tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/edgar-lungu-30036/articlesEdgar Lungu – The Conversation2021-08-22T12:18:26Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1665132021-08-22T12:18:26Z2021-08-22T12:18:26ZWhy Edgar Lungu and his party lost Zambia’s 2021 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417234/original/file-20210820-23-ksl8vn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia's new president Hakainde Hichilema.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Patrick Meinhardt / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hakainde Hichilema’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58226695">election victory</a> is the third time an opposition leader has unseated an incumbent president in Zambia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/02/world/zambian-voters-defeat-kaunda-sole-leader-since-independence.html">since 1991</a>. The victory bequeaths on the new president and his party, the United Party for National Development (UPND), the immense task of restoring the rule of law, fixing the ailing economy and uniting a divided nation.</p>
<p>Hichilema won the poll with 59.38% of the vote. He secured a 1 million-vote lead over his closest rival and incumbent, Edgar Lungu of the Patriotic Front. Lungu polled <a href="https://zambiaelections2021.org.zm//home/results_by_constituency">38.33%</a>.</p>
<p>The election was effectively a referendum on Lungu and the conduct of his party during his tenure from 2015 to 2021. Zambians opted to believe in the campaign promises of his opponent. Hichilema promised to <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/06/hakainde-hichilema-zambians-want-change-we-dont-count-how-many-times-we-run/">grow the economy</a> to alleviate people’s suffering, restore the rule of law, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/94754/zambias-hakainde-hichilema-weve-never-seen-such-levels-of-corruption/">end corruption</a> and that, unlike his opponents, he was not contesting to secure a job.</p>
<h2>Contested candidacy</h2>
<p>Lungu’s candidature was controversial and highly contested. He completed his predecessor, the late <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/30/the-death-of-president-michael-sata-and-issues-of-the-health-of-african-leaders/">Michael Sata’s</a> unfinished term in 2016. He then served a full five-year term after beating, Hichilema in elections held that same year <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2884/">by a narrow margin</a>. </p>
<p>In 2021 Lungu was contesting for office in what some argued would effectively be a third term. The Constitutional Court was thrice petitioned to declare him ineligible. The court ruled in Lungu’s favour on all the occasions. It found that he had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">served only a year</a>, not a full presidential term, between 2015 and 2016 after Sata’s death. This made him eligible to contest the polls in 2021. </p>
<p>In the end it was the ballot box that ended his tenure. The arrogance of power displayed by the Patriotic Front in defying the concerns of the country’s citizens in the way it ran the affairs of state drove voters to voice their displeasure.</p>
<p>There were a number of reasons the electorate decided to back his opponent.</p>
<p>Zambians were irked by the decline of democracy under Lungu, as shown by intimidation, harassment and arrests of members of the <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/hr-e/196/zambia.pdf">oposition</a>, and <a href="https://www.news24.com/channel/Music/News/activist-musician-who-fled-to-south-africa-arrested-as-he-arrives-home-in-zambia-20180517">critics</a> of the government. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/zambia-activists-in-court-on-escalating-crackdown-on-human-rights/">Human rights violations</a> were on the rise.</p>
<p>In December 2020, a state prosecutor and a United Party for National Development supporter were <a href="http://www.hrc.org.zm/index.php/multi-media/news/369-hrc-calls-for-inquest-to-establish-identity-of-individuals-responsible-for-shooting-to-death-of-a-state-prosecutor-and-a-suspected-upnd-sympathiser">shot dead</a> when police fired on a crowd that had gathered near police headquarters to protest the harassment of Hichilema.</p>
<p>The Lungu government even tried to amend the constitution. Experts said this would have taken parliament’s oversight over the executive, creating a <a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/sajpd/vol5/iss1/7/">constitutional dictatorship</a>.</p>
<p>Levels of <a href="https://www.u4.no/publications/zambia-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-2020">corruption</a> also reached unprecedented levels.</p>
<p>In 2018, the Financial Intelligence Centre reported acts of corruption estimated at about <a href="https://www.fic.gov.zm/component/attachments/download/64">$284 million</a>. That same year, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK withheld aid worth about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-corruption-idUSKCN1VH1S7">$34 million</a> because they were concerned about corruption and financial mismanagement.</p>
<p>In 2019, the <a href="https://www.fic.gov.zm/component/attachments/download/95">money laundering and terrorist financing trends report</a> of Zambia’s Financial Intelligence Centre disclosed that public officials had influenced the awarding of contracts. Corruption linked to public sector procurement was a major contributor to proceeds of crime. </p>
<h2>Misplaced priorities</h2>
<p>Zambians went to the 2021 polls in the midst of a <a href="http://saipar.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Charles.Lascu_.AFRODAD-1.pdf">second debt crisis</a> created under the Lungu government. The <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/20/its-true-cost-of-living-has-gone-up-says-wina/">cost of living</a> had also soared as the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-27/zambian-inflation-jumps-to-18-year-high-on-meat-and-fish-prices">annual inflation rate</a> was the highest in about two decades.</p>
<p>Lungu built his campaign on the <a href="https://chinaafricaproject.com/2021/08/09/president-edgar-lungu-commissions-new-chinese-built-airport-as-part-of-a-last-minute-campaign-push/">physical infrastructure</a> his government put up and increased <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-uk-zambia-economy-idAFKBN28R1LU-OZABS">government control</a> of Zambia’s mines.</p>
<p>He promised to roll out more infrastructure if reelected. But for many in Zambia economic conditions were tough. The economy got worse and many remained <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/100265/zambia-will-the-economic-slide-hurt-lungu-in-the-august-polls/">jobless and disgruntled</a> on his watch. </p>
<p>Unemployed young people and households <a href="https://www.jctr.org.zm/uploads/1/1/8/1/118170975/final_bnnb_statement_11.08.2021.pdf">struggling</a> to meet basic needs against escalating prices of essential commodities <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-are-zambians-feeling-the-crunch-a-perception-survey-of-debt-and-the-economy.pdf">blamed the government</a> for the worsening conditions.</p>
<p>Some analysts attributed Zambia’s economic woes to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/707aed78-27ef-4e11-95a3-792b2b91da55">undisciplined debt accumulation</a> to <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/6866-zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-china-to-blame">finance the projects</a> Lungu boasted about.</p>
<p>The combination of high government debt and a weak economy meant that Zambia couldn’t service its debts. Lungu’s government had a fallout with international financial markets after it defaulted on debt repayment <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/zambia-becomes-africas-first-coronavirus-era-default-what-happens-now.html">in 2020 </a>. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had refused to bailout Zambia in 2016 over concerns about <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zambia-braces-for-imf-crunch-talks/a-56496748">government’s commitment</a> to economic reforms.</p>
<p>The IMF <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-zambia-idUSL1N2MX1J1">resumed talks</a> with Zambia to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/imf-zambia-idUSL1N2MX1J1">reform the economy</a> in February 2021, but a deal was <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/66687/zambia-imf-debt-talks-unlikely-to-stop-lungu-from-trying-to-pawn-copper-to-china/">unlikely</a> until after the election. </p>
<h2>Failed reelection strategy</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/100265/zambia-will-the-economic-slide-hurt-lungu-in-the-august-polls/">past elections</a> the Patriotic Front used infrastructure and the tribalism trump card to beat Hichilema. </p>
<p>But, this failed in 2021. </p>
<p>While Hichilema maintained popularity in his traditional stronghold in Zambia’s south-west region, he also broke into Lungu’s stonghold in the north-east, and gained unprecedented support. His campaign message to end corruption, restore the rule of law and the economy resonated among the majority of voters across Zambia.</p>
<p>His pick of Vice President and running mate in <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Mutale_Nalumango">Mutale Nalumango</a> also helped him break into Lungu’s core constituency. The educator and former vice president of the Secondary Schools’ Teachers Union of Zambia served as Movement for Multiparty Democracy Member of Parliament for Kaputa in Northern Zambia from 2001 to 2011. </p>
<p>Hichilema’s break into Lungu’s core constituency saw Lungu <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210815-zambia-election-president-cries-foul-as-opposition-leads-in-early-vote-count-lungu-hichilema-unfair">cry foul</a> that the 2021 election was not free and fair.</p>
<h2>Restoring a fractured country</h2>
<p>Hichilema has his work cut out for him. He has to endear himself to the whole country and prove that he is a national leader. This will enable him to clear his name of accusations that he is a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/04/07/distinguishing-the-tribe-from-the-tribalist-every-tribe-is-good-but-every-tribalist-is-bad-the-dying-of-upnd/">tribalist</a>. </p>
<p>He also faces the daunting task of undoing the culture of violence and extortion in the political arena by party “cadres” - unemployed men who extort money, provide informal security for party elites, and disrupt opposition events. Hichilema will have to tame his own party cadres, and restore sanity through impartial application of the law to set Zambia back on the path of democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>The task that will make or break Hichilema’s leadership, however, is fixing the economy. He has spoken large about this since he stepped on to the political stage, claiming he was best suited to fix Zambia’s economic problems. </p>
<p>Potential supporters of Zambia’s economy, such as the IMF, demand <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/04/pr2159-zambia-imf-staff-completes-virtual-mission-to-zambia">austerity</a> to restore its economic fortunes and set it on a path of recovery. Hichilema will have to balance austerity and the high expectations of the many unemployed young people and struggling people who voted for him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166513/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zambia’s new president will have to balance austerity and the high expectations of the many unemployed young people and struggling people who voted for him.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657602021-08-09T14:04:29Z2021-08-09T14:04:29ZFour priorities for Zambia after the 2021 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415101/original/file-20210808-17-1mt4xmk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Might the 2021 Zambian elections usher in another period of economic growth?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Salim Dawood/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Whoever wins Zambia’s 2021 general elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. To achieve this, the new administration must have at least four priorities. These are regaining credibility with the international financiers, fighting corruption, curtailing the dominance of the executive branch of government, and ending the reign of terror by political party vigilantes, known as “cadres”.</p>
<p>On 12 August, Zambians <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3600/">will elect</a> the president, 156 members of parliament and 117 district council leaders. The elections take place in an increasingly contentious environment.</p>
<p><a href="https://pantheon.world/profile/person/Edgar_Lungu/">Edgar Lungu</a>, who has been president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">since 2015</a> after his predecessor Michael Sata died in office, has shown <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/06/zambia-killings-and-brutal-crackdown-against-dissent-set-the-tone-for-august-election/">increasingly autocratic tendencies</a>. He is running for a controversial <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">third term</a> that opponents argue is unconstitutional since he already has been elected twice, in the 2015 and 2016 general elections. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zambian-court-throws-out-second-challenge-lungu-re-election-bid-2021-06-11/">Constitutional Court dismissed</a> the claim since Lungu’s first term was only one year.</p>
<p>The run-up to the polls has been characterised by <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">accusations</a> that the voters’ register has been manipulated to disadvantage strongholds of the main opposition party, the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/taxonomy/term/165">United Party for National Development (UPND)</a>, led by veteran politician <a href="https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/58535_hh_profile.pdf">Hakainde Hichilema</a>. He lost in 2016 by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zambia-post-elections-president-lungu-has-his-work-cut-out-for-him-64058">only just over 100,000 votes</a> in an election deemed unfair by <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/zambia-091516.html">international observers</a>. </p>
<p>The military has been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/zambia-election-idAFL8N2P80RH">deployed on the streets</a> due to excessive pre-election violence that underscores how competitive the election is. </p>
<p>Following a tactic used by Sata in the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2011/03/13/pf-pvt-system/">2011 elections</a>, Hichilema has mobilised <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/13501/Eyes_on_the_count">20,000 election agents</a> from his party to assist a <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13501/Eyes_on_the_count">parallel vote tabulation</a> process to help monitor fraud. Such a tabulation is a <a href="https://www.ndi.org/pvt">common methodology</a> based on observing a random sample of polling stations to independently verify election results. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, a recently passed Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes Bill is <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/02/23/csos-demand-for-withdrawal-of-cyber-security-and-cybercrimes-bill/">making citizens wary</a> of how internet and digital communications could be <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/as-contentious-election-nears-rights-groups-urge-zambia-to-keepiton/">interrupted</a> as election results roll in. </p>
<p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">A repeat</a> of the aftermath of the 2016 elections could occur. Specifically, if Lungu claims an outright victory – passing the 50% threshold, thus avoiding the need for a second round of voting – Hichilema will likely contest the elections in the courts. This may result in clashes in the cities.</p>
<p>Whoever wins the elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy. This will require the new administration to focus on four priorities.</p>
<h2>Regaining trust of financiers</h2>
<p>Economic debt is Zambia’s biggest challenge. Under Lungu, the debt ballooned from <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/08/05/zambia-heads-towards-a-pivotal-election">36% to 110% of GDP</a>. Zambia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/25/zambias-default-fuels-fears-of-african-debt-tsunami-as-covid-impact-bites">defaulted</a> on repaying $42.5 million in interest on a Eurobond in November 2020.</p>
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<p>The negative impacts of debt servicing have been <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-are-zambians-feeling-the-crunch-a-perception-survey-of-debt-and-the-economy.pdf">deeply felt across Zambian households</a>. Multiple factors <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/11/14/zambia-is-starting-to-look-like-zimbabwe-the-failure-next-door">contributed</a> to the rising debt – including volatile copper prices, drought in 2019, and COVID-19.</p>
<p>The shift by the government towards sovereign financing and Chinese loans since 2012 severely compounded the debt crisis. There has been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/6866-zambias-looming-debt-crisis-is-china-to-blame.pdf">a lack of transparency</a> about the Chinese loans. This has been made worse by concerns about <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/782221512459934813/zambia-economic-brief-how-zambia-can-borrow-without-sorrow">corruption</a> in the use of Eurobond funding for large-scale infrastructure projects. These two factors have <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/zambia-default-test-case-for-africa-debt-relief-01614247805">undermined efforts by the IMF</a> to negotiate debt relief on behalf of commercial creditors.</p>
<h2>Fighting corruption</h2>
<p>Regaining trust, especially with Western donors, requires fighting corruption that has <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2020_Report_EN_0802-WEB-1_2021-02-08-103053.pdf">become endemic under Lungu</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, it was uncovered that the government procured <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/11/11/procurement-corruption-from-fire-tenders-to-ambulances/">42 fire trucks for US$42 million</a>. In the same year, the country’s <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2018/06/01/zambia-lost-k4-5bn-to-financial-crimes-in-2017-fic/">Financial Intelligence Centre</a> revealed that billions of Zambian kwacha had been laundered through high level corruption and tax evasion. In 2018, several bilateral donors <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-corruption/zambia-says-donors-withholding-nearly-34-million-over-mismanagement-idUSKCN1M02TD">halted US$34 million in funding</a> for education and social welfare programmes due to mismanagement. </p>
<p>And, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, US$17 million in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/cpi-2020-zambia-medical-supply-scandal-anti-corruption-key-electoral-issue">procurement irregularities</a> by the Ministry of Health were uncovered.</p>
<h2>Curbing executive dominance</h2>
<p>Lungu’s government attempted to remove legislative oversight over <a href="https://cuts-lusaka.org/pdf/policy-brief-effect-of-the-constitution-of-zambia-amendment-bill-10-2019-on-public-financial-management-and-debt-management.pdf">contracting public debt</a> via a failed constitutional reform known as <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/bills/The%20Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%28Ameement%29%20Bill%202019.pdf">Bill Number 10</a>. </p>
<p>First introduced in mid-2019, the bill’s other provisions included reducing the National Assembly’s powers to impeach the president. It also allowed for judges to be removed through a tribunal appointed by the president, rather than through the extant <a href="https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/An-Analysis-of-Zambias-Proposed-Constiutional-Amendments-Relating-to-the-Judiciary.pdf">Judicial Complaints Commission</a>. Established in 2006, the commission receives complaints against judicial officers and submits recommendation for action to the independent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3758963">Director of Public Prosecutions</a>.</p>
<p>Civil society organisations and legal experts <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/06/03/reject-bill-10-in-zambians-interest-csos-urge-mps/">opposed</a> the attempt to create a “<a href="https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/sajpd/vol5/iss1/7/">constitutional dictatorship</a>”. </p>
<p>In October 2020, UPND members of parliament walked out of the National Assembly to prevent the bill from being passed. But Lungu’s party has <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/11/17/pf-makes-tabling-of-bill-10-in-2021-an-election-issue/">vowed to reintroduce</a> the bill after the elections.</p>
<p>Other forms of executive interference include using the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/zambia/freedom-world/2021">Independent Broadcasting Authority</a> to shut down privately owned news outlets that are critical of the government. This contributes to an already biased media environment.</p>
<h2>Tackling party cadres</h2>
<p>Finally, there is <a href="http://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/433/IDCPPA.WP27SeekingsSiachiwena.pdf">mounting disenchantment</a> with the Patriotic Front in the party’s traditional strongholds of Lusaka and cities in the <a href="https://www.cbt.gov.zm/?page_id=4454">Copperbelt Province</a>. </p>
<p>This is due to the party having <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/107675/zambia-young-urban-and-disgruntled-pf-supporters-can-lungu-woo-them-back/">alienated the urban youth</a> and middle classes because of its repression of civil society, and <a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_wp_136_hinfelaar_resnick_sishuwa.pdf">surveillance on the University of Zambia</a> campus. But the Patriotic Front’s <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">cadres</a> – typically unemployed men hired to extort money, provide informal security for party elites, and disrupt opposition events – are a particular nuisance for urban market traders, minibus and taxi operators. </p>
<p>For instance, they charge extra fees to allow minibuses to pick up customers in particular areas, or threaten violence against traders who refuse to pay them <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003008385-2/formal-informal-interface-lens-urban-food-systems-gilbert-siame-douty-chibamba-progress-nyanga-brenda-mwalukanga-beverly-musonda-mushili-wiza-kabaghe-garikai-membele-wilma-nchito-peter-mulambia-dorothy-ndhlovu">illegal fees to sell from market stalls</a>. </p>
<p>Although they <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">have existed for decades in Zambia</a>, cadres have become <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343319884990">increasingly violent and extortionary</a> under the Patriotic Front.</p>
<p>The extortion deprives the city councils of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003008385-2/formal-informal-interface-lens-urban-food-systems-gilbert-siame-douty-chibamba-progress-nyanga-brenda-mwalukanga-beverly-musonda-mushili-wiza-kabaghe-garikai-membele-wilma-nchito-peter-mulambia-dorothy-ndhlovu">revenue from the markets and bus stations</a>. It has generated a culture of fear and frustration among the urban poor. </p>
<p>But the opposition United Party for National Development <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/JAE18.1Mukunto.pdf">has its own cadres</a> who are equally violent. If elected, Hichilema should enable the police to better regulate the cadres. He must also hold councillors elected on his party ticket accountable if they condone cadre activity.</p>
<h2>Back to the future or a new beginning?</h2>
<p>These four priorities are not new. In 2001, Zambia was massively indebted, politically polarised, and led by a deeply corrupt president – <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-late-zambian-president-fredrick-chiluba-a-legacy-of-failed-democratic-transition/">Frederick Chiluba</a>. He tried (and failed) to change the constitution to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/07/chrismcgreal">run for a third term</a> as leader of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. </p>
<p>Chiluba’s successor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/19/zambia">Levy Mwanawasa</a>, also from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, reversed Zambia’s decline. From 2001 until 2008, the country enjoyed a period of <a href="https://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/131180/filename/131391.pdf">economic growth</a>. This was mostly due to good macroeconomic management that involved <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/90774">fighting corruption</a>. But, when Mwanawasa died in 2008, his successor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rupiah-Banda">Rupiah Banda</a>, created a more restrictive political environment. This <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414012437166">contributed to the popularity of the Patriotic Front</a>.</p>
<p>If this year’s election results in a new leader, the onus will be on Hichilema to do a better job than his predecessors at stopping the cycle from repeating itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danielle Resnick receives funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). </span></em></p>Whoever wins the elections will face two key challenges: reviving the country’s democratic credentials and stimulating the economy.Danielle Resnick, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657762021-08-09T14:04:09Z2021-08-09T14:04:09ZZambians go to elections amid turmoil. What’s at stake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415184/original/file-20210809-21-g4ifkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hakainde Hichilema (C), leader of the Zambia opposition party United Party for National Development. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/NIC BOTHMA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Zambia prepares to go to the general polls on 12 August, it does so in a context of political decay. It’s also in the midst of a serious <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/11/12/how-to-stop-zambia-from-turning-into-zimbabwe">economic crisis</a> and the unfolding <a href="https://theconversation.com/latest-data-from-lusaka-morgue-analysis-shows-spike-in-covid-19-deaths-163438">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>Tensions have escalated for months. In addition to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr63/4057/2021/en/">forceful police conduct</a>, and the prevention of the opposition to campaign, supporters of the ruling party Patriotic Front and the opposition United Party for National Development have <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/06/14/saccord-advises-pf-upnd-to-stop-political-violence/">fought each other</a>. Recently, two Patriotic Front cadres were <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2021/08/01/the-human-rights-commission-condemns-kanyama-killings/">killed</a> in clashes with the opposition in Lusaka. Violence has also occurred between factions within the political parties. </p>
<p>What is at stake in Zambia’s poll and why are the elections so volatile?</p>
<p>The last elections in 2016 were characterised by growing mistrust <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">and a drift towards political violence</a>. The 2016 election was a tight race between the incumbent Edgar Lungu and opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema. Allegations of election fraud followed. And intolerance with the opposition manifested in the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/09/the-real-reasons-zambia-opposition-leader-was-released-from-jail/">imprisonment of the opposition leader</a> Hichilema over treason for almost four months. </p>
<h2>A dismal picture</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://makanday.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Report-of-the-Committee-on-voting-pattern-and-electoral-violence.pdf">final report</a> of the Commission of Inquiry into the election-related violence is a depressing read. </p>
<p>Based on witness testimonies, it tells the story of attacks against people, death, harassment, property destruction, displacement and pervasive hate speech. The commission was appointed by the president, but he’s not acted on its important recommendations. These include depoliticising the police, restoring trust in electoral management bodies and ensuring space for independent media. </p>
<p>This election features the two same players and a highly polarised electorate. Frustration is growing among the opposition supporters who deem the last election as stolen.</p>
<p>Since 2016, the situation is further aggravated by the concentration of political power in the hands of President Edgar Lungu. His grip on power has increased and the quality of democracy has declined. </p>
<p>Zambia was historically a politically stable country, despite failure to <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/57421">fully consolidate democracy</a> after the peaceful transition to multiparty politics in 1991. But Zambia is now labelled as an <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">“electoral autocracy”</a>. It’s even been <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">listed</a> among the world’s top 10 countries that are turning into autocracies.</p>
<p>The human rights situation has also deteriorated. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr63/4057/2021/en/">Violations</a> of human rights –- such as police brutality and unlawful crackdowns on dissent -– have frequently occurred during the last five years.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Public%20Order%20Act.pdf">Public Order Act</a>, a legacy from colonial times, has been misused to severely restrict the rights of individuals and organisations to protest or organise political rallies. A legislated pretext to apply force to break up peaceful assemblies.</p>
<p>The election also takes place in a context where <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/08/zambia-in-a-fair-election-lungu-cant-win-in-an-unfair-one-he-cant-lose/">discontent </a>with President Lungu and the ruling Patriotic Front party has grown. When incumbents, such as Lungu, fear electoral defeat, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/when-do-governments-resort-to-election-violence/2BE13A1FC0696CC41757F2E733A59B32">risk of violence generally rises</a>. </p>
<h2>Politics of fear</h2>
<p>Survey data by <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the independent African survey group, indicates a <a href="http://idcppa.uct.ac.za/pubs/wps/27">decline in support for the ruling party</a>. Recent polls in Zambia placed the incumbent as victor. But these polls were <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/how-not-to-rig-an-election-zambias-dodgy-opinion-poll/">questioned</a> on grounds of their credibility.</p>
<p>Another sign of popular discontent is that violence has been playing out in traditional strongholds of the ruling party. Urban areas are common sites of resistance, but resistance has also happened in rural areas where the ruling party dominates. For instance, in <a href="https://www.znbc.co.zm/news/mpulungu-violence-suspects-arrested/">Mpulungu</a> in the Northern Province.</p>
<p>On August 1st, in an unprecedented move, President Lungu <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/1/zambia-deploys-army-to-curb-violence-ahead-of-elections">deployed the army</a> onto the streets to safeguard the election and restore order. This signals the breakdown of the rule of law. In addition, the legitimacy and capacity of the police has been severely undermined. </p>
<p>But Zambia also follows a pervasive <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2020.1742112">securitisation</a> of elections. Rulers rely on a discourse of politics of fear to justify coercive interventions. Similar securitisation closely accompany elections elsewhere on the continent. </p>
<p>Reports of violence have circulated for some time. Even if tensions have escalated, they largely remain isolated incidents. Regardless of the scale of the violence, and who may be behind it, the discourse is one of politics of fear. Thus, there are suspicions that the army will be used to intimidate opposition voters and depress turnout. Not to ensure electoral security. </p>
<h2>Looking to the future</h2>
<p>What is worrisome is that even if Zambians desire political change, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/07388942211026319">research</a> indicates that fear of facing electoral violence lowers support for democracy. </p>
<p>Another key concern is that the capacity and legitimacy of critical conflict-mitigating institutions – such as civil society organisations and the judiciary – have gradually eroded. At critical junctures in Zambia’s political history, formal and informal institutions played an important role in reducing tensions and solving political disputes. For instance, during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-history-explains-election-violence-kenya-and-zambia-tell-the-story-131405">transition to multiparty elections in 1991</a>, and an <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/106/425/611/48589?login=true">unconstitutional presidential third term bid</a> in 2001 by second president Frederick Chiluba. </p>
<p>The shrinking democratic space, and deteriorating political situation, have reduced the opportunities for constructive intervention. It has also limited the ability of civil society actors and the judiciary to act independently in election-related disputes.</p>
<p>Regardless of who wins the election, key priorities for the country involve combating the economic crisis and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Another critical challenge that lies ahead will be to move away from the politics of fear that permeate the elections. The government must restore citizen trust in the tarnished institutions that for long have kept Zambia at peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165776/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Swedish Research Council (grant 348-2013-5408 and 2016-05833) and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (grant P16-0124:1) funded this research.</span></em></p>Frustration is growing among opposition supporters who believe the last election was stolen.Johan Brosché, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityKristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597302021-05-04T13:24:14Z2021-05-04T13:24:14ZWhy Zambia’s upcoming poll risks tipping the balance against democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397557/original/file-20210428-13-1thnp7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Image of a polling station sign in Kasama, Northern Province, in 2015.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nicole Beardsworth</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zambia is one of the fastest eroding democracies in the world. This is according to the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-dem), one of the most trusted sources of information on indicators of democratic progress or regression. The project’s 2020 <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf">report</a> notes that Zambia has registered a remarkably rapid decline in the quality of democracy since the last election in 2016. </p>
<p>Nor is there great optimism about the next set of elections, due to take place in less than four months. Observers have serious concerns ahead of the polls. One of the main ones is about the quality of the <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/02/27/2021-elections-a-scam-voter-numbers-inflated-in-provinces-likely-to-vote-for-pf-sishuwa/">voters’ roll</a>.</p>
<p>The electoral commission decided in 2020 to <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/08/sadc-elections-monitoring-body-objects-to-new-voters-register/">scrap</a> the voters’ roll that had been in use for over a decade. It then allocated just 38 days to register more than 8 million people in the middle of the rainy season. </p>
<p>The commission <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">has refused</a> to make the roll available for an independent audit, ignoring widespread calls to do so. Such an audit of the roll was allowed in 2016.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/">Christian Churches Monitoring Group</a> – the most reputable local election observation organisation – set about trying to verify the existence of voters and check them against the new roll. But it had to abandon its efforts after the <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-cancellation-of-the-people-to-list-test/">electoral commission warned</a> that this contravened local legislation. </p>
<p>The limited information available in the public domain suggests that the registration process has indeed been skewed towards regions that vote for the ruling party.</p>
<h2>2016 voting patterns and the 2021 register</h2>
<p>Zambia appears to have become more politically polarised along ethnic lines since 2016. This is in part due to regional voting patterns which appeared – on the surface at least – to have split cleanly along ethno-regional lines. </p>
<p>In 2016, support for the ruling Patriotic Front and President Edgar Lungu was drawn predominantly from the largely Bemba-speaking north and Nyanja-speaking east of the country. The Patriotic Front’s support has traditionally come from Bemba-speakers. But Nyanja-speaking easterners have rallied around the Patriotic Front following Lungu’s rise. He originates from the east, has backing from prominent Nyanja-speakers and has elevated easterners in cabinet and government.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397031/original/file-20210426-13-1h1p67s.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: The ruling Patriotic Front party’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In comparison, the main opposition party’s support was drawn substantially from the Tonga-speaking southern and Lozi-speaking western regions. The so-called Bantu Botatwe (affiliated groups from the south and west) have long supported political parties that represent their economic and political interests, but these parties have never come to power or sponsored a president. </p>
<p>These regional patterns of support have not gone unnoticed in Lusaka. Since the 2016 elections, there has been a growing rhetoric of distrust from the ruling party towards the south and west of the country. <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/08/06/katuba-voted-for-a-tribe-i-feel-sad-to-be-tonga-says-pfs-moonga/">Senior</a> members of the ruling party have increasingly made <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/29/lungu-must-act-on-dora-before-tribalism-triggers-violence-tiz/">disparaging remarks</a> against citizens from those regions. </p>
<p>In addition, the cabinet and senior positions in the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/02/04/mwenye-condemns-segregative-appointments-explains-his-legal-opinion-against-lungu-musa/">civil service</a> and <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2021/04/15/president-lungu-swears-7-judges-3-courts/?">judiciary</a> appear to have been skewed towards people who come from the north and east. </p>
<p>By comparison, there is almost no representation of people from the south and west of the country.</p>
<p>Crucially, an analysis of the new 2021 voters’ roll by Zambian academic Dr Sishuwa Sishuwa – recently <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2021/04/irony-and-panic-as-zambias-authoritarianism-turns-to-intellectuals/">threatened</a> with arrest for sedition by a key ruling party figure – suggests that significantly more citizens have been registered for the next poll in regions that support the ruling party. Meanwhile, far fewer voters have been registered in opposition-supporting regions. </p>
<p>These dynamics are important, and worrying. For a long time Zambia has had a policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1959945">regional</a> balancing in key government appointments. This has largely held regional grievances <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610585">in check</a>. </p>
<p>But perceptions of persecution of groups who have historically supported the opposition are deepening, and may well become more entrenched with the elections.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/397033/original/file-20210426-19-1j9pni0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Opposition UPND’s vote share in the 2016 Presidential race.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Credibility gap</h2>
<p>In 2016, Lungu cleared the 50% electoral threshold with just 13,000 votes, with Hakainde Hichilema <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971605100306">close</a> at his heels. Given the clear disparities in the recent registration numbers across regions, it is difficult to interpret them as anything but an attempt to pack the voters’ roll with ruling party supporters. This also serves to disenfranchise opposition voters. </p>
<p>The reluctance of the electoral commission to subject the roll to an independent audit – as it did in 2016 – increases these suspicions.</p>
<p>The Catholic Church, a key player in the country’s politics, has expressed <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/africa/news/2021-03/zambia-bishops-concerned-about-august-elections.html">deep reservations</a> about the registration process. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group has also <a href="https://ccmgzambia.org/ccmg-statement-on-analysis-of-the-voters-register/">highlighted major gaps</a> and deficiencies with both the process and the registration rates. </p>
<p>Hichilema has <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/75948/zambias-new-voters-register-is-a-scam/">noted his serious concern</a> with the register. This distrust of the election commission runs deep within the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.</p>
<p>There are additional worries too. The government has used COVID-19 restrictions to curtail the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/26/chingola-police-nab-27-upnd-cadres-for-unlawful-assembly-on-independence-day/">opposition’s</a> ability to campaign. This includes <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/10/07/zambia-police-denies-upnd-and-ndc-permit-to-hold-a-protest-against-ecz/">demonstrations</a> or party meetings even in <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/02/ndola-police-nabs-3-upnd-officials-for-holding-private-meeting/">private homes</a>. </p>
<p>The electoral commission’s January statement appeared to suggest that movement restrictions during campaigns would be <a href="https://twitter.com/NixiiB/status/1354048226404528129">enforced</a>. </p>
<p>There’s increasing concern about heavy-handed tactics by the police who have repeatedly used excessive force to disperse opposition gatherings. Two people were killed in Lusaka late last year when police <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-23/zambian-police-fire-teargas-as-opposition-leader-questioned">opened fire on a crowd</a> of opposition supporters. </p>
<p>Arrests for insulting or defaming the president have increased. Since March 2020, at least six people, including a 15-year-old boy, have been <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/11/24/police-nab-kitwe-man-for-insulting-lungu/">arrested</a> over such offences. This has reduced space for dissent alongside <a href="https://rsf.org/en/zambia">shrinking</a> space for media and non-governmental organisations wary of running afoul of the government’s agenda.</p>
<p>In 2019 the government set about trying to change the constitution to further strengthen the presidency relative to the judiciary and legislature. It <a href="https://presidential-power.net/?cat=131">failed</a> in late 2020, catching the administration by surprise. </p>
<p>In the wake of this, the ruling party introduced a new Cyber Security and Cyber Crime law. It has been roundly <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/21/church-asks-lungu-not-to-sign-cyber-bill-into-law/">criticised</a> as failing to meet basic <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-04-05-free-speech-zambias-new-internet-law-fails-basic-human-rights-scrutiny/">human rights</a> standards, further <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2021/03/01/cyber-insecurity-potential-impact-of-the-cyber-security-and-cyber-crimes-bill-of-2021-on-an-already-shrinking-civic-space-in-zambia/">shrinking civic space</a> and placing whistleblowers and journalists at unjustified risk. </p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>The divide between the opposition United Party for National Development and ruling Patriotic Front continues to widen, and distrust runs deep. Concerns with the electoral commission’s management of the process have most outside observers worried about the diminishing likelihood of a fair election.</p>
<p>The increasing <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2021/03/19/our-officers-fear-cadres-to-protect-their-jobs-police/">impunity</a> of ruling party-aligned “cadres” and their politicised accusations against <a href="https://twitter.com/2021Zambian/status/1382304037253550081">civil servants</a> and citizens is a growing concern, as much of the violence surrounding the <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2019/11/13/kambwili-kampyongos-hate-speech-influenced-violence-in-2016-elections-reveals-report/">2016 election</a> was perpetrated by these groups of <a href="https://diggers.news/local/2020/10/05/2021-polls-could-be-marred-by-violence-if-govt-doesnt-act-on-inquiry-avap/">young men</a> who are sponsored by politicians. </p>
<p>Zambia’s status as a peaceful, democratic and free country is increasingly at risk. The 2021 election holds the potential to tip the balance if politicians aren’t careful and the international community pays little heed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Beardsworth works for the University of Pretoria. She is also an Honorary Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Warwick, where she receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund and the Institute for Advanced Studies to conduct research on the Zambian elections.</span></em></p>Distrust of the electoral commission runs deep in the opposition, which may well lead to increased tensions ahead of and following the polls.Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1160282019-04-29T09:25:51Z2019-04-29T09:25:51ZZambia: debt, unpaid salaries and a poor harvest have sown seeds of crisis<p>In the volatile landscape of southern Africa, Zambia is often overlooked. It played a huge role in the liberation struggles of its neighbours. The ANC, banned in South Africa by the apartheid government, established its exile headquarters in Lusaka. The SWAPO movement, fighting for a free Namibia, was also headquartered there. Joshua Nkomo’s wing of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe was there, too.</p>
<p>In the 19th century, Zambia was deeply influenced by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Cecil-Rhodes">Cecil Rhodes</a> and his form of corporate colonialism on behalf of the British crown. Rhodes dreamt of a Cape to Cairo road - and the main street of Lusaka is still called Cairo Road, before it branches into the Great North Road.</p>
<p>But, with the closing phase of apartheid, and the fall of founding president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kenneth-Kaunda">Kenneth Kaunda</a> in multiparty elections in 1991, Zambia largely slid from the world’s view as eyes turned to the emergence of Nelson Mandela’s South Africa, and then the degeneration of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Zambia appeared to be having an ongoing democratic revolution. Presidents and parties fell and new ones arose. But every new party was a descendant of Kaunda’s original. Until the current president, Edgar Lungu, every previous leader had also served in a Kaunda cabinet and there was no real difference in policy between them.</p>
<p>There was bitterness, however. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/zambias-2016-elections-democracy-hovering-on-the-precipice-63605">was certainly apparent</a> during the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37086365">2016 election of Lungu</a> – who forced his way to the succession during fragmented and competing party conventions after the death in office of president Michael Sata.</p>
<p>For a short time after his death, Sata’s vice-president, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/11196185/How-Guy-Scott-became-Africas-only-white-president.html">Guy Scott, acted as president</a>. Sata used to joke that “there are two countries on Earth with a black president and a white vice president – the US [Obama and Biden] and Zambia [Sata and Scott]”. Scott was well liked by the Zambian public – but recognised that a white man, even if Zambian, could not be an African president. In southern Africa, white rule was still a living memory and apartheid was still fresh in people’s minds. </p>
<h2>Lungu’s rise</h2>
<p>The subsequent election campaign between Lungu and Zambia’s opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema, was full-blooded. Hichilema offered new industrial and technocratic policies – including a solar energy programme – that were probably not well understood by the electorate. Lungu, meanwhile, unveiled a string of new building and energy projects – showpieces that suggested progress and prosperity – and this probably helped win him the election.</p>
<p>He was savage to Hichilema afterwards, arresting him for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/hakainde-hichilema-pleads-guilty-treason-charges-170814175023908.html">treason</a> after the two men’s motorcades wouldn’t give way to one another. Hichilema <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-zambia-politics/zambian-opposition-leader-walks-free-in-treason-case-idUKKCN1AW0KT">was later released</a>, but Lungu signalled he would be an impatient president, and the showpiece projects kept coming. The only problem was that most were financed by borrowed money.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/271301/original/file-20190428-194609-xfqva4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Struggling with debt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?u=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.shutterstock.com%2Fgatekeeper%2FW3siZSI6MTU1NjUxMjExNCwiYyI6Il9waG90b19zZXNzaW9uX2lkIiwiZGMiOiJpZGxfNTEzNTEyMzQxIiwiayI6InBob3RvLzUxMzUxMjM0MS9tZWRpdW0uanBnIiwibSI6MSwiZCI6InNodXR0ZXJzdG9jay1tZWRpYSJ9LCJzKzdibS83TldxamxmdTVGa1FDVUhEM2hXeUkiXQ%2Fshutterstock_513512341.jpg&pi=33421636&m=513512341&src=_lTgTwJwFvkmc1dF7D37og-1-3">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The result, three years into his term and two years before the next election (in 2021), is a dawning awareness of the scale of the country’s debt – likely in the region of <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2019/04/13/finance-minister-margaret-mwanakatwe-says-she-is-not-worried-about-declining-foreign-reserves/">US$10 billion</a>, much of which is due for repayment shortly after the 2021 elections. </p>
<p>The showpiece projects, which Lungu has staked his future on, cannot be cancelled – but there is not enough money in the country’s budget to pay the salaries of medical, military and educational personnel, or other public servants. In a country with a very low rate of formal employment, the extended families of these public servants are likely to be going hungry, especially so <a href="http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ZMB">after a very poor harvest</a>. The huge sums devoted to showpiece projects have also encouraged corruption to thrive.</p>
<p>International assistance is also unlikely. Just before Easter, Zambia’s finance minister, <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2019/04/13/finance-minister-margaret-mwanakatwe-says-she-is-not-worried-about-declining-foreign-reserves/">Margaret Mwanakatwe</a>, went to Washington, along with several other African finance ministers, for the spring meeting of the IMF and World Bank. While she spoke confidently of the debt being an investment for the future, she offered no firm figures, and certainly no news of debt relief, debt rollover or debt renegotiation.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1116676478140207106"}"></div></p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/baf01b06-4329-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b">a statement</a> released by both the World Bank president, David Malpas, and IMF managing director, Christine Lagarde, spoke of the messiness of debt incurred by many borrowing countries. They complained that countries did not even have coherent records of how much debt – or the types of debt – they had incurred. There were too many lenders and too many different terms and conditions attached to the loans. Not all were transparent. </p>
<p>In short, without mentioning Zambia by name, they seemed to indicate that a country like Zambia would face huge complications in restructuring its debt. And the barely veiled hint was that the IMF and World Bank would take a hard line in any negotiations towards such restructuring. “The seeds of crisis” have been sown, according to one IMF spokesman.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>But what will all this mean for politics in the country? Opposition leader Hichilema is not the force he once was – but new figures will likely enter the fray in 2021. </p>
<p>Lungu is also struggling. Shortly before the IMF World Bank meeting, Lungu’s party fell to a decisive by-election defeat. How will Lungu, his own health not rumoured to be consistently good, react to a powerful new challenge – especially if salaries remain unpaid and it becomes clear to the electorate that debt will force a post-election crisis? New challengers could focus on those issues and capitalise on them.</p>
<p>At this stage, it is not clear who such a challenger might be, or if anyone can mobilise national support to take on an incumbent prepared to use state resources in his campaign.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the once overlooked country in Rhodes’ former troika of southern African states might yet become a focal point in the region – and, indeed, in Africa as a whole. Unfortunately, this may be for reasons it might not welcome; a warning that financial recklessness has a price.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116028/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is a perfect storm brewing in the African nation?Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899802018-01-22T15:43:51Z2018-01-22T15:43:51ZStability in southern Africa hinges on how leaders gain and lose power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202402/original/file-20180118-29900-1tmlu4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand Congolese President Joseph Kabila step down.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While each country in Southern Africa has its own politics, recent developments involving presidents provide interesting contrasts across the region. Which presidents gain and lose power in 2018 – and how they do so – will have significance for the region as a whole, not least in helping determine its continued stability.</p>
<p>As 2018 begins, Joseph Kabila is clinging to the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), claiming that there is insufficient funding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">hold an election</a>, amid <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/53-protesters-killed-over-six-months-in-drc-report-20171121">growing protests</a> against him in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It remains to be seen if he will fulfil the undertaking he has made that elections will be held in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-at-un-pledges-drc-elections-but-still-no-date-20170923">December this year</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries in the region start 2018 on a much more promising footing. In Botswana, President Ian Khama, approaching the end of his two presidential terms, is expected to step down in an <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/09/botswana-president-says-he-will-step-down-at-the-end-of-his-term-in-april//">orderly succession</a> in April and will be suceeded by the vice-president.</p>
<p>In both Zimbabwe and Angola autocratic presidents who had been in power for almost four decades lost power in 2017 in very different ways.</p>
<h2>Military intervention in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe the country’s army intervened in November 2017 to force Robert Mugabe to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">give up power</a>. This came after he had, under the influence of his wife Grace, sacked Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">as vice-president</a>. The Southern African Development Community did not need to intervene, and even the mediation mission it planned wasn’t required.</p>
<p>Instead, the Zimbabwe military acted, with the ruling party, Zanu-PF, to replace Mugabe with Mnangagwa. It did so peacefully, denying during the entire process that a coup was underway. The 93-year-old Mugabe, in office since 1980, initially refused to step down, but was finally removed both as president of the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-21-breaking--zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned/">country and of the ruling party</a>.</p>
<p>The country will go to the polls in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/earliest-election-date-july-23-2018/">mid-2018</a>, and Mnangagwa, who was confirmed in December 2017 as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate, has said that the election will be credible, <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/12/16/mnangagwa-promises-free-fair-elections/">free and fair</a>, but he has yet to confirm that he will allow international and other observers.</p>
<p>With the military more obviously involved in government than anywhere else in the region, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties divided, and with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11532872">seriously ill</a>, there is little likelihood that Zanu-PF or Mnangagwa will lose power.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>In Angola José Eduardo dos Santos, suffering from ill-health, agreed in early 2017 to step down as president of the country. He nominated a man he thought would be a trusted successor, hoping to continue to wield influence as president of the ruling MPLA.</p>
<p>After elections for the National Assembly in August, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angolas-ruling-party-regains-power-but-faces-legitimacy-questions-83983">João Lourenço duly succeeded Dos Santos</a> as president. To widespread surprise, he began sacking the heads of some of the country’s key institutions. These included Dos Santos’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, who was <a href="https://qz.com/1130420/africas-richest-woman-has-been-fired-from-angolas-state-oil-firm-by-the-new-president/">CEO of the state oil company Sonangol</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, left, and his successor Joao Lourenco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And in early 2018 her brother José Filomeno dos Santos, was removed as head of Angola’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42638761">sovereign wealth fund</a>. Their father’s influence was rapidly slipping away.</p>
<p>In Angola, as in Zimbabwe, a change of leader to one with a more reformist approach probably means that the ruling party has consolidated itself in power.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa in December 2017 the leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) passed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1762486/breaking-cyril-ramaphosa-is-the-new-anc-president/">from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who thus became heir apparent to the presidency of the country. While there is no two-term limit for ANC presidents, Zuma had brought the ANC into discredit and Ramaphosa, despite having worked closely with Zuma as deputy president, was seen as the one who would curtail the corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>For now, Zuma remains president of the country until general elections due to be held by June 2019. The country waits to see whether, how and when Ramaphosa can <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-should-end-the-presidential-merry-go-round-in-south-africa-90116">arrange to take over</a> as president of the country as well as of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>A presidential challenge defeated</h2>
<p>In Namibia, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">Hage Geingob</a> had to meet a challenge to his continuing as leader of Swapo, the governing party, in <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/07/10/swapo-elders-endorse-geingob-as-swapo-presidential-candidate/">November last year</a>. He was, however, confirmed in his position and will therefore be Swapo’s presidential candidate for the election scheduled to take place in November 2019.</p>
<p>Geingob supporters now fill all the key posts in his government, enabling him to make policy as he wishes. This is very different from South Africa, where the new ANC leadership remains divided and where Ramaphosa, when he becomes president of the country, will find it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/when-will-zuma-go-its-a-matter-of-time-20171224-3">adopt new policies</a>.</p>
<h2>Malawi and Zambia</h2>
<p>Malawi must hold elections <a href="http://www.mec.org.mw/category/Steps_towards_2019.html">in 2019</a> and the contest for the presidency then has already begun. It is not known whether Joyce Banda, the former president and leader of one of the country’s leading political parties, will <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/">return from self-imposed exile</a> abroad to stand again. In 2017 she was formally charged with having been involved in the massive <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/malawi-issues-warrant-of-arrest-for-former-president-banda-20170731">“Cashgate’ corruption scandal”</a> that was uncovered while she was president.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Zambia, by contrast, where the next election is not due until 2021, the question is how Edgar Lungu, who took over the presidency after narrowly winning the presidential election in August 2016, will try to consolidate his power. </p>
<p>In 2017 Lungu became <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">more authoritarian</a>. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the main opposition United Party for National Development, was arrested on what were clearly trumped-up charges. These were only <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/08/16/knew-hhs-treason-charge-trumped-antonio-mwanza/">dropped in August</a> after interventions by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and inside Zambia by the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/20/real-reasons-hh-released-jail/">local Catholic Archbishop</a>.</p>
<p>Lungu wants to serve a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/05/no-third-term-president-lungu-gbm/">third term as president</a>, and the country’s Constitutional Court has been asked to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2017-11-10-is-zambia-headed-for-a-constitutional-crisis/">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional perspective</h2>
<p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation from similar ones elsewhere. Given that South Africa is the most important country in the region, how the Ramaphosa-Zuma poser is resolved will be significant for the region. Elsewhere, how presidents gain and lose, and try to consolidate their power, will help shape the continued stability of the region. </p>
<p>Will political tensions be managed internally, as in Zimbabwe in late 2017? Or will they require some kind of intervention by the Southern Africa Development Community, in the DRC and perhaps elsewhere, to prevent them from escalating? Throughout the region, contests for presidential power are likely to keep political passions on the boil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation. In southern Africa events in one affect others in the region.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812772017-07-23T11:43:25Z2017-07-23T11:43:25ZZambians firmly defend democracy. But will they stand up against Lungu?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179046/original/file-20170720-8687-1la65jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia has become increasingly ruled by fear under President Edgar Lungu.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Philippe Wojazer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After a year of authoritarian backsliding under <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">President Edgar Lungu</a> in their once-proud democracy, Zambians face a choice of futures. Ordinary citizens are clearly disposed to stand by their democratic ideals and reject dictatorship.</p>
<p>A recent <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad157-democracy-in-zambia-at-a-crossroads">survey</a> by Afrobarometer an independent research network that conducts public attitude surveys across the continent, leaves little doubt that most Zambians are dissatisfied as they see their country going in the “wrong direction” and their democracy beginning to erode.</p>
<p>To defend democracy, citizens require an open political environment, and Zambians see that political space closing. Between 2012 and 2017, the proportion of citizens who say they feel “completely” or “somewhat” free to say what they think has declined sharply, from 81% to 62%. On top of this, 72% of Zambians now say that they must “always” or “often” be “careful of what they say about politics,” a proportion that has risen by 10 percentage points over the past five years.</p>
<p>Since 1999, the proportion of citizens who say they enjoy “somewhat” or “much” more freedom of speech “compared to a few years ago” has dropped from 77% to 41%. </p>
<p>Zambia has gone from a country where most people felt free to engage in open political debate to one where most people have begun to look over their shoulders to see who is listening.</p>
<p>But are citizens prepared to stand up to defend democratic rights at this critical juncture? In Zambia, the answer is mixed. </p>
<h2>Mixed feelings</h2>
<p>On one hand, Zambians are fierce defenders of the right to personal privacy: Two-thirds (67%) reject government monitoring of private communications (on mobile phones, for example), even under the pretext of security. </p>
<p>Almost as many (58%) assert that they “should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves of it”. On the other hand, Zambians fall short in resisting other real or potential excesses of presidential power. A slim majority (54%) says </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(the government) should be able to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Fully 70% say they are willing to accept that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>when faced with threats to public security, the government should be able to impose curfews and set up special roadblocks.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It must be stressed that the April 2017 survey was conducted before Lungu <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">seized extraordinary powers</a>. At that time, few Zambians may have believed that security conditions actually existed that warranted infringements of rights. So these results should not be read as a direct endorsement of the president’s actions.</p>
<p>As in Burundi, where Afrobarometer traced a rise in support for <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/press-release/burundi/bdi_r6_pr_Burundians_support_democracy_08012015.pdf">term limits </a> as President Pierre Nkurunziza moved to undermine them, it may well be that there has been movement in public opinion since Lungu cracked down. </p>
<p>Figure 5: Popular resistance to emergency measures | Zambia | April 2017*</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178799/original/file-20170719-13539-pn4y4n.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 5.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>The questions the respondents were asked include:
1. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Government should be able to monitor private communications, for example on mobile phones, to make sure that people are not plotting violence.
Statement 2: People should have the right to communicate in private without a government agency reading or listening to what they are saying.
2. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: The government should be able to ban any organisation that goes against its policies.
Statement 2: We should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves of it.</em></p>
<h2>Political attitudes</h2>
<p>As Zambia’s own history demonstrates, a mobilised public can be a powerful force for democratisation. But who will lead public opinion in defence of Zambia’s democracy in 2017?</p>
<p>The data show few important differences between urban and rural residents, or between Internet and social-media users and non-users, when it comes to these political attitudes. Instead, educational achievement is the best marker of difference among Zambians in terms of their willingness to support and defend democracy.</p>
<p>Table 1: Political attitudes by level of education | Zambia | 2017
No formal education</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178801/original/file-20170719-13545-1defwr1.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=586&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Table 1.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For some political attitudes, a little education goes a long way. For example, primary schooling seems to sharply step up the likelihood that Zambians will support democracy, reject military and one-man rule, see a need to be careful about what one says about politics, and feel constrained about criticising President Lungu.</p>
<p>In other instances, political attitudes change by increments as respondents gradually attain higher levels of education, with respect to the likelihood that Zambians will, for example, reject one party rule, see the last election as less than free and fair and prefer to limit the president to two terms in office.</p>
<p>Finally, a post-secondary education seems to be required before individuals are able to take on the most demanding understandings of, and commitments to, democracy. For example, majorities of this group tend to recognise recent declines in freedom for the media, NGOs, and opposition parties; oppose efforts by the government to control the mass media and oppose moves by the government to ban independent organisations.</p>
<p>While Zambians strongly endorse democratic principles, less educated citizens may be prone to underestimate the threats inherent in government takeover of the legislature, courts and the mass media, or to acquiesce to specious arguments that law and order requires the sacrifice of individual liberties.<br>
In that case, the defence of democracy in Zambia depends critically on active political engagement by educated citizens. They have essential roles to play in helping other Zambians to understand that the greatest risk to democracy in the country today comes not from the imminent threat of a military coup but from the gradual erosion of hard-won political gains at the hands of an elected civilian leader bent on expanding his own power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afrobarometer receives funding from Swedish International Development, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the US State Department, the National Endowment for Democracy, among others.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span> Afrobarometer receives funding from SIDA, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the Hewlett Foundation , among others.</span></em></p>Zambia has gone from a country where people engaged freely in open political debate to one where most people now look over their shoulders to see who’s listening.Boniface Dulani, Senior lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Malawi and Research Associate, Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape TownMichael Bratton, University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and African Studies, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806282017-07-06T13:22:14Z2017-07-06T13:22:14ZLungu tries to have his cake and eat it: a state of emergency in all but name<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177094/original/file-20170706-11940-1k5qbf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambia's President Edgar Lungu is tightening his grip on power even further.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Abir Sultan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For 24 hours rumours swirled through Zambia that President Edgar Lungu <a href="https://www.zambiawatchdog.com/lungu-likely-to-sign-state-of-emergency-tonight/">planned to initiate a state of emergency</a>. When he finally took to the airwaves to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-05-zambia">make a special announcement</a> he did something different. Invoking <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/07/05/article-31-declaration-relating-threatened-emergency/">Article 31</a> of the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/26620/90492/F735047973/ZMB26620.pdf">constitution</a> – Declaration Relating to Threatened Emergency – rather than Article 30 – Declaration of Public Emergency – the president requested extra powers to prevent a state of emergency rather than actually declaring one.</p>
<p>In practice, the difference between the two is slim. If, as expected, parliament approves his request he will have been given considerably more powers. He will be able to restrict movement of assembly, implement a curfew, curtail parliament, ban publications, order detention without trial, and search any property without a search warrant. As respected Zambian commentator Sishuwa Sishuwa has put it, this is effectively a “State of Threatened Emergency”.</p>
<p>The president’s decision to go with Article 31 is significant for a number of reasons. The first is that it allows the Zambian government to ward off criticism by being able to argue that it has <em>not</em> <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/07/06/president-lungu-not-declared-state-emergency/">declared a state of emergency</a>. This is important because the Patriotic Front regime is in the process of negotiating a much needed <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/05/02/imf-bail-will-not-bring-untold-misery-zambia-mutati/">economic bail out with the International Monetary Fund</a>.</p>
<p>Presenting its authoritarian backsliding in a more palatable way is therefore extremely valuable. By opting for Article 31, Lungu hopes to have his cake and eat it. He will have secured powers to consolidate his political control while generating “plausible deniability” to whether or not he has fatally undermined Zambian democracy.</p>
<p>To some extent this strategy has been successful. Initial Facebook and twitter <a href="https://www.facebook.com/nic.cheeseman/posts/1301668219959781?pnref=story">conversations</a> about how the measure could be reversed quickly gave way to confusion and arguments about what the president had actually declared, and what it meant.</p>
<h2>Why did Lungu do it?</h2>
<p>The official reason behind the president’s request for extra powers is a spate of civil disobedience and arson that has seen a number of markets burnt down. The immediate trigger was a fire that destroyed the country’s largest, the <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00053416.html">City Market in Lusaka</a>.</p>
<p>But the president’s claim to simply be acting in the interests of law and order has been fiercely contested by critics. Instead, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zambia-politics-idUSKBN17Q0W8">opposition leaders allege</a> that the government has been either taking advantage of natural fires or deliberately starting them to justify the extension of authoritarian control. </p>
<p>This claim is lent credibility by the fact that the investigation of the City Market fire had only just begun when the decision to expand the president’s powers was taken. Rumours circulating in Zambia suggest that in fact it resulted from an <a href="http://zambia24.com/news/2017/07/04/city-market-fire-resulted-from-an-electrical-fault-onlookers/">electrical fault rather than sabotage</a>.</p>
<p>If this is true, it raises the question of what lies behind Lungu’s increasingly aggressive strategy. Three overlapping explanations are circulating, all of which have a degree of plausibility.</p>
<p>The first is that it’s simply another way of intimidating the opposition. In addition to <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">arresting United Party for National Development leader Hakainde Hichilema</a>, popularly known as HH, the government has tried various ways to clamp down on opposition to its rule. This has included the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zambia-slides-towards-authoritarianism-as-imf-props-up-government-79533">suspension of 48 opposition MPs</a>. And fears that Hichilema might be acquitted by the High Court, and subsequently released, are said to explain the timing of the president’s statement.</p>
<p>The second is that the president faces serious challenges within the Patriotic Front, where some question his suitability to lead. In addition to rumours that he is in <a href="http://www.zambianobserver.com/edgar-lungu-gets-more-sick-stops-talking/">bad health</a>, this makes him potentially more <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-05-zambia">vulnerable to internal opposition</a> than to the challenge of the main opposition party. On this interpretation, Lungu’s appropriation of extra powers is designed as a warning to his rivals within the party to back off.</p>
<p>Finally, some see his decision as being motivated by his desire to secure a <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zambia-president-lungu-third-term/">third term in office</a> when his current term ends in 2021. The legality of this is questionable, and the move is fiercely opposed by opposition parties.</p>
<p>On their own, none of these claims fully explains why Lungu has opted for such a controversial move when IMF negotiations are at a delicate stage. In reality it may be that the president’s actions are explained by some combination of all three – or indeed, an alternative explanation that has not yet come to light.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>There’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-05-zambia%20%22%22">confusion</a> about exactly where Lungu intends to go from here. In a presidential address in the last hour his stance appeared to harden, rejecting international criticism and <a href="https://www.themastonline.com/2017/07/06/imf-can-go-lungu/">stating that:</a> “If they [IMF] think I am going astray, let them go.” </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-05-zambia">Nicole Beardsworth</a>, a senior researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Lungu’s declaration will give him <a href="http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Preservation%20of%20Public%20Security%20Act.pdf">additional powers</a>. Moreover, if his statutory instrument is approved by Parliament, it can be extended for a period of months.</p>
<p>This would seem to give the president all the time and powers he would need to further cow internal and external opposition, although it’s still possible that he will seek to apply a full state of emergency.</p>
<p>What may prevent this from happening is concern within the cabinet that such a move would be unnecessary and counterproductive. Not all leaders of the Patriotic Front agree with the direction that Lungu is taking his country in. Push back in a cabinet meeting is said to have prevented an even more forceful declaration.</p>
<p>Given the president’s new found capacity to control the media and intimidate the opposition, these internal constraints may prove to be Zambia’s best hope of avoiding dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zambia’s president is securing powers to consolidate his political control while generating ‘plausible deniability’ to whether or not he has fatally undermined democracy.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/795332017-06-18T09:22:56Z2017-06-18T09:22:56ZZambia slides towards authoritarianism as IMF props up government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/174033/original/file-20170615-17797-jcowfe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are fears that Zambia is slipping into authoritarian rule under President Edgar Lungu.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/unwomen/21661333080/in/photolist-PsKWzy-PsKWoG-PRmWiv-PsKWh9-Q2zAHX-Q2B2EZ-PsKWGN-z18ZE1-TdUtB3-T3FdvQ-PsKWeo-NN5hNR-qHthiB-yWkPxC-zfWUXE-PsKWb7-PRmW1g-PPGwUt-NJk7PM-Pr8cGN-PLXcT1-Pr8dwU-PLXdJj-Pr8dWG-PLXdmq-PZUXSV-PPGw6z-Pr8dcf-PPGwnM-PLXd4b-PPGwAT-PPGvxR-PPGuED-PLXddu-Pr8bs3-NHzeNL-PPGvix-PPGugc-Pr8ceJ-tK1rT3-Pr8eP3-PPGu4D-PLXcFY-NJtFx6-PJZwzY-NJtGqZ-PJZwTJ-NJtG3K-PXLFMX-M4Gq5L">UN Women/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The speaker of the Zambian National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, has <a href="http://www.enca.com/africa/zambias-parliament-suspendes-48-opposition-lawmakers">suspended 48 opposition legislators</a> for 30 days as a punishment for unauthorised absence from the parliament. Their offence? To have been missing for President Edgar Lungu’s state of the nation address in March.</p>
<p>The suspension of the MPs does not come as <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">a great surprise</a>. Hardliners from the ruling Patriotic Front have been pushing for something along these lines for some time. The ruling party was quick to try and disassociate itself from the Speaker’s actions. But, as Zambian commentators have pointed out, the action fits into a broader web of measures designed to intimidate those who question the president’s authority. </p>
<p>The most significant was the arrest of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, who remains in jail on trumped up <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/05/20/zambia-s-political-climate-and-treason-trial-of-hichilema-worrying-eu-mps//">treason charges</a>.</p>
<p>While the latest development in Zambia’s growing political crisis doesn’t come as a shock, it will disappoint those who were hoping that Lungu would be persuaded to moderate his position. Instead, it appears that the International Monetary Fund’s decision to <a href="http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/06/11/pr17214-zambia-imf-staff-concludes-visit">go ahead with a bail out</a> package despite the government’s democratic failings has emboldened the president to pursue an authoritarian strategy.</p>
<p>As a result, a swift resolution to the current political standoff seems unlikely.</p>
<h2>Roots of the crisis</h2>
<p>For some time Zambia was considered to be one of the more competitive democracies in Africa. But a period of backsliding under Lungu has raised concerns that the country’s inclusive political culture is <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-need-to-talk-about-zambia-as-it-falls-from-grace-under-president-lungu-77520">under threat</a>. The current impasse stems from the controversial elections in 2016 when Lungu won a narrow victory that <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN10Q163">remains contested</a> by the opposition United Party for National Development.</p>
<p>Hichilema, the leader of the United Party for National Development, has stated that his party will not recognise the legitimacy of Lungu’s victory until its electoral petition against the results is heard in court. The initial petition was <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00045643.html">rejected by the Constitutional Court</a>. But its decision was made in a way that had all the hallmarks of a whitewash. The UPND subsequently appealed to the High Court. Hichilema’s decision to make his party’s recognition of the president conditional on the petition being heard was designed both as an act of defiance, and as a means to prevent the government from simply sweeping electoral complaints under the carpet.</p>
<p>Until the court case is resolved, the opposition is committed to publicly challenging the president’s mandate by doing things like <a href="https://diggers.news/guest-diggers/2017/06/14/the-wholesale-suspension-of-upnd-mps-legal-but-undemocratic/">boycotting his addresses to parliament</a>. In response, members of the ruling party have accused the United Party for National Development of disrespect and failing to recognise the government’s authority. It is this that appears to lie behind Hichilema’s arrest on treason charges.</p>
<h2>Punishing parliamentarians</h2>
<p>The suspension of United Party for National Development legislators needs to be understood against this increasingly authoritarian backdrop. It is one of a number of steps taken by those aligned to the government that are clearly designed to intimidate people who <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/called-professor-nic-cheeseman-causes-zambia-controversy/">don’t fall into line</a>. Other strategies include public condemnation of the government’s critics and proposals to break-up the influential Law Society of Zambia.</p>
<p>Efforts by the <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170614-zambian-government-played-no-part-suspension-opposition-mps-says-spokesman">president’s spokesman</a> to disassociate the regime from the suspensions have been unpersuasive. The official line of the ruling party is that the speaker of parliament is an independent figure and that he made the decision on the basis of the official rules. It’s true that the speaker and the parliamentary committee on privileges, absences and support services have the right to reprimand legislators for being absent without permission. </p>
<p>Nonetheless the argument is disingenuous for two reasons. The speaker is known to be close to the ruling party, a fact that prompted Hichilema to <a href="https://diggers.news/guest-diggers/2017/06/14/the-wholesale-suspension-of-upnd-mps-legal-but-undemocratic/">call for his resignation</a> earlier this year. And the committee’s decisions are clearly driven by the Patriotic Front because it has more members from it than any other party.</p>
<p>The claim that the suspension was not government-led lacks credibility. This is clear from the fact that Patriotic Front MPS have been the most vocal in calling for action to be taken against boycotting United Party for National Development MPs.</p>
<h2>IMF lifeline for Lungu</h2>
<p>There are different perspectives on the crisis in Zambia. Some people invoke the country’ history of more open government to argue that Lungu will moderate his position once the government feels that the opposition has been placed on the back foot. Others identify a worrying authoritarian trajectory that began under the presidency of the late Michael Sata. They conclude that things are likely to get worse before they get better.</p>
<p>One of the factors that opposition leaders hoped might persuade President Lungu to release Hichilema and move discussions back from the police cell to the negotiating chamber was the government’s desperate need for an economic bail out. Following a period of bad luck and bad governance, Zambia faces a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/04/03/zambia-facing-debt-crisis-fundanga/">debt crisis</a>. Without the assistance of international partners, the government is likely to go bankrupt. This would increase public dissatisfaction with the Patriotic Front and undermine Lungu’s hopes of securing a <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zambia-president-lungu-third-term/">third term</a>.</p>
<p>But the willingness of the IMF to move towards the completion of a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-10/zambian-leader-sees-swift-subsidy-cuts-in-1-2-billion-imf-deal">$1.2 billion rescue package</a> suggests that authoritarian backsliding is no barrier to international economic assistance. In turn, IMF support appears to have emboldened the government to continue its efforts to intimidate its opponents.</p>
<p>IMF officials, of course, will point out that they are not supposed to take political conditions into account and that their aim is to create a stronger economy that will benefit all Zambians. This may be true, but the reality is that by saving the Lungu government financially the IMF is also aiding it politically. Whatever its motivation, the agreement will be interpreted by many on the ground as tacit support for the Patriotic Front regime, strengthening Lungu’s increasingly authoritarian position.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79533/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The IMF’s decision to go ahead with a bailout package for Zambia, despite the government’s democratic failings, could embolden the president to pursue an authoritarian strategy.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/786252017-06-01T11:56:04Z2017-06-01T11:56:04ZWestern leaders take their eyes off Africa at just the wrong moment<p>Almost none of the Western world’s leaders have paid much attention to Africa in recent months. One exception was France’s newly-elected president, Emmanuel Macron, who <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/emmanuel-macron-visits-french-troops-northern-mali-170519112433707.html">visited Mali</a> shortly after his inauguration. His trip was partly a show of solidarity with his country’s military effort there, and partly a gesture to the world that he’s serious about confronting insurgency and terrorism. But it was ultimately little more than gesture – one of the various signals new presidents try to send in their early days.</p>
<p>Not all presidents get it right, to put it mildly. And as far as Africa goes, a batch of new world leaders have barely bothered. </p>
<p>The US, for one, seems uninterested. Beset by a hurricane of gaffes, failed initiatives and legal trouble, Donald Trump still hasn’t appointed an assistant secretary of state for Africa. This position is normally the highest post directly concerned with the US’s Africa policy. It has been held in the past by such heavyweights as <a href="http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/crockerc/">Chester Crocker</a>, who managed the Reagan administration’s approach to apartheid South Africa. But four-plus months after Trump’s inauguration, Africa is barely on his administration’s radar. </p>
<p>What Washington gossip there is rates <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-3782324-3r1a8uz/">J. Peter Pham</a> of the Atlantic Council the most likely candidate. But even if he were nominated, Pham would join a State Department desperately short on <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/state-department-trump/517965/">confidence and morale</a>, its budgets about to be <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-budget-2018-state-department-cut-office-global-womens-issues-oxfam-ivanka-a7701631.html">slashed</a> and many of its senior personnel <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-budget-tillerson-idUSKBN17F1QW">shorn away</a>. In particular, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-budget-state-idUSKBN16N0DQ">aid for Africa</a> will be a big casualty of the cuts.</p>
<p>The UK’s election campaign, meanwhile, has seen no mention of Africa at all, save for a debate over whether the 2011 intervention in <a href="https://theconversation.com/political-chaos-in-libya-makes-it-a-haven-for-radical-terrorist-groups-78281">Libya</a> has caused terrorism “blowback”. None of the party leaders have said anything about the continent, aid or security – and nothing about democracy. </p>
<p>The Foreign Office minister responsible for Africa, Tobias Ellwood, is in fact responsible for both Africa and the Middle East – an impossible portfolio in which Africa will be the junior partner, especially as all ministers are made to join in the frantic search for new markets and trading partners as Brexit looms.</p>
<p>And as West averts its eyes, it is overlooking a strange collection of increasingly bizarre drifts away from democracy. </p>
<h2>Steep decline</h2>
<p>In Zambia, opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema is in prison awaiting trial for treason – ostensibly because he <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-african-politics-roiled-by-distortions-junk-bonds-and-road-rage-77022">refused to give way</a> to President Edgar Lungu’s motorcade. Hichilema’s legal petitions contesting last year’s elections have thus far been <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2016/09/05/zambian-court-throws-out-election-petition-case-lungu-to-hold-inauguration//">chewed up</a> in the curious workings of Zambia’s senior courts, which have far from distinguished themselves. </p>
<p>Embarrassingly, South African opposition leader <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/south-africa-mmusi-maimane-barred-zambia-170526081020059.html">Mmusi Maimane</a> lately sought to attend Hichilema’s trial but was denied entry to Zambia at Lusaka International Airport. The Zambian authorities did this despite his having broken no law, despite his being a member of the South African parliament, and despite his leading an opposition party that last year defeated the ANC to take control of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-elections-politics-shuffled-but-not-transformed-63481">most of the country’s major cities</a>. They also did it despite the fact that there’s meant to be free travel within the countries of the Southern African Development Community.</p>
<p>It all looks like the behaviour of a curiously introspective government, one that has suddenly realised the outside world isn’t watching.</p>
<p>Back in South Africa, meanwhile, President Jacob Zuma continues to be rocked by scandals and revolts within his own ANC party as even his party colleagues lose patience with his <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-disastrous-rule-goes-on-as-a-corrupt-elite-robs-south-africa-blind-68185">cynical cronyism</a>. Still tainted by his ties to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22513410">oligarchic Gupta family</a> and the self-serving way he <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-lost-a-key-line-of-defence-against-corruption-what-now-75549">disposed of his finance minister</a>, Zuma is now trying to keep the presidency in the family by nominating as his successor his ex-wife, <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/13/dlamini-zuma-new-anc-leader-must-be-respected">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, who made a distinct lack of impact as chair of the African Union.</p>
<p>A similar feeling of drab continuity persists next door in Zimbabwe. While Robert Muagbe stubbornly remains alive, the opposition – for all the talk of a grand coalition of fractured parties – is as divided as ever. Even party leaders such as Tendai Biti, a former finance minister, are now saying the opposition <a href="https://263africanews.com/2017/05/19/opposition-coalition-will-not-win-biti/">can’t win the 2018 elections</a>. </p>
<p>This all makes Zimbabwe rather an anomaly in its neighbourhood: a stagnant, bankrupt country buffered north and south by wealthier ones racked with tension. There seems little hope that Zambia’s Lungu will return to a more accommodating and genuine sort of democracy, and Zuma isn’t guaranteed an easy escape to the retirement home he’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zumas-dubai-exit-plan-20170527-2">reportedly seeking</a> in Dubai.</p>
<p>All the while, the US and Europe hardly seem to care. Perhaps it counts as a sort of “independence” from the scrutiny of former colonial overlords – but as these countries’ democratic oppositions are finding, living in disregard carries its own perils and pitfalls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The state of democracy isn’t looking good in southern Africa – but these countries’ Western ‘partners’ don’t really seem to care.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/775202017-05-13T10:18:22Z2017-05-13T10:18:22ZWe need to talk about Zambia as it falls from grace under President Lungu<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168980/original/file-20170511-32613-b4m53n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu has been criticised for turning the country into a dictatorship. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zambia has often been ignored by the international media. One reason for this neglect is that it’s been comparatively unexceptional, on a continent with more than its fair share of extremes. </p>
<p>Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249208703954">1991</a>, the country has neither been a clear democratic success story like <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-learning-that-theyre-not-that-exceptional-after-all-75884">Ghana or South Africa </a>, nor a case of extreme authoritarian abuse, as in Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Instead, Zambia has occupied a middle ground lacking a hook with which to sell coverage of the country, journalists have tended to steer clear. But in the last few months things began to change. First, the opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested on trumped up <a href="https://zambiareports.com/2017/04/14/us-eu-condemn-hichilema-arrest-treason-charge/">treason charges</a>. </p>
<p>Shortly after, the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/04/23/catholic-bishops-condemn-hh-arrest-say-zambia-is-now-a-dictatorship/">Conference of Catholic Bishops</a> released a strongly worded criticism of the government that concluded</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our country is now all, except in designation, a dictatorship</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a result, the country has returned to the headlines, and whether one agrees with the bishops’ evaluation or not, one thing is clear: it’s time to start talking about Zambia.</p>
<h2>Democratic success</h2>
<p>Until now, Zambia’s progress under multi-party politics has been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/434/51/72291/Parties-Platforms-and-Political-Mobilization-The">quietly impressive</a>. </p>
<p>Although the level of corruption has <a href="http://lusakavoice.com/2016/01/09/political-corruption-and-poverty-in-zambia-observation-and-facts-part-1/">remained high</a>, and a number of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-01-zambias-general-elections-africas-flagship-democracyunder-scrutiny">highly controversial</a>, elections, the country has consistently pulled back from the brink when authoritarian rule appeared a possibility.</p>
<p>Things appeared to be going downhill, for example, when Zambia’s second president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Chiluba">Frederick Chiluba</a>, manipulated the constitution to prevent his predecessor, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kenneth-Kaunda">Kenneth Kaunda</a>, from running against him on the grounds that he was <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8ae28.html">not really Zambian</a>. This strategy was clearly illegitimate. After all, Kaunda had run the country for over two decades.</p>
<p>But, Chiluba’s position was weaker than he understood and he overplayed his hand by trying to secure an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1162462.stm">unconstitutional third-term</a>. He ultimately left office when his second term expired at the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/africa/20chiluba.html">end of 2002</a>.</p>
<p>While Zambians have been willing to defend their new democracy, political leaders have shown a greater willingness to share power than in many nearby states. On the one hand, presidents from a number of different ethnic groups have occupied State House, which has helped to manage tension. On the other, opposition parties have been able to use populist strategies to attract support in urban areas and build effective political machines. As a result, Zambia is one of the only countries on the continent – along with Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, and Mauritius – that has experienced <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38403553">two transfers of power</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last year, though, things have changed.</p>
<h2>Zambia’s fall from grace</h2>
<p>According to the Conference of Catholic Bishops – one of the most influential bodies in the country – Zambia doesn’t deserve to be called a democracy. Instead, under the leadership of <a href="http://www.herald.co.zw/meet-zambian-president-edgar-chagwa-lungu/">President Edgar Lungu</a> and the <a href="https://www.revolvy.com/topic/Patriotic%20Front%20(Zambia)&item_type=topic">Patriotic Front</a> it has become a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/04/23/catholic-bishops-condemn-hh-arrest-say-zambia-is-now-a-dictatorship/">dictatorship</a> - or getting there. </p>
<p>This statement needs to be taken seriously for two reasons. First, the bishops rarely speak out publicly. Second, many catholic leaders were seen to be sympathetic to the governing Patriotic Front, when it won <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-30-the-puzzle-that-is-michael-sata">power under Michael Sata in 2011</a>. So, their actions cannot simply be put down to party political bias.</p>
<p>So what has changed? The bishops identify a number of recent developments as causes for concern. </p>
<p>First, they point to the treatment of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema. Not only was his arrest conducted in an unnecessarily brutal manner, but the government has not yet provided any evidence to substantiate the <a href="https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/hh-goes-to-high-court/">treason charge</a>. Instead, it appears that his detention is punishment for refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the president, who Hichilema believes won the last election unfairly.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168979/original/file-20170511-32593-19fh27e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambia’s opposition leader and presidential hopeful Hakainde Hichilema.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Rogan Ward</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For obvious reasons, his detention and the question of whether he will be released, has been the focus of recent media coverage. But for the Bishops, Hichilema’s arrest is clearly just the tip of the iceberg. The worries expressed in their statement are less about the fate of the opposition leader, and more about the systematic weakening of the state.</p>
<p>For example, the bishops lament the fact that the <a href="http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/constitutional-court/">Constitutional Court</a> failed to effectively hear the opposition’s election petition, believing the judiciary have <a href="https://cruxnow.com/global-church/2017/04/27/zambian-bishops-say-people-live-fear-police-brutality-increases/">“let the people down”</a>. </p>
<p>They also note that the politicization of the police force has resulted in the violation of citizens’ rights and that, partly as a result, the media has become entrapped in a “culture of silence”. The Bishops suggest that the political manipulation of these institutions has enabled the government to launch attacks on a number of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/democratic-backsliding-in-zambia/">civil society groups</a> that have dared to challenge its authority, including the <a href="http://www.laz.org.zm/">Law Association of Zambia</a>.</p>
<p>While the charges against Hichilema may have triggered the Bishops to act, their letter is underpinned by a deeper and broader concern about the declining quality of governance under President Lungu.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that a Zambian president has sought to consolidate their authority my manipulating state institutions. Nor is it the first time that opposition leaders have been arrested, or civil society groups intimidated. In the recent past, these moments of high political tension have often been resolved peacefully and it’s not impossible that a similar thing will happen this time.</p>
<p>For example, the president may decide to release Hichilema and to pull back from the prohibition of the Law Society of Zambia in the wake of considerable criticism. If the recent spate of attacks has been designed to intimidate his rivals, Lungu may feel that his goal has already been achieved and that he has little to gain by following through with his threats.</p>
<p>But even if this were to happen, it’s unlikely that it would signal a period of a more accountable government, or that Lungu will cede his quest to remain in office. Many things have changed since Chiluba failed to secure a third term in office almost twenty years ago.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, key civil society groups such as the trade unions have been weakened by privatisation, informalisation and unemployment. </p></li>
<li><p>Second, the Constitutional Court that’s responsible for interpreting the constitution was handpicked by Lungu, and is highly unlikely to oppose him.</p></li>
<li><p>Third, Lungu’s case is more complicated than Chiluba’s. In 2001, the second president had served two fill terms in office and wanted one more. Today, Lungu is arguing that he should be allowed to have a third term because his first period in office did not count, as he was just serving out the final year of Michael Sata’s term following his <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/11366872/Five-things-you-probably-didnt-know-about-Zambias-new-president.html">untimely death in office</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>This reading of the <a href="http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20%28Amendment%29%2C%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf">constitution </a> is highly questionable. The clause that stipulates that a period in office only counts as a full term if it’s longer than three years is limited to a set of cases that doesn’t include the way that Lungu actually came to power. But, it is less clear-cut than Chiluba’s power grab.</p>
<p>All of this means that <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/11970/Lungu%27s_way_and_the_highway">Lungu is likely to get his way</a>. But, his third term will not come without a cost. Opposition protests are inevitable, as is some civil society criticism. If past form is anything to go by, Lungu’s government will respond with threats and intimidation, fuelling public fears that Zambian politics has become significantly more violent since the 2016 election campaign. Given this, the Bishops’ recent letter is unlikely to be their last, and we need to talk about Zambia for some time to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world’s media, which has in the past found Zambia uninteresting, are suddenly paying more attention to the impoverished nation, for all the wrong reasons.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/770222017-05-02T12:49:33Z2017-05-02T12:49:33ZSouthern African politics roiled by distortions, junk bonds and road rage<p>I was in Zimbabwe when news came through of a clash of motorcades in neighbouring Zambia. One motorcade was carrying the president, Edgar Lungu, and the other the opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema. It seemed neither would give way to the other. There is little love lost between the two men, and Hichilema still refuses to recognise Lungu’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/zambia-president-edgar-lungu-elected-disputed-vote-160815130511717.html">contentious election victory</a> last year – but even so, no one expected that shortly after the stand off, security forces would storm Hichilema’s home and teargas his family, then <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/upnd-leader-hakainde-hichilema-charged-treason-170412173802546.html">arrest him for treason</a>. </p>
<p>If Lungu was behind this, it was the ultimate in road rage. It seemed at the very least unpresidential, and at worst deeply intolerant and paranoid – and indicative of a disturbingly authoritarian turn that’s not confined to Zambia.</p>
<p>Across southern Africa, the stakes are high for incumbent presidents, whose positions no longer seem so secure. Lungu’s contested 2016 victory came at a relatively thin 52%, unlike Zimbabwean counterpart Robert Mugabe’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23591941">even more disputed</a> 2013 landslide triumph. </p>
<p>But in Zimbabwe, the plots and rumours of plots to succeed the increasingly frail president, either before or shortly after the 2018 elections, all point to the inevitability of an endgame to the elderly Mugabe’s life. And the feverish rumours about whose knife is in whose back all point to a sub-text of a president who serves himself first and the people second, his office organised to accord him power and wealth at everyone’s expense. </p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, no one in politics actually has a programme for the country’s rescue. The country is essentially bankrupt, and the animation of politics is to secure as much money for oneself as possible while it is still there. Beautiful limousines gingerly navigate roads with huge potholes.</p>
<p>South Africa, labouring under Jacob Zuma’s corrupt and disastrous presidency, has now seen its credit rating <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39476903">slashed to junk status</a> by the ratings agency S&P Global. Zuma apparently doesn’t care or cannot conceive of what this grim news means for the future of his country, so intent is he on backroom deals of dubious probity – but the prognosis is clear enough: investment will slow down, the threat of recession will loom, and countries in the junk band typically take over a decade of painful fiscal measures to emerge from it. </p>
<p>Zuma’s opponents are legion – more and more of <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/24/ramaphosa-says-failed-calls-for-zuma-to-step-down-need-to-be-revisited">the ANC’s top rank</a>, the firebrands of Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters, the trade unions, and the opposition Democratic Alliance – but he sails on. So long as he survives, South Africa will find it harder and harder to imagine what a truly responsible government and a well-managed economy might look like.</p>
<p>In short, South Africa’s political meltdown has come with an economic and cultural meltdown attached. In an atmosphere like this, any political conversation easily falls prey to rumours and distortion. And in Zimbabwe, which faces a dramatically more advanced version of the South African situation, I myself became a minor example of it all.</p>
<h2>Soap opera</h2>
<p>In a series <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/04/17/biti-lays-mnangagwa/">of press interviews</a> in Harare, some on the record and some not, I said that the world at large is looking for some hope of a stable Zimbabwe, the Chinese as much as the British. Right now, in the swirl of government factionalism, only one serious presidential contender can be identified: the current vice-president, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/11876/Mugabe%27s_waiting_room">Emerson Mnangagwa</a>. I named no other contender from any of the endless, ever-shifting factions reportedly at work, since those factions are so unstable that seriously weighing up any other contender’s prospects is so far redundant.</p>
<p>My point was that given this frustrating reality, the British and other governments are indeed speculating on what a Mnangagwa government might look like. But when my interviews ran in the press, and continuing to the end of April, the <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/british-govt-prefers-mnangagwa/">headlines</a> reported that I supported Mnangagwa, that the British supported Mnangagwa, and that we all thought only Mnangagwa could stabilise the country.</p>
<p>I should know better. I’ve been visiting Zimbabwe since the transition to independence in 1980, and seen every stage of its development since. But the political atmosphere has become so febrile, and so dizzyingly speculative, that Zimbabwean politics has taken on almost metaphysical, unreal quality. </p>
<p>Or perhaps a better way to think of it would be as a tragic soap opera, one in the same genre as those unfolding in Zambia and South Africa. All sometime beacons of hope, these three countries are now struggling to make sense of their own politics – and to find some hope for a stable future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three democracies once considered beacons of hope are in varying states of disarray.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/647132016-09-02T14:00:32Z2016-09-02T14:00:32ZFrom Gabon to Zimbabwe, African presidents are under siege<p>It’s sometimes democracy as we know it – albeit with twists and turns – but there is certainly a new appetite for political pluralism developing in Africa. This sometimes leads not only to change, but to deep division.</p>
<p>In Gabon, the Bongo family’s father-and-son dynasty faced a challenge as never before. The Bongos have ruled the oil-rich country for almost 50 years, all the while distributing economic benefits grotesquely unevenly. This year’s election was hotly contested; despite all indications in the exit polls, and after a protracted count of just a few hundred thousand votes, the incumbent Ali Bongo was eventually declared the winner. </p>
<p>The aftermath has been deeply ugly, with the opposition’s headquarters in flames. Jean Ping, whom Bongo narrowly defeated, has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37243309">claimed that a presidential guard helicopter bombed the building</a>, killing two people.</p>
<p>Perhaps this is a preview of what might eventually befall Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe’s autocratic, gerontocratic apparatus is apparently cemented in place. The electorate must wait till 2018 if they want to vote it out, but suddenly, street demonstrations have been ramping up, with tear gas-armed riot police doubling down on the state’s suppression. </p>
<p>Sadly, the demonstrators have no political programme to regenerate the economy, and the country’s array of 18 opposition parties has no actual fiscal plans or policies either. </p>
<p>The anti-Robert Mugabe parties boast two political titans: Morgan Tsvangirai, a longtime opposition leader and onetime prime minister, and Joice Mujuru, liberation hero, former ZANU-PF stalwart and onetime national vice-president. The two have never been enemies, but neither of them is much of a technocrat and if either or both somehow got the chance to form a reasonable government, they would still be looking for some sort of salvation from the outside world.</p>
<p>All the while, the people of Zimbabwe still have to wait until 2018 for a chance to vote even for that – unless a brooding army, possibly also about to run out of money, makes a move first. </p>
<p>If it did so, it would probably be in support not of the opposition, but of one faction or another within ZANU-PF. And depending on how much leverage the younger officers had, that could force a long-overdue generation jump in political leadership.</p>
<h2>Heading south</h2>
<p>In South Africa, meanwhile, a hotly anticipated round of <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-elections-politics-shuffled-but-not-transformed-63481">municipal elections</a> was in its own way stunning, if not as stunning as opposition strategists had hoped. </p>
<p>The Democratic Alliance (DA) finally broke out of its established stronghold in the Western Cape, but could not command absolute majorities in key cities. In Johannesburg especially, the new DA mayor owes his place to the hard-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who have chosen to vote with the DA as the lesser of two evils – the other being the ANC and its benighted president, Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>As if determined not to learn anything from his party’s hugely symbolic losses, Zuma has been going about his singularly dodgy brand of business as usual. The latest ploy is a push to undermine his minister of finance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-move-against-gordhan-suggests-south-africas-laws-are-under-threat-64459">Pravin Gordhan</a>. Gordhan seems destined to be hit with corruption charges, but there is a widely held view that these are only being levelled because Gordhan will not allow Zuma himself corrupt free rein.</p>
<p>The last time Zuma played with appointments to the finance portfolio, the Rand lost huge value overnight. It seems he does not learn either from electoral defeat or from economic reality. Or he may simply be working on the assumption that the DA and the EFF, hardly ideological bedfellows, will find it hard to keep up their co-operation and the ANC will continue as before – especially as it continues to command the countryside.</p>
<p>The next elections will be in 2019. Constitutionally, Zuma cannot stand again; but his former wife, African Union chairperson <a href="http://whoswho.co.za/nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-919">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, might make a bid to succeed him – just as in Zimbabwe, where rumours persist that <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-95371.html">Grace Mugabe</a> may in some way become her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Given that the free world may soon be led once again by the house of Clinton, this is far from sinister in itself – except that these two women’s ascent to the top would primarily function to preserve their husbands’ reputations and power bases.</p>
<h2>A bubble burst</h2>
<p>All the while, corruption has also been on the up in Zambia, where the economy has slumped after a bubble in copper prices burst. The elections of August very narrowly re-elected Edgar Lungu, but the results are now being challenged in the constitutional court. At time of writing, the country has no government.</p>
<p>The slowness of the electoral commission’s count, and the refusal to allow observers to witness the centralised verification process, have led to a huge raft of suspicions in what was always going to be an edge-of-the-seat race.</p>
<p>But whoever is finally declared the winner, Zambia is now split in two. The east and the north voted for Lungu; the south, west and north-west voted for his rival, Hakainde Hichilema. And whoever is eventually declared the official winner won’t just have to unite a divided electorate; he will have to grapple with a <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-08/zambia-opposition-leader-signals-strong-support-for-imf-bailout">“rescue package” from the IMF</a>, hardly a harbinger of better times for ordinary Zambians.</p>
<p>Much was made of God’s will in the Zambian elections, but God is unlikely to bail the country out – just as the outside world will not bail out Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, and just as the markets will lose confidence in the Rand again if Zuma gets his way with his finance minister.</p>
<p>Looking across the continent, the problem is all too familiar. In Gabon as in Zambia, the technocratic candidates were suspiciously unsuccessful. Zimbabwe has abandoned technocracy and functional government for the foreseeable future, and South Africa, once a beacon of relative affluence and good governance, has been laid low by brazen infighting and patronage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64713/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Technocrats across the African continent are battling to change the direction of corrupt, violent governmentsStephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/640582016-08-22T08:08:54Z2016-08-22T08:08:54ZZambia post elections: President Lungu has his work cut out for him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/134772/original/image-20160819-30400-3ny64d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Edgar Lungu supporters at a pre-election rally. The level of polarisation before Zambia's polls was unprecedented.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Stella Mapenzausw</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President <a href="http://www.zambiahighcomdelhi.org/news_detail.php?newsid=15">Edgar Lungu</a> of the Patriotic Front (PF) has been declared winner of the most closely fought election Zambia has witnessed since adopting a multiparty system in 1990. </p>
<p>Lungu polled <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/general_election_2016.php">50.35%</a> in the August 11 election. He had a 100,530 vote lead over his closest rival, <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2008/09/19/hhs-curriculum-vitae/">Hakainde Hichilema</a> of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Hichilema polled 47.63%.</p>
<p>Lungu’s victory bequeaths on him and his party the immense task of post-election socioeconomic management and governance.</p>
<p>It is now common for political contestants to spar on economic issues. In this election attention was focused on some of the major <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201210230768.html">infrastructure projects</a> rolled out by Lungu’s predecessor, the late <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/29/michael-sata">Michael Sata</a>. While Lungu’s supporters could point to his accomplishments, few gave serious thought to the debt Zambia has accumulated to finance those projects. </p>
<p>Zambia’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/zambia-debt-costs-set-to-soar-after-terribly-wrong-budget-call">mountain of debt</a> must be serviced. For the president the big question is: how? Lungu should neither consider victory to mean business as usual in the management of the economy nor an opportunity to waste or plunder. One need not look too closely to see the <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zambia/corruption-rank">corruption</a> and waste of public resources in the past five years of the PF’s rule.</p>
<p>A better way for Lungu to celebrate victory would be to seriously reflect on both the accomplishments and the misuse of the PF’s past term in office. He should also develop a concrete agenda to steer Zambia forward.</p>
<h2>Uniting a country fractured along regional lines</h2>
<p>Rallying supporters and opponents in the post-election period is a necessary task for the victor. However, the level of polarisation leading to Zambia’s 2016 polls was unprecedented. In addition to violence, divisive language in the media and by politicians, the voting patterns clearly reveal a country split between the south-west and north-east. Support for Lungu was largely concentrated in the north-east and for Hichilema in the south-west. </p>
<p>One of Zambia’s founding president Kenneth Kaunda’s nation-building strategies after independence was promoting social cohesion through internal migration. As a consequence, many of the country’s citizens from its 72 tribes and languages intermarried. Lungu can build on the foundation established by Kaunda’s <a href="https://politicalmatter.org/2016/04/19/one-zambia-one-nation-the-legacy-of-kenneth-kaunda-by-derrick-m-muwina/">“One Zambia, One Nation”</a>. </p>
<p>But the onus of uniting Zambia is not solely the president’s. Apart from appealing to the population, he should extend the olive branch to his arch-rival Hichilema as well as to smaller parties’ presidents. In turn, they should also publicly appeal to constituents and the nation and prove that they are genuine in their aspiration to lead Zambia.</p>
<h2>Fixing the electoral system</h2>
<p>It took the Electoral Commission of Zambia four days after the polls had closed to announce the final results. Voters elected four categories of office bearers – from president to local government officials. They also voted in a referendum on a new Bill of Rights. The election was the first of its kind. Numerous malpractices and irregularities were reported. </p>
<p>The main opposition party alleged outright <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/08/15/hh-accuse-ecz-colluding-pf-rig-elections-pf-leads-24-constituencies-left/">rigging</a> claiming that the electoral commission had connived with PF to steal the vote. The UPND – and indeed any other party with reservations – has seven days to petition the results with Zambia’s <a href="http://www.judiciary.gov.zm/index.php/court-structure/constitutional-court">Constitutional Court</a>. </p>
<p>But whether they petition or not, the commission’s credibility is sullied. The African Union Election Observation Mission to Zambia, headed by former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, declared the polls <a href="http://www.au.int/en/pressreleases/31222/arrival-statement-african-union-election-observation-mission-republic-zambia%E2%80%99s">peaceful and satisfactory</a>. But other election observer missions from organisations such as the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa reported that the elections were conducted <a href="https://eisa.org.za/pdf/zam2016eom0.pdf">“on an unlevelled playing field”</a>.</p>
<p>The August 2016 elections were held under a <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/legal_framework.php">legal framework</a> and electoral rules introduced just a few months earlier. This posed management challenges associated with new and untested provisions. </p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://eisa.org.za/pdf/zam2016eom0.pdf">the electoral institute</a> identified several other issues with the framework. These included high election registration fees and the requirement for all candidates to be holders of Grade 12 certificates. These have the potential to lock out young and female candidates. </p>
<p>The commission’s apparent lack of efficiency and transparency was exhibited in several ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Delays in releasing election results led some opposition parties to question the commission’s neutrality and its leadership</p></li>
<li><p>Even before the election, media reports suggested that there were foreigners on the voters’ roll and blamed this on the country’s electoral commission</p></li>
<li><p>The commission also delayed releasing the voters’ roll to stakeholders, raising doubts about the roll’s validity. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But clearly, Lungu will have to work on more than just the mechanics of the electoral system. He will also have to address the issue of the commission’s leadership. If there is any lesson he can learn from <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-protests-idUSKCN0Y01B2">Kenya</a>, it is that vacillating on changing the face of the commission only agitates discontented supporters of the losing party further. Reforming the electoral system should involve collaboration between all stakeholders.</p>
<h2>Ordinary Zambians show the way</h2>
<p>On the whole, Zambians have once again demonstrated commitment to preserving peace and nurturing the country’s nascent democracy. The turn was probably made at the death of an incumbent president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/19/zambia">Levy Mwanawasa</a> in 2008 and cemented after the death of another, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/11194490/Zambia-president-Michael-Sata-dies-in-London.html">Sata</a>, in 2014. The peaceful conduct of Zambians through these trying times defies logic in an African country. The 2016 elections reportedly had a <a href="http://www.coastweek.com/3933-Zambia-vote-peaceful-amid-high-voter-turnout-reports-polls-body.htm">high voter turnout</a> too. </p>
<p>The conduct of Zambia’s general population thus suggests one thing. The national leadership should rise to the occasion and move the country in the right direction. To do this Lungu should build a team of selfless political, technocratic and civic leaders to steer Zambia for the next five years. Certainly, he will also need the support of the opposition parties, big and small.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zambia’s Edgar Lungu shouldn’t consider his presidential victory to mean business as usual in the management of the economy; nor an opportunity to waste and plunder.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Research Fellow & Deputy Director, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/636052016-08-07T15:36:26Z2016-08-07T15:36:26ZZambia’s 2016 elections: democracy hovering on the precipice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133232/original/image-20160805-484-37093z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Zambian opposition protester is arrested during a past election: Instances of serious violence have increased dramatically this time around.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Rupiah Banda conceded defeat to Michael Sata in Zambia’s 2011 elections, many commentators hailed the peaceful transfer of power as a sign that the country’s <a href="http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/african-elections-two-divergent-trends">democracy had matured</a>. Twenty years after ousting the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in the historic 1991 multi-party elections, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) lost to Sata’s urban-based and populist Patriotic Front (PF). </p>
<p>Five years later, the country is preparing to go to the polls again on August 11 to vote on a president, parliamentarians, mayors and a referendum on the <a href="http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2898/">Bill of Rights</a>. This time, the entire party system is in flux and electoral violence has been worryingly frequent and extreme. As a consequence, Zambia’s democratic credentials are increasingly in doubt.</p>
<p>The 2016 elections therefore represent a critical point in Zambia’s political history. They could herald a complete rupture of the existing party system and a worrying slide towards a competitive authoritarian regime. But they could also simply reflect a minor detour on the country’s road towards democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>The latter scenario has not been uncommon in Zambia’s history. After the end of Kenneth Kaunda’s almost 30-year presidency (1964-1991), the initial euphoria surrounding the MMD’s victory <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/382537">was squandered</a> by President Frederick Chiluba. The mid-1990s were characterised by increased repression of the opposition and political rights, culminating in 2001 with Chiluba’s failed attempt to change the constitution to run for a third term in office. Although his MMD successor, Levy Mwanawasa, ultimately won the 2001 elections, albeit by very low margins, that period represented a critical juncture in the country’s party system. Defections of disillusioned MMD politicians resulted in the creation of key political parties, including the United Party for National Development (UPND) and the PF. </p>
<p>Today, much is at stake for Zambian citizens who have seen four elections in less than ten years due to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/29/another-zambian-president-dies-in-office-what-happens-now/">two presidential deaths</a> in 2008 and 2014. Whoever wins, most Zambians will be just looking forward to a president who can serve out the five year term and proceed with the business of governing and delivering services rather than divisive campaigning. </p>
<h2>Unexpected trajectory</h2>
<p>Zambia’s current unexpected trajectory can be traced to the death of Sata in October 2014. This led the PF to descend into a tumultuous succession battle between two factions. One, labelled <a href="https://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/zambia-pf-cartel/">“the Cartel”</a>, included long-time PF stalwarts who helped build the party. They included Sata’s vice president, Guy Scott, former party general secretary Wynter Kabimba, former party spokesperson George Challah and the editor-in-chief of <em>The Post</em> newspaper, Fred M’membe. </p>
<p>In the second group were those who became increasingly close to Sata during his period of illness. They included former defence minister Edgar Lungu and finance minister Alexander Chikwanda. Ultimately, Lungu was selected by the party to contest the January 2015 elections and is again the PF’s candidate this year.</p>
<p>Lungu’s most significant opposition opponent is Hakainde Hichilema. The leader of the UPND is poised to contest the elections for the fifth time. Seven additional parties were registered in time to field presidential candidates. Amazingly, this is the first time in more than 20 years that the MMD will not be competing for president. This is due to squabbles between two politicians, Nevers Mumba and Felix Mutati, over who legitimately leads the party. </p>
<p>The PF will be hoping to win over voters by emphasising its large-scale road construction and rehabilitation <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201210230768.html">projects</a>. The party can as well point to the fact that it oversaw the passing of a much demanded <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/01/05/president-lungu-ushers-in-a-new-constitution-calls-for-a-new-approach-to-politics/">new constitution</a> earlier this year. The latter is an achievement that long eluded the MMD. </p>
<p>At the same time, it will be hoping to sidestep scrutiny of its management of the economy. This has been marked by persistent power shortages and <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/zambia-debt-costs-set-to-soar-after-terribly-wrong-budget-call">worryingly high debt levels</a>. While Zambia’s elections are usually held in September or October, they were moved earlier this year ahead of an anticipated deal with the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-22/zambia-preparing-ground-for-inevitable-post-election-imf-aid">International Monetary Fund</a>. Any <a href="http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/11403/Lungu_hangs_on">ensuing austerity</a> would be felt after the elections. </p>
<h2>Unequal playing field</h2>
<p>However, the ruling party is not leaving anything to chance and has brazenly created an unequal playing field for its opponents. The only genuine opposition newspaper, <em>The Post</em>, was <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21702179-lively-government-critic-feels-heat-cry-press-freedom">shut down</a> in June. The newspaper had been instrumental in Sata’s rise but became increasingly anti-PF when the party entered office. Its closure was ostensibly over unpaid taxes but many have pointed out that pro-government newspapers were also in arrears but continued to operate. </p>
<p>Despite more competitive bids from South African companies, the Electoral Commission for Zambia (ECZ) chose a <a href="http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11705/A_close_political_race_gets_angrier">Dubai-based firm</a> to print the election ballots. This has led to speculation over potential vote rigging. Moreover, attempts by the UPND to campaign have been repeatedly blocked, both through the courts and with the use of PF cadres. </p>
<p>Indeed, electoral violence has been worryingly high this year compared with past elections. Based on media reports recorded by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, there have been more than 50 incidents of <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20160808-zambians-face-intimidation-during-election-campaign">electoral violence in Zambia</a> between January and July 2016. Many resulted in severe injuries or the death of party supporters. The violence became so extreme that the electoral commission <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-11-zambias-electoral-commissions-halts-campaigning-in-the-capital-for-10-days-following-the-death-of-opposition-supporter/">suspended campaigning</a> in Lusaka for 10 days and President Lungu called for a national day of prayer on July 25 for peaceful elections. </p>
<h2>Why the violence has spiked</h2>
<p>Why have these elections been particularly violent? One reason is the significant new constitutional requirement for the winning presidential contender to win by an absolute, not just a simple, majority. <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/results/2015_presidential_election">In 2015, Lungu beat Hichilema</a> with less than two percent of the vote – 48% against 46.6%. Since then, mine closures in the populous and traditional PF-stronghold of the Copperbelt have undermined confidence in the ruling party and may generate enough swing voters to give Hichilema the majority that he needs. </p>
<p>Secondly, Sata’s leadership style contributed to a high level of PF infighting and suspicion, with many defections as result. Sata’s <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/urban-poverty-and-party-populism-african-democracies?format=HB&isbn=9781107036802">populism resonated with the poor</a> and underprivileged and contributed to his victory in 2011. But <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2015.1058784">like populist leaders elsewhere</a>, he built the party around his personal image and marginalised anyone seen to disagree with him or prove a potential successor. </p>
<p>He also manipulated the rules for the PF’s gain. Notable examples included the enticement of opposition MPs, especially those from the crumbling MMD, to defect to the PF to help secure the party a parliamentary majority. He also used the Public Order Act to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/zambia">prevent the opposition</a> from holding rallies or meetings. </p>
<p>In the year since Lungu’s election, a number of prominent PF politicians have joined the UPND. These include Guy Scott, Sata’s son and wife, and another former PF minister, Geoffrey Mwamba, who is now Hichilema’s running mate. This makes the UPND not just a formidable opposition competitor but also the refuge for those who posed a threat to Lungu’s faction within the PF and who fuelled Sata’s paranoia about potential successors.</p>
<p>If history is anything to go by, the current political tumult will subside after the elections and result in a new configuration of political parties. And if some <a href="http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20(Amendment),%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf">key provisions</a> in the new constitution are indeed upheld, including preventing sitting MPs from switching party affiliations without losing their seats, then Zambia’s repeated pattern of democratic backsliding and party fissures may hopefully become less pronounced over time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danielle Resnick is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The views expressed here are her's alone and do not represent the views of IFPRI or its funders. </span></em></p>As Zambia prepares to go to the polls again the entire party system is in flux, electoral violence has been worryingly frequent and the country’s democratic credentials are increasingly in doubtDanielle Resnick, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.