tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/belt-and-road-forum-38721/articlesBelt and road forum – The Conversation2023-10-24T12:27:10Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161872023-10-24T12:27:10Z2023-10-24T12:27:10ZPutin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner<p>The third <a href="https://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/201705ydylforum/index.htm">Belt and Road Forum</a> held in Beijing recently <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/which-world-leaders-came-to-chinas-3rd-belt-and-road-forum/">attracted fewer heads of state</a> or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three. </p>
<p>This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the west and a number of non-western countries.</p>
<p>One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s Brics summit in South Africa. </p>
<p>While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the Forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.</p>
<p>He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a UN security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”. </p>
<p>Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion (£163 billion). This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by western sanctions.</p>
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<p>Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics. Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale. </p>
<p>For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.</p>
<p>Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.</p>
<h2>Holding back?</h2>
<p>The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-finalising-power-siberia-2-gas-pipeline-route-china-novak-2023-09-06/">Power of Siberia-2 pipeline</a>, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction. </p>
<p>China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in May 2023, China revived the prospect of building the so-called <a href="https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/central-asia-china-gas-pipeline-line-d/">section “D”</a>, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.</p>
<p>While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the west. </p>
<h2>Beijing making its move</h2>
<p>Putin’s delegation was full of ministers and CEOs of key Russian enterprises, from Rosneft and Gazprom to Novatek, so the conclusion of commercial agreements can’t be ruled out, but the probability is low. It is clear that Beijing does not want to be seen to be openly supporting Russia in resisting and bypassing western sanctions.</p>
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<p>In the 1990s, Russian officials regularly warned of the dangers of becoming a “<a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-putin-turning-russia-chinese-client-state-and-how-stop-it">raw materials appendage</a>” to China. Today the economic benefits that Russian elites gain from hydrocarbons mean this danger has now <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/04/13/russias-kowtowing-to-china-energy-and-beyond/">become a reality</a>. Russia has locked itself into an economic partnership in which it is the supplicant, a role that Moscow seems happy to play.</p>
<p>But the BRI is not just about economics. It is also a key part of Beijing’s bid to project itself as a “global responsible power”. Beijing has recently outlined what it calls its “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html">Global Security Initiative</a>” which explicitly rejects the Western rules-based order. This comes alongside a “<a href="http://ws.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202306/P020230627414336020074.pdf">Global Development Initiative</a>” and, nested within these, a “<a href="http://mv.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgsd/202305/t20230520_11080670.htm">Global Civilisation initiative</a>”. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinas-new-global-initiatives-mask-an-intrusive-agenda/articleshow/104360749.cms">Taken together</a> these question western universalist ideas about human rights and democracy. </p>
<p>China’s thinking has gained traction among many countries of the global south, providing a developmental path without lectures on human rights. China speaks to these countries using its dual identity as both a rapidly developing power and a member of the UN security council. By comparison, notwithstanding its security council position, Russia has few tangible benefits to offer these countries. Last week’s BRI forum has driven this point home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The forum made it clear that Russia is increasingly becoming a client state for China.Marcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies, University of GlasgowNatasha Kuhrt, Senior Lecturer in International Peace & Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794772017-06-30T09:56:07Z2017-06-30T09:56:07ZChina’s grand geopolitical project threatens a new East-West divide in Europe<p>The recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing ushered in a new phase in China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/14/china-xi-silk-road-vision-belt-and-road-claims-empire-building">global repositioning</a>. In his <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm">opening speech</a> China’s president, Xi Jinping, reaffirmed the importance of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/12/the-900bn-question-what-is-the-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI), a massive investment project launched in 2013 to dramatically expand land and sea trade across Asia and beyond.</p>
<p>At the summit, Xi called the BRI “a new kind of globalisation”, a strategy intended to win other countries over rather than coercing them. It seems to be working. The benefits of taking part in the BRI are proving irresistible to many countries – and not just in China’s immediate neighbourhood. </p>
<p>Among the 60 representatives who attended this year’s summit, Central and Eastern European (CEE) states formed the largest group of EU countries. Unlike France and Germany, who sent a senator and a minister respectively, they were represented by their <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/belt-and-road-attendees-list/">very highest state officials</a>, an indicator of just how special a role they now play in China’s European plans.</p>
<p>This special relationship began in 2012, when China explicitly renewed its ties with the CEE states via an initiative known as the <a href="http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/">16+1</a>. This immediately made the “old” EU member states <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-chinese-investment-problem-sigmar-gabriel-eu/">uncomfortable</a> about the scale of Chinese investment to their east, <a href="http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/chinas_scramble_for_europe%20">fearing</a> a “scramble for Europe” might be getting underway.</p>
<p>Indeed, Chinese state-owned enterprises’ investments in European <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/31/c_135400121.htm">nuclear energy</a>, <a href="http://www.novinite.com/articles/174354/China+to+Invest+EUR+20+M+in+Bulgaria%E2%80%99s+Burgas+Port+to+Facilitate+Trade+with+Europe">construction</a> and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/china-pacific-construction-montenegro-idUSL3N13L3Q720151202">railway infrastructure</a> have grown <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-12-03/chinas-foreign-direct-investments-within-161-cooperation">rapidly</a> since 2012. In countries such as the <a href="http://www.radio.cz/en/section/marketplace/chinese-investment-in-czech-republic-comes-under-the-spotlight">Czech Republic</a>, <a href="http://www.thediplomat.ro/articol.php?id=7164">Romania</a> and <a href="http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/hungary-flagship-china-europe">Hungary</a>, Chinese money has flowed into key energy, telecommunications and real estate sectors. </p>
<p>Chinese goods can now get to EU markets all the way to <a href="https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/europe.html">London</a> in as little as 18 days (though few EU goods are ever <a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/61616/">sent in the other direction</a>). The Balkan states, meanwhile, are cheering the prospect of a <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-railway-diplomacy-in-the-balkans/#.V1fscDV94dU">modern train line from Belgrade to Budapest</a>, bringing crucial infrastructure to a post-Communist rust belt left undeveloped for decades. </p>
<p>But regardless of the economic benefits of China’s engagement, the EU still sees it as a threat. Already the signs are there that all this investment comes with political strings attached.</p>
<h2>Pulling away</h2>
<p>Whereas the 16+1 initiative was presented as a unifying force for the region, the reality is that it’s encouraging European countries to directly compete for Chinese cash. China has embraced this state of affairs, changed the Belt and Road’s routes and plans many times already, often to suit a higher or more loyal bidder. </p>
<p>After Lithuania and Estonia welcomed the Dalai Lama in 2011, China offered its Baltic investment to a more “politically correct” <a href="http://www.baltic-press.com/hr007_hr360_summary/05_btj66_60-62.pdf">Latvia</a>. Likewise, when <a href="http://pikio.pl/wielka-szkoda-przez-konflikt-w-rzadzie-polska-stracila-miliardy-na-handlu-z-chinami-interes-przejely/">Poland hesitated</a> to accept Chinese investments due to security concerns the same opportunities were snapped up by its neighbours. This sort of “China-courting” doesn’t just affect the balance of investment, but also the coherence of the EU’s values and foreign policy.</p>
<p>Some analysts, for instance, have shown how Chinese enterprises’ economic power <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2e98f6f4-089d-11e7-ac5a-903b21361b43?mhq5j=e1">translates</a> into political influence at the highest levels of the <a href="http://www.praguemonitor.com/2015/11/20/hn-czech-presidential-office-chinese-cefc-personally-merge">Czech government</a>. Hungary’s vocal <a href="https://bbj.hu/economy/hungary-supports-granting-china-market-economy-status_116908">support for recognition of China as a market economy</a> stands at odds with the EU common trade policy, and its president’s <a href="http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592">praise for the illiberal China model</a> goes against core European values. </p>
<p>For its part, China has done much to calm the EU’s anxieties about its motives, insisting that it would prefer Europe strong and united and <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2094309/never-mind-belt-and-road-cash-what-about-chinas-growing">contributing to various European projects</a> rather than <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/china-uses-juncker-plan-to-boost-involvement-in-europe/">competing with them</a>. Nonetheless, while the EU urgently needs a <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/EPRS_BRI%282016%29586608_EN.pdf">common policy towards China</a>, many EU states clearly think they’ll do better if they form their own bilateral ties with Beijing. Why?</p>
<h2>Pushing back</h2>
<p>Some blame the EU’s failure to invest enough in <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/948137.shtml">developing its own backyard</a>, but that doesn’t explain the u-turns by countries such as Hungary, which have benefited immensely from the EU’s regional funds. The truth is that it isn’t just economics pushing the CEE states into the Chinese investors’ arms – it’s also rising nationalism and populism. </p>
<p>These political tendencies both take a dim view of Brussels and see China as a naturally preferable backer. Whereas the EU is pressing some of the CEE states to accept <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-and-slovakia-take-eu-refugee-quota-scheme-to-court/a-38781422">asylum seeker and refugee quotas</a> and reverse their <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/meps-slam-hungary-call-on-eu-to-explore-sanctions/">democratic deterioration</a>, China’s cash seems to come without political pressure. </p>
<p>Still, for all that the BRI is presented as a purely economic project, it remains deeply political – a key element of a strategy to build <a href="https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/2401876">a new global geopolitical and normative order</a>. The regional rivalry it has created on Europe’s eastern flank perfectly fits that strategy. It not only undermines the EU’s capacity to mount a unified response towards China, but normalises the China’s model as a viable system of governance, further entrenching some of the CEE states’ illiberal ways.</p>
<p>Given the circumstances, these countries’ governments have plenty to answer for. Yes, China might accelerate the EU’s fragmentation by encouraging them to assert themselves against both each other and Brussels – but it is ultimately these governments who are choosing to engage on China’s terms. If they aren’t careful, they could themselves <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-poland-hungary-analys-idUSKCN18A0BN?il=0">lose leverage with both China and Brussels</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, a common EU strategy could empower individual CEE states in their relationship with China as it would keep in check the “divide-and-rule” politics of the BRI. In an unusually assertive move, the EU28 ultimately withdrew from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road">trade statement</a> that capped the May 2017 BRI summit. Perhaps there is more will to push back than China bargained for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Małgorzata Jakimów does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>European countries are competing against Brussels and each other for China’s affections. And that is undermining the EU.Małgorzata Jakimów, Lecturer in Chinese Politics, School of East Asian Studies, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/715752017-05-26T06:39:20Z2017-05-26T06:39:20ZIs China the potential driver of a new wave of globalisation?<p><strong><em>The final part of our series <a href="https://theconversation.com/global/topics/globalisation-under-pressure-38722">Globalisation Under Pressure</a> considers how China is trying to take a leading role in continued global integration with its Belt and Road Initiative, and the obstacles it faces.</em></strong></p>
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<p>Since the 2008 global financial crisis – and with a particular impetus after Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/xi-jinping-communist-party-chinese">became president</a> in 2012 – China’s foreign policy has been characterised by a departure from a “keeping a low profile” approach to one of “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/7/2/153/438673/From-Keeping-a-Low-Profile-to-Striving-for">striving for achievement</a>”. </p>
<p>Putting to use its economic, political and symbolic capital in global affairs, China has developed diplomatic thinking and practice that’s not just concerned with short-term economic benefit. Rather, it has focused on the long-term impact of its actions on both the outlook of the world system and the country’s position in it.</p>
<p>One of the ways China is seeking to achieve this is through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the 21st-century Silk Road. </p>
<p>Formally announced in 2013, the BRI brings together a <a href="https://cpianalysis.org/2016/10/07/how-new-is-the-belt-and-road/">number of pre-existing</a> as well as novel elements to provide <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chieco/v40y2016icp314-321.html">a strong link</a> between China’s domestic imperatives and its global orientation. It has thus become a focal point for the country’s resources, institutions and ideas. </p>
<p>The BRI is a concept with Chinese features; it is characterised by incrementalism, inductive thinking, and experimentation. It is not a uniform project, as different legs and sections of it differ from each other considerably – it includes a major <a href="http://cpec.gov.pk/">China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</a>, which has a notable developmental component, for instance, and buying and operating ports in developed countries such as <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/218666/article/ekathimerini/business/coscos-ambitious-plans-for-piraeus-port">Greece</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/china-bri-forum-pursuing-change/">BRI Forum in Beijing</a> on May 14-15 gathered together dozens of heads of states and many more representatives of governments around the world. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171009/original/file-20170525-23230-q9x5hh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The BRI forum in Beijing hosted 29 head of states, including Vladimir Putin (left) and Recept Tayyep Erdogan (right).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/54491/photos/48321">Kremlin Press Office</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although initially announced as having a specific geographic focus on <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/china-one-belt-one-road-initiative-what-we-know-thus-far">Asia, Europe and parts of Africa</a>, it is now clear that the BRI is a <a href="https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylyw/201705/201705110537027.pdf">truly global initiative</a>, as it aims also to involve the Americas and Oceania.</p>
<h2>Global growth</h2>
<p>In the last four decades, China has risen economically by <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21609649-china-becomes-again-worlds-largest-economy-it-wants-respect-it-enjoyed-centuries-past-it-does-not">integrating itself</a> in the global economy and gradually upgrading its position in the world. The country’s economic development would have not been possible without <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.10/full">the growth of others</a>. </p>
<p>Today, China is not only the second-largest economy (poised to overtake the US in the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/">near future</a>), but also the engine of the world economy. It is <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/why-china-is-central-to-global-growth">central</a> to global economic growth. </p>
<p>It is thus expected that China will assume a more significant role in shaping the future of the global economy. And the BRI is one way it will do this.</p>
<p>The BRI essentially promotes “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23792949.2016.1232598?journalCode=rard20">strategic international economic partnerships and multilateral credit to address investment, infrastructure, employment and economic development</a>”, with the goal of reinvigorating global economic growth. </p>
<p>One of the main concepts that defines China’s approach is <a href="http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2015/03/28/content_281475079065086.htm">production capacity cooperation</a> – best described as the pooling together of resources to meet each other’s needs. The goal of this is to contribute to strengthening trade routes and supply chains, and to ensure sustainable flows of goods and services. </p>
<p>The initiative is a global plan that exceeds all previous such plans; it is <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/the-one-belt-one-road-explained/news-story/d02f063add5ad39d0bddda1718d0d416">seven times</a> larger than the post-second world war US Marshall Plan.</p>
<h2>State and market</h2>
<p>In developing the BRI, Chinese policymakers have drawn on the country’s own experience of developing by <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/xiaolian.htm">“reform and opening up”</a> and the evolving ideology of the Communist Party of China (CPC).</p>
<p>Most significantly, the BRI invokes the central tenets of present-day <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/editorials/sinified-marxism/articleshow/2481741.cms">Sinified Marxism</a>: the state is the most responsible actor for bringing about prosperity, and the market is the main instrument through which this can be achieved. </p>
<p>To describe this complex state-market nexus in China, developmental sociologists <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Global-Rise-China-Today/dp/0745664741">Alvin Y. So and Yin-Wah Chu</a> propose the purposefully self-contradicting term “state neoliberalism” as opposed to the Western-style “market neoliberalism”. </p>
<p>It posits that the party-state needs to be powerful and politically stable in order to be able to act decisively in fine-tuning (both advancing and reversing) market flows, the scope and intensity of regulation, and to create exceptions (such as free economic zones). </p>
<p>The state is also in charge of <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1046925.shtml">stimulating innovation</a> (a key to economic growth), which is strongly emphasised in the BRI. This way of governance allows the state to integrate itself in global neoliberalism, while also developing a particular neoliberal governmentality or rather <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog421/abstract">political technology</a> built into the web of laws, policies and official discourses. </p>
<p>In the debate on bringing the state back in the economy, the example of China (and the so-called <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670561003666061">China Model</a>) is often cited as a challenge to the Western model. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has called the rise of China a “<a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy">wake-up call</a>” in terms of how we think of the global economy. </p>
<p>Chinese policymakers have used this to <a href="https://books.google.it/books?hl=en&lr=&id=mIdzm1imHb0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA23&dq=Neoliberal+Strategies,+Socialist+Legacies:+Communication+and+State+Transformation+in+China,&ots=7srWv2wljH&sig=5iQj554NRhQXMBeCbgSk3sWH6Fk#v=onepage&q=Neoliberal%20Strategies%2C%20Socialist%20Legacies%3A%20Communication%20and%20State%20Transformation%20in%20China%2C&f=false">acquire soft power</a> and boost their legitimacy.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the notion of a strong state that seeks political stability has opened debates on the effects of China’s BRI on <a href="http://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/3/2/dt030207.xml">democracy</a> worldwide.</p>
<p>But in the same process, Chinese policymakers and scholars have argued against the promotion of universal blueprints, repeatedly <a href="http://acyd.org.au/acyd/understanding-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative">emphasising the impossibility of replicating China’s experience</a>. They have <a href="http://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=pol_facpub">called</a> for all nations to exercise their sovereignty in deciding on what model of development is most applicable to their own circumstances.</p>
<h2>Common destiny</h2>
<p>While not interfering in each other’s affairs is the core principle of China’s global involvement, its leaders do, however, frequently espouse a vision of how relations between nations should develop. Under Xi Jinping, this guiding concept has been the “<a href="http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm">community of shared future for mankind</a>”, which emphasises mutual respect and cooperation. This has been built into all Chinese foreign initiatives, including the BRI.</p>
<p>This is why Chinese policymakers and scholars <a href="http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/lessons-asean-xis-belt-and-road-initiative">argue</a> that the BRI is not just a Chinese initiative, but is jointly “owned” by all participating countries. </p>
<p>The idea of a shared future, or “common destiny” as it is often called, is why the BRI is frequently called a blueprint for a different version of economic globalisation. Development scholars have also used the idea of “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23792949.2016.1232598?journalCode=rard20">inclusive globalisation</a>”, a term previously – less successfully – promoted by former UN secretary-general <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SGSM8412.doc.htm">Kofi Annan</a>.</p>
<p>In essence, the BRI aims to address the need not only for a more equitable global economy – or, to cite from the official documents, it aims for “<a href="http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html">jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all</a>”. This echoes the principle of solidarity and cooperation with developing countries, particularly in the Global South, which has been <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325.shtml">central</a> to China’s foreign policy since its foundation in 1949.</p>
<p>Today, there is an added dimension to this, inspired primarily by the rise of new protectionist and economic nationalist forces, best embodied by US President <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/29/donald-trump-is-an-economic-nationalist-whats-an-economic-nationalist/?utm_term=.f7d4674f165e">Donald Trump</a>. At a time of growing doubt about global capitalism, the BRI is a way for China and the world to ensure there are no major reversals.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>But the BRI rests on three defining contradictions. While it is an effort to capitalise on the four decades of growth and China’s newfound clout, it is also an attempt to provide the necessary impetus for a new round of reform and opening up, which the country desperately needs. </p>
<p>While it is an attempt to combat economic nationalism, it also works towards maintaining – and strengthening – the supremacy of the nation-state. And while it is bringing back the state in the economy, it aims to safeguard and advance global markets and free trade.</p>
<p>The outcome of the BRI as a vehicle of a new type of globalisation, therefore, cannot be framed in absolute terms. Nor it will be clear-cut. But it does have the potential to greatly affect the trajectory of the global order as a whole, as well as the trajectories of particular regions and countries, and the way we think about the world. </p>
<p>To properly gauge the potential of the BRI, we need to go back to one of the core statements made by Chinese policymakers – the BRI is intended to be a global, shared project, whose success will depend not only on China’s resolve, but also on the interest and <a href="https://euobserver.com/opinion/137970">response</a> of others.</p>
<p>And while China has so far secured the support of a number of governments around the world, the recent forum in Beijing also unveiled some obstacles to its future advancement.</p>
<p>First, the notable absence of China’s neighbour and partner within the BRICS grouping, <a href="http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2017/may/13/india-boycotts-one-belt-one-road-summit-in-china-1604412--1.html">India</a>, showed that China has yet to overcome border conflicts with its neighbourhood.</p>
<p>Second, a sceptical <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2093859/were-still-figuring-out-chinas-belt-and-road-european">European Union</a> (EU) – a strategic partner of China – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road">backed away from the statement on trade</a>. It has also restated its firm position on <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/26154/european-commission-vice-president-jyrki-katainen-speech-belt-and-road-forum-leaders-round_en">issues such as transparency and reciprocity</a> that have traditionally been a challenge for EU-China relations.</p>
<p>India and the EU are two actors that are particularly relevant for the BRI. Given how much China has invested so far in the initiative, and the extent to which the legacy of Xi Jinping – and the Communist Party – rests on the new global plan, making them more accepting of China’s vision is the new imperative for Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71575/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anastas Vangeli is a Claussen-Simon PhD Fellow at the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius</span></em></p>While China has so far secured support from a number of governments for its Belt and Road Initiative, the recent forum in Beijing also highlighted some obstacles to its advancement.Anastas Vangeli, Doctoral Researcher, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777052017-05-16T20:11:21Z2017-05-16T20:11:21ZThe Belt and Road Initiative: China’s vision for globalisation, Beijing-style<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/169415/original/file-20170516-7015-s5nej7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">World leaders, led by Chinese President Xi Jinping, meet for the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a multifaceted economic, diplomatic and geopolitical undertaking that has morphed through various iterations, from the “New Silk Road” to “<a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad">One Belt One Road</a>”.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html">BRI imagines</a> a US$1.3 trillion Chinese-led investment program creating a web of infrastructure, including roads, railways, telecommunications, energy pipelines, and ports. This would serve to enhance economic interconnectivity and facilitate development across Eurasia, East Africa and more than 60 partner countries. </p>
<p>First proposed in September 2013, it is the signature foreign policy initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is a project of unprecedented geographical and financial scope.</p>
<p>BRI has two primary components: the overland Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and the sea-based 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Together, they form the “belt” and “road”. </p>
<p>SREB’s <a href="http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1882600/laying-foundations-chinas-one-belt-one-road">overland infrastructure network</a> encompasses the New Eurasia Land Bridge and five economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia; China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Pakistan; the China-Indochina peninsula; and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar. The SREB’s connective sinews will be high-speed rail and hydrocarbon pipeline networks.</p>
<p>The MSR is focused on developing key seaports that connect to land-based transportation routes. </p>
<p>China has <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-02/03/content_28087627.htm">been at pains to emphasise</a> the co-operative nature of the initiative and its objective of “win-win outcomes”. In his <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d59444f33677a4d/share_p.html">address</a> to the Belt and Road Forum for International Co-operation in Beijing, Xi framed the BRI in terms of “peace and co-operation”, “openness and inclusiveness”, “mutual learning”, and “mutual benefit”.</p>
<p>Yet behind the rhetoric of harmony and mutuality lies a substantive strategy for growing an emerging China-led operating system for the international economy. This could potentially succeed the US-led <a href="http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html">Washington Consensus</a> and <a href="http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-320747/">Bretton Woods system</a>.</p>
<h2>What China gets from the BRI</h2>
<p>BRI projects are likely to increase China’s economic and political leverage as a <a href="http://www.iberchina.org/files/2016/obor_economist.pdf">creditor</a>. </p>
<p>China has established the multilateral <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a> (AIIB) and the $40 billion <a href="http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23773/index.html">Silk Road Fund</a>. These are financial vehicles for BRI infrastructure projects, yet the vast bulk of funding to date has come from China’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/18db2e80-3571-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e">big state-owned investment banks</a>.</p>
<p>The prospect of access to Chinese financial largesse to fund much-needed infrastructure investments has attracted attention from many prospective partner nations. Many of these appreciate the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-belt-and-road-initiative-is-not-chinas-marshall-plan-why-not/">minimal political conditionalities</a> that come with Chinese finance, in comparison to finance on offer from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.</p>
<p>The BRI has been viewed as a way for China to productively use its enormous, $3 trillion capital reserves, internationalise the renminbi, and deal with structural issues as its economy navigates the so-called “new normal” of lower growth.</p>
<p>Perhaps foremost among these is the issue of <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-the-chinese-marshall-plan-strategy/">industrial over-capacity</a>. Having maxed out investment-driven growth through a frenzy of domestic infrastructure building following the 2008 global financial crisis, the BRI represents an international stimulus package that will utilise China’s idle industrial capacity and safeguard jobs in key industries such as steel and cement.<br>
This is a significant political dividend for the Chinese government. The <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/03/01/chinese-political-legitimacy-in-transition/">Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy</a> rests on maintaining economic growth and improving people’s standard of living. </p>
<p>In relation to energy security, the BRI will assist China in diversifying its energy sources through greater access to <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/deconstructing-chinas-energy-security-strategy/">Russian and Iranian oil and gas</a>. This will be achieved by linking with pipeline networks from Russia and Central Asia. </p>
<p>By investing in pipelines from Gwadar, on the coast of Pakistan, to Xinjiang, and from coastal Myanmar to Yunnan, China also can <a href="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/24/chinas-strategic-interests-in-pakistans-port-at-gwadar/">diversify its transportation routes</a> for maritime energy supplies. This reduces its vulnerability to energy supply disruption at maritime choke-points in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. </p>
<p>The establishment of port facilities in the Indian Ocean will also be advantageous to the emerging blue-water capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. This would assist in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09733159.2015.1025535">keeping vulnerable critical sea lines of communication open</a> for maritime energy supplies from the Middle East. </p>
<p>Collectively, these measures could reduce the ability of the US Navy to blockade China’s energy supply routes in any future conflict scenario. </p>
<h2>Geopolitical implications of the BRI</h2>
<p>After more than a decade of conjecture about China’s increasing international assertiveness, the Chinese government has now clearly signalled its intention to assume a more prominent global leadership role through the BRI. </p>
<p>China is aiming to spur a new round of economic globalisation, but in a changed international order that it has a pivotal role in shaping.</p>
<p>The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS <a href="http://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a>, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership are the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/https:/www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/">software of integration</a>” – the financial pillars of trade and investment in this vision.</p>
<p>The BRI is the development vehicle – the “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/https:/www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-rise-as-a-regional-and-global-power-the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/">hardware of trade and investment</a>” and the final pillar on which China’s claim to global leadership rests.</p>
<p>Somewhat paradoxically, given the investment focus on hydrocarbon pipelines, the BRI also represents the vehicle through which China is likely to shape the contours of the <a href="http://asaa.asn.au/china-set-lead-global-climate-politics/">emerging international post-carbon economy</a>. The <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf">Paris Agreement</a> in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is a keystone document in this respect. </p>
<p>A combination of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/19/reasons-to-be-cheerful-full-switch-low-carbon-energy-in-sight">climate emergency and market behaviours</a> are making fossil fuel energy production increasingly uneconomic. This has spurred an accelerating transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy generation.</p>
<p>China is a world leader in <a href="http://www.wri.org.cn/en/from-commitment-to-action-signs-of-progress-since-the-paris-climate-talks">green and alternative energy technologies</a>. Through the BIR it is well-placed to be the dominant player in facilitating the transition and roll-out of renewable energy infrastructure across Eurasia. This is especially so since the Trump administration has ceded American influence in international climate politics through its <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/27/politics/trump-climate-change-executive-order/index.html">repudiation of proactive climate policies</a>. </p>
<p>Leadership on international climate action is one area in which China can develop significant soft power cache, particularly with developing countries of the global south.</p>
<p>China’s BRI announcement is also reflective of the relative decline of the US as the world’s pre-eminent power. A declaration of intent as bold as that made in Beijing over the weekend at the <a href="http://www.un.org/pga/71/2017/05/14/belt-and-road-forum-for-international-cooperation/">Belt and Road Forum for International Co-operation</a> would have been inconceivable prior to the 2016 US election. </p>
<p>The Trump administration’s clumsy foreign policy manoeuvrings have damaged US prestige, weakened the integrity of a liberal international order <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-decline-the-bretton-woods-institutions-11324">already under duress</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/12/the-united-states-is-losing-asia-to-china/">opened a window</a> for China to stake its claim. </p>
<p>The BRI also signals a deepening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. This is based on a complementary supplier-consumer energy relationship and a mutual antagonism to the US.</p>
<p>However, not all regional countries see the BRI as a boon. The Indian government <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-india-distrusts-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative">has expressed reservations</a> over the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.</p>
<p>The BRI now ups the ante for regional middle powers like Australia that have deftly attempted to hedge between the US and China. Australia’s foreign policymakers must weigh up the case for engaging with the BRI and having a seat at the table as China’s vision takes shape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese government has now clearly signalled its intention to assume a more prominent global leadership role through the Belt and Road Initiative.Benjamin Habib, Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, La Trobe UniversityViktor Faulknor, PhD Candidate in International Relations, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.