tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/alassane-ouattara-25836/articlesAlassane Ouattara – The Conversation2023-05-11T14:27:39Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2030852023-05-11T14:27:39Z2023-05-11T14:27:39ZWest Africa has a small weapons crisis – why some countries are better at dealing with it than others<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525193/original/file-20230509-23793-fiq7oo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small arms and light weapons recovered from bandits in Jos, north central Nigeria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Research has found that globally, small arms and light weapons <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_08-09/mkas98">increase</a> the likelihood, intensity and longevity of conflict. </p>
<p>Small arms and light weapons <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf#page=9">account</a> for most of the African continent’s conflict-related deaths. An estimated <a href="https://oneearthfuture.org/news/stemming-tide-african-leadership-small-arms-and-light-weapons-control">100 million</a> light weapons circulate in Africa. About <a href="https://www.giaba.org/media/f/613_519_giaba%20salw%20nexus-final.pdf#page=4">8 million</a> are in the hands of non-state actors in west Africa. </p>
<p>In 1998 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/citation/quotes/3219">established</a> the world’s first small arms and light weapons moratorium. It became a legally binding convention in <a href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/112514/fp2p-cs-from-moratorium-convention-small-arms-ECOWAS-140608-en.pdf;jsessionid=C4DBF8CCB40D00B0DF8EA04B2C754F49?sequence=1">2006</a>. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?journalCode=fdef20">recent paper</a>, I assessed how ECOWAS members had applied the convention on small arms and light weapons. Compliance varied between countries and the paper looked at domestic political legitimacy as an explanation of these differences. </p>
<p>I used the case studies of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire to test the explanation. </p>
<p>The study revealed that domestic political legitimacy was paramount for effective application and compliance. Legitimacy influences how states and domestic groups behave. A lack of legitimacy can lead to illegal purchases of small arms and light weapons. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that political legitimacy is important for states’ ability to implement collective security agreements such as the one on small arms and light weapons. ECOWAS members with legitimacy challenges must be given support around implementation, because they cannot do this individually. </p>
<h2>State legitimacy as a differentiator</h2>
<p>When a state is seen as legitimate, it’s because those who hold power got it in widely accepted ways and wield it rightfully. A legitimate state is lawful and has authority to issue orders. Citizens obey them because the leaders have moral authority. The path to state legitimacy is through the integrity of elections or the degree to which governments represent the populations they govern. </p>
<p>Where a state does not act legitimately, organised political opposition and sustained armed struggles or insurgencies follow. When a government lacks popular support, it will use strong-arm tactics like illegally obtaining small arms and light weapons to rule.</p>
<p>I examined Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana’s compliance trends and the role of state legitimacy. The countries are neighbours and have plenty in common, but they differ in two ways: their domestic legitimacy; and their records of implementing the region’s small arms convention. </p>
<p>I assessed compliance by looking at what countries do about illegal production and possession of weapons.</p>
<h2>Côte d'Ivoire</h2>
<p>Côte d’Ivoire was one of the top violators of the small arms conventions. </p>
<p>For instance, Laurent Gbagbo’s government between 2000 and 2011 brazenly purchased weapons using <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?af=R&journalCode=fdef20">illegal documents</a>. United Nations weapons experts uncovered vast quantities of ammunition and weapons that Gbagbo’s government had bought illegally. A company linked to Gbagbo appointees unlawfully traded <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/biometric-bribery-semlex/how-semlex-and-gunvor-armed-the-ivorian-civil-war">US$16.3 million</a> worth of weapons to the government. </p>
<p>Legal purchases also rose abruptly, accounting for more than <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?journalCode=fdef20">50%</a> of small arms imported to the region in 2003 alone. </p>
<p>Non-compliance by Gbagbo’s government’s corresponded with domestic legitimacy problems. Legitimacy crises around electoral processes provoked the first and second Ivorian civil wars between 2002 and 2011, increasing the demand for small arms. Gbagbo, under whose watch the small arms convention regime kicked in, chose not to implement it because of low political legitimacy. </p>
<p>Weakened political legitimacy in Côte d’Ivoire sidetracked compliance by diverting Gbagbo’s focus and rerouting opposition energy towards grabbing political power, which requires more weapons. </p>
<p>Gbagbo contested the results of the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2010/12/07/131870188/Ivory-Coast-s-President-Lost-Election-But-Won-t-Concede">2010 election</a>, won by Alassane Ouattara. He bought more weapons illegally to hold on to political power. In response, Ouattara’s fighters used a military offensive to drive Gbagbo from power. </p>
<p>Ouattara’s fighters solicited illicit small arms from foreign and from neighbouring sources. When forces loyal to Ouattara emerged victorious, rebels elevated to military commands used illegal weapons, while troops loyal to Gbagbo fought the state from bases in Liberia. </p>
<p>In Côte d’Ivoire, political illegitimacy morphed into territorial violence, undermining the country’s compliance records.</p>
<h2>Ghana</h2>
<p>In Ghana, no known evidence exists of Ghanaian authorities or organised groups purchasing weapons illegally. My argument is that this is due to the relatively strong legitimacy of the state and its institutions. </p>
<p>Some Russians and Ukrainians <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3568892">allegedly registered</a> front companies in Ghana and tried to use false letterheads from the Ghanaian defence and foreign ministries to sell weapons in 2003. However, these have been foiled. </p>
<p>Since embracing the ECOWAS convention, Ghana has experienced increased political stability and democratic consolidation. Ghana’s relative state legitimacy is grounded in the elite’s willingness to regulate the competition for political power. </p>
<p>The consensual and efficient management of social differences and electoral processes can explain this avoidance of state legitimacy crises. Ghana’s relative stability minimises the use of weapons.</p>
<p>While Ghana has seen high compliance at the national level, the country has a highly developed artisanal weapon market. People make weapons in Ghana and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2023.2188199?af=R&journalCode=fdef20">sell them to buyers in other countries</a> where state legitimacy has been questioned. </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>In Côte d’Ivoire, domestic legitimacy problems have fuelled small arms and light weapons-seeking behaviours by state and non-state groups. In Ghana, a better record of applying the weapons convention stemmed from the country’s domestic legitimacy. </p>
<p>The findings suggest that in troubled regions like the ECOWAS zone, the state’s domestic characteristics matter for a state-level application of collective security regimes and, at the regional level, for their overall success.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Banini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A lack of political legitimacy can lead governments to illegal purchases of small arms and light weapons.Daniel Banini, Researcher and analyst, Eastern Illinois UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1670002021-09-15T14:03:49Z2021-09-15T14:03:49ZGbagbo returns to politics. What it means for Côte d’Ivoire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420653/original/file-20210912-27-5bjhbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former president Laurent Gbagbo may be a rallying figure for opposition movement in Cote d'Ivoire. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sia Kambou/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early August the former president of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, floated the idea of creating a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210810-ivory-coast-s-gbagbo-announces-push-for-new-party">new political party</a>. Gbagbo’s comments came after his return to Côte d’Ivoire on 26 June after nearly 10 years of facing charges at the International Criminal Court. </p>
<p>In July 2019, the court <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-goude">acquitted</a> him of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape and “other inhuman acts” during the 2010-2011 post-election violence. </p>
<p>Gbagbo’s return was sealed when the court’s Appeals Chamber confirmed the acquittal in March 2021. And President Alassane Ouattara gave him a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-gbagbo/ivory-coast-gives-passport-to-exiled-former-president-gbagbo-idUSKBN28E1Y0">diplomatic passport</a>.</p>
<p>Gbagbo’s announcement confirms his interest in exercising political influence in a country where the opposition is divided and the president faces criticism for obtaining a third term. </p>
<p>The prospect of a new political party with Gbagbo’s blessing could unify the opposition and pose a formidable challenge to Ouattara and his ruling coalition. It is also likely to enhance political participation and interest, which has trailed off during successive opposition defeats and boycotts.</p>
<h2>Party divisions</h2>
<p>Côte d’Ivoire has three main political parties: the Front Populaire Ivoirien, Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Républicains and its coalition partner the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain.</p>
<p>During the 1990s, under Gbagbo, the Front Populaire Ivoirien was the main opposition party. After the 1999 military coup and the interim leadership of General Robert Guéï, the party’s strength and a lack of alternatives allowed Gbagbo to win the 2000 presidential election. </p>
<p>The Front Populaire Ivoirien ruled until the disputed 2010 elections. The source of the dispute was the presidential run-off election results, which Gbagbo refused to accept.</p>
<p>While the party was in government, there were internal differences on policy and how to deal with the rebels during the civil war that began in 2002. Some members wanted Côte d’Ivoire to distance itself from France, while others were more conciliatory. Some wanted to negotiate a settlement with the rebels while others sought to win the war militarily.</p>
<p>During the 2010 election, the divisions became more serious. Hardliners close to Gbagbo insisted that he dig in and refuse to transfer power to Ouattara. Others in the party claim to have expressed their support for a power-sharing government like those in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40864715">Kenya and Zimbabwe</a>.</p>
<h2>Gbagbo’s arrest</h2>
<p>The most relevant disagreement among party leaders was about how to deal with Gbagbo’s status in the party after his arrest and indictment at the International Criminal Court. Some leaders encouraged the party to avoid political activities without Gbagbo as their flag bearer. They believed he would return to the country and reestablish his political position. </p>
<p>Other party leaders sought to press ahead with activities and replace Gbagbo as the head. Pascal Affi N'Guessan, a former prime minister during the 2000s, became the head but faced resistance from Gbagbo allies.</p>
<p>Unlike Gbagbo, N’Guessan was not a popular politician in his party. Gbagbo and his allies have stated that N’Guessan <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210810-ivory-coast-s-gbagbo-announces-push-for-new-party">held</a> the Front Populaire Ivoirien “hostage, trampling on years of sacrifice by the men and women who are party activists”.</p>
<p>The party under N'Guessan’s leadership has failed to gain broad-based resonance and political influence. Despite many smaller opposition parties boycotting the 2015 elections, N’Guessan garnered a meagre 9.3% to Ouattara’s 83.7% of the vote. N’Guessan was subsequently approved to run in the elections in 2020 while Gbagbo was barred due to the ongoing court proceedings. Opposition parties, including N'Guessan’s, boycotted the 2020 election and Ouattara won a third-term election without competition.</p>
<h2>Power vacuum</h2>
<p>The boycott highlights the opposition vacuum since the 2010 disputed election. According to Gbagbo loyalists, the vacuum can only be filled by him. But the debate reflects deeper trends of political party alignment in Côte d’Ivoire. In the last five years, the realignment has accelerated, with 57% of Ivorians <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Sommaire%20des%20r%C3%A9sultats/cdi-r8-sor_2019.pdf">indicating</a> that they do not feel close to a political party.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421189/original/file-20210914-27-1kb6jvq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Close to a Political Party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Afrobarometer Survey, Round 5 - 8</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Citizens are also increasingly critical of ruling and opposition parties. Ruling party trust is firmly under 50% and declined to 41% in 2019. Trust in opposition parties has largely stagnated during Gbagbo’s absence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421190/original/file-20210914-21-16gf5t2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Trust in Ruling and Opposition Parties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Afrobarometer Survey, Round 5 - 8</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although trust in Ouattara is just shy of a majority (50%), the ruling party significantly underperforms. </p>
<p>The realignment also shows in citizens’ voting preferences over the past ten years. Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Républicains has seen a decline in support as Ouattara has cobbled together political alliances under the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix banner, which Ouattara emphasizes as his electoral vehicle. Opposition parties have stagnated. The Front Populaire Ivoirien received only 12% of self-reported support in the 2019 Afrobarometer survey.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421191/original/file-20210914-17-14acj40.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 3: Self-Reported Vote Choice.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Afrobarometer Survey, Round 5 - 8</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The party realignment offers an opportunity for new political movements and new (or old turned new) political figures to capture disaffected voters. In recent years, at least a <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Sommaire%20des%20r%C3%A9sultats/cdi-r8-sor_2019.pdf">fifth of Ivoirians reported</a> that they would not vote and one in ten said they did not know who they would vote for.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421193/original/file-20210914-13-1q4tvkg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 4: Self-Reported Vote Choice.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Afrobarometer Survey, Round 5 - 8</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The discontent is yet to find a home in a cohesive opposition movement and is likely helping to drive the present apathy. Moreover, there is a disconnect between a rejection of a third-term president and the reality of the present third term for Ouattara. Gbagbo seeks to tap into this discontent.</p>
<h2>Prospects of a new party</h2>
<p>Gbagbo’s interest in forming a new party reflects an opportunity to re-imagine opposition politics in the country. It also reflects opportunities to forge new alliances. N’Guessan and his allies insist that any Gbagbo takeover of the Front Populaire Ivoirien would be illegal and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210810-ivory-coast-s-gbagbo-announces-push-for-new-party">emblematic</a> of autocratic politics. </p>
<p>It is not clear whether a Gbagbo-sponsored party would fare better than the Front Populaire Ivoirien. But with Ouattara’s eventual exit from the political scene and with growing discontent, Gbagbo’s return to politics could lead to greater political participation. </p>
<p>It is also possible that Gbagbo’s return will accelerate recent efforts among Francophone countries to reevaluate their relationship with France and shape new continental relationships, as seen with Gbagbo’s <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202107050758.html">recent trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar is affiliated with the Leaders of Africa Institute.</span></em></p>Former president Laurent Gbagbo’s interest in forming a new party reflects an opportunity to re-imagine opposition politics in Cote d’ Ivoire.Peter Penar, Director of the Leaders of Africa Institute and Research Affiliate with Davidson College, Davidson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1489312020-11-01T07:59:14Z2020-11-01T07:59:14ZCôte d’Ivoire’s turbulent past remains front and centre in presidential poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/366096/original/file-20201028-21-1y4ysca.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents flee after demonstrators are dispersed in the Cocody district of Abidjan on October 19, 2020, during a protest against a third term for Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Patrick Fort/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An air of fear and uncertainty looms large over the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire as the country struggles to shake off its turbulent past. Numerous factors are critical in determining whether the elections have a peaceful or violent outcome for a country that has lived through two civil wars this century. The first bout of conflict <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR235Sany_final_lowres-1.pdf">lasted between</a> 2002 and 2007. The second ravaged the country <a href="https://www.pri.org/social-tags/second-ivorian-civil-war">from</a> 2010 to 2011.</p>
<p>This history is affecting the mood in the country in direct as well as indirect ways. </p>
<p>The foremost direct effect is the question of the legitimacy of presidential candidates. These include two principal actors in the country’s past armed conflicts – Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro. Both are on the ballot, even though they’re both living abroad to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/ivory-coast-issues-arrest-warrant-presidential-candidate-soro">avoid</a> incarceration.</p>
<p>Gbagbo is currently living in exile in Belgium. The former president was <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1427">acquitted</a> of charges of war crimes by the International Criminal Court. But he remains under legal proceedings in Côte d’Ivoire, where he was <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/515829/societe/cote-divoire-laurent-gbagbo-condamne-a-20-ans-de-prison-pour-le-braquage-de-la-bceao/">tried in absentia and sentenced to 20 years</a> in prison. Soro, the former president of the National Assembly, was also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-52464985">tried in absentia and also sentenced to 20 years</a> in prison. </p>
<p>Given the roles each of these men played in the civil wars that plagued the country in the past, their reemergence as presidential candidates is capable of reviving old divisions and animosities. These are capable of threatening the peace and development that the country has enjoyed since the end of the war.</p>
<p>Further complicating the tense political atmosphere – as evidenced by many <a href="https://www.voaafrique.com/a/des-morts-dans-les-violences-lors-des-manifestations-contre-le-troisi%C3%A8me-mandat-de-ouattara/5542372.html">protests</a> which have already claimed some lives – is the fallout from President Alassane Ouattara’s <a href="https://news.abidjan.net/h/677747.html">decision</a> to <a href="http://www.gouv.ci/doc/1583420766adresse-du-president-alassane-ouattara-sur-l-etat-de-la-nation-yamoussoukro-le-jeudi-05-mars-2020.pd">renounce his pledge</a> not to run for a third five-year term. </p>
<p>Gbagbo lost to Ouattara in the 2010 election and had to be forcibly removed after refusing to hand over to the winner. </p>
<p>The question on everyone’s mind is: can the country’s fledgling democracy withstand these pressures? Or could tensions between political actors, and the lack of a substantive reconciliation since the last civil war which ended in 2011 after claiming the lives of more than 3,000 people, trigger a regression into conflict once again?</p>
<h2>Lack of consolidation</h2>
<p>The democratic nature of electoral competition is yet to be consolidated in Côte d’Ivoire.</p>
<p>This is apparent from two angles.</p>
<p>The first is the heated <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006010024.html">political discourse</a> which shows that the political parties are positioning themselves for a decisive confrontation. Rivals tend to be seen as enemies rather than adversaries. This gives the impression that the country is in a winner-take-all logic where electoral failure is not considered by any of the sides.</p>
<p>The second is continued lack of consensus around the role of the Independent Electoral Commission. The reform of the commission – <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/811029/politique/cote-divoire-la-reforme-controversee-de-la-commission-electorale-adoptee-a-lassemblee/">endorsed</a> by the National Assembly in 2019 – is not to the liking of the opposition, which considers it biased insofar as the president has appointed people close to him at its head.</p>
<p>The contestation has found its way into the courts. The NGO Actions pour la Protection des Droits Humains (Actions for Protecting Human Rights) filed suit with the African Court on Human and People’s Rights in 2014 against the government regarding the unbalanced composition of the members of the commission. The court <a href="https://www.fratmat.info/article/91627/60/reforme-electorale-l-apdh-la-cour-africaine-et-la-cei.%20Consulted%20July%2020,%202020">issued</a> a decision in the NGO’s favour. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://news.abidjan.net/h/676400.html">new decision</a> by the African Court on Human and People’s Rights on reforming the commission has not resolved the dispute but calls on the various actors to continue political dialogue from less ideological standpoints.</p>
<p>A quick compromise between electoral stakeholders must be found on the issue of <a href="https://www.7info.ci/reforme-de-la-cei-lopposition-exige-la-dissolution-de-toutes-les-commissions-locales/">composition</a> of the 15 members of local electoral commissions. The same is true of the other elements of the electoral normative framework, such as the Constitutional Council and the electoral code.</p>
<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>The elections have some implications for the country’s economic fortunes. According to the World Bank, Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/publication/cote-divoire-economic-outlook-why-the-time-has-come-to-produce-cocoa-in-a-responsible-manner">growth rate</a> of 7.4% in 2018 and 7.2% in 2019. This ranks the country only second to Ethiopia in terms of growth on the continent. </p>
<p>This could evaporate if the country can’t reach consensus around the election. That includes, even at this late stage, the question of a postponement. It also includes resolving logistical organisation of the election as well as the disagreements on the powers and composition of the Independent Electoral Commission.</p>
<p>The Democratic Party of Ivory Coast, along with civil society groups, has <a href="https://www.voaafrique.com/a/c%C3%B4te-d-ivoire-vers-un-report-de-la-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-du-31-octobre-/5515231.html">issued calls</a> for a postponement, warning that “the political climate is tense”.</p>
<p>Pre-election, election-related and post-election violence are not inevitable. It will all depend on the will of the various political actors who are free to choose peace or violence. They can choose to settle their disputes either through legal and institutional channels, or through extra-institutional channels that lead to violence. </p>
<p>Hopefully, the choice made will be in the interests of peace for the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arsène Brice Bado does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An air of fear and uncertainty looms large over the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire as the country struggles to shake off its turbulent past.Arsène Brice Bado, Vice-President for Academic Affairs, Centre for Research and Action for Peace (CERAP), The Jesuit University of CERAPLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1429332020-07-20T15:18:29Z2020-07-20T15:18:29ZIvorian president might be sorely tempted to seek a third term. Why he mustn’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/348420/original/file-20200720-37-19cl3xu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Alassane Ouattara of Ivory Coast.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Horacio Villalobos/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/ivory-coast-prime-minister-amadou-gon-coulibaly-dies-200708183836945.html">Ivorian Prime Minister Gon Coulibaly</a> and subsequent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics/ivory-coast-vice-president-quits-days-after-pms-death-idUSKCN24E1D9">resignation</a> of Vice President Daniel Kablan Duncan, reportedly on personal grounds, have added heat to the contestations over the presidential elections planned for October this year. </p>
<p>Coulibaly was the chosen successor of the current president, Alassane Ouattara. The events have reignited concerns over a possible third presidential bid by Ouattara which commenators believe could lead to political instability.</p>
<p>The country was expected to have its first ever peaceful democratic change of power, following Ouattara’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics/ivory-coasts-ouattara-says-he-wont-run-for-re-election-idUSKBN20S1IZ">announcement</a> in March that he would step down at the end of his current term. </p>
<p>The death of Coulibaly has reopened a Pandora’s box. </p>
<p>Quattara’s governing coalition, Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace, has asked him to seek a third term, following the death of his preferred succcessor. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/07/20/world/africa/20reuters-ivorycoast-politics.html?searchResultPosition=8">According</a> to the party’s executive director, Adama Bictogo </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A majority of our supporters have turned to President Alassane Ouattara. He is our solution…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Importantly, Quattara (78) has been blowing hot and cold on whether he’ll be seeking a third term. He may be tempted to reconsider his promised departure to give himself time to groom a new successor. </p>
<p>In my view he should not. Quattara has done well economically. The economy <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/overview">grew above 8% between 2011 and 2018</a>, becoming one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Staying in power could mean continuing this trend. But, that’ll have dire implications for the country’s democratic trajectory. The potential political and security instability that his return could spark would only serve to undo what he has achieved.</p>
<h2>Constitutional ambiguity</h2>
<p>When Ouattara came to power in 2010, the Ivorian constitution contained a two-term limit on presidential candidacy. During his 2015 presidential election campaign, he promised to lead the adoption of a new constitution. This was primarily to abolish the principle of <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/third-cote-divoire-republic-towards-inclusive-constitutional-reform-process">“Ivoirité”</a>, which was used to exclude individuals from the Muslim north from high office. </p>
<p>They were excluded ostensibly because of their perceived links with neighbouring countries. It was infamously used to exclude Ouattara, himself from the Muslim North, from running for the presidency <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/third-cote-divoire-republic-towards-inclusive-constitutional-reform-process">in the 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>A new constitution approved in a referendum in October 2016 <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/third-cote-divoire-republic-towards-inclusive-constitutional-reform-process">resolved</a> the ‘Ivoirité’ problem. Under the new constitution, a presidential candidate need only show that he or she is exclusively Ivoirian, born of a father or of a mother Ivorian by birth.</p>
<p>Under the old constitution, both parents needed to be Ivorian by birth. The new constitution also introduced a new senate and a position of a vice president. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most significant thing about the new constitution is what it didn’t say. It retains the two-term limit on presidential aspirants, but says nothing regarding terms served prior to its adoption. </p>
<p>Exploiting this ambiguity, Ouattara <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-ouattara/ivory-coasts-ouattara-says-hes-free-to-run-again-in-2020-jeune-afrique-idUSKCN1IZ0S3">declared</a> in June that he could run for two more terms.</p>
<p>He subsequently <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/11648/a-third-term-for-ouattara-my-decision-is-almost-made/">quipped</a> that he would step down at the end of his term in October 2020 – but on condition that other members of the old guard also abandoned their presidential aspirations. He was referring to former president and current rival Henri Konan Bédié. Bédié (86), a historical adversary of Ouattara’s, hatched and pursued the “Ivoirité” drive in his first stint as president <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/47c565a0c.html">in the early 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>In the run-up to this decision, Ouattara <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-soro/ivory-coast-presidential-candidate-soro-sentenced-to-20-years-in-prison-idUSKCN22A2E0">pursued criminal charges</a> against Guillaume Soro, a former ally-turned-rival and presidential aspirant.</p>
<p>Following a declaration of his intent to run for the presidency, Soro was hastily charged and convicted of embezzlement for events <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-soro/ivory-coast-presidential-candidate-soro-sentenced-to-20-years-in-prison-idUSKCN22A2E0">dating back to 2007</a>.</p>
<p>Many saw the prosecution and its timing as politically motivated. With Soro effectively out of the way, Coulibaly was set to secure victory for the ruling <a href="https://www.ourcampaigns.com/PartyDetail.html?PartyID=5102">Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace</a> coalition and stay the course Ouattara charted. </p>
<h2>Case against a third term</h2>
<p>With the vice president resigning, Ouattara faced the uneasy lot of backing a less known face. This could ignite succession battles and potential divisions within his ruling coalition, and a potential electoral loss. The party’s view that he should seek a third term would seem to put paid to that. </p>
<p>But, seeking a third term would deny him the chance to leave a good legacy of an improved democratic dispensation, peaceful alternation of power and economic recovery.</p>
<p>Crucially, a new presidential bid would raise legal complexities and could worsen instability and insecurity at a time of when <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-security/suspected-jihadist-militant-head-arrested-in-ivory-coast-idUSKBN23T1U7">terrorism</a> is expanding in the Sahel region.</p>
<p>A third Ouattara presidential bid will almost certainly provoke legal challenges because of the constitutional two-terms limit.</p>
<p>Because all Constitutional Court judges were appointed during Ouattara’s reign, such a case would provide a test of their independence. There is a precedent for this. </p>
<p>Courts in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/30/senegal-president-run-third-term">neighbouring Senegal</a> held in 2012 that a new constitution resets the term count, allowing then President Abdullahi Wade to run again, drawing serious criticism from the opposition, alleging judicial complacency.</p>
<p>To avoid a similar prospect, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2019D.pdf?lang=en">Gambia’s draft constitution</a> includes a specific provision counting terms served prior to the new constitution. If adopted, the Gambia would be the first in Africa to set this trend.</p>
<p>Regardless of the outcome, the spirit of the two-term limit in the Ivorian constitution and the general understanding at the time of its writing was against having presidents for life.</p>
<p>More seriously, a third term for Quattara could worsen risks of political instability. Already, the practical exclusion of Soro and a potential return of former president Laurent Gbagbo, who was recently acquitted of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, plus Quattara’s historical rivalry with Bédié, have created a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/cote-divoire-defusing-electoral-tensions-amid-polarised-politics">potentially combustible political atmosphere</a>. </p>
<p>With the departure of Bédié and other key partners, the ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace coalition is effectively composed of Ouattara’s former <a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/ivory-coast/conflict-profile/key-people/">Rally of the Republicans</a>, with a support base concentrated in the north of the country. Accordingly, the presidential election could heighten inter-regional contestation and rivalry.</p>
<h2>Role for the African Union and ECOWAS</h2>
<p>Considering their mandate to promote stability and democracy, the <a href="https://au.int/en/psc#:%7E:text=The%20powers%20of%20the%20PSC,conflicts%20where%20they%20have%20occurred">African Union </a> and Economic Community of West African States (<a href="https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/ecowas-peace-security-stability-and-governance">ECOWAS</a>) should closely monitor the developments in Cote d’Ivoire. In view of the risks, it would be advisable for them to pursue a proactive rather than reactive approach.</p>
<p>The African Union and ECOWAS would do well to actively nudge Ouattara to leave a good legacy, not just for his country but also the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adem K Abebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Alassane Ouattara (78) has been blowing hot and cold on whether he’ll be seeking a third term.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer and editor of ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1382212020-05-11T14:12:38Z2020-05-11T14:12:38ZGuilty verdict for Soro puts Ivory Coast on political alert – and the ICC back in play<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333834/original/file-20200510-49579-sh7xim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guillaume Soro’s conviction is seen as an attempt to exclude him from the presidential elections scheduled for late October.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sia Kambou/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A political earthquake is rumbling through Ivory Coast. On April 28, an Ivorian court found Guillaume Soro, a hopeful in the October presidential election, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52457131">guilty of embezzlement and money laundering</a>. The 48-year-old former rebel commander-in-chief was sentenced to 20 years in jail. </p>
<p>The political dimension of Soro’s conviction was not lost on Ivorian citizens. They have watched his rise to power over the past two decades. But his presidential ambitions largely explain his judicial downfall. Soro’s conviction can be understood as the latest chapter of a power struggle that began to unravel since president Alassane Ouattara’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34655049">re-election</a> in October 2015.</p>
<p>Several pointers appear to corroborate the suspicion that Soro’s prosecution was politically motivated. His arrest warrant was made public when it was known to all that he was in Europe, providing a compelling reason for him not to return home. The charges filed against him include conspiracy to overthrow sitting president Ouattara.</p>
<p>The decision to proceed against him in absentia, alongside other concerns about due process, suggests that the government’s main intention was to keep him at bay, not in custody.</p>
<p>Overall, many Ivorians see Soro’s conviction as an attempt to exclude him from the presidential elections scheduled for late October. This would pave the way for the election of Ouattara’s favourite candidate and current prime minister, Amadou Gon Coulibaly. </p>
<p>There are much wider implications to these developments too – what Soro’s conviction means for international criminal justice. Two interrelated questions stand out. Why did Soro fall from grace in the first place? And does his demise provide the International Criminal Court with a second – and arguably undeserved – chance to deliver justice for atrocities perpetrated during almost a decade of civil conflict in the West African country?</p>
<h2>The falling out</h2>
<p>There is arguably nobody in Ivory Coast who contributed more to Ouattara’s ascent to the presidency than Soro. Soro was the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces that brought former president Laurent Gbagbo’s illiberal regime to an end.</p>
<p>Soro’s military and political struggle to topple Gbagbo began with the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2268718.stm">failed coup</a> of September 2002. It lasted until Gbagbo’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/ivory-coast-former-leader-arrested">defeat and arrest</a> in April 2011. </p>
<p>Ouattara felt understandably indebted to Soro and rewarded him generously. For this reason, he also turned a blind eye on the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/09/cote-divoire-ouattara-forces-kill-rape-civilians-during-offensive">atrocities</a> perpetrated by Soro’s rebels as they marched on Abidjan. But as time passed and the wartime loyalties faded away, Soro’s past became a political liability for Ouattara and a looming threat for Ivory Coast’s fragile democracy.</p>
<p>Still, Ouattara twice came to the rescue of his former ally. His government refused to comply with two arrest warrants against Soro. One was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35051481">issued by a French judge</a> in December 2015. The other was requested by the government of neighbouring <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35325326">Burkina Faso</a> in January 2016.</p>
<p>Attitudes towards Soro began to change in late 2016, when Ouattara took institutional, political and judicial steps to distance himself from his former ally. Even the adoption of the <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/cte-divoire-new-constitution-adopted/">new constitution</a>, which established the position of vice president and added an upper chamber to the unicameral national assembly, provided an occasion to weaken Soro’s grip on power. </p>
<p>But it was Soro’s suspected involvement in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39920149">mutinies</a> of January and May 2017 that marked the point of no return. Now he was perceived as a threat to the Ivorian state, Soro’s finances and ties with wealthy benefactors suddenly came under close scrutiny by the national judiciary. </p>
<p>Unwilling to accept Ouattara’s proverbial olive branch and endorse his handpicked successor, Soro cut all remaining ties with the president. He <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190208-ivory-coast-parliament-speaker-guillaume-soro-resigns-dispute-president-alassane-outtara">resigned</a> from the national assembly speakership and from his party in February 2019. It was then that Soro, no longer under Ouattara’s patronage, became a viable target for international prosecution.</p>
<h2>The International Criminal Court option</h2>
<p>Having Soro prosecuted in The Hague is certainly appealing to the Ouattara government. A domestic trial would be politically costly. And, given Soro’s popularity and influence over the military, likely conducive to civil turmoil. </p>
<p>At the same time, recourse to international justice is not fail-proof either. The gross mismanagement of the case brought against former president Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé is still fresh in the memory of many Ivorians. It led to their <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1427">acquittal</a> in January 2019. It also served to <a href="https://theconversation.com/gbagbos-acquittal-suggests-confusion-and-dysfunction-at-the-icc-110200">undermine the credibility</a> of the Hague-based tribunal.</p>
<p>Soro’s recent conviction offers an opportunity for improvement and redemption that the court cannot afford to pass. Apart from justice being done, bringing a case against Soro would also help address perceptions about the court’s impartiality – or lack thereof. It would be the first international prosecution targeting a high-ranking member from the “winning” side of the civil war. </p>
<p>On this point, it is worth recalling that scholars and observers of Ivorian politics have <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_AFCO_263_0268--the-gbagbo-ble-goude-trial-for-crimes.htm">lamented</a> the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Prosecutor’s silence regarding alleged crimes committed by pro-Ouattara forces.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Assuming International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s office actually capitalises on this opportunity, how would Ivorian authorities react? Several cues suggest the Ivorian government wants the court to open a case against Soro, the sooner the better. Past interactions between Ivorian authorities and the Hague-based court may help make sense of why and how recent domestic decisions call for ICC scrutiny of Soro.</p>
<p>Let us not forget that the Ouattara government surrendered both Gbagbo and Blé Goudé to the international court, in 2011 and 2013 respectively. When it <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/21/world/africa/ivory-coast-first-lady-icc/index.html">refused to surrender</a> Gbagbo’s wife Simone, the Ivorian judiciary charged her with war crimes, thus halting the ICC’s <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30-907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf">complementarity</a> jurisdiction.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-gbagbo-acquittal-is-a-bigger-blow-for-the-icc-than-the-bemba-decision-109913">Why Gbagbo acquittal is a bigger blow for the ICC than the Bemba decision</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Soro too has been convicted for crimes that do not fall within the International Criminal Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. There is nevertheless no worse country to be in than France for those who seek to escape international justice. For the past 25 years, French authorities have proactively investigated, arrested, and surrendered to international criminal tribunals suspects from numerous countries. These range from the Western Balkans to Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Central African Republic, Libya and Syria. </p>
<p>Lastly, an ICC prosecution has far-reaching political and personal consequences for defendants that may even outlast their acquittal. This was proven by the fact that Gbagbo and Blé Goudé have been unable to return home and resume their political careers <a href="https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/11/gbagbo-ble-goude-trial-the-latest-decisions-of-the-appeals-chamber/">pending appeal</a>. </p>
<p>A case against Soro would be a win for both the Hague-based court, in dire need of a credibility boost, and the outgoing Ivorian administration, seeking to smoothly transfer powers to someone who will continue, rather than undo, Ouattara’s legacy. </p>
<p>What remains to be seen is whether Soro will accept his grim situation or fight to fulfil his dream of capturing the presidency of Ivory Coast by any means necessary.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marco Bocchese does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It remains to be seen whether the former rebel commander and national assembly speaker will accept his situation or fight to capture the presidency.Marco Bocchese, Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1204312019-07-16T12:14:29Z2019-07-16T12:14:29ZFlirting with fire: African leaders and international law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284275/original/file-20190716-173325-7ex9xy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo attends a confirmation of charges hearing at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Kooren </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African leaders often behave in a contradictory way towards international laws, and courts. While speaking out against them, they also voluntarily submit to their scrutiny. </p>
<p>The question is why? </p>
<p>The most likely answer is that they do so for political gain. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power for 33 years, provides a good example of how to make sense of this otherwise contradictory behaviour. </p>
<p>On the one hand, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc/ugandas-museveni-calls-on-african-nations-to-quit-the-icc-idUSKBN0JQ1DO20141212">endorses</a> the African Union (AU)’s critical stance against the International Criminal Court (ICC). The AU’s position is that the ICC <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38826073">unfairly targets African leaders</a> while neglecting non-African ones. </p>
<p>But Museveni and his administration have also fruitfully <a href="http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/uganda">cooperated</a> with ICC investigators and prosecutors in building a strong case against former Lord Resistance Army Brigade Commander Dominic Ongwen – allegedly a key figure in Joseph Kony’s inner circle. </p>
<p>Museveni isn’t alone. Other African leaders have either considered or invited ICC scrutiny. For example, in 2004, former Congolese President Joseph Kabila <a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/28/33093/">invited the ICC</a> to investigate crimes by rebel groups <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d22e2b41a.html">as did General François Bozizé</a> of the Central African Republic in the same year. </p>
<p>The list of African leaders who called on the ICC includes the Malian military junta in July 2012 – just four months after removing President Amadou Toumani Touré from power. It also includes interim President Catherine Samba-Panza of the Central African Republic in late May 2014, and Gabonese President Ali Bongo Ondimba in September 2016.</p>
<p>The common thread in this list of African leaders who have sought ICC involvement in their domestic situation is that they’ve all seen the court as being beneficial to the survival of their governments. At the time they formally invited ICC scrutiny, all were facing serious internal threats to their tenure in power and saw the ICC as an instrument to criminalise their political rivals or military enemies in the eyes of the international community. </p>
<p>Shedding light on how these African leaders have instrumentally used international laws and courts for political gain allows scholars to showcase African actors as protagonists, rather than passive recipients, of international politics. </p>
<p>But engaging in legal brinkmanship is not without risk, as I argue in my latest <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2019.1624537">article</a>. The article focuses on the man who, more than anybody else, has come to regret his decision to invite ICC scrutiny: former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo.</p>
<h2>How decision backfired</h2>
<p>Contrary to common wisdom, Gbagbo – not Museveni – was the first to <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi">invite ICC scrutiny</a> in mid-April 2003. He did so by lodging a declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute. This was a legal expedient that allowed him to accept ICC jurisdiction without ratifying its founding treaty.</p>
<p>As we now know, his decision backfired spectacularly years later. </p>
<p>Gbagbo’s original idea was to have the ICC, an independent international organisation, criminalise the rebel forces in the country. They had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/19/1">staged a coup d’état</a> against him in September 2002, after which they gained control of the northern half of Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, his invitation of ICC scrutiny was untimely because the Court, at best, played only a marginal role during the first <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire/chronology-key-events-ivory-coasts-conflict-2">Ivorian civil war (2002-2007)</a>. It only rose to prominence in the aftermath of the 2010 presidential elections, the outcome of which Gbagbo <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/ivory-coast-election-stalemate-gbagbo">stubbornly refused to accept</a>. This precipitated the country in yet another cycle of civil violence. </p>
<p>As Gbagbo incited loyalist troops and militias to unleash violence against his political rivals, ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo warned Gbagbo and his lieutenant Charles Blé Goudé that they would face trial in The Hague if they did not stop. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1190&context=ilr">historical review</a> of those dramatic days suggests that Moreno Ocampo’s warnings failed to de-escalate the conflict. They could even have strengthened Gbagbo’s resolve to fight to the end. </p>
<p>By December 2010 Gbagbo knew he was at the top of the ICC’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2019.1624537">“most wanted” list</a>. Yet he continued to lead and incite loyalist troops <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unoci/elections.shtml">until his arrest in mid-April 2011</a>. Gbagbo was ultimately transferred to the ICC detention centre in late 2011. It was clear that his successor, President Alassane Ouattara, found it convenient to outsource a politically controversial trial to an independent and faraway third party.</p>
<p>Several years have passed from Gbagbo’s arrest and transfer to the The Hague. But it’s still too soon to write the final chapter of his tumultuous story. </p>
<p>Gbagbo made the headlines again in January 2019, when he was – somewhat surprisingly – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/15/ex-ivory-coast-president-laurent-gbagbo-acquitted-at-icc">acquitted</a> by a panel of three ICC judges. A second panel of ICC judges ultimately opted for the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/icc-orders-conditional-release-ivory-coast-gbagbo-190201162054541.html">conditional release</a> of the Gbagbo and his co-accused Blé Goudé. They ordered their release from prison while prohibiting them to fly back home and resume their political life. </p>
<p>In February this year Gbagbo was transferred to Belgium, where he will await appeal.</p>
<h2>Conclusions</h2>
<p>My research into the ICC’s involvement in Côte d’Ivoire led me to formulate a few conclusions. The first is that a likely explanation for former President Gbagbo’s invitation of ICC scrutiny was that he hoped it would stigmatise his enemies as war criminals. </p>
<p>The second is that the threat of ICC indictment quite possibly strengthened Gbagbo’s resolution to hold on to power despite his defeat in the 2010 presidential elections. </p>
<p>Finally, since Gbagbo’s transfer to the ICC detention centre in November 2011, the Ouattara Administration has undertaken to strengthen judicial capacity, thus preventing key figures of the current government from following Gbagbo’s fate. </p>
<p>It bears recalling that the ICC steps in only when domestic authorities are either unable or unwilling to genuinely prosecute war criminals at home. By boosting judicial capacity, it becomes highly unlikely that the ICC will ever start new investigations into former rebel leaders – those who brought Ouattara to power whilst committing alleged atrocities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120431/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marco Bocchese received funding from Northwestern University Buffett Institute for Global Studies; Northwestern University Dispute Resolution Research Center; and Northwestern University Program of African Studies.</span></em></p>African leaders who have sought ICC involvement have all seen the court as being beneficial to the survival of their governments.Marco Bocchese, Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1102002019-01-23T14:34:15Z2019-01-23T14:34:15ZGbagbo’s acquittal suggests confusion and dysfunction at the ICC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255100/original/file-20190123-135130-1nollzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at the trial against former Ivory Coast president Laurent Gbagbo at the ICC in The Hague.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Peter Dejong</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The international community has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46874517">reacted with shock</a> to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1427">acquittal</a> of former Ivorian leader Laurent Gbagbo and one of his former ministers, Charles Blé Goudé.</p>
<p>Gbagbo was president of Côte d'Ivoire from 2000 until 2010. Blé Goudé was his minister of youth. In 2010, Gbagbo lost an election to Alassane Ouattara, but <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/cote-d-ivoire-war-only-option">refused to concede power</a>. In the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/critical-period-ensuring-stability-cote-d-ivoire">resulting months of violence</a>, more than 3000 people were killed. </p>
<p>Gbagbo was charged with designing and executing a common plan to hold onto power through violence directed at civilians. His case was merged with Blé Goudé’s in 2014. </p>
<p>A majority of the trial chamber found that the prosecution failed to prove the defendants’ connection to the violence; the prosecution has appealed.</p>
<p>Those who watch the ICC closely <a href="https://twitter.com/BatrosBen/status/1085568003519991809">anticipated the acquittal</a>. The judges signalled throughout 2018 that they were seriously entertaining defence motions to acquit based on prosecutorial failures to make a case. </p>
<p>The verdict is the latest in a series of missteps attributed to the prosecution. The DRC’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/bemba-acquittal-overturns-important-victory-for-sexual-violence-victims-99948">Jean-Pierre Bemba</a> was controversially acquitted on appeal of sexual violence in Central African Republic in June 2018. In 2014, charges against Kenyan leader Uhuru Kenyatta relating to post-election violence <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/kenyattaEng.pdf">were withdrawn</a>. Two years later, charges were dropped against two other Kenyan politicians, <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/RutoSangEng.pdf">William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang</a>; these also related to violence after the 2007 elections.</p>
<p>These examples showcase foundational disagreement regarding the substance and application of international criminal law doctrine. They also underline how vulnerable the court is to power politics, as past cases have collapsed due to corrupted evidence and witness tampering. This acquittal thus augments an increasingly urgent conversation about how international criminal law is failing in its promise to hold leaders accountable for committing gross human rights violations. </p>
<h2>Dysfunction and Confusion</h2>
<p>The judgment in the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case was highly unusual in several ways.</p>
<p>First, it was made in an unprecedented format: an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaIfbXBXN5I&feature=youtu.be">oral pronouncement</a> that was not accompanied by a written judgment. The ICC has never taken this approach before. The dissenting judge in this case, Judge Herrera Carbuccia, has argued that this format <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/11-01/15-1234">violates ICC procedural rules</a>. </p>
<p>Written judgments are centrepieces of international criminal law, and legitimise the lengthy trials, long delays and high cost of international justice. Written judgments show the work and professionalism of international courts, and distinguish them from other bodies that make pronouncements without explaining or supporting their rationales. </p>
<p>The ICC will eventually produce a written judgment, but this will come too late for the prosecution, which has asked the court not to release the defendants as it appeals the judgment. The oral judgment only restated the charges made in the indictment, giving no details at all as to why a majority of the trial chamber believed the prosecution’s case was inadequate. </p>
<p>It is also only the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1205">second time</a> in its history that the ICC has acceded to the defence’s request to acquit based on a “no case to answer” motion. </p>
<p>This is a hard motion to win, because the question before the court is not “will this court find the defendants not guilty?” but rather “could no court reasonably find the defendants guilty?” </p>
<p>This is the motion Gbagbo’s and Blé Goudé’s attorneys filed when the prosecution’s case ended in January 2018. Over the course of 2018, the defence and prosecution fought out the question of whether the prosecution had made a case that incriminated the two defendants. </p>
<p>The 15 January judgment answered this question in the negative. This means the prosecution failed to make a case that would permit any court to convict the two defendants, in the opinion of two out of three judges in the trial chamber. </p>
<p>Without the written judgment, it is difficult to assess how to attribute the collapse of the prosecution’s case, which might be due to poor argument, poor evidence, changed circumstances, or something else. It is also difficult to assess why the majority of the trial chamber, after labouring on this question for more than a year, felt so rushed that it could not put its rationale in writing. The oral judgment thus suggests failures on the part of the prosecution and the judges.</p>
<p>And, the controversy is not over. The ICC’s appeals chamber has <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1429">promised</a> to hold a hearing by 1 February 2019. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé will remain in detention at least until then – a direct contravention of the trial chamber’s orders that they should be immediately released following the acquittal. This suggests a power play between the trial and appellate chambers that further detracts from the court’s institutional legitimacy. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>The high-level cases that have collapsed at the ICC in recent years highlight the difficulties faced by institutions that rely on state cooperation to bring prosecutions. Powerful figures with powerful coalitions are successfully resisting challenges to their sovereignty, even when such challenges are based on their violations of universal rights.</p>
<p>Another way to state the problem is to note, as analyst Mark Kersten does, that the ICC has not opened a single case against a state leader since 2011, and that the court risks becoming an institution that “<a href="https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/01/18/some-quick-reflections-on-the-gbagbo-acquittal-at-the-icc/">only prosecutes rebels”</a>.</p>
<p>This latest acquittal and ensuing appeal requires observers to consider not simply what the ICC decided, but how it did so. The messy, foundational disagreements pronounced within the institution itself – between prosecution and bench, within the trial chamber, between trial and appellate chambers – support the charge that the institution is dysfunctional. </p>
<p>The ICC may be able to survive being labelled ineffectual, as evidenced by its ongoing <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">failure to detain Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir</a>; and imbalanced – it is often criticised for <a href="https://iccforum.com/africa">only bringing charges against Africans</a>. But charges of being unprofessional or haphazardness are likely to hurt the court across all its constituencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110200/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kerstin Bree Carlson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Acquittal bolsters an increasingly urgent conversation about how international criminal law is failing in its promise to hold leaders accountableKerstin Bree Carlson, Associate Professor International Law, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1099602019-01-17T07:27:42Z2019-01-17T07:27:42ZWhat the return of Gbagbo could mean for Ivory Coast’s 2020 election<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254132/original/file-20190116-163283-h100c4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo celebrate his likely return home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Legnan Koula</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46875757">acquittal</a> on charges of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) opens the way for his return to Côte d’Ivoire once released.</p>
<p>His return after seven years in detention at The Hague and eight years after being discovered in a bunker during the disputed 2010 presidential election, could shape the character of the country’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/ouattara-s-hint-about-extending-ivory-coast-rule-stirs-concern">2020 presidential election</a>. Despite his absence, his influence on Ivorian politics has shaped opposition divisions in the years since he’s been gone. His <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/icc-rejects-appeal-to-keep-ex-ivorian-leader-gbagbo-in-jail-18850742">return </a>therefore raises the question of internal opposition party loyalties.</p>
<p>Gbagbo and his co-accused, youth militia leader, Charles Blé Goudé, were arrested for having allegedly orchestrated the murder, rape and persecution of opponents after he lost the election in Côte d’Ivoire in December 2010. At least 3,000 people were <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/16/africa/military-mutiny-ivory-coast/index.html">killed in the violence</a>. </p>
<p>Despite his absence, he has continued to influence internal opposition party loyalties. His return is therefore likely to shape the character of the election. Another reason he’s likely to play a significant role is that the coalition that won presidential elections in 2010 and 2015 – led by President Alassane Ouattara – has, for the time being, fallen apart.</p>
<p>Ouattara has signalled that he may stand for a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-politics-ouattara/ivory-coasts-ouattara-says-hes-free-to-run-again-in-2020-jeune-afrique-idUSKCN1IZ0S3">third consecutive term</a>. But Côte d’Ivoire’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cote_DIvoire_2016.pdf?lang=en">new constitution</a> promulgated in 2016, states that a candidate can only be reelected once. </p>
<p>These signals have not been well received by Ouattara’s now former coalition partners. For example, his entertaining a third term and efforts to lessen the power of coalition partners has led one member of the coalition to <a href="http://www.linfodrome.com/vie-politique/43495-bedie-ouattara-ce-qui-plombe-la-reconciliation">quit the arrangement</a>. Others have also walked away. In response, Ouattara has attempted to solidify his support by morphing his ruling coalition into a new party called the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ivory-coast-president-launches-umbrella-party/4485718.html">Houphouetists Rally for Democracy and Peace</a>. The jury is still out on whether it will be enough to bring back disgruntled coalition partners.</p>
<p>With Ouattara’s coalition weakened and the opposition divided, Gbagbo’s return could shape coalition politics before the elections. Gbagbo continues to hold a bastion of popular support in the country, including his home area in Western Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
<p>More broadly, it’s likely that Ivorians would support his bid for the presidency. And, his return to Côte d’Ivoire would lend credence to his purported innocence and the image of success in his struggle against Ouattara and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-gbagbo/gbagbo-faces-charges-of-crimes-against-humanity-icc-idUSTRE7AS1LO20111130">Western bias</a>.</p>
<p>In short, his return could make him a larger than life figure ahead of elections.</p>
<h2>Gbagbo’s friends and foes</h2>
<p>Early on in his absence, Gbagbo’s party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien, fragmented between those loyal to him and those interested in moving beyond his legacy. In particular, Aboudramane Sangaré, Gbagbo’s friend, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/gbagbo-party-faction-fpi-calls-for-ivorian-election-boycott/2922997.html">dismissed attempts to continue the party’s work without him</a>. Sangaré, and like-minded opposition officials, believed that Gbagbo would return to Côte d’Ivoire, ready to contest incumbent President Alassane Ouattara after the ICC proceedings ended.</p>
<p>Sangaré gained the unofficial title of “guardian of the temple”, for his part in maintaining Gbagbo’s place at the centre of the opposition movement. Sangaré died late last year though <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20181103-cote-ivoire-deces-abou-drahamane-sangare-laurent-gbagbo-fpi-0">his imprint hasn’t diminished</a>.</p>
<p>Efforts to move beyond Gbagbo’s legacy were led by Affi Pascal N’Guessan, a former prime minister during Gbagbo’s presidency, who took over the presidency of the party before the 2015 election. This sparked vehement protests from <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKBN1451YP?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews">Gbagbo loyalists</a>. Although N’Guessan paid homage to Gbagbo, the loyalists felt he wasn’t sincere.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=893&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=893&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/254127/original/file-20190116-163283-1670seh.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=893&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Prime minister Affi Pascal N’Guessan led Gbagbo’s adversaries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Penar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More controversy followed N’Guessan when he decided to contest the 2015 presidential election. In advance of the election, he <a href="https://www.ivoirebusiness.net/articles/c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-t%C3%AAte-%C3%A0-t%C3%AAte-hollande-affi-le-sens-d%E2%80%99une-rencontre-in%C3%A9dite">met then French president Francois Hollande</a>. This led to Gbagbo loyalists suggesting he was receiving payment from France to contest the election. The claim has never been verified. </p>
<p>With low voter turnout at 55% compared to 80% in 2010, N’Guessan’s lack of popular and internal party support saw him garner just over 9% of the vote compared to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34655049">Ouattara’s nearly 84%</a>. The opposition boycott and calls to await Gbagbo’s return appeared strong. Since then, N’Guessan has experimented with <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/616598/politique/pascal-affi-nguessan-lalliance-fpi-pdci-cest-un-vieux-souhait-qui-va-bientot-se-realiser/">different political alliances</a> and has seemingly not reconciled with Gbagbo loyalists.</p>
<h2>Gbagbo’s options</h2>
<p>If he returns, one option is that Gbagbo resumes the flag-bearer position of the Front Populaire Ivoirien and contests the 2020 election. Because he sought election in 2010 but lost, he would be able to run. In addition, the removal of a maximum age for candidates (previously age 75) makes him eligible. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12933023">He’ll be 74 in May</a>. This scenario assumes that Ouattara doesn’t set up legal roadblocks to Gbagbo’s return. </p>
<p>Another scenario is that Gbagbo may guide the Front Populaire Ivoirien towards a new political alliance ahead of the election. The alliance may involve some of Ouattara’s unhappy former partners. </p>
<p>A related scenario is that Gbagbo will be able to unite the Front Populaire Ivoirien and opposition forces, but anoint a new flag-bearer and act as the elder statesman for the party. </p>
<p>Finally, Gbagbo may decide to stay on the political sidelines but remain vocal on the political scene. </p>
<h2>What do Ivorians think?</h2>
<p>According to a <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/countries/c%C3%B4te-divoire-0">2017 survey by Afrobarometer</a> - the independent African research network - Ivorians strongly support (81%) the maintenance of a two-term limit for a president. They also overwhelming support democracy (77%). But, they have some concerns about the democratic space afforded ahead of elections next year, with 52% suggesting that they are not satisfied with how democracy works in the country.</p>
<p>One of the criticisms that the opposition has levied against Ouattara is his intolerance of dissent. Among Ivorians, 48% feel that they are not at all – or not very – free to criticise the president. </p>
<p>It’s quite possible that Gbagbo will build on these concerns, and the energy and high levels of participation that characterised Ivorian politics in 2010 could return.</p>
<p><em>Abel Gbala, who holds an M.A. from the University of Félix Houphouët Boigny and is a Development Monitoring and Evaluation expert, contributed to this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo’s absence, he continued to influence opposition party loyalties in the country.Peter Penar, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/714812017-01-18T10:48:47Z2017-01-18T10:48:47ZHigh stakes as West Africa prepares military action against Gambia’s Jammeh<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153190/original/image-20170118-21176-xn0oej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Gambia's Yahya Jammeh at an ECOWAS meeting in Senegal over a political crisis in Mali. Now it's his turn to face the music.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joe Penney/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In further escalation of the post-election <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/timeline-gambias-electoral-crisis-213400700.html">crisis</a> in The Gambia, President Yahya Jammeh declared a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38652939">state of emergency</a> just a day before his official mandate was due to come to an end. The announcement followed reports that a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-38281555">Nigerian warship</a> was deployed off the Gambian coast while a regional military force was being assembled in neighbouring Senegal for possible military intervention. The events are the clearest signs that the regional Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) could act militarily to remove Jammeh from power. The Conversation Africa’s Julius Maina asks Abdul-Jalilu Ateku to examine the prospects.</em></p>
<p><strong>What are the precedents for joint military action by West African states?</strong></p>
<p>This isn’t the first time the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) would be intervening to resolve a national conflict. The 15-member organisation has intervened in all major hot spots within its jurisdiction ranging from the civil war in Liberia in 1990 to the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011. </p>
<p>Ecowas is in fact the first regional security organisation to intervene militarily in an internal conflict in the region. When <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1989.htm">civil war</a> broke out in Liberia in 1989, the US – which had strong ties with Monrovia – merely evacuated its citizens and turned a blind eye to the crisis. The United Nations on the other hand, <a href="http://www.guidohome.com/Mijn%20Bib/Peacekeepers-%20politicians%20and%20warlords-%20the%20Liberian%20peace%20process-%20Pagina%20355%20Door%20Abiodun%20Alao-John%20Mackinlay-Funmi%20Olonisakin.pdf">preoccupied</a> itself in the resolution of crises in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War">Gulf</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399">Yugoslavia</a>, left Liberia to its own devices. Ecowas intervened militarily on humanitarian grounds.</p>
<p>But the crisis that comes closest to the current Gambian impasse is the electoral dispute in Côte d'Ivoire. The incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and his Popular Front Party were defeated in the 2010 run-off elections but <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20101221-ivory-coast-fear-violence-abidjan-gbagbo-resists-international-pressure-ouattara">refused to step down</a> for the winner Alassane Ouattara. West African leaders were quick to decide to intervene militarily to oust the defeated president. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, however, there were already UN peacekeepers deployed to the country in a conflict that started in September 2002.</p>
<p><strong>How clear are the justifications for military intervention?</strong></p>
<p>Ecowas can militarily intervene through its Mediation and Security Council on advise of its Defence and Security Commission. But any intervention must be carried out within the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml">UN Charter</a>. The UN Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security. This is provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter. As a member of Ecowas, Gambia is bound by the decisions of the regional organisation and <a href="http://documentation.ecowas.int/legal-documents/protocols/">protocols</a> relating to peace and security. Indeed the recommendation to establish and deploy the Ecomog – short for Ecowas Ceasefire Monitoring Group – into Liberia in 1990 was made by a committee chaired by the then Gambian president, Dawda Jawara.</p>
<p>For military intervention, regional leaders can invoke the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance which proclaims: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Article 45 (1) states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of human rights in a member state, Ecowas may impose sanctions on the state concerned.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Ecowas mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security – known simply as the Mechanism – authorises all forms of intervention including the deployment of political and military missions.</p>
<p>West African states can intervene militarily under article 25 of the Mechanism in response to conflict between two or several member states and in the event of internal conflict:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster; or that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>What are the chances of success of such intervention?</strong></p>
<p>Jammeh will certainly be removed if Ecowas decides to use force. But that will come at a heavy price – for Gambia, the neighbouring states and the world. The regional ramifications in terms of resources to maintain the mission, refugee flows as well as the destruction and untold hardships that the people will face should not be glossed over.</p>
<p>The use of military force will begin as an attempt to remove a defeated and intransigent president. But the resistance may trigger attacks between his supporters and those of his key opponent Barrow.</p>
<p>Conflict between existing political groupings can trigger a civil war that will be difficult to resolve in a matter of days. It may take the form of ethnic cleansing, particularly in view of his long stay in power and the toes his administration might have stepped on. His supporters will be the targets and there would certainly be reprisal attacks. So, it’s not just simply a matter of forcefully removing Jammeh from power.</p>
<p><strong>What are the potential consequences should such a mission fail?</strong></p>
<p>The success or failure also depends on the mandate. If the Ecowas force’s mandate is to forcefully remove Jammeh and it fails then I’m sure there will be a high human toll. This could result in huge displacements internally and refugees would flow into neighbouring states. But the chances of failure are small if Ecowas intervenes with tacit support of the UN. It wouldn’t be an easy task, but in the end Jammeh would be removed at whatever cost.</p>
<p><strong>Do you think military intervention is the best option?</strong></p>
<p>My own view is that more intense diplomacy is required to mediate before the military option is deployed. Such other options as diplomatic sanctions, including severing ties with Jammeh administration, remain to be pursued. If Ecowas intervenes militarily now to force Jammeh out of office, it may still not get Barrow installed on January 19 because I do not think external military action by Ecowas can easily oust him in matter of few hours to get Barrow invested as the new president of Gambia. </p>
<p>If Barrow is installed in another location, Jammeh is likely to get himself sworn into office as happened in Côte d'Ivoire where Gbagbo was sworn into office despite the certification of election results by the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire. ECOWAS and it’s partners must move cautiously on the military path.</p>
<p><strong>Should the mission succeed, does the end justify the means?</strong></p>
<p>If the mission succeeds through military means, then the international community would have to begin the process of rebuilding peace. If Jammeh gets the backing of his security, which may also be supported by civilian groups, then the international community should be prepared to rebuild what’s destroyed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71481/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Jalilu Ateku receives funding from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom for a PhD in International Relations, University of Nottingham. </span></em></p>Yahya Jammeh will certainly be removed if West Africa decides to use force. But that will come at a heavy price for The Gambia, the neighbouring states and the world as a wholeAbdul-Jalilu Ateku, PhD Candidate in International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/711732017-01-15T07:25:26Z2017-01-15T07:25:26ZHow The Gambia is testing West Africa’s resolve to protect democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152654/original/image-20170113-11207-1f01t1m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Gambia's Yahya Jammeh is under pressure from regional leaders to cede power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thierry Gouegnon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia is an opportunity to reinforce election quality norms for the <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/">Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</a>. The 15-member regional group was initially set up as a trading bloc. But it has increasingly pursued an agenda of trying to ensure that countries apply principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance. This motivation has its roots in protecting civilian governments from military coups and preventing civil conflict in West Africa.</p>
<p>In contrast to other African regional organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community <a href="http://www.sadc.int/">(SADC)</a> and the East African Community <a href="http://www.au.int/en/recs/eac">(EAC)</a>, ECOWAS has pioneered norms around election conditions and observation. This has <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf">included</a> “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”.</p>
<p>For ECOWAS, constitutionalism has increasingly began to trump national sovereignty.</p>
<p>The events unfolding in The Gambia present a crucial test for the regional body’s commitment to this principle.</p>
<p>On 2 December <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38183906">President Yahya Jammeh conceded defeat</a> shortly before the Independent Electoral Commission announced that opposition leader Adama Barrow had won the election. A week later he <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-election-idUSKBN13Y2QO">withdrew his concession</a>. Even before the elections it had been widely expected that Jammeh would try and rig the outcome. This would not have been out of character for a regime that has consistently suppressed <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/gambia#899ef4">political dissent and critical media</a>.</p>
<p>Prior to the December election, ECOWAS challenged Jammeh’s behaviour in power. Based on a pre-election assessment it concluded that the minimal conditions for <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1361893/ecowas-to-boycott-gambias-presidential-elections/">free and fair elections were not being met</a>. It said it would not be sending <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15851706">observers</a>, a decision it had also taken ahead of The Gambia’s 2011 presidential election.</p>
<h2>Not the first time</h2>
<p>The Gambian election dispute is not the first that ECOWAS has confronted. Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential election is a case in point. The country’s electoral commission declared that Alassane Ouattara had <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE6B13FN20101202">won the second round</a>. But, with the power to review the election, the Constitutional Court headed by an ally of the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo cancelled the results in several Ouattara strongholds and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11913832">handed Gbagbo the election</a>. </p>
<p>ECOWAS, cooperating with the United Nations in Côte d’Ivoire, rejected what it viewed as an obvious manipulation of the result by the court. </p>
<p>It went on to reject any power-sharing arrangements being negotiated. This was despite the fact that the African Union (AU), in particular Gbagbo’s ally Angola, had floated the idea. </p>
<p>ECOWAS’s stance was driven by a number of factors. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The failure of power-sharing agreements in Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2008). ECOWAS feared that a power-sharing arrangement would open the door to similar agreements spreading like a cancer in the region. This would mean that losing candidates and parties would always expect power-sharing agreements. </p></li>
<li><p>Its view that power-sharing puts a country outside normal constitutional procedures, contravening the norms of constitutionalism.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Another factor influencing its decision was Gbagbo’s poor relations with neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso, Togo, and Nigeria. </p>
<p>As a result ECOWAS sided with Ouattara and, with backing from the UN and France, organised military intervention.</p>
<h2>Gambia presents another test</h2>
<p>There are certainly differences between The Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire. But a similar dynamic appears to be at work. In The Gambia the election commission also declared the opposition the winner. Despite its critical stance before the elections ECOWAS accepted the result because the poll had taken place in line with The Gambia’s constitutional framework.</p>
<p>But, just as Gbagbo had done, Jammeh looked for ways to stall the process. He did this by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38582180">pursuing an elections dispute</a> resolution at the Supreme Court. The problem was that the Supreme Court did not have the requisite judges to hear a case. In addition, as as in Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court case, the independence of the court is questionable.</p>
<p>ECOWAS is unlikely to be fooled by Jammeh’s legal acrobatics, just as it wasn’t in Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jammeh welcomes the presidents of Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana for crisis talks in December.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This stands in contrast to comparable tactics working in other regions. One example was Robert Mugabe’s move in Zimbabwe to suppress Morgan Tsvangirai and his supporters before the second round of the 2008 presidential election. Even though SADC observers and states <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/zim2008sadc2.pdf">condemned the violence</a>, the regional body did not facilitate a fair solution to prevent wholesale manipulation. </p>
<p>Likewise, the EAC attempted to mediate the political dispute around Burundi’s flawed 2015 election. Yet the selection of Uganda’s <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-12-16-as-body-count-mounts-mediator-museveni-takes-his-eyes-off-burundi-and-country-inches-closer-to-civil-war">Yoweri Museveni to lead mediation efforts</a> – a man who doesn’t support term limits – showed that the EAC was not serious about political dialogue.</p>
<h2>A different approach</h2>
<p>ECOWAS is likely to behave differently when it comes to The Gambia. It has shown that it believes constitutionalism and the transfer of power is a priority. </p>
<p>Article 9 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance states that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The party and/or candidate who loses the election shall concede defeat to the political party and/or candidate finally declared the winner, following the guidelines and within the deadline stipulated by the law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The seriousness of this commitment was seen in Côte d’Ivoire.</p>
<p>It is further buttressed by a burgeoning coalition of heads of state who were formerly opposition leaders. Nana Akufo-Addo (Ghana), Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria), Macky Sall (Senegal), Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), and Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire all have significant experience in the political opposition before being elected. The fact that they are the product of a transfer of power makes them more willing to push for a transfer of power in The Gambia to reinforce the regional norm.</p>
<p>This is not the case in the EAC or SADC where countries are still largely beholden to the old guard of ruling political parties and elites. </p>
<p>There are another three crucial factors.</p>
<p>Regional isolation allows ECOWAS to be tough on Jammeh. There is little evidence that he has friends in West Africa. He made himself unpopular by announcing that The Gambia was <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37771592">leaving the ICC</a>. He also alienated neighbours by vetoing the ECOWAS norm of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">establishing presidential term limits</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Robert Mugabe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli / Pool</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>ECOWAS has also shown it has the ability to gather and assimilate information about political processes, including elections. Although it didn’t deploy an election observation mission in The Gambia, the secretariat is likely to be receiving useful information from an advanced early warning unit. This was designed to monitor conflicts and provide political analysis. </p>
<p>ECOWAS also consistently collaborates with the UN in mediation and intervention efforts. Other regional bodies largely prefer to act independently. ECOWAS regularly consults with the UN Security Council. It did so after the 2010 Côte d’Ivoire election and has done so again over the Gambian election. These consultations are likely to provide additional international support for intervention, which includes mobilising UN assets if necessary. The AU also seems supportive of ECOWAS’ efforts by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/african-union-to-cease-recognizing-jammeh-as-gambias-leader/2017/01/13/375c9198-d9a3-11e6-a0e6-d502d6751bc8_story.html?utm_term=.d3dd6a01a003">refusing to recognise Jammeh</a> as president past 18 January.</p>
<p>Finally, ECOWAS has been willing to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38302533">set time tables with consequences</a>. This was made clear in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/forces-on-standby-to-oust-gambian-president-yahya-jammeh">statements from ECOWAS heads of state</a> that Jammeh must step down on 18 January to allow a transfer of power or face possible military intervention. The one major consideration for ECOWAS is how to handle a potential show down with The Gambia’s military if intervention becomes necessary.</p>
<p>Failure to secure a full transfer of power in The Gambia could affect the ECOWAS’s efforts to manage other disputes in the future. And, supporting a power-sharing agreement could bring about a series of destabilising post-election outcomes. This means that Jammeh is likely to leave power – or feel the collective weight of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar is affiliated with Afrobarometer.</span></em></p>The Gambian election dispute is not the first that ECOWAS has confronted. Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential election is a case in point. There it resorted to military action to enforce the outcome.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/677192016-10-27T17:43:43Z2016-10-27T17:43:43ZControversial constitutional referendum sparks distrust in Cote d'Ivoire<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143426/original/image-20161027-11247-qgfd8b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Côte d'Ivoire's President Alassane Ouattara addresses a rally ahead of the referendum on a new constitution. The placard reads "yes to new Ivory Coast".</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luc Gnago/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In May 2016 Côte d'Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara set up a committee of experts to propose a <a href="http://lider-ci.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/R%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-Avant-projet-de-loi-portant-de-Constitution-Ouattara.pdf">new constitution</a>. This came after he had promised to reform the constitution during his <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/world/africa/jailed-ex-president-lingers-as-a-force-in-ivorian-vote.html">2015 presidential campaign</a>.</p>
<p>The existing 2000 <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cote_DIvoire_2000.pdf?lang=en">constitution</a> bars citizens who are not born to an Ivoirian mother and father to run for president. This became a political issue because at least one of Ouattara’s parents is Burkinabé by birth. The provision would have made it possible for the courts to exclude him from running for president.</p>
<p>The clause is included in the constitution as a result of a deal struck to end the country’s civil war which begun in 2002 with a rebellion in northern regions. As part of the peace settlement the government of then President Laurent Gbagbo, opposition parties and rebels signed a power-sharing agreement in France. The <a href="http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Linas_Marcousis.pdf">Linas-Marcoussis’ agreement (2003)</a> removed the citizenship requirements from article 35 of constitution to allow Ouattara’s future candidacy. This was viewed as a temporary measure.</p>
<p>But Ouattara now argues that he is making the <a href="http://news.abidjan.net/h/601580.html">Linas-Marcoussis framework permanent</a>. The <a href="http://lider-ci.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/R%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-Avant-projet-de-loi-portant-de-Constitution-Ouattara.pdf">new constitution</a> he is proposing clarifies the extra-constitutional order that has been in place since 2003. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, opposition parties consistently refer to <a href="http://www.civox.net/Presidentielle-2015-Pourquoi-la-candidature-de-Ouattara-pose-probleme_a4197.html">Ouattara’s election in 2010 and 2015 as illegitimate</a> because he did not meet the citizenship and residency requirements for president. But, capitalising on support from northerners, many of whom have one or both parents from other countries, Ouattara aims to circumvent the opposition. </p>
<p>The broader concern about citizenship rights is important for northern regions where Ouattara draws his strongest support. In addition, a significant portion of people living in Côte d'Ivoire are <a href="https://remi.revues.org/461">migrants</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://lider-ci.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/R%C3%A9f%C3%A9rendum-Avant-projet-de-loi-portant-de-Constitution-Ouattara.pdf">proposed constitution</a>, which is to be tested through a referendum, also includes the position of a vice-president, establishes a senate, and incorporates traditional leaders. On the face of it, it would seem good for post-conflict consolidation of constitutional principles.</p>
<p>Yet there is already an effort by opposition leaders, including the Alliance of Democratic Forces, to <a href="http://www.voaafrique.com/a/debut-de-la-dampagne-du-referendum-sur-la-constitution-en-cote-d-ivoire/3561902.html">boycott the referendum</a>. One of the concerns is the absence of a broad-based consultative process. Another is the truncated timeline for Ivoirians to know and debate the proposed constitution. There was less than a month between its presentation to parliament and the referendum. The process may significantly taint the constitution at birth.</p>
<h2>Eligibility requirements</h2>
<p>Article 35 of the current constitution, which deals with conditions for eligibility, will be replaced with Article 55. This allows presidential candidates with either both or one Ivoirian parent. It also eliminates strict residency requirements. </p>
<p>This is highly controversial and marks Ouattara’s broader programme to guarantee the citizenship of immigrants with at least one Ivoirian parent. Opponents suggest that this will strengthen the hand of immigrant communities which achieve citizenship by mixed nationality marriages. In effect, this would cement a growing constituency for Ouattara and his allies.</p>
<p>The proposed constitution maintains a two-term limit, which 85% of Ivoirians support, according to an <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/c%C3%B4te-divoire-0">Afrobarometer 2014 survey</a>. It also lowers the minimum age for presidential candidates from 40 to 35.</p>
<h2>Centralisation of power?</h2>
<p>The proposed Article 179 allows the president to appoint a vice-president. Opposition parties see this move as a constitutional “coup” that will protect Ouattara’s allies, mainly Guillaume Soro, president of the National Assembly. </p>
<p>They see this as an attempt to enshrine a succession plan in which Ouattara may step down <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/10/23/cote-d-ivoire-le-president-ouattara-promet-une-nouvelle-constitution-s-il-est-reelu_4795712_3212.html">before the end of his term</a> and appoint Soro. There are also fears that establishing a vice-president’s post will lead to a greater centralisation of power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143433/original/image-20161027-32322-1bwfbzr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ivorian opposition supporters protest during a rally ahead of the referendum in Abidjan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luc Gnago/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, there are fears that the proposed chamber will dilute parliament’s power and that this will open the door to more patronage positions. The proposed Article 87 establishes an upper house of parliament, a senate. One-third of senators will be directly appointed by the president. The remaining members will be elected. </p>
<p>The opposition believes that the appointed senators are likely to act favourably towards the president who appoints them. It would provide non-elected allies a path to Côte d'Ivoire’s representative body.</p>
<p>The ultimate effect may be a dilution of a representative parliament, which since 2001 has been largely without opposition representation. In addition, expecting some contestation for parliamentary elections in December 2016, this preemptive move to establish a senate could limit any representation that opposition may obtain. </p>
<p>The new constitution also includes a National House of Traditional Chiefs and Kings, which could further dilute the power of elected representatives.</p>
<h2>What citizens say</h2>
<p>A 2014 Afrobarometer survey provides some indicators about what Ivoirians expect from their political system and the protection of their rights. </p>
<p>It found that 48% of those surveyed believed that the country was either “not a democracy” or “a democracy, with major problems”. The majority (55%) were not satisfied with how democracy works in the country.</p>
<p>What stands out is that the vast majority – 82% – embraced the need to have a range of political parties in order to have choices. Yet, at the same time, 59% noted that opposition parties were silenced “always” or “often”.</p>
<p>The opposition is citing this, as well as a lack of broad-based citizen and opposition consultation, as a reason to boycott the constitutional referendum. </p>
<p>In late October a peaceful demonstration by opposition parties was dispersed by state security forces and opposition leaders <a href="http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/western-africa/2016/10/20/ivory-coast-police-crack-down-on-march-against-new-constitution/">Mamadou Koulibaly and Aboudramane Sangaré</a> were arrested. </p>
<p>The protest was against the way in which the referendum will be held and because it is being seen as an expedient plebiscite rather than a project owned by all Ivoirians.</p>
<p>The protesters were also calling attention to things that both the proposed and current constitution have not upheld in practice, mainly the freedoms of assembly and speech. </p>
<h2>Prospects for the proposed constitution</h2>
<p>There are already growing concerns about the legality of the constitution referendum process. Aside from the problems of consultation, Ouattara is implementing the constitutional referendum with <a href="http://politikafrique.info/referendum-double-bulletin-cei-surprise-gouvernement-ne-dit-vrai/">two separated ballot questions</a> instead of a single proposal. </p>
<p>This raises the likelihood that citizens may reconsider their position or become confused about the voting. It appears that Ouattara made this decision in violation of the electoral code, specifically <a href="https://www.cei-ci.org/redirect/web/file/uploads/515ae051_code-electoral-nouveau-du-15-avril-2015.pdf">article 37</a>. </p>
<p>In sum, although it is possible that the proposed constitution will pass, it is not apparent that it will have any more legitimacy than the post-coup 2000 constitution. The proposed constitution may therefore not settle the broader concerns of constitutional order. It may in fact further delay much needed national reconciliation and consensus building in Côte d'Ivoire.</p>
<p><em>Abel Gbala, a Masters student in Communication for Development, Université Félix Houphouët-Boigny, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar is affiliated with Afrobarometer. </span></em></p>The proposed new constitution would allow Alassane Ouattara to remain as president. Opposition parties see this move as a constitutional “coup” that will also protect his allies.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/562592016-03-18T12:50:13Z2016-03-18T12:50:13ZCôte d'Ivoire attack: why terrorists are targeting Francophone Africa<p>For the fourth time in five months, a major terror attack inspired by radical Islamist ideology has been perpetrated in the Francophone world. After the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/paris-attacks-2015">November 13 attacks</a> in Paris, gunmen targeted a hotel in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-going-on-in-mali-51066">Malian capital Bamako</a>, followed by another hotel in Ouagadougou <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-burkina-faso-is-a-choice-target-as-al-qaeda-bids-to-reclaim-stolen-thunder-53334">in Burkina Faso</a>. </p>
<p>Then on March 13, gunmen <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ivorycoast-attack-idUSKCN0WF0L9">opened fire at several hotels</a> in the seaside resort of Grand Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire, killing 18 people and injuring 33. Like the attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20160314-after-deadly-attacks-cote-divoire-senegal-could-likely-be-next-experts">reportedly claimed</a> responsibility.</p>
<p>Ivorians knew they were near the top of the hit list for Islamist militant groups operating in West Africa. After a bloody and highly divisive civil war in the early 2000s, the country has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/ivory-coasts-journey-to-democracy-an-under-reported-good-news-story-49522">slowly recovering</a> under the leadership of its president Alassane Ouattara, who was democratically elected head of state in 2011. With French military support, Ouattara had to expel his predecessor Laurent Gbagbo, who had a different view of the outcome of the election. Gbagbo is now on <a href="https://theconversation.com/disbelief-and-division-at-the-icc-inside-the-laurent-gbagbo-trial-54421">trial at the International Criminal Court</a> in The Hague. </p>
<p>Patrols in Côte d'Ivoire’s capital, Abidjan, were scaled up quite visibly in the last few months. Curiously, the very popular seaside resort of Grand Bassam, which <a href="http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1322">had briefly been</a> the colony’s capital in the late 19th century, was apparently not included in these anti-terror measures.</p>
<p>Naturally, it was the weaker spot which the attackers chose to strike. In doing so, they fulfilled several goals. It sent the message that France and her allies remain a prey of choice in the region. The attackers re-asserted the place of al-Qaeda as firmly on the map of international jihadism, at a time when it could be eclipsed by the so-called Islamic State. And, tactically, it extended the range of Islamist terrorism to a country which has been hitherto spared its travails.</p>
<h2>French interests under attack</h2>
<p>While the US is regularly described as the main target of radical Islamist militants, in recent years <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/01/12/les-nouvelles-menaces-contre-la-france-de-l-emir-d-al-qaida-au-sahel_4846015_3210.html">references to France</a> have reached almost the same level of hatred in their official statements.</p>
<p>Within two days of the attacks in Grand Bassam, French ministers Bernard Cazeneuve and Jean-Marc Ayrault had travelled to Abidjan to meet Ouattara. They announced that a special force of gendarmes <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-africa-militants-idUKKCN0WH273">would be stationed in Burkina Faso</a> to react to future terrorist threats in the region. </p>
<p>As a major source of Western cultural influence in North and West Africa, France stands in the way of the islamisation and Arabisation of society advocated by Islamist extremists. </p>
<p>France has been muscularly confronting militarily Islamist terrorism since its intervention in Mali in 2013. <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-going-on-in-mali-51066">Operation Serval in Mali</a> was replaced in 2014 with a larger initiative, Operation Barkhane, involved in anti-terrorist intelligence and military operations across the whole of the Sahel region. </p>
<p>France is a major military, political and cultural obstacle that stands in the way of Islamist terrorists in West Africa. Alongside northern Nigeria, targeted by militant Islamist group Boko Haram, Francophone Africa has become a major hot spot on the map of terror inspired by <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2007-11-01/political-islam-west-africa-state-society-relations-transformed">an interpretation of Islam</a> which is completely alien to local spiritual traditions.</p>
<h2>IS vs al-Qaeda</h2>
<p>Competition for supremacy among Islamist groups is also a major factor in explaining this wave of terrorist acts in West Africa. In the wake of several conflicts which started in Algeria in the 1990s and have remained active on several fronts since then – Mali, Libya and Nigeria, to name just a few – many groups claiming to defend the cause of an Islamic caliphate in North and West Africa have been vying for influence in the region. </p>
<p>Al-Qaeda has traditionally dominated the region’s terrorist groups thanks to the late but steady affiliation of a strong contingent of Algerians hardened by a decade of combat in the civil war of the 1990s. But it is feeling the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-11-23/isis-and-al-qaeda-race-bottom">impact of being globally overshadowed</a> by the so-called Islamic State. </p>
<p>While both share the ultimate goal of their struggle (the establishment of a rigorous caliphate inspired by the example of the early years of Islam), they compete to impose their own specific views and their supremacy, often in addition to personal rivalries. </p>
<p>With the <a href="https://theconversation.com/out-of-the-ashes-of-afghanistan-and-iraq-the-rise-and-rise-of-islamic-state-55437">rise of</a> Islamic State, <a href="https://theconversation.com/al-zawahiri-hopes-an-indian-franchise-will-revive-al-qaeda-31330">al-Qaeda needs</a> to orchestrate high impact actions if it wants to retain its financial channels and to keep recruiting militants – two key assets in global jihad. </p>
<p>The Bamako, Ouagadougou and Grand Bassam attacks have to be understood against the backdrop of this major internal struggle between radical Islamist groups.</p>
<p>With the exception of Somalia, most Sub-Saharan African states have so far resisted full-scale attempts by Islamist militants to destabilise them. Often they have had French or American military and logistical help.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-boko-haram-is-the-worlds-deadliest-terror-group-54216">ongoing battle against Boko Haram</a>, the group’s military strength seems to be currently <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/26/cameroon-says-92-boko-haram-militants-killed-and-850-captives-freed">receding in Nigeria</a>. The military situation in Sub-Saharan Africa also appears less volatile than it was three years ago, when the violence in Mali was at its worst. It is in al-Qaeda’s interest to demonstrate spectacularly that the potential for contagion remains significant. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, it is possible that the Grand Bassam attack will be just another chapter in a longer story that will keep unfolding in West Africa and beyond. This could bring with it even more such bloody episodes, true to the deadly logic of the ideology of their perpetrators.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56259/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Berny Sèbe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The gun attack at a hotel marks another bloody chapter in West Africa’s fight against Islamist militancy.Berny Sèbe, Senior lecturer in colonial and post-colonial studies, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.