tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/chinese-communist-partys-19th-national-congress-44530/articlesChinese Communist Party's 19th National Congress – The Conversation2018-11-16T03:25:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1017352018-11-16T03:25:13Z2018-11-16T03:25:13ZHow digital media blur the border between Australia and China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244735/original/file-20181109-116829-chfqnh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">WeChat is an all-in-one social media platform that combines services such as those offered by WhatsApp, Facebook, Uber and Apple Pay.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sanktpetersburg-russia-july-11-2018-wechat-1133392886?src=rSOPrjGXEzbsCLwxXZQgug-2-52">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In this series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/hacking-auspol-58635">Hacking #auspol</a> we explore whether covert foreign influence operates in Australia, and what we can do about it.</em></p>
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<p>In September, the ABC website was blocked from being accessed inside China. The <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118351.shtml">reason given</a> was the ABC’s “aggressive” reporting on China. Prime Minister Scott Morrison responded by <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-03/china-officially-bans-abc-website/10193158">saying</a> that:</p>
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<p>China’s a sovereign country. They make decisions about what happens there, we make decisions about what happens here.</p>
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<p>But things are a little more complex than that, particularly when it comes to news published on Chinese social media platforms. Apps like <a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">WeChat</a> (known as Weixin 微信 in China) are <a href="https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/100651">widely used</a> in Australia by the Chinese <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-chinese-diaspora">diaspora</a> (people of Chinese descent now living in countries other than China). </p>
<p>Social media platforms like WeChat are subject to controls on what they may publish within China, but it’s unclear whether similar controls are placed on content published outside China. Tencent – the company that operates WeChat – wants to expand the adoption and use of its <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/?lang=en_US">Official Account</a> platform internationally. Some researchers suggest WeChat operates a “<a href="https://citizenlab.ca/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/">one app, two systems</a>” model, with one policy operating in China and another internationally.</p>
<p>As part of our ongoing research, we present some initial findings from an analysis of news targeted at Chinese-language audiences in Australia. Over 18 months we used digital tools to capture news stories in both Australian-based WeChat Official Account news channels, and SBS Mandarin digital news channels. We then compared their content to see if news disseminated via WeChat could be subject to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43283690">influence by the Chinese government</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-taking-up-wechat-heres-what-you-need-to-know-88787">Thinking of taking up WeChat? Here's what you need to know</a>
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<h2>Chinese-language media in Australia</h2>
<p>The Special Broadcasting Service (<a href="https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=970100723;res=IELAPA;subject=Secondary%20education">SBS</a>) makes news available to Australia’s Mandarin-speaking population via in-language content that appears on TV, radio and online. While SBS is funded by the Australian government, it operates with editorial independence.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tencent.com/en-us/articles/17000391523362601.pdf">WeChat</a> is an all-in-one social media platform that combines services such as those offered by WhatsApp, Facebook, Uber and Apple Pay. It also acts as a news service via numerous WeChat <a href="https://mp.weixin.qq.com/?lang=en_US">Official Accounts</a> (also called Public Accounts). These accounts allow government agencies, business corporations, and social organisations to post and distribute news stories to subscribers. WeChat <a href="https://chinachannel.co/1017-wechat-report-users/">users</a> registered outside China are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-22/world-s-most-powerful-app-is-squandering-its-lead">estimated</a> at 100-150 million. </p>
<p>Our content analysis focused on the three most prominent “Official Account” WeChat news providers publishing Mandarin-language news in Australia: <a href="https://www.sydneytoday.com/wechat">Sydney Today</a>, <a href="https://rank.aoweibang.com/mp/Lnbpem/">ABC Media</a> and <a href="http://www.nanhaimedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/%E6%BE%B3%E5%A4%A7%E5%88%A9%E4%BA%9A%E5%8D%97%E6%B5%B7%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E4%BC%A0%E5%AA%92%E9%9B%86%E5%9B%A2.pdf">We Sydney</a>. It’s <a href="http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/9/c/7/9c7bec94e65e56be/mafengwo.mp3?c_id=25617290&cs_id=25617290&destination_id=700932&expiration=1542250653&hwt=0ed5d195c254ca23659406afd3cf205f">hard to verify</a> exact subscriber numbers for these accounts, but they are estimated to each have more than 100,000 subscribers. </p>
<p>To understand the differences in the ways each platform prioritises content, we compared the stories published on the WeChat channels with the stories published on <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin?language=zh-hans">SBS Mandarin</a>.</p>
<h2>What the data show</h2>
<p>Data were collected between 1 January 2016 and 1 August 2017. This timeframe includes two Federal government budget speeches, and the 2016 double dissolution election. Given the amount of data, we used a common analytic technique called <a href="https://cfss.uchicago.edu/fall2016/text02.html">topic modeling</a> to analyse the content, which categorises stories according to theme.</p>
<p>We found that coverage of terrorism, and crime and justice matters increased on both WeChat and SBS during the data collection period. But when it came to stories about China, the coverage was markedly different. SBS paid far more attention to Chinese politics and Chinese foreign affairs than WeChat accounts – and that disparity has intensified since February 2017.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243418/original/file-20181101-173884-1pv7upz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Stories related to terror attacks and criminal cases. Shaded bands are confidence intervals, which denote the range of possible variance on either side of the line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243417/original/file-20181101-173902-8v52dx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stories related to Chinese politics and foreign relations. Shaded bands are confidence intervals, which denote the range of possible variance on either side of the line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over the total time period SBS dedicated 67 out of 2,349 articles to Chinese politics and foreign relations, which is equivalent to 2.85% of the SBS output. Meanwhile, WeChat channels dedicated 37 out of 13,669 articles to those topics, which is equivalent to 0.26% of the output of those channels.</p>
<p>More tellingly, none of the WeChat channels has published a single article on Chinese politics and foreign affairs from March 2017 until the end of the collection period. This was around the time new measures were ramped up to enhance control of WeChat content in the <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/06/minitrue-wechat-group-controls-for-qingdao-sco-summit/">lead up</a> to <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/cnleaders/2018SCOSummit/index.htm">Qingdao Summit</a>, <a href="https://chinachannel.co/wechat-freezes-profile-changing/">and</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2110236/china-tightens-control-chat-groups-ahead-party-congress">ahead</a> of the <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/19cpcnc/index.htm">19th Party Congress</a>. In October 2017, the Chinese government introduced <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/please-self-censor-china-provides-new-regulations-for-online-conduct/">new regulations</a> that made <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-09/07/c_1121624269.htm">Public Account</a> and <a href="http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-09/07/c_1121623889.htm">group</a> chat account holders responsible for what is said by other users on their account pages (this included Official Accounts).</p>
<p>Even before the Sydney based WeChat channels stopped covering Chinese politics, of the 37 articles on this topic, 32 had <a href="https://rank.aoweibang.com/item/a3r6zQ/">similar</a> content to news reports from China’s domestic news agencies, which tend to reflect the position of the Chinese government.</p>
<p>Comparative findings suggest that the differing content on WeChat and SBS could have markedly different effects on readers. For instance, SBS Mandarin content might serve to give readers a sense of informed civic inclusion and democratic participation in Australian society. On the other hand, the WeChat content might be more likely to emphasise stronger cultural ties to the homeland by creating “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0d8fqyc84ms">distraction and diversion</a>” from sensitive political topics. The near absence of political coverage focuses the attention of WeChat readers on celebrity gossip and other entertainment topics rather than the politics of the People’s Republic of China. </p>
<p>This practice has been described as a form of “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11341.html">porous censorship</a>”. While readers could seek out information on China from other sources, it takes time and effort to do so. The “flooding” of the daily news feed is effectively more of a tax than a ban on information – especially considering WeChat is a <a href="https://identitycomms.com.au/2017/07/using-wechat-reach-chinese-consumers-australia/">primary source of information</a> for many Chinese living in Australia.</p>
<p>Even without specific coordination, WeChat news channels may advance strategic interests of the Chinese government in this way, signalling a new mechanism of foreign influence. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-tencent-became-the-worlds-most-valuable-social-network-firm-with-barely-any-advertising-90334">How Tencent became the world's most valuable social network firm – with barely any advertising</a>
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<h2>Targeting diaspora populations</h2>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/asio-report-parliament.html">2017-18 Annual Report</a>, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) expressed concerns about foreign powers secretly manipulating the opinions of Australians to further their own aims. The report specifically suggested that ethnic and religious communities have “been the subject of interference operations designed to diminish their criticism of foreign governments.”</p>
<p>Since the report was first <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-18/asio-overwhelmed-by-foreign-spying-threats-against-australia/9061728">released</a>, there has been considerable public debate and <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=COMMITTEES;id=committees%2Fcommjnt%2F1e36c2f4-7e55-46ed-ab03-e9bd81f4cdb8%2F0004;query=Id%3A%22committees%2Fcommjnt%2F1e36c2f4-7e55-46ed-ab03-e9bd81f4cdb8%2F0000%22">parliamentary concern</a> about the degree of <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2018/august/1533045600/john-garnaut/australia-s-china-reset">influence</a> the Chinese government enjoys in Australia. The focus of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d3ac306a-e188-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce">recent concern</a> has pivoted around the Chinese government’s <a href="https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/">influence</a> in, and upon, the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">Chinese diaspora</a>. </p>
<p>The Chinese government has a keen interest in <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/china-matters">monitoring its growing diaspora</a> populations, and that includes the content of diaspora media channels, including social media channels.</p>
<p>Influence campaigns on social media may take many forms. The most familiar is the kind of direct manipulation we’ve seen with <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-trolls-targeted-australian-voters-on-twitter-via-auspol-and-mh17-101386">Russian campaigns</a> that aim to sow division among a foreign population. A less direct route is to ensure that legitimate news sources only report news that serve the strategic objectives of the government in question. Our study focuses on the second kind.</p>
<h2>Who is the Chinese diaspora?</h2>
<p>The Chinese government <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-04/beijing-official-urges-outreach-to-non-mainland-chinese/9506388">has said</a> it considers those of <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">Chinese descent</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180308082309/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0218/c64094-29090242.html">abroad</a> to be the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184894">nation’s diaspora</a>. The <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/D8CAE4F74B82D446CA258235000F2BDE?OpenDocument">2016 census</a> identified 1.2 million people of “Chinese ancestry” in Australia, with 41% born in China.</p>
<p>It’s important to remember that while idea of “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Allen_Chun">Chineseness</a>” suggests a homogenous identity, ethnicity and culture, in reality this group is made up of different experiences, views and political allegiances. Some people in this group may not have any particular affiliation with China. Nevertheless, they are part of the group the Chinese government has suggested is within its sphere of influence.</p>
<p>A key component of the diaspora is students. There may be between <a href="https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/DataVisualisations/Pages/nationalitySummary.aspx">150,000-200,000 thousand</a> <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-18/australia-hosting-unprecedented-numbers-international-students/9669030">students from China</a> in the Australian education <a href="https://www.austrade.gov.au/News/Economic-analysis/australias-export-performance-in-fy2017">system</a>. Like the diaspora as a whole, the experiences of Chinese students in Australia are complex and not homogeneous.</p>
<p>University of Melbourne researcher <a href="https://www.findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/display/person2095#tab-overview">Fran Martin</a> argues for a more nuanced approach to Chinese international students lived experience of social media in Australia, pointing out that there is no singular experience of <a href="https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/11/how-chinese-students-exercise-free-speech-abroad">free speech in the Chinese student diaspora</a>. And <a href="https://deakin.academia.edu/XinyuZhao">Xinyu Zhao</a>, a PhD student at Deakin, argues that Chinese students are as clever about avoiding oversight of senior relatives in their use of social media as any other young person.</p>
<h2>Controls on WeChat content</h2>
<p>Social media have led to a proliferation of unofficial spaces of communication online, which has created challenges for the Chinese government’s efforts to <a href="http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/21426/frontmatter/9781107021426_frontmatter.pdf">regulate the content of online communications</a>.</p>
<p>Social media companies in China are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43283690">required to censor posts</a> which the Chinese government identifies as “illegal”, and self-censorship among users is encouraged. Examples of illegal content <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19eS47Dg086vR1jh9oo51pXstYVT2wft13JGCrnAeU7A/edit#gid=728354615">includes phrases</a> <a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/chat-censorship/blob/master/wechat/one_app_two_systems/wechat_blocked_keywords.csv">such as</a> “Tiananmen June 4”, “free Tibet” and “Falun Gong”. The flow on effect of regulation and influence on these platforms when they are used outside China’s borders is more complex.</p>
<p>Certainly the Chinese Government does seek to influence the diaspora. There is a dedicated Chinese government department, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), for “overseas Chinese work”. It seeks to both “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/06/minitrue-wechat-group-controls-for-qingdao-sco-summit/">guide</a>” ethnic Chinese, and conduct <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/14409-the-chinese-communist-party-s-foreign-interference-operations-how-the-u-s-and-other-democracies-should-respond">influence operations</a> targeted at foreign actors and states that <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/beijings-influence-operations-target-chinese-diaspora/">further the objectives of the Chinese government</a>. Chinese President Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.edx.org/course/xi-jinpings-thought-on-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-for-a-new-era">described</a> the UFWD’s work as the Chinese government’s “<a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magicweaponsanne-mariebradyseptember162017.pdf">magic weapons</a>”. </p>
<p>The Australian Defence Department is concerned enough about the possibility of Chinese censorship and surveillance being enabled via WeChat that it has <a href="https://www.afr.com/technology/apps/business/australias-defence-department-bans-chinese-app-wechat-20180310-h0xay8">banned</a> the app from work phones, pending security investigation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/video-explainer-at-chinas-19th-national-party-congress-xis-vision-and-legacy-are-at-stake-85325">Video explainer: at China's 19th National Party Congress, Xi's vision and legacy are at stake</a>
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<h2>Impact on political discourse</h2>
<p>There is a long history of countries attempting to impact the political discourse in other nations. This might involve various forms of lobbying and support for political parties and politicians, support of social and political movements, or the state-supported diffusion of cultural objects and information.</p>
<p>But not all state broadcasters are instruments of government propaganda or subject to government editorial control. Few in the West would decry the BBC and its various foreign language services, which have editorial independence from the British government. Indeed, the BBC often reports critically on British government activities. </p>
<p>WeChat is becoming an increasingly important media forum for Australian elections, with politicans beginning to use it to reach Chinese communities online. Some suggest that WeChat was important during the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jul/09/how-a-chinese-language-social-media-campaign-hurt-labors-election-chances">2016 federal election</a> in Victorian communities. And in 2017 Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen was the first Australian politician to use <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin/en/article/2017/10/26/chris-bowen-first-australian-politician-use-wechat-live-communicate-chinese?cid=inbody:who-are-the-australians-that-are-using-chinas-wechat">WeChat Live</a>. </p>
<p>Digital diasporas are accessible for potential foreign influence, and Chinese language social media in Australia are increasingly a focus for local political parties. This dynamic is changing the way we chat about politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101735/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Titus C.Chen receives funding from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Jensen and Tom Sear do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese-language social media in Australia are increasingly a focus for local political parties.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, UNSW Canberra Cyber, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyMichael Jensen, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of CanberraTitus C Chen, Associate Professor, Ph.D. in Political Science, California Irvin University, U.S.A, National Sun Yat-sen UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/860222017-10-20T13:35:07Z2017-10-20T13:35:07ZXi Jinping sets out plans to make China great again<p>In 1793, in his letter to Britain’s King George III, China’s Qianlong emperor rejected all the British requests to improve the state of trade between England and China. After all, the Middle Kingdom “possesses all things in prolific abundance … there is no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians”. Half a century later, China was defeated by Britain in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars">Opium Wars</a>, and started to rethink its place in the world. Ever since, Chinese elites have been searching for answers to the same question: how to make China great again?</p>
<p>The Communist party in China has always claimed that the answer is communism – <a href="http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/18/content_33399242.htm">in more recent years</a>, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” – and that the party is the only force capable of building and maintaining that order. This claim has been driven home as strongly as ever at this year’s 19th party congress, an important meeting of the party that only happens once every five years. </p>
<p>The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, inaugurated the congress with a three-hour-and-20-minute <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-congress.html">opening speech</a>. His message was clear: a confident China is coming back to claim its rightful place of the world and find back the past glory of Chinese civilisation.</p>
<p>The speech was striking for its sheer ideological confidence. The party has always set great store by ideological and theoretical innovation, and Xi is clearly intent on continuing the tradition. His preferred framing, “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”, is supposedly the new great ideological direction, a successor to the party’s past guiding philosophies: <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/63a5a9b2-85cd-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5?mhq5j=e6">Mao Zedong Thought</a>, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/why-china-still-needs-deng-xiaoping/">Deng Xiaoping Theory</a>, <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/3represents/68735.htm">Three Represents</a>, and <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cpc2011/2010-09/08/content_12474310.htm">Scientific Outlook on Development</a>.</p>
<p>So far, so traditional: another (somewhat dull) ideological brand for the party’s plans. But Xi’s speech also issued a politically urgent appeal to the general public: to be more confident about the current one-party system. </p>
<h2>Harmonious and beautiful</h2>
<p>According to Xi, China will push for political system reform and develop China’s socialist democracy, but it will never “copy the foreign political model” of Western liberal democracy. Almost every party congress emphasises this point, but this year, the party is driving it home as confidently and assertively as ever.</p>
<p>Chinese state propaganda consistently warns that were Western liberal democracy imported to China, it would only drag the country into chaos and instability. As far as the Chinese authorities are concerned, Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in the US and the chaos of Brexit in the UK are glaring examples of democratic failure, and they make excellent grist for the propaganda mill.</p>
<p>Xi and the party are confident that the shifting international landscape is also in China’s favour, perhaps more than ever in modern history. In a US-dominated unipolar world, China never had the space nor the capacity to realise its potential as a global power. But even before the rise of Trump, China had by some measures become <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/">the largest economy in the world</a>, and it’s long been perceived as the next superpower. Now, the power gap left by America’s global retreat under Trump will only elevate China’s role in the world order.</p>
<p>Now this opportunity has presented itself, Xi is not shying away from spelling out his ambitions. From 2020-2035, he aims to achieve the “basic modernisation of socialism”, with clear economic, political and environmental goals; from 2035 to the mid-21st century, those goals will be further pursed to make China a “world leading” socialist power – “prosperous, democratic, civilised, harmonious and beautiful”.</p>
<p>In his speech to the congress, he also announced a more specific goal: China will continue to develop a strong army. The word “military” (<em>jun</em>) appeared in Xi’s speech 86 times, more than ever before. According to Xi’s speech, China will complete the basic modernisation of its army in 2035, and by the mid-21st century, it will boast a world-class military under party command.</p>
<p>On this front, China doesn’t have far to go. Its military budget, after all, is already the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/04/24/the-top-15-countries-for-military-expenditure-in-2016-infographic/#5caacef043f3">second largest in the world</a>. But Xi’s plan is much more ambitious: he wants an army that can deliver military victories, and that cannot be achieved by economic resources alone. </p>
<p>To some extent, the party has already achieved its goals by inspiring domestic nationalists who consider a strong military force crucial to prevent a return to centuries of humiliation. Convinced it can make China great again, the party is asking for another three decades’ monopoly on power in exchange for reviving the Middle Kingdom by the mid-21st century – about two centuries after the Opium Wars. And it might just have convinced the Chinese people that it is the only force that can conceivably make that happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jinghan Zeng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Still smarting from centuries of ancient humiliation, China is ready to rise to global supremacy.Jinghan Zeng, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/843412017-10-18T23:53:25Z2017-10-18T23:53:25ZHow China’s skewed sex ratio is making President Xi’s job a whole lot harder<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190924/original/file-20171018-32361-mgdwcu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping presides over the opening ceremony of the 19th Party Congress.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ng Han Guan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As odd as it sounds, China’s economic policy is being held hostage by its heavily skewed sex ratio.</p>
<p>China’s excess of young, unmarriageable males poses an acute dilemma for <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11551399">President Xi Jinping</a> and other leaders as they set the country’s path for the next five years during the <a href="http://thediplomat.com/tag/19th-party-congress/">19th Chinese Communist Party Congress</a>, which opened on Oct. 18. </p>
<p>After years of heavy spending and investment to boost growth and employment, China is at risk of economic stagnation if it doesn’t restructure the economy. Yet there is peril that doing so will lead to dangerous levels of unrest among the millions of unmarried men – known as “bare branches” – who will be laid off from shuttered unneeded steel, coal and auto factories. </p>
<p>So far Xi has tempered reform and kept the money taps open in order to avoid political instability. As the costs of domestic economic imbalances rise and international pressures to cut excess industrial capacity grow, Xi will have to decide what to do about the bare branches strewn in his way. And that won’t be an easy task, as <a href="https://www.abebooks.com/9780030545894/International-Political-Economy-Struggle-Power-0030545897/plp">my research</a> on the intersection of economics and politics suggests.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190952/original/file-20171019-32378-1prm9j1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese workers eat their lunch outside a construction site wall depicting the skyline of the Chinese capital at the Central Business District in Beijing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Andy Wong</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China’s spending spree</h2>
<p>This dilemma has been building for almost a decade, since Chinese leaders responded to the 2008 global financial crisis by channeling massive investments into infrastructure and heavy industry to sustain economic growth and prevent political unrest. </p>
<p>The proportion of China’s economy devoted to investment <a href="http://fromtone.com/what-is-happening-in-china/">shot up</a> from roughly a third to close to half – a level <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Is-China-Over-Investing-and-Does-it-Matter-40121">unprecedented</a> among modern economies (that compares with only <a href="http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/USA/Capital_investment/">20 percent</a> in the U.S. in 2015). Since 2008, for example, <a href="http://www.meti.go.jp/english/mobile/2016/20160727001en.html">China’s crude steel production capacity</a> has more than doubled, reaching close to half of the world total. </p>
<p>This investment has proven <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ecri/2011/492325/">remarkably successful</a>, at least in the short term, helping China avoid the economic downturn experienced by Western countries. China’s investment binge also created the world’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/china/21714383-and-theres-lot-more-come-it-waste-money-china-has-built-worlds-largest">largest bullet train network</a> and <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-china-is-dominating-the-solar-industry/">made it a global leader</a> in solar panel production. </p>
<p>The binge, however, has also left China with a morning-after hangover that threatens to become a “national financial and economic crisis” unless it implements reforms, <a href="https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1609/1609.00415.pdf">according to a group</a> of Oxford-based economists. The report suggests that China focus on fewer but higher-quality infrastructure projects while accelerating a shift in demand from investment to consumption.</p>
<p>Yet China <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1fe4e1e8-88b0-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787">continues to rely</a> heavily upon infrastructure investment to drive growth. Besides steel, the economy also remains plagued by industrial overcapacity in autos, cement, glass, solar cells, aluminum and coal. Recent <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-two-sessions-and-the-2017-economic-outlook/">efforts</a> to close old and inefficient factories have had little effect so far.</p>
<p>This has international consequences as well because all that excess steel, glass and aluminum must go somewhere and often ends up in other countries, hurting domestic markets. Steel exports to the U.S., for example, <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2108732/trump-rejected-chinese-offer-cut-steel-overcapacity">surged 22 percent</a> from August 2016 to July 2017, <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/08/trump-seems-to-genuinely-want-a-trade-war-with-china.html">prompting retaliatory threats</a> from President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>So why did Chinese policymakers extend the investment spree so long? Why have they been reluctant to close down factories producing excess <a href="https://qz.com/699979/how-chinas-overproduction-of-steel-is-damaging-companies-and-countries-around-the-world/">steel</a>, <a href="http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-overcapacity-in-china">solar cells or glass</a> or stop funding the development of uninhabited “<a href="http://www.wired.com/2016/02/kai-caemmerer-unborn-cities/">ghost cities</a>”? </p>
<p>While there are many factors at play, one deserves more attention than it has received: China’s leaders fear the consequences of high unemployment among “bare branches,” a term used in China for young, low-status men who, because they are typically unmarriageable, represent endpoints on the family tree.</p>
<h2>Growth of the ‘bare branches’</h2>
<p>Bare branches are a result of one of the most skewed sex ratios in the world. </p>
<p>China has <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/">106.3 males for every 100 females</a>, compared with a global ratio of 101.8 to 100. In coming years, the workforce imbalance will only worsen because there are <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html">117 boys under age 15 for every 100 girls</a>. This is a result of extreme gender discrimination favoring males, a tendency exacerbated by <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/11/151113-datapoints-china-one-child-policy/">China’s one-child policy</a>, which was in force from 1979 to 2015. Typically, unwanted female fetuses, identified through ultrasound, are <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3168620/">aborted</a>. </p>
<p>This has resulted in a surplus of young bare-branch males. Bare branches are typically low status, since better-educated and higher-income males have better odds of attracting marriage partners. Lacking either skills or the strong community ties brought on by family life, these young, unmarried men make up a large proportion of the internal migrant population that relocates from rural areas to cities in search of work.</p>
<p>Researchers <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/bare-branches">Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer</a> established that societies with large and growing numbers of bare branches are at risk of rising crime and civil unrest. This is especially true if inadequate employment opportunities are available for unmarried young men. The skewed sex ratio is accompanied by other worrisome trends, including <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/11/18/high-income-inequality-still-festering-in-china/#5e33eaa21e50">high income inequality</a> and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2015/oct/29/impact-china-one-child-policy-four-graphs">rising number of elderly</a> that must be supported by each working-age person. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190954/original/file-20171019-32370-s4rue8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A worker labors at a steel mill in a village of Jiangyin city, Jiangsu Province, China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A growing risk of unrest</h2>
<p>It’s this fear of rising unemployment and unrest that has caused China’s hesitation to carry out economic reform. </p>
<p>Some economists believe that China’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-jobs/chinas-unemployment-rate-falls-below-4-percent-at-end-of-first-quarter-idUSKBN17R0JN">official unemployment rate</a> of 4 percent understates the <a href="http://www.nber.org/digest/oct15/w21460.html">reality</a>, which may be more than double that. The rate of unemployment is politically sensitive since unemployed workers are more likely to engage in civil unrest and other anti-regime activities. </p>
<p>And males are <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_371375.pdf">overrepresented</a> in the industries that would be hardest hit by reform like construction and heavy industry. On the other hand, females make up a disproportionate share of workers in the service sector, which must expand in order to sustain economic growth as spending on infrastructure and industry slows.</p>
<p>China’s growth model has actually exacerbated the unemployment problem because infrastructure, construction and heavy industry are relatively capital-intensive, meaning that a given level of investment produces fewer jobs than would be the case were the same investment devoted to service sectors (which are relatively labor-intensive). In other words, a greater emphasis on services would soak up more labor overall and reduce dangerous levels of unemployment.</p>
<p>If China shifts to sector-led growth, the risk of unrest will grow as women find more jobs <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1975810/china-will-need-cut-35-million-jobs-across-six-core-industries">at the expense of men</a>, especially those bare branches. So even if China manages a “soft landing” that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/world/asia/china-premier-li-keqiang-economy.html?_r=0">increases employment overall</a>, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-26/chinas-strikes-and-mass-unemployment-a-growing-worry/7649770">civil and political unrest</a> could rise as well if the proportion of bare branch males among those who remain unemployed also climbs. </p>
<p>This helps explain why Chinese authorities have directed massive amounts of investment into those male-dominated sectors following the global financial crisis. And why, in recent years, they have been slow to implement economic reforms that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/world/asia/china-premier-li-keqiang-economy.html?_r=1">they themselves acknowledge</a> are needed for the overall health of the Chinese economy. </p>
<p>From the perspective of Beijing, better some inefficient investments than the political risks of tossing millions of unemployed young males into the streets of urban China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/190955/original/file-20171019-32355-1qeq9ys.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping promised the usual economic reforms in his speech to the Party Congress.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>No good options</h2>
<p>In his opening address to the 19th Party Congress, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress/chinas-xi-lays-out-vision-for-new-era-led-by-still-stronger-communist-party-idUSKBN1CM35L?il=0">Xi made the usual promises</a> about deepening market reforms, reducing industrial overcapacity and shifting the economy from investment-led to consumption-led growth and focusing on fewer but higher-quality infrastructure projects. Given that these promises are not new, there is room for skepticism about implementation. </p>
<p>But even if reform is successful, it will mean large numbers of unemployed bare branches. That is why economic restructuring must be accompanied by generous unemployment benefits, job retraining programs and support for workers who need to relocate in order to find jobs. The gender composition of the service sector must also change in order to absorb unemployed males. </p>
<p>In short, Xi could forestall reform, thus keeping the bare branches busily employed at the risk of an economic crisis and <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/08/trump-seems-to-genuinely-want-a-trade-war-with-china.html">punitive tarriffs</a> from trading partners like the U.S. Or he could cut investment and close thousands of factories, creating a significant risk of <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22/asia/china-labor-unrest-we-the-workers/index.html">domestic unrest</a> and potentially necessitating some combination of a strengthened social safety net and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress/chinas-xi-lays-out-vision-for-new-era-led-by-still-stronger-communist-party-idUSKBN1CM35L?il=0">political repression</a> to contain it. </p>
<p>Whichever path Xi picks, bare branches will be part of the journey.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84341/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Skidmore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s surplus of unmarriageable men poses a stark dilemma for Xi and other leaders as they set the country’s economic course for the next five years.David Skidmore, Professor of Political Science, Drake UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/840602017-10-15T19:22:43Z2017-10-15T19:22:43ZExpect a shakeup of China’s military elite at the 19th Party Congress<p>On October 18, the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will begin, and China’s military will be in the spotlight. </p>
<p>As well as laying out the nation’s direction for the next five years and appointing its top political leaders, it’s expected that the Congress will confirm the wholesale change of China’s military elite that has been underway for the past several years.</p>
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<p>This comes as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) undergoes its most sweeping and comprehensive set of organisational reforms since the 1950s. These reforms and leadership changes are intended to give China military muscle commensurate with its growing political and economic influence.</p>
<h2>A changing of the guard</h2>
<p>Since assuming power in 2012, General Secretary Xi Jinping has established his control over the military by purging some of the top brass while promoting allies.</p>
<p>Xi’s anti-corruption drive has claimed several <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1994588/former-top-pla-general-guo-boxiong-jailed-life-over">high-level scalps</a>, including generals Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. These two men, as former vice-chairs of the Central Military Commission (CMC), were the two of the most powerful uniformed military leaders in China. </p>
<p>More recently, two other CMC members, Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang, reportedly came <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2109959/chinese-general-reported-be-facing-corruption-probe">under investigation</a> for corruption and disciplinary issues. Fang headed the powerful CMC Joint Staff Department, and was a frontrunner for CMC vice-chairmanship. Zhang served as the Director of the CMC Political Work Department, which looked after ideological education within the military.</p>
<p>This process has intensified in recent months. In 2017 alone, the four service heads (Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force) and the commanders of three of the five military Command Theatres (Southern, Northern and Central) have been replaced. The top leaders of nine of the CMC’s 15 departments have also changed. </p>
<h2>Promoting a new generation</h2>
<p>As well as the purges, Xi has sought to tighten his hold on the military by promoting a generation of younger leaders.</p>
<p>Better educated and more familiar with advanced technologies and modern military thinking than their predecessors, we should assume that they are more adapted to the demands of modern warfare with its focus on information and joint operations.</p>
<p>Indeed, with some estimates suggesting that <a href="https://placornerblog.wordpress.com/2017/10/05/military-delegates-to-18th-and-19th-ccp-party-congresses/">87%</a> of the military’s delegates to the Congress will be participating as first-timers, there will be plenty of new faces, voices and ideas at the top of the PLA and in the CCP Central Committee.</p>
<h2>Capacity overhaul</h2>
<p>No matter who makes up China’s new military leadership, they will need to operate in an environment of significant ongoing reforms and challenges. </p>
<p>In recent years, Xi has pushed forward an ambitious agenda that aims to overhaul the military and improve its combat effectiveness. Most importantly, the responsibilities and relationships between the CMC and subordinate groups, including the five joint Theatre Commands (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central), have been redefined to enhance coordination and joint operations. It may be years before this new system can operate as effectively as intended.</p>
<p>In addition, in late 2015, China established the Strategic Support Force to oversee military operations in space, cyber, electromagnetic and information domains. This highlights the importance of advanced technologies, information and connectivity to Chinese military planners in any future conflict.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/c3C_johrfpk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Video explainer: China’s 19th National Party Congress.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>What will the Congress’ outcomes tell us about China’s changing military? </p>
<p>Most importantly, the structure and makeup of the CMC will be a strong indication of Xi’s hold over the military. It can also give clues to China’s military priorities.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113054/xi-jinping-clears-decks-top-level-changes-chinas">Unverified reports</a> suggest possible reform of the current 11-member CMC. One possibility sees Xi adding two vice-chairs to the CMC while cutting away regular members. This would likely strengthen Xi’s position by concentrating military power in fewer hands.</p>
<p>Another indicator to watch is the PLA’s representation on key Party bodies, especially the Central Committee and the Politburo. However, given the Party’s recent strong insistence on the “Party controlling the gun”, it is unlikely that the military’s political power will expand through increased representation. </p>
<p>Moreover, if Xi is able to push through key personnel appointments on the CMC and on other key bodies in favour of candidates aligned with him, he will go into his second term in a very strong position. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-to-watch-out-for-at-the-chinese-communist-party-congress-83177">Five things to watch out for at the Chinese Communist Party congress</a>
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<p>Ultimately, the new military leadership unveiled during the Congress will send a number of important signals to China’s political elite, to the PLA, and to the world. It will offer clues on Xi’s standing within the Party, the state of Party-military relations, and likely priorities in the ongoing effort to fully modernise the Chinese military. </p>
<p>Looking ahead, expect Xi and the CCP to continue tightening their political control over the PLA while demanding advances in military capability, readiness, and professionalism. </p>
<p>Xi’s military reforms are wide-ranging and daring. If successful, they will increasingly enable China to compete with the United States and its allies for military predominance in Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The upcoming Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress will see one of the biggest turnovers of China’s military elite since the founding of the country.Bates Gill, Professor of Asia-Pacific Security Studies, Macquarie UniversityAdam Ni, China researcher, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.