tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/arms-trade-5966/articles
Arms trade – The Conversation
2024-01-23T13:29:14Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/220762
2024-01-23T13:29:14Z
2024-01-23T13:29:14Z
Where do Israel and Hamas get their weapons?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570215/original/file-20240118-27-hgtf33.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C0%2C8155%2C5457&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli artillery fires toward Gaza.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-taken-in-southern-israel-near-the-border-with-the-news-photo/1861492342">Menahem Kahana/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fighting continues between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas militants in and around Gaza. The death tolls continue to rise, but where do the weapons keep coming from?</p>
<p>The Israeli government estimates that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-details-ultra-secret-buildup-to-october-7-and-isolation-of-hamas-in-its-wake/">Hamas’ surprise attack</a> on Oct. 7, 2023, killed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/12/world/middleeast/israel-death-toll-hamas-attack.html">1,200 people</a> in Israel. </p>
<p>Since then, both sides have fired missiles and rockets, mortars and other weapons at each other. Israeli missiles and bombs have killed over <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/">25,000 people</a> in Gaza, according to the United Nations. Hamas has launched over <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/palestinian-rocket-and-mortar-attacks-against-israel">13,000 rockets and mortar rounds</a> into Israel and <a href="https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/swords-of-iron-idf-casualties">killed 189</a> Israel Defense Forces soldiers. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=HJCRh1MAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of the global defense industry and international weapons trade</a>, I see that both Israel and Hamas make some of their own weapons and get the rest from suppliers in other nations.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers stand near piles of cylinders." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570217/original/file-20240118-17-zkx24s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Israeli troops store tank shells near the Israel-Gaza border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/33027649211441e5a28d452de8a4c25f/photo">AP Photo/Leo Correa</a></span>
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<h2>Israel’s weapons supply</h2>
<p>Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been acutely aware that it is surrounded by hostile countries with many more inhabitants. Its defense strategy has emphasized self-sufficiency and <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250088345/theweaponwizards">advanced technology</a>. This philosophy has been reinforced and refined by the nation’s experience in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars">prior wars</a> in 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well as prior conflicts in Gaza and the West Bank. </p>
<p>And its defense spending matches this priority. In 2022, Israel <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=IL">spent 4.5% of its gross domestic product</a> on defense, a share that was the lowest in decades but <a href="https://milex.sipri.org/sipri">more per person – US$2,623</a> – than any other country except Qatar.</p>
<p>For a small country, Israel has a highly regarded defense industry, which can ramp up production on short notice in case of increased fighting. <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-11/fs_2312_top_100_2022.pdf">Three Israeli companies</a> rank among the world’s top 100 arms producers: Elbit Systems manufactures ammunition and artillery; Israel Aerospace Industries produces unmanned aerial vehicles; and Rafael makes air defense systems. Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries collaborated to develop the highly regarded <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20385306">Iron Dome</a> missile defense system. The U.S. <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/iron-dome/">provided</a> development aid, and about half of Iron Dome’s components are made in America.</p>
<p>Led by those firms, Israel has gone from being a net weapons <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/infographic-what-you-need-to-know-about-israels-military">importer</a> to the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-and-military-expenditure/international-arms-transfers">10th-largest arms exporter</a>. Much of its success in the weapons industry is a result of <a href="https://startupnationbook.com">entrepreneurship and innovation within the overall economy</a>, as well as civilian-military linkages. Since most Israelis are required to serve in the military, they develop decision-making and leadership skills at a young age. They also tend to be given tasks with high levels of responsibility. All of this contributes to the country’s startup and entrepreneurial culture.</p>
<p>Israel also imports weapons from other countries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s <a href="https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php">arms transfers database</a>, 68% of Israel’s weapons imports from 2013 to 2022 came from the U.S. Another 28% came from Germany. Imports are funded in part by $3.3 billion of military aid <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-military-aid-israel-gaza-war/">provided</a> annually by the U.S., along with $500 million for missile defense cooperation.</p>
<p>Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the U.S. has provided more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/21/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-bomb-investigation.html">5,000 MK-84 munitions</a>, a type of 2,000-pound bomb. As of late December 2023, the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-receives-230-planes-20-ships-loaded-with-us-arms-amid-gaza-war/3092301">U.S. had sent</a> artillery shells, armored vehicles and basic combat tools to Israel, delivered in 230 cargo planes and 20 ships. </p>
<p>U.S. military aid to Israel also includes stockpiled weapons. For years, the Pentagon has <a href="https://jinsa.org/sending-dumb-weapons-from-israel-to-ukraine/">stored weapons</a> in Israel, presumably for use by the U.S. military. But the U.S. has allowed Israel to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/27/gaza-war-puts-us-extensive-weapons-stockpile-in-israel-under-scrutiny">draw down</a> some of these supplies during the Gaza conflict. </p>
<p>In fact, the U.S. has directed some of these stored armaments to be <a href="https://jinsa.org/sending-dumb-weapons-from-israel-to-ukraine/">sent to Ukraine</a>, which allows those warehouses in Israel to be restocked with more advanced equipment. Less sophisticated bombs and bullets shipped to Ukraine will free up space, to be filled with precision-guided munitions from the U.S.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Streams of smoke stretch upward from a cityscape." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570220/original/file-20240118-17-u2fgfc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Rockets are fired from inside Gaza toward Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-picture-taken-from-southern-israel-near-the-border-news-photo/1814573875">Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Hamas’ weapons supply</h2>
<p>In response to Israeli blockades, Hamas has constructed an elaborate and extensive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS/GAZA-TUNNELS/gkvldmzorvb/">tunnel</a> complex under Gaza and across the Egyptian border. Hamas gets most of its weapons from <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/04/report-outlines-how-iran-smuggles-arms-hamas">Iran</a>. The weapons are transported though Egypt and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/can-israel-take-out-tunnels-hamas-uses-move-fighters-weapons-rcna120315">smuggled</a> into Gaza through the tunnels. </p>
<p>But Hamas’ weapons also include <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-guns-weapons-missiles-smuggling-adae9dae4c48059d2a3c8e5d565daa30">AK-47 assault rifles from China</a> and Russia, and rocket-propelled grenades manufactured in North Korea and Bulgaria.</p>
<p>In the murky global arms trade, it can be difficult to determine who is selling weapons to whom. A weapon manufactured in one country could end up in the hands of Hamas by way of one or more intermediary countries. Like nonmilitary goods, copycat armaments also are part of the weapons business. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-guns-weapons-missiles-smuggling-adae9dae4c48059d2a3c8e5d565daa30">Hamas fighters are using</a> a variety of Soviet-era weapon designs that have been copied and manufactured by China and Iran.</p>
<p>Hamas even <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/hamas-weaponry-gaza-israel-palestine-unrest-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">manufactures some arms in Gaza</a>. Local <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-hamas-secretly-built-mini-army-fight-israel-2023-10-13/">factories</a>, some of which are within the underground tunnels, produce mortars, rockets, rifles and bullets. </p>
<p>Some countries, such as Russia, give Hamas <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/hamas-weaponry-gaza-israel-palestine-unrest-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">permission to imitate</a> their products. Iran <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/hamas-weaponry-gaza-israel-palestine-unrest-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">trains Gaza-based engineers</a> on design and production techniques. Ironically, when the Israeli military destroys buildings and equipment in Gaza, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/hamas-weaponry-gaza-israel-palestine-unrest-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">material from the ruins is recycled</a> by Hamas factories into weapons.</p>
<p>As the war progresses, Israel will likely be in a position to restock its depleted weapons, so long as Washington continues to provide political and military support. But with Israel now occupying much of Gaza, it will be far more difficult for Hamas to reload.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220762/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terrence Guay previously received funding from the US Department of Defense. </span></em></p>
Israel and Hamas are running through countless weapons in the ongoing war − but where are those weapons coming from?
Terrence Guay, Clinical Professor of International Business; Director, Center for Global Business Studies; Associate Dean for International Programs, Penn State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/204758
2023-05-31T20:07:25Z
2023-05-31T20:07:25Z
The Harvard of anti-terrorism: how Israel’s military-industrial complex feeds the global arms trade
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528780/original/file-20230529-17-hbx826.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C8%2C5531%2C3715&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Israeli soldier, seen through a shattered window of an Israeli army vehicle, near the Gaza border in southern Israel, August, 2010.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tsafrir Abayov/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In <a href="https://scribepublications.com.au/books-authors/books/the-palestine-laboratory-9781922310408">The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World</a>, Antony Loewenstein details how Israel’s military-industrial complex has grown from a minor industry into a dominant economic and social force at home and abroad. </p>
<p>He traces how, since 1967, the Occupied Territories and their people have furnished Israel with a living laboratory for their application and development of border security and surveillance systems, phone-hacking spyware, tracking and targeting technologies, as well as more traditional weapons systems. Tried and tested in the field, these systems are then packaged and sold for export. </p>
<p>In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the wave of anxiety they engendered, demand for Israeli hardware and know-how exploded. Israel is now one of the world’s <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/267131/market-share-of-the-leadings-exporters-of-conventional-weapons/">top-ten weapons dealing nations</a>. Its defence enterprises market everything from small arms to killer drones, from spyware to surface-to-air missiles. If it flies, watches, listens or goes bang, Israeli companies make and will sell it to (just about) anybody. </p>
<p>The Israeli economy, one critic noted, has “abandoned oranges for hand grenades”. Perhaps. But, as Loewenstein notes, everybody wants hand grenades nowadays. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Review: The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World – Antony Loewenstein (Scribe)</em></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=918&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528765/original/file-20230529-9039-43a10a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1154&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Loewenstein’s analysis of Israeli arms dealing offers a sobering roll-call of the past half-century’s standout despots and pariah nations, ranging from apartheid-era South Africa to Saudi Arabia’s bonesaw authoritarians. Their clients have included, among others, Suharto-era Indonesia, Ceausescu’s Romania, Pinochet’s Chile, the Shah’s Iran, the Duvaliers’ – <em>père</em> et <em>fils</em> – Haiti, Stroessner’s Paraguay, and Rios Montt’s genocidal tyranny in Guatemala, where Israeli-made Galil rifles were used to massacre indigenous communities. </p>
<p>Through its commercial relationships and the diplomacy into which they so often shade, Israel has consistently pursued international acceptance of, or acquiescence to, its occupation of pre-1967 Palestinian territories. Israel will trade with any state whose backing will help stifle criticism or stave off sanctions, as well as just about anybody else who can pay. As a result, not only has Israel surrendered its once-prized status as “a light unto nations”, its export policies have ensured that millions labouring under autocratic rule remain locked in darkness. </p>
<p>Despite the massive investments of manpower, materiel and infrastructure, Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the containment of Gaza, has been a boon to the state, not a financial burden. The high operational tempo of its military means that those marketing Israeli defence materiel can point to the performance of their technologies in Gaza, Jenin, and across the Occupied Territories, as well as in Lebanon and Syria. </p>
<p>Do you need to know what your enemies are planning? Listen to these recordings of their conversations and messages sourced via the latest spyware. Do you want to see where your enemies are and interdict them before they can do you any harm? See how this drone locates, tracks and then detonates the car in which the militant commander is travelling. Looking for a surgical strike option? Watch this missile demolish the tower block where enemy intelligence has occupied offices, leaving the surrounding real estate mostly intact. </p>
<h2>Export industry</h2>
<p>The September 11 attacks on New York and Washington turbocharged Israel’s defence sector. Spooked by the fear of hostile foreigners and enemies within, governments from around the world queued up to learn from “the Harvard of anti-terrorism” and buy its technology. </p>
<p>As of 2021, Israeli arms sales had increased by more than 55% over the preceding two years, to a total of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arms-sales-hit-new-record-of-11-3-billion-in-2021/">US$11.3 billion</a>. Its more recent clients include India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan. In each of these countries, Israeli arms have exacerbated existing conflicts. Indeed, Israel rarely meets a client with whom it will not do business. Its government has approved every defence deal brought to it since 2007. </p>
<p>Despite this, the US National Security Agency (NSA) has continued to transfer data-mining and analytical software to the Israelis, who have increasingly passed it on to private companies. Using its operations in the occupied territories as incubator, accelerator and test bed, and drawing on the expertise of Unit 8200 – the Israeli Defense Force’s equivalent of the NSA – the Israeli state has facilitated and funded numerous private start-ups. </p>
<p>Yet the appearance of a thriving defence private sector is illusory, as the government oversees ownership and directs the operations of the key players in the market. NSO, the surveillance company responsible for the phone-hacking spyware Pegasus, is under the “almost complete control” of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, which “controls ownership and rights and has a veto on shareholders, owners and operators. The tech, patent and IP is also controlled.” </p>
<p>All foreign sales are overseen by the Ministry of Defense. A dedicated department of the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment is tasked to ensure that classified information about the defence industry is not inadvertently revealed through any of these deals. Israel thus retains its best and sharpest innovations for its own use.</p>
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<span class="caption">A bomb hits the building housing international media, including The Associated Press, in Gaza City, May 15, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmud Hams /Pool Photo via AP</span></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-75-years-after-losing-their-home-the-palestinians-are-still-experiencing-the-catastrophe-205413">The Nakba: 75 years after losing their home, the Palestinians are still experiencing the 'catastrophe'</a>
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<h2>Commercial sales</h2>
<p>The commercial sale of technologies ordinarily reserved for state purposes, and their subsequent misuse, often by states themselves, has disturbed senior intelligence officials in the <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes">“five eyes” intelligence community</a> and strained ties with Tel Aviv. </p>
<p>The first major customer for NSO’s Pegasus spyware, in 2011, was the Mexican government, which at the time was locked in a bloody struggle against drug cartels. The capacity to listen in to the narco-traffickers’ conversations and read their text exchanges gave Mexican authorities a crucial if temporary edge. Pegasus, they later claimed, had played a key role in the 2016 arrest of the head of the Sinaloa drug cartel, “El Chapo”. </p>
<p>However, it wasn’t long before state officials made the information garnered by Pegasus, and the technology itself, available to the cartels. While the drug traffickers targeted their rivals and their critics in the media, leading to a massive upsurge in the killing of reporters, the government used the technology to spy on critics of its other policies, notably proponents of a sugar tax on the country’s soft-drinks industry, giving the lie to its assurance that it would be used solely to track perpetrators of major crimes. </p>
<p>Jeremy Fleming, former director of Britain’s intelligence, security and cyber agency Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), described NSO’s practices as “beyond the pale” and argued that “countries or companies that promulgate [technology] in an unconstrained way like that are damaging and should not be tolerated”.</p>
<p>How are the Israelis able to behave like this? Why doesn’t the United States rein them in? </p>
<p>Loewenstein argues that after the US failed to protect it from Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War, Israel exercised greater autonomy in the production, deployment and trade in its military technology. It is not an entirely convincing argument. It overlooks the fact that the Scuds that landed on Tel Aviv and Haifa in January 1991 were targeted as much at the Arab and Muslim-majority members of the international coalition that the US had assembled against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as they were at the Israelis. </p>
<p>The missile attacks were intended to provoke a response from Israel, which was not a member of the US-led coalition, in the belief this would bring about the withdrawal of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and others, and so precipitate the collapse of the anti-Iraqi alliance. </p>
<p>Israel has acted with greater independence from the US because, over the past 20 years, it has become less economically dependent. Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel was perennially the largest recipient of US aid, which in 1981 was roughly equivalent to 10% of Israel’s economy. As its economy grew, the size and significance of the US subvention diminished. By 2020, the US’s $4 billion of financial assistance amounted to only 1% of the economy, thus freeing Israel to act, at home and abroad, with less regard for the political interests or moral sensitivities of the US.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528779/original/file-20230529-17-zfc66b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Antony Loewenstein.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alison Martin/Scribe Publishing</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-its-75th-birthday-israel-still-cant-agree-on-what-it-means-to-be-a-jewish-state-and-a-democracy-204770">On its 75th birthday, Israel still can't agree on what it means to be a Jewish state and a democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The border industrial complex</h2>
<p>Before we retreat behind the smug assumption that the unethical sell only to the unprincipled, Loewenstein reminds us that in 2021 the major destination for Israeli arms exports was Europe. </p>
<p>As the immediate threat of terrorism has faded since the defeat of Islamic State, Israeli defence technology has played a central role in helping the European Union and its constituent states to monitor and hold back the flow of refugees making their way to the European mainland. </p>
<p>The EU’s border agency, Frontex, uses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – Israeli Heron and Hermes drones – to monitor movements on its maritime and land borders. Tested over the occupied territories, the Heron can remain in the air for up to 24 hours. Its equipment includes high-resolution and thermal-imaging cameras, artificial intelligence to detect moving targets, and mobile telephone location technology. </p>
<p>While these drones can locate and track migrants on land or the water, in daylight or darkness, providing the Frontex control centre in Warsaw with a visual live feed, they cannot rescue anybody. If the Frontex operator sees an armed vessel or a suspicious-looking boat, he can alert a patrol boat to intercept and investigate. If all he sees is a leaky boat full of refugees, there may not be quite as much hurry. As one analyst noted, the technology gives Frontex “the option to let refugees drown”. </p>
<p>Frontex’s budget grew from €6 million in 2006 to <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/04/27/eu-plans-to-boost-power-of-border-agency-frontex-raise-eyebrows">€460 million in 2020</a>. The EU is now pledged to spend <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4106">€34.9 billion on border and migration management between 2021 and 2027</a>, transforming it from “a coordination mechanism to a fully fledged multinational security force”. </p>
<p>Israel supplies this “border industrial complex” with, among other things, digital barriers, steel fences, observation towers, ground sensors, thermal imaging, virtual border-guard interview machines, and lie-detector machines powered by AI. </p>
<p>The size of the Frontex budget, and the inhuman equipment it furnishes, lays bare just how badly the multicultural project in Europe is struggling. The backlash against immigration has long been a feature of European Union politics, energised by the global financial crisis, and lethally sharpened after the influx of Syrian refugees in 2015. Ethno-nationalists, Brexiteers and other tinpot populists have ridden to power by stoking public fears of the outsider and championing an increasingly narrow vision of national identity and its approved expression. </p>
<p>Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, Loewenstein argues, has been at the forefront in articulating and embedding the policies and practices of this new ethno-nationalism. For a long time, Israel and its policies in the Occupied Territories looked like an outlier. The then US President Barack Obama, in one of his many spats with Netanyahu, argued that the arc of history was bending away from colonialism and racism, and that the Israelis would have to come to a settlement with the Palestinians, as in the 21st century it was no longer sustainable to occupy another land and oppress its people. </p>
<p>Netanyahu disagreed, arguing, as <a href="https://peterbeinart.substack.com/p/benjamin-netanyahu-father-of-our">Peter Beinart</a> put it, that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the future belonged not to liberalism as Obama defined it – tolerance, equal rights and the rule of law – but to authoritarian capitalism: governments that combined aggressive nationalism with economic and technological might. The future, Netanyahu implied, would produce leaders who resembled not Obama, but him.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/528776/original/file-20230529-22-hhwic5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office of the White House, Washington DC, November 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Harnik/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the retreat from liberalism plays out across the world, in the US, India, Hong Kong, Hungary, Poland and multiple African states, Netanyahu looks less like a has-been and more like a portent, the “rough beast, its hour come round at last / Slouch[ing] towards Bethlehem”.</p>
<p>In The Palestine Laboratory, Loewenstein does not merely indict Israel for its failure to live up to the promise of its founding principles and its leading role in the supply, sustainment and normalisation of a border-industrial complex. He also condemns Europe, the US, Australia and the West for their politicisation of fear of the outsider, their receptiveness to divisive demagoguery, and their moral complicity in the immiseration of millions who live under occupation and oppression, and the millions more who roam the Earth in search of safe harbour. Israel may have lost its way, but once-civilised nations seem to be following it into the darkness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204758/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Foster does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Tried and tested in the field, Israeli weapons and surveillance technology are being packaged and sold for export.
Kevin Foster, Associate Professor, School of Languages, Literatures, Cultures and Linguistics, Monash University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/205689
2023-05-16T15:11:49Z
2023-05-16T15:11:49Z
Did South Africa sell arms to Russia? Only a series of unlikely scenarios could have made it possible
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526538/original/file-20230516-23-c8970m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Aerial view of the Simonstown harbour.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 11 May 2023 the US ambassador to South Africa, <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/ambassador-reuben-e-brigety-ii-ph-d/">Reuben Brigety</a>, claimed that South Africa had secretly exported <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/government/breaking-us-ambassador-says-south-africa-gave-weapons-to-russia-for-ukraine-war-20230511">arms to Russia</a> in December 2022. The announcement rapidly fed into a popular narrative that South Africa was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2b7ee958-5f70-4da8-9695-2f17238dc61a">increasingly siding with Russia</a> in relation to Moscow’s aggressive war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Brigety’s statements made both South African and international news headlines, including the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-south-africa-supplied-weapons-ammunition-to-russia-c2489d54">Wall Street Journal</a>, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/11/africa/south-africa-russia-vessel-us-ambo-intl-afr/index.html">CNN</a> and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7ad94426-aafc-4f04-99d7-05f6d5e6f71d">Financial Times</a>. He asserted that, based on US intelligence reports, ammunition and/or arms were furtively loaded onto a Russian cargo vessel, the “Lady R”, at South Africa’s naval base in Simon’s Town. The vessel had earlier been <a href="https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/ofac-37095/">sanctioned</a> by the US government.</p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/law-order/2449262-south-african-minister-we-didnt-approve-any-arms-shipment-to-russia">the South African presidency</a> denied that the government had granted a permit for such arms or ammunition to be exported to Russia. And that no permit approval for Russian arms exports appears in South Africa’s National Conventional Arms Control Committee recent arms export reports other than for electronic observation equipment <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/South%20Africa">annual arms export reports</a>.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, President Cyril Ramaphosa is in the process of establishing a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/11/south-africa-investigating-us-charge-of-supplying-arms-to-russia">commission of inquiry</a> into the incident. </p>
<p>I spent more than 20 years undertaking research and working with governments on the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326462123_The_Illicit_Arms_Trade_in_Africa_A_Global_Enterprise">arms trade</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326462407_Negotiating_an_Arms_Trade_Treaty_A_Toolkit_for_African_States">arms control</a> in Africa, as well as serving as an <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/619180?ln=en">arms smuggling investigator</a> for the United Nations Sanctions Branch. </p>
<p>I am of the view that such an arms transaction would have required a number of developments that don’t seem plausible. These include the overriding of procurement procedures, the bypassing of key ministers, as well as bribery at a grand and sophisticated scale. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the <a href="https://www.unroca.org/">UN Register of Conventional Arms database</a>, Russia has rarely imported South African arms.</p>
<p>The scenario set out by the US ambassador therefore seems highly unlikely. Let me explain why.</p>
<h2>Imports and exports</h2>
<p>The South African <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-12-22-lady-rs-cargo-was-an-old-order-for-ammunition-modise-says/">minister of defence</a>, Thandi Modise, has stated that the Lady R docked in Simon’s Town in December 2022 to deliver a shipment of ammunition for the South African National Defence Force’s Special Forces Regiment that had been ordered prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Indeed the Arms Control Committee’s 2019 arms <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/South%20Africa">import report</a> lists the permit approval for the import of five million rounds of Russian ammunition to South Africa. Russia is the second largest exporter of arms globally. Its largest clients are India, China and Egypt. Over the years, even the US and the UK have imported arms from Russia according to the <a href="https://www.unroca.org/">UN Register of Conventional Arms</a>.</p>
<p>Reports at the time indicate that containers were offloaded in the harbour and then transported to secure locations under tight security. Such measures are in line with the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-conventional-arms-control-act">National Conventional Arms Control Act</a> and were possibly a requirement of the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2010/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/end-user-certificates-improving-standards-prevent-diversion">end user certificate</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, such security was likely necessitated by the theft of a large quantity of ammunition from Durban harbour during the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-08-massive-ammunition-theft-in-durban-raises-fears-of-increased-volatility-and-political-violence-in-kwazulu-natal/">July 2021 unrest</a>. </p>
<p>There were also reports of <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/weapons-stolen-from-south-african-naval-base">weapons theft</a> from the Simon’s Town naval base in 2016.</p>
<p>An anonymous source within the South African Navy reported to <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ladyrussiagate-the-sa-navy-was-sidelined-when-russias-ship-docked-now-officials-wonder-why-20230513">News24</a> that the navy had been “sidelined” by the army during the offloading and loading of the Lady R. This was most likely due to the army being better equipped and more experienced in protecting such a cargo.</p>
<h2>US accusations of South African arms to Russia</h2>
<p>Brigety claimed that the US government had <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-accuses-south-africa-of-shipping-arms-to-russia/7089461.html">intelligence reports</a> indicating that prior to the Lady R departing from Simon’s Town, South African ammunition and possibly arms were loaded onto the vessel and then transported to Russia. </p>
<p>However, the reports have not been made public. Hence it has not been possible to independently verify the information. There has also been no public comment on the matter.</p>
<p>This is critically important given that intelligence reports are not always accurate. This was shown by the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/knight-ridder-small-team-US-journalists-Iraq-war">flawed intelligence</a> that led to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2023-05-14-bright-lights-undercover-vehicles-and-big-stuff-heres-what-happened-the-night-lady-r-docked/">various eyewitness accounts</a> differ as to whether anything significant was loaded onto the Lady R. </p>
<p>It was also not clear if the containers that were loaded were merely empty cargo containers, or included cargo that was to be delivered to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6485f5a6-1188-4b2f-8f9b-dbedced1afbd">other ports</a>. For example, it’s been reported that the vessel docked in Mozambique and Sudan on its return voyage to Russia.</p>
<p>Additionally, why would the Russian government transport millions of rounds of ammunition to South Africa and then buy a large quantity of ammunition from the country, which has a relatively small <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/arms-and-ammunitions-factories-in-africa/">arms manufacturing industry</a>?</p>
<p>South Africa has one of the most comprehensive arms export laws in Africa, the cornerstones of which are transparency and human rights considerations. According to Section 15 of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-conventional-arms-control-act">National Conventional Arms Control Act</a>, decisions by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee in relation to the approval or denial of arms export licence applications must ensure that South Africa’s national interests, and those of its allies, are protected. </p>
<p>Traditionally Russia could be considered a South African ally due to the <a href="http://infobrics.org/">BRICS</a> arrangement. However, reports of Russian perpetrated <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ukraine">human rights abuses</a> in Ukraine would most likely override other considerations in terms of South Africa’s arms export considerations.</p>
<p>In addition, such decisions must not contribute to </p>
<ul>
<li><p>internal repression </p></li>
<li><p>the systematic violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms </p></li>
<li><p>terrorism and crime </p></li>
<li><p>the escalation of regional military conflicts </p></li>
<li><p>the endangering of peace.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>All arms export applications by arms exporters are carefully considered by a scrutiny committee and, thereafter, by the <a href="https://www.gov.za/national-conventional-arms-control-committee-ncacc-statement-south-african-arms-sales-regulation">National Conventional Arms Control Committee</a>. This is made up of a broad spectrum of cabinet ministers. </p>
<p>Consequently, decisions related to export permit applications frequently take an <a href="https://pmg.org.za/files/221103AMD_SUPPORTING_INFORMATION.pdf">inordinate amount of time</a>. The <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/South%20Africa">annual arms export reports</a> show that South Africa generally adheres to the Section 15 criteria. But it has exported defence-related equipment to states that do not meet these criteria. Examples include <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sa-exported-r3-3-billion-worth-of-military-hardware-in-2021/">Myanmar</a> and <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2021-06-07-back-to-old-habits-south-african-arms-exports-to-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae/">Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<p>If the Arms Control Committee had considered an application to export arms and or ammunition to Russia, then consensus among cabinet ministers would have been necessary. This would have been doubtful as ministers responsible for trade and industry and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-05-13-us-rang-the-alarm-bells-in-february-about-sas-alleged-supply-of-arms-to-russian-cargo-ship-lady-r-godongwana/">finance</a> would have indicated that arms exports to Russia would have dire consequences for South Africa’s trade relations with the US which is South Africa’s <a href="https://www.sars.gov.za/customs-and-excise/trade-statistics/">second largest export market</a> after China. </p>
<p>On top of this, the entire defence sector in South Africa would suffer negative repercussions and might even be sanctioned by other governments.</p>
<h2>The devil is in the intelligence reports</h2>
<p>There is still a possibility that ammunition and/or arms could have been loaded onto the Lady R illegally. But such an endeavour would have required the payment of considerable bribes to officials on the docks and the manufacture of fraudulent export documentation. </p>
<p>In addition, substantial illegal arms transactions typically take place through <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/30/sea-trafficking-report-guns-drugs">container ports</a> where they can be more easily concealed.</p>
<p>The crux of the arms-to-Russia allegations relates to the content of the US intelligence reports. It’s therefore essential that these are declassified and provided to the commission of inquiry as soon as it undertakes its work. They should also be made public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Lamb receives funding from the Peace Research Institute, Oslo.</span></em></p>
The crux of the arms-to-Russia allegations relates to the content of the US intelligence reports.
Guy Lamb, Criminologist / Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/194826
2022-12-02T13:03:04Z
2022-12-02T13:03:04Z
Corruption in South Africa: new book lifts the lid on who profits - and their corporate enablers
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496463/original/file-20221121-26-3p10v6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The new <a href="https://jacana.co.za/product/the-unaccountables/">book</a> The Unaccountables: The Powerful Politicians and Corporations who Profit from Impunity is welcome for the way it contextualises corruption. It shows how politicians and bureaucrats could not implement corruption without their corporate and professional enablers – the accountants, auditors and advocates who make it all possible.</p>
<p>The book is the result of a decade of research by <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org.za/">Open Secrets</a> and other NGOs. It is edited by Michael Marchant, Mamello Mosiana, Ra’eesa Pather and Hennie van Vuuren (a blend of investigative journalists and activists) and has 11 named contributors. Analytically, it covers four overlapping issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>crimes such as stealing public funds and evading tax </p></li>
<li><p>culpable negligence by professionals such as auditors </p></li>
<li><p>serial failure by regulatory authorities </p></li>
<li><p>moral and political issues such as inequality and corporate tax avoidance.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Corporate corruption</h2>
<p>Readers who are diligent in taking in the daily media will remember most of the high profile cases summarised in this book. But not all. It reveals that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-deaths-of-144-mentally-ill-patients-and-south-africas-constitutional-democracy-91433">Life Esidemeni tragedy</a>, in which 144 patients died after being placed in inadequate facilities run by NGOs in 2015, had one apartheid precedent. During the 1960s the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">National Party</a> regime outsourced the psychiatric care of 11,000 patients (9,000 of them black) to the British company Intrinsic Investments: 207 died (p.50). </p>
<p>The book fills some gaps in media reports. These tend to focus on those who are despised by the plutocratic, wealthy establishment – the ruling African National Congress politicians and their cronies. The media are comparatively reluctant to cover crimes committed by fellow denizens of their plutocratic stratosphere, such as auditors, accountants and advocates. For example, global media coverage of Hong Kong focuses on Chinese repression of freedom of expression – but overlooks its role as a tax shelter and corporate secrecy hideout for front companies and money laundering:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a long-running failure to hold the powerful and wealthy to account for the crimes that they profit from. Economic crimes and corruption are committed by a small band of the powerful, but they pose fundamental threats to democracy and social justice. They result in the looting of public funds, the destruction of democratic institutions, and ultimately … the human rights of millions of people. (p.12)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fear of those with money to bring defamation litigation, or who decide on corporate advertising spending in the media, aggravates this situation.</p>
<p>This book is structured around apartheid profiteers, war profiteers, state capture profiteers, welfare profiteers, failing auditors, conspiring consultants, and bad lawyers.</p>
<p>The authors note how over 500 global corporations negotiated, thanks to their tax accountants, with Luxembourg, a tax haven, paying only 1% tax on their profits (p.254). They seem to have missed the case of Ireland, where such tax is one thousandth of 1% on profits. Such tax shelters pervade the west, especially <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries">Commonwealth countries</a>.</p>
<p>The book calls for action to end such tax avoidance. But it does not spell out what it would entail. It would require the South African government to negotiate an international coalition to campaign through the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the African Union, to find enough allies to mitigate such a global power structure – class power in its purest form.</p>
<p>US president Joe Biden’s proposal that globally, corporate tax should have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/biden-offers-drop-corporate-tax-hike-proposal-source-2021-06-03/">a floor of 15%</a> provides a good start for such campaigns.</p>
<h2>Regulation failure</h2>
<p>This book gives welcome attention to a long-neglected problem in South Africa. That is the serial failure of regulatory authorities to hold companies or professionals to account. One instance too recent for this book to cover is that the minerals and energy minister, Gwede Mantashe, has fired from the National Nuclear Regulator a civil society representative, on the grounds that he is <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/eskom/mantashe-fires-anti-nuclear-activist-from-regulatory-board-20220225">anti-nuclear</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="Book cover with the words 'The Unaccountable' over images of several punidentifiable men walking." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=929&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496457/original/file-20221121-19-rl2eao.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1167&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since the minister’s portfolio and performance contract require him to promote nuclear power, it is a conflict of interests for him to interfere in the regulator of nuclear safety. The regulator should fall under the environmental affairs department, as in other countries. This is a topical example of the abuse of power, and defanging a regulatory authority.</p>
<p>The book underscores that the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors (IRBA) refuses to name and shame. It abuses secrecy to protect the names and reputations of auditors guilty of conspiring with their corporate clients to conceal the truth (p.272):</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the IRBA’s desire to protect its members overshadows its responsibility. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since at least the first world war, pacifists have denounced the military-industrial complex as the merchants of death. The <a href="https://www.gov.za/national-conventional-arms-control-committee-ncacc-statement-south-african-arms-sales-regulation">National Conventional Arms Control Committee</a> is supposed to oversee South African exports of armaments and munitions. This is to ensure the country does not violate international treaties. It is not known to have refused any permits to export armaments to countries at war, even when they indiscriminately bomb civilians, as in Yemen.</p>
<p>The authors call for its statutory framework to be drastically toughened up.</p>
<h2>Apartheid profiteers</h2>
<p>The historical chapter of the book, on apartheid profiteers, holds no surprises. Of course, <a href="https://www.sanlam.co.za/Pages/default.aspx?gclid=Cj0KCQiA4OybBhCzARIsAIcfn9m5OBZxhgPlZPIjzU68Z0C7CSAqA8Eqkui60NBY7q8qkcX4Hw3vu_UaAlITEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds">Sanlam</a>, the insurance giant, and <a href="https://www.naspers.com/">Naspers</a>, the media behemoth, were always part of the Afrikaner nationalist movement, led by the secretive <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Afrikaner-Broederbond">Broederbond</a>. Of course, individual Afrikaner businessmen donated to the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/national-party-np">Nasionale Party</a>, which formalised apartheid in 1948, as did the military-industrial complex. All those companies manufacturing armaments had only one monopoly buyer – the South African Defence Force:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a significant portion of the business elite kept the taps open to the party at the height of domestic repression and foreign wars (p.25). </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The authors do a thorough job of exposing all the Swiss, Belgian and Luxembourg bankers who comprised the sanction-busting front companies. It exposes the late <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">Mobutu Sese Seko</a> of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) for providing false end user certificates to enable <a href="https://www.armscor.co.za/">Armscor</a>, the apartheid-era state arms procurement company, to smuggle in weaponry (p.42).</p>
<p>The book revisits the controversial <a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/the-arms-deal-what-you-need-to-know-2/">1999 arms deal</a>. It explains how bribes were described in corporate paperwork as consultancy fees. The arms deal was the first opportunity of the post-apartheid military to buy big-ticket weapons after a quarter-century of arms sanctions, which the post-apartheid military lacked the budget to maintain in service. </p>
<p>Since then, the amount wasted in the arms deal has been dwarfed by the billions spent by <a href="https://www.transnet.net/Pages/Home.aspx">Transnet</a>, the rail, ports and pipelines parastatal, on corrupt locomotive contracts. The same for <a href="https://www.prasa.com/">Prasa</a>, the passenger rail parastatal, and <a href="https://www.eskom.co.za/">Eskom</a>, the power utility, contracts.</p>
<p>Overall, it is a book that should be on the bookshelf of every thinking South African.</p>
<p><em>Updated to clear confusion created by the absence of an index in the advance proof sent to the author.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194826/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>
The new book is structured around apartheid profiteers, war profiteers, state capture profiteers, welfare profiteers, failing auditors, conspiring consultants and bad lawyers.
Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western Cape
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/193809
2022-11-03T15:10:16Z
2022-11-03T15:10:16Z
Ukraine war: what new missiles is Iran providing to Russia and what difference will they make?
<p>It has been reported that Iran is preparing to transfer short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use against targets in Ukraine, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/01/politics/iran-missiles-russia/index.html">allegedly as part of a shipment</a> of 1,000 additional weapons of unspecified type. Iran has allegedly already transferred a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. Many of these drones have been used in Ukraine, although the Islamic Republic <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/19/iran-denies-allegations-that-it-supplied-russia-with-drones.html">has denied</a> involvement.</p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-problem-with-russias-sanctions-busting-arms-industry-182358">Russia’s military industrial complex</a> under sanctions, as well as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2020.1778380">Iran’s procurement</a> for its own weapons programmes. This has led me to believe that the transfer of these systems, while allowing Russia to continue to inflict horrendous death and destruction against civilian populations and infrastructure in Ukraine, is unlikely to change the overall strategic balance. </p>
<p>Iranian “kamikaze” drones have been involved in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-social-media-0cc944fef471a425a862728b3dd0d8bc">attacks on Kyiv</a> and other targets in recent weeks. Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – a Iranian paramilitary unit – <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/iranian-revolutionary-guard-on-the-ground-aiding-russia-in-crimea-says-intelligence-report-12725990">have allegedly been sent to</a> Crimea to assist in operating the systems.</p>
<h2>Missiles for Moscow?</h2>
<p>The Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles allegedly being prepared for transfer by Iran to Russia are based on different technology to these UAVs already transferred. The range of the missile systems is shorter than those of the UAVs (<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/iranian-ballistic-missiles-disaster-ukraine-air-force-russia-1756066">300km-700km</a> as opposed to alleged <a href="https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1569961850011262978?lang=en-GB">2,500km range</a> of the Shahed-136 UAV, for example). </p>
<p>But ballistic missiles travel at much higher speeds (often measured in km/second rather than km/hour). This makes defending against these systems and the explosive warheads they carry much more challenging – if not impossible – for Ukrainian forces with current capabilities. </p>
<p>Ukraine has reported it has been able to intercept <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/world/europe/ukraine-russia-drones-iran.html">more than 70%</a> of the propeller-driven Iranian UAVs using a mixture of fighter aircraft, air defence systems and even small arms fire. They would not be able to achieve anything like this success rate against ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>The Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar have similar characteristics as those ballistic missiles <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/28/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-updates-joe-biden-vladimir-putin-russian-nuclear-weapons-dirty-bomb-claim?page=with:block-635b8cf98f082fdc8beafd22">already fired</a> by Russia during the conflict to date, namely speed and ability to penetrate air defences.</p>
<h2>Why seek Iranian support?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that Iran has transferred its missile technology to overseas customers. Since the 1980s the country has had a bilateral relationship with North Korea where technology has at some points <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2021/02/north-korea-iran-missile-cooperation">flowed in both directions</a>. It has also provided missiles to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/5/4/israel-confirms-airstrike-inside-syria">Hezbollah in Lebanon</a> and more recently to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia">Houthi rebels</a> in Yemen. </p>
<p>But, despite a long history of political and commercial relations with Tehran, Russia is a new market for Iranian missile technology, and an unusual one given Russia’s vast military industrial complex. But the conflict in Ukraine has continually <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russian-incompetence-surpassed-expectations-ukraine-ex-nato-commander-1744014">challenged orthodox views</a> of Russia’s perceived capabilities on the battlefield and in its weapons factories. </p>
<p>In seeking Iran’s support, Russia is likely trying to replenish stocks of missiles expended so far during the conflict, with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-63247287">patterns of weapons use</a> suggesting that its arsenal may be depleted in certain areas. It is also trying to offset some of the challenges faced by the Russian defence industrial complex’s efforts to replenish stocks.</p>
<p>Russia’s weapons manufacturers are stretched to the limit by efforts to restock. The country also faces a wide-ranging arms embargo, which for many western states <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/Russia/EU-embargo-on-Russia">including the EU</a> dates back to the 2014 seizure of Crimea or before, and <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9483/">restrictions on the acquisition of dual-use technologies</a> tightened in February this year. </p>
<p>Russia has likely used illicit procurement networks – many run by Russian and before that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/07/25/world/a-trail-of-western-technology-is-followed-to-the-kgb-s-door.html">Soviet intelligence</a> – and long-practised tactics such as the use of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/abs/exploring-the-use-of-third-countries-in-proliferation-networks-the-case-of-malaysia/C8A766A657994027EF3B584E86FF72A4">front companies in third countries</a> to try to get around these restrictions. Western intelligence efforts have long tried to track these networks, occasionally obtaining insights into Russian technologies. </p>
<p>The insights provided by wreckage recovered from Ukraine, however, have been unprecedented. Remains of Russian weapons systems <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/silicon-lifeline-western-electronics-heart-russias-war-machine/">recovered from Ukrainian battlefields</a> – missiles, drones, electronic warfare and other land systems – have been found to be rich in western technology illicitly procured from the international market place. </p>
<p>The same is true for <a href="https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1584476545912971264?s=20&t=LCduSLJBXNaZgIhEpilFlQ">Iranian drones</a>, 300 of which have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/28/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-updates-joe-biden-vladimir-putin-russian-nuclear-weapons-dirty-bomb-claim?page=with:block-635b8cf98f082fdc8beafd22">shot down in the past fortnight</a> according to Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky.</p>
<p>Besides Russia’s need for weaponry, there are clearly political and diplomatic considerations for Vladimir Putin. Russia is highly isolated, and international political support for Moscow is coming from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/un-condemns-russias-annexations-in-ukraine-how-countries-voted">a shrinking circle of states</a>. So Russia has turned to Iran and a small number of other countries on the periphery of the international system such as North Korea, which is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/02/politics/north-korea-russia-ammunition/index.html">allegedly transferring</a> artillery ammunition to replenish Russian stocks.</p>
<p>While providing political benefits for Russia and reducing its isolation, the deal also brings economic benefits for Iran, which has faced significant international sanctions over the past decades, due to its nuclear programme. For both countries, then, bilateral trade will highly beneficial. Russia is thought <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/05/27/world/un-security-council-split/">likely to veto</a> any further UN sanctions against Iran. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The proliferation of Iranian ballistic missiles into the European theatre is not good news. Use of weapons on the battlefield can provide vendors a useful opportunity to test systems in new operational contexts, and could potentially act as a marketing opportunity to showcase these systems to other potential customers. </p>
<p>There are no easy options for countering these arms transfers. This will be especially true if the missiles can be delivered by air <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-iran-sanctions-drones-russia/32031980.html">like the UAVs</a> supplied by Iran appear to have been. Direct flights provide no opportunities for interdiction. </p>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-iran-over-kamikaze-russian-drones">and partners</a> have imposed asset freezes, restrictions on travel and other business activities against Iranian drone manufacturers and operators – and may take new and further measures. They have <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/02/politics/north-korea-russia-ammunition/index.html">stated they will continue</a> efforts to disrupt Iran’s networks. </p>
<p>We may also see the US <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/long-arm">return to extraterritorial tools</a> used in the past to get at parts of these transnational networks based overseas. This includes sting operations, civil asset seizures and information operations. Essentially, the “cat and mouse” game between the US and its allies and Russia and its suppliers will continue – but with new targets and heightened energy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust for a three-year project on arms embargoes.</span></em></p>
Iran has showcased these new weapons, with deadly result, in Yemen and Lebanon.
Daniel Salisbury, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/192780
2022-10-18T18:38:33Z
2022-10-18T18:38:33Z
Iranian drones used by Russia in Ukraine show that there’s already one victor in that war: Iran
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490397/original/file-20221018-22-a66uli.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C7%2C4985%2C3308&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a Kyiv residential building destroyed by a drone that local authorities consider to be Iranian-made. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-rescuers-work-at-the-site-of-a-residential-news-photo/1244045819?phrase=iranian%20drones&adppopup=true">Oleksii Chumachenko/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Ukraine is helping one country achieve its foreign policy and national security objectives, but it’s neither Russia nor Ukraine.</p>
<p>It’s Iran.</p>
<p>That was starkly clear on the morning of Oct. 17, 2022, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/world/europe/russia-ukraine-iran-drones.html">as Iranian-made drones attacked civilian targets in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv</a>. Russia used the Iranian drones to inflict damage on Ukraine’s national energy company headquarters, and the drones also killed four civilians.</p>
<p>Iran is among Russia’s most <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-iran-vladimir-putin-khamenei-nato-us/">vocal supporters</a> in the war. As <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/aaron-pilkington-1364407">a military analyst who specializes in Iranian national security strategy</a>, I see this having little to do with Ukraine and everything to do with Iran’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis the United States. </p>
<p>As Russia’s war on Ukraine passed six months and continued eroding Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62553629">manpower</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-admits-running-out-weapons-ukraine-war-invasion-state-duma-law-1720957">military stores</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/?tpcc=recirc062921">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm">diplomatic connections</a>, leader Vladimir Putin opted for an unlikely but necessary <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/putin-russia-iran-ukraine-00046646">Iranian lifeline</a> to salvage victory in Ukraine and also in Syria where, since 2015, Russian soldiers have been fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad’s government in power. </p>
<p>And at a time when <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/10/17/iran-protests-gen-z-mahsa-amini-death">the Islamic Republic of Iran’s government is facing growing citizen protests</a> against its autocratic rule, Putin’s move has, in turn, helped Iran make progress in promoting its national interests, as defined by its leadership.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three men greet one another -- one in a black suit, the other two in black clerical robes with black headwraps" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, center, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, greet each other as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stands at right during their meeting in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranRussia/f83bd4861f434cfa9da703a103a0be1b/photo?Query=Russia%20Iran&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3751&currentItemNo=41">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Opposing the US everywhere</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w4Ku6l7OEI">Islamic Revolution of 1979</a>, Iran’s leaders have believed the United States is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-leader-death-to-america-means-policies-not-people/">constantly scheming</a> to <a href="https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/467788/%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%DA%98%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C">topple Iran’s government</a>. They view leaders in Washington as the greatest threat and obstacle to promoting Iranian national interests – achieving economic self-sufficiency, international legitimacy, regional security, power and influence. </p>
<p>The fears of Iran’s leaders are not irrational – the long history of U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">meddling</a> in Iranian affairs, continuous <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/09/08/the-axis-of-evil-and-the-great-satan/">open hostility</a> between the two countries and decades of U.S. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-10/guide-to-us-bases-surrounding-iran-in-the-middle-east/11855542">military buildup</a> in close proximity to Iran greatly concern leaders in Tehran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf#page=74">military forces in many</a> Middle Eastern countries, <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/bases-bases-everywhere-except-in-the-pentagons-report">with or without invitation</a>. To promote its national interests, Iran is working to force the U.S. military out of the region and reduce U.S. political influence there. </p>
<p>Iran has an even bigger aim: <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/aug/31/part-ii-khamenei-unworld-order">to overthrow</a> what it sees as the U.S.-dominated global political order. </p>
<p>Iran counters U.S. influence by maintaining partnerships with an assortment of nonstate militias and governments united by their fierce anti-U.S. hostility. The country <a href="https://nowlebanon.com/the-iranian-network/">nurtures a network</a> of militant partner and proxy groups, whose own political preferences and ambitions align with Iran’s objectives, by providing <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/05/09/new-mideast-task-force-can-counter-iranian-arms-smuggling-but-more-capabilities-are-needed/">weapons</a>, <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-lebanon-training-hezbollah">training</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/proxies-and-politics-why-iran-funds-foreign-militias">funds</a> – and, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/21/how-do-irans-proxies-actually-work/">in some cases</a>, direction. Among the recipients are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">Hezbollah</a>, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad">Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad</a>, friendly <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">Iraqi militias</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/16/why-iran-is-getting-blame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/">Ansar Allah</a> in Yemen, better known as the Houthis or the Houthi rebels. </p>
<p>Through these militias and their political arms, Iran extends its influence and works to shape an Iran-friendly government in states like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/newsletters/2022/08/15/us-drone-attack-targets-us-base-in-syria-no-casualties/">It threatens</a> U.S. forces and antagonizes Western-allied governments in states such as Israel, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220714-jordans-position-towards-regional-issues-has-shifted-especially-on-iran/">Jordan</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi Arabia</a>, <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/kuwait-and-iran-a-fluctuating-history-1.1341755">Kuwait</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2017/01/22/Iran-s-export-of-terrorism-poses-threat-to-Bahrain-as-well-as-the-Gulf">Bahrain</a> and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-de-facto-ruler-sees-iran-islamists-threat-ambitious-gulf-safe-haven-2022-05-13/">United Arab Emirates</a>. </p>
<p>At the national level, Iran maintains no permanent mutual defense treaties. Its closest strategic partners include Syria, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-venezuela-relations-presidents-postures-and-pressures">Venezuela</a>, <a href="https://www.38north.org/2021/11/the-north-korea-iran-relationship-an-anti-american-alliance-or-transactional-partnership/">North Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-relations-limited-enduring-strategic-partnership">China</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">Russia</a>. They cooperate <a href="https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/china-iran-create-parallel-global-chessboard/">politically</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-china-sign-economic-security-agreement-challenging-u-s-pressure-11616866936">economically</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/iran-russia-china-to-carry-out-military-drills-in-venezuela/">militarily</a> to create an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-china-iran-russia-triangle-alternative-world-order/">alternative</a> to what their leaders perceive as the U.S.-led world political order. </p>
<p>That cooperation includes undermining <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-are-americas-national-interests">U.S. national interests</a> and helping ease or circumvent <a href="https://www.chairmont.com.au/post/russia-china-and-iran-circumventing-sanctions-trade-wars-us-dollar-and-blockchain">Western political pressure</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/venezuelan-deputy-julio-chavez-iran-russia-china-venezuela-alliance-can-circumvent-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a>. </p>
<h2>Tehran to the rescue</h2>
<p>Russia’s current war in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession">left Moscow with only a handful of sympathetic friends</a>. </p>
<p>Few political leaders understand Putin’s newfound political isolation and related animosity toward the United States more than Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But Iran-Russia relations <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365">are complicated</a>. </p>
<p>The two countries found common cause in helping Syrian strongman Assad defeat his country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34710635">opposition forces</a>, but for different national interests. </p>
<p>Saving Assad helps Russia reassert itself as a <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/how-russia-used-the-war-in-syria-to-reassert-its-global-might/">major power</a> in the Middle East. For Iran, a friendly Syria is a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-unwavering-support-to-assads-syria/">critical link</a> in Iran’s anti-U.S., anti-Israel coalition. </p>
<p>As Russia and Iran fought to sustain Assad, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-war-russia-iran-influence/2021/05/19/7d26851e-a9d1-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html">they also competed</a> for lucrative postwar <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">reconstruction and infrastructure contracts</a> in that country, and to shape the post-civil war political environment to their advantage. </p>
<p>But neither country was bold enough to influence the way the other operated in Syria. Consequently, sometimes Iranian-backed and Russian <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Enduring_Alliance.pdf">forces cooperated</a>, and at other times <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220505-russia-iran-backed-militias-clash-in-syrias-palmyra/">they squabbled</a>. Mostly they <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">left each other alone</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, though, Russia’s plight in Ukraine compelled its leader to solicit Iran’s help in two ways. </p>
<p>First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian military, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/24/russia-ukraine-syria-deployments-iran-israel-confilct/">provided supplementary manpower</a> to fill the void left when Russia reallocated troops from Syria to its Ukraine campaign. </p>
<p>Second, Russia has used Iran’s low-cost and battle-proven unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, to counter Kyiv’s Western-supported arsenal and buttress its own <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/five-reasons-why-russia-struggling-ukraine/362636/">struggling forces</a> and surprisingly <a href="https://cepa.org/russias-military-failure-on-an-awesome-scale/">inept warfighting capabilities</a>. </p>
<p>In July, Iran hosted numerous Russian officers and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/09/politics/russia-training-drones-iran/index.html">conducted training</a> on Iranian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDJ8XzJjOeU">Shahed-129</a> and <a href="https://theaviationist.com/2020/08/02/iran-showcases-shahed-181-and-191-drones-during-great-prophet-14-exercise/">Shahed-191</a> drone operations. As of early August 2022, anonymous intelligence sources and Ukrainian officials <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5">indicated</a> that Russia <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-iran-united-states-d7802180c7ecbdbe5cd06ee72c6d18f7">had obtained</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">used</a> Iranian drones in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Since acquiring Iranian drones in early September, Russia has launched over 100 Iranian <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/18/world/europe/iran-attack-drones-ukraine.html">Shahed-136</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-posts-iranian-drone-official-denies-giving-vladimir-putin-russia-1748518">Mohajer-6</a> attack and reconnaissance drones in over a dozen attacks against a large range of targets: Ukrainian special forces, <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/iranian-drones-create-new-dangers-for-ukrainians-forces.html">armor</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/26/iranian-drones-ukraine-russia-war-00058802">artillery</a> units, air defense and fuel storage <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/10/russias-use-iranian-drones-ukraine-hints-reliance-iran">facilities</a>, Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-military-says-russian-drones-hit-military-objects-odesa-2022-09-26/">military</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/14/ukraine-infrastructure-damage/">energy</a> infrastructure, <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-russia-iran-shahed-136-drones-lawnmowers-death-1895532">civilian targets</a> and a recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-social-media-0cc944fef471a425a862728b3dd0d8bc?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=TopNews&utm_campaign=position_01">series</a> of drone and missile attacks against <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/missiles-exploding-drones-hit-ukraines-power-water-91663099">Kyiv</a>.</p>
<p>Russia is expected to soon rely on Iran further to supplant its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/14/ukraine-infrastructure-damage/">dwindling</a> weapons supplies by acquiring <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/fateh-110/">two</a> <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/zolfaghar/">types</a> of Iranian-made short-range ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine, according to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/17/iran-russia-missile-sales-00062075">U.S.</a> and allied security officials.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A drone flying in the air." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490411/original/file-20221018-7218-wiwrw6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian drone flies over Kyiv during an attack on October 17, 2022, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-flies-over-kyiv-during-an-attack-on-october-17-amid-news-photo/1244032825?phrase=iranian%20drones&adppopup=true">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine war promotes Iran’s interests</h2>
<p>This warming alliance may not help Russia defeat Ukraine. It will promote Iran’s national interests.</p>
<p>Russia’s Syria drawdown brought additional Iranian soldiers there to further prove their fighting abilities and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/in-syria-iranian-forces-fill-gaps-left-by-ukraine-bound-russians-sources/">entrench themselves in Syria</a>. That then allows Iran to control territory threatened by <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-syrias-anti-assad-forces-48527">anti-Assad forces</a> and maintain an open corridor or “<a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/#:%7E:text=Iran%20and%20its%20proxy%20forces%20are%20establishing%20an,southern%20Lebanon%20and%20the%20Golan%20front%20in%20Syria.">land bridge</a>” by which Iran extends support to its network of anti-America and anti-Israel <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/iran/#:%7E:text=Iran%20supported%20various%20Iraqi%20Shia,'ib%20Ahl%20al%2DHaq.">partners and proxies</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s acquisition of Iranian arms <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/08/21/2761396/world-powers-eager-to-obtain-iran-s-military-achievements-top-general">will significantly boost</a> Iran’s weapons industry, whose primary clientele right now is its own militias. Iran’s recent efforts to expand drone manufacturing and exports yielded limited success in small, mostly peripheral markets of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/ethiopia-acquires-iranian-uavs-for-tigray-war/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20latest%20effort%20to,unmanned%20aerial%20vehicles%20(UAVs).">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2132191/middle-east">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/02/31/2711791/%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87">Tajikistan</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-s-apparent-supply-of-combat-drones-to-venezuela-highlights-terrorism-risks/6476585.html">Venezuela</a>. </p>
<p>Moscow is the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/18417/global-weapons-exports/">second-largest global arms exporter</a>, and its surprising transformation to Iranian arms importer signals the seriousness of Russia’s problems. It also legitimizes and expands Tehran’s weapons industry <a href="https://www.irna.ir/news/83197978/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA">beyond arms production for the purpose of self-sufficiency</a>. This one alliance moves Iran toward a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-695755">more prominent role</a> as a major arms exporter.</p>
<p>Lastly, Russia’s war in Ukraine extends a new avenue by which Iran might directly counter U.S.-provided weapons, as well as the opportunity to undermine U.S. and NATO influence in Eurasia. Iran’s drones could afford Moscow an effective and desperately needed response to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/">U.S. weapons</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9CW6fYbT6Y">wreaking havoc</a> <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/watch-this-switchblade-suicide-drone-attack-a-russian-tank-in-ukraine">against Russian</a> <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/here-e2-80-99s-every-weapon-us-has-supplied-to-ukraine-with-2413-billion/ar-AA117AKN">forces in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Iranian weapons may force Ukraine’s Western benefactors to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3083102/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-to-ukraine/">allocate additional billions</a> for counter-drone or air defense systems, or aid to replace assets that Iranian weapons potentially neutralize. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum game</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/16/iran-russia-missiles-ukraine/">introduction of Iranian ballistic missiles to Ukraine</a> would compound the limited tactical victories scored by Iranian drones. They will bring further unnecessary suffering and prolong and further destabilize the war in Ukraine, but I don’t believe they will tip the scales of conflict in Russia’s favor.</p>
<p>Their greater contribution is to Iran’s national interests: They allow Iran to directly check and undermine the U.S. and NATO outside of Iran’s usual regional area of operations. They boost Iran’s profile among countries that also wish to challenge the United States and NATO’s political, military and economic power. And they strengthen solidarity among those countries.</p>
<p>As Iran’s fighters, advisers and weapons proliferate to new areas and empower U.S. adversaries, Iran further promotes its national interests at the expense of U.S. national interests.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-winner-is-emerging-from-the-war-in-ukraine-but-its-not-who-you-think-189036">of a story</a> originally published Aug. 30, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron Pilkington is a U.S. Air Force analyst of Middle East affairs now studying at the University of Denver, conducting research on Iranian national security strategy. He will later join the Military & Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, the United States Air Force Academy, or any other organizational affiliation.</span></em></p>
Iran has a growing role in the Ukraine war, helping Russia augment its dwindling weapons supplies. That may help Russia, but it also serves Iran’s national interests.
Aaron Pilkington, US Air Force Analyst of Middle East Affairs, PhD Candidate at Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/189036
2022-08-30T12:20:14Z
2022-08-30T12:20:14Z
A winner is emerging from the war in Ukraine, but it’s not who you think
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481597/original/file-20220829-8742-2t6sjg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C1%2C1020%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In July 2022, Iran provided the Russian military with training for using Iranian-produced weapons, including the Shahed-129 drone, displayed here at a 2019 military show in Tehran.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-photo-shows-visitors-look-on-the-shahed-129-an-iranian-news-photo/1231019247?adppopup=true">Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Ukraine is helping one country achieve its foreign policy and national security objectives, but it’s neither Russia nor Ukraine.</p>
<p>It’s Iran.</p>
<p>Iran is among Russia’s most <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-iran-vladimir-putin-khamenei-nato-us/">vocal supporters</a> in the war. This has little to do with Ukraine and everything to do with Iran’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis the United States. </p>
<p>As Russia’s war on Ukraine drags on and continues eroding Russia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62553629">manpower</a>, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-admits-running-out-weapons-ukraine-war-invasion-state-duma-law-1720957">military stores</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/22/russia-economy-sanctions-myths-ruble-business/">economy</a> and <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm">diplomatic connections</a>, leader Vladimir Putin has opted for an unlikely but necessary <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/putin-russia-iran-ukraine-00046646">Iranian lifeline</a> to salvage victory in Ukraine and also in Syria where, since 2015, Russian soldiers have been fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad’s government in power.</p>
<p>Putin’s move has, in turn, helped Iran make progress in promoting its national interests.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three men greet one another -- one in a black suit, the other two in black clerical robes with black headwraps" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481580/original/file-20220829-22-ojrk0p.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, center, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, greet each other as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stands at right during their meeting in Tehran, Iran, on July 19, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranRussia/f83bd4861f434cfa9da703a103a0be1b/photo?Query=Russia%20Iran&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3751&currentItemNo=41">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Opposing the US everywhere</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8w4Ku6l7OEI">Islamic Revolution of 1979</a>, Iran’s leaders have believed the United States is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-leader-death-to-america-means-policies-not-people/">constantly scheming</a> to <a href="https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/467788/%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%DA%98%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C">topple Iran’s government</a>. They view leaders in Washington as the greatest threat and obstacle to promoting Iranian national interests – achieving economic self-sufficiency, international legitimacy, regional security, power and influence. </p>
<p>The fears of Iran’s leaders are not irrational – the long history of U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">meddling</a> in Iranian affairs, continuous <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/09/08/the-axis-of-evil-and-the-great-satan/">open hostility</a> between the two countries and decades of U.S. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-10/guide-to-us-bases-surrounding-iran-in-the-middle-east/11855542">military buildup</a> in close proximity to Iran greatly concern leaders in Tehran. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf#page=74">military forces in many</a> Middle Eastern countries, <a href="https://truthout.org/articles/bases-bases-everywhere-except-in-the-pentagons-report">with or without invitation</a>. To promote its national interests, Iran is working to force the U.S. military out of the region and reduce U.S. political influence there. </p>
<p>Iran has an even bigger aim: <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/aug/31/part-ii-khamenei-unworld-order">to overthrow</a> what it sees as the U.S.-dominated global political order. </p>
<p>Iran counters U.S. influence by maintaining partnerships with an assortment of nonstate militias and governments united by their fierce anti-U.S. hostility. The country <a href="https://nowlebanon.com/the-iranian-network/">nurtures a network</a> of militant partner and proxy groups, whose own political preferences and ambitions align with Iran’s objectives, by providing <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/05/09/new-mideast-task-force-can-counter-iranian-arms-smuggling-but-more-capabilities-are-needed/">weapons</a>, <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-lebanon-training-hezbollah">training</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/proxies-and-politics-why-iran-funds-foreign-militias">funds</a> – and, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/21/how-do-irans-proxies-actually-work/">in some cases</a>, direction. Among the recipients are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/">Hezbollah</a>, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad">Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad</a>, friendly <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">Iraqi militias</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/09/16/why-iran-is-getting-blame-an-attack-saudi-arabia-claimed-by-yemens-houthis/">Ansar Allah</a> in Yemen, better known as the Houthis or the Houthi rebels. </p>
<p>Through these militias and their political arms, Iran extends its influence and works to shape an Iran-friendly government in states like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/newsletters/2022/08/15/us-drone-attack-targets-us-base-in-syria-no-casualties/">It threatens</a> U.S. forces and antagonizes Western-allied governments in states such as Israel, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220714-jordans-position-towards-regional-issues-has-shifted-especially-on-iran/">Jordan</a>, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia/">Saudi Arabia</a>, <a href="https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/kuwait-and-iran-a-fluctuating-history-1.1341755">Kuwait</a>, <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2017/01/22/Iran-s-export-of-terrorism-poses-threat-to-Bahrain-as-well-as-the-Gulf">Bahrain</a> and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-de-facto-ruler-sees-iran-islamists-threat-ambitious-gulf-safe-haven-2022-05-13/">United Arab Emirates</a>. </p>
<p>At the national level, Iran maintains no permanent mutual defense treaties. Its closest strategic partners include Syria, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-venezuela-relations-presidents-postures-and-pressures">Venezuela</a>, <a href="https://www.38north.org/2021/11/the-north-korea-iran-relationship-an-anti-american-alliance-or-transactional-partnership/">North Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-iran-relations-limited-enduring-strategic-partnership">China</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">Russia</a>. They cooperate <a href="https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/china-iran-create-parallel-global-chessboard/">politically</a>, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-china-sign-economic-security-agreement-challenging-u-s-pressure-11616866936">economically</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/iran-russia-china-to-carry-out-military-drills-in-venezuela/">militarily</a> to create an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-china-iran-russia-triangle-alternative-world-order/">alternative</a> to what their leaders perceive as the U.S.-led world political order. </p>
<p>That cooperation includes undermining <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/what-are-americas-national-interests">U.S. national interests</a> and helping ease or circumvent <a href="https://www.chairmont.com.au/post/russia-china-and-iran-circumventing-sanctions-trade-wars-us-dollar-and-blockchain">Western political pressure</a> and <a href="https://orinocotribune.com/venezuelan-deputy-julio-chavez-iran-russia-china-venezuela-alliance-can-circumvent-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a>. </p>
<h2>Tehran to the rescue</h2>
<p>Russia’s current war in Ukraine has <a href="https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession">left Moscow with only a handful of sympathetic friends</a>. </p>
<p>Few political leaders understand Putin’s newfound political isolation and related animosity toward the United States more than Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But Iran-Russia relations <a href="https://carnegiemoscow.org/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365">are complicated</a>. </p>
<p>The two countries found common cause in helping Syrian strongman Assad defeat his country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34710635">opposition forces</a>, but for different national interests. </p>
<p>Saving Assad helps Russia reassert itself as a <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/how-russia-used-the-war-in-syria-to-reassert-its-global-might/">major power</a> in the Middle East. For Iran, a friendly Syria is a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-unwavering-support-to-assads-syria/">critical link</a> in Iran’s anti-U.S., anti-Israel coalition. </p>
<p>As Russia and Iran fought to sustain Assad, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-war-russia-iran-influence/2021/05/19/7d26851e-a9d1-11eb-bca5-048b2759a489_story.html">they also competed</a> for lucrative postwar <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">reconstruction and infrastructure contracts</a> in that country, and to shape the post-civil war political environment to their advantage. </p>
<p>But neither country was bold enough to influence the way the other operated in Syria. Consequently, sometimes Iranian-backed and Russian <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Enduring_Alliance.pdf">forces cooperated</a>, and at other times <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220505-russia-iran-backed-militias-clash-in-syrias-palmyra/">they squabbled</a>. Mostly they <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">left each other alone</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, though, Russia’s plight in Ukraine compelled its leader to solicit Iran’s help in two ways. </p>
<p>First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian military, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/24/russia-ukraine-syria-deployments-iran-israel-confilct/">provided supplementary manpower</a> to fill the void left when Russia reallocated troops from Syria to its Ukraine campaign. </p>
<p>Second, Russia will use Iran’s low-cost and battle-proven unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, to counter Kyiv’s Western-supported arsenal and buttress its own <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/five-reasons-why-russia-struggling-ukraine/362636/">struggling forces</a> and surprisingly <a href="https://cepa.org/russias-military-failure-on-an-awesome-scale/">inept warfighting capabilities</a>. </p>
<p>In July, Iran hosted numerous Russian officers and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/09/politics/russia-training-drones-iran/index.html">conducted training</a> on Iranian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDJ8XzJjOeU">Shahed-129</a> and <a href="https://theaviationist.com/2020/08/02/iran-showcases-shahed-181-and-191-drones-during-great-prophet-14-exercise/">Shahed-191</a> drone operations. Anonymous intelligence sources and Ukrainian officials <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5">indicated</a> that Russia <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-iran-united-states-d7802180c7ecbdbe5cd06ee72c6d18f7">already has obtained</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/24/russia-iran-drones-sanctions/">employed</a> Iranian drones in Ukraine. <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202208063214">Though unconfirmed</a>, this is consistent with a previous <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5023137/iran-provide-unmanned-aircraft-training-russia-ukraine-war-jake-sullivan">White House assessment</a> that Iran would provide Russia with “up to several hundred” drones for use in Ukraine. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RwbuYhh0FSM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan tells reporters on July 11, 2022, that Iran planned to send ‘several hundred’ drones, including some equipped with weapons, to Russia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine war promotes Iran’s interests</h2>
<p>This warming alliance may not help Russia defeat Ukraine. It will promote Iran’s national interests.</p>
<p>Russia’s Syria drawdown brought additional Iranian soldiers there to further prove their fighting abilities and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/in-syria-iranian-forces-fill-gaps-left-by-ukraine-bound-russians-sources/">entrench themselves in Syria</a>. That then allows Iran to control territory threatened by <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-syrias-anti-assad-forces-48527">anti-Assad forces</a> and maintain an open corridor or “<a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/#:%7E:text=Iran%20and%20its%20proxy%20forces%20are%20establishing%20an,southern%20Lebanon%20and%20the%20Golan%20front%20in%20Syria.">land bridge</a>” by which Iran extends support to its network of anti-America and anti-Israel <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/iran/#:%7E:text=Iran%20supported%20various%20Iraqi%20Shia,'ib%20Ahl%20al%2DHaq.">partners and proxies</a>.</p>
<p>Second, Russia’s acquisition of Iranian arms <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/08/21/2761396/world-powers-eager-to-obtain-iran-s-military-achievements-top-general">will significantly boost</a> Iran’s weapons industry, whose primary clientele right now is its own militias. Iran’s recent efforts to expand drone manufacturing and exports yielded limited success in small, mostly peripheral markets of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/ethiopia-acquires-iranian-uavs-for-tigray-war/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20latest%20effort%20to,unmanned%20aerial%20vehicles%20(UAVs).">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2132191/middle-east">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/02/31/2711791/%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%DB%8C-%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87">Tajikistan</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-s-apparent-supply-of-combat-drones-to-venezuela-highlights-terrorism-risks/6476585.html">Venezuela</a>. </p>
<p>Moscow is the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/18417/global-weapons-exports/">second-largest global arms exporter</a>, and its surprising transformation to Iranian arms importer signals the seriousness of Russia’s problems. It also legitimizes and expands Tehran’s weapons industry <a href="https://www.irna.ir/news/83197978/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA">beyond arms production for the purpose of self-sufficiency</a>. This one alliance moves Iran toward a <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-695755">more prominent role</a> as a major arms exporter.</p>
<p>Lastly, Russia’s war in Ukraine extends a new avenue by which Iran might directly counter U.S.-provided weapons, as well as the opportunity to undermine U.S. and NATO influence in Eurasia. Iran’s drones could afford Moscow an effective and desperately needed response to U.S. weapons wreaking havoc against Russian forces in Ukraine – <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3095394/us-provided-himars-effective-in-ukraine/">the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System</a>, the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9CW6fYbT6Y">Javelin</a> anti-tank guided missile, the <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/watch-this-switchblade-suicide-drone-attack-a-russian-tank-in-ukraine">Switchblade</a> “kamikaze” or suicide drone <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/here-e2-80-99s-every-weapon-us-has-supplied-to-ukraine-with-2413-billion/ar-AA117AKN">and others</a>. </p>
<p>Iranian weapons may force Ukraine’s Western benefactors to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3083102/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-to-ukraine/">allocate additional billions</a> for counter-drone or air defense systems, or aid to replace assets that Iranian weapons potentially neutralize. </p>
<p>This has already happened on the <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/16/timeline-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia">Arabian Peninsula</a>, where Iran-equipped Ansar Allah’s drone warfare against <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-arabia-drone-attack-oil-infrastructure-ras-tanura-dhahran-houthis-yemen-iran/">Saudi Arabia</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/11/attacks-on-uae-shows-its-strengths-more-than-vulnerabilities-analysts.html">UAE</a> compels Gulf states to expend <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/The-iranian-drone-threat#:%7E:text=Further%2C%20it%20is%20costlier%20to%20defend%20against%20drones,against%20a%20drone%20swarm%20an%20extremely%20expensive%20proposition.">disproportionate sums</a> on costly weapons systems and to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/idex/2021/02/23/from-lasers-to-missiles-idex-exhibitors-are-determined-to-counter-drones/">develop other expensive solutions</a> to counter Iran’s low-cost drones.</p>
<h2>Zero-sum game</h2>
<p>Limited tactical victories scored by Iranian drones may prolong and further destabilize the war in Ukraine, but they will not tip the scales of conflict in Russia’s favor. </p>
<p>Their greater contribution is to Iran’s national interests: They allow Iran to directly check and undermine the U.S. and NATO outside of Iran’s usual regional area of operations. They boost Iran’s profile among countries that also wish to challenge the United States and NATO’s political, military and economic power. And they strengthen solidarity among those countries.</p>
<p>As Iran’s fighters, advisers and weapons proliferate to new areas and empower U.S. adversaries, Iran further promotes its national interests at the expense of U.S. national interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron Pilkington is a U.S. Air Force analyst of Middle East affairs now studying at the University of Denver, conducting research on Iranian national security strategy. He will later join the Military & Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, the United States Air Force Academy, or any other organizational affiliation.
</span></em></p>
There’s an unexpected beneficiary of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Aaron Pilkington, US Air Force Analyst of Middle East Affairs, PhD Student at Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/186340
2022-07-06T11:10:16Z
2022-07-06T11:10:16Z
Ukraine is losing this war at the moment. The west needs to massively step up its military aid
<p>For a few weeks I’ve been in Kyiv, partly as a visiting fellow at leading Ukrainian thinktank the <a href="https://tdcenter.org/">Transatlantic Dialogue Center</a>. Kyiv is an astonishingly elegant and beautiful city; a premier league European capital. The regular air raid warnings delivered on your phone, as well as by the baleful second world war-style sirens, are largely ignored now – despite the occasional <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0chbxsg">missile strike</a>. </p>
<p>Cafes and restaurants are open and largely busy. It was in one of the latter that I met a senior Ukrainian government official who had contacted me, expressing approval for something I had said in the international media.</p>
<p>“You know, don’t you, that this time next year, a Russian soldier could be sitting right where you are,” he said after a brusque introduction. “We are losing this war.” </p>
<p>He is right. There were the great victories at Kyiv, Chernihiv and Kharkhiv. But with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/04/ukraine-donetsk-next-russian-target-after-capture-of-luhansk-says-governor">setbacks in Donetsk and Luhansk</a>, the appalling realisation is sinking in that this is likely to be a very bloody war, lasting years. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ng-interactive/2022/jun/09/the-black-sea-blockade-mapping-the-impact-of-war-in-ukraine-on-the-worlds-food-supply-interactive">country’s coastline</a> is in the invaders’ hands and its <a href="https://www.world-grain.com/articles/17016-odessa-official-ukraine-needs-help-to-break-russian-blockade">ports</a> are blockaded. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-warn-looming-financial-crisis-aid-does-not-come/">A serious economic crisis is looming</a> both in Ukraine and <a href="https://www.lombardodier.com/contents/corporate-news/investment-insights/2022/july/ukraine-s-costly-war-of-attritio.html">more widely</a>. While Ukraine is not winning, it is losing. </p>
<p>Last week’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-us-deploys-more-troops-in-eastern-europe-heres-how-it-compares-with-the-cold-war-186082">Nato summit</a> stated that it would assist member states “<a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm">adequately</a>” in providing support to Ukraine, while recognising each member’s “specific situation” – presumably the specific situation of some countries being unwilling to contribute usefully to the defence of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Assistance in the form of weaponry is still <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3fab0893-cd5e-46b6-9bfe-6b0aff4fcb48">carefully enumerated, itemised and counted</a> – doing Russian intelligence officers’ jobs for them, by giving them often precise information as to the numbers and capabilities of the weapons provided by donors. </p>
<p>All that notwithstanding, western weapons have helped Ukraine hold the line, and are likely to continue to do so. They will, however, be unable to impose strategically meaningful costs on Russia’s leaders.</p>
<p>Between 20,000 and 30,000 soldiers killed and <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html">one-third of Russia’s tank force</a> turned into scrap are meaningless irrelevancies to Vladimir Putin. Generals <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/06/25/russia-shakes-up-top-command-ex-syria-war-general-sacked/">fired</a> or <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61702862">killed</a>? Plenty more where they came from. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-russias-strategic-aims-and-how-effectively-are-they-achieving-them-178243">original Russian objective</a> of neutralising Ukraine as a viable state is being achieved. </p>
<h2>Strategic objectives</h2>
<p>For Ukraine, as for Russia, the key strategic front is in the south. <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/ukrainian-armed-forces-preparing-to-liberate-kherson.html">Retaking Kherson</a> – the ancient city on the Black Sea coast that Russia <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3520728-russia-plans-to-annex-kherson-region-by-autumn-uk-intel.html">seems to be planning to annex</a> as part of its scheme to “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-admits-ukraine-invasion-is-an-imperial-war-to-return-russian-land/">return Russian land</a>” – would be a real blow to the Kremlin. Ukrainian forces entering Crimea, a short tank ride from Kherson, would send the message: “This is what strategic defeat looks like.”</p>
<p>So to attempt this would make sense both militarily and politically. But Ukraine’s problem, as matters stand, is that <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3503567-ukraine-needs-up-to-300-mlr-systems-to-effectively-regain-ground-official.html">it lacks the combat power</a> to be certain of success. The trend of weapons supply is nowhere near what will be required to ensure the <a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/analysis-ukrainian-dreams-of-retaking-kherson-hinge-on-western-weapons">recovery of Ukrainian lands</a> and a consequent end to this war – by negotiation, or decision of arms. </p>
<p>Some weeks ago, the US <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61214176">stated as its aim</a> that Russia is “weakened to the degree it can’t do the kind of things it has done in invading Ukraine”. That is all very well, but the problem is the means by which the west has chosen to achieve this – long-term attrition, rather than decisive defeat.</p>
<h2>Wanted: greater firepower</h2>
<p>What the west calls its “arsenal of democracy” <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/return-of-the-arsenal-of-democracy-russia-ukraine-support-aid-putin-war-invasion-zelensky-weapons-allies-11655829628">is open</a> – but barely. Serious doubt hangs over whether the US is serious about its war aims. The question is: does the US want Ukrainians to win, or does it want them to bleed for years?</p>
<p>If the former, arrangements need to be made very soon to release <a href="http://www.military-today.com/tanks/m1_abrams.htm">the thousands of M1 Abrams tanks</a>, <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32068/thousands-of-army-bradleys-dont-have-the-power-to-use-new-active-protection-systems">Bradley armoured fighting vehicles</a>, artillery, <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39777/marines-reportedly-decommissioning-ah-1zs-as-they-shutter-helicopter-operations-in-hawaii">attack helicopters</a> and other systems – much of which are currently in storage rather than in service.</p>
<p>No units of the US armed forces need to be depleted. All of this equipment was, by the way, specifically designed to destroy the equipment the Russians now deploy. Biden’s pledge to “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/30/biden-war-russia-ukraine-00043449">stick with Ukraine as long as it takes</a>” has something of a double-edged feel. Without a step change in the delivery of weapons, “as long as it takes” – a phrase we’ve heard before from western leaders concerning <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/04/us/america-will-never-run-bush-says-of-iraq.html">Iraq</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-afghanistan-idUSTRE6A71TI20101108">Afghanistan</a> – might indicate a very long time indeed. There is of course, sadly, the possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-ukraine-invasion-wont-be-over-soon-and-putin-is-counting-on-the-wests-short-attention-span-185489">western boredom with a long war</a> setting in first.</p>
<p>Preparations must begin for a move from drip-feeding weapon systems in single figures towards <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/13/ukraine-asks-the-west-for-huge-rise-in-heavy-artillery-supply">numbers in the hundreds</a>. Ukraine also requires an extensive and systematic regime to form and train brigades capable of imposing that really heavy strategic cost upon Putin. No such system of mass “training-and-equipping” seems to be planned.</p>
<p>Back in Kyiv, a colleague’s partner Sergiy (until February in product design) was deployed to the Donetsk region two weeks ago. He now lives in a bunker near the frontline. His group is armed with ancient Soviet gear, and ammunition for their weapons <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220610-ukraine-dependent-on-arms-from-allies-after-exhausting-soviet-era-weaponry">is running out</a></p>
<p>Since deployment, two of Sergiy’s unit have been killed. As matters stand, at best he will be doing these deployments for years as the rest of the world becomes bored, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-vastly-expands-troops-high-readiness-long-term-russian-threat-2022-06-29/#:%7E:text=MADRID%2C%20June%2029%20(Reuters),as%20posing%20the%20greatest%20threat.">Nato bolsters its borders</a>, and the west provides a trickle of weapons.</p>
<p>In 1941, Nazi officers enjoyed their leave passes in Paris – but not London
– as Winston Churchill spoke the words: “<a href="https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/give-us-the-tools.html#:%7E:text=We%20shall%20not%20fail%20or,we%20will%20finish%20the%20job.&text=%E2%80%9CLeave%20the%20past%20to%20history,to%20write%20that%20history%20myself.%E2%80%9D">Give us the tools and we’ll finish the job</a>.” Like those Germans, Russian officers could yet enjoy Ukraine’s beautiful capital. All that is stopping them are Ukrainian soldiers and their still mostly outdated tools.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186340/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Ledwidge is affiliated with. The Transatlantic Dialogue Center, Kyiv.(visiting fellow (non-stipendiary)</span></em></p>
Ukraine is losing this war at the moment. The west needs to massively step up its military aid to the country.
Frank Ledwidge, Senior Lecturer in Military Strategy and Law, University of Portsmouth
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/182358
2022-05-04T13:33:23Z
2022-05-04T13:33:23Z
Ukraine: the problem with Russia’s sanctions-busting arms industry
<p>The UK government has reportedly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/05/02/investigation-launched-british-components-russian-weapons-systems/">launched an enquiry</a> into how British-manufactured components have made their way into Russian weapons systems, despite an arms embargo being in operation since Russia annexed Crimea <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9483/">in 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Russian material captured by Ukrainian forces has revealed a significant dependence on western-made components. Multiple UK-manufactured high-frequency transistors – “dual use” electronics that can be used for both military and civilian purposes – were found inside a Russian <a href="https://www.machtres.com/lang1/borisoglebsk-2.html">Borisoglebsk-2 mobile jamming system</a>. </p>
<p>My research into <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2021.1942848">illicit procurement</a> by sanctioned states for their weapons programmes shows a long history of Soviet and Russian dependence on western technologies. It also suggests that states can be highly adaptive in finding ways around barriers to the acquisition of technology from overseas and that more than just export controls are required to prevent illicit procurement.</p>
<p>A recent report by the <a href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/operation-z-death-throes-imperial-delusion">Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)</a> has suggested that the Russian arms industry uses more western-origin components in its weapons systems than previously thought. The report notes that: “Russia’s latest weapons are heavily dependent upon critical specialist components manufactured abroad.” It found that Ukraine’s scientific establishments noted “a consistent pattern” across major Russian weapons systems recovered from the battlefields.</p>
<p>Many of the western components that have found their way into Russian systems are, like the UK-made transistors, classed as “dual use”, meaning they can be used in both military and civil applications. Civil goods are subject to lesser regulation than military goods, which has been a loophole. The UK only banned the export of dual-use goods to Russia after the current invasion had begun. </p>
<p>Other evidence also suggests that Russia has benefited from access to foreign technology without government consent over the past decade. This has included weapons, from <a href="https://twitter.com/dbsalisbury/status/1258715548046811138?s=20&t=uhTR8O2ggkQNSfZ2-ebxdQ">British sniper rifles</a> used on the frontlines of the Donbas region, to goods for the country’s <a href="https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/ryska-tillverkare-av--karnvapen-koper--svensk-utrustning/">nuclear and missile complex</a>, sourced from Sweden.</p>
<p>The British government’s export licensing system is used to implement the embargoes to Russia and to prevent undesirable exports. There are no specific allegations of breaches of the controls by British companies.</p>
<p>These restrictive measures put in place by Britain – alongside those by <a href="https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2022/04/us-uk-and-eu-impose-new-sanctions-and-export-controls">many other states</a> – do seem to have had some potentially significant effects. Ukrainian government sources <a href="https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277666367879782">suggested in March</a> that Russia’s armoured vehicle plants were struggling to obtain western components. In April, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=293496349628459&id=100069042885845&m_entstream_source=timeline">Ukrainian sources also suggested</a> that similar challenges were being encountered by Russian factories producing radars and surface-to-air missiles.</p>
<h2>Long history of illicit procurement</h2>
<p>When faced with arms embargoes – or other less legally formalised barriers to acquiring arms or components – sanctioned states always look for ways to circumvent them. Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) have a long history of finding ways to access western technologies.</p>
<p><a href="https://kansaspress.ku.edu/978-0-7006-1555-1.html">From the 1920s</a>, Soviet agents sought to openly acquire manufacturing equipment from western markets, as well as covertly acquiring military secrets through espionage. During the second world war, <a href="https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1942-1945/espionage.htm">Soviet spies obtained</a> nuclear secrets from the Manhattan Project, despite extensive security measures taken to prevent such leaks.</p>
<p>There is evidence of continuing Soviet interest in western technology throughout the cold war as the Soviet Union sought to compete with the US. In 1985, as cold war high-tech competition reached its peak, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r000201080007-7">a CIA report</a> noted a “massive and well organised campaign” to acquire western technology illegally. The report went as far as to suggest that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The assimilation of western technology is so broad that the United States and other western nations are thus subsidising the Soviet military buildup.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Closing loopholes</h2>
<p>Putin has doubled down on his war in Ukraine, despite significant troop and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61021388">equipment losses</a> by the Russian military. Hindering the Russian military-industrial complex’s access to international markets will help to prevent destroyed and captured equipment from being replaced, expended munitions from being replenished and damaged vehicles from being repaired.</p>
<p>Export controls can play an important role to this end. Governments, intelligence agencies and law enforcement bodies will undoubtedly increase their efforts towards preventing Russia’s illicit procurement. But, as history shows, the adaptive and deceptive nature of Russia’s illicit procurement networks is challenging to contend with. Those seeking to halt the supply will need to go further than merely putting in place the embargoes. </p>
<p>The US and allies should closely work with international partners and neutral states to counter Russia’s use of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/abs/exploring-the-use-of-third-countries-in-proliferation-networks-the-case-of-malaysia/C8A766A657994027EF3B584E86FF72A4">“third-country” hubs</a> to evade controls. Fully halting the flow of components could require engaging a wide range of states with varying chances of success. Re-export risks are posed by countries like India, with whom Russia has <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/anti-ship-version-of-brahmos-missile-successfully-test-fired-7892226/">ongoing defence equipment projects</a>, large markets like China that have long <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2013/10/engaging-china-in-proliferation-prevention-2/">been sources</a> for sanctioned programmes in the past, and even pariah <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-opportunity-sell-auto-parts-russian-carmaker-84468231">states like Iran</a> that continue to face international sanctions. </p>
<p>Efforts to <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_0708/How-the-Private-Sector-Can-Do-More-to-Prevent-Illicit-Trade">engage and inform industry</a> at home – those who have to comply with export controls but lack intelligence on Russian evasion methods – will be key to the ability of the restrictions to bite.</p>
<p>Russia is only one of many states that have long pursued illicit procurement. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/open-source-intelligence-how-digital-sleuths-are-making-their-mark-on-the-ukraine-war-179135">open-source information, tools and approaches</a> used by researchers outside of government to understand the illicit supply chains and sanctions-busting networks of Iran, North Korea and others should be applied to shine a light on Russia’s networks.</p>
<p>Government enquiries following goods ending up in enemy hands are not uncommon in Whitehall. The most extensive, the Scott enquiry, lasted for four years in the 1990s following <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2012/nov/09/arms-iraq-saddam-hussein">the “arms to Iraq” scandal</a> and led to a shake up of the British export control system. </p>
<p>One of the common takeaways from these scandals is that those inside government and those outside – industry, researchers and academics – must work together if export controls and embargoes are to be rendered effective. Only these collaborative approaches will ensure that export controls can help to undermine Putin’s war machine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182358/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Salisbury receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust for a project on arms embargoes. </span></em></p>
Captured military equipment in Ukraine has revealed the extent to which western tech is used in Russian weapons systems.
Daniel Salisbury, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/168526
2021-09-24T02:09:37Z
2021-09-24T02:09:37Z
Why the Australia-France submarine deal collapse was predictable
<p>Australia’s unilateral cancellation of its contract to purchase French submarines and sign up for the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS">AUKUS security pact</a> constitutes a slap in the face for French diplomacy – variously described as a “stab in the back” and a “betrayal” by French diplomats.</p>
<p>Though Paris may be shocked by this turn of events, it was somewhat foreseeable, for several historical, cultural and diplomatic reasons.</p>
<p>Under this <a href="https://www.smart-appart.fr/en/news/306-contract-of-the-century-for-naval-group-australia-buys-12-submarines-for-31-billion-euros">“contract of the century”</a>, agreed to between Paris and Canberra in 2016, France was to provide Australia with diesel-electric Barracuda submarines for a total of 34 billion euros (A$55 billion) over a 25-year period.</p>
<p>For France, the aim was to develop a <a href="https://au.ambafrance.org/IMG/pdf/texte_final_declaration__cle84c526.pdf">partnership</a> with the largest nation in the South Pacific, one that should have sealed a close and lasting agreement for half a century, thus reinforcing its diplomatic and military network in an area of great strategic interest.</p>
<p>While this plan may have been both judicious (because it proposed a <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/fr_a4_indopacifique_16p_2021_v7_cle4ebee1.pdf">third diplomatic path</a> for the region, freed from the Sino-American stranglehold) and ambitious (because it gave France and Europe a renewed presence in the Indo-Pacific region), there were nonetheless near insurmountable weaknesses in the French position that led to the failure of this collaboration.</p>
<h2>With US or against US</h2>
<p>Let’s be clear: the alliance proposed by France, while laudable, was nonetheless unusual. <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/the-china-crisis-australia-wont-be-able-to-escape-040410205.html">Rising tensions</a> with China over the past three years have brought Australia back into the American fold in a lasting way.</p>
<p>It should be remembered the United States has controlled and monitored Oceania since 1945. It has a <a href="https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/">network of military bases</a> throughout the region, territories of its own, long-standing political associations and even its own state – Hawaii.</p>
<p>Taking advantage of a relative decline in the US presence in the Pacific under the Obama administration (when Joe Biden was vice-president), China has considerably hardened its <a href="https://www.areion24.news/2020/02/13/la-chine-a-la-conquete-de-lindo-pacifique/">expansionist policy</a> in the area, which in turn has prompted a US reversal over the <a href="https://fmes-france.org/lopportunisme-naval-chinois-dans-le-pacifique-ouest-se-poursuivra-t-il-en-2021-par-arnaud-peyronnet/">past three years</a>.</p>
<p>This is where Australia comes in. The US had an interest in seeing Canberra cancel its contract with France and replace it with one with Washington – thus ensuring American control over a fleet of submarines they are likely to build themselves, despite what <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/16/australia-nuclear-submarine-deal-contract-france-scrapped-defence-pact-us-uk">Prime Minister Scott Morrison is saying</a>.</p>
<p>The United States is thus returning to the doctrine of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-23kmhc3P8U">“with us or against us”</a> initiated by then-President George Bush in 2001. As such, it can no longer tolerate a third way in the Pacific. This inflexibility can only lead to an escalation of tensions between Washington and Beijing, with Australia further increasing those tensions by choosing to side with the US.</p>
<h2>Friends in high places</h2>
<p>The cancellation of the Australian contract with Naval Group, while brutal, was therefore not totally unexpected given Australia’s historical connection with the US, especially since Canberra had expressed its dissatisfaction to Paris <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/90b-french-subs-project-could-sink-20210224-p575e5">on several occasions</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, the perception in France of a reversal of Australia’s strategy is misled. AUKUS is a coherent move for Australia, in line with 200 years of Australian diplomatic tradition. It doesn’t mean, however, that it is a good move or a safe one.</p>
<p>Australian diplomacy is based on the doctrine of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/ra/australia/pdf/great_power.pdf">“great and powerful friends”</a>. Until 1942, when the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Westminster_Adoption_Act_1942">Statute of Westminster</a> was ratified by the Australian parliament, the country’s diplomatic decisions were largely taken by or in collaboration with London.</p>
<p>Since 1945, these same decisions have been made slightly more independently, but often in agreement with Washington. Australia followed the US into <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/korea">Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/event/vietnam">Vietnam</a>, Iraq – in <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/gulf">1990</a> then again in <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/research/guide/iraq">2003</a> – and <a href="https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/event/afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>. These modest contingents have allowed the United States to disguise its actions as being part of international coalitions.</p>
<h2>Security or sovereignty?</h2>
<p>How could Paris think it could overturn this loyalty, and reverse contemporary Australia’s deeply anchored colonial mentality?</p>
<p>France’s military and diplomatic project with Australia reflected a misunderstanding of what the Australians see as the main issues in the Indo-Pacific. France wants to maintain peace in the region, while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/25/australian-defence-minister-says-conflict-over-taiwan-involving-china-should-not-be-discounted">Australia rightly or wrongly</a> believes that war may well happen between China and Taiwan – and thus between China and the US, to whom Australia would lend its support.</p>
<p>For France, sovereignty is the alpha and omega of all international action, in a <a href="https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315656717-4">Gaullist tradition</a> shared across the entire French political spectrum.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="President Emmanuel Macron (2/L) and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (C) standing on the deck of HMAS Waller, a Collins-class submarine operated by the Royal Australian Navy" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422666/original/file-20210922-13-ziveu9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">No sovereignty, no sub.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Esposito/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Post-colonial Australia has never been truly sovereign in the way the French understand this notion. Nor does it want to be, because what matters to Australians is not so much sovereignty as security. In this respect, France has neither the scope nor the military capabilities of the United States to attach Australia to its Indo-Pacific policy.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2019/mar/04/massacre-map-australia-the-killing-times-frontier-wars">dispossession of Aboriginal lands</a> and the geographical situation of Australia as a settler state in Asia has long led to a widespread sense of the country being under siege.</p>
<p>Since 1788, white Australia has feared incursions by the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-10/aussies-study-french-invasion-plan-for-sydney/4419168">French</a>, the <a href="https://www.rbth.com/history/330300-how-australia-prepared-for-war-with-russia">Russians</a>, the <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/invading-australia-japan-and-the-battle-for-australia-1942-9781742284859">Japanese</a> and finally <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/09/australians-fear-attack-from-china-almost-as-much-as-taiwanese-do-survey-finds">China</a>.</p>
<p>But is anyone truly interested in taking over Australia? Aren’t we big-noting ourselves in thinking that we matter to others?</p>
<p>This complex considerably weakens the possibility of Australia becoming a non-aligned, autonomous nation. Australia seeks protection above all, even if it means enraging allies whom it transforms into adversaries, while further antagonising China.</p>
<h2>An island in search of a protector</h2>
<p>History will tell whether Australia has made the right choice in tearing up its deal with France and joining AUKUS. In the meantime, Canberra is clearly <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-19/malaysia-indonesia-criticise-australian-submarine-about-face/100474056">isolating itself in the Pacific</a>, having crossed a point of no return by making its own weapons interchangable with those of the US army.</p>
<p>Australia has only ever moved between one influence and another. Canberra has never gone it alone, knowing it does not carry much weight on the international stage. However, and this is what seems aberrant and incomprehensible in the eyes of Paris, nor does it wish to give itself the means to develop its own autonomous defence systems and diplomacy.</p>
<p>Paradoxically, and beyond the nationalist rhetoric, Canberra seems incapable of forming its own <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gc96KVsTKtY">independent destiny</a> in the 21st century.</p>
<p>On the contrary, Australia still sees itself as an island in search of a protector, and in its eyes, France cannot take this role between China and the United States. It is therefore a lack of self-confidence, a lack of resources and, above all, a lack of investment and development of its own <a href="https://theconversation.com/cest-fini-can-the-australia-france-relationship-be-salvaged-after-scrapping-the-sub-deal-168090">strategic industries</a> that condemned Australia to inevitably backtrack on of its deal with France.</p>
<h2>Will history repeat itself?</h2>
<p>If Australia doesn’t develop its own subs now, history is bound to repeat itself. Contracts took <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP04">years to be negotiated with Sweden</a> for the Collins-class submarines in the 1980s, the same problem that can be observed today.</p>
<p>As of now, the contract with the French is dead and there is no new contract with the US. In the meantime, we lose years and billions of dollars while potentially having no submarines between the time of the decommissioning of the Collins-class fleet and the commissioning of the new vessels, sometime in the 2030s.</p>
<p>In 40 years, a new tender will need to be reissued for yet another fleet, creating the same delays and problems we have already twice experienced. But the Morrison government won’t be there to face them. That situation is simply unsustainable.</p>
<p>It might be time for Australia to invest in its own future, with defence programs headed by Australians for Australians, thus enabling us to be a truly sovereign nation that doesn’t need to be dragged along in other countries’ rivalries. But for this, we require truly ambitious leaders and considerable investments in the education and defence sectors.</p>
<p>Lastly, it might also be time to put the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Australia">nuclear question</a> on the table for a referendum. One of the worst aspects of AUKUS is the lack of consultation with all Australians.</p>
<p>Nuclear propulsion for submarines is likely to be used as a backdoor to move Australia toward a nuclear future. Going nuclear – or not – is one of the most important questions for Australians to answer to in the 21st century, both for defence and to <a href="https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/PUB1911_web.pdf">curb carbon emissions</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168526/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Romain Fathi ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
The perception in France of a reversal of strategy is in fact a coherent move for Australia, in line with 200 years of Australian diplomatic tradition – for better or worse.
Romain Fathi, Senior Lecturer, History, Flinders University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/155301
2021-02-18T19:12:07Z
2021-02-18T19:12:07Z
The crisis in Yemen demands an independent review of NZ’s military links with Saudi Arabia
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384877/original/file-20210217-23-xfo6nj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C0%2C3811%2C2552&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The revelation that Air New Zealand had been silently <a href="https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/exclusive-air-nz-has-been-secretly-helping-saudi-arabian-military-despite-its-role-in-yemen-humanitarian-crisis">contracting services</a> to the Saudi Arabian navy was apparently not the only instance of New Zealand’s connection to the murderous war in Yemen.</p>
<p>A week after Air New Zealand <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/436026/air-nz-apologises-after-revelations-it-helped-saudi-arabian-military">apologised</a> to the government, it emerged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAT) had <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/436433/mfat-approved-exports-for-military-equipment-to-saudi-arabia-s-forces">approved exports</a> of military equipment to Saudi Arabia in 2016 and 2018.</p>
<p>Both cases involved a startling lack of transparency and direct inconsistencies with both corporate and country commitments to upholding international human rights obligations.</p>
<p>The conflict in Yemen is currently the world’s <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/news/after-years-conflict-yemen-remains-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-unfpa-2021">worst humanitarian crisis</a>. From indiscriminate targeting of civilians to torture, sexual violence and starvation, the situation reads like a textbook case of war crimes.</p>
<p>Since 2014, there have been an estimated <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1078972">233,000 deaths</a>, including 131,000 from indirect causes such as lack of food, health services and infrastructure. More than 20 million experience food insecurity, and 10 million are at <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/yemen">risk of famine</a>.</p>
<p>The war is complex, fed by opposing regional, national and religious ambitions. While all sides justify their involvement, none have clean hands. All have been increasingly brutal in pursuit of their goals. </p>
<p>The first step towards calming the conflict will involve a halt to providing weapons to those forces not fighting in accordance with international humanitarian law — Saudi Arabia included.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1358723292123729928"}"></div></p>
<h2>Selective embargoes</h2>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/ministry-statements-and-speeches/45th-session-human-rights-council-interactive-dialogue-on-the-reports-of-the-group-of-experts-on-yemen/">being on record</a> supporting calls for all parties in the Yemen conflict to abide by international law, New Zealand can no longer deny any potential complicity in this humanitarian abyss.</p>
<p>Efforts to control the situation stretch back to 2014. As well as various peace initiatives, the UN Security Council has mandated a limited <a href="https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2216(2015)">arms embargo</a>, which <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/sanctions/yemen/">New Zealand complies with</a>. But these are targeted primarily at the Houthi rebels and associated terror groups, not the Saudi-led coalition fighting them.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/yemen-understanding-the-conflict-98296">Yemen: Understanding the conflict</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The inconsistency reflects the power of veto in the Security Council, but a UN panel of experts agreed all parties to the conflict have committed <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_79.pdf">egregious violations</a> of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1359672023526481920"}"></div></p>
<h2>Theory and practice</h2>
<p>In theory, the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty should help curtail the trade in weapons to this disastrous conflict. Its signatories (including New Zealand) <a href="https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html">agree not to authorise</a> any transfer of conventional arms, ammunition, parts and components, if they know such material could contribute to war crimes being committed.</p>
<p>In practice, this meant countries like New Zealand amended export laws to ensure all military and dual-use equipment was strictly controlled and not destined for the wrong places.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-after-a-decade-of-conflict-the-same-old-problems-remain-154314">Arab Spring: after a decade of conflict, the same old problems remain</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>All military-related exports must be explicitly <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/how-to-export-military-and-dual-use-goods/">permitted</a>. Permits will be <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/trading-weapons-and-controlled-chemicals/how-your-application-is-assessed/#criteria">refused</a> if the export violates UN Security Council arms embargoes, contravenes New Zealand’s other international obligations, or if it is known such materials would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.</p>
<p>Reasonably, there should now be no military trade with the Saudi-led coalition (or the other belligerents). No country can seriously claim not to be aware of the extreme violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1360154030312480768"}"></div></p>
<h2>Profit over principle</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, it seems the excessive profits to be made from a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14282?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">soaring arms trade</a> have pushed aside evidence of war crimes or assassinations (in the case of the extrajudicial killing of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45812399">Jamal Khashoggi</a>).</p>
<p>Along with the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/9/uk-approved-1-4bn-of-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-post-export-ban">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/09/canada-doubles-weapons-sales-to-saudi-arabia-despite-moratorium">Canada</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/feb/11/australia-will-not-ban-arms-sales-to-countries-involved-in-yemeni-civil-war">Australia</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/02/04/its-time-to-stop-us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/">US</a> (although the Biden administration is reportedly <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/02/13/joe-biden-looks-to-end-the-war-in-yemen">reconsidering its policy</a>), it now appears New Zealand is included in this company.</p>
<p>Initially, New Zealand’s involvement was confined to humanitarian aid, providing <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/news/new-zealand-humanitarian-assistance-for-yemen/">millions in assistance</a>. But if the latest reports are correct, the government must end any further military or dual-use engagement and ask how such decisions were justified in the past.</p>
<p>New Zealand’s involvement is comparatively small, but the scale of the trade matters less than its legal and ethical basis.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arab-spring-when-the-us-needed-to-step-up-it-stood-back-now-all-eyes-are-on-biden-155058">Arab Spring: when the US needed to step up, it stood back – now, all eyes are on Biden</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Transparency and accountability</h2>
<p>The government must also require full transparency from Air New Zealand as its majority shareholder.</p>
<p>The airline has come a long way since it was famously accused of “<a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/the-detail/117731099/the-detail-legal-clarification-over-the-orchestrated-litany-of-lies-phrase">an orchestrated litany of lies</a>” over the 1979 Erebus disaster. As a putatively responsible corporate citizen it upholds social and environmental <a href="https://p-airnz.com/cms/assets/PDFs/air-new-zealand-sustainability-report-2020.pdf">sustainability</a> as part of its core values and <a href="https://p-airnz.com/cms/assets/PDFs/airnz-code-of-conduct-2020.pdf">code of conduct</a>.</p>
<p>Air New Zealand takes these responsibilities seriously enough to have pledged itself to the <a href="https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles">ten principles</a> of the <a href="https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/all">Global Compact</a>. This UN initiative encourages businesses to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their implementation.</p>
<p>Principle 2 <a href="https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles/principle-2">requires</a> that a company should not be complicit in human rights abuses. Air New Zealand said in its 2020 report to the compact: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We take legal advice in the local jurisdictions we operate in about human rights compliance and require managers across the organisation to comply with all company policies.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So far, none of this adds up — for MFAT, Air New Zealand or the government. An independent review of New Zealand’s involvement in the Yemen crisis — its scale, justification and status under existing laws and principles — is now called for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie has received funding from the NZ Law Foundation and the Francqui Foundation (in Belgium) in the past related to the study of war and conflict. None of it pertained to this piece.</span></em></p>
Air New Zealand and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade have both potentially breached international human rights agreements. The government must demand answers.
Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of Waikato
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/152728
2021-01-18T17:43:54Z
2021-01-18T17:43:54Z
Trump-fuelled chaos shows democracy is in trouble — here’s how to change course
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379269/original/file-20210118-13-1599yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5825%2C3860&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The U.S. National Guard are seen surrounding the U.S. Capitol a week after Donald Trump supporters raided it.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Harnick)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Joe Biden will become the 46th president of the United States on Jan. 20, seven days after outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump became the first commander-in-chief in history to be impeached twice — this time for inciting an insurrection — after his supporters <a href="https://www.masslive.com/politics/2021/01/read-the-article-of-impeachment-against-president-donald-trump-accused-of-inciting-insurrection.html">raided the U.S. Capitol</a>.</p>
<p>The oft-repeated notion that the U.S. is a beacon of democracy owing in part to its tradition of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/abnormal-transitions-of-power-timeline/">peacefully transferring power</a> is no longer a believable proposition.</p>
<p>The common refrain from several U.S. politicians in the days following the U.S. Capitol insurrection on Jan. 6 that “this is not us,” “we’re better than this” and “we are the greatest democracy in history” cannot mask the reality that the U.S. is far from the democracy Americans think it is.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1349508304905637895"}"></div></p>
<p>With thousands of National Guard troops <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/state-capitals-national-guard-inauguration/2021/01/16/d010a97a-5833-11eb-89bc-7f51ceb6bd57_story.html">stationed on Capitol Hill and at state legislatures across the country</a> to protect against further attacks by armed and organized thugs in advance of the inauguration, many of the most salient features of democracy have been profoundly diminished. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="National Guard troops stand along a chain link fence." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/378678/original/file-20210113-21-1upjqb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Washington National Guard stand at a fence surrounding the Capitol in anticipation of protests on Jan. 11, 2021, in Olympia, Wash. State capitols across the country are under heightened security after the siege of the U.S. Capitol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ted S. Warren)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are many ways to <a href="https://www.peterlang.com/view/title/21335">define democracy</a>, but the normative formulation — a constitution, fair elections, an impartial judicial system and a range of presumably fair and open administrative structures and processes — is under attack in contemporary America. </p>
<p>Society is inundated with a daily dose of indices from the stock market and opinion polling, but the chaos in the U.S. over the past several years shows us we need better measurements of the health and vibrancy of democracy. </p>
<p>We advocate for a more <a href="https://myersedpress.presswarehouse.com/browse/book/9781975501433/It-s-Not-Education-that-Scares-Me-It-s-the-Educators">critically engaged democracy</a>, one that includes more robust civil society participation, a focus on social justice, social inequalities and power relations and the need to develop and support transformative practices, solidarity and education. While discussing, developing and achieving a richer democracy requires negotiating a minefield of partisanship and bitter divisions, simply feigning that we’re living in democracies is no longer a viable option.</p>
<p>Our framework advocates re-examining democracy through meaningful dialogue, deliberation, engagement and action. A focus on real-world problems and realities should be a welcome change from the more mainstream focus on the horse race of attaining and maintaining power.</p>
<h2>Reimagining democracy</h2>
<p>There are a number of questions underpinning this reimagining of democracy. For instance:</p>
<p>• What do we know about the arms trade, how much is being sold, to whom, how these arms are used, who are the victims, etc.? </p>
<p>• How do we understand homelessness in terms of the human, economic and political costs?</p>
<p>• How do we document and deal with the reality of women routinely being violated, beaten and killed by men in our society?</p>
<p>• What is the impact of racism on people and society? </p>
<p>• How are we dealing with environmental issues and their impact on the planet?</p>
<p>These are some of the questions all citizens of democracies must ask to move beyond elections as the defining characteristic of democracy. </p>
<p>It’s necessary to question the fundamental components of democracy in order to accurately, transparently and critically assess how democratic our societies really are. In the U.S., in particular, moving beyond baseless assertions that “we are the greatest democracy on Earth” is important, especially for everyone left out of the equation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Dutch demonstrators carry a Stop Facism sign at a protest against the raid on the U.S. Capitol" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379145/original/file-20210117-19-1tv3l2m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators observe social distancing COVID-19 health protocols during an anti-fascism demonstration in Amsterdam, Netherlands, on Jan. 10 against the storming of the U.S. Capitol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Peter Dejong)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Democracy indicators</h2>
<p>There are a slew of democracy indicators and measures in a variety of areas, including <a href="https://www.indexmundi.com/surveys/results/8/table">social justice</a> and racism, <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii">sexism</a>, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/pages/universalhumanrightsindexdatabase.aspx">poverty</a>, <a href="http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/civic-engagement/">citizen engagement</a>, <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/global-state-democracy-indices">citizen participation</a> <a href="https://libguides.usc.edu/c.php?g=234935&p=5813462">in elections</a>, <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/education-all-development-index">education</a>, <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/health-index">health care</a>, <a href="https://libguides.gwu.edu/intreldatabases">international relations</a> with other states and peoples, <a href="https://www.environmentaldemocracyindex.org/node/2730.html">the environment</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020">governance</a> and <a href="https://rsf.org/en/ranking">press freedom.</a></p>
<p>For each indicator, we propose a central question: What is being done and what should be done to ensure governments around the world are working to enhance democracy in each specific area of measurement?</p>
<p>Applying this question to every available indicator will encourage debate and action that move beyond the predilections of the governing party and select interests. </p>
<p>A simple way to do this would be for every democracy indicator to outline where governments stand on each one. What are they doing to combat systemic racism, for example? How are they encouraging citizen engagement in elections, to name another example? The detailed work supporting these indicators would also be made public, allowing for greater citizen participation in understanding, critiquing and addressing key concerns.</p>
<h2>Potential limitations</h2>
<p>There are several issues that could obfuscate and undermine this project. </p>
<ol>
<li><p>Is there the political will to embrace it? </p></li>
<li><p>How to determine who should be involved and who would have the last word? </p></li>
<li><p>What guarantee is there that governments and citizens will consider and use the model? </p></li>
</ol>
<p>A richer democracy will result from documenting and exposing issues and problems and engaging with the population, especially if the process includes meaningful dialogue, accountability and planning. Formally outlining what’s democratic or undemocratic about our society — government policies, programs, laws, practices and traditions, etc. — should compel decision-makers to be more attentive to systemic problems. </p>
<p>The objective is to bring together those working to accurately measure democracy to purposefully reimagine democratic engagement and action. It may be difficult, but the status quo is no longer an option. As citizens, we must push for broad critical discussion and engagement on the foundations of democracy around the world. </p>
<p>Democracy indicators are only a starting point. Our suggestion for a framework to reform democracy is not meant to be a comprehensive, finite policy instrument. But moving beyond soundbites about how the stock market is responding to political upheaval, or how politicians are performing in polls, could bring welcome relief to those adversely affected by the troubling state of democracy right now.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The U.S. Capitol dome is seen in the darkness behind razor wire." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5459%2C3595&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/379147/original/file-20210117-19-ghh4rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. Capitol is seen through razor wire above security fencing, on Jan. 16, 2021, in Washington as security is increased ahead of the inauguration of President-elect Joe Biden and Vice-President-elect Kamala Harris.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The need to go further</h2>
<p>This is not to suggest that democracy indicators currently serve little purpose. In fact, most are accurately informing us how and where democracy is in danger. </p>
<p>But it’s our contention they must go further so that democracy is debated, deliberated, interrogated and reconsidered well outside of the electoral system, which is flawed and limited in many ways. </p>
<p>The United States will illustrate this week that changing a nation’s leader without profoundly rethinking the system he or she is upholding is no longer acceptable for the citizens of any country. Collectively, we need to advocate for a more engaged and meaningful form of democracy that will benefit all citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul R. Carr receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for a research project entitled Social Media, Citizen Participation and Education, for which he is the Principal Investigator, and also the Fonds de recherche du Québec in relation to the UNESCO Chair DCMÉT, for which he is the Chair-Holder.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gina Thésée receives funding from receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for a research project entitled Social Media, Citizen Participation and Education, for which he is the Co-Investigator, and also the Fonds de recherche du Québec in relation to the UNESCO Chair DCMÉT, for which he is the Co-Chair.</span></em></p>
The U.S. illustrates this week that changing a nation’s leader without rethinking the system he or she is upholding is no longer acceptable for citizens. We need an improved form of democracy.
Paul R. Carr, Professeur/Professor (Université du Québec en Outaouais) & Titulaire/Chair, Chaire UNESCO en démocratie, citoyenneté mondiale et éducation transformatoire/ UNESCO Chair in Democracy, Global Citizenship and Transformative Education., Université du Québec en Outaouais (UQO)
Gina Thésée, Professeure/Professor (Université du Québec à Montréal) & Cotitulaire/Co-Chair, Chaire UNESCO en démocratie, citoyenneté mondiale et éducation transformatoire/UNESCO Chair in Democracy, Global Citizenship and Transformative Education., Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/130254
2020-01-24T15:18:08Z
2020-01-24T15:18:08Z
Libya: why enforcing an arms embargo is so hard
<p>A group of countries involved in the ongoing civil war in Libya <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-libya-peace-summit-agrees-on-commitment-to-un-arms-embargo/a-52058307">agreed at a meeting in Berlin</a> on January 19 to uphold a UN arms embargo and stop international meddling in the country’s conflict. </p>
<p>Germany wants to find a way to end the ongoing conflict in Libya to prevent the North African country from becoming a “new Syria”. With Libya <a href="https://theconversation.com/migrants-calling-us-in-distress-from-the-mediterranean-returned-to-libya-by-deadly-refoulement-industry-111219">a key transit country</a> for migration on the shores of Europe, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her European partners have a keen interest in stabilising the country. Also present at the Berlin meeting were representatives from Turkey, Russia, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, Italy, France, the UK, the US and China who all have interests in the country.</p>
<p>My own ongoing research is looking at the ideology of different Islamist and Salafi groups in Libya since the overthrow of Muammar Gadaffi in 2011, a dimension that is often underestimated in the dynamics of the conflict. Since April 2019, Libya has been embroiled in another wave of civil war, initiated by the head of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, who aimed to take over the capital, Tripoli, from the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is backed by the UN. </p>
<p>While the attack by Haftar’s LNA caught the GNA – and the international community – by surprise, so far, he has failed to seize Tripoli from the GNA, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. Both sides of the conflict rely on groups that carry ideological imprints that shape their behaviour and affect their international alliances. </p>
<p>For example the fall of Sirte to the LNA on January 6 was <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security/libyan-commander-haftars-forces-say-they-have-taken-sirte-idUKKBN1Z51L0">enabled by the changing of sides of 604 Brigade</a>, that espouses Salafism, a branch of Sunni Islam, and specifically the teaching of Saudi scholar Rabee al-Madkhali. Previously affiliated with the GNA, the group has now allied itself with the LNA, showing the potential repercussions of having Salafi-Madkhali groups present in the security forces on both main sides of the civil war in Libya. </p>
<p>Haftar’s military offensive has been characterised by repeated <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/libya-haftar-announces-decisive-battle-capture-tripoli-191212205130743.html">declarations of a “zero hour”</a> and claims – none of them fulfilled – that Tripoli would soon fall to his forces. His offensive has been <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/final-report-panel-experts-sudan-s202036-enar">supported by foreign powers</a> via arms shipments, and the deployment to Libya of military equipment and foreign fighters. </p>
<p>The new emphasis in Berlin on enforcing the arms embargo is crucial to the prospects of peace in Libya. Ending foreign interference is essential to alleviate the suffering of the local population who have been the target of multiple airstrike campaigns in recent years. Ultimately, the Berlin peace conference was right to emphasise the importance of a political solution over a military “win”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-too-many-cooks-in-the-kitchen-could-inhibit-a-peace-deal-in-libya-130391">Why 'too many cooks in the kitchen' could inhibit a peace deal in Libya</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Nearly a decade of sanctions</h2>
<p>The UN Security Council placed an arms embargo on Libya in February 2011 relating to the supply of arms and military equipment to and from Libya. Initially, the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/02/367672-security-council-imposes-sanctions-libyan-authorities-bid-stem-violent">sanctions targeted the Gadaffi regime</a> because of its brutal and systematic violations of the human rights of anti-government protesters. </p>
<p>The sanctions regime has been <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/libya/libya_2011">amended three times</a> since then, most recently in July 2016 to authorise states to inspect vessels on the high seas off Libya’s coast believed to be in violation of the arms embargo. </p>
<p>From the start, there were challenges connected to the longstanding <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970843?casa_token=8k8T-bzeRMoAAAAA:e1r6_bT3b3x8KB_UcMoteOi3ThK0D7X5N3ECbkj4zRHfewRtmOKFuzt3YWR3uiCAooY9c4As5gjxoL1iS5-LQfhXGRvtXX1okP6WE4Im1-fjia5X&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">absence of a global enforcer</a> that is capable, interested and willing to bring violators of the arms embargo to task.</p>
<p>Breaches of the arms embargo have come from different directions. First from states that intervene – usually on behalf of their local proxies. And second, non-state groups such as militias and smugglers, who are emboldened by official embargoes to import and sell weapons illegally. These militias are, however, unlikely to be deterred by international naming and shaming or warnings of punishment. </p>
<p>Reports by multiple UN expert panels, the latest <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2021151/S_2019_914_E.pdf">published in December 2019</a>, have outlined breaches of the arms embargo. The experts reported that the UAE and Egypt have breached the arms embargo by supplying weapons to forces affiliated with Haftar’s LNA. More recently, Haftar’s forces have also benefited from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/world/middleeast/russia-libya-mercenaries.html">support of the Russian mercenaries</a> from the infamous Wagner group, accused of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war/">waging secret wars</a> on the Kremlin’s behalf around the world.</p>
<p>The different armed factions fighting on behalf of the GNA have mostly received military support from Turkey, which has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/libya-gna-accepts-turkish-offer-military-support-sources-191219130438161.html">increased its involvement</a> considerably in recent months to try and prevent Haftar’s military victory. The presence of Chadian and Sudanese armed groups in support of forces affiliated with both the GNA and LNA have also been singled out by UN experts. </p>
<h2>Chances for change are slim</h2>
<p>The countries at the Berlin conference were therefore right to emphasise and agree <a href="https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/the-berlin-conference-on-libya-1713882">a commitment to</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Refraining from interference in the armed conflict or in the internal affairs of Libya and urge all international actors to do the same. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>While this commitment is desperately needed, it’s not sufficient to end the conflict and the big challenge is how to enforce the embargo. The lack of an impartial, international enforcing power makes this all the more complex. </p>
<p>The theoretical structures are in place, the reporting mechanisms are clear, and the UN experts have provided thorough evidence of breaches of the embargo, but it’s unlikely that the UN Security Council will agree to apply sanctions as a result. The ingrained wariness and diverging interests among international powers over Libya means they have little trust in the impartial implementation of sanctions. The foreign states supporting the GNA and LNA don’t believe the other will stick to the embargo – and nobody wants to weaken their allies’ chances of victory.</p>
<p>Individual sanctions need to be decided by the UN Security Council, which is riddled by diverging interests and dictated by the veto power of its permanent members. For example, one of the most obvious candidates for sanctions would be the UAE. But, given the closeness between the UAE and the US, which has <a href="https://wtop.com/middle-east/2019/09/a-look-at-foreign-military-bases-across-the-persian-gulf/">military forces stationed in the UAE</a>, the Americans are unlikely to want to jeopardise the relationship by pushing sanctions. </p>
<p>A stable truce in Libya needs an efficient arms embargo. The ultimate beneficiaries of such an embargo – the Libyan population – are unlikely to see any improvements soon. The years of international meddling have led to many countries having steadfast interests in Libya, and as it currently stands, no one is willing to take losses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inga Kristina Trauthig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
With dozens of international players meddling in Libya, nobody wants to see their side weakened.
Inga Kristina Trauthig, Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and PhD Candidate at King's College, King's College London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/125945
2019-10-29T14:53:08Z
2019-10-29T14:53:08Z
Russia steps up efforts to fill gaps left by America’s waning interest in Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298942/original/file-20191028-113953-1km4xt4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin (waving) with some of the heads of state who attended the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SEFE-EPA-Pool/Sergei Chirikov</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Russian government and state companies <a href="https://russkiymir.ru/en/news/264038/">signed dozens of memoranda of understanding and agreements</a> during the first Russia-Africa Summit in the Black Sea resort city of Sochi last week. Russia also promised further cooperation, building on recent agreements with individual African governments.</p>
<p>With the summit, the host, President Vladimir Putin, reaffirmed his intention to <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1478929915623967">restore</a> Russia as a major geopolitical player in Africa. Much of its political clout on the continent has waned in the post-Cold War period. </p>
<p>Russia’s trade with Africa <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/the-us-china-trade-rivalry-is-underway-in-africa.html">remains below levels of trade</a> with Europe, the US and Asia. And Africa has much larger trading relationships with China, the US and India than with Russia. Also, development aid to Africa largely comes from the US, China and Japan. This means that Russia’s engagement and presence in Africa is still lagging behind the other major powers in many ways. </p>
<p>One of Putin’s goals is clearly to revive his country’s great-power status. But how can Africa help him achieve this? First, Africa is an important market for <a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206604">Russian arms exports</a>. It is also where Russia has made key investments in the oil, gas and nuclear power sectors. And Africa is an important source of minerals for Russia. </p>
<p>The summit, the first ever of its kind, is a clear indication that Russia is stepping up its efforts to increase its influence in Africa. The deals signed all underscore how Moscow is using strategic investment in energy and minerals, as well as military muscle and soft power, to gain more traction on the continent.</p>
<h2>Arms export and security deals</h2>
<p>Russia accounts for 35% of arms exports to Africa, followed by China with 17%, the US with 9.6% and France with 6.9%. Africa is the second largest importer of Russian <a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206604">arms globally</a>. The Asia-Pacific region tops the list with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45035889">60%</a>. Russia has also signed close to 20 bilateral <a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206604">military cooperation agreements</a> with African governments in recent years. These range from the supply of military aircraft to missiles to engines. Algeria is the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/african-arms-imports-decreasing-sipri/">largest importer</a> of Russian weapons in Africa, followed by Egypt, Angola and Uganda. </p>
<p>Other military agreements with African states pertain to cooperation on countering terrorism, including jointly training troops for peacekeeping on the continent. The countries involved include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Niger and Rwanda.</p>
<p>At the summit, African states wholeheartedly embraced Russia’s newly established relations. South Africa’s minister of public enterprises, Pravin Gordhan, made this clear when <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1735708/vladimir-putins-russia-africa-promises-wont-match-china/">he said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Anybody who gets business going, either from the Russian point of view or the African point of view, in the medium term will benefit from that process. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was borne out in some of the deals finalised in Sochi. For example, Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-africa-niger-helicopters/russia-signs-deal-to-supply-nigeria-with-12-attack-helicopters-ria-idUSKBN1X220T">purchased</a> 12 military helicopters. In turn, Russia agreed last week to assist Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram. The terror group has waged a decade-long insurgency in the northeastern parts of the country.</p>
<h2>Minerals</h2>
<p>Russia relies on imports from Africa to cover its requirements for minerals such as manganese, bauxite and chromium. </p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/zimbabwe-russia-finalize-deal-for-4-billion-platinum-mine">Great Dyke Investments</a>, a company jointly owned by the Russian and Zimbabwean governments, is developing a $4 billion venture to mine the world’s largest deposits of platinum in Zimbabwe. In oil-rich Angola, discussions with Russian companies have focused on <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20191018-oil-diamonds-and-nuclear-power-russia-eyes-africa-business">hydrocarbon production</a>. </p>
<p>Russia is also interested in <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Russia-discusses-African-nuclear-power-prospects-08031801">Namibia’s uranium</a>. In recent years, Rosatom and the Namibian government have been finalising an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And the Russian state-run oil company Rosneft has benefited from a <a href="https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/196635/">cooperation agreement</a> between the Russian and Mozambican governments and to develop offshore gas exploration in Mozambique.</p>
<p>Precious gems, especially diamonds and gold, are also on Russia’s list of priorities in Africa. Moscow has thus deepened relations with Angola, where <a href="http://eng.alrosa.ru/">Alrosa</a>, the Russian diamond mining giant, mines diamonds.</p>
<p>In some instances military and mineral interests are intertwined. For example, in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) a Russian military and security company known in the Russian media as the <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/diplomacy-and-dividends-who-really-controls-the-wagner-group/">Wagner Group</a> is strongly linked to diamond exploration in the country. </p>
<p>Discussions have been held between the CAR and Russia to explore the country’s natural resources, especially diamonds and gold, on a concession basis. And Russia has successfully managed to offer weapons and instructors to train CAR military forces in exchange for access to markets and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/27/russia-delivers-new-batch-of-weapons-to-central-african-republic-a67483">mining rights</a>.</p>
<h2>Energy</h2>
<p>Russian companies are very active in the energy sector too, making significant investments in Algeria, Egypt, Uganda and Angola.</p>
<p>Several Russian companies, including <a href="https://www.gazprom.com/about/">Gazprom</a>, the global gas company; <a href="https://www.forbes.com/companies/lukoil/#4ba792711f2c">Lukoil</a>, the oil multinational; <a href="https://rostec.ru/en/">Rostec</a>, the advanced technology company; and <a href="https://www.rosatom.ru/en/about-us/">Rosatom</a>, the clean energy company; have done numerous deals amounting to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/as-the-us-looks-elsewhere-russia-seeks-a-closer-relationship-with-africa/2019/10/25/7e329124-f69e-11e9-b2d2-1f37c9d82dbb_story.html">billions of US dollars</a>.</p>
<p>These companies are either <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/02/why-corporations-are-the-kremlins-best-friends-a67106">state-owned or state-controlled</a>. They are beneficiaries of state contracts from the Kremlin and qualify for preferential loans from state-owned banks. Because of the close relationship between the state and these companies, investments are mostly or often linked to diplomatic considerations.</p>
<p>Moscow’s nuclear deals fall firmly into this category. For example, Russia is negotiating with Egypt on its <a href="http://m.engineeringnews.co.za/article/egypt-pushes-ahead-with-plans-for-nuclear-power-2019-04-30/rep_id:4433">first nuclear plant</a>. In Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, a major deal has been concluded with Russia on the construction of <a href="https://www.energycentral.com/news/erafoen-reacts-rosatomnigeria-nuclear-deal">two nuclear power plants</a>, with a view to ending the country’s ongoing energy crisis. </p>
<p>Russia promised aid to combat the Ebola virus and to accommodate more Africans at Russian universities. The details of many agreements are not clear, but Moscow claims that it racked up <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-28-russias-scramble-for-africa/">$12.5 billion in deals</a> during the two-day summit. Critics argue that it remains to be seen whether these deals will materialise as real investments in Africa. </p>
<h2>Geopolitics</h2>
<p>Moscow’s diplomatic efforts to strengthen its political relations with African states, and its related geopolitical ambitions, have not <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/the-us-china-trade-rivalry-is-underway-in-africa.html">escaped Western observers</a>. They come at a time when US influence in Africa – and elsewhere – is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b1253e2c-0b2e-11e8-839d-41ca06376bf2">on the decline</a>. </p>
<p>Russia seems keen to fill the gap. Besides solidifying Russia’s trade relationship with Africa at the summit, Putin also clearly tried to confirm Russia’s status as a more dependable partner for the continent, with less baggage than either the US or other Western powers. He probably succeeded in convincing many African leaders that Moscow can deliver – with no strings attached – on the Russian sweet spots of technology, energy and military support, where African countries experience particular needs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation (SA). </span></em></p>
At the Sochi summit, African states embraced Russia’s newly established relations.
Theo Neethling, Professor and Head: Political Studies and Governance in the Humanities Faculty, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/119205
2019-06-21T14:10:33Z
2019-06-21T14:10:33Z
Why British arms sales to Saudi Arabia ruled unlawful – what this means for the future
<p>The British government’s transfer of weapons to Saudi Arabia, which is leading a coalition engaged in armed conflict in Yemen, was deemed unlawful by the <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/the-queen-on-the-application-of-campaign-against-arms-trade-v-secretary-of-state-for-international-trade-and-others/">UK Court of Appeal</a> on June 21. This prompted the government to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/20/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-for-use-in-yemen-declared-unlawful">suspend issuing of any new arms export licences</a> to Saudi Arabia that could be used in Yemen while it considers the implications of the ruling for its decision-making process.</p>
<p>During the Yemen conflict, which has already resulted <a href="https://www.acleddata.com/2019/06/18/yemen-snapshots-2015-2019/">in estimates of almost 100,000 deaths</a>, the Saudi-led coalition has been accused of several violations of international humanitarian law by <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E">the United Nations</a> and some major non-governmental organisations, including <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-made-missile-used-airstrike-ceramics-factory-yemen">Amnesty International</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/yemen">Human Rights Watch</a>. For example, a 2016 report by a UN panel of experts raised concerns about the widespread bombing of the populated <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_73.pdf">city of Sa’dah in May 2015</a> by the Saudi-led coalition and whether it was proportionate.</p>
<p>The appeal judges accepted the argument made by the Campaign Against Arms Trade in the case and found that the UK had never clearly stated whether the Saudi-led coalition committed past violations of international law. But such an assessment is required by the relevant rules on international arms transfers.</p>
<p><a href="https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253">International</a>, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008E0944">European</a> and <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140325/wmstext/140325m0001.htm">British</a> laws require governments of arms-exporting countries to authorise all arms transfers directed abroad, assessing whether there is a “clear risk” that the weapons will be used to commit serious violations of international law, among other things, by the final recipient. This means the government must make a judgement on the future, a difficult task in scenarios such as Yemen where the situation is volatile and cannot be easily predicted. But it’s possible to look at the past behaviour of the country that will receive the weapons, to make an assessment of its future conduct.</p>
<h2>Irrational decision-making</h2>
<p>The British government has always justified its decision to authorise transfers of weapons to Saudi Arabia by looking purely at the future, avoiding any legal assessment of Saudi Arabia’s past behaviour. In fact, the UK has always justified its decisions to sell arms by stressing its efforts to train and support Saudis to avoid violations of international law, <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CAAT-v-Secretary-of-State-and-Others-Open-12-June-2019.pdf">as well as Saudi Arabia’s own commitment</a> to respect such laws in the future. </p>
<p>But the Court of Appeal found that the British government’s failure to assess the past conduct of Saudi Arabia against international law made its decision-making irrational and so unlawful.</p>
<p>Legally, the Court of Appeal cannot make decisions on whether Britain should transfer weapons to Saudi Arabia or not. This is a choice for the government and democratically judged by the parliament and British people. Nevertheless, the court can evaluate how the government makes its choices. In particular, the court can indicate which information the government needs to take into account before making a decision. In this case, the judges declared the government should have expressed its view on the legality of the Saudi Arabia’s conduct, regardless of how difficult that was. The judges ruled that the failure to take a stance on this undermined the whole process of authorisation of the arms transfers directed to Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>This judgement will not prevent the government from exporting weapons to the Saudis in the future. Nevertheless, it prompted Liam Fox, the secretary of state for international trade, to <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-06-20/debates/D9BD8C37-E5A0-4A7E-9959-AC40A0DEE622/ExportLicencesHighCourtJudgment">tell parliament</a> that the UK will stop issuing new export licences to Saudi Arabia while it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/20/uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-for-use-in-yemen-declared-unlawful">reviews its decision-making process</a>. </p>
<p>The UK ruling came on the same day that the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/us/politics/saudi-arms-sales.html">US Senate blocked an US$8 billion US arms sales deal</a> to Saudi Arabia because of concerns over human rights violations. While, no judges were involved, the bipartisan decision of the US Senate also concerned the pre-export decision-making process. </p>
<h2>International responsibilities</h2>
<p>The judgment is a reminder that ministers cannot avoid their responsibility under international law. While the decision has no legal effects outside the UK, it could have important implications for the future enforcement of international law on the issue of arms transfers. International transfers of legal weapons are not generally banned by international law, but are prohibited when the weapons are or might be involved in the violation of the values and principles that guide the whole international community, such as the protection of civilians during armed conflicts. </p>
<p>The relevant domestic and international laws require governments to undertake a pre-export assessment on every arms transfer before authorising it. Countries cannot transfer weapons if they are completely blind to whether the recipients of the weapons will respect international law. Such blindness would mean accepting a very high risk of supporting military actions that the UK would never consider lawful if committed by its own armed forces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Riccardo Labianco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The UK Court of Appeal ruled that the British government did not properly assess whether Saudi Arabia had violated international law. What this means for the arms trade.
Riccardo Labianco, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/114238
2019-03-27T10:16:39Z
2019-03-27T10:16:39Z
Ukraine: US arms sales making big business money while ordinary people pay the price
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265725/original/file-20190325-36270-kbq9so.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A solider poses with a Javelin anti-tank system during a military parade in Kiev, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/kiev-ukraine-august-24-2018-military-1164460894">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Selling lethal weapons to Ukraine is the equivalent of pouring kerosene onto a flame. But ongoing hostilities between Ukraine and Russia – including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/kerch-strait-confrontation-what-happened-ukrainian-russia-crimea">Kerch strait crisis</a>, which began late last year when Russia intercepted three Ukrainian vessels and took 24 crew members captive – are also a major business opportunity for the world’s largest defence contractors. Despite the risk of serious escalation, these companies continue to provide Ukraine with lethal aid so it can defend itself against Russia – for a price, of course.</p>
<p>The US special representative for Ukraine negotiations, Kurt Volker, <a href="https://www.unian.info/politics/10483848-ukraine-could-receive-another-batch-of-javelins-volker.html">stated</a> recently that Washington remains committed to providing support to Ukraine and its military, including anti-tank systems. He even hinted that the US is considering expanding the types of lethal aid that it could begin selling to Ukraine, <a href="https://www.unian.info/politics/10483848-ukraine-could-receive-another-batch-of-javelins-volker.html">saying</a>: “We also need to be looking at things like air defence and coastal defence.”</p>
<p>This is a troubling prospect. In March, US army general Curtis Scaparrotti <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/432659-general-us-considering-more-weapons-for-ukraine">said</a> that the US could also bolster the Ukrainian military’s sniper capabilities. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition and, perhaps looking at the Kerch Strait, perhaps consideration for naval systems, as well, here in the future as we move forward.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This comment has been widely underreported and has not received nearly as much attention as it deserves considering the potential consequences.</p>
<p>At worst, more lethal aid could escalate the conflict further. At best, it will continue to keep alive a conflict that has already <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict-says-un-rights-office/29791647.html">claimed more than 10,000</a> lives. Finding a straightforward policy alternative is difficult, but sending more lethal aid to achieve the unattainable goal of Ukraine defeating Russia is certainly no solution.</p>
<h2>Impact</h2>
<p>Despite attempts by Volker and Scaparrotti to market the proposition as a way to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia, the immediate benefits seem clearer to America’s weapons manufacturing sector than to Ukrainian civilians, who will undoubtedly get caught in the crossfire.</p>
<p>The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that the US is home to <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/21/military-spending-defense-contractors-profiting-from-war-weapons-sales/39092315/">five of the world’s</a> ten largest defence contractors. Lockheed Martin, by far the largest in the field, in 2017 had an estimated <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/21/military-spending-defense-contractors-profiting-from-war-weapons-sales/39092315/">US$44.9 billion</a> in arms contracts globally.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265728/original/file-20190325-36264-miwr48.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">More weapons will likely only inflame the conflict.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU1MzU4NTI4OCwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfMjU1NDM2Mjc5IiwiayI6InBob3RvLzI1NTQzNjI3OS9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCIwTEhMMHJUS2U1bE9yeVRwZFJlWkdOODIwVUEiXQ%2Fshutterstock_255436279.jpg&pi=33421636&m=255436279">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The company was also <a href="https://defence-blog.com/army/raytheon-lockheed-contracted-for-javelin-missiles-for-ukraine-and-other-five-countries.html">contracted</a> (with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-ukraine/u-s-approves-possible-sale-of-anti-tank-missiles-to-ukraine-idUSKCN1GD6DK">Raytheon</a>) in 2018 to provide Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-ukraine/u-s-approves-possible-sale-of-anti-tank-missiles-to-ukraine-idUSKCN1GD6DK">The US Pentagon said</a>: “The Javelin system will help Ukraine build its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements.”</p>
<p>But Lockheed Martin likely profited handsomely from the deal. Meanwhile, the company’s <a href="https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2019-01-29-Lockheed-Martin-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2018-Results">financial reports</a> showed fourth quarter 2018 net sales of US$14.4 billion, compared to US$13.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2017. This year, the company is expecting sales to grow <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-23/lockheed-s-2019-sales-forecast-bodes-well-for-defense-spending">by as much as 6%</a>. This is unlikely to be the case if the number of conflicts around the world declines.</p>
<p>It’s clear why Washington wants to sell more weapons to Ukraine. But whether Ukraine remains receptive and willing to continue buying them may hinge on the outcome of the upcoming presidential election, which is scheduled for March 31. </p>
<p>Presidential candidate Volodymyr Zelensky, who is currently leading in the polls, seems to offer hope that Ukraine may change its current strategy. This is reflected in a statement <a href="https://www.unian.info/politics/10465101-zelensky-about-war-in-donbas-negotiations-with-russia-inevitable.html">Zelensky made in March</a> in which he emphasised the need to negotiate with Russia in order to “save people’s lives”. </p>
<h2>Is there a solution?</h2>
<p>As well as better diplomacy, Zelensky also sees direct democracy as a way to resolve the crisis. Rather than pursuing the same ineffective policy, which has achieved absolutely nothing except for a greater death toll and growing human misery, he proposed a <a href="https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78218">referendum</a> on the outcome of his negotiations with Russia on the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This approach might not lead to a quick fix or immediately restore peace in the region – but it is more likely to succeed than simply supplying more weapons with which to prolong the fighting.</p>
<p>The West should not abandon its rhetoric of support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. But policymakers and society more broadly should be careful not to assume that simply selling more weapons to Ukraine will yield a definitive victory over Russia and its separatist allies. </p>
<p>While the ongoing war in the the eastern Donbas region and the recent Kerch incident offer an opportunity for big businesses to make a profit, it’s ordinary people who will pay the price. The current approach to deescalating the conflict needs to be dramatically reevaluated – and lethal weapons must be taken off the negotiating table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114238/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liana Semchuk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
At worst, more lethal aid could escalate the conflict further. At best, it will continue to keep alive a conflict that has already claimed more than 10,000 lives.
Liana Semchuk, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of Oxford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/102936
2018-09-14T12:52:47Z
2018-09-14T12:52:47Z
Spain tries to limit arms sales to Saudi Arabia – but following international law is expensive
<p>The Spanish government recently found itself confronting a deeply unpleasant dilemma: whether to help prevent violations of the law of armed conflicts or protect thousands of jobs at home. On September 3, the <a href="http://cadenaser.com/ser/2018/09/07/politica/1536353904_816437.html">radio station Cadena SER</a> reported that the minister of defence, Margarita Robles, intended to stop the delivery of 400 bombs to Saudi Arabia, whose <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29319423">bombing campaign in Yemen</a> has claimed numerous civilian lives.</p>
<p>While Robles’s choice is consistent with the law on international arms transfers, it could seriously affect her government’s commercial relationship with the Saudis while undermining the jobs of thousands of Spanish workers involved in the defence sector.</p>
<p>The deal at the centre of the issue was signed by <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/09/07/actualidad/1536321327_059352.html">Spain and Saudi Arabia in 2015</a> during former prime minister Mariano Rajoy’s conservative government. By the time Pedro Sánchez’s current progressive government took office in June 2018, Saudi Arabia had spent three years bombing Yemen, causing numerous civilian casualties. Robles, a minister in the Sánchez government, seemed concerned by the possibility that Spanish armaments might be used in the conflict at some point.</p>
<p>Immediately after her intentions became public, Spanish media reported on the Saudis’ alarmed reaction and the future of other Saudi-Spanish deals. Top of the list was a contract for five warships to be built by Navantia, a Spanish state-owned company. Cancelling that order would have cost <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/09/10/inenglish/1536568351_837677.html">€1.8 billion and left 6,000 workers unemployed</a>. While there was no official statement by Saudi Arabia, Robles’s idea concerned other Spanish politicians. <a href="http://cadenaser.com/ser/2018/09/07/politica/1536353904_816437.html">Susana Díaz</a>, governor of Andalusia, demanded the government defend the jobs that might have been affected.</p>
<p>This disquiet triggered the involvement of the entire Spanish government – and before long, <a href="https://elpais.com/politica/2018/09/10/actualidad/1536588502_476070.html">Robles made a statement</a> before the Defence Commission of the Spanish Senate on September 10. In it, she denied that the shipment of bombs had been suspended, claiming that the transfer was solely under examination by her ministry.</p>
<p>In just a week, then, forced to consider the consequence on Spanish economy of the decision to cancel the transfer of armaments to Saudi Arabia, Robles withdrew her plan.</p>
<h2>Over the line</h2>
<p>Since March 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a coalition of countries in a military campaign against <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/yemen-houthis-hadi-protests-201482132719818986.html">Houthi rebels</a> who had taken control of parts of Yemen. Since then, Saudi-led air forces have bombed the country on a massive scale, often claiming far more <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45382561">civilian lives</a> than could be reasonably be considered “collateral damage”.</p>
<p>In August 2018, an International Committee of the Red Cross representative in Yemen <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-icrc-deplores-civilian-cost-hodeida-attacks">put it bluntly</a>: “this lack of respect for civilian life and civilian property is reprehensible”. The same month, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23479&LangID=E">a group of experts</a> appointed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights considered the violations of international law in the conflict. They reported that the majority of the civilian casualties were caused by the Saudi-led coalition’s air strikes, which <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/YE/A_HRC_39_43_EN.docx">appeared to frequently target civilian targets</a> such as “residential areas, markets, funerals, weddings, detention facilities, civilian boats and even medical facilities”.</p>
<p>International law prohibits intentional attacks on civilians during a conflict, and requires that appropriate precautions be taken to reduce accidental civilian casualties. Any failure to abide with these rules amounts to a war crime.</p>
<p>Since the 1990s, the norms of the international arms trade have been entwined with the obligation to respect international law. Within the European Union, the subject is regulated by an <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8472/arms-export-control-arms-trade-treaty_en">EU Council Common Position</a> that prohibits the transfers of arms that would be used to commit serious violations of the law of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>Article 6 of the 2013 <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-arms-trade-treaty-37673">Arms Trade Treaty</a> prohibits transfers when the supplying state knows that the weapons would be used to attack civilians or to commit other war crimes. The treaty also holds that, before authorising an arms export, states must assess the potential risk that they will be used to commit serious violations of the law of armed conflicts.</p>
<p>Considering the frequent involvement of civilians and the targeting of civilian environments, states should hesitate to transfer arms to the Saudis. This means Robles’s concerns over Spain’s 400 bombs were every bit in line with the norms and laws of the international arms trade. Yet even though current international and European law provides legal arguments to support governments who move to stop dangerous arms sales, her move to bring Spain more closely in line with that law was stymied.</p>
<p>It’s just another grim reminder that whatever international law is in place to try and spare civilian lives in armed conflicts, money and business too often come first.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102936/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Riccardo Labianco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
When it comes to preventing air strikes on civilians, the law of the arms trade is clear. Why is it so hard for countries to observe it?
Riccardo Labianco, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/102619
2018-09-04T12:49:41Z
2018-09-04T12:49:41Z
Britain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia does far more damage than it’s worth
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speech-at-the-united-states-institute-for-peace">speech</a> the UK foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, stressed that Britain needs to strengthen its support for a rules-based international order, saying there will be a price to pay for countries that do not share the UK’s values and frequently cross geopolitical red lines. Hunt was of course referring to Russia, but he may as well have been taking about Saudi Arabia – a country with a similar recent history of flouting international norms, whose conduct receives far less censure from the UK government.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition of states fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen since 2015. There are credible allegations that it has launched air strikes on civilian targets in the conflict, which a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45329220">recent UN investigation</a> found to amount to potential human right abuses and war crimes. Humanitarian relief organisations have called the situation in Yemen <a href="https://news.un.org/en/focus/yemen">the world’s worst man-made disaster</a>; the coalition has exacerbated the situation by imposing an aid blockade that affects 20.7m of Yemeni citizens (75% of the country’s population) in need of assistance. And domestically, Saudi Arabia remains an autocratic country, one where activists are executed and human rights defenders detained.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia is also perhaps the most important UK ally in the Middle East. Longstanding military and trade relations have meant that the two countries have been co-operating on matters of security and counter-terrorism for decades.</p>
<p>A frequently heard argument for engaging with oppressive countries like Saudi Arabia is that direct diplomatic and military engagement enables the UK to export its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39485083">values</a>, such as respect for basic human rights and a belief in liberal democracy, to such places.</p>
<p>At the start of a visit to Jordan and Saudi Arabia in 2017, the UK prime minister, Theresa May, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-to-visit-saudi-arabia-and-jordan-to-deepen-true-strategic-partnerships">said</a> that “an even deeper partnership with these countries, and greater knowledge and understanding of one another, will increase our ability to address the issues that concern us”.</p>
<p>But in Saudi Arabia’s case at least, little to no progress appears to have been made on this front. In a new <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/news/newsrecords/2018/few-benefits-for-uk-from-security-relationship-with-saudi-arabia.aspx">study</a> of Britain’s ties to the kingdom, my co-researcher and I found that the supposed benefits to the UK are limited at best and non-existent at worst.</p>
<h2>Quid pro quo?</h2>
<p>First, it appears that it is in fact Saudi Arabia which influences the UK’s actions, rather than the other way around. The UK government has a history of covering up allegations of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/court-condemns-blair-for-halting-saudi-arms-inquiry-807793.html">corruption related to arms deals with the country</a>. One of the arguments given for engaging with Saudi Arabia is that the kingdom’s intelligence is crucial for UK counter-terrorism efforts. Yet, details of this are hardly publicly available, and in 2017 the Home Office decided to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/12/uk-terror-funding-report-will-not-be-published-for-national-security-reasons">withhold publication of a report</a> into terrorist financing that would have reflected poorly on Saudi Arabia. We were hard pressed to find similar cases of Saudi Arabia placating the UK in a similar fashion.</p>
<p>Second, the economic value of the relationship for the UK is negligible. Goods and services sold to Saudi Arabia represented just 1% of the UK’s total exports in 2016, while it is estimated that arms sales bring in just <a href="https://www.warchild.org.uk/whats-happening/blogs/%C2%A36bn-arms-dealers-price-millions-lives-yemen">£30m</a> for the Treasury. In our research, we found that that came to just 0.004% of its total revenue in 2016.</p>
<p>Then there’s the reputational damage that comes with providing diplomatic cover to the Gulf state over the war in Yemen. The UK government’s post-Brexit “Global Britain” <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/building-a-global-britain">agenda</a> has seen it emphasise the need to defend and uphold the international rules-based order, but the tacit support for Saudi Arabia’s actions is entirely antithetical to this stated aim. The UK helped to design many international laws and conventions that seek to guarantee a peaceful, stable world. But its stance on Saudi Arabia means its deeds currently don’t match its words, and that puts its credibility at risk.</p>
<p>This is a case study in what happens when a country’s supposed economic interests come into conflict with its stated norms and values and its international obligations. The situation cannot carry on indefinitely. As the UK government makes plans to tread the international stage as a solo player outside the EU, it’s already being confronted with a series of difficult choices and trade-offs. It needs to critically assess its own foreign policy and uphold its own values before it can ask others to do the same.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Armida L. M. van Rij received funding from the Oxford Research Group's Remote Warfare Programme for this study. She is a member of the Women in International Security (WIIS) UK Leadership Team. </span></em></p>
Saudi Arabia gets far more out of being close with the UK than vice versa.
Armida v., Researcher in Security and Defence Policy at the Policy Institute at King's, King's College London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/95473
2018-05-10T15:21:41Z
2018-05-10T15:21:41Z
I go undercover into arms fairs – and secretly draw caricatures of the ‘hell’ I find there
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218081/original/file-20180508-34015-wl9r39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=202%2C155%2C2946%2C2142&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The arms multinational BAE Systems is in the final stages of a deal to sell <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-saudi-bae-systems/britain-to-finalize-typhoon-plane-order-talks-with-saudi-idUSKCN1GL26D">48 Typhoon fighter jets</a> to Saudi Arabia, despite mounting evidence of war crimes in Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks against civilians but the Saudi-led coalition has bombed Yemeni schools, markets and hospitals, <a href="http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/69215/">killing more than 10,000 people</a> including children, while survivors face disease and starvation with the collapse of infrastructure. </p>
<p>Fragments of bombs made in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/exposed-british-made-bombs-used-civilian-targets-yemen">Britain</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/yemen-evidence-indicates-us-made-bomb-was-used-in-attack-on-msf-hospital/">the US</a> have been found in the debris of some of these attacks, yet both countries <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-35898999/uk-made-bomb-destroyed-yemen-factory">continue to sell arms</a> to the Saudi regime.</p>
<p>Such deals take place in arms fairs, away from the public eye. I have drawn undercover in fairs in Europe and the Middle East for the past ten years, in an attempt to understand how international arms sales are normalised and legitimised. Access is restricted, but I get in by dressing up as a security consultant with a suit, heels, fake pearls, and a sham company. My performance is a metaphor for the charade of respectability in the industry.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218078/original/file-20180508-34027-1mmglkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A sales rep.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Arms fairs emerged from the globalisation of the military industry in the late 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, defence budgets were cut. There was a brief opportunity to convert military production facilities into civil areas such as medical equipment, transport and renewable energy; instead, arms companies merged into multinationals, expanded into security, and focused on a global market. Arms fairs were set up to provide venues for these deals. </p>
<p>The largest, DSEI (the Defence Security Exhibition International) takes place every two years in London, with similar fairs in Paris, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. Here, weapons are displayed to an international clientele including countries at war, unstable states and repressive regimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/dsei/delegations">DSEI welcomes</a> 75% of the countries that the UK Foreign Office <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015">has listed</a> as “Human Rights Priorities”, where “the worst, or greatest number of, human rights violations take place”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218084/original/file-20180508-34021-1duho8f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A tank salesman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Inside a fair, missiles, bombs and bullets are arranged under spotlights; guns are available to try out for weight and size, and to aim at imaginary targets; mannequins pose in camouflage offering private military services and tear gas; tanks are open for viewing. “Lethality” is a sales slogan. Manufacturers boast of the precision of their products, as if war could be refined through science. </p>
<p>As with most advertising, such claims turn out to be exaggerated when the weapons are actually used. Bombing is <a href="http://www.comw.org/pda/0402rm9.html">inevitably inaccurate</a>, compromised by an inbuilt margin of error, malfunctions, mistaken intelligence and the weather. The difference between a combatant and civilian is also increasingly unclear, as Yemen shows. Yet such claims make war more likely.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218083/original/file-20180508-34024-1ivlsq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">String quartet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many stalls hand out gifts as an alternative to business cards – stress-balls in the shape of bombs, grenades and tanks, branded sweets and pens. A gas mask manufacturer has condoms with the slogan, “The ultimate protection”. Waiting staff hover with trays of wine, beer and grapes, while a string quartet plays Handel and Mozart.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218087/original/file-20180508-34027-aekk7h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=775&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grenade stress relief.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are also promotions. The BAE subsidiary Bofors has a live satellite link to its weapons testing facility in Sweden where a military vehicle explodes in a cloud of light and metal. Alongside the video screens, bowls are filled with toffees in wrappers saying, “Welcome to hell”. Brochures explain that the Bofors test centre is “Hell for your product, heaven for your investment”. The impact on people of the weapons that pass through the test centre is oddly missing. In an arms fair, missiles are forever products.</p>
<p>How to draw this? My drawings veer between caricature and observational methods. Mainly, I focus on the etiquette that gives the industry an appearance of respectability – the handshakes, pinstriped suits, hospitality, and violins. I also draw cracks in the façade – a lewd advance, a rep slumped in a chair with his head in his hands, the continual, desperate drinking. Brecht used the Latin word <em>gestus</em> to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Brecht_On_Theatre.html?id=W1iCBAAAQBAJ&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">describe</a> an attitude that expresses a social role or condition. In his plays, gestures are frozen so they seem strange. Perhaps drawing can be used in a similar way.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218085/original/file-20180508-34018-18hvzwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Drinking.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Jill Gibbon</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Or, perhaps the gifts are sufficient in themselves to reveal the strange amorality of an industry that uses war as a sales opportunity. The BAE Bofors toffees might be intended to convey the impact of a test centre on weapons with the slogan “Welcome to hell” – but sweets are usually meant for children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jill Gibbon receives funding from the Independent Social Research Foundation. </span></em></p>
There’s a disturbing disconnect between the polite etiquette of arms fairs and the hell that their products create.
Jill Gibbon, Senior Lecturer in Graphic Arts, Leeds Beckett University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/95089
2018-05-04T09:00:32Z
2018-05-04T09:00:32Z
How the arms trade is used to secure access to oil
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217568/original/file-20180503-182160-1qd4wz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/oil-refinery-twilight-106008914?src=2l8_JMeiJQkSsJGYFYHzZA-1-2">shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia increased by 175% <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/uk-accused-of-using-secretive-deals-to-sell-arms-to-saudi-arabia-11278466">in the first nine months of 2017</a> according to an investigation by the Campaign Against Arms Trade. Similarly, France and the US are <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2017">major exporters of arms to the oil-rich Gulf state</a> – in 2017 alone, they were worth around US$2.6 billion.</p>
<p>Selling weapons is a lucrative business. As well as the money to be made, the arms trade is also a barometer of the quality of relationships between states and it creates an interdependence that gives current and future recipient governments incentives to cooperate with arms suppliers. </p>
<p>Oil dependency is another reason. Sometimes this idea <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-crude-conspiracies-right-research-shows-nations-really-do-go-to-war-over-oil-36846">is disregarded as a conspiracy theory</a>, but colleagues Claudio Deiana, Roberto Nisticò and I <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jleo/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewy007/4943983?redirectedFrom=fulltext">recently researched</a> the extent to which oil-dependent countries transfer arms to oil-rich countries. It turns out it’s a lot. </p>
<p>The international transfer of weapons is one of the most dynamic and lucrative sectors of international trade. By one estimate, from the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2017/increase-arms-transfers-driven-demand-middle-east-and-asia-says-sipri">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a>, global transfers of major weapons have grown continuously since 2004 and between 2012 and 2016 reached its highest volume for any five-year period since the end of the Cold War. The value of the global arms trade in 2015 was at least <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/financial-value-global-arms-trade">US$91.3 billion</a>, roughly equal to the GDP of Ukraine, or half of Greece’s GDP.</p>
<p>Since no country is self-sufficient in arms production – even the US – most of the countries in the world import weapons. This is shown in the image below, which displays the volume of arms imports of major conventional weapons between 2012 and 2016. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=232&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=232&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=232&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217254/original/file-20180502-153908-spzk1j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=292&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background">Data: SIPRI</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, the export of arms is a key part of national policy – and weapons are often given only to close allies. It is not unusual to observe arms transferred for free to allies, under the umbrella of military aid, such as <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1505488/colombian-president-visits-thanks-southcom-for-its-support/">US military support to Colombia</a> to fight drug cartels and insurgent groups. Equally, the absence of trade in arms between two countries can reflect a desire to safeguard national security. For example, if there are fears that the importing nation can become a future threat.</p>
<h2>The oil connection</h2>
<p>To test the idea that energy dependence leads to a higher volume of arms transfers between countries, we assembled a large dataset with information on oil wealth (such as production, reserves and recent discoveries) and oil trade data, to measure energy interdependence and the potential damage of regional instabilities to oil supplies. </p>
<p>We found the existence of a “local oil dependence”, which indicates that the amount of arms imported has a direct relationship with the amount of oil exported to the arms supplier. Speculatively, arms export to a specific country is affected by the degree of dependence on its supply of oil. The larger the amount of oil that country A imports from country B, the larger will be the volume of arms that country A will transfer to country B. </p>
<p>But we did not only find the existence of a direct oil-for-weapons relationship. Our results also reveal the presence of a “global oil dependence”. The more a country depends on oil imports, the higher the incentives are to export weapons to oil-rich economies, even in the absence of a direct bilateral oil-for-weapons exchange. The idea is that by providing weapons, the oil-dependent country seeks to contain the risk of instabilities in an oil-rich country. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/217565/original/file-20180503-153888-qttda9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Got to keep that oil flowing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/pipeline-bridge-117314188?src=TX3HhDTpCKJCVjnfmvqk3g-1-6">shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The oil-rich country does not necessarily need to be the oil-dependent’s direct supplier, however, because disruptions in the production of oil are likely to affect oil prices worldwide. Violent events such as civil wars or terrorist incidents <a href="https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Geopolitical-Risk-Is-On-The-Rise-In-Oil-Markets.html">are often accompanied by surging oil prices</a>, or more general insecurity in the supply of oil. This was the case in many recent wars, such as the Gulf War and the Iraq War, the political unrest in Venezuela in 2003, and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a207c98e-b20d-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399">recent Iraq-Kurdistan conflict</a>.</p>
<p>So it does not matter how much oil the UK directly imports from Saudi Arabia for it to want the country to remain stable, which in turn keeps oil prices stable. In line with this, we found that a country with a recent discovery of new oil fields will increase its import of weapons from oil-dependent economies by 56%.</p>
<p>Our results point consistently toward the conclusion that the arms trade is an effective foreign policy tool to secure and maintain access to oil. As such, the arms trade reveals national interests beyond simple economic considerations and the volume of bilateral arms transfers can be used as a barometer of political relations between the supplier and the recipient states. At the same time, we find that oil might play an even larger role in influencing economic and political decisions than is generally acknowledged.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Bove does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The connection between oil and arms trade is not a conspiracy theory.
Vincenzo Bove, Reader in Politics and Quantitative Methods, University of Warwick
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/91348
2018-02-28T14:08:54Z
2018-02-28T14:08:54Z
Can selling weapons to oppressive and violent states ever be justified?
<p>Democratic governments regularly supply weapons to what are sometimes called “outlaw states” – oppressive regimes that violate the basic rights of their own citizens, or aggressive regimes that wrongfully threaten the security of outsiders. Sometimes democratic governments sell the weapons themselves; sometimes they issue export licenses to private arms firms within their jurisdiction. </p>
<p>Both practices <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/01/the-guardian-view-on-the-saudi-visit-to-britain-dont-trade-away-values">are</a> frequently <a href="http://theconversation.com/britain-shouldnt-sell-arms-to-the-saudis-no-matter-what-promises-they-make-81111">condemned</a> on <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-saga-of-britains-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-hits-a-disturbing-new-low-65387">moral grounds</a>. But how might governments who help to arm outlaw states try to defend themselves? What arguments could they appeal to in an attempt to justify their actions?</p>
<p>Politicians sometimes claim that their acts make no difference to the degree of suffering inflicted by the regimes that they arm – that if they didn’t sell weapons to the regimes in question, some other government would. For example, when it was revealed in 2014 that Hong Kong’s riot police had used British-made tear gas against unarmed pro-democracy protesters, then foreign secretary Philip Hammond <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/uk-firm-sold-teargas-hong-kong-review-sales-policy">remarked</a>: “CS gas is available from large numbers of sources around the world. To be frank, I think that is a rather immaterial point. They could buy CS gas from the US.”</p>
<p>But as I argue in an <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032321718754516">article</a> for the journal Political Studies, this kind of argument has multiple shortcomings. When a government permits its firms to compete for certain customers in the international arms market, it puts downward pressure on prices, and this could allow outlaw or oppressive states to purchase weapons in larger quantities. Some governments also offer certain kinds of weapons, or weapons of a particularly high quality, that recipients would not be able to acquire from elsewhere. By offering these weapons, governments increase the efficiency with which their trading partners can pursue their unjust ends. </p>
<p>In addition, the intentions of other suppliers should not be regarded as inalterable features of the world. After all, this is not generally how governments regard the intentions of their foreign counterparts. If it were, diplomacy would be dismissed as a waste of time and resources. When a government wants another to change its behaviour, it tries to persuade it to do so. </p>
<p>If the British government thought it would be better if the Hong Kong authorities lacked easy access to tear gas, it could have impressed its rationale upon its American allies, rather than simply taking the Americans’ behaviour as a given and then trying to exploit that behaviour as a justification for its own.</p>
<h2>The enemy’s enemy</h2>
<p>As I’ve tried to demonstrate <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/trade-justice-9780198810353?cc=gb&lang=en&">in recent work</a>, while many of the arguments that governments employ to defend the sale of weapons to outlaw states are weak and self-serving there is one that, when applicable, <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032321718754516">has potentially greater force</a>. </p>
<p>Sometimes, arms transfers to an oppressive regime can reasonably be expected to actually reduce the degree of oppression that is inflicted. Arms transfers can do this when they help a regime to repel an even more oppressive rival that threatens to overthrow it. Consider the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease">US Lend-Lease programme</a>, which sanctioned arms transfers to the Soviet Union during World War II. This policy could be defended on the plausible grounds that arms transfers enabled the Red Army to resist the greater oppression that would otherwise have been imposed by the Nazis. </p>
<p>Of course, situations like this don’t arise often – and even when they do, arms transfers are not necessarily justifiable.</p>
<p>Evaluation of a proposed arms transfer to an outlaw state must take a comparative form. Whether the transfer can be justified depends on how it fares compared to other actions that could be taken instead. If the transfer is expected to produce worse outcomes than alternative available options, then it isn’t morally acceptable.</p>
<p>Different kinds of intervention or assistance have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but arms transfers always come with serious problems. Most obviously, they provide outlaw states with tools that can be used for oppressive and aggressive ends (in addition to any legitimate defensive ends): other types of support lack this feature. Then there’s the problem of “leakage”. Outlaw states may pass on weapons to third parties, or be unable to ensure the security of stockpiles. The risk of stockpiles being looted is especially high in times of crisis.</p>
<p>In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states is difficult to justify even under the most favourable circumstances. If democratic politicians care about the ethical status of their acts, and aspire to conduct themselves in a manner that can be justified to others, then they should take this fact seriously, and end their casual, callous promotion of trade with tyrants.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Some of James Christensen's past work on the arms trade has been supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>
When confronted with the consequences of arms sales, democratic governments fall back on a number of flawed arguments.
James Christensen, Lecturer in Political Theory, Department of Government, University of Essex
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/84856
2017-10-26T14:24:53Z
2017-10-26T14:24:53Z
Arms trade activists not guilty – but the UK will keep selling to Saudi Arabia
<p>Two anti-arms trade activists, Sam Walton and Dan Woodhouse, have been <a href="https://twitter.com/SamWalton/status/923544594406629376">found not guilty</a> of criminal damage after they were accused of breaking into the BAE Systems plant in Warton, Lancashire, with the intention of disarming warplanes bound for Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Their protest has strong echoes of a case in 1996, when four women broke into the same plant and used a hammer to damage a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2012743.stm">Hawk jet</a>. Known as the “Ploughshares Four”, those women made legal history when they were <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/pounds-15m-hawk-attack-women-freed-1331285.html">acquitted despite having admitted criminal damage</a>. The court accepted that their action was lawful because it prevented the greater crime of genocide by the regime of former Indonesian president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/27/obituaries.johngittings">Haji Mohamed Suharto</a> against the people of East Timor, which was then under an <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/disarming-war-hawk-ploughshares-story">illegal Indonesian occupation</a>.</p>
<p>The trial of the Ploughshares Four put defence exports firmly on the political agenda. When Labour came to power in 1997, arms sales became a litmus test for the credibility of a so-called <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/04/98/labour_-_one_year_on/84778.stm">ethical foreign policy</a>, spearheaded by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/aug/08/guardianobituaries.labour">Robin Cook</a>. New Labour <a href="http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/19fosec.htm">claimed</a> that: “Britain is, again, leading by cleaning up the arms trade” – and government licences were to be denied where there was a clearly identifiable risk that proposed exports might be used for internal repression.</p>
<p>In practice, things proved far less clear-cut. Although the government eventually <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/sep/09/indonesia">admitted</a> that British-made weapons had been used to put down demonstrations in Indonesia, it never accepted that Hawk aircraft had been used in East Timor. Eyewitness accounts disseminated by Nobel Peace laureate <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1996/ramos-horta-facts.html">José Ramos-Horta</a> were not considered objective evidence.</p>
<p>There is no such ambiguity when it comes to today’s Saudi-led campaign in Yemen and, on that front, the current government has made its position perfectly plain. </p>
<h2>Legitimate targets</h2>
<p>In 2015, the then-foreign secretary, Philip Hammond, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11500518/UK-will-support-Saudi-led-assault-on-Yemeni-rebels-but-not-engaging-in-combat.html">confirmed</a> that British-made aircraft were being used in the Yemen conflict. For campaigners, this is <a href="https://www.caat.org.uk/campaigns/stop-arming-saudi/a-shameful-relationship.pdf">shameful</a>; like Indonesia under Suharto, Saudi Arabia has a poor human rights record and is one of the FCO’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2016">human rights priority countries</a>. Yet, as in the Indonesian case, the UK government nevertheless sees a strong defence relationship with the Saudis as vital to British interests. When giving evidence to the Defence Select Committee this week the defence secretary Michael Fallon indeed lamented that criticisms by MPs of Saudi Arabia’s human rights record was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/25/michael-fallon-urges-mps-prioritise-arms-sales-human-rights">‘not helpful’ in securing lucrative arms sales</a>. </p>
<p>Arms sales to Saudi Arabia have galvanised protest for many years. Nevertheless, the <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-12-19/debates/B8EBA03B-5FFC-44CF-8989-883F62F675D4/Yemen">admission</a> by Fallon, that a “limited number” of British-made BL755 cluster bombs had been dropped on Yemen brought a new potency to those objections.</p>
<p>The bombs were old, manufactured in 1986 before they were outlawed by the <a href="http://www.clusterconvention.org/">2008 Ottawa Convention</a>. As the Blair government discovered there is a particular problem with equipment exported under previous administrations, for which governments try to avoid responsibility. Fallon further insisted that the bombs had been dropped against “legitimate military targets”, ignoring the objection that cluster bombs pose an <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-use-of-cluster-munitions-by-saudi-arabia-in-yemen-and-the-responsibility-of-the-united-kingdom/">indiscriminate risk to civilians</a> long after they have been dropped, whatever the original target.</p>
<p>The Saudi-led coalition action in Yemen is quite different to the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. While the UK did not recognise Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over East Timor, it accepts that Saudi Arabia’s intervention is in accordance with international law because Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, the legitimate president of Yemen, had requested it. To critics, however, this does not justify the extent of civilian casualties. The objection, therefore, is not primarily that British-made jets are being flown over Yemen, but that they are being used to violate international humanitarian law. </p>
<p>The question was the subject of a <a href="https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/saudi-arabia/legal-2016/2017-07-10.judgment.pdf">judicial review</a> which sought to establish whether the UK government was obliged by law to halt export licences where there is “a clear risk that the arms might be used in the commission of a serious violation of International Humanitarian Law”. The contrast with the Ploughshares verdict could not be greater, but it is a matter of debate as to which verdict is perverse.</p>
<h2>Litmus test</h2>
<p>20 years on from the Ploughshares case, Britain is still very successful at selling arms abroad. In the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-defence-and-security-export-figures-2016">latest figures</a> published by the Department of Trade and Industry, the UK is said, to be the second largest global defence exporter on a rolling ten-year basis. But while the government continues to pursue its defence relationships with major arms buyers such as <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-agreement-strengthens-uk-saudi-arabia-defence-relationship">Saudi Arabia</a>, the issue of British arms sales is at the heart of the debate over what values should drive Britain’s foreign policy. </p>
<p>At Labour’s 2017 conference, the shadow foreign secretary, Emily Thornberry evoked her predecessor Cook by calling for a UN-led investigation into alleged violations of international humanitarian law by the Saudi coalition and for a “radical revolution in values”. <a href="http://labourlist.org/2016/10/john-woodcock-the-crisis-in-yemen-must-not-be-ignored/">Not all Labour MPs are on board</a> – but nor were they in Cook’s day.</p>
<p>The ethics of foreign policy are far from simple, but the imperative to clarify them isn’t going away. As the current foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, recently told parliament:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is because the world looks to Britain, and it is because the work of the UK overseas is so vital for global security and stability, that it is absolutely vital that we resist the temptation to run down our defences and abrogate our responsibilities to our friends and partners around the world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Most are unlikely to disagree with that statement. But arms sales are still a key indicator of the ethical health of British foreign policy – and the question is whether arming a friendly state like Saudi Arabia counts as “responsible”. The implication of today’s verdict at Burnley Crown Court is that it is not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiona Robertson-Snape does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The UK has never ironed out the ethics of its role in the arms trade. Will the debate ever be resolved?
Fiona Robertson-Snape, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Staffordshire University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/85167
2017-10-09T23:23:18Z
2017-10-09T23:23:18Z
How the US government created and coddled the gun industry
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189471/original/file-20171009-25649-1ts0kj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.S. soldier fires a Colt M16 in Vietnam in 1967.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Operation_“Cook”,_8_September_1967,_Quang_Ngai_Province,_Republic_of_Vietnam-R.C._Lafoon.PNG">U.S. Army</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After Stephen Paddock opened fire on Las Vegas concertgoers on Oct. 1, <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/sunday-talk-shows/354448-talk-of-gun-control-dominates-sunday-shows-after-las-vegas">many people responded</a> with calls for more gun control to help prevent <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44126.pdf">mass shootings</a> and the <a href="http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/">routine violence</a> ravaging U.S. neighborhoods. </p>
<p>But besides a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/top-house-republicans-open-to-legislation-regulating-bump-stocks/2017/10/05/4580cb54-a9dc-11e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.640105e36861">rare consensus</a> on restricting the availability of <a href="https://www.thetrace.org/rounds/nra-bump-stocks-fox-news-wayne-lapierre-chris-cox/">so-called bump stocks</a>, which Paddock used to enable his dozen semi-automatic rifles to fire like machine guns, it’s unclear if <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/banning-bump-stocks-wont-solve-anything.html?_r=0">anything meaningful</a> will come of it. </p>
<p>If advocates for reform <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/opinion/gun-control-vegas-shooting.html">despair</a> after such a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/02/why-congress-still-wont-do-something-about-gun-laws-after-las-vegas/">tragedy</a>, I can understand. The politics seem intractable right now. It’s easy to feel powerless. </p>
<p>But what I’ve learned from a decade of studying the history of the arms trade has convinced me that the American public has more power over the gun business than most people realize. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189449/original/file-20171009-6999-una1zf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gun maker Simeon North made this flintlock pistol around 1813.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Balefire/Shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Washington’s patronage</h2>
<p>The U.S. arms industry’s close alliance with the government is as old as the country itself, beginning with the American Revolution. </p>
<p>Forced to rely on <a href="http://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_438624">foreign weapons</a> during the war, President George Washington wanted to ensure that the new republic had its own arms industry. Inspired by European practice, he and his successors built public arsenals for the production of firearms in Springfield and Harper’s Ferry. They also began doling out lucrative arms contracts to private manufacturers such as Simeon North, the <a href="http://www.courant.com/courant-250/moments-in-history/hc-250-simeon-north-middletown-berlin-20141223-story.html">first official U.S. pistol maker</a>, and <a href="https://www.eliwhitney.org/7/museum/eli-whitney/arms-production">Eli Whitney</a>, inventor of the cotton gin.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/638798">government provided</a> crucial startup funds, steady contracts, tariffs against foreign manufactures, robust patent laws, and patterns, tools and know-how from federal arsenals. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.academia.edu/8058237/American_Arms_Manufacturing_and_the_Onset_of_the_War_of_1812">War of 1812</a>, perpetual conflicts with Native Americans and the U.S.-Mexican War all fed the industry’s growth. By the early 1850s, the United States was emerging as a world-class arms producer. Now-iconic American companies like those started by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Eliphalet-Remington">Eliphalet Remington</a> and <a href="https://connecticuthistory.org/the-colt-patent-fire-arms-manufacturing-company/">Samuel Colt</a> began to acquire international reputations. Even the mighty gun-making center of Great Britain started emulating the <a href="http://doi.org/10.1080/00076798900000002">American system</a> of interchangeable parts and mechanized production. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=247&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=247&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=247&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189448/original/file-20171009-9731-kwg9r5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This is an advertisement for a Remington rifle in the Army and Navy Journal in 1871.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Army and Navy Journal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Profit in war and peace</h2>
<p>The Civil War supercharged America’s burgeoning gun industry.</p>
<p>The Union poured huge sums of money into arms procurement, which manufacturers then invested in new capacity and infrastructure. By 1865, for example, Remington had made nearly <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=E86oBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA89&lpg=PA89&dq=remington+Union+contracts+during+the+civil+war&source=bl&ots=TNb6SfMJxE&sig=hhrPb76HA0rOyDzbvj3PbE8VzVU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZuZfYj-LWAhUE2LwKHWSyC7cQ6AEIPTAE#v=onepage&q=earned%20nearly%20three%20million&f=false">US$3 million</a> producing firearms for the Union. The Confederacy, with its weak industrial base, had to <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/archaeology/historians-reveal-secrets-of-uk-gun-running-which-lengthened-the-american-civil-war-by-two-years-9557937.html">import</a> the vast majority of its weapons.</p>
<p>The war’s end meant a collapse in demand and bankruptcy for several gun makers. Those that prospered afterward, such as Colt, Remington and Winchester, did so by securing <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VeeiAgToOq4C&pg=PA71&lpg=PA71&dq=remington%27s+contracts+with+the+Ottoman+Empire&source=bl&ots=KqHBeJro9w&sig=nZmi4Xp-ubj98K5FbldhZiVlav0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiKkeaYud_WAhUEHZQKHYknCecQ6AEILjAD#v=onepage&q=remington's%20contracts%20with%20the%20Ottoman%20Empire&f=false">contracts</a> from foreign governments and hitching their <a href="http://pamelahaag.com/writing-archive/connecticut-explored/">domestic marketing</a> to the brutal romance of the American West. </p>
<p>While peace deprived gun makers of government money for a time, it delivered a windfall to well capitalized dealers. That’s because within five years of Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, the War Department had decommissioned most of its guns and <a href="https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b2979306;view=1up;seq=52">auctioned</a> off some 1,340,000 to private arms dealers, such as <a href="https://centerofthewest.org/2016/12/09/schuyler-hartley-graham-original-gun-dealer/">Schuyler, Hartley and Graham</a>. The Western Hemisphere’s largest private arms dealer at the time, the company scooped up warehouses full of cut-rate army muskets and rifles and <a href="http://library.centerofthewest.org/cdm/search/collection/SHG/order/identi/ad/asc">made fortunes reselling them at home</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=85nfz5URJZkC&pg=RA1-PA91&lpg=RA1-PA91&dq=%22schuyler,+hartley,+and+graham%22&source=bl&ots=PA3HCpk5Qm&sig=uEJuvgsen6rxocKadN7XFKeg5Zc&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=%22schuyler%2C%20hartley%2C%20and%20graham%22&f=false">abroad</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189447/original/file-20171009-6990-p3yvkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A soldier fires the Sig Sauer P320, which the Army has chosen as its new standard pistol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">U.S. Army</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>More wars, more guns</h2>
<p>By the late 19th century, America’s increasingly aggressive role in the world insured steady business for the country’s gun makers. </p>
<p>The Spanish American War brought a new wave of contracts, as did both <a href="https://www.remingtonsociety.org/remingtons-allied-rifle-contracts-during-wwi/">World Wars</a>, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and the dozens of smaller conflicts that the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations">U.S. waged around the globe</a> in the 20th and early 21st century. As the U.S. built up the world’s most powerful military and <a href="http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/daniel-immerwahr/GUS.pdf">established bases across the globe</a>, the <a href="https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100833931">size of the contracts soared</a>. </p>
<p>Consider <a href="https://www.sigsauer.com/usage/pro/military/">Sig Sauer</a>, the New Hampshire arms producer that made the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/14/the-gun-the-orlando-shooter-used-was-not-an-ar-15-that-doesnt-change-much/?utm_term=.fd14defaee8e">MCX rifle</a> used in the Orlando Pulse nightclub massacre. In addition to arming <a href="http://www.monch.com/mpg/news/14-land/708-sig-sauer-takes-the-extra-mile.html">nearly a third</a> of the country’s law enforcement, it recently won the coveted <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/01/us-army-sig-sauer-p320/">contract</a> for the Army’s new standard pistol, ultimately worth $350 million to $580 million.</p>
<p>Colt might best illustrate the importance of public money for prominent civilian arms manufacturers. Maker of scores of iconic guns for the civilian market, including the AR-15 carbine used in the 1996 massacre that prompted <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2704353/">Australia</a> to enact its famously sweeping gun restrictions, Colt has also relied heavily on government contracts since the 19th century. The Vietnam War initiated a long era of making M16s for the military, and the company continued to <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/071315/why-colt-went-out-business.asp">land contracts</a> as American war-making shifted from southeast Asia to the Middle East. But Colt’s reliance on government was so great that it filed for bankruptcy in 2015, in part because it had <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/15/why-cops-and-soldiers-fell-out-of-love-with-colt-guns/">lost the military contract</a> for the M4 rifle two years earlier.</p>
<p>Overall, gun makers relied on government contracts <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/12/19/seven-facts-about-the-u-s-gun-industry/?utm_term=.2ca2524d1816">for about 40 percent</a> of their revenues in 2012. </p>
<p>Competition for contracts spurred manufacturers to make lethal innovations, such as handguns with magazines that hold 12 or 15 rounds rather than seven. Absent regulation, these innovations show up in <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/susannahbreslin/2013/08/16/gun-magazines/#6dd3a4d2215c">gun enthusiast periodicals</a>, sporting goods stores and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/how-military-guns-make-the-civilian-market/375123/">emergency rooms</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189451/original/file-20171009-6971-kzyn3e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An activist is led away by security after protesting during a statement by NRA CEO Wayne LaPierre, left, during a news conference in response to the Connecticut school shooting in 2012.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Evan Vucci</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>NRA helped industry avoid regulation</h2>
<p>So how has the industry managed to avoid more significant regulation, especially given the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/02/politics/gun-control-polling-las-vegas-shooting/index.html">public anger and calls for legislation</a> that follow horrific massacres like the one in Las Vegas? </p>
<p>Given their historic dependence on U.S. taxpayers, one might think that small arms makers would have been compelled to make meaningful concessions in such moments. But that seldom happens, thanks in large part to the National Rifle Association, a complicated yet invaluable industry partner. </p>
<p>Prior to the 1930s, meaningful firearms regulations came from <a href="http://time.com/3921663/gun-regulation-history/">state and local governments</a>. There was little significant federal regulation until 1934, when Congress – spurred by the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/history-of-gun-control-legislation/2012/12/22/80c8d624-4ad3-11e2-9a42-d1ce6d0ed278_story.html?utm_term=.69769313c6be">bloody “Tommy gun era”</a> – debated the <a href="https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/national-firearms-act">National Firearms Act</a>. </p>
<p>The NRA, founded in 1871 as an organization focused on hunting and marksmanship, rallied its members <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=0xQsDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=NRA+and+the+1934+National+Firearms+Act&source=bl&ots=K50kyM78W0&sig=Iv19dxaW0r3LwG9L9J0AddIG6N4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjW0eCWpODWAhUJzLwKHY-bBcQ4FBDoAQguMAI#v=onepage&q=NRA%20and%20the%201934%20National%20Firearms%20Act&f=false">to defeat</a> the most important component of that bill: a tax meant to make it far more difficult to purchase handguns. Again in 1968, the NRA ensured <a href="http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29197">Lyndon Johnson’s Gun Control Act</a> wouldn’t include <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/10/05/even-in-the-1960s-the-nra-dominated-gun-control-debates/?utm_term=.e172d93ae81a">licensing and registration</a> requirements. </p>
<p>In 1989, it <a href="https://www.thetrace.org/2016/01/nra-background-check-system-brady-bill-wayne-lapierre/">helped delay and water down</a> the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1025/text/rh">Brady Act</a>, which mandated background checks for arms purchased from federally licensed dealers. In 1996 the NRA engineered a virtual ban on <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/cdc-still-cant-study-causes-gun-violence-180955884/?no-ist">federal funding</a> for research into gun violence. In 2000, the group led a <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/smith-and-wesson-almost-went-out-of-business-trying-to-do-the-right-thing-2013-1?r=US&IR=T">successful boycott</a> of a gun maker that cooperated with the Clinton administration on gun safety measures. And it scored another big victory in 2005, by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/7901">limiting the industry’s liability</a> to gun-related lawsuits. </p>
<p>Most recently, the gun lobby has succeeded by promoting an ingenious <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2012/jun/15/nra-right-obama-coming-our-guns/">illusion</a>. It has framed government as the <a href="https://www.alternet.org/tea-party-and-right/how-gun-industry-made-fortune-stoking-fears-obama-would-take-peoples-guns-ammo">enemy</a> of the gun business rather than its indispensable historic patron, convincing millions of American consumers that the state may <a href="http://thehill.com/regulation/248950-gun-production-has-doubled-under-obama">at any moment</a> stop them from buying guns or even try to confiscate them. </p>
<p>Hence the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/business/gun-stocks-vegas-shooting-trump.html">jump</a> in the shares of gun makers following last week’s slaughter in Las Vegas. Investors know they have little to fear from new regulation and expect sales to rise anyway.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/189452/original/file-20171009-6984-13poxmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People have been leaving memorials and tributes in honor of the victims of the Las Vegas mass shooting.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">gotpap/STAR MAX/IPx via AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A question worth asking</h2>
<p>So with the help of the NRA’s magic, major arms manufacturers <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-14/the-nra-racks-up-victories-the-atf-wants-to-give-them-more">have for decades thwarted regulations</a> that <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/22/key-takeaways-on-americans-views-of-guns-and-gun-ownership/psdt_2017-06-22-guns-00-03/">majorities of Americans support</a>. </p>
<p>Yet almost never does this <a href="https://www.citizensforethics.org/gun-companies-arm-trade-association-cash-influence-2016-elections/">political activity</a> seem to jeopardize access to lucrative government contracts. </p>
<p>Americans interested in reform might reflect on that fact. They might start asking their representatives where they get their guns. It isn’t just the military and scores of federal agencies. States, counties and local governments buy plenty of guns, too. </p>
<p>For example, Smith & Wesson is well into a <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-officers-gun-purchase-discounts-smith-wesson-20150925-story.html">five-year contract</a> to supply handguns to the Los Angeles Police Department, the second-largest in the country. In 2016 the company <a href="https://www.nssf.org/smith-wesson-tops-nssf-gunvote-chairmans-club-with-500000-contribution/">contributed $500,000</a> (more than <a href="https://www.citizensforethics.org/gun-companies-arm-trade-association-cash-influence-2016-elections/">any other company</a>) to a get-out-the-vote operation designed to defeat candidates who favor tougher gun laws. </p>
<p>Do taxpayers in L.A. – or the rest of the country – realize they are indirectly subsidizing the gun lobby’s campaign against regulation?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85167/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian DeLay receives funding from the American Council of Learned Societies and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.</span></em></p>
While advocates of gun control may feel powerless in the wake of mass shootings like the one in Las Vegas, the history of government support for the industry shows Americans have more sway than they think.
Brian DeLay, Associate Professor of History, University of California, Berkeley
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/81418
2017-08-14T16:24:17Z
2017-08-14T16:24:17Z
The danger of supplementing aid to Africa with weapons
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181796/original/file-20170811-13463-xpkue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Illicit firearms and small weapons recovered during security operations being destroyed in Nairobi.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-calls-for-greater-investment-in-africa-ahead-of-g20-summit/a-39220029">recent</a> G-20 meeting in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel floated the idea that African countries should be given weapons as part of development aid so that they could be more effective in combating militant <a href="https://theconversation.com/merkels-proposal-to-transfer-weapons-as-aid-needs-to-be-approached-with-caution-81035">groups</a>. </p>
<p>This was a bold departure from the traditional emphasis on economic aid as the bedrock of development efforts in African countries. To many, and for most African states, her statement sounded like a contradiction in terms because spending on arms <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tb-practical-guide-arms-trade-decisions-apr09.pdf">can divert</a> funds from vital areas such as food security, health care and education. </p>
<p>Over the past 20 years Africa has been transitioning from a focus on economic integration to one on security. Until the late 1990s the emphasis in many regions was on economic integration. This was clear from the consolidation of a number of <a href="http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/recs.shtml">regional</a> economic integration communities like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). </p>
<p>But since the turn of the century, there has been a much bigger focus on security and fighting radical Jihadist groups typically affiliated to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As of May 2015, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/peace-operations-africa">there were</a> nine UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa. The big shift towards security started in 2002 when the United States Africa Command <a href="https://www.africom.mil/">(AFRICOM)</a> was formed. This was followed by a security partnership being agreed between the African Union and the EU. And then there are sub-regional security forces like Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/02/07/sahel-g5-countries-to-form-joint-counter-terrorism-force//">Sahel G5 states’</a> counter-terrorism force.</p>
<p>As a result of the growing threat from terror groups, a number of countries, with the help of major powers, have boosted their military capabilities. <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/03/16/520440725/u-s-military-works-with-african-special-forces-to-fight-boko-haram">These include</a> Mali, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire to name a few.</p>
<p>Merkel’s statement was made in the context of many African countries experiencing economic growth while, at the same time, battling militant and terrorist groups. </p>
<p>The view seems to be that by helping Africa contain instability, growth rates will be enhanced, and Europe relieved of mass migrations.</p>
<h2>Increase military capability</h2>
<p>Increased securitisation – the emphasis on a militarily strong state at the expense of basic human needs and a strong civil society – started after the 1998 Al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These led to the creation of AFRICOM which included putting active American troops on the continent. Djibouti serves as a forward base for AFRICOM. It also included a commitment from the US to train and advise African countries that request it. Current key beneficiaries of US military assistance <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19995/u-s-military-assistance-to-africa-is-growing-but-is-it-succeeding">are</a> Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda Chad, Cameroon, and Mauritania. </p>
<p>In addition, French troops have become <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1">more active in Africa</a>. In Mali <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/emmanuel-macron-visits-french-troops-northern-mali-170519112433707.html">they are helping</a> the government contain Jihadist organisations in the north of the country. </p>
<p>There are also regional international efforts, such as the <a href="http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/priority-areas/peace-and-security">security partnership</a> between the European Union the African Union, and the <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/world/france-and-us-agree-on-un-resolution-welcoming-sahel-force-4714435/">UN Mission</a> established to contain terrorist attacks in the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-security-sahel-un-idUSKBN18Z2R7">Sahel region</a>. Known as the G5 Sahel force, it includes troop contributions from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.</p>
<p>France and the US are also active in the Sahel region providing training and equipment to the militaries of Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Naiger and Mauritania, and engaging in joint exercises with the <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serious_questions_remain_over_g5_sahel_military_force_7300">G5</a> forces. </p>
<p>Merkel’s proposal is aimed at taking these engagements even further. What’s she’s <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-calls-for-greater-investment-in-africa-ahead-of-g20-summit/a-39220029">put on the table</a> is a compact with Africa and the G20 which includes weapons transfer as development aid.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>Merkel’s suggestion would mean more weapons on a continent that is already awash with <a href="https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/education/docs/SALW_Africa.pdf">small arms and light weapons</a>. It can’t be denied that Africa as a secure continent would benefit Europe. But weapons as development aid sounds like a contradiction. Do weapon transfers in fact contribute to development? </p>
<p>There are studies that show that the acquisition of weapons by developing countries doesn’t contribute to <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=1LpiAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=the+acquisition+of+weapons+by+developing+countries+doesn%27t+contribute+to+%5Bdevelopment%5D&source=bl&ots=nl08QINADe&sig=LoIdw3iTLWb38tIqSpWWNqWGdzY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTibmY_tbVAhWBaRQKHVmvC-IQ6AEIRjAG#v=onepage&q=the%20acquisition%20of%20weapons%20by%20developing%20countries%20doesn't%20contribute%20to%20%5Bdevelopment%5D&f=false">development</a>. </p>
<p>I believe that more weapons on the continent would have the opposite effect. The African continent already has a great deal of weapons which exacerbate civil strife. <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/rr-human-cost-uncontrolled-arms-africa-080317-en.pdf">Evidence</a> points to the fact that weapons transfers are responsible for conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Somalia, among others. </p>
<p>More weapons and an increased military presence for incumbent African regimes could have negative consequences. </p>
<p>Firstly, it could lead to even more violations of the rule of law as incumbent regimes become militarily stronger. </p>
<p>Secondly, it would improve the changes of regimes surviving longer. They would have the wherewithall to violate human rights even more, as well as suppress opposition voices. And finally, weapons could be diverted to rebel groups through political corruption or for personal selfish objectives.</p>
<p>In conclusion the G20 Compact with Africa is very encouraging. But when it comes to the transfer of more weapons, donors and investors should make sure that this is done under strict rules and regulations. Conditions for receiving aid should also be based on strict adherence to the rule of law, and in particular democratic processes. </p>
<p>In the end the biggest emphasis should be on private investments – as set out in the compact – which will generate millions of jobs for the unemployed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Earl Conteh-Morgan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s comments about weapons as part of development for Africa could have the opposite effect if conditions aren’t strict and democratic processes aren’t followed.
Earl Conteh-Morgan, Professor of International Studies, University of South Florida
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/81111
2017-08-10T09:20:32Z
2017-08-10T09:20:32Z
Britain shouldn’t sell arms to the Saudis, no matter what promises they make
<p>Since the catastrophic <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-two-years-of-war-yemenis-face-cholera-famine-and-state-collapse-77902">Yemeni civil war</a> began in 2015, the British public has woken up to a serious problem: the use of UK-manufactured arms by Saudi Arabia. Various NGOs, campaigners and many MPs are increasingly worried about evidence that since the beginning of the conflict, Saudi Arabia has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/dec/18/uk-cluster-bombs-used-in-yemen-by-saudi-arabia-finds-research">used UK-manufactured arms</a> in ways that violate international law.</p>
<p>The British government, however, seems content to continue selling weapons to the Saudis – and indeed has worked hard to justify doing so. Government representatives have repeatedly claimed that the UK enjoys a “privileged position” from which it can train the Saudi armed forces and pressure them to comply with the international law of armed conflict. The corollary is that if the UK gave that position up, someone more nefarious would inherit it. </p>
<p>As the UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-10-26/debates/61DFF92D-1BE0-4909-8020-76FC80CA5136/Yemen">said in the House of Commons</a> in October 2016:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We would be vacating a space that would rapidly be filled by other Western countries that would happily supply arms with nothing like the same compunctions, criteria or respect for humanitarian law. More importantly, we would, at a stroke, eliminate this country’s positive ability to exercise our moderating diplomatic and political influence on a crisis in which there are massive UK interests at stake.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The government routinely falls back on this argument; it <a href="https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-on-the-application-of-campaign-against-the-arms-trade-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-international-trade-and-interveners/">made the same case</a> recently when it faced a judicial review of its decision to continue exporting arms to the Saudis despite their violations of humanitarian law. </p>
<p>The rationale has so far stood up in British courts and in parliament. But it is nonetheless deeply flawed – and it doesn’t come close to justifying what the government is still doing. Instead, the British government’s legal arguments seem highly selective.</p>
<p>The law regulates arms exports between states in two ways. Some provisions require the supplier state to assess how the recipient will use the arms before it transfers them; other provisions apply after the recipient has actually used the arms unlawfully. The point is that once arms are exported to another country, it is very difficult for the supplier to control who is using them and how. This is why there are legal norms applying to both the misuse of arms in the future and suppliers’ part in past violations.</p>
<p>But it’s not unusual for supplier states to focus solely on “guaranteeing” that arms won’t be misused while avoiding responsibility for unlawful use in the past. This is the case for the British-Saudi transfers, where the UK government seems content to talk about the guarantees that come with future transfers – even though the Saudis and their allies have violated humanitarian law with British weapons before.</p>
<h2>At face value</h2>
<p>In short, as far as international law is concerned, the Saudis’ assurances for the future do not justify the UK’s arms sales. A promise to behave properly in the future cannot justify unlawful behaviour in the past – especially not if the supplier state held a “privileged position” over the recipient when those violations were committed. </p>
<p>More than that, since arms have a long lifespan and are often stored and recycled for future conflicts, they have a nasty way of escaping the supplier’s control, making promises to limit their use essentially immaterial. This is precisely what has happened in Yemen, where the Saudi-led coalition has reportedly <a href="https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-on-the-application-of-campaign-against-the-arms-trade-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-international-trade-and-interveners/">used British-manufactured cluster munitions</a>. </p>
<p>Cluster munitions release or disperse explosive sub-munitions over a wide area, meaning they cannot be precisely targeted. Their imprecision means they can do substantial collateral damage during a conflict and they also leave <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340546/t/cluster-bombs-likely-leave-deadly-legacy/">unexploded ordnance</a> scattered over wide areas where it can injure or kill civilians who find it after a conflict is over. Because of their excessive impact, they have been <a href="http://www.clusterconvention.org/">banned since 2010</a>. </p>
<p>In 2016, the UK defence secretary, Michael Fallon, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/saudi-arabia-admits-use-uk-made-cluster-bombs-yemen">reported</a> that the British-manufactured cluster munitions used in Yemen arrived to Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, 30 years before the international ban. But this misses the point: the UK may not be producing, stockpiling and exporting cluster munitions any longer, but its past exports of these weapons are still in use, and there’s very little that can be done about it. </p>
<p>In any case, the argument that a “privileged position” from which to influence buyers’ behaviour justifies the UK’s arms sales makes no sense. After all, even if the UK could control the way Saudi Arabia uses exported arms, that would surely implicate it in everything the Saudis do with them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81111/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Riccardo Labianco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The international law on arms transfers is clear: suppliers are at least partly accountable for recipients’ human rights violations.
Riccardo Labianco, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.