tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/arlene-foster-23544/articlesArlene Foster – The Conversation2021-06-18T11:59:18Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1627282021-06-18T11:59:18Z2021-06-18T11:59:18ZNorthern Ireland: Paul Givan takes over as first minister, but his party is in crisis<p>Northern Ireland has a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/17/sinn-fein-designates-deputy-first-minister-to-avert-stormont-crisis">new first minister</a> – its youngest ever. But as a mark of the strife and confusion which so often characterises Stormont politics, within hours of the confirmation of the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) Paul Givan, 39, in the top job, the party had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/17/edwin-poots-resigns-as-dup-leader-after-21-days">to deal with the resignation</a> of its shortest serving leader, Edwin Poots, who lasted just 21 days. Outsiders may already be confused, as the two roles are currently separate. But the confirmation of the former triggered the departure of the latter.</p>
<p>More confusing still, Givan is a close ally of Poots. He had been widely tipped as the former DUP leader’s nomination for the first minister role. Poots had <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/sunday-life/news/edwin-poots-doesnt-want-to-be-northern-ireland-first-minister-he-plans-to-split-dup-posts-and-concentrate-on-party-40377786.html">made a promise</a> as part of his campaign for the DUP leadership that he would not be head of the Stormont executive.</p>
<p>This was to show his commitment to reforming the DUP, suggesting that he would forgo the limelight to concentrate on this and involve other party members in the overall leadership operation. The aim was to suggest a greater team effort, and more accountability in the DUP. </p>
<p>It was also an implicit rebuke of Arlene Foster’s leadership, presented as being more top down, and may have helped Poots narrowly defeat the rival candidate, Jeffery Donaldson, seen as representing the more “Fosterite” wing of the DUP.</p>
<p>But Poots’ marginal victory immediately prompted open dissent within the party – and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57283002">even resignations</a>. Donaldson’s backers questioned whether Poots, reflecting a <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/edwin-poots-profile-new-dup-leader-is-a-traditionalist-and-paisleyite-1.4565581">more conservative outlook and religious ethos</a>, could win back the votes the party seems to be losing among younger and more liberal unionists.</p>
<p>Despite the divisions within the DUP, an even greater obstacle to Poots’ agenda emerged when Sinn Féin <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/stormont-faces-crisis-as-sinn-f%C3%A9in-accuses-dup-of-bad-faith-on-irish-language-1.4592339">threatened to veto</a> the nomination of any successor to Foster, who stepped down as first minister on June 15 following her ousting as DUP leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/arlene-foster-where-it-all-went-wrong-for-northern-irelands-first-minister-159966">in April</a>. So far, so confusing – right?</p>
<h2>Power sharing</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/northern-ireland-executive">rules of power-sharing</a> at Stormont effectively allow either Sinn Féin or the DUP to veto the first and deputy first minister nominations, and so gridlock the assembly. The rules also gave the two parties seven days after Foster’s resignation to find agreement on the matter. But Sinn Féin was insisting that it would not proceed without gaining a firm commitment by the DUP to support legislation to protect and promote the Irish language.</p>
<p>This had been agreed as part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-irelands-government-is-back-up-and-running-heres-how-it-happened-and-why-129831">last deal</a> made to restore power-sharing in Northern Ireland in January 2020 – and indeed on many previous occasions. Under Poots, the DUP continued to say it would legislate on the Irish language, but refused to confirm a date for this. Sinn Féin clearly ran out of patience on the issue, hence a standoff which most commentators felt would run at least till the June 21 deadline for agreement on a new Stormont leadership team.</p>
<p>But a surprising solution arrived well ahead of that, with Sinn Féin saying <em>go raibh maith agat</em> (thank you) to the British government after it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57507176">promised legislation</a> on the Irish language at Westminster if the DUP failed to do so. Some were surprised that republicans were accepting the word of the Johnson administration on the matter. It is not seen as the most trustworthy on many issues – but particularly Northern Ireland. This is especially the case given its refusal to honour parts of the Brexit deal relating to the region.</p>
<p>But it was Poots that was taking the greater risk, pressing ahead with the nomination of Givan as first minister even after a rebellion within the DUP. Reports suggest that a party meeting held on the morning of June 17 saw <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57507176">only four</a> of the DUP’s 28 representatives in the Belfast Assembly support the move. However, along with Sinn Féin, Poots proceeded to nominate the new first and deputy first minister team, despite the opposition of most of his DUP colleagues. Following this, a further DUP meeting took place in the evening, after which Poots <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-57521158">announced his resignation</a>. </p>
<h2>Crisis for unionism</h2>
<p>This is Northern Ireland’s centenary year, but what should have been a celebration for unionists has turned into an unprecedented crisis. Indeed, Foster was forced to resign just days before the official birthdate of the state on May 3. There was further shock when the leader of the smaller UUP quit just days later – and now a third unionist leader has been forced out in as many months.</p>
<p>It is hard not to trace the ultimate cause of this instability to Brexit, with the terms of Johnson’s deal establishing customs checks on the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Unionists feel this further <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-vaccines-and-brexit-borders-what-is-happening-in-northern-ireland-154503">separates them</a> from the rest of the UK, while effectively remaining under EU jurisdiction aligns the region towards integration with the Republic of Ireland. </p>
<p>This, the now constant discussion of a border poll, and republicans’ continued momentum – with <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-times-poll-sinn-f%C3%A9in-s-move-to-the-mainstream-seems-inexorable-1.4595221?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Firish-times-poll-sinn-f%25C3%25A9in-s-move-to-the-mainstream-seems-inexorable-1.4595221">polling trends</a> suggesting that Sinn Féin will soon hold power in Dublin as well as Belfast – is unnerving for unionists. Moves towards Irish language legislation just add to their anxieties. Again, the sense is that this will further undermine the “Britishness” of Northern Ireland, preparing the way for Irish reunification.</p>
<p>It is surprising that Poots, seen as a more traditional unionist, thought that he could act as if the deal between Sinn Féin and the British government was unconnected to his move to make Givan first minister. Clearly, most DUP members felt that they would be seen to have facilitated the progress of Irish language legislation – just as the party is seen to have aided Johnson’s Brexit deal, despite voting against it.</p>
<p>This is the dilemma for any new unionist leader. Even if Donaldson is now crowned, what room will he now have for manoeuvre? How can anyone lead unionism when it is clearly paralysed by fear?</p>
<p>Foster is obviously glad to be done with the role. Gently mocking yesterday’s developments at Stormont, she tweeted that she had just enjoyed lunch at one of Belfast’s top restaurants, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57507176">wished everyone</a> a “great day on this lovely sunny afternoon”. But it is hard not to think that the sunshine was just a prelude to an uncomfortably hot summer in Northern Ireland, with the marching season about to begin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin has received funding in the past from the AHRC, Leverhulme, the Irish Research Council, and Fulbright. He is a member of Greenpeace.</span></em></p>With the resignation of shortlived DUP leader Edwin Poots, unionism in Northern Ireland is in turmoil.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1606702021-05-11T14:21:43Z2021-05-11T14:21:43ZDUP leadership election Q&A: all you need to know about Edwin Poots and Jeffrey Donaldson<p>The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is holding the first leadership contest in its 50-year history following the resignation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/arlene-foster-where-it-all-went-wrong-for-northern-irelands-first-minister-159966">Arlene Foster</a>. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, a Westminster MP, is taking on Edwin Poots, agriculture and environment minister in the Northern Ireland Executive, for the top job.</p>
<p>Just eight DUP MPs and 28 DUP Northern Ireland Assembly members get a vote in this contest – so 36 people in total (29 men and seven women). This is the narrowest selectorate of any party in Britain or Ireland. No public hustings are allowed. The result is expected around 5pm on May 14. Here is everything you need to know about the two men hoping to become the leader of Northern Ireland’s biggest unionist party. </p>
<h2>What do these candidates stand for?</h2>
<p>Both candidates have histories of being hardline. They opposed the <a href="https://theconversation.com/good-friday-agreement-ten-key-people-who-helped-bring-about-peace-in-northern-ireland-20-years-ago-94613">Good Friday agreement</a> (GFA) which ended the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The DUP refused to support the 1998 deal, arguing that its terms rewarded those who had perpetrated violence. Donaldson belonged to the pro-GFA Ulster Unionist Party at the time but his opposition to the agreement led to defection to the DUP by 2004. Donaldson objected to Sinn Féin’s presence in government while the IRA was still armed (disarmament eventually did come). </p>
<p>Yet both contestants also have a pragmatic streak. They recognise that working with Sinn Féin is unavoidable, otherwise the devolved power-sharing government collapses.</p>
<h2>Where do the two candidates stand on Brexit?</h2>
<p>There is very little difference between the two candidates in terms of their positions on Brexit. Neither supports how it has been introduced. <a href="https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/eu-exit-and-northern-ireland-protocol">The EU protocol</a> creates a trade border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with the latter still aligned to some EU rules, despite Brexit. The DUP is particularly angry about the deal as Boris Johnson told the party’s conference that no Conservative prime minister “could or should accept such an arrangement” – and then signed up to one.</p>
<p>But Donaldson promises only “meaningful reform” (undefined) of the arrangement and Poots pledges a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-56982383">“judicial review”</a> to assess its legality, without saying what happens if that fails.</p>
<h2>But aren’t both to blame for the Brexit arrangements?</h2>
<p>The DUP supported Brexit and has been criticised for thereby becoming midwife to the misfortune it has brought. Donaldson is criticised by supporters of Poots for being part of the team of DUP MPs in Westminster who were blindsided by Johnson and let this deal happen. Poots, on the other hand, is criticised by Donaldson’s backers for overseeing the building of border control posts for checks on goods entering Northern Ireland after Brexit.</p>
<h2>Is one of them really a creationist?</h2>
<p>Both the candidates have very conservative views on social issues and religion. Both opposed the same-sex marriage and abortion legalisation introduced by the Westminster government. The DUP would like to change the abortion law but seems <a href="https://theconversation.com/westminster-steps-in-after-northern-ireland-fails-to-comply-with-abortion-law-change-how-it-happened-158239">unlikely to be able to do so</a>.</p>
<p>Poots is from the fundamentalist Free Presbyterian wing of the DUP – hardline Protestantism. This was once dominant in the DUP but now represents only one in three party members. Poots is a creationist and believes that the Earth was created only around 6,000 years ago. In practical policy terms though, this matters far less than where unionism is going in the next 60 years. Donaldson is a member of the mainstream Presbyterian Church.</p>
<h2>What are their key strengths and weaknesses?</h2>
<p>Donaldson is likely to hold slightly greater appeal to “small u” unionists who want Northern Ireland to remain in the UK but are concerned that the DUP deters voters by making poor political judgements and with its social conservatism. He is the more probable electoral asset because he stands a better chance of holding on to voters tempted to defect to the UUP or the centre party, Alliance.</p>
<p>Until the last election, when his majority was cut, Donaldson had piled up huge wins in his Lagan Valley constituency. But he is portrayed as “Continuity Arlene” by critics. The coup unseating Foster as leader looks pointless if she is replaced by someone from the same background and views.</p>
<p>The other problem is Donaldson being a Westminster MP. He could become leader of the DUP but cannot be first minister of Northern Ireland while he has that job. And, in fact, could he really effectively lead the party from Westminster? If he resigned from Westminster, it would force a risky byelection in his constituency. And he’d need to find a seat to represent in the Northern Ireland Assembly. With days to go before the contest, we still await clarity on how all this would be sorted. </p>
<p>Poots knows how to work the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly. He has been in the Assembly since 1998. He is well regarded as an agriculture minister. But it’s not clear if he has broader electoral appeal and there are fears that he would appoint a ministerial team drawn from a narrow fundamentalist wing of the party. The electoral appeal is crucial. Poots could stop DUP voters from moving right to the even tougher unionist party Traditional Unionist Voice but the DUP seems more at risk from defections to Alliance.</p>
<p>The DUP risks losing the first ministership to Sinn Féin at next May’s Assembly election. Sinn Féin only trails by one seat and so stands a good enough chance of becoming the largest party in the largest bloc (if nationalist parties combined outweigh unionist parties). That would be a disaster for the DUP and increase the pressure for a referendum on a united Ireland.</p>
<p>Poots has also said he would <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/edwin-poots-to-turn-down-role-as-first-minister-if-leadership-bid-succeeds-40379059.html">appoint someone else to be first minister</a> if he wins the DUP leadership. This could be a useful ploy to get votes from assembly members hopeful of the job. Given he is in the assembly, Poots has no need to split the posts. A cynical view is that he is downplaying the role of first minister in case the DUP loses the position at the assembly election next May. </p>
<h2>Who will win?</h2>
<p>Difficult question, not least since we have no previous contests to reflect back on for signs. Logically, Poots should win, as he is popular within the assembly team, and they provide the most voters for the ballot. But Donaldson is a savvy campaigner.</p>
<p>If the small electorate is thinking in party terms, Poots wins. If they are thinking in electoral terms, Donaldson triumphs. Donaldson might just scrape a win, but only a fool would take a short price for this contest. It looks close.</p>
<p>An even more difficult question is what happens if it’s a tie. Penalties or straws perhaps? Assume there will be a second vote, but it will be a case of making up the rules.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Tonge received funding from the Leverhulme Trust for a membership study of the Democratic Unionist Party. </span></em></p>A tiny group of people will select the man to lead Arlene Foster’s party following her resignation. But, bizarrely, it might be that neither becomes first minister.Jonathan Tonge, Professor of Politics, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1599662021-04-29T12:07:01Z2021-04-29T12:07:01ZArlene Foster: where it all went wrong for Northern Ireland’s first minister<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397768/original/file-20210429-23-20jkyg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C43%2C5691%2C3966&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alamy/Xinhua</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Arlene Foster, Northern Ireland’s first minister and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), is to stand down from both roles after apparently losing the confidence of her own party. She will be gone by July, she <a href="https://mydup.com/news/statement-by-rt-hon-arlene-foster-mla">announced</a> just ahead of a leadership vote she looked likely to lose. The vote takes place every year and has only ever been a formality. But this time her party had turned against her. </p>
<p>Foster was always an unusual Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leader. She was the first woman to head a stridently patriarchal party. She is a member of the Church of Ireland, while the DUP remains broadly evangelical in its membership. And she was formerly a Ulster Unionist Party member, defecting over David Trimble’s handling of the early peace process.</p>
<p>In her political stance, however, Foster was no mould-breaker. From the outset of her leadership, she looked back rather than forward, constantly citing her own experience of the <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/arlene-foster-relives-horror-of-fathers-shooting-by-ira-and-tells-how-bus-blast-could-have-killed-her-34297350.html">Troubles and republican violence</a>. In recounting events such as an IRA attack on her own father, Foster’s message was clear – she had neither forgotten nor forgiven, and would certainly not be soft on Sinn Féin.</p>
<p>Her joint leadership of Northern Ireland alongside Martin McGuinness, a former IRA commander, was thus a tense affair, and the relationship broke down after just one year. The immediate cause was Foster’s handling of a scandal over a green energy scheme which wasted more than <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38301428">£30m of tax payers’ money</a>, but a whole series of new tensions emerged between Sinn Féin and DUP while the power-sharing government was collapsed. It would take three years for the two parties to resolve their differences and get the administration up and running again. By then, McGuinness had died, and Michelle O’Neill replaced him as deputy first minister. Foster hardly had a better partnership with her.</p>
<h2>Brexit disaster</h2>
<p>It is fair to say that Foster faced unprecedented challenges in her time as DUP leader. But her handling of Brexit is undoubtedly the main reason for her downfall.</p>
<p>She chose to support the Leave campaign in the run up to the 2016 referendum, despite the obvious challenges this would pose for Northern Ireland, and the fact that a majority in the region opposed Brexit.</p>
<p>This was clearly a bad move, but like many, Foster may have thought it unlikely that the UK would really leave the EU. She may have seen supporting the Brexit campaign as a cost-free way to rally supporters behind a familiar cause of defending British sovereignty.</p>
<p>Harder to explain was how the DUP used its position at Westminster in the hung parliament of 2017-19. When the then UK prime minister, Theresa May, lost her majority in the 2017 election, Foster signed the DUP up to support her in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservatives-strike-deal-with-the-dup-experts-react-80101">confidence-and-supply arrangement</a>. However, Foster’s MPs went on to repeatedly vote against May’s Brexit proposals, which eventually led to the prime minister being ousted. Her replacement, Boris Johnson, had encouraged the DUP’s intransigence over Brexit, but then abandoned the party by negotiating Brexit arrangements that effectively left Northern Ireland under EU regulations.</p>
<p>Faced with Brussels’ opposition to a “hard border” between Northern Ireland and Ireland, Johnson instead signed a Brexit deal that created a border in the Irish Sea, with goods moving between Britain and Northern Ireland now facing customs checks. For unionists, this undermines the union and their Britishness. The fact that the DUP, under Foster, facilitated this outcome has brought her political demise. </p>
<p>But the DUP’s Westminster policy was not led by Foster, who sits in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Rather it was steered by her deputy, Nigel Dodds, formerly an MP in the London parliament. And it is hard to believe that Foster, herself from a border town in Northern Ireland, did not foresee the particular problems that Brexit posed for such areas. However, over in Westminster, enjoying the full attention of the Tories for a period, Foster’s party colleagues became ever more convinced of the need for a “hard Brexit”. Foster was party leader, so cannot escape blame for the decisions made, but the move against her is clearly a way for other members to disassociate themselves from an approach they pressed for with ever greater vigour. </p>
<p>As the realities of Brexit have become apparent in Northern Ireland, unionist anger has risen, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-56664378">spilling onto the streets in recent weeks</a>. Whilst condemning this violence, the DUP’s only practical response has been to call for the checks on goods to be scrapped. The party offers no viable alternative to an arrangement that took more than four years to negotiate, and it seems unlikely that London and Brussels will make any major changes. Ousting Foster may be an attempt to plot a different course, or just panic in response to <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dups-support-takes-a-dive-in-wake-of-irish-sea-border-row-40033751.html">polls showing the DUP losing support</a>.</p>
<h2>Now what?</h2>
<p>The DUP now faces its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Unionist-Party">first leadership election in its history</a>. Foster’s replacement will have to find a different way forward for unionism in a much changed landscape. The signs do not look encouraging. One candidate is Edwin Poots, who, as health minister, maintained a ban on gay men donating blood after this rule was <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/judge-says-edwin-poots-was-biased-in-gay-men-blood-ban-1.2059441">scrapped in the rest of the UK</a>. As environment minister, he rejected the idea that the <a href="https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2020/07/24/news/edwin-poots-criticised-for-saying-there-is-no-climate-emergency--2014473/">climate change represented a crisis</a>, and as a “young-Earth creationist”, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/11/northern-ireland-edwin-poots-creationist-anti-gay">believes the Earth is just 4,000 years old</a>. This hardly suggests that Ulster unionism would be ready to face the future under Poots. </p>
<p>Opponents may scoff, but the beleaguered DUP remains Northern Ireland’s largest party, and the lead voice of unionism. As such, a crisis within its leadership is not good news for anyone in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin has received funding in the past from the AHRC, Leverhulme, the Irish Research Council, and Fulbright.
He is a member of Greenpeace. </span></em></p>An incoherent Brexit policy has ended the DUP leader’s career – but her party can’t pretend they didn’t giver her full support.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1391482020-06-04T13:10:37Z2020-06-04T13:10:37ZNorthern Ireland after coronavirus: three scenarios for politics and peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336752/original/file-20200521-102667-czhntd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">PA</span> </figcaption></figure><p>When it comes to disruptions from outside, the Northern Ireland conflict has a reputation for being immune to them. Winston Churchill observed this after the first world war, in one of the most quoted remarks on Irish politics:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… as the deluge subsides and the waters fall short we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions that has been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A century later, the “integrity of their quarrel”, for the most part, remains. That said, external developments like the US civil rights campaign, the end of the cold war and the EU have influenced events in the region.</p>
<p>So far, the coronavirus pandemic has interacted with Northern Ireland politics in some intriguing ways. At the beginning of the crisis in mid-March, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/coronavirus-michelle-o-neill-calls-for-northern-ireland-schools-to-close-1.4202136">the cross-community executive became split</a> on whether to follow Dublin’s lead in immediately closing schools or stick with the UK’s more relaxed approach.</p>
<p>Yet since then, the first and deputy first ministers, Arlene Foster and Michelle O’Neill, have maintained a mostly united front. This has been in contrast with the three years before January 2020, when their parties wouldn’t work together, leaving Northern Ireland without devolution. The mere sight of Northern Ireland’s provincial politicians, schooled in the tribal minutia of a nationalist conflict, battling a global natural disaster has been arresting.</p>
<p>North-south co-operation has also been in the spotlight. This is a key part of the Good Friday Agreement. While Belfast and Dublin agreed they would share information on the virus, <a href="https://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/coronavirus-ni-minister-slams-varadkar-for-lack-of-cooperation-with-stormont-999848.html">deficiencies in coordination</a> have been exposed.</p>
<p>Another feature of the crisis in Northern Ireland has been the outpouring of support for the NHS from across society. Remarkably, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-52449747">murals praising</a> this (British) institution have appeared in both unionist and nationalist areas.</p>
<p>Does any of this matter? When the deluge of COVID-19 subsides, there are three possible scenarios. The first is, of course, that there won’t be any long-term consequences of the pandemic and that political life picks up mostly where it left off.</p>
<p>However, the pandemic could, on the other hand, worsen divisions. Stormont now has its own roadmap out of lockdown, which is different to those of both London and Dublin. This has cross-community support but there is still plenty of room for unionists and nationalists to split over virus policy. </p>
<p>Anger at the Conservative government’s handling of the crisis, and the prominence of the devolved administrations, could hasten the end of the UK, with all the tumult that would bring to Northern Ireland. Paramilitary <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-52703305">murders</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-52616059">threats</a> have continued during the shutdown. And the dreary steeples of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-52654166">Brexit</a> have never been fully out of view.</p>
<h2>A chance to change</h2>
<p>But a third possibility – and narrowly, the most likely – is that the virus, overall, has a stabilising influence. It could put political identity politics into perspective.</p>
<p>While COVID-19 is an external shock, it has shone a light on existing social realities: inequality; challenges in education; the quality of people’s environment, lifestyle and relationships; and above all, the health service. Public interest in these issues may increase over Orange-Green politics. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-923X.12835">the success</a> of the non-aligned Alliance Party and Greens in the 2019 election showed, this process was already under way. Before the crisis, the main parties knew that the current period of devolution could be the last chance they get to show the public that they can govern effectively. The socio-economic damage of the shutdown may stimulate bold, unprecedented policy solutions.</p>
<p>Irish republicans have argued that the pandemic, which respects no borders, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/utv/2020-04-27/covid-19-sinn-fein-leader-s-irish-unity-comments-regrettable-says-foster/">proves the illogic of partition</a> on a small island. But pandemics, we hope, will not be something Ireland or any country has to face often. And the problem of differing strategies between neighbouring countries is not unique to Ireland, but has been felt across Britain and Europe. The crisis may actually slow the momentum of the Irish unity discussion, which had been given so much oxygen by Brexit, especially given the looming financial pressures.</p>
<p>When the dust settles, Northern Ireland could have a stable executive focused on everyday politics in the north, pragmatically aligned with Dublin or London or Brussels on particular issues. In other words, the region could find itself closer to the vision of the Good Friday Agreement than it has been for some years.</p>
<p>What is beyond doubt is that sectarianism, Northern Ireland’s local brand of social distancing, offers no protection from an infectious disease. Whatever its legacy, COVID-19’s indiscrimination proves that the physical space is in fact a shared one. Those who live in that space share the same fate, no matter the imagined national communities to which they purport to belong.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mitchell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A crisis can create divisions but it can also help heal them.David Mitchell, Assistant Professor in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1298312020-01-13T16:31:17Z2020-01-13T16:31:17ZNorthern Ireland’s government is back up and running – here’s how it happened and why<p>The Northern Ireland government is back up and running after the British and Irish governments jointly announced a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51047216">draft deal</a> to resolve the continued political stalemate in the region, exactly three years to the day since power-sharing broke down. A few days later, the deal has now been formally agreed.</p>
<p>It has been widely suggested that the Westminster elections, and losses suffered by both the DUP and Sinn Féin, were the main reason they suddenly agreed to return to sharing power. The threat of a fresh assembly election for Northern Ireland, which could see their dominance further eroded, may well have influenced their thinking. Recent gains by moderate parties, arguably reflecting the frustration of voters at the inability of Sinn Féin and the DUP to compromise, surely focused minds.</p>
<p>One of the key sticking points had been Sinn Féin’s insistence on legislation to help promote and protect the Irish language in Northern Ireland. Many unionists were staunchly opposed, seeing this as part of a broader project by Sinn Féin to gradually undermine the “Britishness” of Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The new deal allows compromise on this issue. It promises to appoint an Irish language commissioner, and standards that public bodies will have to meet to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51063140">provide services in Irish</a>. However, balancing things out, Sinn Féin did not get the stand-alone Irish language act which it had demanded. </p>
<p>Indeed, the new deal makes similar commitments for Ulster-Scots, which is spoken by some unionists. It also states that the first minister and deputy first minister – posts long held by the DUP and Sinn Féin – must both agree on any new language proposals. That effectively gives the first minister, currently the DUP’s Arlene Foster, an effective veto over moves to give Irish greater prominence, such as by introducing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51063140">bilingual road signs, for example</a>.</p>
<p>On the subject of vetoes, the new deal also promises to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51047216">reform the petition of concern mechanism</a>, which gives members of the Northern Ireland assembly the ability to raise opposition to legislative proposals. It is this mechanism which effectively gave the DUP and Sinn Féin a veto over each other’s proposals, allowing them to gridlock and eventually collapse power-sharing in the first place. </p>
<p>Reform of the mechanism to minimise its use may help, but the DUP and Sinn Féin will also need to try harder to find compromise if things are to work. They both need to rebuild damaged relations and trust. In short, they must genuinely share power if they are to exercise any.</p>
<h2>UK and Ireland step in</h2>
<p>What really forced the deal between Sinn Féin and the DUP, however, was intervention from the British and Irish governments. Their decisiveness, and boldly pre-emptive announcement of a deal, resulted from the recent changes at Westminster. </p>
<p>Thus, it was not just the losses suffered by the DUP and Sinn Féin in the UK election which mattered. The Conservative victory can be said to have, in a way, “resolved” Brexit – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/13/brexit-irish-border-uk-northern-ireland">at least for now</a>. This allowed London and Dublin to finally focus on and cooperate in their efforts to restore power-sharing in Northern Ireland. The fact that the election decisively removed the Tories’ reliance on DUP support at Westminster also eased this path toward progress.</p>
<p>Economic pressures were just as important. London promised significant financial support to help address the multiple healthcare crises in Northern Ireland, and Dublin offered money for large infrastructure projects in the region. However, these commitments were conditional upon the local parties accepting the deal. With nurses and other workers in the region currently engaging in strike action, this put huge pressure on Sinn Féin and the DUP.</p>
<p>This approach triggered <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/the-northern-capacity-to-focus-on-the-negative-can-be-breathtaking-1.4135922">claims of blackmail</a>, and exasperation by others that it took “outsiders” to force Northern Ireland’s squabbling parties to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/10/the-guardian-view-on-the-northern-ireland-deal-take-it-move-on">face up to their responsibilities</a>. But there has always been an element of blackmail – or, more positively, “incentivisation” – in the way the British and Irish governments have <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315638065/chapters/10.4324/9781315638065-15">dealt with Northern Ireland</a> – justifiably so in that it has largely worked to deliver a more stable and peaceful society.</p>
<p>As for suggestions that this shows a lack of political maturity in Northern Ireland, well again, yes. Northern Ireland has only had regional democracy since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Thus, of course the practice of democracy in the region is underdeveloped. It has also been hindered by the legacy of 30 years of bloody conflict, and many more decades of discrimination and exclusion, leaving deep divisions.</p>
<p>It was the failure of Britain and Ireland to resolve their own relationships which created this problem, resulting in partition and the birth of Northern Ireland exactly 100 years ago. For decades thereafter, London and Dublin largely ignored the problem, and it was only from the 1980s that they began to properly re-engage in a way that allowed for the subsequent peace process. Unfortunately, however, Brexit once again complicated relations between the two governments – <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-reason-why-northern-ireland-has-been-without-a-government-for-more-than-500-days-brexit-102297">undoubtedly reinforcing</a> the stalemate in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The re-engagement of London and Dublin with the region is to be commended, and their continued commitment will be required to face the fresh challenges that Brexit throws up. The draft document they announced last week was entitled “New Decade, New Approach”. One hundred years on from the birth of Northern Ireland, it might even have promised a “New Century, New Approach”. The British and Irish governments, and certainly the local parties, will all need to continue to work hard together to ensure that this new century undoes the divisions and distrust of the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129831/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new deal has been signed that seeks to encourage Sinn Fein and the DUP to work together.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1263222019-11-07T13:32:35Z2019-11-07T13:32:35ZDUP may be overestimating opposition to Irish Sea border in Northern Ireland – new survey<p>The roots of the UK’s forthcoming election lie in Brexit – and Westminster’s inability to agree on what to do about the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This issue will therefore be particularly central in campaigns for seats in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>Unionist parties oppose Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal and, in particular, the suggestion that there would be a <a href="https://fullfact.org/europe/withdrawal-agreement-border-irish-sea/">border in the Irish Sea</a> after Brexit. Both the DUP and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) have denounced this as a grave threat to the union and will be arguing as much over the coming weeks. However, data from our survey indicates that unionist voters might not feel quite so strongly about this border proposal when it is packaged with other policy dimensions. </p>
<p>Could the DUP have weakened its position by opposing Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal? It has, since the last election, played a very powerful role in Westminster. Now it could even lose seats. </p>
<p>The DUP is much more opposed to Johnson’s Brexit deal with the EU than the one reached by his predecessor Theresa May, with its hated “Irish backstop” element. This was only intended as a temporary arrangement, but the prospect of Northern Ireland diverging from UK regulations even to this extent was enough to make the DUP vote against it. </p>
<p>Johnson’s revamped deal potentially places a permanent customs border in the Irish Sea. From the DUP’s perspective, it annexes Northern Ireland economically from Great Britain and pushes it closer to Ireland. </p>
<p>DUP MP <a href="https://twitter.com/eastantrimmp/status/1188890374175100928">Sammy Wilson</a> recently made some outlandish claims about the DUP winning many more seats in Westminster in this election because opposition to the border is so strong. But what if the DUP is overestimating unionist sentiment?</p>
<p>We found that when you connect the east-west post-Brexit border with other issue choices, presenting it as part of a package rather than an isolated issue, most people end up accepting <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-brexit-poll-finds-a-plan-for-the-irish-border-both-unionists-and-nationalists-can-agree-on-99266">the proposal</a> – even within the unionist community.</p>
<p>It’s clear that there is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-brexit-poll-finds-a-plan-for-the-irish-border-both-unionists-and-nationalists-can-agree-on-99266">large degree of unionist opposition</a> to such a border when it is presented by itself, but people become more flexible when <a href="http://kentucytool.ucy.ac.cy/home">mitigating factors</a> are brought into the picture. For example, they might be more open to having an east-west border if they are reassured that border checks were to be electronic, with only some random physical checks of goods crossing the border. That becomes preferable to the prospect of physical checks on all goods at the border, which might follow a no-deal Brexit.</p>
<p>When offered the prospect of a substantial increase in public spending in Northern Ireland and co-operation with the Republic of Ireland on the costs of and control over the border, unionists also become more open to the idea.</p>
<p>Presenting the border as part of a wider package is arguably a more realistic way to gauge attitudes than asking for opinions on an individual issue. This is because compromise agreements tend to be defined by what is acceptable to most people, rather than what they find most desirable. Objectionable dimensions are balanced out by more attractive options. </p>
<p>When considered in association with other elements of an agreement (such as the intrusiveness of border checks, the amount of financial compensation available and the oversight mechanisms employed), it may be that the current Brexit deal could become acceptable to unionist voters.</p>
<h2>Pressure on the DUP</h2>
<p>How all of this shakes out in the election in Northern Ireland is difficult to predict, but the DUP faces a tough test. It has has been close to the Brexit negotiations and now opposes the outcome of them. There are grounds for believing that the DUP could struggle to return the ten MPs it has, never mind adding more.</p>
<p>Our survey suggests voters might not be completely responsive to the idea that an east-west border is a threat to the United Kingdom. Those voters who do think this is an exaggeration may feel the DUP is responsible for the current situation. It could have provided the crucial votes to help May ratify her version of the Brexit deal, avoiding the need for a permanent border in the Irish Sea – not to mention a Christmas election. It is conceivable that such people might vote for the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) or for the resurgent Alliance Party instead of backing the DUP.</p>
<p>And those who buy the argument that the current Brexit deal and prospect of a border in the Irish Sea presents an existential threat to the union might well blame the DUP for delivering it. Indeed, <a href="https://uup.org/news/6298/21/Northern-Ireland-needs-MPs-who-will-not-be-patsies-to-a-Tory-government-Aiken#.Xbww1vZ2uUk">Steve Aiken</a>, the newly appointed leader of the UUP, has set out to make the DUP “own” the withdrawal agreement. He argues that his political rivals for the unionist vote are responsible for creating the biggest threat to the union in recent times. These voters might vote for the UUP, or the smaller Traditional Unionist Voice, or simply stay at home on December 12.</p>
<p>While the DUP faces competition from two directions, pro-Remain parties are striking electoral pacts to maximise their chances against it. Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) are cooperating to maximise the Remain vote in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50289309">seats currently held by the unionists</a>. This will present a big challenge to Nigel Dodds, the leader of the DUP in Westminster, as he tries to hold on to his North Belfast seat. The party also faces strong challenges in South and East Belfast from the SDLP and Alliance Party respectively.</p>
<p>Far from dramatically increasing its Westminster seats by opposing the Brexit deal, the DUP may be overemphasising the issue and compromising its electoral prospects as a result.</p>
<p><em>The data referred to in this article was also gathered by <a href="https://www.kent.ac.uk/politics-international-relations/people/2268/www.kent.ac.uk/politics-international-relations/people/2268/morgan-jones-edward">Edward Morgan-Jones</a>, <a href="https://www.essex.ac.uk/people/sudul52703/laura-sudulich">Laura Sudulich</a> and <a href="https://www.kent.ac.uk/politics-international-relations/people/522/loizides-neophytos">Neophytos Loizides</a>.</em></p>
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKGE2019&utm_content=GEBannerA">Click here to subscribe to our newsletter if you believe this election should be all about the facts.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126322/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feargal Cochrane is a Professor of International Conflict Analysis at the University of Kent. He, along with the other researchers linked to this project, has received research grant income from the United States Institute of Peace.</span></em></p>Has the party unecessarily compromised its powerful position in Westminster?Feargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1112332019-02-05T20:05:22Z2019-02-05T20:05:22ZBrexit: David Trimble’s legal challenge to the Irish backstop is a hiding to nothing<p>There has always been something of Don Quixote about David Trimble, the awkward politician who never really shrugged off his persona as a legal academic. In 1998 no one could deny the urgency with which he sought to right seemingly unrightable wrongs. In reaching the <a href="https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-agreement-1.pdf">Good Friday Agreement</a> – also known as the Belfast Agreement – the then leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) set out to build a new Northern Ireland, one free from the spectre of political violence and shorn of the sectarian discrimination of the past. </p>
<p>If Northern Ireland could change from being, in the ringing words of Trimble’s <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1998/trimble/lecture/">Nobel lecture</a>, “a cold house for Catholics”, maybe the nationalist community would become less resistant to it remaining part of the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>Nearly 21 years later, Trimble has announced a bold move to capture the limelight: threatening a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/david-trimble-to-take-uk-government-to-court-over-irish-backstop/">legal challenge</a> against the part of the Brexit <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-political-declaration">withdrawal agreement</a> relating to the so-called Irish “backstop”, for breaching the Good Friday Agreement.</p>
<h2>The principle of consent</h2>
<p>The agreement is built on the consent principle, whereby the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK can only be altered by a referendum vote in favour of a united Ireland. </p>
<p>Most of the substance of the agreement, however, dealt with changing governance and identity in Northern Ireland. Strand 1 established protections enabling people to identify as Irish or British (or both) as they chose, without discrimination. Strand 2 built up detailed arrangements for north-south co-operation in Ireland.</p>
<p>These arrangements provided a new constitutional settlement which sought to persuade nationalists to become soft unionists. Northern Ireland after 1998 established power-sharing arrangements to prevent nationalists from being locked out of governance and ensured that Northern Ireland would work closely together with Ireland on a range of policy issues. In Trimble’s account, the agreement secured the union: it placed Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK in the hands of its own people, and it tackled the grievances that could create pressure for a border poll.</p>
<h2>Enter Brexit</h2>
<p>Despite Trimble’s pivotal role in ending Northern Ireland’s conflict, he and the party he led, the UUP, have found themselves sidelined in the last 15 years by the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) electoral success.</p>
<p>As such, Trimble continues a quest for relevance in his political twilight. Brexit has provided one such outlet, particularly as the future of Northern Ireland and its border have become so prominent within negotiations. As my co-authors and I set out in our book, <a href="http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=1000392">Bordering Two Unions</a>, over the last two years Trimble has yo-yoed between insisting that the Good Friday Agreement has no relevance for Brexit and that the UK-EU negotiations threatens to undermine everything he worked to put in place in 1998. Not quite the impossible dream, but nonetheless a position that is difficult to comprehend.</p>
<p>The Irish backstop elements of the Brexit withdrawal agreement provide a variable level of alignment between the UK and the European Union after Brexit even if no comprehensive deal on their future relationship can be reached. In short, Northern Ireland would remain deeply aligned with the EU across trading rules and anti-discrimination law. Great Britain would become less aligned, an arrangement which could be further hollowed out if a future UK government is not dependent on DUP votes through a confidence and supply arrangement at Westminster.</p>
<p>This makes many unionists uncomfortable, and is why DUP leader Arlene Foster has presented the backstop as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/feb/05/brussels-and-dublin-intransigence-could-mean-no-deal-brexit-dup-arlene-foster">an existential threat</a> that will “cause the break up of the UK into the mid and longer term”. </p>
<h2>Punching holes in his own legacy</h2>
<p>Trimble’s threat of a legal challenge smacks of his problem solving as a legal academic, no matter how hopeless the cause. Even if a judge agreed to hear such a challenge and not dismiss it as academic (on the basis that the withdrawal agreement might never be ratified) his two main <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0002bmj">arguments</a> are paper thin.</p>
<p>Trimble’s first complaint is that the withdrawal agreement would change the devolved administration’s competences and introduce new institutional arrangements – possibly a reference to the committees that would be formed to oversee the operation of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol within the withdrawal agreement. The problem with this claim is that the 1998 arrangements have never been set in stone. The Northern Ireland Assembly’s competences have changed over the intervening decades – adding responsibility for policing and justice, for example, in 2010. New institutional arrangements have also come and gone, such as the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/independent-monitoring-commission">Independent Monitoring Commission</a>.</p>
<p>The important factor is the underlying spirit of the post-1998 arrangements. Although the new arrangements in the withdrawal agreement were not created as a product of multi-party talks in Northern Ireland, they were put in place to defend the Good Friday Agreement arrangements against being undermined by Brexit. Which brings us to Trimble’s second complaint – that the backstop arrangements threaten Northern Ireland’s place in the UK without asking the consent of its people.</p>
<p>This argument runs straight into the problem that the UK Supreme Court already considered the question of how the principle of consent operates. When considering a 2017 <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgment.pdf">legal challenge</a> to Brexit, the court found that consent <a href="http://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitfilestore/Filetoupload,779431,en.pdf">only applies</a> to the question of whether Northern Ireland remains part of the UK.</p>
<p>Trimble’s possible legal challenge, if it ever gets off the ground, looks like a hiding to nothing. Worse, he is falling into line with Foster in adopting an approach to Brexit that punches holes in his own legacy. </p>
<p>Brexit threatens the deep connections that have been developed between Northern Ireland and Ireland since the 1990s. It stands to leave nationalists in Northern Ireland as Irish citizens in a non-EU territory, undermining many of their current EU citizenship rights. UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-news-live-theresa-may-speech-irish-backstop-border-dup-conservatives-latest-a8763511.html">assertion</a> that it is a “concerning time” for people in Northern Ireland is laden with understatement.</p>
<p>Without a backstop in place to protect these interests, without even a working assembly at Stormont because of an ongoing breakdown in power-sharing, nationalists will continue to loudly question what happened to their voice in Northern Ireland’s governance. The promise of an inclusive Northern Ireland becomes the unreachable star. That poses far greater questions for Northern Ireland’s continued place in the UK than the backstop.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111233/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Colin Murray receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (alongside A. O'Donoghue (Durham), S. de Mars (Newcastle) and B. Warwick (Durham)) to support the project “Performing Identities: Post-Brexit Northern Ireland and the reshaping of 21st-Century Governance" (Grant ES/S006214/1). This article does not reflect the views of the research council. </span></em></p>One of the architects of the Good Friday Agreement, David Trimble, is threatening legal action against a controversial part of the Brexit withdrawal agreement.Colin Murray, Reader in Public Law, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1022972018-08-29T09:29:09Z2018-08-29T09:29:09ZThere’s a reason why Northern Ireland has been without a government for more than 500 days – Brexit<p>After more than 500 days of stalemate, Northern Ireland has surpassed the record previously set by Belgium for the longest run in peacetime <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-45134828">without a working government</a>. The trigger for the collapse of Stormont’s power-sharing institutions concerned a relative anodyne issue – the implication of the DUP leader Arlene Foster in a seriously flawed <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/q-a-what-is-the-northern-ireland-cash-for-ash-scheme-1.2907866">renewable energy scheme</a>. However, there were a range of other factors which created a breakdown in trust between Foster’s party and Sinn Féin. Among these were the DUP’s opposition to Sinn Féin’s proposal of an act to help preserve and promote the Irish language and its refusal to countenance gay marriage. On top of these, there were issues relating to Northern Ireland’s past conflict.</p>
<p>Arguably, though, the key factor that continues to prevent an agreement to restore power-sharing in Northern Ireland is the same issue that has destabilised politics right across the UK: Brexit. The day after the vote to leave the EU in 2016, Sinn Féin called for a <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/gerry-adams-repeats-call-for-vote-on-united-ireland-1.3550189">vote on Irish unity</a>. This was linked to the threat that Brexit could re-establish a hard border in Ireland, with serious economic implications for both parts of the island. Sinn Féin argues that this might change the attitudes even of many unionists in Northern Ireland, creating a momentum towards republicans’ long-standing goal of reunification.</p>
<p>The DUP naturally opposed such suggestions. And, indeed, it had backed the Leave campaign in the referendum. So, after the surprising loss of the Westminster majority for the Conservatives in 2017’s election, it was much less surprising that the DUP came to their aid with <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conservative-and-dup-agreement-and-uk-government-financial-support-for-northern-ireland/agreement-between-the-conservative-and-unionist-party-and-the-democratic-unionist-party-on-support-for-the-government-in-parliament">a confidence-and-supply accord</a>.</p>
<p>Having a say in the governance of the UK as a whole, and helping to deliver the claimed “will of the British people” on Brexit, has helped burnish the DUP’s unionist credentials. Also, the Tory-DUP deal involved a commitment to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-tory-dup-deal-could-bring-even-stormier-waters-to-northern-ireland-79235">increase public spending in Northern Ireland</a>. This sold well with the DUP’s supporters, who, for many years, have chafed at the changes of the peace process, interpreted as rewarding republicans. Conversely, republicans now chafe at the DUP’s enhanced political influence. They note that a majority in Northern Ireland voted Remain, while support for the EU in the Irish Republic remains high.</p>
<p>Brexit has thus revived the ideologies of Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism, and reignited their most central dispute – continued union with Britain or unification with Ireland. Brexit has simply created a new arena for an age-old contest.</p>
<h2>Over to you, Brussels</h2>
<p>This underlying tension is arguably the real reason for the continued failure of efforts to resolve other disagreements between the DUP and Sinn Féin and restore power-sharing. Indeed, these other issues are far less challenging than those previously resolved through the peace process. This is not to downplay the importance of Irish speakers in Northern Ireland having the same protections enjoyed by those using other indigenous languages across the UK and Ireland, or the rights of the gay community to marriage equality as in any other part of these islands. However, issues like the decommissioning of IRA weapons, policing reform, or the release of paramilitary prisoners under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement proved far more controversial. Yet they were all delivered, and so established the basis for Sinn Féin and the DUP to work together in government for nearly a decade.</p>
<p>However, the peace process did not reconcile Sinn Féin and the DUP. It forced them to be friends. Specifically, the British and Irish governments made clear that they could only have power if they shared power. The unity of political purpose between London and Dublin, so evident and successful in the early years of the peace process, has been seriously damaged by Brexit. Though there are very particular implications for Northern Ireland and the Irish border, Brexit has created wider challenges for London and Dublin. Given the highly important all-Ireland and UK dimensions of Irish trade, and nearly half a century of British integration with Europe, the outcome of Brexit could have massively disruptive effects on either or both national economies.</p>
<p>This has often left London and Dublin at odds in the course of the Brexit negotiations. The DUP’s role in supporting the Westminster government has only complicated matters further. While London and Dublin remain divided over the direction of Brexit, however, they cannot lead a co-ordinated effort to force the Northern Ireland parties to resolve their differences and restore power-sharing at Stormont.</p>
<p>This creates a Catch-22. Just as the issue of the Irish border remains the chief obstacle to an agreement on Brexit, so Brexit remains the chief obstacle to an agreement at Stormont. It seems then that a political deal in Belfast will only emerge as we near a political deal in Brussels. Northern Ireland may have taken the Belgian title for the longest period without governance, but ironically it is in the Belgian capital that any move to end that run will likely develop.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belgium held the previous record with 541 days without a government. What’s holding up power-sharing?Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1013322018-08-10T15:28:31Z2018-08-10T15:28:31ZNorthern Ireland needs a new unionism that reflects a diverse and multicultural UK<p>Since the spiralling civil conflict of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/day_troubles_began">the Troubles</a> in the early 1970s, <a href="http://www.kevinbyrne.ie/pubs/ByrneOMalley2013a.pdf">unionism</a> in Northern Ireland has always been more preoccupied with asserting its opposition to Irish unification, as opposed to articulating a vision of what it is and aspires to be, and how it fits into an increasingly multicultural United Kingdom.</p>
<p>People in Northern Ireland stoically resisted a <a href="http://www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-ireland-conflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#.W2xbbv5Kj-Y">campaign of republican violence</a> throughout the 30 years of the Troubles. But the reasons for this understandable hunkering down are long gone. The battlefield is now cultural and unionism is losing. </p>
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<h2>Declaring for the Union</h2>
<p>I was born 65 years ago in the predominantly Protestant environs of south Belfast; for me, Northern Ireland represents the corner of the Union that is both Irish and British. My cultural identity is bound up in this place and its symbolically endowed landscape that incorporates both these dimensions alongside a strong cultural and historical <a href="http://www.ulsterscotsagency.com/what-is-ulster-scots/">Scottish link</a>.</p>
<p>This space of the imagination and real cultural interaction remains potentially fluid. While unionism in the past has been associated with <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9781137453945_7">narrow triumphalism and religious dogma</a>, such influences are on the wane even if the pace appears frustratingly slow. To be out of step with wider liberalising currents in the UK is to invite embarrassment – that peculiar relative in the attic of the Union. But any attempt to distil the essence of unionism in more neutral, dry, constitutional relationships, obligations or even economic interests does not address the more fundamental cultural factors that define each group.</p>
<p>My unionist culture is part of a broader British culture which I unapologetically embrace. It has no truck with <a href="https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/10444060610734172?journalCode=ijcma">discriminatory sectarian practices</a>, which some have uncharitably labelled the very lifeblood of unionism. But the idea that unionist culture is shallow, based on economic supremacy and a hangover from a colonial presence still prevails. </p>
<p>The 1998 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Good-Friday-Agreement">Good Friday Agreement</a> that ended the Troubles recognises the importance of culture in acknowledging differences between the two major traditions in Northern Ireland. But after 20 years, the hoped-for generation of an emergent civic culture bridging the ethnic divide has failed to appear.</p>
<p>While unionism pragmatically saw the deal on the whole as the best available, republicanism sees the agreement as a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-30194908">transitional step</a> towards full Irish political unification. The result has been difficulty in moving beyond a war of cultural attrition; the potential fluidity of identities has been frozen.</p>
<p>What is needed is a notion of two identities embedded within a culture of openness and dialogue that is not closed to the potentially new, novel and unexpected. In reimagining itself, unionism must think beyond a <a href="http://www.sinnfein.ie/what-sinn-fein-stands-for">Sinn Féin</a> projection of cultural superiority and its cool reception to the idea of British-Irish identity. To engage effectively in cultural debate, unionism needs to have a more considered and long-term strategy.</p>
<h2>Last chance saloon</h2>
<p>Sinn Féin’s call to join in building a “new Ireland” (as opposed to a “united Ireland”) with a rainbow of identities, is a soft approach which gives unionism cause to be sceptical. And the way republicans have denigrated unionist tradition, portraying it as a stereotypical <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/22/ireland-sectarian-referendum-england-move-on">sectarian</a> monolith, is frequently criticised by seasoned political commentators and academics. But this is not to deny that certain unionist voices can also be insulting towards nationalist culture. </p>
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<span class="caption">Openness to dialogue and a sense of shared values is the way forward for Northern Ireland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.paimages.co.uk/image-details/2.1761122">PA</a></span>
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<p>Unionists need to set out their own stall. First they must assert their own brand of Irishness which is infused with Britishness as well. This involves more than recognising that the Irishness of Catholics requires legitimate expression in Northern Ireland – it must include the belated appropriation of Irishness as a constituent part of the Protestant unionist identity too. Engaging with current debates about identity and belonging in Brexit Britain is a substantial but vital challenge for unionism, whose past record has been poor.</p>
<p>Northern Ireland is often dismissed as “a place apart”, ignoring the historical bonds and close cultural relationship with Britain. But identities can become static if they’re not open to change as circumstances alter. Here unionism has not adapted well; it has to engage in the debate over what defines Britishness in an increasingly diverse society. A positive and less defensive case must be made for the Union.</p>
<p>Difference can be celebrated and respected, but it must be accompanied by shared values. The argument that British and Irish are not mutually exclusive categories needs strong voices as the Republic of Ireland calls on unionism in <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/good-friday-agreement-20th-anniversary/557393/">uncertain Brexit times</a> to throw in its lot with an evolving nation on a different European trajectory. Any response must go beyond saving the Union for unionists and make a case to the middle ground of Northern Irish Catholic opinion, which lack of vision has almost squandered. </p>
<h2>Selling the Union</h2>
<p>The prospect of a prosperous, secular, multicultural and eurocentric Republic of Ireland is a strong one. The watchwords of any counter offer must be courtesy, due recognition of cultural difference, reasonableness and compromise. And not sweating the small stuff. For unionism, circling the wagons is not an option. It will more likely survive through kind words than belligerence.</p>
<p>Returning recently to Ireland from a foreign trip I presented my British passport to a border official at Dublin Airport. Glancing at it, he said, “Welcome home sir”. Those three kind words did more to waken my Irish roots than three decades of armed IRA struggle.</p>
<p>Disputes over flags, <a href="https://www.irishpost.com/uncategorized/twelve-things-know-marching-season-northern-ireland-94314">marching</a> and place names are of course emotive, but the high ground does not promote parades that are not welcomed by locals. It does not seek to insult. It contemplates compromise on <a href="http://www.thejournal.ie/irish-language-act-explainer-3851417-Feb2018/">Gaelic language rights</a> and sees advantages in the rich and varied cultures of the UK. </p>
<p>As Brexit sees the middle ground of those open to such ideas recede further, the leader of political unionism, Arlene Foster, has begun to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-44605264">change tack</a> with outreaching gestures that reclaim the civic dimension of unionism with a more inclusive <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-44198803">citizenship and rights agenda</a>. But whether such belated and slow-moving attempts will be enough to lead on to a necessary reframing of unionism has yet to play out. </p>
<p>A unionist response has been too long in the making. Moderate unionism must reassert itself, because adhering staunchly to an identity bound up in the past has outlived its sell-by date.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William JV Neill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The only way forward is a more inclusive unionism that reflects the diverse and multicultural nature of the UK.William JV Neill, Visiting Professor, Institute of Irish Studies, QUB and Emeritus Professor of Spatial Planning, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/898122018-01-10T12:11:30Z2018-01-10T12:11:30ZAbortion rights: the DUP doesn’t seem to mind ‘regulatory divergence’ on this one important issue<p>The Democratic Unionist Party has consistently <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-deal-breaks-deadlock-experts-react-88879">stressed</a> that it will reject any Brexit deal which creates a regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.</p>
<p>This position has had a significant impact on Brexit talks to date. The British government has jumped through hoops to reassure the DUP that its promise not to impose a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland won’t also result in some kind of border emerging between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.</p>
<p>For a time, it looked as though Northern Ireland might be handed some kind of special status after Brexit. This was in order to avoid having to introduce customs checks at the border with the republic and to ensure the continued effective implementation of the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/583116/IPOL_BRI(2017)583116_EN.pdf">Good Friday Agreement</a>. DUP leader Arlene Foster said she would block any such move. Northern Ireland is part of the UK, the DUP argues, and must therefore continue to live by the same rules as the UK, not Europe.</p>
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<p>This perspective may be expected from a hardline unionist political party, but it’s hypocritical. Northern Ireland diverges from the rest of the UK on a number of matters, the majority of which have been consistently supported by the DUP. The party supports devolving power to the Northern Ireland Assembly to set corporation tax and air passenger duty, for example. That’s largely in the hope of competing with the Republic of Ireland for business. Same-sex marriage also remains banned.</p>
<p>What’s more, Northern Ireland diverges from the UK on the key matter of abortion. It has failed to adopt the 1967 British Abortion Act and continues to implement an archaic system. Procedures are only available in the most extreme circumstances. </p>
<p>This doesn’t mean, however, that women from Northern Ireland don’t have abortions. Almost <a href="http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefing_papers/series5/dr-bloomer-and-dr-hoggart-version-2.pdf">1,000 women</a> travel to England each year to access abortion services. Until <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/29/rebel-tories-could-back-northern-ireland-abortion-amendment">mid 2017</a>, they had to pay as private patients while all other British citizens were entitled to free care on the NHS. Countless others access the abortion pill online illegally, and have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/26/ulster-woman-who-bought-abortion-pills-for-daughter-can-challenge-prosecution">prosecuted</a> for doing so.</p>
<p>The DUP’s staunch opposition to any relaxation of abortion laws highlights the party’s ability to put aside the importance of consistency within the United Kingdom when it suits its political beliefs.</p>
<p>In fact, <a href="http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefing_papers/series6/bloomer161116.pdf">analysis</a> conducted on the five political debates which have taken place in Stormont on the issue since 2000 (with Dr Fiona Bloomer of Ulster University) highlights something quite surprising. DUP party members actually tend to subvert their unionism when discussing abortion. They reaffirm an all-island affinity on the issue and a united religious and political front. They refer to abortion as a topic that brings together Protestant and Catholic communities.</p>
<p>During a 2013 debate on the provision of abortion services in Belfast by the private provider Marie Stopes International, for example, DUP member Paul Givan illustrated a lack of concern for overarching legal consistency within the UK:</p>
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<p>Across the island of Ireland, we share a common bond in seeking to protect and provide the best care for mothers and unborn children. We are recognised globally as one of the premier providers of maternal care. That this common political bond has been replicated across our religious communities is demonstrated by support from the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Catholic Church. People ask what a shared future looks like, and I point to this moment of an SDLP, DUP and Ulster Unionist bringing forward proposed legislation related to the most basic of human rights; the right to life.</p>
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<p>Much of this rhetoric is misleading. Contemporary <a href="http://www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update115.pdf">opinion polls</a> indicate that both Catholic and Protestant communities are supportive of at least limited reform of abortion law. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/04/northern-irish-unionist-parties-alienating-young-protestants-study">Research</a> has highlighted that pro-unionist under-40s feel largely underrepresented by parties in the region because of the social conservatism of most unionist parties.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the majority of Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, yet the DUP continues to push an agenda that views a border with Ireland as preferable to a border with the rest of the UK. </p>
<p>The DUP seem to use different identities to support the limitation of rights to particular groups in Northern Ireland. This is increasingly worrying given the high stakes of Brexit and the powerful role the party now plays in Westminster through its <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservatives-strike-deal-with-the-dup-experts-react-80101">pact</a> with the Conservative Party.</p>
<p>The hypocrisy of the DUP when reiterating their opposition to regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK will be felt most keenly by those women from Northern Ireland who must continue to travel to England to access abortion services or who are forced to procure their abortion illegally online.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89812/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Pierson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Northern Irish party were horrified at the suggestion that Brexit might mean different customs rules. But when it comes to women’s rights, it’s a different story.Claire Pierson, Lecturer in Politics, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/886502017-12-05T12:02:09Z2017-12-05T12:02:09ZNever mind the DUP, Theresa May needs Ireland on side to survive this shambles<p>The <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ireland-border-deal-uk-latest-updates-brexit-eu-withdrawal-dup-dublin-republic-a8091326.html">debacle</a> that unfolded in Brussels on December 4 was a shambles on many levels – even by the standards of the Brexit talks, where rank amateurism on the UK side has long been the standard operating procedure.</p>
<p>The first formal <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-davis-brexit-no-notes-brexit-negotiations-a7845686.html">Brexit meeting</a> in July set the tone for what has followed over the past few months. Britain’s Brexit secretary David Davis was photographed turning up to the landmark talks without so much as a pen and paper. Meanwhile, on the other side of the table was a team of EU negotiators, armed with thick dossiers of notes in neatly arranged binders.</p>
<p>The most recent joint press conference, this time held by EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker and UK Prime Minister Theresa May was awkward. They had finally been ready to break some positive news and instead had to bite their lips, trying not to draw attention to what had become, behind the scenes, a diplomatic train wreck.</p>
<p>In fact, it all makes for an excellent case study of how not to negotiate. I’d use it with my students if it wasn’t quite so lacking in complexity. Start with a weak leader and a divided party, add a confused set of core objectives, agree to a text that you are not in a position to deliver on, reach an agreement with your main opponents and raise their expectations that you are primed to conclude a deal on those terms, then abandon your position at the last minute, leaving your negotiating partners dangling.</p>
<p>Irish taoiseach Leo Varadkar’s <a href="https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/2017/12/statement-by-the-taoiseach-on-brexit-talks-progress.pdf">comment</a> that he was “surprised and disappointed” that a draft text agreed by Dublin had not been signed off by the UK and EU was the sort of spectacular example of understatement that might have graced the lips of the most urbane of British diplomats. The only outcome from this sort of negotiating “style” is that you eventually come back to the negotiating table weakened and end up with an outcome based on less favourable terms than were available before.</p>
<p>However, Theresa May has had worse days – that’s how bad it is for her. By contrast, it looked like DUP leader Arlene Foster had a much stronger day. Her party flexed its muscles and torpedoed the deal, unable to control its collective gagging reflex over the “continued regulatory alignment” phrase at the heart of this aborted attempt at constructive ambiguity over the Irish border.</p>
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<p>To the DUP, this sounded very much as if Northern Ireland was being awarded an opt-out on Brexit that aligned it with the Irish Republic. The DUP is adamant that it wants to leave the EU on the same terms as the rest of the UK and has been clear for some weeks that an opt-out arrangement for Northern Ireland was totally unacceptable. May and her officials will now surely be spending some time trying to calm DUP fears about exactly what “continued regulatory alignment” means. However, any backing away now from the interpretations already provided on this to Dublin and Brussels would be politically impossible for them to accept – even if they wanted to.</p>
<h2>Ireland’s gain</h2>
<p>So what have we learned from this sorry episode? One key message to be drawn is that, notwithstanding the DUP winning the latest battle, it is Ireland that is winning the war. The DUP is experiencing a temporary period of influence over the current minority government but that won’t last forever, even with a good wind. And with every gaffe-strewn week that passes, the current government’s grip on power looks increasingly tenuous.</p>
<p>The Irish Republic, for so long the minor partner in its relationship with the UK, is experiencing an unparalleled phase of influence in Anglo-Irish relations and it looks set to remain in a dominant position in the months and years ahead – certainly until March 2019, assuming the UK continues to pursue a negotiated deal with the EU and tries to have it ratified by the other 27 states. That eventual deal will shape the political and economic future of the UK (perhaps whether there even continues to be a UK) for the next 25 to 50 years.</p>
<p>The Irish Republic effectively has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/leo-varadkar-irish-leader-reveals-fraying-patience-over-brexit-border-82099">veto</a> on any deal that the UK wishes to make with the EU. That veto has its limits, admittedly. A “no-deal” outcome would be economically disastrous for Ireland, so any black-balling from Dublin in the final analysis is far from a cost-free option. Notwithstanding that caveat, who does the UK need as an ally to ensure it gets the best settlement that it can? That would be Ireland – not the DUP. That inescapable fact will shape what happens between now and 2019 and conceivably into the transition period beyond that.</p>
<p>Arlene Foster and her party might care to ponder that going forward, irrespective of whether or not the DUP tail can continue to wag the Tory government dog in the short term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feargal Cochrane works for the University of Kent where he is Professor of International Conflict Analysis and is Vice Chair of the Political Studies Association in the UK. </span></em></p>The latest Brexit talks would offer a masterclass in how not to negotiate if they weren’t so lacking in complexity.Feargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/801022017-06-26T16:46:55Z2017-06-26T16:46:55ZDUP takes £1 billion to support Theresa May, but at what cost to the United Kingdom?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/175675/original/file-20170626-29088-hj97po.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nice work team.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservatives-strike-deal-with-the-dup-experts-react-80101">agreement</a>, following the UK general election, between the Conservative and Unionist Party and Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has seen both parties extend their cooperation beyond matters of confidence and supply, to vital questions of Brexit and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621794/Confidence_and_Supply_Agreement_between_the_Conservative_Party_and_the_DUP.pdf">national security</a>.</p>
<p>However, perhaps the most explosive aspect of the deal, in domestic political terms, pertains to the additional £1 billion “cash for votes” agreement. This will see extra money flow to Northern Ireland over the next two years. In effect, Theresa May’s government has spent £100 million of taxpayers’ money for the support of each of the ten DUP MPs at Westminster.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621797/UK_Govt__financial_support_for_Northern_Ireland.pdf">pledging</a> that financial support, the deal states that the government “recognises that Northern Ireland has unique circumstances within the United Kingdom, not least as a consequence of responding to the challenges of the past”.</p>
<p>Many people in England, Scotland and Wales may have imagined the existing fiscal and constitutional settlement had already recognised in full measure Northern Ireland’s “unique circumstances”. In 2015-16, the people of Northern Ireland were recipients of the highest identifiable public spending on services in the UK, at £10,983 per person. By contrast, Scotland received £10,536 per person and Wales just £9,996 per person. In <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/569815/Country_and_Regional_Analysis_November_2016.pdf">England</a> it was a mere £8,816 per person.</p>
<h2>Poor relations</h2>
<p>At such a critical juncture, when the political viability of fiscal austerity has been widely challenged, this agreement will reopen the debate about the fairness of the territorial allocation of public funding within and between the nations of the UK. This is currently allocated according to the archaic non-statutory <a href="http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7386">Barnett formula</a>.</p>
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<p>This system was devised in the late 1970s, prior to the election of the first Thatcher government, to determine changes to the block grants for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, based upon changes in the budgets of UK government programmes in England, for example for health and education. Such calculations would be made upon the basis of comparability between services in different parts of the UK, and the different proportions of the UK population in each nation.</p>
<p>The Conservative deal with the DUP includes an extra £200m for health services in Northern Ireland over the next two years. Under the terms of the most recent 2015 spending review, to justify spending of that kind, health funding in England would have had to have increased by £5.935bn over the same period.</p>
<p>May will argue that its funding deal for Northern Ireland lies outside the Barnett formula. It has provided the funding to the Northern Ireland Executive in addition to its block grant, rather than as a consequence of changes to health funding in England. Therefore, there should be no additional consequential funding for Scotland or Wales.</p>
<p>That technicality hasn’t gone down well as an excuse in Westminster, Holyrood and Cardiff. Labour leader <a href="http://press.labour.org.uk/post/162279198274/this-marks-another-decisive-blow-against-this">Jeremy Corbyn</a> insisted that “austerity has failed. Cuts to vital public services must be halted right across the UK, not just in Northern Ireland”. He further questioned where the money to fund the deal would come from, and whether all other parts of the UK would receive much needed additional funding.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2017/jun/26/brexit-eu-nationals-theresa-may-to-meet-arlene-foster-in-hope-of-finalising-torydup-deal-politics-live?page=with:block-5950ebeae4b0cdea6d8652c8#block-5950ebeae4b0cdea6d8652c8">Carwyn Jones</a>, the Welsh first minister, called the deal “a straight bung to keep a weak prime minister and a faltering government in office”. To him, the “outrageous” agreement “all but kills the idea of fair funding for the nations and regions” of the UK.</p>
<h2>The English problem</h2>
<p>However, the greatest political risks for the May government reside with the fiscal and political implications of its DUP deal for England – and with its impact upon potentially rebellious Conservative backbenchers. They are already dubious about the benefits for England of devolution, and could yet threaten the May Government’s wafer thin majority.</p>
<p>The Grenfell Tower fire has deepened public debate about the scale of England’s <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/report/housing-in-england-overview">housing crisis</a>, and the financial sustainability of <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/report/financial-sustainability-of-local-authorities-capital-expenditure-and-resourcing/">local government in England</a>, which also happens to have the lowest spending per person on health among the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539465/PESA_2016_Publication.pdf">nations of the UK</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the prime minister has found an additional £100m per year for two years to support the transformation of the NHS in Northern Ireland and another £50m per year for two years to address “immediate pressures in health and education” in Northern Ireland, while England’s schools face an average of <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/report/financial-sustainability-in-schools/">8% real terms’ funding cuts by 2019-20</a>.</p>
<p>For the May government, an agreement with the DUP is the political price to be paid for staying in office to implement Brexit. For Wales and Scotland, the UK government’s deal with the DUP has highlighted the fiscal limitations of the current devolution settlement. For voters and MPs in England, the very different funding settlement for health and education in Northern Ireland to their own has raised important questions about the price to be paid for preserving the UK’s “precious union”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80102/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A generous funding package for Northern Ireland has gone down like a lead balloon in other parts of the country.Simon Lee, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of HullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/801012017-06-26T15:26:23Z2017-06-26T15:26:23ZConservatives strike deal with the DUP: experts react<p>After more than two weeks of negotiating, Theresa May, the UK prime minister, has reached a confidence and supply deal with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). In exchange for parliamentary support for her minority government, May has pledged to invest around an extra £1 billion in Northern Ireland, largely to be spent on health, education and infrastructure. Below, our experts respond to the development.</p>
<h2>The view from Belfast</h2>
<p><strong>John Garry, professor of political behaviour, Queen’s University Belfast.</strong></p>
<p>“Our aim in these negotiations has been to deliver for <em>all</em> of the people of Northern Ireland.” DUP leader Arlene Foster’s heavy emphasis on the word “all” when announcing her <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621794/Confidence_and_Supply_Agreement_between_the_Conservative_Party_and_the_DUP.pdf">deal with the Conservative government</a> illustrates the way her party will sell this deal as a victory for Northern Ireland rather than a victory for the DUP or for unionism.</p>
<p>Everyone is in favour of great wads of cash, after all, and the DUP is bringing it home by the bucket load from London. The figure of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621797/UK_Govt__financial_support_for_Northern_Ireland.pdf">£1 billion</a> has a very nice round and rosy look to it and the DUP will quite rightly be able to boast that it has played a blinder at the negotiation poker table. There are promises of investments in Northern Ireland’s hospitals, roads and schools. It’s hard to knock that, whatever your community background.</p>
<p>And, right on script, the Welsh and the Scots are hopping mad with envy, which is fantastic news for the DUP. The greater their incandescence, the more savvy a political player Foster looks. Even the English are bemoaning the greater resources going to Northern Ireland. It’s very hard for political opponents to caricature Foster as primarily driven by a unionist agenda if she has managed to annoy the entire rest of the UK by redirecting British gold to Belfast. </p>
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<p>It’s crucial for the DUP that the coverage of this deal is about money for Northern Ireland as it will facilitate a story of ruthlessly effective engagement by the DUP at Westminster to improve the everyday lives of everyone in Northern Ireland – in contrast, the DUP will argue, to Sinn Féin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/fighting-an-election-only-to-refuse-a-seat-sinn-fein-and-westminster-abstention-76963">policy of abstention</a>. The greater challenge for the party is to convince people that this deal is completely separate from any emerging deal to re-establish a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-tory-dup-deal-could-bring-even-stormier-waters-to-northern-ireland-79235?sr=2">power sharing government</a> in Northern Ireland.</p>
<h2>The magic money tree blossoms</h2>
<p><strong>Stuart McAnulla, associate professor in politics, University of Leeds</strong></p>
<p>The money involved in this deal is much less likely to worry the Conservatives than the political cost. Many will ask why the Conservatives’ election manifesto didn’t contain more of the kind of pledges now being made for Northern Ireland in this deal.</p>
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<p>Having attacked Labour for offering endless funds from a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/06/magic-money-tree-theresa-may-banks-nurses">“magic money tree”</a>, the Conservatives will now be asked why money can seemingly be quickly found when it is politically expedient for them.</p>
<p>By no means were all Conservatives on board with this deal. Former prime minister <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/election-2017-john-major-theresa-may-conservatives-dup-deal-violence-northern-ireland-a7787681.html">John Major</a> warned it could destabilise the Northern Ireland peace process. Others argued the Conservatives could have governed as a minority without a formal deal, as the DUP would have been unlikely to vote against them in a confidence vote and risk the Republican-sympathetic Jeremy Corbyn becoming prime minister.</p>
<p>However, the deal does have clear benefits for the Conservatives. DUP backing is guaranteed on the issues of Brexit and security, and this could prove invaluable when controversial aspects of British withdrawal for the EU are debated. The deal offers May the possibility, however daunting, of leading Britain through Brexit, with the hope that successful leadership can turn around her fortunes. However in the short-to-medium term this arrangement will give ammunition to her opponents inside and outside the Conservative party.</p>
<h2>Understanding the political play</h2>
<p><strong>Katy Hayward, senior lecturer in sociology, Queen’s University Belfast</strong></p>
<p>The deal will please the party’s supporters in both style and content. The DUP’s statement emphasises the “shared priorities” of the two parties when it comes to national security and Brexit. The security aspect of the deal is really an opportunity to draw parallels between the threat of terrorism in the UK and the NI experience, which the DUP does not wish to be forgotten. The focus on Brexit is an attempt to show that DUP party interests are the same as “national” ones – even where they apparently conflict with the regional interests of Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The 56% Remain vote in Northern Ireland and the consistent evidence of the economic dangers posed to NI by a hard Brexit are made subservient here to the greater ideological cause. DUP leaders want to present themselves as dedicated evangelists for exiting the EU.</p>
<p>In terms of the details of the financial plan, there is no sense here of the future development of the UK or Northern Ireland’s place within it. The DUP wish list is made up of very local concerns (such as Belfast’s York Street interchange) and some rather vague demands (enhanced promotion of NI through UK embassies). Together, these demands fall far short of meeting the financial challenges that already exist in Northern Ireland, or that are bound to come as a result of Brexit. </p>
<h2>A corporation tax sweetener</h2>
<p><strong>Grahame Steven, lecturer in accounting, Edinburgh Napier University</strong></p>
<p>The UK currently has a single corporation tax rate – but this is apparently going to change. The agreement between the Tories and the DUP states that one of their first tasks is to devolve control of corporation tax rates to Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>If Stormont sets the Northern Irish tax rate lower than the rest of the UK, some companies will naturally be tempted to be taxed there. While this wouldn’t be practical for many companies – manufacturers, say, or retailers with face-to-face businesses – it could open up opportunities for plenty of others, in particular e-businesses. Still, if the rates were significantly lower, manufacturers could be tempted to set up marketing and research development activities in Northern Ireland to gain a tax advantage, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ireland-managed-to-keep-investment-flowing-during-the-tough-times-44379">as many companies have done</a> in the Republic of Ireland.</p>
<p>So how does this work? The internet allows businesses to deal directly with their customers wherever they’re located. <a href="http://www.seqlegal.com/blog/offer-and-acceptance-online">Legally speaking</a>, websites that display products are “invitations to treat”; an invitation is “accepted” when a confirmation email is sent to a customer from the country where the order is accepted. So provided they accept orders via the internet, companies can choose where they want to be taxed. Perhaps Amazon, Apple, Google and so on will start looking for office space in Belfast.</p>
<p>Still, this could be just the beginning. If the corporation tax promise is fulfilled, the Scottish government will surely consider seeking the same power. Should Wales enter the fray, the UK could end up with four tax jurisdictions competing for business by reducing tax rates. May’s government might just have kick-started a new race to the bottom.</p>
<h2>Historical precedent</h2>
<p><strong>Conor Mulvagh, lecturer in Irish history, University College Dublin</strong></p>
<p>It’s useful to consider some historical precedents for this deal. Between two major seat redistributions in the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2">Representation of the People Acts</a> of 1884 and 1918, Irish MPs managed to hold the balance of power in no less than four of the eight general elections held: 1885, 1892, and twice in 1910. Since the south of Ireland gained independence in 1922 and ceased to send MPs to Westminster, Northern Irish Westminster MPs have had occasion to call the shots when UK governments were clinging to power – but never before have they secured a position as commanding as that now held by the DUP.</p>
<p>The 1885 general election was the first time that British electors were rudely awakened to the fact that Irish MPs could seize the balance of power at Westminster and dictate the terms of their support. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/parnell_charles.shtml">Charles Stewart Parnell</a>, leader of the Irish Nationalist Home Rule party, was in a manifestly better position than that which DUP leader Arlene Foster occupies today. His party’s 86 seats could either grant Gladstone’s Liberal party a comfortable majority or he could combine with the Conservatives to produce a dead even split: 335 seats apiece. Parnell was not ashamed to entertain overtures from both parties. He extracted major concessions from Gladstone which ultimately split the British Liberal party over home rule in 1886. Foster does not have such a strong hand today. She can either prop up the government with a tight margin or she can send the entire country back to the polls.</p>
<p>In 1886, home rule was the price Parnell charged for his support, and all players knew in advance that would be the demand on the table. In 2017, the mainstay of the DUP deal with the Conservative party is cold hard cash. Only time will tell what impact an additional £1 billion in government spending will have for communities across Northern Ireland.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Garry is the Principal Investigator on the ESRC funded ‘Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study 2016’ and the Principal Investigator on the ESRC funded ‘The UK/Ireland Border and the Stability of Peace and Security in Northern Ireland’ study focusing on Brexit and Northern Ireland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katy Hayward has received funding from the ESRC and is on the Board of the Centre for Cross Border Studies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Conor Mulvagh, Grahame Steven, and Stuart McAnulla do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The unionists have pledged to back up the Conservative government in exchange for an extra £1 billion for Northern IrelandJohn Garry, School of History, Anthropology, Philosohy and Politics, Queen's University BelfastConor Mulvagh, Lecturer in Irish History, University College DublinGrahame Steven, Lecturer in Accounting, Edinburgh Napier UniversityKaty Hayward, Reader in Sociology, Queen's University BelfastStuart McAnulla, Associate Professor in Politics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792672017-06-12T10:48:25Z2017-06-12T10:48:25ZWhy more power for the DUP is bad news for abortion rights<p>For decades, there was a lack of awareness in the rest of the UK that the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/87/contents">1967 Abortion Act</a> did not apply to Northern Ireland. This started to change recently, as organisations such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/ireland-abortion-laws-violated-human-rights-says-un">UN</a> joined abortion activists in drawing attention to the lack of access to abortion for women in Northern Ireland. This general election result, in which the DUP was thrust centre stage as potential props of a minority Conservative government, is likely to further shine a light on their record.</p>
<p>Women’s rights to abortion in Northern Ireland have been held back significantly by this socially conservative party. DUP MPs have also consistently voted against abortion rights in the mainland – and are likely to do so again in the future.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/24-25/100/contents">1861 Offences Against the Person Act</a>, under which all abortion is a crime, is the primary legislation governing abortion in Northern Ireland. The 1967 act, which gave increased access to legal abortions in other parts of the UK, was never passed there.</p>
<p>The devolved government in Northern Ireland made no attempt to introduce parallel legislation. The only exception to an absolute ban on abortions is when there is a permanent or serious risk to a woman’s life or mental or physical health. In 2015 and 2016, there were only <a href="https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/health/hs-termination-of-pregnancy-stats-15-16.pdf">16 abortions</a> carried out in Northern Ireland under this exception. This means that the majority of women either have to travel to the British mainland and pay for their treatment or buy abortion pills online. While there are safe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/17/seeking-medical-abortions-online-is-safe-and-effective-study-finds">medically-supervised sites</a> that they can access, women risk being <a href="http://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2017/05/31/news/date-set-for-landmark-legal-bid-to-stop-prosecution-of-mother-for-allegedly-procuring-daughter-s-abortion-1041407/">prosecuted</a> unless they can afford and be able to arrange to travel.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, an attempt to allow women to access abortion in Northern Ireland in cases of fatal foetal abnormality and sexual crime was voted down in Stormont. The lack of access to abortion in these cases was ruled as a breach of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-35110085">women’s human rights</a> by the Belfast High Court. The DUP was among those who refused to allow women to access abortions in these circumstances.</p>
<h2>Voting record</h2>
<p>Despite the 1967 Abortion Act not applying to Northern Ireland, the DUP has often voted in debates surrounding the extension or restriction of the act in the Westminster parliament.</p>
<p>Recently, the DUP spoke and voted to restrict abortion in a proposed amendment to the serious crime bill in 2015 that was aimed at preventing abortion on the grounds of sex selection. The amendment was rejected after it was revealed that far from protecting female foetuses, it was part of a broader campaign to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-i-oppose-a-ban-on-sex-selection-abortion-36684">restrict abortion</a>. </p>
<p>Earlier this year, members of the DUP all voted against a bill to <a href="https://theconversation.com/abortion-is-still-illegal-in-the-uk-thanks-to-this-victorian-law-48536">decriminalise abortion</a> in England and Wales. This bill is significant as it sought to repeal the threat of criminal sanctions for abortion and ensure that it is treated as any other health procedure in England and Wales. The bill wouldn’t have changed the law in Northern Ireland – although it would have increased the divide in abortion rights with the mainland.</p>
<p>The DUP’s record on voting on abortion in parliament shows that the party is willing to use its political power to restrict abortion beyond Northern Ireland. This is in sharp contrast with the SNP, which did not vote on decriminalisation because abortion in Scotland is now a devolved issue.</p>
<h2>Political football</h2>
<p>At this stage, it’s impossible to know whether or not abortion rights could be used a political bargaining chip to keep the Conservative party in power. But there is reason to believe that it might happen, especially in the case of Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>In 2008, there was an attempt to extend the 1967 Abortion Act to Northern Ireland but the Labour government blocked it. It was widely believed that the government took this action in order to get backing for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/jun/12/terrorism.labour">terrorist legislation</a> from the DUP. This is the precedent on which many are currently assessing the current pact proposals with the DUP.</p>
<p>It’s unlikely that a Conservative/DUP pact would break with convention and seek to introduce new legislation on abortion, but that doesn’t mean abortion laws won’t be affected. If the DUP has a strengthened role in Westminster, it may not work as hard as it might otherwise would to restore power sharing in Northern Ireland, which is currently without a devolved government. </p>
<p>This could harm the chances of any future attempts to extend abortion rights, even in the very limited areas of fatal foetal abnormality and sexual crimes. Women seeking abortions will still have to break the law or arrange and pay to travel to the mainland.</p>
<p>In England and Wales, the DUP is likely to continue to vote against abortion rights, and if it holds the balance of power, it is entirely possible that backroom deals will be made to prevent any extension of abortion rights being made by blocking attempts to insert progressive clauses into other bills or even though introducing attempts to restrict abortion in other acts.</p>
<p>The DUP’s homophobic and sexist agenda has been an issue in Northern Ireland for decades, and even while courting the party’s support, the Conservatives are trying to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40238454">distance themselves</a> from being associated with this. There is already public opposition to any arrangement, especially from those campaigning for better access to abortion.</p>
<p>It’s important now that all those in opposition to the DUP’s position on abortion join forces to work together to defend and extend abortion rights in all parts of the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79267/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pam Lowe is member of Abortion Rights and the Labour Party. </span></em></p>Northern Ireland remains out of step with the rest of the UK when it comes to accessing abortion. Now the people behind that have become extremely powerful.Pam Lowe, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792352017-06-09T15:59:17Z2017-06-09T15:59:17ZWhy a Tory-DUP deal could bring even stormier waters to Northern Ireland<p>The website of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) crashed amid a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40211261">surge of interest</a> in the Northern Irish party. “DUP” was also one of the most searched terms on Google as the party emerged as kingmakers whose ten seats at Westminster could help the Conservatives hold onto power after Theresa May’s party lost its overall majority. But the DUP will drive a hard bargain.</p>
<p>Before <a href="https://twitter.com/BBCBreaking/status/873176075081101314">announcing</a> that her party would explore a deal with the Conservatives, DUP leader Arlene Foster <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/776bc97d-14fd-3898-9bf7-2327f554c24e">had already suggested</a> that it would be “difficult” for May to remain as Tory leader. Yet standing on the steps of 10 Downing Street, May showed no signs that she was planning to resign. Foster’s comments may be just part of a pre-negotiating strategy. Subsequently showing “flexibility” on the Tory leadership issue – about which the DUP likely care little – would allow the party to extract concessions elsewhere, which is probably their real intent. </p>
<p>Primarily they will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-the-dup-will-want-in-return-for-propping-up-a-conservative-government-79222">aiming for</a> lots of “goodies” for Northern Ireland – including economic and particularly infrastructure investment, and additional support for seriously stretched healthcare services. </p>
<p>This would obviously allow the DUP to show its own supporters what they had gained for Northern Ireland. It is also a deal that the Tories could easily sell to its heartlands, by working with a party very similar to its own in attitude to the union, its economic philosophy, and its preparedness to countenance even a hard Brexit. Despite May’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/hung-parliament-disaster-for-the-tories-election-weekly-podcast-79223">obvious misjudgment</a> in calling a snap election, she might still be able to claim the “strong and stable” government she said she was seeking in advance of the Brexit negotiations.</p>
<h2>Less room for manoeuvre</h2>
<p>However, the implications of such a deal for the UK, Brexit, and particularly for Northern Ireland, may all be less rosy. Even with DUP support, May (or any alternative leader), still has a slimmer majority than the one with which the Tories entered the election. The Conservative leader would still have to deal with zealously anti-European Tory backbenchers who are likely to cause problems in the difficult Brexit talks ahead. Indeed, their numbers would be boosted by some similarly “uber-patriotic” Britishness from the DUP ranks. </p>
<p>This defeats what was surely the underlying aim of May’s bid for an increased majority: the room for manoeuvre and the ability to compromise in EU talks, without being held hostage by a few backbench rebels. May’s more obvious aim, to weaken the political opposition on the other side of the Commons, has also been defeated. A remarkable campaign by Jeremy Corbyn, clearly aided by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-seismic-shift-has-occurred-in-british-politics-79209">surging youth vote</a>, produced a stronger and newly energised Labour party that will harry any Tory-led government through the challenges ahead. Good for democracy, certainly – but for stability and a workable Brexit deal, less so.</p>
<h2>A Sinn Féin faultline</h2>
<p>While Northern Ireland might get some shiny new motorways and more much-needed GPs, there are serious political implications to a Tory-DUP deal. The DUP vote has risen, but so has Sinn Féin’s. Together, they now hold all but one seat in Northern Ireland. This reflects the continued electoral polarisation of the region in recent months, which has now seen the moderate SDLP and UUP wholly wiped from the political map. </p>
<p>This does not bode well for the difficult talks and compromise that are also necessary in Northern Ireland if it is to restore the <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-ireland-faces-a-bunch-of-bad-options-as-it-strives-to-keep-devolution-alive-75465">recently collapsed</a> local power-sharing arrangements. </p>
<p>A DUP deal at Westminster, where Sinn Féin refuse to take their seats, will facilitate a Brexit deal which could have huge ramifications for the Irish border. Sinn Féin and other nationalists want “<a href="http://www.irishnews.com/news/politicalnews/2017/02/06/news/brexit-sinn-fe-in-writes-to-27-leaders-asking-for-special-eu-status-support-921729/">special case</a>” status for Northern Ireland in the Brexit talks – some way of keeping it in the single European market, thus avoiding a <a href="https://theconversation.com/fortress-island-britain-what-could-happen-to-uk-borders-after-brexit-69744">customs border</a> in Ireland, and the potentially disastrous effects that would have for economies North and South. </p>
<p>Such a deal would effectively involve moving the border to the Irish sea. Economic and other controls would then exist between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, with the possibility of Ulster unionists requiring passports to travel to Scotland and England. Such decoupling of the UK and Northern Ireland is why the DUP have opposed Sinn Féin’s line on Europe, even if Northern Ireland’s departure from the European trading bloc could have terrible effects for their own supporters, particularly those in farming and border communities.</p>
<p>While the DUP might enjoy the prestige and new power that comes with any Westminster deal, and take delight in defeating Sinn Féin’s line on Brexit, any strengthening of the Irish border as a result will only feed nationalist anger and backing for a referendum on Irish unity. So, while Sinn Féin may feign outrage at any DUP-Tory pact, they do so knowing it boosts support for their agenda. As ever, Sinn Féin and the DUP continue to enjoy a symbiotic relationship – each feeding off the other.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79235/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A deal could have huge implications for Brexit and politics in Northern Ireland.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/737082017-03-01T09:53:42Z2017-03-01T09:53:42ZScorpions in a bottle: the fight between Northern Ireland’s two main parties defines another election<p>Northern Ireland witnessed the seemingly unthinkable in 2007. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/ian_paisley/">Protestant fundamentalist and hardline DUP leader, Ian Paisley</a> sat down alongside <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-37425809">alleged former IRA chief</a> Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Féin, to announce that their parties had agreed to share power.</p>
<p>Though this unlikely alliance has now survived for 10 years, it remains inherently unstable. Sinn Féin and the DUP are, to invert a famous phrase from George W Bush, a “coalition of the unwilling”.</p>
<p>Now, less than a year since the last election, Northern Ireland is again voting for a new assembly. The likely result? Sinn Féin and the DUP will once more be elected the leading parties in their respective communities. And given that the reason for the premature vote was that Sinn Féin and the DUP could not agree on a way forward in the last assembly, stalemate and instability loom again.</p>
<h2>The spat</h2>
<p>The trigger for the most recent breakdown was the so-called <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/q-a-what-is-the-northern-ireland-cash-for-ash-scheme-1.2907866">“cash-for-ash” scandal</a>, relating to a renewable heat incentive scheme established under Arlene Foster, the then minister for enterprise, now DUP leader and – until recently – Northern Ireland’s first minister. The scheme was woefully planned, leading to a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38414486">likely overspend of £490m for taxpayers to cover</a>.</p>
<p>But even in the wake of the scandal, Foster refused to do as any leader operating in a more normal political system would and step aside. The reason she would not? Because Sinn Féin demanded she do so. And thus the reason why the Sinn Féin leader, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/09/martin-mcguinness-to-resign-as-northern-ireland-deputy-first-minister">Martin McGuinness, instead resigned</a>? Because he therefore felt he could no longer stay in government with the DUP. Neither side could be seen to back down to the other, such is the sectarian imperative which still drives politics in Northern Ireland. Conceding ground to the “other side” will cost you support among your “own”.</p>
<p>McGuinness’s resignation precipitated the new election – the political system in Northern Ireland requiring the support of a majority on both sides of the divide in order to function. But with the poll likely to see Sinn Féin and the DUP retaining their positions as the leading parties in their respective communities, they will remain as scorpions in a bottle.</p>
<h2>The campaign</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.sinnfein.ie/">Sinn Féin’s election campaign has championed two main principles</a>. First is “integrity” – an implicit reference to the cash-for-ash scandal. Then comes “equality” – a demand which resonates with Sinn Féin’s political base in a number of ways. Because it comes from an ostensibly socialist party, the goal suggests socio-economic or gender equality, but also equality in terms of sexual orientation. Sinn Féin supports the introduction of gay marriage in Northern Ireland – something which the DUP has previously resisted. But it also implies cultural equality. Sinn Féin is demanding that the Irish language be given the same official status as English in Northern Ireland. Unsurprisingly, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38881559">Foster has already responded by saying she will never agree to this</a>.</p>
<p>As the largest unionist party, the particular provisions of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf">the Good Friday Agreement</a> allow the DUP to veto all of Sinn Féin’s demands, and Foster appears to enjoy the idea that this shows republicans who is really the boss. However, as the largest nationalist party, the Good Friday Agreement also allows Sinn Féin to do likewise. It can veto the DUP’s return to government.</p>
<p>If the two main parties cannot agree the terms on which they will share power, they will not exercise any power. Foster seemed to forget this in resisting all of Sinn Féin’s aims. She seemed to think that her title of first minister made her the boss, when in fact the deputy first minister enjoys the exact same powers – something McGuinness, who held the post, clearly demonstrated when he pulled the plug on the last assembly.</p>
<p>In truth, though, Foster is acutely aware of Sinn Féin’s power. She has emphasised the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-39030276">threat of Sinn Féin</a> overtaking the DUP in the impending vote, which would deliver a republican first minister. In constantly reminding voters of this, Foster is arguably hoping to scare would-be defectors in her own camp – DUP supporters also perturbed by the cash-for-ash scandal who might contemplate voting for an alternative unionist party.</p>
<p>However, obtaining the role of first minister wouldn’t give Sinn Féin any more powers than it previously enjoyed, and unionists would retain their veto over anything republicans might propose. That is the beauty of the Good Friday Agreement – protecting nationalists as the current minority, but unionists if the tables were to turn. This guarantee should give political leaders on each side the confidence to pursue a more normal political agenda rather than narrow sectarian strategies. </p>
<p>Instead, we see the same old dynamic at play, with the DUP demanding that all unionists rally behind its banner as the only way to avoid the supposed dangers of a Sinn Féin first minister – a prospect which would, as noted, in no way enhance republicans’ actual power. However, calls for sectarian solidarity on one side of the divide only promote the same on the other. Thus, Sinn Féin and the DUP enjoy a strangely symbiotic relationship. Support for one feeds the other.</p>
<h2>The worst possible moment</h2>
<p>All this could not come at a worse time for Northern Ireland. Brexit and the possible return of a hard border in Ireland could have terrible economic consequences, and further <a href="https://theconversation.com/fortress-island-britain-what-could-happen-to-uk-borders-after-brexit-69744">destabilise the peace process</a>. But instead of working to find an agreed strategy for Northern Ireland in the critical Brexit talks ahead, politicians are again in dispute with one another.</p>
<p>Despite my pessimistic tone, none of this is actually inevitable. Voters could change everything in this election if they backed different politicians. They could vote for those genuinely prepared to work with one another and for the good of all of Northern Ireland. Indeed, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results">nearly half of all electors did not vote in the last two assembly elections</a>. If they and others chose to use their most fundamental political right in a different way, there would be a very different outcome. If they don’t, they can’t simply complain that democracy is not working in Northern Ireland – people, as well as politicians, have to make it work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73708/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The two ruling parties live by the letter of the Good Friday Agreement, but not the spirit.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/714182017-01-17T13:46:45Z2017-01-17T13:46:45ZHow Northern Ireland’s government went from mutual suspicion to collapse<blockquote>
<p>As doctors say of a wasting disease, to start with it is easy to cure but difficult to diagnose; after a time, unless it has been diagnosed and treated at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. So it is in politics.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This quote in some ways explains the collapse of the Northern Ireland government. But it comes not from the lips of the former deputy first minister, Martin McGuinness, whose <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38561507">resignation</a> has effectively <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38644157">forced a forthcoming election</a> in March, but from Niccoló Machiavelli’s advice in The Prince, written in 1513. It gets to the heart of why the Northern Ireland Executive has collapsed barely eight months after the last election, which pitched Sinn Féin and the DUP into a two-party coalition government for the first time ever.</p>
<p>The relationship between the DUP and Sinn Féin had been souring for several years before this debacle, but it wasn’t always so. The former DUP leader and first minister, Ian Paisley, formed the unlikeliest of relationships with McGuinness when the two governed together. They got on so well that they were affectionately known as the <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/filming-to-begin-on-ian-paisley-and-martin-mcguinness-chuckle-brothers-comedy-drama-the-journey-31567404.html">Chuckle Brothers</a>. While working together, the two agreed to disagree about Northern Ireland’s final destination as part of the UK or a reunited Irish state.</p>
<h2>Declining relations</h2>
<p>A more humourless dynamic arrived when Peter Robinson succeeded Paisley in 2008. The relationship between the two parties began to unwind. This was partly because the DUP benefited electorally from a frosty public relationship with Sinn Féin. An assertive brand of unionism helped prevent votes from leaking to the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the DUP’s main unionist rival party.</p>
<p>Political space narrowed further when identity politics began to reassert itself over the disputed flags in December 2012. Unionists complained about Belfast City Council’s decision to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20651163">only fly the Union flag on designated days</a> (in line with the rest of Great Britain) rather than every day, as had been done before.</p>
<p>Agreements between the DUP and Sinn Féin began to disintegrate. The planned regeneration of the former Maze prison was, for example, abandoned: under pressure from unionist hardliners, the DUP decided the project risked turning the site into a “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22279360">shrine to terrorism</a>”.</p>
<p>From 2007 until the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results">last assembly election</a> in May 2016, the relationship between the DUP and Sinn Féin has been mediated by the fact that they were the two dominant partners in a five-party coalition. Smaller partners the UUP and SDLP declined to take their seats in government and instead went into formal opposition. This left the DUP and Sinn Féin joined cantankerously at the hip in government.</p>
<h2>Referendum rancour</h2>
<p>Then came <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">Brexit</a>. The result of the June referendum provided a structural basis for the DUP and Sinn Féin to rationalise their adversarial behaviour. A programme for government, hammered out at great pains just a month previously, was significantly derailed by the fact that the DUP and Sinn Féin adopted opposing positions on Brexit.</p>
<p>The subsequent months have calcified their positions – and this looks likely to become more entrenched after Article 50 is triggered in March 2017. Disagreement over leaving the EU, and a post-Brexit deal, have re-energised an aspect of the NI conflict that many had hoped had been anaesthetised by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement">Good Friday Agreement</a> in 1998.</p>
<p>Since then, the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland has become more of a porous membrane. Now the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/09/britain-to-push-post-brexit-uk-immigration-controls-back-to-irish-border">land border</a> may need to be more formally demarcated and policed, since one side will remain in the EU and the other will be leaving. </p>
<p>Leaving aside the economic impacts, a hard Brexit threatens to emphasise the Britishness and Irishness of the two jurisdictions, shining a harsh unforgiving light on the “constitutional question”.</p>
<h2>A rough campaign</h2>
<p>Following the collapse of the government, an election has been scheduled for March 2. And the campaign looks set to be nasty. Rather than defending their records in government, the DUP and Sinn Féin will call each other out.</p>
<p>Sinn Féin will focus on First Minister Arlene Foster’s personal responsibility for the <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/q-a-what-is-the-northern-ireland-cash-for-ash-scheme-1.2907866">Renewable Heating Initiative</a> scandal that cost taxpayers £490m. The party will also suggest that wider policy decisions, not least the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38422550">withdrawal of public money</a> for the Irish language classes in the run up to Christmas, demonstrated the anti-nationalist mentality of the DUP. More broadly, the DUP will be accused of arrogance and contempt for the supposed partnership with Sinn Féin.</p>
<p>For its part, the DUP will criticise Sinn Féin for prompting the collapse of the government in the first place by deciding not to replace McGuinness after his resignation. It will say Sinn Féin is putting everyone through a needless election as a result, disguising narrow party interests as political principle.</p>
<p>An election suits Sinn Féin more than the DUP. Foster’s personal credibility has been badly damaged by the funding scandal and the DUP may suffer some electoral losses to the UUP. Sinn Féin also looks set to take votes from the SDLP as a result of changes to the electoral system. In the assembly election on March 2, the number of seats will be reduced from 108 to 90, meaning that smaller parties such as the SDLP are likely to be squeezed further in a system that benefits the larger parties. </p>
<p>But whatever happens in the election, it is almost certain that the DUP and Sinn Féin will remain the two largest parties. After they finish negotiating following the election (which may take weeks, months or years) they will have to face each other once again in government. And all of the issues that have torn them apart will have become more difficult to resolve in the meantime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feargal Cochrane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What was already an uneasy alliance first turned sour, and then utterly disintegrated. Where did it all go wrong?Feargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/524732015-12-17T17:39:55Z2015-12-17T17:39:55ZFive things you need to know about Northern Ireland’s new leader<p>Northern Ireland is to have a new first minister in January, in the form of Arlene Foster, the new leader of the pro-UK Democratic Unionist Party. Foster will take over from her DUP colleague Peter Robinson, who has held the position since 2008.</p>
<p>Her arrival as leader will mark a <a href="http://repository.liv.ac.uk/1657692/">pivotal change</a> for the party and for Northern Ireland. This is what you need to know about the woman taking on the most tumultuous job in British politics.</p>
<h2>She’s a she!</h2>
<p>Foster is the first woman to lead Northern Ireland – which is certainly worth shouting about given the current gender disparity in the national assembly and at all levels of government.</p>
<p>Over the past 15 years, in local, national and European elections, Northern Ireland has been shamed by the gender parity efforts of the UK’s other devolved institutions.</p>
<p>The Scottish parliament and Welsh Assembly have had an average of 37% and 45% of female elected representatives respectively since 1998. Northern Ireland lags considerably behind at <a href="http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/content/69/1/93.full?keytype=ref&ijkey=kcpP9Q3QR64Pbjn">just 17%</a>. </p>
<p>One of the main hurdles to gender equality are the conservative gender roles that Foster herself has acknowledged when we interviewed her in 2013:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Inevitably I get asked the question of my children … and what is really frustrating is that you never ask that of any of my male colleagues … I think Northern Ireland is a very conservative society. I think it’s changing and I do think that generally the electorate want to see a reflection back at them of society.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The analysis is spot on. In the 2015 General Election Survey, almost two-thirds (65%) of people in Northern Ireland said they wanted to see more women elected. </p>
<p>During an all woman <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2014.970826#.VnLP3sCLRhA">focus group</a>, party members referred to Foster as an inspiration and “the champion of women” in the DUP. Let’s see if she will live up to expectation.</p>
<h2>She voted against the Belfast Agreement</h2>
<p>The peace process in Northern Ireland culminated in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement">Belfast/Good Friday Agreement</a> in 1998. The deal was <a href="http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm">approved by 72%</a> of the population in Northern Ireland – but Foster wasn’t one of them.</p>
<p>She <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/politics/fostering-ambition-we-profile-politician-arlene-foster-31226463.html">opposed the vague arrangements</a> being made for IRA decommissioning, the early release of paramilitary prisoners and reforms to policing.</p>
<p>Having negotiated further on some of these key issues in subsequent agreements, including Sinn Fein’s support for policing in the region, the DUP entered <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-northern-irish-politics-40443">power sharing</a> with its historic republican enemy in 2007.</p>
<p>Interaction between the two governing parties remain minimal and relations are tense, but Foster has said that the difficulties between the two parties must be overcome since both have a mandate to govern. Pragmatism, it seems, trumps the politics of dislike.</p>
<h2>She used to be in the Ulster Unionist Party</h2>
<p>In 2004 Foster was among a group of politicians who defected from the Ulster Unionist Party to the DUP. She brought many grass roots supporters with her. One local party member exclaimed at the time: “Wherever Arlene goes, I follow”.</p>
<p>Between 1998 and 2006 the Belfast Agreement acted as the catalyst for a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/3419253.stm">mass defection</a> from the UUP to the DUP. The DUP was presenting itself as a party of protest and pledged to make sure Northern Ireland remained part of the UK. The UUP was seen as conceding too much to Sinn Fein at the expense of the unionist community. </p>
<p>The DUP’s defence of the union remains its main appeal – something Foster, as a former UUP member, will be well aware of. </p>
<h2>She voted against same-sex marriage</h2>
<p>The DUP is largely conservative and greatly influenced by Evangelical Christian beliefs. The UUP defectors tend to be less religious but the bulk of the party continues to oppose same-sex marriage and abortion.</p>
<p>Two-thirds of DUP party members say they think <a href="http://www.ippr.org/juncture/between-money-and-morality-how-would-northern-irelands-dup-approach-post-election-deal-making">homosexuality is wrong</a> and the party (including Foster) <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-ten-years-of-civil-partnerships-we-still-arent-sure-what-they-mean-or-who-theyre-for-50644">blocked a vote to legalise same-sex marriage in November</a>, even though it had been approved by the assembly. This position appears out of step with public opinion in Northern Ireland, since only 28% in the Northern Ireland Election Survey opposed same-sex marriage. </p>
<p>When it comes to abortion, four-fifths of the party membership are against legalisation in Northern Ireland. This, again, leaves the DUP in a difficult position, since a high court judge <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-court-just-made-a-landmark-ruling-for-abortion-rights-in-northern-ireland-51520">recently ruled</a> the current law on abortion in Northern Ireland is “incompatible” with human rights law and that the almost total ban on access in Northern Ireland should at least be relaxed in cases of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormalities. Less than a third of the Northern Irish population <a href="http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/projects?ref=ES/L007320/1">disagree</a> that abortion should be legalised. </p>
<p>While the DUP remains relatively united against any change on either of these issues, Foster faces the tricky task of justifying its stance to the broader population.</p>
<h2>She’s not entirely new to the job</h2>
<p>Foster has in fact held the position of first minister before, replacing Robinson for <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/14/peter-robinson-rejects-1bn-property-sell-off-payment-accusations-northern-ireland-first-minister-nama-deal-us-firm-cerberus">six weeks</a> as acting first minister in 2010 while he dealt with allegations about his finances.</p>
<p>During this time, she steered the DUP ship through significant political wrangling. Her appointment signalled that the DUP had faith in her political leadership. The looming election is an opportunity for Foster to assert her authority and set the tone for her tenure as party leader.</p>
<p>Her first tasks will be to work out how to accommodate a burgeoning DUP membership base with a broadening spectrum of attitudes, how to take on her former colleagues (and now main political rivals) at the UUP, and how to shore up the electoral gains made under her predecessor.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maire Braniff receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council and Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Whiting does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>She defected from the UUP to the DUP, and now Arlene Foster will be the first woman to run Northern Ireland. Here’s where she stands on the big issues.Sophie Whiting, Lecturer in Politics, University of BathMaire Braniff, Lecturer in Sociology, Ulster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.