tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/brexit/articlesBrexit – The Conversation2019-12-13T01:28:52Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288502019-12-13T01:28:52Z2019-12-13T01:28:52ZBoris Johnson’s big election victory: academics on what it means for the UK and Brexit<p>Boris Johnson is now confirmed to have secured a big victory in the British general election. He went into the poll at the head of a minority government and has emerged with a significant majority. His Conservative Party now holds 365 seats in the 650-seat Westminster parliament. </p>
<p>The Labour Party has suffered its worst loss in decades – and its fourth general election defeat in a row, ending up with just 203 seats. The Scottish National Party has made significant gains in Scotland and now holds 48 seats. That would appear to strengthen the case for a second Scottish independence referendum, posing another huge constitutional question for the UK.</p>
<p>While the <a href="https://theconversation.com/2019-election-polls-how-to-understand-a-confusing-picture-in-the-last-days-of-the-campaign-128416">polls had generally pointed</a> towards a victory for Johnson, it had been predicted to be small. It even looked like a hung parliament was a possibility according to some pre-vote opinion polling. So how did the UK come to this decision and what happens now with Brexit? Over the campaign, academic experts have been analysing the policy platforms of each party and can shed light on the current situation. </p>
<h2>Brexit is go …</h2>
<p>Johnson’s majority puts him in a position to comfortably pass his Brexit deal through parliament after several years of stalemate. He can now be expected to plough ahead at speed, given that all his parliamentary candidates agreed to support the deal’s passage through parliament ahead of the election. His plan is to leave the EU by January 31, 2020.</p>
<p>This is therefore a good moment to read over what exactly that deal entails. In brief, it is a relatively hard form of Brexit – although whether it will stay that way is up for debate now that Johnson has such a significant majority and potentially the freedom to soften his position. Under the current plan, though, the UK will leave the single market and customs union, ending free movement with a plan to introduce a points-based immigration system. But there remain questions about potential trade friction between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. All this was outlined by Oliver Patel, research associate at the UCL European Institute, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnsons-brexit-policy-explained-128490">combed through the documents</a> a few days before the vote.</p>
<p>Patel looked ahead to the next stages too, since departure marks the beginning of an intense period of negotiations with Brussels. He noted that there is much still to be agreed – and on a tight timetable.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The UK and the EU have between the withdrawal date and December 31 2020 (the end of the transition period) to negotiate and ratify the full agreement on their future relationship, which should govern relations in a vast range of areas such as trade, migration, security, foreign policy and data.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>… but Brexit is not ‘done’</h2>
<p>It’s hard to deny that this election appears to have been won at least partly because of one promise – that Johnson will <a href="https://theconversation.com/lets-be-clear-about-what-get-brexit-done-really-means-128347">“get Brexit done”</a>. He repeated his three-word mantra over and over again, at every opportunity. But as multiple experts have pointed out in recent weeks, this is an optimistic take. Even if Johnson does meet his self-imposed deadline of January 31, the story is far from over. </p>
<p>Helen Parr, professor of history at Keele University’s school of social, global and political studies, sees a long road ahead, and one that could still end in what is effectively a no-deal Brexit.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The reality is that government resources will be tied up on Brexit for the foreseeable future. Equally, the idea that the UK will be free to do as it pleases the moment the withdrawal bill passes through the House of Commons is an illusion. Rather, Britain will find its freedom of action constrained by what sort of future relationship it can agree with the EU and other trading partners. Those questions will take years to answer, if they are ever satisfactorily resolved.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Johnson has ruled out extending the transition period so if sticks by that and then can’t strike a trade deal by the end of 2020, the UK may depart without one. </p>
<h2>A new political identity</h2>
<p>This election has dramatically redrawn the electoral map in the UK. Chunks of the country that have traditionally been considered Labour strongholds have turned Conservative. This is a switch of allegiances that would have been considered unthinkable just a few years ago.</p>
<p>But as Geoffrey Evans, professor in the sociology of politics, at the University of Oxford, revealed, <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-identities-how-leave-versus-remain-replaced-conservative-versus-labour-affiliations-of-british-voters-110311">political identities</a> in the UK are now as often defined by your position on Brexit as by which party you support. He has conducted surveys charting this shift in the years since the 2016 referendum and watched as people steadily change to prioritise their Brexit identity. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Tellingly, even in mid-2018, two years after the referendum, only just over 6% of people did not identify with either Leave or Remain. Compare this with party political attachment, where the percentage with no party identity increased from 18% to 21.5% over the same period – in part due to the decline of UKIP. Only one in 16 people don’t have a Brexit identity whereas more than one in five have no party identity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This election is arguably the culmination of this process. So many voters in Labour’s so-called “red wall” in the midlands of England and northern England appear to have voted in a way they <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-people-hardly-ever-thought-about-the-eu-before-brexit-now-it-dominates-their-lives-123784">probably wouldn’t have countenanced</a> just five years ago, delivering the biggest Conservative majority in years. </p>
<h2>What went wrong for Labour?</h2>
<p>This loss will certainly force some deep soul searching within the Labour Party. Its leader Jeremy Corbyn opted to fight this election on an ambitious platform of reform, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-labours-plans-to-renationalise-certain-public-services-make-economic-sense-126814">pledging to nationalise utilities</a> and even offering <a href="https://theconversation.com/economics-of-labours-plan-to-nationalise-broadband-20-billion-cost-is-unrealistic-127256">free internet access</a> for all. He proposed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-labours-green-industrial-revolution-tackle-the-climate-crisis-experts-weigh-in-127542">radical green agenda</a> that would have put the UK miles out ahead of other nations while Johnson didn’t even bother turning up to a debate on climate change. So how could such a bumper package deliver such a dismal return? </p>
<p>Labour will need to look particularly closely at the working class voters it has lost in the country’s former industrial bases. David Etherington, professor of local and regional economic development at Staffordshire University <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-labour-lost-working-class-support-in-uks-left-behind-regions-128332">explored the party’s recent history</a> with these supporters and found its approach lacking. Years of decline, followed by the financial crash of 2008 left many people in these “left behind” regions wanting change. And many saw their opportunity in 2016: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the absence of a coherent alternative to austerity and, more importantly, a previous lack of active engagement by the Labour Party with its core electorate, a vote to leave the EU was a vote for change. And for some it was as an expression of protest.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Labour has struggled for years to define its position on Brexit. Even though it has more recently solidified its stance, pledging a second referendum, it also sought to make the 2019 election about anything other than Brexit. There will certainly now be questions about whether these were the right decisions. </p>
<h2>Is Scotland on the way out?</h2>
<p>The Scottish National Party surge leaves it in charge of nearly every constituency in Scotland. The nationalists have put calls for a second independence referendum at the centre of their campaign. As William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics at Glasgow Caledonian University, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nicola-sturgeon-is-pushing-so-hard-for-indyref2-now-127883">explains</a>, first minister Nicola Sturgeon is capitalising on anti-Brexit sentiment to push for another go at breaking away from the United Kingdom:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The reason why support for independence has risen is perhaps that a section of Remain voters have switched sides: the SNP’s Remain credentials help the party to distance its brand of civic and cosmopolitan nationalism from the anti-EU, anti-immigrant nationalism that we see in a number of countries. As a result, the pro-independence vote which was already largely pro-EU is now even more solidly in favour of Scotland staying in the EU.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A strong Conservative majority in Westminster certainly makes it hard to see how another independence referendum would actually come about, but for now, a big statement has been made in the shift towards Sturgeon’s party.</p>
<h2>Who is Boris Johnson, really?</h2>
<p>Johnson has been prime minister for a few months already but he can be a tricky character to pin down – especially when he’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/11/boris-johnson-hides-in-fridge-to-avoid-piers-morgan-interview">hiding in fridges</a>. Chris Stafford, a doctoral researcher at the University of Nottingham, <a href="https://theconversation.com/boris-johnson-by-numbers-the-new-uk-prime-ministers-career-summed-up-120787">gave it a good go when he first took office</a>, painting by numbers to find the man beneath.</p>
<p>From his chequered 14-year career in journalism to his tenure as London mayor, during which time he showed a penchant for vanity projects, Johnson has made some surprising choices in his various careers.</p>
<p>But this all appears to have been priced into the 2019 vote. Johnson is regularly accused of hiding who he really is, but maybe that’s not actually the case at all. He has left enough clues along the way for us to build a picture of the man he is – and the British public has decided they are fine with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
From Brexit and Labour’s future to Britain’s new political battlegrounds, here’s the expert lowdown on what Boris Johnson’s predicted landslide win means.Laura Hood, Senior Politics Editor, Assistant Editor, The Conversation (UK edition)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/967352018-05-23T09:29:11Z2018-05-23T09:29:11ZCan technology and ‘max fac’ solve the Irish border question? Expert explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219759/original/file-20180521-14950-1ru31da.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The old border was a source of anger, resentment and violence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/123732078@N07/17393227164">henrikjohn/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>How might the UK “take back control” of its borders without making the border in Ireland any harder. One proposal on the table is maximum facilitation (max fac). This approach does not avoid the creation of a customs border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but rather aims to make the border as invisible and frictionless as possible through the use of technology. This includes electronic customs registration, unobtrusive screening techniques and even the <a href="https://theconversation.com/finally-interesting-uses-for-the-blockchain-that-go-beyond-bitcoin-51213">technology behind Bitcoin</a>.</p>
<p>But the application of technology cannot sugarcoat the fact that being outside the customs union will have a material impact on the Irish border. Such an impact jars with the UK government’s commitment that the Irish border would have <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf">“no physical infrastructure or related checks or controls”</a>. For it is absolutely clear what a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/notice_to_stakeholders_brexit_customs_and_vat_en.pdf">UK-EU customs border would mean</a>. Goods moving between the two would be subject to customs supervision and this means checks and controls. </p>
<h2>Electronic customs</h2>
<p>Custom authorities around the world are keen to find technological means of improving efficiency. Paper forms have steadily been replaced by electronic customs declarations, which can be submitted more easily and enable quicker movement between different customs zones. For this reason, both <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/getting-ready-for-the-customs-declaration-service">the UK</a> and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/union-customs-code_en">the EU</a> are in the process of creating fully electronic customs systems. </p>
<p>Singapore has just revealed the world’s first <a href="http://fintechnews.sg/19677/blockchain/blockchain-based-e-certificate-of-origin-singapore-chamber-of-commerce">blockchain-based platform</a> for electronic certificates of origin (eCOs). <a href="https://theconversation.com/blockchain-could-challenge-the-accepted-ways-we-shape-and-manage-society-53647">Blockchain is a way of recording transactions</a> on a decentralised public register that’s very hard to tamper with, and is the technology behind bitcoin. Verification of eCOs through a private blockchain network helps prevent fraud and alterations of certificates of origin. This could address one issue that the UK and the EU face. </p>
<p>But this doesn’t go anywhere near resolving the risk of customs fraud on the Irish border. The difficulty of policing this border was exploited by smugglers even when it was heavily securitised. </p>
<p>More fundamentally, any solution would have to address the historical, economic and geographical realities of the Irish border, as well as its political and social significance. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-good-friday-agreement-in-northern-ireland-at-20-the-anthill-podcast-94610">The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland at 20 – The Anthill podcast</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Gathering Information</h2>
<p>The effectiveness of maximum facilitation in customs enforcement stands or falls on the scale and quality of the information the systems receive. This type of border control requires operators and travellers to pre-register for customs checks and constantly disclose accurate information to all relevant parties.</p>
<p>When vehicles pass through approved crossings, officials can track the progress of registered vehicles (albeit without knowledge of what they are carrying). If used on a mass scale, big data can be be used to identify patterns of suspicious activity. </p>
<p>It is also possible to gather information that is not willingly – nor wittingly – submitted by those crossing the border. Sensors buried in the ground or micro <a href="http://spie.org/newsroom/0456-compact-low-cost-synthetic-aperture-radar?SSO=1">synthetic aperture radar</a> on drones in the air could detect unexpected vehicle movement across a border. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219758/original/file-20180521-14970-1l4mwz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Border drones in Ireland would be intrusive and offensive.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CBP_Unmanned_aerial_vehicle.jpg">US Department of Homeland Security</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such technology may have its uses in unpopulated, inhospitable plains where border crossings are almost automatically suspect. But as a means of monitoring a border that is literally criss-crossed with small roads and straddled by farms, households and parishes, it is as redundant as it is offensive. </p>
<p>Just think how the residents of Dover or Holyhead would respond to the idea of being constantly surveilled by drones or mobile phone tracing. Those in the Irish border region have recent experience of close surveillance and border controls. Twenty years on from the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, the negative consequences of militarised security at the Irish border remain evident: economically, socially and politically.</p>
<p>It is absolutely critical to appreciate that the achievement of a porous, unmonitored Irish border is a much-cherished sign of the peace process. Hence the promise to avoid a hard border. </p>
<h2>Checking goods</h2>
<p>Another concern about customs checks is the question of how these might occur. Goods container inspections require physical infrastructure and human resources. Experience on the Irish border shows that routine customs inspections can escalate into <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/23/northern-ireland-brexit-border-old-wounds-troubles">serious operations requiring security protection</a>. Politicians hope technology can alleviate this.</p>
<p>There have been steady advances in non intrusive screening techniques. Vapour analysis using what’s known as <a href="https://nmi3.eu/neutron-research/techniques-for-/chemical-analysis.html">neutron-activated spectroscopy</a> could enable customs to detect the presence of certain chemical compounds. <a href="https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/august-2010/accelerator-apps-cargo-scanning">Gamma ray scanning</a> can be used to give a type of x-ray image of what is inside a container, while <a href="http://www.lanl.gov/org/padste/adeps/physics/thrusts/muon-tomography.php">Muon tomography</a> can help customs assess the volume and location of contents in a container.</p>
<p>But these technologies are very expensive and impractical. They are designed for a particular task, such as detecting a specific type of contraband, and are neither speedy nor invisible.</p>
<p>Human checks on goods will remain critical to customs supervision. At the very least this will require warehouses large enough to inspect freight. Locating them away from the border does not mean no border controls, only less effective ones. For the further from the border these are located, the greater the opportunity for cargo to be swapped or stolen. </p>
<h2>Sugar coating the real problem</h2>
<p>Maximum facilitation can do no more than its name suggests – facilitate customs procedures. It cannot end the need for customs checks. In fact, it relies upon them. </p>
<p>The more hidden the technology monitoring a customs border is, the greater the need for surveillance and data capture. Movements, transactions and communications across the Irish border are a precious part of everyday life for so many in Ireland, north and south. To gather data on such movements, transactions and communications for the purpose of enforcing a customs border that no one in Northern Ireland wishes to see is hardly a viable (let alone democratic) solution. </p>
<p>Max fac could certainly conjure up more efficient and surreptitious border controls than have previously existed between the UK and Ireland. But the sugar-coating of technology would hardly last long before the bitter reality of enforcing a UK-EU customs border in Ireland was revealed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katy Hayward receives funding from SSHRC (Canada) 'Borders in Globalization' project. Research contributing to this article was funded through the ESRC project TRUST Tracing Risk and Uncertainty in Security Technology (ES/K011332/1).</span></em></p>After Brexit, politicians hope that technology can help us avoid a hard border in Ireland.Katy Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/967632018-05-18T08:44:28Z2018-05-18T08:44:28ZWhy Wales was right to say yes to the UK’s Brexit Bill<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219392/original/file-20180517-155558-x2gnuw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">UK, EU, Wales.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/flags-united-kingdom-european-union-wales-785853919?src=SDxgfLMBF1tchP4QQea2nw-1-19">alexfan32</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Both Wales and Scotland have <a href="https://gov.wales/newsroom/firstminister/2017/170713-joint-statement-from-first-ministers-of-wales-and-scotland/?lang=en">acknowledged the need to prepare UK laws for EU withdrawal</a>, yet they have taken very different stances on how this can be achieved. While the Welsh Assembly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-44109489">has agreed</a> to the UK government’s proposed Brexit Bill, the Scottish parliament <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotlands-brexit-bill-rejection-could-be-the-start-of-a-new-constitutional-crisis-96664">has said no</a>. </p>
<p>The Welsh government has said their position was based on negotiations that “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-wales-politics-44131326/welsh-government-brexit-bill-deal-right-for-devolution">strengthens devolution and protects the UK</a>”. By contrast, Scotland’s refusal was based on the bill being evidence that the UK government <a href="https://theconversation.com/scotlands-brexit-bill-rejection-could-be-the-start-of-a-new-constitutional-crisis-96664">could not be trusted with devolution</a>.</p>
<p>Not all in Wales agree with the move, however. Leanne Wood, leader of Plaid Cymru, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2018-05-15/withdrawal-bill-consent-lcm-wales-assembly/">accused Welsh ministers</a> of “bowing down to the Tories at Westminster and supporting their power grab”. But, despite making a move <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/apr/24/wales-isolates-nicola-sturgeon-over-eu-powers-after-brexit">that isolates Scotland</a> in its fight against Westminster, did Wales actually get it right?</p>
<h2>Political possibilities vs. legal reality</h2>
<p>There are a few important points to note here. Drawing strict comparisons between the Welsh and Scottish position can lead to artificial discussion. The job of the Welsh Assembly is to represent Wales’s interests, which are not necessarily the same as what the Scottish parliament feels is right for Scotland. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results">EU referendum result</a>, party allegiances of <a href="http://senedd.assembly.wales/mgMemberIndex.aspx">Welsh Assembly Members (AMs)</a> compared to the <a href="http://www.parliament.scot/msps/current-msps.aspx">Scottish MSPs</a>, and the policies of the <a href="https://www.snp.org/what_is_the_snp_plan_for_brexit">SNP</a> compared to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-43085235">Welsh Labour</a>, are all clear evidence of these differences. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219394/original/file-20180517-155584-48xa6s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Senedd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Leighton Collins/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, while politically sensitive, Wales and Scotland <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-can-wales-and-scotland-block-the-brexit-repeal-bill-81041">cannot constitutionally stop Brexit</a> – contrary to some <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/904422/Brexit-Nicola-Sturgeon-SNP-Lord-Adonis-second-referendum-Scotland">headlines</a>. The unequivocal legal reality is that the powers that devolved legislatures enjoy stem from Westminster. And within all <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35559447">devolution acts</a>, it is made explicitly clear that the UK parliament retains supremacy on constitutional matters.</p>
<p>The relationships between Westminster, Holyrood and the Senedd have, arguably, been one of <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-04-18/debates/7EBC6648-C6E8-4E91-929F-D9A06222CDAF/LeavingTheEUScotlandAndWalesContinuityBills">relative mutual compliance</a> to date, based on respect for legislative competences and political sensitivities. If Westminster had occasion to pass a law affecting a devolved area, then negotiations have traditionally taken place to agree a legislative consent motion (LCM) – <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2016-0196.html">not legally binding</a> but politically respected. So the UK parliament could very well proceed with the Brexit Bill without agreement from Wales and Scotland. </p>
<p>In the absence of a legal solution, Wales pursued a political one through negotiation. Their initial concerns related to the “<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/devolution-clause-11-report-published-17-19/">constitutionally insensitive</a>” <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu-withdrawal-bill-clause-11-devolution">clause 11</a> of the bill. This would see <a href="https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/24-powers-devolved-areas-uk-14388918">24 powers</a> return from Brussels to Westminster in areas that the Welsh Assembly and Scottish parliament have traditionally had competence over (subject to Brussels’s precedence).</p>
<p>Following nearly a year of discussions, Wales has compromised, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2018-05-15/withdrawal-bill-consent-lcm-wales-assembly/">temporarily agreeing</a> that these powers can be held by Westminster for an intermittent period of time. Their reasons were not to effect UK trade, and to achieve regulatory alignment for the whole of the UK, until a new legal framework is established.</p>
<h2>Why Wales was right</h2>
<p>The laws and powers governing the relationship between Westminster and Brussels predate the UK’s devolved governments by 26 years. The powers that are allegedly coming back from Brussels, are ones that would not have been previously envisaged when drafting the devolved legislation from 1998 onwards. Owing to Brussels’s oversight, it was not possible – at the time of establishing the devolved parliaments – to have a situation where the UK’s regions could pursue major regulatory differences. </p>
<p>So, as the UK tries to enter new international markets, it is within Wales’s interests to want to protect its key industries within the <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubadm/484/48407.htm">24 areas of control</a> (such as agriculture and fisheries) by feeding into a whole UK policy approach. </p>
<p>Alternatively, if the UK government agrees a new relationship with the EU that maintains market access, these internal constitutional disputes may be redundant. If the UK does agree some form of access, it is likely that compulsory regulatory alignment with the existing EU requirements will be a prerequisite for the whole UK anyway (making Welsh or Scottish divergence an impossibility).</p>
<h2>Principles of Welsh devolution at stake?</h2>
<p>So the question becomes one of principle. Should Wales accept legislative oversight from Westminster in devolved areas in the future (as opposed to Brussels)? </p>
<p>Oversight has always been there for all the devolved regimes. The position that Wales has adopted is a pragmatic one. The undeniable reality of any negotiation is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2018/mar/02/may-brexit-speech-theresa-may-to-use-her-brexit-speech-to-say-we-cant-have-everything-grayling-says-politics-live">compromise and respect</a>, and for the time being, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2018-05-15/withdrawal-bill-consent-lcm-wales-assembly/">the Welsh government</a> appears to be content that, politically speaking, London is willing to listen and make adjustments. </p>
<p>That is not to suggest that Wales should concede on all matters within their devolved competence. As David Rees AM, chair of the Welsh <a href="http://www.assembly.wales/en/bus-home/committees/Pages/Committee-Profile.aspx?cid=449">External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee</a> put it, Wales should still be cautiously concerned that the Assembly’s ability to pass laws in devolved policy areas <a href="http://senedd.assembly.wales/documents/s75443/European%20Union%20Withdrawal%20Bill%20-%20Progress%20towards%20delivering%20our%20six%20objectives%20-%2014%20May%202018.pdf">could be constrained by the UK parliament</a> in the future. Even where the Assembly has refused consent for constraints to be imposed. </p>
<p>But given the current harshness of the extreme alternative – whereby Wales would have limited legal influence by refusing the LCM – the negotiated agreement and political advantage for Wales, at least for now, does seem the right solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96763/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Clear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scotland said no, so why would Wales say yes to letting the UK take over devolved powers?Stephen Clear, Lecturer in Law, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966642018-05-16T10:06:55Z2018-05-16T10:06:55ZScotland’s Brexit Bill rejection could be the start of a new constitutional crisis<p>“Vote leave to take back control” – but control of what, and from whom? The plethora of questions stemming from this Brexit mantra have already threatened to steer the UK towards a new constitutional crisis. And now, in an unprecedented move, the Scottish parliament is expected to, for the first time, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-44108200">refuse a legislative consent motion</a> (LCM) from the UK government relating to the EU Withdrawal Bill. </p>
<p>First minister Nicola Sturgeon has called it part of Scotland fighting back against attempts to undermine the devolved administrations, and Westminster’s opportunistic Brexit <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-40586269">“power-grab”</a>. But it may also just be the first step in a new bid for Scottish independence, and ultimately a constitutional crisis for the whole country. </p>
<p>Sometimes referred to as <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/legislative-consent/">a Sewel motion</a>, a LCM is a motion passed by the Scottish parliament, Welsh assembly or Northern Irish assembly indicating their respective agreement to Westminster passing new laws in areas that they would traditionally have control of – for example health or education. </p>
<p>LCMs operate on the basis that, by convention, the UK legislature will not normally pass laws that either directly affect a devolved subject matter – areas which are <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35559447">typically controlled by the devolved government</a> such as health, or education, for example – , or change the competence, or powers, of a devolved legislature or its ministers, without consent to do so. </p>
<p>However, while these rules exist politically (and have been recognised in the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/11/contents/enacted">Scotland Act</a> and <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/4/contents/enacted">Wales Act</a>), they are not legally binding. Nor do they limit the sovereign power of the UK parliament. </p>
<h2>Devolution disputes</h2>
<p>Since <a href="https://gov.wales/newsroom/firstminister/2017/170713-joint-statement-from-first-ministers-of-wales-and-scotland/?lang=en">2017</a>, both the Scottish and Welsh governments have <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-can-wales-and-scotland-block-the-brexit-repeal-bill-81041">disputed the repatriation</a> of powers from Brussels to the UK in areas that are theoretically of devolved importance, but in practice are governed by EU law (which currently takes precedence over domestic rules). </p>
<p>The devolved governments’ concerns relate to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-43343716">24 retained areas of control</a>, including agriculture and fisheries. At present, the UK government, under the “<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/devolution-clause-11-report-published-17-19/">constitutionally insensitive</a>” clause 11 of the Brexit Bill, states that they should have power to amend “retained EU law”, rather than Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219075/original/file-20180515-195318-cfv9es.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Scottish parliament.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/edinburgh-scotland-uk-may-27-2016-685365952">jax10289/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The UK government argues that they need to retain these powers, for an intermittent period of time, so as to create a new UK-wide legal framework to replace EU legislation. It claims this is needed to protect the UK markets, and avoid a direct impact on trade via divergence across the different UK regions. </p>
<p>The Scottish government, however, argues that such action defies the will of the Scottish people who voted in favour of Scottish devolution. Sturgeon has said that the UK government <a href="https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-says-cant-trust-12537066">cannot be trusted with devolution</a>, and <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/constitutional-crisis-looms-as-msps-prepare-to-reject-uk-s-brexit-bill-1-4739408">the principle issue</a> is that “the consent of the Scottish parliament to the removal of any of its powers should be an absolute prerequisite”.</p>
<p>Scotland’s Brexit minister Mike Russell has added that refusing the LCM presents the Scottish parliament with a powerful opportunity to unite together and “<a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/constitutional-crisis-looms-as-msps-prepare-to-reject-uk-s-brexit-bill-1-4739408">protect the powers of devolution</a>”, by sending a signal that Scotland will not accept attempts to constrain their powers. </p>
<p>Although these are both strong political sentiments, refusing a LCM – alone – is less likely to achieve legal impact on the Brexit Bill. </p>
<h2>Scotland fronting the challenge</h2>
<p>By contrast, following months of negotiations, the majority of Welsh assembly members (AMs) are expected to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-44109489">back the Brexit Bill</a>, and approve the LCM. This is on the basis that the EU powers will be held in Westminster for up to seven years before being devolved back to Wales. </p>
<p>But why the differing opinions over LCMs? It is worth noting the different political climate in Wales compared to Scotland. The majority of Welsh constituencies <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results">voted in favour</a> of Brexit. And there are a higher percentage of UKIP and Conservative AMs <a href="http://senedd.assembly.wales/mgMemberIndex.aspx?FN=PARTY&VW=LIST&PIC=0">in Wales</a> compared to MSPs <a href="http://www.parliament.scot/msps/12450.aspx">in Scotland</a>. </p>
<p>Furthermore, with the collapse of the power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland, there is no official government <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-42608322">representing Nothern Irish views in these negotiations</a>. </p>
<h2>Where next?</h2>
<p>The legal reality is, even if the Scottish parliament refuses to approve a LCM, Brexit legislation will not be delayed. Furthermore, the UK government has already indicated that it is willing to challenge Scotland over <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/uk-to-challenge-scotland-s-brexit-bill-in-supreme-court-1-4722757">its recent legislation pertaining to Brexit</a>. But, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2011-0108.html">as in previous cases</a>, it is likely that the Scottish government will similarly want to launch a legal challenge in the Supreme Court. This time relating to new laws that go against the devolved legal competence of Scotland. </p>
<p>However, given UK sovereignty rules, and that the Supreme Court has <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2016-0196.html">already stated</a> that LCMs are just political conventions – and that policing their scope and manner “does not lie within the constitutional remit of the judiciary” – it seems unlikely that Scotland will enjoy much success in pursuing such arguments. </p>
<p>But that won’t be the end of things. Instead, the looming constitutional crisis may come politically. There will likely be consequences for Westminster, which will be seen as defying the will of the Scottish people “again”. They voted in favour of devolution after all. Scotland also voted against Brexit, and yet is having to go through with it too. With this backdrop the whole country may very well be heading towards a new constitutional crisis and a <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/2018-year-nicola-sturgeon-calls-indyref2/">second Scottish independence referendum</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Clear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Scotland’s decision to reject the Brexit Bill may herald a national constitutional crisis.Stephen Clear, Lecturer in Law, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841322017-09-15T14:28:11Z2017-09-15T14:28:11ZCan Britannia ride the waves in choppy European seas?<p>The UK government has attempted to outline its plan for defence and security after Brexit in the latest in a series of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-a-future-partnership-paper">position papers</a> aimed at informing negotiations with the EU.</p>
<p>No sooner was it launched than Brexiteers began shrieking about an “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/12/military-veterans-fear-eu-ambush-post-brexit-defence-cooperation/">EU ambush</a>” and a British “surrender” to Brussels because of the government’s promise that it is “unconditionally committed” to European security. </p>
<p>Yet when Theresa May addressed security and defence in her <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf">letter triggering Article 50</a>, she was accused of “blackmail”. She was, apparently, issuing a “blatant threat” and “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/29/brexit-eu-condemns-mays-blackmail-over-security-cooperation">treating security as a ‘bargaining chip’</a>” by suggesting that the security partnership would have to be agreed before many other elements could be negotiated. The hope here was that the EU would recognise the UK’s relative strength on defence and offer a favourable divorce settlement.</p>
<p>And while the language in this paper is more moderate than that in the Article 50 letter, the UK government is obviously betting that it carries enough weight on matters of defence and security to make its plans a reality.</p>
<p>This also helps to explain why the same morning the paper was released, defence secretary Michael Fallon, insisted that this new partnership demands <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-11/u-k-will-offer-troops-to-support-eu-operations-after-brexit">co-operation on matters of both economics and security</a>.</p>
<p>But will this argument convince (or divide) the EU member states enough for them to acquiesce? Will they agree to combine “future relationship issues” with negotiations on the terms of the divorce? To judge by chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier’s <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-security-terrorism-uk-shows-its-upper-hand/">statement</a> that “those papers which refer to the future relationship” will be kept for later, the chances are slim.</p>
<h2>In or out?</h2>
<p>One could be forgiven for thinking this latest paper was written by a state trying to join the EU, not one trying to leave it. Its very first line states that “the United Kingdom wants to build a new, deep and special partnership with the European Union”. Of its 22 pages, the first 17 proclaim the UK and the EU’s “shared values”, “shared foreign and security threats” and “foreign policy”. All the while it boasts of the UK’s considerable defence capabilities. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the British government’s vision of the future UK-EU relationship is allocated a mere four pages at the paper’s back end. This section is quite vague. It’s never spelled out exactly why this new relationship would be “special” or how it would work in practice, either operationally or institutionally.</p>
<p>Essentially, if you’re interested in the concrete details of how “the UK’s future partnership with the EU” will work in practice, this is document is not the place to find them.</p>
<p>Instead, it’s a tautology from start to finish. Its logic seems to be that the UK has long been a “committed partner” with shared interests so therefore needs a future relationship with the EU that is “unprecedented in its breadth” (discounting the one that already exists) that has as its starting point “both our shared interests”. </p>
<p>According to the paper, the UK is proposing “regular close consultations on foreign and security policy issues” through “existing foreign policy mechanisms”. This apparently involves “maximising the effectiveness” in “operational, institutional or industrial co-operation”. Of course, what is not detailed are the precise mechanisms that will be used to achieve all this.</p>
<p>The UK is seeking an arrangement whereby “the level of UK involvement in the planning process” is “reflective of the UK’s contribution”, which is understandable. But the EU has not always been accommodating to non-EU member mission contributors when it comes to actually making decisions about defence. From the other side, it’s hard to see the UK contributing large resources to operations in which it has no decision-making privileges. </p>
<p>Now the UK is leaving the EU, it will push for greater co-operation between the EU and NATO. It has always been a key British objective to keep the EU’s shared defence efforts close to NATO. This will be an imperative now more than ever. But as <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/feus20/current">my own research has always tried to demonstrate</a>, EU-NATO relations are themselves fraught with difficulties. And no longer being a member of both organisations will not help the UK navigate those problems.</p>
<h2>Plodding on</h2>
<p>It’s unlikely that the EU will integrate enough to produce a federalised super-state with a consequential EU army that “<a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/the-fate-of-britain-offshore-balancing-and-the-brexit/">tells London how high to jump</a>” – at least not any time soon. It’s also unlikely that the UK can leave the EU and retain all the same privileges within European defence that it currently enjoys. More likely, and to paraphrase academic David Blagden’s <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/the-fate-of-britain-offshore-balancing-and-the-brexit/">argument</a> before the Brexit referendum, EU defence will continue moving in “stops and starts” – “with or without Britain”.</p>
<p>A document as ambiguous as this latest <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-a-future-partnership-paper">defence paper</a> simply <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-eu-anywhere-near-getting-its-own-army-59188">incites</a> angry Brexiteers to shout about surrendering to some chimera EU Army, a nonexistent project that remains nothing more than <a href="http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/66456">a European federalist’s pipe dream</a>. It also leaves a big question unanswered: if all the proclamations and proposals in this document are sincere and the UK is just going to cobble together some new arrangement to replace its membership practically part-for-part, what is the point of leaving at all? </p>
<p>Of course, the answer is that it’s in the interest of both the UK and the EU to retain some form of special partnership after the UK leaves, even if the result is sub-optimal for both. But the UK will not feel altogether comfortable being neither the engine nor the brake of European defence. And although some in the EU will be glad to see the UK robbed of its ability to frustrate their defence integration projects, most will actually regret the loss of a capable military power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform.</span></em></p>A new position paper on co-operating with the EU on defence assumes a lot and suggests very little.Simon J Smith, Lecturer in International Relations, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/795112017-06-20T09:24:55Z2017-06-20T09:24:55ZA weak UK government might do a better Brexit deal than a strong one<p>When Theresa May called her disastrous snap election, she <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-39627177/theresa-may-s-full-announcement-on-calling-snap-election">justified it</a> by saying she needed a longer and stronger mandate to negotiate a Brexit deal. Her campaign was based on the claim that she embodies strength and stability, and is therefore a better negotiator than her Labour rival, Jeremy Corbyn. </p>
<p>May’s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/theresa-may-hated-strong-and-stable-election-slogan_uk_593ea75be4b02402687b3f5c">much-derided</a> “strong and stable” slogan boiled down to the idea that it was self-evident that Britain needs a strong domestic position to negotiate to its advantage, and to strongarm the EU into giving it concessions. Labour tried to convince the electorate that it could also offer a strong position if the voters backed it, but never challenged the assumption that a unified, internally strong Britain would be a better bargainer. </p>
<p>Yet strangely enough, when it comes to the way negotiation dynamics work, this “common sense” flies in the face of both theory and empirical research – both of which would have it that the UK’s messy political situation in fact puts it in a better position from which to get what it wants. When it comes to extracting concessions in negotiations, strength is weakness and weakness is strength. </p>
<p>This was famously suggested by <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-32865248">John Nash</a>, whose work on game theory won a Nobel Prize in economics (and whose life won an Oscar for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFJgUm7iOKw">best film</a>). Nash’s mathematical bargaining formula holds that if one side in a negotiation is less than fully dependent on a deal being struck but more inflexible than the other side when it comes to the deal’s terms, then it will have to yield less than the opposing side.</p>
<p>While Nash’s <a href="http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/spring02/papers/nash50a.pdf">bargaining theory</a> is fully explained using highly complex mathematical proofs, the point that’s relevant to Brexit is relatively simple.</p>
<p>Imagine you visit a dealership to buy a car. If you were choosing a car completely independently and were dead set on buying one, you’d be less determined to negotiate a good price than you would be if you weren’t entirely sure you really needed a car, or if you had to justify your purchase to someone else – a sceptical spouse, say. If you’re less purely invested in the car no matter what and instead under pressure to justify the terms of the deal, you will need to get a better price. The dealer, meanwhile, just has to sell you the car.</p>
<h2>Everyone’s watching</h2>
<p>May’s government might now have a hazier vision of what it wants than it did headed into the election, but Nash’s theory would imply that since there are plenty of sceptical voices inside the Conservative party as well as outside it, the British team will now be better placed to get the best possible deal.</p>
<p>When a negotiator is vigilantly monitored rather than given freedom to make independent decisions with a clear mandate, it’s difficult for them to settle for the other side’s demands. According to Jean Bartunek’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/173443?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">research team</a>, this gives one side a paradoxical sort of strength: to reach a negotiated solution, the “stronger” side ends up having to make more compromises than the weaker one. </p>
<p>A similar conclusion was reached by <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2420020304/full">Helmuth Lamm and his co-researchers</a>: if a negotiator is not only closely monitored but weakly positioned vis-à-vis the people monitoring them, they will be under even more pressure not to compromise. This might make the process messier and the agreement harder to reach – but it also means that if both sides want to reach one, the stronger side will be the one that needs to compromise.</p>
<p>This is the dynamic that may be about to play out. May is short of a working majority, and is having to make difficult deals in order to govern with any sort of confidence. Her government will directly depend on the support of MPs and parties who aren’t committed to its preferred form of Brexit. May has neither strength nor stability on her side, and her team have substantially less political capital than they thought; that means a show of steadfastness in the face of EU demands could be their best hope for being allowed to see the negotiations through.</p>
<p>As things stand, the EU and its member states want a negotiated solution with the UK rather than no deal at all. Faced with the tightrope-walking representatives of a weak, pressurised government, they’ll have to accept that unreasonable demands have little or no chance of making it into the deal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timo A Kivimäki does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When it comes to difficult negotiations, weakness is strength and strength weakness.Timo A Kivimäki, Professor of International Relations, Director of Research, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718952017-01-25T13:15:38Z2017-01-25T13:15:38ZWhy Scottish nationalists won’t see Article 50 ruling as a defeat<p>The UK Supreme Court <a href="https://theconversation.com/government-loses-brexit-court-case-so-what-happens-now-71824">ruling</a> over the triggering of Article 50, the EU process that will make Brexit possible, was half a victory for the Scottish government – and perhaps more than that. </p>
<p>On the plus side, it means there will now be a Westminster vote over triggering Brexit. On the minus side, there will be no veto for Scotland or the other devolved parliaments. Yet this too is arguably a positive in the Scottish government’s quest to keep Scotland in the EU and eventually gain independence. </p>
<p>The court’s decision to allow both houses of parliament to vote on the Brexit bill will help the Scottish nationalist MPs at Westminster as they try to build support for avoiding a departure from the European single market. It will also cause difficulties particularly for Labour, which is already torn between having many MPs who oppose Brexit but serve constituencies that voted in favour. </p>
<p>Still the SNP’s main competitor for votes in Scotland, Labour’s intractable mess over Brexit will become much more obvious in debates and votes in the House of Commons. This will help to sharpen political conflict over the process and substance of Brexit, which sees the SNP aligned with Scottish voters and many of the country’s institutions and interest groups – a fairly novel situation for the party on a major constitutional, political and economic issue.</p>
<p>Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP leader and Scottish first minister, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-nicola-sturgeon-members-scottish-parliament-will-be-given-chance-vote-triggering-article-50-a7541531.html">has already said</a> her party will table 50 “serious and substantive amendments” to the bill. These will include a proposal that the UK would remain in the EU under revised membership terms if MPs reject the final deal; and that any deal will require the unanimous agreement of the Joint Ministerial Committee of the UK’s four nations. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/UEZPs7sXev0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>No veto</h2>
<p>The Supreme Court’s decision against allowing the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish governments to have a formal role in the Brexit process is a mixed blessing for the SNP. The Scottish government would have used its institutional leverage to bargain, negotiate and threaten the UK with a veto – not least as it <a href="http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0051/00512073.pdf">has produced</a> its own Brexit options for Scotland. Now the Scottish government is <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-nicola-sturgeon-members-scottish-parliament-will-be-given-chance-vote-triggering-article-50-a7541531.html">reduced to</a> making political hay by <a href="http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/holyrood-could-left-powerless-supreme-9685853">moving for</a> a Brexit vote in Holyrood anyway. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the Supreme Court ruling relegated the importance of devolution and supports the supremacy of Westminster. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">55% No vote</a> in the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 was built on a strong and improved <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/by/gary-gibbon/blogs/almost-federal-offer-scots-change-votes">devolution settlement</a> and the argument that UK membership was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11102834/Spanish-prime-minister-says-a-separate-Scotland-would-spend-years-outside-the-EU.html">the only way</a> to stay in the EU: both have been fatally undermined by Brexit.</p>
<p>It’s a funny kind of unionism that prevents Scotland (and the other devolved nations) from having a voice over Brexit through institutions set up to bolster their role in the UK. The Conservative government’s position isn’t exactly consistent with claims from senior figures to “<a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/may-willing-to-listen-to-scotland-over-brexit-plan-ndlgf6cp0">listen to Scotland</a>” and that the UK is a “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29987193">partnership of nations</a>”. It doesn’t make Scotland appear to have “the strongest devolved parliament in the world”, contrary to <a href="https://www.holyrood.com/articles/inside-politics/how-general-election-changed-scotland">promises from</a> former prime minister David Cameron.</p>
<h2>Poll position</h2>
<p>Where does this all leave a second independence referendum? Following the court’s verdict, Nicola Sturgeon did not really move forward from her previous indications that a referendum is probable. She <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/nicola-sturgeon-steps-up-indyref2-calls-after-supreme-court-ruling-1-4347343">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is Scotland content for our future to be dictated by an increasingly right-wing Westminster government with just one MP here – or is it better that we take our future into our own hands? It is becoming ever clearer that this is a choice that Scotland must make.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My own reading is that the court’s decision probably makes a second referendum closer. Crucially, however, there will be less control over the timing than last time around. When the Scottish government <a href="http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence">negotiated</a> the terms of the first independence referendum in 2012, it was given the power to hold it by the end of 2014. This gave it some control over the timetable. This time, the timing of such a poll will probably be dictated by the Brexit departure timetable. </p>
<p>And while Brexit is certainly the type of explicit material change the SNP has long <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/20/nicola-sturgeon-launches-ambitious-and-reforming-snp-manifesto">said would</a> legitimise a second referendum, this doesn’t make it inevitable or winnable. There are a lot of obstacles in the way, such as the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b2ee7448-6a0e-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f">oil price</a>, the <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/poll-two-thirds-of-scots-back-currency-union-post-independence-1-4302829">currency</a> question, future <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/03/can-scotland-be-part-of-brexit-britain-and-the-eu-at-the-same-time">EU membership</a> and lukewarm <a href="http://whatscotlandthinks.org">independence polling</a>. </p>
<p>The SNP leadership is realistic about this, retaining a note of caution, knowing that everything is different to 2014 except public opinion. Yet much could still change: a lot of the substance of Brexit and its effects are still to come. That will feed into the SNP’s agenda on the constitution – not to mention policy issues for the Scottish government such as EU citizens, social policy, the environment, single market, energy and higher education. As Nicola Sturgeon and her advisers await the UK goverment’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2017/jan/25/labour-threatens-hand-to-hand-combat-in-parliament-over-article-50-bill-politics-live">White Paper</a> on Brexit, they will certainly be feeling that there is still everything to play for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lynch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Holyrood won’t get a veto, but the Supreme Court has done the union no favours.Peter Lynch, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/687002016-11-14T23:56:13Z2016-11-14T23:56:13ZA Brexit strategy that could unite UK’s parliaments – and keep Britain in the single market<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145809/original/image-20161114-5084-1te5z5f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Which way forward?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-443766001/stock-photo-dilemma-which-way-to-go-brexit-or-europe.html?src=sfBXGKUFTAjgyxatHqZAdA-1-30">safriibrahim</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nearly six months after the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810887">UK’s vote</a> to leave the EU, the path to Brexit is still uncharted. All we know is that because the UK government wants to maximise single market access without accepting the free movement of people, it is looking for a different arrangement to any that currently exists. </p>
<p>Representatives of the EU institutions and the other 27 member states <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/only-real-alternative-hard-brexit-no-brexit-eu-chief-warns-1586295">have rejected</a> the idea of a bespoke free-trade agreement with the UK. They argue that the single market is defined by the four freedoms – free movement of goods, capital, services and people – and that they cannot be unpicked. </p>
<p>They also argue, quite correctly, that no country can have full unfettered access to the EU single market without also agreeing to abide by a single set of rules governing that market. With multiple red lines on both sides, the margins for negotiation seem very limited. </p>
<h2>What the UK should do</h2>
<p>I <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/16/here-is-a-quick-fix-for-our-brexit-dilemmas/">have argued</a> elsewhere that the UK should seek to remain in the single market by joining the European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which <a href="https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2535258/brexit-essentials-alternatives-to-eu-membership.pdf">incorporate</a> Norway, Switzerland, Liechenstein and Iceland. This would be subject to agreement by EFTA and the EU. </p>
<p>My reasoning is that the costs of leaving the EU will be <a href="http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0050/00504615.pdf">considerable</a> – cutting 1.8% to 7.8% from annual GDP by 2030 depending on the trade deal, according to independent analysts. Some <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/27/uk-economy-defies-brexit-slowdown-fears">counter that</a> there is no evidence of such economic dislocation in the British economy but they are missing the point. We will only experience lower trade, investment and GDP growth after we leave the EU. </p>
<p>The current <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-shock-has-caused-a-sterling-crash-of-historic-proportions-heres-just-how-bad-it-is-for-the-pound-62191">sterling depreciation</a> is the financial markets’ closest estimate of the damage to come. Remaining in the single market through the EEA/EFTA while negotiating free-trade deals with non-EU countries is the UK’s second best option. And in an era where isolationism in trade looks set to be increasing following the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election, the last thing you want is to be outside a major trade bloc. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145811/original/image-20161114-5078-1u3xfl3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Time of the essence.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/103191722?src=wP2hlDbLwgNp3M2p3akNNw-1-51&id=103191722&size=medium_jpg">Vasabil</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The UK government may prefer a better deal than EEA/EFTA membership, for example by remaining in the EU’s customs union, since it imposes single EU tariffs on all outside countries and would therefore keep UK trade much simpler. But it is difficult to see how the UK can achieve what it wishes within the two-year time limit for negotiations after <a href="http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/the-mechanics-of-leaving-the-eu-explaining-article-50/">Article 50</a> of the Lisbon Treaty is triggered – <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37532364">due by</a> the end of March. </p>
<p>With the UK in a very weak bargaining position, EEA/EFTA membership would be a “truce position” that would ensure an arrangement was in place within the two years. Remaining in the single market through EEA/EFTA but outside the customs union would also increase its margin for negotiation with non-EU countries – as Norway has done. </p>
<h2>Alternatives</h2>
<p>There have been <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-hard-brexit-soft-article-free-movement-deal-single-market-access-a7341886.html">indications</a> that the UK is trying to chart an alternative Brexit course. It may want to reach an agreement with the EU on tariff-free trade as a transitional arrangement while leaving the single market, for example. The obvious problem is this would not allow the UK to overcome potential non-tariff barriers to the EU, such as the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/london-banking-will-struggle-to-escape-brexit-trap-61929">passporting rights</a>” that allow financial services companies to operate across the union from a single country. </p>
<p>Such an arrangement also runs the risk of falling <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm">foul of</a> World Trade Organisation (WTO) <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm">rules</a> on free-trade deals, unless it were seen as an interim agreement leading to a more comprehensive deal within <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm">ten years</a>. This would require an agreement to that effect with the EU, which adds a level of complication. </p>
<p>A variation is that the UK could pursue a “sector-by-sector” deal that goes beyond tariffs to retain full trading privileges for priority sectors – financial services and motor manufacture for example. The problem is that the EU would want concessions in return, for example in agriculture and fisheries. The UK would have to favour some sectors at the expense of others, which wouldn’t be popular, particularly as the vote to leave was particularly <a href="http://www.fwi.co.uk/news/exclusive-survey-reveals-farmers-back-eu-exit.htm">strong</a> in <a href="http://stv.tv/news/politics/1356963-nine-in-ten-fishermen-will-back-brexit-survey-suggests/">the sectors</a> the EU would want to protect. </p>
<p>The EU might also demand other concessions such as requiring the UK to contribute to the EU budget, as Switzerland has to, or to compromise on freedom of movement. A sector-by-sector deal also seems to flout <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm">WTO rules</a> that in free-trade agreements, the two sides’ duties and restrictive regulations have to be eliminated on “substantially all the trade” between them. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145815/original/image-20161114-5067-9ex36l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Decisions, decisions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-219102193/stock-photo-the-way-forward-railway.html?src=FiTlSzkfKSyKIoC6Ot66fg-1-7">hxdyl</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The devolved dimension</h2>
<p>The Brexit negotiations also involve an important intra-UK dimension. Two of the UK’s constituent nations, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36599102">Scotland</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36614443">Northern Ireland</a>, voted to Remain, as did London, whose economy depends critically on financial and other services exports to the EU. Scotland’s first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, has <a href="http://www.snp.org/nicola_sturgeon_opening_address_2016">argued</a> forcefully that in the absence of a commitment to keep the whole of the UK in the single market her government will seek to explore ways of implementing an alternative plan for Scotland to protect its interests: what has been <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14825041.Nicola_Sturgeon_urges_UK_Government_to_consider__flexible_Brexit_/">dubbed</a> a “flexible Brexit”. </p>
<p>The EU and EEA certainly already display a number of legal models which have been developed over time to deal with different territories’ specific needs. The situation of Northern Ireland will also require the exploration of a bespoke solution as it seeks to maintain free movement across the Irish border as per the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement">Good Friday agreement</a>. </p>
<p>The question remains whether the UK as the member state will choose to agree to build in these intra-UK dimensions to the Brexit negotiations. The UK has so far provided little insight as to its strategy, albeit Theresa May, the UK prime minister, has <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/02/theresa-may-no-scotland-opt-out-or-veto-from-brexit/">said publicly</a> there will be no Brexit opt-outs. </p>
<p>One irony is that if early next year the UK Supreme Court upholds the recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/nov/03/article-50-high-court-ruling-high-court-set-to-rule-on-whether-mps-should-vote-on-triggering-article-50-politics-live">High Court decision</a> that there must be a parliamentary vote ahead of triggering Article 50, it might actually strengthen the government’s hand. Suppose parliament stipulated it would only authorise triggering Article 50 if the government didn’t negotiate anything which imperilled full unfettered access to the single market, for example. </p>
<p>By imposing this limit on the Brexit negotiations, parliament may remove a key red line on the government’s side and widen its room for negotiation. This would also bring the UK government closer to the positions of the devolved administrations in their pursuit of single market participation and freedom of movement. </p>
<p><em>Anton Muscatelli will be speaking at <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-live-in-glasgow-countdown-to-brexit-where-next-for-the-uk-and-europe-68371">Countdown to Brexit: where next for UK and Europe?</a> – a Conversation Live panel discussion on November 18 in association with Policy Scotland at the University of Glasgow.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68700/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anton Muscatelli is chair of the Scottish government's Standing Council on Europe.</span></em></p>Nearly six months on from the UK’s shock vote, there looks very little room for manoeuvre in negotiations.Anton Muscatelli, Principal and Vice Chancellor, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/623932016-07-14T09:00:53Z2016-07-14T09:00:53ZHow the BBC’s obsession with balance took Labour off air ahead of Brexit<p>As Britain reflects on the fallout from the EU Referendum, <a href="http://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/eu-referendum/uk-news-coverage-2016-eu-referendum-report-5-6-may-22-june-2016/">analysis</a> from Loughborough University demonstrates that the BBC, in common with all other media, ignored concerns of Labour voters in favour of an entirely artificial notion of “balance” that was pitched as a ball-by-ball commentary of a Conservative power struggle. </p>
<p>Labour members canvassing in the streets and housing estates, waited in vain for the BBC – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/jun/22/bbc-tops-poll-as-most-important-news-source-for-eu-referendum?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other">the country’s most trusted news source</a> – to provide any serious analysis that could back up the Labour message on the doorstep. They had been expecting the BBC to deliver, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/appendix8#heading-13-principles-of-the-guidelines">as promised</a>, “impartial and independent reporting of the campaign, providing them with fair coverage and rigorous scrutiny of the policies and campaigns of all relevant parties and campaign groups”.</p>
<p>Television is bound by rules of impartiality and the BBC is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/impartiality">committed</a> to ensuring that “a range of views is appropriately reflected” in its coverage. In spite of this, David Deacon, professor of communication and media analysis at Loughborough, found that all television channels covered the campaign in very much the same way as each other – and the press.</p>
<p>In the first month, up to June 8, the Labour Party had attracted a mere 6% of the campaign coverage on TV (less even than the 9% in the press). The Conservatives, meanwhile, grabbed 32% of the coverage. </p>
<p>For a brief period in mid-June, as former prime minister Gordon Brown <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36513921">entered the fray</a>, Labour’s share of the political spotlight increased. But the interest in the Labour message was not sustained. In the final count of the frequency of appearances by media sector, Labour members figured in 10% of the TV coverage. The Conservatives provided almost 30%.</p>
<h2>Blame Corbyn?</h2>
<p>For many in the “Labour In” campaign, the problem was the lukewarm approach taken by Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/political-parties/labour-party/news/76762/labour-grandee-alan-johnson-lays-jeremy-corbyns">He was criticised</a> by campaign leader and veteran MP Alan Johnson, for “actively undermining the party’s efforts”.</p>
<p>However, by the end of the campaign, Corbyn had made 6.1% of all media appearances while Johnson figured in less than 1%. Given that accounts of the campaign suggest Johnson was far more actively engaged than Corbyn, this points to an editorial decision to ignore Labour Party campaigners in favour of highlighting what felt like the more high-profile battle between the Conservative “big beasts”. </p>
<p>By the later stages of the campaign, when it had begun to be clear that the final decision now rested on the votes of Labour voters in the old industrial heartlands, simple journalistic nous might have encouraged the BBC’s political team to find out what issues were likely to influence this key constituency and to seek out those politicians who represented them. Anecdotal evidence, that was not reflected in news bulletins, suggested that activists were finding a frustrating lack of knowledge about the campaign <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/30/labour-voters-in-the-dark-about-partys-stance-on-brexit-research-says">and Labour’s position</a> on the doorsteps.</p>
<h2>Crucial concerns ignored</h2>
<p>By focusing entirely on the Conservatives, the BBC failed to address the concerns of a very large section of its audience. The editorial team appeared not to understand that concerns about the impact on the economy and the City would not register with people for whom the City is considered to be directly responsible for the recession, austerity, job losses and the benefit curbs that came with it. </p>
<p>Links could have been made with the issues that the Labour Party wanted to focus on: jobs, employment rights, the health service and prices, but these topics barely made the news agenda. By June 22, employment had received 3.4% of the television coverage and health garnered 1.7%. The possibility of rising prices didn’t figure at all. By far the biggest category, with 28.9% of coverage, was the conduct of the campaign itself. </p>
<p>The BBC’s assistant political editor, Norman Smith, justified this approach on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07cyvk5">its Radio 4 Feedback programme</a> by explaining: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are there to report what the main combatants in this referendum say, do, argue. I don’t think it’s up to us to, as it were, go AWOL and say well, fine, but we’re actually going to talk about this because we think that’s what voters are interested in.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Really not cricket</h2>
<p>The decision to cover the referendum as though it were a cricket match, rather than a complex event in which every viewer and listener was actually a participant, rather than an observer, meant that in the days before the <a href="http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-3-news/scrutinising-statistical-claims-and-constructing-balance-television-news-coverage-of-the-2016-eu-referendum/">vote, fewer than a third</a> of voters felt well, or very well, informed about their vote.</p>
<p>There has already been a <a href="http://mediatel.co.uk/newsline/2016/06/15/eu-referendum-the-principles-of-broadcasting-impartiality-have-hit-a-snag">lot of concern</a> expressed at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jun/12/bbc-fairness-not-balance-one-side-lying-brexit">failure of the BBC</a> to address the obvious lies being peddled in the campaign and the decision to give each side the opportunity to rebut any attempt by experts to correct such misinformation. </p>
<p>There needs also to be a thorough review of the decision by the BBC to interpret balance in a way which simply ignored the interests of working class viewers and listeners, casting them as observers rather than participants in the campaign. </p>
<p>While it is true that social media was important in consolidating the Leave campaign, it is also true that most of what is circulated on social media (whatever the platform) originates in the mainstream. The BBC <a href="http://digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2016/overview-key-findings-2016/">is not only</a> the most watched, it is also the most shared, news source. Audiences cannot watch or share information that isn’t there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela Phillips is affiliated with the Media Reform Coalition and is a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>BBC editorial decisions cast Labour voters as onlookers in the referendum campaign.Angela Phillips, Professor, Goldsmiths, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/620092016-07-06T11:59:15Z2016-07-06T11:59:15ZBrexit adds a twist, but Eastern Europeans have been maligned for years<p>The question of whether the UK should leave the EU is being reinterpreted by some as an opportunity to call for EU citizens to leave the UK. A tiny but vocal minority of Brexit supporters are showing hostility towards the people they think should leave the country. There has been a surge in reports of <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/d6c3c43e-3c66-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0">hate crimes</a> and leaflets have been sent around <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-36633388">one English town</a> calling for Polish people to leave, in very unpleasant terms. </p>
<p>This recent spate of post-Brexit racially motivated antagonism toward Eastern Europeans – and Poles in particular – is a troubling development. But it’s nothing new. This kind of racism has been festering for years.</p>
<p>Eastern Europeans have been maligned in the tabloid press for the past decade. They have been the focal point for recession and post-recession anxieties that have been legitimated by politicians who present immigration in general, and EU migration specifically, as a problem that needs to be urgently addressed.</p>
<p>And it gets personal. The general consensus that immigration is a problem has, for some time, been expressed as a specific concern about immigrants. This is what’s behind a small but growing number of <a href="http://www.irr.org.uk/news/eastern-european-workers-under-attack/">racially motivated incidents involving Eastern Europeans</a>.</p>
<p>From <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/21/race-northern-ireland-romanian-gypsies">Loyalist attacks</a> in Belfast in 2009 that forced more than 100 Romanians to abandon their homes, to the brutal murder of a Polish migrant worker in <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/north_east/7126870.stm">Wrexham in 2007</a>, Poles, Romanians, and other Eastern Europeans have long been targeted and victimised by racially motivated attacks.</p>
<p>Northern Ireland police statistics show a 162% increase in racist crimes against Eastern Europeans between <a href="https://www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/hate-motivation-statistics/hate_motivated_incidents_and_crimes_in_northern_ireland_2004-05_to_2014-15.pdf">2012 and 2015</a> while the number of victims of racist attacks who were recorded as being “gypsy/traveller, Polish white and other white” in Scotland rose by <a href="http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00489644.pdf">410%</a> between 2005 and 2014.</p>
<p>In 2010, the Federation of Poles in Great Britain reported a 20% rise in <a href="http://stv.tv/news/scotland/227562-racism-on-the-increase-in-scotland/">racist incidents against Poles</a>. This figure was corroborated by an <a href="http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/IRR_Briefing_No.6.pdf">Institute of Race Relations report</a> which identified 7% of all victims of racially motivated attacks in 2009 as Polish.</p>
<p>The figures could be much higher, given the general ill will towards Europeans. But acts of racism require specific targets, and the whiteness of Eastern Europeans effectively means they can move around without drawing unwanted attention to their immigrant origins. Indeed, in most cases, it’s only their language (speaking their own languages or accented English) that might potentially out them.</p>
<p>This makes it hard to target Eastern Europeans. But some certainly are trying. The impulse is there – an impulse that has been granted credibility by a media and political elite which has painted a crude picture of immigration as a problem. From there, it’s a slippery slope towards immigrants being the problem.</p>
<p>Of course, not all people expressing concerns about immigration are perpetrators of racially motivated violence. Far from it. But Brexit has supplied a new context for the vilification of migrants, which in a small number of cases can lead to racially motivated abuse.</p>
<p>This racism is not new: it’s a variation on a migration theme that’s been around since the onset of mass migration on an industrial scale. Indeed, the racism experienced by Eastern Europeans pales in comparison to that experienced by previous cohorts of immigrants, for whom it’s not so easy to escape the gaze of racists – and who are now also finding themselves on the receiving end of post-Brexit racism.</p>
<p>The current racism against Eastern Europeans reminds us of a longer term problem we have in adjusting to the perceived disruptions that come with immigration. Even when migrant and native look the same, racism has a way of making them different – of ensuring that “they” are not “us”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62009/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Fox received funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>When immigrants, rather than immigration, are seen as the problem.Jon Fox, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/615382016-06-25T15:27:59Z2016-06-25T15:27:59ZDown about the EU referendum result? Here’s how to cope<p>The result of the EU referendum was always going to be relatively close, and 48% of the British population didn’t get their way. For them, initial feelings of disbelief will dissipate but anger and resentment may well linger.</p>
<p>Tensions have been high for months, the campaigns have been brutal and the stakes have been far higher than in any general election.</p>
<p>This decision will have far longer lasting implications than electing a five-year government, which is why people have been so emotional, passionate, and concerned about it. We might have expected this; <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/209721/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/the-unbearable-toxicity-of-referendum-campaigns">history</a> tells us that referendums are not nice things to participate in.</p>
<p>Of course, not every Remainer will experience defeat in the same way. <a href="http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html">Social Identity Theory</a> espouses that we each interpret the world based on the groups in which we fit, such as social class, gender, ethnicity, and, in this case, which side of the referendum debate you associated most with.</p>
<p>It follows, therefore, that the result will be exciting for some and destructive for others. </p>
<h2>Winning and losing</h2>
<p>The consequences of this vote are far reaching; the implications for political, social, and economic futures will continue to shift and change as the weeks and months go by and a new Britain outside the EU emerges. The divisiveness of this vote has wrenched apart friends and family, communities and colleagues. How long it will take for these heightened emotions to calm down is unknown. </p>
<p>In Scotland the fallout of the independence referendum of 2014 is still being <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/sep/18/10-things-scottish-voters-scottish-independence-referendum">felt</a>. And the debate around the EU referendum has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jun/20/jk-rowling-eu-referendum-campaign">nowhere near as positive</a> as it was in Scotland for the independence vote.</p>
<p>Arguments have happened. There have been disputes around the dinner table and on social media. We can’t ignore them. And in fact they should be acknowledged. </p>
<p>In his work, <a href="https://www.wickedproblems.com/1_wicked_problems.php">Horst Rittel talked about “wicked problems”</a>. These are complex, messy, and argument-inducing – and they have no simple “right” solution. The EU referendum was just such a problem, so it was never just about winning or losing – it is far too complex for that. It was about each of us having the opportunity to air our views and to make a difference.</p>
<h2>Onwards and upwards</h2>
<p>The heightened emotions throughout the campaign mean that the feelings stirred by the result are stronger than any other vote in recent political history. That is clear from the outpouring of emotion that has already followed the vote. </p>
<p>We might expect the coming months and years to be further fuelled with anguish and bitterness for some. The debate over the past six months has been all consuming and, in many ways, divided the nation; the situation will likely remain politically toxic for some time. So how can we influence that?</p>
<p>Think consciously about how to engage with friends, family, and colleagues. Don’t rub it in that they didn’t back the winning side and you did. Let’s not be hostile and instead empathise and encourage people to identify the positive elements of the outcome – but certainly don’t belittle their perspective. </p>
<p>So, the UK will soon no longer be in the European Union. The democratic process has been followed. The result isn’t to the liking of 48% of the population, but that is the nature of democracy. That 48% would not like to be treated with contempt if they had won and they would not like to be denied any right to democratically express their views.</p>
<p>Remember, just because your side didn’t win doesn’t mean votes or perspectives are any less valid. The country now needs to reconcile its differences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61538/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Schofield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A significant number of people were always going to be disappointed by the result. This is for anyone who wanted to stay.Keith Schofield, MBA Course Director, University of HuddersfieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616142016-06-24T16:43:25Z2016-06-24T16:43:25ZBy riding the tiger of populism, the Conservatives may have destroyed the UK<p>It’s a familiar cliché that the Conservative Party is the most successful political party in the democratic world. Once called the <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2010/03/conservative-party-cameron">natural party of government</a>, it has been in power for most of the last 150 years and, for good or ill, has shaped modern Britain. The UK is a conservative country in all senses of the word.</p>
<p>But the past four decades have demonstrated that the modern Conservative Party can no longer be trusted in its role as the guardian of British institutions. </p>
<p>The revolutionary free-market zealotry of the Thatcherites and their successors not only put the social fabric of Britain under severe strain, but also undermined the credibility of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Of the three pillars of High Toryism; church, state and monarchy, Britons only seem to still like the latter.</p>
<p>The decline in Tory respect for British institutions has also been on full display, not least in David Cameron’s willingness to risk the union’s survival twice – first in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/scottish-referendum">Scottish Independence referendum</a>, and then, probably fatally, in the EU membership referendum. </p>
<p>The Scottish National Party (SNP) leader and first minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, has already <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-back-in-play-after-brexit-shock-with-a-note-of-caution-61457">signalled</a> that she will in all likelihood now call another referendum at a time of her government’s choosing. The leaders of Sinn Fein, meanwhile, are calling for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-ireland-prepares-to-enter-a-post-brexit-quagmire-61590">referendum on Irish unification</a>. In time, we will now quite probably witness the break-up of the UK – all because of of an arrogant and ill-starred gamble for partisan advantage.</p>
<p>Even worse, the Tories have wreaked this havoc on the UK while riding the tiger of angry populism that they have done so much to cause in the first place. In England in particular, this populist rage has mapped to a certain extent onto the resurgent nationalism amplified by the Scottish referendum.</p>
<p>On the day after the result of the Scottish referendum, Cameron further stoked English grievances against Scotland’s attempted departure, and subsequently exploited fears of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-nicola-sturgeon-want-in-return-for-supporting-a-labour-government-40426">SNP influence over a possible Miliband Labour government</a> during the 2015 general election campaign. Inevitably, that tiger has now devoured Cameron.</p>
<h2>The ties that bind</h2>
<p>Despite the insurrectionist rhetoric, however, all we have seen so far in concrete terms is the prospect of the transfer of political power from one Eton-educated Tory to another. The British political elite remains as distant and out of touch as it ever was. But the departure of Cameron will be just the start of a process, not the end of one.</p>
<p>The grievances that fuel provincial populism – economic decline, globalisation, demographic change, pressure on services, disappointment with their own lives, fears for their children’s futures – can never be addressed by the narrow market solutions favoured by Boris Johnson and his acolytes. Making a real difference to these people’s lives would require a degree of state activism and redistributive economic policy that most of today’s Tories cannot conceive of, let alone countenance.</p>
<p>Johnson’s muted attempt to reach out to the Remain camp immediately after the result indicates that he senses the danger ahead. For, in less time than many probably anticipate, the angry citizens who voted Leave in the hope of a change in circumstances will realise they have been sold a dodgy bill of goods in order to transfer power from one bunch of toffs to another. They will ask why they remain in low-wage jobs, why their children still can’t get on the housing ladder, why life remains insecure, and they will no longer have Europe to blame. </p>
<p>They will inevitably look closer to home for their scapegoats. When that happens, Johnson, Theresa May or whoever else becomes the next Conservative Party leader and prime minister later this year will find that the ties that bind us all have stretched painfully thin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61614/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Lees is a member of the Labour Party</span></em></p>With an arrogant, ill-starred gamble for partisan advantage, the Conservatives have destroyed the very thing they supposedly stand for.Charles Lees, Professor of Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616052016-06-24T15:39:18Z2016-06-24T15:39:18ZHow the UK press woke up to Brexit with that morning-after feeling<p>As Britain – and indeed, the rest of the world – reels from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/eu-referendum">ramifications of the Brexit vote</a> in the UK, we are already hearing many explanations about the motives of those who disregarded so much expert testimony and voted to leave. Watching the television as the news sank in, I heard countless descriptions of the Brexit vote – from journalists and campaigners on both sides – as a kind of anti-establishment insurgency.</p>
<p>Yet, in many ways, that was precisely what it wasn’t. What 52% of voters did on Thursday was very much in line with reported conventional wisdom. Research carried out by Loughborough University during the campaign <a href="https://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/eu-referendum/media-coverage-of-the-eu-referendum-report-3/">showed a clear bias towards Leave</a> in the newspapers most people read.</p>
<p>Across the UK national press, Leave articles outnumbered those on the Remain side by 59% to 41%. When weightings for circulation are factored in, this ratio becomes an overwhelming “<a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-analysis-shows-extent-of-press-bias-towards-brexit-61106">18% pro-IN and 82% pro-OUT</a>”. While the broadcast media tried hard to remain balanced, the overall media climate clearly favoured Leave. If there was anyone resisting what they were being told to do, it was many of the 48% on the Remain side.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=960&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=960&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128064/original/image-20160624-28354-te9d15.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=960&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It was the Sun wot got it wrong.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Sun</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But even so there was an air of shocked surprise in even some of the papers that had favoured Brexit. The Sun, for example, rushed out with a front page almost as soon as polls closed, quoting Nigel Farage’s rather strange <a href="https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/uk/concession-became-non-concession-early-results-rolled/">apparent – and certainly well premature – concession</a>. The steadily eurosceptic Daily Mail, meanwhile, mixed triumphalism with caution: giving its right-wing columnist <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3658316/Pinch-dreaming-s-day-Britain-stood-proud-tall-reclaimed-birthright.html">Katie Hopkins free rein to gloat</a> while at the same time cautioning of <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/news/article-3657847/What-does-Brexit-mean-money-Six-ways-finances-affected-Britain-voted-quit-EU.html">financial turmoil to come</a>. Somewhat late, it warned its middle England readership that their savings and investments might be in for a bumpy ride.</p>
<p>On the openly Remain side, The Guardian had an air of shock about it. Polly Toynbee <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/eu-referendum-our-panel-on-the-vote-for-brexit">mourned for a Britain</a> that has broken in two, thanks to the way eurosceptic media and politicians had “injected poison into the nation’s bloodstream”. </p>
<h2>A lie repeated</h2>
<p>So was it, to echo the now-infamous boast by The Sun, the media wot won it for Brexit? Many years of research tells us that it is hard for campaigns to inspire dramatic shifts in public sentiment. The seeds of the Brexit vote were sown long before the campaign began – and not just by a Eurosceptic press. When Cardiff University looked at the <a href="http://ukandeu.ac.uk/event/reporting-europe-the-uk-media-and-the-eu/">broadcast media coverage of the EU</a> in recent years it found that – despite its commitment to impartiality – the EU was repeatedly cast as a negative force in people’s lives (bureaucratic, interfering, undemocratic and the rest). Political debate was not whether the EU was good or bad – it was almost a given that the EU was a problem – but how best for Britain to deal with such a behemoth.</p>
<p>Research by the monitoring group Media Tenor found much the same. Even our more even-handed media (the BBC and the Financial Times) has portrayed the EU in overwhelmingly negative terms over a 15-year period. Indeed, their research suggests that <a href="http://uk.mediatenor.com/en/library/newsletters/999/even-cox-murder-did-not-change-the-overall-negative-media-frame-on-eu">only during the final week of the campaign</a> did positive and negative portrayals became evenly balanced. As Media Tenor put it: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Nobody wins a referendum against an opposing media narrative … The Brexit vote was less a referendum and more of a reflex on how opinion-leading media have framed Brussels and Strasbourg for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So while broadcasters were very careful to remain impartial during the campaign, they had – over a period of decades – helped to create a climate of negativity around the EU. By the time the campaign began, it was too late to ask the question: “What has the EU ever done for us?” – and even more difficult for politicians (who prefer not to go against conventional wisdom) to answer it.</p>
<h2>Blame’s a game</h2>
<p>The news media would, reasonably enough, blame the politicians. Governments have, for obvious reasons, often portrayed themselves as standing up for Britain’s interests against the EU. It is always much easier to blame Brussels than accept responsibility as an influential member state. If David Cameron’s advocacy of the EU sounded unconvincing, it was because he had colluded in the traditional sport of bashing the EU for so long. Much the same could be said about immigration, which is invariably presented as a problem.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=779&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=779&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=779&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=979&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=979&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128070/original/image-20160624-28391-2k2db5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=979&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Happy days for the permanently europsceptic Daily Express.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daily Express</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The media coverage, in this sense, reflected the political debate. Indeed, Media Tenor has found much the same patterns of coverage in other EU countries, for many of the same reasons.</p>
<p>But is this good enough? Reporters have a duty to challenge politicians, and yet the Cardiff study found that when it came to the EU, they did little to question the basis for a politician’s anti-EU stance, and all too often replicated it.</p>
<p>It certainly did little to educate people about the EU: people in the UK were almost <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/nov/27/brits-least-knowledgeable-european-union-basic-questions">uniquely ill-informed</a> going into the campaign. A <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/27/brits-know-less-about-the-eu-than-anyone-else/">Eurobarometer survey </a>last year found that only 27% of people in the UK could answer three basic questions about the EU – lower than in any of the other 28 member states except Latvia.</p>
<p>So while the broadcasters (unlike the press) may have passed the test of impartiality during the campaign, it was after years of one-sided coverage. A vote to leave was, in that sense, the obvious default response, while the Remain camp was obliged to try and sell a damaged bill of goods. All this may, of course, be one reason why young people are so much less cynical about the EU. They are much not only less likely to read newspapers, but they have been subjected to fewer years of one-sided coverage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justin Lewis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of Fleet Street had worked hard for a Leave vote, but it still took even eurosceptic papers by surprise.Justin Lewis, Professor of Communication, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/614582016-06-24T14:54:31Z2016-06-24T14:54:31ZCapital against country, young against old: Brexit Britain is broken Britain<p>Is Brexit Britain David Cameron’s famous “broken Britain”? The bitterness of the referendum campaign and the divides it has revealed within the Conservative Party and between the Labour Party and its core supporters might certainly suggest so. </p>
<p>Deep rifts now run between old and young, London and England, England and Scotland. The prospect of a second referendum on Scottish independence is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/scottish-independence-back-in-play-after-brexit-shock-with-a-note-of-caution-61457">firmly in play</a>.</p>
<p>The Remain camp argued for a Britain playing its full part in Europe and accused Brexit of wanting a “little England”. Is that what we have all woken up to this morning?</p>
<p>“Little Englander” is a rather contemptuous term originally used by Victorian supporters of the Empire. It was used especially with reference to Britain’s role in the Boer War to denigrate their opponents and critics, who they accused of wanting to keep Britain small and ineffectual in a world of global European empires.</p>
<p>More recently it has been used by pro-Europeans to accuse Brexiters of much the same thing in a world of regional unions. Are they right? Has the electorate’s decision to back Brexit revealed Britain as a little country, a small island, inward-looking and parochial?</p>
<p>It depends firstly on what we mean by Britain. Modern little Englanderism hardly applies in Scotland. England and Wales may have turned their backs on Europe but Scotland, true to its continental links dating back to the <a href="http://www.nas.gov.uk/downloads/declarationArbroath.pdf">Declaration of Arbroath</a> (1320) emphatically did not. The fear of Scottish independence made not a jot of difference to voting intentions in England or Wales on Thursday. Did English and Welsh voters realise they were clearly turning their backs on Edinburgh as well as on Brussels? Maybe, but didn’t care. Perhaps they hate the EU even more than they value the Union.</p>
<p>Disraeli spoke of England as “two nations” – the rich and the poor. Modern England is just as divided but along a different faultline. This referendum was a revolt of the provinces against the domination of the capital. Not since London rallied to the side of parliament and drove out Charles I have capital and country been so much at odds.</p>
<p>For all the talk of immigration – and this was par excellence a vote about immigration – there is a certain irony that the most immigrant-rich part of the whole country voted overwhelmingly to remain. </p>
<p>Young people, unhindered by memories of World War II or the immediate post-war period, are much more European in outlook than the older generation, who voted for a nostalgic “golden age” when, they assume, Britain was Great.</p>
<p>The Brexit campaign’s “take back control” slogan was a canny exercise in nostalgia politics. It suggested that there was a time before 1973 when Britain was fully in control of its destiny. But was there? Britain had twice sought entry to the EEC before 1973 precisely because it felt so economically and politically powerless in its post-imperial role. Is it now about to return to that state of impotence? </p>
<p>Two years after Edward Heath took Britain into the EEC he was himself thrown out of office in a general election fought on the question “Who Rules Britain?” David Cameron has now been brought down by a referendum fought on much the same question. As we survey the ravaged political landscape that has resulted, the question must now be: what sort of Britain has Brexit left his successor to govern?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Lang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The United Kingdom is looking pretty divided right now.Sean Lang, Senior Lecturer in History, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/615772016-06-24T12:34:22Z2016-06-24T12:34:22ZAfter this miserable and divisive campaign, we need to talk about immigration<p>Britain has voted to leave the European Union. The weeks and months of highly spirited and at times rancorous political campaigning have shown just how deep the fissures that run through Britain really are. And the ultimate dividing line, the defining issue of the referendum, was <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-jasinowski/presidential-debates_b_8478456.html">not the economy</a>, but immigration. </p>
<p>For all the other issues that were thrown up, this was a campaign about securing borders and controlling numbers. It was also about diversity. What mattered for so many people across the country from the once-great industrial heartlands of the UK, the long-ago thriving seaside resorts, fishing villages and mining towns, right through to the more prosperous and affluent parts of the country was the question about national identity – how comfortable citizens feel on the streets of modern Britain.</p>
<p>Many people, looking into a collective national mirror, were ill at ease with the image of Britain that stared back. The mood recalls the “too diverse” argument made back in 2004 by <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation">David Goodhart</a>, who argued that the welfare state couldn’t survive if a society were too diverse because citizens are less willing to pay into a system that serves people with whom they can’t identify.</p>
<p>One of the central ideals of the European Union, the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html">free movement of people</a> across national state barriers for all its hundreds of millions of citizens, was among Britons’ biggest concerns. That was especially true for older generations, who have seen the country twice transformed in the post-war period, first by large-scale migration from the countries of the former British Empire in the 1950s and 1960s and, in the past decade, by migrants from newer EU accession states.</p>
<p>Net migration from the EU stands at 184,000 (the combined figure including migrants from both inside and outside the EU stands at <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36382199">330,000</a>). David Cameron had, of course, pledged to cut net migration to the tens of thousands and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/even-brexit-would-not-cut-high-migration-admits-treasury-a6989621.html">failed to deliver</a>. Jeremy Corbyn, on the other hand, spoke about there being <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2016/jun/19/jeremy-corbyn-no-upper-limit-to-immigration-video">no upper limit</a> on immigration. Clearly Cameron’s failure and Corbyn’s rejection of calls to clamp down worried some voters and angered others.</p>
<p>For the Leave camp, “taking back control of our borders” was a key mobilising slogan. Brexiters argue that Britain will be more able to control immigration outside of the EU.</p>
<p>While they stressed high immigration depressed wages especially for low-skilled workers, the leavers built much of their campaign on the quality of life argument – the idea that immigration had stretched public services beyond the point of adequate delivery. The solution for the Leavers was clear: to quit the EU and implement an <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-australias-points-system-for-immigration-26065">Australian-style points based system</a> for all newcomers from inside and outside the EU.</p>
<p>The remainers tried to talk around the immigration question for as long as possible, focusing instead on the economy. But faced with the blunt force of the Leave campaign’s message on immigration and genuine public anxiety, they could avoid it no longer.</p>
<h2>A nation divided</h2>
<p>They argued that EU migrants contributed more to the UK economy in tax than they took out in benefits. They said Britain could (and indeed Cameron had) negotiated a deal to restrict the benefits for EU migrant workers. And rather more half-heartedly, they argued that immigration was on the whole good for the economy.</p>
<p>But what good is a few extra quid in your pocket, the Brexiters argued, when within a generation your entire world has become unrecognisable? People feel out of place in their own country. Britain, as Goodhart said, is simply too diverse.</p>
<p>This message was delivered most explicitly by Nigel Farage’s poster of a serpent of dark-skinned migrants heading Britain’s way simply read “Breaking Point”. It was identified by some as the lowest point in the increasingly rancorous campaign. </p>
<p>The referendum is over, and its message is clear: this is a nation divided, polarised along old faultlines of class, wealth and geography that have been driven open by globalisation. Those who have benefited from the free movement of information, capital, goods and people have little in common, it seems, with those left behind. </p>
<p>While some on the Remain side saw most Brexiters as <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/aa-gill-argues-the-case-against-brexit-kmnp83zrt">parochial little-Englanders</a> mired in false nostalgia and withdrawing into defensive insularity, many on team Leave were equally contemptuous of their rivals, who they saw as rich denizens of a cosmopolitan elite who dabble in difference when they fancy it, knowing they can always afford to shut it out. The pressure on public services, school places, the NHS, and so on is only felt by those who cannot afford to go private.</p>
<p>This was a de facto referendum on immigration and its attendant cultural anxieties about the changing face of Britain. These feelings are sincere, and they will not go away. Its verdict is clear: we can no longer put off an informed, robust and open-minded conversation about immigration, diversity and identity – however painful.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61577/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parveen Akhtar has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy. </span></em></p>The EU referendum came down to deep divisions over immigration, borders and cultural identity that cannot be safely ignored.Parveen Akhtar, Lecturer in Sociology, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/615972016-06-24T10:12:37Z2016-06-24T10:12:37ZFour ways Brexit will hit personal finances<p>British people have woken up to the news that their country has voted to leave the European Union. Along with this, there has been turmoil in financial markets – the pound has hit a 30-year low and the FTSE dropped <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/23/markets-live-will-sterling-surge-or-slump-as-the-eu-referendum-c/">more than 8%</a>. </p>
<p>Though the Brexit process will probably take two years (and the UK will remain a full member of the EU in the meantime), some aspects of the decision will affect British people straight away.</p>
<h2>1. The pound in your pocket</h2>
<p>There is inevitably going to be a period of uncertainty and turmoil. As the referendum result emerged, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36611512">pound fell</a> 10% against the US dollar on the foreign exchange markets and 7% against the Euro. If this persists, things the UK imports, such as oil (affecting domestic fuel prices and petrol), foreign cars, coffee, bananas and clothing, will cost more. Overall, then, the general price level may rise meaning that your income will not stretch quite so far.</p>
<p>If you’re holidaying abroad over the coming months and haven’t bought your currency yet, the weaker pound means you’ll also now pay more.</p>
<h2>2. Your job and income</h2>
<p>A weak pound affects industry as well and so may impact on jobs. Company costs will rise if they import their raw materials and most firms will be hit by higher fuel prices. But the fall in sterling makes it easier for exporters to sell their goods and services abroad. So some jobs and wages may be more at risk, while recruitment rises in other areas.</p>
<p>Longer term, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-the-academic-consensus-on-the-cost-of-brexit-being-ignored-59540">economists have been remarkably consistent</a> in predicting that UK growth is likely to be lower outside the EU than it would have been inside. Businesses do not like uncertainty, so they may put off investing in new plant, machinery and jobs, as being outside the EU trading bloc may make trading with other countries more difficult and some firms may decide to quit the UK. This could mean that jobs and wages will be lower than they might otherwise have been, though not necessarily lower than today.</p>
<p>Before the referendum, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36534192">Chancellor George Osborne</a> threatened a post-Brexit emergency Budget that would cut public spending and raise taxes. This seems an unlikely immediate response since it would further depress the UK economy just when it is reeling with uncertainty and MPs across all parties were quick to say they would not support such measures. A new prime minister, due from October, may well appoint a new chancellor with his or her own ideas.</p>
<h2>3. Your savings and pensions</h2>
<p>Uncertainty while markets adjust and firms decide how to respond means the UK stock market is likely to be volatile for some time. Anyone who has recently retired and opted to take an income using drawdown (periodic cashing in of a pension fund still invested in the stock market) may have to take tough decisions about drawing less income now or risk running out of retirement savings later on.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128038/original/image-20160624-28370-1pb81wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pensioners may face some complications.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Savers have suffered since the global financial crisis of 2008 with rock-bottom interest rates. It’s unclear what might happen to these. On the one hand, rising consumer prices may push interest rates up; and credit rating agencies have said <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/sp-says-uk-to-lose-top-credit-rating-after-vote-to-leave-the-eu-reports-a7099581.html">they may downgrade UK government debt</a> which means the government would have to raise interest rates to persuade savers to buy its debt. But, if the economy struggles to grow, the Bank of England – which has said it stands ready to deploy any measures <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36618560">to maintain financial stability</a> – might embark on new rounds of quantitative easing to keep interest rates low to encourage economic growth.</p>
<h2>4. Your home and mortgage</h2>
<p>While savers would welcome a rise in interest rates, this would increase mortgage repayments for borrowers and could even trigger repossessions.
The <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/ea304c65-3afa-3b0f-b90c-8c7d5ef3198d">International Money Fund</a> has predicted that UK house prices could drop sharply post-Brexit. You might be concerned about that if you are in one of the six out of ten UK households that own their own home. But this could be good news for younger generations who have been struggling to afford a home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonquil Lowe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Brexit process will take two years but it is having an immediate effect on your finances.Jonquil Lowe, Lecturer in Personal Finance, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/612622016-06-22T14:56:33Z2016-06-22T14:56:33ZPolls close: what you need to know about referendum night<p><em>The polling stations have closed in Britain’s big decision on whether to leave or remain in the European Union. Here’s what you need to know about the count now taking place. Conversation editors are updating this article through the night of June 23 and morning of June 24.</em></p>
<h2>When might we expect a result?</h2>
<p>If the vote is as close as opinion polls suggest, we’ll be unlikely to get an official result before 8am UK time on Friday. Counting is taking place overnight. The first results were from 11pm onwards but around half will not be declared until after 4am. If counting proceeds efficiently and one side has built up a clear lead, it may be possible to project the outcome accurately by around 5am. </p>
<h2>Will there be an exit poll?</h2>
<p>There is no official exit poll. Polling companies have conducted referendum day polling but these are <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-do-you-read-an-election-poll-41204">not exit polls</a>. It is understood exit polls have been <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57ce9e5a-271d-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89.html#axzz4C3mTKl2V">commissioned by hedge funds</a> looking to make financial gains in international currency markets. These exit polls will not be published and their likely reliability has been questioned. Attempts to infer the results from movements in foreign exchange trading may be misleading. </p>
<p>Exit polls at general elections are based on measuring changes in support for parties from the previous election in a large number of carefully chosen polling districts. It is impossible to replicate this approach for a one-off electoral event such as a referendum.</p>
<h2>Is counting the same as in a UK general election?</h2>
<p>There are a few differences to how counts take place at a British general election. Counting is happening in 382 counting area (380 local authorities in England, Wales and Scotland, plus Northern Ireland as a whole, and also Gibraltar) rather than in 650 parliamentary constituencies.</p>
<p>Unlike a general election, what matters is not so much who wins in each counting area but how many votes are secured by the rival campaigns along the way. The totals for Leave and Remain will be aggregated at a regional level and declarations made by regional counting officers. Once all the regional counts are complete, the UK result will be announced from Manchester by Jenny Watson, chair of the Electoral Commission.</p>
<h2>Will results be announced along the way?</h2>
<p>Yes, each of the 382 counting areas are announcing their results. These local results will be relayed by the broadcasters – but it will be difficult to keep up once they start to come in thick and fast at around 3am. It should also be possible to track local results via council websites and Twitter feeds. There will also be rumours and speculation about local outcomes circulating on social media. They should be treated with a degree of caution in advance of official declarations. </p>
<h2>Could any areas give an indication of the result?</h2>
<p>Early results will require careful interpretation. Metropolitan areas outside London with very large electorates, notably Birmingham and Leeds but also Sheffield, Liverpool and Manchester, could prove crucial and are expected to declare from 4am to 5am.</p>
<p>For Remain, low margins of victory or low turnouts in these cities could spell very bad news. If the totals remain close at 6am, when Cornwall (circa 400,000 electors) is due to declare, a clear lead for either side on a relatively high turnout may suggest which way the wind is blowing. </p>
<h2>Key results to look out for?</h2>
<p>Unlike a general election, there are no “safe” and “marginal” seats. However, the socio-demographic make-up of each counting area and past support for UKIP are expected to provide a <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/can-we-really-not-predict-who-will-vote-for-brexit-and-where/">strong indication of how individual areas will vote</a>. On this basis, early results from Scotland and London could be seen as safe for Remain. Conversely, parts of the east coast such as Great Yarmouth, North Norfolk, Boston and South Holland should be safe territory for Leave.</p>
<p>Some counting areas come close to representing the socio-demographics of the country in microcosm. Swindon, often regarded as a barometer town in politics, is expected to declare at around 1am. A clear lead for either side here could be indicative of a wider pattern.</p>
<h2>What amounts to a decisive victory?</h2>
<p>Given how tight the polls have been, a ten-point margin of victory (for example, 55% to 45%) will almost certainly be interpreted as decisive. However, for the issue to be considered settled, at least in the short term, a margin of victory for Remain over Leave would have to be at least 60% to 40%. A narrow victory for Leave, for example 51% to 49%, could be one of the most problematic outcomes from a political perspective, particularly if secured on the back of a relatively low turnout.</p>
<h2>What amounts to a close result?</h2>
<p>Anything within the margins of 47:53 either way will probably be seen as close and the polls suggest that such an outcome is clearly possible. Ultimately, the vote can be won by a margin of just one vote. That is the nature of a referendum.</p>
<p>Recounts can be requested in individual counting areas but only prior to official declarations being made. There is no legal provision for a national recount. The only means of challenging the result will be via <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/150499/Challenging-elections-in-the-UK.pdf">judicial review</a>.</p>
<h2>Should I stay up for the result or go to bed?</h2>
<p>Staying up until breakfast time for the official result is possibly going to be the preserve of the political obsessive. Assuming the opinion polls are broadly correct (admittedly a big assumption after the last general election) and the vote is as close as expected, the real excitement is likely to be from 5am onwards, at which point it may be possible for broadcasters to project a winner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61262/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Wilks-Heeg has previously received funding for research or consultancy on electoral matters from the UK Electoral Commission and the UK Cabinet Office. He is the Chair of Democratic Audit, an independent research organisation based at the London School of Economics which monitors the health of democracy in the UK.</span></em></p>How will the votes be counted? When will we know the result? Stuart Wilks-Heeg has all the answers.Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Head of Politics, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/610422016-06-16T15:09:59Z2016-06-16T15:09:59ZAs international law goes, the EU is a model of accountability and democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126948/original/image-20160616-15082-g6s8v1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From the EU to the UN. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Diliff and UN via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Those advocating for a UK exit from the European Union claim that Britain would be “<a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_control">taking back control</a>” from Brussels if it left the EU. But their arguments about sovereignty and “control” appear to conveniently forget that many laws exist internationally. Often, these laws are created in ways that are far less democratic than the way the EU makes its legislation. </p>
<p>While the chorus of those claiming Britain needs to get its sovereignty back gets louder, few would advocate a withdrawal from, say, the United Nations. This is for good reasons, among them the value of international cooperation. But the same reasons also apply to the EU, whose democratic and judicial accountability is actually further evolved than that of the UN and other international organisations. Undoing the EU as a more advanced system of international law would be a significant set-back for international cooperation.</p>
<p>Today, international cooperation spans a broad range of everyday life activities from travel by air, to trade and the internet. It also covers global issues such as environmental protection, terrorism, arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Such cooperation happens through a complex web of international agreements, and has happened for a long time. International treaties predate the modern nation state and go back to antiquity, such as peace treaties of Ancient Greece or Rome or treaties conferring reciprocal privileges on foreigners or traders in a territory.</p>
<p>At the end of World War I in 1918, it was then-US President Woodrow Wilson in his famous <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/fourteen_points.shtml">Fourteen Points</a> who proposed international integration to obtain “just and secure peace”. The League of Nations was founded on these ideas, but it took another world war for states to face the reality that there was no alternative to cooperation. In 1945, in San Francisco, 50 countries <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/">founded the United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, the legal framework established by international law, including specialised treaties and organisations has increased tremendously. Requirements of integration and changing perceptions about good governance and the rule of law have given rise to numerous human rights treaties since 1945 and which have put the individual more at the centre of international law. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s database <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-treaties">UK Treaties Online</a> contains over 14,000 treaties involving the UK. </p>
<h2>EU: a lab for international law</h2>
<p>But the international legal framework remains rudimentary and incomplete in comparison to a country’s domestic laws, both from the perspective of accountability – the rule of law – and of democracy.</p>
<p>There are two main consequences of this. First, an enforcement gap: international rules frequently cannot be enforced in the same way as laws within states. This means states and international organisations are less likely to be held to account if they breach the law. Second, a democracy gap: international law tends to be made by national executives, and the governance structure of international organisations tends to be less democratic than that of states.</p>
<p>On both counts, the EU and its law-making scrubs up much better than other international law and international organisations, including the UN. </p>
<p>The EU’s legal framework holds to account both its own member states on the international stage and the EU itself – and empowers individuals to do the same. It is the most powerful but also the most accountable international organisation there is today and may <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2554069">even be considered</a> as a model or “laboratory” for other areas of international law.</p>
<p>Such accountability contrasts sharply with the picture elsewhere in international law. UN peackekeepers have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-report-details-un-peacekeepers-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-39004">criticised for human rights abuses</a>. UN missions such as <a href="http://www.unmikonline.org/pages/default.aspx">UN’s Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</a> have extensive powers over individuals, but mechanisms to hold international organisations such as the UN to account either do not exist in the first place or are weak and <a href="http://www.unmikonline.org/hrap/Eng/Pages/default.aspx">only developing slowly</a>. </p>
<p>In contrast, EU law has allowed individuals to review far-reaching interference with their rights. For example, people who were (at times erroneously) listed as terrorists <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-402/05&">have been able</a> to review the restrictions imposed on them by EU – and indirectly UN law – such as the complete freezing of access to their bank accounts.</p>
<p>More than that, the EU has influenced the UN, which realised that it had to give individuals a means of challenging UN sanctions decisions made against them. This provided an impulse to create the <a href="https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson">Office of the Ombudsperson</a>. </p>
<h2>Questions of legitimacy</h2>
<p>In the context of decision-making on foreign policy issues, accountability is “thinned” out, although not totally eliminated. A government’s action within the UN Security Council, for example, is made by representatives of its national government. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126732/original/image-20160615-14016-11a8a9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A global model for cooperation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pack-Shot/www.shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In contrast, through the EU treaties EU member states <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-back-control-from-europe-is-not-the-democratic-option-60665">have created</a> significant mechanisms which are capable of conferring more direct democratic legitimacy – including a democratically-elected European Parliament and the involvement of national parliaments in legislative procedures. These mechanisms help to compensate for a general “loss of control” that occurs in foreign policy areas. </p>
<p>Although the procedures may not be perfect, the biggest challenge to democratic legitimacy results from the lack of participation of European citizens – one of the consequences of the <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2568723">picture painted of the EU by national governments</a>. </p>
<p>The pro-Brexit argument that “taking back control” would “reinstate our sovereignty” is disingenuous. International interdependency and laws are here to stay, and need to stay, as two world wars have shown. We need cooperation both for peace and the environment, and for the more anodyne <a href="https://theconversation.com/rubbish-for-remain-or-bins-for-brexit-how-the-eu-affects-your-garbage-60830">practicalities of our lives</a>. It’s also disingenuous because international cooperation in other contexts than the EU, such as bilateral trade agreements that have been proposed as an alternative to EU membership, would be far less accountable and democratic. </p>
<p>Leaving the EU and contributing to its potential downfall puts much more at stake than a few rules we don’t understand or like and may want to legitimately criticise. Leaving threatens international integration as a principle and would cripple the most democratic and most accountable international integration project in recent history. </p>
<p>The EU needs to continue to provide a model of international cooperation in the future. For that it needs to be developed, not trashed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katja Ziegler received funding from the British Academy (Mid-career Fellowship) in 2014-15. </span></em></p>Few would advocate a withdrawal from the United Nations. But international law has a big impact on Britain too.Katja Ziegler, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/611642016-06-16T12:45:57Z2016-06-16T12:45:57ZIf Britain leaves the EU, could it simply re-join?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126920/original/image-20160616-15104-f0atqn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whatever the outcome of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">EU referendum</a>, there will be voters who, after the event, will have second thoughts on the wisdom of their choice. They will have cast their vote, however. And that cannot be undone. The result will stand. </p>
<p>Assuming the vote is to leave, withdrawal negotiations would ensue and the UK would probably leave the EU two years later.</p>
<p>But what if after leaving, the UK had a change of heart? What if the economic doom predicted by some in the Remain campaign were to be realised? Could the UK simply rejoin the EU?</p>
<p>This would be uncharted territory – because the UK would have been the first member state to leave the EU. Nevertheless, Article 50 of the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0026">Treaty on European Union</a> is clear on the matter:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, if the UK wanted to rejoin, it would be treated no differently to any other state seeking membership. There is no special procedure for readmission. There is no special route back into the EU for past members.</p>
<h2>No picking and choosing</h2>
<p>So if the UK wanted to rejoin the EU it would have to submit an application for membership as if it were applying for the first time.</p>
<p>The EU would review whether the UK meets the membership criteria. Given its previous membership of the EU, it is extremely unlikely that the UK’s eligibility would be questioned.</p>
<p>But the UK would also need to show that it is ready to assume the obligations of membership. And that is a different matter.</p>
<p>A key factor here is the nature of the membership that would be on offer. Importantly, precedent from other states joining suggests that the UK would have to accept full membership. It would not be able to insist on the same opt-outs and the budget rebate it currently enjoys. </p>
<p>That probably means signing up to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/schengen">Schengen area</a> on passport-free movement and, importantly, committing to joining the euro. It would also mean recommitting to the goal of “ever closer union”.</p>
<p>Importantly, current opt-outs were not secured through accession to the EU. The UK opt-out from the euro dates back to the 1991 <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0026">Maastricht Treaty</a> and the opt-out from Schengen came later that decade. In both cases, the UK held a veto over treaty reforms under discussion at the time. Threatening to use that veto, it extracted these concessions.</p>
<h2>Beware the veto</h2>
<p>If the UK, having left, were to seek to rejoin the EU, it would not be in a position to wield a veto. The power of veto would lie very much with the EU and its member states.</p>
<p>In fact, the unanimous agreement of the member states is needed to admit a new member. Each has a veto, as the UK first found to its cost in 1963 when French president Charles de Gaulle issued an emphatic “non” to the UK joining the European Communities.</p>
<p>As the case of <a href="https://theconversation.com/never-mind-brexit-scaremongering-turkey-is-a-long-way-from-joining-the-eu-58958">Turkey</a> amply demonstrates, each member state holds multiple vetoes to a country joining the EU. They can veto the opening of negotiations, the opening and closing of each of the 36-plus <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/chapters_en.htm">negotiating chapters</a>, and the signing of the treaty of accession.</p>
<p>It would take much less time for the UK to negotiate accession than it is taking Turkey, but the process would not be swift and would not automatically lead to membership.</p>
<p>It would also most likely be frustrating. All the evidence shows the EU is increasingly strict in its application of the accession criteria and holds rigidly to the position that there can be no opt-outs, exemptions or permanent derogations from the obligations of membership. </p>
<p>There is also a clear expectation that an applicant state demonstrates a proven track record in implementing the acquis before it is admitted. </p>
<p>In the specific case of a further UK application, it could be anticipated that the EU’s member states and institutions, having facilitated a UK withdrawal, would also need serious reassurances (and probably sustained evidence) that the UK was committed to membership before they would be willing to readmit it. Having lost an awkward partner, they would be unlikely to hold the door wide open and unhesitatingly welcome the UK back with open arms.</p>
<p>In the interests of securing renewed UK membership, the EU might be willing to readmit the UK on the same terms as it had prior to withdrawal, with exemptions from Schengen and the euro, but that is extremely unlikely. There would be no requirement to honour the previous terms of membership. After all, a UK vote to leave the EU would have been a democratic rejection of those terms.</p>
<p>More importantly, granting an opt-out would reignite the possibility of contagion. Other member states might seek special treatment, too. It is also almost inconceivable that newer member states who have assumed all the obligations of membership would be willing to see a larger and richer state being granted special treatment.</p>
<p>Even if all these hurdles were cleared, most member states also need to get the agreement of their national parliaments before a new country can join. Some, such as France, could even have to hold a referendum.</p>
<p>Joining the EU is a complicated, demanding and highly politicised process. Rejoining the EU would be no different. It would take time and require unanimous support from existing member states.</p>
<p>Moreover, there is no guarantee at all that the previous terms of membership would be either acknowledged or honoured. A leave would be a leave. Rejoining the EU would involve applying afresh and being subject to the same principles and procedures as any other state seeking to join.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Phinnemore has received funding from the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council and the European Union. The views expressed here do not represent those of any of these funders</span></em></p>Voting out is not a return ticket, unless you’re ready to eat some serious humble pie – and join the euro.David Phinnemore, Professor of European Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/611062016-06-16T10:48:40Z2016-06-16T10:48:40ZHard Evidence: analysis shows extent of press bias towards Brexit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126908/original/image-20160616-15082-rmgg5j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sun nails UK's colours to its mast.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Sun’s declaration of <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1277920/we-urge-our-readers-to-believe-in-britain-and-vote-to-leave-the-eu-in-referendum-on-june-23/">support for the Leave campaign</a> in the EU referendum might seem entirely predictable. After all, the paper has been at the forefront of EU-bashing for decades, most memorably in its “<a href="http://www.classicheadlines.co.uk/up-yours-delors/?doing_wp_cron=1466016871.9263529777526855468750">Up Yours Delors</a>” headline from 1990 when it stated its forthright views on proposals for a European Currency Unit. But there are three reasons why this development highlights the need for a detailed and nuanced analysis of press partisanship in the referendum campaign.</p>
<p>This is not an “either/or” matter, even though the referendum will ultimately be decided by a stark two-way choice. Endorsements for either option can range from strong advocacy to tepid. We need to consider where titles sit on the continuum of opinion between these polarities.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=768&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=768&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=768&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126907/original/image-20160616-15079-1hmwvef.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sun has always been quite clear as to where it stands on EU.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In making this assessment, there is also a need to examine what newspapers do in their routine coverage as well as say in their major leader editorials. There are times when these are not entirely in accordance. A famous example of this occurred in the 1997 UK general election, when The Sun made an early declaration that it “backed Blair”. This was followed by several weeks of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13689889808413009?journalCode=fbep19#.V2Gkp8v2ZGE">decidedly lukewarm coverage</a> towards New Labour.</p>
<p>And the political complexities of the EU referendum also mean that national newspapers cannot orient to their usual party political alliances. The 2015 general election saw the re-emergence of a <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa/news/uk-election-analysis-2015-media-voters-and-campaign">highly partisan “Tory press” in the UK</a> but participants in this group now have to decide which Conservative party they want to support – as the referendum has divided the party from top to bottom. They also need to consider whether they should temper or increase their criticisms of the leaders of other parties: Jeremy Corbyn, Nigel Farage, Nicola Sturgeon and others. It’s all very complicated. </p>
<h2>Crunching the numbers</h2>
<p>Loughborough University’s Centre for Research in Communication and Culture <a href="http://www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/eu-referendum/">has been closely monitoring</a> national press partisanship in the referendum as part of a wider “real time” news audit of the campaign. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=971&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=971&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126919/original/image-20160616-15108-1fi7lix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=971&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Daily Mail makes its position clear.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although many national newspapers have yet to formally declare their position, our findings – based on an analysis of 1,127 items published in the national daily press between May 6 and June 8 – provide some clear indications as to where support is likely to be eventually distributed. </p>
<p>Our latest findings show that <a href="http://blog.lboro.ac.uk/crcc/eu-referendum/media-coverage-of-the-eu-referendum-report-3/">referendum press coverage</a> may be full of heated claim and counter-claim from different camps but there is less evidence that this is producing consistent and concerted patterning in the news angles adopted by many newspapers. </p>
<p>The graph below shows that a high proportion of items across many titles have reported the competing arguments rather than advanced arguments that favour one particular side. Furthermore, this distribution does not map neatly onto traditional means of differentiating the press sector as “popular” (Daily Mirror, Daily Star and The Sun), “mid-market” (Daily Express and Daily Mail) and “quality” (Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Guardian and The Times) newspapers. </p>
<p>This suggests the differences cannot be explained entirely by differing conventions regarding the presentation of political news. The Sun may now have made up its mind on the decision but these results suggest it spent quite a bit of time thinking about it. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126917/original/image-20160616-15079-1o2mity.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>How does this coverage sit alongside other articles where it was possible to deduce the privileging of one or other camp? To assess this, we individually scored each item. Where an article was orientated to the Remain position, it was given a value of +1. If it privileged Leave, it scored as -1. Items where there was no clear evaluation, or coverage was balanced, were coded as zero. </p>
<p>This rudimentary scale allowed us to calculate two measures: first, the volume – the total number of pro-Remain items minus the number of pro-Leave items; and second, the average – the mean score for referendum items when they were published. Positive values for either measure indicate a pro-Remain orientation, negative values reveal a pro-Leave orientation. The further away either value is from zero, the stronger the partisanship of coverage on the continuum.</p>
<p>The graph below provides the volume comparison, organising titles in rank order. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126939/original/image-20160616-15082-5s3d5k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And here we see the equivalent ranking for average which shows that, on balance, the Financial Times was the most pro-Remain, followed by the Guardian, while the Daily Express and Daily Mail have been the most consistently pro-Leave. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126914/original/image-20160616-15095-15wi8ai.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As these different measures provide slight variations in rank order, we have combined them to establish the current, overall positioning of papers on the continuum of opinion:</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126793/original/image-20160615-14045-6k6khv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These results show we are a lifetime away from the 1975 EEC referendum, when all UK national daily newspapers, with the exception of the Morning Star, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/feb/04/did-national-papers-pro-european-bias-in-1975-affect-the-referendum">endorsed the case for staying in Europe</a>. But they also suggest a degree of parity, with five titles on either side of the debate. Across the 1,127 items sampled there was only a balance of 64 articles in favour of Leave compared with Remain.</p>
<h2>Where the eyeballs are</h2>
<p>But these figures give no consideration to the different reach of newspapers. When you take newspaper circulation into account a significant gulf opens up between the two sides. A straightforward percentage comparison of the number of Remain to Leave items finds 41% were pro-Remain and 59% pro-Leave. But when weightings for circulation are factored in, the fact that the highest circulating newspapers have tended to support Brexit means that the gap between the two positions widens into a substantial difference of 18% pro-Remain and 82% pro-Leave. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126909/original/image-20160616-15079-mi76nm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This suggests that the real significance of The Sun’s decision to back withdrawal from the EU is not so much in opening up a “coverage gap” between Remain and Leave campaigns but in contributing to a very significant “circulation gap” between the two positions – put simply, more newspaper readers are exposed to the Brexit message. Most of the newspapers aligned with Leave also have a significant C2DE readership – that is, working class newspaper readers and those in casual or no employment. These <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/03/24/eu-referendum-provincial-england-versus-london-and/">may be crucial groups</a> in determining the outcome of the referendum vote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Deacon receives funding from the ESRC, the Electoral Commission, The British Academy/ Leverhulme Trust for political communication analysis, including media analysis of electoral and referendum coverage in past campaigns</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic Wring has previously received funding from the Electoral Commission, The Guardian and the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust for media analysis of electoral and referendum coverage in past campaigns</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Stanyer has previously received funding from the Electoral Commission, The Guardian and the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust for media analysis of electoral and referendum coverage in past campaigns</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Downey has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Electoral Commission, The British Academy/Leverhulme Trust for media analysis of electoral and referendum coverage.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Harmer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When you take into account the weight of circulation, most readers are getting the Brexit message.David Deacon, Professor of Communication and Media Analysis, Loughborough UniversityDominic Wring, Professor of Political Communication, Loughborough UniversityEmily Harmer, Lecturer in Communication and Media Studies, Loughborough UniversityJames Stanyer, Professor of Communication and Media Analysis, Loughborough UniversityJohn Downey, Professor of Comparative Media Analysis, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/610572016-06-15T10:09:56Z2016-06-15T10:09:56ZHow Brexit fears are shaking the currency markets<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126598/original/image-20160614-22383-yy9x6c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Valeri Potapova/shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is an old saying about currency markets: “The only certainty is that the exchange rate will fluctuate”. So <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/41ec240c-3223-11e6-bda0-04585c31b153">increased fluctuations in the currency market</a> in the build-up to the UK’s referendum on EU membership are not unexpected. The levels of volatility, however, are unprecedented in recent times. </p>
<p>As the June 23 referendum approaches, traders have been speculating both on the direction of movement of the British pound against currencies such as the dollar, euro and yen, and also on the amount of volatility that is likely to occur in each of these currency pairs on an hourly, daily, weekly and even monthly basis.</p>
<p>In the early days, following the referendum announcement on February 20, many assumed that the remain camp <a href="https://ig.ft.com/sites/brexit-polling/">would win out</a>. But the <a href="http://graphics.wsj.com/brexit/#polls">opinion polls</a> now indicate a much greater chance of Brexit. This means that there is now much greater uncertainty in the market. </p>
<p>This uncertainty is being reflected in increased foreign exchange market volatility, especially for the pound. This makes it much more expensive for companies to hedge the risk of a large movement in the pound against currencies such as the dollar and the euro. </p>
<p>For instance, according to the markets, the current US$1.42/£1 exchange rate of the pound has a 95% chance of ending up in the region of US$1.55/£1 to US$1.29/£1 over the next week – a potential 9% movement. Over the next two weeks, which now covers the referendum result, there is a 95% chance of it ending up in the region of US$1.94/£1 to US$0.90/£1 – a dramatic 36% movement one way or the other. </p>
<p>These potential extremes are unprecedented in recent times and reflect the high degree of uncertainty about the outcome of the referendum result.</p>
<h2>Risk assessed?</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, many large firms have been assessing the risk they face from such large potential movements in order to manage their currency exposure. A large depreciation of the pound could eventually boost exports and reduce imports, but significant order changes for exports and imports could take 12 to 18 months to occur. In the meantime, a depreciation of the pound raises the cost of imports, pushing up the inflation rate. </p>
<p>Exchange rate volatility, however, is only likely to hurt international trade volumes if it persists for a significant period of time, as companies can manage risks over the short term by using futures and options contracts. Futures contracts guarantee a company a certain exchange rate in, say, three or six months. Options contracts give the company, in return for an upfront premium, the right to buy or sell a currency at a particular exchange rate in the future. </p>
<p>Most large multinational companies will have already expected much higher volatility than normal in the run up to the referendum and taken out contracts to manage their risk exposure for the next six months to a year. They will not be too greatly affected in the short-term, whatever the result. Some, however, will not have done so and will find their profit and loss accounts will be heavily affected by large currency movements.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=201&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=201&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=201&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=252&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=252&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126587/original/image-20160614-22398-yt5zbu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=252&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sterling implied volatility 2011-2016, using monthly data.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Data: Chicago Board Options Exchange</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The increased uncertainty over the last two months about the result means the cost of buying protection against a large shift in the value of the pound has increased dramatically – as is shown in the chart above. </p>
<p>A red candle indicates expected volatility is down for the month with the wick indicating the highest and lowest volatility forecast for the month, while a grey candle indicates volatility is up for the month with the wicks again indicating the highest and lowest points for the month. It is now much more expensive for companies to protect themselves against large currency movements than in early May, for example.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=212&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=212&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=212&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126590/original/image-20160614-22380-k2d10s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sterling implied volatility March-June 2016, using daily data.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Data: Chicago Board Options Exchange</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are a <a href="http://www.cityam.com/243002/twelve-reasons-britain-is-better-off-remaining-a-member-of-the-eu">number of reasons</a> why I think leaving the EU would be a disaster for the UK economy and its citizens. But the currency effect does not rank highly among them.</p>
<p>When the referendum result is known, sterling will either strongly appreciate on a remain vote (to perhaps US$1.55/£1) or depreciate (to perhaps $1.25/£1) on a Brexit vote. If it’s a vote to remain, volatility will likely return to much lower levels.</p>
<p>But if it’s a Brexit vote, a high degree of volatility should be expected for a prolonged period of several months. Some currency speculators will make large profits and others will make large losses once the result is revealed. Eventually, however, there will be a period of tranquillity until another major event hits the currency markets.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61057/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Pilbeam is affiliated with the Labour Party. He also studied at the College of Europe
in Bruges and obtained a PhD from the European University Instutute in Florence</span></em></p>Uncertainty over the outcome of the EU referendum has sent currency markets into overdrive.Keith Pilbeam, Professor of Economics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/608972016-06-14T12:59:28Z2016-06-14T12:59:28ZFact Check: do 89% of businesses really support Remain?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126181/original/image-20160610-29219-1v16oq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ready for my close up.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&searchterm=business%20attitudes&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=216365722">Irina Braga</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p><em>Independent poll: 89% of businesses back staying in Europe.</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Britain Stronger in Europe <a href="http://www.strongerin.co.uk/get_the_facts#5V2t8bz1mzTk24zu.97">campaign claim</a></strong></p>
<p>Immigration and the economy have taken centre stage in the British EU referendum. The future economic performance of the UK in particular – its growth, job and wealth creation prospects – depends on how business fares. This helps explain why business attitudes to the referendum have regularly been published in the run-up. </p>
<p>The Britain Stronger in Europe <a href="http://www.strongerin.co.uk/get_the_facts#vSBLftmwq0i1Jt5E.97">campaign relies on</a> one such survey in its campaign literature. Conducted by the Council of British Chambers of Commerce in Europe (COBCOE), it <a href="http://www.cobcoe.eu/files/cobcoe-europe-member-poll-results-fa-aLS79E.pdf">found that</a> 89% of member businesses were opposed to a UK exit from the EU, while only 7% were in favour. The claim is <a href="http://www.libdemvoice.org/what-our-liberal-democrat-leaders-are-saying-about-the-eu-referendum-50868.html">regularly repeated</a> by voices on the Remain side as evidence of the economic damage that a Brexit would cause. So is it accurate?</p>
<p>In fact, it turns out that the survey does not include any UK businesses. Instead, it reflects the views of the members of a total of 38 national chambers of commerce in countries ranging from Austria to Israel to Ukraine. This appears to make it quite a strange survey for Remain to be relying on. </p>
<p>When you look at other business surveys, several things stand out. They too tend to back Remain – if a little less decisively – and the balance of opinion is much tighter with smaller companies than larger ones. The CBI’s <a href="http://news.cbi.org.uk/news/cbi-to-make-economic-case-to-remain-in-eu-after-reaffirming-strong-member-mandate/">survey in March</a> of nearly 800 UK companies found 84% backing Remain among large companies and 71% among smaller ones. </p>
<p>The British Chambers of Commerce <a href="http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/policy-maker/policy-reports-and-publications/bcc-eu-survey-business-vote-tightens-as-referendum-campaign-heads-to-the-finish-line.html">survey</a> of 2,200 members from May found 54% backed Remain compared to 37% against. The smallest businesses were more narrowly in favour, however. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/02/uk-small-businesses-are-evenly-split-on-brexit-poll-says">TNS survey</a> in June of more than 500 small and medium-sized companies found 38% backed Remain and 37% Leave. Yet a new <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-fishermen-want-out-of-the-eu-heres-why-60803">academic survey</a> of UK skippers and boat owners in the fishing industry <a href="https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/news/uk/942753/skippers-want-out-of-eu-according-to-aberdeen-university-research/">found that</a> 92% favour a Brexit. This all raises interesting questions about the differences between various businesses. </p>
<h2>Scottish echoes</h2>
<p>During the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/scotland-decides/results">Scottish independence referendum</a> of 2014, I conducted <a href="http://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk/blogs/news/wp-content/uploads/sites/25/2016/01/Working-Paper-Referendum-CEO-Guide-Kelly-and-MacKay-08-January-2015.pdf">extensive research</a> into business attitudes. Despite close to 50 referendums on various issues across Europe since 2011 alone, there has been very little systematic research of this kind into business opinion. </p>
<p>I found business attitudes to an independence referendum are generally driven by a small number of variables: where the business is headquartered; the ownership structure; the jurisdiction where the balance of its trade takes place; and the most advantageous place for foreign direct investment by multinationals. Having applied the same framework to the EU referendum, it turns out the same variables apply. </p>
<p>Business leaders of UK-headquartered listed companies, or multinationals with subsidiary headquarters in the UK with significant trade in the EU, have been the most perplexed by a vote to leave and most willing to relocate business investment elsewhere. That is why 36 heads of FTSE 100 companies <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35636838">signed an open letter</a> arguing for a Remain vote, and 95% of members of the British American Business Association <a href="http://www.babc.org/public/docs/BATI2016_Guide_WEB.pdf">oppose</a> a Brexit. </p>
<p>Heads of privately-owned companies with comparable EU trading interests also oppose a Brexit, though without the same shareholder pressures they tend to be more willing to soldier on with UK investments if it comes to pass. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/18/richard-branson-says-eu-exit-would-be-saddest-day-for-britain-european-union-virgin">Think about</a> Sir Richard Branson and the Virgin group, for instance. </p>
<p>People who run private companies whose trade is more global are either ambivalent or in favour of leaving – if they can identify a specific benefit for their business. Lord Bamford, the chairman of building group JCB who <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36485985">came out</a> in favour of Leave recently, is a prime example of the latter. Companies of this sort are a minority, however. </p>
<p>Business leaders most in favour of Leave are the ones who mainly trade at home and see a cost advantage or a greater ability to influence the political process after separation. Tim Martin of pub chain Wetherspoons <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/jd-wetherspoon-interview-tim-martin-eu-referendum-democracy-brexit-imf-bee-mats-2016-6">fits into</a> this category. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>It appears misleading for the Remain side to be using the COBCOE survey, though business surveys do generally lean towards the same point of view. Bigger businesses are pro-Remain – unless their sales are primarily either global or UK-focused – while small and medium-sized businesses trading predominantly at home take a different view. </p>
<p>Sectors with a strong view one way or the other are driven by their own motivations – for instance UK fishermen tend to feel unfairly constrained by fishing quotas allocated by the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/index_en.htm">European Common Fisheries Policy</a>. </p>
<p>On the whole, however, the business case for Brexit doesn’t appear to add up. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p><em>Michael Danson, professor of enterprise policy, Heriot-Watt University</em></p>
<p>This piece has identified that, as with many of the claims made by all sides in the EU referendum, Britain Stronger in Europe has been rather fast and loose with presenting COBCOE’s statistics. Nevertheless it is believable that firms successfully doing business internationally would support the status quo, while those struggling at home may have different concerns or else reflect <a href="http://whatukthinks.org/eu/opinion-polls/poll-of-polls/">the divisions</a> within the country as a whole.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=712&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=712&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/126528/original/image-20160614-22386-6dblzw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=712&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Good for who?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&search_tracking_id=EPT7E9qi4jCtGcbpzDvHBQ&searchterm=business%20opinion&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=284750732">Mad Dog</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some questions in business surveys are poorly posed or ambiguous – does “good for business” mean for my firm, for trade, or for the economy as a whole? Are these mutually compatible, or is what is good for a multinational contrary to the needs of smaller companies? As with the Scottish referendum, companies’ opinions seem dominated by self-interest, which never necessarily means in all our interests. </p>
<p>Apart from misleading us over business opinion with the COBCOE survey, Britain Stronger in Europe <a href="http://www.strongerin.co.uk/get_the_facts#kQ5lUsDTLMQvRdir.97">also promotes</a> many campaign slides that play up the worst case scenario in the short-term forecasts of banks, treasuries and international bodies – all of which undermine the objectivity of its message. These contrast different futures under the same free-market regime rather than presenting an alternative inclusive EU agenda that could lead to a different future for the continent. </p>
<p><em>This article originally said that the BCC’s survey had micro-businesses backing Brexit. This has now been corrected.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60897/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brad MacKay receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council in the Future of the UK and Scotland programme, but the views expressed here are entirely his own. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Danson is on the board of the Jimmy Reid Foundation, but the views in this piece are entirely his own.</span></em></p>The Remain campaign cites this survey as proof of the economic benefits of staying in the EU. Here’s the story behind the numbers.Brad MacKay, Professor in Strategic Management, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/607642016-06-13T15:03:46Z2016-06-13T15:03:46ZHow likely is a UK population of 80m – and would it really be a problem?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125896/original/image-20160609-7074-8ljp3m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JuliusKielaitis / Shutterstock.com </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Stay in the EU and the UK’s population could rise to 80m people, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/boris-johnson-uk-population-will-hit-80-million-if-we-stay-in-the-eu_uk_57541387e4b040e3e819a096">claim those</a> campaigning for Brexit. But looking at all the evidence and projections, it is highly unlikely that this will happen. And even if it does, I’m not sure it’s a problem. </p>
<p>The latest population projections released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in October 2015 <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/compendium/nationalpopulationprojections/2015-10-29">showed</a> that the UK population is projected to increase by 9.7m over the next 25 years, from an estimated 64.6m in mid-2014 to 74m in mid-2039. </p>
<p>Around half of this growth is projected to come from natural increases (an excess of births over deaths) and the other half from positive net migration – more people arriving in the UK than leaving. But leave campaigners have suggested that this population growth might be underestimated, and the UK population could reach nearly 80m, fuelled by high levels of migration. </p>
<p>Projecting the future is an inexact science. It involves making assumptions around the three key components of population change: fertility, mortality and migration. So, recognising that projections are uncertain and become increasingly so the further forward in time we go, the ONS also produces a range of alternative scenarios, as the graph below shows. The most <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/compendium/nationalpopulationprojections/2015-10-29/summaryresults">extreme of these</a> – where we assume that fertility, life expectancy and migration all rise significnatly – results in a population of 79.1m by 2039. </p>
<iframe id="datawrapper-chart-HG2Fn" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/HG2Fn/3/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<h2>High-rise assumptions</h2>
<p>But how realistic is this? First, it assumes that the number of children a woman would have, on average, over her reproductive lifetime will rise to 2.09. The last time the UK experienced fertility rates at that level was in the <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/resources/tfrchart2014large_tcm77-410957.png">1960s</a>.</p>
<p>Bearing in mind that this is the average, and a growing proportion of couples are choosing to have <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/conceptionandfertilityrates/bulletins/childbearingforwomenbornindifferentyearsenglandandwales/2015-11-10">one or no children</a>, for total fertility to rise to 2.09 means that more families will need to have three, four or even more children. Most family demographers suggest, however, that <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/compendium/nationalpopulationprojections/2015-10-29/fertilityassumptions">fertility will remain stable</a> or even fall as more women stay in education and then work full-time. </p>
<p>It is also important to remember that fertility levels in the EU countries accounting for the major flows of migrants, such as Poland, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Total_fertility_rate,_1960%E2%80%932014_%28live_births_per_woman%29_YB16.png">are currently lower</a> than in the UK. So the argument that the higher fertility of migrants will drive up average UK fertility is not clear cut.</p>
<p>The 80m figure also assumes the rate of mortality will improve by 2.4% a year until 2030, twice the level of improvement in the ONS’s principal projection. This means average life expectancy at birth in the UK will be 86 for men and 88.7 years for women. Although there have been dramatic improvements in life expectancy over the past century as a result of changes in living standards and improvements in medical treatments, many commentators now think that the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/403477/Recent_trends_in_life_expectancy_at_older_ages.pdf">rate of improvement</a> is slowing down. </p>
<p>The longer-term impact of factors such as increased air pollution and rising obesity is, however, difficult to assess. In determining the assumptions used in its projections, the ONS assembled a panel of leading experts: their view was that an improvement in mortality of 1.2% was the most realistic.</p>
<p>Finally, the figure of 80m also assumes higher migration than the ONS’s principal projection, with long-term annual net international migration of 265,000 a year instead of the central assumption of 185,000. Of all the three components of population change, migration is the most difficult to predict. </p>
<p>Recognising this, the ONS <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/population-and-migration/population-projections/npp-migration-assumptions-methodology-review/index.html">commissioned a review of its methodology</a> and the latest projections include new estimates of long-term migration. It’s difficult to say what will happen in 25 years. If we wound the clock back to 1990 we certainly would have not have predicted the last 25 years. But again, many commentators think that the current flows will stabilise and may even reverse. </p>
<h2>Is Britain full up?</h2>
<p>A frequent argument against further population growth is that Britain is full. The evidence for this, however, is not incontrovertible. According to the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/">latest estimates</a> from the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the population density of the world is estimated at around 56.5 people per km². In the UK, it is currently around 267.5 people per km², so compared with the global average you might argue that Britain is indeed “full”.</p>
<p>But we need to remember that there are significant areas of the world that are very sparsely inhabited: in Mongolia, population density is just under two people per km². As the graph below shows, there are other countries where people live in very close proximity – the country with the highest population density is actually in Europe, where Monaco has 25,322 inhabitants per km². </p>
<iframe id="datawrapper-chart-3EhH1" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/3EhH1/2/" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" webkitallowfullscreen="webkitallowfullscreen" mozallowfullscreen="mozallowfullscreen" oallowfullscreen="oallowfullscreen" msallowfullscreen="msallowfullscreen" width="100%" height="421"></iframe>
<p>If the UK’s population were to grow from its current 64m to 80m, this would definitely increase our population density but we would still be below that of some of our European neighbours including the Netherlands and Belgium. A high population density is also not necessarily a problem if the growth is properly planned for, with essential services such as housing made available.</p>
<p>We may not wish to live in high-rise Singapore, but in reality, such high-density urban living is very efficient in terms of resources. It is the concentration of people in towns over the last 200 years that facilitated the industrial and then the technological revolutions. </p>
<p>Population growth also increases the supply of both workers and consumers, and over the long run, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6imRcAJPhnoC&pg=PT39&lpg=PT39&dq=Production+and+reproduction:+the+significance+of+population+history+tony+wrigley&source=bl&ots=uAaH1-7tU_&sig=QH2BTB6cyfnmThGaotAqTxHevOI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjKurq-zqTNAhUFIMAKHbSaBOYQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&q=Production%20and%20reproduction%3A%20the%20significance%20of%20population%20history%20tony%20wrigley&f=false">economic historians</a> have found a positive link between the two. Rapid population growth can, however, present problems in the short-term if economic productivity or the supply of education and health care fails to keep pace. So population size <em>per se</em> is not the problem – it is how we deal with it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Falkingham receives funding from the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC). This article does not reflect the views of the research councils. </span></em></p>Some scenarios put the UK population at just under 80m by 2039. Here are the facts.Jane Falkingham, Dean of the Faculty of Social, Human and Mathematical Sciences, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/600182016-06-09T09:44:01Z2016-06-09T09:44:01ZBrexit backfire? UK actually has more ‘energy sovereignty’ inside the EU than out<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125134/original/image-20160603-11585-r1mvu4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ditttmer / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK imports around <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/357534/Imports__exports_and_transfers_of_electricity.pdf">6% of its electricity</a> through undersea cables linking it to the European mainland. These links help Britain deal with the ebbs and flows of renewable energy generation, and give the country a “safety net” in case things go wrong. Europe’s electricity network shows just how interconnected nation states are these days, and energy offers many insights into wider issues raised by the EU referendum.</p>
<p>The first is that national sovereignty – if that means the ability of a nation state to promote its best interests – is not necessarily best achieved at a purely national level. The UK has had lots of influence on the EU’s energy policy over the years, on everything from liberalising EU energy markets to the more recent push to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive">ditch fossil fuels for renewables</a>. On these and other issues, the UK has led and other member states have followed. British sovereignty in respect of energy and climate change policy has been expanded, not diminished, by its EU membership.</p>
<p>Sovereignty doesn’t necessarily imply democracy, of course. Yet people sometimes call the EU “undemocratic” without having the first idea of how it operates. Don’t forget that all European legislation is debated and approved, unanimously or by majority vote, by elected representatives from each member country. The European parliament, elected by proportional representation, is rather more democratically representative than the UK parliament, in which a party with <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/usvsth3m/victory-most-people-dont-actually-5667728">only 37% of the popular vote</a> has an absolute majority of seats.</p>
<p>This means directives on renewables or energy efficiency have been agreed by British politicians in discussion with their counterparts from all other member states. They’re not <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2895999/Now-Europe-comes-Sunday-roast-Brussels-impose-maximum-power-limit-new-gas-electric-ovens-month.html">“imposed” by “Brussels”</a>, as such legislation is so often described. At the same time, <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/proportionality.html">checks</a> and <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/subsidiarity.html">balances</a> ensure that the EC does not over-reach itself, and national governments get to decide how most European legislation is actually implemented in their countries. Therefore it’s up to the UK how it chooses to keep the lights on while reducing its carbon emissions – not the EU.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125713/original/image-20160608-3497-1vcmi25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The EU leads the world in offshore wind … by far.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nhd-info/8033151828/">NHD</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With member states moving in broadly the same direction on renewables and energy efficiency, the markets for new technologies are larger. The EU harnesses these economies of scale so that products are cheaper, which benefits both Europe’s consumers and exporters. This is the point of the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/internal-market_en">single internal market</a>.</p>
<p>This effect is especially important in the energy sector. Energy, and especially electricity, flows through networks that need to be regulated and balanced by complex technical and institutional arrangements. If a power plant suddenly goes down, for example, or a still, overcast day prevents wind and solar generation, then electricity can still be wired in from a neighbouring nation. Most people won’t even notice any disruption. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=753&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=753&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=753&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=946&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=946&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125598/original/image-20160607-15024-133iac0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=946&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Undersea ‘interconnectors’ link the UK with France, Ireland and the Netherlands. (Proposed links with Iceland and Norway are in blue).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">J JMesserly / wiki</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Under the EU’s <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en">Energy Union</a> proposals, the UK is having its interconnection to other European countries substantially strengthened, with new cables to France, Denmark, Belgium, Norway and Iceland either agreed or <a href="http://www.scottishenergynews.com/ofgem-proposes-three-new-electricity-interconnectors-between-uk-and-eu-but-not-scotland/">mooted</a>. Such new interconnectors would be possible if the UK was outside the EU and its Energy Union, of course, but they would be a much lower priority for the EU and would almost certainly be <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/uk-energy-links-to-europe-at-risk-from-brexit-analysts-warn/">substantially more expensive</a>.</p>
<p>The conclusions from the available evidence are clear. Inside the EU, the UK will have considerable influence over how the continent cuts its carbon emissions and adopts radical new renewable technology. Britain’s energy system will be well-integrated into that of the mainland, delivering benefits from economies of scale and common standards, while ensuring a secure and stable supply of electricity.</p>
<p>Outside the EU the UK will either exist in an energy isolation that is both more expensive and less secure than being part of the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.2.html">internal energy market</a>, or it will be a second-tier member of that market, bound to accept the rules made by EU members but having no influence over how they are agreed.</p>
<p>The paradox is that inside the EU the UK will be more sovereign, in the sense of having more control over its energy future, and part of a wider democracy, with an energy system that is more secure and delivers energy at lower cost, than if the UK sought to control energy developments by itself. Such paradoxes in today’s globally interconnected world are not uncommon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60018/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Ekins is a Fellow of the Energy Institute. He receives funding for his research from the UK Research Councils, both directly at UCL and through the UK Energy Research Centre. He has also received funding from DG Research of the European Commission. This article does not reflect the views of the research councils.</span></em></p>Energy isolation would be more expensive and less secure.Paul Ekins, Professor of Resources and Environmental Policy, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/604942016-06-06T16:10:04Z2016-06-06T16:10:04ZBrexit betting odds: lesson from Scotland is not promising for Leave<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125354/original/image-20160606-25972-16i5gut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Just before they burst. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/cat.mhtml?lang=en&language=en&ref_site=photo&search_source=search_form&version=llv1&anyorall=all&safesearch=1&use_local_boost=1&autocomplete_id=&search_tracking_id=iU2dBgT4PbF3k_J8T7EZMA&searchterm=scottish%20referendum&show_color_wheel=1&orient=&commercial_ok=&media_type=images&search_cat=&searchtermx=&photographer_name=&people_gender=&people_age=&people_ethnicity=&people_number=&color=&page=1&inline=218099434">Andrea Obzerova</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The runners and riders in the EU referendum are making the final turn into the home straight. Both teams are jostling for position and the race is becoming increasingly acrimonious. The Leave campaign has abandoned the economic arguments and instead is focusing almost exclusively on migration. </p>
<p>The Remain campaign continues to release dire warnings of a post-Brexit world that seems to include all ten plagues of Egypt except slaughter of the firstborn. Following some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/04/poll-eu-brexit-lead-opinium">good polls</a> for Leave in the past couple of days, the poll of polls <a href="http://whatukthinks.org/eu/opinion-polls/poll-of-polls/">currently points to</a> a 50-50 dead heat. </p>
<p>Bookies too have been adjusting the odds offered as they seek to maximise their expected gain from the outcome. Over the last few weeks, this resulted in a substantial fall in the implied probability of a Leave outcome – and as I wrote in my <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-campaign-is-doomed-if-bookmakers-are-right-again-57514">previous piece</a> about Brexit odds, the weight of betting was far less promising for Leave than the opinion polls before that anyway. </p>
<p>On April 26, the probability of a vote to leave from the <a href="http://www.oddschecker.com">oddschecker.com</a> average of some 20 bookmakers’ odds stood at 0.35, meaning slightly better than a one in three chance. By May 22 it had fallen to 0.22 or almost one in five. Perhaps the tsunami of warnings from national and international organisations of the economic consequences of Brexit was being factored into punters’ assessments of how the vote will go.</p>
<p>Since then, the news for the Brexit camp has got slightly better. The slide was arrested on May 27 and there has been a modest recovery which took the probability of Brexit up to 0.30 by June 6. Perhaps punters were thinking the switch of emphasis to migration will carry more voter appeal: or that they are more confident of a high turnout among Leave supporters. </p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-238" class="tc-infographic" height="610" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/238/33b50a32b76a46a5e309241d24d47e9c755bf389/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Of course, these predicted probabilities do not mean that a Leave outcome will not occur – just that it is seen as rather unlikely. They reflect all of the information available to punters. This may be drawn from a wide variety of sources – opinion polls, press coverage, personal contacts and so on. The point has been <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/bookmakers-prediction-eu-referendum-brexit-winner-a7046966.html">made elsewhere</a> that punters are not representative of the population as a whole. But they don’t need to be to use this information intelligently. </p>
<p>Indeed, not all those betting need to act in an informed way. So long as there are sufficient well informed punters willing to place their bets where they see an opportunity for gain based on the current odds, the odds will come to reflect the underlying chance that the event occurs (with the small complication that bookies always build in a profit margin).</p>
<p>Will the odds change substantially over the remainder of the campaign? It seems unlikely that they can change sufficiently to suggest that a Leave outcome is more likely than a Remain outcome. Nothing in the history of betting odds suggests that a swing of 24 percentage points is possible over a three-week period. </p>
<h2>Ecosse and effect</h2>
<p>The Scottish referendum is a useful precedent. Events during the last few weeks included some surprises which perhaps punters had not anticipated. Most important was the <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/uk-news/scots-independence/60436/scottish-independence-odds-bookmakers-shorten-odds-on-no">closing of the gap</a> between the Yes and No polling. </p>
<p>This had a dramatic effect on media coverage and on the politics during the run-up to the vote. It also influenced the bookies’ odds (see graphic below), increasing the probability of a Yes outcome by 16 percentage points between the 23rd day and the ninth day before the polls. But then the upward momentum petered out and by the time of the vote the odds had fallen back to more or less where they had started. </p>
<p><strong>Betting probability of a Yes vote in Scottish referendum</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/125353/original/image-20160606-25992-ie4o4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: oddschecker.com.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On June 5, 18 days before the Brexit vote, the probability of a Leave vote stood at 0.30 or 30%. In Scotland, the probability of a Yes vote at the same point before the independence referendum was slightly lower at 0.20. </p>
<p>While the implied probability of the UK leaving the EU is currently higher than the implied probability of Scotland leaving the UK was at that stage, it will take a bigger and more sustained change of events in the last few days of the campaign than that which happened in Scotland to persuade bookies to offer anything like evens on a vote for Brexit. </p>
<p>To see whether Johnson, Gove and co can make it happen, bookmark this piece. The graphic on the EU referendum betting odds will keep updating as we near polling day. </p>
<h2>Update, June 23</h2>
<p>It looks to me that the betting markets have made up their mind that the status quo is the likely outcome. Like in the Scottish referendum, a late surge towards the more radical alternative petered out in the last week of the campaign, perhaps because of the incessant warnings about the potential risks of change. </p>
<p>Based on the odds being offered on different outcomes for the size of the Remain vote, the most likely outcome is Remain 53.5% – Leave 46.5%. Of course there is a margin of error associated with this estimate. Gamblers have a financial incentive in making the correct prediction, but they could be wrong. We will soon know one way or the other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Bell receives funding from the ESRC, but the views expressed in this piece are entirely his own. </span></em></p>The swing in betting sentiment the month before the Scottish indyref tells us Boris has his work cut out.David Bell, Professor of Economics, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.