-increasingly-vicious-civil-war-in-yemen-55968">Explained: how the Arab Spring led to an increasingly vicious civil war in Yemen</a>
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<p>Two thirds of the Yemeni population require humanitarian support or protection, 17 million are food insecure, three million have fled their homes and 14.5 million require access to safe drinking water. And as <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/9/take-five-areej-jamal-al--khawlani">UN Women has found, women and girls bear the brunt of this devastating situation</a>. <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479">A 2018 report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</a> concluded that violations and crimes under international law have occurred and continue to be perpetrated in Yemen. </p>
<h2>Canada’s complicity</h2>
<p>Canada is complicit in the war in Yemen. The export of made-in-Canada light armoured vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia, an approximately $15-billion contract originally signed by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper, is now proceeding under export permits approved by the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau.</p>
<p>New export permits for arms shipments to Saudi Arabia have reportedly been suspended <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-says-canada-trying-to-end-arms-export-deal-to-saudi-arabia/">pending an indefinite review by the Trudeau government following the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi</a>. But <a href="https://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cimt-cicm/topNCommodity-marchandise?lang=eng&getSectionId()=0&dataTransformation=0&scaleValue=0&scaleQuantity=0&refYr=2019&refMonth=4&freq=12&countryId=369&getUsaState()=0&provId=1&retrieve=Retrieve&country=null&tradeType=1&topNDefault=10&monthStr=null&chapterId=87&arrayId=9800087&sectionLabel=XVII%20-%20Vehicles,%20aircraft,%20vessels%20and%20associated%20transport%20equipment">according to recent data from Statistics Canada</a> over half a billion dollars worth of armoured fighting vehicles have been exported through the port of Saint John, N.B., to Saudi Arabia in 2019 alone. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/saudi-arms-used-against-yemeni-rebels-seem-to-match-canadian-lavs/article28846678/">credible evidence that Canadian weapons sold to Saudi Arabia are being used in the devastating war in Yemen</a>. The Saudi-led coalition continues to commit serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Yemen, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/saudi-arabia">and Saudi Arabia also has a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of its own citizens</a>. </p>
<h2>Where’s the Canadian labour movement?</h2>
<p>In April 2016, the CLC — as part of coalition of human rights, development and arms-control groups — endorsed an open letter to Trudeau that expressed profound concerns about issuing export permits for Canada’s arms deal with Saudi Arabia, <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/sites/amnesty/files/CanadaSaudiArabiaJointLetterPM25April16.pdf">“despite flagrant incompatibilities of this contract with the human rights safeguards of our export controls.”</a> The letter urged the prime minister to rescind this <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/saudi-arms-deal-breaks-canadas-export-controls-opponents-argue/article29769283/">“immoral and unethical” decision</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the silence of the CLC has been deafening. </p>
<p>On this issue, Canada’s labour movement is uniquely situated to bring pressure to bear on the government. While Amnesty International, Oxfam Canada and other civil society organizations have called for the cancellation of the arms deal via the open letter, it is unionized Canadian workers in manufacturing plants, on railways and in ports who have the real power to stop the production and shipment of arms to the Saudi regime. </p>
<p>In the face of the global climate and migration crises, and in an era in which right-wing politicians demonize migrants and refugees while pushing an agenda of austerity, environmental destruction and war that drives displacement and migration, the CLC must stand for a green, peaceful socially just economy. Good jobs must not depend on developing, building and shipping machinery used to make war. </p>
<p>After all, manufacturing, rail and dock workers would likely prefer to be working on and transporting products central to the fight against climate change than weapons of war.</p>
<h2>Dockworkers lead the way</h2>
<p>Labour can and must be a voice for peace. Working with peace activists and human rights organizations, unions in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/25/why-germany-shouldnt-yield-arms-sales-saudis">Denmark, Finland, Germany and Norway have successfully pressured their respective governments to suspend Saudi arms transfers</a>. </p>
<p>And in the past few weeks, union dockworkers in the Italian port of Genoa and the French port of Marseilles made international headlines <a href="https://diem25.org/they-shall-not-pass/">when they refused to move, load or help ship military cargo destined for Saudi Arabia.</a> </p>
<p>Here in Canada in late December 2018, members of the International Longshoremen’s Association Local 273 courageously refused to cross a picket line at the Saint John port where peace activists had assembled <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canadians-like-to-think-of-themselves-as-peacemakers-the-saudi-arms/">to protest the arrival of a Saudi cargo ship scheduled to transport Canadian-made LAVs to their destination in Saudi Arabia</a>. Yet unlike union dockworkers in Europe, Local 273 received little in the way of solidarity from other unions. </p>
<p>The CLC must be a voice for peace and human rights and demand that the Canadian government immediately cancel its arms deal with Saudi Arabia and use its considerable resources to co-ordinate labour movement opposition to the deal. Yemen can’t wait.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why is Canada’s labour movement so quiet on the Saudi arms deal? It should be a voice for peace and human rights and demand that the Canadian government immediately cancel the deal.Simon Black, Assistant Professor of Labour Studies, Brock UniversityAnthony Fenton, PhD Candidate (ABD), York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1192052019-06-21T14:10:33Z2019-06-21T14:10:33ZWhy British arms sales to Saudi Arabia ruled unlawful – what this means for the future<p>The British government’s transfer of weapons to Saudi Arabia, which is leading a coalition engaged in armed conflict in Yemen, was deemed unlawful by the <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/the-queen-on-the-application-of-campaign-against-arms-trade-v-secretary-of-state-for-international-trade-and-others/">UK Court of Appeal</a> on June 21. This prompted the government to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/20/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-for-use-in-yemen-declared-unlawful">suspend issuing of any new arms export licences</a> to Saudi Arabia that could be used in Yemen while it considers the implications of the ruling for its decision-making process.</p>
<p>During the Yemen conflict, which has already resulted <a href="https://www.acleddata.com/2019/06/18/yemen-snapshots-2015-2019/">in estimates of almost 100,000 deaths</a>, the Saudi-led coalition has been accused of several violations of international humanitarian law by <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E">the United Nations</a> and some major non-governmental organisations, including <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-made-missile-used-airstrike-ceramics-factory-yemen">Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/yemen">Human Rights Watch</a>. For example, a 2016 report by a UN panel of experts raised concerns about the widespread bombing of the populated <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_73.pdf">city of Sa’dah in May 2015</a> by the Saudi-led coalition and whether it was proportionate.</p>
<p>The appeal judges accepted the argument made by the Campaign Against Arms Trade in the case and found that the UK had never clearly stated whether the Saudi-led coalition committed past violations of international law. But such an assessment is required by the relevant rules on international arms transfers.</p>
<p><a href="https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253">International</a>, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0944">European</a> and <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140325/wmstext/140325m0001.htm">British</a> laws require governments of arms-exporting countries to authorise all arms transfers directed abroad, assessing whether there is a “clear risk” that the weapons will be used to commit serious violations of international law, among other things, by the final recipient. This means the government must make a judgement on the future, a difficult task in scenarios such as Yemen where the situation is volatile and cannot be easily predicted. But it’s possible to look at the past behaviour of the country that will receive the weapons, to make an assessment of its future conduct.</p>
<h2>Irrational decision-making</h2>
<p>The British government has always justified its decision to authorise transfers of weapons to Saudi Arabia by looking purely at the future, avoiding any legal assessment of Saudi Arabia’s past behaviour. In fact, the UK has always justified its decisions to sell arms by stressing its efforts to train and support Saudis to avoid violations of international law, <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CAAT-v-Secretary-of-State-and-Others-Open-12-June-2019.pdf">as well as Saudi Arabia’s own commitment</a> to respect such laws in the future. </p>
<p>But the Court of Appeal found that the British government’s failure to assess the past conduct of Saudi Arabia against international law made its decision-making irrational and so unlawful.</p>
<p>Legally, the Court of Appeal cannot make decisions on whether Britain should transfer weapons to Saudi Arabia or not. This is a choice for the government and democratically judged by the parliament and British people. Nevertheless, the court can evaluate how the government makes its choices. In particular, the court can indicate which information the government needs to take into account before making a decision. In this case, the judges declared the government should have expressed its view on the legality of the Saudi Arabia’s conduct, regardless of how difficult that was. The judges ruled that the failure to take a stance on this undermined the whole process of authorisation of the arms transfers directed to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>This judgement will not prevent the government from exporting weapons to the Saudis in the future. Nevertheless, it prompted Liam Fox, the secretary of state for international trade, to <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-06-20/debates/D9BD8C37-E5A0-4A7E-9959-AC40A0DEE622/ExportLicencesHighCourtJudgment">tell parliament</a> that the UK will stop issuing new export licences to Saudi Arabia while it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/20/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-for-use-in-yemen-declared-unlawful">reviews its decision-making process</a>. </p>
<p>The UK ruling came on the same day that the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/us/politics/saudi-arms-sales.html">US Senate blocked an US$8 billion US arms sales deal</a> to Saudi Arabia because of concerns over human rights violations. While, no judges were involved, the bipartisan decision of the US Senate also concerned the pre-export decision-making process. </p>
<h2>International responsibilities</h2>
<p>The judgment is a reminder that ministers cannot avoid their responsibility under international law. While the decision has no legal effects outside the UK, it could have important implications for the future enforcement of international law on the issue of arms transfers. International transfers of legal weapons are not generally banned by international law, but are prohibited when the weapons are or might be involved in the violation of the values and principles that guide the whole international community, such as the protection of civilians during armed conflicts. </p>
<p>The relevant domestic and international laws require governments to undertake a pre-export assessment on every arms transfer before authorising it. Countries cannot transfer weapons if they are completely blind to whether the recipients of the weapons will respect international law. Such blindness would mean accepting a very high risk of supporting military actions that the UK would never consider lawful if committed by its own armed forces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Riccardo Labianco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The UK Court of Appeal ruled that the British government did not properly assess whether Saudi Arabia had violated international law. What this means for the arms trade.Riccardo Labianco, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1119522019-02-15T18:24:20Z2019-02-15T18:24:20ZSenate vote could end US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259331/original/file-20190215-56215-kyv5id.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Severe malnutrition, like this Yemeni boy experienced, is one of the results of the Yemen conflict. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Yemen-Malnutrition/ab4969ee717245b8ac36b4dd034437c0/91/0">AP/Hani Mohammed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. House of Representatives has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/politics/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html">voted overwhelmingly</a> to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.</p>
<p>The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=36#!/conflict/war-in-yemen">aggressively bombing Yemen</a> and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">to describe</a> Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p>
<p>The legislation now goes to the Senate. <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/429894-house-passes-bill-to-end-us-military-support-to-saudis-in-yemen">President Trump has said that he would veto</a> it if passed. </p>
<p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/bachman.cfm">scholar of genocide and human rights</a>, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.</p>
<p>Based on my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1539910">published online</a> by Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p>
<h2>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</h2>
<p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Shia Houthi movement</a> – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia</a>. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. </p>
<p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/houthis-deny-u-s-saudi-claim-that-they-are-irans-puppets">assertions</a> that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/?utm_term=.cc639b2c69c8">uncontested</a>. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p>
<p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the <a href="http://yemendataproject.org/">Yemen Data Project</a>, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” </p>
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<p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, the Yemen Data Project reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against nonmilitary and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. </p>
<p>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl">rules</a> of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.</p>
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<p>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. </p>
<p>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. </p>
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<p>Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.</p>
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<h2>How to make a crisis</h2>
<p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf">according</a> to the U.N. panel of experts on Yemen.</p>
<p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-017-0092-3">analysis of the blockade’s legality</a>, <a href="http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/f/i/m.d.fink/m.d.fink.html">Dutch military scholar Martin Fink</a> writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” </p>
<p>Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p>
<p>In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376891524812213584/Securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-Yemen-an-assessment-of-constraints-and-options-for-intervention">notes</a>, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” </p>
<p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mass-starvation-political-weapon">Alex de Waal describes Yemen</a> as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure</a>.” </p>
<p>The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/response-plans/2017/yemen/en/">only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen</a> were functional. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">Secretary-General Guterres put it</a>, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”</p>
<p>As of February 2018, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22651&LangID=E">according</a> to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. </p>
<p>Yet, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-famine-children-deaths-1.4914179">estimated</a> 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/yemen-al-hudaydah-famine-houthis.html">50,000 child deaths</a> in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.</p>
<p>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide</a>,” referred to as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bEcTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false">“synchronized attack on different aspects of life</a>.” </p>
<h2>The US contribution</h2>
<p>The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen">the Obama</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/12/trumps-one-step-back-on-yemen-wont-satisfy-critics/">Trump administrations</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. <a href="https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/US%20Arms%20Sales%202017%20Report.pdf">In 2016</a>, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p>
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<p>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. </p>
<p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and midair refueling of coalition warplanes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.b66185ea63b1">which was halted in early November 2018</a>. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. </p>
<h2>Shared responsibility for genocide</h2>
<p>As a genocide scholar, I believe that under <a href="http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25.pdf">international law</a>, the U.S. shares responsibility with the coalition for genocide in Yemen. </p>
<p>What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” </p>
<p>However, even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto. </p>
<p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. </p>
<p>Of course, this is not an ideal world. </p>
<p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html">authority</a> to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-failed-authority-of-the-international-criminal-court/">authority</a> to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a U.N. Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p>
<p>All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations-106896">an article</a> originally published on November 26, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Bachman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has supported a Saudi-led military coalition that has inflicted profound and deadly damage on Yemen. A Senate vote could end what a human rights scholar says is US complicity in genocide.Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1095222019-01-09T07:25:45Z2019-01-09T07:25:45ZHow foreign backing is keeping Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252847/original/file-20190108-32145-3r0bzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at the 2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Day after day Sudanese are <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article66878&utm_source=Media+Review+for+January+7%2C+2019&utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+January+7%2C+2019&utm_medium=email">taking to the streets to protest</a> against the rule of Omar al-Bashir. The president, who himself seized power in 1989 when he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-warcrimes-sudan-bashir-profile/factbox-sudans-president-omar-hassan-al-bashir-idUKL1435274220080714">led a coup</a>, is facing the most serious challenge in his three decades in power. Fury at sharp rises in the cost of bread and fuel, and allegations of corruption, have fuelled the protests.</p>
<p>Thus far the president has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bashir-will-not-budge-nationwide-protests-in-sudan-take-aim-at-the-president/2019/01/06/550ebf9a-0fac-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_campaign=Media%20Review%20for%20January%207%2C%202019&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Media%20Review%20for%20January%207%2C%202019&utm_term=.34a805320c64">managed to resist the anger of his people</a>. But Sudanese have a long history of overthrowing unpopular regimes. Twice before – in 1964 and then again in 1985 – revolts led to changes of government. On each occasion the armed forces abandoned the regime and sided with the people. This has not occurred during the current protests for good reasons, as university lecturer and <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-uprisings-in-modern-sudan-9781472574015/">author of Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan</a> Willow Berridge <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/01/07/sudan-protests-learn-1964-1985/">points out</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Al-Bashir’s regime clearly learnt from the mistakes of its predecessors. It has created a much stronger National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) as well as a host of other parallel security organisations and armed militias that it uses to police Khartoum instead of the regular army. This set up, combined with various commanders’ mutual fears of being held to account for war crimes if the regime falls, means an army intervention will not occur easily as in 1964 or 1985. This is one reason the current uprising has already lasted longer than its precedents.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But the regime’s survival cannot simply be seen as a domestic issue. He has strong international allies. The West once reviled Omar al-Bashir as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/21/omar-bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant">indicted war criminal</a>. However, more recently they have begun to view him as a source of stability and intelligence in a troubled region. The president also has the backing – both political and financial – of key Arab allies.</p>
<h2>Arab support</h2>
<p>Sudanese have traditionally been said to look North to Cairo for support. This crisis is no exception. In December Egypt’s foreign minister and intelligence chief visited Khartoum, <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/egypt-backs-sudan-government-amid-deadly-protests-1.807138">pledging their support for Al-Bashir</a>. </p>
<p>Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, who flew to Sudan with intelligence chief General Abbas Kamel, confidently stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Egypt is confident that Sudan will overcome the present situation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was followed earlier this month during a reciprocal trip to Cairo by the Sudanese president at which President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/sudan-fresh-protests-planned-bashir-sacks-health-minister-190106061946232.html">commented</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Egypt fully supports the security and stability of Sudan, which is integral to Egypt’s national security.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But political support alone wouldn’t be enough to keep the Sudanese regime in power. There is also financial backing from across the Red Sea. In return for Sudan entering the Yemeni war Khartoum is <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-houthi-economy.html">reported to have received investments worth US$2.2 billion</a>. More than 10,000 Sudanese troops are fighting on the Yemeni frontline. Some are said to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html">child soldiers</a> who were recruited by the Saudis, with offers of US$10,000 for each recruit.</p>
<h2>Other allies</h2>
<p>The rehabilitation of al-Bashir in the US goes back to President Barack Obama’s era. As one of the last acts of his office, he <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41531855">lifted a range of US sanctions against the Sudanese regime</a>. The CIA’s large office in Khartoum was cited as <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/10/10/why-america-has-lifted-sanctions-on-sudan">one of the key reasons for his policy shift</a>.</p>
<p>Nor is Washington alone in this view. As Europe battles to restrict the number of Africans crossing the Mediterranean it has seen the Sudanese government as an ally. The <a href="https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/the-khartoum-process">“Khartoum Process”</a>, signed in the Sudanese capital, is critical to this relationship. In November 2015 European leaders met their African counterparts in the Maltese capital, Valletta, to try to put flesh on the bones of this agreement. The aim was made clear in the accompanying EU press release which <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4832_en.htm">concluded that</a>;</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The number of migrants arriving to the European Union is unprecedented, and this increased flow is likely to continue. The EU, together with the member states, is taking a wide range of measures to address the challenges, and to establish an effective, humanitarian and safe European migration policy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The summit led to the drafting of an <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf">Action Plan</a> which has guided the EU’s policy objectives on migration and mobility ever since.</p>
<p>The plan detailed how European institutions would cooperate with their African partners to fight</p>
<blockquote>
<p>irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Europe promised to offer training to “law enforcement and judicial authorities” in new methods of investigation and</p>
<blockquote>
<p>assisting in setting up specialised anti-trafficking and smuggling police units.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These commitments were an explicit pledge to support and strengthen elements of the Sudanese state. A Regional Operational Centre (ROCK) has been <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/horn-africa/regional/regional-operational-centre-support-khartoum-process-and-au-horn-africa_en">established in Khartoum</a> whose <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-union-sudan.html">chief aim</a> it to halt people smuggling and refugee flows by allowing European officials to work directly with their Sudanese opposite numbers. The counter-trafficking coordination centre in Khartoum — staffed jointly by police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France and Italy — will partly rely on information sourced by the Sudanese national intelligence service.</p>
<p>Finally there is some evidence of Russian involvement in the Sudanese crisis. Russian troops, working for a private contractor, are <a href="https://defence-blog.com/army/russian-private-military-contractors-spotted-in-sudan.html">reported to have been seen on the streets of Khartoum, suppressing the uprising</a>.</p>
<p>Given the range of support for al-Bashir it isn’t surprising that he’s managed to resist popular pressure to step down. Much depends on how long demonstrations can be maintained, and how much force the regime is prepared to deploy to crush its opponents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109522/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>Given the range of support for President Omar al-Bashir it isn’t surprising that he’s managed to resist pressure to step down.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1068962018-11-26T11:36:31Z2018-11-26T11:36:31ZUS complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen spans Obama, Trump administrations<p>A Saudi-led coalition of states has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=36#!/conflict/war-in-yemen">aggressively bombing Yemen</a> and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">to describe</a> Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p>
<p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/bachman.cfm">scholar of genocide and human rights</a>, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.</p>
<p>Based on my research, to be published in an upcoming issue of Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p>
<h2>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</h2>
<p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Shia Houthi movement</a> – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia</a>. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. </p>
<p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/houthis-deny-u-s-saudi-claim-that-they-are-irans-puppets">assertions</a> that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/?utm_term=.cc639b2c69c8">uncontested</a>. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p>
<p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the <a href="http://yemendataproject.org/">Yemen Data Project (YDP)</a>, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” </p>
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<p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, YDP reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against non-military and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. </p>
<p>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl">rules</a> of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.</p>
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<p>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. </p>
<p>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. </p>
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<p>Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.</p>
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<h2>How to make a crisis</h2>
<p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf">according</a> to the UN panel of experts on Yemen.</p>
<p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-017-0092-3">analysis of the blockade’s legality</a>, <a href="http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/f/i/m.d.fink/m.d.fink.html">Dutch military scholar Martin Fink</a> writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” </p>
<p>Despite UN efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p>
<p>In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376891524812213584/Securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-Yemen-an-assessment-of-constraints-and-options-for-intervention">notes</a>, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” </p>
<p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mass-starvation-political-weapon">Alex de Waal describes Yemen</a> as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure</a>.” </p>
<p>The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/response-plans/2017/yemen/en/">only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen</a> were functional. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">Secretary-General Guterres put it</a>, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”</p>
<p>As of February 2018, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22651&LangID=E">according</a> to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. </p>
<p>Yet, according to the OHCHR report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-famine-children-deaths-1.4914179">estimated</a> 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/yemen-al-hudaydah-famine-houthis.html">50,000 child deaths</a> in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.</p>
<p>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide</a>,” referred to as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bEcTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false">“synchronized attack on different aspects of life</a>.” </p>
<h2>The US contribution</h2>
<p>The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen">the Obama</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/12/trumps-one-step-back-on-yemen-wont-satisfy-critics/">Trump administrations</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. <a href="https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/actions/MAR_6--US_Arms_Sales_2017_Report_manual_footnotes_%281%29_1.pdf">In 2016</a>, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p>
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<p>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. </p>
<p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and mid-air refueling of Coalition warplanes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.b66185ea63b1">which was halted in early November, 2018</a>. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. </p>
<h2>Shared responsibility for genocide</h2>
<p>As a genocide scholar, I believe that under <a href="http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25.pdf">international law</a>, the U.S. shares responsibility with the Coalition for genocide in Yemen. </p>
<p>What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for Coalition action.</p>
<p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. </p>
<p>Of course, this is not an ideal world. </p>
<p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html">authority</a> to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/winter2003/irr_hr_winter03_usopposition/">authority</a> to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a UN Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p>
<p>All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Bachman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Obama and Trump administrations have supported a military coalition that has inflicted profound and deadly damage on Yemen. A human rights scholar says the US is complicit in genocide.Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1026192018-09-04T12:49:41Z2018-09-04T12:49:41ZBritain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia does far more damage than it’s worth<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speech-at-the-united-states-institute-for-peace">speech</a> the UK foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, stressed that Britain needs to strengthen its support for a rules-based international order, saying there will be a price to pay for countries that do not share the UK’s values and frequently cross geopolitical red lines. Hunt was of course referring to Russia, but he may as well have been taking about Saudi Arabia – a country with a similar recent history of flouting international norms, whose conduct receives far less censure from the UK government.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition of states fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen since 2015. There are credible allegations that it has launched air strikes on civilian targets in the conflict, which a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45329220">recent UN investigation</a> found to amount to potential human right abuses and war crimes. Humanitarian relief organisations have called the situation in Yemen <a href="https://news.un.org/en/focus/yemen">the world’s worst man-made disaster</a>; the coalition has exacerbated the situation by imposing an aid blockade that affects 20.7m of Yemeni citizens (75% of the country’s population) in need of assistance. And domestically, Saudi Arabia remains an autocratic country, one where activists are executed and human rights defenders detained.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia is also perhaps the most important UK ally in the Middle East. Longstanding military and trade relations have meant that the two countries have been co-operating on matters of security and counter-terrorism for decades.</p>
<p>A frequently heard argument for engaging with oppressive countries like Saudi Arabia is that direct diplomatic and military engagement enables the UK to export its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39485083">values</a>, such as respect for basic human rights and a belief in liberal democracy, to such places.</p>
<p>At the start of a visit to Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 2017, the UK prime minister, Theresa May, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-to-visit-saudi-arabia-and-jordan-to-deepen-true-strategic-partnerships">said</a> that “an even deeper partnership with these countries, and greater knowledge and understanding of one another, will increase our ability to address the issues that concern us”.</p>
<p>But in Saudi Arabia’s case at least, little to no progress appears to have been made on this front. In a new <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/news/newsrecords/2018/few-benefits-for-uk-from-security-relationship-with-saudi-arabia.aspx">study</a> of Britain’s ties to the kingdom, my co-researcher and I found that the supposed benefits to the UK are limited at best and non-existent at worst.</p>
<h2>Quid pro quo?</h2>
<p>First, it appears that it is in fact Saudi Arabia which influences the UK’s actions, rather than the other way around. The UK government has a history of covering up allegations of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/court-condemns-blair-for-halting-saudi-arms-inquiry-807793.html">corruption related to arms deals with the country</a>. One of the arguments given for engaging with Saudi Arabia is that the kingdom’s intelligence is crucial for UK counter-terrorism efforts. Yet, details of this are hardly publicly available, and in 2017 the Home Office decided to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/12/uk-terror-funding-report-will-not-be-published-for-national-security-reasons">withhold publication of a report</a> into terrorist financing that would have reflected poorly on Saudi Arabia. We were hard pressed to find similar cases of Saudi Arabia placating the UK in a similar fashion.</p>
<p>Second, the economic value of the relationship for the UK is negligible. Goods and services sold to Saudi Arabia represented just 1% of the UK’s total exports in 2016, while it is estimated that arms sales bring in just <a href="https://www.warchild.org.uk/whats-happening/blogs/%C2%A36bn-arms-dealers-price-millions-lives-yemen">£30m</a> for the Treasury. In our research, we found that that came to just 0.004% of its total revenue in 2016.</p>
<p>Then there’s the reputational damage that comes with providing diplomatic cover to the Gulf state over the war in Yemen. The UK government’s post-Brexit “Global Britain” <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/building-a-global-britain">agenda</a> has seen it emphasise the need to defend and uphold the international rules-based order, but the tacit support for Saudi Arabia’s actions is entirely antithetical to this stated aim. The UK helped to design many international laws and conventions that seek to guarantee a peaceful, stable world. But its stance on Saudi Arabia means its deeds currently don’t match its words, and that puts its credibility at risk.</p>
<p>This is a case study in what happens when a country’s supposed economic interests come into conflict with its stated norms and values and its international obligations. The situation cannot carry on indefinitely. As the UK government makes plans to tread the international stage as a solo player outside the EU, it’s already being confronted with a series of difficult choices and trade-offs. It needs to critically assess its own foreign policy and uphold its own values before it can ask others to do the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Armida L. M. van Rij received funding from the Oxford Research Group's Remote Warfare Programme for this study. She is a member of the Women in International Security (WIIS) UK Leadership Team. </span></em></p>Saudi Arabia gets far more out of being close with the UK than vice versa.Armida v., Researcher in Security and Defence Policy at the Policy Institute at King's, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014882018-08-19T12:43:56Z2018-08-19T12:43:56ZHow Canada could use the Saudi quarrel to help the Middle East – and itself<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232174/original/file-20180815-2897-1s1jokn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women were only just granted permission to drive in Saudi Arabia, a kingdom with an atrocious human rights record. Canada can and should leverage its ongoing spat with the country to advocate for human rights across the Middle East.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Nariman El-Mofty)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The diplomatic row <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/saudi-arabia-suspends-trade-canada-ambassador-1.4775133">that erupted</a> between Canada and Saudi Arabia is based on a mild criticism of an autocracy’s human rights abuses that normally <a href="https://twitter.com/RexBrynen/status/1028020301362163713">does not get</a> much response. </p>
<p>Yet the Saudi overreaction presents Canada with an opportunity to rethink its Middle East policy. Canada could choose a new path based on universal human rights that would greatly benefit not just Saudi Arabians but those in the broader Middle East and Canadians too.</p>
<h2>Mild rebuke</h2>
<p>Canada’s critique was quite mild considering how horrible the Saudi government’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/saudi-arabia">human rights</a> record is. For decades, millions of Saudi citizens and <a href="http://al-bab.com/blog/2017/06/saudi-arabia-elected-un-body-promoting-workers-rights">indentured labourers</a> have been forced to live in fear under an extremist form of religious rule that <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html">inspired ISIS</a>. </p>
<p>This rule is enforced by a repressive <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2vbs9ZppP4">religious police</a> and brutal <a href="https://youtu.be/qTaklcWDrSA?t=4m37s">Mabahith</a> secret police. </p>
<p>Religious freedom is <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/saudi-arabias-curriculum-intolerance">non-existent</a> and the situation for women is so bad that they only recently earned the right to drive. Meanwhile, they can still be charged for crimes like <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-the-world-of-gulf-state-slavery">defaming their husbands</a> and important decisions are left to the authority of a <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/60339/things-women-cant-do-in-saudi-arabia">male guardian</a>. </p>
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<p>In Saudi Arabia, counter-terrorism laws are used <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia/report-saudi-arabia/">to stop human rights</a> work. Teens face death by <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabias-human-rights-abuses-10-examples-a6794576.html">beheading or crucifixion</a> for engaging in protest, Indigenous minority communities <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/08/07/saudi-arabia-canada-tweet/">are severely</a> <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/middleeast/saudi-arabia-awamiya/index.html">repressed</a>, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-crucified-man-in-mecca-while-calling-out-canada-human-rights-2018-8">same-sex relationships</a> are punishable by death and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/saudi-arabias-war-on-witchcraft/278701/">“sorcery”</a> is too. </p>
<p>While counter-terrorism laws are used to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/06/un-accuses-saudi-arabia-of-using-anti-terror-laws-to-justify-torture">suppress human rights</a> at home, Saudi donors generously <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-qa-is-saudi-arabia-funding-isis">fund terrorism</a> worldwide. Without coincidence, 15 of the 19 <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/finding-discussion-and-narrative-regarding-certain-sensitive-narrative-matters-saudi-arabia-911-11-a6999091.html">hijackers on 9-11</a> were Saudi. In fact, the Saudi regime seems to see terrorists as a tool, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/10266957/Saudis-offer-Russia-secret-oil-deal-if-it-drops-Syria.html">threatening Russia with them</a> at the 2012 Sochi Winter Olympics. </p>
<p>This all adds gravity to a threat tweeted from a Saudi <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-twitter-account-axed-after-seeming-to-threaten-9-11-style-attack-on-canada/">government-linked</a> account implying a suicide attack by an <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-appeared-to-threaten-canada-with-a-911-style-attack-2018-8">Air Canada jet</a> on Toronto’s iconic CN tower.</p>
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<p>The Saudi regime has also been actively oppressing people abroad and contributing to the Middle East’s instability. This includes <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/bahrain-uprisinginterventionsaudiarabiaemirates.html">invading Bahrain</a> to stop <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/bahrain-satellite-photos-of-inequality-2013-4">a popular uprising</a>, and imposing a blockade on Qatar that might <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/">have been an invasion</a> if not stopped by former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. </p>
<p>These interventions further involve <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saad-hariri-latest-update-lebanon-hezbollah-saudi-arabia-kidnapping-prime-minister-return-war-a8048571.html">kidnapping</a> the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/surprise-resignation-of-lebanon-prime-minister-saad-hariri-saudi-arabia-tv-interview">Lebanese prime minister</a>, strained relations <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-uae-hostile-turkey-1184696487">with Turkey</a> tied to the failed 2016 coup there and significant <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt">financial support</a> for the Egyptian dictator that overthrew a Turkish-backed democratic government. Saudi Arabia also contributed to <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/giorgio-cafiero/the-uae-and-qatar-wage-a-_b_8801602.html">Libya’s instability</a> and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/13/middleeast/yemen-children-school-bus-strike-intl/index.html">led a brutal</a> <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/">war in Yemen</a> that has created the world’s worst humanitarian <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/yemen">catastrophe</a>. </p>
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<p>The Saudi regime has done this all <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/02/24/133991181/twenty-years-later-first-iraq-war-still-resonates">under the protection</a> of the West. In return, it offers economic buy-offs such as keeping petroleum and investments flowing to countries <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-saudi-arabia-neil-macdonald-1.3251239">like Canada</a>. It also includes direct and indirect <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/its-time-for-canada-to-take-the-next-step-against-saudi-arabia/">financing of</a> influential political families like <a href="https://www.salon.com/2004/03/12/unger_2/">the Bushes</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/trump-clinton-foundation-224287">the Clintons</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Dc4LF3uVm4">the Trumps</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/blair-advising-saudi-under-9m-deal-between-country-and-his-institute-report-1679707539">the Blairs</a>, <a href="http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/news-comment/3017-philip-may-profiting-from-wife-s-military-policies">the Mays</a>, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brian-mulroney-institute-paradise-papers-1.4425014">the Mulroneys</a> and <a href="https://nowtoronto.com/news/john-baird-strikes-gold-with-barrick/">the Bairds</a>.</p>
<h2>Two wrongs don’t make a right</h2>
<p>In response to Canada’s human rights criticism, pro-regime social media users pointed out Canada’s failures, like its <a href="http://homelesshub.ca/resource/state-homelessness-canada-2014">homelessness crisis</a> and long history <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/05/31/how-many-first-nations-kids-died-in-residential-schools-justice-murray-sinclair-says-canada-needs-answers.html">of abuse</a> of First Nations peoples. There is also Canada’s distinct double standard on <a href="https://canadatalksisraelpalestine.ca/2018/06/05/whats-behind-the-trudeau-governments-new-phrasing-that-canada-is-a-friend-of-israel-and-a-friend-of-the-palestinian-people/">Palestinian</a> human rights.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-saudi-canada-spat-both-countries-are-wrong-101248">The Saudi-Canada spat: Both countries are wrong</a>
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<p>Yet Canada’s worst shortcomings are no basis to argue for a Saudi status quo. </p>
<p>Contrary to the views of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/12/saudi-arabia-spat-canada-mohammed-bin-salman-true-colours">mainstream media</a>, Saudi Arabia is not reforming under the progressive leadership of a visionary millennial crown prince. Instead, it is reacting to unending pressure from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-economy/saudi-arabia-avoids-financial-crisis-now-for-the-hard-part-idUSKBN1801P0">economic turmoil</a> and an oppressed population seeking freedom. Those pressures are compounded by expensive foreign interventions and funding <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-cables-saudi-princes-parties">the lavish</a> <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/money/wealth/popular-instagram-account-shows-off-the-elite-lifestyles-of-worlds-richest-young-people/news-story/5047eb9ca4ccf1fd9d81917f239113b7">lifestyles</a> of the Saudi elite in a country with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/01/saudi-arabia-riyadh-poverty-inequality">significant poverty</a>. </p>
<p>Meaningless “reforms” like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/20/saudi-arabias-first-cinema-in-over-35-years-opens-with-black-panther">opening cinemas</a> are offered by an elite desperate to retain the levers of power. They are fearful of the spread of democracy and project these insecurities abroad. The row with Canada only serves as a distraction from the regime’s serious domestic issues and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-saudi-arabias-bold-move-has-nothing-to-do-with-canada/">foreign-policy blunders</a>.</p>
<h2>Nothing to gain for Canada</h2>
<p>Yet the Canadian public has <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/star-columnists/2018/08/09/stakes-are-low-in-canada-saudi-arabia-squabble.html">little to gain</a> from wooing a despotic regime <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/saudi-official-says-oil-sales-unaffected-by-dispute-with-canada-1.4045917">desperate to sell</a> its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-arabia-imf/saudi-arabia-needs-oil-at-85-87-a-barrel-to-balance-budget-imf-official-idUSKBN1I30H7">single resource</a>. If the diplomatic row escalates to the extent that Saudi Arabia cancels its military contract <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/star-columnists/2018/08/10/on-saudi-arabia-canadas-stance-is-principled-but-conflicted.html">for Canadian</a> armoured assault vehicles, all the better for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/justin-trudeau-defends-canada-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia">the people</a> they are <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/saudis-use-armoured-vehicles-to-suppress-internal-dissent-videos-show/article29970955/">used against</a>. </p>
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<p>Instead, this dispute offers Canada the chance to reflect and to adopt a new foreign policy based on advancing human rights in the Middle East, and supporting the right of the Saudi people to determine their <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/saudis-economic-future-six-problems-it-needs-solve-vision-2030-plan-1907352248">own fate</a>. </p>
<p>Real change would dramatically improve daily life there, contribute to regional stability and reduce poverty through better governance. One can also only imagine how appreciative those people would be of Canada for having advanced their rights, not opposed them.</p>
<p>If in the process Canada is improved by reflecting on its own failings, all the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Wildeman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Saudi-Canadian row offers Canada an opportunity to adopt a new Middle East policy based on universal human rights that address the needs of the many and contributes to regional stability.Jeremy Wildeman, Research Associate in International Development, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.