tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/chad-8822/articlesChad – The Conversation2024-03-18T18:33:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255082024-03-18T18:33:20Z2024-03-18T18:33:20ZChad presidential election: assassination of main opposition figure casts doubt on country’s return to democracy<p><em>The <a href="https://www.miragenews.com/chad-opposition-leader-assassinated-1185873/">assassination</a> of Chad’s main opposition leader, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68435145">Yaya Dillo</a>, is hanging heavy over <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/02/28/chads-election-agency-sets-dates-for-presidential-polls//">presidential elections</a> due in early May. Dillo was killed on 28 February when the headquarters of the opposition <a href="https://psf-tchad.org/">Party Socialiste sans Frontières</a> (Party of Socialists without Borders) in the Chadian capital N'Djamena was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/28/chad-announces-several-deaths-after-foiled-intelligence-office-attack">besieged</a> by the newly formed Rapid Reaction Force.</em> </p>
<p><em>It’s not the first violence meted out to the opposition. In October 2022 Chadian security forces <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/24/deadly-chad-protests-death-toll-now-estimated-at-128//">killed</a> hundreds of protesters. They were protesting the extension of the transition to democracy from 18 to 36 months and the decision of transitional <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/mahamat-idriss-deby-itno-named-chad-s-transitional-president/2706374">president Mahamat Idriss Déby</a> to stand as a candidate in presidential elections.</em></p>
<p><em>An expert on democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa, especially Chad, <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/helga-dickow-1209876">Helga Dickow</a>, sets out what this level of violence portends for the country.</em> </p>
<hr>
<h2>Who was Dillo, and why was he important for the upcoming poll?</h2>
<p>The assassination took place one day after the publication of the electoral calendar for the presidential elections. For the first time a member of the ruling clan was killed publicly in N'Djamena. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.state.gov/chads-national-dialogue-commission-report/">resolutions</a> of the 2022 national dialogue, elections must take place before October 2024 to end the political transition and return to constitutional order. No dates have been set for the parliamentary and local elections. It is more than doubtful that they will take place in the near future.</p>
<p>Dillo was determined to take part in the elections and challenge the rule of his cousin, Mahamat Déby, even though he’d faced heavy intimidation. His <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/01/chad-prominent-opposition-leader-killed">stated ambition</a> was to see Chad return to democracy, to end widespread corruption and improve the living conditions of poor people in the country. </p>
<p>Dillo had clear ideas about fighting poverty based on insights he’d gained doing a doctorate in economics in Canada.</p>
<p>There are a number of reasons, in my view, why his death is a tragic loss for Chad.</p>
<p>Firstly, Chad has lost a political leader whose competences are desperately needed in the country.</p>
<p>Secondly, Yaya Dillo was one of the few politicians from the north of the country and the only one from the ruling Zaghawa clan who reached out to and connected with the opposition in the south. </p>
<p>He had shown that he was able to overcome ethnic, religious and regional boundaries in a highly divided country. An example of this was that he <a href="https://eng.fatshimetrie.org/2023/12/11/political-tensions-in-chad-one-week-before-the-vote-on-the-new-constitution-the-country-is-preparing-to-make-a-crucial-decision-for-its-future/">joined</a> the opposition coalition Groupe de concertation des acteurs politiques (Group of Consultative Political Actors), which opposes the dynastisation of the Déby family and stands for better living conditions for all Chadians. </p>
<p>This voice has now been silenced. His supporters are in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/01/chad-prominent-opposition-leader-killed">hiding</a> or have already been arrested and taken to the Koro Toro high-security prison in the desert. His party has been dissolved by the government.</p>
<h2>What does the assassination mean for the presidential elections?</h2>
<p>Dillo’s murder hasn’t changed the programme for the upcoming elections. Three days after Dillo’s death, transitional president Mahamat Déby <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/2/chad-interim-leader-deby-confirms-plan-to-run-for-president-in-may">declared</a> himself a candidate. </p>
<p>Déby, who became interim president in 2021, is the candidate of a new coalition of more than 200 political parties and more than 1,000 civil society organisations, the so-called Coalition pour un Tchad uni (<a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/news/for-a-united-chad-coalition">Coalition for a United Chad</a>).</p>
<p>The driving force behind this coalition is the former ruling party <a href="https://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/the-party-system-and-conditions-of-candidacy/chad/">Mouvement Patriotique du Salut</a>, which was led by his <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idriss-Deby">father, the late Idriss Déby</a>. </p>
<h2>How prepared is Chad to conduct elections?</h2>
<p>The transitional president and his allies, especially the Movement Patriotique du Salut and some members of the parliament, are in a hurry to hold the elections to replace the “interim president” with a “president”.</p>
<p>But the key question is whether the presidential poll will be followed by parliamentary elections, as was agreed in the transition plan of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/chads-national-dialogue-commission-report/">national dialogue of 2022</a>. </p>
<p>There are many, including myself, who doubt this will happen. Mahamat Déby is likely to act like his father, who attached great importance to presidential elections but steered clear of parliamentary polls. Before <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">Idriss Déby’s death</a> in 2021, the last parliamentary elections were held in <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3518/">2011</a>.</p>
<p>Additionally, there are strong doubts about the independence of the electoral authorities. Mahamat Déby nominated most members of the Agence nationale de gestion des élections (<a href="https://eng.fatshimetrie.org/2024/01/26/the-national-election-management-agency-in-chad-a-crucial-issue-for-democracy-in-a-period-of-political-transition/">National Election Management Agency</a>) and of the Constitutional Court, which must validate the election results. All of them were loyal to his father in the past and have been members of the Movement Patriotique du Salut for many years.</p>
<p>Potential candidates in the presidential election could submit their candidacy from 6 to 15 March. The list of candidates approved by the Constitutional Council will be published on 24 March. Voter registration has already taken place in preparation for the constitutional referendum in December 2023. The same lists will be used. But anyone who reached the age of 18 in the period between the registration exercise and May 2024 will not be able to vote.</p>
<p>From a logistical point of view, everything seems to be ready for the presidential poll.</p>
<h2>What’s behind the political violence in the country?</h2>
<p>Violence against the political opposition is nothing new in Chad. It has always taken the form of attacking anyone in the way of either Déby. In 2008, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr200032012en.pdf">Ibni Oumar</a>, a widely respected political opponent of Idriss Déby in the north and south, was arrested. He <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article26131/">disappeared</a>. No trace of his body was ever found.</p>
<p>On 28 February 2021, Yaya Dillo was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68435145">attacked</a> in his home and his mother and other members of his household were killed. He managed to escape. He had declared his intention to run against <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idriss-Deby">Idriss Déby</a> in the presidential poll that year. </p>
<p>On exactly the same day three years later, he was killed in very similar circumstances. </p>
<p>Dillo was one of the few Zaghawa who <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202403060514.html">continued</a> to call for an investigation into Idriss Déby’s death. Three years later, the circumstances are still unclear. Salay Déby, a younger brother of Idriss Déby, has gone as far as to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/violence-against-chads-opposition-escalates-before-polls/a-68450630">accuse</a> Mahamat Déby, the (adopted) son and president of the transitional government, of being behind the death of his own father. </p>
<p>Yaya Dillo and Salay Déby, both members of the ruling clan, joined forces two weeks before Dillo’s assassination. The party headquarters that has now been destroyed was located in Salay Déby’s house.</p>
<h2>How inclusive is the electoral process?</h2>
<p>Looking only at the Coalition pour un Tchad uni, the electoral process might appear to be inclusive. But democracy is not a one-party system. It is doubtful that all the parties and associations joined out of conviction in favour of Mahamat Déby and his allies in the parliament.</p>
<p>On the contrary, it is obvious that the regime used and will continue to use violence. The fear is that recent events are only the beginning of another permanent dictatorship in Chad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225508/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is feared that the current violence against political opposition in Chad could signal the beginning of another long term dictatorship.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232532024-02-14T14:26:07Z2024-02-14T14:26:07ZWagner Group is now Africa Corps. What this means for Russia’s operations on the continent<p><em>In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/hand-grenade-explosion-caused-plane-crash-that-killed-wagner-boss-says-putin">his private jet crashed</a> about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia’s pointman in Africa since the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">began operating on the continent in 2017</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The group is known for <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders</a>. It has had a destabilising effect. Prigozhin’s death – and his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/24/timeline-how-wagner-groups-revolt-against-russia-unfolded">aborted mutiny</a> against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group’s activities.</em></p>
<p><em>What does this mean for Africa? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fvXhZxQAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Alessandro Arduino’s research</a> includes mapping the evolution of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">mercenaries</a> and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current status of the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defence quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-wagner-group-evolves-after-the-death-of-prigozhin/">business as usual</a> – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">Recent reports</a> on the Wagner Group suggest a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20has%20been%20replaced,its%20new%20leader%20has%20confirmed.">transformation</a> is underway. </p>
<p>The group’s activities in Africa are now under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">direct supervision</a> of the Russian ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Wagner commands an estimated force of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Rather%20than%20a%20single%20entity%2C%20Wagner%20is%20a,of%20former%20Russian%20soldiers%2C%20convicts%2C%20and%20foreign%20nationals.">5,000 operatives</a> deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defence ministry has renamed it the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa">Africa Corps</a>. </p>
<p>The choice of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-military-unit-recruiting-former-wagner-fighters-ukraine-veterans-2023-12?r=US&IR=T">name</a> could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-owned-mine-seized-by-russian-mercenaries-in-africa-is-helping/">serve one master</a> – the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia’s ministry of defence will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin’s involvement. The head of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">attempted to use this defence in Mali</a>.</p>
<p>The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/afrika-korps">Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps</a>. Nazi Germany wove myths around his <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/115/4/1243/35179?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic and tactical successes in north Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wagner-group-africa-where-rubber-meets-road-206202">distinctive modus operandi</a> that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin’s reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated network of financing to enhance combat capabilities.</p>
<h2>What will happen to Wagner’s modus operandi now?</h2>
<p>In my recent book, <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones and the Future of War</a>, I record Prigozhin’s adept weaving of disinformation and misinformation. </p>
<p>Numerous meticulously orchestrated campaigns flooded Africa’s online social platforms <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/">promoting</a> the removal of French and western influence across the Sahel. </p>
<p>Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the propaganda arm of the group. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html">admitted</a> to founding the so-called troll farm: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never just been the financier of the Internet Research Agency. I invented it, I created it, I managed it for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a financial perspective, Prigozhin’s approach involved establishing a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581">convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations</a>. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. </p>
<p>This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/how-russia-recruiting-wagner-fighters-continue-war-ukraine">Russian state</a> to support the Wagner Group’s direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine, and across north and west Africa.</p>
<p>My research shows Prigozhin networks are solid enough to last. But only as long as the golden rule of the mercenary remains intact: guns for hire are getting paid.</p>
<p>In Libya and Mali, Russia is unlikely to yield ground due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy and securing its position as a kingmaker in the region. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group’s involvement here was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">primarily linked</a> to Prigozhin’s personal interests in goldmine revenues.</p>
<p>The Russian ministry of defence will no doubt seek to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today’s Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility.</p>
<p>History has shown that Africa serves as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">lucrative arena for mercenaries</a> due to various factors. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts reduces the risks to mercenaries’ lives compared to full-scale wars like in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-720">Ukraine</a></p></li>
<li><p>the continent’s abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As it is, countries in Africa once considered allies of the west are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">viable candidate</a>. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/">develop bilateral ties</a>”. Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.</p>
<p>A month earlier, Russia’s deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who’s been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and north Africa, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">visited Niger</a>. The two countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">agreed to strengthen military ties</a>. Niger is currently led by the military after a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in July 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Where does it go from here?</h2>
<p>There are a number of paths that the newly named Africa Corps could take.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It gets deployed by Moscow to fight in conflicts meeting Russia’s geopolitical ends. </p></li>
<li><p>It morphs into paramilitary units under the guise of Russian foreign military intelligence agencies.</p></li>
<li><p>It splinters into factions, acting as heavily armed personal guards for local warlords. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The propaganda machinery built by Prigozhin may falter during the transition. But this won’t signal the immediate disappearance of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. </p>
<p>Russian diplomatic efforts are already mobilising to preserve the status quo. This is clear from Moscows’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russia-deepens-counter-terrorism-ties-to-sahelian-post-coup-regimes/">backing</a> of the recent Alliance of Sahelian States encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are led by military rulers who overthrew civilian governments a recently announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">plans to exit</a> from the 15-member Economic Community of West African States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>Will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the ruthless modus operandi that propelled it to the spotlight in Africa?Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214222024-02-04T11:54:02Z2024-02-04T11:54:02ZChad: promises of a new chapter fade as junta strengthens its hold ahead of elections<p>It’s been three years since Chad’s former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno</a> died. A transitional authority took over after his death. Yet the transition to democracy that was on the cards following his 31 years in power has failed to materialise.</p>
<p>What Chadians hoped for was:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a referendum on whether they wanted to be a unitary or federal state</p></li>
<li><p>a return to constitutional order once that had been decided </p></li>
<li><p>a return to democracy with elections being held by October 2024.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>But the fulfilment of this plan has hit the wall. Chadians are concerned that the transitional authority isn’t acting in their interests but rather in the interest of transitional <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/mahamat-idriss-deby-itno-named-chad-s-transitional-president/2706374">president Mahamat Idriss Déby</a>.</p>
<p>Concerns were sparked by the way the referendum was run. Chadians and international observers had <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/649385-analysis-can-chads-constitutional-referendum-still-be-saved.html">assumed</a> that voters could choose between two constitutions, a unitarian and a federal one. But the national commission in charge of running the referendum <a href="https://www.eisa.org/yes-no-or-boycott-a-fierce-campaign-ahead-of-chads-constitutional-referendum/">presented</a> the option of approving or rejecting the complete draft for a centralised constitution. The vote was to be Oui (yes) or Non (no).</p>
<p>In the run-up to the referendum, it became clear that nothing had changed under the rule of transitional <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/mahamat-idriss-deby-itno-named-chad-s-transitional-president/2706374">president Mahamat Idriss Déby</a>, one of the sons of late Idriss Déby. Critics of the process argue that the main aim of the referendum was in fact to legitimise the transitional authority’s policies at national and international level.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/1/former-chad-opposition-leader-appointed-as-pm-of-transitional-government#:%7E:text=Chad's%20transitional%20government%20has%20appointed,the%20presidency%2C%20said%20on%20Monday.">appointment</a> on 1 January of the former opposition leader Succès Masra as the new prime minister raised fresh concerns. Masra is a controversial opposition figure who has recently endeared himself to Chad’s president.</p>
<p>As a political scientist who has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279330599_Authoritarian_Structures_in_Chad_Perceptions_of_Power_among_the_Powerless?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InByb2ZpbGUiLCJwYWdlIjoicHJvZmlsZSJ9fQ">researched</a> Chad and its politics for the last 15 years, my view is that the referendum and the appointment of Masra only benefit <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/mahamat-idriss-deby-itno-named-chad-s-transitional-president/2706374">Déby</a> – not the Chadian people. </p>
<p>Under these circumstances, Chadians could once again go into rebellion. Chad is a country that is prone to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23018899">cycle of violent rebellion and repression</a>. In this context some observers fear the outbreak of violence. Peace and unity may continue to evade Chad.</p>
<h2>Who benefits from a centralised Chad?</h2>
<p>Chad is an ethnically, religiously and politically <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/Ethnic-groups">divided</a> country. On top of this, the question of the kind of state it should be has been a divisive issue since independence from France in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/History">August 1960</a>.</p>
<p>Under the late Déby’s reign, only politicians of the south repeatedly asked for federalism. Politicians used federalism to express their opposition to Idriss Déby’s authoritarian rule and to demand an equal share of state revenues. </p>
<p>The opposition has always argued that a unitary state has not advanced the country since independence. Furious at the way in which the referendum was being organised, the opposition, which included representatives from all parts of the country, rejected the new constitution. </p>
<p>As before, they argued that a unitary state had not advanced the country since independence. In addition, they argued that the proposed constitution did not comply with the national dialogue’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/after-a-new-constitution-whats-next-for-chad/a-67851992">propositions</a> and would perpetuate the Déby clan and the transitional authorities in power.</p>
<p>The referendum results, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/voa60-africa---chad-s-supreme-court-confirms-result-of-constitutional-referendum/7417462.html">confirmed</a> by the Supreme Court, put voter turnout at 63.7%. Out of this number, 85.90% voted Oui, 14.10% Non. </p>
<p>On 1 January Masra was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/1/former-chad-opposition-leader-appointed-as-pm-of-transitional-government#:%7E:text=Chad's%20transitional%20government%20has%20appointed,the%20presidency%2C%20said%20on%20Monday.">appointed</a> as the new prime minister by the transitional president.</p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>Masra is a controversial figure. His appointment came as a surprise and raises a host of concerns, including the fact that it sidelined the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chad-saleh-kebzabo-named-as-new-prime-minister/a-63418692">transitional prime minister, Saleh Kebzabo</a>. </p>
<p>Kebzabo had led the coalition that was formed ahead of the referendum. It was made up mainly of members of the transitional authorities and more than 200 political parties. </p>
<p>Masra, president of the <a href="https://eng.fatshimetrie.org/2023/11/07/release-of-activists-from-the-les-transformateurs-party-in-chad-an-expected-relief-in-the-face-of-political-challenges/">party Les Transformateurs</a>, joined the coalition during the last days of the campaign and toured his native south.</p>
<p>Masra invokes strong passions in Chad. He was the main organiser of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/23/chad-justice-needed-october-crackdown">demonstrations</a> in October 2022. These were organised in protest against a decision taken by the transitional government to extend the transition to democracy, and the announcement that Mahamat Déby would stand in the next elections. Hundreds of demonstrators were <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/24/deadly-chad-protests-death-toll-now-estimated-at-128//">killed</a> by security forces, and the day was named <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67505683">Black Thursday</a>.</p>
<p>Prior to the tragedy, intermediaries had pressed Masra to cancel the demonstrations. It was known to insiders that special forces would react without any mercy for protesters, even peaceful ones.</p>
<p>Masra fled the country. For the next year he toured the world, vehemently <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/africa/chad-opposition-leader-returns-from-exile-15675412">denouncing</a> Mahamat Déby and his regime at every opportunity. </p>
<p>After an agreement mediated by the DRC’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67718533">Felix Tshisekedi</a>, he <a href="https://weafrica24.com/2023/11/22/historic-meeting-between-mahamat-idriss-deby-and-opponent-succes-masra/">returned</a> to Chad in November 2023 and was received in the presidential palace in N’Djamena by Déby. </p>
<p>Since then the two men, almost the same age, have called each other brothers.</p>
<p>But relations between Kebzabo and Masra are extremely bad. This was evident in the icy atmosphere at the handover ceremony. </p>
<p>Kebzabo <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/chad-black-thursday-at-least-50-killed-in-protests-against-extension-military-transitional-period-qhf1/">labelled</a> Masra a terrorist after the Black Thursday protest and accused him of planning a coup d'état. Kebzabo was clearly unhappy having to vacate his office in favour of a man 35 years younger.</p>
<p>Masra, known for his presidential ambitions since he wanted to run against Idriss Déby in 2021, will certainly stand for office this year. He faces major handicaps, though. </p>
<p>Firstly, now seen as Déby’s close collaborator, he has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/19/chad-is-succes-masra-being-rejected-by-the-opposition/">lost</a> many of his followers and allies.</p>
<p>It’s also clear from the publication of his cabinet that he has very little room for manoeuvre. With a few exceptions, the most important ministerial posts of Kebzabo’s cabinet have been confirmed in office.</p>
<p>Masra could only appoint a few companions to state secretariat positions. </p>
<p>As a prime minister, he has to organise the elections this year. At the same time, as a potential presidential candidate he needs to satisfy the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview#:%7E:text=Poverty%20and%20vulnerability%20are%20pervasive,2021%20and%2035.4%25%20in%202023.">poverty-stricken</a> Chadian population. But the 2024 budget was approved before his appointment. </p>
<p>In his first statement he <a href="https://weafrica24.com/2024/01/18/chad-prime-minister-succes-masra-to-pres/">announced</a>, among many things, that he would address the country’s dilapidated school system. But, without any budget and little room to manoeuvre, it is doubtful whether he will be able to reconcile his ambitions with his new post.</p>
<p>It seems that Mahamat Déby is not only the winner of the referendum. He has also managed to embed his most dangerous political opponent into the transitional structures and under his authority. </p>
<p>Déby can wait calmly for the presidential elections and will most likely win the race against his prime minister and newly found brother. </p>
<p>Chadians, for their part, could well have lost the last bit of trust in politicians and democratic procedures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Transitional president Mahamat Idriss Déby appears to be the only winner of the Chadian constitutional referendum.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165552023-12-15T09:07:27Z2023-12-15T09:07:27ZThe Sahara Desert used to be a green savannah – new research explains why<p>Algeria’s <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/179/">Tassili N’Ajjer plateau</a> is Africa’s largest national park. Among its vast sandstone formations is perhaps the world’s largest art museum. Over 15,000 etchings and paintings are exhibited there, some as much as 11,000 years old according to scientific dating techniques, representing a unique ethnological and climatological record of the region. </p>
<p>Curiously, however, these images do not depict the arid, barren landscape that is present in the Tassili N'Ajjer today. Instead, they portray a vibrant savannah inhabited by elephants, giraffes, rhinos and hippos. This rock art is an important record of the past environmental conditions that prevailed in the Sahara, the world’s largest <a href="https://www.livescience.com/23140-sahara-desert.html">hot desert</a>. </p>
<p>These images depict a period approximately 6,000-11,000 years ago called the <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/green-sahara-african-humid-periods-paced-by-82884405/">Green Sahara or North African Humid Period</a>. There is widespread climatological <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332220301007#bib31">evidence</a> that during this period the Sahara supported wooded savannah ecosystems and numerous rivers and lakes in what are now Libya, Niger, Chad and Mali. </p>
<p>This greening of the Sahara didn’t happen once. Using marine and lake sediments, scientists have <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0076514">identified</a> over 230 of these greenings occurring about every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. These greening events provided vegetated corridors which influenced species’ distribution and evolution, including the out-of-Africa migrations of ancient humans.</p>
<p>These dramatic greenings would have required a large-scale reorganisation of the atmospheric system to bring rains to this hyper arid region. But most climate models haven’t been able to simulate how dramatic these events were. </p>
<p>As a team of climate modellers and anthropologists, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-41219-4">we have overcome this obstacle</a>. We developed a climate model that more accurately simulates atmospheric circulation over the Sahara and the impacts of vegetation on rainfall. </p>
<p>We identified why north Africa greened approximately every 21,000 years over the past eight million years. It was caused by changes in the Earth’s orbital <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/precession-of-the-equinoxes">precession</a> - the slight wobbling of the planet while rotating. This moves the Northern Hemisphere closer to the sun during the summer months. </p>
<p>This caused warmer summers in the Northern Hemisphere, and warmer air is able to hold more moisture. This intensified the strength of the West African Monsoon system and shifted the African rainbelt northwards. This increased Saharan rainfall, resulting in the spread of savannah and wooded grassland across the desert from the tropics to the Mediterranean, providing a vast habitat for plants and animals. </p>
<p>Our results demonstrate the sensitivity of the Sahara Desert to changes in past climate. They explain how this sensitivity affects rainfall across north Africa. This is important for understanding the implications of present-day climate change (driven by human activities). Warmer temperatures in the future may also enhance monsoon strength, with both local and global impacts. </p>
<h2>Earth’s changing orbit</h2>
<p>The fact that the wetter periods in north Africa have recurred every 21,000 years or so is a big clue about what causes them: variations in Earth’s orbit. Due to gravitational influences from the moon and other planets in our solar system, the orbit of the Earth around the sun is not constant. It has cyclic variations on multi-thousand year timescales. These orbital cycles are termed <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/211/orbital-cycles/">Milankovitch cycles</a>; they influence the amount of energy the Earth receives from the sun. </p>
<p>On 100,000-year cycles, the shape of Earth’s orbit (or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/eccentricity-astronomy">eccentricity</a>) shifts between circular and oval, and on 41,000 year cycles the tilt of Earth’s axis varies (termed <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/obliquity">obliquity</a>). Eccentricity and obliquity cycles are responsible for driving the ice ages of the past 2.4 million years. </p>
<p>The third Milankovitch cycle is <a href="https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/251/axial-precession-wobble/">precession</a>. This concerns Earth’s wobble on its axis, which varies on a 21,000 year timescale. The similarity between the precession cycle and the timing of the humid periods indicates that precession is their dominant driver. Precession influences seasonal contrasts, increasing them in one hemisphere and reducing them in another. During warmer Northern Hemisphere summers, a consequent increase in north African summer rainfall would have initiated a humid phase, resulting in the spread of vegetation across the region.</p>
<h2>Eccentricity and the ice sheets</h2>
<p>In our study we also identified that the humid periods did not occur during the ice ages, when large glacial ice sheets covered much of the polar regions. This is because these vast ice sheets cooled the atmosphere. The cooling countered the influence of precession and suppressed the expansion of the African monsoon system. </p>
<p>The ice ages are driven by the eccentricity cycle, which determines how circular Earth’s orbit is around the sun. So our findings show that eccentricity indirectly influences the magnitude of the humid periods via its influence on the ice sheets. This highlights, for the first time, a major connection between these distant high latitude and tropical regions.</p>
<p>The Sahara acts as a gate. It controls the dispersal of species between north and sub-Saharan Africa, and in and out of the continent. The gate was open when the Sahara was green and closed when deserts prevailed. Our results reveal the sensitivity of this gate to Earth’s orbit around the sun. They also show that high latitude ice sheets may have restricted the dispersal of species during the glacial periods of the last 800,000 years. </p>
<p>Our ability to model the African humid periods helps us understand the alternation of humid and arid phases. This had major consequences for the dispersal and evolution of species, including humans, within and out of Africa. Furthermore, it provides a tool for understanding future greening in response to climate change and its environmental impact. </p>
<p>Refined models may, in the future, be able to identify how climate warming will influence rainfall and vegetation in the Sahara region, and the wider implications for society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216555/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Sahara Desert is green and vegetated every 21,000 years. A climate model shows why.Edward Armstrong, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of HelsinkiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2173052023-11-16T14:46:31Z2023-11-16T14:46:31ZThere are too few toilets in Africa and it’s a public health hazard – how to fix the problem<p>Imagine you are miles from the nearest restroom, and nature’s call is urgent – a situation that might raise a mild panic during a hike or at a music festival. Now, picture that same scenario, not as a one-off inconvenience, but as a daily reality. This is the case for about <a href="https://tropmedhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s41182-022-00416-5">half a billion</a> people globally. </p>
<p>In African countries, the issue of open defecation often goes unaddressed by society and policymakers despite its negative impact on health, economic development, dignity and the environment. </p>
<p>Led from Queen’s University Belfast, a team of multidisciplinary researchers aimed to evaluate how prevalent the practice is in African countries and which social factors are driving it. We also aimed to establish which communities were in most urgent need of interventions. </p>
<p>We used demographic and health surveys, alongside World Bank data. In a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-023-03992-6">recent paper</a> we set out our findings. </p>
<p>Our main ones were that in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso and Chad, a large number of people engaged in open defecation. </p>
<p>We found that as few as ten countries could account for 247 million Africans defecating in the open by 2030 if critical and emergency actions are not taken.</p>
<p>The biggest driver is lack of access to proper sanitation facilities. The poorest individuals, particularly in rural areas, are more likely to resort to open defecation than people in urban areas. In regions with the most critical need, the poorest are 43 times more likely than the wealthy to resort to open toileting. </p>
<p>We recommend tackling poverty, and intervening in regions and communities that urgently need improved sanitation infrastructure and programmes. West Africa needs special attention since many of its communities are in the critical category.</p>
<h2>A systematic approach</h2>
<p>Sanitation has far-reaching implications for food safety. Contaminated water sources and unsanitary conditions can spread waterborne diseases, which can contaminate food and put millions at risk. Addressing open defecation is a step in ensuring the safety and hygiene of the food chain.</p>
<p>The link between poor sanitation and health is well <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/sanitation">documented</a>. But our study casts this relationship in a new, alarming light: the likely role of open defecation in antimicrobial resistance. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/antimicrobial-resistance">Antimicrobial resistance</a> is the ability of microbes, such as bacteria, viruses and fungi, to resist the effects of medications that were once used effectively against them. It is a looming crisis, threatening to make antibiotics ineffective. Common infections could once again become deadly. </p>
<p>Our research suggests a probable link between open defecation and antimicrobial resistance. When people defecate outdoors, resistant bacteria from human waste can contaminate water and food. This <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taad069">often leads</a> to faecal-oral diseases and urinary tract infections.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gutter-to-gut-how-antimicrobial-resistant-microbes-journey-from-environment-to-humans-189446">Gutter to gut: How antimicrobial-resistant microbes journey from environment to humans</a>
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<p>However, there is a need for more research to clarify the relationship, its implications and prevention. A clear recommendation from our research is that data about antimicrobial resistance should be integrated into health surveys.</p>
<p>While the full breadth of the study’s findings is huge, its conclusions are clear: open defecation is a challenge in Africa that requires actions. Our research doesn’t just ring the alarm bell; it provides a blueprint for change, identifying specific regions where the practice is most prevalent and where interventions could have the greatest impact.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Addressing open defecation across a continent as vast and diverse as Africa is no small feat. We made a number of recommendations in the study.</p>
<p><strong>A pragmatic three-tier priority system</strong> </p>
<p>This will categorise regions based on the urgency of need for intervention: critical, high, and medium. Regions marked as critical are those with the highest prevalence of open defecation (more than 80% of the population) and the least access to sanitation facilities. These areas need immediate attention with the deployment of resources and sanitation infrastructure. The high priority regions have some access to sanitation. Here, the strategy is a combination of infrastructure development and community education. For medium priority areas (40%-59%), where some sanitation infrastructure may exist, the focus should be on sustainable practices, behavioural change and maintenance of existing facilities.</p>
<p>The system above is just to cut the high rates and inequalities among communities in a country. There is also a lot to do in communities with an open defecation rate of less than 40%. The goal is to reinforce positive behaviour and ensure facilities are maintained and improved. </p>
<p>Policy support, such as incentives for building private toilets or community sanitation blocks, may also help. This tiered strategy hinges on continuous assessment and reallocation of resources. Interventions should respond to the changing landscape as regions improve or decline. </p>
<p><strong>Support sanitation projects and policies</strong></p>
<p>Advocacy is important to increase awareness and donations to organisations that build toilets and provide sanitation programmes in affected areas. </p>
<p><strong>Educate and spread awareness</strong></p>
<p>Learning about the cultural and socio-economic factors that contribute to this practice must be encouraged and the knowledge shared with others. Campaigns that focus on the importance of sanitation for health and the environment are key.</p>
<p><strong>Encourage sustainable sanitation practices</strong></p>
<p>This includes using toilets properly, not littering, and understanding local challenges. The use of compostable toilets and other sustainable waste management practices where traditional toilets are not feasible must be encouraged.</p>
<p><strong>Foster global partnerships for sanitation</strong></p>
<p>Global partnerships can amplify efforts to end open defecation. Collaborations between governments, NGOs, private sector stakeholders and international organisations must be encouraged. Pooling resources and sharing knowledge can lead to more effective and sustainable solutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The struggle with open defecation is a silent emergency, undermining the continent’s efforts towards sustainable development goals.Omololu Fagunwa, Research Fellow, Queen's University BelfastHelen Onyeaka, Associate Professor, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164832023-10-27T14:09:00Z2023-10-27T14:09:00ZChad’s first dengue fever outbreak: what you should know<p><em>Chad has <a href="https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/dengue/chad-reports-its-first-dengue-outbreak">reported</a> its first dengue outbreak, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The country’s health ministry declared an outbreak on 15 August and so far 1,342 suspected cases have been reported, 41 of them confirmed in the laboratory. One death was reported among the patients with lab-confirmed cases. The outbreak started in Ouaddaï province in eastern Chad, currently the outbreak epicentre. Illnesses have also been reported in three other provinces. Godfred Akoto Boafo spoke to medical entomologist Eunice Anyango Owino about the disease.</em></p>
<h2>What causes dengue fever and how does it affect people?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/dengue-and-severe-dengue">Dengue fever</a> is a mosquito-borne viral disease caused by one of the four dengue virus serotypes. It is primarily transmitted by the <em>Aedes aegypti</em> mosquito and to a lesser extent the <em>Aedes albopictus</em> mosquito, mainly in the tropical and sub-tropical areas of the world. </p>
<p>Infection with one serotype provides long-term immunity to that particular serotype, but not the others. That means that, after recovery, a person can still be infected by the other three serotypes. Serotypes are groups within a single species of microorganisms, such as bacteria or viruses, which share distinctive surface structures.</p>
<p>Most infections produce only mild flu-like illness; 80% of cases are asymptomatic. But getting infected with different serotypes one after the other puts a person at a greater risk of severe dengue, also known as dengue hemorrhagic fever. It is characterised by serious internal bleeding and organ damage, and a sudden drop in blood pressure that causes shock which can be fatal. </p>
<h2>How widespread is it in the Sahel? Why is this first outbreak in Chad significant?</h2>
<p>Dengue fever has been <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37473544/">endemic in Sudan</a>, with outbreaks documented in 2010, 2013, 2017 and 2019. Unfortunately, due to years of political and civil conflicts, the control and response capacity of the public health sector in Sudan has been limited. </p>
<p>The risk of spread in the Sahel region, which includes Niger, Mali and Chad, has always been high. This is because these countries all host the suitable mosquito vectors (<em>Aedes</em>). They also share the same tropical climate with seasonal heavy rains and floods. </p>
<p>To add to the problem, countries like Chad are grappling with a massive influx of refugees and returnees from Sudan who might be carrying the disease. The epicentre of the current outbreak, the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/chad/chad-humanitarian-update-june-2023#:%7E:text=Following%20the%20escalation%20of%20conflict%20in%20El%20Geneina,Sudanese%20border%20in%20the%20Ouadda%C3%AF%20province%20of%20Chad">province of Ouaddaï</a> at the eastern border with Sudan, hosts more than 400,000 refugees. </p>
<p>The cities at the border with Sudan are densely populated and have poor sanitation. This provides a favourable environment for the vectors to breed. </p>
<p>In addition, Chad lacks effective disease control programmes. This is its first dengue outbreak. It doesn’t have the necessary public health preparedness and response capacities. So the risk posed by this outbreak is high. </p>
<p>The movement of the <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2019-DON207">returning refugees</a> has the potential to spread the outbreak in Chad and even across the border to other countries in the Sahel, the rest of Africa, and the world at large. </p>
<h2>What treatment is available?</h2>
<p>There’s currently no available treatment for dengue in the world. Timely detection and case management, especially treatment of dehydration and plasma leakage by oral or intravenous rehydration, are key in preventing severe illness and death. </p>
<p>There is an approved dengue vaccine (Dengvaxia) for use in people aged 9-45 years. But for it to be effective they must have had one infection of dengue by any of the four serotype viruses, which must be confirmed by a laboratory test. </p>
<p>The vaccine is given in three doses within 12 months and protects against all the four dengue virus serotypes with an efficacy of 80%. However, its availability in developing countries in Africa isn’t assured, although it has been licensed by several national regulatory authorities. </p>
<p>Apart from the vaccine, the only other guard against dengue fever is prevention of mosquito bites and vector control.</p>
<h2>What is the way forward in controlling the disease?</h2>
<p>More investment should be put on expanding clinical and laboratory capabilities to deal with the disease. Given that this is Chad’s first outbreak, it needs to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>put in place standard operating procedures for clinical management of suspected and confirmed dengue cases </p></li>
<li><p>expand the capacity for early detection of cases – this could be done by procurement of rapid diagnostic tests and by alerting communities </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen disease surveillance and coordinate the response by actively finding cases. Cases within the community are likely to be underreported as dengue is unknown to the public. Also, clinicians might not be familiar with the disease presentation. It could be confused with other common fevers. </p></li>
<li><p>put in place effective vector control measures, like draining stagnant water around residential areas, cleaning and replenishing water storage containers on a weekly basis, distributing insecticide-treated nets, spraying indoors and using window and door screens.</p></li>
<li><p>strengthen surveillance to assess the vector breeding potential in containers and to monitor insecticide resistance. This is critical for selecting the most effective insecticides. </p></li>
<li><p>make communities aware of the risks of infection and how to protect themselves. Engaged communities can take ownership of the vector control strategy and adopt healthy behaviours. </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen cross-border collaboration. The current outbreak most likely spread from Sudan. The focus should be on prevention and vector control measures in border areas.</p></li>
<li><p>mobilise resources for a national contingency plan for dengue preparedness and response. And seek help from experienced organisations like the WHO.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eunice Anyango Owino receives funding from National Research Fund, Kenya. </span></em></p>The Sahel region is grappling with an outbreak of the deadly mosquito-borne disease.Eunice Anyango Owino, Medical Entomologist at the School of Biological Sciences, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120222023-09-05T15:07:08Z2023-09-05T15:07:08ZFrance in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger<p>French west Africa has experienced <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">five coups</a> in the past three years. Underpinning most of these coups is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66406137">hostility</a> towards France, a former colonial authority. Mohamed Bazoum of Niger’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-underlies-the-coup-in-niger/">downfall</a> in July 2023 comes after coups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/7/mali-military-promises-return-to-civilian-rule-in-march-2024">Mali</a> in August 2020, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/chad-deby-coup-leader-democracy/">Chad</a> in April 2021, <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-burkina-faso-latest-coup/">Burkina Faso</a> in September 2022 and Gabon in September 2023.</p>
<p>The perpetrators of these coups have, among their <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/coups-in-west-africa-is-france-to-blame/">justifications</a>, mentioned the overbearing influence of France and its president, <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-in-africa-a-cynical-twist-to-repair-the-colonial-past-while-keeping-a-tight-grip-189175">Emmanuel Macron</a>, in their affairs. The influence of France in military affairs and maintenance of dominance in business has been a key cog of the Macron agenda. Unlike other former colonial powers, France still has military <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/06/06/france-will-further-cut-back-military-presence-in-africa_6029304_7.html">bases</a> in Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon. </p>
<p>At the same time, Macron has put forward <a href="https://www.nation.sc/archive/259549/macron-embraces-african-entrepreneurship">entrepreneurship</a> as the best form of development assistance. This strategic pivot away from personal relationships with African leaders is rooted in Macron’s <a href="https://jacobin.com/2021/03/emmanuel-macron-neoliberalism">neoliberal beliefs</a>. This is a political approach that favours free-market capitalism, deregulation and a reduction in government spending. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.uu.nl/staff/fplgerits">historian</a> who has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576170">researched</a> the relationship between France and its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Africa, Macron’s neoliberal turn has stripped France of the long-standing myth that it was somehow a more benevolent coloniser because of the cultural links it established with African elites. Macron’s approach has only increased distrust and anger because a large military presence has not been replaced by a <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/new-financial-order-will-help-the-world-overcome-poverty-and-climate-change/#:%7E:text=President%20William%20Ruto%20has%20said,the%20hands%20of%20the%20few.%E2%80%9D">new international economic order</a>, but with <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-africa-reset-strategy-francafrique/">small-scale business deals and start-ups</a>. This is not what Africans <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43?ln=en">wanted</a>, but it is what they got.</p>
<h2>Neoliberal values are French values</h2>
<p>Rather than a remaking of the economic and financial infrastructure, Macron has pushed entrepreneurship as development assistance: promoting start-ups and training Africa’s youth. <a href="https://www.afd.fr/fr">Agence Française de Dévelopment</a> (France’s main institution for policy implementation) is still investing in education, agriculture and infrastructure. But what Macron wants observers to notice is that increasingly, French development aid in Africa has to be run by French businesses. </p>
<p>French corporations are no longer making money in secret, as in the era of <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/macron-and-the-future-of-francafrique-6781/">Françafrique</a>. This was a period when French presidents supported African dictators to maintain influence. Rather, Macron’s speeches put forward business activities and neoliberal values as French values that benefit the continent. </p>
<p>This reliance on French culture and values can be seen as a continuation of a strategy that started with the French colonial project. Macron’s values, however, are the values of neoliberalism. At home he has pushed through a pension plan to limit French state debt. Abroad, he wants French development policy to be driven by private initiatives. </p>
<p>In light of that strategy, it becomes clear that sentiments among Africans have not become more anti-French. Rather, by elevating economics to a core value of his relationship to Africa, Macron has played into a widely accepted African worldview in which underdevelopment is the product of dependency on Europe and neocolonial exploitation.</p>
<p>Every visitor who talks to cab drivers or vendors in Dakar figures out quite quickly that the French are seen as colonisers first, possible friends second. What has changed is that Macron has unknowingly confirmed African suspicions about his intentions: he never wanted to change economic structures. Instead Africans get bread crumbs in the form of start-up money. </p>
<h2>The free market as the dividing line in west Africa</h2>
<p>Entrepreneurship is not universally loved on the continent. The belief in the free market as an engine for development has redrawn the battle lines in west Africa. Countries within the regional body Ecowas like Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal – which have had high economic growth in the past decade – are clashing with Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – which have experienced deepening poverty. </p>
<p>While other African countries like Kenya are confronted with similar debates about how to stimulate development – Kenyan president William Ruto famously believes in the “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220913-william-ruto-kenya-s-hustler-in-chief-president">hustler nation</a>” – climate change and terrorism have led to a more combustible mix in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The juntas that have come to power therefore do not only present themselves as caretakers who are trying to do the job politicians will not do. They are also claiming they want a new ideological direction for their countries. <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso</a> has styled himself to be the successor to Thomas Sankara, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66282417">Assimi Goïta</a> has cast himself as a reformer not a revolutionary. </p>
<p>In the past, the fires of African instability and anti-French sentiment were fanned by the French underdelivering on their – sometimes cynical – promises of big structural change. Today, instability is being fed by the opposite. It is African leaders who demand big structural change, but are met with small business efforts to maintain French influence on the cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Gerits does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The French president has struggled to maintain the influence his country gained in Africa through colonialism.Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122022023-08-28T14:43:16Z2023-08-28T14:43:16ZNiger’s coup weakens regional fight against Boko Haram: four reasons why<p>Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/armed-troops-blockade-presidential-palace-in-niger-mohamed-bazoum">detained and deposed</a> on 26 July by his military guard under the command of General Abdourahamane Tchiani. </p>
<p>The unconstitutional change of government has been widely <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-president-says-democracy-will-be-saved-following-coup-2023-07-27/">condemned</a> internationally. Ecowas, the regional group, also issued sanctions and <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/11/coup-review-your-military-threat-sanctions-against-niger-%E2%80%90-fulani-group-tells-ecowas/">threatened</a> military intervention. </p>
<p>However, other military juntas in the region have been <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">sympathetic</a> to the cause of the coup leaders. </p>
<p>The Niger coup has changed the security priority of key actors in the Lake Chad region, from fighting Boko Haram to addressing the political crisis.</p>
<p>Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and spread across the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The group has directly or indirectly killed more than <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/09/23/boko-haram-war-over-300000-children-killed-in-northeast-unicef/">300,000 children</a> and displaced <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-five-million-displaced-in-lake-chad-buhari/">five million</a> people in the region.</p>
<p>At its peak in early 2015, the insurgents <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003211525-1/boko-haram-lake-chad-basin-temitope-oriola-freedom-onuoha-samuel-oyewole">controlled</a> about 20,000 square miles (over 50,000km²) of Nigerian territory. </p>
<p>Early in the fight against Boko Haram, especially between 2010 and 2013, neighbouring states in the Lake Chad region displayed inadequate interest in cooperating with Nigeria. </p>
<p>Regional discord allowed the terrorists to attack targets in Nigeria and escape to neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>From around 2013, the region showed growing interest in the fight against Boko Haram, as terrorist attacks spread beyond Nigeria. The 2014 Paris and London <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">conferences</a> further encouraged common frontline and international support against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.</p>
<p>Cameroon opened the second front against Boko Haram, deploying over <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">3,000 troops</a> to its northern region in July 2014. Around the same time, Niger Republic <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015.1047227">granted</a> the Nigerian military the right to pursue terrorists across the border. </p>
<p>Niger later declared a state of emergency and deployed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">3,000 troops</a> to the Differ region, threatened by Boko Haram, in February 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">Chad</a> deployed 4,500 troops against the insurgents in early 2015. At the same time, Nigeria and Cameroon <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1188533">raised</a> their forces to 25,000 and 7,000 respectively. </p>
<p>In July 2015, the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/about/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> became operational against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. With headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, the force established sectors in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The force is made up of 10,000 troops drawn from the four frontline countries and Benin Republic.</p>
<p>To support them, France, the US, Belgium, Italy and Germany maintain varying degrees of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2021.1868798">military presence</a> in Niger. </p>
<p>This coordinated response is now threatened by the shift in focus from fighting Boko Haram to removing the coup leaders in Niger. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=vU7aPGIAAAAJ&citation_for_view=vU7aPGIAAAAJ:43bX7VzcjpAC">researched</a> Boko Haram and its operations in the Lake Chad region for the last 13 years. Based on my <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Boko-Harams-Terrorist-Campaign-in-Nigeria-Contexts-Dimensions-and-Emerging/Oriola-Onuoha-Oyewole/p/book/9781032077840">research</a> and <a href="https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html">understanding</a> of the region, I see four ways in which the events in Niger will make the regional fight against Boko Haram more difficult:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Ecowas’s attention is divided</p></li>
<li><p>Niger’s attention is diverted</p></li>
<li><p>the gaps in security may give Boko Haram the opportunity to regroup and restrategise</p></li>
<li><p>suspension of western aid to Niger could fuel poverty and drive recruitment into Boko Haram.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Niger’s coup and its benefits to Boko Haram</h2>
<p>The member states of the Lake Chad security arrangement and their western partners have condemned the Niger coup, and become hostile to the junta. </p>
<p>Ecowas, led by Nigeria, has <a href="https://ecowas.int/final-communique-fifty-first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">sanctioned</a> Niger. Ecowas suspended financial and commercial relations, closed land borders and restricted flights to and from Niger. The regional bloc also threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order in the country. </p>
<p>This means the Nigerian military has been preoccupied with possible Ecowas intervention in Niger. Data extracted from the <a href="https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/">Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project</a> as of 23 August shows that the last offensive operation against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military was on 25 July. Since then, four insurgent attacks have been recorded, where 12 civilians were killed and 15 were kidnapped in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The military priority of Niger has also shifted from fighting against Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups. Now it is regime security. Niger’s military is preoccupied with a potential Nigeria-led Ecowas military intervention. </p>
<p>The junta has thus <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/07/africa/niger-coup-deadline-intl/index.html">prioritised</a> defence of the national capital and south-western borders. This is to the detriment of south-eastern borders, where Boko Haram is a threat. </p>
<p>Boko Haram is already taking advantage of this shift. On 15 August, <a href="https://punchng.com/17-niger-soldiers-killed-in-attack-near-mali-ministry/#google_vignette">17 Niger soldiers</a> were killed in an attack by suspected jihadists near the country’s border with Mali. The attack was described as the first in over a year. </p>
<p>Many western countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/#:%7E:text=NIAMEY%2C%20July%2029%20">suspended</a> critical development and security aid to Niger. This is to the detriment of the country’s counter-insurgency capacity. </p>
<p>Niger’s military junta is mobilising anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66365376">severed</a> defence cooperation with France and is aligning with pro-Russian forces. </p>
<p>Boko Haram can exploit the Niger crisis to regroup and re-strategise. Terrorist movement from Sahel to the Lake Chad region was recently <a href="https://dailytrust.com/niger-coup-iswap-migrating-from-sahel-to-lake-chad-north-west/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20top%20ISWAP%20fighters%20and,of%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20region">reported</a>.</p>
<p>The humanitarian effects of Ecowas sanctions and suspension of western aid may also fuel terrorist recruitment and a new wave of insecurity in the region. </p>
<p>The anti-western mobilisation of the junta can advance Boko Haram’s agenda to end western influence and establish Islamic State in the Lake Chad region and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Oyewole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boko Haram may be the unintended beneficiary of the crisis created by the recent coup in Niger.Samuel Oyewole, Lecturer, Political Science, Federal University, Oye EkitiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097402023-07-17T14:08:21Z2023-07-17T14:08:21ZIt’s time for Ghana to enshrine its respect for the right to life – by abolishing the death penalty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537450/original/file-20230714-17-ymm8xc.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The death penalty has not been enforced in Ghana for over three decades</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thirty years have now gone by since Ghana used its gallows, a fact that indicates the country’s respect for human life. It also means that Ghana is one of <a href="https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/international/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries">about 42 nations</a> – many of which are in Africa – that the United Nations calls <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/migrated/field/field_document/56_hood_roger_libro_homenaje.pdf">abolitionist de facto</a> because they have not executed anyone for at least a decade. </p>
<p>However, there is a paradox. Not only does Ghana retain the death penalty as a sentence for three crimes (murder, treason and genocide), death is the mandatory punishment for them. The law gives the judges no choice in sentencing for these crimes. Last year, the courts sentenced seven people to death. At the end of 2022, there were <a href="https://ghanaprisons.gov.gh/about-us/statistics.cits">176 inmates</a> on death row, and the list grows every year. </p>
<p>It could be argued that by continuing to hand down mandatory death sentences, Ghana’s courts are unusually harsh, for, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/6548/2023/en/#page=4">according</a> to Amnesty International, only ten countries did so last year. </p>
<p>But Ghanaian policymakers and civil society are making a renewed effort to resolve the contradictions on the death penalty. These efforts have led to <a href="http://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/2385/Criminal%20Offence%20%28Amendment%29Bill%2c2022.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">two new bills</a> due to be debated by parliament. They would enable Ghana to abolish capital punishment in law, as well as in practice. </p>
<p>As academic and legal experts on capital punishment for more than 30 years, we have been assisting Ghanaian policymakers and civil society groups. The latest initiative to end the use of the death penalty is firmly rooted in human rights principles and evidence based research. </p>
<p>A broad engagement in Ghana over a sustained period with a diverse range of stakeholders has enabled members of parliament to consider key aspects of capital punishment objectively. Previous attempts to abolish the death penalty in Ghana have involved complex constitutional amendments. The current moves require only amendments to criminal statutes: a majority of MPs need to vote for abolition. </p>
<h2>A chance for change</h2>
<p>The two new bills before parliament create a golden opportunity to bring the contradictions to an end. One covers the military, the other the civilian courts. </p>
<p>This opportunity follows a recent wave of abolition across sub-Saharan Africa. In the last ten years, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Zambia have all abolished the death penalty. Despite their vastly different histories and legal contexts, through political will and leadership these countries all reached a recognition of the cruelty, inhumanity and injustice inherent in capital punishment. In doing so, they joined over 100 other countries worldwide which have now fully abolished. </p>
<p>Ghana’s <a href="https://www.parliament.gh/committees?com=15">Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs</a>, assisted by senior justice officials, has been scrutinising the new bills carefully. We also had the privilege of being able to offer the committee advice. Its reports are now in, recommending that the House should pass the bills and replace the sentence of death with life imprisonment.</p>
<p>The committee’s reports note a further contradiction in Ghana’s current stance: it has ratified international human rights treaties and conventions, including the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human Rights</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>. These, the committee says, “oblige the country to guarantee its citizens the right to life, and to live free from torture or cruelty.” </p>
<p>The reports deploy further, persuasive arguments. </p>
<p>One is that no criminal process can ever achieve certainty or perfection, so that retaining the death penalty will always carry the risk that an innocent person could be executed. </p>
<p>Another examines the claim that capital punishment is a deterrent to offending. The committee says there is no empirical evidence for this. In the United States, the murder rate is <a href="https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/states-with-no-death-penalty-share-lower-homicide-rates">consistently higher</a> in states that use capital punishment than in those that don’t. The seven <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">least violent</a> countries in the world have all abolished it. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-has-kenya-not-abolished-the-death-penalty-habit-and-inertia-189955">Why has Kenya not abolished the death penalty? Habit and inertia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It is now up to parliament. Abolishing the death penalty in law would place Ghana squarely within a worldwide trend, which is especially noticeable in Africa at the moment. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ACT5011622019ENGLISH.pdf#page=9">Movements</a> to do the same are gathering pace in other jurisdictions on the continent. </p>
<h2>A willing public</h2>
<p>The latest effort at abolishing the death penalty is not the first. In 2012, Ghana came close to abolishing the death penalty altogether, following a <a href="https://rodra.co.za/images/countries/ghana/research/WHITE%20PAPER%20%20ON%20THE%20REPORT%20OF%20THE%20CONSTITUTION%20REVIEW%20COMMISSION%20PRESENTED%20TO%20THE%20PRESIDENT%20.pdf#page=42">recommendation</a> by the Constitution Review Commission that was accepted by the then-government. Unfortunately, the path it tried to adopt, amending the constitution, is complex and challenging and in the end it failed.</p>
<p>Although its courts are still sentencing people to death, Ghana supported a UN General Assembly <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/764/50/PDF/N2276450.pdf?OpenElement">resolution</a> last December calling for an indefinite, worldwide moratorium on the death penalty “with a view to abolition”. Similar resolutions have been carried repeatedly with steadily increasing majorities since 2007. In 2022, almost two-thirds of the world’s nations voted in favour. For the first time, Ghana was among them, having abstained previously.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, although politicians sometimes <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/death-penalty-appeals-more-to-victims-families-than-life-imprisonment-cletus-avoka.html#:%7E:text=In%20a%20radio%20interview%20monitored,family%20than%20the%20life%20imprisonment.%22">express</a> the fear that abolishing the death penalty would be unpopular, there is good evidence that in Ghana the opposite is true. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/702009/1/Public-Opinion-on-the-Death-Penalty-in-Ghana-Final.pdf">study</a> published in 2015, there are clear majorities against the death penalty for all three of the crimes to which it is applicable. Just 8.6% of those surveyed said they were “strongly in favour” of it. In all, 71% were against. Based on interviews with more than 2,000 people who reflected Ghana’s socio-economic and ethnic composition, this survey was described by the late Professor Roger Hood of the University of Oxford in his <a href="https://arro.anglia.ac.uk/id/eprint/702009/1/Public-Opinion-on-the-Death-Penalty-in-Ghana-Final.pdf">foreword</a> to the report as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the first methodologically sound study of public opinion on the death penalty in an African state.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some might argue that since Ghana is an abolitionist de facto nation, there is no pressing need for legal abolition. In practice, what difference would it make? To this argument, we would say: look at Myanmar, which having been abolitionist de facto since the 1980s, resumed executions last year. No state can ever be entirely immune from the political upheaval that caused this shift. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyan-prisoners-on-death-row-werent-deterred-by-the-threat-of-the-death-penalty-new-research-findings-197701">Kenyan prisoners on death row weren’t deterred by the threat of the death penalty: new research findings</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Back in 1992, Ghana’s <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/political-developmental-constitution-report-constitutional-review-commission-ghana-2011">Constitutional Review Commission</a> observed that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the sanctity of life is a value so much engrained in the Ghanaian social psyche that it cannot be gambled away with judicial uncertainties. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The best way to protect that value now is for parliament to accept the committee’s reports, and vote for abolition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana is a signatory to several international conventions that oblige it to guarantee the right to life.Saul Lehrfreund, Visiting Professor, School of Law, University of ReadingCarolyn Hoyle, Director of the University of Oxford Death Penalty Research Unit, Centre for Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2078682023-06-29T13:59:31Z2023-06-29T13:59:31ZElections can lead to conflict if they are not free and fair – what role observers play to make sure they are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534294/original/file-20230627-21-vo6y4p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">European Union election observers in Zimbabwe during the 2018 general elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MarcoLongari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>At least two dozen presidential, national, regional and local elections are held across the African continent <a href="https://www.eisa.org/election-calendar/">each year</a>. The sometimes <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65775996">fierce electoral competition</a>, a <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:556709/fulltext01.pdf">history of violence</a> or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">vote rigging</a> make it especially important to know that elections are free, fair and credible. This is where election observers come in. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, spoke to Kealeboga J. Maphunye, a political scientist and <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/people/kealeboga-j-maphunye/">elections expert</a>, about the often difficult, and sometimes even dangerous, work of observers.</em></p>
<h2>What do election observers do?</h2>
<p>There are two kinds of observers: domestic and international. Both may be politically and economically aligned or impartial. Aligned observers usually support their governments, organisations or funding agencies’ policies. All may be from civil society organisations or bodies like the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> (AU), <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> (UN), <a href="https://www.sadc.int/">Southern African Development Community</a>, <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a> and <a href="https://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a>. </p>
<p>Observers cannot criticise a country’s election practices, electoral body or machinery – except discreetly. They may not stop any electoral process to “rectify” what they see as “discrepancies”. They must document these in their final report. </p>
<p>The terms election “observers” and “monitors” are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/723342">used interchangeably</a>. This often blurs their differences. </p>
<p>“Monitors” normally play an interventionist, robust role such as questioning election outcomes publicly. Unlike traditional observers, they may also lobby or agitate to amend or overturn election results. They may also criticise some electoral practices. </p>
<p>Very few African countries allow “monitors” to oversee their elections. They see them as promoting hostile advocacy against their governments and <a href="https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/report-on-the-election-in-zimbabwe-by-the-wcc/aacc-observer-mission">national interests</a>.</p>
<h2>What do they do? Why do we need them?</h2>
<p>Most election observers assess a country’s pre-election readiness and adherence to its electoral and other laws. They also assess a country’s ability to hold free, fair and internationally accepted elections. They <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/election-observation-in-africa-put-to-the-test">comment on the outcome</a>.</p>
<p>Both international and domestic observers serve as a verification mechanism. They provide an extra layer of accountability to the voters and international community on the conduct and outcome of the election. Their presence may help <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=1944">alleviate disputes</a>.</p>
<h2>How much influence do they have?</h2>
<p>Their presence and reports assure regional and international bodies like the AU, UN, <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/">Commonwealth</a> and governments of the legitimacy of electoral processes and outcomes. Their reports may be referred to where disputes or post-election violence arise. </p>
<p>Winners often cite the reports as proof of their electoral victory. Losers, on the other hand, might use them to support their allegations of election malpractices or rigging. These may lead to the questioning or <a href="https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/case-continued-election-observation-africa">annulment of election results</a>.</p>
<p>Different observer missions may contradict each other. When this happens, their pronouncements that elections were “free and fair” are less useful. They can be <a href="https://sites.duke.edu/kelley/files/2012/03/JOD.pdf">challenged</a>.</p>
<h2>What standards are they held to; are there codes to observe?</h2>
<p>Observers rely on international and regional standards and national legislation to do their work. For example, the <a href="https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SADC_-Principles-and-Guidelines-Governing-Democratic-Elections.pdf">Southern African Development Community has a set of election principles</a>.</p>
<p>Yet some countries <a href="https://www.arabianjbmr.com/pdfs/RD_VOL_1_6/2.pdf">flout or overlook the standards</a>. This allows unscrupulous incumbents to win unfairly. Endorsing such <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/8/6/how-did-mnangagwa-win-zimbabwes-landmark-july-30-election">illegitimate election outcomes</a> can compromise the integrity of observers and the elections.</p>
<h2>What makes them successful?</h2>
<p>Their success lies in their visibility at polling stations. Also key is their power of persuasion when dealing with contesting political parties, and election management bodies. Their mere presence in a country during an election can assure voters that <a href="https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/publication/Chapter7.htm">someone impartial is watching the process</a>. </p>
<p>This may minimise violence or electoral malpractices. Their reports may also help exert diplomatic pressure or influence on election management bodies, governments and other stakeholders.</p>
<p>Observers rely on innovative tools like taking representative samples of polling stations, and biometric and global positioning system (GPS) technologies. These may convince stakeholders that their <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/introducing-biometric-technology-in-elections-reissue.pdf">coverage</a> of a country’s election was geographically balanced and evidence based.</p>
<h2>Which are the common obstacles?</h2>
<p>Observers can face rough terrain, election-related violence, misinformation, uncooperative governments and unwarranted or illegal internet shutdown. They sometimes face hostile or pessimistic opposition parties. In some countries, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/kenyas-controversial-election-commission-quits-20161006-61">biased election management bodies</a> may undermine observers’ work. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0021909621999402">COVID pandemic</a> showed how viruses and diseases may undermine elections. In volatile countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mozambique, Mali and Nigeria, observers also face rebel attacks, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/09/mozambique-police-linked-killing-election-observer">abductions and killings</a>.</p>
<p>The cost of organising and deploying observers, including providing for their daily needs and welfare, continually poses challenges for observer missions. </p>
<h2>Which are the worst countries in Africa for election observation?</h2>
<p>There are no “best” or “worst” countries for observing elections anywhere in the world. But, in Africa, observers regularly risk dangers arising from political instability, insecurity, violence and other crises in countries like Somalia, Chad, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria, South Sudan and Mali.</p>
<p>Such countries can’t guarantee observer safety and security, nor ensure an environment conducive to free, fair and credible elections. Election related violence in countries like <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/un-human-rights-team-issues-report-post-election-violence-kenya">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence">Uganda</a>, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/05/dr-congo-voter-suppression-violence">DRC</a>, and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/02/cote-divoire-post-election-violence-repression">Côte d’Ivoire</a> undermines election observation. </p>
<p>So does insecurity and terrorism (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230530-at-least-40-killed-in-weekend-terrorist-attacks-in-western-burkina-faso">Burkina Faso</a>) as well as war (<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-sudan-puts-south-sudan-in-danger-too-the-worlds-youngest-nation-needs-a-stable-neighbour-206517">Sudan</a>). In Zimbabwe, Congo Republic and Ethiopia, pre-election instability, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343315626240?casa_token=2ZtAFmaw-IAAAAAA:BvbgxCwjAegHYPxRnpz9V-I489Hc1WTL05T4pWC7yrueR_TD4cBit5d2my8KcsTpyQgg1nCfrvf8LA">post-election violence and other malpractices</a> have affected the quality of election observation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye recently received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>Observers regularly face dangers owing to political instability, insecurity, violence and other crises in some countries.Kealeboga J Maphunye, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2073542023-06-14T13:34:39Z2023-06-14T13:34:39ZNigeria’s response to the Sudan crisis is lacking – it could play a leading role in bringing peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531660/original/file-20230613-29-m9x1lj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People fleeing war-torn Sudan on 13 May 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Khaled Desouki/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hostilities between rival military parties in Sudan had claimed more than <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/death-toll-from-sudan-war-rises-to-more-than-600/7086508.html">600 lives</a> by May 2023. </p>
<p>The infighting has mostly been between the Sudanese Armed Forces loyal to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s current military ruler, and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, a paramilitary force led by his deputy <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, “Hemedti”</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan and Nigeria have regional and geographical connections, especially through Chad, which is a neighbour to both. </p>
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<p>As I have <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/01/sudan-war-chad-sahel-small-arms-car-iswap/">previously noted</a>, the fallout of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region, of which Nigeria is a core member, directly affects the country’s peace and security. </p>
<p>Nigeria is duty bound to respond to the unfolding situation, considering the 5,500 Nigerian nationals and the over <a href="https://dailytrust.com/we-have-over-5-million-sudanese-of-nigerian-origin-in-our-country/">5 million</a> Sudanese of Nigerian origin in Sudan. </p>
<p>Aside from helping the Nigerians trapped in Sudan, Nigeria needs to offer relief and assistance because a spiralling Sudan will have an impact on Nigeria’s own peace.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/author/folahanmi-aina/#:%7E:text=Folahanmi%20Aina%20is%20an%20associate,Basin%2C%20and%20the%20Sahel%20region">international security expert</a> with a regional focus on west Africa, I argue that without Nigeria’s input, the prospects of lasting peace in Sudan remain elusive, as no other country in Africa has what it takes to fill this role. </p>
<p>Sudan could experience a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65409730">prolonged conflict</a> that the sub-region cannot afford to manage. The situation in Sudan offers Nigeria an opportunity to reassert a leadership role. Nigeria also has the legitimacy and recognition to take the lead on providing an African solution to an African problem. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s regional role</h2>
<p>Nigeria dominates the west African sub-region. It has the largest population in Africa at over <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG">213 million people</a>, and the largest economy by gross domestic product at <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG">US$440.8 billion</a> as of 2021. </p>
<p>With an estimated total military personnel of <a href="https://punchng.com/nigeria-maintains-35th-position-in-global-military-ranking/">215,000, of which 135,000 are active</a>, Nigeria has the most formidable military force in west Africa. </p>
<p>A recurring argument is that given Nigeria’s current economic woes, which include a <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/578847-nigerias-public-debt-rose-to-n44-06trn-in-q3-2022.html">rising debt profile</a>, it may not be able to take the leadership role. If it doesn’t, who will, and what would the implications be? </p>
<h2>A history of interventions</h2>
<p>Nigeria has a record of intervening to achieve stability in west Africa. It did this during <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/nigeria-spent-13bn-on-liberation-of-sierra-leone-liberia-says-envoy">the first (1989-1996) and second (1999-2003) Liberian civil wars, and Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002)</a>. In both cases, Nigeria played a leading role in restoring peace and security. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s decision at the time reflected a willingness to avert a regional humanitarian crisis and the potential spillover effects of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>Nigeria has also helped to sustain democratic rule in west Africa. A case in point was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ecowas-ivorycoast-20110323-idAFJOE72M0NU20110323">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, where after a disputed election, Laurent Gbagbo refused to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara. </p>
<p>In 2016, following Yahyah Jammeh’s refusal to relinquish political power in The Gambia, Nigeria <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/foreign/west-africa-foreign/255739-gambias-president-reveals-buharis-statement-helped-sack-jammeh.html?tztc=1">mobilised</a> regional support. This regional intervention <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-politics-idUSKBN15305Q">led to the emergence of Adama Barrow</a> as president. Nigeria also contributed to the 4,000 troops who remained in The Gambia. </p>
<p>In July 2022, Nigeria <a href="https://punchng.com/fg-wades-in-mali-cote-divoire-row-over-detained-soldiers/">waded</a> in on the crisis between Mali and Cote d’Ivoire over detained soldiers.</p>
<h2>Sudan’s impact on Nigeria</h2>
<p>The situation in Sudan has already led to a worsening humanitarian crisis in the region. The UN refugee agency recently noted that <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/number-of-refugees-who-fled-sudan-for-chad-double-in-week-/7095241.html">55,000</a> people have fled from Sudan to Chad. </p>
<p>With a 1,300km border between Sudan and Chad, the unfolding situation could lead to an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/01/sudan-war-chad-sahel-small-arms-car-iswap/">influx</a> of small and light arms and displaced people, which could worsen the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions. </p>
<p>For Nigeria, this would mean increased pressure on infrastructural facilities arising from the arrival of refugees. </p>
<p>There is also the possibility of an upswing in violence if foreign terrorist fighters from across the Sahel region seek new recruits and safe havens. </p>
<p>For Nigeria, this would be one trouble too many. The country’s security forces have been stretched responding to multiple security threats at home. </p>
<h2>What Nigeria should do</h2>
<p><strong>Mediation:</strong> the United States is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/307029/sudan-whats-wrong-with-the-us-saudi-mediated-talks-in-jeddah/">attempting</a> to play the role of a mediator but the chances of it brokering a peace deal are slim. </p>
<p>Citizens in west African states like Mali and Burkina Faso see the west, including France, as part of the problem rather than the solution. </p>
<p>A state-led mediation effort from an African regional power like Nigeria offers a better chance at acceptability and recognition. It avoids the suspicion that comes with the involvement of western powers. </p>
<p>Nigeria should send a special envoy to Sudan and rally continental efforts through the African Union. </p>
<p><strong>Effective manning of entry points:</strong> Nigeria needs to guard potential illegal entry points and use aerial surveillance.</p>
<p>Nigeria’s Immigration Service and its National Identity Management Centre must also be ready for rapid documentation of foreign nationals finding their way into the country. </p>
<p><strong>Refugee management:</strong> emergency refugee camps will be needed to accommodate refugees from the war in Sudan.</p>
<p><strong>Provision of relief materials:</strong> the Nigerian Air Force should be willing to airlift medical and relief materials into Sudan. Nigeria’s vast experience in this regard would make a difference on the ground. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>As a regional leader, Nigeria must not sit by at a time of turbulence such as this. </p>
<p>Doing so widens the existing “policing gap” across the region, especially since <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment">France’s exit</a> from Mali. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s foreign policy actions and inaction will be closely watched. The unfolding situation in Sudan reinforces the need for Nigeria to come up with an articulate <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/240218/why-nigeria-needs-a-grand-strategy/">grand strategy</a> that reflects its position and national interests in a complex and fast-changing region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spiralling Sudan will affect peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin region, of which Nigeria is a member.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070622023-06-08T14:08:49Z2023-06-08T14:08:49ZChad on the brink: how the war in Sudan hurts its fragile neighbour<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530631/original/file-20230607-17-bbcsrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 2014 view of Gaoui refugee camp in N'Djamena, Chad. Pressure on refugee camps in Chad has increased due to latest fighting in Sudan.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sebnem Coskun/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 15 April <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">outbreak of hostilities</a> in Sudan, the civilian population has been bearing the brunt. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, led by <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (called Hemeti</a>), are in conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s de facto head of state.</p>
<p>Nearly <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/">1.4 million</a> people have been displaced. Of these, 330,000 have crossed into neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>Chad – already a fragile country itself – is one. Around <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/sudanese-refugees-fleeing-violence-flock-chad">90,000</a> Sudanese refugees have entered Chad since the conflict began. The new arrivals have added to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/over-60000-have-fled-chad-sudan-since-conflict-started-unhcr-2023-05-22/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20arrivals%20have%20added,for%20displaced%20people%20from%20Sudan.">600,000</a> mostly Sudanese refugees already in Chad after fleeing previous conflicts, especially in the Darfur region. </p>
<p>Despite its oil wealth, Chad is one of the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/chad">poorest countries</a> in the world. Chad and Sudan share a common border of 1,400 kilometres. They also share the same ethnic groups living on both sides of their borders. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/helga-dickow-1209876">political scientist and expert in ethnic and religious conflict</a> with a focus on Chad, I outline how the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad. </p>
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<h2>Fragile security</h2>
<p>In the past, relations between Chad and Sudan have been characterised by <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf">conflicts, proxy wars and fragile peace agreements</a>. </p>
<p>The Darfur region plays a crucial role. It has at different times been a shelter for rebel groups of both countries.</p>
<p>Before he took power in Chad through a coup in December 1990, <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno</a>, an ethnic Zaghawa, and his militia had their rear base in Darfur. Members of Darfurian Zaghawa belonged to the inner circle of his rule. </p>
<p>After his <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">death in 2021</a>, a military council led by his son Mahamat took power in Chad.</p>
<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-the-feared-ex-warlord-taking-on-sudan-army-hemedti">Hemedti</a> is well connected within Chadian politics and military. He is of Chadian Arab descent and has his stronghold in the Darfur region. His family lives on both sides of the border. </p>
<p>Hemedti’s cousin, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13366/Death_on_the_front_line%2c_a_coup%2c_and_then_an_about_turn">General Bichara Issa Djadalla</a>, is the personal chief of staff to Mahamat Déby. Hemedti’s victory or defeat in Sudan could be a huge risk for the transitional president Déby in Chad.</p>
<p>In the case of his victory, Chadian Arabs could feel encouraged to try to take power in Chad as well. Many Chadians want an end to the Zaghawa rule, which has lasted for more than 30 years. Chadian Arab forces could be a real threat for Mahamat Déby.</p>
<p>In case of defeat, Hemeti would not give up his stronghold, Darfur. The gold of Darfur is the reason for his wealth and military strength. Hemedti is known for his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-hemedti-the-puppeteer-behind-sudans-feared-rsf-fighters">cruelty and ruthlessness</a>. The Zaghawa of Darfur could become the victims, as it was during the <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en">Darfur crisis in 2003</a>. If Mahamat Déby did not intervene, other sons of Déby and Zaghawa members of the army could quickly get rid of him.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian crisis</h2>
<p>The consequences of the outbreak of fighting in Khartoum were immediately felt in eastern Chad. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/23/more-than-90000-sudanese-take-refuge-in-chad-to-flee-the-fighting/">90,000 refugees</a> have fled from Sudan to Chad so far. Among them are about <a href="https://storyteller.iom.int/stories/plight-homecoming-chadians-fleeing-violence-sudan">12,500 Chadian returnees</a> who have been living in Sudan for decades. </p>
<p>Most refugees arrived in eastern Chad with only what they could carry. Here they met a poor but traditionally hospitable population, including earlier refugees. The arrival of more refugees risks worsening a precarious situation.</p>
<p>International aid is desperately needed. The people lack water, food, medical care and all other necessities of life. According to UNHCR, only <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/chad-funding-2023">17%</a> of the funds needed to meet the most urgent needs of refugees in Chad have been received from donors. </p>
<p>During her recent visit, USAID administrator Samantha Power pledged <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/readout/may-20-2023-administrator-samantha-power-travels-chad-visits-refugee-camp-support-humanitarian-response-crisis-sudan">$17 million</a> in humanitarian aid to the Chadian government for new and long-time refugees in the east of the country. </p>
<p>UNHCR’s deputy high commissioner for refugees, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/23/1177626408/unexpectedly-high-number-of-refugees-cross-into-chad-to-flee-fighting-in-sudan">Raouf Mazou</a>, also promised help for refugees and Chadians during his audience with Mahamat Déby on 22 May 2023.</p>
<p>In spite of these promises, there’s a risk that if any group feels neglected in the allocation of support, tensions between the local population and the newcomers could increase. </p>
<p>With the rainy season approaching, the situation threatens to deteriorate further. Access to the refugee camps becomes almost impossible due to poor or non-existent roads. This will make it even more difficult for aid organisations to distribute relief supplies and to move the refugees away from the border region. A humanitarian disaster in eastern Chad is a possibility. </p>
<h2>Economic crisis</h2>
<p>Landlocked Chad is heavily dependent on imports of most goods – industrial products, raw materials and food. The two main ports that supply Chad are Douala in Cameroon and Bur Sudan in Sudan.</p>
<p>The closure of the borders has had an immediate impact on Chadian consumers. Prices of goods and services have risen by up to <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2023/05/18/nigeria-increases-trade-with-chad-on-war-in-sudan/">70%</a>, according to the Observatory for Economic Complexity. </p>
<p>The few Chadian exports have come to a standstill. Cotton, gum arabic and livestock are Chad’s <a href="https://www.export.gov/article?series=a0pt00000000GtoAAE&type=Country_Commercial__kav">main non-oil exports</a>. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan might bring the already weak Chadian economy to a standstill. To make matters worse, there is currently a <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/03/06/chad-reels-from-fuel-shortage/">shortage of fuel</a> in Chad. The shortage led to an increase in fuel prices of up to 300% - in a country where private households and manufacturers rely almost entirely on their own generators. </p>
<h2>Political implications</h2>
<p>Chad’s transitional president Mahamat Déby was surprised by the fighting in Sudan while on a pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. It took him almost a week to find a safe way to fly back home to N'Djamena. </p>
<p>However, he announced on his <a href="https://www.facebook.com/presidencetd">Facebook account</a> that he had been in telephone contact with the two warring parties, trying to convince them to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>He wanted to present himself as a mediator to the international public. By talking to the two generals, he avoided choosing sides. He cannot afford to get caught on either side of the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemeti. </p>
<p>Since the death of his father, Mahamat Déby has tried to keep a firm grip on power despite national and international criticism. The transitional authorities suppress <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/26/chad-scores-protesters-shot-dead-wounded">opposition</a> to the Déby dynasty. </p>
<p>At its last meeting, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/communique-1152nd-meeting-peace-and-security-council-african-union-report-panel-wise-its-mission-republic-chad-held-11-may-2023">African Union Security Council</a> reiterated the ineligibility of the transitional government, including its president. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan and its outcome could destabilise Chad even further and lead it away from any path to peace and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ongoing war in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2056632023-05-23T13:57:23Z2023-05-23T13:57:23ZSudan’s peace mediation should be led by the African Union: 3 reasons why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526781/original/file-20230517-12607-2lblkm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese protesters in Khartoum. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Questions about who mediates in a conflict – and when – are crucial. Mediation is about trust, an awareness of regional realities and insights into complex politics. It should happen before conflict reaches a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TimingofPeaceInitiatives_Zartman2001.pdf">mutually damaging stalemate</a>. This spares lives and political disintegration of the kind seen in <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-06-25/The-U-S-is-to-blame-for-Libya-s-disintegration-11npdH9dn5C/index.html">Libya</a> and <a href="https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=bildhaan">Somalia</a>. </p>
<p>Who’s likely to be the most successful as a mediator is a question that needs to be addressed urgently in the ongoing <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-has-fighting-broken-out-again-in-sudan-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-region-203928">Sudan civil war</a>.</p>
<p>Based on our <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-42890-7">research</a> on <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration/Moyo-Nshimbi/p/book/9781032543499">continental integration</a> and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Conflict-Management-and-Resolution-in-South-Sudan/Alusala-Liaga-Rupiya/p/book/9781032530932">conflict management</a> in <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/MONO129FULL.PDF">war situations</a>, we believe that an African Union-led mediation process promises a better and more stable peace agreement than a non-African mediation process. </p>
<p><a href="https://au.int/en/overview">The African Union’s</a> mediation would bring on board Sudan’s immediate neighbours (Chad, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and South Sudan). This would give these countries an opportunity to address <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/26/humanitarian-fears-as-thousands-of-sudanese-flee-to-chad-on-foot">their concerns</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/impact-sudan-crisis-central-african-republic-flash-update-27-april-2023#:%7E:text=The%20ongoing%20conflict%20in%20Sudan,the%20price%20of%20basic%20commodities.">interests</a> in the conflict for a lasting peace agreement.</p>
<p>The African Union successfully <a href="http://www.internationalpolicybrief.org/images/2020/DECEMBER/IJCSIRD/ARTICLE1.pdf">mediated in 2019</a> in Sudan after the military overthrew president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">Omar al-Bashir</a>. This <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/new-sudan-thousands-celebrate-as-protesters-army-sign-deal-20190818">intervention</a> helped, at the time, to prevent the country’s descent into a military dictatorship. It also helped align the demands of the Sudanese people in anticipation of a transition to civilian rule. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-is-awash-with-weapons-how-the-two-forces-compare-and-what-that-means-for-the-war-205434">warring parties</a> in the ongoing conflict have also shown an openness to the African Union’s mediation. <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-coup-abdel-fattah-burhan-who">General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, who led a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/25/africa/sudan-military-prime-minister-intl-hnk/index.html">coup in October 2021</a>, sent a team to the union’s Peace and Security Council in <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article270455/">February 2023</a>. The team lobbied for the lifting of sanctions on Sudan. The African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/articles/sudan-suspended-african-union">suspended</a> Sudan in 2019 from participating in the organisation’s activities until it sets up a civilian-led government. </p>
<p>The African Union has refrained from taking a position on the conflict, which makes it a suitably neutral negotiator. Additionally, it’s working on <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/meeting-extended-mechanism-sudan-crisis">measures</a> to ensure that Sudan gets back to <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-people-toppled-a-dictator-despite-the-war-theyre-still-working-to-bring-about-democratic-change-205236">transitioning to democracy and civilian rule</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan crisis explained: What's behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation's troubled past</a>
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<p>We’re not against the ongoing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/06/sudans-warring-sides-to-begin-talks-in-saudi-arabia-as-fighting-rages-on">US-Saudi Arabia-mediated initiative</a> in Jeddah. But these negotiations are primarily about opening <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/22/air-strikes-hit-sudans-capital-as-ceasefire-approaches">humanitarian corridors</a> for civilians. They’re not for negotiating an end to the fighting. </p>
<p>In our view, this is a process that the African Union is best placed to lead. This doesn’t exclude the participation of other countries. Three reasons favour the African Union as the lead mediator in Sudan. </p>
<h2>Trust, regional realities and insights into complex politics</h2>
<p>Firstly, the African Union has the trust of Sudan’s warring parties after its successful mediation in 2019. This intervention was in line with the union’s policy to provide “<a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9654-assembly_au_dec_474-489_xxi_e.pdf#page=23">African solutions to African problems</a>”. This policy resonates with the union’s 55 member states. It played out in Ethiopia in November 2022 when the organisation helped negotiate a <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/cessation-of-hostilities-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-and-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-tplf">cessation of hostilities</a> agreement between prime minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>Secondly, regional realities, dynamics and the interests of Sudan’s neighbours are crucial to the resolution of the conflict. Take Chad, with which Sudan shares a 1,403km border. Chad is just emerging from decades of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13164690">sustained conflict</a>. It shares strong historical, economic, cultural and religious relations with Sudan. But these relations are strained. </p>
<p>Sudanese rebels have previously <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/master/frd/frdcstdy/su/sudancountrystud00berry/sudancountrystud00berry.pdf#page=343">attacked Sudan</a> from hideouts in Chad’s territory. Chadian rebels have done the same to Chad from Sudan’s territory. Both countries have accused each other of launching these <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/sudan-and-chad-accuse-each-other-helping-rebels?gclid=Cj0KCQjwpPKiBhDvARIsACn-gzB1bsLURmfXaUtZqhYe6NknKh1UcaIsBeRu9WoxPmd_GZVrySN7NlwaAn_fEALw_wcB">proxy attacks</a> through their respective rebel groups. This has led to clashes between their militaries along their common border in the past, straining stability.</p>
<p>The fallout of conflict in Sudan extends beyond Chad. Sudan’s seven neighbours have <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">an interest in Sudan’s stability</a>. None wants to host <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-refugee-crisis-aid-agencies-face-huge-challenges-as-hundreds-of-thousands-flee-violence-205217">Sudanese refugees</a> as the situation degenerates into a humanitarian crisis. Fighting in one country easily causes <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration/Moyo-Nshimbi/p/book/9781032543499">cross-border flows</a> of people. This threatens regional stability. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan: the longer the conflict lasts, the higher the risk of a regional war</a>
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<p>These threats to stability are best understood and resolved by the African Union. The union is a leading and active mediator in African conflicts and has a generally <a href="http://ssrc-cdn1.s3.amazonaws.com/crmuploads/new_publication_3/a-survey-of-mediation-in-african-coups.pdf">successful mediation track record</a>. Mediators from outside Africa are either not cognisant of – or ignore – <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Peacemaking_in_Civil_War_International_Mediation_in_Zimbabwe_1974_1980">these sensitive African elements</a> to conflict. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the war in Sudan is driven by complex politics. In our view, only mediators who have been involved in helping the country solve its tensions before can possibly help both sides stand down.</p>
<p>The armed conflict in Sudan between the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/18/the-sudan-crisis-a-power-struggle-by-design">Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces</a> was <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-entire-history-has-been-dominated-by-soldiers-and-the-violence-and-corruption-they-bring-204928">inevitable</a> because of pre-existing instability. </p>
<p>One reason for this was the 2019 overthrow of Bashir. The military subsequently established a <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/">transitional military council</a>. But the Sudanese people <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics-idUSKCN1RY0EI">demanded civilian rule</a>. </p>
<p>The African Union mediated a settlement between the military and civilian representatives. This helped establish a three-year power-sharing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/17/sudan-protest-leaders-military-sign-transitional-government-deal">Transitional Sovereign Council</a> in 2019. However, Burhan’s 2021 coup undid this agreement. This led to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/26/one-killed-on-sudan-anti-coup-protest-anniversary">political deadlock and civilian protests</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-people-toppled-a-dictator-despite-the-war-theyre-still-working-to-bring-about-democratic-change-205236">Sudan's people toppled a dictator – despite the war they’re still working to bring about democratic change</a>
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<p>The African Union understands this context. </p>
<p>As a continental body, the union has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aus-role-in-brokering-sudan-deal-offers-lessons-for-the-future-121822">legitimacy and the authority</a> to sanction member states into compliance. It also <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/african-union-condemns-violence-sudan-calls-humanitarian-ceasefire-and-urges">desires a satisfactory outcome</a> for citizens of a state for which it is an umbrella organisation. </p>
<h2>Continental interests</h2>
<p>International actors like the US and Saudi Arabia engage others because they’re driven by <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/anarchy-is-what-states-make-of-it-the-social-construction-of-power-politics/B03BC7C9AAC5211B6DC319C077C1A854">national interests</a>. The African Union’s participation would serve continental interests. The union has the goal to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-union-has-failed-to-silence-the-guns-and-some-solutions-139567">silence the guns</a> and boost African integration and peace. It’s aware that continental development is at stake. It should <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/meeting-extended-mechanism-sudan-crisis">continue asserting its role</a> in addressing the situation in Sudan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi receives funding from the National Research Foundation (South Africa) and the European Commission. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nelson Alusala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An African-led process would take into account complex regional dynamics – which would lead to a better and more stable peace agreement.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & SARChI Research Chair: Political Economy of Migration in the SADC Region, University of PretoriaNelson Alusala, Senior Research Associate, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052172023-05-11T09:19:32Z2023-05-11T09:19:32ZSudan refugee crisis: aid agencies face huge challenges as hundreds of thousands flee violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525604/original/file-20230511-25-7g00wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees who crossed from Sudan to Ethiopia wait in line to register at the International Organization for Migration at Metema on May 4, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by AMANUEL SILESHI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Sudan stands on the brink of yet another civil war <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">sparked by</a> a confrontation between two generals: the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdelfatah El-Burhan, and the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.</em></p>
<p><em>The conflict, currently unfolding in the capital, Khartoum, has created a widespread humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people, trying to escape the violence, are crossing into neighbouring countries. International law and refugee <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Asylum-Seeker-and-Refugee-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-The-Peregrination/dOrsi/p/book/9781138025424">expert</a> Cristiano d'Orsi tells us what his biggest concerns about the situation are, and what needs to be done to address them.</em></p>
<h2>What are your biggest concerns with the refugee situation?</h2>
<p>In Sudan, the situation is particularly worrying because of the huge number of refugees that will be moving. People are leaving from many parts of the country. Though the conflict’s epicentre is in Khartoum, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/18/what-is-happening-in-sudan-a-simple-guide">it has spread</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082722">At least</a> 100,000 people have already arrived in neighbouring countries, <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15265.doc.htm">including</a> Chad, Egypt and South Sudan. Contingency plans are being put in place <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-sudan-refugee-response-will-need-445-million-rising-numbers-fleeing-sudan">for about</a> 860,000 refugees. As an <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Asylum-Seeker-and-Refugee-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-The-Peregrination/dOrsi/p/book/9781138025424">expert on</a> the legal protection of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants, I’m interested in seeing how these vulnerable groups will fare.</p>
<p>The numbers are high partly because Sudan hosted <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/countries/sudan">1.1 million</a> refugees, one of the largest refugee populations in Africa. South Sudanese represented more than 70% (800,000) of the refugees in Sudan, followed by 126,000 Eritrean refugees (11%). Most of these refugees, about 60%, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-country-refugee-response-plan-crp-january-december-2023">lived outside</a> camps – in towns, villages and areas just outside Khartoum.</p>
<p>The refugees hosted by Sudan are now fleeing violence in Sudan. Neighbouring countries will have to treat them as asylum-seekers or refugees because <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/6450e5814.html#page=3">they cannot</a> be returned to a situation of conflict. Some will also face the difficult decision of returning to their home countries. For instance, there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/07/eritrea-accused-of-forcibly-repatriating-civilians-caught-up-in-sudan-fighting">reports</a> that Eritrean men who escaped military service and fled to Sudan are already being detained upon their return.</p>
<p>Another big concern I have is the challenges facing aid efforts. </p>
<p>With Khartoum under attack, aid efforts – to support both refugees and the wider public – will require a new operational hub. Port Sudan – a city and port on the Red Sea in eastern Sudan – has become a hub for evacuations, and looks set to become an operating base for the UN and aid groups. </p>
<p>Given the current insecurity, getting relief to people in need will be a massive hurdle. Depending on how the conflict unfolds, aid may need to move across front lines or across national borders. </p>
<p>In addition, last year the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that Sudan’s aid groups, including those looking after refugees, only received <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1068/summary">around half</a> of the nearly US$2 billion they requested from donors – a shortfall that other relief missions are also facing. </p>
<p>The crisis places huge, new demands on the international community to increase funding. UNHCR alone will need <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-sudan-refugee-response-will-need-445-million-rising-numbers-fleeing-sudan?mc_cid=14b70653fa&mc_eid=4aad996b35">at least US$445 million</a> to support the displaced until October 2023.</p>
<p>How long it will take for donor funding to materialise remains to be seen. In the meantime, frontline communities and mutual aid networks <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65344673">are acting</a> as first responders, from hosting displaced families to coordinating relief in Khartoum and beyond. </p>
<h2>What’s the international response been like?</h2>
<p>There has been some international action. From what I’ve seen, for now, it’s mostly been the United Nations, European Union and a handful of individual countries. </p>
<p>The African Union has <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/african-union-condemns-violence-sudan-calls-humanitarian-ceasefire-and-urges">condemned the violence and called</a> for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. It has also pledged to coordinate international action on Sudan. </p>
<p>A regional refugee emergency response, led by UNHCR, is underway. And the International Medical Corps <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-conflict-situation-report-2-april-27-2023">has launched</a> a regional response to meet the needs of internally displaced persons and refugees. </p>
<p>The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">has provided</a> critical water, sanitation and hygiene support to hospitals in Khartoum and Darfur. UN Women <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">is providing</a> financial and technical support to young Sudanese women who are using app technology to keep themselves safe. They’re able to find food, medicine and safe routes away from the fighting. The UN is <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">also</a> tracking cases and allegations of gender-based violence and taking measures to support victims. </p>
<p>The European Union has <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/sudan_en">allocated</a> €200,000 (about US$220,000) for immediate relief and first aid assistance to those injured or exposed to high risk. This will support the Sudanese Red Crescent Society with first aid, evacuation services, and psychosocial support.</p>
<p>The Arab League <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/07/arab-league-begins-negotiations-between-sudans-warring-sides">has been holding</a> emergency meetings to find a real solution to the clashes and stop the bloodshed.</p>
<h2>What more needs to be done?</h2>
<p>The root causes of refugee flows need to be addressed. The most obvious solution to end Sudan’s refugee crisis is to make efforts to reach a peace agreement.</p>
<p>While attempts to mediate the conflict are underway, for instance by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-pin-their-hopes-talks-saudi-arabia-2023-05-08/">Arab League</a>, there are several factors that must be respected. </p>
<p>First, the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and returnees must be respected and protected. All of Sudan’s neighbours have a duty under law to do this. Five of Sudan’s neighbours are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, so they’re obliged to protect refugees on their territory. </p>
<p>Even though Libya and Eritrea aren’t party to the convention, the principle of non-refoulement – whereby people aren’t allowed to be returned to situations of harm – has today become <a href="https://harvardilj.org/2022/12/the-obligation-of-non-refoulement-and-its-erga-omnes-partes-character/">a principle of customary</a> international law. This means they can’t force people to return to Sudan, while it’s still volatile. The UN, the AU and UNHCR typically supervise this. </p>
<p>UNHCR <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/6450e5814.html#page=3">has called on</a> states to suspend the forcible return of nationals and stateless people residing in Sudan. </p>
<p>In addition, countries that people are fleeing to must suspend issuance of negative decisions on applications for international protection, until the situation in Sudan has stabilised.</p>
<p>Finally, all countries <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-urges-states-keep-borders-open-sudanese-suspend-negative-asylum-decisions?mc_cid=14b70653fa&mc_eid=4aad996b35">must allow</a> civilians of all nationalities fleeing Sudan non-discriminatory access to their territories. These include those who do not have documentation or passports. </p>
<p>Next, Sudan will need stronger aid infrastructure. This <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/04/26/aid-agencies-sudan-war">includes</a> improved security analysis and better coordination mechanisms between civilian and military actors. </p>
<p>Finally, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/04/26/aid-agencies-sudan-war">funding</a> for relief efforts will also need to increase substantially. Key to this is <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/four-key-areas-improve-aid-effectiveness">accountability</a>. Donors are more likely to base their own policies on recipient priorities if donors act together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The number of refugees leaving Sudan is particularly high because Sudan was itself host to a million refugees.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2042992023-04-27T15:53:49Z2023-04-27T15:53:49ZSudan: questions about Wagner Group involvement as another African country falls prey to Russian mercenaries<p>After more than a week of intense fighting between Sudanese government troops and paramilitary forces in Khartoum, many western countries – including the US and UK – are evacuating their nationals from the strife-torn city.</p>
<p>While the conflict has been billed as a clash between rival warlords, there are questions about the role played by the private Russian mercenary company, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">the Wagner Group</a>. This group, allegedly associated with Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ally Yevgeny Prigozhin – although he has denied any involvement – is heavily engaged in several African countries, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/25/russia-wagner-group-africa-terrorism-mali-sudan-central-african-republic-prigozhin/">exacerbating</a> regional instability.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-violence-between-army-and-militia-is-a-symptom-of-an-old-disease-that-is-destroying-africa-204288">Sudan: violence between army and militia is a symptom of an old disease that is destroying Africa</a>
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<p>Aid organisations have warned of a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/other/influx-of-sudan-refugees-in-neighbouring-countries-could-worsen-humanitarian-crisis-in-region/ar-AA1agYd8">humanitarian crisis</a> as, in recent days, tens of thousands of people have fled Sudan to neighbouring countries that already face their own internal issues. </p>
<p>The potential involvement of Russia and the shadowy Wagner Group in the region complicates things further. While the group <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russias-private-wagner-group-denies-it-is-operating-in-sudan/ar-AA1a4YoB">has denied</a> involvement in the current conflict in Sudan, these denials appear <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-wagner-offered-arms-to-sudanese-general-battling-army-c71f65f3">increasingly questionable</a>.</p>
<p>There is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/20/africa/wagner-sudan-russia-libya-intl/index.html">growing evidence</a> of Wagner’s role in arming the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces which are engaged in a violent power struggle against the Sudanese military. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, this week confirmed Washington’s belief that the group of mercenaries is involved in the conflict, stating:</p>
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<p>We do have deep concern about the engagement of the Prigozhin group (the Wagner Group) in Sudan … Its engagement simply brings more death and destruction with it.</p>
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<h2>Wagner Group in Africa</h2>
<p>Students taking the <a href="https://www.brunel.ac.uk/study/postgraduate/intelligence-and-security-studies-distance-learning-ma">Master’s degree in intelligence and security studies</a> at Brunel University London were tasked with assessing the capabilities and intentions of the Wagner Group (and Russia) in Africa. They collected publicly available material (sometimes referred to as “<a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/open-source-intelligence-definition">open source intelligence</a>”) to assess the group’s influence. This information was then subjected to <a href="https://www.cia.gov/static/955180a45afe3f5013772c313b16face/Tradecraft-Primer-apr09.pdf">structured analytic techniques</a> used by the UK intelligence community and elsewhere, as part of a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850600600829940?needAccess=true">Brunel Analytical Simulation Exercise</a> to prepare the students for roles as professional intelligence analysts. </p>
<p>They found numerous examples of how the Wagner Group has expanded its operations in recent years – often at the request of national governments. In January, the UK Ministry of Defence <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1616323761392812033">estimated</a> there were as many as 5,000 Wagner operatives across Africa in 2022.</p>
<p>Despite the war in Ukraine, leaked <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/23/wagner-russia-africa-leaked-documents/">US intelligence documents</a> suggest the group is developing a “confederation” of anti-western states. These include Chad, to the west of Sudan, where US intelligence reports allege that Wagner mercenaries are involved in <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-intelligence-points-to-wagner-plot-against-key-western-ally-in-africa-29867547">destabilising the government</a>. Chad is a key ally of the US in this region of Africa.</p>
<p>Sitting directly beneath Chad is the Central African Republic (CAR), where the Russian ambassador Alexander Bikantov <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-envoy-says-1890-russian-instructors-central-african-republic-ria-2023-02-03/">said in February</a> there are 1,890 “instructors” involved in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/wagner-mercenaries-sustain-losses-in-fight-for-central-african-republic-gold">fighting between the government and rebel troops</a>. </p>
<p>The Wagner Group has reportedly had a presence in CAR for several years, initially providing training and back-up services and latterly involved in combat operations against rebel insurgencies. According to the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic">International Crisis Group</a>, although the CAR’s president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, has denied signing a contract with the Wagner Group, “its presence … is barely a secret”.</p>
<p>The Crisis Group’s report continued:</p>
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<p>Rather than eradicating armed groups, the contractors are perpetrating abuses that increasingly drive violence in the provinces and fuel guerrilla warfare against government troops by rebels scattered in the bush.</p>
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<p>Wagner mercenaries are also reportedly active in Sudan’s north-western neighbour, Libya, which has been in a state of armed chaos since the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi in 2012. In 2020, the BBC reported a leaked UN document saying there were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52571777">1,200 Wagner personnel in Libya</a>. They have reportedly been supporting rebel warlord <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/wagner-group-sudan-war-army-b2327044.html">Khalifa Hafter</a>’s forces against the Tripoli-based government, alongside other mercenaries from Belarus, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Shifting influence</h2>
<p>In Mali, the Wagner Group has supported the military junta to enforce its rule, with a large base at <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">Bamako International Airport</a>. The group’s increasing influence in that part of Africa has coincided with a dilution of western involvement. In February 2022, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/17/world/africa/mali-france-withdrawal.html">French government announced</a> the withdrawal of its forces after nine years of trying, and failing, to counter Islamist insurgency. </p>
<p>In March 2022, Malian state forces – reportedly supported by “suspected Russian mercenaries” (although no group was identified) – <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-60997602">massacred</a> civilians and militant fighters. Calls by the UN Security Council for an independent investigation into the massacre were <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/04/10/mali-russia-blocks-un-security-council-request-for-investigation-into-moura-massacre/">blocked by Russia</a>, and the UN was not granted <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14856.doc.htm">access</a> to the site.</p>
<p>There is also growing evidence of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-raises-questions-about-growing-russian-involvement-in-west-africa-191909">Wagner Group’s presence in Burkina Faso</a> and the <a href="https://tfiglobalnews.com/2023/01/22/has-us-incompetence-pushed-drc-away-to-russias-side/">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> (DRC). Burkina Faso has experienced two coups in the last 12 months, and is facing escalating threats from <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/attacks-kill-dozens-in-burkina-faso-security-sources-say-/6927428.html">Islamic State-linked groups</a>. </p>
<p>Russia is courting Burkina Faso through <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-63171771">military and political</a> endeavours, and has stated its intent to aid nations in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahel">Sahelian region</a> in combating the jihadist threat in their countries. DRC, Mali, CAR and Sudan have all <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/24/un-tells-russia-to-leave-ukraine-how-did-countries-vote">abstained or voted against</a> requiring Russia to remove troops from Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-coup-raises-questions-about-growing-russian-involvement-in-west-africa-191909">Burkina Faso coup raises questions about growing Russian involvement in west Africa</a>
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<p>It’s unclear to what extent the Wagner Group does the Kremlin’s bidding as Prigozhin himself has repeatedly denied any involvement. But as a private enterprise, the profits for them in Africa are spectacular. And, as with so many of the biggest Russian businesses, Wagner’s successes are owed to the Russian state and the kleptocratic elites who are likely to share in its revenue.</p>
<p>The Kremlin provides direct support where profit interests align with Russia’s political interests. At the moment, the troubled countries in which the Wagner Group is alleged to be involved in conflict and destabilisation provide resources and political support at the UN, which are important for Russia’s war on Ukraine. Further regional instability is to be expected.</p>
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<p><em>Brunel MA students Laura Collins, Freya De Santis and Bobby Payne assisted with the research for this article</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The role of the Wagner Group in the Sudan crisis is not yet clear, but its mercenaries are reported to be involved in a number of African countries.Kristian Gustafson, Reader in Intelligence & War, Brunel University LondonDan Lomas, Lecturer in Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University LondonNeveen S Abdalla, Lecturer, International Relations, Defence, and Security, Brunel University LondonSteven Wagner, Senior Lecturer in International Security, Brunel University LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039462023-04-23T08:53:02Z2023-04-23T08:53:02ZChad picks a fight with Germany – what’s behind it and what the consequences are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522150/original/file-20230420-20-k95dt2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French President Emmanuel Macron welcomes President of Chad's Transitional Military Council Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, in Paris, in 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gao Jing/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Chad recently ordered the German ambassador to the country, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chad-expels-german-ambassador-over-impolite-attitude/a-65262678">Dr Gordon Kricke</a>, to leave within 48 hours, accusing him of disrespectful behaviour and disregard for diplomatic protocol. In retaliation, Berlin <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-expels-chads-ambassador-in-tit-for-tat-response/a-65281147">expelled</a> the Chadian ambassador to Germany. Helga Dickow, a political scientist and expert on Chad, explains the link between the diplomatic tit-for-tat and the now delayed Chadian transition to constitutional rule.</em> </p>
<h2>What are the holdups in Chad’s transition to constitutional rule?</h2>
<p>Chad has been in transition since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">death</a> of long-time ruler Idriss Déby Itno in April 2021 and the seizure of power by a military council led by Déby’s son, Mahamat Déby Itno.</p>
<p>In May 2021, Mahamat Déby <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-signs-of-a-true-transition-in-chad-a-year-after-idriss-debys-death-181203">promised</a> a transition to constitutional rule and free elections within 18 months. The African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), notably France and other partners, had sanctioned the change of power in view of this promise.</p>
<p>They insisted that the 18-month transition period be respected and that Mahamat Déby not be allowed to stand in the elections. </p>
<p>The African Union’s decision was informed by <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">section 25</a> of its Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to which Chad is a signatory. It prohibits anyone involved in a coup d'état from standing for election. It has taken the same approach in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>However, since the so-called <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/chads-national-dialogue-concludes-amid-uncertainties-transition">National Dialogue </a> in September 2022 it has become clear that Mahamat Déby is planning to foist a political dynasty, something predicted by the opposition.</p>
<p>The dialogue forum was largely made up of regime supporters. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chad-is-making-a-huge-effort-to-find-peace-chadians-arent-convinced-it-will-work-189268">Important actors</a> from the opposition stayed away. Despite criticisms, the National Dialogue <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/chads-national-dialogue-concludes-amid-uncertainties-transition#:%7E:text=Despite%20significant%20criticism%2C%20the%20DNIS,extended%20for%20another%2024%20months.">extended</a> the transition period by 24 months and allowed Mahamat Déby to contest in the poll. </p>
<h2>Which countries are Chad’s closest allies?</h2>
<p>Despite its oil wealth, Chad is one of the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/chad">poorest countries</a> in the world. Nevertheless it remains an important partner in a region that is crisis ridden and unstable.</p>
<p>Chad lacks the financial resources to conduct elections and is dependent on foreign donors – most notably the United Nations and the European Union. The European Union promised the transitional government support for the country’s return to constitutional order, <a href="https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/chad_en">including the necessary financial resources</a>.</p>
<p>But, by extending the transition period and allowing Mahamat Deby to contest, the Chadian transitional authorities have not lived up to the agreement.</p>
<p>The US, France and Germany have signalled their displeasure over the transition being prolonged, the renewed postponement of the electoral process and severe human rights violations. This position is also shared by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ep-plenary-military-junta-crackdown-peaceful-demonstrations-chad_en">European Parliament</a>.</p>
<h2>So, why target Germany?</h2>
<p>It was obvious that Chad’s transitional authorities had had enough of criticism from their partners. The expulsion of the German ambassador could be a warning to other embassies, especially France, to be more restrained in their criticism of Chadian politics and not to support the opposition. </p>
<p>It can also be argued that Germany was an easy target. </p>
<p>Expelling the ambassador of France would be near impossible. This is because France, Chad’s former colonial power, has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-deby-france-explainer-idAFKBN2C727Q">several</a> military bases in Chad. It has also been seen as a supporter of Idriss, and now, Mahamat Déby. </p>
<p>France’s support became more than visible during the funeral of Déby’s father in 2021. French President Emmanuel Macron was the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-france-is-backing-chads-new-leader-mahamat-idriss-deby/a-57316728">only</a> European head of state at the funeral, accompanied by EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell. </p>
<p>Mahamat Déby was in Paris a few weeks ago and <a href="https://www.news360.es/belgique/2023/02/03/macron-rencontre-le-president-tchadien-lundi-a-paris/">had dinner with President Macron</a>. Little has been leaked about this meeting. </p>
<p>There aren’t many other targets for possible expulsion. The US is also Chad’s military partner. And other European countries only deployed chargés d'affaires or have no representation at all.</p>
<h2>What role is the opposition playing in Chad?</h2>
<p>In October 2022 there were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/26/chad-scores-protesters-shot-dead-wounded">mass protests</a> in N'Djamena and the major cities of the south against the extension of the transition.</p>
<p>The opposition party <a href="https://www.facebook.com/transtchad/?locale=fr_FR">Les Transformateurs </a> and the alliance <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/109643941190301/">Wakit Tama</a>, a coalition of trade unions, civil society groups and opposition parties, had called for the protests. But the authorities had not granted permission for the demonstrations.</p>
<p>The government brought in tanks to the capital during the night and security forces trained in anti-terrorism <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/chad-experts-alarmed-lethal-use-force-against-protesters-and-call-de">fired into the crowd</a>.</p>
<p>Some protesters were killed. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-police-fire-tear-gas-pro-democracy-protests-2022-10-20/">official figures</a> differ considerably from those of the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/24/deadly-chad-protests-death-toll-now-estimated-at-128/">opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Even though some demonstrators were equipped with knives and stones, they could not carry out a rebellion with these weapons, as some Chadian politicians later <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/10/25/chadian-leader-slams-recent-protests-citing-foreign-meddling//">claimed</a>. </p>
<p>Hundreds of people were arrested at their homes during curfews imposed in the following days. They were taken to the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/12/12/139-people-released-from-prison-after-deadly-protests-in-chad/">Koro Toro high security prison</a> in the inhospitable north of the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/23/chad-justice-needed-october-crackdown">Human Rights Watch</a> has also reported that detainees were tortured, and some died.</p>
<p>The leaders of the opposition movements <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/10/chads-two-main-opposition-figures-in-hiding-for-safety/">Wakit Tama and Les Transformateurs</a> fled abroad after 20 October and have since been campaigning for an independent investigation into what has become known as <a href="https://www.newenglishreview.org/articles/black-thursday-in-chad-the-reality-of-the-countrys-authoritarian-future/">Black Thursday</a>.</p>
<h2>What does this all mean for the transition plan and Chad’s future?</h2>
<p>It is quite possible that the Chadian transitional president and his confidants miscalculated when they expelled the German ambassador.</p>
<p>European ambassadors have already shown solidarity with the ambassador’s forced departure. As a clear signal of solidarity and unity, they accompanied him to the airport in N'Djamena. This sent a signal that they are united in their support for a foreign policy based on values. This was also confirmed by the <a href="https://www.brusselstimes.com/454555/eu-slams-chads-expulsion-of-german-ambassador">EU spokesperson</a> in Brussels.</p>
<p>Two years after the death of Idriss Déby and the takeover by the transitional authorities, not many Chadians believe that the country is on a path towards democracy. </p>
<p>They may be right. The absence of external donor funding for the election process is likely to give those in power a good pretext for further delaying the transition process. </p>
<p>For the government and its president Mahamat Déby, the delay would provide even more time and opportunity to expand their power. Frustrations about this could again lead to attacks by politico-military groups and further destabilisation of the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Expulsion of the German ambassador could be a way of warning other embassies, especially France, to steer clear of Chadian politics and support for the opposition.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039852023-04-17T21:52:35Z2023-04-17T21:52:35ZSudan crisis explained: What’s behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation’s troubled past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521406/original/file-20230417-14-9k84wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C170%2C4166%2C2628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan army soldiers are fighting a rival paramilitary group.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sudanese-greet-army-soldiers-loyal-to-army-chief-abdel-news-photo/1251884288?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Days of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/17/sudan-fighting-live-news-nearly-100-killed-as-clashes-spread">violence in Sudan</a> have resulted in the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-fighting-military-rsf-eafa3246b1e3004a1a9f2b9af9561362">deaths of at least 180 people</a>, with many more left wounded.</em></p>
<p><em>The fighting represents the latest crisis in the North African nation, which has contended with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559">numerous coups and periods of civil strife</a> since becoming independent in 1956.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://history.washington.edu/people/christopher-tounsel">Christopher Tounsel</a>, a Sudan specialist and interim director of the University of Washington’s African Studies Program, to explain the reasons behind the violence and what it means for the chances of democracy being restored in Sudan.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on in Sudan?</h2>
<p>It all revolves around infighting between two rival groups: the Sudanese army and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">paramilitary group known as the RSF</a>, or Rapid Support Forces.</p>
<p>Since a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/25/africa/sudan-coup-explained-intl-cmd/index.html">coup in the country in 2021</a>, which ended a transitional government put in place after the fall of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir</a> two years earlier, Sudan has been run by the army, with coup leader General Abdel-Fattah Burhan as de facto ruler.</p>
<p><iframe id="nO9q2" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/nO9q2/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The RSF, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo – who is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">generally known by the name Hemedti</a> – has worked alongside the Sudanese army to help keep the military in power.</p>
<p>Following Bashir’s ouster, the political transition was supposed to result in elections <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/25/sudan-coup-fears-amid-claims-military-have-arrested-senior-government-officials">by the end of 2023</a>, with Burhan <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59855246">promising a transition to civilian rule</a>. But it appears that neither Burhan nor Dagalo has any intention of relinquishing power. Moreover, they are locked in a power struggle that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">turned violent on April 15</a>, 2023.</p>
<p>Since then, members of the RSF and the Sudanese army have engaged in gunfights in the capital, Khartoum, as well as elsewhere in the country. Over the course of three days, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-fighting-military-rsf-eafa3246b1e3004a1a9f2b9af9561362">violence has spiraled</a>.</p>
<p>The recent background to the violence was a disagreement over how RSF paramilitaries <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-s-military-warns-of-conflict-after-rival-force-deploys-/7050034.html">should be incorporated</a> into the Sudanese army. Tensions boiled over after the RSF started deploying members around the country and in Khartoum without the expressed permission of the army.</p>
<p>But in reality, the violence has been brewing for a while in Sudan, with concern over the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48987901">RSF seeking to control more of the country’s economic assets</a>, notably its gold mines.</p>
<p>The developments in Sudan over the last few days are not good for the stability of the nation or its prospects for any <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134137">transition to democratic rule</a>.</p>
<h2>Who are the two men at the center of the dispute?</h2>
<p>Dagalo rose to power within the RSF beginning in the early 2000s when he was at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">head of the militia known as Janjaweed</a> – a group responsible for human right atrocities in the Darfur region.</p>
<p>While then-Sudanese President Bashir was the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">face of the violence</a> against people in Darfur – and was later <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CaseInformationSheets/AlBashirEng.pdf">indicted on crimes against humanity</a> by the International Criminal Court – the Janjaweed is <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">also held responsible</a> by the ICC for alleged acts of genocide. While they were doing so, Dagalo was rising up the ranks.</p>
<p>As head of the RSF, Dagalo has faced accusations of overseeing the bloody crackdown of pro-democracy activists, including <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/18/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum">the massacre of 120 protesters</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>The actions of Burhan, similarly, have seen the military leader <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/sudan">heavily criticized by human rights groups</a>. As the head of the army in power and the country’s de facto head of government for the last two years, he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/pro-democracy-protests-set-to-mark-sudan-coup-anniversary-despite-crackdown-01666672508">oversaw a crackdown of pro-democracy activists</a>.</p>
<p>One can certainly interpret both men to be obstacles to any chance of Sudan transitioning to civilian democracy. But this is first and foremost a personal power struggle.</p>
<p>To use an African proverb, “When the elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled.”</p>
<h2>So this is about power rather than ideology?</h2>
<p>In my opinion, very much so.</p>
<p>We are not talking about two men, or factions, with ideological differences over the future direction of the country. This cannot be framed as a left-wing versus right-wing thing, or about warring political parties. Nor is this a geo-religious conflict – pitting a majority <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-south-sudan-turns-10-questions-over-the-role-of-the-church-emerge-amid-anti-clerical-violence-164018">Muslim North against a Christian South</a>. And it isn’t racialized violence in the same way that the Darfur conflict was, with the self-identified Arab Janajaweed killing Black people.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-burhan-hemeti-tensions-escalate-framework-dea">observers are interpreting</a> what is happening in Sudan – correctly, in my opinion – as a battle between two men who are desperate not to be ejected from the corridors of power by means of a transition to an elected government.</p>
<h2>How does the violence fit Sudan’s troubled past?</h2>
<p>One thing that is concerning about the longer dynamics at play in Sudan is the violence now forms part of a history that fits the trope of the “failed African nation.”</p>
<p>Sudan has, to my knowledge, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">had more coups</a> than any other African nation. Since gaining independence from the U.K. in 1956, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559">there have been coups</a> in 1958, 1969, 1985, 1989, 2019 and 2021.</p>
<p>The coup in 1989 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">brought Bashir to power</a> for a three-decade run as dictator during which the Sudanese people suffered from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/11/quran-and-ak-47-the-30-year-rule-of-sudans-omar-al-bashir">typical excesses of autocratic rule</a> – secret police, repressions of opposition, corruption. </p>
<p>When Bashir was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/11/omar-al-bashir-deposed-how-the-world-reacted">deposed in 2019</a>, it was shocking to many observers – myself included – who assumed he would die in power, or that his rule would end only by assassination.</p>
<p>But any hopes that the end of Bashir would mean democratic rule were short-lived. Two years after his ouster – when elections were due to be held – the army decided to take power for itself, claiming it was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/26/sudans-army-chief-defends-militarys-seizure-of-power">stepping in to avert a civil war</a>.</p>
<p>As striking as the recent violence is now, in many ways what is playing out is not unusual in the context of Sudan’s history.</p>
<p>The army has long been at the center of political transitions in Sudan. And resistance to civilian rule has been more than less the norm since <a href="https://countrystudies.us/sudan/20.htm">independence in 1956</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there a danger the violence will escalate?</h2>
<p>A coalition of civilian groups in the country has called for an immediate halt to the violence – as has the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-secretary-state-blinken-calls-immediate-end-violence-sudan-2023-04-15/">U.S. and other international observers</a>. But with both factions dug in, that seems unlikely. Similarly, the prospect of free and fair elections in Sudan seems some ways off.</p>
<p>There doesn’t appears to be an easy route to a short-term solution, and what makes it tougher is that you have two powerful men, both with a military at their disposal, fighting each other for power that neither seem prepared to relinquish.</p>
<p>The concern is that the fighting might escalate and destabilize the region, jeopardizing Sudan’s relations with its neighbors. Chad, which borders Sudan to the west, has already <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230416-chad-closes-borders-with-sudan-amid-armed-clashes/">closed its border</a> with Sudan. Meanwhile, a couple of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/egyptian-soldiers-captured-in-sudan-to-be-returned-says-rsf">Egyptian soldiers were captured</a> in northern Sudan while violence was happening in Khartoum. Ethiopia, Sudan’s neighbor to the east, is still reeling from a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">two-year war in the Tigray region</a>. And the spread of unrest in Sudan will be a concern to those watching an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/why-has-peace-eluded-south-sudan-2023-02-03/">uneasy peace deal</a> in South Sudan – which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html">gained independence from Sudan in 2011</a> and has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">beset by ethnic fighting ever since</a>.</p>
<p>As such, the stakes in the current unrest could go beyond the immediate future of Burhan, Dagalo and even the Sudanese nation. The stability of the region could also be out at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Tounsel has previously received funding from the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Social Science Research Council, the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the University of Michigan, the Pennsylvania State University, Macalester College, and the University of Washington. </span></em></p>Violence in Sudan threatens to throw the troubled nation into chaos. A scholar of the region explains what is going on and what’s at stake.Christopher Tounsel, Associate Professor of History, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999912023-03-02T14:25:26Z2023-03-02T14:25:26ZThe Lake Chad Basin is a security nightmare. 5 guidelines for finding solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510857/original/file-20230217-26-979ksn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The violence in north-east Nigeria has displaced thousands of people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is now 14 years since Boko Haram and other armed groups began to operate in the Lake Chad Basin. The region, which includes Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, has become unstable and the people who live there are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. </p>
<p>Out of the <a href="https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/climate-change/climate-change-conflict-what-is-fuelling-the-lake-chad-crisis-75639">30 million</a> people in the Lake Chad region, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/icrc-urgent-efforts-needed-ensure-protection-11-million-people-lake-chad-region">11.3 million</a> have been displaced by the conflict and over <a href="https://www.unocha.org/lakechad2023">11 million</a> urgently need aid. </p>
<p>Drought and flooding are adding to the problem. Lake Chad, the primary source of water in the region, has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-private-sector-is-shaping-the-future-of-lake-chad-and-the-congo-basin-162532">shrunk</a> significantly due to drought <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-private-sector-is-shaping-the-future-of-lake-chad-and-the-congo-basin-162532">since the 1960s</a>. In 2022, the region was hit by a severe flood. More than <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022-000287-tcd">600,000 people</a> and large areas of agricultural land were affected. These climate-related disasters pose a serious challenge to food security. <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis">Over 5 million people</a> in the region are struggling to get enough food to survive and <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis">half a million children</a> are suffering from acute malnutrition. </p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin conflict affects everyone who lives there. But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12548.pdf">evidence</a> suggests that young people experience the greatest impact. The majority of the people who join Boko Haram are young men. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12548.pdf">Poverty</a>, absence of basic services like education and healthcare, and loss of livelihoods push young men to join Boko Haram. </p>
<p>With the region’s population expected to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/demographic-dynamics-and-crisis-countries-around-lake-chad">double</a> in the next two decades, the insecurity has serious implications for development and people’s well-being.</p>
<h2>Five focus areas for Lake Chad</h2>
<p>For many years, the governments of the affected countries have worked together with the international community to find solutions. Several <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis">high level conferences</a> have been organised to raise funds and discuss the crisis. In 2018, the affected countries adopted a five-year <a href="https://cblt.org/regional-strategy-stabilization/">regional strategy</a> to address the root causes of Boko Haram’s emergence and its consequences. But the crisis has continued, largely due to limited collaboration and underfunding.</p>
<p>In January 2023, as <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/projects/internationalrelationssecurity/dataanddisplacement/data-displacement/researchteam/team-members">researchers </a>and <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/people/chika-charles-aniekwe/">practitioners</a> working in the fields of stabilisation and displacement we visited Niamey, the capital of Niger, for the <a href="https://www.unocha.org/lakechad2023">3rd High Level Conference on the Lake Chad Basin Region</a>. </p>
<p>The aim of the conference was to take stock of the progress made in addressing the crisis and to forge pathways for a more coherent and collaborative response. A diverse range of voices was represented, from government officials to international agencies, researchers and civil society groups.</p>
<p>The importance of local ownership, social inclusion, civilian protection and climate action are key points that emerged from the conference.</p>
<p><strong>Regional and national ownership</strong></p>
<p>International partners, donors and other actors involved in stabilisation, peace, development and humanitarian aid agreed to work with the local communities, national governments and regional institutions to foster regional and national ownership of intervention programmes. This idea isn’t new: it was <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/fixing-the-lake-chad-crisis-from-the-bottom-up/">mooted</a> in 2021 at the third governors’ forum. Yet progress has been slow. </p>
<p>The idea is that the local communities who suffer the impact of the crisis and who know the context must participate actively in finding and implementing solutions, rather than having external solutions imposed. Solutions that are shaped by the culture and values of the affected populations are more likely to be relevant to them. This will help to build trust and sustain peace and development. </p>
<p><strong>Including young people, women and girls</strong></p>
<p>Young men face higher risk of joining Boko Haram. Women and girls face the risk of sexual violation and gender-based violence, including rape and forced marriage at the hands of extremist groups. The key message of this high-level conference was “leave no one behind”. Participants emphasised the need to create employment opportunities for young people to restore their hope and build shared prosperity. This can be achieved through entrepreneurship programmes, skills training and engaging youths in productive agriculture. Victims of sexual violations should receive mental health and psychosocial support.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003041566-10/violent-militancy-mended-masculinities-modestatochi-alozie">research</a> has shown that youth interventions can reinforce inequality if elites or youth representatives “capture” the programmes and less powerful youth groups are excluded. This must be avoided.</p>
<p><strong>Managing mass exit from Boko Haram</strong></p>
<p>Some programmes have been implemented to facilitate the voluntary exit of Boko Haram recruits and reintegrate them into the society. Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor">Operation Safe Corridor</a> is one.</p>
<p>But if exits from violent groups are not handled well, social cohesion and community security could be undermined. <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b170-exit-boko-haram-assessing-nigerias-operation-safe-corridor">Critics</a> point out that Operation Safe Corridor does not provide enough screening, training, support and reparations for Boko Haram members before reintegrating them into the community.</p>
<p><a href="https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/lake-chad-basin-crisis-response-plan-2022#:%7E:text=Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Crisis%20Response%20Plan%202022,%24%2038.7M%20FUNDING%20CONFIRMED%20%24%20153.3M%20FUNDING%20GAP">Transitional justice mechanisms</a> will be needed to address the legacy of the conflict (including human rights violations and abuses) and ensure accountability, justice and reconciliation. The root causes of the conflict, such as poverty and lack of economic opportunities, must also be addressed so that those who return home can live dignified and better lives.</p>
<p>Consultation with the wider community is necessary to improve acceptance and to ensure peaceful reintegration. Prioritising the needs of former Boko Haram members over those of the victims is unfair. </p>
<p><strong>Protection of civilians</strong></p>
<p>Many civilians continue to face violent attacks not just from Boko Haram but also from military officials. In recent years, civilians‘ access to humanitarian assistance has decreased. In part, this is due to immigration obstacles and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/echo-crisis-report-n-19-lake-chad-basin-crisis-11-february-2021">increasing attacks</a> on humanitarian workers. Civilians could be better protected through training more military officers on human rights and by supporting communities to build their own coping mechanisms. </p>
<p><strong>Climate action</strong></p>
<p>Conference participants explained that more work is needed to address the link between climate change, violence and displacement in response planning. Drought and flooding are increasing competition for land, water and food. This has led to conflict and displacement, as seen in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-fPEHUqhyA">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2023/1/18/climate-fueled-violence-and-displacement-in-the-lake-chad-basin-focus-on-chad-and-cameroon">Cameroon</a>.</p>
<p>An important first step will be to amend the <a href="https://cblt.org/regional-strategy-stabilization/">Regional Stabilisation Strategy</a> to respond to this link. More funds will also be required to manage the harmful consequences of climate change. Yet funding continues to shrink. In 2022, the <a href="https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/lake-chad-basin-crisis-response-plan-2022#:%7E:text=Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Crisis%20Response%20Plan%202022,%24%2038.7M%20FUNDING%20CONFIRMED%20%24%20153.3M%20FUNDING%20GAP">International Organization for Migration</a> reported an 87% funding gap in addressing the drivers and longer term impacts of crises and displacement in the region, including climate change. </p>
<p>Achieving a peaceful future in the Lake Chad Basin requires more collaboration and financial commitment. Time, however, is running short.</p>
<p><em>This article was co-authored with Dr. Chika Charles Aniekwe. He is the Senior Advisor and Head of Stabilisation for the UNDP/Lake Chad Basin Stabilisation Strategy</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Modesta Tochukwu Alozie has Consulted for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a Rapporteur and as a conflict analyst. </span></em></p>The insecurity in the area has serious implications for development and the well-being of people, especially young people.Modesta Tochukwu Alozie, Lead Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996282023-02-20T13:52:18Z2023-02-20T13:52:18ZIslamist terrorism is rising in the Sahel, but not in Chad – what’s different?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511155/original/file-20230220-18-cskr5w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Local residents gather around the biggest mosque in the region for the evening prayer in Bahai, Chad.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Di Lauro/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the rise of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria and the emergence of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat">Islamist-Salafist</a> groups in northern Mali in 2013, the Sahel has increasingly been caught in the maelstrom of Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>The region is now described as the new <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133217">global epicentre</a> of violent extremism. The population is suffering immensely, and in some areas more than <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698048/EPRS_BRI(2021)698048_EN.pdf">2 million</a> people have been displaced. Agriculture and development have come to a halt there.</p>
<p>Five explanations are usually given for the rise of Islamist terrorism in the Sahel: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/salafism-in-nigeria/5EC64F70A4BCBD521C64C610A0A05FD8">dissatisfaction</a> with the political order, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">bad governance</a>, <a href="https://www.clingendael.org/publication/crime-after-jihad-illicit-business-post-conflict-mali">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=364364319">ethnic rivalries</a> to <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/money-talks-a-key-reason-youths-join-boko-haram">economic reasons</a> such as poverty or unemployment, especially among the youth. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/hope-better-jobs-eclipses-religious-ideology-main-driver-recruitment-violent-extremist-groups-sub-saharan-africa">recent study</a> cited economic precarity as the main factor. This is a scenario where young people in particular face high unemployment and thus lose hope about the future.</p>
<p>Chad is one of the <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks">poorest countries</a> in the world. It was ruled for 30 years by the authoritarian president Idriss Déby Itno, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">died in 2021</a> under unexplained circumstances. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno offered Chadians great hope, but ended up leaving a terrible legacy</a>
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<p>The country fulfils all the conditions associated with Islamist terrorism. But, so far, the threat reaches Chad from the neighbouring countries and not from the inside. So then, what holds Chadian society together? </p>
<p>For my <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/contjas/article/view/239122">research</a> I drew on data from an opinion survey I conducted in five Chadian towns (the capital N’Djamena, Abéché, Sarh, Mongo and Moundou) from 2015 to 2016. My aim was to get the views of all ethnic and linguistic groups in the country. Long-term studies show that people do not change their political and religious attitudes overnight. In view of the actual political transition in Chad and the increase in Islamist terror in the region, the results are still valid today and could allow conclusions to be drawn for other countries.</p>
<p>The results show that one reason the threat of Islamist terrorism doesn’t come from inside is because Chadians want to live together peacefully. Other reasons include the fact that Chadians have high religious tolerance and Deby’s authoritarian regime favoured groups who had a tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas - appeasing them with economic benefits. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>My research sampled 1,857 people who answered about 130 questions in face-to-face interviews. By analysing the quantitative dataset, I identified groups within Chadian society according to their propensity for democracy, cohabitation and religiosity, and their religious fundamentalist tendencies.</p>
<p>The data confirmed a high fragmentation of Chad’s society along ethnic, religious and economic lines. </p>
<p><strong>Democracy:</strong> Chad is one of the <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TCD#pos4">least democratic</a> countries of the world. Yet more than half of the survey respondents supported democratic ideas. </p>
<p><strong>Tolerance:</strong> A substantial majority of respondents expressed the desire to live peacefully with other groups. But the respondents who labelled themselves Salafists – the spectrum of Salafism ranges from a spiritual renewal of Islam as in the times of Mohammed to a hybrid religious-political ideology seeking to establish a global caliphate – were the least inclined to social coexistence.</p>
<p>During individual interviews, religious Muslim and Christian leaders and opinion leaders also emphasised Chadians’ willingness to live together peacefully. They stressed that both religions are frequently represented in many families. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-rise-of-jihadist-movements-in-africa-42905">What lies behind the rise of jihadist movements in Africa</a>
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<p><strong>Religion:</strong> Chad, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2010/04/15/religious-affiliation-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/">a predominantly Muslim society</a>, is one of the few countries in the Sahel region to have a substantial Christian minority. This is partly a legacy of French colonial rule, which fostered a Christian educated elite in the south of the country.</p>
<p>It is also a consequence of Déby’s authoritarian and corrupt rule which emphasised the balance between the different religions. However, he favoured certain groups from the north who had been Islamised for centuries. Members of these groups were over represented in the highest income categories.</p>
<p>The data confirmed that religion played an important role in the daily life of most of those interviewed. The regular observance of religious practices is firmly embedded in the everyday life of Muslims and Christians. </p>
<p>The religious practices of the other religions were also acknowledged. </p>
<p>I was particularly interested in the respondents’ tendency towards religious fundamentalist ideas that could possibly lead to religious violence. The dataset allowed me to create an “Islamist fundamentalism” index. </p>
<p>In contrast to “religiosity”, which measures religious affiliation, belief and practice, conceptualising the measurement of any <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4">religious fundamentalism</a> focuses on:</p>
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<li><p>a literal understanding of the sacred book of the respective religion </p></li>
<li><p>the exclusivity of one’s religion </p></li>
<li><p>the importance of religion in societal life. </p></li>
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<p>The Islamist fundamentalism index also contained specific items like the introduction of Sharia law. In this way, I was able to identify respondents who were more inclined towards Islamic fundamentalism, and might even be willing to lean towards Islamist terrorism to achieve their goals.</p>
<p>The highest Islamist attitudes were expressed by more than a third of the sampled Muslim population. I found the strongest Islamist fundamentalist attitudes among respondents who attended an Arabic primary school or a Qur’anic school and had no further schooling, and among respondents with two years of higher education.</p>
<p>Only a minority of the respondents who never went to any school showed Islamist fundamentalist attitudes. </p>
<p><strong>Social profile:</strong> A large number of respondents who scored high as Islamist fundamentalists were merchants and came from high income groups. Most were most likely to have benefited economically during the Déby era. They displayed the biggest support for the late authoritarian president, embraced above average undemocratic attitudes, and supported authoritarian structures in general.</p>
<h2>What’s significant</h2>
<p>Why are these results noteworthy? </p>
<p>Research in other countries has shown that dissatisfaction and frustration about bad governance, corruption or poverty fosters the emergence of Islamist terrorism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988">Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship</a>
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<p>In Chad, however, the profiteers of the Déby regime were the most fundamentalist. They admitted that they were willing to take to violence if they did not agree with their political leader. But, with their own position secured, they seem not to have seen any need to turn against the corrupt structures that benefited them. They had made peace with the regime.</p>
<p>Déby’s son Mahamat Déby has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56836109">taken power</a> by violating the country’s constitution. He was appointed transitional president in October 2022 following a so-called national inclusive dialogue. Like his father, he has to deal with sporadic attacks by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria">Boko Haram</a> in the Lake Chad region, which is threatened by Islamist terrorism. The economic situation of the country is precarious. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chad-is-making-a-huge-effort-to-find-peace-chadians-arent-convinced-it-will-work-189268">Chad is making a huge effort to find peace: Chadians aren't convinced it will work</a>
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<p>Will Mahamat Déby continue to satisfy his wealthier, non-democratic compatriots, who are more inclined towards Islamist fundamentalist ideas and were the strong supporters of his father’s rule?</p>
<p>Or will he opt for democratic structures and fair distribution of resources and wealth so as not to give fundamentalist Islamist groups inside Chad a reason to turn to violence and against the state?</p>
<p>The answers to these questions are unclear. What’s needed is more knowledge about these groups and their attitudes, their behaviour and propensity for radicalisation. This will broaden our understanding of Islamist tendencies and threats, and to develop long-term peace in the Sahel.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow received funding from the Gerda-Henkel-Foundation in the framework of the special research programme “Islam” for a research project about laicism in Chad. </span></em></p>Chad fulfils all conditions to be affected by Islamist terrorism. But the threat so far comes from its neighbours, not from the inside.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1950442022-12-04T08:40:51Z2022-12-04T08:40:51ZViolent extremism could beckon in north-western Nigeria if local dynamics are ignored<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496711/original/file-20221122-20-imd8gj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Parents of students abducted from Bethel Baptist High School, Kaduna State, north-west Nigeria, pray inside the school premises. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 2022, in a bid to stem a tide of violent attacks and kidnappings in north-western Nigeria, the government <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/6/nigeria-labels-bandit-gangs-terrorists-in-bid-to-stem-violence">labelled</a> the armed groups involved in the violence “terrorists”. </p>
<p>The relationship between these groups and the internationally designated terrorist groups <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a> and <a href="https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Facing-the-Challenge-of-the-Islamic-State-in-West-Africa-Province">Islamic State in West Africa Province</a> in north-eastern Nigeria was unclear. </p>
<p>But the decision illustrated growing concern that violent extremism might spread to the country’s north-west. It also raised questions about the types of measures that were needed to prevent escalation of violence. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/">Small Arms Survey</a> and the <a href="https://www.undp.org/">United Nations Development Programme</a> (UNDP) recently launched a <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/perceptions-vulnerabilities-and-prevention-violent-extremism-threat-assessment-selected">new report</a> assessing the threat of violent extremism in this border region, as well as in four other border areas in northern Chad, southern Libya, north-eastern Niger, and western Sudan. </p>
<p>We contributed to the report, which builds on the UNDP’s 2017 Journey to Extremism in Africa <a href="https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/">study</a>. That study found that individuals raised in marginalised borderlands can be especially vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups. Hence the focus on border regions and prevention in the new report. </p>
<p>The Small Arms Survey is an internationally funded programme. It has an extensive track record in research on weapons and armed actors in <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources?combine=nigeria&sort_by=field_date_value&type=All&theme=All&region=All&language=All">Nigeria</a>, and the broader <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/project/security-assessment-north-africa-sana">West Africa and Sahel region</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-SANA-Report-Lost-in-Trans-nation.pdf">Marginalised border communities</a> are also seen as vulnerable to the <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-AU-Weapons-Compass.pdf">proliferation of illicit small arms</a>. </p>
<p>By relying on general population surveys, the report shows how local societies are, or could be affected by violent extremism. It aims to inform policy making and programming for prevention. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496705/original/file-20221122-22-xu4jmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<h2>The study</h2>
<p>The study surveyed people’s perceptions of drivers (or root factors), actors and values associated with violent extremism. It is based on 6,852 interviews between December 2020 and July 2021, including 1,643 in north-western Nigeria. </p>
<p>The surveyed regions were not considered to be hotspots of violent extremism. We selected them due to concerns that terrorist organisations operating nearby might eventually expand their activities to these areas. </p>
<p>The study included north-western Nigeria because of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem">conflict</a> there between Fulani herders and Hausa farmers over pastoral and agricultural resources, as well as competition over emerging mining opportunities.</p>
<p>It was also important to take into account the transnational dimension of conflict drivers. Government policies on border management, such as permissive immigration policies, might be relevant. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/halting-deepening-turmoil-nigerias-north-west">range of armed groups</a> have perpetrated violence in north-western Nigeria. Among them are vigilantes, criminal gangs, herder-allied groups and jihadists. Local “bandits” also appear to be mingling with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/18/rising-insecurity-in-northwest-nigeria-terrorism-thinly-disguised-as-banditry/">violent extremist groups</a>. </p>
<p>Armed groups in the region have used <a href="https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-BP-Nigeria-craft-weapons.pdf">locally manufactured firearms</a> and factory-produced small arms. The weapons <a href="https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/nigerias-herder-farmer-conflict/">reportedly</a> come from other countries in the region and from within Nigeria. </p>
<h2>Drivers of violent extremism</h2>
<p>The seven drivers of conflict we focused on were: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>hardship and deprivation</p></li>
<li><p>lack of adequate security and justice</p></li>
<li><p>limited access to basic services</p></li>
<li><p>the growing importance of ethnic or religious identities</p></li>
<li><p>chronic instability and insecurity</p></li>
<li><p>blocked political participation and the influence of non-state armed groups</p></li>
<li><p>the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Figure 4.35 shows that exposure to the various drivers depends on the context of each region. </p>
<p>Reducing vulnerability to violent extremism will require putting each region’s most relevant needs and grievances first.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/496704/original/file-20221122-20-fqd0k3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<h2>The situation in north-western Nigeria</h2>
<p>Overall, north-western Nigeria appeared less exposed to strong religious and ethnic identities, and to poverty and deprivation than the other four case studies. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the Nigerian respondents reported higher than average levels of disgruntlement with the government, and north-western Nigeria also stood out as vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisation along identity lines. Interestingly, dissatisfaction with security forces was not as strong as with the government. But perceived insecurity was the highest in north-western Nigeria. </p>
<p>Respondents felt strongly that women and youth were under-represented in leadership, community and political roles. The region also reported the study’s highest levels of victimisation to gender-based violence — by a significant margin. </p>
<p>The region’s respondents reported the highest levels of proliferation of small arms. They reported flows of small arms with other regions of the country and other countries in the region. They were particular about Niger, Chad, Libya and Mali. </p>
<p>A significant 19% of respondents in all regions reported being aware of recruitment by local or foreign armed groups in their communities. The rate in north-western Nigeria was the highest at 35%. This shows the border region’s particular exposure to the activities of non-state armed groups. </p>
<p>Interviewees in all regions said armed groups recruited both men and boys, and women and girls. </p>
<p>Armed groups were not only seen as a threat. In some instances their role was perceived as positive. For example, some respondents noted that armed groups offered protection, owned businesses, and provided cash income. </p>
<p>Respondents also felt more secure where security providers were a mix of national and local actors, including non-state actors. </p>
<h2>What must be done</h2>
<p>Policies and responses need to take into account these complex dynamics. Interventions that focus purely on security could have a negative impact on local economies and informal trade flows.</p>
<p>The report’s findings can be challenging to interpret. This is because we do not have a baseline to compare them to. But the study shows that extreme views are held by about 3% of the population in the five regions surveyed. </p>
<p>If measures don’t address the specific needs, vulnerabilities and grudges of border communities, radical views could well gain more ground and translate into increased violence. </p>
<p>Implementing timely and context-specific <a href="https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/SAS-Report-18-ExSum-EN-WEB.pdf">preventive measures</a> will be critical for reducing the risk of violent extremism in these border regions.</p>
<p>Such measures should form part of broader regional development and stabilisation efforts, to prevent extremist groups from taking advantage of a vacuum or lack of state services. </p>
<p>They may also involve community-led engagement and dialogue to address social cohesion challenges. Interventions in areas that are highly dependent on cross-border trade will be essential, yet particularly challenging. </p>
<p>The affected population and their perceptions should be at the centre of interventions. </p>
<p><em>Acknowledgement: The report discussed in this article is a joint publication of the Small Arms Survey and the UNDP’s Regional Prevention of Violent Extremism Project for Africa - which is a joint initiative of the UNDP Regional Bureaus of Africa and the Arab States. It benefited from the support of the governments of the Netherlands and Sweden. In addition to the authors, Darine Atwa, SANA project assistant, and Gergely Hideg, survey specialist, both at the Small Arms Survey, contributed to the writing of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195044/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas works for the Small Arms Survey, which is an internationally-funded associated programme of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Obayi Onyishi is currently the Adjunct Country Director of Center for Development of Institutions, Abuja. He received research grants previously from Social Science Academy of Nigeria, DFID, USIS, CODESRIA, etc. He is a member of Society for Awareness and Development in Africa (SADA), and a resource person for YIAGA, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, CISSLAC, etc.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alaa Tartir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To stem the tide of violent extremism across the Sahel region, especially northwest Nigeria, the vulnerabilities and grudges of border communities need to be properly addressed.Nicolas Florquin, Head of Data & Analytics and Senior Researcher for the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Alaa Tartir, Senior Researcher and Coordinator of the Security Assessment in North Africa project at the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Anthony Obayi Onyishi, Professor of Political Science & International Relations, University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1892682022-08-25T15:30:09Z2022-08-25T15:30:09ZChad is making a huge effort to find peace: Chadians aren’t convinced it will work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480913/original/file-20220824-9815-zql1sf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Opening ceremony of Chad's national inclusive dialogue, in N'Djamena on August 20. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Aurelie Bazzara-Kibangula/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The normally quiet airport at the Chadian capital N’Djamena was recently inundated with internationally well-known arrivals. </p>
<p>High-ranking politicians, such as Senegalese president and chair of the African Union <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Macky-Sall">Macky Sall</a>, paid a visit to support the Chadian interim president <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/07/04/chad-s-new-leader-mahamat-deby-on-a-friendship-and-working-visit-to-france//">Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno</a>, while the African Union (AU) Commission chair, <a href="https://au.int/en/cpauc5">Moussa Faki Mahamat</a>, participated in the opening ceremony of the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/15/chad-sets-new-date-for-national-dialogue-in-august/">national inclusive dialogue</a>, which started on 20 August.</p>
<p>There were also some faces that were less well known. They included men and women returning to Chad after many years of exile. They are leaders of what are called politico-military movements. They repeatedly challenged the late president Idriss Déby’s rule by advancing militarily from neighbouring Sudan or Libya towards the capital.</p>
<p>More than 40 of these groups had just <a href="https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/09/08/2022/chad-parties-sign-peace-deal-to-start-national-dialogue">signed a peace accord</a> with the Chadian transitional government in Doha after five months of negotiations. They are back in the country to participate in the national inclusive dialogue. Both the Chadian transitional government and the international community believe the dialogue is the way to peace and democracy in Chad.</p>
<p>More than 1,400 representatives of all social groups are to draw up a new social contract and a constitution that will unite multi-ethnic, multi-religious and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13164690">conflict-ridden Chad</a> after 30 years of authoritarian rule. </p>
<p>The elections are supposed to end the military rule of the transitional government and hand over power to a civilian government. </p>
<p>But many Chadians suspect that the military and the interim president are not willing to do so. </p>
<h2>Why a national dialogue now?</h2>
<p>Chad is in a phase of transition due to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">unexpected death</a> of long-time president Idriss Déby Itno in April 2021. </p>
<p>His death resulted in the politico-military movement <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/qui-sont-les-rebelles-du-front-pour-lalternance-et-la-concorde-au-tchad/a-57255972">Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad</a> (FACT) advancing towards N’Djamena.</p>
<p>The Conseil Militaire de Transition under the leadership of late Déby’s son Mahamat unconstitutionally took over power immediately. </p>
<p>Under pressure from the former colonial power and now <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/france-urges-chad-not-to-delay-peace-dialogue/">ally France</a> as well as the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1016th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-3-august-2021-on-the-report-of-the-au-commission-on-progress-of-the-political-transition-in-chad-and-the-au-support-mechanism-ausm">AU</a>, the Conseil Militaire de Transition agreed to a transition period of 18 months. </p>
<p>The agreement was that during this period, a national inclusive dialogue would be held, a new constitution drafted and elections organised. </p>
<p>But before the dialogue could take place, a peace agreement was needed with the various <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir">politico-military movements</a> that had repeatedly threatened Déby’s authoritarian rule. These movements are led by political opponents, former profiteers of his regime, or even disgraced family or members of his own ethnic group. </p>
<p>As a result a pre-dialogue took place in Doha, the capital of Qatar. </p>
<p>After five months of negotiations between representatives of more than 50 movements and the Chadian government, a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chad-historic-agreement-no-guarantee-for-peace/a-62758243">peace agreement</a> was finally signed on 8 August 2022.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/08/africa/chad-rebels-peace-agreement-intl/index.html">Doha peace agreement</a> is aimed at ensuring a ceasefire between the transition government and the movements. </p>
<p>The government promised them security on their return to Chad, amnesty for their fighters and the restitution of their confiscated properties. The agreement foresees a disarmament programme.</p>
<p>For their part the movements pledged not to recruit new fighters. </p>
<p>It all sounds fine, but there are serious shortcomings. </p>
<h2>The gaps</h2>
<p>The big questions are about government’s security guarantees and compensation for properties confiscated decades ago. Chad is a country where blood revenge is still the order of the day in some regions. And it is one of the world’s <a href="https://borgenproject.org/tag/poverty-in-chad/">poorest countries</a>. </p>
<p>But most importantly, the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/08/meet-rebel-groups-in-chads-peace-deal/">two strongest military movements</a> have not signed the agreement. These are the FACT and the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/tchad-le-mouvement-politico-militaire-ccmsr-suspend-sa-participation-aux-n%C3%A9gociations-de-doha-/2552626">Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République</a>(CCMSR). </p>
<p>The CCMSR has repeatedly confronted the Chadian military near the Libyan border. FACT’s advance in 2021 led to Déby’s death under what are still unclear circumstances. </p>
<p>FACT’s leader, Mahamat Mahdi, justified his non-signature by stating that not all of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chad-historic-agreement-no-guarantee-for-peace/a-62758243">his organisation’s demands</a> had been taken into account. This included the immediate release of prisoners.</p>
<p>The fact that the two strongest opposition movements are staying away means the prospects for peace aren’t very promising even though some of the former heavyweights have signed. </p>
<p>Among those who have signed are late Déby’s nephew <a href="https://information.tv5monde.com/info/retour-au-tchad-du-chef-rebelle-timan-erdimi-apres-des-annees-d-exil-468324">Timane Erdimi</a>, leader of the Union des Forces de la Résistance, who has been in exile since 2006. There is also <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190617-chad-rebel-chief-nouri-ufdd-arrested-france-war-crimes">Mahamat Nouri</a>, leader of the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement, whose forces almost overthrew Déby when they reached N’Djamena in 2008. </p>
<h2>Who will take part in the national dialogue?</h2>
<p>Since the Conseil Militaire de Transition came to power, civil society, led by Wakit Tama, and political opposition have <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/getting-chads-transition-track">demanded a revision</a> of the transitional charter to assure that Conseil Militaire de Transition members, especially Mahamat Déby, will not stand for the next election. </p>
<p>Mahamat Déby remains vague about his political ambitions. According to the Doha agreement, this question will be included in the national dialogue. But who are the participants who will finally decide on these issues? </p>
<p>The organisers of the dialogue <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/05/chad-junta-publishes-list-of-participants-in-national-dialogue/">published a list</a> that includes the percentage of representatives of presumably all levels of society. Even if one approaches the list impartially, some of the numbers are puzzling. </p>
<p>For example, the diaspora in the whole of Europe or North America (the US and Canada) are each given two places – the same number as Burkina Faso or Benin, to name two smaller African states. </p>
<p>Civil society and political opposition published a calculation on 8 August 2022 showing that <a href="https://www.dw.com/fr/le-plan-de-table-du-dialogue-national-au-tchad/a-62872647">90%</a> of the more than <a href="https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1123939/world/region/chad-at-decisive-moment-as-dialogue-opens">1,400 delegates</a> are close to the Conseil Militaire de Transition. </p>
<p>The political and civil opposition, headed by <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2021/12/15/chad-Wakit-Tama-continues-to-protest-military-authorities-continue-restrict-right-to-protest/">Wakit Tama</a> and the <a href="https://m.facebook.com/transtchad/about">party Les Transformateurs</a>, therefore decided to boycott the national dialogue. </p>
<p>Once again, the hard hand of the transitional authorities was shown: a demonstration that had been announced for the day before the start of the dialogue was forbidden.</p>
<p>It is little wonder that ordinary Chadians don’t expect a lot from the national dialogue, let alone a change of government in the long run. </p>
<h2>Chadians aren’t convinced</h2>
<p>For many Chadians it seems to be obvious that the ruling elite, the Déby clan and the generals of the Conseil Militaire de Transition will try everything to stay in power, including contesting in the next elections. This has implications because under the late Déby election results were never a <a href="https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TCD#pos4">true representation</a> of voters’ will. </p>
<p>International media and <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/chad/news/article/chad-france-welcomes-the-signing-of-a-peace-agreement-between-chad-s-government">politicians</a> praise the transition authorities’ will to reform. Even UN general secretary Antonio Guterres sent a video message at the signature of the Doha agreement. </p>
<p>However, Chadians are very aware of the international community’s and especially <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/keeping-chads-transition-track">France’s support</a> for the Conseil Militaire de Transition. France has a strong military presence and <a href="https://lejournaldelafrique.com/en/pourquoi-la-france-continue-a-soutenir-deby-au-tchad/">military base</a> in Chad. And the airport of N’Djamena is vital for France’s fight against jihadism in the Sahel. </p>
<p>Of course, Chadians want peace after years of civil wars. But they also do not want to be ruled by a clan that has been enriching itself from the resources of the state for decades instead of <a href="https://ideas4development.org/en/chad-oil-war/">investing</a> the oil revenues into the development of the country.</p>
<p>At the same time, people face severe hardship. Chad is one of the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Chad_Country_Profile_January_2021.pdf">five poorest countries</a> in the world. Most of its citizens are struggling to survive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189268/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chad’s ongoing national inclusive dialogue appears great on paper but there are serious gaps and little hope for peace and democracy.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1892562022-08-24T15:30:47Z2022-08-24T15:30:47ZBreakthrough shows humans were already standing on their own two feet 7 million years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480806/original/file-20220824-12-6oj7od.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C10%2C3521%2C2461&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Artwork in the Djourab desert, Chad, gives a taste of how our oldest ancestors got around.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sabine Riffaut, Guillaume Daver, Franck Guy / Palevoprim / CNRS – Université de Poitiers / MPFT</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The study of present-day species has delivered a clear verdict on humanity’s place in the living world: right alongside chimpanzees and bonobos. However, this does not tell us much about <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-humans-split-from-the-apes-55104">our earliest human representatives</a>, their biology or geographical distribution – in short, how we became human. For this, we mainly have to rely on the morphology of frustratingly rare fossils, given <a href="https://serious-science.org/paleogenetics-1936">paleogenetic</a> information is only preserved for recent periods – and even then, in rather cool climates.</p>
<p>Since the 1960s and the identification of the very early age of <em>Australopithecus</em> – including the famous <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/lucy-a-marvelous-specimen-135716086/">Lucy</a> aged 3.18 Ma (million years ago), discovered in 1974 in Ethiopia – <a href="https://www.hominides.com/html/dossiers/bipedalism.php">the acquisition of bipedalism</a> has been regarded as a decisive step in human evolution. Indeed, it is an essential feature that marks the transition from non-human to human long before the significant increase in the size of our brain.</p>
<p>There has been much anticipation of <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04901-z">our study</a>, published on 24 August in <em>Nature</em>, on the skeleton of <a href="https://www.medecinesciences.org/fr/articles/medsci/full_html/2006/04/medsci2006223p250/medsci2006223p250.html"><em>Sahelanthropus tchadensis</em></a>, who is a candidate for the oldest-known representative of humanity. </p>
<p>So, was our distant ancestor a biped or not – i.e., human or not human? In reality, asking the question in these terms borders on circular reasoning. Given we have yet to discover the last common ancestor we share with chimpanzees, we do not know the initial state of human locomotion – bipedal or otherwise.</p>
<h2>Were the first representatives of humanity bipeds?</h2>
<p>Until now, the earliest data available to us were the limb bones of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orrorin"><em>Orrorin</em></a> (6 Ma, Kenya) and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardipithecus"><em>Ardipithecus</em></a> (5.8 Ma–4.2 Ma, Ethiopia), which practised a different type of bipedalism from that of more recent species. It turns out bipedalism is not an invariable feature of humanity and has its own history within our history. The right question is therefore: were the first representatives of humanity bipedal, and if so, to what extent and how? This is the question that our <a href="http://palevoprim.labo.univ-poitiers.fr/missing-limbs/">Franco-Chadian team</a> sought to answer by studying the much older remains (about 7 Ma) of <em>Sahelanthropus</em>.</p>
<p>The existence of <em>Sahelanthropus</em> was initially <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature00879">deduced in 2002</a> from a distorted but otherwise well-preserved cranium (nicknamed Toumaï) and a few other cranio-dental specimens discovered by the <a href="http://palevoprim.labo.univ-poitiers.fr/2018/06/19/tchad/">Franco-Chadian palaeoanthropological mission</a> (founded and directed by Michel Brunet) at Toros-Menalla in the Djourab Desert in Chad, representing at least three individuals. The study is primarily based on the morphology of the teeth, face and braincase that this species has been compared with more recent human fossils.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 80,000 readers look to The Conversation France’s newsletter for expert insights into the world’s most pressing issues</em>. <a href="https://theconversation.com/fr/newsletters/la-newsletter-quotidienne-5?utm_source=inline-70ksignup">Sign up now</a>]</p>
<p>The limb bones described in our article include a partial left femur (thigh bone) and two left and right ulnae (together with the radius, the ulna is one of the two bones in the forearm that form our elbow). These bones were found in the same locality and year as the cranium, but <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-00972-z">were identified later</a> in 2004. They most likely belong to the same species as the cranium, as only one large primate was identified out of nearly 13,800 fossils representing about 100 different vertebrates across 400 localities in Toros-Menalla. However, it is not known whether this femur, ulnae and cranium belong to the same individual, as at least three different individuals were found onsite.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480807/original/file-20220824-20-q8sbdu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">3D digitised models of the three limb bones of TM 266 attributed to <em>Sahelanthropus tchadensis</em> (left, femur in posterior and medial views; right, the two ulnae in anterior and lateral views).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Franck Guy/CNRS/Université de Poitiers/MPFT</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A number of factors slowed down our research, which began in 2004. For example, we were required to prioritise field research of other postcranial remains, while we struggled to analyse fragmentary material. We eventually relaunched the project in 2017 and concluded it five years later.</p>
<h2>Bones studied from every angle</h2>
<p>Given the poor preservation of these long bones (the femur, for example, has lost both ends), <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047248420301597">brief analyses</a> cannot provide reliable interpretations. We therefore studied them from all angles, both in terms of their external morphology and internal structures.</p>
<p>To reduce uncertainty, we employed an extensive set of methods, including direct observations and biometric measurements, 3D image analysis, shape analysis (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morphometrics">morphometrics</a>) and biomechanical indicators. We compared the Chadian material with present-day and fossil specimens through the prism of 23 criteria. Taken separately, none can be used to propose a categorical interpretation of the material – indeed, there are no “magic” traits in paleoanthropology, and all will be subject to discussion within the scientific community.</p>
<p>Taken together, however, these traits result in an interpretation of these fossils that is far more parsimonious than any alternative hypothesis. This combination therefore indicates that <em>Sahelanthropus</em> practised habitual bipedalism – i.e., that is as a regular means of locomotion. In this case, bipedalism was probably used for movement on the ground as well as in trees. In the latter case, it was most likely accompanied by a quadrupedal gait accompanied by the grasping of branches, in contrast from the quadrupedal gait practised by gorillas and chimpanzees, known as “knuckle walking”, in which weight is supported by the backs of the phalanges.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480823/original/file-20220824-24-m7s9pf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relationships between humans, gorillas and chimpanzees. Bipedalism gradually became the means of locomotion within the human branch from a combination of bipedalism and tree climbing, as documented by Sahelanthropus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Franck Guy/CNRS/Université de Poitiers/MPFT</span>, <span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The results are consistent with observations made on <em>Orrorin</em> and <em>Ardipithecus</em>, and have several implications. First, they reinforce the concept of a very early form of bipedalism in human history coexisting with other modes of locomotion. Thus there was no “sudden” appearance of a characteristic unique to humanity right from the start, but a long, slow transition spanning millions of years. </p>
<p>This phase of human evolution thus took place in ways that are quite common throughout the history of life and the globe, and it reminds us that our species is but a fragment of biodiversity. This fact alone should lead us to rethink our attitude toward the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rapport-de-lipbes-sur-la-biodiversite-lheure-nest-plus-aux-demi-mesures-116473">living world</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/comprendre-la-notion-de-limites-planetaires-145227">parameters</a> that govern the hospitality of our planet.</p>
<p>Second, the characteristics of <em>Sahelanthropus</em>, <em>Orrorin</em> and <em>Ardipithecus</em> suggest the ancestor we share with chimpanzees was neither chimpanzee-like nor the exclusive biped we have become. Contrary to the hypothesis that chimpanzees and bonobos <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-02226-5">retained their ancestral morphology</a>, their particular combination of vertical climbing and “knuckle walking” more likely evolved well after our divergence.</p>
<p>Finally, if <em>Sahelanthropus tchadensis</em> is a witness of human diversity among others, it is, to this day, the only known habitual bipedal species of that age. Considering the whole, weakly diversified, hominoid fossil record of Africa and Eurasia at the end of the Miocene (after 10 Ma), the acquisition of bipedalism by the human branch on the African continent remains the only well-documented hypothesis to date. At this stage, the bipedalism appears to be part of an opportunistic locomotor repertoire – flexible, able to take advantage of different environments – that corresponds well to the diversified paleoenvironment of Toros-Menalla as reconstructed by the geologists, paleobotanists and paleontologists of our team.</p>
<p>This work was developed through a strong North-South scientific collaboration in palaeoanthropology, namely between the <a href="http://palevoprim.labo.univ-poitiers.fr/2018/06/19/tchad/">PALEVOPRIM laboratory</a>, the palaeontology department of the <a href="https://www.universite-ndjamena.td/">University of N’Djaména</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnar-cnrd.org/index.php/accueil">Centre National de Recherche pour le Développement</a>. These three bones belong to the Chadian heritage and will soon return to their country. At the same time, our fruitful collaboration will continue through new studies of the material as well as new field research that follows in the footsteps of the much-missed <a href="https://theconversation.com/laustralopitheque-lucy-ne-fut-pas-la-seule-passion-dyves-coppens-185927">Yves Coppens</a>, pioneer of paleontological research in Chad.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was co-authored by Abderamane Moussa (University of N’Djaména, Chad).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189256/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jean-Renaud Boisserie is associated researcher to the French Center for Ethiopian Studies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andossa Likius, Clarisse Nekoulnang Djetounako, Franck Guy, Guillaume Daver, Laurent Pallas, Mackaye Hassane Taisso et Patrick Vignaud ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur poste universitaire.</span></em></p>New research shows our oldest ancestors were able to walk as well as evolve in trees.Jean-Renaud Boisserie, Directeur de recherche au CNRS, paléontologue, Université de PoitiersAndossa Likius, Mission Paléoanthropologique Franco-Tchadienne, Université de N'Djamena (Tchad)Clarisse Nekoulnang Djetounako, Enseignante chercheure en paléontologie, Université de N'Djamena (Tchad)Franck Guy, Paléoanthropologue, Université de PoitiersGuillaume Daver, Maîtres de conférences en paléoanthropologie, Université de PoitiersLaurent Pallas, Paléontologue, Kyoto UniversityMackaye Hassane Taisso, Paléontologue, Université de N'Djamena (Tchad)Patrick Vignaud, Pr. Paléontologie, Université de PoitiersLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1849312022-06-22T14:52:55Z2022-06-22T14:52:55ZTriple punch of shocks threatens to upend debt sustainability and recovery in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469180/original/file-20220616-18-b32fy8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Children queue for porridge in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe during the height of the COVID pandemic.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Food and fuel price increases and the aftermath of the COVID pandemic are really just the start of the story when it comes to fiscal shocks which have exacerbated government debt vulnerabilities in Africa.</p>
<p>Tightening global financial conditions present a third shock that will cause debt-servicing costs to climb dramatically. This is because central banks around the world are hiking interest rates to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-01/global-economy-faces-410b-financial-shock-as-central-banks-pull-back">rein in inflation</a> that’s running at the fastest pace not seen in recent decades. </p>
<p>After the 2008 financial crisis, borrowing costs had been reduced to relatively low levels due to lower interest rates in developed countries. This enabled African governments to borrow at relatively lower rates.</p>
<p>The triple punch of rising interest rates, rising food and fuel prices and the COVID aftermath will significantly squeeze government budgets, threatening the continent’s fragile post-pandemic recovery. </p>
<p>The strain on government finances will vary across countries. Net importers of essential food items (such as wheat) and fuel have to pay more for imports, and are thus experiencing a much bigger drain on their fiscal resources. </p>
<p>On the other hand, net exporters of oil like Nigeria and Angola are likely to benefit from rising oil prices, and will have more budgetary room for responding to policy demands. </p>
<p>Not all African countries are experiencing the same squeeze on their public finances. But the triple punch of shocks has markedly increased the number that are at high risk of – or are already in – debt distress that require sovereign debt restructuring. Unfortunately, the only system in place for debt restructuring – the <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2021/12/02/the-g20-common-framework-for-debt-treatments-must-be-stepped-up/">G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment</a> – has proved ineffective for a number of reasons. These include the absence of clear procedures and timelines for debtors and creditors, a lack of clarity on how different creditors will be treated, and the growing geopolitical rift between the US and EU on one side and China and Russia on the other. </p>
<p>This is why an alternative system to the framework must be put in place without delay to alleviate the debt problems faced by African countries. Failure to do so will make it difficult to restrain Africa’s debt and imperil its fragile post pandemic recovery.</p>
<h2>The shocks</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2021/04/15/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2021">International Monetary Fund</a>, African countries spent only about 2.6% of GDP on average in 2020 to cushion the impact of COVID-19 on firms and households. And as government revenues plummeted in response to the sharp economic downturn induced by the pandemic, budget deficits widened. This added considerable strain on government debt which was already elevated. </p>
<p>As shown in Figure 1, fiscal balances further deteriorated when the pandemic struck, which constricted fiscal space and drove up government debt burdens in Africa. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469592/original/file-20220618-22-fqj9mg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Between 2019 and 2021, government debt as a percent of GDP spiked from a pre-pandemic level of 51% to a pandemic-era of 61% for the median country in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">Sub-Saharan Africa</a>. Zambia’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/zambia-becomes-africas-first-coronavirus-era-default-what-happens-now.html">default on its sovereign debt in 2020</a> was a harbinger of trouble ahead. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/39/Debt-Sustainability-Framework-for-Low-Income-Countries">IMF and World Bank</a> now consider 23 low-income African countries to be at high risk of, or already, in debt distress. This calls into question whether they will be able to keep up with their debt repayments.</p>
<p>Seven countries – Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe – are in debt distress, meaning that they are having trouble servicing their public debt. The other 16 African countries are at high risk of debt distress. Cabo Verde and Zambia stand out as the only two where public debt exceeded 100% of GDP in 2021. </p>
<p>A handful of others including Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia are at risk. Ghana’s sovereign debt jumped from <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">63% in 2019 to 82% in 2021</a>, while Guinea-Bissau’s sovereign debt edged up from <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">66% to 81%</a> over the same period. Gambia’s debt showed no signs of easing, and has remained elevated at an average level of about <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">84% since 2019</a>. </p>
<p>IMF and World Bank assessments of a country’s risk of experiencing public debt distress are based on two main types of debt sustainability analyses. The first considers a country’s projected debt burden and its vulnerability to shocks. The second assesses the risk of external and overall public debt distress using a country’s macroeconomic environment and other country specific factors.</p>
<p>For this reason, a country with a relatively lower public debt ratio could also still be vulnerable. For example, Ethiopia was deemed to be at high risk of debt distress even though its sovereign debt of <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/April">53% of GDP in 2021</a> was relatively lower. </p>
<h2>Restructuring</h2>
<p>Given this state of affairs, sovereign debt restructuring has become inevitable. The G20’s Common Framework has not been effective amid growing mistrust among the different parties involved. Any optimism that it could be improved has been dented further by escalating geopolitical tensions between the US and EU on one side and China and Russia on the other.</p>
<p>Therefore, expecting both sides to sit down and coordinate with other G20 members to negotiate new debt terms with African governments and other sovereign debtors in the developing world is a long stretch. This casts further doubt on the G20 as a negotiating forum. </p>
<p>This is why an alternative system must be put in place without delay to alleviate Africa’s debt problems in a timely manner.</p>
<p>Failure to do so will make it difficult to restrain Africa’s debt and will weaken its post pandemic recovery.</p>
<p>In the past, sovereign debtors relied on the <a href="https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/paris-club-definition-meaning/">22-member Paris Club</a> of wealthy creditor nations to negotiate debt restructurings. However, this time around, the Paris Club can no longer be used as the lead forum for debt treatments. This is largely because China is now one of Africa’s largest creditors, but is not one of the Paris Club’s members. </p>
<h2>Policy responses</h2>
<p>A return to debt sustainability will create fiscal room for African policy makers to stave off risks to the post-pandemic recovery in the face of multiple shocks that are teaming up to elevate sovereign debt pressures. But fiscal policy must be carefully targeted to avoid adding to debt vulnerabilities. This can be done in several ways.</p>
<p>First and foremost, policy makers should direct fiscal resources to protect the most vulnerable households affected by the cost-of-living crisis being wrought by the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Second, policy makers should use any budgetary room created by restraining debt to heal pandemic scars that are holding back the economic recovery. This includes supporting companies that can survive or recover, but are saddled with debt or cannot raise the financing to support themselves. </p>
<p>Support should also target new productive companies that are innovative and contribute to growth, jobs, and overall economic development. Additionally, workers set back by the pandemic should be given assistance to learn in-demand skills and adjust to new careers. </p>
<p>One of the deep scars of the pandemic was the severe disruption to schooling which led to a surge in teen pregnancies. Re-enrolling girls in classes by supporting community-based programs like <a href="https://www.projectelimu.org/">Kenya’s Project Elimu</a> will help limit the loss in human capital, and should be a top priority for policy makers.</p>
<p>Finally, African governments should use technical assistance support from multilateral lenders (IMF and World Bank) in areas that strengthen debt sustainability. These include debt management reforms, improved government revenue collection, smarter public investment programs, and debt sustainability analysis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A return to debt sustainability will create room for African policy makers to stave off risks to the post-pandemic recovery.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818832022-05-01T08:29:57Z2022-05-01T08:29:57ZHow Chad’s involvement in peace missions held back democracy back home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459735/original/file-20220426-14-agr0t0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chadian soldiers benefited from foreign aids and training.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Troop contributions to international interventions by authoritarian states pose a puzzle. On the one hand, participation in such interventions indicates support for a liberal-cosmopolitan order that entails the protection of human rights at an international level. On the other, authoritarian regimes deny these rights to their own citizens. </p>
<p>Research on this puzzle has produced contradictory findings. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2067968">Some</a> assume that, in the medium to long term, troop deployment supports democratisation efforts and eventually helps implementing a liberal-cosmopolitan order.</p>
<p>Others challenge this perspective. For example professor of international affairs Arturo C. <a href="https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/10959/myth-democratic-peacekeeper">Sotomayor</a> argues that this is a “myth of democratic peacekeepers”. The military, in many places a key obstacle towards democratisation, does not necessarily become democratic through their participation in peace operations. Academics in political science and international affairs Jamie Levin, Joseph MacKay, and Abouzar Nasirzadeh go even further to argue that troop deployment <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1108845">impedes democratic change</a>. </p>
<p>I argue that Chad during the reign of President Idriss Déby supports this.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2067968">My central argument</a> is that Déby used participation in international interventions for his own purposes, namely to stay in power. He lacked <a href="https://doi.org/10.3790/soc.64.1.53">domestic legitimacy</a> and presided over a little-institutionalised state between 1990 until his death in 2021. Through his participation in international interventions, Déby made himself an indispensable ally of France (and to a lesser extent of the US) and helped them further their interests in the wider Sahel. </p>
<p>Déby benefited threefold from his alignment with France and his active stance in international interventions. First, he received large-scale funding that he could feed into his patronage network and strengthen the military. </p>
<p>Second, he could reduce tensions within the military by sending parts of it abroad. </p>
<p>And finally, and most importantly, he secured the support of major external actors who helped silencing national and international criticism against his rule. In 2019, the French government even <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/02/airstrikes-stability-what-french-army-doing-chad/">rescued the Chadian president</a> once rebels advanced toward the capital.</p>
<h2>The dividend of troop deployment</h2>
<p>Chadian troops have participated in several international interventions on the continent. This includes France’s and the United Nation’s operations in Mali, the operations of the G5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force in the Sahel, and the operations of the African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States in the Central African Republic.</p>
<p>For Déby the financial benefits of providing peacekeeping forces were significant. </p>
<p>France alone allocated €12 million a year to Chad throughout the 2010s for structural cooperation . In addition, <a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-info/i2114.asp">donations and other forms of aid</a> worth €53 million were provided through the French forces which maintained a large base in Chad. </p>
<p>Chad also benefited from joining the <a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-up-the-g5-sahel-why-an-option-that-seemed-unlikely-came-into-being-180422">G5 Sahel Joint Force</a> and the Multinational Joint Task Force. The two coalitions were established to fight al-Qaida, Boko Haram, and their affiliates in the region.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/setting-up-the-g5-sahel-why-an-option-that-seemed-unlikely-came-into-being-180422">Setting up the G5 Sahel: why an option that seemed unlikely came into being</a>
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<p>Donors were willing <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram">to spend more</a> on these mechanisms than they would have been prepared to offer on a purely bilateral basis. </p>
<p>Another source of foreign funding were the reimbursements paid by the United Nations for the peacekeepers. The 1,090 Chadian troops deployed in peace operations in 2014, for example, meant a reimbursement of an estimated US$17.4 million for that <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-and-reimbursement">year</a>. </p>
<p>These funds benefited the military as well Déby’s regime in two ways. Chadian troops became better equipped and trained, which helped the Chadian leader in his fight against domestic rebels and other challengers. And Chad received large amounts of development aid in the slipstream of military assistance. These funds could be fed into the patronage network, resembling a kind of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1283926">“rentier peacekeeping.”</a></p>
<p>Déby benefited from participation in military operations in other ways too. Sending troops abroad helped him ensure that the military would not turn into a threat. Such a threat loomed large after he provided some positions within the military to his group, the Bideyat. Sending some forces abroad <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiw3Ov1uLH3AhUxQ_EDHRhpAp0QFnoECAIQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.almendron.com%2Ftribuna%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F05%2Fan-emerging-military-power-in-central-africa-chad-under-idriss-deby.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1fs6xXSp-QTMaiWjg0cHEJ">mitigated internal tensions</a> within the group.</p>
<p>It was nevertheless costly, and led to rivalries with other segments of the security apparatus. </p>
<p>Lastly, Déby saw his international reputation rise – and dependence on him increase as well. </p>
<p>Even though oil revenues had generated funds to improve the military’s capabilities and secure Déby’s regime from within (Chad became a large oil exporter in the <a href="https://www.oilandgasonline.com/doc/chad-prepares-to-be-an-oil-producer-0001">2000s</a> there were nevertheless a host of external threats especially in the early days of his rule. </p>
<p>As such, Chad had suffered from insecurity in its neighbouring states and from a proxy war fought on its soil. A different kind of threat stemmed from French politicians who had vigorously demanded democratic reforms in Chad. </p>
<p>It was the eventual support for France, the US, and their counter-terrorism agenda that led to a situation in which Déby’s rule became significantly less challenged from abroad. </p>
<p>Chad’s active participation in international interventions and Déby’s willingness to assume casualties – particularly in Mali, where his troops fought alongside France – were the main factors that brought that change. The Chadian president could translate the external recognition, visible, for example, through several visits of French presidents, into a stronger domestic position that overshadowed concerns about the legitimacy of his rule. </p>
<p>At Déby’s funeral in April 2021 Macron dignified Chad’s late president as a “friend” and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/chad-holds-funeral-for-late-president-idris-deby-itno/a-57307686">“courageous”</a> soldier. </p>
<h2>The downside</h2>
<p>But international support for Déby and the dependence on his troops had a downside: it came at the expense of democracy and respect for human rights. </p>
<p>Chadian civil society was frequently frustrated with the unconditional support Déby received from his international backers. Western governments ignored calls from national and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/chad-deby-leaves-legacy-abuse">international NGOs</a> to hold Déby’s regime accountable for the human rights abuses and antidemocratic practices in the country. Authoritarian rule was effectively strengthened. Déby was just too important. </p>
<p>And the pattern seems to be repeating itself for his son Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno who succeeded him after his death.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The German Foundation for Peace Research kindly supported this research project.</span></em></p>International support for Déby and the dependence on Chad’s peacekeeping troops had a downside: it came at the expense of democracy and respect for human rights.Martin Welz, Lecturer of Political Science, University of HamburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1812032022-04-19T14:26:00Z2022-04-19T14:26:00ZNo signs of a true transition in Chad a year after Idriss Déby’s death<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457956/original/file-20220413-28-mbhlag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The coffin of Idriss Deby Itno during his funeral on April 23, 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Desirey Minkoh/AfrikImages Agency/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many Chadians are looking to the capital of Qatar where almost <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/13/chad-peace-negotiations-adjourned/">50 political-military movements</a> and representatives of the Chadian transitional government have been engaged in talks since early March.</p>
<p>Qatar <a href="https://www.dohanews.co/meeting-ahead-of-qatar-facilitated-chad-talks-takes-place-in-doha/">offered</a> to facilitate negotiations, the so-called pre-dialogue, between the transitional government and the different rebel movements to give all parties the opportunity to participate.</p>
<p>The meeting’s outcome could decide the country’s future. It will determine whether Chad will be peaceful or once again be torn apart by <a href="https://www.academia.edu/44424294/Chad_Armed_Presidents_and_Politics">armed conflicts</a> over its resources.</p>
<p>One year ago the president of Chad, <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno</a>, died. The long-term ruler was killed under unexplained circumstances while visiting his troops as the Chadian rebel group <a href="https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/15.didr_tchad_le_front_pour_lalternance_et_la_concorde_au_tchad_fact_ofpra_01032018.pdf">Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad</a> advanced towards the capital, N'Djamena.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno offered Chadians great hope, but ended up leaving a terrible legacy</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/24/chads-military-ruler-mahamat-deby-names-transitional-parliament">Transitional Military Council</a>, led by his adopted son Mahamat Idriss Déby, then took power. The Zaghawa, the ethnic group of the old and new presidents, occupy the majority of posts in the council. </p>
<p>According to the constitution, the president of parliament should have acted as interim leader and called for new elections. A <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/chads-military-transition-bottleneck-and-deadlocks-constitution-making-process">transitional constitution</a> now grants Mahamat Déby even more power than his autocratic father ever had. </p>
<p>He appointed the prime minister who had already served under his father, a <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210503-military-council-in-chad-names-new-transition-government-idriss-deby-death">transitional government</a>, a transitional parliament and committees to take care of the transition. </p>
<p>He promised reconciliation, inclusive dialogue, a referendum to decide on a new constitution and elections within 18 months. This transition period could be extended once. </p>
<p>But despite the talks, what’s happened in the last 12 months makes it seem unlikely that the Military Transitional Council and Déby are willing to leave power. They would rather consolidate their rule, relying on the former power elite and the military. Liberalisation is only a cosmetic move. The country’s resources will continue to benefit the few, at the expense of its citizens. </p>
<h2>In the grip of the Zaghawa</h2>
<p>Unlike the cases of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/west-african-bloc-issues-fresh-sanctions-over-coups-in-mali-guinea/a-59750025">Mali or Guinea</a>, which had military coups in 2020 and 2021, no international sanctions against the unconstitutional transfer of power were imposed on Chad. </p>
<p>Rather, French president Emmanuel Macron provided Mahamat Déby with international recognition as his father’s successor through his presence at <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56857563">Déby’s funeral ceremonies</a>. Chad and France are closely intertwined militarily. The country is a strong military partner of France in the fight against jihadism in the Sahel.</p>
<p>The Chadian population was initially relieved that power changed without violence. The rebels withdrew and there were no clashes between different factions within the National Army. But large parts of civil society immediately spoke out against the establishment of a family rule and against French support for the Transitional Military Council. </p>
<p>Leading the way was <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2021/12/15/chad-Wakit-Tama-continues-to-protest-military-authorities-continue-restrict-right-to-protest/">Wakit Tamma</a> –- a broad alliance supported by unions, student movements and the emerging party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p09f9kgd">Les Transformateurs</a>. This alliance had rallied in the run-up to the presidential elections in February 2021 to prevent Idriss Déby’s sixth mandate. </p>
<p>As under the father’s rule, security forces brutally put down demonstrations against the new leaders. In the first protest on 27 April 2021, many people were <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/07/chad-we-do-not-recognise-the-cmt-wakit-tama/">injured and killed</a>. Wakit Tamma demands that the members of the Transitional Military Council, and above all Déby, are not allowed to stand in the next elections.</p>
<p>The military council does allow demonstrations now. However, they are allotted secluded routes so that they don’t attract attention. State television simply ignores them.</p>
<p>The supporters of the Transitional Military Council include those who benefited from Idriss Déby’s 30 years of rule. Supported by the security forces and the secret service and based on oil revenue, he built up an elaborate patronage system. </p>
<p>Members of his family, of his ethnic group the Zaghawa, and of the ruling party <a href="https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Patriotic_Salvation_Movement">Mouvement du Patriotique du Salut</a> were able to amass enormous fortunes as a reward for their loyalty – in one of the <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2021_mpi_statistical_data_table_1_and_2_en.pdf">poorest countries</a> in the world. </p>
<p>The largest share of the Zaghawas’ wealth is said to be outside the country. Chad is classified as one of the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021">most corrupt countries</a>.</p>
<p>The political opposition, already weak and fragmented under Déby senior, has slipped into insignificance since his death. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/03/chad-s-ruling-junta-appoints-transitional-government/">few prominent representatives</a> have been appointed ministers or to well-paid posts in the transitional committees. There are only a few former opposition members in the transitional parliament. Most are close to the former ruling party.</p>
<p>Then there are the political-military movements. Advances by various <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47185304">rebel movements</a> and coalitions repeatedly threatened Déby’s rule. They range from political opponents to former profiteers of his regime and disgraced family members. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-popular-movement-could-threaten-idriss-deby-itnos-30-years-in-power-157162">How a popular movement could threaten Idriss Déby Itno's 30 years in power</a>
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<p>For some, the different rebellions <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/Continuing-conflict">since 1990</a> were desperate attempts to end authoritarian rule by force – for others, a business model. Like opposition members, some rebel leaders were rewarded, at least in the short term, for their surrender with well-paid ministerial or other posts in the Déby era. </p>
<p>Some could still pose a military threat to the country’s stability.</p>
<h2>Rough road ahead</h2>
<p>This is why the pre-dialogue is now taking place in Doha. The inclusive dialogue, with representatives of the whole society, is scheduled for 10 May 2022 in Chad. </p>
<p>However, both sides request guarantees. The transitional government demands a non-aggression pact and the disarmament of the rebels. The rebel leaders insist on a reform of the army, which is considered an extension of the clan, an amnesty, and on the release of all <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211129-chad-gives-amnesty-to-hundreds-of-rebels-and-dissidents">arrested fighters</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/6/what-is-happening-with-chads-peace-talks-in-doha">Initial reports</a> from Doha suggest that the Transitional Military Council is continuing its policy of divide and conquer. For one thing, a surprisingly large number of rebel leaders has been invited. The key movements could be outvoted in any decision. </p>
<p>In addition, increasing differences within the movements can be observed. At present, it is uncertain if the transition calendar will be met at all and if elections will take place this year. </p>
<p>Having visited recently, my observation is that there is no sign of political will for real change. Instead, restrictive measures have been put in place. </p>
<p>And the demand of civil society and Wakit Tamma has not yet been answered. Transitional president Déby <a href="https://www.alwihdainfo.com/Presidentielle-au-Tchad-Mahamat-Idriss-Deby-un-futur-candidat_a108774.html">reacted</a> evasively to the question of whether he would stand in future elections. </p>
<p>But even if he were to withdraw, some of his brothers have already founded their own parties. It is obvious: the Zaghawa want to continue their grip on Chad, no matter what the president’s first name is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Talks being facilitated by Qatar will determine whether Chad will be peaceful or once again be torn apart by armed conflicts.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.