tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/chinese-politics-40782/articlesChinese politics – The Conversation2022-11-29T20:12:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1955152022-11-29T20:12:40Z2022-11-29T20:12:40ZChinese protests are about more than COVID – student discontent has fuelled the biggest movement since Tiananmen Square<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498015/original/file-20221129-20-a933ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">blank</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Protests have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/28/what-know-china-protests-covid/">erupted across China</a>, initially in response to the deaths of ten people in a fire in an apartment block in Xinjiang in the country’s northwest. The demonstrations represent the biggest expression of public unrest <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-COVID-protests-mark-biggest-act-of-resistance-in-decades">since the 1989 Tiananmen Square</a> pro-democracy movement was savagely crushed.</p>
<p>The deaths have been blamed on China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/29/china-zero-covid-policy-what-is-it-and-why-lockdowns-quarantine-protests">strict zero-COVID policy</a>. The deceased were reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-63766125">prevented from leaving the burning building</a> and their deaths have sparked an outpouring of grief and anger.</p>
<p>Many of the demonstrations have been led by students. According to <a href="https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/demonstrations-scores-campuses-china-covid-protests">reports in the international media</a>, by November 27 public protests of various sizes had been staged by students from at least 79 universities across 15 provinces of China. </p>
<p>Students have a range of grievances, high among them the zero-COVID policy. But, more broadly, many are protesting against the regime’s stifling of free speech and its heavy-handed political control. On one campus – Tsingshua University in Beijing – a video captured hundreds of students gathering to air their grievances. </p>
<p>One young woman made a speech saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If we dare not speak out because we are afraid of being arrested, I think our people will be disappointed with us. As a student of Tsinghua University, I will regret it for the rest of my life!</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the background, large numbers of students chanted the slogan: “Democracy, rule of law and freedom of speech.”</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/KttJfTZb-3s?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Beijing students protesting.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The protests have been dubbed the “<a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4733888">A4 revolution</a>” or “blank paper revolution”, after the students’ expression of their anger and discontent by holding up blank sheets of A4 paper, symbolising both the silencing of protest and defiance and rejection of state censorship and control. </p>
<h2>The trouble with students</h2>
<p>Since the 1989 student-led pro-democracy movement was crushed in the massacre at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48445934">Tiananmen Square</a> in Beijing, campus protests have been rare in China. This has drawn criticism from China expert Elizabeth Perry of Harvard University who has accused China’s academy for what she terms its “<a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/elizabethperry/publications/educated-acquiescence-how-academia-sustains-authoritarianism-china">educated acquiescence</a>”. </p>
<p>In a 2020 paper, How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China, Perry criticises students and academics alike for “acceding to political compliance in exchange for the many benefits conferred upon it by the state”. By doing this, Perry argues, academia has buttressed the authoritarian rule of the regime in China. </p>
<p>But, in recent times – and even before the fire in Xinjiang – discontent has been discernible on China’s university campuses. The growing anger at the prolonged zero-COVID lockdowns has added to an undercurrent of unrest at deteriorating economic conditions which have led to growing unemployment and a waning belief among young people in Xi Jinping’s nationalistic “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22726375">China Dream</a>”.</p>
<p>China has enforced lockdowns in different parts of the country almost continuously for three years. The chaotic and harsh control measures across the country have caused huge disruption to everyday lives, not only the loss of freedom of movement but also food shortages and various forms of psychological harm. </p>
<p>As on many western campuses, but on a much greater scale, students’ lives have been severely disrupted and there is widespread disillusionment. One tactic of demonstrators which has caught international media attention is the bizarre ritual that has become known as “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/11/21/watch-reason-students-china-crawling-around-circles-campus/">collective crawling</a>”. </p>
<p>Footage of students forming a circle and crawling around on their hands and knees has flooded social media. The ritual is designed to express frustration at the boredom of endless lockdown conditions, said to represent the attempt to use “meaninglessness to resist meaninglessness”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1593099922806804480"}"></div></p>
<p>Students’ frustration over the gloomy economic outlook and associated grim job prospects is significant. The Chinese government’s legitimacy centres on its economic performance and the 40 years of rapid economic growth delivered by the Communist party. </p>
<p>COVID has changed the course of China’s economic trajectory and, unsurprisingly, the employment market has suffered. In July 2022, the youth jobless rate hit <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-youth-unemployment-nearly-20-/6715736.html">a record 19.9%</a>. And, with 11.58 million students <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-16/china-s-record-graduates-to-pressure-youth-jobs-market-in-2023">due to graduate</a> into the job market next year, these students’ prospects are not looking bright.</p>
<p>It’s a measure of how deeply this disenchantment is felt among young people that many are accusing the government of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/28/china-censors-maskless-crowd-footage-in-world-cup-broadcasts">censoring coverage of the World Cup</a> in Qatar because crowds there are not wearing masks. </p>
<h2>Xi’s problem</h2>
<p>The lockdowns and grim economic prospects are undermining young people’s confidence in Xi’s much-hyped nationalistic vision. We are now seeing even some formerly solid supporters of the administration openly questioning and criticising the zero-COVID policies on the Chinese <a href="https://weibo.com/207080805">social media platform Weibo</a> And some of the more daring young people protesting in China are voicing the unprecedented demand that “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-63771109">Xi Jinping step down</a>”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oTyWLj4NcIs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Students protesting in Shanghai.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China’s unachievable zero-COVID policy is being hung around Xi’s neck. The Chinese leader has achieved a cult of personality and control not seen since the days of Mao Zedong and he was recently awarded an unprecedented third term as leader at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-echoes-of-authoritarian-past-as-xi-jinping-cements-his-place-at-the-heart-of-a-communist-party-now-entirely-built-around-him-193122">20th party congress in October</a>, essentially making him “ruler for life”. But what looks like a political miscalculation over the zero-COVID policy, which has no end in sight as infection numbers continue to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-daily-covid-cases-hit-record-high-2022-11-24/">rise to record levels</a>, has brought him the most challenging test yet. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-dont-mistake-xi-jinpings-crackdowns-for-a-second-cultural-revolution-167483">China: don't mistake Xi Jinping's crackdowns for a second Cultural Revolution</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Students have now been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/health-beijing-xi-jinping-shanghai-covid-5e6340710ba8b273b3be88d8844feed0">sent home from their universities</a>. And the security services are working overtime to stifle dissent on the streets and in cyberspace. But Xi’s reputation is now tarnished, perhaps irrevocably. And it’s hard to see these grievances on campuses and beyond simply disappearing quietly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195515/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tao Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young people are angry at COVID restrictions, but also poor job prospects and China’s heavy-handed suppression of free speech.Tao Zhang, Senior Lecturer, School of Arts & Humanities, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1931222022-10-24T12:48:49Z2022-10-24T12:48:49ZChina: echoes of authoritarian past as Xi Jinping cements his place at the heart of a Communist Party now entirely built around him<p>It has been suggested that the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-63358627">removal of Hu Jintao</a>, Xi Jinping’s predecessor, from the closing ceremony of the 20th Communist Party congress could overshadow all other news from Beijing during the past week. Was there a health reason for this dramatic development – or was it a live purge, planned or even spontaneously decided by the Chinese president to send a clear message to everyone in the party? We may never find out. </p>
<p>But the photo capturing the moment of Hu being escorted out of the congress, looking desperately at an apparently cold and indifferent Xi, depicts well the end of what Hu (and Deng and Jiang before him) came to be associated with: collective leadership, internal democracy and consensus building. </p>
<p>During the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/23/xi-jinping-to-rule-china-for-precedent-breaking-third-term">week-long congress</a> several changes in people, guiding ideas and policy priorities have been announced, all pointing to the same direction. Xi Jinping is now in full control of the Chinese Communist Party as his decade-long effort to centralise his power over the communist regime has been completed.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/YKwnbx7HhvI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>The composition of the 20th <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-new-elite-communist-party-leadership-2022-10-23/">Politburo Standing Committee (PSC)</a>, the seven-member strong leading organ of the party and the country, offers the most straightforward example of Xi’s domination of China’s political system. Announced on October 23, all the positions of the PSC were given to politicians with long political and personal connections to Xi and proven loyalty. </p>
<p>Li Qiang (party secretary of Shanghai) and Cai Qi (party secretary of Beijing), are tenacious supporters and implementers of the unpopular <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-63112996">zero-COVID policy</a>. Ding Xuexiang (Xi’s chief of staff) has been close to the Chinese president since serving with him in Shanghai in 2007, and Li Xi (party secretary of Guangdong) is one of the most longstanding supporters and a family friend of the president. These four new members joined the existing loyalists from the 19th PSC, Zhao Leji (head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) and Wang Huning (Xi’s top theorist). </p>
<p>The new Politburo, the 24-member-strong pool from which the PSC is selected, also demonstrates Xi’s complete control of the party’s political elite. To achieve that, long-established rules and customs on the career progression of politicians have been only selectively applied or ignored completely, setting a precedent for future congresses. And, for the first time in decades, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/world/asia/women-china-party-congress.html">no women have been included</a> in the group.</p>
<h2>Doubling down on stability and control</h2>
<p>On guiding ideas and policy priorities, the congress adopted Xi’s entire agenda, which was subsequently enshrined in the party’s constitution, and elected him for an unprecedented third term as general secretary. In terms of the economy, we had the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/20/china-economy-what-cpc-party-congress-this-week-means-for-growth.html">reaffirmation of existing policies</a>. No relaxation of the zero-COVID policy was announced, while the decisive interference of the state – a trend that has intensified in recent years – will continue. There was no change in reference to “common prosperity”, the idea of a more equitable growth for all, and to the emphasis on the domestic market and its capabilities for innovation as well as for self-reliance. </p>
<p>The underlying vision is that of China as a more inward-looking country, with a more selective engagement with the world and a universal equation of policymaking with the “core” of the party – Xi himself. For the first time since the death of Mao, there appear to be few (if any) institutional or political checks on the leader’s power.</p>
<p>But any <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-xi-jinping-poised-for-a-third-term-with-no-plans-to-relinquish-power-any-time-soon-192560">comparison with Mao</a> is somewhat simplistic. Mao thought of himself as being above the party, which he viewed as a vehicle to implement his irrational ideas and settle scores with other leaders. He surrounded himself with sycophants who knew nothing about governing a country, not loyal technocrats as Xi has. And of course, Mao did not hesitate to throw the CCP into the abyss of radicalism when he lost its control.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-xi-jinping-poised-for-a-third-term-with-no-plans-to-relinquish-power-any-time-soon-192560">China: Xi Jinping poised for a third term with no plans to relinquish power any time soon</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The havoc and anarchy of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">Cultural Revolution</a> that Mao created, became the context in which Xi grew up. It left deep personal wounds (his father Xi Zhongxun was abducted by Red Guards and elder sister Xi Heping committed suicide) and a distaste for disorder. </p>
<p>When Xi came to power in 2012, he saw laxity in party discipline and ineffective control of society as two trends that had to be tamed. A decade later, he has managed to significantly expand the party’s capacity for surveillance and repression of society, he has purged a great number of cadres who were either corrupt, potentially disloyal to him or both, and has centralised control of the communist regime.</p>
<h2>The rise of ‘XiCP’</h2>
<p>Xi’s version of centralisation is very different to Mao’s as it is taking place within the party. But it shares one key characteristic: collective leadership, internal democracy and consensus building are sacrificed in favour of discipline and loyalty to the “core” leader. In a setting with almost no checks on power, the personal charisma, judgment, strengths and failings of the leader have a much greater impact on the future direction and resilience of the regime than when rules and the constant need for consensus-building constrain the ruler. </p>
<p>In addition, history tells us that the more centralised a system is the more bitter the fight for succession is likely to be. Without a clear heir, a top leadership only united by their loyalty to Xi and reform-era succession rules and conventions gone, it will be much harder to secure a stable and orderly passing of power from Xi to the next leader. We should expect that at the first hint of Xi’s retirement or poor health, his men will draw their knives and fight for the top job. </p>
<p>Through centralisation, Xi has replaced the CCP with his own control-obsessed version, but at the cost of undermining the operating principles that have played an important role in the party’s longevity and success so far. It remains to be seen whether this new “XiCP” will be as successful in securing the prosperity of a dynamically changing society as the party we knew up until recently.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193122/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Konstantinos Tsimonis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Xi is now the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.Konstantinos Tsimonis, Lecturer in Chinese Society, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1928472022-10-23T08:25:37Z2022-10-23T08:25:37ZXi cements his power at Chinese Communist Party congress – but he is still exposed on the economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491155/original/file-20221023-41683-h1jvue.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hao/EPA/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Xi Jinping’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-communist-party-politburo-standing-committee-unveiled-2022-10-23/">clean sweep</a> in elevating trusted allies to the commanding heights of the Chinese Communist Party is a political outcome that has implications beyond China’s borders.</p>
<p>Xi sits virtually unchallenged, for the time being, at the apex of a political organisation that oversees a country with the world’s second largest economy, a rapidly modernising military and, perhaps most importantly, global ambitions to match its growing economic and military strength.</p>
<p>In a ritual that would not have been out of place in a traditional Peking opera, the 69-year-old Xi led his new team of seven members of the ruling Standing Committee of the Politburo (SCP) onto the stage in front of the world’s media.</p>
<p>All of those who are to serve on China’s ruling body are Xi loyalists. All six have worked with him over many years.</p>
<p>Most significant is Li Qiang, the Shanghai party secretary. He will replace Premier Li Keqiang, who is being bundled into retirement.</p>
<p>The new SCP reflects the further ascendancy of a harder line Xi faction in the Chinese leadership and a setback for the party’s liberalising wing.</p>
<p>This is a seminal moment in China political history with unpredictable consequences.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/has-xi-jinping-miscalculated-in-aligning-himself-with-vladimir-putin-178308">Has Xi Jinping miscalculated in aligning himself with Vladimir Putin?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Xi in charge</h2>
<p>No-one observing <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-s-party-congress/Transcript-President-Xi-Jinping-s-report-to-China-s-2022-party-congress">deliberations of the 20th National Party Congress</a> could be left in doubt that China under Xi will continue to assert itself forcefully in what he calls “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>At present, momentous changes of a like not seen in a century are accelerating across the world [in] a significant shift in the international power balance presenting China with strategic opportunities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This was hardly a subtle reference to Chinese perceptions of a superpower rival beset with challenges at home and abroad against a background of a disrupted global environment. The Ukraine crisis is merely one example of a global order that is fragmenting.</p>
<p>In a “work report” delivered every five years at the most important political gathering on China’s calendar, it would be surprising if a Chinese leader did not avail himself of the opportunity to assert his country’s global ambitions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491157/original/file-20221023-29696-ovckhv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xi Jinping has unveiled the new Politburo Standing Committee - all Xi loyalists.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kydpl Koyodo/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, Xi’s assertiveness – in contrast to his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao – is unsettling for China’s regional neighbours, including Australia, and for a US-led western alliance more generally.</p>
<p>The Chinese thrust into the western Pacific in a region long-regarded as free of big power tensions is one example.</p>
<p>China’s aggressive push into the South China Sea, sometimes referred to in propaganda as a “Chinese lake”, is another.</p>
<p>Still another is Beijing’s sabre-rattling towards Taiwan.</p>
<p>Since Xi’s tenure may last well into the 2030’s, Taiwan will remain his most pressing unresolved issue for the foreseeable future. As years pass, pressure for some sort of resolution, whether by force or otherwise, will increase.</p>
<p>Xi’s words will not have eased concerns about China’s intentions.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The wheels of history are rolling on towards China’s reunification […] Complete reunification of our country must be realised, and it can, without doubt, be realised.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Economic woes still loom large</h2>
<p>In all of this, the critical question is whether Xi will become a more abrasive global figure unbound by restrictions on his tenure, and surrounded in the leadership by allies who are unlikely to challenge him?</p>
<p>Are there risks that his reach on issues like Taiwan will exceed his grasp?</p>
<p>The short answer is we don’t yet know. But Xi will likely have been further emboldened by his continued rise.</p>
<p>Xi is also a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Xi-Jinping">relentless aggregator of power</a>. Since his elevation in 2007 to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, he has moved relentlessly.</p>
<p>In the decade since he was confirmed in 2012 as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party he has, step by step, consolidated power.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/little-red-children-and-grandpa-xi-chinas-school-textbooks-reflect-the-rise-of-xi-jinpings-personality-cult-168482">Little red children and 'Grandpa Xi': China's school textbooks reflect the rise of Xi Jinping's personality cult</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This all comes with the important caveat that behind the scenes in an opaque Chinese system, politicking can be brutal. Power struggles, sometimes violent, have scarred Chinese Communist Party history since its founding in Shanghai in 1921.</p>
<p>Xi would not need reminding that what the Communist Party giveth, it can also taketh away.</p>
<p>His own family’ experience is a case in point. Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun, a member of the first generation, with Mao Zedong, of Communist leaders, was purged in 1962. He was accused of being a member of a rightist clique.</p>
<p>Xi Jinping tasted the bitterness of that experience. He was shipped off to Shaanxi province, south-west of Beijing, in the early 1960s, where he spent six years in the countryside.</p>
<p>Xi senior was rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution. Xi junior completed a degree in chemical engineering at Tsinghua University, one of China’s premier universities, before making his way up party ranks with various provincial assignments.</p>
<p>History will not be absent from Xi’s calculations, nor will he overlook the historical significance of the National Party Congress just concluded in Beijing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491158/original/file-20221023-38878-fqxhat.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">But will China’s ‘COVID zero’ policy come back to haunt Xi economically?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Pavevski/EPA/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the annals of Communist Party history, the 2022 NPC will likely be regarded as a landmark event. The anointing of Xi as party leader, effectively for life, or at least until his age catches up with him, has echoes in the dominance of Mao Zedong, and to a lesser degree Deng Xiaoping.</p>
<p>Both were described as “paramount” leaders, even though Deng chose not to burden himself with the full panoply of titles that would have been available to him. Apart from his honorary presidency of the Chinese Bridge Association, he served in the powerful position of chairman of the Central Military Commission.</p>
<p>In Xi’s case, he is general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, chair of the Central Military Commission, and president. This is a “full-house” of leadership positions.</p>
<p>If there is an historical reference point for the 20th NPC, it is the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-history-factbox-idUSKBN1CF35B">11th National Party Congress of 1982</a>. This event crowned Deng protégé Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>What is different this time is that whereas Hu was an economic liberaliser committed to Deng’s mantra of “reform and opening”, Xi Jinping has shown himself to be less of a reformer and more of a consolidator. He has sought to rein in entrepreneurial impulses unleashed under his predecessors in the interests of stabilising China and fighting corruption. This has been in pursuit of his “common prosperity” policy aimed at narrowing a yawning rich-poor gap.</p>
<p>Finally, there is one important respect in which Xi is exposed. This is in his management of the economy.</p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63274391">“zero covid” policy</a> has weighed heavily with its nationwide shutdowns. This has contributed to a stuttering economy to the point where GDP growth is faltering for the first time in decades.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview">World Bank</a> has cut its forecast for 2022 GDP growth to just 2.8%, from a previous forecast of 5.5%. GDP growth in 2021 was 8.1%.</p>
<p>With a collapsing real estate sector weighing on a stretched banking system, the economy is Xi’s vulnerability. Getting the numbers from his comrades to endorse himself and his underlings in leadership roles is one thing; shifting the economy back on track is quite another.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker is a board member of The Conversation.</span></em></p>Chinese President Xi Jinping has effectively become “leader for life” at this weekend’s congress. But his strict COVID zero policy may bring economic turmoil.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1752122022-02-10T15:39:02Z2022-02-10T15:39:02ZTrudeau should have withdrawn Canada from the 2022 Beijing Olympics after reports of Chinese residential schools<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443595/original/file-20220131-23-11bdif3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5751%2C3819&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tibetans use the Olympic Rings as a prop as they hold a street protest against the 2022 Winter Olympics in Dharmsala, India on Feb. 3, 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ashwini Bhatia)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 175px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/trudeau-should-have-withdrawn-canada-from-the-2022-beijing-olympics-after-reports-of-chinese-residential-schools" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Last June, Canada’s delegation to the United Nations was part of an international effort calling for UN inspectors to have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canada-un-calls-investigation-crimes-indigenous-uyghurs-1.6075025">free and unfettered access to China’s Xinjiang region</a> to assess reports of human rights violations against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. </p>
<p>Chinese UN representative Jiang Duan promptly <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canada-un-calls-investigation-crimes-indigenous-uyghurs-1.6075025">fired back</a>, noting that Canada “robbed Indigenous people of the land, killed them and eradicated their culture.” </p>
<p>The truth is, the Chinese government is taking a page out of Canada’s cultural genocide handbook in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia — extinguishing multiple cultures within their borders. </p>
<p>With the 2022 Beijing Olympics underway, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-diplomatic-boycott-winter-olympic-games-1.6277773">refusal to support a full boycott</a> of the Games is perplexing. </p>
<h2>Ongoing colonialism</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700421995135">Settler colonialism</a> is a specific kind of colonization where settlers seek to not only displace Indigenous people, but <a href="https://www.facinghistory.org/stolen-lives-indigenous-peoples-canada-and-indian-residential-schools/chapter-3/killing-indian-child">replace them entirely</a>. </p>
<p>In Canada, this has <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/oka-crisis">included armed assault</a>, <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-reserves">geographical displacement</a> and the eradication of Indigenous culture and fragmentation of families (as was done through <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/residential-schools">the residential school system</a> and the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/cbcdocspov/features/the-sixties-scoop-explained">60s scoop</a>). </p>
<p>China has used settler colonialism to destroy Uyghur and Tibetan cultures, moving large numbers of Han settlers <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv28x2b9h.13">into Xinjiang</a> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26921467?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">and Tibet</a>. </p>
<p>International affairs scholar <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/our-authors/roberts-sean-r">Sean R. Roberts</a> and anthropologist <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1326761032000176122">Uradyn Bulag</a> have labelled Chinese efforts in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia as settler colonialism.</p>
<p>As international relations scholar <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1534801">Dibyesh Anand</a> explains: “The basic premise behind development in contemporary China is not the empowerment of these peoples but their disempowerment, by making them dependent on the state, by destroying their traditional ways of being, and by taking away their dignity, ultimately through state violence.”</p>
<p>And Anand isn’t alone. Academics are pointing to ongoing settler colonialism along China’s borders. Identifying China as an imperial state, anthropologist <a href="https://www.aup.nl/en/book/9789463728713/frontier-tibet">Carol McGranahan</a> argues that the regime’s settler colonialism has inflicted “dispossession and domination, including the loss of state sovereignty.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman wearing a head covering reaches out with a metal scoop into a bag of dried herbs" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443570/original/file-20220131-117572-1kwgbea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Uyghur woman who fled China for Turkey works in her shop in Istanbul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Emrah Gurel)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Canada, the Indian Residential School system <a href="https://theconversation.com/not-in-the-past-colonialism-is-rooted-in-the-present-157395">and colonialism are often framed as in the past</a> — but the last <a href="https://www2.uregina.ca/education/saskindianresidentialschools/gordons-indian-residential-school/">school closed less than 30 years ago</a>, and colonialism is still ongoing.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1450124405592/1529106060525">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> published <a href="https://irsi.ubc.ca/sites/default/files/inline-files/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf">its final report in 2015</a> detailing the horrific atrocities that occurred at Indian Residential Schools and its ongoing impact on communities. </p>
<p>The report also included <a href="https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/british-columbians-our-governments/indigenous-people/aboriginal-peoples-documents/calls_to_action_english2.pdf">94 calls to action</a> that must be completed as steps toward reconciliation — in six years however, <a href="https://newsinteractives.cbc.ca/longform-single/beyond-94">only 13 calls have been completed</a>. </p>
<p>Summer 2021 was a period of reckoning for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/27/canada-must-reveal-undiscovered-truths-of-residential-schools-to-heal">many Canadians as they faced the horrific truths</a> dredged up by unmarked graves at former Indian Residential Schools. And Canadians are still reckoning with the country’s acts of genocide as more <a href="https://bc.ctvnews.ca/potential-remains-found-in-93-spots-at-b-c-residential-school-but-some-children-will-be-unaccounted-for-even-after-investigation-1.5753439">unmarked graves continue to be found</a>. </p>
<p>We’ve now begun to face the realities of whats been happening in our own country, but we must maintain that same expectation in our relationships abroad.</p>
<h2>Concerning parallels</h2>
<p>For hundreds of thousands of children in China, being taken away from their homes and placed in boarding schools is a grim reality. </p>
<p>A recent report by the <a href="https://tibetaction.net/campaigns/colonialboardingschools/">Tibet Action Institute</a> estimates that the Chinese government is forcing three out of four Tibetan students into boarding schools and separating up to 900,000 children from their families. </p>
<p>The goal, explains the Tibet Action Institute, is to “eliminate Tibetan identity and supplant it with a Chinese nationalist identity in order to neutralize any resistance to Chinese Communist Party rule.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People standing in a line wearing blue masks with red hands painted across the mouth area" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443571/original/file-20220131-27-15cauw3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Student activists wearing masks with the colours of the pro-independence East Turkistan flag protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia in January 2022 to demand the cancellation of the Beijing Olympics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, traditional language education is being eradicated. In Xinjiang in particular, more than <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/4438757/china-uighur-muslim-interment-camps-xinjiang/">a million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims</a> are forced into political “re-education camps,” used for “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997">coercive social re-engineering</a>” compatible with the government’s aim to promote a universal Chinese culture within its borders. </p>
<p>Many children of detainees are sent to state-run institutions where they are “<a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691234496/the-war-on-the-uyghurs">raised ostensibly as Han children in a Chinese-language environment with Han child rearing methods adopted by the state as standard</a>.” </p>
<p>Should we — as Canadians — be shocked? That’s partly how settler colonialism works: domination has its regional differences, but the broader patterns are mostly the same.</p>
<h2>The prime minister hasn’t learned</h2>
<p>It seems Trudeau hasn’t learned as much as he should have from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Because here we are, with a prime minister who refuses to take a political stance against what is happening in China. </p>
<p>His approach, which borders on disinterest, diminishes <a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-more-shocking-residential-schools-discoveries-non-indigenous-people-must-take-action-161965">the efforts made by Canadians to address their own country’s wrongs</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/2022-winter-olympics-will-help-beijing-sportwash-its-human-rights-record-154911">2022 Winter Olympics will help Beijing 'sportwash' its human rights record</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Following Chinese UN representative Jiang Duan’s condemnation of Canada’s human rights record at the UN, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-trudeau-challenges-china-to-publicly-probe-its-mistreatment-of-uyghurs/">Trudeau asked</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“In Canada, we had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Where is China’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission?” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Although Trudeau did appear to see the parallels between China and Canada, and Canada’s quest for truth and reconciliation, he still stopped short of withdrawing the nation from the 2022 Beijing Olympics. </p>
<p>The Olympics will undoubtedly draw attention away from the Chinese government’s genocidal policies, permitting the authoritarian regime “<a href="https://theconversation.com/2022-winter-olympics-will-help-beijing-sportwash-its-human-rights-record-154911">to sportwash</a>” its reputation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The similarities between ongoing settler-colonialism in China and the history of settler-colonialism in Canada are frighteningly similar.MacIntosh Ross, Assistant Professor, Kinesiology, Western UniversityJanice Forsyth, Associate Professor, Sociology & Director, Indigenous Studies, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1684822021-11-22T19:08:50Z2021-11-22T19:08:50ZLittle red children and ‘Grandpa Xi’: China’s school textbooks reflect the rise of Xi Jinping’s personality cult<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432329/original/file-20211117-17-8jltky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/group-asian-elementary-school-children-one-591940196">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When students in China returned to classrooms in September 2021, they were provided with a <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/lingli_vienna/status/1413865821319860224">new series of textbooks</a> outlining China’s president Xi Jinping, or “Grandpa Xi’s”, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/1/chinas-pupils-get-schooled-in-xi-jinping-thought">political philosophy</a>. </p>
<p>Each textbook on “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”, as Xi’s political philosophy is officially called, is tailored to students at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1413865821319860224"}"></div></p>
<p>“Xi Jinping Thought” was enshrined into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-10/29/c_136713559.htm">Constitution</a> in 2017. Although the main stated aims are to remain committed to reform and build a “moderately prosperous society”, the <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7872#bodyftn4">realities</a> of this political philosophy has been a tightening of party discipline and curtailing of social freedom. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-sixth-plenum-will-consolidate-xi-jinpings-power-and-chart-the-countrys-ambitions-for-the-next-5-years-171395">China's sixth plenum will consolidate Xi Jinping's power and chart the country's ambitions for the next 5 years</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>While prior textbooks were focused on the CCP, the new versions centre on China’s paramount leader. In this way they reflect the growing personality cult of Xi Jinping, eerily reminiscent of the days of China’s founding father Mao Zedong.</p>
<h2>The rise of the personality cult</h2>
<p>According to China’s <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202108/25/WS61259859a310efa1bd66aea6.html">National Textbook Committee</a>, the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>textbooks reflect the will of the Communist Party of China and the nation and directly impact the direction and quality of talent cultivation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In particular, the <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202108/25/WS61259859a310efa1bd66aea6.html">Committee</a> stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Primary schools should foster love and right understanding for the Party, country and socialism in students.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/12/content_33160115.htm">core socialist values</a> highlighted in the textbooks include prosperity, patriotism and friendship. </p>
<p>Targeted at children, the moniker of “Grandpa Xi” is part of the ongoing strategy towards creating a personality cult in China. Authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union also used the grandfather figure (“Grandpa Lenin”) as part of propaganda aimed at children. This enhanced Lenin’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230518216_6">personality cult</a> across the Soviet nations. </p>
<p>Political scientist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crzp.7?seq=5#metadata_info_tab_contents">Pao-min Chang</a> defines the personality cult as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The artificial elevation of the status and authority of one man […] through the deliberate creation, projection and propagation of a godlike image.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Like Lenin, a personality cult around Mao Zedong emerged during China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Although later leaders Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s economic reform, and Wen Jiabao, who was Premier between 2003 and 2013, are popularly known as “Grandpa Deng” and “Grandpa Wen,” they did not overtly push for this image. </p>
<p>Xi returns to Mao in his efforts to build a <a href="https://utsynergyjournal.org/2019/03/16/the-cult-of-xi-chinas-return-to-a-maoist-personality-cult/">personality cult</a> around himself. Since coming to power, he has cultivated the image of being “a man of the people” in a bid to make his authoritarianism more palpable to the masses. </p>
<h2>Little red children and Grandpa Xi</h2>
<p>The new primary school textbooks emphasise Xi’s wisdom, friendliness and care for the children. Early signs of this strategy can be seen in government propaganda video, Grandpa Xi is Our Big Friend, that circulated online in 2015. </p>
<p>The video was <a href="https://www.dwnews.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/59660857/%E5%BB%B6%E5%AE%89%E5%AD%A6%E7%AB%A5%E6%AD%8C%E9%A2%82%E4%B9%A0%E7%88%B7%E7%88%B7%E7%BD%91%E5%8F%8B%E8%B5%9E%E4%BA%BA%E6%89%8D">recorded</a> at Yan'an Yucai Primary School in Shaanxi. The location is significant because the school was founded by Mao Zedong in 1937. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-puts-his-stamp-on-communist-party-history-but-is-his-support-as-strong-as-his-predecessors-170874">Xi Jinping puts his stamp on Communist Party history, but is his support as strong as his predecessors?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In the video, Xi Jinping is not presented as a distant authority figure. Instead, Grandpa Xi is a caring “big friend.” The children sing that his “warm smile” is “brighter than the sun.” Images of children waving sunflowers and lyrics that describe Xi’s visit as “better than the warmth of a spring day” serve to accentuate his friendly disposition. </p>
<p>Most importantly, the children sing about the need to “study diligently” to “achieve the Chinese Dream”. This dream is Xi Jinping’s vision for China to become a prosperous society.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Statue of Mao Zedong" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/433031/original/file-20211122-13-1wujt62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A personality cult around Mao Zedong was a large part of the propaganda during China’s Cultural Revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/lijiang-china-march-8-2012-statue-531870715">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The children wear red scarves and red stars in the video. These <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/220558">symbols</a> represent the national flag. The colour red alludes to the blood of revolutionary <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17482798.2011.587293">martyrs</a>. They remind children of their connection to the nation and the Party. </p>
<p>Xi wears a red scarf in the video. In one scene, he places a red scarf over the shoulders of a child. This accessory and gesture are depicted in the 2021 primary school textbooks as well. The act of placing a scarf on a child signifies children taking on the mantle of happily fulfilling Grandpa Xi’s vision. </p>
<h2>The CCP’s Young Pioneers</h2>
<p>The textbook for lower primary students contain photos of Xi planting trees with children and meeting them at school. </p>
<p>The books include statements such as: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Grandpa Xi Jinping is very busy with work, but no matter how busy he is, he still joins our activities and cares about our growth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Xi shares his memories of being emotional when joining the Young Pioneers of China (the CCP’s youth organisation) in 1960. He then invites readers to describe their own feelings about becoming a part of the Young Pioneers, thus encouraging young people to join.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=693&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=871&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=871&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422845/original/file-20210923-1932-oof5br.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=871&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xi Jinping tying a red scarf around a child at a Beijing primary school.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">'Page from Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics For the New Era' textbook for lower primary.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The textbooks use illustrations with speech bubbles to make the ideological content more interesting. Some illustrations are of students sitting around a table teaching each other Grandpa Xi’s expectations to become a person of “good moral character” and who is “diligent and thrifty”. </p>
<p>The books also emphasise acquiring knowledge about “science and technology,” as well as being “creative and innovative”. </p>
<p>The children must cultivate these markers of good citizenship to become what the books refer to as “qualified builders and successors of socialism”. This rhetoric of children as the <a href="https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=394">hope of the nation</a> has been in use since the late nineteenth century. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/academic-chongyi-feng-profits-freedom-and-chinas-soft-power-in-australia-78751">Academic Chongyi Feng: profits, freedom and China’s 'soft power' in Australia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The emphasis on being “qualified” suggests children must live up to the expectations set out by Xi. The textbooks imply this is only possible because of Grandpa Xi’s continued care for them. </p>
<p>This image of Grandpa Xi as a “big friend” is a gentler form of propaganda than that seen during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Propaganda aimed at children during the Cultural Revolution positioned the Party as the surrogate parent. It also highlighted <a href="https://books.google.co.nz/books/about/Picturing_Power_in_the_People_s_Republic.html?id=I3S6mlTj1K4C&redir_esc=y">children’s violence</a> as they fought for the socialist cause. Young Red Guards sang patriotic songs and read the Little Red Book. These rituals fostered Mao’s cult of personality. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether the new school curriculum is a harbinger of future deification of Xi Jinping.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New school textbooks in China focus less on the Chinese Communist Party and more on its figurehead Xi Jinping. The growing cultivation of a personality cult is reminiscent of the days of Mao Zedong.Shih-Wen Sue Chen, Senior Lecturer in Writing and Literature, Deakin UniversitySin Wen Lau, Senior Lecturer in China Studies, University of OtagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1607082021-09-09T20:13:36Z2021-09-09T20:13:36ZFriday Essay: an introduction to Confucius, his ideas and their lasting relevance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410506/original/file-20210709-21-gcdtw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C1%2C1081%2C1597&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Confucius at the 'Apricot Altar'. By Kano Tan'yû (Japanese, 1602–1674). Mid-17th century</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Museum of Fine Arts, Boston</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The man widely known in the English language as Confucius was born around 551 BCE in today’s southern Shandong Province. Confucius is the phonic translation of the Chinese word <em>Kong fuzi</em> 孔夫子, in which <em>Kong</em> 孔 was his surname and <em>fuzi</em> is an honorific for learned men.</p>
<p>Widely credited for creating the system of thought we now call Confucianism, this learned man insisted he was “not a maker but a transmitter”, merely “believing in and loving the ancients”. In this, Confucius could be seen as acting modestly and humbly, virtues he thought of highly. </p>
<p>Or, as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kang-Youwei">Kang Youwei</a> — a leading reformer in modern China has argued — Confucius tactically framed his revolutionary ideas as lost ancient virtues so his arguments would be met with fewer criticisms and less hostility. </p>
<p>Confucius looked nothing like the great sage in his own time as he is widely known in ours. To his contemporaries, he was perhaps foremost an unemployed political adviser who wandered around different fiefdoms for some years, attempting to sell his political ideas to different rulers — but never able to strike a deal. </p>
<p>It seems Confucius would have preferred to live half a millennium earlier, when China — according to him — was united under benevolent, competent and virtuous rulers at the dawn of the Zhou dynasty. By his own time, China had become a divided land with hundreds of small fiefdoms, often ruled by greedy, cruel or mediocre lords frequently at war. </p>
<p>But this frustrated scholar’s ideas have profoundly shaped politics and ethics in and beyond China ever since his death in 479 BCE. The greatest and the most influential Chinese thinker, his concept of filial piety, remains <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/people-culture/china-personalities/article/3136992/fewer-babies-altered-expectations-and">highly valued among young people in China</a>, despite rapid changes in the country’s demography.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://theconversation.com/confucius-doesnt-live-here-anymore-33006">some doubts</a> as to whether many Chinese people take his ideas seriously, the ideas of Confucius remain directly and closely relevant to contemporary China.</p>
<p>This situation perhaps is comparable to Christianity in Australia. Although institutional participation is in constant decline, Christian values and narratives remain influential on <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-becomes-less-religious-our-parliament-becomes-more-so-80456">Australian politics</a> and vital <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-the-australian-christian-lobby-waging-a-culture-war-over-lgbtq-issues-127805">social matters</a>. </p>
<p>The danger today is in Confucianism being considered the single reason behind China’s success or failure. The British author Martin Jacques, for example, recently <a href="https://twitter.com/martjacques/status/1395011696956256265">asserted</a> Confucianism was the “biggest single reason” for East Asia’s success in the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, without giving any explanation or justification.</p>
<p>If Confucius were alive, he would probably not hesitate to call out this solitary root of triumph or disaster as being lazy, incorrect and unwise.</p>
<h2>Political structure and mutual responsibilities</h2>
<p>Confucius wanted to restore good political order by persuading rulers to reestablish moral standards, exemplify appropriate social relations, perform time-honoured rituals and provide social welfare. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C628%2C603%2C906&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C628%2C603%2C906&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1512&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1512&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1900&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410505/original/file-20210709-13-zw0lht.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1900&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Confucius painted by Kano Yôsen'in Korenobu (Japanese, 1753–1808).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fenollosa-Weld Collection/Museum of Fine Arts, Boston</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He worked hard to promote his ideas but won few supporters. Almost every ruler saw punishment and military force as shortcuts to greater power.</p>
<p>It was not until 350 years later during the reign of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_Wu_of_Han">Emperor Wu of Han</a> that Confucianism was installed as China’s state ideology. </p>
<p>But this state-sanctioned version of Confucianism was not an honest revitalisation of Confucius’ ideas. Instead, it absorbed many elements from rival schools of thought, notably <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/">legalism</a>, which emerged in the latter half of China’s Warring States period (453–221 BCE). Legalism argued efficient governance relies on impersonal laws and regulations — rather than moral principles and rites.</p>
<p>Like most great thinkers of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/list/the-axial-age-5-fast-facts">Axial Age</a> between the 8th and 3rd century BCE, Confucius did not believe everyone was created equal.</p>
<p>Similar to Plato (born over 100 years later), Confucius believed the ideal society followed a hierarchy. When asked by Duke Jing of Qi about government, Confucius famously replied:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>let the ruler be a ruler; the minister, a minister; the father, a father; the son, a son.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However it would be a superficial reading of Confucius to believe he called for unconditional obedience to rulers or superiors. Confucius advised a disciple “not to deceive the ruler but to stand up to them”. </p>
<p>Confucius believed the legitimacy of a regime fundamentally relies on the confidence of the people. A ruler should tirelessly work hard and “lead by example”. </p>
<p>Like in a family, a good son listens to his father, and a good father wins respect not by imposing force or seniority but by offering heartfelt love, support, guidance and care.</p>
<p>In other words, Confucius saw a mutual relationship between the ruler and the ruled. </p>
<h2>Love and respect for social harmony</h2>
<p>To Confucius, the appropriate relations between family members are not merely metaphors for ideal political orders, but the basic fabrics of a harmonious society. </p>
<p>An essential family value in Confucius’ ideas is <em>xiao</em> 孝, or filial piety, a concept explained in at least 15 different ways in the Analects, a collection of the words from Confucius and his followers. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-ne-zha-the-chinese-superhero-with-1b-at-the-box-office-teach-us-how-to-raise-good-kids-124987">Can Ne Zha, the Chinese superhero with $1b at the box office, teach us how to raise good kids?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Depending on the context, Confucius defined filial piety as respecting parents, as “never diverging” from parents, as not letting parents feel unnecessary anxiety, as serving parents with etiquette when they are alive, and as burying and commemorating parents with propriety after they pass away.</p>
<p>Confucius expected rulers to exemplify good family values. When Ji Kang Zi, the powerful prime minister of Confucius’ home state of Lu asked for advice on keeping people loyal to the realm, Confucius responded by asking the ruler to demonstrate filial piety and benignity (<em>ci</em> 慈). </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=668&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=668&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410507/original/file-20210709-21-vjm4ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=668&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The first leaf to ‘Song Album of The Classic of Filial Piety in Painting and Calligraphy,’ with Confucius seated at centre. Calligraphy and painting by Gaozong (1107-1187) and Ma Hezhi (c.1130-c.1170), Song dynasty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Palace Museum</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Confucius viewed moral and ethical principles not merely as personal matters, but as social assets. He profoundly believed social harmony ultimately relies on virtuous citizens rather than sophisticated institutions.</p>
<p>In the ideas of Confucius, the most important moral principle is <em>ren</em> 仁, a concept that can hardly be translated into English without losing some of its meaning. </p>
<p>Like filial piety, <em>ren</em> is manifested in the love and respect one has for others. But <em>ren</em> is not restricted among family members and does not rely on blood or kinship. <em>Ren</em> guides people to follow their conscience. People with <em>ren</em> have strong compassion and empathy towards others.</p>
<p>Translators arguing for a single English equivalent for <em>ren</em> have attempted to interpret the concept as “benevolence”, “humanity”, “humanness” and “goodness”, none of which quite capture the full significance of the term. </p>
<p>The challenge in translating <em>ren</em> is not a linguistic one. Although the concept appears more than 100 times in the Analects, Confucius did not give one neat definition. Instead, he explained the term in many different ways. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.veryshortintroductions.com/view/10.1093/actrade/9780195398915.001.0001/actrade-9780195398915">summarised by China historian Daniel Gardner</a>, Confucius defined <em>ren</em> as: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>to love others, to subdue the self and return to ritual propriety, to be respectful, tolerant, trustworthy, diligent, and kind, to be possessed of courage, to be free from worry, or to be resolute and firm. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Instead of searching for an explicit definition of <em>ren</em>, it is perhaps wise to view the concept as an ideal type of the highest and ultimate virtue Confucius believed good people should pursue.</p>
<h2>Relevance in contemporary China</h2>
<p>Confucius’ thinking hs had a profound impact on almost every great Chinese thinker since. Based upon his ideas, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mencius/">Mencius</a> (372–289 BCE) and <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/xunzi/">Xunzi</a> (c310–c235 BCE) developed different schools of thought within the system of Confucianism. </p>
<p>Arguing against these ideas, <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/.">Mohism</a> (4th century BCE), <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/">Daoism</a> (4th century BCE), <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/">Legalism</a> (3rd century BCE) and many other influential systems of thought emerged in the 400 years after Confucius’ time, going on to shape many aspects of the Chinese civilisation in the last two millennia.</p>
<p>Modern China has a complicated relationship with Confucius and his ideas. </p>
<p>Since the early 20th century, many intellectuals influenced by western thought started denouncing Confucianism as the reason for China’s national humiliations since <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Opium_War">the first Opium War</a> (1839-42). </p>
<p>Confucius received fierce criticism from both liberals and <a href="https://theconversation.com/to-make-sense-of-modern-china-you-simply-cant-ignore-marxism-34606">Marxists</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=029_grieder.inc&issue=029">Hu Shih</a>, a leader of China’s New Culture Movement in the 1910s and 1920s and <a href="https://c250.columbia.edu/c250_celebrates/remarkable_columbians/hu_shih.html">an alumnus of Columbia University</a>, advocated overthrowing the “House of Confucius”. </p>
<p>Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, also repeatedly denounced Confucius and Confucianism. Between 1973 and 1975, Mao devoted <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643955">the last political campaign in his life</a> against Confucianism.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-make-sense-of-modern-china-you-simply-cant-ignore-marxism-34606">To make sense of modern China, you simply can't ignore Marxism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Despite these fierce criticisms and harsh persecutions, Confucius’ ideas remain in the minds and hearts of many Chinese people, both in and outside China. </p>
<p>One prominent example is <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15890.html">PC Chang</a>, another Chinese alumnus of Columbia University, who was instrumental in drafting the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a>, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10 1948. Thanks to Chang’s <a href="https://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/ngier/declaration.htm">efforts</a>, the spirit of some most essential Confucian ideas, such as <em>ren</em>, was deeply embedded in the Declaration. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410520/original/file-20210709-21-1317fe3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The first session of the drafting committee on International Bill of Rights, Commission on Human Rights, at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 9 June 1947. Dr PC Chang was vice president of the committee, and is seated second from left.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">United Nations/flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, many Chinese parents, as well as the Chinese state, are keen children be provided <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2021/05/22/chinese-parents-are-keen-on-a-more-confucian-education">a more Confucian education</a>. </p>
<p>In 2004, the Chinese government named <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-confucius-institutes-and-do-they-teach-chinese-propaganda-114274">its initiative of promoting language and culture overseas</a> after Confucius, and its leadership has been <a href="https://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/27/content_17133357.htm">enthusiastically embracing Confucius’ lessons</a> to consolidate their legitimacy and ruling in the 21st century.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-confucius-institutes-and-do-they-teach-chinese-propaganda-114274">Explainer: what are Confucius Institutes and do they teach Chinese propaganda?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160708/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu Tao does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Confucius looked nothing like the great sage in his own time as he is widely known in ours. But his ideas continue to shape contemporary life for many.Yu Tao, Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1578862021-05-19T19:59:08Z2021-05-19T19:59:08ZTeaching Chinese politics in Australia: polarised views leave academics between a rock and a hard place<p>I was making small talk with a medical technician during a health check a few months ago. After hearing I was a senior lecturer teaching Chinese politics at the University of Sydney, she commented: “It must be very hard for you.” My first thought was that she meant it must have been hard to teach online during the pandemic lockdown. But then she asked: “How do you manage to overcome your bias?”</p>
<p>I am an academic of Chinese background in Australia. So am I necessarily biased in my approach to Chinese politics? Is it indeed possible that my upbringing in China has made me a blind supporter of the Chinese system? Or has my embrace of liberal values turned me into a militant “China basher”? </p>
<p>These questions had occurred to me before, of course. But against the background of the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-retaliates-suspending-its-strategic-economic-dialogue-with-australia-is-symbolic-but-still-a-big-deal-160452">souring of China-Australia relations</a>, they have become more acute than ever before. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-australia-china-relationship-is-unravelling-faster-than-we-could-have-imagined-145836">Why the Australia-China relationship is unravelling faster than we could have imagined</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In November 2020, for the first time in ten years of teaching, a student who described themselves as a “Chinese patriot” accused me of being a “Taiwan independence supporter”. The reason was my comment in class that, after the election of Joe Biden as US president, issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan were likely to cause tensions between China and the United States. On the same day in the same class, a non-Chinese student protested that, while wishing to avoid turning academic analysis into a moral judgment, I should have remembered that “authoritarianism is evil”.</p>
<p>Teaching the topic of Chinese politics is becoming more challenging in a world increasingly divided by ideas, beliefs and interests. Of course, our own values and experiences always influence and even drive inquiry and the extension of knowledge. But if students come to class with pre-existing rigid mindsets and refuse to engage with different opinions and viewpoints, then education simply fails in its purpose.</p>
<p>“We should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports,” Chinese leader Mao Zedong <a href="http://large.stanford.edu/history/kaist/references/marx/mao/c2/">said in a 1939 interview</a>. Taken out of context (Mao was describing the rivalry between the Chinese Communist Party and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reformed_Government_of_the_Republic_of_China">Japanese puppet government in Nanjing</a>) this sounds one-sided and superficial. But if we succumb to nationalistic emotions, moral values and political ideology, then this perspective is exactly how we see the world. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/students-in-china-heed-their-governments-warnings-against-studying-in-australia-141871">Students in China heed their government's warnings against studying in Australia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Understanding China – and ourselves</h2>
<p>In the study of politics in China, I have endeavoured to teach students that things are often not as clear-cut and absolute as many expect. In other words, nuance is the key to understanding China.</p>
<p>It is valid to question the legitimacy and stability of any system, particularly if the system may rely on censorship and coercion. But over the years, all the predictions of the system’s collapse have proved wrong. China’s one-party rule has been firm and strong to this day. </p>
<p>We need to consider the question of what explains the resilience and prosperity of the Chinese system. Before we criticise it for its lack of liberal democratic values, it is important to first understand what the system is and how it operates – that includes its economic drivers, its sources of legitimacy, its historical legacy and its developmental trajectory. </p>
<p>Why is it important? Such understanding will help us better cope with a world where China is a significant power and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>We have seen the rise of a new generation of patriotic Chinese “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolf_warrior_diplomacy">wolf warriors</a>” who aggressively defend the state’s positions. But it is equally important for them to engage with different opinions and perspectives. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-china-nationalists-are-using-intimidation-to-silence-critics-can-they-be-countered-without-stifling-free-speech-145241">Pro-China nationalists are using intimidation to silence critics. Can they be countered without stifling free speech?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For one thing, when defending China against Western countries’ frequent “attacks” on “sensitive issues”, they need to understand that such issues might reflect the inherent problems of China’s system. These problems include economic inequality, ethnic tensions, vulnerable property rights, lack of individual freedom, and many more. Moreover, they could benefit from a self-recognition of the origins of their own strong feelings of pride and loyalty to the Chinese nation as a result of how it constructs their identity and sense of belonging. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1333358355792924682"}"></div></p>
<h2>Research versus parroting the official line</h2>
<p>Returning to the question of how I manage my bias when teaching Chinese politics, I guess my identity as a Chinese immigrant will always have an impact on my understanding of the Chinese system. For all of us, our perceptions of the world reflect the values and beliefs associated with our identities and experiences. </p>
<p>Just like my students, some readers of this article might think I am too critical of China. In the eyes of others I might appear not critical enough. This is understandable: my opinions have been informed by my own experiences, as well as by my analysis of primary sources, engagement with many academic thinkers and communications with researchers, policymakers and business owners. </p>
<p>I try to expose students to the complexity of Chinese politics through such a research-driven approach. This approach is largely missing in public debate about China in Australia. Yet it is a difficult but important task. </p>
<p>If we fail in this task, in the quest for knowledge and understanding based on careful evaluation of opinions and facts, our discussions would be reduced to nothing more than an indiscriminate acceptance and simple repetition of official discourses or media coverage, whatever their source. My students in the class reflect the views of their home societies. In the current environment, that’s making it more difficult than ever to engage in productive analysis and discussion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Minglu Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Increasingly strained relations between the two countries are adding to the challenges of teaching students enrolled in Chinese studies at Australian universities.Minglu Chen, Senior Lecturer, Government and International Relations, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1391782020-05-23T11:39:50Z2020-05-23T11:39:50ZChina’s new coronavirus recovery strategy explained<p>When Chinese Premier Li Keqiang delivered his <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020lh/2020-05/22/c_1126018545.htm?baike">annual report</a> to China’s national legislature on May 22, his focus was firmly on COVID-19. His 55-minute speech to the gathering of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) put the prevention and control of COVID-19 at the heart of the government’s strategy for the year ahead. The focus will be on protecting employment, livelihoods, businesses and supply chains from collapse. </p>
<p>While media coverage of the NPC was dominated by China’s plan to enact <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52762291">new security powers in Hong Kong</a>, the meeting also reveals how cautious China is about its coronavirus recovery. </p>
<p>Western European countries are pursuing a return to normal, but Li signalled that in the coming year, the plan for China is a “normalisation of prevention and control”. Although Li did not set out in detail what control would mean, it currently involves measures that go beyond just <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html">track and tracing</a> to <a href="http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-05/08/content_5509896.htm">widespread</a> temperature controls and social distancing measures. In his opening passage, he warned: “The pandemic is not over.” </p>
<p>The speech, known as the government work report (政府工作报告, zhengfu gongzuo baogao), stressed that continued vigilance against the coronavirus will be a core thread determining everything from macro-level strategy down to micro-level policy for the foreseeable future in China. This may reflect the fact that China has recently experienced new localised outbreaks of the virus – most notably in its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/19/china-puts-city-of-shulan-under-wuhan-style-lockdown-after-fresh-covid-19-cases">north-eastern provinces</a>.</p>
<h2>Message for millions</h2>
<p>The government work report is delivered every year on behalf of the executive branch of government to parliament. Its deliberation by the NPC is mainly a formality. </p>
<p>Delayed for over two months due to the pandemic, anticipation of 2020’s report was high, with audiences waiting to hear how the Chinese government would move forward. Li made clear that all efforts toward socioeconomic development must be planned in coordination with pandemic prevention and control. In other words, preventing and controlling coronavirus will go hand in hand with planning, decision-making and implementation of government policy over the coming year. </p>
<p>Although some international media <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/asia/china-coronavirus-national-peoples-congress.html">had predicted</a> Li would claim victory over the virus, he was in fact only cautiously positive. He stressed the challenges ahead and noted that successes so far had come “at great cost”. His speech was unembellished, his tone solemn and matter-of-fact. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/socialpolitical/research/sccr/research/covid-19understandingchinesegovernmentcontainmentmeasuresandtheirsocietalimpacts/chinasdelayed2020twosessionswhattheycantellusaboutitscurrentcovid-19policy/#">research</a> shows that in fact this was to be expected: the government work report is aimed at multiple audiences, but its key role is to signal to government departments and officials what their work should focus on in the coming year. It must therefore adopt a measured tone.</p>
<p>Li’s speech was also shorter and very different in structure from his reports in previous years. In Chinese government reports, format and structure are used to signal priorities and principles. This time the speech was almost halved in length – 20 pages compared to 35 in 2019 – and structured differently to the standard format of the last decade. </p>
<p>The atypical length reflected the need to prioritise efficiency, both in the context of the continued presence of the virus – where all interactions, even the meeting he was speaking at, still pose a risk – and in the tough job of getting the economy going. The structure of the speech reflected the government’s new development strategy. Dropping concrete targets for <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-opening/china-drops-gdp-goal-as-parliament-opens-virus-slams-economy-idUKKBN22Y05K">GDP for the first time</a> since 1990, Li left room for flexibility in the face of continued COVID-19 uncertainty. The speech also allowed local governments space to pursue policies to mitigate the social effects of the pandemic rather than focus purely on economic recovery. </p>
<h2>Six Protections Policy</h2>
<p>Li’s strategy for mitigating the damaging effects of the epidemic for society and the economy was summed up in the short slogan, the “Six Protections”. These six protections are: job security, people’s livelihoods, businesses, food and energy security, stable industrial and supply chains, and the functioning of the lower levels of the Chinese government’s five-level hierarchy. </p>
<p>This slogan forms the core of the Chinese government strategy, and is integrated into the national leadership’s <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2020-04/20/c_1125879422.htm">recent goals</a> of ensuring stability in employment, finance, foreign trade, investment, and market expectations. </p>
<p>Implementing the strategy will involve the national government both introducing new policies and strengthening existing ones. This includes allowing a ¥1 trillion (£115 billion) rise in the fiscal deficit and earmarking ¥1 trillion of special governments bonds for the as yet defined purpose of “COVID-19 control”. All this will to be transferred to local governments so that they can support employment, basic needs, and businesses.</p>
<p>Overall, the key message from the Chinese government in its annual work report is that rather than returning the economy and society to normal, or relaxing restrictions (as many European countries are trying to do), for the foreseeable future it is putting prevention and control of the epidemic front and centre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duckett received funding from UKRI Medical Research Council and the National Institute for Health Research for the research underpinning this article. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Holly Snape receives funding from the British Academy. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hua Wang receives funding from UKRI Medical Research Council and the National Institute for Health Research for the research underpinning this article. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yingru Li receives funding from UKRI Medical Research Council and the National Institute for Health Research for the research underpinning this article. </span></em></p>When China’s Premier Li Keqiang delivered the annual government work report on the opening day of the National People’s Congress, COVID-19 was at the heart of it.Jane Duckett, Professor and Edward Caird Chair of Politics, University of GlasgowHolly Snape, British Academy Fellow, University of GlasgowHua Wang, Researcher in the Scottish Centre for China Research, University of Glasgow, University of GlasgowYingru Li, Lecturer in Financial Accounting, Tax and Audit, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1307202020-02-04T15:03:13Z2020-02-04T15:03:13ZCoronavirus: how health and politics have always been inextricably linked in China<p>Since the onset of the Chinese revolution in the early 20th century, public health objectives have been an integral part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideology. China’s overwhelming poverty, linked to poor hygiene and health of the Chinese population, particularly those living in the countryside, signalled China’s backwardness to the world. </p>
<p>And China was the “sick man of Asia” in so many ways. Revolutionaries and social reformers, Chinese or Western, including medical missionaries, believed that improving healthcare for the Chinese people would open the door for modernisation. </p>
<p>Since the CCP seized power and established a strong centralised communist country – the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – in 1949, health has continued to play an outsized role in the internal politics of the communist state. In complex ways, as my <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/48587522-the-people-s-health">own research has examined</a>, it has come to define the PRC’s standing around the world. </p>
<p>The new outbreak of coronavirus has put these issues centre stage once again. With the city of Wuhan on lockdown, and China sending out <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200203-china-says-urgently-needs-medical-masks-to-tackle-virus">an urgent request</a> for help to source protective medical equipment, the need to control the virus spreading is seen as vital to China’s stability and national security – and the CCP’s political legitimacy. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-outbreak-quarantining-millions-in-china-is-unprecedented-and-wrong-130565">Coronavirus outbreak: quarantining millions in China is unprecedented and wrong</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Throughout Chinese history, epidemic, war and natural disasters, including famine, have been seen as signals of the downfall of many dynasties – the loss of the Mandate of Heaven. Beginning with the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02549948.1958.11730973">Yellow Turban Rebellion</a> in the 2nd century AD, almost all major sectarian insurgences in Chinese history had involved some forms of faith healing. An outbreak of a mystery disease was also linked to the defeat of warlord Cao Cao’s army at <a href="http://oa.lib.ksu.edu.tw/OA/retrieve/65815/%E8%B3%87%E6%B2%BB%E9%80%9A%E9%91%91%E5%85%A8%E8%AD%AF%20A.pdf">the Battle of Red Cliffs</a> in 208-9 AD. As a result, China was divided into three warring states entering the Three Kingdom Period (220-280 AD), also known as the “Period of Disunity”, which is remembered as one of the bloodiest periods in Chinese history. </p>
<p>During the era of Mao Zedong, public health work became one of the central means to influence the masses. Public health campaigns were <a href="https://chineseposters.net/themes/patriotic-health-campaign.php">simultaneously political campaigns</a>. At the same time, the CCP leadership knew well that promises of healing and health were powerful forms of propaganda. </p>
<iframe src="https://www.facebook.com/plugins/post.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FChinesePosters%2Fposts%2F124774715691993&width=500" width="100%" height="732" style="border:none;overflow:hidden" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allow="encrypted-media"></iframe>
<p>In the decades after 1949, Mao and the CCP leadership made eradicating diseases and improving the health of the entire population <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Politics_Medicine_China_h.html?id=Q6C2AAAAIAAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">a central pillar of their policies</a>. In the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward famine, which claimed millions of lives, famine-related diseases such as oedema, gynaecological problems, and child malnutrition ravaged the entire country. To prove the infallibility of their socialist utopian project, Mao and the CCP leadership attempted once again to turn the masses into “believers” with the promise of health and healing. Following the collapse of the state health system after the famine, they adopted a grassroots health initiative and turned it into a revolutionary brand: the barefoot doctor programme. </p>
<p>During the 1970s, the programme, also called the “Chinese approach to health” became the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-51250-1_6">public face of the PRC</a> in its relationship with the rest of the world. The leaders of the World Health Organization (WHO) at the time felt strongly that the Chinese experience in tackling health problems with limited financial, technological, and human resources should be promoted globally. By 1978, “Health for All” was adopted as a global goal for primary health care in the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf">WHO’s Alma Ata Declaration</a>. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the PRC leadership realised that health initiatives could be “inexpensive but profitable” undertakings that could boost their efforts to promote a new international order: a People’s Revolutionary Movement against colonialism and imperialism. Between 1963 and 1989, the <a href="https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-755.php">PRC sent medical teams</a> to more than 40 countries in Africa. The PRC’s increasing medical humanitarian activities, and the bonds of friendship created through such undertakings, helped the country at the UN. At the 1971 UN General Assembly, 26 African countries voted in favour of <a href="https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI)">restoring the status</a> of the PRC at the UN. </p>
<h2>Creaking under pressure</h2>
<p>Since the early 1990s, China has undergone an unprecedented scale of urbanisation, driving millions of rural villagers into cities. These cities create ever greater health risks: air pollution and pandemics such as Sars in 2003, avian influenza in 2013 and now the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/coronavirus-5830">new coronavirus outbreak</a> have become the largest threats to people’s health in urban areas. </p>
<p>Making the current outbreak worse is the state of the Chinese health system: overloaded, ineffective, expensive and chaotic. While there have been some attempts to reform the Chinese health system, most were carried out in a haphazard fashion. For example, in the aftermath of the Sars crisis, many public health units <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5105031/">were reconfigured</a> into local centres for disease control, but a systematic prevention programme for infectious diseases remains absent.</p>
<p>As the political importance of Sars evaporated, money for research and prevention quickly dried out. Meanwhile, the Chinese health system remains reactive rather than proactive. It continues to fail stress tests and is unable to cope with major disease outbreaks. Lack of resources has been further exasperated by a muddled reporting structure across health departments. <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)61315-3/fulltext">Violence against doctors</a>, known in China as “medical disturbances” (医闹), has increased in recent years. There are no long-term goals for public health because the issue is subjugated to the CCP’s political interests. </p>
<p>A lack of access to healthcare has also made many rural migrants more vulnerable to such outbreaks. Since the late 1980s, the PRC government opted for a market model for financing health services, which has made it unaffordable for many, particularly rural migrants in cities. Yet, these rural migrant workers often live in squalid, crowded conditions, some without access to clean water. Their homes and workplaces have become the hotbed for a number of infectious diseases, and their spread.</p>
<h2>Moving beyond rhetoric</h2>
<p>With cases of the new coronavirus now spreading around the world, the WHO <a href="https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/coronavirus-who-declares-global-virus-emergency">declared it</a> a global public emergency on January 30. Concerned with the international image of China as the source of a new global epidemic, and with the economic slowdown and the trade war with the US looming in the background, questions are growing about the CCP’s political legitimacy. Some people on the social media platform Wechat questioned whether, if the government can’t control the spread of virus, it is fit to rule – but these posts were removed. On February 2, authorities <a href="http://www.nnnews.net/nnby/p/3023322.html">threatened</a> to close down their Wechat accounts of anyone caught spreading “rumours” about coronavirus. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wuhan-coronavirus-crisis-management-is-a-test-to-xi-jinpings-powers-130678">Wuhan coronavirus: crisis management is a test to Xi Jinping's powers</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As well as the order to lock down Wuhan, authorities in Beijing have turned the control of the virus into a political campaign. On January 21, the PRC’s top political body responsible for law and order – the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-51221394">openly stated</a> that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Anyone who deliberately delays and hides the reporting of (virus) cases out of his or her own self-interest will be nailed on the pillar of shame for eternity. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In rural Hubei province near Wuhan, local authorities <a href="https://images.shobserver.com/img/2020/1/30/94739e89-c500-4635-bbd8-feef06684293.jpg">translated the message</a> into a big red banner, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. It read: “Anyone who does not report they have fever is the class enemy of the people.” </p>
<p>The CPLAC also urged all local authorities to make “the safety of people’s lives and their physical health the top priority”. But in the PRC, protecting people’s lives and their physical health has remained largely political rhetoric. </p>
<p>Seventy years after the founding of the PRC, China is a long way from being the disease free “socialist garden” imagined in the CCP’s utopian plans. If the Sars outbreak in 2003 was a wake-up call, the current coronavirus crisis should be an urgent warning: protecting lives should be given priority over the growth of GDP before it’s too late.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Xun Zhou's study on health intervention and delivery in the People's Republic of China was funded by the European Commission Research Executive Agency.</span></em></p>The Chinese Communist Party has long used healthcare as part of its propaganda operation.Xun Zhou, Reader, Department of History, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/926172018-03-05T15:18:07Z2018-03-05T15:18:07ZWhy China won’t let people compare Xi Jinping with an imperial predecessor<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208683/original/file-20180302-65529-b3lb8x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C721%2C607&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yuan Shikai in 1915.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Yuan_Shikai_of_China.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy is largely based on a supposed contrast between its “enlightened” leadership and the despotism of “Old China”. Any hint that the party is creating a new emperor must therefore be quashed. But the Chinese public know their history, and history is a potent political force in all nations – none more so than China.</p>
<p>In the days since the Communist Party recommended <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-xi-jinpings-lifetime-presidency-could-change-china-for-better-or-worse-92472">removing the limit on President Xi Jinping’s term in office</a>, one of the top ten banned terms on Chinese social media is a name: Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), the first president of the Republic of China. </p>
<p>Yuan is notorious for attempting to make himself emperor in 1915. A betrayal of republican principles, the move proved deeply unpopular and was reversed within months; Yuan died shortly after. This is clearly not the sort of parallel the Chinese government wants people to draw.</p>
<p>The proposed end to presidential term limits was announced without fanfare in the Chinese media, and was buried among 20 other constitutional amendments. There was to be no public discussion about the change. The Chinese middle classes nonetheless took to social media in large numbers to criticise the move, only to find that a host of sensitive terms were censored: “Yuan Shikai”, “Hongxian” (the term used for his brief reign), and any references to “emperor” or “ascending to the throne”, were all were blocked on Weibo, China’s most important social network. </p>
<p>The comparison is unflattering for several reasons. In assuming the imperial throne, Yuan was betraying a republican principle that had only been established in 1912. By contrast, Xi is changing a constitutional principle established by Deng Xiaoping all the way back in 1982 – and many in China oppose a move that allows for a kind of strongman leadership reminiscent of Mao Zedong. (The term “Xi Zedong” is currently banned too.)</p>
<h2>Going too far</h2>
<p>Xi’s time at the top of Chinese politics wasn’t entirely constrained before these amendments were floated. It is now convention that the president is also the party general secretary – in practice the more powerful of the two offices, and also not subject to term limits. By lifting limits on the presidency as well, Xi is only consolidating power further, and reversing efforts made after the death of Mao to prevent such concentration of power. </p>
<p>But in the end, individual popularity may be more important than constitutional principle. Again, Yuan makes for an instructive comparison. While Chinese intellectuals were affronted by his abandonment of republicanism, he was right that most people were not against the existence of emperors in general. His problem was that they did not believe he himself had any legitimacy in the role. His attempts to improve China’s political and economic strength were faltering, he had no imperial lineage, and nor had he led a popular movement to establish a new dynasty.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"968555656541216768"}"></div></p>
<p>Xi, also known as Xi Dada or Uncle Xi, enjoys greater support due to China’s increasing prosperity, ongoing stability, and his popular <a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anti-corruption-campaign-86396">anti-corruption campaign</a> (which has conveniently also targeted his opponents, making public dissent more dangerous). Crucially, he came to power through orderly, constitutional means. Many young people chafe at the growing repression of civil society in China, but like the intellectuals of Yuan’s day, they do not represent broader public opinion.</p>
<p>The Chinese government’s comprehensive control of the media affords it a monopoly on information that Yuan could have only dreamed of. While early republican China enjoyed a dynamic press, the law banned publication of any “subversive provocation to the government” – but Yuan’s censorship techniques were far less sophisticated than those honed in Communist China. The newspaper Guofeng Daily <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Nq5hBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=guofeng+daily+newspaper&source=bl&ots=chjbwcyXCP&sig=uz26pI82OJEadidu3hmQn76RQUs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi8-d-pjdXZAhUFK1AKHeflBfUQ6AEINzAC#v=onepage&q=guofeng%20daily%20newspaper&f=false">left its front page blank</a> the day he became emperor in protest at both his new status and the censorship of efforts to report it. No such protest would be possible in China today.</p>
<h2>Trouble ahead</h2>
<p>A power grab like this is not necessarily a sign of strength. Yuan declared himself emperor as the country faced insupportable debt levels, his authority across China crumbled and warlords stepped into the power vacuum. It was an attempt to shore up his position, as he believed that the country wanted to restore the “natural” order of rule by an emperor.</p>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party is struggling to implement the reforms needed to contain <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-rating/chinas-reforms-not-enough-to-arrest-mounting-debt-moodys-idUKKBN18M06Z">mounting debt</a> and ensure a smooth transition to an economy with <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2135450/china-tipped-cut-fiscal-deficit-it-tightens-purse-strings-goes">slower, steadier growth</a> than China has grown used to. Many think that Xi will need more than one more term to achieve these aims. But a longer term increases the chance that he will oversee an economic downturn that would damage his reputation.</p>
<p>Whereas Yuan was forced to reverse the declaration that he was emperor after just 83 days, the National People’s Congress will soon rubber-stamp the recommended changes to the constitution, and the revised version will remain in place for years to come. The difficulty will arise when a new potential leader eventually rises to the fore. The party is throwing away one of the strengths of its political system over other one-party dictatorships: orderly transitions of power. </p>
<p>In the decade following Yuan’s death in 1916, China had no fewer than 13 presidents while its politics was beset by power struggles. By contrast, Xi isn’t going anywhere anytime soon. But it is now unclear how his successor will take control when his leadership eventually ends.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isabella Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There’s a very unflattering historical parallel for Xi Jinping’s move to lift term limits. The Chinese Communist Party is having none of it.Isabella Jackson, Assistant Professor in Chinese History, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/924722018-02-27T09:33:23Z2018-02-27T09:33:23ZHow Xi Jinping’s ‘lifetime presidency’ could change China – for better or worse<p>Thanks to surprising new <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/26/asia/china-xi-jinping-president-intl/index.html">constitutional amendments</a> – curiously, first announced in English – the path is clear for Xi Jinping and his chosen vice-president to rule China beyond the ten-year two-term limit. </p>
<p>Pragmatically, most analysts expected Xi to retain power to some extent after 2023 by retaining his posts as Chairman of the Central Military Commission and General-Secretary of the Communist Party. But now, it seems he is going nowhere and the full implications of this will busy China watchers for many years.</p>
<p>What does a (potentially) life-term president in Beijing mean for China’s Asian neighbours? For starters, Asian countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/vietnam-is-struggling-to-unite-its-mekong-neighbours-against-china-63969">worried</a> about China’s increasing assertiveness can no longer pin their hopes on a more benign and mild leader arising in the future. Strategically, they would have to meet a more robust China as a geopolitical fact for decades to come. This would mean, possibly, more countries pivoting towards China as a hugely <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-test-how-trumps-unpredictability-changes-the-game-77908">unpredictable</a> US continues to send mixed signals to Asia. </p>
<p>Next, as a historically weak institution, we can expect to see growing confidence from the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/10/xi-solidify-legacy-changes-not-tectonic/">Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs</a> and its diplomats. Xi has already shown he’s prepared to rely on the ministry as he consolidates power even further, and now, its stock will continue to rise. </p>
<p>China is now also ready to recalibrate its “soft power” efforts along more Xi-centric lines. China Xinhua News may have laid it on rather thickly by <a href="https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/910006947948109824">claiming</a> that the “personal charisma of President #XiJinping fosters a love of China in countries all around the world #Xiplomacy”, but the rest of the world can nonetheless expect more efforts to control and promote Xi the man as a regional and global leader.</p>
<p>The role of vice-president will also be closely watched. Traditionally, the vice-presidency is largely ceremonial and devoid of real power or in a suppliant position for the president-elect to observe and be observed. But with Xi’s changes in place, a future vice-president will wield considerable influence and power – even if Xi decides to appoint one who currently sits outside the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13904441">Politburo</a> (the party’s political bureau) or its smaller standing committee.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/wang-qishan-returns-to-chinas-political-stage/">widely rumoured</a> frontrunner for the job is Xi’s trusted ally Wang Qishan. Wang not long ago <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-congress-wang/chinas-xi-looks-set-to-keep-right-hand-man-on-despite-age-idUKKBN1CG0IW">retired</a> from the seven-member Politburo, which some saw as a sign that Xi still felt bound by the so-called “seven up eight down” norm in which officials must retire from the Politburo Standing Committee if they are 68 or older at the time of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-sets-out-plans-to-make-china-great-again-86022">Party Congress</a>. But given Xi has now sidestepped both party and state convention to further entrench his power base, his new prerogatives quite probably override conventions over who can be appointed to what and when.</p>
<h2>The perks of a lifetime president</h2>
<p>However unpalatable it may sound, having a strong, long-serving leader may be a good thing for China. Predictability and stability will earn Xi the political capital he needs to instigate urgently needed financial and social reforms – fixing the banking system, allocating and reallocating capital, reworking regulatory structures, tackling inequality. This can only bode well for the Chinese economy, and as an upshot, the regional and global economy. </p>
<p>On another front, the prospect of a lifelong Xi presidency will disappoint many corrupt and potentially corrupt Chinese officials who originally thought they could simply stick it out till 2023. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign (even if we consider it a political pruning exercise) has undoubtedly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/961a8e3c-1824-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a">delivered real benefits</a> to the economy and its people. Having shown no signs of slowing down his campaign, Xi seems intent on not just rooting out corrupt individuals, but forcing the sort of cultural shift that inevitably takes a long time. If he succeeds, this may be his most important legacy.</p>
<p>Additionally, if Xi indeed stays on for more than ten years, it prevents alternative leaders from undoing his work. This gives him all the more freedom and resources to achieve the “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html">Chinese Dream</a>” and the twin goals known as the “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IxxBDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT16&lpg=PT16&dq=%22Two+Centenaries%22+china&source=bl&ots=fjnngqIx5X&sig=MTUXe03MBai9wOWKZpli21Ej_cY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj81rbZv8TZAhXBFywKHREDC7YQ6AEIWzAE#v=onepage&q&f=false">Two Centenaries</a>” – a “moderately well-off society” by 2021 and a “democratic, civilised, harmonious, and modern socialist country” by 2049.</p>
<p>While it may seem too early to consider life after Xi, China has to start imagining what that life might look like – especially if Xi successfully uses his long reign to refashion institutional and party norms in his image.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/01/when-ailing-dictators-die-in-office-what-happens-next/?utm_term=.75e92e605a6d">study</a> by Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor shows that institutionalised authoritarian regimes tend to remain remarkably stable where they enjoy strong party and military support. As they write:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>22% of highly personalised dictatorships (those regimes lacking strong parties or a military) collapsed when the leader died – compared to 6% of institutionalised dictatorships. Although instability risk in highly personalised settings is comparatively higher, the actual prospects remain low.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If we take their findings as read and assume that Xi gets his way, the prospect that this president will eventually be succeeded by another enduring and entrenched authoritarian is more than likely. That is a worrying prognosis. Xi has eliminated his political rivals and emasculated alternative power centres. Should a truly dangerous dictator come to power, he would find a cowed elite, weak institutional constraints, and a compliant public unused to political mobilisation. Xi’s move, perhaps ironically and however unintended, lays the groundwork for another Mao to emerge - presenting the biggest risk of all in Xi’s gambit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dylan M.H Loh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Xi Jinping is now ruling without term limits. That’s bad news for corrupt officials – and perhaps for the Chinese people.Dylan M.H Loh, Graduate Research Fellow and PhD Candidate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894242018-01-11T14:08:05Z2018-01-11T14:08:05ZThe forecast for British-Chinese relations in 2018: a storm on the horizon<p>As vague, well-worn pronouncements on the rise of China give way to the complex reality of increasing Chinese power, a number of countries have begun to seriously consider the influence of the Party-State within their own borders. The factors that have triggered debate in countries such as Australia and New Zealand are also to be found in the UK. Yet at the same time, Brexit changes the calculus of engagement. Britain is soliciting more trade and investment from further afield. The upshot might well be a tumultuous year for British-Chinese relations.</p>
<p>From Chinese tech giant Huawei’s <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9691370/Conservatives-and-Lib-Dems-take-donations-from-Chinese-company-accused-of-US-security-threat.html">courting of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats</a> during their coalition government, to the astonishing decision to move forward with the French-Chinese backed Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, there is no shortage of links that merit further scrutiny.</p>
<p>In the course of my own research, it’s been fascinating to observe how the Hinkley Point project has united all manner of experts (engineers, physicists, environmentalists, China specialists, business analysists) in fierce criticism of the project as it stands. Despite serious doubts over the practicality of the project that saw two of French energy giant EDF’s directors <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/28/resignation-edf-director-hinkley-point-gerard-magnin">resign in protest</a>, as well as widespread claims that it was a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/dec/21/hinkley-point-c-dreadful-deal-behind-worlds-most-expensive-power-plant">terrible deal</a> for British consumers, supporters eventually pushed the deal through. Chinese state-run China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) will own a third of the project, with plans to lead construction of further nuclear power stations in the UK. </p>
<p>The deal is only a small part of a <a href="https://cpianalysis.org/2017/12/20/david-camerons-new-china-job-is-it-time-for-a-debate-on-the-role-of-elites/">wider phenomenon</a>. Though increased interactions with China, including trade and investment, are to be welcomed, there are a growing number of elite linkages developing in tandem. Rather than seeking out characters in Le Carré novels, the focus should be on strategic influence that impels certain behaviour. As ever more numerous debates around the globe attest, the reach of the Chinese Party-State is becoming problematic.</p>
<h2>Under pressure</h2>
<p>These issues are not limited to politics and business. Take academia, for instance. When organising a debate on China at Durham University recently, students were <a href="http://www.durhamadvertiser.co.uk/news/15085503.Durham__Chinese_embassy_official_calls_for_speaker_to_be_barred_from_University_debate/">reportedly</a> contacted by the Chinese embassy and warned against hosting a politically sensitive speaker. To its credit, the university didn’t interfere with the debate on that occasion. Nonetheless, the incident does perhaps reveal new pressures that universities face. </p>
<p>At the University of Cambridge, a £3.7m donation to fund the Centre of Development Studies and an associated professorship was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10890356/Revealed-Wen-Jiabaos-family-is-behind-Cambridge-University-professorship.html">revealed</a> to have come from the family of former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao through a convoluted chain. One academic at the time <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10890356/Revealed-Wen-Jiabaos-family-is-behind-Cambridge-University-professorship.html">noted</a> that “it seems a foreign government appointed a professor of politics at Cambridge”. This comes at a time when Chinese academic institutions face the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-zero-tolerance-for-academic-freedom-85200">biggest crackdown</a> on their academic freedoms for a generation.</p>
<p>Huawei’s hiring practices and the University of Cambridge donation were revealed by the Daily Telegraph. However, after those particular stories broke, the Telegraph <a href="https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/04/03/china-spends-big-on-propaganda-in-britain-but-returns-are-low/">signed an agreement</a> to offer the monthly supplement “China Watch” to its readers, made up exclusively of stories written by China Daily. Though the content is not likely to change too many readers’ minds on China, might the £750,000 annual income it pulls in for the Telegraph raise questions about wider China coverage in the paper? </p>
<p>The Telegraph’s own chief political correspondent, Peter Oborne, resigned over the matter in 2015, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/peter-oborne/why-i-have-resigned-from-telegraph">claiming</a> that stories critical of HSBC were discouraged after the bank pulled advertising in response to criticism. Oborne even mentioned his fears about the impact of the “China Watch” income in his resignation letter. He may have been less than impressed when his new employer, the Daily Mail, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-37088736">signed its own content-sharing agreement</a> with China’s People’s Daily in 2016.</p>
<p>To be clear, the world will benefit from increased exposure to China, not only in terms of trade but also culture, language and friendship. Let’s not conflate a people with its representatives – China contains myriad viewpoints and worldviews, the official voice of which is only one. Participants in the British branch of this debate must also ensure it doesn’t descend into unfounded suspicion of the vibrant British-Chinese community.</p>
<p>As the British government promotes international trade and investment in the run up to Brexit, <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-marks-20-years-since-handover-as-china-tightens-its-grip-80210">tension in Hong Kong</a> is one of many issues coming into sharper focus. At the same time, the UK boasts the sort of links with the Party-State that have recently fallen under intense scrutiny in Chinese influence debates around the world. Britain may be forced to ask difficult questions about the nature of its relationship with China. Will it tolerate increasing Party-State influence inside its borders – and can it afford not to?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Thorley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brexit means the UK is seeking new partners, but how much is it willing to put up with to get a deal?Martin Thorley, PhD candidate in Contemporary Chinese Studies and International Relations, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/860222017-10-20T13:35:07Z2017-10-20T13:35:07ZXi Jinping sets out plans to make China great again<p>In 1793, in his letter to Britain’s King George III, China’s Qianlong emperor rejected all the British requests to improve the state of trade between England and China. After all, the Middle Kingdom “possesses all things in prolific abundance … there is no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians”. Half a century later, China was defeated by Britain in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Opium-Wars">Opium Wars</a>, and started to rethink its place in the world. Ever since, Chinese elites have been searching for answers to the same question: how to make China great again?</p>
<p>The Communist party in China has always claimed that the answer is communism – <a href="http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/18/content_33399242.htm">in more recent years</a>, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” – and that the party is the only force capable of building and maintaining that order. This claim has been driven home as strongly as ever at this year’s 19th party congress, an important meeting of the party that only happens once every five years. </p>
<p>The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, inaugurated the congress with a three-hour-and-20-minute <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-congress.html">opening speech</a>. His message was clear: a confident China is coming back to claim its rightful place of the world and find back the past glory of Chinese civilisation.</p>
<p>The speech was striking for its sheer ideological confidence. The party has always set great store by ideological and theoretical innovation, and Xi is clearly intent on continuing the tradition. His preferred framing, “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”, is supposedly the new great ideological direction, a successor to the party’s past guiding philosophies: <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/63a5a9b2-85cd-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5?mhq5j=e6">Mao Zedong Thought</a>, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/why-china-still-needs-deng-xiaoping/">Deng Xiaoping Theory</a>, <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/3represents/68735.htm">Three Represents</a>, and <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cpc2011/2010-09/08/content_12474310.htm">Scientific Outlook on Development</a>.</p>
<p>So far, so traditional: another (somewhat dull) ideological brand for the party’s plans. But Xi’s speech also issued a politically urgent appeal to the general public: to be more confident about the current one-party system. </p>
<h2>Harmonious and beautiful</h2>
<p>According to Xi, China will push for political system reform and develop China’s socialist democracy, but it will never “copy the foreign political model” of Western liberal democracy. Almost every party congress emphasises this point, but this year, the party is driving it home as confidently and assertively as ever.</p>
<p>Chinese state propaganda consistently warns that were Western liberal democracy imported to China, it would only drag the country into chaos and instability. As far as the Chinese authorities are concerned, Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in the US and the chaos of Brexit in the UK are glaring examples of democratic failure, and they make excellent grist for the propaganda mill.</p>
<p>Xi and the party are confident that the shifting international landscape is also in China’s favour, perhaps more than ever in modern history. In a US-dominated unipolar world, China never had the space nor the capacity to realise its potential as a global power. But even before the rise of Trump, China had by some measures become <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/">the largest economy in the world</a>, and it’s long been perceived as the next superpower. Now, the power gap left by America’s global retreat under Trump will only elevate China’s role in the world order.</p>
<p>Now this opportunity has presented itself, Xi is not shying away from spelling out his ambitions. From 2020-2035, he aims to achieve the “basic modernisation of socialism”, with clear economic, political and environmental goals; from 2035 to the mid-21st century, those goals will be further pursed to make China a “world leading” socialist power – “prosperous, democratic, civilised, harmonious and beautiful”.</p>
<p>In his speech to the congress, he also announced a more specific goal: China will continue to develop a strong army. The word “military” (<em>jun</em>) appeared in Xi’s speech 86 times, more than ever before. According to Xi’s speech, China will complete the basic modernisation of its army in 2035, and by the mid-21st century, it will boast a world-class military under party command.</p>
<p>On this front, China doesn’t have far to go. Its military budget, after all, is already the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/04/24/the-top-15-countries-for-military-expenditure-in-2016-infographic/#5caacef043f3">second largest in the world</a>. But Xi’s plan is much more ambitious: he wants an army that can deliver military victories, and that cannot be achieved by economic resources alone. </p>
<p>To some extent, the party has already achieved its goals by inspiring domestic nationalists who consider a strong military force crucial to prevent a return to centuries of humiliation. Convinced it can make China great again, the party is asking for another three decades’ monopoly on power in exchange for reviving the Middle Kingdom by the mid-21st century – about two centuries after the Opium Wars. And it might just have convinced the Chinese people that it is the only force that can conceivably make that happen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jinghan Zeng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Still smarting from centuries of ancient humiliation, China is ready to rise to global supremacy.Jinghan Zeng, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/834162017-09-05T07:28:31Z2017-09-05T07:28:31ZChina will do little about North Korea before the National Congress<p>After North Korea conducted its <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-panics-the-world-but-h-bomb-test-changes-little-83413">sixth underground nuclear test</a>, which was 10 times stronger than its last one, the US responded by warning Pyongyang that any threat to the US or its allies would be met with a “massive military response”. Donald Trump tweeted that he is considering ceasing trade with any country that does business with the north – and of course, it’s clear which countries he meant.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"904377075049656322"}"></div></p>
<p>China is the <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">top destination</a> for North Korean goods, with exports worth US$2.83 billion, dwarfing the US$97.8m that northern products fetch from second-placed India. That leaves China exposed to the US’s unpredictable ire.</p>
<p>Prior to the nuclear test, South Korea had already sought a review of a cap on ballistic missile numbers; Trump approved it, meaning Seoul can now increase the distance and the force of its missiles, an outcome sure to discomfort Beijing. Shortly after the test, South Korea’s defence ministry said that it will <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korea-to-announce-approval-of-environment-report-for-thaad-deployment-on-monday">deploy</a> four more Terminal High Altitude Defence (THAAD) missile systems. This is bound to further frustrate Beijing, which is still fuming about the systems deployed already.</p>
<p>More worryingly for China, Japan has also taken steps to boost its defence mechanisms, ostensibly to counter the North Korean missile threat but conveniently dovetailing with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s campaign for a normalised and robust military. Abe has proposed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-budget/japan-seeks-funds-to-boost-missile-ranges-days-after-north-korea-threat-idUSKCN1BB0DH">2.5% increase in Japan’s defence budget</a>, including research into hypersonic missiles and the extension of the range of its missiles.</p>
<p>With China increasingly viewing the South Korean and Japanese moves as hostile, it seems like East Asia’s strategic calculus could be changing. And while China has shown a remarkable amount of patience for North Korea’s military advances, Kim’s apparent disrespect for its president, Xi Jinping, might just tip the scales.</p>
<h2>Upstaged!</h2>
<p>The latest nuclear test was conducted just as Xi was busy hosting a BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations conference in Xiamen. This was supposed to be the latest feather in Xi’s cap, a chance to show off his diplomatic finesse after <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-china-india-comment-3c5af5c4-8f4a-11e7-84c0-02cc069f2c37-20170901-story.html">resolving the Doklam border dispute</a> with India just before the summit. But then came the nuclear test, and the attention Xi dearly wanted immediately evaporated.</p>
<p>This act of upstaging is a serious matter. The importance of the BRICS summit should not be understated; this was the last major international event for Xi before the <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-to-watch-out-for-at-the-chinese-communist-party-congress-83177">19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party</a>, China’s most important domestic political event, which kicks off on October 18. </p>
<p>Unlike the standard agenda of previous meetings, this year’s national congress is immensely personally important to Xi. He is trying to install allies in the Politburo Standing Committee, to push through wide-ranging social, economic and military reforms, and possibly aiming to stay on in some capacity beyond the normal 10-year term. </p>
<p>Strange that it’s not domestic rivals but Kim Jong-un (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/china-fatty-nickname-kim-jong-un-jin-san-pang">mocked</a> by some Chinese as “Kim fatty the third”) that poses the biggest headache for Xi. Still, the latest indications point towards <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41144356">yet another missile test</a>. Xi will certainly not appreciate Pyongyang overshadowing the build-up to the 19th Congress, or worse still, staging a test of some sort when it’s underway next month.</p>
<p>So what options does the Chinese leadership have? Very few, and none of them very good. </p>
<p>After the September 3 test, the nationalist Chinese paper Global Times said that China is <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1064487.shtml">not prepared to put an oil embargo</a> on North Korea. Some voices are even arguing that it may be better to simply <a href="https://theconversation.com/should-we-really-be-so-afraid-of-a-nuclear-north-korea-71855">accept the reality</a> that North Korea will soon be fully nuclear-armed, but that would be a huge risk. Trump has stated repeatedly that the US will not accept a nuclear North Korea, and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-missile-test-how-trumps-unpredictability-changes-the-game-77908">unpredictability</a> has to be taken into account when gaming out his administration’s possible response.</p>
<p>Alternatively, China could fully abandon North Korea to deal Kim a real blow. But again, this does not seem attractive. If the North Korean regime were really threatened with war or collapse, Kim could turn his weaponry and army towards China with the full rage of the scorned. All things considered, China will most likely stick to the script: asking for all parties to cease provocation.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Xi is not prepared to risk worsening the situation in the run up to the 19th Congress. What would be interesting to watch is what China does after the 19th Congress is concluded. If Xi comes out of it with more authority and political capital to spend domestically and abroad, perhaps he will start to take more decisive measures against his troublesome neighbour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dylan M.H Loh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s Xi Jinping has a crucial political manoeuvre to execute at home – and North Korea has stolen the limelight.Dylan M.H Loh, Graduate Research Fellow and PhD Candidate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/831772017-08-30T09:58:13Z2017-08-30T09:58:13ZFive things to watch out for at the Chinese Communist Party congress<p>The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will soon embark on its own “Game of Thrones” as delegates gather for its 19th National Congress in Beijing. A variety of posts will be filled for the next five years – including the vitally important General Secretary of the CCP (President of the People’s Republic of China or PRC), as well as members of the Standing Committee (roughly akin to the UK Cabinet). These individuals will find themselves leading a massive organisation, which has more than 80m members, and running what is arguably the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-30483762">world’s largest economy</a>. They will wield considerable powers but the incumbent leader is unlikely to relinquish his grip on power. So what should we look out for?</p>
<h2>1. Xi Jinping’s ambition</h2>
<p>Since becoming the party’s General Secretary in 2012 (and therefore President of the PRC), <a href="https://www.forbes.com/profile/xi-jinping/">Xi Jinping</a> has consolidated his position. At the heart of this has been the anti-corruption drive. To Xi’s supporters, this represents the General Secretary’s earnest desire to rid the party of impure elements that undermine the party’s legitimacy. </p>
<p>In contrast, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Chinese-Politics-Era-Jinping-Retrogression/dp/0765642093/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1503304663&sr=8-2&keywords=chinese+politics+in+the+era+of+xi+jinping">critics say</a> that this drive is a front to remove opponents and to consolidate his power. Whatever the truth, it is virtually certain (barring illness) that Xi will be returned as General Secretary for another five years. </p>
<p>In addition, Xi will surely retain his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission – thereby exercising significant influence over the armed forces. But there are rumours that Xi intends to extend his influence <a href="https://qz.com/1030850/all-the-signs-that-chinas-xi-jinping-is-planning-on-a-third-term/">beyond five years</a>. If so, this represents a significant departure from the gradual institutionalisation of Chinese politics. </p>
<p>Since the 1990s, CCP General Secretaries have generally served only two terms (Zhang Zemin was elected in 1992 and 1997 – although he had become General Secretary slightly earlier in 1989 as part of the Tiananmen re-shuffle – and Hu Jintao was elected in 2002 and 2007). If Xi tries to prolong his influence, this may indicate a return to the more personalised politics of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. </p>
<h2>2. The age double standard</h2>
<p>Even if Xi “Da Da” (“Father/Uncle Xi”) emerges with enhanced prestige following the 19th congress, a complete return to the Maoist personality cult depicted in propaganda posters of the 1960s and 1970s seems unlikely. The Chinese Communist Party is not monolithic and is comprised of different factions, such as the Shanghai gang, the Communist Youth League and the Princelings. To make matters more complicated, there is also <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/d/Books/New-Emperors-Power-Princelings-China-Kerry-Brown/1780769105/ref=sr_1_28?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1502808664&sr=1-28&keywords=kerry+brown">overlap between these groups</a>. Nevertheless, the National Congress – and hence the election of CCP officers – will indicate which groups are ascendant or in retreat.</p>
<p>Who serves on the Standing Committee also matters. It is widely expected that because most of the current Standing Committee are aged in their late 60s, there will be a high turnover of its membership this autumn. <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/china/21713913-reading-runes-will-be-even-more-difficult-usual-xi-jinping-busy-arranging-huge">Recent convention suggests</a> that if candidates are over 68, they will be retired. </p>
<p>This age restriction does not apply to Xi or Chinese “prime minister” Li Keqiang as both are in their early 60s (and both serve on the Standing Committee). But there are suggestions that Xi’s anti-corruption manager, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d82964ba-6d42-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa">Wang Qishan</a>, may stay on – even though he is 68. If Wang continues on the Standing Committee, this would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-retirement-rules.html">symbolise Xi’s power</a>. </p>
<h2>3. The power of former leaders</h2>
<p>Another telling development will be the ability of former presidents to anoint future presidents. China’s “paramount leader” during the 1980s, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-a-political-wizard-who-put-china-on-the-capitalist-road.html?mcubz=3">Deng Xiaoping</a>, helped ensure that Hu Jinto succeeded Jiang Zemin in 2002. For his part, Jiang <a href="http://nationalpost.com/news/xi-jinping-assumes-leadership-of-china-in-once-in-a-decade-political-transition">was instrumental</a> in Xi’s rise to power after Hu in 2012. Given this precedent, one might expect Hu to secure the promotion of one of his protégés to the Standing Committee later this year in the hope that this candidate will succeed Xi in 2022. It remains to be seen if Hu has sufficient clout. </p>
<h2>4. The challenges ahead</h2>
<p>On a recent visit to China, I was struck by the pace of change, including high speed trains and the purchasing of goods by mobile phones (not cash). Yet for all these technological developments, there are still significant challenges for China: rural poverty, environmental degradation and the economic turbulence generated by the “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34344926">new normal</a>” –China is now transitioning from export-led economic growth to consumer-driven growth. </p>
<p>The Xi-Li administration has sought to tackle these problems as part of the “Chinese Dream” – or national “rejuvenation” – which aspires to attain a “<a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Governance-China-Xi-Jinping/dp/1602204098/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1502885483&sr=8-2&keywords=xi+jinping">moderately prosperous society</a>”. We will see this autumn how far the party judges the Chinese Dream to have been realised.</p>
<h2>5. Foreign policy and North Korea</h2>
<p>We may also gain insight into China’s foreign policy for the next five years. Recently, China’s neighbours have been unnerved by territorial disputes in the South China Sea and by the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/28/asia/china-navy-new-destroyer/index.html">steady advance</a> of the PRC’s military. Again, the shuffling of personnel and speeches at the National Congress may indicate where the PRC sees itself going. Will it become a regional or global power? Will China be an economic, military or diplomatic player? </p>
<p>A potential test case is the current standoff between the US and North Korea. Nobody knows how this situation will develop – in late August, North Korea <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/28/politics/north-korea-launch-unidentified-projectile/index.html">fired a missile over Japan</a>. But given the close proximity of the Korean peninsula to China, one can bet that Beijing will be monitoring the situation closely. One thing is for sure, China’s leaders will have a full in-tray when they go back to work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Hill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The future direction of the Chinese Communist Party will be decided at this year’s National Congress. The leader may not change but there are key roles up for grabs.Simon Hill, Visiting Lecturer / Research Associate, University of ChesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812202017-07-20T01:47:26Z2017-07-20T01:47:26ZWhy the US doesn’t understand Chinese thought – and must<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178694/original/file-20170718-2912-196tw9r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Plato, Confucius and Aristotle. Ancient Greek philosophy is widely taught in American universities, but classes in Chinese philosophy are few and far between.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://pixabay.com/en/china-stature-figure-sculpture-1703288/">Public domain</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The need for the U.S. to understand China is obvious. The Chinese economy is on track to <a href="http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/study-china-will-overtake-the-u-s-as-worlds-largest-economy-before-2030/">become the largest in the world by 2030</a>, Chinese leadership may be the key to <a href="http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/does-china-have-a-secret-solution-for-north-korea/">resolving the nuclear crisis with North Korea</a> and China has military and economic ambitions in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38729207">the South China Sea</a> and <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/china-ready-war-india-open-fire-border-638300">India</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/asia/trump-taiwan-and-china-the-controversy-explained.html">Trump administration has shown</a> (<a href="http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2017/07/10/499312/the-white.htm">repeatedly</a>) that it’s not even clear on the difference between the People’s Republic of China (the authoritarian state that occupies the mainland and that recently <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-winnie-the-pooh-xi-jinping-president-sina-wibo-gifs-wechat-state-censor-communist-congress-a7845671.html">blacklisted Winnie the Pooh</a>) and the Republic of China (the <a href="http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-contagious-taiwans-democracy">democratic state</a> that occupies the island of Taiwan and that numerous U.S. presidents have defended against <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/aircraft-carriers-in-the-taiwan-strait/">mainland Chinese shows of force</a>).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178700/original/file-20170718-20386-ed77ku.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the G20 conference in Hamburg, Germany.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/China-White-House-Gaffe/6c5dca6f7952497c8bd6ee1e9cbc57d1/1/0">Saul Loeb/Pool Photo via AP, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Part of what U.S. diplomats and informed citizens need to know is the <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-colossal-events-changed-china-forever-13046">basic historical background</a> to contemporary China. However, as a <a href="http://www.bryanvannorden.com/">scholar of Chinese philosophy</a>, I believe it’s at least as important to understand how China thinks.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, very few universities in the United States teach traditional Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism or Daoism. Why not? And why should we care?</p>
<h2>Why study Chinese philosophy?</h2>
<p>There are at least three reasons that the lack of Chinese philosophy instruction in U.S. universities is problematic.</p>
<p>First, <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-steps-up-as-us-steps-back-from-global-leadership-70962">China is an increasingly important world power</a>, both economically and geopolitically – and traditional philosophy is of continuing relevance in China. President Xi Jinping <a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/xismoments/2017-05/12/content_29324341.htm">has repeatedly praised Confucius</a>, the influential Chinese philosopher who lived around 500 B.C.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"886684878162599936"}"></div></p>
<p>Like the Buddha, Jesus and Socrates, Confucius has been variously interpreted – sometimes idolized and other times demonized. At the beginning of the 20th century, some Chinese modernizers claimed that <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520068377">Confucianism was authoritarian and dogmatic</a> at its core. Other thinkers have suggested that <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9838.html">Confucianism provides a meritocratic alternative</a> that is arguably superior to Western liberal democracy.</p>
<p>Second, Chinese philosophy has much to offer simply as philosophy. The late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia expressed a common misconception about Chinese philosophy, dismissing it as the “<a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/confucius-on-gay-marriage/">mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie</a>.” In reality, Chinese philosophy is rich in persuasive argumentation and careful analysis. </p>
<p>For example, Georgetown professor <a href="http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/emc89/">Erin Cline</a> has shown how Confucian ethics can provide a deeper understanding of <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/families-of-virtue/9780231171557">ethical issues regarding the family</a> and can even inform policy recommendations. Confucians emphasize both the role of parents in nurturing children and the responsibility of government to create environments in which families can flourish. Cline demonstrates that practical initiatives like the <a href="http://www.nursefamilypartnership.org/about">Nurse-Family Partnership</a> help to realize both goals.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178698/original/file-20170718-10320-1ib05v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese philosophers like Confucius have much to teach us. So why are they being ignored in many American universities?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bibbit/2700170983/">Bridget Coila</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The third reason that it’s important to add Chinese philosophy to the curriculum has to do with the need for cultural diversity. As two philosophers <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-schwitzgebel-cherry-philosophy-so-white-20160306-story.html">pointed out</a> in a Los Angeles Times op-ed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…academic philosophy in the United States has a diversity problem. …Among U.S. citizens and permanent residents receiving philosophy Ph.D.’s in this country, 86 percent are non-Hispanic white. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Both my own experience and that of many of my colleagues suggest that part of the reason for this is that students of color are confronted with a curriculum that appears to be a temple to the achievements of white men. We need to expand the philosophical curriculum to include not only Chinese philosophy, but also the other <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/taking-back-philosophy/9780231184373">less commonly taught philosophies</a>, including Africana, feminist, indigenous American, Islamic, Latin American and South Asian philosophies.</p>
<h2>Just how bad is the situation?</h2>
<p>Most philosophy departments <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/if-philosophy-wont-diversify-lets-call-it-what-it-really-is.html">seem unwilling to admit</a> there’s philosophy outside of the European tradition that’s worth studying.</p>
<p>Among the <a href="http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/overall.asp">top 50 philosophy departments in the U.S.</a> that grant a Ph.D., only six (by my reckoning) have a member of their regular faculty who teaches Chinese philosophy: <a href="https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Doctoral-Programs/Philosophy/Faculty-Bios/Hagop-Sarkissian">CUNY Graduate Center</a>, <a href="http://philosophy.duke.edu/people/david-b-wong">Duke University</a>, <a href="https://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/detail/336">University of California at Berkeley</a>, <a href="http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/%7Eeschwitz/">University of California at Riverside</a>, <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/alexusmcleod013/home">University of Connecticut</a> and <a href="http://warpweftandway.com/sonya-hired-michigan/">University of Michigan</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178697/original/file-20170718-5965-aoczbi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Parmenides (center) and Heraclitus (right) are relatively obscure Greek philosophers, but their disagreement on the changing nature of the universe is still widely taught in the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/profzucker/14770157081">Raphael via Steven Zuker</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In contrast, every one of the top 50 schools has at least one regular member of the philosophy department who can lecture competently on <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/parmenides/#WayCon">Parmenides</a>, a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher. His only surviving work is a poem filled with cryptic utterances like: “for not to be said and not to be thought / is it that it is not.” Is this really more profound than the sum total of Chinese philosophy?</p>
<p>I was recently part of <a href="http://www.apaonline.org/?page=E2016_Invited">a panel at a major academic conference</a> that was specifically advertised as an opportunity for nonspecialists to learn about Chinese philosophy. While other sessions at the conference had packed rooms, we lectured to an audience of fewer than a dozen people.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115673/original/image-20160319-4446-1et00s5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Empty room at the start of an American Philosophical Association panel on Chinese philosophy on Jan. 6, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bryan W. Van Norden</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In contrast, at Chinese universities, both Western and traditional Chinese philosophy are routinely taught. China is also heavily investing in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-chinas-education-strategy-fits-into-its-quest-for-global-influence-50864">higher education</a>, while the Trump administration <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-trumps-harsh-education-cuts-undermine-his-economic-growth-goals-78297">hopes to slash funding for education</a>. I expect that China understands the U.S. better than we understand it.</p>
<h2>What does the future hold?</h2>
<p>At the beginning of this article, I cited some reasons that China is increasingly important on the world stage. Here’s one more: China is currently starting upon one of the most ambitious building projects in all of human history, the <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/reviving-the-ancient-silk-road-whats-the-big-deal-about-chinas-one-belt-one-road">One Belt, One Road</a> initiative. A modern version of the ancient <a href="http://en.unesco.org/silkroad/about-silk-road">Silk Road</a>, it will expand and solidify Chinese economic and political power across all of Eurasia. </p>
<p>Can the U.S. really afford not to understand this country? As <a href="http://ctext.org/dictionary.pl?if=en&id=1117#s10019891">Confucius said,</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Do not worry that others fail to understand you; worry that you fail to understand others.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p><em>This draws on material previously published in <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-philosophy-is-missing-from-u-s-philosophy-departments-should-we-care-56550">this article</a> from May 18, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bryan W. Van Norden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s more important than ever that the U.S. understand China. So why don’t our universities teach Chinese thought?Bryan W. Van Norden, Kwan Im Thong Hood Cho Temple Professor, Yale-NUS CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/810552017-07-14T16:00:54Z2017-07-14T16:00:54ZLiu Xiaobo: a voice of conscience who fought oppression for decades<p>Only a few weeks after being diagnosed with a late-stage liver cancer in late May 2017, the world learned that China’s most prominent dissident, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-40597514">Liu Xiaobo</a>, died at 61 in a hospital in the north-east region of China, where he was born. As the poetess Tang Danhong <a href="https://twitter.com/DanHongTang/status/885500304476839937">wrote</a>, he departed as “an innocent prisoner into the eternal light” (无罪的囚徒,融入永恒的光芒). What a tragedy for a man who fought most of his life for freedom to live out his last days in a hospital bed under lock and key.</p>
<p>While I never had the chance to meet Liu in person, I feel like I’ve lost someone very close to me, as if his death has torn away a part of myself. While he was behind bars in Jinzhou prison, I was trying my best to better understand what his human rights struggle was all about and to imagine his thoughts on what happened in China and around the world during the last eight years he spent in prison. </p>
<p>More recently, as I was anticipating his release in June 2020, aged 64, I even indulged in imagining his surprise at seeing a young Frenchman coming from nowhere brandishing a newly written book about him. There was so much I wanted to discuss with him, and I regret that I will never have the chance.</p>
<p>Words can hardly express the emotion and disgust I feel at this cruelty and injustice. I remain lucky to have known Liu through his writings and his friends – I will struggle to come to terms with his departure, but I take comfort in imagining how many people are now mourning his loss around the world.</p>
<h2>Living in truth</h2>
<p>As a student who fell in love with China in the early 2000s and devoured hundreds of books and articles on China to quench my curiosity and satiate the hunger of my ignorance, reading Liu’s critical analyses of Chinese politics and society was hugely enlightening. His works compelled me to question my assumptions and unlearn many of the false narratives that I took for granted about Chinese culture and history. </p>
<p>It was thanks to him that I so enjoyed learning the Chinese language – unlike the heavy, wooden register of Chinese officialdom, the language Liu used felt natural and his arguments more intuitive, especially when it came to our shared human condition and aspiration for universal values.</p>
<p>The moral maturity and dignity of his work also made me more aware of how we ought to live and act in everyday life, of the importance of listening to our conscience and rejecting lies. In particular, Liu highlighted the need to unlearn the “enemy mentality” (敌人意识) that the Chinese party-state relentlessly instils with its constant propaganda about “hostile forces” trying to “split China” or “spread chaos” – a false worldview meant to justify the regime’s oppression.</p>
<p>In talking to Liu’s friends, I also learned about his integrity and authenticity as a person and about all the solidarity initiatives that he organised to call for the release of persecuted fellow citizens despite the risks of retaliation from China’s unpredictable party-state.</p>
<p>At his <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/21/china-liu-xiaobos-trial-travesty-justice">trial in December 2009</a>, Liu reaffirmed with calm and eloquence what he stood for 20 years earlier during the democracy protests at Tiananmen Square: “I have no enemy, no hatred” (没有敌人,没有仇恨). And yet, the regime went on treating him like a top enemy of the state, sentencing him on a trumped-up charge to 11 years in prison and ruthlessly detaining his wife, <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/liu-xiaobos-widow-still-uncontactable-say-friends-636576">Liu Xia</a>, while also sentencing her brother, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/liu-hui-loses-appeal-11-years-liu-xiaobo">Liu Hui</a>, to 11 years in prison on another trumped-up charge.</p>
<h2>Not giving in</h2>
<p>For three decades, Liu persistently fought for a freer China, throwing himself into a human rights struggle in which he and Liu Xia suffer and sacrifice their freedom for the freedom of others. Viewed from afar, it may be hard to comprehend how a frail human being like Liu who only used his pen to write articles and collect signatures for open letters could attract so much cruelty from the Chinese regime – a regime on which the West now depends to lead the fight against global warming and promote global free trade.</p>
<p>The spectacle of Liu’s last days are testament to the cruelty of the Chinese regime. But although grief and anger at Liu’s fate might make us hate that government, I hope we will never forget his message about the importance of not giving in to hatred. An enemy mentality poisons hearts and minds. This is a universal message – one that very much applies in a Western world increasingly blighted by xenophobia.</p>
<p>The world has lost a precious mind, but we can still ensure through our words and actions that his “enduring spirit of freedom” won’t die with him. Considering how much effort the Chinese regime still puts into erasing his legacy and silencing his wife, it’s now time to take urgent action to make sure that his wife and her brother can finally move around freely.</p>
<p>Now more than ever, the international community must shout their indignation against the Orwellian brutality of Xi Jinping’s government. It must show its full support with all China’s innocent prisoners of conscience and their families and try to make sure they will one day be free to love and support each other without being driven into exile by fear and suffering. </p>
<p>This would be the most concrete way of ensuring that however cruel his final years, Liu’s efforts to build China’s democratic future were not in vain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hermann Aubié does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The lessons of Liu’s life and work must never be forgotten.Hermann Aubié, Lecturer in Sociology and Policy, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.