It should have led to lower electricity prices; that was the theory at least. But the 2006 disaggregation of Western Australia’s vertically-integrated electricity utility, Western Power Corporation, into four separate state-owned entities – Verve Energy (generation), Western Power (networks), Synergy (retail sales) and Horizon Power (the state’s regional power supply entity) – has not met the expectations of the policy pundits who pushed for the reform.
The disaggregation of Western Power was expected to lead to increased efficiency due to the introduction of competition, which would in turn bring about lower electricity prices. However this has not transpired. Rather, between 2008 and 2012, retail electricity prices for households connected to the Western Power Network in the south west of the state rose by 48%, and this does not even include the comparatively small (and mostly compensated for) impact of the carbon tax.
On the surface, it was almost a direct application of text-book economics: full disaggregation, creation of an independent regulator and a Ministerial Direction which put a 3000 MW cap on the generation capacity of Verve Energy.
So why have electricity prices risen so dramatically in Western Australia since this reform? In answering this question, it helps to focus on the main contributor to the retail electricity price: the capacity cost of meeting system-peak demand. It’s mainly a network cost but also includes the cost of peak generation capacity.
This cost has not been adequately constrained? Why? The short version of the story is one of poor policy implementation due to the conflict of interest that arises when state government bureaucracy regulates state government enterprise.
One doesn’t need to have too cynical a view of government in Western Australia to see your electricity tariff as being part service delivery payment and part state tax. Electricity network regulation in Western Australia is essentially cost-plus. This means that all costs incurred in building Western Power’s network capacity are recovered, along with a juicy monopoly profit, from electricity consumers.
This profit is risk-free for the monopolist and is delivered from the consumer to the state treasury via Western Power as its surrogate tax collector. In 2011, $84 million of the State’s $484 million surplus was delivered by the dividend that Western Power paid to the government.
Every dollar that Western Power spends on expanding its network capacity, whether it is needed or not, provides a return to the state government. Therefore, there is a tendency for the government owned network business to over-invest in capacity. This leads to a phenomenon known in the field of regulatory economics as “gold plating”.
Under the current regulatory system in Western Australia, gold plating results in higher electricity tariffs than those that would occur if Western Power was not rewarded for its over-investment. It is in this way that government revenues derived from gold plating of the network are equivalent to a state tax; a state tax with an extremely high cost of administration.
Since 2006, Western Power’s expenditure and its guaranteed risk-free profit have been approved by the Economic Regulation Authority under regulatory rules approved by the Minister for Energy. Recently the CEO of the ERA’s secretariat denied any gold plating of the Western Power Network, stating, “our view is that there has certainly not been gold plating overall of Western Power’s network. Indeed, we saw a period of significant catch-up expenditure needed to meet the service standards.”
A similar, perhaps more cautious, denial came from the Deputy Director General of the government’s principle energy policy agency, the Public Utilities Office, who said, “the view of government here is that … [gold plating] is probably not the case for the Western Australian network businesses.”
These views are not consistent with the available evidence. Take the most recent financial year as an example. A total of 5,493 MW of generation capacity was assigned to the South West Interconnected System in 2011-12. However, the peak generation for 2011-12 which occurred on Australia Day was only 3,868 MW.

The South West Interconnected System is regulated as an “unconstrained network”. This means that in 2011-12 the regulatory framework required sufficient investment in substations, high voltage transmission lines and low voltage distribution systems to deliver 5,493 MW to consumers. This regardless of the fact that system-peak demand was only 3,868 MW.
By building more capacity than is required to meet system-peak demand, in 2011-12 the South West Interconnected System was gold plated by about 42%. The estimated value of this over-investment in Western Australia’s major electricity system was $3.85 billion in 2011-12.
Under the Western Australian system, all of this $3.85 billion, plus profit, must be recovered from wholesale consumers of electricity. These include major retailer Synergy and the publicly owned Water Corporation, who are then put under pressure to recover the associated cost increases from their retail customers.
The fact is that this approach to network regulation places all of the investment risk on consumers, but no financial risk is placed on the network business paid to augment the network.
What is needed is a network tariff system that shifts the financial risk away from consumers and back onto the network operators.
A solution would be to replace the current system of network tariffs, which are spread across the year as energy consumption charges, by a system of network tariffs based on actual system-peak power demand. Under this system a network business would be automatically penalised for their gold plating of the network.
Denial of gold plating by the government agencies responsible for Western Australia’s regulatory framework does not inspire much faith in them devising a solution to the problem. It appears that the Western Australian Government is quite happy to maintain the status-quo, despite a looming election in which electricity prices are likely to be a hot topic of political debate.
Justin Wood
logged in via Facebook
Great piece, and exceedingly timely — WA often gets forgotten, but we haven't avoided gold-plating either. And we have our own microcosm of probably-conflicted regulators to boot.
It's really past time electricity was treated with 21st century sophistication rather than antiquated regulatory controls and pricing systems from yesteryear: smart grids, smart supply sources, and smart pricing.
Stephan Lewandowsky
Chair of Cognitive Psychology at University of Bristol
Very interesting, but how does 'gold plating' differ from prudent management of anticipated increases in demand? An alternative view of this would be that the grid is not close to the edge and unlikely to collapse if demand spikes. Isn't that a good thing--up to a point? Could it be argued that unlike W.A. roads and public transport, which fail to keep pace with development, the grid at least is poised for future increases?
Note that I am not endorsing mindless growth, but I prefer my infrastructure to come with a bit of padding and redundancy, so I'd like to know more about where "prudent management" turns into "gold plating."
Adam McHugh
Lecturer in Energy Economics at Murdoch University
Hi Steve, you are quite right. There are two reasons why some amount of spare capacity is required. The first is that the central planners at the IMO and Western Power may get their demand forecast wrong and underestimate the system-peak. The second is that generation or network capacity may experience unscheduled outages during the system-peak.
The main point I am making above is that Western Australia’s rate-of-return approach to electricity market regulation passes all of the risk of a demand…
Read moreStephan Lewandowsky
Chair of Cognitive Psychology at University of Bristol
Thanks, makes sense.
David Arthur
n/a
Looks like the people who devised this disaggregation scheme passed Competition Theory 1.01 with flying colours, then set themselves up as Consultants.
It's a shame they didn't stay to read Competition Theory 1.02: for competition to be effective as an optimising technique, you need a large enough market to have a sufficiently large number of competitors.
Peter Bysouth
Semi-Retired
An interesting article that highlights the governance issues in any corporatisation venture. Especially one where the continuing owner (a Government) defines the regulators rules, which as highlighted, looks after that owner/Government and not the consumer. If your main aim is to prevent brownouts or heaven forbid even blackouts, or in other words avoid political embarrassment, then there is no proven "gold plating". However, as Prof Lewandowsky points out the then WA Government was anticipating…
Read moreR. Ambrose Raven
none
An ideologically self-serving exposition.
First: the error was not primarily the break-up of Western Power, but the earlier break-up of SECWA. Rabid economic fundamentalist ideologues such as Mike Nahan or Lyndon Rowe are obsessed with the funder-purchaser-provider model and the delusion of competition.
Second: Energy is certainly becoming more expensive. Electricity charges have risen by 35% over the past three years, and are forecast by the federal government to double in the next five…
Read moreZvyozdochka
logged in via Twitter
During the 3,868 MW peak, is there good data on the sources of demand? What is/was the residential/industrial breakdown, loses, inputs, wind contribution, solar contribution?
In my experience, one of the problems with WA is the relatively poor data collection and availability.
For example; if I wanted to get the performance data for Government owned Pinjar (crappy old peaking power plant) - do you think I can? No way.
Lastly, the gold plating problem can be expressed right here; I live in an older suburb of Perth that installed all underground power. We got new switchboards and smart meters. Our main switch has 35A stamped on it. I'm going to go away and check, but if our supply capability can support 35A and our neighbours can too, then there's your problem right there.
Rob Phillips
Academic
Let's assume for a moment that Adam is correct, and Western Power is 'gold plating' its transmission network, and this causes increased prices. There is another factor which will impact on prices over the next few years. That is, that the distribution network is focussed around power radiating from Collie, with few cross connections. WA Greens MP Robin Chapple has been arguing for some time that the current grid can't handle new renewable power sources at the edge of the current grid, e.g. Solar Thermal in the Goldfields; wind power near the coast. Billions will need to be spent on upgrading grid capacity for the upcoming change to renewables.
Not only does Western Power seem to be gold plating, but they're doing it in inappropriate places!
Adam McHugh
Lecturer in Energy Economics at Murdoch University
Erratum:
There are a couple of errors in this article which have been pointed out to me. First, between 2009 and 2012 the retail electricity price for customers connected to the Western Power Network rose by 62.5% not 48% (I failed to include the second of two price increases in 2010). Second the 2011-12 system peak did not occur on Australia Day but rather on the day before Australia Day.
The top 12 highest load half-hours (i.e. trading intervals) of the year occurred on January 25, and the 13th highest on January 27. The difference between the system-peak demand trading interval and the 13th highest load trading interval was 192 MW. This demonstrates the well known fact that a large proportion of the cost of electricity supply is incurred during only a small fraction of the year.