tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/al-shabab-2471/articlesAl Shabab – The Conversation2023-12-12T09:10:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2180972023-12-12T09:10:47Z2023-12-12T09:10:47ZWhat’s east Africa’s position on the Israel-Hamas war? An expert unpacks the reactions of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda<p>The reactions of some east African countries to the ongoing conflict in Gaza have been less dramatic than South Africa’s. South Africa’s parliament has passed a resolution calling for the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21/">closure</a> of its embassy in Tel Aviv. Algeria and South Africa have been the most supportive of the Palestinians. Thus far only South Africa and Chad have withdrawn their representatives from Tel Aviv.</p>
<p>In contrast, the reactions from east African capitals have been less dramatic. At the outset of the current conflict in Gaza, Kenya’s President William Ruto <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-10-08-kenya-stands-with-israel-ruto-says-amidst-war-with-palestine/">expressed solidarity</a> with Israel and condemned</p>
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<p>terrorism and attacks on innocent civilians in the country.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-reacts-as-hamas-attack-on-israel-spirals-4393308">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-calls-for-peace-as-israel-palestine-war-intensifies-4394110">Tanzania</a> condemned all forms of violence and called for</p>
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<p>restraint to stem further loss of human life.</p>
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<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Michael+Bishku+research&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart">scholar</a> of Middle Eastern and African history, I have researched the relationship between Israel and African countries including those in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312006990_Israel's_Relations_with_the_East_African_States_of_Kenya_Uganda_and_Tanzania_-_From_Independence_to_the_Present">east Africa</a>. </p>
<p>It is my conclusion that the reactions of the east African states to the conflict in the Middle East are shaped by two things: the perceived national threat of terrorism by Islamist factions and, for those states with democratic institutions, domestic public opinion.</p>
<p>In my view these three countries are unlikely to change their stance unless the current conflict escalates. On the one hand they will continue to limit their actions to voting in the United Nations for resolutions in support of the Palestinians. On the other they will continue to solicit technical assistance – especially in agriculture and security – from Israel.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Relations between African countries and Israel have been tested before. For example, in 1973, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455585">25 independent African states</a> cut diplomatic relations with Israel after its occupation of Egyptian territory. These included east African states, such as Kenya, which had enjoyed particularly <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-history-of-africa-israel-relations/a-43395892">close relations</a> with Israel since its independence from Britain in 1963.</p>
<p>East African countries colonised by Britain <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/09/israeli-penetration-east-africa-objectives-risks-160929102604246.html">sought</a> technical assistance after independence. This was particularly true in agriculture. They viewed Israel as complementary or an alternative to having to seek assistance from the big powers.</p>
<p>When African states cut off the diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973, Kenya was reluctant but had to act in solidarity with other independent African nations. It kept its cooperation with Israel even before the formal ties were restored in 1988. It facilitated Israel’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Entebbe-raid">1974 rescue operation</a> at Uganda’s Entebbe airport. The operation was meant to rescue passengers of a French jet airliner that was hijacked on its way from Israel to France, and flown to Entebbe. </p>
<p>Tanzania, on the other hand, sought a more neutral course after independence. It found the socialist character of the Israeli Labour governments appealing but Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories following the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War">1967 Six-Day War</a> complicated relations. </p>
<p>Tanzania was one of the last African states to <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1481841?ln=en">renew</a> relations with Israel in 1994. That was a year after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oslo-Accords">Oslo Accords</a> between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Tanzania was also the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200605-palestine-julius-nyerere-and-international-solidarity/">first African country</a> to recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1973 and to host a representative office in its capital. </p>
<p>Uganda has had the most tempestuous relationship with Israel. Under the erratic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a> the country broke off relations with Israel and embraced Libya. Israel and Uganda have had good relations under President Yoweri Museveni. Israeli companies <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/nairobi/bilateral-relations/Pages/Israel-and-Uganda.aspx">currently operate</a> in Uganda’s construction, infrastructure, agriculture and water management, communications and technology sectors.</p>
<p>Uganda joined most other African countries in <a href="https://truman.huji.ac.il/publications/uganda-and-israel-history-complex-relationship">renewing</a> relations with Israel just after the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Uganda, along with Kenya, has militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission. </p>
<p>The ebbs and flows of these relationships have to be seen against the backdrop of the hard work Israel has put in to building <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with a range of other African countries too. By 2023 it had ties with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<h2>National security threat</h2>
<p>Kenya has been affected by instability in neighbouring Somalia and has been the victim of terror attacks. </p>
<p>In 1998, al Qaeda attacks <a href="https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980813.sc6559.html">targeted</a> the US embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Nairobi attack <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-victims-of-1998-us-embassy-bombing-demand-compensation-/7215264.html">resulted</a> in over 200 deaths and thousands of people were injured. Since then, Israel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/nairobi-attack-israel-advising-kenyan-forces">has taken the lead</a> among foreign countries in aiding and advising Kenyan security.</p>
<p>Kenya has suffered attacks since then by al-Shabaab – across its <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">border</a> as well as in <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/kenya/">Nairobi</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>Tanzania’s security situation has been different. Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has not militarily intervened in Somalia as part of an African Union mission (Amisom). The mission has been operating since 2007 to provide security in that country in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Uganda has its own set of security problems. A terrorist bombing in Uganda’s capital Kampala in 2010 was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/7/13/al-shabab-claims-uganda-bombings">attributed</a> to al-Shabaab. But a bigger threat to Uganda’s security has come from Islamist rebels known as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">Allied Democratic Forces</a> based in the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<h2>Domestic institutions and public opinion</h2>
<p>There is one other factor that explains east Africa’s relations with Israel: the religious composition of populations in the region. </p>
<p>Israel is <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/truth-many-evangelical-christians-support-israel-rcna121481">popular</a> with many devout Christians in east Africa, as is the case throughout the continent. If given the opportunity, these Christians would make a pilgrimage to the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.09">Holy Land</a>. This factor obviously affects <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/israel-in-africa-9781786995056/">public opinion</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, Muslims in east Africa have a greater concern for the situation of the Palestinians. All three countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – have populations adhering to these two religions. </p>
<p>Given the democratic characters of Kenya and Tanzania, where there have been peaceful transfers of power, public opinion has more of an impact. This explains Ruto’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/president-ruto-changes-tune-on-israel-hamas-conflict-4431560">change of tone</a> after the initial statement strongly critical of Hamas.</p>
<p>Tanzania has remained consistent in condemning all forms of violence. That country calls for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as do the other east African states. </p>
<p>Public pressure is less important in Uganda, where Museveni is quite autocratic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael B. Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>East Africa’s reaction to the war in Gaza appears shaped by history, affinity to the policies of the west and the threat of terrorism.Michael B. Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126742023-09-10T10:13:49Z2023-09-10T10:13:49ZAU peacekeepers are leaving Somalia: what needs to happen to keep the peace<p>The phased withdrawal of the <a href="https://atmis-au.org/">African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis)</a> began earlier this year and is <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2628">scheduled</a> to end in December 2024. </p>
<p>The withdrawal of African Union (AU) peacekeepers poses risks for Somalia. For one, it may reduce the pressure on al-Shabaab at a crucial time during the Somali government’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-plans-eliminate-al-shabaab-months-analysts-sceptical-2023-08-18/">latest offensive</a>. These risks cannot be completely eliminated but there are important steps the Somali authorities and the AU must take before the mission’s exit.</p>
<p>The withdrawal of the AU troops hands a battlefield and propaganda advantage to al-Shabaab. Beyond that, it reduces support for Somali forces trying to wage an offensive. There is also a risk that Somali forces garrisoned in former AU operating bases might be particularly vulnerable to al-Shabaab attack.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://amisom-au.org">AU Mission in Somalia</a> arrived in Mogadishu in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Peace-Somalia-Analysis-2007-2017/dp/0198851677/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">March 2007</a>, eventually growing to a force of over 22,000 personnel by 2014. From December 2017, the force was gradually downsized. In 2022 it was renamed a transitional force, a signal that the AU was entering the last phase of its military deployment in Somalia. </p>
<p>In the next drawdown <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2687">phase</a>, 3,000 out of 17,500 peacekeepers should depart by the end of September.</p>
<p>To ensure a smooth departure, the Somali authorities and AU forces must accomplish several key tasks. Somalia must reform and strengthen its internal security. The AU must coordinate with Somali forces and partner with the United Nations to handle the difficult logistics of the exiting troops. If they both succeed, then it’s worth speculating about what is likely to happen after the AU peacekeepers leave.</p>
<h2>Somalia’s key tasks</h2>
<p>For the Somali authorities, the key political challenge is to finalise the structure of their national security architecture. This has been stuck in draft form since 2017 and was recently revised. <a href="https://heritageinstitute.org/security-sector-reform-in-somlia-challenges-and-opportunities/publications/">It is crucial</a> that the type and numbers of forces, as well as command and control, and financial relationships are clear and agreeable to both the federal government and federal member states. It will be impossible to conduct successful offensive campaigns unless the Somali federal and regional authorities are on the same page.</p>
<p>Second, Somalia and its regions must recruit more security personnel, principally soldiers for the Somali National Army as well as federal and local police officers. The stated goals are about 23,000 deployable soldiers and 32,000 police officers. This was formally recognised in UN Security Council resolutions in <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2628">2022</a> and <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2687">2023</a>. But winning a war takes more than just fielding new, inexperienced personnel. The Somali army still lacks the supporting equipment, field mentoring, infrastructure and governing institutions it needs.</p>
<p>Finally, the Somali authorities must make significant progress in the war against al-Shabaab before the AU force leaves. President Hassan Sheikh’s goal of defeating al-Shabaab in <a href="https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1692306866573852795?s=20">five months</a> is wildly optimistic. It’s also counterproductive because it frames the current offensive campaign as a sprint rather than the marathon it really is. For over a decade, the central military problem has not been ejecting al-Shabaab from settlements, it has been holding them afterwards and delivering a real peace dividend to the local population.</p>
<h2>The AU’s key tasks</h2>
<p>The AU has its own list of difficult tasks to ensure a smooth, phased withdrawal of peacekeepers.</p>
<p>Having withdrawn 2,000 <a href="https://atmis-au.org/au-transition-mission-in-somalia-concludes-phase-one-of-troop-drawdown-hands-over-final-two-forward-operating-bases/">troops</a> in June, the AU’s immediate task is to identify and withdraw the next 3,000 by the end of September 2023. The soldiers will probably be drawn from across all the mission’s sectors and troop-contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda).</p>
<p>Second, the AU must work with <a href="https://unsos.unmissions.org/">the UN Support Office in Somalia</a> to ensure that the logistics go smoothly. The <a href="https://youtu.be/gis-DUfMZ-o">logistical challenges</a> are considerable and will involve many vehicles and aircraft moving troops and equipment. The largest portion of this activity will involve the handover of <a href="https://youtu.be/PSBHvFnMoU8?si=JvBIsWBqk43cpupl">forward operating bases</a> from the AU to the Somali security forces, and perhaps the closure of some bases. These will be particularly vulnerable to al-Shabaab attack after the handovers.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, the AU transitional force must continue to <a href="https://atmis-au.org/atmis-troops-to-continue-supporting-somali-forces-in-ongoing-offensive-against-al-shabaab/">support the Somali Army’s offensive operations</a>, currently underway on two fronts in central and southern Somalia.</p>
<p>Finally, the AU force must maintain its regular operations while preparing for the third drawdown of troops, scheduled for June 2024.</p>
<h2>What next after the AU transitional force?</h2>
<p>Assuming the transition of security responsibilities to the Somali authorities sticks to the official plan, then the AU force’s mandate will end by 2025. But this does not necessarily mean the end of international forces in Somalia. Security assistance programmes and operations by the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2020-07-14-us-policy-somalia-williams.pdf">United States</a>, <a href="https://heritageinstitute.org/security-sector-reform-in-somlia-challenges-and-opportunities/publications/">Turkey</a>, the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-background-papers/european-union-training-mission-somalia-assessment">European Union</a>, and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-support-to-somalias-security-transition#:%7E:text=In%202021%2F2022%2C%20the%20UK,trained%20over%202000%20SNA%20soldiers.">United Kingdom</a> are unlikely to end abruptly when the AU force exits. If nothing else, an international security presence will remain in and around Mogadishu to protect the diplomatic community.</p>
<p>Nor will Somalia’s neighbours reduce their forces to zero. Indeed, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-neighbours-launch-new-operations-against-al-shabaab-militants-2023-02-01/">earlier this year</a>, Somalia’s neighbours agreed to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-neighbors-to-send-additional-troops-to-fight-al-shabab-/6986748.html">provide additional troops</a> to help the federal government fight al-Shabaab, a clear signal of what the period after the AU force might entail. So far, however, this commitment doesn’t appear to have been implemented.</p>
<p>The Somali federal government is hence likely to enter into bilateral security agreements with its neighbours. It is also probable that Somalia will ask Uganda to retain a security force in and around Mogadishu. This makes practical sense because Ugandan troops have over 16 years of experience fighting al-Shabaab. It would be very difficult for any other foreign country to replicate that. In this scenario, Burundi might be the only country whose troops leave Somalia when the mandate of the AU transitional force ends. If so, this would not represent a major strategic change in the dynamics of this long war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams has previously received funding from the George Washington University to conduct research on Somalia. </span></em></p>A rapid exit of AU troops from Somalia could hand a battlefield and propaganda advantage to al-Shabaab.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010392023-07-05T13:25:43Z2023-07-05T13:25:43ZMozambican terror group is strikingly similar to Nigeria’s deadly Boko Haram<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535867/original/file-20230705-17871-w4xgot.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican Armed Defence Forces being inspected in Cabo Delgado Province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Terrorism is a global problem affecting many countries. Until 2017, however, southern Africa was largely spared from this phenomenon. The bloody conflict sparked by <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/african-conflicts-to-watch-in-2022">Ansar al-Sunna</a> in northern Mozambique has since changed the region’s security landscape.</p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna, also called Al-Shabaab Mozambique, is an Islamic extremist movement which has <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/the-genesis-of-insurgency-in-northern-mozambique">gained prominence</a> in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province. Despite military intervention by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/rwandan-and-mozambican-army-bosses-meet-ahead-of-sadc-meeting-on-insurgency-20220110">Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/rwandan-and-mozambican-army-bosses-meet-ahead-of-sadc-meeting-on-insurgency-20220110">Rwanda</a> since 2021, the bloody insurgency is far from quelled.</p>
<p>The group’s goals and operations, and the challenges it poses, are similar to those of the most feared terrorist groups in other African countries. These are in particular <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/terrorism-in-africa/">Al Shabaab</a> in Somalia and <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Is%20Might%20Right.pdf">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria.<br>
Boko Haram has posed a significant threat to the Nigerian state since 2009. It has also undermined the security of several neighbouring states. It preys on <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/06/13/nigeria-is-a-fragile-state-international-studies-prove-it/">state fragility</a> and the resultant <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/SystemFiles/MASA8-1Eng.06Bamidele413395087.pdf">socio-economic challenges</a>. Poverty <a href="https://www.csef.it/WP/wp495.pdf">disproportionately affects the rural, northern region</a>, where Boko Haram is most active.</p>
<p>Decades of <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=iKCKnrkAAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> on conflict in Africa made me aware of similarities between Ansar al-Sunna and Boko Haram. This prompted me to compare their origins, doctrines and acts of terror. </p>
<p>I recently delivered a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/104218615/Boko_Haram_and_Ansar_al_Sunna_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Insurgency_Dynamics_and_Governance_Failures">paper</a> on the subject at<a href="https://ecasconference.org/2023/programme#12436.68172"> a conference in Germany</a>. The paper deals with:</p>
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<li><p>the emergence of the two groups </p></li>
<li><p>their ideological linkages and links with regional and international jihadist groups </p></li>
<li><p>the socio-economic conditions that facilitate radicalism and recruitment </p></li>
<li><p>how the two groups source their funds </p></li>
<li><p>the security responses of the Nigerian and Mozambican governments.</p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambique-insurgency-focus-needs-to-shift-to-preventing-criminality-at-sea-166138">Mozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea</a>
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<h2>Similarities</h2>
<p>The first similarity is that both Ansar al-Sunna (“the youth” in Arabic) and Boko Haram emerged as militant Islamist movements committed to establishing Islamic caliphates in their countries. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, Boko Haram set out to separate from secular society, and draw students from poor Muslim families to an Islamic school in Borno State. Its founder, Mohammad Yusuf, argued that Islam <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf">forbade western education</a>. The group eventually went beyond targeting western education to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200507_nigeria_boko_haram_afzal.pdf">attacking Nigeria’s political system</a>. This included the country’s constitution, national anthem, national flag and other formal symbols.</p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna, too, was not primarily politically active at first. It started by rejecting Mozambique’s educational, health and legal systems on religious grounds. It demanded that its followers support alternative services offered <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/">at its mosques</a> – a counter-society of a kind. </p>
<p>Second, there is no real documented evidence of direct control of either Boko Haram or Ansar Al-Sunna by foreign jihadists. This implies a strong local context and drivers. But there are clear ideological linkages or sentiments. They both communicate with regional or international jihadist groups. The United States alleges the two movements are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19361610.2021.1882281">connected to ISIS</a>. It also links Boko Haram to al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Third, I argue in my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/104218615/Boko_Haram_and_Ansar_al_Sunna_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_Insurgency_Dynamics_and_Governance_Failures">paper</a> that both Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna are largely <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/crime-illicit-markets-violence-instability-nigeria/">funded by dubious and illegal sources</a>. For Boko Haram, cross-border cattle rustling has been a substantial source of income. So are ransom payments for kidnapping, bank robberies and “tax” collections. </p>
<p>Ansar al-Sunna <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GITOC-ESAObs-Insurgency-illicit-markets-and-corruption-The-Cabo-Delgado-conflict-and-its-regional-implications.pdf#page=7">receives its funding</a> primarily from local business people, as well as cash and goods seized during attacks. </p>
<p>Fragile public institutions and the limitations of state security explain the two movements’ ability to get funding and potent large-calibre weapons.</p>
<p>Fourth, poor and even desperate socio-economic conditions provided opportunities for Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna to emerge in the political landscapes of Nigeria and Mozambique. Both operate in the less governed, poverty-stricken parts of their countries – north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique. </p>
<p>Those poor conditions are typical of state fragility and limited statehood. Among the <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/AM2021/Global_POVEQ_NGA.pdf">almost 40% of Nigerians living in poverty</a> in 2018–2019, close to 85% lived in rural areas. Almost 77% were in the predominantly Muslim north. In Mozambique, Cabo Delgado has an illiteracy rate of about 60%. Some of <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-27.pdf">the poorest schools and health facilities</a> in the country are in Cabo Delgado. Unemployment is as high as 88%. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-mozambiques-failure-to-find-lasting-peace-and-true-democracy-171434">What lies behind Mozambique's failure to find lasting peace and true democracy</a>
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<p>There is a striking parallel in the inequality and socio-economic exclusion of the affected regions. In both, the central government and relevant state institutions are simply absent, or can’t meet the basic needs of their populations. They don’t provide schools, hospitals, roads and other public infrastructure. They have massive youth unemployment, corruption, poverty and underdevelopment. </p>
<p>Fifth, both militant groups sparked heavy-handed security responses from the respective governments. Confrontations between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state eventually led to a <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/Is%20Might%20Right.pdf#page=13">state of emergency in 2013</a> in three north-eastern states. But the group’s violent campaign escalated, taking a heavy toll on lives and property.</p>
<p>Similarly in Mozambique, the emergence of Ansar al-Sunna got a strong response from the security forces in 2020. Foreign private military companies joined later. In both cases, the government adopted a militaristic approach to the insurgency, without any positive outcomes. </p>
<p>In both countries, the insurgency dynamics and problems required political and economic solutions. These are strategies that address the root causes of conflict. Instead, regional military responses were unleashed – by <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan">ECOWAS</a> in Nigeria, and the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique">SADC and Rwanda</a> in Mozambique. Both interventions are hampered by inadequate resources and <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/slow-progress-for-west-africas-latest-counter-terrorism-plan">insufficient funding</a>. This clearly rules out a military solution or victory.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>State fragility and governance limitations not only provided fertile ground for the rise of Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sunna. They also prevent the relevant state institutions in Nigeria and Mozambique from solving the problem.</p>
<p>Inequality and socio-economic exclusion in north-eastern Nigeria and northern Mozambique continue.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/regional-military-intervention-in-mozambique-is-a-bad-idea-heres-why-161549">Regional military intervention in Mozambique is a bad idea. Here's why</a>
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<p>The central governments and state institutions are unable to address the dire socio-economic conditions and related instability. </p>
<p>This is why counterinsurgency efforts have had limited impact. The conflict in northern Mozambique could become a long, low-intensity war, as it has in Nigeria and Somalia. That is unless the authorities adopt counter-insurgency measures that go beyond military operations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>In parts of Nigeria and Mozambique, the central governments and state institutions are either absent or unable to address the dire socio-economic conditions and related instability.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1911592022-10-12T14:07:02Z2022-10-12T14:07:02ZSomalia: Puntland state port is getting a revamp - this is key to its future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486144/original/file-20220922-9184-qhdxbu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bosaso has become a major export hub since security improved in Somalia's Puntland region.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-taken-on-november-18-2013-shows-bosaso-harbor-news-photo/450358003?adppopup=true">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The port city of Bosaso, located at the north-eastern corner of Somalia, provides a striking example of the interlinkage between security and infrastructure. The city benefited from the civil war that ravaged the southern parts of Somalia in the 1990s and 2000s. It developed into a booming trade centre. But increased violence in Bosaso has negatively affected international trade in the last decade. Security improvements and the recovery of other ports in Somalia and Somaliland have provided alternatives.</p>
<p>In July 2022, the Emirates-based Dubai Ports World (DP World), a global operator of ports and logistics, returned to Bosaso. The company had signed a <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2022/01/13/bossaso-port-optimising-port-activities-and-transforming-circulations/">concession agreement</a> with the government in Puntland, a federal member state of Somalia, in 2017. But the plans to modernise the port were never realised. </p>
<p>DP World’s <a href="https://puntlandpost.net/2022/02/21/puntland-renegotiates-dp-world-concession-to-manage-bosaso-port/">return</a> has instigated optimism across the city, though numerous challenges still lie ahead.</p>
<p>Our research project is <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org/">studying</a> the Horn of Africa’s emerging port infrastructures and their impact on the everyday lives of people in cities. </p>
<p>Bosaso’s efforts to remain economically relevant will have implications for the relative independence that Puntland has achieved from the federal government in Mogadishu. An upgraded port could bolster citizens’ trust in the semi-autonomous government.</p>
<h2>A lifeline for Puntland</h2>
<p>The port of Bosaso is located on the Red Sea. Its development was tied to the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in the 1980s. Siad Barre, the military dictator who ruled the country from 1969 to 1991, rehabilitated a highway between Bosaso and central Somalia, and <a href="https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01044642">allowed Bosaso to operate the port duty-free</a>. This was to appease his opponents in the north-east and to economically harm rising opposition in the north-west (now Somaliland). </p>
<p>Trading activities and property investments in Bosaso increased significantly after the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Bosaso City <a href="https://securityonthemove.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/SOTM-Research-Brief-BOSAASO.pdf">grew considerably</a> in the early 1990s when it evolved into a prime destination for people who fled from violence in the southern parts of Somalia. </p>
<p>Among the immigrants were former political and business elites with clan affiliations to the north-east. Others were from the politically marginalised and harassed clans and minority groups of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>The closeness and historic shipping links between Bosaso and Yemen additionally pulled people to the city. Younger people looking for an option to escape poverty and a life full of risks moved to Bosaso to embark on Tahriib, the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/going-tahriib">undocumented and dangerous migration</a> across the Red Sea to the Gulf states and from there, if possible, further to Europe.</p>
<p>During the early 1990s, Bosaso had the only relatively safe port in Somalia. It became a major trade hub for livestock exports and consumer goods imports. This integrated Bosaso into an international trade network and linked the port to central Somalia and eastern Ethiopia. </p>
<p>New livestock quarantine stations were established, financed by Saudi Arabia and managed by a highly skilled labour force (mainly from Egypt). This was to avoid economically damaging <a href="https://sominvest.gov.so/livestock-trade-in-the-djibouti-somali-and-ethiopian-borderlands-2010/">livestock bans</a> from Saudi Arabia on the basis of animal health. </p>
<p>Income from the flourishing seaport supported the establishment of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in 1998. </p>
<h2>Port in decline</h2>
<p>But Bosaso is currently struggling to maintain its economic relevance. This has political implications for the relative independence that Puntland has achieved from the Somali federal government. </p>
<p>International trade activities have been declining during the last decade. Since 2015, the war in Yemen has interrupted established trade routes. Additionally, the city has faced threats from Islamist insurgents, prominently Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia. </p>
<p>The concession agreement with DP World’s subsidiary P&O Ports in 2017 added further layers of insecurity. Local groups criticised the “sell-out” of the port to a foreign country, while business groups feared that a rise in port fees would have a negative impact on local trade. </p>
<p>Disputes among the Puntland leadership, and disagreements between Puntland and P&O Ports, delayed the planned modernisation. P&O eventually left Bosaso in 2019 after <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-47114779">its port manager</a> was killed by gunmen, an attack for which al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. </p>
<p>These developments stood in contrast to security improvements in southern Somalia. These were visible in the reopening of Mogadishu’s seaport, which has been managed by <a href="https://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1.1+Somalia+Port+of+Mogadishu">a Turkish company</a> since 2014. Competition increased further with the DP World-driven modernisation of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/waiting-for-ethiopia-berbera-port-upgrade-raises-somalilands-hopes-for-trade-188949">port in Berbera</a> in Somaliland. </p>
<p>Bosaso is not able to compete with the much larger multi-purpose ports in Berbera and Mogadishu. The two ports are fitted with container terminals and furnished with modern equipment. Bosaso, instead, has had a <a href="https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/1275207/DIIS_WP_2017_13.pdf">crucial position</a> in a more informal overseas trade. </p>
<p>The ongoing transformation of global supply chains, with circulation increasingly relying on cranes and containers, detaches Bosaso from important trade networks. For example, containerised ports import goods directly from producing countries like China, while Bosaso relies on transshipment through intermediary ports in Yemen, Oman or elsewhere.</p>
<p>These developments have political implications. Many Bosaso residents attribute the port’s decline to leadership failure. A port official explained in an interview in August 2022: </p>
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<p>The port has been neglected by all Puntland leaders. There was no investment provided to the port since 1991. The port is about to be relegated to irrelevance. </p>
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<h2>At a crossroads</h2>
<p>The modernisation of the port is critical for Puntland. An upgraded port will ensure Puntland keeps a significant position within the fragmented political landscape of Somalia. It will also prevent traders from looking for alternative outlets. </p>
<p>Multiple challenges, among them security considerations, lie ahead. The relations between Puntland and the government in Mogadishu, as well as disagreements within the Puntland leadership, are crucial. In short, Bosaso is at a crossroads and faces a defining moment for its political and economic future.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed Hassan Ibrahim, a research consultant in the <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/staff/">port infrastructure project</a>, is a lead contributor and conducted most of the research for this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. The research is part of the project: Port Infrastructure, International Politics, and Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa, <a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a></span></em></p>A modern port raises Puntland’s stake within the fragmented political landscape of Somalia and prevents traders from seeking alternatives.Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham UniversityMay Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726872021-12-09T15:24:24Z2021-12-09T15:24:24ZWhat’s the history of foreign troops on Kenyan soil? Here’s a brief rundown<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435068/original/file-20211201-24-1uqflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A new US report claims that China plans to open new military bases across Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peoples-liberation-army-soldiers-and-members-of-a-united-news-photo/76777070?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The presence of foreign military personnel is rarely a hot topic in Kenya, except in rare cases of transgressions such as recent <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/agnes-wanjiru-kenyan-victims-family-sues-mod-over-failure-to-investigate-murder-tzz37vgn0#:%7E:text=In%20an%20interview%20with%20The,and%20confessed%20to%20killing%20her.&text=Wanjiru's%20body%20was%20found%20in,ready%20on%20April%205%2C%202013">reports</a> linking a British soldier to the murder of a woman 10 years ago. And now, a recent US defence <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF">report</a> suggested that China could be wooing Kenya (amongst other countries in the region) to host a military base. China dismissed the claim, <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/china-hits-out-at-the-us-over-kenya-military-base-claim-3611430">accusing the US of stoking old Cold War fears</a>. The Conversation Africa’s George Omondi asked Macharia Munene to make sense of the seemingly high stakes.</em></p>
<h2>What is the foreign military presence in Kenya?</h2>
<p>The foreign military presence in Kenya isn’t very pronounced, but British and the American personnel do operate, either in training or assisting in security operations.</p>
<p>About <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/newsite/pages/Ali/eastafricanencyl/newone/kenya/kdfnce.html">300</a> British officers regularly train in Kenya with Kenyan soldiers. They are mostly in Nanyuki, a town located about 285 kms north of Nairobi. </p>
<p>The British have been in Kenya since independence through bilateral security arrangements. Kenya’s dependence on the UK increased after 1964. In that year there was a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292229499_The_Lanet_incident_2-25_January_1964_Military_unrest_and_national_amnesia_in_Kenya">mutiny</a> at the Lanet military base in Nakuru as well as grumblings at the Langata Barracks in Nairobi. Soldiers in the Kenya Rifles were demanding pay rises, almost copying what had happened in Tanganyika and Uganda, the two other former British protectorates in East Africa. At the request of Prime Minister <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jomo-Kenyatta">Jomo Kenyatta</a>, British troops helped to put down the unrest. Kenya’s reliance on Britain subsequently increased. Britain’s Major General Ian H. Freeland commanded Kenyan troops at the time.</p>
<p>The initial command of the armed forces was under British officers, on secondment. But the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/kenyas-africanization-program-priorities-of-development-and-equity/1C0833CCC30C4D7A572C45D10595F3F6">Africanisation policy</a> led to African officers rising up the ranks. The UK helped to establish both the Kenya Navy and the Kenya Air force. Currently, the Chief of Defence Forces, and all service commanders, are Kenyans.</p>
<p>The US military presence in Kenya started largely as part of the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287086790_The_cold_war">Cold War</a> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40625828">chess</a> game. For example, in 1980 the US entered into an <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3991274">agreement</a> with Kenya for the use of its air-force and naval facilities. </p>
<p>In the post-Cold War period, the American presence in Kenya has largely related to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/24/world/africa/al-shabab-somalia-us-cia.html">countering</a> terrorist activities in Somalia. For instance, there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-diplomatic-muscle-could-achieve-more-in-somalia-than-drone-strikes-146589">drone strikes</a> against <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-shabaab">Al-Shabaab</a> leaders in Somalia. </p>
<p>The Americans have made regular visits, mainly naval, throughout the period. Their objectives are to keep rivals off a geo-strategically important state in Eastern Africa, and reportedly give aid of military nature. </p>
<p>Americans <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/biden-orders-shabaab-us-military-lamu-base-raid-3360986">are also</a> in Lamu County, located on the Indian Ocean near Kenya’s border with Somalia, where they keep an eye on activities of the Al-Shabaab. The jihadist group has been fighting to overthrow the government in Mogadishu since 2006. It continues to launch regular cross-border raids.</p>
<h2>What do we know about China’s reported interests?</h2>
<p>The details of Chinese interests are not available. But China generally <a href="http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/60670">views</a> Kenya as a gateway to the eastern Africa region. That makes Kenya a key area of focus for its trade and economic strategy in Africa.</p>
<p>In the last few years, it has become clear that there has been a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307820816_Is_China's_Rise_going_to_be_Peaceful">rise</a> in China’s efforts to achieve greater global status and presence. This has been true across all aspects of China’s foreign policies – from cultural, to industrial and trade. It also includes a drive to show a military presence outside China to protect external interests and to flex geopolitical muscles. </p>
<p>President Xi Jingpin is seemingly determined to shape discussions in the world using the slogans of ‘<a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2020-0017/full/html">socialism with Chinese characteristics</a>’ and paying attention to global ’<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324564102_The_Concept_of_'Community_of_Common_Destiny'_in_China's_Diplomacy_Meaning_Motives_and_Implications">common destiny</a>’.</p>
<p>In terms of geo-political projection, China has increased its military presence through UN Peace keeping operations or by opening bases. In the 1960s and 1970s, China assisted liberation forces in Southern Africa’s remnants of colonial white settlerdom <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1042892">militarily</a>. It has roughly 2000 troops as UN peace keepers in countries including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan and Central Africa Republic.</p>
<p>There are also <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/china/china-vying-to-set-up-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-reveals-us-intel.html">reports</a> that China could be establishing naval bases in Namibia, Mauritania, and Tanzania. Its established military base nearest to Kenya is in Djibouti, in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Horn-of-Africa">Horn of Africa</a>. </p>
<h2>How does Kenya benefit from having foreign troops on its soil?</h2>
<p>Kenya benefits materially and psychologically. Besides donations of armaments, cash and training opportunities, the agreements give Kenya a sense of security, particularly when its neighbours appear to be hostile.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, Kenya had ideological differences with Tanzania while its leader, Kenyatta, had personality clashes with Idi Amin in Uganda. Kenya also faced the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3627482">irredentist</a> Somalia, Marxist Ethiopia, and unstable Sudan. These led to the breakdown of the East African Community, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Entebbe-raid">Entebbe raid</a> which involved Israeli forces freeing hostages from a hijacking, influx of refugees to Kenya from unstable neighbours, and increased availability of illicit small arms and ammunition. </p>
<p>There is an assumption that Kenya is responsible for the security and well-being of Eastern Africa as a region. Nevertheless, it cannot do it alone which is why it accommodates friendly big powers to help. </p>
<p>When Kenya acquired American F16 jet fighters between 1975 and 1976, it was a result of a feeling that Kenya, as a Western outpost, was vulnerable in terms of security and ideologically from its ‘socialistic’ neighbours. That was the argument that Kenya’s Foreign Minister <a href="https://mod.go.ke/history-and-evolution-of-the-ministry-of-defence/attachment/dr-munyua-waiyaki-2/">Munyua Waiyaki</a> used on US Secretary of State <a href="https://www.henryakissinger.com/">Henry Kissinger</a> to get the jets and train the pilots.</p>
<p>Another benefit is that Kenyan officers continue to receive high-level training in the US and the UK.</p>
<h2>Would the US feel uneasy about China’s presence?</h2>
<p>The US and China are in stiff competition for global dominance. The US has had the upper hand but has become increasingly uncomfortable that it may be losing to China on several fronts. The November 2021 <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/17/1056646754/antony-blinken-starts-his-3-nation-visit-to-africa-in-kenya">visit</a> by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal, was partly motivated by American <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blinken-us-sees-african-countries-as-equal-partners/6320400.html#:%7E:text=19%2C%202021.&text=U.S.%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20Blinken%20said%20Friday%20the%20United,aid%20from%20U.S.%20rival%20China">desire</a> to counter Chinese inroads in Africa. It is concerned that China, its geopolitical rival, has chance to protect and advance such Chinese global interests in Africa, such as acquisition of strategic raw materials, commerce and financial operations, and gain political leverage. </p>
<p>China is the engine behind the current global power <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2012/12/11/the-coming-rise-and-decline-of-world-powers-foretold-in-charts/">realignment</a>. It has systematically taken advantage of the perceived geopolitical <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341370012_The_Decline_of_the_West_What_is_it_and_Why_Might_it_Matter">weaknesses</a> of the US and the West. And it has skilfully projected itself globally as the reasonable power when compared to the West. </p>
<p>It has also made use of its new economic muscle. The US realised rather late that it was losing global influence in terms of the economy and geopolitics and thus tries to catch up with China. </p>
<p>US President Joe Biden has stated that <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/29/biden-calls-for-us-to-become-more-competitive-against-china.html">competing</a> with – and outdoing China – is a new American pre-occupation. It does not look good for the US to appear as a secondary power to China or any other region. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bidens-summit-for-democracy-what-africa-needs-to-bring-to-the-table-173265">Biden's summit for democracy: what Africa needs to bring to the table</a>
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<p>American interests, which include the image, require that it pays attention to Chinese interests in Kenya which it considers to be part of its geopolitical backyard in Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172687/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Macharia Munene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign military presence is not very pronounced in Kenya, though British and American personnel either train or assist in security operations.Macharia Munene, Associate Fellow at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies and Professor of History and International Relations, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721542021-11-22T15:30:35Z2021-11-22T15:30:35ZEast Africa’s terrorism hotspots: examining the roots and solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432586/original/file-20211118-26-1jt7hvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somalia is one of East Africa's terrorism hotspots.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/SAID YUSUF WARSAME</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Uganda has had a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/suicide-bomb-attacks-kampala-uganda">string</a> of terror attacks lately. The most recent bombings took place in Kampala’s central business district and were <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/islamic-state-claims-deadly-bombings-in-uganda-s-capital-kampala-3621676">claimed</a> by the Islamic State jihadist group. Tensions have been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-11-17-kampala-bombings-kenya-tracking-terror-cells/">increasing</a> across the border too, in Kenya. The government has instructed security agencies to be more vigilant. Moina Spooner, of The Conversation Africa, asked terrorism researcher Dr Anneli Botha to provide insights into what drives terrorism in the region and how it should be addressed.</em></p>
<h2>Where are Eastern Africa’s terrorism hotspots?</h2>
<p>Eastern Africa has two primary terrorism hotspots.</p>
<p>The first is Somalia. It has experienced continuous instability since 1991, due to clan-based warlords and the lack of a functioning central government. The creation of ungoverned spaces provided Al-Qaeda with a foothold in the region. Ethiopian intervention in 2006 added fuel to the fire after the establishment of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) earlier in the 2000s. In 2005, Al-Shabaab was established as an offshoot of the ICU to become the most relevant actor in Somalia. Since then it has executed attacks beyond its area of operations in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36400842">Uganda</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-djibouti-attacks-idUSKBN0E72AA20140527">Djibouti</a> and Kenya.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab has been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328791465_Assessing_the_vulnerability_of_Kenyan_youths_to_radicalisation_and_extremism">recruiting</a> from marginalised communities in Kenya. It has also attracted fighters from Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, the US and Europe. </p>
<p>Secondly, similar to Somalia, the eastern part of the DRC has been a hotspot since its own civil war from <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/drc-conflict-facts">1997 to 2003</a>. An ungoverned part of the country provided a “safe” area where over 100 rebel organisations could base their operations. Groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces and Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda, under pressure from Ugandan security forces, established themselves in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) along with others in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. </p>
<p>The origins of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/54b642a14.html">Allied Democratic Forces</a> can be traced back to Christian-Muslim and ethnic divisions even before independence in 1962. The perception of government interference in Muslim affairs played a role in establishing the idea of fighting for an Islamic state (not Islamic State as we know it today). The change in leadership following the arrest of Jamil Mukulu introduced a new chapter under Seka Musa Baluku. Since 2019, the organisation has executed attacks under the umbrella of Islamic State in the Central African Province (IS-CAP), which is also linked to the instability in northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>In the DRC, the local communities within the organisation’s area of operations have had to bear the brunt of attacks. </p>
<h2>What have been the main root causes of terror attacks in the region?</h2>
<p>The root causes of terror attacks are domestic, with origins in each country’s history. There is no single “profile” or reason. It is always a combination of factors – political, social, and economic – that cannot be separated from regional and international events. </p>
<p>The main question is why anyone would want to join any violent extremist organisation, risking death or capture. </p>
<p>Some join voluntarily. Identity politics, due to existing ethnic and religious divisions and subsequent marginalisation and frustration, can drive people to join violent extremist organisations. Others will join for financial reasons.</p>
<p>The final “push” relates to the way security forces respond to the terrorist threat. In my <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council">research since 2011</a> and as part of <a href="https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIma_5zYai9AIVDu3tCh0dDg36EAAYAiAAEgJk7fD_BwE">research projects</a> with the United Nations Development Programme and Finn Church Aid, involving interviews with former members of violent extremist organisations, I’ve heard repeatedly how revenge, anger and hatred of governments and their security forces drove people into joining.</p>
<p>Some are tricked into joining, not knowing what they’ve signed up for. Others are forced, especially where not joining could be interpreted as spying for the government, as <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-executes-5-people-for-spying/2162149">witnessed</a> in Somalia. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>In Somalia there is also a nationalistic-religious component that facilitated recruitment into Al-Shabaab. This followed the intervention of Ethiopia (supported by the United States), then Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti (African Union Mission troop contributing countries). These are regarded as “Christian nations” invading a Muslim country. It played into a broader narrative starting with the US and western intervention in Afghanistan, but especially Iraq following 9/11.</p>
<h2>How have governments sought to deal with terror attacks and their root causes?</h2>
<p>Predominantly from a short-term security perspective, by “eliminating” the “problem” of suspected terrorists. This has included disappearances and extrajudicial killings. </p>
<p>The way governments respond depends on the level of government control over territory. Where government has no or limited control, the military takes the lead in counterinsurgency (as seen in Somalia and eastern DRC). Where government control increases, the police take the lead. Respecting human rights while countering violent extremism and terrorism has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/">proved</a> to be particularly <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_nigerias-military-burns-villages-war-boko-haram-rights-group-says/6184250.html">difficult</a> under military command. One reason is that the military’s focus is not on collecting evidence to build a criminal case.</p>
<p>Governments worldwide seldom look into their role in communal marginalisation and frustration. But it’s a crucial root cause. People feel excluded if development in their part of the country is neglected because they don’t support certain politicians. </p>
<h2>Have governments been successful? If not, why?</h2>
<p>No, unfortunately not completely, due to two primary challenges.</p>
<p>First, limited capacity and training and a history of very limited relations between the state, its security forces and the public across the continent. Security sector reforms and community policing initiatives require trust, dedication and time. </p>
<p>Second, governments on the continent have tended to invest more in the military (securing their regime) and not in the police and the broader criminal justice framework (including the judiciary and prisons).</p>
<p>Third, addressing the root causes is not the responsibility of security agencies only. It requires an all of government approach starting with good governance and providing basic public goods equally.</p>
<h2>What else should they do?</h2>
<p>International organisations – for example the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, through its Regional Office for Eastern Africa and Interpol – and the international community have made considerable strides in building capacity and providing equipment to law enforcement agencies across the region. This happens under the guidance of the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/what-we-do/terrorism-prevention/supporting-the-eapcco-counter-terrorism-centre.html">Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Also NGOs and a growing civil society, through research and working with vulnerable communities, provide important guidance and support.</p>
<p>Government and security agencies must be willing to receive support and act in a responsible manner to prevent and counter violent extremism. In eastern Africa, this investment has started to show results. This is clear if one compares the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/16/africa/kenya-hotel-complex-terror-attack/index.html">DusitD2 attacks in Nairobi in 2019</a>, when law enforcement took the lead, with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya">2013 Westgate attack</a>, when the military took the lead.</p>
<p>Not all countries have received assistance across the region. Nor can the threat of violent extremism be addressed by individual countries. Violent extremism and organised crime always present transnational challenges. Coordinated efforts, cooperation and capacity building are needed to address an increasing threat that is already having a ripple effect into southern Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anneli Botha is a consultant for the UNODC in Eastern Africa. </span></em></p>All terrorism in the region has domestic origins but is linked to regional and international events.Anneli Botha, Senior Lecturer, Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1407452020-06-22T14:32:54Z2020-06-22T14:32:54ZWhy South Africa has a keen interest in extremist violence in northern Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342951/original/file-20200619-43225-4yacj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Mozambican military has proven to be inept at stopping atrocities by extremist insurgents in the Cabo Delgado province.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Antonio Silva</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A growing insurgency in the northern parts of Mozambique has caught the attention of conflict analysts and observers worldwide. There is now even a possibility that the South African National Defence Force <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883">might become involved</a> in the most northern Cabo Delgado province, with a view to ending the deadly violence and <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/opinion/2020/04/09/op-ed-mozambique-islamist-militants-continue-attacks-in-cabo-delgado/">litany of atrocities</a>, abductions and destruction of infrastructure.</p>
<p>Should the South African government decide to send in its military, the main aim would be to focus on the violent activities of an extremist and militant Islamic group, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah</a>. It is also locally known as Al Shabaab, even though it has no connections with the Somali movement of the same name. The group aims to <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">establish its own mosques and madrassas</a> to enhance the spread of its radical dogma.</p>
<p>Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah started as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">religious sect which turned into a guerrilla group</a>. Initially its goal was to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/harsh-punishments-under-sharia-are-modern-interpretations-of-an-ancient-tradition-115211">Sharia law</a> (Islamic law) in Cabo Delgado. It rejected the state’s schooling, health system and laws, which resulted in much tension in the province. Some analysts argue that the movement is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44320531">motivated more by greed</a> than by dogma or grievance: that it is making millions of dollars a week through criminal activities relating to mining, logging, poaching and contraband.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, many of its members appear to be socio-economically marginalised young people without a proper education and formal employment. They have been joined by young immigrants in a similar marginalised position. It is estimated that the movement’s members are <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">organised in tens of small cells</a> along the coast of northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>There is rightly widespread concern over these developments. Should South Africa – and specifically its defence force – get involved, it would certainly be venturing into a highly violent and complex landscape, requiring a counter-terrorism type of operations. </p>
<p>Such operations are always highly challenging. Countering terrorist and insurgent forces in Mozambique could be as challenging as the protracted operations <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2015/02/03/boko-haram-and-al-shabaab-comparable-threats-to-african-security/">against Boko Haram and Al Shabaab</a>, the militant Islamist sects that operate predominantly in Nigeria and Somalia, destabilising large areas with their terror campaigns.</p>
<p>Why should there be serious concern over the situation in Mozambique? </p>
<p>Mozambique borders Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and eSwatini. Four of these six countries are landlocked, and hence depend on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">Mozambique as a gateway to global markets</a>. Events in Cabo Delgado could thus threaten regional stability. </p>
<p>Even though <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-insurgents-leave-mocimboa-da-praia-after-1-day-occupation-which-showed-local-support-by-joseph-hanlon-156346/">Mocímboa da Praia</a>, which is regarded as the headquarters of the extremists, is about 2,500km from South Africa, the group nevertheless poses a challenge to the country too. After all, Mozambique has strong economic ties with South Africa as the region’s economic engine. Regional stability is certainly in the interest of South Africa.</p>
<p>From a South African standpoint, four main issues stand out. These are: the danger of the spread of Islamist extremism so close to home; the strategic importance of the area under siege; weakness of Mozambican security forces; and combating organised crime. </p>
<h2>Violent extremism</h2>
<p>This is the first case of violent extremism of this kind in southern Africa. It is also the first manifestation of a militant movement which is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/mozambique-admits-presence-isil-affiliated-fighters-200424200048073.html">associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</a>, and the notion of a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamic-state-taking-charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency">jihadist insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>Until recently, acts of terror conducted by extremists in southern Africa were confined to Tanzania and Zanzibar. </p>
<p>The death toll and displacements of Mozambican locals in Cabo Delgado are difficult to verify. But reports indicate that <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/jihadist-insurgency-crisis-could-spill-over-into-kzn-warn-analysts-48747883">more than 1,000 people have died</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-deteriorating-humanitarian-situation-cabo-delgado-province-short-note">about two million are affected</a> by the crisis overall.</p>
<p>Secondly, in recent years massive <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">offshore natural gas deposits</a> have been identified, drawing some of the world’s biggest energy players. Offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area is among Africa’s three largest liquid natural gas projects. </p>
<p>Investments of billions of dollars have already been made, but an escalation of violence is <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency/">putting the future of these investments at risk</a>.</p>
<p>These projects could be of major importance to poverty alleviation in the country. Poverty affects most of those in rural areas with low levels of formal education. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/overview">Economic activity in Mozambique</a> has improved in recent years and has the potential to strengthen in the foreseeable future. But much will depend on the megaprojects in Cabo Delgado, debt restructuring, COVID-19, macroeconomic stability and improved political and economic governance, among other key factors. </p>
<p>For decades, South Africa has experienced an illegal influx of Mozambicans due to development challenges in their country. Thus, economic, political and social development in Mozambique are of the utmost importance to South Africa, which is battling massive poverty and unemployment of its own.</p>
<p>Although exploration in Mozambique is offshore, support facilities are onshore and most vulnerable to attacks. The foreign companies with their massive investments feel threatened, especially now that <a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2020/06/02/mozambiques-energy-sector-caught-in-southern-africas-first-terrorist-insurgency/">final investment decisions</a> have to be taken. </p>
<p>South Africa has another interest in these developments. The South African energy and chemical multinational <a href="https://www.sasol.com/growing-our-upstream-base-mozambique">Sasol</a> has invested heavily in gas exploration projects since 2014. </p>
<p>The arrival of foreign companies has led to deep discontent among local people who are deeply aggrieved by their activities. They had to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/gas-rich-mozambique-headed-disaster-200223112556449.html">relocate to make way</a> for the infrastructure development, amid complaints about the compensation they received. They’re also aggrieved that they have been resettled inshore, away from the coastal fishing areas. </p>
<p>These factors further complicate security challenges in the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/02/12/Mozambique-Cabo-Delgado-militancy-Islamic-State-Al-Shabab">very delicate social landscape</a>. Moreover, the insurgents can easily exploit local grievances as matters play into their hands.</p>
<p>The Mozambican military and police have proven to be no match for the militants. They have been unable to prevent them from taking the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-26-islamist-insurgents-capture-second-town-in-northern-mozambique-within-48-hours/#gsc.tab=0">northern strategic town of Mocímboa de Praia</a>, as well as invading a town near Quissanga.</p>
<p>To counter the growing insurgency, the Mozambican government has contracted <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-in-northern-mozambique/#gsc.tab=0">the Wagner group</a>, a private Russian military company, to assist government forces. But the situation appears to have gone from <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-islamic-state-taking-charge-of-mozambiques-jihadist-insurgency">bad to worse</a>.</p>
<p>A South African security group, the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/private-military-contractors-appear-to-be-active-in-mozambique/">Dyck Advisory Group</a>, was also allegedly assisting the Mozambican government.</p>
<p>A fourth cause for concern over dynamics in the Cabo Delgado province relates to organised crime. The area is a major conduit for <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-06-27-research-paper-heroin-coast-pdf.pdf">smuggling drugs and other contraband</a>. The volume of heroin produced and shipped from Afghanistan along a network of routes, via East and southern Africa, has increased considerably in recent years. </p>
<p>Cabo Delgado is a key point for smuggling drugs, wildlife, timber, gems and gold. The insurgency makes it more difficult to enforce the law in the province.</p>
<h2>No choice</h2>
<p>Operations aimed at countering Islamist extremists tend to continue for many years. Success at curbing violent terrorist attacks requires careful and long term responses.</p>
<p>Ideally, these should comprise a mixed set of interventions, including social reform, economic development and varying degrees of military force.</p>
<p>South African political involvement is now almost inevitable as the Southern African Development Community <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-20-leaders-commit-sadc-to-helping-mozambique-fight-jihadist-insurgency/#gsc.tab=0">has already undertaken to help Mozambique</a> in its fight against the insurgency. This makes it highly likely that South Africa’s military forces will somehow get involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Should South Africa’s military get involved, it would be venturing into a highly violent and complex landscape, requiring a counter-terrorism type of operations.Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1164392019-05-08T13:03:12Z2019-05-08T13:03:12ZTracking the DRC’s Allied Democratic Forces and its links to ISIS<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272216/original/file-20190502-103075-f2b6b6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Isis claims attacks in Beni province of northern Kivu, eastern Congo, close to the border to Uganda.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In April the Islamic State, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/world/africa/isis-congo-attack.html?module=inline">took responsibility</a> for an attack on an army base in the troubled Beni region of North Kivu province, eastern Congo, close to the border with Uganda. The Islamic state <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/world/africa/isis-congo-attack.html?module=inline">credited</a> this and <a href="https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/is-reports-4-attacks-in-congo-in-naba-179-publishes-photo-of-fighters-in-its-central-africa-province.html">four other</a> attacks to the Central African Province of the Islamic State.</p>
<p>The attacks came amid signs that the Islamic State’s offshoots outside the Levant (the area encompassing modern day Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq) are growing in relative importance. Some of these offshoots have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi/islamic-state-airs-video-purporting-to-be-leader-al-baghdadi-idUSKCN1S51QB">depicted, or mentioned in the latest video</a> of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. </p>
<p>Links between groups within North Kivu province and the Islamic state are not new. As early as 2017 a poorly-made video emerged <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/islamic-state-loyal-group-calls-for-people-to-join-the-jihad-in-the-congo.php">showing a small group of fighters</a> (including what seemed to be foreigners), declaring loyalty to the Islamic State. The troubled province of North Kivu has seen almost continuous violence for more than two decades, with violence erupting from 1993 and onward. </p>
<p>In 2018, Kenyan authorities <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=976V_KbwxRo">arrested</a> two people they accused of raising money and supporting various Islamic state organisations in Syria, Libya and the Congo. In Congo’s case, the fingers were pointed at a group called Allied Democratic Forces, based in North Kivu. The case is yet to be prosecuted, but the group was mentioned in other cases of alleged links to Islamic State as well.</p>
<p>The last link was the discovery of a <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2018/12/04/tentative-ties-allied-democratic-forces-isis-dr-congo/">book published</a> by the Islamic State’s Al Himmah Library on the body of a dead Allied Democratic Forces soldier in February 2018. The book is easy to download from the internet, so it remains unclear whether the download was at the instigation of the Islamic State or not.</p>
<p>All of these signs indicate that there are some links, ideological or organisational, but the nature of these links might be complicated and fragmented.</p>
<h2>The Allied Democratic Force</h2>
<p>The Allied Democratic Forces was a creation of Congolese and Sudanese attempts to undermine the Yoweri Museveni regime in Uganda in the 1990s. Created in Congo in 1995, it consisted of two very distinct elements with relatively strong ideological traits, and separate past histories. </p>
<p>The first group that entered the union that was to become the Allied Democratic Force was the National Army for The Liberation of Uganda. This was one of many based around the mainly Christian Bakonjo-Baamba people of Rwenzori, and their <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/horn-sahel-and-rift/">struggle</a> for more autonomy and independence from Uganda. </p>
<p>The second component was the Islamic Salafi Foundation, an organisation with roots going back to protests against Uganda’s attempts <a href="https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/jihadists-rebels-or-bandits-the-threat-of-the-allied-democratic-forces">to control Islam</a>. </p>
<p>Inside Congo, the two ideologically different organisations were fused together into a new organisation by the regimes of Mobutu Sese Seko in Congo and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. The two men envisaged it could be used as a tool against Uganda, to check Museveni’s influence and stir up domestic politics.</p>
<p>I trace the development of the group in my book <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/horn-sahel-and-rift/">Horn, Sahel and Rift: Fault-lines of the African Jihad</a>, pointing out that the new organisation quickly became embedded in Congo. This happened in two ways. The first was through the active attempts by Mobutu to integrate it into the local governance and security of his regime. The second was through Bakonjo-Baamba networks. </p>
<p>Mobutu also encouraged the Allied Democratic Forces to invest in local businesses and partner in business ventures. Some of these links remain active. These old business associates tend to be seen as a part of the organisation which has led to the perception that the Allied Democratic Force has wider reach than is actually the case. </p>
<p>The early golden age of the Allied Democratic Forces ended when Mobutu lost power in Congo in 1997. It was forced to relocate into the Rwenzori Mountains on the border between Uganda and Congo to avoid offensives from Uganda and the new regime in Congo. </p>
<h2>Radicalisation phase</h2>
<p>In the subsequent years the Allied Democratic Forces grew in a more Islamist direction. A number of factors contributed to this. The first was that its Uganda liberation component had slowly weakened as soldiers and officers left the organisation. Seven top leaders of the old National Army for The Liberation of Uganda also <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/horn-sahel-and-rift/">surrendered</a> under a UN disarmament programme. </p>
<p>Secondly, the organisation seems to have increasingly used religious networks to harness funds in the Congo and Uganda. Religious rhetoric grew more important and indoctrination became a vital component in its training camps. </p>
<p>However, compared with other African jihadist outfits such as Boko Haram and the al-Shabaab, the group lacked the ideological focus, religious sophistication and wide distribution.</p>
<h2>Recent developments</h2>
<p>At the start of 2018 Allied Democratic Forces were dealt <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fardc-and-monusco-launch-joint-operations-against-adf">severe blows</a> from a Congolese government offensive. Many local respondents predicted its end.</p>
<p>Rumours of Allied Democratic Forces factions “for hire” in local conflicts surfaced, with local low level sub-commanders appearing on different sides in the complex conflicts in Kivu. </p>
<p>Over the past two years there have also been regular rumours of tension within the organisation. </p>
<p>But in late 2018 Allied Democratic Forces again attacked villages in Kivu, and Mozambican media even <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/allied-democratic-forces-adf-opens-cell-in-mozambique-says-security-expert-report/">reported</a> about potential offshoots in Mozambique. </p>
<p>In 2018, the Ugandan security services also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-3465844-org7g0/index.html">accused</a> the group of being behind killings of sheikhs in Kampala. </p>
<p>It’s hard to determine if violence in the region is being committed by the Allied Democratic Forces, or other militias. It’s also hard to determine the exact borders of the organisation. And it’s hard to say if the new Islamic State affiliate in Congo is a breakaway organisation of the Allied Democratic Forces. </p>
<p>But, given it’s history, it’s safe to say that the Allied Democratic Forces has vital experience in surviving hardship and pressure, and that it’s aided by regional rivalries and local tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116439/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Links between groups within the Kivu province and the Islamic state are not new.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1115632019-02-18T14:26:08Z2019-02-18T14:26:08ZTracing the history of Mozambique’s mysterious and deadly insurgency<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259002/original/file-20190214-1748-193gr4g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique, provides fertile ground for extremism. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flcker</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province has been held hostage by insurgents for nearly 17 months. Armed attacks, decapitations and the destruction of property have <a href="https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-own-version-of-boko-haram-is-tightening-its-deadly-grip-98087">become common</a>. Many are worried that the violence may escalate and destabilise the country’s economy further. </p>
<p>One of the biggest problems is that nobody really knows who the insurgents are. They don’t make public statements, so their motives are unclear.</p>
<p>Speculation and conspiracy theories abound. Many, including state officials and the new president of the <a href="https://macua.blogs.com/files/perdiz-n%C2%BA-245.pdf">Renamo opposition party</a>, believe the insurgency is part of a struggle within the national elite for the control of Cabo Delgado’s oil, gas and mineral riches. </p>
<p>The government offers few – and contradictory – explanations. It has said both that the violence is committed by local unemployed <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/no-attacks-in-cabo-delgado-just-crimes-say-police-mozambique">“criminals”</a>, and that the attacks are the result of <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/president-nyusi-warns-that-cabo-delgado-terrorists-can-spread-to-other-neighbouring-countries/">global jihadism trying to move into Mozambique</a>.</p>
<p>Lack of information and clashing explanations have led to confusion as to what’s happening in Northern Mozambique and what should be done to reverse the situation. </p>
<h2>Roots of insurgency</h2>
<p>The local population calls the group behind the attacks “al-Shabaab”. This means “youth” in Arabic and refers, of course, to the global terror group in Somalia (though the Mozambican insurgents have no formal links to them). In Mozambique, the group’s origins go back to the 2000s, when some young men within the Islamic Council of Mozambique began to develop a <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1074#ftn89">new reading and practice of Islam</a>. </p>
<p>In Cabo Delgado, they created a sub-organisation within the Islamic Council called <a href="https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/academico-recomenda-cuidado-ao-governo-para-nao-alienar-apoio-popular-no-norte-de-mocambique-10470432.html">“Ansaru-Sunna”</a> which registered legally with the state. It built new mosques and preached a stricter form of Islam across the province. Soon, a more radical and activist group formed within this sub-organisation and split off as a sect – what has become known locally as “al-Shabaab”.</p>
<p>This group initially concerned itself with religious debates, practice and opposition to the secular state. In 2010 the villagers of Nhacole in the Balama district decided to get rid of the group and destroyed its mosque. Sect members fled to the town of Mucojo, in the district of Macomia. There tensions flared with the local population and authorities. </p>
<p>The police had to intervene twice in Mucojo. In 2015 they were called in because the sect tried to forcefully impose a ban of alcohol in the town. Death and injuries ensued when a sect member fatally <a href="http://www.jornaldomingo.co.mz/index.php/reportagem/7791-tumultos-em-pangane-provocam-morte-e-feridos">stabbed a policeman</a>. </p>
<h2>Resort to arms</h2>
<p>Mainstream Muslim organisations and individuals, among them the Islamic Council from which the “al-Shabaab” sect split off, were disquieted by the group’s actions. They repeatedly <a href="https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ataque-em-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-ter%C3%A1-sido-caso-isolado/a-40977442">asked the government to intervene</a>.</p>
<p>In late 2016, the government finally acceded to their request and began to arrest and bring some group leaders to court across the province. The men were accused of engaging in disinformation, rejecting state authority, refusing to send their children to school, and <a href="http://www.magazineindependente.com/www2/detidos-tres-membros-grupo-muculmano-promove-desinformacao-cabo-delgado">using knives to protect themselves</a>.</p>
<p>It’s not clear when the “al-Shabaab” members began to train militarily, but the state’s actions against their leaders seem to have been the tipping point towards their passing to armed action. Their <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia-">first attack</a> was in October 2017 in the town of Mocímboa da Praia and surrounding communities.</p>
<p>Since then, sect members have taken to the bush from where they attack isolated villages. The number of attacks and their brutality increased steadily in 2018. The insurgency seems to have become more organised. Its attacks and activities have focused on a coastal band about 150kms wide, from the provincial capital of Pemba to the Tanzanian border. </p>
<h2>Seeds of discontent</h2>
<p>It is clear, then, that the insurgency has built on some local social, religious and political tensions. Cabo Delgado is Mozambique’s poorest province; unemployment is high, particularly among the youth. It’s also largely rural. <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/northern_mozambique_violence/">Government services are not reliable</a>.</p>
<p>Major recent oil and gas <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">discoveries in the area</a> have generated many expectations, but communities have seen <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/poverty-and-unemployment-fuels-cabo-delgado-insurgency-admits-nyusi-by-joseph-hanlon/">very few, if any, benefits, particularly in rural areas</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the fact that Muslims feel particularly marginalised in Cabo Delgado, where their ethnic neighbours have had <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1410">privileged access to national political power since independence</a>, helps explain how an anti-state Islamist discourse may have gained traction.</p>
<p>Another aspect is the group’s international connections. Much has been said about <a href="http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/67947-atanasio-mtumuke-reinsiste-que-os-ataques-armados-em-cabo-delgado-tem-mao-externa">links to Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda</a>. But most connections are with Tanzania.</p>
<p>Mozambican Islamic clerics have trained in Tanzania for more than a century and exchanges have taken place for longer, among religious communities on both sides of the border. So it’s unsurprising that the Mozambican “al-Shabaab” connected with like-minded Muslims in Tanzania in the 2010s.</p>
<p>After Tanzanian radicals became violent and the state <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/tanzania">responded forcefully against them after 2015</a>, and <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/282841.htm">particularly strongly in early 2017</a>, some of them took refuge with the Mozambican “al-Shabaab”. This has reinforced and partially internationalised the insurgency.</p>
<h2>Seeking solutions</h2>
<p>Since the “al-Shabaab” in Mozambique is not the result of an internal or external conspiracy, the state needs to focus on the social, religious and political dynamics at play to control and combat the insurgency.</p>
<p>While the Mozambican army has managed successfully to contain the geographical spread of the armed sect, the government needs to focus with equal force on redressing the local grievances which the insurgents are tapping into.</p>
<p>Mozambican scholar <a href="https://pt.euronews.com/2018/10/05/yussuf-adam-nega-jihadismo-nos-ataques-de-cabo-delgado">Yussuf Adam</a> has put forward an interesting idea to start addressing these grievances. He argues that the state should hold district “general estate assemblies” to identify issues, and to design solutions from the bottom up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111563/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Speculation and conspiracy theories abound about the Mozambican insurgents leaving a trail of violence in resource rich Cabo Delgado.Eric Morier-Genoud, Senior Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855042017-10-18T15:06:31Z2017-10-18T15:06:31ZWhy Islamist attack demands a careful response from Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190361/original/file-20171016-30979-10vz4fa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambique's military responded swiftly following deadly attacks by Islamist gunmen on three police stations recently.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the early hours of 5 October 2017 a group of <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/armed-men-attack-police-stations-in-mocimboa-da-praia-aim-report/">30 men attacked three police stations</a> in Mocimboa da Praia, a small <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moc%C3%ADmboa_da_Praia">town</a> of 30,000 inhabitants in Northern Mozambique. They killed two policemen, stole arms and ammunition, and occupied the town. </p>
<p>They told local people they would not hurt them, that their fight was with the state and the police. They explained that they rejected state health and education and refused to pay taxes. The local population calls these men <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/individuals-allegedly-linked-to-al-shabaab-attack-police-station-in-mocimboa-da-praia-mozambique/">“Al-Shabaabs”</a>.</p>
<p>Mozambique’s government’s response was swift. It fought back with forces from other districts and special forces from the provincial capital. The battle <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/life-returns-to-normal-in-mocimboa-da-praia/">lasted several hours and left 16 dead</a>, including two policemen and a community leader.</p>
<p>The attack came as a shock to a country already grappling with <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/2017-war-hidden-debts-economic-stabilisation-carry-next-year-mozambique/">major economic and political problems</a>. The incident is the first confirmed Islamist armed attack in Mozambique.</p>
<p>Information is still sparse and confused. But for now, we can say with some degree of certainty that what happened on 5 October 2017 was not a Somali Al-Shabaab attack nor an externally driven <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201710060373.html">international Jihadi plot</a>. Nor was it a state <a href="https://www.facebook.com/unai.kambuma.matsangaisse/posts/522924458056358">conspiracy </a>as some had suggested. </p>
<p>Rather, the attack appears to have been carried out by a group of local young Muslims who formed a sect in 2014 in Mocimboa da Praia which is known as <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/46966-jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia.html">“Al-Shabaab”</a>. The group controls two mosques in the town and have told their followers to stop sending their children to secular institutions such as state schools and hospitals. It wants Sharia law applied in their area. </p>
<p>The fact that this first Islamist attack was carried out by Mozambicans makes the event no less shocking, particularly in a country proud of its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations. Until we get more information on the group and what triggered it to attack the state, it’s worth setting the incident within a historical context. </p>
<h2>Islam in Mozambique</h2>
<p>Islam has a very old presence in Mozambique, particularly on the coast and in the Northern parts of the country. Various Sultanates and Sheikdom existed before Portugal occupied the territory in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Mozambique/Colonial-Mozambique">late 19th Century</a> .</p>
<p>The Portuguese colonialists openly and officially favoured Catholicism, at a time <a href="http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/alpers.pdf">repressing Islam</a> and other religions. But Islam gained converts and nonetheless grew. By the time of <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/mozambique%E2%80%99s-40-years-independence-past-and-present-challenges">independence in 1975</a> Muslims officially accounted for 13% of the population. The 1997 census gave the figure of 17.8%. Both figures are contested by Muslims who believe them to be higher.</p>
<p>After independence the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Marxist-Leninism. It attacked all faiths, but Islam was particularly affected. It was a faith most state leaders didn’t understand. This was evident in incidents such as President Samora Machel keeping his shoes when he walked into the main mosque in the country. <a href="https://www.academia.edu/723143/_Lislam_au_Mozambique_apr%C3%A8s_lind%C3%A9pendance_Histoire_dune_mont%C3%A9e_en_puissance_in_Christian_Coulon_ed._LAfrique_politique_2002_Islams_dAfrique_entre_le_local_et_le_global_Paris_Karthala_2002._p._123-146">Another example</a> was the government insisting on pigsties being built in Muslim areas in the name of “development”. Memories such as these are still raw and were raised yet again after the Mocimboa da Praia attack.</p>
<p>After Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism and shifted to multiparty democracy, the party began courting all religions to gain electoral support. But tensions still arose from time to time. One involved the government taking steps to officially recognise Islamic holidays. This sparked a crisis in parliament in 1996 and the Frelimo governing party backtracked, adopting a more secular approach from then on. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5854764/_The_1996_Muslim_holiday_affair._Religious_competition_and_state_mediation_in_contemporary_Mozambique_Journal_of_Southern_African_Studies_26_3_2000_pp._409-27">incident</a> served to remind Muslims that they still felt marginalised.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/alpers.pdf">Islam is overwhelmingly Sufi in Mozambique</a>, with a majority of Muslims belonging to different Turuq (brotherhoods). <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-islam-so-different-in-different-countries-51804">Sufism</a> represents the more mystical side of Islam - opposed by scripturalist Muslims, such as the Wahhabi, who accuse them of deviating from the Koran.</p>
<p>The return of African graduates from Saudi Arabia in the 1970s gave political clout to the reformist and scripturalist movements in Mozambique. They gained control of some mosques and, in collaboration with the Portuguese, expanded their presence. </p>
<p>Today the main national organisation is the reformist <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Conselho-Islamico-de-Mocambique-CISLAMO-169928693058683/">Islamic Council</a> which was created after independence by Wahhabi elements and grew in the 1980s and 1990s in partnership with the authorities. </p>
<p>Splinter organisations appeared in the late 1990s and 2000s, particularly in Northern Mozambique. As reformism gained firmer ground in the north, tensions and conflict increased. Controversies emerged in relation to sufi practices, alcohol, education and dress code. There was, however, never any violence against the state.</p>
<h2>Powder keg</h2>
<p>Although no international terror group has been linked to Mocimba da Praia, the incident is very serious. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabo_Delgado_Province">Cabo Delgado</a> is a Muslim-majority province where discoveries of giant oil and gas reserves have brought international conglomerates and their private security, making the area a potential powder-keg.</p>
<p>On top of this, the area is desperately poor. Northern areas of Mozambique have gained little from the economic boom of the 2000s. Mocimboa da Praia is a case in point: little development has been seen even as expectations exploded following the discovery of massive gas and oil reserves in the province. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/mozambique-gas/mozambique-sees-30-bln-investment-for-2018-lng-exports-startup-idUSL5N0QR49C20140821">Billions of dollars</a> have been invested in offshore drilling, with little benefit to local communities.</p>
<p>The government must devise a careful and well-thought response to this new Islamist threat. Downplaying the affair as “banditry” and dealing only with the sect when it’s clear that there are broader religious and social dynamics at play risks seeing the problem reemerge elsewhere. </p>
<p>In turn, going for an all-out repression to eradicate the “Islamist threat” could radicalise other Muslims and root the problem deeper and more widely – think only of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marc_Antoine_Montclos/publication/280592679_Boko_Haram_and_politics_from_insurgency_to_terrorism/links/56c47b8908aeeeffa9e5b663.pdf">Boko Haram in West Africa in 2009</a>. </p>
<p>So far state officials have been careful and moderate in their <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/46980-vida-e-seguranca-voltam-a-normalidade-em-mocimboa-da-praia.html">statements</a>. But practice on the ground needs to follow the same line and some changes in social and religious policy will need to follow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The first Islamist attack carried out by Mozambicans in the country is particularly surprising given the pride the country takes in its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations.Eric Morier-Genoud, Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/742382017-04-11T01:51:43Z2017-04-11T01:51:43ZThree reasons for optimism in Somalia<p>In 2016, Somalia was declared <a href="http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016">the most fragile state in the world</a> – worse off than Syria. </p>
<p>In February 2017, the United Nations issued an early famine warning for the country, which is suffering from drought, clan warfare, government corruption and attacks from the Islamic militant group, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/27/al-shabaab-claims-to-have-killed-dozens-of-kenyan-troops-in-somalia">al-Shabab</a>. Adding to the misery, President Trump has attempted to <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-revised-travel-ban-still-faces-legal-challenges-74141">ban Somali refugees’</a> entry into the U.S. </p>
<p>Yet, as an academic who studies <a href="http://www.firstforumpress.com/uploads/55b14cb0e6953.pdf">European</a> and <a href="http://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=D6946C">African state and nation building</a>, I see three reasons for hope in Somalia.</p>
<h2>1. Building stable institutions</h2>
<p>For the first time since the 1991 overthrow of former dictator Siad Barre and the collapse of central government authority, Somalia has newly functioning political institutions. </p>
<p>In 2004, a transitional federal government tried to centralize the government but failed to hold elections. During the 2011 famine, the delivery of humanitarian aid was disrupted by recurring clan warfare. Somalis realized they needed stronger, legitimate political institutions to control and unify their national territory. </p>
<p>There are four major and many minor Somali clans, each with its own traditions and territories. <a href="http://www.fragilestates.org/2012/01/10/somalias-complex-clan-dynamics/">Clan divisions</a> have had a significant impact on Somalia’s status as a fragile state. </p>
<p>By 2012, and with help from the U.N., <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/somalias-new-president-spent-time-in-buffalo-and-now-faces-these-3-challenges/?utm_term=.95526b2af6c3">the clans agreed</a> to a power sharing formula to allocate parliamentary seats. The agreement helped the clan elders come together and led to the first formal parliament in 20 years.</p>
<p>Elections followed, but cautiously. The 2016 parliamentary elections and the 2017 presidential elections built on the formula created in 2012, but with more delegates participating to elect the parliament. To avoid violence from the clans or Al Shabab contingents, the vote for president was limited to members of the upper and lower houses of parliament, the members of which were chosen by the clans. They <a href="http://www.startribune.com/somalia-faces-presidential-election-under-threat-of-attack/413120073/">cast ballots</a> at a heavily guarded air force base in Mogadishu.</p>
<p>Citizen response to the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was enthusiastic. He took office on Feb. 8, 2017, in <a href="http://www.startribune.com/somalia-faces-presidential-election-under-threat-of-attack/413120073/">a smooth transition</a> from the former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. He declared an era of unity. Farmajo’s experience of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/07/somalias-new-president-spent-time-in-buffalo-and-now-faces-these-3-challenges/?utm_term=.95526b2af6c3">living in the United States</a> – he holds dual citizenship and graduated from SUNY, Buffalo – and remittances from the Somali diaspora may help the economy grow and democratic values take hold. </p>
<p>The new president is representative of the almost two million Somalis who left the country, many between <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora/">1990 and 2015</a>, and the <a href="http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/HIPS_Policy_Brief_007-2014_ENGLISH.pdf">significant number</a> who have <a href="http://www.startribune.com/somalia-faces-presidential-election-under-threat-of-attack/413120073/">returned</a> from abroad. Somalia is home again to many former refugees to the U.S., Canada and Europe who have dual citizenship and good educations. Many of these returnees have shown an interest in politics.</p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://qz.com/922449/the-fate-of-fragile-somalia-is-now-in-the-hands-of-a-remarkably-young-diverse-parliament/">one-third of the elected candidates</a> in the 2016 parliamentary election hold foreign passports. Out of the 275 members of the Somali parliament, 22 are Somali-Americans and 29 are British Somalis. The <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/hassan-ali-khaire-somalia-prime-minister-farmajo-561723">48-year-old prime minister</a>, a former senior official in the Soma Oil and Gas exploration company, is a dual Somali-Norwegian citizen. </p>
<h2>2. Better famine preparedness</h2>
<p>The existence of more stable government than before the 2011 famine <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/03/04/somalia-110-dead-hunger-past-48-hours-drought/98739642/">allowed the prime minister to act faster</a> to declare the 2017 drought a natural disaster. </p>
<p>In the 2011 famine, international aid groups in Somalia were hampered by lack of access to affected regions, clan warfare and <a href="http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/somalia-country-peril-policy-nightmare">dangerous conditions</a> caused by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094503">a state of anarchy</a>. Aid often went undelivered. </p>
<p>By 2012, thanks to the power sharing agreement reached by the clans, warfare had declined and <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/somalia-famine-farmaajo-al-shabaab-556679">aid delivery improved</a>. Overall funding for Somalia in 2016 amounted to <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/505/summary">US$637.7 million</a>. </p>
<p>Funding from the U.S. and the EU is an important support for the new government. The U.S. provides significant aid for political and economic recovery, as well as <a href="https://usaid.gov/crisis/somalia">humanitarian</a> and <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/al-shabaab-somalia-black-hawk-down-561586">military aid</a> to fight al-Shabab and improve state security. </p>
<p>The EU has donated over <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/tags/eu-emergency_en">1.2 billion euros</a> since 2008 through the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/1079">European Development Fund</a>. </p>
<p>Aid reaches its targets better now that the country is more stable. However, there is also growing <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fixing-failed-states-9780195398618?cc=us&lang=en&">recognition</a> that to be successful, development must be more rooted in Somalia.</p>
<h2>3. Progress against al-Shabab</h2>
<p>Protecting borders is vital for state building. Forces favorable to the Somali government <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094503">have made advances</a> against al-Shabab militants since 2012. The retreat of al-Shabab in many regions suggests that Somalia can defend its borders better now. </p>
<p>Funding cuts under the recent EU budget <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/african-union-s-somalia-mission-hit-by-eu-funding-cut/">will affect</a> the African Union’s Somalia mission of fighting al-Shabab. There are expectations, however, that the <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/al-shabaab-somalia-black-hawk-down-561586">U.S. will increase military spending in Somalia</a> to offset this loss. </p>
<p>Since 2007, the U.S. has played an important role in fighting al-Shabab, for example by carrying out <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/al-shabaab-somalia-black-hawk-down-561586">drone strikes</a>. In addition, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/world/africa/setbacks-press-shabab-fighters-to-kill-inexpensively.html?_r=0">The New York Times reports</a> that the U.S. has helped pay for an African Union stabilization force in Somalia. About <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/al-shabaab-somalia-black-hawk-down-561586">50 U.S. commandos remain</a> in Somalia, with the ability to launch air strikes and accompany Somali troops on missions. They may <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect-civilians.html">soon do more</a>. </p>
<h2>Hope for the Somali state</h2>
<p>Despite the challenges of famine and continuing threats from al-Shabab, a stronger Somalia seems possible. <a href="http://www.global-economic-symposium.org/knowledgebase/the-global-polity/repairing-failed-states/proposals/liberia-rebuilding-for-growth-and-development">Liberia</a> and <a href="http://www.uncdf.org/gfld/docs/post-conflict.pdf">Sierra Leone</a> are examples of countries that have successfully managed their state building and made similar turnarounds. </p>
<p>Somalians <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fixing-failed-states-9780195398618?cc=us&lang=en&">want to rebuild</a> their state from the bottom up, depending more on domestic sources. Unfortunately, Somalia’s current recovery is fragile and could easily derail. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/17/somali-refugees-killed-helicopter-attack-off-yemen-coast">recent attack</a> on Somali refugees off the coast of Yemen highlights continuing problems. Now is not the time for a ban on Somali refugees entering either the EU or the U.S. A more stable Somali government should merit some reconsideration of this order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eleanor Zeff is affiliated with the Iowa International Center and the Alliance Francaise</span></em></p>According to 2016 rankings, Somalia is the most fragile state in the world, worse off even than Syria. But there are reasons to believe things will improve.Eleanor Zeff, Associate Professor of Political Science, Drake UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/429052015-06-11T04:19:18Z2015-06-11T04:19:18ZWhat lies behind the rise of jihadist movements in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84359/original/image-20150609-10675-hyrnwc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The dogmas of ruling and rebel groups in Africa conflate political conflict and spirituality.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Alain Amontchi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa arguably faces the biggest threat to political stability since the collapse of colonialism in the mid-20th century.</p>
<p>The threat comes in the main from the proliferation of militant Islamic groups in parts of the continent. These groups, which strike at the heart of African <a href="http://bit.ly/1B9E9Xc">cohesion</a> and nation-building, include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/734613/al-Qaeda">al-Qaeda</a> in Islamic Maghreb – in the northern and western Africa region, covering Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-explaining-nigerias-boko-haram-and-its-violent-insurgency/">Boko Haram</a> in north-eastern Nigeria;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/african_al_qaeda_lea.php">Mulathameen Brigade</a> in Algeria;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/organizations/ansar-al-dine">Ansar al-Dine</a> in Mali;</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED-Country-Report_Central-African-Republic.pdf">Séléka</a> in the Central African Republic; and</p></li>
<li><p>Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Journalists, analysts and scholars provide crucial insights into the identity and practices of Africa’s rebel groups. But credible information is invariably a casualty of war. This requires people to exercise a high level of critical analysis to attain an unbiased understanding of conflict in Africa.</p>
<p>The consequences of the support by the West for oppressive African regimes needs to be considered. In turn, strident Muslim aggression needs to be understood in relation to the influence of Western-based Christian fundamentalist groups in Africa. Many devout Muslim believers see this as a muted form of the <a href="http://pursuingveritas.com/2015/02/23/book-review-fields-of-blood-armstrong/">Christian crusades</a> that endured for 200 years.</p>
<p>Some 800 years later, the current conflict is understood as a continuing fight for the purity of an Islamic belief. For them, defeat is not an option.</p>
<h2>Drivers of the jihadist conflict</h2>
<p>Understanding jihadist conflict in Africa needs to address at least the following five elements.</p>
<p><strong>Ideological conflicts</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/577523/Sykes-Picot-Agreement">Sykes-Picot agreement</a>, which entrenched European dominance in the Arabian Peninsula in the wake of the first world war, plus the West’s protection of the newly established state of Israel in 1948, resulted in a resurgence of Islamic extremism in global politics.</p>
<p>The effects of the <a href="http://www.ushistory.org/us/52a.asp">Cold War</a> escalated, and the African independence struggles resulted in a plethora of African coup d’etats, counter-coups and deep-seated tensions in the 1950s and 1960s. This ideological conflict soon mutated into resource wars and economic deprivation, manipulated by religion and culture, still today.</p>
<p><strong>Dominant groups</strong></p>
<p>African notions of state have their roots in colonial law, which resulted in political control by a dominant group. This “crime”, says world-renowned Ugandan scholar <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130322131149861">Mahmood Mamdani</a>, led to the politicisation of culture, religion and indigeneity to the exclusion of subservient and minority groups.</p>
<p>The failure of African states to adequately address their racial, ethnic, cultural, religious and economic differences provided the fertile ground on which rebel groups now prosper.</p>
<p>The gap between the basic principles of democracy and political participation, and their non-implementation, has contributed to the stand-off between government and individual ethnic, cultural and religious groups.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/84354/original/image-20150609-10717-1ecole.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relatives and friends gather view the body of a student killed during a recent al-Shabaab attack in Kenya.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Economic dependency</strong></p>
<p>Capitalism, deeply entrenched in the global economy, has produced dependent African economies. Only a minority of grassroots Africans have been drawn into the middle and upper classes which, in the words of South African political analyst Steven Friedman, constitute an exclusive club “never meant to be for everyone”.</p>
<p>In the absence of compromise between the two ends of this economic divide, the fabric of African co-existence is under serious threat. This contributes significantly to the fight-back by Africa’s poor, which includes a growing number of alienated and unemployed young people.</p>
<p><strong>Toxic mix of religion and poverty</strong></p>
<p>African poverty acts in a symbiotic relationship with religion, which is a powerful mobilising force among poor communities.</p>
<p>Priests, mullahs, rabbis and other religious leaders are frequently associated with extremist views which they communicate through religious language and symbols that acquire apocalyptic dimensions involving a choice between divine wrath and favour. They demand dogmatic obedience by their followers, while promising rewards in heaven.</p>
<p>At the same time, there are inspirational religious leaders and grassroots believers in Islam and Christianity who affirm the supremacy of God and Allah over state and rebel leaders. </p>
<p>But their focus on the pre-eminence of the divine is largely suppressed as institutional religion is captured by the dogma of ruling and rebel groups. This lifts the political conflict into the realm of spiritual encounters between rebels and the state.</p>
<p>Driven by different forms of propaganda, this dogma promotes and legitimates violent behaviour. Believers engage in civilian massacres, kidnapping and abduction, rape of women and girls, forced marriages and the killing of so-called infidels and apostates. The slaughter of rebels by government forces also occurs under this rubric.</p>
<p><strong>Dehumanisation of the other</strong></p>
<p>The extent of this violence, driven by a sense of exclusivity, moral superiority, religious intensity and blind submission to authority has resulted in the endemic demonisation and dehumanisation of “the other”.</p>
<p>This is true among Christians, Muslims, members of opposing groups or those who are indifferent to the prevailing conflict. It is evoked by rebel groups as well as strident state officials who sanction violence as the only solution to the prevailing conflict.</p>
<p>There are no quick answers to the toxic mix of the above five ingredients. Understanding and unravelling the intertwined causes will require critical elements that need to be creatively reviewed by African leaders, credible facilitators and a pool of multi-disciplinary analysts.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.marxist.com/karl-marx-130-years.htm">Karl Marx</a> warned that “the tradition of dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living”. The past needs to be pondered as a basis for each new African generation to create a new future.</p>
<p>If individual African countries, together with regional and global agencies, fail to embrace this responsibility, Africa’s much-heralded economic progress is likely to be engulfed in an ideological war which knows no state borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Villa-Vicencio does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The failure of African states to adequately address their racial, ethnic, cultural, religious and economic differences provided the fertile ground on which rebel groups now prosper.Charles Villa-Vicencio, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/405152015-04-28T11:24:16Z2015-04-28T11:24:16ZWhoever governs, Britain’s Africa policy is tied to the UN and the EU<p>The hallmark of Britain’s policy towards Africa is continuity. Under the coalition, Africa has not taken the morality flavoured prominence it had in Labour’s foreign policy, but the core of the relationship has nonetheless been upheld. </p>
<p>Of course, Britain’s colonial past in Africa still weighs heavy, especially with regard to countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Somalia. But Britain is also tied to Africa by its permanent seat and veto power on the UN Security Council. </p>
<p>The Security Council spends a lot of time on Africa, where some of the UN’s largest and most costly <a href="https://theconversation.com/leaked-report-details-un-peacekeepers-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-39004">peacekeeping operations</a> are deployed. Since no future UK government would want to give up this privileged position, Africa is destined to be a permanent fixture on Britain’s multilateral agenda. </p>
<h2>Justice and aid</h2>
<p>The coalition has stood firm on two more recently established principles: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-welcomes-icc-judgment-in-lubanga-case">support for the International Criminal Court</a>, in spite of growing criticism of the court’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-international-criminal-court-must-fix-its-anti-african-image-32983">overwhelming focus on Africa</a>, and the considerable foreign policy role now played by the Department for International Development (DfID).</p>
<p>DfID is now at the centre of the UK’s Africa policy, most clearly in the ongoing efforts to keep the UK to the UN target spend of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/mar/09/uk-passes-bill-law-aid-target-percentage-income">0.7% of GDP</a> on official development aid. </p>
<p>That this level of aid spending has been upheld is remarkable given the coalition government’s strict adherence to austerity, while the former no doubt in great part explains why Britain has generally <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389305/Rwanda.pdf">maintained its support to Rwanda</a>, one of DfID’s long-time favourites, in spite of growing evidence of the country’s involvement in the on-going <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/22/uk-rwanda-aid-drc-rebels">violence</a> in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<h2>Stepping in</h2>
<p>As far as Africa goes, the coalition years have also been defined by Britain’s role in two major crises. </p>
<p>The British government organised a high-profile international conference on Somalia in May 2013, which helped bolster international support to the country’s transitional road map. Somalia remains plagued by political instability and attacks from al-Shabab, but the funds gathered on the occasion have helped finance the African Union’s mission AMISOM and an on-going reform of the national security sector. </p>
<p>The second is the Ebola crisis, which has claimed nearly 10,000 lives in West Africa. Alongside the region’s other former colonial power, France, the UK has led the international state response – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/six-lessons-from-the-initial-failed-international-response-to-ebola-37862">frustratingly slow and limited</a> as it was, there is evidence showing that it has saved lives and has also enabled the further development of good practice and research essential for future prevention and rapid response efforts. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79580/original/image-20150428-3062-bbt4he.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Secretary of State for International Development Justine Greening.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/15234027227/sizes/l">DFID/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The next government’s relations with Africa will probably be dominated by a similar mixture of principles and reactions, but the overall direction will nonetheless depend on the leading party’s defined priorities and foreign policy philosophy – and political pressure at home.</p>
<h2>In or out</h2>
<p>Of course, the election will have some effect on Africa policy, but the consequences of the various possible outcomes are far from clear.</p>
<p>A Conservative-led government would be under serious pressure to at the very least renegotiate its relationship with the EU, and Cameron has already committed to a referendum on leaving it entirely. But if Britain were to leave the EU, it would have to radically rethink the way it engages with Africa, where the European regional organisation has deployed a vast and more politically-minded <a href="http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/">external action service</a> and nine <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-the-uk-perspective">Common Security and Defence Policy</a> missions – for example in the <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/index_en.htm">Horn of Africa</a>. Britain cannot do these things on its own, but it can hardly cast off its post-colonial and commonwealth responsibilities simply out of euroscepticism.</p>
<p>A Labour-led government, on the other hand, would be more likely to stick wholeheartedly to a multilateral agenda. That philosophy has long guided the party’s foreign policy approach (at least in theory), and it was recently <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/event/britains-place-world-labour-perspective">reaffirmed by Miliband at Chatham House</a>, particularly with reference to Libya. </p>
<p>The party has stayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/manifesto-check-labour-keeps-it-vague-on-eu-reform-40105">relatively vague</a> on its European plans, but it would clearly be keen to put Britain back at the heart of EU foreign policy.</p>
<h2>Crisis point</h2>
<p>But whatever the political orientation of the next government, its policies in Africa will also be shaped by towering crises that are already well underway. </p>
<p>Chief among them is the threat of <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/libya-isis-crisis-libyan-militias-fight-islamic-state-airstrikes-official-says-1895583">Islamic State</a> (IS), <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32435614">Boko Haram</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-attack-al-shabaabs-violent-radicalism-cant-be-tackled-by-force-alone-39714">al-Shabab</a>, some of which count <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24639648">British citizens</a> among their fighters and have in the case of IS <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11418966/Islamic-State-planning-to-use-Libya-as-gateway-to-Europe.html">set their sights on Europe</a>. Britain has to decide how to support the African armed forces fighting these groups on the battlefield – even if only financially and logistically.</p>
<p>Just as pressingly, the recent deaths of hundreds of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean are testing the next government’s Africa policy – and again, forcing the issue of European co-operation front and centre in what is, in many ways, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-deal-with-the-refugee-crisis-you-need-to-understand-the-cause-40737">pan-African crisis</a>.</p>
<p>The mutilateral tangle of interests and political agendas that these crises have exposed are a preview of what awaits the next government – whatever it looks like.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marie Gibert does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Governments come and go, but Britain’s Africa policy has long been a beacon of continuity.Marie Gibert, Lecturer in International Relations, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/185822013-09-24T18:43:46Z2013-09-24T18:43:46ZKenya is Somalia’s latest victim in region of failed states<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ENOUGH Project</span></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/31881/original/nxtqxhq2-1380041363.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pretty, but vulnerable.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ENOUGH Project</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The terrorist <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24189116">attack</a> on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, has come to an <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24225319#%22">end</a> now with five more terrorists killed and eleven in custody. The attack raises a number of questions over security and stability in East Africa that need to be asked and answered. This region has suffered from a prolonged crisis primarily connected to the collapse of any semblance of order in <a href="http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/106/424/357.full">Somalia</a> more than two decades ago. </p>
<p>Despite numerous efforts of Western donors and regional powers, there is still no effective government in Somalia and al-Shabaab, the terrorist group behind the attack in Nairobi, has a strong foothold in the country. From this base, the group has now hit out at Kenya, a country that has intervened militarily in Somalia in support of an embattled, African Union and UN-backed government.</p>
<p>This is not the first time Kenya has been affected by the lack of effective governance in Somalia. Islamic extremists based in Somalia have carried out <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-09-12/british-man-killed-in-kenya/2880964">attacks against tourist resorts</a> in Kenya for several years, as have <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/suspected-somali-pirates-kill-british-tourist-kidnap-wife-attack-exclusive-kenyan-resort-article-1.957846">pirates</a>, another major source of threat emanating from Somalia, and “home-grown” <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2013/03/28/seven-die-in-attack-on-kenyan-tourist-resort/">separatists</a> in Kenya itself.</p>
<p>So the problem in itself is not new: as Samuel Makinda puts it, Somalia’s anarchy is <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-mall-attacks-somalias-anarchy-spreads-18518">spreading</a>. What does give cause for concern is the scale and audacity of this most recent attack by a well-known terrorist group that has clearly demonstrated its capacity for complex operations outside its traditional comfort zone.</p>
<p>But the problem is also deeper than Somalia. Kenya is far from a stable and well-governed country. It is still recovering from the violence after the 2007 disputed presidential elections, its current president and vice president have both been indicted in connection with atrocities committed then. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/23/kenya-behind-terror-rampant-corruption">Corruption</a> is a systemic threat to good governance in Kenya. Local unrest, especially in the North Eastern Province of Kenya with its significant Somalian population, adds further to the cross-border challenges that are exacerbated by al-Shabaab’s retaliation against Kenya’s military intervention in 2011, forecast at the time already by the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/184-the-kenyan-military-intervention-in-somalia.aspx">International Crisis Group</a>.</p>
<p>Somalia is thus a pivotal state in what I referred to in earlier research as a <a href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=8305898&jid=RIS&volumeId=37&issueId=03&aid=8305897&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0260210510000951">state failure region</a>. Unrest in Somalia has drawn in the country’s two powerful neighbours – <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15807215">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="http://csis.org/publication/kenyas-intervention-somalia">Kenya</a> – and in turn contributed much to local instability there. While politically stable, the third neighbour – <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483836.html">Djibouti</a> – has been affected by a constant stream of refugees from Somalia and served as a transit hub for migration across the Red Sea.</p>
<p>While migration links East Africa with the Arab world in one direction, links in the opposite direction have <a href="http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/maseh-zarif-terror-partnership-shabaab-aqap-july-2-2011">connected</a> al-Shabaab with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) for some time as well, thus further increasing the destabilising potential that Somalia has, not least because of its critical geostrategic location.</p>
<p>Beyond geography, what makes this location so significant is that the region as a whole and on both sides of the Red Sea is beset by problems that are acutely tied to individual, local, regional and global security. Organised crime (piracy, illegal migration), international terrorism (al-Shabaab, AQAP), and civil wars (southern Yemen, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, the North Eastern Province in Kenya, and Somalia as a whole) combine to create a deadly cocktail of challenges. States with weak capacity and political will are ill-equipped to tackle them at the best of times and the international community can only at best <a href="http://eunavfor.eu/">contain</a> them.</p>
<p>What the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi thus illustrates is a longer-term trend of insecurity and instability in East Africa that is of a different scale, but not of a fundamentally new quality. Its causes are complex and long-standing, and they have been allowed to fester for long enough that they are now difficult to untangle and manage, let alone resolve. Somalia is clearly at the core of the many problems that the region faces, but it has also created a degree of instability beyond its own borders that requires a regional and cross-sectoral approach by the international community. </p>
<p>Hopefully, the sheer scale of the Nairobi attack serves as a wake-up call that triggers a renewed effort by Somalians, their neighbours, and their international partners to come together and finally address a decades-old crisis that has slowly but undeniably spun out of control. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, has come to an end now with five more terrorists killed and eleven in custody. The attack raises a number of questions over security…Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/56652012-03-05T01:49:52Z2012-03-05T01:49:52ZWhat the al Shabab-al Qaeda merger means for Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8316/original/w972gbnz-1330907626.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The aftermath of a car bombing in Mogadishu in February, blamed on Al-Shabab.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Elyas Ahmed</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda">Al Qaeda’s</a> recent acquisition of the Somali militant group <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Shabaab">al Shabab</a> as its newest franchise has been dismissed in some circles as a propaganda ploy, and a play for relevance by two groups on the decline. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waziristan">Waziristan</a>-based central al Qaeda organisation has been operationally impotent since July 2005, when it last carried out a successful mass-impact strike in the West, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_July_2005_London_bombings">targeting London’s underground</a> with coordinated suicide attacks. </p>
<p>Since first campaigning for al Qaeda membership in 2009, al Shabab has seen its military power diminish, despite merging with another Somali militant group, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12038556">Hizbul Islam</a>, in 2010. </p>
<p>These circumstances have caused some analysts to see the merger as stemming from both groups’ weaknesses, but such assessments overlook the resources al Shabab still maintains, its post-merger pledge to put them under the authority of al Qaeda, and the pressure and authority al Qaeda will bring to bear for al Shabab’s resources to be used in attacks against the West. </p>
<h2>Joining al Qaeda</h2>
<p>When a group signs on to become an al Qaeda franchise, it is required to uphold the organisation’s global agenda alongside its own locally-focused objectives. This includes, where possible, and upon request, seeking to undertake attacks against the West. </p>
<p>Al Shabab is likely to be under more pressure than other al Qaeda subsidiaries to attack because it already has its own independent support networks operating in many Western countries, including Australia. </p>
<p>Al Shabab has also attracted the largest number of Western passport holders of any al Qaeda grouping. It is, therefore, the most ideally positioned to pursue attacks against the West. </p>
<h2>The Australian angle</h2>
<p>Australians rank among those who have joined al Shabab, trained with them, supported them and most significantly, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/18-years-jail-for-army-terrorattack-plan-20111216-1oy3f.html">sought to carry out an attack</a> within Australia under the group’s name. In the Australian context then, the merger of these two groups does not show a weakening, but rather intensifies the threat. And Australia, along with other countries home to an al Shabab support base, faces an increased likelihood of being targeted.</p>
<p>One reason Australia may be vulnerable to an attack on its soil is the activist nature of some al Shabab supporters operating within the country. They have distinguished themselves from al Shabab networks in other western countries by being operationally active, instead of focusing on facilitation and support activities. </p>
<p>In 2009, a small group of men sought al Shabab’s permission to carry out a suicide attack under its name in Australia. At least one travelled to Somalia to receive training and secure endorsement for the attacks but al Shabab’s senior religious figures reportedly declined to grant approval. </p>
<p>Their reticence stemmed from a concern that such attacks would cause harm to other Muslims and damage al Shabab’s support networks. In a rare case of going against a militant group’s senior religious figures, the Australia-based cell decided to pursue the plot regardless, although it is not clear if they still intended to claim their attack in al Shabab’s name as the plot was interdicted by authorities in an investigation code named <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holsworthy_Barracks_terror_plot">Operation Neath</a>. </p>
<h2>Sacrificing a support network</h2>
<p>What this incident ultimately shows was at that time al Shabab saw the broader support network in Australia as too important to sacrifice and was thus unwilling to jeopardise it by endorsing a terrorist attack within the country. </p>
<p>These same fears were presumably held by the faction within al Shabab that opposed a merger with al Qaeda. With the merger now complete, it is apparent al Shabab’s calculus has changed, and its leadership is willing to accept the consequences of a greater counter terrorism campaign brought to bear against the group as a result of its merger with al Qaeda and expansion of its agenda. </p>
<p>Clearly, the fears of those who rejected attacks in Australia (and presumably the West more broadly) were overcome, or overruled. This is significant because al Shabab’s willingness to sacrifice support networks in the face of an intensified counter terrorism campaign also means it might be willing – on al Qaeda’s urging – to sacrifice networks in pursuit of an attack against the West. </p>
<h2>Australian success against al Shabab</h2>
<p>Al Shabab was proscribed in Australia before its merger with al Qaeda, and its support network has already been subject to significant counter terrorism pressure over the past five or so years. However, an intensified counter terrorism campaign will do little to militate against intent — as the 2009 plot, where the perpetrators believed they were under surveillance, demonstrates. </p>
<p>Counter terrorism pressure is also unlikely to stem the desire of radicalised people to travel to Somalia to obtain training and participate in the jihad. Particularly given al Shabab’s increasingly sophisticated propaganda and active recruitment networks. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/8317/original/gf34jhmb-1330907652.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Wissam Mahmoud Fattal is led from the dock during the Holsworthy Army barracks case.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Julian Smith</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>To date, Australia’s counter terrorism apparatus has been successful in preventing attacks within the country. However, an often overlooked consequence of counter terrorism pressure, and particularly disruption activities, is their potential role in contributing to further radicalisation. </p>
<p>For example, one key counter terrorism strategy employed by Australia is to disrupt its citizens from travelling overseas to join the jihad or obtain training. This is done by a variety of means including revoking of passports, thus preventing travel. But a consequence of frustrated ambitions to travel to a site of jihad, either through counter terrorism disruption activities or other unrelated factors, has been the focus turning inward, towards undertaking an attack in Australia. </p>
<p>Indeed, frustrated ambitions played a role in the desire of at least one of those subsequently investigated and jailed as part of Operation Neath to conduct an attack in Australia.</p>
<h2>Danger remains</h2>
<p>Should this strategy be utilised as a means of disrupting the travel of al Shabab supporters to join the jihad, it is a very real possibility they too could turn their focus inward. What makes this particularly significant is that the constraints that previously held al Shabab back from sanctioning an attack, are in all likelihood removed. </p>
<p>Those seeking to join the jihad may no longer identify themselves with al Shabab, but rather al Qaeda. Even if al Shabab were to rebuff al Qaeda’s urges, the lessons of Operation Neath show that refusing permission for an attack has not always stopped those planning. </p>
<p>Now that al Shabab is officially an al Qaeda franchise those frustrated in their ambition to join the jihad may deem that direct permission from al Shabab is not required to carry out an attack here.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/5665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leah Farrall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al Qaeda’s recent acquisition of the Somali militant group al Shabab as its newest franchise has been dismissed in some circles as a propaganda ploy, and a play for relevance by two groups on the decline…Leah Farrall, Research Associate in Counter Terrorism at the United States Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.